Naval heg Bad

1NC Shell
Empirical studies prove the navy is not capable of
deterring threats
Daniel 04 (Donald C.F. Daniel, Professor Daniel was Special Assistant to the Chairman of the National
Intelligence Council, held the Milton E. Miles Chair of International Relations at the US Naval War College, Newport, RI, also
chaired the Strategic Research Department in the College's Center for Naval Warfare Studies. Professor Daniel has also
served as a Fellow in the Departments of Military History of the Swedish National Defence College, Stockholm, has been a
Research Associate at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, a Visiting Fellow at the Brookings
Institution in Washington, and a resident Research Fellow in the Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project of the United
Nations Institute for Disarmament Research in the Palais des Nations in Geneva. His book on Strategic Military Deception
was designated a "book of the year" by Choice, the journal for librarians, and his book on Anti-Submarine Warfare and
Superpower Strategic Stability was selected as a notable naval book by the US Naval Institute, Ph.D. in International
Relations from Georgetown University, B.A. in political Science at College of the Holy Cross, The Future of American Naval
Power: Propositions and Recommendations, Globalization and American Power. Chapter 27. Institute for National
Strategic Studies National Defense University, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=448133, 7/12/04, 7/26/14, MEM)

Thus, it would seem a raising of false expectations to argue, for example, that the gapping of aircraft
carriers in areas of potential crisis is an invitation to disasterand therefore represents culpable

the United States

maintained three aircraft carrier battle groups in the Mediterranean Sea but
later gradually found that it needed to scale back. Currently, a single battle
group operates there for less than 9 months of the year on average. This is a
significant reduction, but no one can prove that the Mediterranean region
became less stable. Conversely, the Navy began to maintain a regular presence
in the Arabian Gulf in 1979, but this did not prevent Iran or Iraq from
attacking ships during their war. In the 1980s, attacks generally increased in number over the
8 years of the war.34 As for deterring the initiation of a crisis in the first place, it is
essentially impossible for an outsider to prove that such deterrence was
successful except in the rare case in which a deterred party admits that he
was deterred and states the reasons.35 Adam Siegel, John Arquilla, Paul Huth, Paul Davis,
negligence on the part of Americas defense decision-makers.33 In the early 1960s,

and a Rutgers Center for Global Security and Democracy team led by Edward Rhodes have each attempted

The deficiency of such study

is always in making the definitive link between them. The majority of these
studies suggest that [h]istorically sea power has not done well as a
deterrent in preventing the outbreak of conflicts,36 principally because landbased powers not dependent on overseas trade are relatively insensitive to
the operations of naval forces.37 One instance when continuous noncrisis naval presence may
to study the effects of forward presence and general deterrence.

have contributed to general deterrence may have been in the Cold War when the U.S. and Soviet navies

Each navy maintained

forward-deployed forces that could be counted upon to react to one another
in a crisis. Hence it seems reasonable to assume that this reality became incorporated in each sides
regularly rubbed shoulders in the Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean.

calculations and may have had some deterrent effect, but, again, evidence is the problem.38 If the
evidence is slim concerning deterring the onset of a crisis, it is only slightly better when it comes to the
issue of shaping events (that is, to positively changing the political landscape of an area in a manner
favoring American interests). Systematic analytic attempts are few and definitive results are sparse. The
Rutgers team did conclude in their study on shaping that it works best when it is limited to deterring
external actions and is not based on a sweeping set of goals.39 As against that conclusion, several studies
that involved interviews of U.S. country teams and foreign political leaders suggest that military presence
can be seen by friendly nations as a commitment to a security environment in which stability provides for
greater economic development. This environment of stability leads to both greater local investment and
trade by U.S. companies and greater local support for U.S. policies. Some foreign interviewees specifically
linked their willingness to support the U.S. politically to the reassurance they received from a U.S.
presence.40 In short, then, to say that balanced forward naval presence will be increasingly vital in
shaping the peace41 seems true only vis--vis friends but not potential adversaries or third parties. It
would not seem to have much direct impact on the shape of a friends domestic politics but could affect its
economy (and thus indirectly the domestic political scene) and its willingness to support U.S. foreign policy.
There is no evidence, however, that presence need be continuous to achieve these effects. The
Mediterranean analysis suggests that, at the end of the day, what is vital instead is that U.S. naval forces

show up when neededthat is, during the run-up to and the onset of a contingencyand because of prior
operations with regional friends, that it immediately act effectively in concert with them.

U.S. Navy power decline inevitable multiple reasons

Collins and Erikson 12 (Gabe Collins and Andrew Erickson, contributors to the

Diplomat, U.S. Navy Takes Notice: China is Becoming a World- Class Military Shipbuilder,
http://thediplomat.com/2012/11/u-s-navy-take-notice-china-is-becoming-a-world-class-militaryshipbuilder/?allpages=yes, 11/1/12, 7/26/14, MEM)

Chinas military shipyards now are surpassing Western European, Japanese,

and Korean military shipbuilders in terms of both the types and numbers of
ships they can build. If Beijing prioritizes progress, Chinas military
shipbuilding technical capabilities can likely become as good as Russias are
now by 2020 and will near current U.S. shipbuilding technical proficiency
levels by 2030. China is now mass producing at least six classes of modern
diesel-electric submarines and surface warships, including the new Type 052C
Luyang II and Type 052D Luyang III destroyers now in series production.
Eight key themes, listed sequentially below, characterize Chinas rise as a worldclass military shipbuilder. For reference, the companies building the warships are China State
Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC) and China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation (CSIC). 1. Chinas warship
buildout thus far supports modernization and replacement, notrapid expansion Over the past six years,
Chinas overall fleet of frontline combatants has expanded, but slowly, growing from 172 ships in 2005 to

the fleet has improved substantially in

qualitative terms as newer ships and subs replace older ones. For instance, as Type
an estimated 221 vessels in 2012. However,

052 C/D Luyang-series destroyers, Type 054A Jiangkai II-series frigates, and Type 041 Yuan diesel-electric
submarines have come into the fleet, they are allowing the Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to
steadily retire obsolete platforms like Ludadestroyers and Ming submarines. 2. Chinese military
shipbuilders are catching up to Russian and U.S. Yards Chinas large state-backed military shipbuilders are
approaching their Russian and U.S. peers in terms of the number of warships built. Chinas large submarine
and surface warship buildout will, in a decade, likely have it become second only to the U.S. in terms of
total warships produced since 1990. More importantly, the ramp-up of Chinas construction of large
warships in recent years will mean the PLA Navy will likely be taking delivery of larger numbers of modern
surface combatants and submarines annually than the U.S. Navy. Measured in terms of warships
commissioned since 1990, China is now number three globally and is rapidly gaining on Russia, the
number two country. Most of Russias post-1990 military ship deliveries simply reflected yards finishing

Chinese yards, in contrast, have come on strong over the

past decade, with a big push in submarine construction that began in 200203 and a strong pipeline of surface warship deliveries that continues to gain
steam to this very day. Chinese military shipyardsin particular the
Changxing Island and Hudong Zhonghua yards near Shanghaiare humming
with activity, and over the next 2-3 years, China is likely to commission
enough large warships to put it second only to the U.S. in terms of large
warships built and delivered since 1990. 3. Chinas military shipbuilders are using modular
up Soviet-era projects.

mass production techniques CSSCs Jiangnan Shipyard is using modular construction methods to build Type
052-series destroyers. Modular construction involves building the ship in blocks. This maximizes a
shipyards productive potential and also provides greater latitude for modifying designs and customizing
ships. Modular construction also gives yards the flexibility to either build centers of expertise within the
yard or outsource the production of certain components and then import them to the yard for final
assembly. CSSCs Hudong Zhonghua shipyard also appears to be using modular construction techniques
for the Type 071 LPD. The yard has now constructed four of the vessels, two of which are in service and
two of which are in the trial/outfitting stage. They have also been able to fabricate the Type 071 hulls
faster, with a time gap of nearly four years between the first and second vessels, but only 10 months
between vessels two and three, and four months between vessels three and four. 4. Chinas military
shipyards appear to be sharing design and production information across company lines Historically, CSIC
built all Chinese submarines, but the current production run of Type 041 Yuan-class advanced diesel
electric subs has seen at least two boats being built in CSSCs Jiangnan yard. This suggests submarine
construction expertise is growing outside of CSIC. However, there are no indications thus far that CSSC is
doing submarine design work, which could mean that Beijing is making the companies and their design
institutes share submarine design and construction information. Likewise, the new Type 056 corvette is
being built in both CSSC and CSIC shipyards, suggesting that a standardized design and production

approach is being shared by both companies. 5. Chinas military shipbuilders will be able to indigenously
build aircraft carriers Chinas first aircraft carrier, Liaoning, which entered service on September 25th of
this year, started as an empty hull and gave CSIC valuable experience in effectively creating an aircraft
carrier from the keel up. China has a total of seven shipyards with sufficiently large berths to assemble a
carrier hull (three hundred meters or more), and the yards are basically equally dispersed between CSSC
and CSIC. These yards are located in Dalian (CSIC), Qingdao (CSIC), Huludao (CSIC), Shanghai (CSSC), and
Guangzhou (CSSC). CSIC Bohai Shipbuilding Heavy Industry complex near Huludao (where China builds its
nuclear submarines) is a top candidate due to its large, covered building sheds where carrier parts could
be fabricated in modular fashion and out of the view of satellite surveillance. The company says it has the
largest indoor seven-step ship construction facilities in China. This facility, together with CSSCs large
new Changxing Island yard, and CSICs Dalian yardwhich fitted out the carrier Liaoning that just entered
PLAN serviceare the three leading candidates to build Chinas indigenous carriers. 6. China will retain a
military shipbuilding cost advantage We project that for at least the next five years, Chinese shipbuilders
will have a substantial labor cost advantage over their counterparts in South Korea, Japan, and the U.S.
CSSCs Jiangnan shipyard can likely deliver a Type 052C destroyer for 24% less than it costs Koreas
Hyundai heavy Industries to produce a KDX-III destroyer. Likewise, according to disclosures in the July 2011
issue of Shipborne Weapons, Wuchang shipyard can produce a late model diesel electric sub such as the
Type 041 for roughly 47% less than it would cost South Koreas DSME to make a Type 209 submarine. The
lower labor cost in China likely serves as a core driver. This may help explain the larger Chinese cost
advantage in building submarines, since advanced submarines can require substantially larger number of
man-hours to build than surface ships do. 7. Chinas neighbors feel increasingly compelled to augment
their naval forces in response to Chinese warship production South Korea has decided to expand its
procurement of advanced diesel-electric submarines to include nine KSS-III 3,000-ton submarines by 2020
and nine 1,800-ton subs by 2018. This acquisition will basically double the size of the countrys current sub
force and substantially enhance its capabilities, since the biggest boats in the fleet are currently 1,800-ton
vessels. South Korea has also elected to double its Aegis destroyer purchases over the next decade.
Similarly, Vietnams maritime friction with China and fear of the PLANs growing power is making Hanoi
into one of the Russian defense industrys star customers. Vietnam has ordered six Kilo-class diesel
submarines from Russia and is likely to take delivery of its first Kilo by the end of 2012. Hanoi is also
adding advanced Russian anti-ship missiles and stealthy Gepard-class missile armed patrol boats to its
naval force. 8. China now has the potential to become a significant exporter of diesel submarines and
smaller surface warships Chinas shipbuilders are becoming increasingly competitive in terms of the ratio
of cost to combat power they can deliver. For instance, the July 2011 issue of Shipborne Weapons reports
that China will supply 6 potentially Air-Independent Propulsion (AIP)-equipped submarines to Pakistan for
as little as 1/3 the unit price at which European shipyards would be able to supply comparable boats. With
the advent of the Type 041 Yuan-class diesel sub and Type 056 corvette, China now has two platforms for
which it is already capable of series production and for which the unit costs are likely to drop significantly
in coming years. The export version of Russias Steregushiy-class corvette, called Tigr, currently stands at
aroundU.S. $150 million per vessel. As Chinas Type 056 production run continues to expand, it would not
be a surprise to eventually see the PLANs unit cost end up in the U.S. $110-120 million per vessel cost
range, which would make the Type 056 a serious export competitor to the Tigr and other smaller Russian
warships. Conclusion Chinas naval shipbuilding industry has advanced to the point that it can series
produce modern diesel submarines, landing platform docks (LPDs), destroyers, frigates, corvettes, and fast
attack craft, albeit with some imported components for a number of key systems. The ongoing series
production of Type 041 SSKs, Type 071 LPDs, Type 052 destroyers, and Type 056 corvettes strongly
suggests that Chinas military shipbuilders have rapidly assimilated commercial innovations such as
modular construction. Chinese naval shipbuilding faces several challenges moving forward. Most notably,
six major questions remain: 1. Does Beijing have the political will to continue devoting substantial and
growing resources to naval modernization? 2. Can China achieve requisite technical advances in weapons
systems, propulsion, and military electronics? 3. Can China master the technologies needed to build
nuclear submarines capable of surviving in a conflict with U.S. and Russian boats? 4. Can it build an aircraft
carrier with catapults that would allow it to maximize the strike and air combat capabilities of the J-15
fighter it is likely to carry? 5. Will the Chinese leadership be willing to invest political and financial capital in
establishing intensive and realistic training for the PLAN and provide diplomatic support for establishment
of sustained access to facilities in key areas such as the Indian Ocean region? 6. Will continued weakness
in the global ship market prompt Beijing to capitalize on the availability of shipyard space to further
increase the pace of military shipbuilding? Chinas military shipbuilders are showing that they can meet

The
U.S. strategic rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific will need more than rhetoric
if it is to remain credible in the face of Chinas potential to rapidly produce
modern warships. The Pentagon should consider adjusting the U.S. Navys
ship acquisition programs in response. As Chinese warships become better,
the numbers ratio between the PLAN and U.S. Navy combatants will become
increasingly important. Given that shipbuilding is an industry where lead
times can be many years, now is the time for Washington to begin responding
Beijings current call for warships and could produce more if given the mandate and the resources.

to Chinas warship production improvements and prepare strategically for

further naval advances that Beijing is likely to unveil over the next 2-3 years.

Data disproves their impact hegemony doesnt

decrease conflict, and Heg decline doesnt lead to war
Fettweis 11 (Christopher J. Fettweis, Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane

University, former Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Naval War College,
former Post-Doctoral Fellow at the Mershon Center for International Security at Ohio State
University, holds a Ph.D. from the Department of Government and Politics at the University of
Maryland-College Park, Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand
Strategy,Comparative Strategy,
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01495933.2011.605020, 9/26/11, 7/26/14, MEM)

It is perhaps worth noting that there is no evidence to support a direct

relationship between the relative level of U.S. activism and international
stability. In fact, the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be
true. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998,
the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990.51 To
internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this
irresponsible peace dividend endangered both national and global security.
No serious analyst of American military capabilities, argued Kristol and
Kagan, doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet
Americas responsibilities to itself and to world peace. 52 On the other hand, if the
pacific trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against
interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability
and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world
grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to
believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable United States
military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No
militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums, no security dilemmas
drove insecurity or arms races, and no regional balancing occurred once the
stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as

if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. Most
of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict
declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as
the Bush Administration ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be

Military spending figures by

themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S.
actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue
that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and
that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that
maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not
have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that
relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although
the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative
advantage never wavered. However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative
necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated.

spending account for global pacific trends, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at
drastically lower levels of both.

In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in

the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of
engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing
international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend
cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand
strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic
logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while

seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many
believe it to be, no increase in conflict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save
untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends
had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or
insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulfilled. If
increases in conflict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then

the only
evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained
United States suggests that the current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S.
military spending. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively
without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on
logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands,

faith alone.

2NC
Cost benefit analysis proves that the navy is unneeded
Quiggin 12 (John, an Australian economist, a Professor and an Australian Research Council
Federation Fellow and a Laureate Fellow at the University of Queensland, and a member of the Board of
the Climate Change Authority of the Australian Government, October 4, 2012, Who needs a navy?,
http://crookedtimber.org/2012/10/04/who-needs-a-navy/)

The Navy Departments budget is around $150 billion a

year (that should be adjusted to exclude the Marine Corps operates independently). Like other post-WWII
navies, it has undertaken little naval warfare of the kind for which its force
structure is largely optimized, that is, battles in which the opposing side has significant naval (or
air-to-sea) capacity of its own. Of course, it can be argued that the US doesnt
engage in naval warfare because it doesnt have to. Its 11 carrier strike groups
Now, Ill turn to the US Navy.

massively outweigh the rest of the worlds navies put together. Moreover navies benefit from the military
equivalent of offshore tax havens, the so-called right of innocent passage, by which ships of one navy
are entitled to enter the territorial waters of another country, a right not accorded to land or air forces. So,
carrier strike groups can be used as a threat without any breach of international law. On a few occasions,
this capacity has been used effectively, for example, with cruise missiles against Serbian forces during the
Balkans wars. But these examples are rare, and have commonly involved tacit or overt co-operation with
ground forces, which is not always feasible. In the original post, I suggested that the benefits from these
capacities arent great enough to justify the costs. As far as I can recall, no one challenged this, but theres
still room to do so if you want. Finally, and most important in terms of my differences with the critics,

The US has been involved in five major wars

since 1945, with outcomes that have been at best equivocal. With the exception of Korea, the
contribution of the Navy in these wars has not been commensurate with its
share of the military budget. Carrier-based planes have played a role, but they are an expensive
alternative to Air Force operations from ground bases. Other functions like transporting heavy
equipment, enforcing blockades and so on , again dont seem to go far in
justifying the Navys share of the budget. The crucial point, though, and one which the
critics havent responded to at all, is that the US military as a whole has not succeeded
in the tasks that have been assigned to it. By contrast, much of the criticism seems to take
there is the role of the Navy in land wars.

as its premises a world where the US can and should have the capacity to dictate whatever outcomes it
chooses, and then to work back to the naval expenditure needed to achieve this. Thats not the world we

Defense funds allocated to the navy are at the expense of alternatives

that might produce better outcomes on land . An obvious response, and one which I would
live in.

certainly endorse, is that the US should fight fewer wars and seek to end then sooner. And, as I observed in

the benefits of military activity in general

are negative, so that it doesnt matter if defense funds are allocated to activities with low benefit-cost
ratios. But, since these arguments seem unlikely to command much support , I conclude that
current US naval expenditure does not pass the benefit-cost test.
the original post, it could certainly be argued that

No rivals in the Pacific- China isnt seeking hegemony

Zeenews 6/28 (zeenews.com, China 'won't seek hegemony' says President Xi,
http://zeenews.india.com/news/world/china-won-t-seek-hegemony-says-presidentxi_943574.html, 6/28/14, 7/25/14, MEM)

Xi Jinping said on Saturday that China is incapable of "hegemony or

militarism", after calling for stronger border defences to avoid a repeat of
past humiliations by foreign powers. "Hegemony or militarism is not in the
genes of the Chinese," Xi said in a speech commemorating the six-decade old establishment of a
Beijing: President

commitment to peaceful coexistence with India and Myanmar. "China neither interferes in other countries'

internal affairs nor imposes its will on others," Xi added. "It will never seek
hegemony no matter how strong it may become." Xi spoke to an audience of Chinese
officials, military officers and foreign diplomats in a cavernous room in Beijing's Great Hall of the People.
Myanmar President Thein Sein and Indian Vice President Mohammad Hamid Ansari, who also gave

speeches, sat on stage as Xi spoke, as did Chinese Premier Li Keqiang and two other top ruling circle
officials. The speeches were part of commemorations for the 60th anniversary of a mutual peace vow by

The 1954 Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence include

mutually respecting sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as mutual
non-aggression and non-interference in each other's domestic affairs. Xi's
speech to an international audience contrasted with nationalistic remarks
quoted by state media earlier in the day when he said China should bear in
mind its history as a victim of foreign aggression and strengthen its frontier defences on
China, Myanmar and India.

land and sea.

Prolif deters large-scale regional wars

Karl 97 (David, Ph.D. International Relations at the University of Southern California,
"Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers," International Security, p. 90-91,
Winter 1997, 7/26/14, MEM)

Although this school bases its claims upon the U.S-Soviet Cold War nuclear relationship, it admits of no basic exception to
the imperatives of nuclear deterrence. Nothing within the school's thesis is intrinsic solely to the superpower experience.

Nuclear-armed adversaries, regardless of

context, should behave toward each other like the superpowers during the
Cold War's "nuclear peace." The reason for this near-absolute claim is the supposedly immutable quality of
nuclear weapons: their presence is the key variable in any deterrent situation,
because fear of their devastating consequences simply overwhelms the
operation of all other factors. 'Martin van Creveld alleges that "the leaders of medium and
small powers alike tend to be extremely cautious with regard to the nuclear
weapons they possess or with which they are faced-the proof being that, to
date, in every region where these weapons have been introduced, large-scale
interstate warfare has disappeared ." Shai Feldman submits that "it is no longer disputed
that the undeclared nuclear capabilities of India and Pakistan have helped
stabilize their relations in recent years. It is difficult to see how escalation of the conflict
over Kashmir could have been avoided were it not for the two countries' fear of
nuclear escalation." The spread of nuclear weapons tech nology is thus viewed by
optimists as a positive development, so much so that some even advocate its selective abettance by current
The nuclear "balance of terror" is seen as far from fragile.

nuclear powers.'

Proliferation is inevitablecountries will always want

weapons they do not have for security reasons
Waltz 03 (Kenneth N. Waltz, Adjunct Professor of Political Science at

Columbia University, More May Be Better The Spread of Nuclear

Weapons: A Debate Renewed, 2003,7/26/14, MEM)
One worry remains: A nuclear North Korea would put pressure on South
Korea and Japan to develop comparable weapons. Their doing so would
hardly be surprising. Nuclear states have tended to come in hostile pairs.
American capability led to the Soviet Unions, the Soviet Unions to Chinas,
Chinas to Indias, Indias to Pakistans, and Israels spurred Iraqs efforts to
acquire bombs of its own. Countries are vulnerable to capabilities that they
lack and others have. Sooner or later, they try to gain comparable
capabilities or seek protection of states that have them. Do we think we
change age-old patterns of international behavior? A nuclear North Korea is
but one reason for other countries in the region to go nuclear, especially
when confidence in Americas extended deterrent waned as the bipolar
world disappeared. Former CIA director James Woolsey has said that he

think of no example where the introduction of nuclear weapons into a region

has enhanced that regions security benefited the security interests of the
United States. Surely nuclear weapons helped to maintain stability during
the cold war and to preserve peace throughout the instability that came in
its wake. Except for interventions by major powers in conflicts that for them
were minor, peace has become the privilege of states having nuclear
weapons, while have been fought mainly by those who lack them. Weak
states cannot help noticing this. That is why states feeling threatened want
to have their own nuclear weapons and why states that have them find it so
hard to halt their spread.

History proves nuclear acquisition will be slow and result

in deterrence, making war less likely.
Bennett 05 (Drake Bennett, Boston Globe, Give nukes a chance,
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/ideas/articles/2005/03/20/give_nukes_a_chance?
pg=full,2005, 7/26/14,MEM)

KENNETH N. WALTZ, adjunct professor of political science at Columbia

University, doesn't like the phrase ''nuclear proliferation.'' ''The term
proliferation' is a great misnomer,'' he said in a recent interview. ''It refers to
things that spread like wildfire. But we've had nuclear military capabilities
extant in the world for 50 years and now, even counting North Korea, we
only have nine nuclear countries.'' Strictly speaking, then, Waltz is as
against the proliferation of nuclear weapons as the next sane human being.
After all, he argues, ''most countries don't need them.'' But the eventual
acquisition of nuclear weapons by those few countries that see fit to pursue
them, that he's for. As he sees it, nuclear weapons prevent wars. ''The only
thing a country can do with nuclear weapons is use them for a deterrent,''
Waltz told me. ''And that makes for internal stability, that makes for peace,
and that makes for cautious behavior.'' Especially in a unipolar world,
argues Waltz, the possession of nuclear deterrents by smaller nations can
check the disruptive ambitions of a reckless superpower. As a result, in
words Waltz wrote 10 years ago and has been reiterating ever since, ''The
gradual spread of nuclear weapons is more to be welcomed than feared.''

Empirically, heg doesnt solve conflict

Hachigan and Sutphen 8 (Nina Hachigan and Monica Sutphen, Stanford Center for International
Security, The Next American Century, p. 168-9, 2008, 7/26/14, MEM)
In practice, the strategy of primacy failed to deliver. While the fact of being the worlds only superpower has substantial

a national security strategy based on suing and ratiaing primacy has

not made America more secure. Americas military might has not been the
answer to terrorism, disease, climate change, or proliferation. Iraq, Iran, and North
benefits,

Korea have become more dangerous in the last seven years, not less. Worse than being ineffective with transnational

a strategy of maintaining primacy is counterproductive

when it comes to pivotal powers. If America makes primacy the main goal of its national security
threats and smaller powers,

strategy, then why shouldnt the pivotal powers do the same? A goal of primacy signals that sheer strength is most critical
to security. American cannot trumpet its desire to dominate the world military and then question why China is
modernizing its military.

Naval power is good for nothing

Reed 8 (John T. Reed, West Point Graduate and platoon leader in the 82nd Airborne

Division., June, 2008.,"Are U.S. Navy surface ships sitting ducks to enemies with modern
weapons?", http://www.johntreed.com/sittingducks.html, june 2008, 7/25/14, MEM)

whenever the U.S. Navy did computer war games

against the Soviet Union, all significant U.S. Navy surface ships were
destroyed by the Soviets within about 20 minutes of the start of the
computerized war. How? Nukes. A reader says that the Soviet submarines in the
Cuban missile crisis had nuclear torpedoes which they would have
used if we did an amphibious landing. I have no way to confirm that. Although the
Navy ships and their carrier-based planes perform spectacularly well
against third-rate enemies like Afghanistan and Iraq, I wonder how they
would do against Argentina or any other enemy equipped with modern
weapons. In short, I wonder if U.S. Navy surface vessels are obsolete. Think about it.
They are large, slow-moving, metal objects that float on the surface of
the oceanin the Twenty-First Century! Ocean liners were the main way to get across the oceans for
I have read media stories that said

civilian passengers until the second half of the Twentieth Century. Since then, most people have used planes because they are much faster
and cheaper. Except the U.S. military. Civilians essentially got rid of their navy around 1950. Only the hidebound military would still have a
Navy in the Twenty-First Century. Nowadays, civilians only ride passenger ships for pleasure cruises. An argument can be made that the Navy
does the same. Only maybe the old line, you can tell the men from the boys by the size of their toys is a more accurate way to put it. Navy
brass want to grow up to captain a ship. A big ship. The bigger the better. Before WW II, they wanted to be captains of battleships. After WW II,
British historian B.H. Liddell Hart said, A battleship had long been to an admiral what a cathedral is to a bishop. Now Navy officers want to
captain aircraft carriers. Very exciting. Very romantic. Great fun. But obsolete. WW II in the Pacific last time they were not obsolete The last
time we used them to fight worthy opponents was in the Pacific during World War II. At that time, warring navies had to send out slow-moving
patrol planes to search for the enemys ships. The motion picture Midway does an excellent job of showing both the Japanese and the

Surface
ships are not only easily seen by the human eye absent fog or clouds,
they are also easily detected, pinpointed, and tracked by such
technologies as radar, sonar, infrared detectors, motion detectors,
noise detectors, magnetic field detectors, and so forth. Nowadays, you can probably
Americans doing this. Low-visibility weather would often hide ships back then. Easily detected- Those days are long gone.

create an Exocet-type, anti-ship missile from stuff you could buy at Radio Shack. Surface ships can no longer hide from the enemy like they did
in World War II. Satellites- Satellites and spy planes obviate the need for World War II-type patrol planes and blimps, unless someone shoots

Too slow- Anti-ship missiles can

travel at speeds up to, what, 20,000 miles an hour in the case of an
ICBM aimed at a carrier task force. Carriers move at 30 knots or so
which is 34.6 miles per hour. Too thin-skinned- Can you armor the ships so antiship missiles do not damage them? Nope. They have to stay relatively
light so they can float and go 34.6 miles per hour. Cannot defend themselves-Can you arm them
with anti-missile defenses? They are trying. They have electronic Gatling guns that
them down, in which case planes can accomplish the same thing..

automatically shoot down the incoming missiles. But no doubt those Gatling guns have a certain capacity as to number of targets they can hit

like any mechanical device, would

malfunction at times. Generally, one would expect that if the enemy fired enough
missiles at a Gatling-gun-equipped ship, one or more would eventually
get through. How many? Lets say the capacity of an aircraft carrier and its entourage body-guard ships to stop simultaneous
at a time and range and ammunition limitations. They also,

Exocet-type anti-ship missiles is X. The enemy then need only simultaneously fire X + 1 such missiles to damage or sink the carrier. In the
alternative, the enemy could fire one Exocet-type missile at a time at the carrier. Unless they are programmed otherwise, having only one such
target, all the relevant guns would fire at it, thereby exhausting the carrier task forces anti- missile ammunition more quickly, in which case
fewer than X +1 Exocet-type missiles might be enough to put the carrier out of action. As Japans top WW II Admiral Yamamoto said, There is
no such thing as an unsinkable ship. The fiercest serpent may be overcome by a swarm of ants. U.S. warships also have electronic

warfare jamming devices that screw up the guidance systems of some types of incoming
missiles. These, of course, are ineffective against nuclear-tipped missiles that
need little guidance. Furthermore, if the enemy uses 20,000-miles-per-hour nuclear missiles, there is no known antimissile defense. They move too fast for the electronic Gatling guns and do not need to ever get within the Gatling guns range to destroy the
ships. Our enemy certainly would use nukes if they had enough of them and were in an all-out war against us. Cannot hide, run, or defend

In summary, Navy surface ships cannot hide from a modern

enemy. They cannot run from a modern enemy. And they cannot
themselves

defend themselves against a modern enemy. Accordingly, they are only useful for action against
backward enemies like Afghanistan and Iraq or drug smugglers.

Heg doesnt solve war

Preble 10 (Christopher Preble, director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute,
U.S. Military Power: Preeminence for What Purpose? http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/u-smilitary-power-preeminence-for-what-purpose/, August 2010, 7/25/14, MEM)
Most in Washington still embraces the notion that America is, and forever will be, the worlds indispensable nation. Some

scholars, however, questioned the logic of hegemonic stability theory from the very beginning. A number
continue to do so today. They advance arguments diametrically at odds with the primacist consensus. Trade routes need not
be policed by a single dominant power; the international economy is complex and
resilient. Supply disruptions are likely to be temporary, and the costs of mitigating their
effects should be borne by those who stand to lose or gain the most. Islamic extremists are
scary, but hardly comparable to the threat posed by a globe-straddling Soviet Union armed with thousands of nuclear weapons. It is
frankly absurd that we spend more today to fight Osama bin Laden and his tiny band of murderous thugs than we spent to face down
Joseph Stalin and Chairman Mao. Many

factors have contributed to the dramatic decline in the

number of wars between nation-states; it is unrealistic to expect that a new spasm of
global conflict would erupt if the United States were to modestly refocus its efforts, draw
down its military power, and call on other countries to play a larger role in their own
defense, and in the security of their respective regions. But while there are credible alternatives to the
United States serving in its current dual role as world policeman / armed social worker, the foreign policy establishment in
Washington has no interest in exploring them. The people here have grown accustomed to living at the center of the earth, and indeed,
of the universe. The tangible benefits of all this military spending flow disproportionately to this tiny corner of the United States while
the schlubs in fly-over country pick up the tab.

Continuous navy presence is unnecessary the navy is

only effective after a crisis has already occurred
Daniel, 02 (Donald C.F. Daniel, Ph.D. Georgetown University, International Relations B.A.
(1966) College of the Holy Cross, Political Science, The Future of American Naval Power:
Propositions and Recommendations, Globalization and American Power. Chapter 27. Institute
for National Strategic Studies National Defense University.
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Books/Books_2002/Globalization_and_Maritime_Power_Dec_0
2/01_toc.htm, 2002, 7/25/14, MEM)

In short, then, to say that balanced forward naval presence will be

increasingly vital in shaping the peace41 seems true only vis--vis friends
but not potential adversaries or third parties. It would not seem to have
much direct impact on the shape of a friends domestic politics but could
affect its economy (and thus indirectly the domestic political scene) and its
willingness to support U.S. foreign policy. There is no evidence, however,
that presence need be continuous to achieve these effects. The
Mediterranean analysis suggests that, at the end of the day, what is vital
instead is that U.S. naval forces show up when neededthat is, during the
run-up to and the onset of a contingencyand because of prior operations
with regional friends, that it immediately act effectively in concert with
them.

Primacy does not create stability

Hachigan and Sutphen 08(Nina Hachigan and Monica Sutphen, studied at
Stanford Center for International Security, The Next American Century, p. 168-9, 2008,
7/25/14, MEM)

the strategy of primacy failed to deliver. While the fact of being

the worlds only superpower has substantial benefits, a national
security strategy based on suing and ratiaing primacy has not made
In practice,

America more secure. Americas military might has not been the
answer to terrorism, disease, climate change, or proliferation. Iraq,
Iran, and North Korea have become more dangerous in the last seven
years, not less. Worse than being ineffec tive with transnational
threats and smaller powers, a strategy of maintaining primacy is
counterproductive when it comes to pivotal powers. If America makes
primacy the main goal of its national security strategy, then why
shouldnt the pivotal powers do the same? A goal of primacy signals
that sheer strength is most critical to security. American cannot
trumpet its desire to dominate the world military and then question
why China is modernizing its military.

Primacy spurs proliferation among non-state and rogue

state actors.
Weber et al 7

(Steven -,Professor of Political Science and Director of the Institute for

International Studies at the University of California-Berkeley, et al., with Naazneen Barma,
Matthew Kroenig, and Ely Ratner, Ph.D. Candidates at the University of California-Berkeley and
Research Fellows at its New Era Foreign Policy Center, How Globalization Went Bad, Foreign
Policy, Issue 158, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Academic Search Premiere, p.
51-52, January/February 2007, 7/25/14, MEM)

The world is paying a heavy price for the instability created by the
combination of globalization and unipolarity, and the United States is
bearing most of the burden. Consider the case of nuclear proliferation.
Theres effectively a market out there for proliferation, with its own
supply (states willing to share nuclear technology) and demand (states that badly want a nuclear weapon).
The overlap of unipolarity with globalization ratchets up both the
supply and demand, to the detriment of U.S. national security. It has become

fashionable, in the wake of the Iraq war, to comment on the limits of conventional military force. But much of this analysis
is overblown. The United States may not be able to stabilize and rebuild Iraq. But that doesnt matter much from the
perspective of a government that thinks the Pentagon has it in its sights. In Tehran, Pyongyang, and many other capitals,
including Beijing, the bottom line is simple: The U.S. military could, with conventional force, end those regimes tomorrow if

No country in the world can dream of challenging U.S.

conventional military power. But they can certainly hope to deter
America from using it. And the best deterrent yet invented is the threat
of nuclear retaliation. Before 1989, states that felt threatened by the
United States could turn to the Soviet Unions nuclear umbrella for
protection. Now, they turn to people like A.Q. Khan. Having your own
nuclear weapon used to be a luxury. Today, it is fast becoming a
necessity. North Korea is the clearest example. Few countries had it worse during the Cold War. North Korea was
it chose to do so.

surrounded by feuding, nuclear-armed communist neighbors, it was officially at war with its southern neighbor, and it
stared continuously at tens of thousands of U.S. troops on its border. But, for 40 years, North Korea didnt seek nuclear
weapons. It didnt need to, because it had the Soviet nuclear umbrella. Within five years of the Soviet collapse, however,
Pyongyang was pushing ahead full steam on plutonium reprocessing facilities. North Koreas founder, Kim Il Sung, barely
flinched when former U.S. President Bill Clintons administration readied war plans to strike his nuclear installations
preemptively. That brinkmanship paid off. Today North Korea is likely a nuclear power, and Kims son rules the country
with an iron fist. Americas conventional military strength means a lot less to a nuclear North Korea. Saddam Husseins

How would things be

different in a multipolar world? For starters, great powers could split
the job of policing proliferation, and even collaborate on some
particularly hard cases. Its often forgotten now that, during the Cold War, the only
state with a tougher nonproliferation policy than the United States was
the Soviet Union. Not a single country that had a formal alliance with
great strategic blunder was that he took too long to get to the same place.

Moscow ever became a nuclear power. The Eastern bloc was full of
countries with advanced technological capabilities in every area except
onenuclear weapons. Moscow simply wouldnt permit it. But today we
see the uneven and inadequate level of effort that non-superpowers
devote to stopping proliferation. The Europeans dangle carrots at Iran, but they are unwilling to
consider serious sticks. The Chinese refuse to admit that there is a problem. And the Russians are aiding Irans nuclear

When push comes to shove, nonproliferation today is almost

entirely Americas burden.
ambitions.

Heg forces other nations to acquire nukes

Maddock 10 (Shane J Maddock, PhD from the University of Connecticut in US history
and teacher at Stonehill College, author of multiple books concerning American Foreign
Relations, Nuclear Apartheid, The University of North Carolina Press, Print, 2010, 7/25/14,
MEM)

Throughout the nuclear age, the United States has squandered

opportunities to forge cooperative ventures to halt
proliferation. From the Baruch Plan to national missile defense, Americans have
remained infatuated with unilateral and technological
solutions to the atomic threat. And they have repeatedly
attempted to preserve U.S. nuclear hegemony by undercutting
their own professed commitment to nuclear nondissemination.
A paradoxical equation derived from this practice. American
hegemony, combined with arrogance and a Hobbesian
worldview, catalyzed nuclear nationalism in other states and
helped break the bonds of Washingtons influence. Taught by
the superpowers that nuclear weapons equal political power
and that warheads prevent wars, other states built the bomb
when they could afford to. As the technology became cheaper
and more easily available, even states that could not provide their citizenry with a decent
standard of living, such as India, Pakistan, North Korea, and the PRC, found
the resources to produce limited nuclear arsenals. Since the dawn of the
nuclear age, no president has proven capable of producing the right political mixture to yield a viable nonproliferation
accord. The superpowers remained so convinced of the correctness of their respective privileged positions in the world
system that they refused to make mutual concessions to achieve arms control. Other nations also chose military strength
over cooperation and in the process diminished Washingtons and Moscows power in the international system.

Spread of weapons decreases the risk of wars and

ensures rapid de-escalation if wars do happen
Waltz 3 (Kenneth Waltz, Emeritus Professor of Political Science at UC Berkeley and Adjunct Senior
Research Scholar at Columbia University, past President of the American Political Science Association, and
a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate,
2003, 7/25/14,MEM)

For a number of reasons, deterrent strategies promise less damage than warfighting strategies. First, deterrent strategies induce caution all around and
this reduce the incidence of war. Second, wars fought in the face of strategic
nuclear weapons must be carefully limited because a country having them
may retaliate if its vital interests are threatened. Third, prospective
punishment need only be proportionate to an adversarys expected gains in

war after those gains are discounted for the many uncertainties of war.
Fourth, should deterrence fail, a few judiciously delivered warheads are likely
to produce sobriety in the leaders of all the countries involved and thus bring
rapid de-escalation. Finally, war fighting strategies offer no clear place to stop
short of victory for some and defeat for others. Deterrent strategies do, and
that place is where one country threatens the others vital interests.
Deterrent strategies lower the probability that wars will begin. If wars start
nevertheless, deterrent strategies lower the probability that they will be
carried far. Nuclear weapons lessen the intensity as well as the frequency of
war among their possessors. For fear of escalation, nuclear states do not
want to fight long and hard over important interestsindeed, they do not
want to fight at all.

AT: Heg is sustainable

Navies are obsolete cruise missiles and submarines will
take out the fleet
Burleson 07 (Mike Burleson, Columnist for Sea Classics Magazine, An All-Submarine
Navy, June 19th 2007,
http://www.opinioneditorials.com/guestcontributors/mburleson_20070619.html, 6/19/07,
7/25/14, MEM)
Last week, the third in a new class of underwater battleships, the USS MICHIGAN, joined the fleet after a $1
billion face lift. The 4 converted subs of the OHIO class, former Trident missile ships, are the undersea
equivalent of the reborn IOWA class from the 1980s. Armed with over 150 Tomahawk cruise missiles, plus
the ability to carry special forces and unmanned vehicles, they give the Navy an incredible ability to strike

in full-scale shooting war at sea, the US

surface navy will be devastated in the first day., by the combination of cruise
missiles and stealthy submarines. The survivors would all be forced into port,
unable to participate in the counterattack, which would likely be initiated by
our own deadly nuclear attack submarines. What this means is, our current force of
colossal and pricey warships including aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers,
and amphibious ships are obsolete in todays precision, push button warfare .
decisively from the sea. I am of the opinion that

They are also tremendously expensive to build and operate, with only the richest of earths superpowers
able to afford them in ever declining numbers. If this wasnt reason enough for maritime nations to

there are few if any jobs the surface fleet can do

which the submarine cannot. Ill elaborate: Command of the Sea Submariners say there are
only 2 types of ships: submarines and targets. Theres valid reasons for this. Since World War 2 antisubmarine defenses have failed to match the attack boats advancements in
speed, stealth, and weaponry. For instance, since 1945 the average speed of destroyers have
reevaluate their shipbuilding priorities,

remained at 30 knots, with only nuclear vessels able to maintain this rate for any period. In contrast, the
velocity of nuclear attack submarines, beginning with the launch of USS NAUTILUS in 1954, has tripled and
quadrupled from around 10 knots submerged to 30-40 knots. Also, an antisubmarine vessel must get
within a few miles of an enemy sub to fire its rockets or torpedoes. Its only long-range defense, the
helicopter, is slow and must linger in a vulnerable hover while its sonar buoys seek out their prey. Some
Russian-built boats come equipped with anti-aircraft missiles which makes this standard ASW tactic

a modern submarine can launch its missiles from 75 miles

away and farther. Should it choose to close the distance, as occurred when a Chinese SONG class
suicidal. In contrast,

stalked the USS KITTY HAWK last year, to fire its ship killing torpedoes, it can do so at speeds as fast as
and sometimes surpassing surface warships. Whether attacking with cruise missiles or wake-homing
torpedoes the attack boat remains submerged; the preeminent stealth vessel. The sub has likely held this
dominate position on the high seas, since the dawn of the first nuke ships beginning in the 1950s. The
only lacking factor has been a full-scale naval war to prove it. The single example is the sinking of the
Argentine cruiser BELGRANO 25 years ago by the British submarine HMS CONQUEROR in the Falklands
Conflict. Afterward, the Argentine Navy fled to port and remained there! Commerce Raiding/Protection:
This traditional role of the submarine is one which it excelled in the last century. The difference today is,

neither America nor Britain has the capability to mass produce the thousands
of anti-submarine escorts which just barely defeated Germanys U-boats in 2
world wars, even if it would matter. In the next war at sea, the submarine
would bring all commerce to a halt, making a mockery of the globalized free
market system. The only counter to this menace is perhaps a combination of aircraft and submarine
escorts, with the latter acting as the destroyer, shepherding its convoy through the shark ridden waters.

The US navy is obsolete

Reed 11 (John T., bachelors degree from the United States Military Academy at West Point and a
master of business administration degree from Harvard Business School., Are U.S. Navy surface ships
sitting ducks to enemies with modern weapons?, 2011, http://www.johntreed.com/sittingducks.html)

whenever the
U.S. Navy did computer war games against the Soviet Union, all significant
U.S. Navy surface ships were destroyed by the Soviets within about 20
minutes of the start of the computerized war. How? Nukes. A reader says that the Soviet submarines in
Computer naval war games against the Soviets I have read media stories that said

the Cuban missile crisis had nuclear torpedoes which they would have used if we did an amphibious
landing. I have no way to confirm that. Although the Navy ships and their carrier-based planes perform
spectacularly well against third-rate enemies like Afghanistan and Iraq, I wonder how they would do
against Argentina or any other enemy equipped with modern weapons. In short, I wonder if

U.S. Navy

surface vessels are obsolete. Think about it. They are large, slow-moving, metal objects that float
on the surface of the oceanin the Twenty-First Century! Ocean liners were the main way to get across

most
people have used planes because they are much faster and cheaper. Except
the U.S. military. Civilians essentially got rid of their navy around 1950 . Only
the oceans for civilian passengers until the second half of the Twentieth Century. Since then,

the hidebound military would still have a Navy in the Twenty-First Century. Nowadays, civilians only ride
passenger ships for pleasure cruises. An argument can be made that the Navy does the same. Only maybe
the old line, you can tell the men from the boys by the size of their toys is a more accurate way to put
it. Navy brass want to grow up to captain a ship. A big ship. The bigger the better. Before WW II, they
wanted to be captains of battleships. After WW II, British historian B.H. Liddell Hart said, A battleship had
long been to an admiral what a cathedral is to a bishop. Now Navy officers want to captain aircraft
carriers. Very exciting. Very romantic. Great fun. But obsolete. WW II in the Pacific last time they were not
obsolete The last time we used them to fight worthy opponents was in the Pacific during World War II. At
that time, warring navies had to send out slow-moving patrol planes to search for the enemys ships. The
motion picture Midway does an excellent job of showing both the Japanese and the Americans doing this.
Low-visibility weather would often hide ships back then. Easily detected Those days are long gone.

ships are not only easily seen by the human eye absent fog or clouds, they are also easily
detected, pinpointed, and tracked by such technologies as radar, sonar, infrared
Surface

detectors, satellites, motion detectors, noise detectors, magnetic field detectors, and so forth. Nowadays,
you can probably create an Exocet-type, anti-ship missile from stuff you could buy at Radio Shack. Surface

ships can no longer hide from the enemy like they did in World War II. Satellites Satellites
and spy planes obviate the need for World War II-type patrol planes and blimps, unless someone shoots
them down, in which case planes can accomplish the same thing. Too slow Anti-ship missiles can
travel at speeds up to, what, 20,000 miles an hour in the case of an ICBM aimed at a carrier task force.
Carriers move at 30 knots or so which is 34.6 miles per hour. Too thin-skinned Can you armor the
ships so anti-ship missiles do not damage them? Nope. They have to stay relatively light so they can float
and go 34.6 miles per hour. Cannot defend themselves Can you arm them with anti-missile
defenses? They are trying. They have electronic Gatling guns that automatically shoot down the incoming
missiles. But no doubt those Gatling guns have a certain capacity as to number of targets they can hit at a
time and range and ammunition limitations. They also, like any mechanical device, would malfunction at
times. Generally, one would expect that if the enemy fired enough missiles at a Gatling-gun-equipped ship,
one or more would eventually get through. How many? Lets say the capacity of an aircraft carrier and its
entourage body-guard ships to stop simultaneous Exocet-type anti-ship missiles is X. The enemy then need
only simultaneously fire X + 1 such missiles to damage or sink the carrier. In the alternative, the enemy
could fire one Exocet-type missile at a time at the carrier. Unless they are programmed otherwise, having
only one such target, all the relevant guns would fire at it, thereby exhausting the carrier task forces antimissile ammunition more quickly, in which case fewer than X +1 Exocet-type missiles might be enough to
put the carrier out of action. A U.S. 2001 Naval Academy graduate said of this scenario: The combat
scenario which you seem to be imaging surface ships facing is one of saturation fire. 14 planes loaded out
with 6 Air to Surface each would defiantly [sic] win against one DDG, but that's a highly unlikely situation.
Reed response: I disagree. This saturation fire scenario is precisely what the Japanese did at the end of
World War II, only they used kamikaze suicide planes rather than missiles. It worked. Our enemies will
attack in the way most likely to work. If thats saturation, they will use saturation. As Japans top WW II
Admiral Yamamoto said, There is no such thing as an unsinkable ship. The fiercest serpent may be
overcome by a swarm of ants. U.S. warships also have electronic warfare jamming devices that screw up
the guidance systems of some types of incoming missiles. These, of course, are ineffective against nucleartipped missiles that need little guidance. Furthermore, if the enemy uses 20,000-miles-per-hour nuclear
missiles, there is no known anti-missile defense. They move too fast for the electronic Gatling guns and do
not need to ever get within the Gatling guns range to destroy the ships. Our enemy certainly would use
nukes if they had enough of them and were in an all-out war against us. Cannot hide, run, or defend

Navy surface ships cannot hide from a modern enemy. They

cannot run from a modern enemy. And they cannot defend themselves
against a modern enemy. Accordingly, they are only useful for action against backward enemies
themselves In summary,

like Afghanistan and Iraq or drug smugglers. Militant stepchild The Navy has long been a sort of stepchild

in the American military. And it has been a very militant stepchild throwing such ferocious tantrums that it
was able to get its own air forceNavy carrier-based planesand its own armythe U.S. Marine Corps.
Not only does the Navy have its own army and air force, the Navys armythe Marine Corpshas its own
air force, too. (Astronaut and later Senator John Glenn was a Marine pilot.) Unbelievable. It should be
noted that the Army does not have its own air force or navy. (The Army needs its own helicopters and small
fixed-wing planes because they work very closely with ground units in combat.) Nor does the Air Force

The missions of the Navy pilots could just as easily be

carried out by Air Force pilots trained to use carriers as their base . The Army
could perform, and does perform, the functions of the Marine Corps. Marines
have its own army or navy.