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In "Schizophrenics, Cyborgs and the Pitfalls of Posthumanism," Angela
Woods invites us to revisit two canonical analyses of the postmodern:
Fredric Jameson's "Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late
Capitalism" and Donna Haraway's "A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science,
Technology and Socialist Feminism in the 1980s." Jameson and Haraway
introduced to contemporary cultural criticism two posthumanist icons:
the schizophrenic, a pathologized victim of postmodernity, and the
cyborg, a vision of strategic posthuman subjectivity. In her timely
and critical analysis of these articles, Woods challenges the
established notion of an oppositional relationship between the
schizophrenic and the cyborg. She turns to the "schizo-cyborgs" of
cultural theory, psychiatry and psychoanalysis as evidence of the
intimacy between the schizophrenic and the cyborg, an intimacy which
deeply problematizes the uncritical celebration of Utopian cyborg
subjectivity and raises significant questions about the capacity of
either figure to account for posthuman embodiment.
Schizophrenics, Cyborgs and the Pitfalls of Posthumanism
Angela Woods
<1> The subject -- its construction and deconstruction, its importance to a
radical politics, and its fate in postmodernity -- is an ongoing, central
focus of contemporary critical theory. Unable to withstand the stringent
critiques of feminist and postcolonial theorists, the universal subject of
liberal humanism has, along with its Cartesian metaphysics, been catapulted
into crisis. Postmodernity is now widely credited with imploding, or at least
destabilizing, the binary oppositions that underpinned the intelligibility,
autonomy and integrity of this so-called "master subject of modernism" [1].
Distinctions between culture and nature, cerebral and corporeal, human and
machine, masculine and feminine, and reason and unreason are no longer
perceived to provide an unproblematic foundation for identity or emancipatory
politics. The mid 1980s saw the publication of two canonical Marxist/Socialist
analyses of the postmodern which continue to influence debates about new forms
of subjectivity peculiar to the late twentieth century. In "Postmodernism, or
The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism" [2], Fredric Jameson deployed the term
'schizophrenia" to describe specific experiences of time and language in the
postmodern dissolution of subjectivity. Donna Haraway, in "A Manifesto for
Cyborgs: Science, Technology and Socialist Feminism in the 1980s" [3],
reconfigured the radically fragmented subject as a cyborg or cybernetic
organism, a futuristic vision of posthuman hybridity. Since their debut in the
Anglo-American academy, the schizophrenic has functioned to pathologize the
decentred subject and the cyborg to denote a new strategic subjectivity, but
should we be satisfied that these roles are as stable and as oppositional as
they first appear? More importantly, should we be satisfied that these
templates for contemporary subjectivity mark a significant departure from the
conceptual framework of liberal humanism, and offer insight into the embodied
experience of postmodernity?
<2> Twenty years later, there are compelling reasons for revisiting Jameson
and Haraway's articles. Foremost among these is simply that despite being
widely anthologized, Jameson and Haraway have not been construed as
interlocutors, and their well-circulated concepts of the schizophrenic and the
cyborg are seldom, if ever, critically compared. Considering the political

affinities and structural similarities of their projects, this is somewhat

surprising. Writing at the height of the Cold War and the dawn of the digital
revolution [4], Jameson and Haraway both provide compelling arguments for
approaching postmodernity as an economically and technologically distinct
historical period. Furthermore, for each theorist, coding or mapping the
information age of multinational capitalism effectively requires an
interdisciplinary approach [5] and a renewed commitment to analysing
postmodernity as a dominant, global phenomenon. Reconceptualizing subjectivity
is central to both their navigational projects, but from the outset it should
be clear that while Jameson confines himself to diagnosing the "decentred
subject" as the schizophrenic casualty of postmodernity, Haraway's aim is to
sketch an ironic Utopian vision of a new late twentieth-century subject.
<3> This article confronts the conceptual boundary separating the
schizophrenic and cyborg by first analysing the way in which "Cultural Logic"
and "A Manifesto for Cyborgs" describe, situate and code these figures as
responses to a perceived crisis of humanist subjectivity. Few critics have
paused to examine the complexity of these subjective maps, and fewer still
their interrelationship. Here, I offer a critical comparison of the
schizophrenic and the cyborg and a critique of the widespread framing of these
exemplary postmodern subjects as polar opposites. If taken at face value, the
schizophrenic and the cyborg appear diametrically opposed, so much so as to
signal a new constellation of binary oppositions: fragmentation and synthesis;
isolation and collectivity; disembodied (non)subject and cybernetic organism;
political dysfunctionality and oppositional agency. However, by pressing
beyond Jameson and Haraway's claims and examining other theoretical fusions of
the schizophrenic and cyborg, I will argue that the intimacy of their
relationship complicates such neat binary coding. If schizophrenia can be seen
as a distinctively cyborgian fear of subjective fragmentation, and the cyborg
a schizophrenic delusion of unity, is any simple delineation between them
possible? In collapsing the boundaries that have rendered lived experience
intelligible, both these offspring of late capitalism risk becoming universal
categories that cannot account for material differences of any kind. My
suggestion, ultimately, is that the schizophrenic and cyborg are significant
to critical theorists today not as models for postmodern or posthumanist
subjectivity -- one symptomatic and the other strategic. Rather, as I will
demonstrate, instead of resolving the question of how we might most usefully
conceive of postmodern subjectivity, they serve as strategic reminders that
questions of collectivity, communication, and embodiment are fundamental to
its ongoing analysis.
<4> Fredric Jameson has been hailed as "America's leading Marxist critic and
as theorist supreme of the postmodern" [6]. "Postmodernism, or The Cultural
Logic of Late Capitalism," his major statement on the postmodern [7], is said
to be the most quoted and discussed article of the 1980s [8]. For Jameson,
postmodernism signals, above all, a loss of depth. The waning of affect, the
eclipse of parody by pastiche, the loss of the historical referent, the
flattening of space into surfaces, the abandonment of theoretical depth
models, and the schizophrenic aesthetic are all symptomatic of "a new kind of
superficiality" that Jameson argues is the 'supreme formal feature" of the
postmodern [9]. Only when postmodernism is interpreted as an integrated
expression of historically specific economic conditions can the logic of this
aesthetic inventory be "properly" gauged: it must be understood, according to
Jameson, as "the internal and superstructural expression of a whole new wave
of American military and economic domination throughout the world" [10].
Jameson defends [11] his reading of postmodernism as cultural hegemony as a

strategic one, arguing that we must approach it as "a new systemic cultural
normin order to reflect more adequately on the most effective forms of any
radical politics today" [12]. His commitment to totalizing analysis derives
from a classical Marxism "decidedly unpopular with the contemporary left" [13]
because it ignores gender, race, and ethnicity -- in short, heterogeneity and
hierarchy. Indeed, although Jameson later concedes that postmodernism serves
the interests of a white, male-dominated elite, he all but dismisses what he
calls non-class micropolitics as a "profoundly postmodern phenomenon" [14].
Marxism is Jameson's privileged hermeneutic by virtue of its breadth and its
resolute exteriority to postmodernism.
<5> Jameson identifies the decentred subject as the causal link between late
capitalism and the postmodern aesthetic. Despite being initially suspicious of
the all-too fashionable "death" of the subject [15], Jameson's entire thesis
depends upon the assumption that the subject is no longer bounded, centred or
possessed of psychic depth. Exactly which economic, technological or political
manifestations of late capitalism are implicated in the postmodern shift from
an alienated to a fragmented subject remains unclear [16], but through it,
time, language and subjectivity are thrown into crisis. Jameson's sudden
introduction of the term schizophrenia to explain these interrelated crises is
therefore potentially misleading, as it creates the impression that
schizophrenia is just a new symptom of the postmodern, as many critics have
concluded. As discussed below, recasting the decentred subject as
schizophrenic enables Jameson to explore specific aspects of the postmodern
dissolution of self, but the reconfiguration also serves a doubly strategic
function. Firstly, it detracts attention from the fact that for Jameson, the
schizophrenic, as the decentred subject, precipitates postmodernism's major
aesthetic trends. Secondly, despite Jameson's explicit disavowal of any
association with the morbid psychiatric reality of schizophrenia, and his
assurances that he is not offering a "culture-and-personality diagnosis" of
contemporary society [17], the substitution of schizophrenic for decentred
subject functions precisely as a diagnosis, if not a pathologization, of the
postmodern self. As several theorists have noted, it would be disingenuous
indeed to imagine that the term floats free of any clinical connotations of
psychic suffering as well as dysfunction [18].
<6> Postmodern schizophrenia is not to be confused, however, with the highmodernist experiences of "radical isolation and solitude, anomie, private
revolt [and] Van Gogh-type madness" [19], as the decentred subject can no
longer project the drama of inner feeling [20]. For Jameson (loosely following
Lacan) subjectivity is a function of language, where identity is created and
sustained through the temporal organization of linguistic signifiers.
Schizophrenia is the disintegration of this "objective mirage of
signification," such that "when the links of that signifying chain snap, then
we have schizophrenia in the form of a rubble of distinct and unrelated
signifiers" [21]. Again, Jameson seems typically disinterested in causally
linking this 'snap" to a specific aspect of late capitalism, focussing instead
on its consequences. "If we are unable to unify the past, present and future
of the sentence," Jameson argues, "then we are similarly unable to unify the
past, present and future of our own biographical experience or psychic life"
[22]. Identity and intentionality are thus abolished in the schizophrenic
surrender to the mysterious affective charge and dazzling materiality of the
isolated signifier [23]; "action, project, and orientation collapse in the
literal, nauseous, and real present" [24]

<7> Jacqueline Rose asks an extremely pertinent question of Jameson's

totalizing account of postmodern schizophrenic subjectivity:
What dramatization, sanitization, and desexualization follow from this general
inflation of psychic economies across the whole of social space? Dramatization
because it becomes precisely the drama of all modern subjects; sanitization
since, despite the idea of a crisis, the model seems to become strangely
divested of some of the most difficult aspects of the psychic itself;
desexualization perhaps most oddly of allbecause of the glaring omission of
any question of sexual difference [25]
Anthony Elliott goes on to suggest that the question of sexual difference is
simply displaced onto the all-purpose category of fragmentation [26]. Most
troubling, I would argue, is the schizophrenic transcendence or erasure of the
body and its social inscriptions. Despite these serious shortcomings, which I
discuss in more detail later, the idea of a symbiotic relationship between
schizophrenia and postmodernism has strong support in contemporary literary
and cultural theory [27], and some even suggest the connection is more than
allegorical [28]. While Jameson's is by no means the first or the most
psychologically sophisticated analysis of postmodernism and schizophrenia
[29], his boundary-dwelling schizophrenic is a vivid symbol of the perceived
loss of subjective depth in postmodernity. Stranded in the perpetual present
with no border between the self and the stimuli of the external world [30],
the schizophrenic is incapable of achieving critical distance, representing
the "technological sublime," and cognitive mapping -- projects of subjective
orientation that Jameson argues are essential if we are to navigate the
unrepresentable totality of capital [31]. In summary, schizophrenia is for
Jameson "a challenge to overcome and surmount" [32].
<8> The move from the schizophrenic disintegration of subjective boundaries to
a cyborg identity "predicated on transgressed boundaries" [33] brings us to
the work of Donna Haraway. Haraway is without doubt the most important
theorist of "cyborgology," an interdisciplinary critical field that is as much
an "academic attitude" [34] as a fertile territory where science, feminism,
and cultural studies converge. For Haraway, the cyborg is an ontological
solution to an epistemological problem: a new mode of postmodern being and a
strategic intervention in 1980s feminism. Haraway's founding premise is that
"There is nothing about being "female" that naturally binds women. There is
not even such a state as "being" female, itself a highly complex category
constructed in contested sexual scientific discourses and other social
practices" [35]. By claiming to speak for all women, socialist, radical,
liberal and ecofeminists effect, in Haraway's view, an "unintended erasure of
polyvocal, unassimilable, radical difference" [36]. Victimhood, innocence,
pre-Oedipal desire, and pseudo-divine feminine intuition are, she argues,
neither grounds for insight, nor suitable bases for a responsible feminist
politics [37]. For Haraway, postmodernity's new biotechnologies, proliferating
communication systems, and exploitative "homework economy" are key markers of
the transition from older hierarchical social structures into 'scary new
networks" she terms the "informatics of domination" [38]. The challenge for
feminists is to map the informatics of domination without recourse to
metanarratives, 'salvation history" or the phallogocentric master code [39].
Rejecting the essential innocence of unity, origin and nature, Haraway calls
for a politics that would "embrace partial, contradictory, permanently
unclosed constructions of personal and collective selves and still be
faithful, effective -- and, ironically, socialist feminist" [40].

<9> The cyborg myth attempts to reconcile these contradictory political

imperatives. Heralded as "the postmodern icon" [41], the cyborg is every inch
a late twentieth century being born from the breakdown of three key boundaries
-- those separating human from animal, organism from machine, and physical
from non-physical [42]. Haraway's cyborg is a synthetic figure and a figure of
synthesis, a cybernetic organism that incorporates the "other" into the
"human" and captures the tensions between them. Neither bounded nor
autonomous, it is a function of multiple, intersecting communication networks.
Consequently, Haraway pays little attention to psychic interiority in her
account of cyborg identity, instead privileging bodies, texts, and labor as
its key construction sites. "A cyborg body," she insists, "is not innocent; it
was not born in a garden; it does not seek unitary identity" [43]. With "an
intimate experience of boundaries, their construction and deconstruction"
[44], and a penchant for fusing, coupling and (re)assembling parts, the cyborg
is both a material being in constant flux, and a framework through which to
imagine new collaborative and collective identities.
<10> Unlike Jameson, who situates himself outside postmodernism in order to
diagnose its symptoms, Haraway foregrounds her own situatedness, writing from
"the belly of the monster" [45] with a sense of urgency, frustration and
excitement befitting a manifesto. Haraway's passionate investment in the
cyborg does not, however, make it an unproblematic ontological model. As
Rosemary Hennessy points out, Haraway does not escape feminist standpoint
theory's difficulty in adequately explaining the relationship between the
discursive (the cyborg as a new feminist mode of subjectivity) and the
presumably non-discursive (the changing material reality of women's lives)
[46]. While explicitly rejecting totalizing theory [47], Haraway's postmodern
manifesto paradoxically constructs cyborg identity as a global phenomenon that
is the only viable mode of subjectivity in postmodernity. Her famous parting
shot, "I"d rather be a cyborg than a goddess" [48], has therefore attracted
responses both petulant ("Why not explore the potential of cybergoddesses?"
[49]) pertinent ("Is it better to be a cyborg than a woman?" [50]) and
political ("If I"m a cyborg rather than a goddess will patriarchy go away?"
[51]). Haraway's subsequent description of her 1985 cyborg as "a girl who's
trying not to become Woman, but remain responsible to women of many colors and
positions" [52] encapsulates the feminist impulse of the manifesto, but is
incommensurable with her claim that she sought to dismiss "the fetishized
perfect subject of oppositional history" [53] in favor of a frequently
ambiguous and permanently incomplete cyborg. How the cyborg can sustain such
openness and an allegiance to socialist feminism is a central, unresolved
problem.
<11> What makes Haraway's cyborg so attractive to its supporters is that it
participates in "a decentring of traditional subjectivity" while offering "a
physical and bodily experience ofstrategic subjectivities" [54]. She insists
upon a subject who can be 'something other than a shroud for the day after the
apocalypse" [55]. But while cyborg subjectivity-as-collage is distinctly unfunereal, is it necessarily revolutionary? Can we, with Chela Sandoval,
confidently claim that it offers hope to "Jameson's lost subject"? [56] The
cyborg certainly appears more savvy than the schizophrenic, but Haraway's
unmistakable Utopianism does not in itself ensure its political efficacy. The
cyborg's extreme dependence on and proximity to postmodern communication
networks renders it particularly susceptible to information overload, and even
subjective disintegration [57]. When the "privileged pathology" of
postmodernity is communications breakdown [58], how can we differentiate
cyborg heteroglossia from the schizophrenic's "rubble of distinct and

unrelated signifiers"? Cyborg integrity and oppositionality, which I am

suggesting is as much about resisting schizophrenic disintegration as it is
about outmanoeuvring the goddess, hinges upon a strategic commitment Haraway
promises but cannot guarantee.
<12> Since their Anglo-American debut in the mid 1980s, the schizophrenic and
the cyborg have been frequently interpreted as victim and visionary of the
postmodern. So well entrenched are the perceived distinctions between them, it
is tempting to suggest that Haraway and Jameson's border-subjects
paradoxically offer us a new binary opposition with which to map contemporary
subjectivity. However, like most boundaries in postmodern theory, this one is
certainly permeable, contested and unstable. To explore in more depth the
intersections (and indeed, intimacy) between the schizophrenic and the cyborg,
I turn first to the 'schizo-cyborgs" of two post-Marxist texts -- Gilles
Deleuze and Flix Guattari's Anti-Oedipus [59] and Jean Baudrillard's The
Ecstasy of Communication [60] -- and then to the cyborgian dimensions of
schizophrenic delusions, as articulated within psychiatric and psychoanalytic
discourse.
<13> For Deleuze and Guattari, schizophrenia is a process of ego-loss; a deOedipalization of the subject reconceptualized as an endlessly reassembling
desiring-machine. This schizophrenic process is emancipatory [61], for Deleuze
and Guattari, because it liberates desire that is presumed to be subversive,
revolutionary and true to itself [62]; and dismantles the insidious fiction of
autonomous, bounded selfhood. Jameson's schizophrenic owes much to Deleuze and
Guattari's schizo, but his stated affiliation with their project [63] is
fraught, not least because
Deleuze and Guattari's whole view of history as an essentially aleatory,
contingent, and heterogeneous series of intensive states experienced by
partial, nomadic subjects secreted by schizophrenic desiring-production would
seem to be completely incommensurable with Jameson's own conception of a
single great adventure of class struggle [64].
Rather than interpret schizophrenia as a primarily linguistic or psychic
phenomenon, Deleuze and Guattari emphasize the materiality of fragmentation.
Like Haraway, they valorize the cyborgian coupling, networking and fusion of
human/nonhuman parts, but explicitly reject the idea of their integrated
assembly. The notion of a single cybernetic organism is rejected in favor of a
body-without-organs, "an imageless, organless body [which is] perpetually
reinserted into the process of production" [65]. Here, Anti-Oedipus, I would
argue, loosely equates the schizophrenic dissolution of subjectivity with the
production of interminably dis/assembling cyborgs: both 'schizo" and cyborg
are effective insofar as they remain partial and deterritorialized.
<14> Jean Baudrillard offers a very different, and markedly more frightening,
view of the cyborgian schizophrenic as a "pure screen," an "immanent surface"
across which communication networks simply flicker [66]. Like Jameson's
schizophrenic, Baudrillard's schizo-cyborg is primarily described in terms of
communicative dysfunction. Bereft of psychic depth and flattened into two
dimensions, any distinction between interior and exterior is abolished, and
along with it any notion of corporeality. This schizophrenic-as-terminal
effectively signals a termination of political subjectivity. Interpenetrated
by the communication apparatuses of a technologically manipulated world,
Baudrillard's schizophrenic is characterized by a terrifying overexposure to

the hyperreal [67]. This is schizophrenia as cyborg reification, where the

self, or any meaningful approximation of it, is utterly subsumed by the vast
digital networks of late capitalism. More disturbing than the idea of an
automaton invaded and controlled by technology, here the schizo-cyborg is
simply its empty reflection.
<15> Schizo-cyborgs are not creatures confined to Marxist and post-Marxist
imaginaries, but have long circulated in the annals of psychiatric and
psychoanalytic accounts of psychosis. Experiencing the self as a machine, in
whole or in part, or as cybernetically connected to external technological
devices, is well documented as a staple schizophrenic delusion. Emil
Kraepelin, the first psychiatrist to identify dementia praecox (schizophrenia)
as a disease entity, remarked on the prevalence of delusions of technological
persecution and bodily mutation [68]; Carl Jung analysed the role "the
telephone" played in commenting on his schizophrenic patient's other delusions
[69]; in 1919, Victor Tausk published his seminal analysis of the "influencing
machine" in schizophrenia [70]; and today's diagnostic manuals still single
out the reassembly of body organs as a typically "bizarre" delusion [71]. The
delusional reconfiguration of bodies or body parts as independently mechanical
and externally operated can be seen as a means of symbolically arresting the
fragmentation or dissolution of self; as the schizophrenic stabilization of a
perceived lack of autonomy and boundedness. As Avital Ronell suggests, "the
schizophrenic gives us exemplary access to the fundamental shifts in
affectivity and corporeal organization produced and commanded by technology,
in part because the schizophrenic inhabits these other territorialities" [72]
While the schizophrenic only technically becomes cyborg, according to
cyborgologists, when delusions are treated psychopharmacologically [73], from
within the depth of a delusion acutely registered on the body, the
schizophrenic can articulate what it feels like to be a cyborg, to be
"produced" if not "commanded by technology." The schizo-cyborg can suggest
possibilities for the romantic revisioning of subjectivity (Deleuze and
Guattari) as well as its expiration (Baudrillard), but by raising the question
of the delusion (as in "real-life" schizophrenia) it forces us to rethink the
dualisms of mind/body and real/unreal in accounts of schizophrenic and cyborg
subjectivity.
<16> As I hope to have demonstrated, the appearance of multiple schizo-cyborgs
suggests a theoretical intimacy between the schizophrenic and cyborg,
rendering them a potentially dysfunctional or ineffectual binary opposition.
Nothing beyond an imputed oppositionality guarantees that the cyborg will
successfully negotiate the multiple networks of the information age, as
schizophrenia's communicative breakdown -- isolation in a chaos of
disassociated signifiers -- haunts Haraway's cyborg as its "privileged
pathology." Equally, the integrity and agency of the cyborg body could be a
delusion of Jameson's depthless and disoriented schizophrenic. Such confusions
arise because Jameson and Haraway relocate the decentred subject in an
unmapped territory, an area beyond the boundaries of gender, race, sexuality,
class and even psychic structure; a conceptual space only tenuously, if at
all, connected to the changed material and economic reality of postmodernity.
The possibility -- or desirability -- of resurrecting liberal humanism or
identity politics in order to map this space is rejected by both Jameson and
Haraway; unlike some cyberfeminists, they refuse to valorize "the local" as
the only contemporary guarantor of self-hood [74]. So the central question
raised, and still unresolved, by the schizophrenic and cyborg is: how can we
imagine posthumanist subjects capable of sustaining connection across time and
in space? Drawing on the work of Elizabeth Grosz [75] and N Katherine Hayles

[76], I argue that the schizophrenic and cyborg call attention to the
importance of the body, or more specifically, embodiment, as a precondition of
orientation and participation in the communication networks of late
capitalism.
<17> Despite acknowledging that culture today is "dominated by space and
spatial logic" [77], Jameson portrays the fragmentation of subjectivity
exclusively as a crisis of the temporal organization of language. For all his
discussion of the quantifiable material markers of this new epoch, the
arguably most basic material reference point -- the body -- is absent. As
exemplary postmodern subject, the schizophrenic does not dismantle the
Cartesian divide between mind and body that characterized its liberal humanist
predecessor; on the contrary, it would appear that schizophrenia exacerbates
the split, throwing the mind into crisis and signalling the disappearance of
the body altogether. Although for Jameson it is class consciousness, rather
than corporeality, which is essential to the cognitive mapping of the
postmodern, he claims that postmodern hyperspace 'stands as something like an
imperative to grow new organs, to expand our sensorium and our body to some
new, as yet unimaginable, perhaps ultimately impossible, dimensions" [78]. As
"current fantasies about the salvational nature of high technology
entertainedby many intellectualsare essentially of a piece with more vulgar
apologies for postmodernism" [79], Jameson clearly refuses the proposition
that cyborg modification would ensure effective corporeal reconfiguration.
Constrained by a view of the body as "merely physical," Jameson refers only to
its role in navigating physical space, overlooking its importance to
subjective orientation in history and cultural space. As it is
the disembodied schizophrenic who, for Jameson, is a symbol of temporal,
linguistic and subjective disintegration, he seems implicitly to suggest that
the successful negotiation of postmodernism requires a reconceptualization of
embodiment.
<18> In seeking to move beyond a feminist valorization of nature or the female
body as grounds for insight or resistance, Haraway locates cyborg corporeality
at the intersection of fiction and reality. What is troubling about Haraway's
account of the cyborg body is its singularity: disrupting the organic
wholeness of "traditional bodies," it risks reinscribing their very real
differences as an unending and unrepresentable proliferation of difference, or
subsuming them within a new Platonic ideal. Promising an ironic ontology
liberated from the hierarchical taxonomies of gender and race, the cyborg
simultaneously threatens to liberate us from the materiality of embodiment, to
become, as Haraway herself acknowledges, "the awful apocalyptic telosof the
"West's" escalating dominations of abstract individuation" [80]. For Hayles,
construing the cyborg body as an effect of communication networks continues,
rather than disrupts, the liberal humanist erasure of embodiment [81];
privileging a normative ideal of "the body" which ignores its specific and
messy instantiation. Grosz further argues that neutralizing or neutering the
specificity of the body reinstates an entire matrix of binary oppositions in
which women are assigned an inferior place [82]. The urgent task for
feminists, she contends, is to provide an account of "embodied subjectivity"
which "refuses reductionism, resists dualism, and remains suspicious of the
holism and unity implied by monism," as there is "no one mode that is capable
of representing the "human" in all its richness and variability" [83].
<19> In surrendering to the proliferation of difference (represented as
linguistic chaos, or the endless refiguring of the cyborg body) both
schizophrenic and cyborg effectively erase difference, becoming metaphors for

a universal subjectivity. As maps of the postmodern, singular icons for

radical heterogeneity, neither the schizophrenic nor the cyborg can begin to
account for a variety of lived experience in postmodernity, let alone the
inequitable distribution of power and resources among global citizens.
"Cultural Logic" and "A Manifesto for Cyborgs" are principally concerned with
the subjective navigation of the postmodern, but as the schizophrenic and
cyborg are both abstracted from the cultural specificity of embodiment upon
which orientation depends, neither feminist coding nor cognitive mapping is
logically possible, for successful cartography is surely a prerogative of
political, geographical and ideological location. Embodiment is, as Grosz and
Hayles make clear, essential to the remapping of subjectivity beyond the
paradigm of liberal humanism, to the configuration of subjects in an epoch
said to have imploded binary oppositions, but unable to abolish the material
effects of their operation. It would therefore be a mistake to see Haraway's
cyborg exclusively as a postmodern success story, because to be faithful to
socialist feminism (and impervious to technofascism [84]) the cyborg must
constantly return to material realities shaped by class and gender, to the
very bodily boundaries it is deemed to have transgressed. Similarly, by
"inflating" and "dramatising," to use Rose's terms, the collapse of a
particular kind subject as a crisis ofall subjects, Jameson begs the question
of whether those who were historically subordinated within the philosophical
framework of liberal humanism on the basis of their bodies also have a
schizophrenic experience of postmodernity [85]. Although the cyborg seems to
foreclose the possibility of an appeal to different physical realities, in
fact it joins Jameson's schizophrenic in implicitly calling attention to the
importance of the body -- or rather, bodies -- in accounts of contemporary
subjectivity. What both the schizophrenic and the cyborg do within the broader
context of Jameson and Haraway's analyses is signal the urgent need for
subjects to map and code postmodernity not from a disembodied vantage point,
but from a corporeally-informed perspective, one which would see embodiment as
a precondition of viable communication and collectivity.
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---. Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. London: Verso,
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Nervous and Mental Disease Monographs, 1944.
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Goddess will Patriarchy go away?" CyberFeminism: Connectivity, Critique and
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Routledge, 2000.
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an Umbrella' -- Fantasies of the Modern and Postmodern." Universal Abandon:
The Politics of Postmodernism. Ed. Andrew Ross. Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1988. Sandoval, Chela. "New Sciences: Cyborg Feminism and the
Methodology of the Oppressed." Cybersexualities: A Reader on Feminist Theory,
Cyborgs and Cyberspace. Ed. Jenny Wolmark. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University
Press, 1999.
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---. Madness and Modernism: Insanity in the Light of Modern Art, Literature
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Critical Introductions. Ed. Robert Fliess. London: The Hogarth Press and the
Institute of Pyscho-Analysis, 1950. 31 - 64.
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Notes
[1] Fredric Jameson, quoted in Anders Stephanson, "Regarding Postmodernism - A
Conversation with Fredric Jameson," Universal Abandon? The Politics of
Postmodernism, ed. Andrew Ross (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1988) 21. [^]
[2] Fredric Jameson, "Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late
Capitalism," New Left Review 146 July/August (1984). [^]
[3] Donna Haraway, "A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology and Socialist
Feminism in the 1980s," Socialist Review 80 March/April (1985). [^]
[4] It is not unfitting that "A Manifesto for Cyborgs" was the first piece
Haraway wrote on a computer. Donna Haraway, How Like a Leaf: an interview
with Thyrza Nichols Goodeve (New York: Routledge, 2000) 39. [^]
[5] For an extensive discussion of the far-reaching interdisciplinary
influence of "A Manifesto for Cyborgs," see Zo Sofoulis, "Cyberquake:
Haraway's Manifesto," Prefiguring Cyberculture: An Intellectual History, eds.
Darren Tofts, Annemarie Jonson and Alessio Carallaro (Sydney: Power
Publications, 2002). [^]
[6] Michael Hardt and Kathi Weeks, eds., The Jameson Reader (Oxford:
Blackwell, 2000) 1-2. [^]
[7] The article is an extended version of Fredric Jameson, "Postmodernism and
Consumer Society," The Anti-Aesthetic: Essays on Postmodern Culture, ed. Hal
Foster (Port Townsend: Bay Press, 1983). It is also reproduced as the first
chapter of Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late
Capitalism (London: Verso, 1991). [^]
[8] Douglas Kellner, "Introduction: Jameson, Marxism, and
Postmodernism," Postmodernism/Jameson/Critique, ed. Douglas Kellner
(Washington: Maisonneuve Press, 1989) 2. [^]
[9] Jameson, "Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism," 60.
[^]
[10] Jameson, "Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism," 57.
[^]

[11] Challenges to Jameson's totalizing analysis have come even from those
most sympathetic to his account of postmodernism. See Fred Pfeil, "'Makin'
Flippy-Floppy': Postmodernism and the Baby-Boom PMC," Another Tale to Tell:
Politics and Narrative in Postmodern Culture (London and New York: Verso,
1990). [^]
[12] Jameson, "Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism," 57.
[^]
[13] Hans Bertens, "Fredric Jameson: Fear and loathing in Los Angeles," The
Idea of the Postmodern: A History (London and New York: Routledge, 1995) 165.
See also Steven and Douglas Kellner Best, "Marxism, Feminism, and Political
Postmodernism," Postmodern Theory: Critical Interrogations (New York:
Guilford, 1991) 188. [^]
[14] Jameson, Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism 318-9.
[^]
[15] Jameson, "Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism," 63.
[^]
[16] In an earlier essay, Jameson is equally vague on this point: "The immense
culture of the simulacrum whose experience, whether we like it or not,
constitutes a whole series of daily ecstasies and punctual fits
of jouissance or schizophrenic dissolutionsmay appropriately, one would
think, be interpreted as so many unconscious points of contact with that
equally unfigurable and unimaginable thing, the multinational apparatus, the
great suprapersonal system of late capitalist technology." Fredric Jameson,
"Pleasure: a Political Issue (1983)," The Ideologies of Theory, Essays 1971 1986, Volume 2: The Syntax of History (London: Routledge, 1988) 73. [^]
[17] Jameson, "Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism," 71.
[^]
[18] Anthony Elliott, Subject to Ourselves: Social Theory, Psychoanalysis and
Postmodernity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996) 35. See also James M Glass,
"Postmodernism and the Multiplicity of Self," Shattered Selves: Multiple
Personality in a Postmodern World (Ithaca and London: Cornell University
Press, 1993) 7. [^]
[19] Jameson, "Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism," 63.
[^]
[20] Jameson, "Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism," 61.
[^]
[21] Jameson, "Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism," 72.
[^]
[22] Jameson, "Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism," 72.
[^]
[23] Jameson, "Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism," 73.
[^]

[24] John O"Neill, "Religion and Postmodernism: The Durkheimian Bond in Bell
and Jameson," Postmodernism/Jameson/Critique, ed. Douglas Kellner (Washington:
Maisonneuve Press, 1989) 148. [^]
[25] Jacqueline Rose, ""The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat" or "A Wife is
Like an Umbrella" -- Fantasies of the Modern and Postmodern," Universal
Abandon: The Politics of Postmodernism, ed. Andrew Ross (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1988) 241. [^]
[26] Anthony Elliott, "The Dislocating World of
Postmodernism," Psychoanalytic Theory: An Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell,
1994) 161. [^]
[27] See David Michael Levin, ed., Pathologies of the Modern Self: Postmodern
Studies of Narcissism, Schizophrenia and Depression (New York and London: New
York University Press, 1987);John Johnston, "Ideology, Representation,
Schizophrenia: Toward a Theory of the Postmodern Subject," After the Future:
Postmodern Times and Places, ed. Gary Shapiro (Albany: State University of New
York Press, 1990); Stephen Frosh, Identity Crisis: Modernity, Psychoanalysis
and the Self (London: Macmillan, 1991);Mark Currie, "Culture and
Schizophrenia," Postmodern Narrative Theory (London: Macmillan, 1998). [^]
[28] Joel Kovel, 'schizophrenic Being and Technocratic Society," Pathologies
of the Modern Self: Postmodern Studies of Narcissism, Schizophrenia and
Depression, ed. David Michael Levin (New York and London: New York University
Press, 1987) 334;Louis A Sass, "The Consciousness Machine: Self and
Subjectivity in Schizophrenia and Modern Culture," The Conceptual Self in
Context: Culture, Experience, Self-understanding, eds. Ulric Neisser and David
A Jopling (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) 217. [^]
[29] Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus was well known to Jameson, and his
relatively brief account of schizophrenia in no way rivals the complexity of
Sass" work. See Louis A Sass, Madness and Modernism: Insanity in the Light of
Modern Art, Literature and Thought (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard
University Press, 1992). [^]
[30] Klaus R. Scherpe, "Dramatization and De-dramatization of 'the End': The
Apocalyptic Consciousness of Modernity and Post-Modernity," trans. Brent O.
Peterson, Cultural Critique 5 (1986): 102. [^]
[31] We are using unfashionable here in the sense used by Geoffrey Bennington
in Interrupting Derrida (New York: Routledge, 2000), 129-a sense to do with
the hope of academic discourse that it will be able "to set the tone again."
[32] Bennington, 133. [^]
[33] See our "extroduction" to Stefan Herbrechter and Ivan Callus,
eds, Discipline and Practice: The (Ir)Resistibility of Theory (Lewisburg, PA:
Bucknell University Press; forthcoming), and also our "What's Wrong with
Posthumanism?" in Rhizomes 7 (2003). Available online:
http://www.rhizomes.net/issue7/callus.htm [^]
[34] Bennington, 130. [^]

[35] See Jean-Franois Lyotard, "Unbeknownst," in Postmodern Fables, trans.

Georges van der Abbeele (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 18597. [^]
[20] Jameson, "Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism," 61.
[^]
[21] Jameson, "Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism," 72.
[^]
[22] Jameson, "Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism," 72.
[^]
[23] Jameson, "Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism," 73.
[^]
[24] John O"Neill, "Religion and Postmodernism: The Durkheimian Bond in Bell
and Jameson," Postmodernism/Jameson/Critique, ed. Douglas Kellner (Washington:
Maisonneuve Press, 1989) 148. [^]
[25] Jacqueline Rose, ""The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat" or "A Wife is
Like an Umbrella" -- Fantasies of the Modern and Postmodern," Universal
Abandon: The Politics of Postmodernism, ed. Andrew Ross (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1988) 241. [^]
[26] Anthony Elliott, "The Dislocating World of
Postmodernism," Psychoanalytic Theory: An Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell,
1994) 161. [^]
[27] See David Michael Levin, ed., Pathologies of the Modern Self: Postmodern
Studies of Narcissism, Schizophrenia and Depression (New York and London: New
York University Press, 1987);John Johnston, "Ideology, Representation,
Schizophrenia: Toward a Theory of the Postmodern Subject," After the Future:
Postmodern Times and Places, ed. Gary Shapiro (Albany: State University of New
York Press, 1990); Stephen Frosh, Identity Crisis: Modernity, Psychoanalysis
and the Self (London: Macmillan, 1991);Mark Currie, "Culture and
Schizophrenia," Postmodern Narrative Theory (London: Macmillan, 1998). [^]
[28] Joel Kovel, 'schizophrenic Being and Technocratic Society," Pathologies
of the Modern Self: Postmodern Studies of Narcissism, Schizophrenia and
Depression, ed. David Michael Levin (New York and London: New York University
Press, 1987) 334;Louis A Sass, "The Consciousness Machine: Self and
Subjectivity in Schizophrenia and Modern Culture," The Conceptual Self in
Context: Culture, Experience, Self-understanding, eds. Ulric Neisser and David
A Jopling (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) 217. [^]
[29] Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus was well known to Jameson, and his
relatively brief account of schizophrenia in no way rivals the complexity of
Sass" work. See Louis A Sass, Madness and Modernism: Insanity in the Light of
Modern Art, Literature and Thought (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard
University Press, 1992). [^]
[30] Adam Roberts, Frederic Jameson (London: Routledge, 2000) 123-4. Kathleen
Kirby argues persuasively that as the postmodern subject has "lost its

traditional from of enclosed interiority encapsulated in a boundary,"

schizophrenia can be interpreted as much as a dysfunction of spatial as
temporal existence. Kathleen M Kirby, "Re: Mapping subjectivity: Cartographic
Vision and the Limits of Politics," Bodyspace: Destabilizing Geographies of
Gender and Sexuality, ed. Nancy Duncan (London and New York: Routledge, 1996)
51. [^]
[31] Jameson, "Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism," 7791.See also Fredric Jameson, "Cognitive Mapping," Marxism and the
Interpretation of Culture, eds. Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (Chicago:
University of Illinois Press, 1988) 347-57. [^]
[32] Kellner, "Introduction: Jameson, Marxism, and Postmodernism," 29. [^]
[33] Anne Balsamo, "Reading Cyborgs Writing Feminism," The Gendered Cyborg: A
Reader, ed. Gill Kirkup, et al (London: Routledge, 2000) 155. [^]
[34] Chris Hables Gray, Steven Mentor and Heidi J Figueroa-Sarriera,
"Cyborgology: Constructing the Knowledge of Cybernetic Organisms," The Cyborg
Handbook, ed. Chris Hables Gray (New York: Routledge, 1995) 7-8. See also
Jenny Wolmark, "Introduction and Overview," Cybersexualities: A Reader on
Feminist Theory, Cyborgs and Cyberspace, ed. Jenny Wolmark (Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, 1999) 3-4. [^]
[35] Haraway, "A Manifesto for Cyborgs," 72. [^]
[36] Haraway, "A Manifesto for Cyborgs," 78. [^]
[37] Haraway, "A Manifesto for Cyborgs," 75,96,101. [^]
[38] Haraway, "A Manifesto for Cyborgs," 80. [^]
[39] Haraway, "A Manifesto for Cyborgs," 95. [^]
[40] Haraway, "A Manifesto for Cyborgs," 75. [^]
[41] Balsamo, "Reading Cyborgs Writing Feminism," 149. Emphasis in the
original. [^]
[42] Haraway, "A Manifesto for Cyborgs," 68-71. [^]
[43] Haraway, "A Manifesto for Cyborgs," 99. [^]
[44] Haraway, "A Manifesto for Cyborgs," 100. [^]
[45] Donna Haraway quoted in Constance Penley, and Andrew Ross, "Cyborgs at
Large: Interview with Donna Haraway," Technoculture, eds. Constance Penley and
Andrew Ross (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991) 6. Haraway's
critique of viewpoints that "deny stakes in location, embodiment, and partial
perspective [in order to] make it possible to see well" is elucidated in Donna
Haraway, "Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the
Privilege of Partial Perspective," Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The
Reinvention of Nature (London: Free Association Books, 1991) 191. [^]

[46] Rosemary Hennessy, Materialist Feminism and the Politics of

Discourse (New York and London: Routledge, 1993) 67-9, 71-3. [^]
[47] Haraway, "A Manifesto for Cyborgs," 100. [^]
[48] Haraway, "A Manifesto for Cyborgs," 101. [^]
[49] Nina Lykke, "Between Monsters, Goddesses and Cyborgs: Feminist
Confrontations with Science," The Gendered Cyborg: A Reader, ed. Gill Kirkup,
et al (London: Routledge, 2000) 85. [^]
[50] Gill Kirkup, "Introduction," The Gendered Cyborg: A Reader, ed. Gill
Kirkup, et al (London: Routledge, 2000) 5. [^]
[51] Renate Klein, "The Politics of Cyberfeminism: If I'm a Cyborg rather than
a Goddess will Patriarchy go away?," CyberFeminism: Connectivity, Critique
and Creativity, eds. Susan Hawthorne and Renate Klein (Melbourne: Spinifex,
1999). [^]
[52] Haraway, quoted in Penley, "Cyborgs at Large," 20. [^]
[53] Donna Haraway, "The actors are Cyborg, Nature is Coyote, and the
Geography is Elsewhere: Postscript to 'Cyborgs at Large,'" Technoculture, eds.
Constance Penley and Andrew Ross (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1991) 22. [^]
[54] Chris Hables Gray, and Steven Mentor, "The Cyborg Body Politic and the
New World Order," Prosthetic Territories: Politics and Hypertechnologies, eds.
Gabriel Brahm Jr and Mark Driscoll (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1995)
228-9. [^]
[55] Haraway, "A Manifesto for Cyborgs," 75. [^]
[56] Chela Sandoval, "New Sciences: Cyborg Feminism and the Methodology of the
Oppressed," Cybersexualities: A Reader on Feminist Theory, Cyborgs and
Cyberspace, ed. Jenny Wolmark (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999)
249. [^]
[57] Wendy Brown, "Feminist Hesitations, Postmodern Exposures," Prosthetic
Territories: Politics and Hypertechnologies, eds. Gabriel Brahm Jr and Mark
Driscoll (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1995) 115. [^]
[58] Haraway, "A Manifesto for Cyborgs," 82. [^]
[59] Gilles and Flix Guattari Deleuze, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and
Schizophrenia, trans. R Hurley, M Seem and H R Lane (New York: Viking Press,
1982). [^]
[60] Jean Baudrillard, The Ecstasy of Communication, trans. Bernard and
Caroline Shutze, ed. Sylvre Lotringer (New York: Semiotext(e) Columbia
University, 1988). [^]

[61] George Ritzer, Postmodern Social Theory (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1997)
125-7. [^]
[62] Elliott, "The Dislocating World of Postmodernism," 148. [^]
[63] Fredric Jameson, The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially
Symbolic Act (London: Methuen, 1981) 22. [^]
[64] Sean Homer, Fredric Jameson: Marxism, Hermeneutics,
Postmodernism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998) 79. [^]
[65] Deleuze, Anti-Oedipus 8. [^]
[66] Baudrillard, The Ecstasy of Communication 27. [^]
[67] Baudrillard, The Ecstasy of Communication 27. [^]
[68] Emil Kraepelin, Clinical Psychiatry, trans. A R Diefendorf, vol. 7 (New
York: Scholars' Facsimiles & Reprints, 1981). [^]
[69] Carl Jung, The Psychology of Dementia Praecox, trans. A A Brill (New
York: Nervous and Mental Disease Monographs, 1944). [^]
[70] Victor Tausk, "On the Origin of the 'Influencing Machine' in
Schizophrenia (1919)," The Psycho-Analytic Reader: An Anthology of Essential
Papers with Critical Introductions, ed. Robert Fliess (London: The Hogarth
Press and the Institute of Pyscho-Analysis, 1950). [^]
[71] American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders, Text Revision, 4th ed. (Washington: American Psychiatric
Association, 2000) 324. [^]
[72] Avital Ronell, The Telephone Book: Technology, Schizophrenia, Electric
Speech (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989) 109. [^]
[73] Hables Gray, "Cyborgology," 2. [^]
[74] See Susan Hawthorne, "Connectivity: Cultural Practices of the Powerful or
Subversion from the Margins?," CyberFeminism: Connectivity, Critique and
Creativity, eds. Susan Hawthorne and Renate Klein (Melbourne: Spinifex, 1999).
[^]
[75] Elizabeth Grosz, Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism (St
Leornards, NSW: Allen and Unwin, 1994). [^]
[76] N. Katherine Hayles, How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in
Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1999). [^]
[77] Jameson, "Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism," 71.
[^]

[78] Jameson, "Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism," 80.

[^]
[79] Jameson, "Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism," 85.
[^]
[80] Haraway, "A Manifesto for Cyborgs," 67. [^]
[81] Hayles, How We Became Posthuman 4-5. [^]
[82] Grosz, Volatile Bodies ix. [^]
[83] Grosz, Volatile Bodies 22. [^]
[84] Andrew Ross, quoted in Penley, "Cyborgs at Large," 7. [^]
[85] I have argued elsewhere that the "crisis" figured by Jameson's
schizophrenic might be best conceptualized as one besetting contemporary white
masculinity, in which case his schizophrenic cannot be seen as the universal
and disembodied casualty of the postmodern. See Angela Woods, "Subjectivity
'in crisis': Masculinity and Schizophrenia in David Fincher's Fight
Club," antiTHESIS 13 (2002). [^]