Anda di halaman 1dari 4

G.R. No.

168289

March 22, 2010

THE MUNICIPALITY OF HAGONOY, BULACAN, represented by the HON. FELIX V. OPLE, Municipal Mayor, and FELIX V. OPLE, in his personal
capacity, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. SIMEON P. DUMDUM, JR., in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of the REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 7, CEBU CITY; HON. CLERK OF COURT &
EX-OFFICIO SHERIFF of the REGIONAL TRIAL COURT of CEBU CITY; HON. CLERK OF COURT & EX-OFFICIO SHERIFF of the REGIONAL TRIAL COURT of
BULACAN and his DEPUTIES; and EMILY ROSE GO KO LIM CHAO, doing business under the name and style KD SURPLUS, Respondents.
Facts:
Emily Rose Go Ko Lim Chao (Chao) filed a complaint against Municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan and its chief executive, Felix Ople (Ople) for collection of a sum of money
and damages. Chao had entered into an agreement with petitioner municipality through Ople for the delivery of motor vehicles, which supposedly were needed to carry out
certain developmental undertakings in the municipality. Respondent claimed that because of Oples earnest representation that funds had already been allocated for the
project, she agreed to deliver twenty-one motor vehicles. However, despite having made several deliveries, Ople allegedly did not heed respondents claim for payment.
The trial court granted Chaos prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment. The trial court issued the Writ of Preliminary Attachment upon Chaos posting of bond
and directing the sheriff "to attach the estate, real and personal properties" of petitioners.
Municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan filed a Motion to Dismiss and a Motion to Dissolve and/or Discharge the Writ of Preliminary Attachment Already Issued invoking immunity
of the state from suit, unenforceability of the contract, and failure to substantiate the allegation of fraud.
The Trial Court denied two motions. Upon appeal by the petitioners to the Court of Appeals (CA), CA affirmed the trial courts order.
Municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan contended that Municipality of Hagonoy, as a municipal corporation, is immune from suit, and that its properties are by law exempt from
execution and garnishment. The writ of preliminary attachment should not have been issued in the first place and the Motion to Discharge the Writ of Preliminary
Attachment be granted.
Chao counters that Municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacans claim of immunity from suit is negated by Section 22 of the Local Government Code, which vests municipal
corporations with the power to sue and be sued and she was able to substantiate the allegation of fraud.
Issue:
Whether or not CA erred in affirming the trial courts order denying the Motion to Discharge the Writ of Preliminary Attachment
Ruling:
CA erred in denying the Motion to Discharge the Writ of Preliminary Attachment.
The Court holds that the writ of preliminary attachment must be dissolved and, indeed, it must not have been issued in the very first place. While there is merit in private
respondents position that she, by affidavit, was able to substantiate the allegation of fraud in the same way that the fraud attributable to petitioners was sufficiently alleged
in the complaint and, hence, the issuance of the writ would have been justified. Still, the writ of attachment in this case would only prove to be useless and unnecessary
under the premises, since the property of the municipality may not, in the event that respondents claim is validated, be subjected to writs of execution and garnishment
unless, of course, there has been a corresponding appropriation provided by law.
The general rule spelled out in Section 3, Article XVI of the Constitution is that the state and its political subdivisions may not be sued without their consent. Otherwise put,
they are open to suit but only when they consent to it. Consent is implied when the government enters into a business contract, as it then descends to the level of the other
contracting party; or it may be embodied in a general or special law such as that found in Book I, Title I, Chapter 2, Section 22 of the Local Government Code of 1991,
which vests local government units with certain corporate powers one of them is the power to sue and be sued.
Where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimants action "only up to the completion of proceedings
anterior to the stage of execution" and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized under
writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the
corresponding appropriations as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion
of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects.

1|P a g e

G.R. No. 199027

June 9, 2014

THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL (OSG), Petitioner,


vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT OF SAGUIRAN, LANAO DEL SUR, Respondents.

Facts:
Former members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Saguiran (Respondents) filed a petition for mandamus against Municipality of Saguiran to compel the municipality to pay
their unpaid terminal leave benefits. The Municipality of Saguiran sought for the dismissal of the petition. The trial court dismissed the petition for mandamus on the ground
that the act being sought by former sangguninan members was not a ministerial duty. It also directed the municipality to include in its general or special budget the subject
claims for terminal leave benefits.
The municipality appealed the order of the trial court to the Court of Appeals (CA). CA issued a notice requiring the OSG to file a memorandum for the Municipality of
Saguiran. The Office of Solicitor General (OSG) flied a Manifestation and Motion requesting to be excused from filing the memorandum. It reasoned that the Municipality of
Saguiran had to be represented by its legal officer pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC). CA denied OSGs motion.
The OSG argues that the legal officer of a local government unit must represent it in its lawsuits, citing the provisions of the LGC and jurisprudence which bar local
government units from obtaining the services of a lawyer other than their designated legal officers.
Issue:
Whether or not CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in compelling the OSG to represent the Municipality of Saguiran in its
lawsuit
Ruling:
Yes. The Legal Officer of the Municipal Government of Saguiran, Lanao del Sur, or if there is none, the Provincial Attorney of the Province of Lanao del Sur, and not the
Office of the Solicitor General, has the duty to represent the local government unit as counsel.
LGC vested exclusive authority upon legal officers to be counsels of local government units. Even the employment of a special legal officer is expressly allowed by the law
only upon a strict condition that the action or proceeding which involves the component city or municipality is adverse to the provincial government or to another
component city or municipality.
Book III, Title V, Article XI, Section 481 of the LGC provides that the Legal Officer represents the local government unit in all civil actions and special proceedings wherein
the local government unit or any official thereof, in his official capacity, is a party: Provided, That, in actions or proceedings where a component city or municipality is a
party adverse to the provincial government or to another component city or municipality, a special legal officer may be deployed to represent the adverse party
The mere fact that the OSG initially filed before the CA a motion for extension of time to file the required memorandum could not have estopped it from later raising the
issue of its lack of authority to represent the Municipality of Saguiran. Its mandate was to be traced from existing laws. No action of the OSG could have validated an act
that was beyond the scope of its authority.

2|P a g e

G.R. No. 188500

July 24, 2013

PROVINCE OF CAGAYAN, represented by HON. ALVARO T. ANTONIO, Governor, and ROBERT ADAP, Environmental and Natural Resources Officer, Petitioners,
vs.
JOSEPH LASAM LARA, Respondent.
Facts:
Lara obtained an Industrial Sand and Gravel Permit3 (ISAG Permit) from Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), authorizing him to conduct quarrying
operations and extract and dispose of sand, gravel, and other unconsolidated materials from the Permit Area.
The Environmental and Natural Resources Officer, petitioner Robert Adap (ENRO Adap) refused to issue an Order of Payment despite various pleas of Laras
representative and counsel for Lara to be able to pay the extraction fee and other fees for Laras quarrying operations.
Lara commenced his quarrying operations. Later that day, however, a total of four trucks loaded with sand and gravel extracted from the Permit Area were stopped and
impounded by several local officials. Consequently, Lara filed an action for injunction with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin the
stoppage of his quarrying operations. A writ of preliminary injunction was issued enabling Lara to restart his business.
Lara received a Stoppage Order from Cagayan Governor Alvaro T. Antonio (Gov. Antonio), directing him to stop his quarrying for his failure to secure all necessary permits
or clearances from the local government unit concerned as required by the ECC.
Lara filed a motion for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction before the RTC. RTC granted the motion.
Province of Cagayan contended that despite the issuance of the ISAG Permit Lara has yet to secure the necessary permits and clearances from the local government unit
concerned and hence, remains to be proscribed from conducting any quarrying operations.
Lara alleged that ISAG Permit and ECC dispensed the need to secure any permit from the local government and the only reason why he failed to secure such permits was
because the local government officials deliberately refused to process his applications without any legitimate reason
Issue:
Whether or not RTC erred in granting the motion for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction
Ruling:
RTC did not err in granting the motions.
Under Section 138(2) of RA 7160 provides that the permit to extract sand, gravel and other quarry resources shall be issued exclusively by the provincial governor,
pursuant to the ordinance of the sangguniang panlalawigan. A governors permit is a pre-requisite before one can engage in a quarrying business in Cagayan. Records,
however, reveal that Lara admittedly failed to secure the same; hence, he has no right to conduct his quarrying operations within the Permit Area. Consequently, he is not
entitled to any injunction.

3|P a g e

G.R. No. 195390, December 10, 2014


GOV. LUIS RAYMUND F. VILLAFUERTE, JR., AND THE PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR,Petitioners, v. HON. JESSE M. ROBREDO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, Respondent.
Facts:
Former Governor Luis Raymund F. Villafuerte, Jr. (Villafuerte) and the Province of Camarines Sur (petitioners) filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to annul
and set aside three memorandum circulars issued by the late Honorable Jesse M. Robredo (respondent), in his capacity as then Secretary of the Department of the
Interior and Local Government (DILG), to wit: Memorandum Circular (MC) No. 2010-83 pertaining to the full disclosure of local budget and finances, and bids and public
offerings, MC No. 2010-138 pertaining to the use of the 20% component of the annual internal revenue allotment shares;and, MC No. 2011-08 pertaining to the strict
adherence to Section 90 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10147 or the General Appropriations Act of 2011 ,
The petitioners argued that the assailed issuances of the respondent interfere with the local and fiscal autonomy of LGUs embodied in the Constitution and the LGC and
the respondent cannot substitute his own discretion with that of the local legislative council in enacting its annual budget and specifying the development projects that the
20% component of its IRA should fund
Issue:
Whether or not the assailed memorandum circulars violate the principles of local and fiscal autonomy enshrined in the Constitution and the LGC.
Ruling:
The assailed memorandum circulars do not transgress the local and fiscal autonomy granted to LGUs.
MC No. 2010-138 shows that it is a mere reiteration of an existing provision in the LGC. It was plainly intended to remind LGUs to faithfully observe the directive stated in
Section 287 of the LGC to utilize the 20% portion of the IRA for development projects. It was, at best, an advisory to LGUs to examine themselves if they have been
complying with the law. It must be recalled that the assailed circular was issued in response to the report of the COA that a substantial portion of the 20% development
fund of some LGUs was not actually utilized for development projects but was diverted to expenses more properly categorized as MOOE, in violation of Section 287 of the
LGC. This intention was highlighted in the very first paragraph of MC No. 2010-138, which reads:
Section 287 of the Local Government Code mandates every local government to appropriate in its annual budget no less than 20% of its annual revenue allotment for
development projects. Contrary to the petitioners posturing, however, the enumeration was not meant to restrict the discretion of the LGUs in the utilization of their funds. It
was meant to enlighten LGUs as to the nature of the development fund by delineating it from other types of expenses.
The assailed issuances of the respondent, MC Nos. 2010-83 and 2011-08, are but implementation of this avowed policy of the State to make public officials accountable to
the people. They are amalgamations of existing laws, rules and regulation designed to give teeth to the constitutional mandate of transparency and accountability.
A scrutiny of the contents of the mentioned issuances shows that they do not, in any manner, violate the fiscal autonomy of LGUs.

4|P a g e

Anda mungkin juga menyukai