CHANGE OF NAME / CORRECTION OF ENTRIES

[G.R. No. 130277. May 9, 2002]

MA. LOURDES BARRIENTOS ELEOSIDA, for and in behalf of her minor child, CHARLES CHRISTIAN ELEOSIDA, petitioner, vs. LOCAL CIVIL
REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, and CARLOS VILLENA BORBON, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Orderi[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 89, which dismissed motu
proprio the petition of Ma. Lourdes Eleosida to correct some entries in the birth certificate of her son, Charles Christian. The birth
certificate shows, among others, that the child's full name is Charles Christian Eleosida Borbon. He was born on May 24, 1992 to Ma.
Lourdes Barrientos Eleosida and Carlos Villena Borbon. The birth certificate also indicates that the child's parents were married on
January 10, 1985 in Batangas City.ii[2]
On January 30, 1997, petitioner Ma. Lourdes Eleosida filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City seeking to correct
the following entries in the birth certificate of her son, Charles Christian: first, the surname "Borbon" should be changed to
"Eleosida;" second, the date of the parents' wedding should be left blank; and third, the informant's name should be "Ma. Lourdes B.
Eleosida," instead of "Ma. Lourdes E. Borbon." In support of her petition, petitioner alleged that she gave birth to her son out of
wedlock on May 24, 1992; that she and the boy's father, Carlos Borbon, were never married; and that the child is therefore
illegitimate and should follow the mother's surname. The petition impleaded the Local Registrar of Quezon City and Carlos Villena
Borbon as respondents.iii[3]
On April 23, 1997, the trial court issued a notice of hearing stating:
Verified petition having been filed by petitioner Ma. Lourdes Barrientos Eleosida, praying that the entries in the Certificate of Live
Birth of her minor child, Charles Christian Eleosida Borbon, be changed and/or corrected, such that, his last name BORBON be deleted
and instead place therein the name ELEOSIDA, which is the surname of his mother-petitioner; the entry "January 10, 1985 - Batangas
City", be likewise deleted, since the petitioner and respondent Carlos Villena Borbon, at the time of the minor's birth were not legally
married; and the surname BORBON of petitioner Ma. Lourdes E. Borbon under the column Informant, be also deleted;
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, that this petition is set for hearing on June 26, 1997 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning, in the Session Hall of
this Court sitting at the Ground Floor, Room 118, Hall of Justice, Quezon City, which is ordered published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation and published in Metro Manila, to be selected by raffle, at the expense of
the petitioner, at which date, time and place, the petitioner shall appear and prove her petition, in that all other persons having or
claiming any interest thereon shall also appear and show cause why, if any, they have, the petition shall not be granted.
Let copies of this notice be furnished the petitioner, and together with copies of the petition, respondent Carlos Villena Borbon; the
Offices of the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Solicitor General, who are given fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition,
or from the last date of publication of such notice, within which to file their opposition thereto, if any. In the event that the Solicitor
General may not be able to appear on the scheduled hearing, to designate the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to appear for and in
behalf of the State.
SO ORDERED.iv[4]
On June 26, 1997, the trial court issued another order setting the date for the presentation of evidence on July 23, 1997. It stated:
Considering that there is no opposition filed despite notice to the Solicitor General as contained in the notice of hearing dated April
23, 1997 requiring that office to file their opposition, if any, to the petition for correction of entries in the birth certificate of minor
child Charles Christian Eleosida, the petitioner will be allowed to present compliance with the jurisdictional requirements and at the
same time initially present evidence on July 23, 1997, at 8:30 o'clock in the morning. v[5]
On August 25, 1997, the trial court motu proprio dismissed the petition for lack of merit. It ruled:
It is an established jurisprudence that, only CLERICAL ERRORS OF A HARMLESS AND INNOCUOUS NATURE like: misspelled name,
occupation of the parents, etc., may be the subject of a judicial order (contemplated under Article 412 of the New Civil Code),
authorizing changes or corrections and: NOT as may affect the CIVIL STATUS, NATIONALITY OR CITIZENSHIP OF THE PERSONS
INVOLVED.
In the present case, it is very clear that the changes desired by the petitioner will ultimately affect the CIVIL STATUS OF CHARLES
CHRISTIAN, as she wants the Court to direct the Civil Registrar of Quezon City to substitute her maiden name, ELEOSIDA, with that of
BORBON; to delete the information supplied in ITEM 12, respecting the date and place of marriage of parents, on the ground that she
was never married to respondent CARLOS VILLENA BORBON and amend the information in ITEM 14, respecting the name of the
informant, from MA. LOURDES E. BORBON to MA. LOURDES B. ELEOSIDA, and is indicative of petitioner's intention and device to
establish that CHARLES CHRISTIAN's civil status as ILLEGITIMATE.

With the petition's ultimate purpose on the part of petitioner to secure judicial order, which would authorize a change in the civil
status of CHARLES CHRISTIAN, this Court, finds the action improper. The matters desired to be cancelled and/or changed by
petitioner cannot be considered falling under the ambit of the words clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature.
WHEREFORE, for LACK OF MERIT, the petition is now MOTU PROPIO (sic) dismissed. vi[6]
Petitioner filed the instant petition for review raising the issue of whether corrections of entries in the certificate of live birth pursuant
to Article 412 of the Civil Code, in relation to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court may be allowed even if the errors to be corrected are
substantial and not merely clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature. vii[7]
The Court required the respondents to comment on the petition. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Manifestation in Lieu
of Comment. The OSG submitted that even substantial errors in the civil registry may be corrected provided that the parties
aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. Thus it argued that even if the petition seeks the
correction and eventual change in the civil status of Charles Christian, the same can be ordered by the court as long as all the parties
who may be affected by the entries are notified and represented.viii[8] Respondent Carlos Borbon, on the other hand, failed to submit
his comment on the petition despite several notices from this Court. Hence, on January 24, 2001, the Court dispensed with the filing
of respondent Borbon's comment and gave due course to the petition. ix[9]
We find merit in the petition. Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in
the civil registry. The proceedings under said rule may either be summary or adversary in nature. If the correction sought to be made
in the civil register is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or
nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary. x[10] This is our ruling in Republic vs.
Valenciaxi[11] where we held that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established under Rule
108 provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. An appropriate adversary
suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly
developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite party's case, and where the evidence has
been thoroughly weighed and considered. The Court further laid down the procedural requirements to make the proceedings under
Rule 108 adversary, thus:
The pertinent sections of Rule 108 provide:
SEC. 3. Parties.--When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have
or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication.--Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of
the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order
to be published once in a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition.--The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or
correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice, file his opposition thereto.
Thus, the persons who must be made parties to a proceeding concerning the cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register
are--(1) the civil registrar, and (2) all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby. Upon the filing of the
petition, it becomes the duty of the court to--(1) issue an order fixing the time and place for the hearing of the petition, and (2) cause
the order for hearing to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province. The following are likewise entitled to oppose the petition:--(1) the civil registrar, and (2) any person having or claiming any
interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought.
If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition for correction and/or cancellation of entries in the record of birth
even if filed and conducted under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court can no longer be described as 'summary.' xxx xii[12]
It is true in the case at bar that the changes sought to be made by petitioner are not merely clerical or harmless errors but substantial
ones as they would affect the status of the marriage between petitioner and Carlos Borbon, as well as the legitimacy of their son,
Charles Christian. Changes of such nature, however, are now allowed under Rule 108 in accordance with our ruling in Republic vs.
Valencia provided that the appropriate procedural requirements are complied with. The records show that upon receipt of the
petition, the trial court issued a notice of hearing setting the hearing on June 26, 1997 at 8:30 in the morning at Room 118, Hall of
Justice, Quezon City. The trial court likewise ordered the publication of said notice once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation and its posting in selected places in Metro Manila. The notice stated that the petitioner shall prove
her petition during said hearing and all other persons having or claiming any interest thereon shall also appear and show if there is
any reason why the petition should not be granted. Respondents Carlos Villena Borbon, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and
the Solicitor General were all furnished with a copy of the notice of hearing together with a copy of the petition. On June 26, 1997,
the trial court issued a second order giving the petitioner an opportunity to show compliance with the jurisdictional requirements and
to present evidence during the hearing set on July 23, 1997. The foregoing satisfy all the requirements of Rule 108 to make it an
adversary proceeding. It was therefore an error for the trial court to dismiss the petition motu proprio without allowing the petitioner
to present evidence to support her petition and all the other persons who have an interest over the matter to oppose the same.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED and the Order dated August 25, 1997 of the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 89, subject of
the petition at bar is set aside. The case is REMANDED to the court a quo for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 170340

June 29, 2007

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
CARLITO I. KHO, MICHAEL KHO, MERCY NONA KHO-FORTUN, HEDDY MOIRA KHO-SERRANO, KEVIN DOGMOC KHO (Minor), and KELLY
DOGMOC KHO (Minor), respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Challenged via petition for review on certiorari is the October 27, 2005 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 78124
which affirmed the September 4, 2002 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Butuan City, Branch 5 granting the prayer of
respondents Carlito I. Kho (Carlito), Michael Kho, Mercy Nona Kho-Fortun, and Heddy Moira Kho-Serrano for the correction of entries in
their birth certificates as well as those of Carlitos minor children Kevin and Kelly Dogmoc Kho.
The undisputed facts are as follows:
On February 12, 2001, Carlito and his siblings Michael, Mercy Nona and Heddy Moira filed before the RTC of Butuan City a verified
petition for correction of entries in the civil registry of Butuan City to effect changes in their respective birth certificates. Carlito also
asked the court in behalf of his minor children, Kevin and Kelly, to order the correction of some entries in their birth certificates.
In the case of Carlito, he requested the correction in his birth certificate of the citizenship of his mother to "Filipino" instead of
"Chinese," as well as the deletion of the word "married" opposite the phrase "Date of marriage of parents" because his parents, Juan
Kho and Epifania Inchoco (Epifania), were allegedly not legally married.
The same request to delete the "married" status of their parents from their respective birth certificates was made by Carlitos siblings
Michael, Mercy Nona, and Heddy Moira.
With respect to the birth certificates of Carlitos children, he prayed that the date of his and his wifes marriage be corrected from
April 27, 1989 to January 21, 2000, the date appearing in their marriage certificate.
The Local Civil Registrar of Butuan City was impleaded as respondent.
On April 23, 2001, Carlito et al. filed an Amended Petition 3 in which it was additionally prayed that Carlitos second name of "John" be
deleted from his record of birth; and that the name and citizenship of Carlitos father in his (Carlitos) marriage certificate be
corrected from "John Kho" to "Juan Kho" and "Filipino" to "Chinese," respectively.
As required, the petition was published for three consecutive weeks 4 in Mindanao Daily Patrol-CARAGA, a newspaper of general
circulation, after which it was set for hearing on August 9, 2001.
In a letter of June 18, 2001 addressed to the trial court, the city civil registrar 5 stated her observations and suggestions to the
proposed corrections in the birth records of Carlito and his siblings but interposed no objections to the other amendments.
On the scheduled hearing of the petition on August 9, 2001, only the counsel for respondents appeared as the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) had yet to enter its appearance for the city civil registrar. The trial court thus reset the hearing to October 9, 2001. 6 On
September 14, 2001,7 the OSG entered its appearance with an authorization to the city prosecutor of Butuan City to appear in the
case and render assistance to it (the OSG).
On January 31, 2002, respondents presented documentary evidence showing compliance with the jurisdictional requirements of the
petition. They also presented testimonial evidence consisting of the testimonies of Carlito and his mother, Epifania. During the same
hearing, an additional correction in the birth certificates of Carlitos children was requested to the effect that the first name of their
mother be rectified from "Maribel" to "Marivel."
By Decision8 of September 4, 2002, the trial court directed the local civil registrar of Butuan City to correct the entries in the record of
birth of Carlito, as follows: (1) change the citizenship of his mother from "Chinese" to "Filipino"; (2) delete "John" from his name; and
(3) delete the word "married" opposite the date of marriage of his parents. The last correction was ordered to be effected likewise in
the birth certificates of respondents Michael, Mercy Nona, and Heddy Moira.

Additionally, the trial court ordered the correction of the birth certificates of the minor children of Carlito to reflect the date of
marriage of Carlito and Marivel Dogmoc (Marivel) as January 21, 2000, instead of April 27, 1989, and the name "Maribel" as "Marivel."
With respect to the marriage certificate of Carlito and Marivel, the corrections ordered pertained to the alteration of the name of
Carlitos father from "John Kho" to "Juan Kho" and the latters citizenship from "Filipino" to "Chinese."
Petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, appealed the RTC Decision to the CA, faulting the trial court in granting the petition for
correction of entries in the subject documents despite the failure of respondents to implead the minors mother, Marivel, as an
indispensable party and to offer sufficient evidence to warrant the corrections with regard to the questioned "married" status of
Carlito and his siblings parents, and the latters citizenship.
Petitioner also faulted the trial court for ordering the change of the name "Carlito John Kho" to "Carlito Kho" for non-compliance with
jurisdictional requirements for a change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.
By the assailed Decision of October 27, 2005, the CA denied petitioners appeal and affirmed the decision of the trial court.
The CA found that Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, which outlines the proper procedure for cancellation or correction of entries
in the civil registry, was observed in the case.
Regarding Carlitos minor children Kevin and Kelly, the appellate court held that the correction of their mothers first name from
"Maribel" to "Marivel" was made to rectify an innocuous error.
As for the change in the date of the marriage of Carlito and Marivel, albeit the CA conceded that it is a substantial alteration, it held
that the date would not affect the minors filiation from "legitimate" to "illegitimate" considering that at the time of their respective
births in 1991 and 1993, their father Carlitos first marriage was still subsisting as it had been annulled only in 1999.
In light of Carlitos legal impediment to marry Marivel at the time they were born, their children Kevin and Kelly were illegitimate. It
followed, the CA went on to state, that Marivel was not an indispensable party to the case, the minors having been represented by
their father as required under Section 5 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Further, the CA ruled that although Carlito failed to observe the requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, he had complied
nonetheless with the jurisdictional requirements for correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The
petition for correction of entry in Carlitos birth record, it noted, falls under letter "o" of the enumeration under Section 2 of Rule 108.
In the present petition, petitioner contends that since the changes sought by respondents were substantial in nature, they could only
be granted through an adversarial proceeding in which indispensable parties, such as Marivel and respondents parents, should have
been notified or impleaded.
Petitioner further contends that the jurisdictional requirements to change Carlitos name under Section 2 of Rule 103 of the Rules of
Court were not satisfied because the Amended Petition failed to allege Carlitos prior three-year bona fide residence in Butuan City,
and that the title of the petition did not state Carlitos aliases and his true name as "Carlito John I. Kho." Petitioner concludes that the
same jurisdictional defects attached to the change of name of Carlitos father.
The petition fails.
It can not be gainsaid that the petition, insofar as it sought to change the citizenship of Carlitos mother as it appeared in his birth
certificate and delete the "married" status of Carlitos parents in his and his siblings respective birth certificates, as well as change
the date of marriage of Carlito and Marivel involves the correction of not just clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature. 10
Rather, the changes entail substantial and controversial amendments.
For the change involving the nationality of Carlitos mother as reflected in his birth certificate is a grave and important matter that
has a bearing and effect on the citizenship and nationality not only of the parents, but also of the offspring. 11
Further, the deletion of the entry that Carlitos and his siblings parents were "married" alters their filiation from "legitimate" to
"illegitimate," with significant implications on their successional and other rights.
Clearly, the changes sought can only be granted in an adversary proceeding. Labayo-Rowe v. Republic 12 explains the raison d etre:
x x x. The philosophy behind this requirement lies in the fact that the books making up the civil register and all documents relating
thereto shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained. If the entries in the civil register could be corrected or changed
through mere summary proceedings and not through appropriate action wherein all parties who may be affected by the entries are

notified or represented, the door to fraud or other mischief would be set open, the consequence of which might be detrimental and
far reaching. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
In Republic v. Valencia,13 however, this Court ruled, and has since repeatedly ruled, that even substantial errors in a civil registry may
be corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108. 14
It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for the correction of clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous
nature, but one involving nationality or citizenship, which is indisputably substantial as well as controverted, affirmative relief cannot
be granted in a proceeding summary in nature. However, it is also true that a right in law may be enforced and a wrong may be
remedied as long as the appropriate remedy is used. This Court adheres to the principle that even substantial errors in a civil registry
may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate
adversary proceeding.
xxxx
What is meant by "appropriate adversary proceeding?" Blacks Law Dictionary defines "adversary proceeding["] as follows:
One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte application, one of which the party seeking relief has given
legal warning to the other party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. x x x 15 (Emphasis, italics and underscoring
supplied)
The enactment in March 2001 of Republic Act No. 9048, otherwise known as "An Act Authorizing the City or Municipal Civil Registrar
or the Consul General to Correct a Clerical or Typographical Error in an Entry and/or Change of First Name or Nickname in the Civil
Register Without Need of Judicial Order," has been considered to lend legislative affirmation to the judicial precedence that
substantial corrections to the civil status of persons recorded in the civil registry may be effected through the filing of a petition under
Rule 108.16
Thus, this Court in Republic v. Benemerito 17 observed that the obvious effect of Republic Act No. 9048 is to make possible the
administrative correction of clerical or typographical errors or change of first name or nickname in entries in the civil register, leaving
to Rule 108 the correction of substantial changes in the civil registry in appropriate adversarial proceedings.
When all the procedural requirements under Rule 108 are thus followed, the appropriate adversary proceeding necessary to effect
substantial corrections to the entries of the civil register is satisfied. 18 The pertinent provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court read:
SEC. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil registrar is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who
have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of
the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order
to be published once in a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or
correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his
opposition thereto. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
There is no dispute that the trial courts Order 19 setting the petition for hearing and directing any person or entity having interest in
the petition to oppose it was posted 20 as well as published for the required period; that notices of hearings were duly served on the
Solicitor General, the city prosecutor of Butuan and the local civil registrar; and that trial was conducted on January 31, 2002 during
which the public prosecutor, acting in behalf of the OSG, actively participated by cross-examining Carlito and Epifania.
What surfaces as an issue is whether the failure to implead Marivel and Carlitos parents rendered the trial short of the required
adversary proceeding and the trial courts judgment void.
A similar issue was earlier raised in Barco v. Court of Appeals.21 That case stemmed from a petition for correction of entries in the
birth certificate of a minor, June Salvacion Maravilla, to reflect the name of her real father (Armando Gustilo) and to correspondingly
change her surname. The petition was granted by the trial court.
Barco, whose minor daughter was allegedly fathered also by Gustilo, however, sought to annul the trial courts decision, claiming that
she should have been made a party to the petition for correction. Failure to implead her deprived the RTC of jurisdiction, she
contended.

In dismissing Barcos petition, this Court held that the publication of the order of hearing under Section 4 of Rule 108 cured the failure
to implead an indispensable party.
The essential requisite for allowing substantial corrections of entries in the civil registry is that the true facts be established in an
appropriate adversarial proceeding. This is embodied in Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, which states:
Section 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who
have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
xxxx
Undoubtedly, Barco is among the parties referred to in Section 3 of Rule 108. Her interest was affected by the petition for correction,
as any judicial determination that June was the daughter of Armando would affect her wards share in the estate of her father. x x x.
Yet, even though Barco was not impleaded in the petition, the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out that the defect was cured by
compliance with Section 4, Rule 108, which requires notice by publication x x x.
xxxx
The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole world to the subsequent judgment on the petition. The sweep of the
decision would cover even parties who should have been impleaded under Section 3, Rule 108, but were inadvertently left out. x x x
xxxx
Verily, a petition for correction is an action in rem, an action against a thing and not against a person. The decision on the petition
binds not only the parties thereto but the whole world. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. Publication
is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection of
any sort against the right sought to be established. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the
case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it. 22
Given the above ruling, it becomes unnecessary to rule on whether Marivel or respondents parents should have been impleaded as
parties to the proceeding. It may not be amiss to mention, however, that during the hearing on January 31, 2002, the city prosecutor
who was acting as representative of the OSG did not raise any objection to the non-inclusion of Marivel and Carlitos parents as
parties to the proceeding.
Parenthetically, it seems highly improbable that Marivel was unaware of the proceedings to correct the entries in her childrens birth
certificates, especially since the notices, orders and decision of the trial court eHe were all sent to the residence 23 she shared with
Carlito and the children.
It is also well to remember that the role of the court in hearing a petition to correct certain entries in the civil registry is to ascertain
the truth about the facts recorded therein.24
With respect to the date of marriage of Carlito and Marivel, their certificate of marriage 25 shows that indeed they were married on
January 21, 2000, not on April 27, 1989. Explaining the error, Carlito declared that the date "April 27, 1989" was supplied by his
helper, adding that he was not married to Marivel at the time his sons were born because his previous marriage was annulled only in
1999.26 Given the evidence presented by respondents, the CA observed that the minors were illegitimate at birth, hence, the
correction would bring about no change at all in the nature of their filiation.
With respect to Carlitos mother, it bears noting that she declared at the witness stand that she was not married to Juan Kho who died
in 1959.27 Again, that testimony was not challenged by the city prosecutor.
The documentary evidence supporting the deletion from Carlitos and his siblings birth certificates of the entry "Married" opposite
the date of marriage of their parents, moreover, consisted of a certification issued on November 24, 1973 by St. Joseph (Butuan City)
Parish priest Eugene van Vught stating that Juan Kho and Epifania had been living together as common law couple since 1935 but
have never contracted marriage legally.28
A certification from the office of the city registrar, which was appended to respondents Amended Petition, likewise stated that it has
no record of marriage between Juan Kho and Epifania. 29 Under the circumstances, the deletion of the word "Married" opposite the
"date of marriage of parents" is warranted.

With respect to the correction in Carlitos birth certificate of his name from "Carlito John" to "Carlito," the same was properly granted
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. As correctly pointed out by the CA, the cancellation or correction of entries involving changes of
name falls under letter "o" of the following provision of Section 2 of Rule 108: 30
Section 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil register may
be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separation; (e) judgments of annulment of marriage; (f)
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j)
naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Hence, while the jurisdictional requirements of Rule 103 (which governs petitions for change of name) were not complied with,
observance of the provisions of Rule 108 suffices to effect the correction sought for.
More importantly, Carlitos official transcript of record from the Urious College in Butuan City, 31 certificate of eligibility from the Civil
Service Commission,32 and voter registration record33 satisfactorily show that he has been known by his first name only. No prejudice
is thus likely to arise from the dropping of the second name.
The correction of the mothers citizenship from Chinese to Filipino as appearing in Carlitos birth record was also proper. Of note is the
fact that during the cross examination by the city prosecutor of Epifania, he did not deem fit to question her citizenship. Such failure
to oppose the correction prayed for, which certainly was not respondents fault, does not in any way change the adversarial nature of
the proceedings.
Also significant to note is that the birth certificates of Carlitos siblings uniformly stated the citizenship of Epifania as "Filipino." To
disallow the correction in Carlitos birth record of his mothers citizenship would perpetuate an inconsistency in the natal
circumstances of the siblings who are unquestionably born of the same mother and father.
Outside the ambit of substantial corrections, of course, is the correction of the name of Carlitos wife from "Maribel" to "Marivel." The
mistake is clearly clerical or typographical, which is not only visible to the eyes, but is also obvious to the understanding 34 considering
that the name reflected in the marriage certificate of Carlito and his wife is "Marivel."
Apropos is Yu v. Republic35 which held that changing the appellants Christian name of "Sincio" to "Sencio" amounts merely to the
righting of a clerical error. The change of name from Beatriz Labayo/Beatriz Labayu to Emperatriz Labayo was also held to be a mere
innocuous alteration, which can be granted through a summary proceeding. 36 The same ruling holds true with respect to the
correction in Carlitos marriage certificate of his fathers name from "John Kho" to "Juan Kho." Except in said marriage certificate, the
name "Juan Kho" was uniformly entered in the birth certificates of Carlito and of his siblings. 37
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 159966. March 30, 2005]
IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME AND/OR CORRECTION/CANCELLATION OF ENTRY IN CIVIL REGISTRY OF JULIAN LIN CARULASAN
WANG also known as JULIAN LIN WANG, to be amended/corrected as JULIAN LIN WANG, JULIAN LIN WANG, duly represented by his
mother ANNA LISA WANG, petitioner, vs. CEBU CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR, duly represented by the Registrar OSCAR B. MOLO, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
I will not blot out his name out of the book of life.
Revelation 3:5
On 22 September 2002, petitioner Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, a minor, represented by his mother Anna Lisa Wang, filed a petition
dated 19 September 2002 for change of name and/or correction/cancellation of entry in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan
Wang. Petitioner sought to drop his middle name and have his registered name changed from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin
Wang.
The petition was docketed as Special Proceedings Case No. 11458 CEB and raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City,
Branch 57.

The RTC established the following facts:

Julian Lin Carulasan Wang was born in Cebu City on February 20, 1998 to parents Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang who were then
not yet married to each other. When his parents subsequently got married on September 22, 1998, ...they executed a deed of
legitimation of their son so that the childs name was changed from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang.
The parents of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang plan to stay in Singapore for a long time because they will let him study there together with
his sister named Wang Mei Jasmine who was born in Singapore. Since in Singapore middle names or the maiden surname of the
mother are not carried in a persons name, they anticipate that Julian Lin Carulasan Wang will be discriminated against because of his
current registered name which carries a middle name. Julian and his sister might also be asking whether they are brother and sister
since they have different surnames. Carulasan sounds funny in Singapores Mandarin language since they do not have the letter R
but if there is, they pronounce it as L. It is for these reasons that the name of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang is requested to be changed
to Julian Lin Wang.[1]
On 30 April 2003, the RTC rendered a decision denying the petition.[2] The trial court found that the reason given for the change of
name sought in the petitionthat is, that petitioner Julian may be discriminated against when studies in Singapore because of his
middle namedid not fall within the grounds recognized by law. The trial court ruled that the change sought is merely for the
convenience of the child. Since the State has an interest in the name of a person, names cannot be changed to suit the convenience
of the bearers. Under Article 174 of the Family Code, legitimate children have the right to bear the surnames of the father and the
mother, and there is no reason why this right should now be taken from petitioner Julian, considering that he is still a minor. The trial
court added that when petitioner Julian reaches the age of majority, he could then decide whether he will change his name by
dropping his middle name.[3]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision but this was denied in a resolution dated 20 May 2004.[4] The trial court
maintained that the Singaporean practice of not carrying a middle name does not justify the dropping of the middle name of a
legitimate Filipino child who intends to study there. The dropping of the middle name would be tantamount to giving due recognition
to or application of the laws of Singapore instead of Philippine law which is controlling. That the change of name would not prejudice
public interest or would not be for a fraudulent purpose would not suffice to grant the petition if the reason for the change of name is
itself not reasonable.[5]
Petitioner then filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari (Under Rule 45)[6] arguing that the trial court has decided a question of
substance not theretofore determined by the Court, that is: whether or not dropping the middle name of a minor child is contrary to
Article 174[7] of the Family Code. Petitioner contends that [W]ith globalization and mixed marriages, there is a need for the
Supreme Court to rule on the matter of dropping of family name for a child to adjust to his new environment, for consistency and
harmony among siblings, taking into consideration the best interest of the child.[8] It is argued that convenience of the child is a
valid reason for changing the name as long as it will not prejudice the State and others. Petitioner points out that the middle name
Carulasan will cause him undue embarrassment and the difficulty in writing or pronouncing it will be an obstacle to his social
acceptance and integration in the Singaporean community. Petitioner also alleges that it is error for the trial court to have denied the
petition for change of name until he had reached the age of majority for him to decide the name to use, contrary to previous cases[9]
decided by this Court that allowed a minor to petition for change of name.[10]
The Court required the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment on the petition. The OSG filed its Comment[11] positing that
the trial court correctly denied the petition for change of name. The OSG argues that under Article 174 of the Family Code, legitimate
children have the right to bear the surnames of their father and mother, and such right cannot be denied by the mere expedient of
dropping the same. According to the OSG, there is also no showing that the dropping of the middle name Carulasan is in the best
interest of petitioner, since mere convenience is not sufficient to support a petition for change of name and/or cancellation of entry.
[12] The OSG also adds that the petitioner has not shown any compelling reason to justify the change of name or the dropping of the
middle name, for that matter. Petitioners allegation that the continued use of the middle name may result in confusion and difficulty
is allegedly more imaginary than real. The OSG reiterates its argument raised before the trial court that the dropping of the childs
middle name could only trigger much deeper inquiries regarding the true parentage of petitioner. Hence, while petitioner Julian has a
sister named Jasmine Wei Wang, there is no confusion since both use the surname of their father, Wang. Even assuming that it is
customary in Singapore to drop the middle name, it has also not been shown that the use of such middle name is actually proscribed
by Singaporean law.[13]
We affirm the decision of the trial court. The petition should be denied.
The Court has had occasion to express the view that the State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for
purposes of identification, and that a change of name is a privilege and not a right, so that before a person can be authorized to
change his name given him either in his certificate of birth or civil registry, he must show proper or reasonable cause, or any
compelling reason which may justify such change. Otherwise, the request should be denied.[14]
The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be proper and reasonable cause for which the change is sought.[15]
To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper or compelling reason therefore but also that he
will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. Among the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are:

(a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal
consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since
childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of
former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no
showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.
[16]
In granting or denying petitions for change of name, the question of proper and reasonable cause is left to the sound discretion of the
court. The evidence presented need only be satisfactory to the court and not all the best evidence available. What is involved is not a
mere matter of allowance or disallowance of the request, but a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of the
justifications advanced in support thereof, mindful of the consequent results in the event of its grant and with the sole prerogative for
making such determination being lodged in the courts.[17]
The petition before us is unlike other petitions for change of name, as it does not simply seek to change the name of the minor
petitioner and adopt another, but instead seeks to drop the middle name altogether. Decided cases in this jurisdiction involving
petitions for change of name usually deal with requests for change of surname. There are only a handful of cases involving requests
for change of the given name[18] and none on requests for changing or dropping of the middle name. Does the law allow one to drop
the middle name from his registered name? We have to answer in the negative.
A discussion on the legal significance of a persons name is relevant at this point. We quote, thus:
For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by which he is known and called in the community in which he
lives and is best known. It is defined as the word or combination of words by which a person is distinguished from other individuals
and, also, as the label or appellation which he bears for the convenience of the world at large addressing him, or in speaking of or
dealing with him. Names are used merely as one method of indicating the identity of persons; they are descriptive of persons for
identification, since, the identity is the essential thing and it has frequently been held that, when identity is certain, a variance in, or
misspelling of, the name is immaterial.
The names of individuals usually have two parts: the given name or proper name, and the surname or family name. The given or
proper name is that which is given to the individual at birth or baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The name or family
name is that which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given name may be freely
selected by the parents for the child; but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law.
A name is said to have the following characteristics: (1) It is absolute, intended to protect the individual from being confused with
others. (2) It is obligatory in certain respects, for nobody can be without a name. (3) It is fixed, unchangeable, or immutable, at least
at the start, and may be changed only for good cause and by judicial proceedings. (4) It is outside the commerce of man, and,
therefore, inalienable and intransmissible by act inter vivos or mortis causa. (5) It is imprescriptible.[19]
This citation does not make any reference to middle names, but this does not mean that middle names have no practical or legal
significance. Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as further distinguish him from
others who may have the same given name and surname as he has.
Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.[20]
The Family Code gives legitimate children the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother,[21] while illegitimate children
shall use the surname of their mother, unless their father recognizes their filiation, in which case they may bear the fathers surname.
[22]
Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the father bears only a given name and his mothers
surname, and does not have a middle name. The name of the unrecognized illegitimate child therefore identifies him as such. It is
only when the illegitimate child is legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the father in a public
document or private handwritten instrument that he bears both his mothers surname as his middle name and his fathers surname
as his surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child or an acknowledged illegitimate child.
Accordingly, the registration in the civil registry of the birth of such individuals requires that the middle name be indicated in the
certificate. The registered name of a legitimate, legitimated and recognized illegitimate child thus contains a given or proper name, a
middle name, and a surname.
Petitioner theorizes that it would be for his best interest to drop his middle name as this would help him to adjust more easily to and
integrate himself into Singaporean society. In support, he cites Oshita v. Republic[23] and Calderon v. Republic,[24] which, however,
are not apropos both.
In Oshita, the petitioner therein, a legitimate daughter of a Filipino mother, Buena Bartolome, and a Japanese father, Kishimatsu
Oshita, sought to change her name from Antonina B. Oshita to Antonina Bartolome. The Court granted her petition based on the

following considerations: she had elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; her other siblings who had also
elected Philippine citizenship have been using their mothers surname; she was embarrassed to bear a Japanese surname there still
being ill feeling against the Japanese due to the last World War; and there was no showing that the change of name was motivated by
a fraudulent purpose or that it will prejudice public interest.
In Calderon, the Court allowed petitioner Gertrudes Josefina del Prado, an illegitimate minor child acting through her mother who filed
the petition in her behalf, to change her name to Gertudes Josefina Calderon, taking the surname of her stepfather, Romeo C.
Calderon, her mothers husband. The Court held that a petition for change of name of an infant should be granted where to do is
clearly for the best interest of the child. The Court took into consideration the opportunity provided for the minor petitioner to
eliminate the stigma of illegitimacy which she would carry if she continued to use the surname of her illegitimate father. The Court
pronounced that justice dictates that every person be allowed to avail of any opportunity to improve his social standing as long as
doing so he does not cause prejudice or injury to the interests of the State or of other people.
Petitioner cites Alfon v. Republic,[25] in arguing that although Article 174 of the Family Code gives the legitimate child the right to use
the surnames of the father and the mother, it is not mandatory such that the child could use only one family name, even the family
name of the mother. In Alfon, the petitioner therein, the legitimate daughter of Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Alfon, sought to change
her name from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte (her name as registered in the Local Civil Registry) to Estrella S. Alfon (the
name she had been using since childhood, in her school records and in her voters registration). The trial court denied her petition but
this Court overturned the denial, ruling that while Article 364 of the Civil Code states that she, as a legitimate child, should principally
use the surname of her father, there is no legal obstacle for her to choose to use the surname of herm other to which she is entitled.
In addition, the Court found that there was ample justification to grant her petition, i.e., to avoid confusion.
Weighing petitioners reason of convenience for the change of his name against the standards set in the cases he cites to support his
contention would show that his justification is amorphous, to say the least, and could not warrant favorable action on his petition.
The factual antecedents and unique circumstances of the cited cases are not at all analogous to the case at bar. The instant case is
clearly distinguishable from the cases of Oshita and Alfon, where the petitioners were already of age when they filed their petitions
for change of name. Being of age, they are considered to have exercised their discretion and judgment, fully knowing the effects of
their decision to change their surnames. It can also be unmistakably observed that the reason for the grant of the petitions for
change of name in these two cases was the presence of reasonable or compelling grounds therefore. The Court, in Oshita, recognized
the tangible animosity most Filipinos had during that time against the Japanese as a result of World War II, in addition to the fact of
therein petitioners election of Philippine citizenship. In Alfon, the Court granted the petition since the petitioner had been known
since childhood by a name different from her registered name and she had not used her registered name in her school records and
voters registration records; thus, denying the petition would only result to confusion.
Calderon, on the other hand, granted the petition for change of name filed by a mother in behalf of her illegitimate minor child.
Petitioner cites this case to buttress his argument that he does not have to reach the age of majority to petition for change of name.
However, it is manifest in Calderon that the Court, in granting the petition for change of name, gave paramount consideration to the
best interests of the minor petitioner therein.
In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle name is convenience. However, how such
change of name would make his integration into Singaporean society easier and convenient is not clearly established. That the
continued use of his middle name would cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it
from his registered complete name.
In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation on which his petition for change of name is based, it is
best that the matter of change of his name be left to his judgment and discretion when he reaches the age of majority.[26] As he is
of tender age, he may not yet understand and appreciate the value of the change of his name and granting of the same at this point
may just prejudice him in his rights under our laws.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 181174

December 4, 2009

MA. CRISTINA TORRES BRAZA, PAOLO JOSEF T. BRAZA and JANELLE ANN T. BRAZA, Petitioners,
vs.
THE CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR OF HIMAMAYLAN CITY, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, minor PATRICK ALVIN TITULAR BRAZA, represented by LEON
TITULAR, CECILIA TITULAR and LUCILLE C. TITULAR, Respondents.
DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Petitioner Ma. Cristina Torres (Ma. Cristina) and Pablo Sicad Braza, Jr. (Pablo), also known as "Pablito Sicad Braza," were married 1 on
January 4, 1978. The union bore Ma. Cristinas co-petitioners Paolo Josef 2 and Janelle Ann3 on May 8, 1978 and June 7, 1983,
respectively, and Gian Carlo4 on June 4, 1980.
Pablo died5 on April 15, 2002 in a vehicular accident in Bandung, West Java, Indonesia.
During the wake following the repatriation of his remains to the Philippines, respondent Lucille Titular (Lucille) began introducing her
co-respondent minor Patrick Alvin Titular Braza (Patrick) as her and Pablo's son. Ma. Cristina thereupon made inquiries in the course
of which she obtained Patrick's birth certificate6 from the Local Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental with the
following entries:
Name of Child :

PATRICK ALVIN CELESTIAL TITULAR

Date of Birth :

01 January 1996

Mother :

Lucille Celestial Titular

Father :

Pablito S. Braza

Date Received at the Local

Civil Registrar :

January 13, 1997

Annotation :

"Late Registration"

Annotation/Remarks :

"Acknowledge (sic) by the father Pablito Braza on January 13, 1997"

Remarks :

Legitimated by virtue of subsequent marriage of parents on April 22, 1998 at Manila. Henceforth,
the child shall be known as Patrick Alvin Titular Braza (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Ma. Cristina likewise obtained a copy7 of a marriage contract showing that Pablo and Lucille were married on April 22, 1998, drawing
her and her co-petitioners to file on December 23, 2005 before the Regional Trial Court of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental a
petition8 to correct the entries in the birth record of Patrick in the Local Civil Register.
Contending that Patrick could not have been legitimated by the supposed marriage between Lucille and Pablo, said marriage being
bigamous on account of the valid and subsisting marriage between Ma. Cristina and Pablo, petitioners prayed for (1) the correction of
the entries in Patrick's birth record with respect to his legitimation, the name of the father and his acknowledgment, and the use of
the last name "Braza"; 2) a directive to Leon, Cecilia and Lucille, all surnamed Titular, as guardians of the minor Patrick, to submit
Parick to DNA testing to determine his paternity and filiation; and 3) the declaration of nullity of the legitimation of Patrick as stated in
his birth certificate and, for this purpose, the declaration of the marriage of Lucille and Pablo as bigamous.
On Patricks Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, the trial court, by Order 9 of September 6, 2007, dismissed the petition without
prejudice, it holding that in a special proceeding for correction of entry, the court, which is not acting as a family court under the
Family Code, has no jurisdiction over an action to annul the marriage of Lucille and Pablo, impugn the legitimacy of Patrick, and order
Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test, hence, the controversy should be ventilated in an ordinary adversarial action.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration having been denied by Order 10 of November 29, 2007, they filed the present petition for
review.
Petitioners maintain that the court a quo may pass upon the validity of marriage and questions on legitimacy even in an action to
correct entries in the civil registrar. Citing Cario v. Cario,11 Lee v. Court of Appeals12 and Republic v. Kho,13 they contend that even
substantial errors, such as those sought to be corrected in the present case, can be the subject of a petition under Rule 108. 14
The petition fails. In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original
Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiation.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis a vis Article 412 of the Civil Code15 charts the procedure by which an entry in the civil registry may
be cancelled or corrected. The proceeding contemplated therein may generally be used only to correct clerical, spelling,
typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry. A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the
understanding; an error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing, or a harmless change such as a correction
of name that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the parent. Substantial or contentious alterations may be
allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in which all interested parties are impleaded and due process is properly observed. 16
The allegations of the petition filed before the trial court clearly show that petitioners seek to nullify the marriage between Pablo and
Lucille on the ground that it is bigamous and impugn Patricks filiation in connection with which they ask the court to order Patrick to
be subjected to a DNA test.
Petitioners insist, however, that the main cause of action is for the correction of Patricks birth records 17 and that the rest of the
prayers are merely incidental thereto.

Petitioners position does not lie. Their cause of action is actually to seek the declaration of Pablo and Lucilles marriage as void for
being bigamous and impugn Patricks legitimacy, which causes of action are governed not by Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
which took effect on March 15, 2003, and Art. 17118 of the Family Code, respectively, hence, the petition should be filed in a Family
Court as expressly provided in said Code.1avvphi1
It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct
action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack such as the petition filed before the court a quo.
Petitioners reliance on the cases they cited is misplaced.
Cario v. Cario was an action filed by a second wife against the first wife for the return of one-half of the death benefits received by
the first after the death of the husband. Since the second wife contracted marriage with the husband while the latters marriage to
the first wife was still subsisting, the Court ruled on the validity of the two marriages, it being essential to the determination of who is
rightfully entitled to the death benefits.
In Lee v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that contrary to the contention that the petitions filed by the therein petitioners before the
lower courts were actions to impugn legitimacy, the prayer was not to declare that the petitioners are illegitimate children of Keh
Shiok Cheng as stated in their records of birth but to establish that they are not the latters children, hence, there was nothing to
impugn as there was no blood relation at all between
the petitioners and Keh Shiok Cheng. That is why the Court ordered the cancellation of the name of Keh Shiok Cheng as the
petitioners mother and the substitution thereof with "Tiu Chuan" who is their biological mother. Thus, the collateral attack was
allowed and the petition deemed as adversarial proceeding contemplated under Rule 108.
In Republic v. Kho, it was the petitioners themselves who sought the correction of the entries in their respective birth records to
reflect that they were illegitimate and that their citizenship is "Filipino," not Chinese, because their parents were never legally
married. Again, considering that the changes sought to be made were substantial and not merely innocuous, the Court, finding the
proceedings under Rule 108 to be adversarial in nature, upheld the lower courts grant of the petition.
It is thus clear that the facts in the above-cited cases are vastly different from those obtaining in the present case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 174689

October 22, 2007

ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created them male and female. (Genesis 5:1-2)
Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard voices coming from inside the bamboo. "Oh North
Wind! North Wind! Please let us out!," the voices said. She pecked the reed once, then twice. All of a sudden, the bamboo
cracked and slit open. Out came two human beings; one was a male and the other was a female. Amihan named the man
"Malakas" (Strong) and the woman "Maganda" (Beautiful). (The Legend of Malakas and Maganda)
When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does the law recognize the changes made by a physician using
scalpel, drugs and counseling with regard to a persons sex? May a person successfully petition for a change of name and sex
appearing in the birth certificate to reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery?
On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth
certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. The petition, docketed as SP Case No. 02-105207, impleaded the civil
registrar of Manila as respondent.
Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino
Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate).
His sex was registered as "male."

He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female" and that he had
always identified himself with girls since childhood.1 Feeling trapped in a mans body, he consulted several doctors in the United
States. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to
a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery 2 in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter
examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate
attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone the procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name in his birth
certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female."
An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the Peoples Journal Tonight, a newspaper of general circulation in Metro
Manila, for three consecutive weeks.3 Copies of the order were sent to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the civil registrar
of Manila.
On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established. No opposition to the petition was made.
During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his American fianc, Richard P. Edel, as
witnesses.
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision 4 in favor of petitioner. Its relevant portions read:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but
solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his present sex.
The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.
The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.
Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more in consonance with the principles of justice and
equity. With his sexual [re-assignment], petitioner, who has always felt, thought and acted like a woman, now possesses the
physique of a female. Petitioners misfortune to be trapped in a mans body is not his own doing and should not be in any
way taken against him.
Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be caused to anybody or the community in granting the
petition. On the contrary, granting the petition would bring the much-awaited happiness on the part of the petitioner and her
[fianc] and the realization of their dreams.
Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to deny the present petition despite due notice and
publication thereof. Even the State, through the [OSG] has not seen fit to interpose any [o]pposition.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and ordering the Civil Registrar of Manila to change the
entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth of [p]etitioner, specifically for petitioners first name from "Rommel Jacinto" to
MELY and petitioners gender from "Male" to FEMALE. 5
On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. 6 It
alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.
On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals7 rendered a decision8 in favor of the Republic. It ruled that the trial courts decision lacked
legal basis. There is no law allowing the change of either name or sex in the certificate of birth on the ground of sex reassignment
through surgery. Thus, the Court of Appeals granted the Republics petition, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the
dismissal of SP Case No. 02-105207. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied. 9 Hence, this petition.
Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the
Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048. 10
The petition lacks merit.
A Persons First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex Reassignment
Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for change of name and sex. As found by the trial court:

Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but
solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his present sex. (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a female, he became entitled to the civil registry changes
sought. We disagree.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification. 11 A change of name is a
privilege, not a right.12 Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes.13 In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code
provides:
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section 1 of RA 9048 provides:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname. No entry in a civil
register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first
name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in
accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. 14 It vests the power and authority to entertain petitions for change of first name to
the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of
first name is now primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the
change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil
Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied. 15
It likewise lays down the corresponding venue,16 form17 and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating change of
first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. The petition for change of first name or nickname may be
allowed in any of the following cases:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or
pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly
known by that first name or nickname in the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Petitioners basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He intended to make his first name compatible
with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through surgery. However, a change of name does not alter ones legal capacity
or civil status.18 RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding
confusion, changing petitioners first name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry and the
public interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying
such change.19 In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. 20 In this case, he failed to
show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioners first name was not within that courts primary
jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an
improper remedy because the proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong
venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had
no merit since the use of his true and official name does not prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly
dismissed petitioners petition in so far as the change of his first name was concerned.
No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of Sex Reassignment
The determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to the statutes. 21 In this
connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048 in so far as clerical or typographical errors are
involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a
judicial order. In effect, RA 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors. 22 Rule 108
now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register. 23
Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical work in writing,
copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled
name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can
be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or records: Provided, however, That no correction
must involve the change of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis supplied)
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a
substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in
Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:24
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages
void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11)
loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation
of a minor; and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those that occur after birth. 25
However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of sex
reassignment.
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from" while to change means "to replace something with
something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute." 26 The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error.
All entries therein, including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts (such as legitimations, acknowledgments of
illegitimate children and naturalization), events (such as births, marriages, naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as
legal separations, annulments of marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of
citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and changes of name). These acts, events and judicial decrees produce
legal consequences that touch upon the legal capacity, status and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by
the laws. In contrast, sex reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized nor even
mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.
"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of capacities and incapacities) of a person in
view of his age, nationality and his family membership. 27
The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily
terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not. The comprehensive term
status include such matters as the beginning and end of legal personality, capacity to have rights in general, family
relations, and its various aspects, such as birth, legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes
even succession.28 (emphasis supplied)
A persons sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a persons legal capacity and civil status. In this
connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by special laws.
But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to petitioners cause.
Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:
SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. The declaration of the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or, in
default thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the
civil register. Such declaration shall be exempt from documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not
later than thirty days after the birth, by the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or by either parent of the
newborn child.
In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the following facts: (a) date and hour of birth; (b) sex and
nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship and religion of parents or, in case the father is not known, of the mother alone;
(d) civil status of parents; (e) place where the infant was born; and (f) such other data as may be required in the regulations
to be issued.
xxx

xxx

xxx (emphasis supplied)

Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of birth. 29 Thus, the sex of
a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the
infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a persons sex made at the time of
his or her birth, if not attended by error,30 is immutable.31
When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary meaning in the absence of a contrary
legislative intent. The words "sex," "male" and "female" as used in the Civil Register Law and laws concerning the civil registry (and
even all other laws) should therefore be understood in their common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to the
contrary. In this connection, sex is defined as "the sum of peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a male from a
female"32 or "the distinction between male and female."33 Female is "the sex that produces ova or bears young" 34 and male is "the sex
that has organs to produce spermatozoa for fertilizing ova." 35 Thus, the words "male" and "female" in everyday understanding do not
include persons who have undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, "words that are employed in a statute which had at the time a
well-known meaning are presumed to have been used in that sense unless the context compels to the contrary." 36 Since the statutory
language of the Civil Register Law was enacted in the early 1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term "sex" as
used then is something alterable through surgery or something that allows a post-operative male-to-female transsexual to be
included in the category "female."
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the intervention of modern
surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his
petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate.
Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be Changed on the Ground of Equity
The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the principles of justice and equity. It believed that allowing
the petition would cause no harm, injury or prejudice to anyone. This is wrong.
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy consequences. First, even the trial court
itself found that the petition was but petitioners first step towards his eventual marriage to his male fianc. However, marriage, one
of the most sacred social institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman.37 One of its essential
requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female.38 To grant the changes sought by
petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man
with another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual). Second, there are various
laws which apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women, 39 certain felonies under
the Revised Penal Code40 and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, 41 among
others. These laws underscore the public policy in relation to women which could be substantially affected if petitioners petition were
to be granted.
It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence,
obscurity or insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a license for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is
to apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend it.
In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine what guidelines should govern the
recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines becomes particularly important in this case where
the claims asserted are statute-based.

To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for correction or change of entries in the civil
registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what proof must be presented and what procedures shall be
observed. If the legislature intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and
sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that
privilege.
It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be recognized as having successfully
changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to fashion a law on that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a
law where no law exists. It can only apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of government, Congress.
Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness, contentment and [the] realization of their dreams."
No argument about that. The Court recognizes that there are people whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the
commonly recognized parameters of social convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the remedies
petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

G.R. No. 166676

Petitioner,

Present:

- versus -

Quisumbing, J., Chairperson,

JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN,

Carpio Morales,

Respondent.

Tinga,
VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ.
Promulgated:
September 12, 2008

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising purely questions of law and seeking a reversal of the
Decision[1] dated January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, which granted the Petition for
Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate filed by Jennifer B. Cagandahan and ordered the following changes of entries in Cagandahans
birth certificate: (1) the name "Jennifer Cagandahan" changed to "Jeff Cagandahan" and (2) gender from "female" to "male."
The facts are as follows.
On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate 2 before the RTC,
Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna.

In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and was registered as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth but
while growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH)
which is a condition where persons thus afflicted possess both male and female characteristics. She further alleged that she was
diagnosed to have clitoral hyperthropy in her early years and at age six, underwent an ultrasound where it was discovered that she
has small ovaries. At age thirteen, tests revealed that her ovarian structures had minimized, she has stopped growing and she has no
breast or menstrual development. She then alleged that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has
become a male person. Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed from female to male
and her first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff.
The petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation for three (3) consecutive weeks and was posted in conspicuous
places by the sheriff of the court. The Solicitor General entered his appearance and authorized the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to
appear in his behalf.
To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented the testimony of Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry,
University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital. Dr. Sionzon issued a medical certificate stating that respondents condition is
known as CAH. He explained that genetically respondent is female but because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs
did not develop normally and she has two sex organs 17 female and male. He testified that this condition is very rare, that
respondents uterus is not fully developed because of lack of female hormones, and that she has no monthly period. He further
testified that respondents condition is permanent and recommended the change of gender because respondent has made up her
mind, adjusted to her chosen role as male, and the gender change would be advantageous to her.
The RTC granted respondents petition in a Decision dated January 12, 2005 which reads:
The Court is convinced that petitioner has satisfactorily shown that he is entitled to the reliefs prayed [for]. Petitioner has adequately
presented to the Court very clear and convincing proofs for the granting of his petition. It was medically proven that petitioners body
produces male hormones, and first his body as well as his action and feelings are that of a male. He has chosen to be male. He is a
normal person and wants to be acknowledged and identified as a male.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Civil Register of Pakil, Laguna is hereby ordered to make the following corrections in the birth
[c]ertificate of Jennifer Cagandahan upon payment of the prescribed fees:
a) By changing the name from Jennifer Cagandahan to JEFF CAGANDAHAN; and
b) By changing the gender from female to MALE.
It is likewise ordered that petitioners school records, voters registry, baptismal certificate, and other pertinent records are hereby
amended to conform with the foregoing corrected data.
SO ORDERED.[3]
Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeking a reversal of the abovementioned ruling.
The issues raised by petitioner are:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION CONSIDERING THAT:
I.
THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULES 103 AND 108 OF THE RULES OF COURT HAVE NOT BEEN COMPLIED WITH; AND,
II.
CORRECTION OF ENTRY UNDER RULE 108 DOES NOT ALLOW CHANGE OF "SEX" OR "GENDER" IN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE, WHILE
RESPONDENTS MEDICAL CONDITION, i.e., CONGENITAL ADRENAL HYPERPLASIA DOES NOT MAKE HER A "MALE." 4
Simply stated, the issue is whether the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in the birth certificate of respondent to
change her sex or gender, from female to male, on the ground of her medical condition known as CAH, and her name from "Jennifer"
to "Jeff," under Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.
The OSG contends that the petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance with Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court
because while the local civil registrar is an indispensable party in a petition for cancellation or correction of entries under Section 3,
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, respondents petition before the court a quo did not implead the local civil registrar. 5 The OSG further
contends respondents petition is fatally defective since it failed to state that respondent is a bona fide resident of the province where
the petition was filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of such filing as mandated under Section 2(b), Rule 103 of the Rules
of Court.6 The OSG argues that Rule 108 does not allow change of sex or gender in the birth certificate and respondents claimed
medical condition known as CAH does not make her a male. 7

On the other hand, respondent counters that although the Local Civil Registrar of Pakil, Laguna was not formally named a party in the
Petition for Correction of Birth Certificate, nonetheless the Local Civil Registrar was furnished a copy of the Petition, the Order to
publish on December 16, 2003 and all pleadings, orders or processes in the course of the proceedings, 8 respondent is actually a male
person and hence his birth certificate has to be corrected to reflect his true sex/gender, 9 change of sex or gender is allowed under
Rule 108,10 and respondent substantially complied with the requirements of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court. 11
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court provide:
Rule 103
CHANGE OF NAME
Section 1. Venue. 17 A person desiring to change his name shall present the petition to the Regional Trial Court of the province in
which he resides, [or, in the City of Manila, to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court].
Sec. 2. Contents of petition. 17 A petition for change of name shall be signed and verified by the person desiring his name
changed, or some other person on his behalf, and shall set forth:
(a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the petition is filed for at least three (3) years prior to the
date of such filing;
(b) The cause for which the change of the petitioner's name is sought;
(c) The name asked for.
Sec. 3. Order for hearing. 17 If the petition filed is sufficient in form and substance, the court, by an order reciting the purpose of
the petition, shall fix a date and place for the hearing thereof, and shall direct that a copy of the order be published before the
hearing at least once a week for three (3) successive weeks in some newspaper of general circulation published in the province, as
the court shall deem best. The date set for the hearing shall not be within thirty (30) days prior to an election nor within four (4)
months after the last publication of the notice.
Sec. 4. Hearing. 17 Any interested person may appear at the hearing and oppose the petition. The Solicitor General or the proper
provincial or city fiscal shall appear on behalf of the Government of the Republic.
Sec. 5. Judgment. 17 Upon satisfactory proof in open court on the date fixed in the order that such order has been published as
directed and that the allegations of the petition are true, the court shall, if proper and reasonable cause appears for changing the
name of the petitioner, adjudge that such name be changed in accordance with the prayer of the petition.
Sec. 6. Service of judgment. 17 Judgments or orders rendered in connection with this rule shall be furnished the civil registrar of the
municipality or city where the court issuing the same is situated, who shall forthwith enter the same in the civil register.
Rule 108
CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES
IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY
Section 1. Who may file petition. 17 Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons
which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating
thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.
Sec. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. 17 Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil register may
be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f)
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j)
naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.
Sec. 3. Parties. 17 When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who
have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
Sec. 4. Notice and publication. 17 Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing
of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the
order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
Sec. 5. Opposition. 17 The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or
correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his
opposition thereto.

Sec. 6. Expediting proceedings. 17 The court in which the proceedings is brought may make orders expediting the proceedings, and
may also grant preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings.
Sec. 7. Order. 17 After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the cancellation or correction
prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall annotate the
same in his record.
The OSG argues that the petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance with Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because
respondents petition did not implead the local civil registrar. Section 3, Rule 108 provides that the civil registrar and all persons who
have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceedings. Likewise, the local civil registrar
is required to be made a party in a proceeding for the correction of name in the civil registry. He is an indispensable party without
whom no final determination of the case can be had.[12] Unless all possible indispensable parties were duly notified of the
proceedings, the same shall be considered as falling much too short of the requirements of the rules. 13 The corresponding petition
should also implead as respondents the civil registrar and all other persons who may have or may claim to have any interest that
would be affected thereby.14 Respondent, however, invokes Section 6,[15] Rule 1 of the Rules of Court which states that courts shall
construe the Rules liberally to promote their objectives of securing to the parties a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of the
matters brought before it. We agree that there is substantial compliance with Rule 108 when respondent furnished a copy of the
petition to the local civil registrar.
The determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to the statutes. In this
connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376[16] of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by Republic Act No. 9048[17] in so far as clerical or
typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be made through administrative proceedings
and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, Rep. Act No. 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the
correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register. 18
Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is
a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. 19
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in
Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from
the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12)
recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16)
changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those that occur after birth. 20
Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the early or "inappropriate" appearance of male characteristics. A person,
like respondent, with this condition produces too much androgen, a male hormone. A newborn who has XX chromosomes coupled
with CAH usually has a (1) swollen clitoris with the urethral opening at the base, an ambiguous genitalia often appearing more male
than female; (2) normal internal structures of the female reproductive tract such as the ovaries, uterus and fallopian tubes; as the
child grows older, some features start to appear male, such as deepening of the voice, facial hair, and failure to menstruate at
puberty. About 1 in 10,000 to 18,000 children are born with CAH.
CAH is one of many conditions[21] that involve intersex anatomy. During the twentieth century, medicine adopted the term
"intersexuality" to apply to human beings who cannot be classified as either male or female.[22] The term is now of widespread use.
According to Wikipedia, intersexuality "is the state of a living thing of a gonochoristic species whose sex chromosomes, genitalia,
and/or secondary sex characteristics are determined to be neither exclusively male nor female. An organism with intersex may have
biological characteristics of both male and female sexes."
Intersex individuals are treated in different ways by different cultures. In most societies, intersex individuals have been expected to
conform to either a male or female gender role.[23] Since the rise of modern medical science in Western societies, some intersex
people with ambiguous external genitalia have had their genitalia surgically modified to resemble either male or female genitals.[24]
More commonly, an intersex individual is considered as suffering from a "disorder" which is almost always recommended to be
treated, whether by surgery and/or by taking lifetime medication in order to mold the individual as neatly as possible into the
category of either male or female.
In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations which
should not be subject to outright denial. "It has been suggested that there is some middle ground between the sexes, a no-mans
land17 for those individuals who are neither truly male17 nor truly female17."[25] The current state of Philippine statutes

apparently compels that a person be classified either as a male or as a female, but this Court is not controlled by mere appearances
when nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid classification.
In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a female, then there is no basis for a change in the birth certificate entry for
gender. But if we determine, based on medical testimony and scientific development showing the respondent to be other than
female, then a change in the
subjects birth certificate entry is in order.
Biologically, nature endowed respondent with a mixed (neither consistently and categorically female nor consistently and
categorically male) composition. Respondent has female (XX) chromosomes. However, respondents body system naturally produces
high levels of male hormones (androgen). As a result, respondent has ambiguous genitalia and the phenotypic features of a male.
Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender
classification would be what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her
sex. Respondent here thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen)
there is preponderant biological support for considering him as being male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes
the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed.
Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural steps to arrest or interfere with what he was born
with. And accordingly, he has already ordered his life to that of a male. Respondent could have undergone treatment and taken steps,
like taking lifelong medication,[26] to force his body into the categorical mold of a female but he did not. He chose not to do so.
Nature has instead taken its due course in respondents development to reveal more fully his male characteristics.
In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent concerning a matter so innately private as ones
sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or not to undergo medical treatment to reverse the male tendency due to
CAH. The Court will not consider respondent as having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in order to become or remain as a
female. Neither will the Court force respondent to undergo treatment and to take medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as
society commonly currently knows this gender of the human species. Respondent is the one who has to live with his intersex
anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice
of what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that
respondent is an "incompetent"[27] and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will harm other
members of society who are equally entitled to protection under the law, the Court affirms as valid and justified the respondents
position and his personal judgment of being a male.
In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how an individual deals with what nature has
handed out. In other words, we respect respondents congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is already
difficult for the ordinary person. We cannot but respect how respondent deals with his unordinary state and thus help make his life
easier, considering the unique circumstances in this case.
As for respondents change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial
discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the consequences that will follow.[28] The trial courts grant of
respondents change of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine name. Considering the
consequence that respondents change of name merely recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in respondents change of
name. Such a change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth certificate from female to male.
WHEREFORE, the Republics petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of
Siniloan, Laguna, is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 198010

August 12, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER,

vs.
DR. NORMA S. LUGSANAY UY, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the Court of Appeals (CA) 1 Decision2 dated
February 18, 2011 and Resolution 3 dated July 27, 2011 in CA-G.R. CV No. 00238-MIN. The assailed decision dismissed the appeal filed
by petitioner Republic of the Philippines and, consequently, affirmed in toto the June 28, 2004 Order 4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 27, Gingoog City in Special Proceedings No. 230-2004 granting the Petition for Correction of Entry of Certificate of Live Birth
filed by respondent Dr. Norma S. Lugsanay Uy; while the assailed resolution denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The facts of the case are as follows:

On March 8, 2004, respondent filed a Petition for Correction of Entry in her Certificate of Live Birth. 5 Impleaded as respondent is the
Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City. She alleged that she was born on February 8, 1952 and is the illegitimate daughter of Sy Ton and
Sotera Lugsanay6 Her Certificate of Live Birth7 shows that her full name is "Anita Sy" when in fact she is allegedly known to her family
and friends as "Norma S. Lugsanay." She further claimed that her school records, Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) Board of
Medicine Certificate,8 and passport9 bear the name "Norma S. Lugsanay." She also alleged that she is an illegitimate child considering
that her parents were never married, so she had to follow the surname of her mother. 10 She also contended that she is a Filipino
citizen and not Chinese, and all her siblings bear the surname Lugsanay and are all Filipinos. 11
Respondent allegedly filed earlier a petition for correction of entries with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City to
effect the corrections on her name and citizenship which was supposedly granted. 12 However, the National Statistics Office (NSO)
records did not bear such changes. Hence, the petition before the RTC.
On May 13, 2004, the RTC issued an Order13 finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance and setting the case for
hearing, with the directive that the said Order be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Gingoog and the
Province of Misamis Oriental at least once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks at the expense of respondent, and that the order
and petition be furnished the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the City Prosecutors Office for their information and
guidance.14 Pursuant to the RTC Order, respondent complied with the publication requirement.
On June 28, 2004, the RTC issued an Order in favor of respondent, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. THE CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR OF GINGOOG CITY, or any
person acting in his behalf is directed and ordered to effect the correction or change of the entries in the Certificate of Live Birth of
petitioners name and citizenship so that the entries would be:
a)

b)

As to petitioners name :
First Name

: NORMA

Middle Name

: SY

Last Name

: LUGSANAY

As to petitioners nationality/citizenship :
: FILIPINO

SO ORDERED.15
The RTC concluded that respondents petition would neither prejudice the government nor any third party. It also held that the names
"Norma Sy Lugsanay" and "Anita Sy" refer to one and the same person, especially since the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City has
effected the correction. Considering that respondent has continuously used and has been known since childhood as "Norma Sy
Lugsanay" and as a Filipino citizen, the RTC granted the petition to avoid confusion. 16
On February 18, 2011, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC Order. The CA held that respondents failure to implead other indispensable
parties was cured upon the publication of the Order setting the case for hearing in a newspaper of general circulation for three (3)
consecutive weeks and by serving a copy of the notice to the Local Civil Registrar, the OSG and the City Prosecutors Office. 17 As to
whether the petition is a collateral attack on respondents filiation, the CA ruled in favor of respondent, considering that her parents
were not legally married and that her siblings birth certificates uniformly state that their surname is Lugsanay and their citizenship is
Filipino.18 Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated July 27, 2011.
Hence, the present petition on the sole ground that the petition is dismissible for failure to implead indispensable parties.
Cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry is governed by Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which
has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with
the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.
SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be
cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f)
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j)
naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.
SEC. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have
or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and Publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of
the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order
to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.

SEC. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or
correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his
opposition thereto.
SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. The court in which the proceeding is brought may make orders expediting the proceedings, and
may also grant preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings.
SEC. 7. Order. After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the cancellation or correction
prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall annotate the
same in his record.19
In this case, respondent sought the correction of entries in her birth certificate, particularly those pertaining to her first name,
surname and citizenship. She sought the correction allegedly to reflect the name which she has been known for since childhood,
including her legal documents such as passport and school and professional records. She likewise relied on the birth certificates of her
full blood siblings who bear the surname "Lugsanay" instead of "Sy" and citizenship of "Filipino" instead of "Chinese." The changes,
however, are obviously not mere clerical as they touch on respondents filiation and citizenship. In changing her surname from "Sy"
(which is the surname of her father) to "Lugsanay" (which is the surname of her mother), she, in effect, changes her status from
legitimate to illegitimate; and in changing her citizenship from Chinese to Filipino, the same affects her rights and obligations in this
country. Clearly, the changes are substantial.
It has been settled in a number of cases starting with Republic v. Valencia 20 that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be
corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary
proceeding.21 The pronouncement of the Court in that case is illuminating:
It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for the correction of clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous
nature, but one involving nationality or citizenship, which is indisputably substantial as well as controverted, affirmative relief cannot
be granted in a proceeding summary in nature. However, it is also true that a right in law may be enforced and a wrong may be
remedied as long as the appropriate remedy is used. This Court adheres to the principle that even substantial errors in a civil registry
may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate
adversary proceeding. x x x
What is meant by "appropriate adversary proceeding?" Blacks Law Dictionary defines "adversary proceeding" as follows:
One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte application, one of which the party seeking relief has given
legal warning to the other party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. Excludes an adoption proceeding. 22
In sustaining the RTC decision, the CA relied on the Courts conclusion in Republic v. Kho, 23 Alba v. Court of Appeals,24 and Barco v.
Court of Appeals,25 that the failure to implead indispensable parties was cured by the publication of the notice of hearing pursuant to
the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. In Republic v. Kho, 26 petitioner therein appealed the RTC decision granting the petition
for correction of entries despite respondents failure to implead the minors mother as an indispensable party. The Court, however, did
not strictly apply the provisions of Rule 108, because it opined that it was highly improbable that the mother was unaware of the
proceedings to correct the entries in her childrens birth certificates especially since the notices, orders and decision of the trial court
were all sent to the residence she shared with them.27
In Alba v. Court of Appeals,28 the Court found nothing wrong with the trial courts decision granting the petition for correction of
entries filed by respondent although the proceedings was not actually known by petitioner. In that case, petitioners mother and
guardian was impleaded in the petition for correction of entries, and notices were sent to her address appearing in the subject birth
certificate. However, the notice was returned unserved, because apparently she no longer lived there. Thus, when she allegedly
learned of the granting of the petition, she sought the annulment of judgment which the Court denied. Considering that the petition
for correction of entries is a proceeding in rem, the Court held that acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner is,
therefore, not required and the absence of personal service was cured by the trial courts compliance with Rule 108 which requires
notice by publication.29
In Barco v. Court of Appeals,30 the Court addressed the question of whether the court acquired jurisdiction over petitioner and all
other indispensable parties to the petition for correction of entries despite the failure to implead them in said case. While recognizing
that petitioner was indeed an indispensable party, the failure to implead her was cured by compliance with Section 4 of Rule 108
which requires notice by publication. In so ruling, the Court pointed out that the petitioner in a petition for correction cannot be
presumed to be aware of all the parties whose interests may be affected by the granting of a petition. It emphasized that the
petitioner therein exerted earnest effort to comply with the provisions of Rule 108. Thus, the publication of the notice of hearing was
considered to have cured the failure to implead indispensable parties.
In this case, it was only the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City who was impleaded as respondent in the petition below. This,
notwithstanding, the RTC granted her petition and allowed the correction sought by respondent, which decision was affirmed in toto
by the CA.
We do not agree with the RTC and the CA.
This is not the first time that the Court is confronted with the issue involved in this case. Aside from Kho, Alba and Barco, the Court
has addressed the same in Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo, 31 Ceruila v. Delantar,32 and Labayo-Rowe v. Republic.33

In Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo,34 claiming that his parents were never legally married, respondent therein filed a petition to change
his name from "Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng Magpayo," the name appearing in his birth certificate to "Julian Edward Emerson
Marquez Lim Coseteng." The notice setting the petition for hearing was published and there being no opposition thereto, the trial
court issued an order of general default and eventually granted respondents petition deleting the entry on the date and place of
marriage of parties; correcting his surname from "Magpayo" to "Coseteng"; deleting the entry "Coseteng" for middle name; and
deleting the entry "Fulvio Miranda Magpayo, Jr." in the space for his father. The Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, assailed
the RTC decision on the grounds that the corrections made on respondents birth certificate had the effect of changing the civil status
from legitimate to illegitimate and must only be effected through an appropriate adversary proceeding. The Court nullified the RTC
decision for respondents failure to comply strictly with the procedure laid down in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Aside from the
wrong remedy availed of by respondent as he filed a petition for Change of Name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, assuming that
he filed a petition under Rule 108 which is the appropriate remedy, the petition still failed because of improper venue and failure to
implead the Civil Registrar of Makati City and all affected parties as respondents in the case.
In Ceruila v. Delantar,35 the Ceruilas filed a petition for the cancellation and annulment of the birth certificate of respondent on the
ground that the same was made as an instrument of the crime of simulation of birth and, therefore, invalid and spurious, and it
falsified all material entries therein. The RTC issued an order setting the case for hearing with a directive that the same be published
and that any person who is interested in the petition may interpose his comment or opposition on or before the scheduled hearing.
Summons was likewise sent to the Civil Register of Manila. After which, the trial court granted the petition and nullified respondents
birth certificate. Few months after, respondent filed a petition for the annulment of judgment claiming that she and her guardian were
not notified of the petition and the trial courts decision, hence, the latter was issued without jurisdiction and in violation of her right
to due process. The Court annulled the trial courts decision for failure to comply with the requirements of Rule 108, especially the
non-impleading of respondent herself whose birth certificate was nullified.1wphi1
In Labayo-Rowe v. Republic,36 petitioner filed a petition for the correction of entries in the birth certificates of her children, specifically
to change her name from Beatriz V. Labayu/Beatriz Labayo to Emperatriz Labayo, her civil status from "married" to "single," and the
date and place of marriage from "1953-Bulan" to "No marriage." The Court modified the trial courts decision by nullifying the portion
thereof which directs the change of petitioners civil status as well as the filiation of her child, because it was the OSG only that was
made respondent and the proceedings taken was summary in nature which is short of what is required in cases where substantial
alterations are sought.
Respondents birth certificate shows that her full name is Anita Sy, that she is a Chinese citizen and a legitimate child of Sy Ton and
Sotera Lugsanay. In filing the petition, however, she seeks the correction of her first name and surname, her status from "legitimate"
to "illegitimate" and her citizenship from "Chinese" to "Filipino." Thus, respondent should have impleaded and notified not only the
Local Civil Registrar but also her parents and siblings as the persons who have interest and are affected by the changes or corrections
respondent wanted to make.
The fact that the notice of hearing was published in a newspaper of general circulation and notice thereof was served upon the State
will not change the nature of the proceedings taken.37 A reading of Sections 4 and 5, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court shows that the
Rules mandate two sets of notices to different potential oppositors: one given to the persons named in the petition and another given
to other persons who are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered interested or affected parties. 38 Summons
must, therefore, be served not for the purpose of vesting the courts with jurisdiction but to comply with the requirements of fair play
and due process to afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect his interest if he so chooses. 39
While there may be cases where the Court held that the failure to implead and notify the affected or interested parties may be cured
by the publication of the notice of hearing, earnest efforts were made by petitioners in bringing to court all possible interested
parties.40 Such failure was likewise excused where the interested parties themselves initiated the corrections proceedings; 41 when
there is no actual or presumptive awareness of the existence of the interested parties; 42 or when a party is inadvertently left out.43
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register involves
substantial and controversial alterations, including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage,
a strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 ofthe Rules of Court is mandated. 44 If the entries in the civil register could be
corrected or changed through mere summary proceedings and not through appropriate action wherein all parties who may be
affected by the entries are notified or represented, the door to fraud or other mischief would be set open, the consequence of which
might be detrimental and far reaching.45
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated February 18, 2011 and
Resolution dated July 27, 20011 in CA-G.R. CV No. 00238-MIN, are SET ASIDE. Consequently, the June 28, 2004 Order of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 27, Gingoog City, in Spl. Proc. No. 230-2004 granting the Petition for Correction of Entry of Certificate of Live Birth
filed by respondent Dr. Norma S. Lugsanay Uy, is NULLIFIED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 196049

June 26, 2013

MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER,

vs.
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL
REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION

CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 107, Quezon City, through a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on a pure question of law. The petition assails the Order 1 dated 31 January 2011 of the
RTC in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 and its Resolution dated 2 March 2011 denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC
dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based on improper
venue and the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.
The Facts
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines 2
on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioners parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he
resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and
Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly
suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki. 3
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment
from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. 4 On 14 January
2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)."
Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and
Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines; 5 and (3) for the RTC to direct the
Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay
and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics
Office (NSO).6
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing the petition and withdrawing the case from
its active civil docket.7 The RTC cited the following provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC):
Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Venue. The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the petitioner or the respondent has been
residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing, or in the case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the
Philippines, at the election of the petitioner. x x x
The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross violation" of the above provisions. The trial court based its
dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which provides that "[f]ailure to comply with any of the preceding requirements
may be a ground for immediate dismissal of the petition." 8 Apparently, the RTC took the view that only "the husband or the wife," in
this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki.
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC contemplated ordinary civil actions for declaration
of nullity and annulment of marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply. A petition for recognition of foreign judgment is a
special proceeding, which "seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact," 9 and not a civil action which is "for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong." 10 In other words, the petition in the RTC sought to
establish (1) the status and concomitant rights of Fujiki and Marinay as husband and wife and (2) the fact of the rendition of the
Japanese Family Court judgment declaring the marriage between Marinay and Maekara as void on the ground of bigamy. The
petitioner contended that the Japanese judgment was consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines 11 on bigamy
and was therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine courts. 12
In any case, it was also Fujikis view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only to void marriages under Article 36 of the Family Code on
the ground of psychological incapacity.13 Thus, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC provides that "a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriages may be filed solely by the husband or the wife." To apply Section 2(a) in bigamy would be absurd

because only the guilty parties would be permitted to sue. In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of course, difficult to realize that the party
interested in having a bigamous marriage declared a nullity would be the husband in the prior, pre-existing marriage." 14 Fujiki had
material interest and therefore the personality to nullify a bigamous marriage.
Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court is applicable. Rule 108 is
the "procedural implementation" of the Civil Register Law (Act No. 3753) 15 in relation to Article 413 of the Civil Code. 16 The Civil
Register Law imposes a duty on the "successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to send a copy of the final decree of
the court to the local registrar of the municipality where the dissolved or annulled marriage was solemnized." 17 Section 2 of Rule 108
provides that entries in the civil registry relating to "marriages," "judgments of annulments of marriage" and "judgments declaring
marriages void from the beginning" are subject to cancellation or correction. 18 The petition in the RTC sought (among others) to
annotate the judgment of the Japanese Family Court on the certificate of marriage between Marinay and Maekara.
Fujikis motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial court "gravely erred" when, on its own, it dismissed the
petition based on improper venue. Fujiki stated that the RTC may be confusing the concept of venue with the concept of jurisdiction,
because it is lack of jurisdiction which allows a court to dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate
Court19 which held that the "trial court cannot pre-empt the defendants prerogative to object to the improper laying of the venue by
motu proprio dismissing the case." 20 Moreover, petitioner alleged that the trial court should not have "immediately dismissed" the
petition under Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC because he substantially complied with the provision.
On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioners motion for reconsideration. In its Resolution, the RTC stated that A.M. No. 0211-10-SC applies because the petitioner, in effect, prays for a decree of absolute nullity of marriage. 21 The trial court reiterated its two
grounds for dismissal, i.e. lack of personality to sue and improper venue under Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC
considered Fujiki as a "third person"22 in the proceeding because he "is not the husband in the decree of divorce issued by the
Japanese Family Court, which he now seeks to be judicially recognized, x x x." 23 On the other hand, the RTC did not explain its ground
of impropriety of venue. It only said that "[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x as a ground for dismissal of this case[,] it
should be taken together with the other ground cited by the Court x x x which is Sec. 2(a) x x x." 24
The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition based on Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City,
Negros Occidental.25 The Court in Braza ruled that "[i]n a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or
Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages x x x." 26 Braza emphasized that
the "validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper
party, and not through a collateral attack such as [a] petition [for correction of entry] x x x." 27
The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of marriage between Marinay and Maekara. The trial court held
that this is a "jurisdictional ground" to dismiss the petition. 28 Moreover, the verification and certification against forum shopping of the
petition was not authenticated as required under Section 5 29 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Hence, this also warranted the "immediate
dismissal" of the petition under the same provision.
The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General and the Letters of Marinay and Maekara
On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on the petition for review. 30 The public respondents, the Local
Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the NSO, participated through the Office of the
Solicitor General. Instead of a comment, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion. 31
The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTCs "pronouncement that the petitioner failed to comply with x x
x A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC x x x be set aside" and that the case be reinstated in the trial court for further proceedings. 32 The Solicitor
General argued that Fujiki, as the spouse of the first marriage, is an injured party who can sue to declare the bigamous marriage
between Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor General cited Juliano-Llave v. Republic33 which held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 0211-10-SC does not apply in cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave, this Court explained:
[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only discovered during the connubial period that the
marriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss had already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit
from the bigamous marriage, it would not be expected that they would file an action to declare the marriage void and thus, in such
circumstance, the "injured spouse" who should be given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting previous marriage. The latter is
clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior
marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be a reminder of
the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is protected by the Constitution. 34
The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding.35 In Corpuz v. Santo Tomas,36 this Court held that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule
108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the
status or right of a party or a particular fact." 37 While Corpuz concerned a foreign divorce decree, in the present case the Japanese
Family Court judgment also affected the civil status of the parties, especially Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen.

The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the procedure to record "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees
concerning the civil status of persons" in the civil registry as required by Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other words, "[t]he law
requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences upon a persons legal capacity and status x
x x."38 The Japanese Family Court judgment directly bears on the civil status of a Filipino citizen and should therefore be proven as a
fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.
Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void marriage under Rule 108, citing De
Castro v. De Castro39 and Nial v. Bayadog40 which declared that "[t]he validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked." 41
Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the directive for them to comment on the petition. 42
Maekara wrote that Marinay concealed from him the fact that she was previously married to Fujiki. 43 Maekara also denied that he
inflicted any form of violence on Marinay.44 On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she had no reason to oppose the petition. 45 She
would like to maintain her silence for fear that anything she say might cause misunderstanding between her and Fujiki. 46
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following legal issues:
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 0211-10-SC) is applicable.
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the
subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or correction of
entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petition.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not
apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a
foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic,47 this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or
wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage "does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy." 48
I.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a
foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a
copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to
Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.49 Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an official
publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in
a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign
service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office.50
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment would mean that the trial court and the
parties should follow its provisions, including the form and contents of the petition, 51 the service of summons,52 the investigation of
the public prosecutor,53 the setting of pre-trial,54 the trial55 and the judgment of the trial court.56 This is absurd because it will litigate
the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to limit repetitive litigation on claims and
issues."57 The interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case on the merits. In Mijares v. Raada,58 this Court
explained that "[i]f every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her
original cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation." 59
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal capacity of its parties. However, the
effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must
determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws. 60 Article 15 of the Civil Code
provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon
citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad." This is the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine
State may require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its citizen, over
whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal capacity of such citizen.

A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation under a Philippine court of the case
as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under
which the foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the
foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact
according to the rules of evidence.
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final order against a person creates a "presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of
Court states that "the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not
allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can
only be repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e. , "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact." The rule on limited review embodies the policy of efficiency and the protection of party expectations, 61 as well
as respecting the jurisdiction of other states.62
Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine courts have recognized foreign divorce decrees between a Filipino and a foreign
citizen if they are successfully proven under the rules of evidence. 64 Divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the
recognition of a foreign divorce decree does not involve the extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary
trial. While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained
a divorce decree abroad.65
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court
judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article
35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the
Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of
Court.
II.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court
provides that "[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." Rule 108
creates a remedy to rectify facts of a persons life which are recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753.
These are facts of public consequence such as birth, death or marriage, 66 which the State has an interest in recording. As noted by
the Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in
a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to
establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact." 67
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which
has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with
the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay
and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he
has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry
on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted
and the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous
marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of
the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances 68) his most intimate human relation, but also to protect his property
interests that arise by operation of law the moment he contracts marriage. 69 These property interests in marriage include the right to
be supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the family" 70 and preserving the property regime of the marriage. 71
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, 72 but a spouses right in a marriage extends further to
relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code. 73 A.M. No. 02-1110-SC cannot "diminish, increase, or modify" the substantive right of the spouse to maintain the integrity of his marriage. 74 In any
case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right by limiting the personality to sue to the husband or the
wife of the union recognized by law.

Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to question the validity of a subsequent
marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife"75it refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are
neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the
personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the beginning, is the civil aspect of Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code,76 which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy because
any citizen has an interest in the prosecution and prevention of crimes. 77 If anyone can file a criminal action which leads to the
declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage, 78 there is more reason to confer personality to sue on the husband or the wife of a
subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the public interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also
personally interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting his marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an injured party and is therefore interested in
the judgment of the suit.79 Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse "is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only
threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the
prior spouse."80 Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this
purpose, he can petition a court to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a fact that
such judgment is effective in the Philippines. Once established, there should be no more impediment to cancel the entry of the
bigamous marriage in the civil registry.
III.
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this Court held that a "trial court has no jurisdiction to
nullify marriages" in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. 81 Thus, the
"validity of marriage[] x x x can be questioned only in a direct action" to nullify the marriage. 82 The RTC relied on Braza in dismissing
the petition for recognition of foreign judgment as a collateral attack on the marriage between Marinay and Maekara.
Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage where one
of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a
marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the
Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited
grounds for the dissolution of marriage,83 support pendente lite of the spouses and children,84 the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses,85 and the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion. 86 A direct action
for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts
under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry
may be filed in the Regional Trial Court "where the corresponding civil registry is located." 87 In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot
dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry entry based on the recognition of a foreign
judgment annulling a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. There is neither circumvention of the
substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369.
A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the
effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under foreign law. The procedure in
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the foreign court.
Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino
spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code provides that "[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law." In Republic v. Orbecido,88 this Court recognized the legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article
26 which is "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a
divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse"89 under the laws of his or her country. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code only authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does
not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a case for divorce.
The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the anomaly that results from a marriage between a
Filipino, whose laws do not allow divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse
being tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. The correction is made by
extending in the Philippines the effect of the foreign divorce decree, which is already effective in the country where it was rendered.

The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is based on this Courts decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo90 which declared that
the Filipino spouse "should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served." 91
The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino and a foreign citizen who obtains a foreign
judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the marriage void
on the ground of bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code applies because the foreign spouse,
after the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or her country. If the foreign
judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be discriminatedthe foreign spouse can remarry while the
Filipino spouse cannot remarry.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are empowered to correct a situation where the Filipino
spouse is still tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code,
Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the foreign
judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. A critical difference between the case of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine
public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the
option to undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only
remedy available to him or her. Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage,
without prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their judgment on how a case was decided
under foreign law. They cannot decide on the "family rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity" of the foreign
citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to extend the effect of a
foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country,
Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15
of the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public policy
in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public
policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of the
comity of nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that the foreign judgment is already "presumptive evidence of a
right between the parties." Upon recognition of the foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the
basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a new status, right and fact 92 that needs to be reflected in the civil registry.
Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency between the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public records in
the Philippines.1wphi1
However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is without prejudice to prosecution for bigamy under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.93 The recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for
extinction of criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised Penal
Code, "[t]he term of prescription [of the crime of bigamy] shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine archipelago."
Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the need to address the questions on venue and the contents
and form of the petition under Sections 4 and 5, respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011 and the Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to
REINSTATE the petition for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 189538

February 10, 2014

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the Regional Trial Court1 (RTC) Decision2 dated
May 5, 2009 and Order3 dated August 25, 2009 in SP. Proc. No. 16519-CEB. The assailed decision granted respondent Merlinda L.
Olaybar's petition for cancellation of entries in the latter's marriage contract; while the assailed order denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner Republic of the Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
The facts of the case are as follows:
Respondent requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate of No Marriage (CENOMAR) as one of the requirements
for her marriage with her boyfriend of five years. Upon receipt thereof, she discovered that she was already married to a certain Ye
Son Sune, a Korean National, on June 24, 2002, at the Office of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Palace of Justice. She denied
having contracted said marriage and claimed that she did not know the alleged husband; she did not appear before the solemnizing
officer; and, that the signature appearing in the marriage certificate is not hers.4 She, thus, filed a Petition for Cancellation of Entries
in the Marriage Contract, especially the entries in the wife portion thereof.5 Respondent impleaded the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu
City, as well as her alleged husband, as parties to the case.
During trial, respondent testified on her behalf and explained that she could not have appeared before Judge Mamerto Califlores, the
supposed solemnizing officer, at the time the marriage was allegedly celebrated, because she was then in Makati working as a
medical distributor in Hansao Pharma. She completely denied having known the supposed husband, but she revealed that she
recognized the named witnesses to the marriage as she had met them while she was working as a receptionist in Tadels Pension
House. She believed that her name was used by a certain Johnny Singh, who owned a travel agency, whom she gave her personal
circumstances in order for her to obtain a passport.6 Respondent also presented as witness a certain Eufrocina Natinga, an employee
of MTCC, Branch 1, who confirmed that the marriage of Ye Son Sune was indeed celebrated in their office, but claimed that the
alleged wife who appeared was definitely not respondent.7 Lastly, a document examiner testified that the signature appearing in the
marriage contract was forged.8
On May 5, 2009, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, the petition is granted in favor of the petitioner, Merlinda L. Olaybar. The Local Civil
Registrar of Cebu City is directed to cancel all the entries in the WIFE portion of the alleged marriage contract of the petitioner and
respondent Ye Son Sune.
SO ORDERED.9
Finding that the signature appearing in the subject marriage contract was not that of respondent, the court found basis in granting
the latters prayer to straighten her record and rectify the terrible mistake.10
Petitioner, however, moved for the reconsideration of the assailed Decision on the grounds that: (1) there was no clerical spelling,
typographical and other innocuous errors in the marriage contract for it to fall within the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court;
and (2) granting the cancellation of all the entries in the wife portion of the alleged marriage contract is, in effect, declaring the
marriage void ab initio.11
In an Order dated August 25, 2009, the RTC denied petitioners motion for reconsideration couched in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the court hereby denies the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Republic of the Philippines. Furnish copies of this
order to the Office of the Solicitor General, the petitioners counsel, and all concerned government agencies.
SO ORDERED.12
Contrary to petitioners stand, the RTC held that it had jurisdiction to take cognizance of cases for correction of entries even on
substantial errors under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court being the appropriate adversary proceeding required. Considering that
respondents identity was used by an unknown person to contract marriage with a Korean national, it would not be feasible for
respondent to institute an action for declaration of nullity of marriage since it is not one of the void marriages under Articles 35 and
36 of the Family Code.13
Petitioner now comes before the Court in this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal
of the assailed RTC Decision and Order based on the following grounds:
I.
RULE 108 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT APPLIES ONLY WHEN THERE ARE ERRORS IN THE ENTRIES SOUGHT TO BE CANCELLED
OR CORRECTED.

II.
GRANTING THE CANCELLATION OF "ALL THE ENTRIES IN THE WIFE PORTION OF THE ALLEGED MARRIAGE CONTRACT," IS IN EFFECT
DECLARING THE MARRIAGE VOID AB INITIO.14
Petitioner claims that there are no errors in the entries sought to be cancelled or corrected, because the entries made in the
certificate of marriage are the ones provided by the person who appeared and represented herself as Merlinda L. Olaybar and are, in
fact, the latters personal circumstances.15 In directing the cancellation of the entries in the wife portion of the certificate of
marriage, the RTC, in effect, declared the marriage null and void ab initio.16 Thus, the petition instituted by respondent is actually a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage in the guise of a Rule 108 proceeding.17
We deny the petition.
At the outset, it is necessary to stress that a direct recourse to this Court from the decisions and final orders of the RTC may be taken
where only questions of law are raised or involved. There is a question of law when the doubt arises as to what the law is on a certain
state of facts, which does not call for the examination of the probative value of the evidence of the parties.18 Here, the issue raised
by petitioner is whether or not the cancellation of entries in the marriage contract which, in effect, nullifies the marriage may be
undertaken in a Rule 108 proceeding. Verily, petitioner raised a pure question of law.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets forth the rules on cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry, to wit:
SEC. 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of
persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any
entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.
SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil register
may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of
marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments
of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial
determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.
SEC. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons
who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and Publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the
hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall
also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in
the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or
correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such
notice, file his opposition thereto.
SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. The court in which the proceedings is brought may make orders expediting the
proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such
proceedings.
SEC. 7. Order. After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the cancellation or
correction prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned who
shall annotate the same in his record.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings
may either be summary or adversary. If the correction is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification
affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary.
Since the promulgation of Republic v. Valencia19 in 1986, the Court has repeatedly ruled that "even substantial errors in a civil
registry may be corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108, with the true facts established and the parties aggrieved by the
error availing themselves of the appropriate adversarial proceeding."20 An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the
trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have
been given opportunity to demolish the opposite partys case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and
considered.21

It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing may be dispensed with, and the remedy [is] granted upon mere
application or motion. However, a special proceeding is not always summary. The procedure laid down in Rule 108 is not a summary
proceeding per se. It requires publication of the petition; it mandates the inclusion as parties of all persons who may claim interest
which would be affected by the cancellation or correction; it also requires the civil registrar and any person in interest to file their
opposition, if any; and it states that although the court may make orders expediting the proceedings, it is after hearing that the court
shall either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the same. Thus, as long as the procedural requirements in Rule 108 are
followed, it is the appropriate adversary proceeding to effect substantial corrections and changes in entries of the civil register.22
In this case, the entries made in the wife portion of the certificate of marriage are admittedly the personal circumstances of
respondent. The latter, however, claims that her signature was forged and she was not the one who contracted marriage with the
purported husband. In other words, she claims that no such marriage was entered into or if there was, she was not the one who
entered into such contract. It must be recalled that when respondent tried to obtain a CENOMAR from the NSO, it appeared that she
was married to a certain Ye Son Sune. She then sought the cancellation of entries in the wife portion of the marriage certificate.
In filing the petition for correction of entry under Rule 108, respondent made the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her
alleged husband Ye Son Sune, as parties-respondents. It is likewise undisputed that the procedural requirements set forth in Rule 108
were complied with. The Office of the Solicitor General was likewise notified of the petition which in turn authorized the Office of the
City Prosecutor to participate in the proceedings. More importantly, trial was conducted where respondent herself, the stenographer
of the court where the alleged marriage was conducted, as well as a document examiner, testified. Several documents were also
considered as evidence. With the testimonies and other evidence presented, the trial court found that the signature appearing in the
subject marriage certificate was different from respondents signature appearing in some of her government issued identification
cards.23 The court thus made a categorical conclusion that respondents signature in the marriage certificate was not hers and,
therefore, was forged. Clearly, it was established that, as she claimed in her petition, no such marriage was celebrated.
Indeed the Court made a pronouncement in the recent case of Minoru Fujiki v. Maria Paz Galela Marinay, Shinichi Maekara, Local Civil
Registrar of Quezon City, and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the National Statistics Office24 that:
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a
marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the
Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited
grounds for the dissolution of marriage, support pendente lite of the spouses and children, the liquidation, partition and distribution of
the properties of the spouses and the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion. A direct action for declaration of
nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family
Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the
Regional Trial Court where the corresponding civil registry is located. In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by
the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to show the existence of marriage.1wphi1 Rather,
respondent showed by overwhelming evidence that no marriage was entered into and that she was not even aware of such existence.
The testimonial and documentary evidence clearly established that the only "evidence" of marriage which is the marriage certificate
was a forgery. While we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage, we cannot nullify the
proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had been given the opportunity to contest the allegations of respondent; the
procedures were followed, and all the evidence of the parties had already been admitted and examined. Respondent indeed sought,
not the nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to speak of, but the correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the
truth as set forth by the evidence. Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the
wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there was no marriage to speak of.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Regional Trial Court Decision dated May 5, 2009 and
Order dated August 25, 2009 in SP. Proc. No. 16519-CEB, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
PREROGATIVE WRITS
G.R. No. 182484

June 17, 2008

DANIEL MASANGKAY TAPUZ, AURORA TAPUZ-MADRIAGA, LIBERTY M. ASUNCION, LADYLYN BAMOS MADRIAGA, EVERLY
TAPUZ MADRIAGA, EXCEL TAPUZ, IVAN TAPUZ AND MARIAN TIMBAS, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE ELMO DEL ROSARIO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC Br. 5 Kalibo, SHERIFF NELSON DELA
CRUZ, in his capacity as Sheriff of the RTC, THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE stationed in Boracay Island, represented
by the PNP STATION COMMANDER, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN CEBU 18 th DIVISION, SPOUSES GREGORIO
SANSON & MA. LOURDES T. SANSON, respondents.

RESOLUTION
BRION, J.:
Before us for the determination of sufficiency of form and substance (pursuant to Sections 1 and 4 of Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court; Sections 1 and 5 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo;1 and Sections 1 and 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data2) is the
petition for certiorari and for the issuance of the writs of amparo and habeas data filed by the above-named petitioners against the
Honorable Judge Elmo del Rosario [in his capacity as presiding judge of RTC Br. 5, Kalibo], Sheriff Nelson de la Cruz [in his capacity as
Sheriff of the RTC], the Philippine National Police stationed in Boracay Island, represented by the PNP Station Commander, the
Honorable Court of Appeals in Cebu, 18th Division, and the spouses Gregorio Sanson and Ma. Lourdes T. Sanson, respondents.
The petition and its annexes disclose the following material antecedents:
The private respondents spouses Gregorio Sanson and Ma. Lourdes T. Sanson (the "private respondents"), filed with the Fifth
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Buruanga-Malay, Aklan (the "MCTC") a complaint3 dated 24 April 2006 for forcible entry and damages
with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the petitioners Daniel Masangkay Tapuz, Aurora
Tapuz-Madriaga, Liberty M. Asuncion, Ladylyn Bamos Madriaga, Everly Tapuz Madriaga, Excel Tapuz, Ivan Tapuz and Marian Timbas
(the "petitioners") and other John Does numbering about 120. The private respondents alleged in their complaint that: (1) they are
the registered owners under TCT No. 35813 of a 1.0093-hectare parcel of land located at Sitio Pinaungon, Balabag, Boracay, Malay,
Aklan (the "disputed land"); (2) they were the disputed land's prior possessors when the petitioners - armed with bolos and carrying
suspected firearms and together with unidentified persons numbering 120 - entered the disputed land by force and intimidation,
without the private respondents' permission and against the objections of the private respondents' security men, and built thereon a
nipa and bamboo structure.
In their Answer4 dated 14 May 2006, the petitioners denied the material allegations of the complaint. They essentially claimed that:
(1) they are the actual and prior possessors of the disputed land; (2) on the contrary, the private respondents are the intruders; and
(3) the private respondents' certificate of title to the disputed property is spurious. They asked for the dismissal of the complaint and
interposed a counterclaim for damages.
The MCTC, after due proceedings, rendered on 2 January 2007 a decision 5 in the private respondents' favor. It found prior possession the key issue in forcible entry cases - in the private respondents' favor, thus:
"The key that could unravel the answer to this question lies in the Amended Commissioner's Report and Sketch found on
pages 245 to 248 of the records and the evidence the parties have submitted. It is shown in the Amended Commissioner's
Report and Sketch that the land in question is enclosed by a concrete and cyclone wire perimeter fence in pink and green
highlighter as shown in the Sketch Plan (p. 248). Said perimeter fence was constructed by the plaintiffs 14 years ago. The
foregoing findings of the Commissioner in his report and sketch collaborated the claim of the plaintiffs that after they
acquired the land in question on May 27, 1993 through a Deed of Sale (Annex 'A', Affidavit of Gregorio Sanson, p. 276, rec.),
they caused the construction of the perimeter fence sometime in 1993 (Affidavit of Gregorio Sanson, pp. 271-275, rec.).
From the foregoing established facts, it could be safely inferred that the plaintiffs were in actual physical possession of the
whole lot in question since 1993 when it was interrupted by the defendants (sic) when on January 4, 2005 claiming to (sic)
the Heirs of Antonio Tapuz entered a portion of the land in question with view of inhabiting the same and building structures
therein prompting plaintiff Gregorio Sanson to confront them before BSPU, Police Chief Inspector Jack L. Wanky and Barangay
Captain Glenn Sacapao. As a result of their confrontation, the parties signed an Agreement (Annex 'D', Complaint p. 20)
wherein they agreed to vacate the disputed portion of the land in question and agreed not to build any structures thereon.
The foregoing is the prevailing situation of the parties after the incident of January 4, 2005 when the plaintiff posted security
guards, however, sometime on or about 6:30 A.M. of April 19, 2006, the defendants some with bolos and one carrying a sack
suspected to contain firearms with other John Does numbering about 120 persons by force and intimidation forcibly entered
the premises along the road and built a nipa and bamboo structure (Annex 'E', Complaint, p. 11) inside the lot in question
which incident was promptly reported to the proper authorities as shown by plaintiffs' Certification (Annex 'F', Complaint, p.
12) of the entry in the police blotter and on same date April 19, 2006, the plaintiffs filed a complaint with the Office of the
Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay Balabag, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan but no settlement was reached as shown in their
Certificate to File Action (Annex 'G', Complaint, p. 13); hence the present action.
Defendants' (sic) contend in their answer that 'prior to January 4, 2005, they were already occupants of the property, being
indigenous settlers of the same, under claim of ownership by open continuous, adverse possession to the exclusion of other
(sic)'. (Paragraph 4, Answer, p. 25).
The contention is untenable. As adverted earlier, the land in question is enclosed by a perimeter fence constructed by the
plaintiffs sometime in 1993 as noted by the Commissioner in his Report and reflected in his Sketch, thus, it is safe to
conclude that the plaintiffs where (sic) in actual physical possession of the land in question from 1993 up to April 19, 2006

when they were ousted therefrom by the defendants by means of force. Applying by analogy the ruling of the Honorable
Supreme Court in the case of Molina, et al. vs. De Bacud, 19 SCRA 956, if the land were in the possession of plaintiffs from
1993 to April 19, 2006, defendants' claims to an older possession must be rejected as untenable because possession as a
fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two different personalities.
Defendants likewise contend that it was the plaintiffs who forcibly entered the land in question on April 18, 2006 at about
3:00 o'clock in the afternoon as shown in their Certification (Annex 'D', Defendants' Position Paper, p. 135, rec.).
The contention is untenable for being inconsistent with their allegations made to the commissioner who constituted (sic) the
land in question that they built structures on the land in question only on April 19, 2006 (Par. D.4, Commissioner's Amended
Report, pp. 246 to 247), after there (sic) entry thereto on even date.
Likewise, said contention is contradicted by the categorical statements of defendants' witnesses, Rowena Onag, Apolsida
Umambong, Ariel Gac, Darwin Alvarez and Edgardo Pinaranda, in their Joint Affidavit (pp. 143- '144, rec.) [sic] categorically
stated 'that on or about April 19, 2006, a group of armed men entered the property of our said neighbors and built plastic
roofed tents. These armed men threatened to drive our said neighbors away from their homes but they refused to leave and
resisted the intruding armed men'.
From the foregoing, it could be safely inferred that no incident of forcible entry happened on April 18, 2006 but it was only on
April 19, 2006 when the defendants overpowered by their numbers the security guards posted by the plaintiffs prior to the
controversy.
Likewise, defendants (sic) alleged burnt and other structures depicted in their pictures attached as annexes to their position
paper were not noted and reflected in the amended report and sketch submitted by the Commissioner, hence, it could be
safely inferred that these structures are built and (sic) situated outside the premises of the land in question, accordingly,
they are irrelevant to the instant case and cannot be considered as evidence of their actual possession of the land in
question prior to April 19, 20066."
The petitioners appealed the MCTC decision to the Regional Trial Court ("RTC," Branch 6 of Kalibo, Aklan) then presided over by Judge
Niovady M. Marin ("Judge Marin").
On appeal, Judge Marin granted the private respondents' motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
through an Order dated 26 February 2007, with the issuance conditioned on the private respondents' posting of a bond. The writ 7 authorizing the immediate implementation of the MCTC decision - was actually issued by respondent Judge Elmo F. del Rosario (the
"respondent Judge") on 12 March 2007 after the private respondents had complied with the imposed condition. The petitioners moved
to reconsider the issuance of the writ; the private respondents, on the other hand, filed a motion for demolition.
The respondent Judge subsequently denied the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and to Defer Enforcement of Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction in an Order dated 17 May 20078.
Meanwhile, the petitioners opposed the motion for demolition.9 The respondent Judge nevertheless issued via a Special Order 10 a writ
of demolition to be implemented fifteen (15) days after the Sheriff's written notice to the petitioners to voluntarily demolish their
house/s to allow the private respondents to effectively take actual possession of the land.
The petitioners thereafter filed on 2 August 2007 with the Court of Appeals, Cebu City, a Petition for Review 11 (under Rule 42 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) of the Permanent Mandatory Injunction and Order of Demolition of the RTC of Kalibo, Br. 6 in
Civil Case No. 7990.
Meanwhile, respondent Sheriff Nelson R. dela Cruz issued the Notice to Vacate and for Demolition on 19 March 2008. 12
It was against this factual backdrop that the petitioners filed the present petition last 29 April 2008. The petition contains and prays
for three remedies, namely: a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court; the issuance of a writ of habeas data
under the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data; and finally, the issuance of the writ of amparo under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
To support the petition and the remedies prayed for, the petitioners present factual positions diametrically opposed to the MCTC's
findings and legal reasons. Most importantly, the petitioners maintain their claims of prior possession of the disputed land and of
intrusion into this land by the private respondents. The material factual allegations of the petition - bases as well of the petition for
the issuance of the writ of amparo - read:
"29. On April 29, 2006 at about 9:20 a.m. armed men sporting 12 gauge shot guns intruded into the property of the
defendants [the land in dispute]. They were not in uniform. They fired their shotguns at the defendants. Later the following
day at 2:00 a.m. two houses of the defendants were burned to ashes.

30. These armed men [without uniforms] removed the barbed wire fence put up by defendants to protect their property from
intruders. Two of the armed men trained their shotguns at the defendants who resisted their intrusion. One of them who was
identified as SAMUEL LONGNO y GEGANSO, 19 years old, single, and a resident of Binun-an, Batad, Iloilo, fired twice.
31. The armed men torched two houses of the defendants reducing them to ashes. [...]
32. These acts of TERRORISM and (heinous crime) of ARSON were reported by one of the HEIRS OF ANTONIO
TAPUZ [...]. The terrorists trained their shotguns and fired at minors namely IVAN GAJISAN and MICHAEL
MAGBANUA, who resisted their intrusion. Their act is a blatant violation of the law penalizing Acts of Violence
against women and children, which is aggravated by the use of high-powered weapons.
[]
34. That the threats to the life and security of the poor indigent and unlettered petitioners continue because the private
respondents Sansons have under their employ armed men and they are influential with the police authorities owing to their
financial and political clout.
35. The actual prior occupancy, as well as the ownership of the lot in dispute by defendants and the atrocities of the
terrorists [introduced into the property in dispute by the plaintiffs] are attested by witnesses who are persons not related to
the defendants are therefore disinterested witnesses in the case namely: Rowena Onag, Apolsida Umambong, Ariel Gac,
Darwin Alvarez and Edgardo Penarada. Likewise, the affidavit of Nemia T. Carmen is submitted to prove that the plaintiffs
resorted to atrocious acts through hired men in their bid to unjustly evict the defendants. 13"
The petitioners posit as well that the MCTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint for forcible entry that the private respondents filed
below. Citing Section 33 of The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691,14 they maintain that the
forcible entry case in fact involves issues of title to or possession of real property or an interest therein, with the assessed value of the
property involved exceeding P20,000.00; thus, the case should be originally cognizable by the RTC. Accordingly, the petitioners
reason out that the RTC - to where the MCTC decision was appealed - equally has no jurisdiction to rule on the case on appeal and
could not have validly issued the assailed orders.
OUR RULING
We find the petitions for certiorari and issuance of a writ of habeas data fatally defective, both in substance and in
form. The petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo, on the other hand, is fatally defective with respect to
content and substance.
The Petition for Certiorari
We conclude, based on the outlined material antecedents that led to the petition, that the petition for certiorari to nullify the assailed
RTC orders has been filed out of time. It is not lost on us that the petitioners have a pending petition with the Court of Appeals (the
"CA petition") for the review of the same RTC orders now assailed in the present petition, although the petitioners never disclosed in
the body of the present petition the exact status of their pending CA petition. The CA petition, however, was filed with the Court of
Appeals on 2 August 2007, which indicates to us that the assailed orders (or at the very least, the latest of the interrelated assailed
orders) were received on 1 August 2007 at the latest. The present petition, on the other hand, was filed on April 29, 2008 or more
than eight months from the time the CA petition was filed. Thus, the present petition is separated in point of time from the assumed
receipt of the assailed RTC orders by at least eight (8) months, i.e., beyond the reglementary period of sixty (60) days 15 from receipt
of the assailed order or orders or from notice of the denial of a seasonably filed motion for reconsideration.
We note in this regard that the petitioners' counsel stated in his attached "Certificate of Compliance with Circular #1-88 of the
Supreme Court"16 ("Certificate of Compliance") that "in the meantime the RTC and the Sheriff issued a NOTICE TO VACATE AND FOR
DEMOLITION not served to counsel but to the petitioners who sent photo copy of the same NOTICE to their counsel on April 18, 2008
by LBC." To guard against any insidious argument that the present petition is timely filed because of this Notice to Vacate, we feel it
best to declare now that the counting of the 60-day reglementary period under Rule 65 cannot start from the April 18, 2008 date
cited by the petitioners' counsel. The Notice to Vacate and for Demolition is not an order that exists independently from the RTC
orders assailed in this petition and in the previously filed CA petition. It is merely a notice, made in compliance with one of the
assailed orders, and is thus an administrative enforcement medium that has no life of its own separately from the assailed order on
which it is based. It cannot therefore be the appropriate subject of an independent petition for certiorari under Rule 65 in the context
of this case. The April 18, 2008 date cannot likewise be the material date for Rule 65 purposes as the above-mentioned Notice to
Vacate is not even directly assailed in this petition, as the petition's Prayer patently shows. 17
Based on the same material antecedents, we find too that the petitioners have been guilty of willful and deliberate misrepresentation
before this Court and, at the very least, of forum shopping.

By the petitioners' own admissions, they filed a petition with the Court of Appeals (docketed as CA - G.R. SP No. 02859) for the review
of the orders now also assailed in this petition, but brought the present recourse to us, allegedly because "the CA did not act on the
petition up to this date and for the petitioner (sic) to seek relief in the CA would be a waste of time and would render the case moot
and academic since the CA refused to resolve pending urgent motions and the Sheriff is determined to enforce a writ of demolition
despite the defect of LACK OF JURISDICTION."18
Interestingly, the petitioners' counsel - while making this claim in the body of the petition - at the same time represented in his
Certificate of Compliance19 that:
"x x x
(e) the petitioners went up to the Court of Appeals to question the WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION copy of the petition is
attached (sic);
(f) the CA initially issued a resolution denying the PETITION because it held that the ORDER TO VACATE AND
FOR DEMOLITION OF THE HOMES OF PETITIONERS is not capable of being the subject of a PETITION FOR
RELIEF, copy of the resolution of the CA is attached hereto; (underscoring supplied)
(g) Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on August 7, 2007 but up to this date the same had not been resolved copy
of the MR is attached (sic).
x x x"
The difference between the above representations on what transpired at the appellate court level is replete with significance
regarding the petitioners' intentions. We discern -- from the petitioners' act of misrepresenting in the body of their petition that "the
CA did not act on the petition up to this date" while stating the real Court of Appeals action in the Certification of Compliance -- the
intent to hide the real state of the remedies the petitioners sought below in order to mislead us into action on the RTC orders without
frontally considering the action that the Court of Appeals had already undertaken.
At the very least, the petitioners are obviously seeking to obtain from us, via the present petition, the same relief that it could not
wait for from the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 02859. The petitioners' act of seeking against the same parties the nullification of
the same RTC orders before the appellate court and before us at the same time, although made through different mediums that are
both improperly used, constitutes willful and deliberate forum shopping that can sufficiently serve as basis for the summary dismissal
of the petition under the combined application of the fourth and penultimate paragraphs of Section 3, Rule 46; Section 5, Rule 7;
Section 1, Rule 65; and Rule 56, all of the Revised Rules of Court. That a wrong remedy may have been used with the Court of
Appeals and possibly with us will not save the petitioner from a forum-shopping violation where there is identity of parties, involving
the same assailed interlocutory orders, with the recourses existing side by side at the same time.
To restate the prevailing rules, "forum shopping is the institution of two or more actions or proceedings involving the same parties for
the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, on the supposition that one or the other court would make a
favorable disposition. Forum shopping may be resorted to by any party against whom an adverse judgment or order has been issued
in one forum, in an attempt to seek a favorable opinion in another, other than by appeal or a special civil action for certiorari. Forum
shopping trifles with the courts, abuses their processes, degrades the administration of justice and congest court dockets. Willful and
deliberate violation of the rule against it is a ground for summary dismissal of the case; it may also constitute direct contempt." 20
Additionally, the required verification and certification of non-forum shopping is defective as one (1) of the seven (7) petitioners - Ivan
Tapuz - did not sign, in violation of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 7; Section 3, Rule 46; Section 1, Rule 65; all in relation with Rule 56 of the
Revised Rules of Court. Of those who signed, only five (5) exhibited their postal identification cards with the Notary Public.
In any event, we find the present petition for certiorari, on its face and on the basis of the supporting attachments, to be devoid of
merit. The MCTC correctly assumed jurisdiction over the private respondents' complaint, which specifically alleged a cause for forcible
entry and not - as petitioners may have misread or misappreciated - a case involving title to or possession of realty or an interest
therein. Under Section 33, par. 2 of The Judiciary Reorganization Act, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691, exclusive
jurisdiction over forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases lies with the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts. These first-level courts have had jurisdiction over these cases - called accion interdictal - even before the R.A.
7691 amendment, based on the issue of pure physical possession (as opposed to the right of possession). This jurisdiction is
regardless of the assessed value of the property involved; the law established no distinctions based on the assessed value of the
property forced into or unlawfully detained. Separately from accion interdictal are accion publiciana for the recovery of the right of
possession as a plenary action, and accion reivindicacion for the recovery of ownership.21 Apparently, these latter actions are the
ones the petitioners refer to when they cite Section 33, par. 3, in relation with Section 19, par. 2 of The Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, in which jurisdiction may either be with the first-level courts or the regional trial courts,
depending on the assessed value of the realty subject of the litigation. As the complaint at the MCTC was patently for forcible entry,
that court committed no jurisdictional error correctible by certiorari under the present petition.

In sum, the petition for certiorari should be dismissed for the cited formal deficiencies, for violation of the non-forum
shopping rule, for having been filed out of time, and for substantive deficiencies.
The Writ of Amparo
To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the number of
killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary
concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent
remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to
protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and
uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo - in line with the extraordinary character of the writ and the
reasonable certainty that its issuance demands - requires that every petition for the issuance of the Pwrit must be supported by
justifying allegations of fact, to wit:
"(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;
(b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat, act or omission, or, if the name is
unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be described by an assumed appellation;
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation by an
unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant
circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances, and addresses of the
investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the investigation, together with
any report;
(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the
identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and
(f) The relief prayed for.
The petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable reliefs." 22
The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie existence of the ultimate facts determinable from the
supporting affidavits that detail the circumstances of how and to what extent a threat to or violation of the rights to life, liberty and
security of the aggrieved party was or is being committed.
The issuance of the writ of amparo in the present case is anchored on the factual allegations heretofore quoted, 23 that are essentially
repeated in paragraph 54 of the petition. These allegations are supported by the following documents:
"(a) Joint Affidavit dated 23 May 2006 of Rowena B. Onag, Apolsida Umambong, Ariel Gac, Darwin Alvarez and Edgardo
Pinaranda, supporting the factual positions of the petitioners, id., petitioners' prior possession, private respondents' intrusion
and the illegal acts committed by the private respondents and their security guards on 19 April 2006;
(b) Unsubscribed Affidavit of Nemia Carmen y Tapuz, alleging the illegal acts (firing of guns, etc.) committed by a security
guard against minors - descendants of Antonio Tapuz;
(c) Unsubscribed Affidavit of Melanie Tapuz y Samindao, essentially corroborating Nemia's affidavit;
(d) Certification dated 23 April 2006 issued by Police Officer Jackson Jauod regarding the incident of petitioners' intrusion into
the disputed land;
(e) Certification dated 27 April 2006 issued by Police Officer Allan R. Otis, narrating the altercation between the Tapuz family
and the security guards of the private respondents, including the gun-poking and shooting incident involving one of the
security guards;
(f) Certification issued by Police Officer Christopher R. Mendoza, narrating that a house owned by Josiel Tapuz, Jr., rented by a
certain Jorge Buenavente, was accidentally burned by a fire."

On the whole, what is clear from these statements - both sworn and unsworn - is the overriding involvement of property issues as the
petition traces its roots to questions of physical possession of the property disputed by the private parties. If at all, issues relating to
the right to life or to liberty can hardly be discerned except to the extent that the occurrence of past violence has been alleged. The
right to security, on the other hand, is alleged only to the extent of the threats and harassments implied from the presence of "armed
men bare to the waist" and the alleged pointing and firing of weapons. Notably, none of the supporting affidavits compellingly
show that the threat to the rights to life, liberty and security of the petitioners is imminent or is continuing.
A closer look at the statements shows that at least two of them - the statements of Nemia Carreon y Tapuz and Melanie Tapuz are
practically identical and unsworn. The Certification by Police Officer Jackson Jauod, on the other hand, simply narrates what had been
reported by one Danny Tapuz y Masangkay, and even mentions that the burning of two residential houses was "accidental."
As against these allegations are the cited MCTC factual findings in its decision in the forcible entry case which rejected all the
petitioners' factual claims. These findings are significantly complete and detailed, as they were made under a full-blown judicial
process, i.e., after examination and evaluation of the contending parties' positions, evidence and arguments and based on the report
of a court-appointed commissioner.
We preliminarily examine these conflicting factual positions under the backdrop of a dispute (with incidents giving rise to allegations
of violence or threat thereof) that was brought to and ruled upon by the MCTC; subsequently brought to the RTC on an appeal that
is still pending; still much later brought to the appellate court without conclusive results; and then brought to us on interlocutory
incidents involving a plea for the issuance of the writ of amparo that, if decided as the petitioners advocate, may render the pending
RTC appeal moot.
Under these legal and factual situations, we are far from satisfied with the prima facie existence of the ultimate facts that would
justify the issuance of a writ of amparo. Rather than acts of terrorism that pose a continuing threat to the persons of the petitioners,
the violent incidents alleged appear to us to be purely property-related and focused on the disputed land. Thus, if the petitioners wish
to seek redress and hold the alleged perpetrators criminally accountable, the remedy may lie more in the realm of ordinary criminal
prosecution rather than on the use of the extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo.
Nor do we believe it appropriate at this time to disturb the MCTC findings, as our action may carry the unintended effect, not only of
reversing the MCTC ruling independently of the appeal to the RTC that is now in place, but also of nullifying the ongoing appeal
process. Such effect, though unintended, will obviously wreak havoc on the orderly administration of justice, an overriding goal that
the Rule on the Writ of Amparo does not intend to weaken or negate.
Separately from these considerations, we cannot fail but consider too at this point the indicators, clear and patent to us, that the
petitioners' present recourse via the remedy of the writ of amparo is a mere subterfuge to negate the assailed orders that the
petitioners sought and failed to nullify before the appellate court because of the use of an improper remedial measure. We discern
this from the petitioners' misrepresentations pointed out above; from their obvious act of forum shopping; and from the recourse
itself to the extraordinary remedies of the writs of certiorari and amparo based on grounds that are far from forthright and sufficiently
compelling. To be sure, when recourses in the ordinary course of law fail because of deficient legal representation or the use of
improper remedial measures, neither the writ of certiorari nor that of amparo - extraordinary though they may be - will suffice to
serve as a curative substitute. The writ of amparo, particularly, should not issue when applied for as a substitute for the appeal or
certiorari process, or when it will inordinately interfere with these processes - the situation obtaining in the present case.
While we say all these, we note too that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for rules on the institution of separate actions, 24 for
the effect of earlier-filed criminal actions,25 and for the consolidation of petitions for the issuance of a writ of amparo with a
subsequently filed criminal and civil action.26 These rules were adopted to promote an orderly procedure for dealing with petitions for
the issuance of the writ of amparo when the parties resort to other parallel recourses.
Where, as in this case, there is an ongoing civil process dealing directly with the possessory dispute and the reported acts of violence
and harassment, we see no point in separately and directly intervening through a writ of amparo in the absence of any clear prima
facie showing that the right to life, liberty or security - the personal concern that the writ is intended to protect - is immediately in
danger or threatened, or that the danger or threat is continuing. We see no legal bar, however, to an application for the issuance of
the writ, in a proper case, by motion in a pending case on appeal or on certiorari, applying by analogy the provisions on the coexistence of the writ with a separately filed criminal case.
The Writ of Habeas Data
Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data requires the following material allegations of ultimate facts in a petition for the
issuance of a writ of habeas data:
"(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent;

(b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or
security of the aggrieved party;
(c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the data or information;
(d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government office, and the person in charge, in
possession or in control of the data or information, if known;
(e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or
information or files kept by the respondent.
In case of threats, the relief may include a prayer for an order enjoining the act complained of; and
(f) Such other relevant reliefs as are just and equitable."
Support for the habeas data aspect of the present petition only alleges that:
"1. [ ] Similarly, a petition for a WRIT OF HABEAS DATA is prayed for so that the PNP may release the report on the burning
of the homes of the petitioners and the acts of violence employed against them by the private respondents, furnishing the
Court and the petitioners with copy of the same;
[]
66. Petitioners apply for a WRIT OF HABEAS DATA commanding the Philippine National Police [PNP] to produce the police
report pertaining to the burning of the houses of the petitioners in the land in dispute and likewise the investigation report if
an investigation was conducted by the PNP."
These allegations obviously lack what the Rule on Writ of Habeas Data requires as a minimum, thus rendering the petition fatally
deficient. Specifically, we see no concrete allegations of unjustified or unlawful violation of the right to privacy related to the right to
life, liberty or security. The petition likewise has not alleged, much less demonstrated, any need for information under the control of
police authorities other than those it has already set forth as integral annexes. The necessity or justification for the issuance of the
writ, based on the insufficiency of previous efforts made to secure information, has not also been shown. In sum, the prayer for the
issuance of a writ of habeas data is nothing more than the "fishing expedition" that this Court - in the course of drafting the Rule on
habeas data - had in mind in defining what the purpose of a writ of habeas data is not. In these lights, the outright denial of the
petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas data is fully in order.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DISMISS the present petition OUTRIGHT for deficiencies of form and substance
patent from its body and attachments.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 182795

June 5, 2008

ARMANDO Q. CANLAS, MIGUEL D. CAPISTRANO, MARRIETA PIA, petitioners,

vs.
NAPICO HOMEOWNERS ASSN., I XIII, INC., ET AL., respondents.
RESOLUTION
REYES, R.T., J.:
THE present petition filed on May 26, 2008 seeks the issuance of a Writ of Amparo upon the following premise:
Petitioners were deprived of their liberty, freedom and/or rights to shelter enshrined and embodied in our Constitution, as
the result of these nefarious activities of both the Private and Public Respondents. This ardent request filed before this
Honorable Supreme Court is the only solution to this problem via this newly advocated principles incorporated in the Rules
the "RULE ON THE WRIT OF AMPARO."1
It appears that petitioners are settlers in a certain parcel of land situated in Barangay Manggahan, Pasig City. Their dwellings/houses
have either been demolished as of the time of filing of the petition, or is about to be demolished pursuant to a court judgment.

While they attempted to focus on issuance of what they claimed to be fraudulent and spurious land titles, to wit:
Petitioners herein are desirous to help the government, the best way they can, to unearth these so-called "syndicates"
clothed with governmental functions, in cahoots with the "squatting syndicates" - - - - the low so defines. If only to give its
proper meanings, the Government must be the first one to cleans (sic) its ranks from these unscrupulous political protges.
If unabated would certainly ruin and/or destroy the efficacy of the Torrens System of land registration in this Country. It is
therefore the ardent initiatives of the herein Petitioners, by way of the said prayer for the issuance of the Writ of Amparo,
that these unprincipled Land Officials be summoned to answer their participation in the issuances of these
fraudulent and spurious titles, NOW, in the hands of the Private Respondents. The Courts of Justice, including
this Honorable Supreme Court, are likewise being made to believe that said titles in the possession of the
Private Respondents were issued untainted with frauds.2
what the petition ultimately seeks is the reversal of this Courts dismissal of petitions in G.R. Nos. 177448, 180768, 177701, 177038,
thus:
That, Petitioners herein knew before hand that: there can be no motion for reconsideration for the second or third time to be
filed before this Honorable Supreme Court. As such therefore, Petitioners herein are aware of the opinion that this present
petition should not in any way be treated as such motions fore reconsideration. Solely, this petition is only for the possible
issuance of the writ of amparo, although it might affect the previous rulings of this Honorable Supreme Court in these cases,
G.R. Nos. 177448, 180768, 177701 and 177038. Inherent in the powers of the Supreme Court of the Philippines
is to modify, reverse and set aside, even its own previous decision, that can not be thwarted nor influenced by
any one, but, only on the basis of merits and evidence. This is the purpose of this petition for the Writ of
Amparo.3
We dismiss the petition.
The Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:
Section 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and
security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a
private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. (Emphasis supplied.)
The threatened demolition of a dwelling by virtue of a final judgment of the court, which in this case was affirmed with finality by this
Court in G.R. Nos. 177448, 180768, 177701, 177038, is not included among the enumeration of rights as stated in the above-quoted
Section 1 for which the remedy of a writ of amparo is made available. Their claim to their dwelling, assuming they still have any
despite the final and executory judgment adverse to them, does not constitute right to life, liberty and security. There is, therefore, no
legal basis for the issuance of the writ of amparo.
Besides, the factual and legal basis for petitioners claim to the land in question is not alleged in the petition at all. The Court can only
surmise that these rights and interest had already been threshed out and settled in the four cases cited above. No writ of amparo
may be issued unless there is a clear allegation of the supposed factual and legal basis of the right sought to be protected.
Under Section 6 of the same rules, the court shall issue the writ upon the filing of the petition, only if on its face, the court ought to
issue said writ.
Section 6. Issuance of the Writ. Upon the filing of the petition, the court, justice or judge shall immediately order the
issuance of the writ if on its face it ought to issue. The clerk of court shall issue the writ under the seal of the court; or in
case of urgent necessity, the justice or the judge may issue the writ under his or her own hand, and may deputize any officer
or person to serve it.
The writ shall also set the date and time for summary hearing of the petition which shall not be later than seven (7) days
from the date of its issuance.
Considering that there is no legal basis for its issuance, as in this case, the writ will not be issued and the petition will be dismissed
outright.
This new remedy of writ of amparo which is made available by this Court is intended for the protection of the highest possible rights
of any person, which is his or her right to life, liberty and security. The Court will not spare any time or effort on its part in order to
give priority to petitions of this nature. However, the Court will also not waste its precious time and effort on matters not covered by
the writ.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 182165

November 25, 2009

P/SUPT. FELIXBERTO CASTILLO, POLICE OFFICERS ROMEO BAGTAS, RUPERTO BORLONGAN, EDMUNDO DIONISIO,
RONNIE MORALES, ARNOLD TRIA, and GILBERTO PUNZALAN, ENGR. RICASOL P. MILLAN, ENGR. REDENTOR S. DELA
CRUZ, MR. ANASTACIO L. BORLONGAN, MR. ARTEMIO ESGUERRA, "TISOY," and JOHN DOES, Petitioners,
vs.
DR. AMANDA T. CRUZ, NIXON T. CRUZ, and FERDINAND T. CRUZ, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioners1 , employees and members of the local police force of the City Government of Malolos, challenge the March 28, 2008
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Branch 10 in a petition for issuance of writs of amparo and habeas data
instituted by respondents.
The factual antecedents.
Respondent Amanda Cruz (Amanda) who, along with her husband Francisco G. Cruz (Spouses Cruz), leased a parcel of land situated
at Barrio Guinhawa, Malolos (the property), refused to vacate the property, despite demands by the lessor Provincial Government of
Bulacan (the Province) which intended to utilize it for local projects.
The Province thus filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the Spouses Cruz before the then Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Bulacan, Bulacan.
By Decision of September 5, 1997, the MTC rendered judgment against the Spouses Cruz, which judgment, following its affirmance by
the RTC, became final and executory.
The finality of the decision in the ejectment case notwithstanding, the spouses Cruz refused to vacate the property. They thereupon
filed cases against the Province2 and the judges who presided over the case. 3 Those cases were dismissed except their petition for
annulment of judgment lodged before Branch 18 of the RTC of Malolos, and a civil case for injunction 833-M-2004 lodged before
Branch 10 of the same RTC Malolos.
The Spouses Cruz sought in the case for injunction the issuance of a permanent writ of injunction to prevent the execution of the final
and executory judgment against them.
By Order of July 19, 2005, the RTC, finding merit in the Spouses Cruzes allegation that subsequent events changed the situation of
the parties to justify a suspension of the execution of the final and executory judgment, issued a permanent writ of injunction, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated August 10, 2004 is hereby GRANTED. Order
dated August 10, 2004 is hereby RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. Further, the verified petition dated November 05, 2002 are
hereby REINSTATED and MADE PERMANENT until the MTC-Bulacan, Bulacan finally resolves the pending motions of petitioners
with the same determines the metes and bounds of 400 sq. meters leased premises subject matter of this case with immediate
dispatch. Accordingly, REMAND the determination of the issues raised by the petitioners on the issued writ of demolition to the MTC
of Bulacan, Bulacan.
SO ORDERED.4 (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)
Finding that the fallo of the RTC July 19, 2005 Order treats, as a suspensive condition for the lifting of the permanent injunction, the
determination of the boundaries of the property, the Province returned the issue for the consideration of the MTC. In a Geodetic
Engineers Report submitted to the MTC on August 31, 2007, the metes and bounds of the property were indicated.
The MTC, by Order of January 2, 2008, approved the Report and ruled that the permanent injunction which the RTC issued is
ineffective. On motion of the Province, the MTC, by Order of January 21, 2008, thus issued a Second Alias Writ of Demolition.

On receiving notice of the January 2, 2008 MTC Order, the Spouses Cruz filed a motion before Branch 10 of the RTC for the issuance of
a temporary restraining order (TRO) which it set for hearing on January 25, 2008 on which date, however, the demolition had, earlier
in the day, been implemented. Such notwithstanding, the RTC issued a TRO. 5 The Spouses Cruz, along with their sons-respondents
Nixon and Ferdinand, thereupon entered the property, placed several container vans and purportedly represented themselves as
owners of the property which was for lease.
On February 21, 2008, petitioners Police Superintendent Felixberto Castillo et al., who were deployed by the City Mayor in compliance
with a memorandum issued by Governor Joselito R. Mendoza instructing him to "protect, secure and maintain the possession of the
property," entered the property.
Amanda and her co-respondents refused to turn over the property, however. Insisting that the RTC July 19, 2005 Order of Permanent
Injunction enjoined the Province from repossessing it, they shoved petitioners, forcing the latter to arrest them and cause their
indictment for direct assault, trespassing and other forms of light threats.
Respondents later filed on March 3, 2008 a "Respectful Motion-Petition for Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data," docketed as Special
Civil Action No. 53-M-2008, which was coincidentally raffled to Branch 10 of the RTC Malolos.
Respondents averred that despite the Permanent Injunction, petitioners unlawfully entered the property with the use of heavy
equipment, tore down the barbed wire fences and tents, 6 and arrested them when they resisted petitioners entry; and that as early
as in the evening of February 20, 2008, members of the Philippine National Police had already camped in front of the property.
On the basis of respondents allegations in their petition and the supporting affidavits, the RTC, by Order of March 4, 2008, issued
writs of amparo and habeas data.7
The RTC, crediting respondents version in this wise:
Petitioners have shown by preponderant evidence that the facts and circumstances of the alleged offenses examined into on Writs of
Amparo and Habeas Data that there have been an on-going hearings on the verified Petition for Contempt, docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 306-M-2006, before this Court for alleged violation by the respondents of the Preliminary Injunction Order dated July
16, 2005 [sic] in Sp. Civil Action No. 833-M-2002, hearings were held on January 25, 2008, February 12 and 19, 2008, where the
respondents prayed for an April 22, 2008 continuance, however, in the pitch darkness of February 20, 2008, police officers, some
personnel from the Engineering department, and some civilians proceeded purposely to the Pinoy Compound, converged therein and
with continuing threats of bodily harm and danger and stone-throwing of the roofs of the homes thereat from voices around its
premises, on a pretext of an ordinary police operation when enterviewed [sic] by the media then present, but at 8:00 a.m. to late in
the afternoon of February 21, 2008, zoomed in on the petitioners, subjecting them to bodily harm, mental torture, degradation, and
the debasement of a human being, reminiscent of the martial law police brutality, sending chill in any ordinary citizen, 8
rendered judgment, by Decision of March 28, 2008, in favor of respondents, disposing as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commitment Orders and waivers in Crim. Cases Nos. 08-77 for Direct assault; Crim. Case
No. 08-77 for Other Forms of Trespass; and Crim. Case No. 08-78 for Light Threats are hereby DECLARED illegal, null and void, as
petitioners were deprived of their substantial rights, induced by duress or a well-founded fear of personal violence. Accordingly, the
commitment orders and waivers are hereby SET ASIDE. The temporary release of the petitioners is declared ABSOLUTE.
Without any pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED."9 (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari, pursuant to Section 19 10 of The Rule on the Writ of Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9-12SC),11 which is essentially reproduced in the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data (A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC). 12
In the main, petitioners fault the RTC for
giving due course and issuing writs of amparo and habeas data when from the allegations of the petition, the same ought not to
have been issued as (1) the petition in [sic] insufficient in substance as the same involves property rights; and (2) criminal cases had
already been filed and pending with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1, City of Malolos. (Underscoring supplied)
The petition is impressed with merit.
The Court is, under the Constitution, empowered to promulgate rules for the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. 13 In
view of the heightening prevalence of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo was issued
and took effect on October 24, 2007 which coincided with the celebration of United Nations Day and affirmed the Courts commitment

towards internationalization of human rights. More than three months later or on February 2, 2008, the Rule on the Writ of Habeas
Data was promulgated.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:
Section 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and
security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a
private individual or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:
Section 1. Habeas Data. The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security
is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or of a private individual or entity engaged in
the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved
party. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
From the above-quoted provisions, the coverage of the writs is limited to the protection of rights to life, liberty and security. And
the writs cover not only actual but also threats of unlawful acts or omissions.
Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo14 teaches:
As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of "extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances," its
coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. "Extralegal killings" are "killings committed
without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings." On the other hand, "enforced disappearances" are
"attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups
or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or
whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the
protection of law.15 (Underscoring supplied, citations omitted)
To thus be covered by the privilege of the writs, respondents must meet the threshold requirement that their right to life, liberty and
security is violated or threatened with an unlawful act or omission. Evidently, the present controversy arose out of a property dispute
between the Provincial Government and respondents. Absent any considerable nexus between the acts complained of and its effect
on respondents right to life, liberty and security, the Court will not delve on the propriety of petitioners entry into the property.
Apropos is the Courts ruling in Tapuz v. Del Rosario:16
To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the number of
killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary
concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent
remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to
protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and
uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo in line with the extraordinary character of the writ and the
reasonable certainty that its issuance demands requires that every petition for the issuance of the writ must be supported by
justifying allegations of fact, to wit:
xxxx
The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie existence of the ultimate facts determinable from the
supporting affidavits that detail the circumstances of how and to what extent a threat to or violation of the rights to life, liberty and
security of the aggrieved party was or is being committed. 17 (Emphasis and italics in the original, citation omitted)
Tapuz also arose out of a property dispute, albeit between private individuals, with the petitioners therein branding as "acts of
terrorism" the therein respondents alleged entry into the disputed land with armed men in tow. The Court therein held:
On the whole, what is clear from these statements both sworn and unsworn is the overriding involvement of property issues as the
petition traces its roots to questions of physical possession of the property disputed by the private parties. If at all, issues relating to
the right to life or to liberty can hardly be discerned except to the extent that the occurrence of past violence has been alleged. The
right to security, on the other hand, is alleged only to the extent of the treats and harassments implied from the presence of "armed
men bare to the waist" and the alleged pointing and firing of weapons. Notably, none of the supporting affidavits compellingly
show that the threat to the rights to life, liberty and security of the petitioners is imminent or continuing. 18 (Emphasis in
the original; underscoring supplied)

It bears emphasis that respondents petition did not show any actual violation, imminent or continuing threat to their life, liberty and
security. Bare allegations that petitioners "in unison, conspiracy and in contempt of court, there and then willfully, forcibly and
feloniously with the use of force and intimidation entered and forcibly, physically manhandled the petitioners (respondents) and
arrested the herein petitioners (respondents)"19 will not suffice to prove entitlement to the remedy of the writ of amparo. No undue
confinement or detention was present. In fact, respondents were even able to post bail for the offenses a day after their arrest. 20
Although respondents release from confinement does not necessarily hinder supplication for the writ of amparo, absent any evidence
or even an allegation in the petition that there is undue and continuing restraint on their liberty, and/or that there exists threat or
intimidation that destroys the efficacy of their right to be secure in their persons, the issuance of the writ cannot be justified.
That respondents are merely seeking the protection of their property rights is gathered from their Joint Affidavit, viz:
xxxx
11. Kami ay humarang at humiga sa harap ng mga heavy equipment na hawak hawak ang nasabing kautusan ng RTC Branch 10
(PERMANENT INJUNCTION at RTC ORDERS DATED February 12, 17 at 19 2008) upang ipaglaban ang dignidad ng kautusan ng korte,
ipaglaban ang prinsipyo ng "SELF-HELP" at batas ukol sa "PROPERTY RIGHTS", Wala kaming nagawa ipagtanggol ang aming
karapatan sa lupa na 45 years naming "IN POSSESSION." (Underscoring supplied)
Oddly, respondents also seek the issuance of a writ of habeas data when it is not even alleged that petitioners are gathering,
collecting or storing data or information regarding their person, family, home and correspondence.
As for respondents assertion of past incidents21 wherein the Province allegedly violated the Permanent Injunction order, these
incidents were already raised in the injunction proceedings on account of which respondents filed a case for criminal contempt
against petitioners.22
Before the filing of the petition for writs of amparo and habeas data, or on February 22, 2008, petitioners even instituted a petition for
habeas corpus which was considered moot and academic by Branch 14 of the Malolos RTC and was accordingly denied by Order of
April 8, 2008.
More. Respondent Amanda and one of her sons, Francisco Jr., likewise filed a petition for writs of amparo and habeas data before the
Sandiganbayan, they alleging the commission of continuing threats by petitioners after the issuance of the writs by the RTC, which
petition was dismissed for insufficiency and forum shopping.
It thus appears that respondents are not without recourse and have in fact taken full advantage of the legal system with the filing of
civil, criminal and administrative charges.231avvphi1
It need not be underlined that respondents petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data are extraordinary remedies which cannot
be used as tools to stall the execution of a final and executory decision in a property dispute.
At all events, respondents filing of the petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data should have been barred, for criminal
proceedings against them had commenced after they were arrested in flagrante delicto and proceeded against in accordance with
Section 6, Rule 11224 of the Rules of Court. Validity of the arrest or the proceedings conducted thereafter is a defense that may be set
up by respondents during trial and not before a petition for writs of amparo and habeas data. The reliefs afforded by the writs may,
however, be made available to the aggrieved party by motion in the criminal proceedings. 25
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged March 4, 2008 Order of Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos is
DECLARED NULL AND VOID, and its March 28, 2008 Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Special Civil Action No. 53-M-2008 is
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 189155

September 7, 2010

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF MELISSA C.
ROXAS, MELISSA C. ROXAS, Petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GILBERT TEODORO, GEN. VICTOR S. IBRADO, P/DIR. GEN. JESUS AME VERZOSA, LT. GEN.
DELFIN N. BANGIT, PC/SUPT. LEON NILO A. DELA CRUZ, MAJ. GEN. RALPH VILLANUEVA, PS/SUPT. RUDY GAMIDO
LACADIN, AND CERTAIN PERSONS WHO GO BY THE NAME[S] DEX, RC AND ROSE, Respondents.
DECISION

PEREZ, J.:
At bench is a Petition For Review on Certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated 26 August 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
00036-WRA a petition that was commenced jointly under the Rules on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule) and Habeas Data (Habeas
Data Rule). In its decision, the Court of Appeals extended to the petitioner, Melissa C. Roxas, the privilege of the writs of amparo and
habeas data but denied the latters prayers for an inspection order, production order and return of specified personal belongings. The
fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY MERITORIOUS. This Court hereby grants Petitioner the privilege of the Writ of Amparo and
Habeas Data.
Accordingly, Respondents are enjoined to refrain from distributing or causing the distribution to the public of any records in whatever
form, reports, documents or similar papers relative to Petitioners Melissa C. Roxas, and/or Melissa Roxas; alleged ties to the CPP-NPA
or pertinently related to the complained incident. Petitioners prayers for an inspection order, production order and for the return of
the specified personal belongings are denied for lack of merit. Although there is no evidence that Respondents are responsible for the
abduction, detention or torture of the Petitioner, said Respondents pursuant to their legally mandated duties are, nonetheless,
ordered to continue/complete the investigation of this incident with the end in view of prosecuting those who are responsible.
Respondents are also ordered to provide protection to the Petitioner and her family while in the Philippines against any and all forms
of harassment, intimidation and coercion as may be relevant to the grant of these reliefs. 3
We begin with the petitioners allegations.
Petitioner is an American citizen of Filipino descent. 4 While in the United States, petitioner enrolled in an exposure program to the
Philippines with the group Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-United States of America (BAYAN-USA) of which she is a member.5 During
the course of her immersion, petitioner toured various provinces and towns of Central Luzon and, in April of 2009, she volunteered to
join members of BAYAN-Tarlac6 in conducting an initial health survey in La Paz, Tarlac for a future medical mission. 7
In pursuit of her volunteer work, petitioner brought her passport, wallet with Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) in cash, journal,
digital camera with memory card, laptop computer, external hard disk, IPOD,8 wristwatch, sphygmomanometer, stethoscope and
medicines.9
After doing survey work on 19 May 2009, petitioner and her companions, Juanito Carabeo (Carabeo) and John Edward Jandoc (Jandoc),
decided to rest in the house of one Mr. Jesus Paolo (Mr. Paolo) in Sitio Bagong Sikat, Barangay Kapanikian, La Paz, Tarlac.10 At around
1:30 in the afternoon, however, petitioner, her companions and Mr. Paolo were startled by the loud sounds of someone banging at the
front door and a voice demanding that they open up.11
Suddenly, fifteen (15) heavily armed men forcibly opened the door, barged inside and ordered petitioner and her companions to lie on
the ground face down.12 The armed men were all in civilian clothes and, with the exception of their leader, were also wearing bonnets
to conceal their faces.13
Petitioner tried to protest the intrusion, but five (5) of the armed men ganged up on her and tied her hands. 14 At this juncture,
petitioner saw the other armed men herding Carabeo and Jandoc, already blindfolded and taped at their mouths, to a nearby blue
van. Petitioner started to shout her name. 15 Against her vigorous resistance, the armed men dragged petitioner towards the van
bruising her arms, legs and knees.16 Once inside the van, but before she can be blindfolded, petitioner was able to see the face of one
of the armed men sitting beside her.17 The van then sped away.
After about an hour of traveling, the van stopped. 18 Petitioner, Carabeo and Jandoc were ordered to alight. 19 After she was informed
that she is being detained for being a member of the Communist Party of the Philippines-New Peoples Army (CPP-NPA), petitioner
was separated from her companions and was escorted to a room that she believed was a jail cell from the sound of its metal doors. 20
From there, she could hear the sounds of gunfire, the noise of planes taking off and landing and some construction bustle. 21 She
inferred that she was taken to the military camp of Fort Magsaysay in Laur, Nueva Ecija. 22
What followed was five (5) straight days of interrogation coupled with torture. 23 The thrust of the interrogations was to convince
petitioner to abandon her communist beliefs in favor of returning to "the fold." 24 The torture, on the other hand, consisted of taunting,
choking, boxing and suffocating the petitioner.25
Throughout the entirety of her ordeal, petitioner was made to suffer in blindfolds even in her sleep. 26 Petitioner was only relieved of
her blindfolds when she was allowed to take a bath, during which she became acquainted with a woman named "Rose" who bathed
her.27 There were also a few times when she cheated her blindfold and was able to peek at her surroundings. 28
Despite being deprived of sight, however, petitioner was still able to learn the names of three of her interrogators who introduced
themselves to her as "Dex," "James" and "RC." 29 "RC" even told petitioner that those who tortured her came from the "Special
Operations Group," and that she was abducted because her name is included in the "Order of Battle." 30

On 25 May 2009, petitioner was finally released and returned to her uncles house in Quezon City. 31 Before being released, however,
the abductors gave petitioner a cellular phone with a SIM32 card, a slip of paper containing an e-mail address with password, 33 a
plastic bag containing biscuits and books,34 the handcuffs used on her, a blouse and a pair of shoes. 35 Petitioner was also sternly
warned not to report the incident to the group Karapatan or something untoward will happen to her and her family. 36
Sometime after her release, petitioner continued to receive calls from RC via the cellular phone given to her. 37 Out of apprehension
that she was being monitored and also fearing for the safety of her family, petitioner threw away the cellular phone with a SIM card.
Seeking sanctuary against the threat of future harm as well as the suppression of any existing government files or records linking her
to the communist movement, petitioner filed a Petition for the Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data before this Court on 1 June 2009. 38
Petitioner impleaded public officials occupying the uppermost echelons of the military and police hierarchy as respondents, on the
belief that it was government agents who were behind her abduction and torture. Petitioner likewise included in her suit "Rose," "Dex"
and "RC."39
The Amparo and Habeas Data petition prays that: (1) respondents be enjoined from harming or even approaching petitioner and her
family; (2) an order be issued allowing the inspection of detention areas in the 7th Infantry Division, Fort Magsaysay, Laur, Nueva
Ecija; (3) respondents be ordered to produce documents relating to any report on the case of petitioner including, but not limited to,
intelligence report and operation reports of the 7th Infantry Division, the Special Operations Group of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) and its subsidiaries or branch/es prior to, during and subsequent to 19 May 2009; (4) respondents be ordered to
expunge from the records of the respondents any document pertinent or connected to Melissa C. Roxas, Melissa Roxas or any name
which sounds the same; and (5) respondents be ordered to return to petitioner her journal, digital camera with memory card, laptop
computer, external hard disk, IPOD, wristwatch, sphygmomanometer, stethoscope, medicines and her P15,000.00 cash.40
In a Resolution dated 9 June 2009, this Court issued the desired writs and referred the case to the Court of Appeals for hearing,
reception of evidence and appropriate action. 41 The Resolution also directed the respondents to file their verified written return. 42
On 18 June 2009, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Return of the Writs 43 on behalf of the public officials impleaded as
respondents.
We now turn to the defenses interposed by the public respondents.
The public respondents label petitioners alleged abduction and torture as "stage managed." 44 In support of their accusation, the
public respondents principally rely on the statement of Mr. Paolo, as contained in the Special Report 45 of the La Paz Police Station. In
the Special Report, Mr. Paolo disclosed that, prior to the purported abduction, petitioner and her companions instructed him and his
two sons to avoid leaving the house.46 From this statement, the public respondents drew the distinct possibility that, except for those
already inside Mr. Paolos house, nobody else has any way of knowing where petitioner and her companions were at the time they
were supposedly abducted.47 This can only mean, the public respondents concluded, that if ever there was any "abduction" it must
necessarily have been planned by, or done with the consent of, the petitioner and her companions themselves. 48
Public respondents also cited the Medical Certificate49 of the petitioner, as actually belying her claims that she was subjected to
serious torture for five (5) days. The public respondents noted that while the petitioner alleges that she was choked and boxed by her
abductorsinflictions that could have easily produced remarkable bruisesher Medical Certificate only shows abrasions in her wrists
and knee caps.50
For the public respondents, the above anomalies put in question the very authenticity of petitioners alleged abduction and torture,
more so any military or police involvement therein. Hence, public respondents conclude that the claims of abduction and torture was
no more than a charade fabricated by the petitioner to put the government in bad light, and at the same time, bring great media
mileage to her and the group that she represents. 51
Nevertheless, even assuming the abduction and torture to be genuine, the public respondents insist on the dismissal of the Amparo
and Habeas Data petition based on the following grounds: (a) as against respondent President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in particular,
because of her immunity from suit,52 and (b) as against all of the public respondents, in general, in view of the absence of any specific
allegation in the petition that they had participated in, or at least authorized, the commission of such atrocities. 53
Finally, the public respondents posit that they had not been remiss in their duty to ascertain the truth behind the allegations of the
petitioner.54 In both the police and military arms of the government machinery, inquiries were set-up in the following manner:
Police Action
Police authorities first learned of the purported abduction around 4:30 oclock in the afternoon of 19 May 2009, when Barangay
Captain Michael M. Manuel came to the La Paz Municipal Police Station to report the presence of heavily armed men somewhere in
Barangay Kapanikian.55 Acting on the report, the police station launched an initial investigation. 56

The initial investigation revolved around the statement of Mr. Paolo, who informed the investigators of an abduction incident involving
three (3) personslater identified as petitioner Melissa Roxas, Juanito Carabeo and John Edward Jandocwho were all staying in his
house.57 Mr. Paolo disclosed that the abduction occurred around 1:30 oclock in the afternoon, and was perpetrated by about eight (8)
heavily armed men who forced their way inside his house. 58 Other witnesses to the abduction also confirmed that the armed men
used a dark blue van with an unknown plate number and two (2) Honda XRM motorcycles with no plate numbers. 59
At 5:00 oclock in the afternoon of 19 May 2009, the investigators sent a Flash Message to the different police stations surrounding La
Paz, Tarlac, in an effort to track and locate the van and motorcycles of the suspects. Unfortunately, the effort yielded negative
results.60
On 20 May 2009, the results of the initial investigation were included in a Special Report 61 that was transmitted to the Tarlac Police
Provincial Office, headed by public respondent P/S Supt. Rudy Lacadin (Supt. Lacadin). Public respondent Supt. Lacadin, in turn,
informed the Regional Police Office of Region 3 about the abduction.62 Follow-up investigations were, at the same time, pursued. 63
On 26 May 2009, public respondent PC/Supt. Leon Nilo Dela Cruz, as Director of the Regional Police Office for Region 3, caused the
creation of Special Investigation Task GroupCAROJAN (Task Group CAROJAN) to conduct an in-depth investigation on the abduction
of the petitioner, Carabeo and Jandoc.64
Task Group CAROJAN started its inquiry by making a series of background examinations on the victims of the purported abduction, in
order to reveal the motive behind the abduction and, ultimately, the identity of the perpetrators. 65 Task Group CAROJAN also
maintained liaisons with Karapatan and the Alliance for Advancement of Peoples Rightsorganizations trusted by petitionerin the
hopes of obtaining the latters participation in the ongoing investigations. 66 Unfortunately, the letters sent by the investigators
requesting for the availability of the petitioner for inquiries were left unheeded. 67
The progress of the investigations conducted by Task Group CAROJAN had been detailed in the reports 68 that it submitted to public
respondent General Jesus Ame Verzosa, the Chief of the Philippine National Police. However, as of their latest report dated 29 June
2009, Task Group CAROJAN is still unable to make a definitive finding as to the true identity and affiliation of the abductorsa fact
that task group CAROJAN attributes to the refusal of the petitioner, or any of her fellow victims, to cooperate in their investigative
efforts.69
Military Action
Public respondent Gilbert Teodoro, the Secretary of National Defense, first came to know about the alleged abduction and torture of
the petitioner upon receipt of the Resolution of this Court directing him and the other respondents to file their return. 70 Immediately
thereafter, he issued a Memorandum Directive71 addressed to the Chief of Staff of the AFP, ordering the latter, among others, to
conduct an inquiry to determine the validity of the accusation of military involvement in the abduction. 72
Acting pursuant to the Memorandum Directive, public respondent General Victor S. Ibrado, the AFP Chief of Staff, sent an AFP Radio
Message73 addressed to public respondent Lieutenant General Delfin N. Bangit (Lt. Gen. Bangit), the Commanding General of the
Army, relaying the order to cause an investigation on the abduction of the petitioner. 74
For his part, and taking cue from the allegations in the amparo petition, public respondent Lt. Gen. Bangit instructed public
respondent Major General Ralph A. Villanueva (Maj. Gen. Villanueva), the Commander of the 7th Infantry Division of the Army based
in Fort Magsaysay, to set in motion an investigation regarding the possible involvement of any personnel assigned at the camp in the
purported abduction of the petitioner.75 In turn, public respondent Maj. Gen. Villanueva tapped the Office of the Provost Marshal (OPV)
of the 7th Infantry Division, to conduct the investigation. 76
On 23 June 2009, the OPV of the 7th Infantry Division released an Investigation Report 77 detailing the results of its inquiry. In
substance, the report described petitioners allegations as "opinionated" and thereby cleared the military from any involvement in her
alleged abduction and torture.78
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision,79 the Court of Appeals gave due weight and consideration to the petitioners version that she was indeed abducted
and then subjected to torture for five (5) straight days. The appellate court noted the sincerity and resolve by which the petitioner
affirmed the contents of her affidavits in open court, and was thereby convinced that the latter was telling the truth. 80
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals disregarded the argument of the public respondents that the abduction of the petitioner was
"stage managed," as it is merely based on an unfounded speculation that only the latter and her companions knew where they were
staying at the time they were forcibly taken. 81 The Court of Appeals further stressed that the Medical Certificate of the petitioner can
only affirm the existence of a true abduction, as its findings are reflective of the very injuries the latter claims to have sustained
during her harrowing ordeal, particularly when she was handcuffed and then dragged by her abductors onto their van. 82

The Court of Appeals also recognized the existence of an ongoing threat against the security of the petitioner, as manifested in the
attempts of "RC" to contact and monitor her, even after she was released. 83 This threat, according to the Court of Appeals, is all the
more compounded by the failure of the police authorities to identify the material perpetrators who are still at large. 84 Thus, the
appellate court extended to the petitioner the privilege of the writ of amparo by directing the public respondents to afford protection
to the former, as well as continuing, under the norm of extraordinary diligence, their existing investigations involving the abduction. 85
The Court of Appeals likewise observed a transgression of the right to informational privacy of the petitioner, noting the existence of
"records of investigations" that concerns the petitioner as a suspected member of the CPP-NPA. 86 The appellate court derived the
existence of such records from a photograph and video file presented in a press conference by party-list representatives Jovito
Palparan (Palparan) and Pastor Alcover (Alcover), which allegedly show the petitioner participating in rebel exercises. Representative
Alcover also revealed that the photograph and video came from a female CPP-NPA member who wanted out of the organization.
According to the Court of Appeals, the proliferation of the photograph and video, as well as any form of media, insinuating that
petitioner is part of the CPP-NPA does not only constitute a violation of the right to privacy of the petitioner but also puts further strain
on her already volatile security.87 To this end, the appellate court granted the privilege of the writ of habeas data mandating the public
respondents to refrain from distributing to the public any records, in whatever form, relative to petitioners alleged ties with the CPPNPA or pertinently related to her abduction and torture. 88
The foregoing notwithstanding, however, the Court of Appeals was not convinced that the military or any other person acting under
the acquiescence of the government, were responsible for the abduction and torture of the petitioner. 89 The appellate court stressed
that, judging by her own statements, the petitioner merely "believed" that the military was behind her abduction. 90 Thus, the Court of
Appeals absolved the public respondents from any complicity in the abduction and torture of petitioner. 91 The petition was likewise
dismissed as against public respondent President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in view of her immunity from suit. 92
Accordingly, the petitioners prayers for the return of her personal belongings were denied. 93 Petitioners prayers for an inspection
order and production order also met the same fate. 94
Hence, this appeal by the petitioner.
AMPARO
A.
Petitioner first contends that the Court of Appeals erred in absolving the public respondents from any responsibility in her abduction
and torture.95 Corollary to this, petitioner also finds fault on the part of Court of Appeals in denying her prayer for the return of her
personal belongings.96
Petitioner insists that the manner by which her abduction and torture was carried out, as well as the sounds of construction, gun-fire
and airplanes that she heard while in detention, as these were detailed in her two affidavits and affirmed by her in open court, are
already sufficient evidence to prove government involvement.97
Proceeding from such assumption, petitioner invokes the doctrine of command responsibility to implicate the high-ranking civilian and
military authorities she impleaded as respondents in her amparo petition. 98 Thus, petitioner seeks from this Court a pronouncement
holding the respondents as complicit in her abduction and torture, as well as liable for the return of her belongings. 99
Command Responsibility in Amparo Proceedings
It must be stated at the outset that the use by the petitioner of the doctrine of command responsibility as the justification in
impleading the public respondents in her amparo petition, is legally inaccurate, if not incorrect. The doctrine of command
responsibility is a rule of substantive law that establishes liability and, by this account, cannot be a proper legal basis to implead a
party-respondent in an amparo petition.100
The case of Rubrico v. Arroyo,101 which was the first to examine command responsibility in the context of an amparo proceeding,
observed that the doctrine is used to pinpoint liability. Rubrico notes that: 102
The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the development of laws of war and armed combats.
According to Fr. Bernas, "command responsibility," in its simplest terms, means the "responsibility of commanders for crimes
committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic
conflict."103 In this sense, command responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity. The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted
the doctrine of command responsibility,104 foreshadowing the present-day precept of holding a superior accountable for the atrocities
committed by his subordinates should he be remiss in his duty of control over them. As then formulated, command responsibility is
"an omission mode of individual criminal liability," whereby the superior is made responsible for crimes committed by his
subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the perpetrators 105 (as opposed to crimes he ordered). (Emphasis in the orginal,
underscoring supplied)

Since the application of command responsibility presupposes an imputation of individual liability, it is more aptly invoked in a fullblown criminal or administrative case rather than in a summary amparo proceeding. The obvious reason lies in the nature of the writ
itself:
The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief consisting of the appropriate remedial measures and
directives that may be crafted by the court, in order to address specific violations or threats of violation of the constitutional rights to
life, liberty or security.106 While the principal objective of its proceedings is the initial determination of whether an enforced
disappearance, extralegal killing or threats thereof had transpiredthe writ does not, by so doing, fix liability for such disappearance,
killing or threats, whether that may be criminal, civil or administrative under the applicable substantive law. 107 The rationale
underpinning this peculiar nature of an amparo writ has been, in turn, clearly set forth in the landmark case of The Secretary of
National Defense v. Manalo:108
x x x The remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make
the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable
doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence
that will require full and exhaustive proceedings.109(Emphasis supplied)
It must be clarified, however, that the inapplicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in an amparo proceeding does not, by
any measure, preclude impleading military or police commanders on the ground that the complained acts in the petition were
committed with their direct or indirect acquiescence. In which case, commanders may be impleadednot actually on the basis of
command responsibilitybut rather on the ground of their responsibility, or at least accountability. In Razon v. Tagitis, 110 the distinct,
but interrelated concepts of responsibility and accountability were given special and unique significations in relation to an amparo
proceeding, to wit:
x x x Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever
way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the
directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on the
other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced
disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with
knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to
discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance.
Responsibility of Public Respondents
At any rate, it is clear from the records of the case that the intent of the petitioner in impleading the public respondents is to ascribe
some form of responsibility on their part, based on her assumption that they, in one way or the other, had condoned her abduction
and torture.111
To establish such assumption, petitioner attempted to show that it was government agents who were behind her ordeal. Thus, the
petitioner calls attention to the circumstances surrounding her abduction and torturei.e., the forcible taking in broad daylight; use of
vehicles with no license plates; utilization of blindfolds; conducting interrogations to elicit communist inclinations; and the infliction of
physical abusewhich, according to her, is consistent with the way enforced disappearances are being practiced by the military or
other state forces.112
Moreover, petitioner also claims that she was held inside the military camp Fort Magsaysaya conclusion that she was able to infer
from the travel time required to reach the place where she was actually detained, and also from the sounds of construction, gun-fire
and airplanes she heard while thereat.113
We are not impressed. The totality of the evidence presented by the petitioner does not inspire reasonable conclusion that her
abductors were military or police personnel and that she was detained at Fort Magsaysay.
First. The similarity between the circumstances attending a particular case of abduction with those surrounding previous instances of
enforced disappearances does not, necessarily, carry sufficient weight to prove that the government orchestrated such abduction. We
opine that insofar as the present case is concerned, the perceived similarity cannot stand as substantial evidence of the involvement
of the government.
In amparo proceedings, the weight that may be accorded to parallel circumstances as evidence of military involvement depends
largely on the availability or non-availability of other pieces of evidence that has the potential of directly proving the identity and
affiliation of the perpetrators. Direct evidence of identity, when obtainable, must be preferred over mere circumstantial evidence
based on patterns and similarity, because the former indubitably offers greater certainty as to the true identity and affiliation of the
perpetrators. An amparo court cannot simply leave to remote and hazy inference what it could otherwise clearly and directly
ascertain.

In the case at bench, petitioner was, in fact, able to include in her Offer of Exhibits, 114 the cartographic sketches 115 of several of her
abductors whose faces she managed to see. To the mind of this Court, these cartographic sketches have the undeniable potential of
giving the greatest certainty as to the true identity and affiliation of petitioners abductors. Unfortunately for the petitioner, this
potential has not been realized in view of the fact that the faces described in such sketches remain unidentified, much less have been
shown to be that of any military or police personnel. Bluntly stated, the abductors were not proven to be part of either the military or
the police chain of command.
Second. The claim of the petitioner that she was taken to Fort Magsaysay was not adequately established by her mere estimate of the
time it took to reach the place where she was detained and by the sounds that she heard while thereat. Like the Court of Appeals, We
are not inclined to take the estimate and observations of the petitioner as accurate on its facenot only because they were made
mostly while she was in blindfolds, but also in view of the fact that she was a mere sojourner in the Philippines, whose familiarity with
Fort Magsaysay and the travel time required to reach it is in itself doubtful. 116 With nothing else but obscure observations to support
it, petitioners claim that she was taken to Fort Magsaysay remains a mere speculation.
In sum, the petitioner was not able to establish to a concrete point that her abductors were actually affiliated, whether formally or
informally, with the military or the police organizations. Neither does the evidence at hand prove that petitioner was indeed taken to
the military camp Fort Magsaysay to the exclusion of other places. These evidentiary gaps, in turn, make it virtually impossible to
determine whether the abduction and torture of the petitioner was in fact committed with the acquiescence of the public
respondents. On account of this insufficiency in evidence, a pronouncement of responsibility on the part of the public respondents,
therefore, cannot be made.
Prayer for the Return of Personal Belongings
This brings Us to the prayer of the petitioner for the return of her personal belongings.
In its decision, the Court of Appeals denied the above prayer of the petitioner by reason of the failure of the latter to prove that the
public respondents were involved in her abduction and torture.117 We agree with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals, but not
entirely with the reason used to support it. To the mind of this Court, the prayer of the petitioner for the return of her belongings is
doomed to fail regardless of whether there is sufficient evidence to hold public respondents responsible for the abduction of the
petitioner.
In the first place, an order directing the public respondents to return the personal belongings of the petitioner is already equivalent to
a conclusive pronouncement of liability. The order itself is a substantial relief that can only be granted once the liability of the public
respondents has been fixed in a full and exhaustive proceeding. As already discussed above, matters of liability are not determinable
in a mere summary amparo proceeding.118
But perhaps the more fundamental reason in denying the prayer of the petitioner, lies with the fact that a persons right to be
restituted of his property is already subsumed under the general rubric of property rightswhich are no longer protected by the writ
of amparo.119 Section 1 of the Amparo Rule,120 which defines the scope and extent of the writ, clearly excludes the protection of
property rights.
B.
The next error raised by the petitioner is the denial by the Court of Appeals of her prayer for an inspection of the detention areas of
Fort Magsaysay.121
Considering the dearth of evidence concretely pointing to any military involvement in petitioners ordeal, this Court finds no error on
the part of the Court of Appeals in denying an inspection of the military camp at Fort Magsaysay. We agree with the appellate court
that a contrary stance would be equivalent to sanctioning a "fishing expedition," which was never intended by the Amparo Rule in
providing for the interim relief of inspection order.122 Contrary to the explicit position 123 espoused by the petitioner, the Amparo Rule
does not allow a "fishing expedition" for evidence.
An inspection order is an interim relief designed to give support or strengthen the claim of a petitioner in an amparo petition, in order
to aid the court before making a decision.124 A basic requirement before an amparo court may grant an inspection order is that the
place to be inspected is reasonably determinable from the allegations of the party seeking the order. While the Amparo Rule does not
require that the place to be inspected be identified with clarity and precision, it is, nevertheless, a minimum for the issuance of an
inspection order that the supporting allegations of a party be sufficient in itself, so as to make a prima facie case. This, as was shown
above, petitioner failed to do.
Since the very estimates and observations of the petitioner are not strong enough to make out a prima facie case that she was
detained in Fort Magsaysay, an inspection of the military camp cannot be ordered. An inspection order cannot issue on the basis of
allegations that are, in themselves, unreliable and doubtful.

HABEAS DATA
As earlier intimated, the Court of Appeals granted to the petitioner the privilege of the writ of habeas data, by enjoining the public
respondents from "distributing or causing the distribution to the public any records in whatever form, reports, documents or similar
papers" relative to the petitioners "alleged ties with the CPP-NPA or pertinently related to her abduction and torture." Though not
raised as an issue in this appeal, this Court is constrained to pass upon and review this particular ruling of the Court of Appeals in
order to rectify, what appears to Us, an error infecting the grant.
For the proper appreciation of the rationale used by the Court of Appeals in granting the privilege of the writ of habeas data, We
quote hereunder the relevant portion 125 of its decision:
Under these premises, Petitioner prayed that all the records, intelligence reports and reports on the investigations conducted on
Melissa C. Roxas or Melissa Roxas be produced and eventually expunged from the records. Petitioner claimed to be included in the
Governments Order of Battle under Oplan Bantay Laya which listed political opponents against whom false criminal charges were
filed based on made up and perjured information.
Pending resolution of this petition and before Petitioner could testify before Us, Ex-army general Jovito Palaparan, Bantay party-list,
and Pastor Alcover of the Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy party-list held a press conference where they revealed that they
received an information from a female NPA rebel who wanted out of the organization, that Petitioner was a communist rebel. Alcover
claimed that said information reached them thru a letter with photo of Petitioner holding firearms at an NPA training camp and a
video CD of the training exercises.
Clearly, and notwithstanding Petitioners denial that she was the person in said video, there were records of other investigations on
Melissa C. Roxas or Melissa Roxas which violate her right to privacy. Without a doubt, reports of such nature have reasonable
connections, one way or another, to petitioners abduction where she claimed she had been subjected to cruelties and dehumanizing
acts which nearly caused her life precisely due to allegation of her alleged membership in the CPP-NPA. And if said report or similar
reports are to be continuously made available to the public, Petitioners security and privacy will certainly be in danger of being
violated or transgressed by persons who have strong sentiments or aversion against members of this group. The unregulated
dissemination of said unverified video CD or reports of Petitioners alleged ties with the CPP-NPA indiscriminately made available for
public consumption without evidence of its authenticity or veracity certainly violates Petitioners right to privacy which must be
protected by this Court. We, thus, deem it necessary to grant Petitioner the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Data. (Emphasis supplied).
The writ of habeas data was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right to privacy, most especially the right to
informational privacy of individuals.126 The writ operates to protect a persons right to control information regarding himself,
particularly in the instances where such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.
Needless to state, an indispensable requirement before the privilege of the writ may be extended is the showing, at least by
substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim. 127 This, in the
case at bench, the petitioner failed to do.
The main problem behind the ruling of the Court of Appeals is that there is actually no evidence on record that shows that any of the
public respondents had violated or threatened the right to privacy of the petitioner. The act ascribed by the Court of Appeals to the
public respondents that would have violated or threatened the right to privacy of the petitioner, i.e., keeping records of investigations
and other reports about the petitioners ties with the CPP-NPA, was not adequately provenconsidering that the origin of such records
were virtually unexplained and its existence, clearly, only inferred by the appellate court from the video and photograph released by
Representatives Palparan and Alcover in their press conference. No evidence on record even shows that any of the public respondents
had access to such video or photograph.
In view of the above considerations, the directive by the Court of Appeals enjoining the public respondents from "distributing or
causing the distribution to the public any records in whatever form, reports, documents or similar papers" relative to the petitioners
"alleged ties with the CPP-NPA," appears to be devoid of any legal basis. The public respondents cannot be ordered to refrain from
distributing something that, in the first place, it was not proven to have.
Verily, until such time that any of the public respondents were found to be actually responsible for the abduction and torture of the
petitioner, any inference regarding the existence of reports being kept in violation of the petitioners right to privacy becomes
farfetched, and premature.
For these reasons, this Court must, at least in the meantime, strike down the grant of the privilege of the writ of habeas data.
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE
Our review of the evidence of the petitioner, while telling of its innate insufficiency to impute any form of responsibility on the part of
the public respondents, revealed two important things that can guide Us to a proper disposition of this case. One, that further

investigation with the use of extraordinary diligence must be made in order to identify the perpetrators behind the abduction and
torture of the petitioner; and two, that the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), pursuant to its Constitutional mandate to "investigate
all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights and to provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of
human rights,"128 must be tapped in order to fill certain investigative and remedial voids.
Further Investigation Must Be Undertaken
Ironic as it seems, but part and parcel of the reason why the petitioner was not able to adduce substantial evidence proving her
allegations of government complicity in her abduction and torture, may be attributed to the incomplete and one-sided investigations
conducted by the government itself. This "awkward" situation, wherein the very persons alleged to be involved in an enforced
disappearance or extralegal killing are, at the same time, the very ones tasked by law to investigate the matter, is a unique
characteristic of these proceedings and is the main source of the "evidentiary difficulties" faced by any petitioner in any amparo
case.129
Cognizant of this situation, however, the Amparo Rule placed a potent safeguardrequiring the "respondent who is a public official or
employee" to prove that no less than "extraordinary diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in
the performance of duty."130 Thus, unless and until any of the public respondents is able to show to the satisfaction of the amparo
court that extraordinary diligence has been observed in their investigations, they cannot shed the allegations of responsibility despite
the prevailing scarcity of evidence to that effect.
With this in mind, We note that extraordinary diligence, as required by the Amparo Rule, was not fully observed in the conduct of the
police and military investigations in the case at bar.
A perusal of the investigation reports submitted by Task Group CAROJAN shows modest effort on the part of the police investigators to
identify the perpetrators of the abduction. To be sure, said reports are replete with background checks on the victims of the
abduction, but are, at the same time, comparatively silent as to other concrete steps the investigators have been taking to ascertain
the authors of the crime. Although conducting a background investigation on the victims is a logical first step in exposing the motive
behind the abductionits necessity is clearly outweighed by the need to identify the perpetrators, especially in light of the fact that
the petitioner, who was no longer in captivity, already came up with allegations about the motive of her captors.
Instead, Task Group CAROJAN placed the fate of their investigations solely on the cooperation or non-cooperation of the petitioner
who, they claim, was less than enthusiastic in participating in their investigative efforts. 131 While it may be conceded that the
participation of the petitioner would have facilitated the progress of Task Group CAROJANs investigation, this Court believes that the
formers reticence to cooperate is hardly an excuse for Task Group CAROJAN not to explore other means or avenues from which they
could obtain relevant leads.132 Indeed, while the allegations of government complicity by the petitioner cannot, by themselves, hold
up as adequate evidence before a court of lawthey are, nonetheless, a vital source of valuable investigative leads that must be
pursued and verified, if only to comply with the high standard of diligence required by the Amparo Rule in the conduct of
investigations.
Assuming the non-cooperation of the petitioner, Task Group CAROJANs reports still failed to explain why it never considered seeking
the assistance of Mr. Jesus Paolowho, along with the victims, is a central witness to the abduction. The reports of Task Group
CAROJAN is silent in any attempt to obtain from Mr. Paolo, a cartographic sketch of the abductors or, at the very least, of the one who,
by petitioners account, was not wearing any mask.1avvphi1
The recollection of Mr. Paolo could have served as a comparative material to the sketches included in petitioners offer of exhibits
that, it may be pointed out, were prepared under the direction of, and first submitted to, the CHR pursuant to the latters independent
investigation on the abduction and torture of the petitioner. 133 But as mentioned earlier, the CHR sketches remain to be unidentified
as of this date.
In light of these considerations, We agree with the Court of Appeals that further investigation under the norm of extraordinary
diligence should be undertaken. This Court simply cannot write finis to this case, on the basis of an incomplete investigation
conducted by the police and the military. In a very real sense, the right to security of the petitioner is continuously put in jeopardy
because of the deficient investigation that directly contributes to the delay in bringing the real perpetrators before the bar of justice.
To add teeth to the appellate courts directive, however, We find it fitting, nay, necessary to shift the primary task of conducting
further investigations on the abduction and torture of the petitioner upon the CHR. 134 We note that the CHR, unlike the police or the
military, seems to enjoy the trust and confidence of the petitioneras evidenced by her attendance and participation in the hearings
already conducted by the commission.135 Certainly, it would be reasonable to assume from such cooperation that the investigations of
the CHR have advanced, or at the very least, bears the most promise of advancing farther, in terms of locating the perpetrators of the
abduction, and is thus, vital for a final resolution of this petition. From this perspective, We also deem it just and appropriate to
relegate the task of affording interim protection to the petitioner, also to the CHR.
Hence, We modify the directive of the Court of the Appeals for further investigation, as follows

1.) Appointing the CHR as the lead agency tasked with conducting further investigation regarding the abduction and torture
of the petitioner. Accordingly, the CHR shall, under the norm of extraordinary diligence, take or continue to take the
necessary steps: (a) to identify the persons described in the cartographic sketches submitted by the petitioner, as well as
their whereabouts; and (b) to pursue any other leads relevant to petitioners abduction and torture.
2.) Directing the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP), or his successor, and the incumbent Chief of Staff of
the AFP, or his successor, to extend assistance to the ongoing investigation of the CHR, including but not limited to
furnishing the latter a copy of its personnel records circa the time of the petitioners abduction and torture, subject to
reasonable regulations consistent with the Constitution and existing laws.
3.) Further directing the incumbent Chief of the PNP, or his successor, to furnish to this Court, the Court of Appeals, and the
petitioner or her representative, a copy of the reports of its investigations and their recommendations, other than those that
are already part of the records of this case, within ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision.
4.) Further directing the CHR to (a) furnish to the Court of Appeals within ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision, a
copy of the reports on its investigation and its corresponding recommendations; and to (b) provide or continue to provide
protection to the petitioner during her stay or visit to the Philippines, until such time as may hereinafter be determined by
this Court.
Accordingly, this case must be referred back to the Court of Appeals, for the purposes of monitoring compliance with the above
directives and determining whether, in light of any recent reports or recommendations, there would already be sufficient evidence to
hold any of the public respondents responsible or, at least, accountable. After making such determination, the Court of Appeals shall
submit its own report with recommendation to this Court for final action. The Court of Appeals will continue to have jurisdiction over
this case in order to accomplish its tasks under this decision.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY MERITORIOUS. We hereby render a decision:
1.) AFFIRMING the denial of the petitioners prayer for the return of her personal belongings;
2.) AFFIRMING the denial of the petitioners prayer for an inspection of the detention areas of Fort Magsaysay.
3.) REVERSING the grant of the privilege of habeas data, without prejudice, however, to any modification that this Court may
make on the basis of the investigation reports and recommendations submitted to it under this decision.
4.) MODIFYING the directive that further investigation must be undertaken, as follows
a. APPOINTING the Commission on Human Rights as the lead agency tasked with conducting further investigation
regarding the abduction and torture of the petitioner. Accordingly, the Commission on Human Rights shall, under
the norm of extraordinary diligence, take or continue to take the necessary steps: (a) to identify the persons
described in the cartographic sketches submitted by the petitioner, as well as their whereabouts; and (b) to pursue
any other leads relevant to petitioners abduction and torture.
b. DIRECTING the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police, or his successor, and the incumbent Chief of
Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or his successor, to extend assistance to the ongoing investigation of
the Commission on Human Rights, including but not limited to furnishing the latter a copy of its personnel records
circa the time of the petitioners abduction and torture, subject to reasonable regulations consistent with the
Constitution and existing laws.
c. Further DIRECTING the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police, or his successor, to furnish to this Court,
the Court of Appeals, and the petitioner or her representative, a copy of the reports of its investigations and their
recommendations, other than those that are already part of the records of this case, within ninety (90) days from
receipt of this decision.
d. Further DIRECTING the Commission on Human Rights (a) to furnish to the Court of Appeals within ninety (90)
days from receipt of this decision, a copy of the reports on its investigation and its corresponding recommendations;
and (b) to provide or continue to provide protection to the petitioner during her stay or visit to the Philippines, until
such time as may hereinafter be determined by this Court.
5.) REFERRING BACK the instant case to the Court of Appeals for the following purposes:
a. To MONITOR the investigations and actions taken by the PNP, AFP, and the CHR;

b. To DETERMINE whether, in light of the reports and recommendations of the CHR, the abduction and torture of the
petitioner was committed by persons acting under any of the public respondents; and on the basis of this
determination
c. To SUBMIT to this Court within ten (10) days from receipt of the report and recommendation of the Commission
on Human Rightsits own report, which shall include a recommendation either for the DISMISSAL of the petition as
against the public respondents who were found not responsible and/or accountable, or for the APPROPRIATE
REMEDIAL MEASURES, AS MAY BE ALLOWED BY THE AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA RULES, TO BE UNDERTAKEN as
against those found responsible and/or accountable.
Accordingly, the public respondents shall remain personally impleaded in this petition to answer for any responsibilities and/or
accountabilities they may have incurred during their incumbencies.
Other findings of the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated 26 August 2009 in CA-G.R. SP No. 00036-WRA that are not contrary to this
decision are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 178497

February 4, 2014

EDITA T. BURGOS, Petitioner,

vs.
GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., LT. GEN. ROMEO P. TOLENTINO, MAJ. GEN. JUANITO GOMEZ, MAJ. GEN. DELFIN
BANGIT, LT. COL. NOEL CLEMENT, LT. COL. MELQUIADES FELICIANO, and DIRECTOR GENERAL OSCAR CALDERON,
Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 183711
EDITA T. BURGOS, Petitioner,
vs.
GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., LT. GEN. ROMEO P. TOLENTINO, MAJ. GEN. JUANITO GOMEZ, MAJ. GEN. DELFIN
BANGIT, LT. COL. NOEL CLEMENT, LT. COL. MELQUIADES FELICIANO, and DIRECTOR GENERAL OSCAR CALDERON,
Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 183712
EDITA T. BURGOS, Petitioner,
vs.
GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., LT. GEN. ROMEO P. TOLENTINO, MAJ. GEN. JUANITO GOMEZ, LT. COL. MELQUIADES
FELICIANO, and LT. COL. NOEL CLEMENT, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
*G.R. No. 178497 is included.
G.R. No. 183713
EDITA T. BURGOS, Petitioner,
vs.
CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR.; Commanding General
of the Philippine Army, LT. GEN. ALEXANDER YANO; and Chief of the Philippine National Police, DIRECTOR GENERAL
AVELINO RAZON, JR., Respondents.
RESOLUTION
BRION, J.:
We resolve in this Resolution all the pending incidents in this case, specifically:

(a) The determination of the relevance and advisability of the public disclosure of the documents submitted by respondents
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Lt. Gen. Romeo P. Tolentino, Maj. Gen. Juanito Gomez, Maj. Gen. Delfin Bangit, Lt. Col.
Noel Clement, Lt. Col. Melquiades Feliciano, Director General Oscar Calderon, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, Jr.; Commanding General of the Philippine Army, Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano; and Chief
of the Philippine National Police, Director General Avelino Razon, Jr. to this Court per paragraph III (i) of the fallo of our July 5,
2011 Resolution; and
(b) The Urgent Ex Parle Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela1 (together with sealed attachments) filed by petitioner Edita T. Burgos
praying that the Court: (1) order the persons named in the sealed documents impleaded in CA-G.R. SP No. 00008-WA and
G.R. No. 183713; (2) issue a writ of Amparo on the basis of the newly discovered evidence (the sealed attachments to the
motion); and (3) refer the cases to the Court of Appeals (CA) for further hearings on the newly discovered evidence.
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
A. The Courts June 22, 2010 Resolution
These incidents stemmed from our June 22, 2010 Resolution referring the present case to the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) as
the Courts directly commissioned agency, tasked with the continuation of the investigation of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos abduction with
the obligation to report its factual findings and recommendations to this Court. This referral was necessary as the investigation by the
Philippine National Police-Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG), by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Provost
Marshal, and even the initial CHR investigation had been less than complete. In all of them, there were significant lapses in the
handling of the investigation. In particular, we highlighted the PNP-CIDGs failure to identify the cartographic sketches of two (one
male and one female) of the five abductors of Jonas, based on their interview with the eyewitnesses to the abduction.
In this same Resolution, we also affirmed the CAs dismissal of the petitions for Contempt and issuance of a Writ of Amparo with
respect to President Macapagal-Arroyo who was then entitled, as President, to immunity from suit.
The March 15, 2011 CHR Report
On March 15, 2011, the CHR submitted to the Court its Investigation Report on the Enforced Disappearance of Jonas Burgos (CHR
Report), in compliance with our June 22, 2010 Resolution. On the basis of the gathered evidence, the CHR submitted the following
findings:
Based on the facts developed by evidence obtaining in this case, the CHR finds that the enforced disappearance of Jonas Joseph T.
Burgos had transpired; and that his constitutional rights to life liberty and security were violated by the Government have been fully
determined.
Jeffrey Cabintoy and Elsa Agasang have witnessed on that fateful day of April 28, 2007 the forcible abduction of Jonas Burgos by a
group of about seven (7) men and a woman from the extension portion of Hapag Kainan Restaurant, located at the ground floor of
Ever Gotesco Mall, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City.
xxxx
The eyewitnesses mentioned above were Jeffrey Cabintoy (Jeffrey) and Elsa Agasang (Elsa), who at the time of the abduction were
working as busboy and Trainee-Supervisor, respectively, at Hapag Kainan Restaurant.
In his Sinumpaang Salaysay, Jeffrey had a clear recollection of the face of HARRY AGAGEN BALIAGA, JR. as one of the principal
abductors, apart from the faces of the two abductors in the cartographic sketches that he described to the police, after he was shown
by the Team the pictures in the PMA Year Book of Batch Sanghaya 2000 and group pictures of men taken some years thereafter.
The same group of pictures were shown to detained former 56th IB Army trooper Edmond M. Dag-uman (Dag-uman), who also
positively identified Lt. Harry Baliaga, Jr. Dagumans Sinumpaang Salaysay states that he came to know Lt. Baliaga as a Company
Commander in the 56th IB while he was still in the military service (with Serial No. 800693, from 1997 to 2002) also with the 56th IB
but under 1Lt. Usmalik Tayaban, the Commander of Bravo Company. When he was arrested and brought to the 56th IB Camp in April
2005, he did not see Lt. Baliaga anymore at the said camp. The similar reaction that the pictures elicited from both Jeffrey and
Daguman did not pass unnoticed by the Team. Both men always look pensive, probably because of the pathetic plight they are in
right now. It came as a surprise therefore to the Team when they could hardly hide their smile upon seeing the face of Baliaga, as if
they know the man very well.
Moreover, when the Team asked how certain Jeffrey was or [sic] that it was indeed Baliaga that he saw as among those who actually
participated in Jonas abduction. Jeffrey was able to give a graphic description and spontaneously, to boot, the blow by blow account
of the incident, including the initial positioning of the actors, specially Baliaga, who even approached, talked to, and prevented him
from interfering in their criminal act.
A Rebel-returnee (RR) named Maria Vita Lozada y Villegas @KA MY, has identified the face of the female in the cartographic sketch as
a certain Lt. Fernando. While Lozada refuses to include her identification of Lt. Fernando in her Sinumpaang Salaysay for fear of a
backlash, she told the Team that she was certain it was Lt. Fernando in the cartographic sketch since both of them were involved in
counter-insurgency operations at the 56th IB, while she was under the care of the battalion from March 2006 until she left the 56th IB
Headquarters in October 2007. Lozadas involvement in counter-insurgency operations together with Lt. Fernando was among the

facts gathered by the CHR Regional Office 3 Investigators, whose investigation into the enforced disappearance of Jonas Joseph
Burgos was documented by way of an After Mission Report dated August 13, 2008.
Most if not all the actual abductors would have been identified had it not been for what is otherwise called as evidentiary difficulties
shamelessly put up by some police and military elites. The deliberate refusal of TJAG Roa to provide the CHR with the requested
documents does not only defy the Supreme Court directive to the AFP but ipso facto created a disputable presumption that AFP
personnel were responsible for the abduction and that their superiors would be found accountable, if not responsible, for the crime
committed. This observation finds support in the disputable presumption "That evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if
produced." (Paragraph (e), Section 3, Rule 131 on Burden of Proof and Presumptions, Revised Rules on Evidence of the Rules of Court
of the Philippines).
In saying that the requested document is irrelevant, the Team has deemed that the requested documents and profiles would help
ascertain the true identities of the cartographic sketches of two abductors because a certain Virgilio Eustaquio has claimed that one
of the intelligence operatives involved in the 2007 ERAP 5 case fits the description of his abductor.
As regards the PNP CIDG, the positive identification of former 56th IB officer Lt. HARRY A. BALIAGA, JR. as one of the principal
abductors has effectively crushed the theory of the CIDG witnesses that the NPAs abducted Jonas. Baliagas true identity and
affiliation with the military have been established by overwhelming evidence corroborated by detained former Army trooper Daguman.
For lack of material time, the Commission will continue to investigate the enforced disappearance of Jonas Burgos as an independent
body and pursuant to its mandate under the 1987 Constitution. Of particular importance are the identities and locations of the
persons appearing in the cartographic sketches; the allegations that CIDG Witnesses Emerito G. Lipio and Meliza Concepcion-Reyes
are AFP enlisted personnel and the alleged participation of Delfin De Guzman @ Ka Baste in the abduction of Jonas Burgos whose
case for Murder and Attempted Murder was dismissed by the court for failure of the lone witness, an army man of the 56th IB to
testify against him.
Interview with Virgilio Eustaquio, Chairman of the Union Masses for Democracy and Justice (UMDJ), revealed that the male abductor of
Jonas Burgos appearing in the cartographic sketch was among the raiders who abducted him and four others, identified as Jim
Cabauatan, Jose Curament, Ruben Dionisio and Dennis Ibona otherwise known as ERAP FIVE.
Unfortunately, and as already pointed out above, The Judge Advocate General (TJAG) turned down the request of the Team for a
profile of the operatives in the so-called "Erap 5" abduction on the ground of relevancy and branded the request as a fishing
expedition per its Disposition Form dated September 21, 2010.
Efforts to contact Virgilio Eustaquio to secure his affidavit proved futile, as his present whereabouts cannot be determined. And due to
lack of material time, the Commission decided to pursue the same and determine the whereabouts of the other members of the "Erap
5" on its own time and authority as an independent body.2
B. The Courts July 5, 2011 Resolution
On July 5, 2011, in light of the new evidence and leads the CHR uncovered, we issued a Resolution: (1) issuing anew a Writ of Habeas
Corpus and referring the habeas corpus petition to the CA; (2) holding in abeyance our ruling on the merits of the Amparo aspect of
the case; referring back the same to the CA in order to allow Lt. Harry A. Baliaga, Jr. and the present Amparo respondents to file their
Comments on the CHR Report; and ordering Lt. Baliaga to be impleaded as a party to the Amparo petition; and (3) affirming the
dismissal of the petitioners petition for Contempt, without prejudice to the re-filing of the contempt charge as may be warranted by
the results of the subsequent CHR investigation. To quote the exact wording of our Resolution:
WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice and for the foregoing reasons, we RESOLVE to:
I. IN G.R. NO. 183711 (HABEAS CORPUS PETITION, CA-G.R. SP No. 99839)
a. ISSUE a Writ of Habeas Corpus anew, returnable to the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals who shall
immediately refer the writ to the same Division that decided the habeas corpus petition;
b. ORDER Lt. Harry A. Baliaga, Jr. impleaded in CA-G.R. SP No. 99839 and G.R. No. 183711, and REQUIRE him,
together with the incumbent Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines; the incumbent Commanding General,
Philippine Army; and the Commanding Officer of the 56th IB, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army at the time of the
disappearance of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos, Lt. Col. Melquiades Feliciano, to produce the person of Jonas Joseph T.
Burgos under the terms the Court of Appeals shall prescribe, and to show cause why Jonas Joseph T. Burgos should
not be released from detention;
c. REFER back the petition for habeas corpus to the same Division of the Court of Appeals which shall continue to
hear this case after the required Returns shall have been filed and render a new decision within thirty (30) days
after the case is submitted for decision; and
d. ORDER the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Commanding General of the Philippine
Army to be impleaded as parties, separate from the original respondents impleaded in the petition, and the
dropping or deletion of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as party-respondent.

II. IN G.R. NO. 183712 (CONTEMPT OF COURT CHARGE, CA-G.R. SP No. 100230)
e. AFFIRM the dismissal of the petitioners petition for Contempt in CA-G.R. SP No. 100230, without prejudice to the
re-filing of the contempt charge as may be warranted by the results of the subsequent CHR investigation this Court
has ordered; and
f. ORDER the dropping or deletion of former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as party-respondent, in light of the
unconditional dismissal of the contempt charge against her.
III. IN G.R. NO. 183713 (WRIT OF AMPARO PETITION, CA-G.R. SP No. 00008-WA)
g. ORDER Lt. Harry A. Baliaga, Jr., impleaded in CA-G.R. SP No. 00008-WA and G.R. No. 183713, without prejudice to
similar directives we may issue with respect to others whose identities and participation may be disclosed in future
investigations and proceedings;
h. DIRECT Lt. Harry A. Baliaga, Jr., and the present Amparo respondents to file their Comments on the CHR report
with the Court of Appeals, within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Resolution.
i. REQUIRE General Roa of the Office of the Judge Advocate General, AFP; the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, JI,
AFP, at the time of our June 22, 2010 Resolution; and then Chief of Staff, AFP, Gen. Ricardo David, (a) to show cause
and explain to this Court, within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Resolution, why
they should not be held in contempt of this Court for their defiance of our June 22, 2010 Resolution; and (b) to
submit to this Court, within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Resolution, a copy of the
documents requested by the CHR, particularly:
1) The profile and Summary of Information and pictures of T/Sgt. Jason Roxas (Philippine Army); Cpl. Maria
Joana Francisco (Philippine Air Force); M/Sgt. Aron Arroyo (Philippine Air Force); an alias T.L. - all reportedly
assigned with Military Intelligence Group 15 of Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and 2Lt. Fernando, a lady officer involved in the counter-insurgency operations of the 56th IB in 2006 to
2007;
2) Copies of the records of the 2007 ERAP 5 incident in Kamuning, Quezon City and the complete list of the
intelligence operatives involved in that said covert military operation, including their respective Summary
of Information and individual pictures; and
3) Complete list of the officers, women and men assigned at the 56th and 69th Infantry Battalion and the
7th Infantry Division from January 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007 with their respective profiles, Summary of
Information and pictures; including the list of captured rebels and rebels who surrendered to the said
camps and their corresponding pictures and copies of their Tactical Interrogation Reports and the cases
filed against them, if any.
These documents shall be released exclusively to this Court for our examination to determine their relevance to the
present case and the advisability of their public disclosure.
j. ORDER the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Commanding General of the Philippine
Army to be impleaded as parties, in representation of their respective organizations, separately from the original
respondents impleaded in the petition; and the dropping of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as party-respondent;
k. REFER witnesses Jeffrey T. Cabintoy and Elsa B. Agasang to the Department of Justice for admission to the
Witness Protection Security and Benefit Program, subject to the requirements of Republic Act No. 6981; and
l. NOTE the criminal complaint filed by the petitioner with the DOJ which the latter may investigate and act upon on
its own pursuant to Section 21 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.3
C. The Courts August 23, 2011 Resolution
On August 23, 2011, we issued a Resolution resolving among others:
(a) to NOTE the Explanation separately filed by Brigadier Gen. Gilberto Jose C. Roa, Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP), General Ricardo A. David, Jr., AFP (ret.), and Rear Admiral Cornelio A. dela Cruz, Jr., AFP;
xxxx
(c) to LIMIT the documents to be submitted to this Court to those assigned at the 56th Infantry Battalion (IB) from
January 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007, and to SUBMIT these materials within ten (10) days from notice of this Resolution,
without prejudice to the submission of the other documents required under the Courts July 5, 2011 Resolution,
pertaining to those assigned at the other units of the AFP, should the relevance of these documents be established
during the Court of Appeals hearing;

(d) to REQUIRE the submission, within ten (10) days from notice of this Resolution, of the Summary of Information
and individual pictures of the intelligence operatives involved in the ERAP 5 incident, in compliance with the Courts
July 5, 2011 Resolution;
(e) to REQUIRE the submission, within ten (10) days from notice of this Resolution, of the profile and Summary of
Information and pictures of an alias T.L., reportedly assigned with Military Intelligence Group 15 of the Intelligence
Service of the AFP and of a 2Lt. Fernando, a lady officer in the counter-insurgency operations of the 56th IB in 2006
to 2007, in compliance with the Courts July 5, 2011 Resolution.4
The Respondents September 23, 2011 Manifestation and Motion
On September 23, 2011, the respondents submitted a Manifestation and Motion in compliance with the Courts August 23, 2011
Resolution. Attached to this Manifestation and Motion are the following documents:
a. The Summary of Information (SOI) of the officers and enlisted personnel of the 56th IB, 7th ID from January 1,
2004 to June 30, 2007;
b. The Summary of Information (SOI) of the intelligence operatives who were involved in the ERAP 5 incident; and
c. The Summary of Information (SOI) of 2Lt. Fernando, who was a member of the 56th IB, 7th ID.5
D. The Courts September 6, 2011 Resolution
On August 19, 2011, the petitioner filed a Manifestation and a Motion for Clarificatory Order praying among others that she be
allowed to examine the documents submitted to the Court pursuant to paragraph III (i) of the Courts July 5, 2011 Resolution. In our
September 6, 2011 Resolution, we resolved, among others, to:
(3) DENY the petitioners request to be allowed to examine the documents submitted to this Court per paragraph (i) of the fallo of our
July 5, 2011 Resolution, without prejudice to our later determination of the relevance and of the advisability of public disclosure of
those documents/materials;6
E. The Courts October 11, 2011 Resolution
On October 11, 2011, we issued a Resolution requiring the CHR to secure Virgilio Eustaquios affidavit, and to submit a report of its
ongoing investigation of Jonas abduction, viz:
(1) REQUIRE the Commission on Human Rights to undertake all available measures to obtain the affidavit of witness
Virgilio Eustaquio in connection with his allegation that one of the male abductors of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos,
appearing in the cartographic sketch, was among the "raiders" who abducted him and four others, identified as Jim
Cabauatan, Jose Curament, Ruben Dionisio and Dennis Ibona (otherwise known as the "ERAP FIVE");
(2) DIRECT the Commission on Human Rights to submit to this Court, within thirty (30) days from receipt of this
Resolution, a Report, with its recommendations of its ongoing investigation of Burgos abduction, and the affidavit
of Virgilio Eustaquio, if any, copy furnished the petitioner, the Court of Appeals, the incumbent Chiefs of the AFP,
the PNP and the PNP-CIDG, and all the present respondents before the Court of Appeals.7
F. The Courts November 29, 2011 Resolution
On November 2, 2011, we received a letter dated October 28, 2011 from Commissioner Jose Manuel S. Mamauag, Team
Leader, CHR Special Investigation Team, requesting photocopies of the following documents:
i. SOI of the officers and enlisted personnel of the 56th IB, 7th ID from January 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007;
ii. SOI of the intelligence operatives who were involved in the ERAP 5 incident; and
iii. SOI of 2Lt. Fernando who was a member of the 56th IB, 7th ID.8
In our November 29, 2011 Resolution, we denied the CHR's request considering the confidential nature of the requested
documents and because the relevance of these documents to the present case had not been established. We referred the
CHR to our July 5, 2011 Resolution where we pointedly stated that these documents shall be "released exclusively to this
Court for our examination to determine their relevance to the present case and the advisability of their public disclosure."9
We held that "[w]e see no reason at this time to release these confidential documents since their relevance to the present
case has not been established to our satisfaction. It is precisely for this reason that we issued our October 24, 2011
Resolution and directed the CHR to submit to this Court, within thirty (30) days from receipt of the Resolution, a Report with
its recommendations of its ongoing investigation of Jonas Burgos abduction, and the affidavit of Virgilio Eustaquio, if any.

Simply stated, it is only after the CHR's faithful compliance with our October 24, 2011 Resolution that we will be able to
determine the relevance of the requested documents to the present case."10
G. The March 20, 2012 CHR Progress Report and Eustaquios Affidavit
On March 20, 2012, the CHR submitted its Progress Report detailing its efforts to secure the affidavit of witness Eustaquio in relation
with his allegation that one of the male abductors of Jonas, appearing in the cartographic sketch, was among the raiders who
abducted him and four others, identified as Jim Cabauatan, Jose Curament, Ruben Dionisio and Dennis Ibona (otherwise known as the
"ERAP FIVE"). Attached to this Report is Eustaquios sworn affidavit dated March 16, 2012, which pertinently stated:
1. I was one of the victims in the abduction incident on May 22, 2006 otherwise known as ERAP 5 and because of
that, we filed a case with the Ombudsman against Commodore Leonardo Calderon, et al., all then ISAFP elements,
docketed as OMB-P-C-06-04050-E for Arbitrary Detention, Unlawful Arrest, Maltreatment of Prisoners, Grave Threats,
Incriminatory Machination, and Robbery.
2. On March 16, 2012, I was approached again by the CHR Special Investigation Team regarding the information I
have previously relayed to them sometime in September 2010 as to the resemblance of the cartographic sketch of
the man as described by the two eyewitnesses Elsa Agasang and Jeffrey Cabintoy in the abduction case of Jonas
Burgos;
3. I can say that the male abductor of Jonas Burgos appearing in the cartographic sketch is among the raiders who
abducted me and my four other companions because the cartographic sketch almost exactly matched and/or
resembled to the cartographic sketch that I also provided and described in relation to the said incident at my rented
house in Kamuning, Quezon City on May 22, 2006.
4. I am executing this affidavit voluntarily, freely and attest to the truth of the foregoing.11
H. The March 18, 2013 CA Decision
On March 18, 2013, the CA issued its decision pursuant to the Courts July 5, 2011 Resolution referring the Amparo and Habeas
Corpus aspects of the case to the CA for appropriate hearings and ruling on the merits of the petitions.
Petition for Habeas Corpus
The CA held that the issue in the petition for habeas corpus is not the illegal confinement or detention of Jonas, but his enforced
disappearance. Considering that Jonas was a victim of enforced disappearance, the present case is beyond the ambit of a petition for
habeas corpus.
Petition for the Writ of Amparo
Based on its finding that Jonas was a victim of enforced disappearance, the CA concluded that the present case falls within the ambit
of the Writ of Amparo. The CA found that the totality of the evidence supports the petitioners allegation that the military was
involved in the enforced disappearance of Jonas. The CA took note of Jeffrey Cabintoys positive identification of Lt. Baliaga as one of
the abductors who approached him and told him not to interfere because the man being arrested had been under surveillance for
drugs; he also remembered the face of Lt. Baliaga the face he identified in the pictures because he resembles his friend Raven. The
CA also held that Lt. Baliagas alibi and corroborative evidence cannot prevail over Cabintoys positive identification, considering
especially the absence of any indication that he was impelled by hatred or any improper motive to testify against Lt. Baliaga. Thus,
the CA held that Lt. Baliaga was responsible and the AFP and the PNP were accountable for the enforced disappearance of Jonas.
Based on these considerations, the CA resolved to:
1) RECOGNIZING the abduction of Jonas Burgos as an enforced disappearance covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo;
2) With regard to authorship,
a) DECLARING Maj. Harry A. Baliaga, Jr. RESPONSIBLE for the enforced disappearance of Jonas Burgos; and
b) DECLARING the Armed Forces of the Philippines and elements of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, particularly
the Philippine Army, ACCOUNTABLE for the enforced disappearance of Jonas Burgos;
3) DECLARING the Philippine National Police ACCOUNTABLE for the conduct of an exhaustive investigation of the enforced
disappearance of Jonas Burgos. To this end, the PNP through its investigative arm, the PNP-CIDG, is directed to exercise
extraordinary diligence to identify and locate the abductors of Jonas Burgos who are still at large and to establish the link
between the abductors of Jonas Burgos and those involved in the ERAP 5 incident.

(4) DIRECTING the incumbent Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Director General of the Philippine
National Police, and their successors, to ensure the continuance of their investigation and coordination on the enforced
disappearance of Jonas Burgos until the persons found responsible are brought before the bar of justice;
(5) DIRECTING the Commission on Human Rights to continue with its own independent investigation on the enforced
disappearance of Jonas Burgos with the same degree of diligence required under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo; and
(6) DIRECTING the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to extend full assistance to the
Commission on Human Rights in the conduct of the latters investigation.
The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Director General, Philippine National Police and the Chairman, Commission on
Human Rights are hereby DIRECTED to submit a quarterly report to this Court on the results of their respective investigation.
The filing of petitioners Affidavit-Complaint against Maj. Harry A. Baliaga, Jr., et al. before the Department of Justice on June 9, 2011 is
NOTED. Petitioner is DIRECTED to immediately inform this Court of any development regarding the outcome of the case.12
The Respondents April 3, 2013 Motion for Partial Reconsideration
The Solicitor General, in behalf of the public respondents (the AFP Chief of Staff and the PNP Director General), filed a motion for
partial reconsideration of the March 18, 2013 CA decision. The motion made the following submissions:
5. x x x[T]he Director General, PNP, respectfully takes exception to the Honorable Courts findings that the PNP, specifically
the CIDG, "failed to exercise extraordinary diligence in the conduct of its investigation." x x x [T]hat this Honorable Court
arrived at a conclusion different from that of the CIDG, or accorded different credence to the statements of the witnesses
presented by the parties, does not necessarily translate to the CIDGs failure to exercise extraordinary diligence.
6. The Chief of Staff, AFP also takes exception to the Honorable Courts findings that the "Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines and the Commanding General should be held accountable for Jonas Burgos disappearance for failing to
exercise extraordinary diligence in conducting an internal investigation on the matter. The unwillingness of the respondent
officers of the 56th IB to cooperate in the investigation conducted by the CHR is a persuasive proof of the alleged cover up of
the militarys involvement in the enforced disappearance of Jonas Burgos."
The AFP and the Philippine Army conducted a thorough investigation to determine the veracity of the allegations implicating
some of its officers and personnel. After the conduct of the same, it is the conclusion of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
and the Philippine Army, based on the evidence they obtained, that Jonas Burgos has never been in custody.
7. The Chief of Staff, AFP, also respectfully takes exception to the finding of the Honorable Court "recognizing the abduction
of Jonas Burgos as an enforced disappearance."
xxxx
That the Honorable Court found a member of the Philippine Army or even a group of military men to be responsible for the abduction
of Jonas Burgos, does not necessarily make the same a case of "enforced disappearance" involving the State. There is dearth of
evidence to show that the government is involved. Respondent Baliagas alleged participation in the abduction and his previous
membership in the 56th Infantry Battalion of the Philippine Army, by themselves, do not prove the participation or acquiescence of
the State.13
I. The CA Resolution dated May 23, 2013
On May 23, 2013, the CA issued its resolution denying the respondents motion for partial reconsideration. The CA ruled that as far as
the PNP was concerned, its failure to elicit leads and information from Cabintoy who witnessed Jonas abduction is eloquent proof of
its failure to exercise extraordinary diligence in the conduct of its investigation. As far as the AFP was concerned, the CA held that the
fact that Lt. Baliaga of the Philippine Army was positively identified as one of the abductors of Jonas, coupled with the AFPs lack of
serious effort to conduct further investigation, spoke loudly of the AFP leaderships accountability.
To date, the respondents have not appealed to this Court, as provided under Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.14
J. The Petitioners Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela dated April 1, 2013
On April 1, 2013, the petitioner filed an Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela asking the Court to: (1) order the persons named in the
sealed documents to be impleaded in CA-G.R. SP No. 00008-WA and G.R. No. 183713; (2) issue a writ of Amparo on the basis of the
newly discovered evidence (the sealed attachment to the motion); and (3) refer the cases to the CA for further hearing on the newly
discovered evidence.
The petitioner alleged that she received from a source (who requested to remain anonymous) documentary evidence proving that an
intelligence unit of the 7th Infantry Division of the Philippine Army and 56th Infantry Battalion, operating together, captured Jonas on
April 28, 2007 at Ever Gotesco Mall, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City. This documentary evidence consists of: (1) After

Apprehension Report dated April 30, 2007; (2) Psycho Social Processing Report dated April 28, 2007; and (3) Autobiography of Jonas.
The petitioner also claimed that these are copies of confidential official reports on file with the Philippine Army.
i. After Apprehension Report dated April 30, 2007
This report is a photocopy consisting six pages dated April 30, 2007, addressed to the Commanding Officer, 7MIB,
7ID, LA, Fort Magsaysay, NE. The report detailed the planning and the objective of apprehending target communist
leaders, among them, one alias "Ramon" who was captured at Ever Gotesco Mall, Commonwealth, Quezon City on
April 28, 2007 by joint elements of the 72 MICO and S2, 56th IB. This report also listed the names of the military
personnel belonging to task organization 72 MICO and 56th IB who conducted the operation.
ii. Psycho Social Processing Report dated April 28, 2007
This report details Jonas abduction and "neutralization"; the results of his interrogation and the intelligence
gathered on his significant involvements/activities within the CPP/NPA/NDF organization.
iii. Undated Autobiography
This autobiography narrates how Jonas started as a student activist, his recruitment and eventual ascent in the
CPP/NPA as an intelligence officer.
K. The Courts April 11, 2013 Resolution
In our April 11, 2013 Resolution, the Court resolved to require the respondents to Comment on the petitioners Urgent Ex Parte Motion
Ex Abundanti Cautela and its attachments, within ten (10) days from receipt of the Resolution. In the same Resolution, the Court:
(1) required BGen. Roa and Lt. Gen. Emmanuel T. Bautista to fully comply with the terms of Section III (i) of the
dispositive portion of our July 5, 2011 Resolution within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the resolution;
(2) required Lt. Gen. Emmanuel T. Bautista to submit a written assurance within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
Resolution that the military personnel listed in the submitted After Apprehension Report can be located and be
served with the processes that the Court may serve;
(3) issued a Temporary Protection Order in favor of the petitioner and all the members of her immediate family;
(4) directed the DOJ and the NBI to provide security and protection to the petitioner and her immediate family and
to submit a confidential memorandum on the security arrangements made;
(5) directed the NBI to coordinate and provide direct investigative assistance to the CHR as it may require pursuant
to the authority granted under the Courts June 22, 2010 Resolution.15
i. The respondents Comment from the petitioners Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela dated June 6, 2013
On June 6, 2013, the respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed their comments on the petitioners Urgent Ex Parte
Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela.
First, the respondents alleged that the documents submitted by the petitioner do not exist in the concerned military units respective
records, nor are they in the custody or possession of their respective units. To support their allegations, the respondents submitted
the following:
a. Certification dated May 29, 2013 from Maj. Gen. Gregorio Pio P. Catapang, Jr. Commander, 7th Infantry Division,
Philippine Army stating that the documents16 submitted by the petitioner "do not exist nor in the
possession/custody of this Headquarters."
b. Certification dated May 29, 2013, from Lt. Col. Louie D.S. Villanueva, Assistant Chief of Staff, Office of the
Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel, G1, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army stating that the documents
submitted by the petitioner "could not be found nor do they exist in the records of this Command."
c. Certification dated May 24, 2013 from Lt. Col. Bernardo M. Ona, Commanding Officer, 56th Infantry Battalion, 7th
Infantry Division, Philippine Army stating that the documents submitted by the petitioner "do not exist at this unit."
d. Certification dated May 24, 2013 from 1Lt. Donal S. Frias, Acting Commanding Officer, 72nd Military Intelligence
Company, 7th Military Intelligence Battalion, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army stating that the documents
submitted by the petitioner "do not exist at the records or in the possession of this unit."17
The respondents also submitted the affidavits of Lt. Col. Melquiades Feliciano, Maj. Allan M. Margarata and Cpl. Ruby Benedicto, viz:

a. In his June 3, 2013 Affidavit, Col. Feliciano stated:

1. That I was assigned as Battalion Commander of 56th Infantry Division, 7th Infantry Division, PA last 17 January
2007 to 17 August 2007.
2. That I was showed a photocopy of the After Apprehension Report dated 30 April 2007 wherein members of 56th
IB, 7ID, PA were included therein.
3. I vehemently oppose to (sic) the existence of the said document and the participation of my men listed thereat.
There were no military operations that I have authorized or approved regarding Jonas Burgos. The contents thereof
are false and utter fabrication of facts.
b. In his May 31, 2013 Affidavit, Maj. Margarata stated:
1. That I was assigned at 72nd Military Intelligence Company (72MICO), 7th Infantry Division, PA from 01 July 2006
to 01 July 2008.
2. That I was showed a photocopy of the Psycho-Social Processing Report dated 28 April 2007 and After
Apprehension Report dated 30 April 2007, both of which purportedly came from 72MICO, 7th Infantry Division,
Philippine Army and that on the last page of the Pyscho-Social Processing Report appears my name therein.
3. I vehemently oppose to (sic) the existence of the said documents and the implication of my name in the said
documents. The contents thereof are purely a product of wild imagination. I have never seen such document until
now.
4. I can only surmise that these are plainly a fishing expedition on the part of Mrs. Edita Burgos. A ploy to implicate
any military personnel especially those belonging to the 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army.
c. In her May 31, 2013 Affidavit, Cpl. Benedicto stated:
1. That I was never assigned at 72nd Military Intelligence Company, 7th Infantry Division, PA.
2. That I was showed a photocopy of the Psycho-Social Processing Report dated 28 April 2007 and After
Apprehension Report dated 30 April 2007, both of which purportedly came from 72MICO, 7th Infantry Division,
Philippine Army and that on the last page of the Psycho-Social Processing Report appears my name therein.
3. I vehemently oppose to (sic) the existence of the said documents and the implication of my name in the said
documents. The contents thereof are false and utter fabrication of facts. How can I ever be at 72MICO if I was never
assigned thereat.
4. I have never been an interrogator in my entire military service. I have never been a member of any operation
which involves the name of Jonas Burgos or any other military operation for that matter. I have never seen such
document until now.
5. Furthermore, I have never worked with Maj. Allan Margarata or of his unit, 72MICO.18
Second, the respondents note that none of the documents submitted by the petitioner were signed; a writ of Amparo cannot be
issued and the investigation cannot progress on the basis of false documents and false information.
Lastly, the respondents argue that since the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and CHR are conducting their own investigations
of the case, the petitioners motion at this point is premature; the proceedings to be conducted by the CA will be at the very least
redundant.
ii. The Respondents Compliance dated June 7, 2013
On June 7, 2013, the respondents, through the Office of Judge Advocate General, complied with our April 11, 2013 Resolution by
submitting the following documents:
a. Profile/Summary of Information (SOI) with pictures of the personnel of 56th Infantry Battalion (IB), 69th IB, and
7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army (PA). These documents were submitted by the 7th ID in sealed nine (9) small
and three (3) big boxes (total of twelve (12) sealed boxes);
b. Investigation Report of the Intelligence Service, Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP) on the 2007 "ERAP 5"
incident in Kamuning, Quezon City; Profile/Summary of Information (SOI) with pictures of the Intel Operatives
involved in the "ERAP 5" incident; and certification issued by the Command Adjutant of ISAFP concerning T/Sgt.
Jason Roxas (Philippine Army), Cpl. Maria Joana Francisco (Philippine Air Force), M/Sgt. Aron Arroyo (Philippine Air

Force), an alias T.L., all reportedly assigned with the Military Intelligence Group 15 of the Intelligence Service, AFP
(MIG 15, ISAFP). These documents were submitted by ISAFP in a sealed envelope;
c. Profile/Summary of Information (SOI) with a picture of 2LT Fernando PA. This document was submitted by Deputy
Chief of Staff for Personnel, G1, PA in a sealed envelope;
d. A certification issued by 56IB and 69IB, 7ID, PA concerning captured/surrendered rebels;
e. A certification stating the present location and whereabouts of military personnel listed in the submitted After
Apprehension Report, dated April 30, 2007, allegedly identified as members of the Task Organization -72 MICO and
56th IB with the inclusion of four (4) separate certifications from Commander, 7ID, PA, Office of the Assistant Chief
of Staff for Personnel, G1, 7ID, PA, Commanding Officer, 72 MICO, and 56Ib, 71ID, PA, respectively, stating the nonexistence of the following documents: Psycho-Social Processing Report dated 28 April 2007; After-Apprehension
Report dated 30 April 2007; Autobiography of Jonas Burgos; and Picture of Jonas Burgos;
f. Affidavit of Compliance of General Emmanuel T. Bautista, AFP, the Chief of Staff, assuring that the active military
personnel mentioned in the purported apprehension report can be located at their given locations and be served
with the processes that may be issued by the Honorable Court.19
OUR RULING
A. On the relevancy and disclosure of the documents submitted to this Court per paragraph III(i) of the fallo of our July 5, 2011
Resolution
The directive for the submission of the above-mentioned documents arose from our determination in our June 22, 2010 Resolution
that the PNP-CIDG failed to identify the cartographic sketches of two (one male and one female) of the five abductors of Jonas, based
on their interview with eyewitnesses to the abduction. For this reason, the Court directly commissioned the CHR to continue the
investigation of Jonas abduction and the gathering of evidence.
Based on its March 15, 2011 Report, the CHR uncovered a lead a claim made by Eustaquio, Chairman of the Union Masses for
Democracy and Justice, that the male abductor of Jonas appearing in the cartographic sketch was among the raiders who abducted
him and four others, known as the "ERAP FIVE."
This prompted the CHR to request copies of the documents embodied in par. III(i) of the fallo of the Courts July 5, 2011 Resolution
from General Gilberto Jose C. Roa of the Office of the Judge Advocate General, AFP. Gen. Roa initially denied this request but
eventually complied with the Courts directive of July 5, 2011 to submit the documents via the September 23, 2011 Manifestation and
Motion and the June 7, 2013 Compliance. In the same July 5, 2011 Resolution, the Court made it plain that these documents shall be
released exclusively to the Court for its examination to determine their relevance to the present case and the advisability of their
public disclosure.
Pursuant to the Courts October 11, 2011 Resolution, the CHR submitted its March 20, 2012 Progress Report on its continuing
investigation of Jonas abduction. Attached to this Progress Report was Virgilio Eustaquios sworn affidavit stating that: (1) he was one
of the victims of the abduction incident on May 22, 2006, otherwise known as the "ERAP FIVE" incident; (2) as a result of this incident,
they filed a case with the Ombudsman against Commodore Leonardo Calderon and other members of the Intelligence Service, AFP
(ISAFP) for arbitrary detention, unlawful arrest, maltreatment of prisoners, grave threats, incriminatory machination and robbery; and
(3) the male abductor of Jonas appearing in the cartographic sketch shown to him by the CHR was among the raiders who abducted
him and his four companions because it resembled the cartographic sketch he described in relation to the ERAP FIVE incident on May
22, 2006.
After reviewing the submissions of both the respondents20 and the CHR21 pursuant to the Courts July 5, 2011, August 23, 2011 and
October 11, 2011 Resolutions, we resolve to grant the CHR access to these requested documents to allow them the opportunity to
ascertain the true identities of the persons depicted in the cartographic sketches.
At this point, we emphasize that the sworn affidavit of Eustaquio (that attests to the resemblance of one of Jonas abductors to the
abductors of the ERAP FIVE) constitutes the sought-after missing link that establishes the relevance of the requested documents to
the present case. We note that this lead may help the CHR ascertain the identities of those depicted in the cartographic sketches as
two of Jonas abductors (one male and one female) who, to this day, remain unidentified.
In view of the sensitive and confidential nature of the requested documents, we direct the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court to
allow the duly-authorized representatives of the CHR to inspect the requested documents in camera within five (5) days from receipt
of this Resolution.
The documents shall be examined and compared with the cartographic sketches of the two abductors of Jonas, without copying and
without bringing the documents outside the premises of the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court. The inspection of the
documents shall be within office hours and for a reasonable period of time sufficient to allow the CHR to comprehensively investigate
the lead provided by Eustaquio.
To fully fulfill the objective of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, further investigation using the standard of extraordinary diligence
should be undertaken by the CHR to pursue the lead provided by Eustaquio. We take judicial notice of the ongoing investigation being

conducted by the Department of Justice (DOJ), through the NBI, on the disappearance of Jonas.22 In this regard, we direct the NBI to
coordinate and provide direct investigative assistance to the CHR as the latter may require, pursuant to the authority granted under
the Courts June 22, 2010 Resolution.
For this purpose, we require the CHR to submit a supplemental investigation report to the DOJ, copy furnished the petitioner, the NBI,
the incumbent Chiefs of the AFP, the PNP and the PNP-CIDG, and all the respondents within sixty days (60) days from receipt of this
Resolution.
B. On the Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela
After reviewing the newly discovered evidence submitted by the petitioner and considering all the developments of the case,
including the March 18, 2013 CA decision that confirmed the validity of the issuance of the Writ of Amparo in the present case, we
resolve to deny the petitioners Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela.
We note and conclude, based on the developments highlighted above, that the beneficial purpose of the Writ of Amparo has been
served in the present case. As we held in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis,23 the writ merely embodies the Courts directives to police agencies to
undertake specified courses of action to address the enforced disappearance of an individual. The Writ of Amparo serves both a
preventive and a curative role. It is curative as it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators through the investigation and
remedial action that it directs.24 The focus is on procedural curative remedies rather than on the tracking of a specific criminal or the
resolution of administrative liabilities. The unique nature of Amparo proceedings has led us to define terms or concepts specific to
what the proceedings seek to achieve. In Razon Jr., v. Tagitis,25 we defined what the terms "responsibility" and "accountability" signify
in an Amparo case. We said:
Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by
action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to
file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on the other hand,
refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance
without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating
to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of
extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance.26
In the present case, while Jonas remains missing, the series of calculated directives issued by the Court outlined above and the
extraordinary diligence the CHR demonstrated in its investigations resulted in the criminal prosecution of Lt. Baliaga. We take judicial
notice of the fact that the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 216, has already found probable cause for arbitrary detention
against Lt. Baliaga and has ordered his arrest in connection with Jonas disappearance.27
We also emphasize that the CA in its March 18, 2013 decision already ruled with finality on the entities responsible and accountable
(as these terms are defined in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis) for the enforced disappearance of Jonas. In its March 18, 2013 decision, the CA
found, by substantial evidence, that Lt. Baliaga participated in the abduction on the basis of Cabintoys positive identification that he
was one of the abductors of Jonas who told him not to interfere because the latter had been under surveillance for drugs. In the same
Decision, the CA also held the AFP and the PNP accountable for having failed to discharge the burden of extraordinary diligence in the
investigation of the enforced disappearance of Jonas. Thus, the CA issued the following directives to address the enforced
disappearance of Jonas:
(1) DIRECT the PNP through its investigative arm, the PNP-CIDG, to identify and locate the abductors of Jonas Burgos who are
still at large and to establish the link between the abductors of Jonas Burgos and those involved in the ERAP 5 incident;
(2) DIRECT the incumbent Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Director General of the Philippines
National Police, and their successors, to ensure the continuance of their investigation and coordination on the enforced
disappearance of Jonas Burgos until the persons found responsible are brought before the bar of justice;
(3) DIRECT the Commission on Human Rights to continue with its own independent investigation on the enforced
disappearance of Jonas Burgos with the same degree of diligence required under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo;
(4) DIRECT the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to extend full assistance to the Commission
on Human Rights in the conduct of the latters investigation; and
(5) DIRECT the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Director General, Philippine National Police and the
Chairman, Commission on Human Rights to submit a quarterly report to the Court on the results of their respective
investigation.28
We note that the respondents did not appeal the March 18, 2013 CA decision and the May 23, 2013 CA resolution denying their
motion for partial reconsideration.
Based on the above considerations, in particular, the final ruling of the CA that confirmed the validity of the issuance of the Writ of
Amparo and its determination of the entities responsible for the enforced disappearance of Jonas, we resolve to deny the petitioners
prayer to issue the writ of Amparo anew and to refer the case to the CA based on the newly discovered evidence. We so conclude as
the petitioners request for the reissuance of the writ and for the rehearing of the case by the CA would be redundant and superfluous
in light of: (1) the ongoing investigation being conducted by the DOJ through the NBI; (2) the CHR investigation directed by the Court
in this Resolution; and (3) the continuing investigation directed by the CA in its March 18, 2013 decision.

We emphasize that while the Rule on the Writ of Amparo accords the Court a wide latitude in crafting remedies to address an
enforced disappearance, it cannot (without violating the nature of the writ of Amparo as a summary remedy that provides rapid
judicial relief) grant remedies that would complicate and prolong rather than expedite the investigations already ongoing. Note that
the CA has already determined with finality that Jonas was a victim of enforced disappearance.
We clarify that by denying the petitioners motion, we do not thereby rule on the admissibility or the merits of the newly discovered
evidence submitted by the petitioner. We likewise do not foreclose any investigation by the proper investigative and prosecutory
agencies of the other entities whose identities and participation in the enforced disappearance of Jonas may be disclosed in future
investigations and proceedings. Considering that the present case has already reached the prosecution stage, the petitioners motion
should have been filed with the proper investigative and prosecutory agencies of the government.
To expedite proceedings, we refer the petitioners motion, this Resolution and its covered cases to the DOJ for investigation, for the
purpose of filing the appropriate criminal charges in the proper courts against the proper parties, if warranted, based on the gathered
evidence. For this purpose, we direct the petitioner to furnish the DOJ and the NBI copies of her Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti
Cautela, together with the sealed attachments to the Motion, within five (5) days from receipt of this Resolution.
As mentioned, we take judicial notice of the ongoing investigation by the DOJ, through the NBI, of the disappearance of Jonas. This
DOJ investigation is without prejudice to the Office of the Ombudsmans exercise of its primary jurisdiction over the investigation of
the criminal aspect of this case should the case be determined to be cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.29
As we direct below, further investigation for purposes of the present proceedings shall continue to be undertaken by the CHR, in close
coordination with the NBI, for the completion of the investigation under the terms of our June 22, 2010 Resolution and the additional
directives under the present Resolution.
As a final note, we emphasize that our ROLE in a writ of Amparo proceeding is merely to determine whether an enforced
disappearance has taken place; to determine who is responsible or accountable; and to define and impose the appropriate remedies
to address the disappearance.1wphi1
As shown above, the beneficial purpose of the Writ of Amparo has been served in the present case with the CAs final determination
of the persons responsible and accountable for the enforced disappearance of Jonas and the commencement of criminal action
against Lt. Baliaga. At this stage, criminal, investigation and prosecution proceedings are already beyond the reach of the Writ of
Amparo proceeding now before us.
Based on the above developments, we now hold that the full extent of the remedies envisioned by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo has
been served and exhausted.
Considering the foregoing, the Court RESOLVES to:
(1) DENY petitioner Edita Burgos Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela;
(2) REFER the petitioners Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela, this Resolution and its covered cases to the
Department of Justice for investigation for the purpose of filing the appropriate criminal charges in the proper courts against
the proper parties if such action is warranted by the gathered evidence. The referral to the Department of Justice is without
prejudice to the Office of the Ombudsmans exercise of its primary jurisdiction over the investigation should the case be
determined to be cognizable by the Sandiganbayan;
(3) DIRECT the petitioner to furnish the Department of Justice and the National Bureau of Investigation copies of her Urgent
Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela, together with the sealed attachments to the Motion, within five (5) days from receipt
of this Resolution;
(4) DIRECT the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court to allow the duly-authorized representatives of the Commission on
Human Rights to inspect the requested documents in camera within five (5) days from receipt of this Resolution. For this
purpose, the documents shall be examined and compared with the cartographic sketches of the two abductors of Jonas
Burgos without copying and bringing the documents outside the premises of the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Supreme
Court. The inspection of the documents shall be conducted within office hours and for a reasonable period of time that would
allow the Commission on Human Rights to comprehensively investigate the lead provided by Virgilio Eustaquio;
(5) DIRECT the National Bureau of Investigation to coordinate and provide direct investigative assistance to the Commission
on Human Rights as the latter may require, pursuant to the authority granted under the Court's June 22, 2010 Resolution.
(6) REQUIRE the Commission on Human Rights to submit a supplemental investigation report to the Department of Justice,
copy furnished the petitioner, the National Bureau of Investigation, the incumbent Chiefs of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, the Philippine National Police and the Philippine National Police-Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, and
all the respondents, within sixty (60) days from receipt of this Resolution.
(7) DECLARE this Writ of Amparo proceeding closed and terminated, without prejudice to the concerned parties' compliance
with the above directives and subject to the Court's continuing jurisdiction to enforce compliance with this Resolution.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 199199

August 27, 2013

MARICRIS D. DOLOT, CHAIRMAN OF THE BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN-SORSOGON, PETITIONER

vs.
HON. RAMON PAJE, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES, REYNULFO A. JUAN, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, MINES AND GEOSCIENCES BUREAU, DENR, HON. RAUL R. LEE,
GOVERNOR, PROVINCE OF SORSOGON, ANTONIO C. OCAMPO, JR., VICTORIA A. AJERO, ALFREDO M. AGUILAR, AND JUAN
M. AGUILAR, ANTONES ENTERPRISES, GLOBAL SUMMIT MINES DEV'T CORP., AND TR ORE, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Order 2 dated September 16, 2011 and
Resolution3 dated October 18, 2011 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sorsogon, Branch 53. The assailed issuances dismissed
Civil Case No. 2011-8338 for Continuing Mandamus, Damages and Attorneys Fees with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Environment Protection Order.
Antecedent Facts
On September 15, 2011, petitioner Maricris D. Dolot (Dolot), together with the parish priest of the Holy Infant Jesus Parish and the
officers of Alyansa Laban sa Mina sa Matnog (petitioners), filed a petition for continuing mandamus, damages and attorneys fees with
the RTC of Sorsogon, docketed as Civil Case No. 2011-8338.4 The petition contained the following pertinent allegations: (1) sometime
in 2009, they protested the iron ore mining operations being conducted by Antones Enterprises, Global Summit Mines Development
Corporation and TR Ore in Barangays Balocawe and Bon-ot Daco, located in the Municipality of Matnog, to no avail; (2) Matnog is
located in the southern tip of Luzon and there is a need to protect, preserve and maintain the geological foundation of the
municipality; (3) Matnog is susceptible to flooding and landslides, and confronted with the environmental dangers of flood hazard,
liquefaction, ground settlement, ground subsidence and landslide hazard; (4) after investigation, they learned that the mining
operators did not have the required permit to operate; (5) Sorsogon Governor Raul Lee and his predecessor Sally Lee issued to the
operators a small-scale mining permit, which they did not have authority to issue; (6) the representatives of the Presidential
Management Staff and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), despite knowledge, did not do anything to
protect the interest of the people of Matnog;5 and (7) the respondents violated Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7076 or the Peoples SmallScale Mining Act of 1991, R.A. No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, and the Local Government Code. 6 Thus, they prayed for
the following reliefs: (1) the issuance of a writ commanding the respondents to immediately stop the mining operations in the
Municipality of Matnog; (2) the issuance of a temporary environment protection order or TEPO; (3) the creation of an inter-agency
group to undertake the rehabilitation of the mining site; (4) award of damages; and (5) return of the iron ore, among others. 7
The case was referred by the Executive Judge to the RTC of Sorsogon, Branch 53 being the designated environmental court. 8 In the
Order9 dated September 16, 2011, the case was summarily dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in the Resolution 10 dated October 18, 2011. Aside from sustaining
the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction, the RTC 11 further ruled that: (1) there was no final court decree, order or decision yet
that the public officials allegedly failed to act on, which is a condition for the issuance of the writ of continuing mandamus; (2) the
case was prematurely filed as the petitioners therein failed to exhaust their administrative remedies; and (3) they also failed to attach
judicial affidavits and furnish a copy of the complaint to the government or appropriate agency, as required by the rules. 12
Petitioner Dolot went straight to this Court on pure questions of law.
Issues
The main issue in this case is whether the RTC-Branch 53 has jurisdiction to resolve Civil Case No. 2011-8338. The other issue is
whether the petition is dismissible on the grounds that: (1) there is no final court decree, order or decision that the public officials
allegedly failed to act on; (2) the case was prematurely filed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies; and (3) the petitioners
failed to attach judicial affidavits and furnish a copy of the complaint to the government or appropriate agency.
Ruling of the Court
Jurisdiction and Venue

In dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction, the RTC, in its Order dated September 16, 2011, apparently relied on SC
Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 7 defining the territorial areas of the Regional Trial Courts in Regions 1 to 12, and Administrative
Circular (Admin. Circular) No. 23-2008,13 designating the environmental courts "to try and decide violations of environmental laws x x
x committed within their respective territorial jurisdictions." 14 Thus, it ruled that its territorial jurisdiction was limited within the
boundaries of Sorsogon City and the neighboring municipalities of Donsol, Pilar, Castilla, Casiguran and Juban and that it was "bereft
of jurisdiction to entertain, hear and decide [the] case, as such authority rests before another co-equal court." 15
Such reasoning is plainly erroneous. The RTC cannot solely rely on SC A.O. No. 7 and Admin. Circular No. 23-2008 and confine itself
within its four corners in determining whether it had jurisdiction over the action filed by the petitioners.
None is more well-settled than the rule that jurisdiction, which is the power and authority of the court to hear, try and decide a case,
is conferred by law.16 It may either be over the nature of the action, over the subject matter, over the person of the defendants or
over the issues framed in the pleadings.17 By virtue of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,
jurisdiction over special civil actions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is vested in the RTC. Particularly, Section 21(1) thereof
provides that the RTCs shall exercise original jurisdiction
in the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction which may be enforced in
any part of their respective regions. (Emphasis ours)
A.O. No. 7 and Admin. Circular No. 23-2008 was issued pursuant to Section 18 of B.P. Blg. 129, which gave the Court authority to
define the territory over which a branch of the RTC shall exercise its authority. These administrative orders and circulars issued by the
Court merely provide for the venue where an action may be filed. The Court does not have the power to confer jurisdiction on any
court or tribunal as the allocation of jurisdiction is lodged solely in Congress. 18 It also cannot be delegated to another office or agency
of the Government.19 Section 18 of B.P. Blg. 129, in fact, explicitly states that the territory thus defined shall be deemed to be the
territorial area of the branch concerned for purposes of determining the venue of all suits, proceedings or actions. It was also clarified
in Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Matas 20 that
Administrative Order No. 3 [defining the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts in the National Capital Judicial Region] and,
in like manner, Circular Nos. 13 and 19, did not per se confer jurisdiction on the covered regional trial courts or its branches, such that
non-observance thereof would nullify their judicial acts. The administrative order merely defines the limits of the administrative area
within which a branch of the court may exercise its authority pursuant to the jurisdiction conferred by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. 21
The RTC need not be reminded that venue relates only to the place of trial or the geographical location in which an action or
proceeding should be brought and does not equate to the jurisdiction of the court. It is intended to accord convenience to the parties,
as it relates to the place of trial, and does not restrict their access to the courts. 22 Consequently, the RTCs motu proprio dismissal of
Civil Case No. 2011-8338 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction is patently incorrect.
At most, the error committed by the petitioners in filing the case with the RTC of Sorsogon was that of improper venue. A.M. No. 09-68-SC or the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (Rules) specifically states that a special civil action for continuing mandamus
shall be filed with the "[RTC] exercising jurisdiction over the territory where the actionable neglect or omission occurred x x x." 23 In
this case, it appears that the alleged actionable neglect or omission occurred in the Municipality of Matnog and as such, the petition
should have been filed in the RTC of Irosin.24 But even then, it does not warrant the outright dismissal of the petition by the RTC as
venue may be waived.25 Moreover, the action filed by the petitioners is not criminal in nature where venue is an essential element of
jurisdiction.26 In Gomez-Castillo v. Commission on Elections, 27 the Court even expressed that what the RTC should have done under
the circumstances was to transfer the case (an election protest) to the proper branch. Similarly, it would serve the higher interest of
justice28 if the Court orders the transfer of Civil Case No. 2011 8338 to the RTC of Irosin for proper and speedy resolution, with the RTC
applying the Rules in its disposition of the case.
At this juncture, the Court affirms the continuing applicability of Admin. Circular No. 23-2008 constituting the different "green courts"
in the country and setting the administrative guidelines in the raffle and disposition of environmental cases. While the designation
and guidelines were made in 2008, the same should operate in conjunction with the Rules.
A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC: Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases
In its Resolution dated October 18, 2011, which resolved the petitioners motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal, the RTC
further ruled that the petition was dismissible on the following grounds: (1) there is no final court decree, order or decision yet that
the public officials allegedly failed to act on; (2) the case was prematurely filed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies; and (3)
there was failure to attach judicial affidavits and furnish a copy of the complaint to the government or appropriate agency. 29 The
respondents, and even the Office of the Solicitor General, in behalf of the public respondents, all concur with the view of the RTC.
The concept of continuing mandamus was first introduced in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Concerned Residents of
Manila Bay.30 Now cast in stone under Rule 8 of the Rules, the writ of continuing mandamus enjoys a distinct procedure than that of
ordinary civil actions for the enforcement/violation of environmental laws, which are covered by Part II (Civil Procedure). Similar to the

procedure under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for special civil actions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, Section 4, Rule 8 of
the Rules requires that the petition filed should be sufficient in form and substance before a court may take further action; otherwise,
the court may dismiss the petition outright. Courts must be cautioned, however, that the determination to give due course to the
petition or dismiss it outright is an exercise of discretion that must be applied in a reasonable manner in consonance with the spirit of
the law and always with the view in mind of seeing to it that justice is served. 31
Sufficiency in form and substance refers to the contents of the petition filed under Rule 8, Section 1:
When any agency or instrumentality of the government or officer thereof unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station in connection with the enforcement or violation of an
environmental law rule or regulation or a right therein, or unlawfully excludes another from the use or enjoyment of such right and
there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty, attaching thereto supporting evidence, specifying that the petition
concerns an environmental law, rule or regulation, and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to do an act
or series of acts until the judgment is fully satisfied, and to pay damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the malicious
neglect to perform the duties of the respondent, under the law, rules or regulations. The petition shall also contain a sworn
certification of non-forum shopping.1wphi1
On matters of form, the petition must be verified and must contain supporting evidence as well as a sworn certification of non-forum
shopping. It is also necessary that the petitioner must be one who is aggrieved by an act or omission of the government agency,
instrumentality or its officer concerned. Sufficiency of substance, on the other hand, necessitates that the petition must contain
substantive allegations specifically constituting an actionable neglect or omission and must establish, at the very least, a prima facie
basis for the issuance of the writ, viz: (1) an agency or instrumentality of government or its officer unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act or unlawfully excludes another from the use or enjoyment of a right; (2) the act to be performed by the
government agency, instrumentality or its officer is specifically enjoined by law as a duty; (3) such duty results from an office, trust or
station in connection with the enforcement or violation of an environmental law, rule or regulation or a right therein; and (4) there is
no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law.32
The writ of continuing mandamus is a special civil action that may be availed of "to compel the performance of an act specifically
enjoined by law."33 The petition should mainly involve an environmental and other related law, rule or regulation or a right therein.
The RTCs mistaken notion on the need for a final judgment, decree or order is apparently based on the definition of the writ of
continuing mandamus under Section 4, Rule 1 of the Rules, to wit:
(c) Continuing mandamus is a writ issued by a court in an environmental case directing any agency or instrumentality of the
government or officer thereof to perform an act or series of acts decreed by final judgment which shall remain effective until
judgment is fully satisfied. (Emphasis ours)
The final court decree, order or decision erroneously alluded to by the RTC actually pertains to the judgment or decree that a court
would eventually render in an environmental case for continuing mandamus and which judgment or decree shall subsequently
become final.
Under the Rules, after the court has rendered a judgment in conformity with Rule 8, Section 7 and such judgment has become final,
the issuing court still retains jurisdiction over the case to ensure that the government agency concerned is performing its tasks as
mandated by law and to monitor the effective performance of said tasks. It is only upon full satisfaction of the final judgment, order or
decision that a final return of the writ shall be made to the court and if the court finds that the judgment has been fully implemented,
the satisfaction of judgment shall be entered in the court docket. 34 A writ of continuing mandamus is, in essence, a command of
continuing compliance with a final judgment as it "permits the court to retain jurisdiction after judgment in order to ensure the
successful implementation of the reliefs mandated under the courts decision." 35
The Court, likewise, cannot sustain the argument that the petitioners should have first filed a case with the Panel of Arbitrators
(Panel), which has jurisdiction over mining disputes under R.A. No. 7942.
Indeed, as pointed out by the respondents, the Panel has jurisdiction over mining disputes. 36 But the petition filed below does not
involve a mining dispute. What was being protested are the alleged negative environmental impact of the small-scale mining
operation being conducted by Antones Enterprises, Global Summit Mines Development Corporation and TR Ore in the Municipality of
Matnog; the authority of the Governor of Sorsogon to issue mining permits in favor of these entities; and the perceived indifference of
the DENR and local government officials over the issue. Resolution of these matters does not entail the technical knowledge and
expertise of the members of the Panel but requires an exercise of judicial function. Thus, in Olympic Mines and Development Corp. v.
Platinum Group Metals Corporation,37 the Court stated
Arbitration before the Panel of Arbitrators is proper only when there is a disagreement between the parties as to some provisions of
the contract between them, which needs the interpretation and the application of that particular knowledge and expertise possessed
by members of that Panel. It is not proper when one of the parties repudiates the existence or validity of such contract or agreement
on the ground of fraud or oppression as in this case. The validity of the contract cannot be subject of arbitration proceedings.

Allegations of fraud and duress in the execution of a contract are matters within the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts of law. These
questions are legal in nature and require the application and interpretation of laws and jurisprudence which is necessarily a judicial
function.38 (Emphasis supplied in the former and ours in the latter)
Consequently, resort to the Panel would be completely useless and unnecessary.
The Court also finds that the RTC erred in ruling that the petition is infirm for failure to attach judicial affidavits. As previously stated,
Rule 8 requires that the petition should be verified, contain supporting evidence and must be accompanied by a sworn certification of
non-forum shopping. There is nothing in Rule 8 that compels the inclusion of judicial affidavits, albeit not prohibited. It is only if the
evidence of the petitioner would consist of testimony of witnesses that it would be the time that judicial affidavits (affidavits of
witnesses in the question and answer form) must be attached to the petition/complaint. 39
Finally, failure to furnish a copy of the petition to the respondents is not a fatal defect such that the case should be dismissed. The
RTC could have just required the petitioners to furnish a copy of the petition to the respondents. It should be remembered that "courts
are not enslaved by technicalities, and they have the prerogative to relax compliance with procedural rules of even the most
mandatory character, mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to speedily put an end to litigation and the parties right to an
opportunity to be heard."40
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order dated September 16, 2011 and Resolution dated October 18, 2011 issued by the
Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Branch 53, dismissing Civil Case No. 2011-8338 are NULLIFIED AND SET ASIDE. The Executive Judge
of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon is DIRECTED to transfer the case to the Regional Trial Court of Irosin, Branch 55, for further
proceedings with dispatch. Petitioner Maricris D. Dolot is also ORDERED to furnish the respondents with a copy of the petition and its
annexes within ten (10) days from receipt of this Decision and to submit its Compliance with the RTC of Irosin.
SO ORDERED.

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