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CRITICAL ADULT EDUCATION AND THE POLITICALPHILOSOPHICAL DEBATE BETWEEN NANCY FRASER
AND AXEL HONNETH
Rauno Huttunen
Department of Education
University of Joensuu

ABSTRACT. Critical adult education is inspired by Paulo Freires educational writings. For him, the aim of
the pedagogy of the oppressed is to emancipate people from social and economic repression. Critical adult
education is intellectual work that aims to make the world more just. One might ask what exactly justice
and injustice mean here, however. Is the work against social injustice mainly concerned with the redistribution of material goods or recognition and respect? This is the issue debated by Nancy Fraser and Axel
Honneth. Honneth claims that in the context of social justice, recognition is a fundamental, overarching
moral category and redistribution is derivative. Fraser denies that distribution could be subsumed under
recognition and introduces a perspectival dualist analysis of social justice that considers the two categories (redistribution and recognition) as equally fundamental, mutually irreducible dimensions of justice. In this essay, Rauno Huttunen reflects on the relation between maldistribution and misrecognition,
in order to think through critical adult educations task in fighting against social injustice.

INTRODUCTION
The idea of critical adult education is connected to the ideals of social justice
and democracy. Critical adult education is inspired by Paulo Freires educational
writings.1 For Freire, the aim of the pedagogy of the oppressed is to emancipate people from social and economic repression. Following the Freirean approach, critical
adult education aims at action intended to alter the world in the direction of
greater solidarity. One might ask what exactly justice and injustice mean in this
context. Is the work against social injustice mainly concerned with the question of
the redistribution of material goods or that of recognition and respect? This is precisely the issue dealt with in the political-philosophical exchange between philosopher and political scientist Nancy Fraser and critical social theorist Axel Honneth
in their coauthored book Redistribution or Recognition.2
Honneth claims that in the context of social justice, recognition is a fundamental and overarching moral category and the distribution of material goods is a derivative category. Fraser counters this claim by denying that distribution can be
subsumed under recognition. She presents a so-called perspectival dualist analysis of
social justice, which considers the two categories redistribution and recognition
as equally fundamental, mutually irreducible dimensions of justice. If the task of
critical adult education is to combat social injustice, then it is necessary to reflect
on the relation between maldistribution and misrecognition as forms of injustice.
1. See especially Paulo Freire, Cultural Action for Freedom (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard Educational Review, 1970); Pedagogy of the Oppressed (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1972); and
Pedagogy of Hope: Reliving the Pedagogy of the Oppressed (New York: Continuum, 1994).
2. See Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth, Introduction: Redistribution or Recognition? in Redistribution
or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange (New York: Verso, 2004).
EDUCATIONAL THEORY j Volume 57 j Number 4 j 2007
2007 Board of Trustees j University of Illinois

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AXEL HONNETHS THEORY OF RECOGNITION

The German word Anerkennung means that somebody recognizes somebody
else as being worth something.3 The minimum level of recognition is that an individual is merely noticed or seen. On the other hand, the worst kind of humiliation
is not to see or notice another human being. Recognition is an important element
in social interaction. This means more than just a kind word or gesture.4 According
to Charles Taylor, due recognition is not a courtesy we owe people. It is a vital
human need.5 For Carl-Goran Heidegren, recognition matters so much because
our personal identity is dependent upon it.6 Arto Laitinen claims that recognition is a precondition of actual personhood and personal identity.7 It is for this reason that people strive for recognition or, in other words, struggle to achieve
recognition.
In Honneths theory, the struggle for recognition also occurs in civilized society on the levels of family, civil society (community of rights), and state (community of values).8 The family is the main institution for love. Honneth considers love
to be the first and most basic form of recognition. Acknowledging the rights of a
mature person is the second level of recognition. This happens in civil society. Getting credit for ones work (dignity) is the third level of recognition, and this happens
at the state level. Honneths tri-level concept of recognition is based on his interpretation of G.W.F. Hegels Jena writings.9 Honneth deliberately avoids using
Hegels mature works like Philosophy of Right, since Honneth dislikes the concept
3. According to Heikki Ikaheimo, the words recognition and Anerkennung do not have a clear meaning
in terms of their everyday or philosophical usage. This has caused quite a bit of confusion in theoretical
discourses. See Ikaheimo, On the Genus and Species of Recognition, Inquiry 45, no. 4 (2002): 447. See
also Honneths reply to Ikaheimo in Axel Honneth, Grounding Recognition: A Rejoinder to Critical
Questions, Inquiry 45, no. 4 (2002): 505.
4. Rauno Huttunen and Hannu Heikkinen, Teaching and the Dialectic of Recognition, Pedagogy, Culture and Society 12, no. 2 (2004): 163174.
5. Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition,
ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994).
6. Carl-Goran Heidegren, Anthropology, Social Theory, and Politics: Axel Honneths Theory of Recognition, Inquiry 45, no. 4 (2002): 436.
7. Arto Laitinen, Interpersonal Recognition: A Response to Value or a Precondition of Personhood,
Inquiry 45, no. 4 (2002): 476.
8. Honneth presents his theory of recognition in his book, Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar
of Social Conflicts (Oxford: Polity Press, 1996). The first time that Honneth used the concept of the
struggle for recognition was in his 1981 article, Moralbewusstsein und soziale Klassenherrschaft
[Moral Consciousness and Class Domination], Leviathan 9 (1981): 556570. See Heidegren, Anthropology, Social Theory, and Politics, 435.
9. Honneth adopts this interpretation from Ludwig Siep, Anerkennung als Prinzip praktischen Philosophie [Recognition as a Principle of Practical Philosophy] (Freiburg and Munchen: Alber, 1979). See also
G.W.F. Hegel, System of Ethical Life and First Philosophy of Spirit (Albany, New York: SUNY Press,
1979); and Hegel and the Human Spirit: A Translation of the Jena Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit
(18051806), trans. and commentary by Leo Rauch (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1983).
RAUNO HUTTUNEN is Senior Researcher of Education and Adult Education in the Faculty of Education at the University of Joensuu, P.O. Box 111, 80101 Joensuu, Finland; e-mail \rauno.huttunen@
joensuu.fi[. His primary areas of scholarship are philosophy of education and theoretical foundations of
educational research.

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of self-consciousness and Hegels philosophy of Spirit.10 Honneth claims that in

Hegels mature philosophy ethical life [Sittlichkeit] has become, in short, a form
of monologically self-developing Spirit and no longer constitutes a particularly
demanding form of intersubjectivity.11
According to Hegel, recognition must be based on some of the persons existing
abilities and skills. By receiving recognition from others, one achieves ones identity;
one learns to know oneself and ones special characteristics. When one receives positive recognition because of some particular ability, one starts to form a positive selfimage. One becomes aware of ones abilities and qualities. Honneth claims that
humans require the intersubjective recognition of their abilities and achievements
in order to develop a productive relationship with themselves: Should this form of
social approval fail to arise at any level of development, it opens up, as it were, a psychological gap within the personality, which seeks expression through the negative
emotional reactions of shame or anger, offence or contempt.12
Honneth states that the basic claim in Hegels earlier work is that recognition is
given on three hierarchical levels. The person begins at the first level and gradually
moves on to the higher levels. Accordingly, Honneths theory includes three so-called
practical self-relations in the social development of personality: (1) self-confidence
(Selbstvertrauen), (2) self-respect (Selbstachtung), and (3) self-esteem (Selbstschatzung).13 These practical self-relations are achieved at the three levels of the struggle for
recognition, which are family (love), civil society (rights), and state (solidarity).14
An individuals self-confidence is established and reproduced in the relations of
friendship and love. This is the first level of recognition. At this level, one seeks recognition of ones existence that is, recognition that one has the right to exist as
the kind of person one is. This elementary form of recognition takes place in the primary socialization process within the family and within circles of other persons that
one is close to. Through ones very first contacts with ones parents, one gradually
achieves a basic level of trust. One learns to express ones needs without the fear of
10. Robert Williams claims that this prejudice comes from Alexandre Kojeve and Jurgen Habermas.
Williams considers this interpretation to be seriously mistaken, because without Hegels Philosophy of
Right the concept of recognition remains essentially deficient. See Williams, Hegels Ethics of Recognition, 15. See also G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, trans. T.M. Knox (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1952). In addition, Ikaheimo considers Honneths suspicions toward Hegels account of the recognition
between the Jena Realphilosophien and the Philosophy of Right as unnecessary. See Ikaheimo, On the
Genus Species of Recognition, 449. Nowadays Honneth is less prejudiced against Hegels mature philosophy. See Honneth, Recognition or Redistribution? Changing Perspectives on the Moral Order of Society, Theory, Culture and Society 18, no. 23 (2001): 4355; and Leiden an Unbestimmtheit [Suffer from
Uncertainty] (Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam, 2001).
11. Honneth, Struggle for Recognition, 61.
12. Axel Honneth, Integrity and Disrespect: Principles of a Conception of Morality Based on a Theory
of Recognition, in The Fragmented World of the Social: Essays in Social and Political Philosophy, ed.
C.W. Wright (Albany, New York: SUNY Press, 1995), 257.
13. It is important to note that these translations (self-confidence, self-respect, and self-esteem) have a
very different meaning in this context than in their everyday usage. See Christopher Zurn, Anthropology and Normativity: A Critique of Axel Honneths Formal Conception of Ethical Life, Philosophy
and Social Criticism 26, no. 1 (2000): 16.
14. Honneth, Struggle for Recognition, 129.

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abandonment. Love and friendship are the forms of recognition by which parents
create basic trust.15 The experience of love and care is a precondition for the formation of an individuals identity and morality (Sittlichkeit). This experience is also
a precondition for the development of more advanced self-relations: self-respect and
self-esteem. Honneth presents the formation of self-confidence as follows:
This relation of recognition thus also depends on the concrete physical existence of other persons who acknowledge each other with special feelings of appreciation. The positive attitude
which the individual is capable of assuming toward himself if he experiences this type of emotional recognition is that of self-confidence.16

At the second level of recognition, the individual strives for the practical selfrelation called self-respect (Selbstachtung). Self-respect in this context means that
a person in a community of rights gains recognition as a legally and morally
mature person. Hegel refers to this community of rights as a civil society. At this
level, the individual either receives or does not receive basic legal rights. Recognition at this level also means that you are accepted as an autonomous person who
has the right and the competence to take part in the discourses in which people
reach consensus about political and theoretical issues.17 The issue is not just that
the person has a right to ownership and a right to enter into contracts, but it is also
the Kantian universal respect for the freedom of the will of the person. At this
level, the individual is recognized as a person who ascribes the same moral
accountability as every other human being.18 Put differently, this level of recognition entails regarding this individual as a person who is responsible for his or her
own actions. The opposite of this is a paternalizing attitude, which denies the individuals freedom of will, autonomy, and ability to work independently. Self-respect
grows out of recognition of responsibility, which the individual gains at the level of
the civil society (community of rights).
At the third level of recognition, the individual strives for self-esteem (Selbstschatzung). Self-esteem is built through the respect one receives for ones work. Here, it
is essential that one is recognized for some work through which one expresses
oneself. Only through self-directed and autonomous work can one perform ones
freedom of will. And only when one begins to work out of ones own free will for a
common good can one become respected in a community (or the state, in Hegelian
terminology). Self-esteem means that one sees ones work being acknowledged
and recognized. At this level, the individual is recognized as a person whose
capabilities are of constitutive value to a concrete community.19 In this way, the
individual really becomes recognized as a person who has something to give to the
15. Erik Erikson, Identity and the Life Cycle (New York: Norton, 1980), 5767.
16. Honneth, Integrity and Disrespect (Principles of a Conception of Morality Based on a Theory of Recognition), 253.
17. Rauno Huttunen and Hannu Heikkinen, Between Facts and Norms: Action Research in the Light of
Jurgen Habermass Theory of Communicative Action and Discourse Theory of Justice, Curriculum
Studies 6, no. 3 (1998): 307322.
18. Axel Honneth, Recognition and Moral Obligation, Social Research 64, no. 1 (1997): 30.
19. Ibid., 27.

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community. The reciprocal recognition of each others work creates a strong feeling of solidarity in the community. In such communities, individuals are strongly
motivated and enjoy their work.20
The table below summarizes Honneths view of the various components of
recognition. The forms of disrespect are also presented in the table, but a brief
explanation of these is warranted as well. The first level of disrespect insults ones
physical integrity. Its most extreme form is physical abuse. The denial of physical
integrity could lead to permanent psychological damage, which would then interfere with the development of practical self-relations.
The denial of social integrity means that the individual is not considered a
mature personality. One is not treated as a person having freedom of will that
is, one is not considered a subject of ones action, but rather an object that causally
reacts to stimuli. Ones moral responsibility remains in an undeveloped stage. The
teaching method referred to by Freire as the banking concept of education is a
good example of this sort of attitude.21
The disrespect that occurs at the third level of recognition implies that no recognition is given even though ones work is worthy of such recognition. When one
only receives feedback regarding ones actions on making a mistake, ones selfesteem does not develop. At worst, this kind of disrespect can even turn into
mud slinging. Individuals who engage in this type of behavior usually suffer
from weak self-esteem. Thus, the struggle for recognition has the potential to turn
into a vicious circle, which in turn might have a severely detrimental impact on
the development of interpersonal relations.
THE STRUCTURE OF THE INTERSUBJECTIVE RELATIONS OF RECOGNITION22
Components of recognition

First level

Second level

Third level

Dimension of personality

Needs and emotions

Moral responsibility

Traits and abilities

Forms of recognition

Primary relationships
love, friendship

Legal relations
rights

Community of value
solidarity

Practical relation to self

Self-confidence

Self-respect

Self-esteem

Forms of disrespect

Abuse and rape

Denial of rights,
exclusion

Denigration, insult

Threatened component of
personality

Physical integrity

Social integrity

Honor and dignity

20. Huttunen and Heikkinen, Teaching and the Dialectic of Recognition, 164.
21. Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, 4559.
22. Honneth himself says that he had yet to decide when writing his book The Struggle for Recognition
whether these three forms of recognition were to be conceived of as constants of human nature or as
the result of an historical process. Arto Laitinen claims that Honneth postulates in this book that
these are the only three possible forms of recognition. See Laitinen, Interpersonal Recognition, 470.
Nevertheless, in his more recent works, Honneth considers these three forms of recognition as the result
of history. See Honneth, Grounding Recognition: A Rejoinder to Critical Questions, Inquiry 45, no. 4
(2002): 501.

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For Honneth, recognition is a fundamental and overarching moral and social

category. The struggle for recognition is the origin of all major social conflicts. All
other conflicts are derivatives of the struggle for recognition. Honneth claims, for
example, that conflicts over distribution. are always symbolic struggles over the
legitimacy of the sociocultural disposition that determines the value of activities,
attributes and contributions. In this way, struggles over distribution, contrary to
Nancy Frasers assumption, are themselves locked into a struggle for recognition.23 Furthermore, Honneth contends that the contribution of critical theory to
social justice must rely on the unified framework of the terms of recognition. He
presents his idea of critical theory as follows:
My thesis is that an attempt to renew the comprehensive claims of critical theory under
present conditions does better to orient itself by the categorical framework of a sufficient
theory of recognition, since this established a link between the social causes of widespread
feelings of injustice and the normative objectives of emancipatory movements.24

I conclude that the main idea of critical adult education is this kind of emancipatory movement, which is the struggle against social injustice. For Honneth, all
forms of social injustice are forms of the maldistribution of recognition. This view is
called the normative monism of recognition. Should critical adult education as a
theoretical discipline and political praxis take this view as such? Is Honneths theory
of recognition sufficient in order to meet the needs of critical adult education?
NANCY FRASERS ALTERNATIVE: THE PERSPECTIVAL DUALISM OF
REDISTRIBUTION AND RECOGNITION
Nancy Fraser proposes a so-called two-dimensional conception of justice in
response to Honneths normative monism of recognition. Fraser speaks of a perspectival dualist analysis in which the claims of redistribution and recognition coexist
as fundamental and mutually irreducible dimensions of justice. Fraser wants to create a coherent theory of capitalism that links these two categories together without
reducing either to the other. She argues that only a framework that integrates the
two analytically distinct perspectives of distribution and recognition can grasp the
imbrication of class inequality and status hierarchy in contemporary society.25
Honneths claim is that we should understand the unjust capitalist economic order
as a consequence of the mode of cultural valuation that is based on asymmetrical
forms of recognition. Fraser, on the other hand, does not say that we should understand
misrecognition as a result of the capitalist mode of production. According to her, calls
for social justice can be divided into two distinct types. First is the claim for a more just
distribution of resources and wealth that is the claim of redistribution. Second, there
is a claim concerning the politics of recognition, which she outlines as follows:
Here the goal, in its most plausible form, is a difference-friendly world, where assimilation
to majority or dominant cultural norms is no longer the price of equal respect. Examples
include claims for the recognition of the distinctive perspectives of ethnic, racial, and sexual
23. Honneth, Recognition or Redistribution? 54.
24. Axel Honneth, Redistribution as Recognition: A Response to Nancy Fraser, in Redistribution or
Recognition? 113.
25. Fraser and Honneth, Introduction: Redistribution or Recognition? 3.

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minorities, as well as of gender differences.The discourse of social justice, once centered on

distribution, is now increasingly divided between claims for redistribution, on the one hand,
and claims for recognition, on the other.26

Fraser concludes that the nature of the relation between maldistribution and
misrecognition is such that neither has any direct or indirect effect on the other.
They are both primary and original. It follows from this conclusion that neither a
politics of redistribution nor a politics of recognition alone will suffice. The twodimensional subordination (through maldistribution and misrecognition) of a person or group requires the simultaneous presence of both forms of politics.27 Fraser
claims that we should not allow the politics of recognition to displace the politics
of redistribution or vice versa. On her view, when it comes to facilitating an understanding of modern society, vulgar culturalism (primarily of the politics of recognition) is no better than vulgar economism (primarily of the politics of
redistribution).28
For example, in order to understand the gender issue, it is imperative to consider
both the aspects of maldistribution and misrecognition. If we understand the gender
issue solely as a gender-specific form of maldistribution, then the only requirement
is to abolish the gender-based division of labor. According to Fraser, however, this is
only half the story, because gender is not only a class-like division but also a status
differentiation. Clearly, gender-specific maldistribution is something that must be
eliminated, although doing so would not solve the whole problem, as gender-based
injustice is not limited solely to maldistribution. Fraser claims that gender-based
injustices of recognition are relatively independent of the political economy. Similarly, the elimination of gender-specific misrecognition is also a clear necessity, but
it cannot alone solve the gender issue because disrespect for the female sex is not
the primary and only reason for the unjust relation between men and women. Fraser
draws the following conclusion about the gender issue:
Gender, in sum, is two-dimensional social differentiation. It combines a class-like dimension,
which brings it within the ambit of redistribution, with a status dimension, which brings it
simultaneously within the ambit of recognition.Here difference is constructed from both economic differentials and institutionalized patterns of cultural value. Here both maldistribution
and misrecognition are fundamental. Gender injustice can only be remedied, therefore, by an
approach that encompasses both a politics of redistribution and a politics of recognition.29

Fraser poses the question of whether this two-dimensionality is the exception

or the norm. Is this gender issue a rare case of two-dimensionality in an otherwise
one-dimensional world? Frasers answer is that two-dimensionality is more the
norm. Even the category of class includes dimensions of distribution and recognition. In the case of class, these two dimensions are interconnected, although they
remain sufficiently autonomous.30 The fact that in some cases maldistribution and
26. Nancy Fraser, Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics Redistribution, Recognition, and Participation, in Redistribution or Recognition? 7.
27. Ibid., 19.
28. Nancy Fraser, Rethinking Recognition, New Left Review 2, no. 3 (2000): 111.
29. Fraser, Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics, 22.
30. Ibid., 2324.

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misrecognition form a vicious circle of subordination (maldistribution causes misrecognition and vice versa) does not change this two-dimensionality.31 Maldistribution and misrecognition are often practically entwined with each other, yet
they remain mutually irreducible.32
In her dualistic model, Fraser also understands the concept of recognition in a
slightly different manner. She claims that for Charles Taylor and Axel Honneth,
recognition mainly concerns self-realization that is, the subjects practical
relation-to-self. Fraser refers to Taylor and Honneths model of recognition as the
identity model of recognition and considers it very problematic because it presents
misrecognition as a damaged identity and thus emphasizes psychic structures over
social institutions and relations. The identity model tends both to posit group
identity as the object of recognition and to place moral pressure on individuals to
conform to group culture. The worst-case scenario could be a simplified group
identity, which denies the polyphony of voices and the multiplicity of individual
identifications. This could in turn hinder transcultural flows and treat cultures
as neatly separated and noninteracting units. Fraser claims that in the worst case,
the identity model promotes separatism, enclaves cultural groups, denies internal
heterogeneity of groups, reinforces intragroup domination, and in general lends
itself all too easily to repressive forms of communitarianism.33
In contrast, she conceives recognition primarily as a matter of justice. The
injustice of misrecognition lies not in the fact that it distorts the subjects selfrealization. Rather, the issue in misrecognition is that it is simply unjust that
some individuals and groups are denied the status of full partnership in social
interaction:
To view recognition as a matter of justice is to treat it as an issue of social status. This means
examining institutionalized patterns of cultural value for their effects on the relative standing
of social actors. If and when such patterns constitute actors as peers, capable for participating
on a par with one another in social life, then we can speak of reciprocal recognition and status
equality. When, in contrast, institutionalized patterns of cultural value constitute some actors
as inferior, excluded, wholly other, or simply invisible, hence as less than full partners in social
interaction, then we should speak of misrecognition and status subordination. I shall call this
the status model of recognition.34

The status model does not attach recognition to group-specific identity, and
thus misrecognition does not imply the deformation of group identity. In this
model, misrecognition means social subordination in the sense that an individual
is being prevented from participating as a peer in social life. The struggle against
this kind of injustice demands a politics of recognition, not a politics of identity.
The aim of a politics of recognition is to overcome subordination by establishing
the misrecognized group as a full member of society that can participate in the
community on a par with other members.

31. Fraser, Rethinking Recognition, 118.

32. Fraser, Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics, 48.
33. Nancy Fraser, Recognition Without Ethics? Theory, Culture and Society 18, no. 23 (2001): 24.
34. Fraser, Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics, 29.

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Fraser claims that her status model has yet another advantage compared to the
identity model. Namely, it is related to the debate concerning justice and the good
life. According to Fraser, Taylor and Honneth understand recognition in the Aristotelian sense of its being an issue of the good life. From this perspective, to deny
someones recognition means to deprive him or her of the basic conditions necessary for human flourishing.35 Thus, both Taylor and Honneth understand misrecognition in terms of damaged self-identity. On this view, misrecognition means
harming an individuals capacity for achieving a good life. Frasers counterclaim is
to conceive recognition as an issue of justice. Misrecognition is wrong not because
it impedes human flourishing, but because it is unjust. It is unjust that some
individuals are denied the status of full partners in social life because of certain
institutionalized patterns of cultural values. In other words, misrecognition is
wrong because it constitutes unjust social structures.36
Fraser claims that her approach, given its reliance on the notion of justice, has
several advantages over Honneths approach, given its reliance on the notion of the
good life. First, her approach permits one to justify the claim that recognition is
morally binding in the postmodern age of value pluralism. Furthermore, according
to Fraser, any attempt to justify claims of recognition as being based on a single
concept of the good life is necessarily sectarian. The second point is that because
Frasers model conceives misrecognition as status subordination, it locates its
inherent injustice as lying in social relations as opposed to individual psychology.
Fraser claims that, as a result, her approach escapes psychologization. Since in the
Honnethian view misrecognition is equated with prejudice in the minds of the
oppressors, its solution requires the policing of the oppressors beliefs, which in
Frasers view is illiberal and authoritarian. The third point is that because Frasers
model aligns recognition with justice instead of the good life, it avoids the opinion
that everyone has an equal right to social esteem. This opinion is untenable
because it would render the concept of social esteem meaningless:
The account of recognition proposed here, in contrast, entails no such reductio ad absurdum.
What it does entail is that everyone has equal right to pursue social esteem under fair conditions
of equal opportunity. And such conditions do not obtain when, for example, institutionalized patterns of cultural value pervasively downgrade femininity, nonwhiteness, homosexuality and
everything culturally associated with them.For all these reasons, recognition is better treated as
a matter of justice, and thus of morality, than as a matter of the good life, and thus of ethics.37

Frasers model denies that any one dimension of injustice could be superior to
or more essential than any other. Her slogans are no redistribution without recognition and no recognition without redistribution.38 If we want to apply Fraser to
critical adult education, it would mean the equal coexistence of the struggle for
recognition and the struggle for redistribution. In addition, since her theory of

35. Freire might have supported this line of argumentation because he spoke about the ontological
vocation to be more fully human. See Freire, Pedagogy of Hope, 48.
36. Nancy Fraser, Recognition without Ethics? 26.
37. Ibid., 28.
38. Fraser, Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics, 67.

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recognition and redistribution relies on the idea of justice and not on the idea of
the good life, one might argue that Frasers model is better suited to critical adult
education, because it rests on solid ground for social criticism: the universal idea of
justice that is not dependent on the current sociohistorical context. However, do
critical adult education and social criticism need the universal notion of justice
especially when Freire himself does not rely on the concept of justice, but rather on
the notions of love and humanity and how can we be sure that such a notion
exists?
HOW SHOULD CRITICAL ADULT EDUCATION REACT TO THE
DEBATE BETWEEN FRASER AND HONNETH?
Juha Suoranta and I have argued elsewhere that in the field of critical adult
education it is possible to identify two orientations: the cultural and the critical.
This division partly dovetails the Fraser-Honneth debate. Culturally oriented
researchers study various aspects of everyday life and its life-politics. Researchers representing the critical orientation are interested in a societys economic and
structural themes. In the cultural orientation, the self and ones cultural identity,
as well as particular acts, are seen as necessary and emancipatory. In the critical
orientation, on the other hand, social circumstances and their transformation are
emphasized at both the local and global levels. Researchers from the school of cultural orientation study peoples daily lives and their agency, whereas researchers
representing the school of critical orientation analyze the social, economic, and
political structures and conditions of peoples actions. In the cultural orientation,
researchers emphasize the importance of understanding peoples actions within
context, including the pressures of capitalism and the forms of cultural industry.
In the critical orientation, they stress the need to change the present repressive
conditions. The two orientations also differ in their definition of mutual recognition. In the cultural orientation, recognition refers primarily to peoples respect,
love, and caring for each other in education and other practices. This can be
referred to as social recognition. In the critical orientation, recognition refers to
universal political and economic justice. This can be called critical recognition.39
In terms of politics, the difference between the two orientations can be
described by using the concepts of micro- and macropolitics. Researchers with a
cultural orientation represent a micropolitical approach in which they study various aspects of everyday life and its life-politics. Researchers representing the
critical orientation are for their part interested in macropolitics, such as societys
economic and structural themes. Their aim is to study not only social, economic,
and political questions, but also to change these systems and raise peoples critical
awareness. These orientations, and their politics, can be seen as contradictory but
also in a dialectical relation to each other. Therefore, it is possible to think that
the positive results achieved in the area of micropolitics can affect critical

39. Rauno Huttunen and Juha Suoranta, Critical and Cultural Orientation in Radical Adult Education,
in In from the Margins: Adult Education, Work and Civil Society, eds. Ari Antikainen, Paivi Harinen,
and Carlos Torres (Rotterdam: Sense Publisher, 2006).

HUTTUNEN

Critical Adult Education

consciousness, that is, the ways in which people are activated in macropolitical
action.40
When one accepts that critical adult education requires both cultural and critical orientations, it seems clear that both Fraser and Honneth make important
contributions to critical adult education, although at the theoretical level Frasers
and Honneths approaches stand in contradiction. Some of Frasers commitments
are more plausible for critical adult education than are Honneths ideas. For example, a crucial contribution of Frasers model from the standpoint of critical adult
education is its denial that one dimension recognition or redistribution can
be more essential than the other. The application of Frasers conceptual model, the
perspectival dualist model, to critical adult education would mean a coexistence
of cultural and critical orientations. But there are elements of Frasers model that
are very strange to the critical adult education movement. For instance, it not only
relies on the notion of justice, but it also denies any role for the notion of the good
life and the idea of human flourishing. It is hard to see why these ideas are necessarily dangerous or totalitarian, as Fraser suggests. In Freires pedagogy, love, care,
and human flourishing are crucial elements. Critical adult education surely needs
the notion of social justice and the Kantian ethics of imperatives, but it also needs
Aristotelian ideas of the good life and human flourishing. The task of critical adult
education is not only to work toward a formally just society but also a decent society where each member can construct his or her own good life in a caring community and strive for self-realization of ones practical relation-to-self in a
reciprocal relation of recognition.41 For this purpose, critical adult education needs
the Honnethian identity model of recognition without accepting Honneths normative monism of recognition.

40. Ibid.
41. Avishai Margalit, Decent Society (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1996).

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