Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

and control 988.85 grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), a regulated drug

without the corresponding license.
Contrary to law.5

SECOND DIVISION
Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. A joint trial of the two cases ensued.

G.R. No. 175940

February 6, 2008
[Formerly G.R. Nos. 155361-62]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
ANSON ONG a.k.a. ALLAN CO, appellant.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
In dubio pro reo.1

Subject of this automatic review is the Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals dated 7 August 2006 which
affirmed the Judgment3 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 110, convicting appellant Anson
Ong alias Allan Co of illegal sale and possession of shabu.
Two separate Informations were filed before the trial court. In Criminal Case No. 97-0017, appellant was
accused of illegal sale of shabu, thus:
That on or about the 21st day of [April] 1997, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping one another without authority of law, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver 989.05 grams of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride (shabu), a regulated drug.
Contrary to law.4
In Criminal Case No. 97-0018, appellant was charged with illegal possession of shabu allegedly
committed as follows:
That on or about the 21st day of April 1997, Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Anson Ong alias "Allan
Co," did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody

The operative facts are narrated by prosecution witnesses who comprised members of the buy-bust team.
Sometime in April 1997, Col. Zoila Lachica (Lachica) was tipped off by a female walk-in informant that a
group, led by a Chinese national, was engaged in drug trafficking in Pasay City. Upon verification of said
information, a meeting took place between Lachica and the informant where the latter was able to arrange
a drug deal with appellant in the vicinity of Heritage Hotel. 6 Lachica then instructed Investigator Oscar
Coballes (Coballes) to prepare the boodle money consisting of four P500.00 bills and five P100.00 bills
placed on top of nine (9) bundles of paper cut to the size of the peso bills. These bills were then submitted
to the PNP Crime Laboratory for ultraviolet powder dusting. 7 Before lunchtime on 21 April 1997, Lachica
organized a team and planned the conduct of a buy-bust operation. The twelve-man team was composed
of Lachica, Coballes, Police Supt. Edgar Danao (Danao), P/Inspector Rolando Montes (Montes), PO3
Manuelito Lagradilla (Lagradilla), SPO2 Wilfredo Saballa (Saballa), SPO3 Pardo, SPO2 Pedro Tan, the
confidential informant, and other civilian agents. Danao acted as the team leader with Montes assisting
him. Saballa was designated as the poseur-buyer and the other members of the team were tasked to secure
the area.8
After lunch, the group proceeded to the parking lot of San Juan de Dios Hospital onboard four (4)
vehicles, including a motorcycle driven by Lagradilla. At about 3:00 p.m., they reached the parking lot
where Danao conducted the final briefing and then deployed his men strategically between the premises of
Heritage Hotel and Copacabana Hotel. 9 At 4:00 pm, Saballa and the informant went to Heritage Hotel
while the other team members strategically posted themselves within the hotel premises.10
Fifteen minutes later, Saballa and the informant left Heritage Hotel and proceeded to the adjacent
Copacabana Hotel where he waited at the main entrance of the lobby. Suddenly, a black Honda Civic car
with Plate No. ULN 766 arrived and parked along the driveway near the front entrance. 11 The informant
approached the car while Saballa was left behind holding the black bag containing the boodle
money.12 Upon signal by the informant, Saballa came up to the right front door. Saballa showed the
contents of the bag to the driver of the car, who was later identified as appellant. He then handed the bag
to him.13 Instantaneously, a man approached the car, took the boodle money from appellant and ran
away.14 Coballes ran towards the drivers side and poked his gun at appellant. Appellant tried moving the
car but Coballes stood in front and blocked it. Appellant was then ordered to open the door. Coballes saw a
red bag containing white crystalline substance inside the car and took it into custody. 15Meanwhile,
Lagradilla chased the man who took the boodle money around the parking area of Copacabana
Hotel.16 While on the run, Lagradilla saw the man throw the money inside a passing white Toyota car
driven by a certain Chito Cua (Cua). Instead of pursuing the man, Lagradilla blocked the white Toyota car
and arrested Cua.17
Appellant presented an entirely different account of the incident on 21 April 1997. Appellant, who
apparently does not know English and Tagalog was assisted by an interpreter, narrated that he is a resident
of Chuan Chow, Peoples Republic of China. Upon the suggestion of Lau Chan, appellant decided to go to
the Philippines to start a clothing business. In the morning of 21 April 1997, appellant told Lau Chan that
he wanted to go to Baclaran. Lau Chan, who himself was planning to go to the casino at Heritage Hotel,

asked appellant to meet up with him. Appellant tried calling Lau Chan on this cellphone but the latter was
not answering. This prompted appellant to go to Heritage Hotel to look for Lau Chan. At around 4:00
p.m., appellant was walking along Epifanio Delos Santos Avenue towards the direction of the Light Rail
Transit when he noticed a commotion in front of the hotel and saw some men carrying guns. Fearing for
his safety, appellant decided to walk faster but someone stopped him and poked a gun at him. He was
made to board a white car in which he met Cua for the first time. They were then brought to Camp Crame
for questioning. It was Cua who translated the questions propounded by the police officers to appellant.
He was informed by Cua that he was arrested for failure to show any document regarding his stay in the
country. During arraignment however, he learned that he was being charged of possession and sale
ofshabu.
Finding the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses credible as against the bare and self-serving
assertions of appellant, the trial court rendered a decision finding appellant guilty as charged. The
dispositive portion of the 11 February 2002 Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the herein accused ONG POK PIW
a.k.a. ANSON ONG a.k.a. ALLAN CO, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) offenses
for Violations of Section 15 and 16, Article III of Republic Act [No.] 6425, as amended in
relation to Section 20 and 21 of Article IV of said law and hereby imposes on him the penalty
of two (2) RECLUSION PERPETUAS in these cases and a fine in the total amount
of P200,000.00 in these cases without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or "shabu" in Criminal Case No. 97-0017 for Violation
of Section 15 of Republic Act [No.] 6425, as amended, weighing 989.05 grams and the
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or "shabu" in Criminal Case No. 97-0018 weighing 988.85
grams are hereby declared confiscated in favor of the government. The PNP Crime Laboratory
at Camp Crame, Quezon City or its duly authorized representative which has custody and
possession of said regulated drugs are hereby directed to immediately cause the delivery and
transportation thereof to the Dangerous Drugs Board for proper disposition in accordance with
law. The Chief of said office is further directed to inform this Court within 20 days from
receipt hereof of the action taken thereon.
The period during which the herein accused was under detention during the pendency of these
cases shall be credited to him in full provided he agreed to abide by strictly with the rules and
regulations of the City Jail.
SO ORDERED.18
An appeal was directed to this Court. However, in a Resolution 19dated 20 February 2006, the case was
transferred to the Court of Appeals in light of our pronouncement in People v. Mateo. 20
On 7 August 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision affirming with modification the
trial courts ruling, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 110, Pasay City, in Criminal Case Nos. 97-0017 and 97-0018 is hereby AFFIRMED
with modification. As modified, the fine is increased to Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00) for each offense or a total of ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00).

SO ORDERED.21
In finding appellant guilty, the appellate court strongly relied on the testimonies of the police officers and
dismissed the imputed inconsistencies in their statements as being minor.
At the core of this appeal is the issue of whether the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable
doubt the guilt of appellant.
Appellant primarily questions the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. He claims that their testimonies
were tainted with inconsistencies which even the trial court had noted in its decision. Appellant relies on
said observation to support his acquittal based on reasonable doubt. He asserts that his conviction must
rest on the strength of the prosecutions own evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence for the
defense.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Brief, 22 insists that all the elements of sale and illegal
possession of shabu were duly established by the prosecution. It avers that appellant was caught
in flagrante delicto sellingshabu to the poseur-buyer in a legitimate buy-bust operation. 23 Moreover, when
the poseur-buyer and Coballes opened the door of appellants car, they saw a red bag on the floor
containing white crystalline substances which were later tested and found positive for the presence
of shabu.24 The OSG contends that the opinion of the trial court with respect to the actuations of the
prosecution witnesses on the stand did not affect its judgment of conviction because the trial court lent full
faith and credence to the collective testimonies of the police officers who are presumed to have performed
their duties in accordance with law.25
For the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs to prosper, the following elements must be proved: (1) the
identity of the buyer and seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and
the payment therefor. What is material is the proof that the transaction actually took place, coupled with
the presentation before the court of the corpus delicti.26
The prosecution seeks to establish the presence of these elements through the testimonies of the police
officers involved in the buy-bust operation. The innocence or culpability of appellant thus hinges on the
issue of credibility. It is an oft-repeated rule that findings of facts of the trial court, as affirmed by the
appellate court, are conclusive on this Court, absent any evidence that both courts ignored, misconstrued,
or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances of substance which, if considered, would warrant a
modification or reversal of the outcome of the case.27 This case falls under the exception.
In determining the credibility of prosecution witnesses regarding the conduct of buy-bust operation, the
"objective test," as laid down in People v. Doria,28 is utilized. It has been held that it is the duty of the
prosecution to present a complete picture detailing the buy-bust operationfrom the initial contact
between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the
consideration, until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal subject of sale. The manner
by which the initial contact was made, the offer to purchase the drug, the payment of the buy-bust money,
and the delivery of the illegal drug must be the subject of strict scrutiny by courts to insure that lawabiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense.29
In People v. Ong30 and Cabugao v. People31 where the "objective test" was also applied, chasmic
deficiencies that similarly marked the prosecution evidence led to the absolution of the accused. In Ong,
also involving Chinese nationals as accused, the prosecution evidence on the buy-bust operation was

outrageously complete as the confidential informant who had sole knowledge of how the alleged illegal
sale of shabu was initiated and how it was carried out was not presented as a witness. 32 In Cabugao, the
prosecution witnesses could not agree on the reason that prompted them to conduct the buy-bust
operation. While the first witness testified that the tip came from their informants, the second witness
maintained that no informer was involved in the operation.33
In the case at bar, the evidence for the prosecution failed to prove all the material details of the buy-bust
operation. The details of the meeting with the informant, the alleged source of the information on the sale
of illegal drugs, appear hazy. Lachica declared that he met the informant for the first time a week before
the buy-bust operation:
Q

He reports in our office every now and then.35

Coballes related that the informant was present during the briefing held before lunch on 21 April 1997:
Q Now when Col. Lachica called you, aside from you and some members of your office, are
there any other persons present?
A

Yes sir, our informant.

Now how do you know that this person is an informant?

He was introduced to us by our chief, Col. Lachic[a], sir.36

Do you recall Mr. Witness when that walk-in informant visited your office?

A I cannot recall the exact date but as far as I can remember she visited before the operation
was conducted.

while Lagradilla denied seeing the informant at the meeting:

COURT

FISCAL

In that briefing, was there a mention of an informant or an asset?

And you are referring to the operation on April 21, 1997?

A

Yes, sir.

WITNESS
A

COURT
How many days prior to the date of operation did that alleged walk-in informant go
to your office?

Col. Lachica mentioned of a certain asset.

COURT
Was that asset present during the briefing at the headquarters?

A I cannot remember the exact date but I think more or less one week before. More or less 1
week.34
But Coballes testified that the informant reports to their office every now and then, thus:

Asset was not present[,] sir.37

Despite being the designated poseur-buyer, Saballa testified that he had no knowledge of how
much shabu he was going to buy.

COURT
Q

How much shabu are you going to purchase?

One (1) kilo, Your Honor.

WITNESS

How much is one kilo worth?

I am not aware of the price, Your Honor.

How much is one kilo worth?

I do not know the price they have agreed, Your Honor.

A
moment counsel, this informant, was he an employee of your office or an
informant working for your office?

He is an informant working from our office.

COURT
When you say informant working in your office, is he receiving salary from your
office as a regular employee or he reports or he goes to your office every now and
then?

Q You are supposed to be the poseur buyer and you do not know how much shabu you are
going to buy?
A

And so, in your testimony February 13, 2000[,] you narrated to the Court that Col.
Lachica led this operation?

I do not know, Your Honor.38

The actual exchange of the bags containing shabu and the boodle money was not clearly established. The
presentation of shabu before the Court could have shed light on the identity of the object of the sale.
Unfortunately, the presentation of the shabu purportedly confiscated from appellant was dispensed with at
the instance of the defense counsel.39
Coballes testified that he saw Saballa hand the boodle money to appellant in exchange for a wrapped
object presumed to be shabu.40 On the contrary, the ultraviolet dusting of the boodle money was conducted
but appellant was found negative for fluorescent powder. 41
As between the prosecution witnesses account that it was appellant to whom the boodle money was
passed and who was driving the black Honda Civic car during the alleged buy-bust operation and
appellants denial that he owned and drove said car, we are inclined to believe appellant. The prosecution
failed to present the purported drivers license confiscated from appellant. In fact, they reasoned that it
was missing.42 On the other hand, the defense presented a certification from the Land Transportation
Office (LTO) and the Philippine Motor Association stating that appellants name does not exist in the
LTOs file of licensed drivers and has not been issued a Philippine International Driving Permit 43 by the
Automobile Association of the Philippines.
Further rendering the prosecutions version dubious is the escape of another alleged cohort of appellant.
Lagradilla, who was specifically tasked to block or run after any escaping suspect, failed in this regard.
During the alleged buy-bust operation, he was positioned in such a manner that a firewall was blocking his
vantage point.44Instead of using his motorcycle, he chased the suspect on foot. 45 Moreover, it is quite
difficult to imagine how one suspect can easily escape notwithstanding the presence of at least twelve (12)
police operatives in the vicinity.
The witnesses hesitation in answering questions on the stand, as aptly observed by the trial court, 46 only
compounded their lack of credibility.
Lachica, who was the Chief of the Criminal Investigation Division of the NCR-CIDG, cannot seem to
recall the vital parts of the buy-bust operation such as the composition of the buy-bust team, the strategic
location of the team members, the presence of the name of the other accused, Cua, 47 and how much of the
boodle money was recovered.48
Moreover, he denied any participation in the conduct of the buy-bust operation:
Q

ATTY. ZULUETA

You said you supervised the planning of this operation. Did you not say that?

A No Your Honor[,] what I said is that I gave instruction to Col. Danao and we planned out
the operation and our procedure, the [over-all] team leader will be the one to provide or make
some arrangement[s] pertaining to the police operation.49
However, Coballes insisted that Lachica was present all throughout the operation, thus:

Yes, sir.

He was with you on the parking lot to brief you on your operation?

Yes.

And he was with you all throughout the operation?

He was at the Heritage Hotel. Yes.

Mr. Witness[,] you as police officer[,] do you know the penalty for perjury?

I know that perjury is punishable but I dont know the penalty.

Q
Did you know that Col. Lachica appeared before this Court and testified in this Hon.
Court on July 29, 1999 and he testified that he did not conduct the actual operation but it was
Col. Danao?
A

He was with us and Col. Danao at the Heritage Hotel at the time.

Will you still maintain that, who is lying now, Col. Lachica or you?

A
Col. Lachica and the rest stayed at the Heritage Hotel considering that the buy-bust
operation was at the Heritage Hotel.
Q
And yet, Col. Lachica said that as lone Chief of the Criminal Investigation Division he
only gave instruction to Col. Danao. The question is[:] do you still maintain despite that [sic]
testimony that Col. Lachica was present during the operation?
A

I do.50

Lachica denied having heard of the name of appellant until he was arrested:
Q

Will you tell the Court[,] do you know a certain Anson Ong alias Allan Co?

During April?

Before April?

A
No, I dont remember that I encountered a name Anson Ong but after the operation
conducted by Edgar Danao[,] I read the name of Anson Ong as the arrested person. 51
On the other hand, Montes alleged that the name of appellant was mentioned during the briefing held in
the office:

I cannot recall the exact amount or quantity but the deal is more than one million. x x x54

Who provided the buy bust money for this buy-bust operation?

I was the one who provided the buy-bust money, the boodle money.

FISCAL VIBANDOR

FISCAL

Q
Mr. Witness, on April 21, 1997, you said that you will conduct a buy-bust operation
against whom?

WITNESS

A I cannot remember the exact amount because the money used in that operation is boodle
money.

And to whom did you give this money that will be used in this [buy-bust] operation?

FISCAL VIBANDOR

I think Agent Coballes.

Q Now, when for the first time did you come to know that you are going to conduct [buybust] operation against Anson Ong?

Do you recall in what denomination were these [buy-bust] money given?

I cannot remember.55

Against Anson Ong.

During our briefing at the office.

xxx
Q

And who were present during that briefing?

A All of us except for Lagradilla because he was sent out to get his motor bike, it was only
Col. Danao, myself, Coballes, Saballa, Tan and [a] civilian asset.52
According to Coballes, he was instructed by Lachica to prepare the boodle money to be submitted to the
PNP Crime Laboratory for powder dusting:
Q You want to impress us Mr. Witness, that a week or before the day that you first met the
informant you were instructed by Colonel Lachica to prepare buy-bust money?
WITNESS
A

Yes, sir.53

Lachicas million-peso estimate of the drug deal is certainly higher than the P250,000.00 amount stated by
Coballes. Ironically, Lachica cannot recall the exact amount or denomination of the boodle money he
himself had provided for the operation:
Q According to you[,] there will be a drug deal. Do you know how much shabu is involved
in this drug deal as arranged by your lady informant?

How much money did you provide?

While the presentation of the boodle money, as a general rule, is not indispensable in the prosecution of a
drug case, the material inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and the nonpresentation of the buy-bust money raise reasonable doubts on the occurrence of a buy-bust operation. 56 It
is indeed suspicious that vital pieces of evidence, such as the boodle money and the drivers license were
lost while in the custody of Coballes who unfortunately passed away during trial. Certainly, the failure to
present vital pieces of these evidence cast doubt on the veracity of the buy-bust operation.
Another baffling point is the dismissal of the criminal case against Cua, the alleged accomplice of
appellant. The prosecution witnesses testified that the boodle money was found in his possession. This fact
was confirmed by the presence of fluorescent powder on Cuas hands.
The Constitution mandates that an accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven beyond
reasonable doubt. While appellants defense engenders suspicion that he probably perpetrated the crime
charged, it is not sufficient for a conviction that the evidence establishe a strong suspicion or probability of
guilt. It is the burden of the prosecution to overcome the presumption of innocence by presenting the
quantum of evidence required.
In the case at bar, the basis of acquittal is reasonable doubt, the evidence for the prosecution not being
sufficient to sustain and prove the guilt of appellants with moral certainty. By reasonable doubt is not
meant that which of possibility may arise but it is that doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole
proof and an inability, after such an investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt. An
acquittal based on reasonable doubt will prosper even though the appellants' innocence may be doubted,
for a criminal conviction rests on the strength of the evidence of the prosecution and not on the weakness
of the evidence of the defense.57 Suffice it to say, a slightest doubt should be resolved in favor of the
accused.58

With the failure of the prosecution to present a complete picture of the buy-bust operation, as highlighted
by the disharmony and incoherence in the testimonies of its witnesses, acquittal becomes ineluctable.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02256
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Anson Ong a.k.a. "Allan Co" is ACQUITTED of the crime charged
against him on the ground of reasonable doubt. His immediate release from prison is ordered unless he is
being held for some other valid or lawful cause.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to implement this Decision forthwith and to
INFORM this Court, within five (5) days from receipt hereof, of the date appellant was actually released
from confinement. Costsde oficio.

For review before this Court is the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 31713
dated 30 October 2009,1 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 76, Malolos,
Bulacan,2 which found petitioners Valentin Zafra y Dechosa (Zafra) and Eroll Marcelino y Reyes
(Marcelino) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Possession of Dangerous Drugs in violation of Section 11,
Article II of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165 (the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) and
imposing on each of them the penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day as the
minimum term, to thirteen (13) years as maximum, and of fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P300,000.00).
The Facts
The prosecution charged Zafra and Marcelino with violation of Section 11, Article II of RA No.
91653 before the RTC of Bulacan under the Information below:

SO ORDERED.

That on or about the 12th day of June, 2003, in the municipality of Balagtas, province of Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without
authority of law and legal justification, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in
their possession and control dangerous drug consisting of two (2) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet of
methylamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) weighing 0.0614 gram, in conspiracy with one another.5

Quisumbing,Chairperson, Carpio, Carpio-Morales, Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.

The prosecutions lone witness, SPO4 6 Apolinario Mendoza (SPO4 Mendoza), Chief of the Investigation
and Drug Enforcement Unit of the Philippine National Police of Balagtas, Bulacan, testified that on 12
January 2003, at around 4:30 in the afternoon, he conducted surveillance in front of a sari-sari store at the
corner of Miraflor Subdivision and P. Castro Street in Balagtas, Bulacan, due to reported drug trafficking
in the area. SPO4 Mendoza found there the group of Zafra, Marcelino, and a certain Marlon Daluz (Daluz)
standing and facing each other.7 In that position, he saw Zafra and Marcelino holding shabu, while Daluz
was holding an aluminum foil and a disposable lighter.8 Seeing this illegal activity, SPO4 Mendoza singlehandedly apprehended them. He grabbed the shabu from the hands of Zafra and Marcelino, and
confiscated the drug paraphernalia from Daluz. Then, he ordered the three to lie down; he frisked them.
Boarding a tricycle, he brought them to the Balagtas Police Station, 9 where he personally marked the
confiscated two (2) sachets of shabu, one with VSD, the initials of Valentin Zafra y Dechosa and the other
with EMR, the initials of Eroll Marcelino y Reyes.10
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio

On the following day, 13 June 2003, SPO4 Mendoza brought the accused and the items to the crime
laboratory for urine sampling and laboratory examination, respectively.11 The test of the items resulted to
positive presence of methylamphetamine hydrochloride.12

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 190749

April 25, 2012

VALENTIN ZAFRA y DECHOSA and EROLL MARCELINO

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:

The RTC, Branch 76, Malolos, Bulacan, in a decision dated 11 June 2008, convicted Zafra and Marcelino
for the crime of possession of shabu:

REYES, Petitioners,

WHEREFORE, finding guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. 2297-M-2003,
accused VALENTIN ZAFRA y DECHOSA and accused EROLL MARCELINO y REYES are hereby
CONVICTED for possession of sachets of methylamphetamine hydrochloride commonly known as shabu,
with a weight of 0.31 gram and 0.30 gram, respectively, which are classified as dangerous drugs in
violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the "Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002" and are each SENTENCED to suffer the IMPRISONMENT of, applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, TWELVE (12) YEARS AND ONE DAY, AS THE MINIMUM TERM,
TO THIRTEEN (13) YEARS, AS THE MAXIMUM TERM, and to pay the FINE of THREE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P300,000.00).13

Daluz, on the other hand, who was charged of possession of drug paraphernalia in violation of Section 12
of RA No. 9165 pleaded guilty to the charge and was released after serving his sentence of eight (8)
months.14
Zafra and Marcelino appealed; but the CA affirmed in toto the RTC Decision:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the
assailed 11 June 2008 Decision of the Court a quo STANDS.15
Hence, this appeal on the following grounds: first, the arrest was unlawful; second, the prohibited drugs
are inadmissible in evidence; third, Section 21 of RA No. 9165 was not complied with; and, finally, the
prosecution failed to prove petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The Courts Ruling

the instant case, these circumstances are present, that, when properly appreciated, would warrant the
acquittal of petitioners.
Certainly, SPO4 Mendozas credibility has to be thoroughly looked into, being the only witness in this
case. While in his affidavit, SPO4 Mendoza claimed that he saw the sachet of shabu (0.30 gram) because
Zafra was in the act of handing it to Marcelino, his testimony during the direct examination reveals
another version, that is, from a distance, he saw Zafra and Marcelino holding shabu, respectively, hence,
he approached them from behind and confiscated the shabu from both of them and the paraphernalia from
Daluz. How he saw a 0.30 gram of shabu from a distance in a busy street, baffles this Court. Asked,
however, on cross examination, who among the three were holding the shabu and drug paraphernalia,
SPO4 Mendoza failed to be consistent with his earlier testimony and pointed to Daluz as the one holding
shabu with a handkerchief in his hand and Zafra as the one in possession of drug paraphernalia. These
inconsistencies are not minor ones, and, certainly, not among those which strengthens the credibility of a
witness. Possession of drug paraphernalia vis--vis shabu, are two different offenses under RA No. 9165.
That Zafra was holding drug paraphernalia and not shabu is material to this case, to the accusation against
him, and to his defense.

We resolve to ACQUIT petitioners Zafra and Marcelino on the following grounds:

First, the prosecutions lone witness, SPO4 Mendoza, 16 testified that, from a distance, he saw Zafra and
Marcelino holding shabu by their bare hands, respectively, while Daluz was holding an aluminum foil and
a disposable lighter.17 Seeing this illegal activity, he single-handedly apprehended them. 18 He grabbed the
shabu from the hands of Zafra and Marcelino, and confiscated the drug paraphernalia from Daluz.

Second, a reading of the RTC decision on this matter reveals that the conviction was arrived at upon
reliance on the presumption of regularity in the performance of Mendozas official duty.25

In his affidavit, however, SPO4 Mendoza stated, that:

It is noteworthy, however, that presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions cannot
by its lonesome overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. 26 Evidence of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt and nothing else can eclipse the hypothesis of guiltlessness. And this burden is met not
by bestowing distrust on the innocence of the accused but by obliterating all doubts as to his culpability.27

Na, nitong nakaraang Hunyo 12, 2003 ng 4:30 ng hapon humigit kumulang, sa P. Casto St., Barangay
Borol-1, Balagtas Bulacan, habang ako ay nagsasagawa ng surveillance sa Suspected Drug Pusher sa
nasabing lugar ay aking nakita ang tatlo (3) kalalakihan na nakatalikod sa isang corner ng tindahan sa P.
Castro St., na nakilala ko na sina Valentine D. Zafra @ Val, Eroll R. Marcelino @ Eroll, at Marlon B.
Daluz @ Marlon na pawang mga residente ng Borol-1, Balagtas, Bulacan.

Third, SPO4 Mendoza was the lone arresting officer, who brought the petitioners to the police
station,28 who himself marked the confiscated pieces of evidence sans witnesses, photographs, media, and
in the absence of the petitioners. His colleagues were nowhere. 29 And, worse, he was the same person who
took custody of the same pieces of evidence, then, brought them on his own to the crime laboratory for
testing.30 No inventory was ever done;31 no inventory was presented in court.

Na, ako ay lumapit na naglalakad kina Valentine Zafra, Errol Marcelino at Marlon Daluz at sa aking
paglapit sa kanilang tatlo ay aking nakita at naaktuhang inabot ni Valentine Zafra kay Eroll Marcelino ang
isang (1) plastic sachet ng shabu may timbang na 0.30 grams, at isa pang plastic sachet ng shabu na si
Marlon Daluz ay hawak ang isang disposable lighter at 2 piraso ng aluminum foil na inaayos na nilalagyan
ng lupi at 7 piraso ng empty plastic sachet. (Emphasis supplied)19

The solo performance by SPO4 Mendoza of all the acts necessary for the prosecution of the offense is
unexplained and puts the proof of corpus delicti, which is the illegal object itself in serious doubt. No
definite answer can be established regarding the question as to who possessed what at the time of the
alleged apprehension. More significantly, we are left in doubt whether not the two sachets
of shabu allegedly seized from the petitioners were the very same objects offered in court as the corpus
delicti.

xxxx
On cross examination, SPO4 Mendoza testified that it was Zafra and not Daluz, who was holding the
aluminum foil (contrary to his earlier testimony that Zafra was holding shabu); 20 that Daluz (whom he
claimed during the direct examination to be holding the aluminum foil) and Marcelino were holding
handkerchiefs and on top of them were shabu; 21 When the defense confronted SPO4 Mendoza about the
inconsistency, he told the court that his version during his direct testimony was the correct one.22
While, it is hornbook doctrine that the evaluation of the trial court on the credibility of the witness and the
testimony is entitled to great weight and is generally not disturbed upon appeal, 23 such rule does not apply
when the trial court has overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied any fact of weight or substance. 24 In

Prosecutions for illegal possession of prohibited drugs necessitates that the elemental act of possession of
a prohibited substance be established with moral certainty.32 The dangerous drug itself constitutes the
very corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to a judgment of
conviction.33 Essential therefore in these cases is that the identity of the prohibited drug be established
beyond doubt.34 Be that as it may, the mere fact of unauthorized possession will not suffice to create in a
reasonable mind the moral certainty required to sustain a finding of guilt. 35 More than just the fact of
possession, the fact that the substance illegally possessed in the first place is the same substance offered in
court as exhibit must also be established with the same unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a
finding of guilt.36 The chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures that
unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed. 37

Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of RA No. 9165 reads:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure
and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

Gutierrez,42 for the failure of the buy-bust team to inventory and photograph the seized items without
justifiable grounds. People v. Cantalejo 43 also resulted in an acquittal because no inventory or photograph
was ever made by the police.
We reached the same conclusions in the recent cases of People v. Capuno, 44 People v. Lorena,45 and People
v. Martinez.46
The present petition is the sum total of all the violations committed in the cases cited above.

Section 21(a) Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA No. 9165 reads:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or
the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the
physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or
at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items.
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit
be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent
claims it to be.38 It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was
picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit
would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the
witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to
the next link in the chain.39 These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there
had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have
possession of the same.40
The records readily raise significant doubts as to the identity of the sachets of shabu allegedly seized from
Zafra and Marcelino. SPO4 Mendozas claim that the two sachets of shabu presented in court were the
same ones confiscated from the petitioners, cannot be taken at its face value, solely on the presumption of
regularity of ones performance of duty. SPO4 Mendoza blatantly broke all the rules established by law to
safeguard the identity of a corpus delicti. There was even no mention about the details of the laboratory
examination of the allegedly seized drugs. To allow this to happen is to abandon everything that has been
said about the necessity of proving an unbroken chain of custody. SPO4 Mendoza cannot alone satisfy the
requirements in RA No. 9165 which is anchored on, expressly, the participation of several personalities
and the execution of specified documents.
And, while jurisprudence has refined the enumerated duties of an apprehending officer in a drug case and
has thus described the equivalent requirements for a proper chain of custody of the corpus delicti, still, the
case at bar cannot pass the constitutional requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt.
We reiterate, that this Court will never waver in ensuring that the prescribed procedures in the handling of
the seized drugs should be observed. In People v. Salonga, 41 we acquitted the accused for the failure of the
police to inventory and photograph the confiscated items. We also reversed a conviction in People v.

Lest the chain of custody rule be misunderstood, we reiterate that non-compliance with the prescribed
procedural requirements does not necessarily render the seizure and custody of the items void and invalid;
the seizure may still be held valid, provided that (a) there is a justifiable ground for the non-compliance,
and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are shown to have been properly
preserved.47 These conditions, however, were not met in the present case as the prosecution did not even
attempt to offer any justification for the failure of SPO4 Mendoza to follow the prescribed procedures in
the handling of the seized items.1wphi1 As we held in People v. De Guzman,48 the failure to follow the
procedure mandated under RA No. 9165 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations must be adequately
explained. The justifiable ground for the non-compliance must be proven as a fact. The Court cannot
presume what these grounds are or that they even exist.
In our constitutional system, basic and elementary is the presupposition that the burden of proving the
guilt of an accused lies on the prosecution which must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on
the weakness of the defense.49 The rule is invariable whatever may be the reputation of the accused, for the
law presumes his innocence unless and until the contrary is shown. 50 In dubio pro reo.51 When moral
certainty as to culpability hangs in the balance, acquittal on reasonable doubt inevitably becomes a matter
of right.52
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 30 October 2009 in CA-G.R. CR No. 31713. Petitioners Valentin Zafra y Dechosa and
Eroll Marcelino y Reyes are hereby ACQUITTED for the failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. They are ordered immediately RELEASED from detention, unless they are
confined for another lawful cause.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City, for
immediate implementation. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to report to this Court
the action taken within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 178300

March 17, 2009

PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
DOMINGO REYES y PAJE, ALVIN ARNALDO y AVENA and JOSELITO FLORES y
VICTORIO, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
For review is the Decision,1 dated 14 August 2006, and Resolution, 2 dated 18 October 2006, of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02301 affirming with modifications the Decision, 3 dated 26 February
2002, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, Malolos, Bulacan, in Criminal Case No. 1611-M-99
finding herein accused-appellants Domingo Reyes y Paje (Reyes), Alvin Arnaldo y Avena (Arnaldo) and
Joselito Flores y Victorio (Flores) guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with
homicide and imposing upon each of them the capital punishment of death.
The facts culled from the records are as follows:
On 11 August 1999, an Information4 was filed before the RTC charging appellants with the special
complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide. The accusatory portion of the information reads:
The undersigned State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice hereby accuses Domingo Reyes y Paje,
Alvin Arnaldo y Avena and Joselito Flores y Victorio of the crime of kidnapping for ransom with
homicide defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, committed as
follows:
That on or about 11:00 p.m. on July 16, 1999, at Sitio Lambakin, barangay Sto. Cristo, San Jose del
Monte, Bulacan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another and grouping themselves together with
Juanito Pataray y Cayaban, Federico Pataray y Cabayan and Rommel Libarnes y Acejo, who are still at
large, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force and intimidation and
with use of firearms, carry away and deprive Robert Yao, Yao San, Chua Ong Ping Sim, Raymond Yao,
Ronald Matthew Yao, Lennie Yao, Charlene Yao, Jona Abagatnan ang Josephine Ortea against their will
and consent on board their Mazda MVP van for the purpose of extorting money in the amount of Five
Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00), that during the detention of Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymong Yao, said

accused with intent to kill, willfully and unlawfully strangled Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond Yao to
death to the damage and prejudice of their heirs in such amount as may be awarded to them by this
Honorable Court.
During their arraignment,5 appellants, assisted by a counsel de oficio, pleaded "Not guilty" to the charge.
Trial on the merits thereafter followed.
The prosecution presented as witnesses Jona Abagatnan (Abagatnan), Robert Yao (Robert), Yao San,
Police Officer 3 (PO3) Alex Alberto, PO3 Roberto Jabien, Atty. Florimond Rous (Atty. Rous) and Atty.
Carlo Uminga (Atty. Uminga). Their testimonies, taken together, attest to the following:
The Yao family is composed of Yao San (father), Chua Ong Ping Sim (mother), Robert and Raymond
(children), Lenny (daughter-in-law, wife of Robert), Matthew and Charlene (grandchildren), and Jona
Abagatnan and Josephine Ortea (housemaids). The Yao family owns and operates a poultry farm in
Barangay Santo Cristo, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan.
On 16 July 1999, at about 11:00 p.m., the Yao family, on board a Mazda MVP van, arrived at the their
poultry farm in Barangay Sto. Cristo, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan. Yao San alighted from the van to open
the gate of the farm. At this juncture, appellant Reyes and a certain Juanito Pataray (Pataray) approached,
poked their guns at Yao San, and dragged him inside the van. Appellant Reyes and Pataray also boarded
the van. Thereupon, appellants Arnaldo and Flores, with two male companions, all armed with guns,
arrived and immediately boarded the van. Appellant Flores took the drivers seat and drove the van.
Appellants Reyes and Arnaldo and their cohorts then blindfolded each member of the Yao family inside
the van with packaging tape.6
After about 30 minutes of traveling on the road, the van stopped. Per order of appellants and their cohorts,
Chua Ong Ping Sim, Robert, Raymond and Jona Abagatnan (Abagatnan) stepped out of the van with
appellants Reyes and Arnaldo, Pataray and one of their male companions. 7 Appellant Flores, with the
other male companion, drove the van with the remaining members of the Yao family inside the vehicle. 8
Later, the van stopped again. Appellant Flores and his male companion told Yao San to produce the
amount of five million pesos (P5,000,000.00) as ransom in exchange for the release of Chua Ong Ping
Sim, Robert, Raymond and Abagatnan. Thereafter, appellant Flores and his male companion left the van
and fled; while Yao San, Lenny, Matthew, Charlene and Josephine remained inside the van. Upon sensing
that the kidnappers had already left, Yao San drove the van towards the poultry farm and sought the help
of relatives.9
Meanwhile, Chua Ong Ping Sim, Robert, Raymond and Abagatnan were taken on foot by appellants
Reyes and Arnaldo, Pataray and one male companion to a safe-house situated in the mountainous part of
San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan where they spent the whole night. 10
On the morning of the following day, at around 4:00 a.m., appellants and their cohorts tried to contact Yao
San regarding the ransom demanded, but the latter could not be reached. Thus, appellants instructed
Abagatnan to look for Yao San in the poultry farm. Appellants Reyes and Arnaldo and one male
companion escorted Abagatnan in proceeding to the poultry farm. Upon arriving therein, Abagatnan
searched for Yao San, but the latter could not be found. Appellants Reyes and Arnaldo told Abagatnan to
remind Yao San about the ransom demanded. Thereafter, appellants Reyes and Arnaldo and their male
companion left Abagatnan in the poultry farm and went back to the safe-house.11

In the safe-house, appellants told Robert that they would release him so he could help Abagatnan in
locating Yao San. Robert and appellants left the safe-house, and after 30 minutes of trekking, appellants
abandoned Robert. Robert then ran towards the poultry farm. Upon arriving at the poultry farm, Robert
found Yao San and informed him about the ransom demanded by the appellants. Robert also told Yao San
that Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond were still held by appellants and their cohorts. 12
On 18 July 1999, appellants called Yao San through a cellular phone and demanded the ransom of P5
million for Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond. Yao San acceded to appellants demand. Appellants
allowed Yao San to talk with Chua Ong Ping Sim.13
On the morning of 19 July 1999, appellants again called Yao San via a cellular phone and threatened to
kill Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond because of newspaper and radio reports regarding the incident. Yao
San clarified to appellants that he did not report the incident to the police and also pleaded with them to
spare the life of Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond. Appellants then instructed Yao San to appear and
bring with him the ransom of P5 million at 3:00 p.m. in the Usan dumpsite, Litex Road, Fairview, Quezon
City. Yao San arrived at the designated place of the pay-off at 4:00 p.m., but none of the appellants or their
cohorts showed up. Yao San waited for appellants call, but none came. Thus, Yao San left.14
On 23 July 1999, the corpses of Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond were found at the La Mesa Dam,
Novaliches, Quezon City.15 Both died of asphyxia by strangulation.16
On 26 July 1999, appellant Arnaldo surrendered to the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force
(PAOCTF) at Camp Crame, Quezon City. Thereupon, appellant Arnaldo, with the assistance of Atty.
Uminga, executed a written extra-judicial confession narrating his participation in the incident. Appellant
Arnaldo identified appellants Reyes and Flores, Pataray and a certain Tata and Akey as his co-participants
in the incident. Appellant Arnaldo also described the physical features of his cohorts and revealed their
whereabouts.17
Subsequently, appellant Reyes was arrested in Sto. Cristo, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan. Thereafter,
appellants Arnaldo and Reyes were identified in a police line-up by Yao San, Robert and Abagatnan as
their kidnappers.18
On 10 August 1999, agents of the PAOCTF arrested appellant Flores in Balayan, Batangas. Afterwards,
appellant Flores, with the assistance of Atty. Rous, executed a written extra-judicial confession detailing
his participation in the incident. Appellant Flores identified appellants Reyes and Arnaldo, Pataray and a
certain Tata and Akey as his co-participants in the incident. Appellant Flores was subsequently identified
in a police line-up by Yao San, Robert and Abagatnan as one of their kidnappers.19
The prosecution adduced documentary evidence to bolster the aforesaid allegations, to wit: (1)
Sinumpaang Salaysay of Abagatnan (Exhibit A); 20 (2) Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay of Abagatnan,
Robert and Yao San (Exhibit B);21 (3) sketch made by Abagatnan (Exhibit C);22 (4) death certificates of
Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond (Exhibits D & E); 23 (5) Sinumpaang Salaysay of Robert (Exhibit
F);24 (6) Sinumpaang Salaysay of Yao San (Exhibit H);25 (7) joint affidavit of Police Senior Inspector
Loreto P. Delelis and PO3 Roberto Jabien (Exhibit I); 26 (8) joint affidavit of PO3 Alex Alberto and PO3
Leonito Fermin (Exhibit J);27 (9) written extra-judicial confession of appellant Flores (Exhibit K); 28 (10)
written extra-judicial confession of appellant Arnaldo (Exhibit L);29 and (11) sketch made by appellant
Arnaldo (Exhibit M).30

For its part, the defense presented the testimonies of appellants, Marina Reyes, Irene Flores Celestino,
Wilfredo Celestino, Jr., Rachel C. Ramos, and Isidro Arnaldo. Appellants denied any liability and
interposed alibis and the defense of frame-up. Their testimonies, as corroborated by their witnesses, are as
follows:

The defense proffered documentary and object evidence to buttress their foregoing claims, to wit: (1)
prayer booklet of appellant Arnaldo (Exhibit 1 for appellant Arnaldo); 36 (2) calling card of Colonel
Mancao (Exhibit 2 for appellant Arnaldo);37 and (3) pictures allegedly showing appellant Flores working
as a carpenter in Antipolo City (Exhibits 1 & 2 for appellant Flores).38

Appellant Arnaldo testified that he was an "asset" of the PAOCTF. He narrated that on 25 July 1999, while
he was at the tricycle terminal of Brgy. Sto. Cristo, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, a police officer named
Liwanag of the PAOCTF approached and invited him to go to Camp Crame to shed light on a kidnapping
case allegedly committed by a certain Brgy. Captain Ramos and by members of the Aguirre and Bautista
families. He accepted the invitation. Subsequently, he proceeded to Camp Crame and met therein Colonel
Cesar Mancao III (Colonel Mancao) of the PAOCTF. Colonel Mancao told him that the PAOCTF would
arrest Brgy. Capt. Ramos and certain persons named Gerry Bautista and Dadie Bautista. Colonel Mancao
instructed him to identify said persons as responsible for the kidnapping of the Yao family. He refused to
do so because he feared Brgy. Capt. Ramos. The day after, Colonel Mancao called appellant Arnaldo to his
office. Upon arriving thereat, the latter saw Yao San. Yao San promised him that if their kidnappers would
be apprehended through his cooperation, he would give himP500,000.00. He accepted Yao Sans offer
under the condition that he would identify a different set of suspects. Later, Colonel Mancao gave
him P30,000.00.31

After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision dated 26 February 2002 convicting appellants of the special
complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide and sentencing each of them to suffer the
supreme penalty of death. Appellants were also ordered to pay jointly and severally the Yao
family P150,000.00 as civil indemnity,P500,000.00 as moral damages and the costs of the proceedings.
The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:

Subsequently, he pointed to appellants Reyes and Flores as his cohorts in kidnapping the Yao family. He
implicated appellants Reyes and Flores to get even with them, since the two had previously mauled him
after he sold their fighting cocks and failed to give them the proceeds of the sale. 32
He denied having met with Atty. Uminga. He was not assisted by the latter when he was forced by the
PAOCTF to make a written extra-judicial confession on the kidnapping of the Yao family. Further, he
claimed that while he was under the custody of PAOCTF, a certain Major Paulino utilized him as a drug
pusher. Upon failing to remit the proceeds of the drug sale, he was beaten up by PAOCTF agents and
thereafter included as accused with appellants Reyes and Flores for the kidnapping of the Yao family.33
On the other hand, appellant Reyes testified that he slept in his house with his family from 6:00 p.m. of 16
July 1999 until the morning of the next day; that on the early morning of 26 July 1999, five policemen
barged into his house and arrested him; that the policemen told him that he was a suspect in the
kidnapping of the Yao family; that he was mauled by the policemen outside his house; that the policemen
forcibly brought him to Camp Crame, where he was subsequently tortured; that he knew the Yao family
because he worked as a carpenter in the familys poultry farm at Brgy. Sto. Cristo, San Jose del Monte,
Bulacan; that he had no involvement in the kidnapping of the family; and that appellant Arnaldo
implicated him in the kidnapping of the family because appellant Arnaldo held a grudge against him. 34
For his part, appellant Flores testified that he stayed in his sisters house at Antipolo City from 12 July
1999 up to 30 July 1999; that he went to her house on 12 July 1999 because it was the birthday of her
child; that he worked as a construction worker during his stay in his sisters house; that he was arrested in
Batangas and thereafter brought to Camp Crame, where he was beaten up by policemen for refusing to
admit involvement in the kidnapping of the Yao family; that after three days of beating, he was forced to
sign a document which he later found out to be a written extra-judicial confession; that he never met nor
did he know Atty. Rous; that he knew the Yao family because he lived near the familys poultry farm, and
he used to work therein as a welder; that he had no participation in the kidnapping of the family; and that
appellant Arnaldo implicated him in the kidnapping of the family because he and appellant Reyes had
mauled appellant Arnaldo several years ago.35

WHEREFORE, finding herein three (3) accused DOMINGO REYES y PAJE, ALVIN ARNALDO y
AVENA, and JOSELITO FLORES y VICTORIO guilty as principals beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM WITH (DOUBLE) HOMICIDE as charged, they are hereby
sentenced each to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH as mandated by law, to jointly and severally
indemnify the heirs of deceased Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond Yao in the amount of One Hundred
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00), and all the private offended parties or victims, including the heirs of
the deceased, in the amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) as moral damages, subject to
the corresponding filing fee as a first lien, and to pay the costs of the proceedings.39
By reason of the death penalty imposed on each of the appellants, the instant case was elevated to us for
automatic review. However, pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo, 40 we remanded the instant case to
the Court of Appeals for proper disposition.
On 14 August 2006, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision affirming with modifications the RTC
Decision. The appellate court reduced the penalty imposed by the RTC on each of the appellants from
death penalty to reclusion perpetua without the possibility of parole. It also decreased the amount of civil
indemnity fromP150,000.00 to P100,000.00. Further, it directed appellants to pay jointly and severally the
Yao familyP100,000.00 as exemplary damages. The fallo of the Court of Appeals decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan,
Branch 12, dated February 26, 2002, in Criminal Case No. 1611-M-99 convicting accused-appellants of
the crime of Kidnapping For Ransom with (Double) Homicide, is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS in that:
1) accused-appellants are instead sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua;
2) the award of civil indemnity ex delicto is hereby reduced to P100,000; and
3) accused-appellants are further ordered to pay private complainants the amount
of P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.41
Appellants filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals Decision but this was denied.
Hence, appellants filed their Notice of Appeal on 25 August 2006.
In their separate briefs,42 appellants assigned the following errors:

I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF
THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES;
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING A CONSPIRACY BETWEEN APPELLANTS;
III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE EXTRA-JUDICIAL
CONFESSIONS OF APPELLANT ARNALDO AND APPELLANT FLORES;

the incident, appellant Reyes and Pataray approached him, poked their guns at him, and dragged him into
the van. Appellant Flores took the drivers seat and drove the van. Appellant Flores and his male
companion told him to produce P5 million as ransom money in exchange for the release of Chua Ong Ping
Sim, Robert, Raymond and Abagatnan.47
Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San testified in a clear and candid manner during the trial. Their respective
testimonies were consistent with one another. They were steadfast in recounting their ordeal despite the
grueling cross examination of the defense. Moreover, their testimonies were in harmony with the
documentary evidence adduced by the prosecution. The RTC and the Court of Appeals found their
testimonies credible and trustworthy. Both courts also found no ill motive for Abagatnan, Robert and Yao
San to testify against appellants.
Appellants, nonetheless, maintain that Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San could not have identified their
kidnappers, because (1) the incident occurred in the darkness of the night; (2) they were blindfolded then;
and (3) the heads of the kidnappers were covered by T-shirts.

IV.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TOTALLY IGNORING THE CORROBORATED EVIDENCE OF THE
DEFENSE;
V.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION HAD PROVEN
APPELLANTS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.43
Anent the first assigned error, appellants assail the credibility of prosecution witnesses Abagatnan, Robert
and Yao San.
In resolving issues pertaining to the credibility of the witnesses, this Court is guided by the following
well-settled principles: (1) the reviewing court will not disturb the findings of the lower court, unless there
is a showing that the latter overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight
and substance that may affect the result of the case; (2) the findings of the trial court on the credibility of
witnesses are entitled to great respect and even finality, as it had the opportunity to examine their
demeanor when they testified on the witness stand; and (3) a witness who testifies in a clear, positive and
convincing manner is a credible witness.44
After carefully reviewing the evidence on record and applying the foregoing guidelines to this case, we
found no cogent reason to overturn the RTCs ruling finding the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
credible. Prosecution witnesses Abagatnan, Robert, and Yao San positively identified appellants and their
cohorts as their kidnappers during a police line-up and also during trial. Abagatnan specifically testified
during the trial that after appellants and their cohorts forcibly entered the van where she and the Yao
family were, appellant Flores drove the van away from the poultry farm; that appellants Reyes and
Arnaldo were among the kidnappers who guarded her, Robert, Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond in the
safe-house; and that appellants Reyes and Arnaldo accompanied her in going to the poultry farm to search
for Yao San and remind him about the ransom demanded. 45 Robert confirmed that appellants and their
cohorts blindfolded them inside the van during the incident. He also recounted that appellants and their
cohorts detained him and Chua Ong Ping Sim, Raymond and Abagatnan in a safe-house. He was later
instructed by appellants to find Yao San and remind him about the ransom. 46 Yao San declared that during

It appears that the crime scene was well-lighted during the incident. At that time, there was a light from a
fluorescent bulb hanging above the gate of the poultry farm wherein Yao San was held at gunpoint by
appellant Reyes and Pataray.48 The headlights of the van were also turned on, making it possible for
Abagatnan and Robert to see the faces of appellant Reyes and Pataray as the two approached and poked
their guns at Yao San.49 Further, there was a bulb inside the van, which turned on when the doors van was
opened. This bulb lighted up when appellants and their cohorts forcibly boarded the van, thus, allowing
Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San to glance at the faces of appellants and their cohorts. 50
Although the Yao family was blindfolded during the incident, it was, nevertheless, shown that it took
appellants and their cohorts about 10 minutes before all members of the Yao family were
blindfolded.51 During this considerable length of time, Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San were able to take a
good look at the faces of appellants and their cohorts. In addition, Abagatnan and Robert narrated that
their respective blindfolds loosened several times, giving them the opportunity to have a glimpse at the
faces of appellants and their cohorts.52
Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San testified that even though the heads of appellants and their cohorts were
covered by T-shirts, their faces were, nonetheless, exposed and uncovered, allowing them to see their
faces.53Robert and Yao San also declared that they recognized the faces of appellants during the incident
because the latter resided near the poultry farm of the Yao family, which used to hire them several times in
the farm as carpenters/welders.54
Appellants, however, insist that the testimonies of Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San that they were able to
recognize the kidnappers -- because although the kidnappers heads were covered with T-shirts, their faces
were nevertheless exposed or uncovered -- are incredible. Appellants argue that it is against human nature
and experience that kidnappers would cover only their heads and not their faces in concealing their
identities.
It is not illogical or against human nature for appellants and their cohorts to cover their heads with Tshirts, while leaving their faces exposed and uncovered when they kidnapped the Yao family. Perhaps,
appellants and their cohorts thought that putting T-shirts on their heads without covering their faces was
sufficient to conceal their identities. Regardless of their reason, the fact remains that Abagatnan, Robert
and Yao San positively identified appellants as their kidnappers, and their said identification and
testimonies were found by the RTC, the Court of Appeals and by this Court to be credible. In People v.

Barredo,55 the victim testified that he was able to identify the accused as his assailants because the latter
took off their masks during the assault. The accused argued that the victims testimony was incredible
because persons who wore masks would not take them off so casually in the presence of their victims, as
doing so would reveal their identities. The trial court, nonetheless, ruled that the victims testimony was
credible and truthful. We sustained such ruling of the trial court and ratiocinated:

Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, there is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit
a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy presupposes unity of purpose and unity in the execution of
the unlawful objective among the accused. 61 When the accused by their acts aimed at the same object, one
performing one part and the other performing another part as to complete the crime, with a view to the
attainment of the same object, conspiracy exists.62

Appellants dispute the plausibility of Enrico Cebuhanos claim that he was able to identify the assailants
because they took off their masks. Persons who wear masks would not take them off so casually in the
presence of their victims, as doing so would thereby reveal their identities. x x x.

As can be gleaned from the credible testimonies and sworn statements of Abagatnan, Robert and Yao,
appellant Reyes and Pataray63 approached and poked their guns at Yao San, and thereafter dragged the
latter into the van. Appellant Flores then took the drivers seat and drove the van, while each member of
the Yao family was blindfolded by appellants Reyes and Arnaldo and their cohorts inside the van.
Thereafter, appellant Flores instructed Yao San to produce the amount of P5 million as ransom money in
exchange for the release of Chua Ong Ping Sim, Robert, Raymond and Abagatnan. Appellant Reyes and
appellant Arnaldo were among the kidnappers who guarded Abagatnan, Robert, Chua Ong Ping Sim and
Raymond in the safe-house. They also accompanied Abagatnan and Robert in going to the poultry farm to
search for and remind Yao San about the ransom demanded. Further, appellants Arnaldo and Flores
narrated in their respective extra-judicial confessions64 how they planned and executed the kidnapping of
the Yao family. Their extra-judicial confessions also detailed the particular role/participation played by
each of appellants and their cohorts in the kidnapping of the family. Clearly, the foregoing individual acts
of appellants and their cohorts demonstrated their unity of purpose and design in kidnapping the Yao
family for the purpose of extorting ransom.

The above arguments are untenable. In his testimony, Enrico Cebuhano clearly stated that the men who
entered his home removed their masks when he was brought downstairs. Why they did so was known only
to them. It is possible that they thought that there was no one in the vicinity who could identify them, or
that they wanted Enrico to see who they were so as to intimidate him. It is also possible that they felt
secure because there were 14 of them who were all armed. In any event, what is important is that the trial
court found Enrico Cebuhanos testimony to be both credible and believable, and that he was able to
positively identify appellants herein, because the men who entered his home removed their masks, x x x.
It is significant to note that Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond were brutally killed as a result of the
kidnapping. It is difficult to believe that Robert and Yao San would point to appellants and their cohorts as
their kidnappers if such were not true. A witness relationship to the victim of a crime makes his testimony
more credible as it would be unnatural for a relative interested in vindicating a crime done to their family
to accuse somebody other than the real culprit. 56 Relationship with a victim of a crime would deter a
witness from indiscriminately implicating anybody in the crime. His natural and usual interest would be to
identify the real malefactor and secure his conviction to obtain true justice for the death of a relative. 57
Appellants put in issue the failure of Robert and Yao San to immediately report the incident and identify
appellants to authorities despite their common claim that they recognized appellants, as the latter used to
work in the poultry farm.
Robert and Yao San cannot be blamed for not immediately reporting the incident to the authorities. Chua
Ong Ping Sim and Raymond were still held by appellants and their cohorts when the ransom was
demanded for their release. Appellants and their cohorts were armed and dangerous. Appellants and their
cohorts also threatened to kill Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond if Yao San and Robert would report the
incident to the authorities.58Understandably, Yao San and Robert were extremely fearful for the safety of
their loved ones, and this caused them to refrain from reporting the incident. Robert and Yao San cannot
also be blamed for not reporting the incident to the police even after the corpses of Chua Ong Ping Sim
and Raymond had already been found, and appellants and their cohorts had cut their communication with
them. Certainly, the killings of Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond had a chilling/paralyzing effect on
Robert and Yao San. Also, appellants and their cohorts were still at large then, and the possibility that they
would harm the remaining members of the Yao family was not remote, considering that appellants and
their cohorts were familiar with the whereabouts of the Yao family. At any rate, we have held that failure
to immediately report the kidnapping incident does not diminish the credibility of the witnesses. 59 The
lapse of a considerable length of time before a witness comes forward to reveal the identities of the
perpetrators of the crime does not taint the credibility of the witness and his testimony where such delay is
satisfactorily explained.60
Apropos the second assigned error, appellants contend that the prosecution failed to prove that they
conspired in kidnapping the Yao family.

Appellants, however, challenge the legality and admissibility of the written extra-judicial confessions.
Appellant Reyes claims that his alleged participation in the kidnapping of the Yao family was based solely
on the written extra-judicial confessions of appellants Arnaldo and Flores. He maintains, however, that
said extra-judicial confessions are inadmissible in evidence, because they were obtained in violation of his
co-appellants constitutional right to have an independent counsel of their own choice during custodial
investigation. Appellant Reyes alleges that the agents of the PAOCTF did not ask his co-appellants during
the custodial investigation whether they had a lawyer of their own choice, and whether they could afford
to hire a lawyer; that the agents of the PAOCTF suggested the availability of Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous
to his co-appellants; and that Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous were associates of the PAOCTF. Appellant
Reyes also asseverates that the extra-judicial confessions of appellants Arnaldo and Flores cannot be
utilized against him.
Appellant Flores argues that his written extra-judicial confession is inadmissible in evidence, because it
was obtained in violation of his constitutional right to have an independent counsel of his own choice
during custodial investigation. He insists that his written extra-judicial confession was elicited through
force, torture and without the assistance of a lawyer. He avers that he was not assisted by any lawyer from
the time he was arrested until he was coerced to sign the purported confession; that he was forced to sign
it because he could not anymore endure the beatings he suffered at the hands of the PAOCTF agents; and
that he never met or knew Atty. Rous who, according to the PAOCTF, had assisted him during the
custodial investigation.
Appellant Arnaldo contends that his written extra-judicial confession should be excluded as evidence, as it
was procured in violation of his constitutional right to have an independent counsel of his own choice
during custodial investigation. He claims that he was not given freedom to choose his counsel; that the
agents of the PAOCTF did not ask him during the custodial investigation whether he had a lawyer of his
own choice, and whether he could afford to hire a lawyer; and that the agents of the PAOCTF suggested
the availability of Atty. Uminga to him.

An extra-judicial confession is a declaration made voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement by a

person under custodial investigation, stating or acknowledging that he had committed or participated in
the commission of a crime.65 In order that an extra-judicial confession may be admitted in evidence,
Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution mandates that the following safeguards be observed 66:
Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These
rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.1awphi.zw+
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be
used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other forms of detention are
prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 shall be inadmissible in
evidence against him.
Thus, we have held that an extra-judicial confession is admissible in evidence if the following requisites
have been satisfied: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of competent and
independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing.67
The mantle of protection afforded by the above-quoted constitutional provision covers the period from the
time a person is taken into custody for the investigation of his possible participation in the commission of
a crime or from the time he is singled out as a suspect in the commission of the offense although not yet in
custody.68
The right of an accused to be informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel contemplates the
transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an
abstract constitutional principle.69 Such right contemplates effective communication which results in the
subject understanding what is conveyed.70
The right to counsel is a fundamental right and is intended to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead
the accused to admit something false.71 The right to counsel attaches upon the start of the investigation,
i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or
admissions from the accused.72 The lawyer called to be present during such investigation should be, as far
as reasonably possible, the choice of the accused. If the lawyer is one furnished in behalf of accused, he
should be competent and independent; that is, he must be willing to fully safeguard the constitutional
rights of the accused.73 A competent and independent counsel is logically required to be present and able
to advice and assist his client from the time the latter answers the first question asked by the investigator
until the signing of the confession. Moreover, the lawyer should ascertain that the confession was made
voluntarily, and that the person under investigation fully understood the nature and the consequence of his
extra-judicial confession vis-a-vis his constitutional rights. 74
However, the foregoing rule is not intended to deter to the accused from confessing guilt if he voluntarily
and intelligently so desires, but to protect him from admitting what he is being coerced to admit although
untrue. To be an effective counsel, a lawyer need not challenge all the questions being propounded to his
client. The presence of a lawyer is not intended to stop an accused from saying anything which might
incriminate him; but, rather, it was adopted in our Constitution to preclude the slightest coercion on the

accused to admit something false. The counsel should never prevent an accused from freely and
voluntarily telling the truth.75
We have gone over the records and found that the PAOCTF investigators have duly apprised appellants
Arnaldo and Flores of their constitutional rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel of their own choice during their respective custodial investigations.
The Pasubali76 of appellants Arnaldo and Floress written extra-judicial confessions clearly shows that
before they made their respective confessions, the PAOCTF investigators had informed them that the
interrogation about to be conducted on them referred to the kidnapping of the Yao family. Thereafter, the
PAOCTF agents explained to them that they had a constitutional right to remain silent, and that anything
they would say may be used against them in a court of law. They were also told that they were entitled to a
counsel of their own choice, and that they would be provided with one if they had none. When asked if
they had a lawyer of their own, appellant Arnaldo replied that he would be assisted by Atty. Uminga, while
appellant Flores agreed to be represented by Atty. Rous. Thereafter, when asked if they understood their
said rights, they replied in the affirmative. The appraisal of their constitutional rights was done in the
presence of their respective lawyers and in the Tagalog dialect, the language spoken and understood by
them. Appellants Arnaldo and Flores and their respective counsels, Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous, also
signed and thumbmarked the extra-judicial confessions. Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous attested to the
veracity of the afore-cited facts in their respective court testimonies. 77 Indeed, the appraisal of appellants
constitutional rights was not merely perfunctory, because it appeared certain that appellants had
understood and, in fact, exercised their fundamental rights after being informed thereof.
Records reflect that appellants Arnaldo and Reyes were likewise accorded their right to competent and
independent counsel during their respective custodial investigations.
As regards appellant Arnaldo, Atty. Uminga testified that prior to the questioning of appellant Arnaldo
about the incident, Atty. Uminga told the PAOCTF investigators and agents to give him and appellant
Arnaldo space and privacy, so that they could freely converse. After the PAOCTF investigators and agents
left them, he and appellant Arnaldo went to a cubicle where only the two of them were present. He
interviewed appellant Arnaldo in the Tagalog language regarding the latters personal circumstances and
asked him why he was in the PAOCTF office and why he wanted a lawyer. Appellant Arnaldo replied that
he wanted to make a confession about his participation in the kidnapping of the Yao family. Thereupon, he
asked appellant Arnaldo if the latter would accept his assistance as his lawyer for purposes of his
confession. Appellant Arnaldo agreed. He warned appellant Arnaldo that he might be sentenced to death if
he confessed involvement in the incident. Appellant Arnaldo answered that he would face the
consequences because he was bothered by his conscience. He inquired from appellant Arnaldo if he was
harmed or intimidated into giving self-incriminating statements to the PAOCTF investigators. Appellant
Arnaldo answered in the negative. He requested appellant Arnaldo to remove his shirt for him to check if
there were torture marks on his body, but he found none. He also observed that appellant Arnaldos
appearance and movements were normal. His conference with appellant Arnaldo lasted for 15 minutes or
more. Thereafter, he allowed the PAOCTF investigators to question appellant Arnaldo. 78
Further, Atty. Uminga sat beside appellant Arnaldo during the inquiry and listened to the latters entire
confession. After the taking of appellant Arnaldos confession, Atty. Uminga requested the PAOCTF
investigators to give him a copy of appellant Arnaldos confession. Upon obtaining such copy, he read it
entirely and thereafter gave it to appellant Arnaldo. He instructed appellant Arnaldo to read and
comprehend the same carefully. He told appellant Arnaldo to ask him for clarification and comment if he
did not agree or understand any part of his written confession. Appellant Arnaldo read his entire written

confession and handed it to him. Atty. Uminga asked him if he had objections to it. Appellant Arnaldo
replied in the negative. He then reminded appellant Arnaldo that the latter could still change his mind, and
that he was not being forced to sign. Appellant Arnaldo manifested that he would sign his written
confession. Later, he and appellant Arnaldo affixed their signatures to the written confession. 79
With respect to appellant Flores, Atty. Rous declared that before the PAOCTF investigators began
questioning appellant, Atty. Rous interviewed him in Tagalog inside a room, where only the two of them
were present. He asked appellant Flores about his personal circumstances. Appellant Flores replied that he
was a suspect in the kidnapping of the Yao family, and he wanted to give a confession regarding his
involvement in the said incident. He asked appellant Flores whether he would accept his assistance as his
lawyer. Appellant Flores affirmed that he would. He asked appellant Flores why he wanted to give such
confession. Appellant Flores answered that he was bothered by his conscience. Atty. Rous warned
appellant Flores that his confession would be used against him in a court of law, and that the death penalty
might be imposed on him. Appellant Flores told him that he wanted to tell the truth and unload the burden
on his mind. He requested appellant Flores to lift his shirt for the former to verify if there were torture
marks or bruises on his body, but found none. Again, he cautioned appellant Flores about the serious
consequences of his confession, but the latter maintained that he wanted to tell the truth. Thereafter, he
permitted the PAOCTF investigators to question appellant Flores.80
Additionally, Atty. Rous stayed with appellant Flores while the latter was giving statements to the
PAOCTF investigators. After the taking of appellant Flores statements, he instructed appellant Flores to
read and check his written confession. Appellant Flores read the same and made some minor corrections.
He also read appellant Flores written confession. Afterwards, he and appellant Flores signed the latters
written confession.81
It is true that it was the PAOCTF which contacted and suggested the availability of Atty. Uminga and Atty.
Rous to appellants Arnaldo and Flores, respectively. Nonetheless, this does not automatically imply that
their right to counsel was violated. What the Constitution requires is the presence of competent and
independent counsel, one who will effectively undertake his clients defense without any intervening
conflict of interest.82 There was no conflict of interest with regard to the legal assistance rendered by Atty.
Uminga and Atty. Rous. Both counsels had no interest adverse to appellants Arnaldo and Flores. Although
Atty. Uminga testified that he was a former National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) agent, he,
nevertheless, clarified that he had been separated therefrom since 1994 83 when he went into private
practice. Atty. Uminga declared under oath that he was a private practitioner when he assisted appellant
Arnaldo during the custodial investigation.84 It appears that Atty. Uminga was called by the PAOCTF to
assist appellant Arnaldo, because Atty. Umingas telephone number was listed on the directory of his
former NBI officemates detailed at the PAOCTF. Atty. Rous, on the other hand, was a member of the Free
Legal Aid Committee of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Quezon City at the time he rendered legal
assistance to appellant Flores.85 Part of Atty. Rous duty as member of the said group was to render legal
assistance to the indigents including suspects under custodial investigation. There was no evidence
showing that Atty. Rous had organizational or personal links to the PAOCTF. In fact, he proceeded to the
PAOCTF office to assist appellant Flores, because he happened to be the lawyer manning the office when
the PAOCTF called.86 In People v. Fabro,87 we stated:
The Constitution further requires that the counsel be independent; thus, he cannot be a special counsel,
public or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is admittedly
adverse to that of the accused. Atty. Jungco does not fall under any of said enumeration. Nor is there any
evidence that he had any interest adverse to that of the accused. The indelible fact is that he was president
of the Zambales Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and not a lackey of the lawmen.

Further, as earlier stated, under Section 12(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution, an accused is entitled to
have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. The phrase "preferably of his own
choice" does not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is
exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys from handling the defense.
Otherwise, the tempo of custodial investigation would be solely in the hands of the accused who can
impede, nay, obstruct, the progress of the interrogation by simply selecting a lawyer who, for one reason
or another, is not available to protect his interest. 88While the choice of a lawyer in cases where the person
under custodial interrogation cannot afford the services of counsel or where the preferred lawyer is not
available is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the suspect has the final choice, as he may reject
the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one. A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed
engaged by the accused when he does not raise any objection to the counsels appointment during the
course of the investigation, and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of the statement before
the swearing officer.89 Appellants Arnaldo and Flores did not object to the appointment of Atty. Uminga
and Atty. Rous as their lawyers, respectively, during their custodial investigation. Prior to their
questioning, appellants Arnaldo and Flores conferred with Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous. Appellant
Arnaldo manifested that he would be assisted by Atty. Uminga, while appellant Flores agreed to be
counseled by Atty. Rous. Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous countersigned the written extra-judicial confessions
of appellants Arnaldo and Flores, respectively. Hence, appellants Arnaldo and Flores are deemed to have
engaged the services of Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous, respectively.
Since the prosecution has sufficiently established that the respective extra-judicial confessions of appellant
Arnaldo and appellant Flores were obtained in accordance with the constitutional guarantees, these
confessions are admissible. They are evidence of a high order because of the strong presumption that no
person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime, unless prompted by truth
and conscience.90Consequently, the burden of proving that undue pressure or duress was used to procure
the confessions rests on appellants Arnaldo and Flores.91
In the case at bar, appellants Arnaldo and Flores failed to discharge their burden of proving that they were
forced or coerced to make their respective confessions. Other than their self-serving statements that they
were maltreated by the PAOCTF officers/agents, they did not present any plausible proof to substantiate
their claims.lawphil.netThey did not submit any medical report showing that their bodies were subjected
to violence or torture. Neither did they file complaints against the persons who had allegedly beaten or
forced them to execute their respective confessions despite several opportunities to do so. Appellants
Arnaldo and Flores averred that they informed their family members/relatives of the alleged maltreatment,
but the latter did not report such allegations to proper authorities. On the contrary, appellants Arnaldo and
Flores declared in their respective confessions that they were not forced or harmed in giving their sworn
statements, and that they were not promised or given any award in consideration of the same. Records also
bear out that they were physically examined by doctors before they made their confessions. 92 Their
physical examination reports certify that no external signs of physical injury or any form of trauma were
noted during their examination. 93 In People v. Pia,94 we held that the following factors indicate
voluntariness of an extra-judicial confession: (1) where the accused failed to present credible evidence of
compulsion or duress or violence on their persons; (2) where they failed to complain to the officers who
administered the oaths; (3) where they did not institute any criminal or administrative action against their
alleged intimidators for maltreatment; (4) where there appeared to be no marks of violence on their
bodies; and (5) where they did not have themselves examined by a reputable physician to buttress their
claim.
It should also be noted that the extra-judicial confessions of appellants Arnaldo and Flores are replete with
details on the manner in which the kidnapping was committed, thereby ruling out the possibility that these
were involuntarily made. Their extra-judicial confessions clearly state how appellants and their cohorts

planned the kidnapping as well as the sequence of events before, during and after its occurrence. The
voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its language if, upon its face, the confession exhibits
no suspicious circumstances tending to cast doubt upon its integrity, it being replete with details which
could only be supplied by the accused.95
With respect to appellant Reyess claim that the extra-judicial confessions of appellants Arnaldo and
Flores cannot be used in evidence against him, we have ruled that although an extra-judicial confession is
admissible only against the confessant, jurisprudence makes it admissible as corroborative evidence of
other facts that tend to establish the guilt of his co-accused. 96 In People v. Alvarez,97 we ruled that where
the confession is used as circumstantial evidence to show the probability of participation by the coconspirator, that confession is receivable as evidence against a co-accused. In People v. Encipido 98 we
elucidated as follows:
It is also to be noted that APPELLANTS extrajudicial confessions were independently made without
collusion, are identical with each other in their material respects and confirmatory of the other. They are,
therefore, also admissible as circumstantial evidence against their co-accused implicated therein to show
the probability of the latters actual participation in the commission of the crime. They are also admissible
as corroborative evidence against the others, it being clear from other facts and circumstances presented
that persons other than the declarants themselves participated in the commission of the crime charged and
proved. They are what is commonly known as interlocking confession and constitute an exception to the
general rule that extrajudicial confessions/admissions are admissible in evidence only against the
declarants thereof.
Appellants Arnaldo and Flores stated in their respective confessions that appellant Reyes participated in
their kidnapping of the Yao family. These statements are, therefore, admissible as corroborative and
circumstantial evidence to prove appellant Reyes guilt.
Nevertheless, even without the extra-judicial confessions of appellants Arnaldo and Flores, evidence on
record is sufficient to sustain a finding of culpability of appellant Reyes. As earlier found, Abagatnan,
Robert and Yao positively identified appellant Reyes as one of their kidnappers. They specifically testified
that during the incident, appellant Reyes (1) approached and pointed a gun at Yao San and dragged the
latter inside the van; and (2) accompanied Abagatnan and Robert in going to the poultry farm to search for
and remind Yao San about the ransom demanded. The RTC, Court of Appeals and this Court found such
testimonies credible.
Appellants argue that their alibis cast reasonable doubt on their alleged guilt. Appellant Reyes avers that
he could not have been one of those who kidnapped the Yao family on the night of 16 July 1999 at around
11:00 p.m., because he was sleeping with his family in their residence during such time and date.
Likewise, appellant Flores asseverates that he could not have been present at the crime scene on such date
and time, as he was already sleeping in his sisters house at Antipolo City. For his part, appellant Arnaldo
asserts that he is a victim of a police frame-up. He alleges that he was an asset of the PAOCTF, but was
later utilized as a drug pusher by the said agency. Upon failing to remit the proceeds of a shabu sale to the
PAOCTF officers, he was beaten up and included as accused in the kidnapping of the Yao family.
Alibi is the weakest of all defenses, for it is easy to contrive and difficult to prove. Alibi must be proved
by the accused with clear and convincing evidence; otherwise it cannot prevail over the positive
testimonies of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. For alibi to prosper, it is not enough
for the accused to prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed. He must likewise

prove that it was physically impossible for him to be present at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity at
the time of its commission.99
The defense of frame-up, like alibi, has been invariably viewed by this Court with disfavor, for it can
easily be concocted but is difficult to prove. In order to prosper, the defense of frame-up must be proved
by the accused with clear and convincing evidence.100
It should be observed that the family residence/house of appellant Reyes where he claimed to have slept
when the incident occurred is located within Brgy. Sto. Cristo, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan. 101 This is the
same barangay where the Yao familys poultry farm is situated. Appellant Reyes, in fact, admitted that the
poultry farm is near his residence.102 There is a huge possibility that appellant Reyes slept for a while,
woke up before 11:00 p.m., and thereafter proceeded to the Yao familys poultry farm to participate in the
kidnapping of the family. The same is true with appellant Flores. Wilfredo, appellant Flores nephew,
testified that he and appellant went to bed and slept together in the house of appellants sister in Antipolo
City at about 8:00 p.m. of 16 July 1999.103 It is greatly possible that Wifredo did not notice when appellant
Flores woke up later at 9:00 p.m. and immediately proceeded to the Yao familys poultry farm to
participate in the kidnapping of the family, arriving therein at about 11:00 p.m. It is a fact that a person
coming from Antipolo City may reach San Jose del Monte, Bulacan in two hours via a motor vehicle,
considering that there was no more heavy traffic at that late evening. Obviously, appellants Reyes and
Flores failed to prove convincingly that it was physically impossible for them to be at the crime scene
during the incident.
Appellant Flores submitted two pictures which, according to him, show that he worked as a construction
worker from 12 July 1999 up to 30 July 1999 while staying in his sisters house at Antipolo City. These
pictures, however, do not clearly and convincingly support such claim, because (1) the pictures were
undated; (2) the shots were taken from a far distance; and (3) the face of the man in the pictures which
appellant Flores claims as his is blurred, unrecognizable and almost hidden, as such person is wearing a
cap and is in a position where only the right and back portions of his head and body are visible.
Appellant Arnaldo also failed to prove with convincing evidence his defense of frame-up. Aside from his
self-serving testimony that he was a former PAOCTF agent and that he was beaten and included as
accused in the kidnapping of the Yao family by the PAOCTF agents because he failed to remit to the
PAOCTF officers the proceeds of his sale of shabu, he did not present convincing proof to support said
allegations. He submitted the calling card of Colonel Mancao, which appears to have been signed by the
latter at the back portion, but there is nothing on it which indicates or verifies that appellant Arnaldo was
indeed a former PAOCTF agent. He also submitted a prayer book containing his handwritten narration of
torture he allegedly experienced at the hands of the PAOCTF agents, but this does not conclusively show
that he was beaten by the PAOCTF agents. As we earlier found, appellant Arnaldo did not produce any
medical records/certificates or file any complaint against the PAOCTF agents to bolster his claim of
maltreatment.
It is true that the alibis of appellants Reyes and Flores and the defense of frame-up of appellant Arnaldo
were corroborated on some points by the testimonies of some of their relatives/friends. We have, however,
held that alibi and the defense of frame-up become less plausible when they are corroborated only by
relatives and friends because of perceived partiality.104
Indeed, the positive and credible testimonies of Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San prevail over the alibis and
defense of frame-up of appellants.105

We shall now determine the propriety of appellants conviction for the special complex crime of
kidnapping for ransom with homicide and the corresponding penalties imposed.
Under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of kidnapping is committed with the concurrence
of the following elements: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another, or in
any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and (4) in the
commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention
lasts for more than three days; (b) it is committed by simulating public authority; (c) serious physical
injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d) the
person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer. 106 All of the foregoing elements were
duly establish by the testimonial and documentary evidences for the prosecution in the case at bar. First,
appellants and their cohorts are private individuals. Second, appellants and their cohorts kidnapped the
Yao family by taking control of their van and detaining them in a secluded place. Third, the Yao family
was taken against their will. And fourth, threats to kill were made and the kidnap victims include females.
Republic Act No. 7659 provides that the death penalty shall be imposed if any of the two qualifying
circumstances is present in the commission of the kidnapping: (1) the motive of the kidnappers is to extort
ransom for the release of the kidnap victims, although none of the circumstances mentioned under
paragraph four of the elements of kidnapping were present. Ransom means money, price or consideration
paid or demanded for the redemption of a captured person that would release him from
captivity.107 Whether or not the ransom is actually paid to or received by the perpetrators is of no
moment.108 It is sufficient that the kidnapping was committed for the purpose of exacting ransom; 109 and
(2) the kidnap victims were killed or died as a consequence of the kidnapping or was raped, or subjected
to torture or dehumanizing acts. Both of these qualifying circumstances are alleged in the information and
proven during trial.
As testified to by Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San, appellants and their cohorts demanded the amount
of P5 million for the release of Chua Ong Pong Sim and Raymond. In fact, Yao San went to the Usan
dumpsite, Litex Road, Fairview, Quezon City, to hand over the ransom money to appellants and their
cohorts, but the latter did not show up. It was also apparent that Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond were
killed or died during their captivity. Yao San declared that appellants and their cohorts called up and told
him that they would kill Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond who were still under their custody, because
they heard the radio report that the incident was already known to the police. True to their threats, the
corpses of Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond were later found dumped in La Mesa Dam. Their respective
death certificates show that they died of asphyxia by strangulation.
Withal, the death penalty cannot be imposed on the appellants in view of the passage of Republic Act No.
9346 on 24 June 2006 prohibiting the imposition of death penalty in the Philippines. In accordance with
Sections 2 and 3 thereof, the penalty that should be meted out to the appellants is reclusion perpetua
without the possibility of parole. The Court of Appeals, therefore, acted accordingly in imposing the
penalty of reclusion perpetua without the possibility of parole on each of the appellants.
The Court of Appeals was also correct in ordering appellants to jointly and severally pay civil indemnity
and exemplary damages to the Yao family. Nonetheless, their corresponding amounts should be modified.
In People v. Quiachon,110 we explained that even if the death penalty was not to be imposed on accused
because of the prohibition in Republic Act No. 9346, the civil indemnity of P75,000.00 was still proper, as
the said award was not dependent on the actual imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that
qualifying circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended the commission of the
offense. As earlier stated, both the qualifying circumstances of demand for ransom and the double killing

or death of two of the kidnap victims were alleged in the information and proven during trial. Thus, for the
twin deaths of Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond, their heirs (Yao San, Robert, Lenny, Matthew and
Charlene) are entitled to a total amount of P150,000.00 as civil indemnity. Exemplary damages are
imposed by way of example or correction for the public good. 111 In criminal offenses, exemplary damages
may be recovered when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances, whether
ordinary or qualifying.112 Since both the qualifying circumstances of demand for ransom and the killing or
death of two of the kidnap victims (Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond) while in captivity were alleged in
the information and proven during trial, and in order to deter others from committing the same despicable
acts, the award of exemplary damages is proper. The total amount of P100,000.00 as exemplary damages
should be modified. In several cases,113 we awarded an amount of P100,000.00 to each of the kidnap
victims. As in this case, the amount of P100,000.00 as exemplary damages should be awarded each to Yao
San, Robert, Lenny, Matthew, Charlene, Abagatnan and Ortea. This makes the total amount of exemplary
damages add up to P700,000.00.
The appellate court aptly held that the award of moral damages is warranted. Under Article 2217 of the
New Civil Code, moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
wounded feelings, moral shock and similar injury. Article 2219 of the same Code provides that moral
damages may be recovered in cases of illegal detention. There is no doubt that each member of the Yao
family suffered physical and/or psychological trauma because of the ordeal, especially because two of the
family members were ruthlessly killed during their captivity. Pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, 114 Yao
San, Robert, Lenny, Matthew, Charlene, Abagatnan and Ortea should each receive the amount
of P100,000.00 as moral damages. Per computation, the total amount of moral damages is P700,000.00
and not P500,000.00 as fixed by the RTC and the Court of Appeals.
Finally, we observed that the RTC and the Court of Appeals denominated the crime committed by
appellants in the present case as the special complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with double
homicide since two of the kidnap victims were killed or died during the kidnapping. The word "double"
should be deleted therein. Regardless of the number of killings or deaths that occurred as a consequence of
the kidnapping, the appropriate denomination of the crime should be the special complex crime of
kidnapping for ransom with homicide.
WHEREFORE, the Decision, dated 14 August 2006, and Resolution, dated 18 October 2006, of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02301 is hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the total amount of civil
indemnity is P150,000.00; (2) the total amount of exemplary damages is P700,000.00; (3) the total amount of moral
damages is P700,000.00; and (4) the appropriate denomination of the crime committed by appellants is the special
complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide.SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 151258
February 1, 2012
ARTEMIO
VILLAREAL, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 154954
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
The HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ANTONIO MARIANO ALMEDA, DALMACIO LIM,
Jr., JUNEL ANTHONY AMA, ERNESTO JOSE MONTECILLO, VINCENT TECSON, ANTONIO
GENERAL, SANTIAGO RANADA III, NELSON VICTORINO, JAIME MARIA FLORES II,

ZOSIMO MENDOZA, MICHAEL MUSNGI, VICENTE VERDADERO, ETIENNE GUERRERO,

JUDE FERNANDEZ, AMANTE PURISIMA II, EULOGIO SABBAN, PERCIVAL BRIGOLA,
PAUL ANGELO SANTOS, JONAS KARL B. PEREZ, RENATO BANTUG, JR., ADEL ABAS,
JOSEPH LLEDO, and RONAN DE GUZMAN, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 155101
FIDELITO
DIZON, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080
GERARDA
H.
VILLA, Petitioner,
vs.
MANUEL LORENZO ESCALONA II, MARCUS JOEL CAPELLAN RAMOS, CRISANTO CRUZ
SARUCA, Jr., and ANSELMO ADRIANO, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
The public outrage over the death of Leonardo "Lenny" Villa the victim in this case on 10 February
1991 led to a very strong clamor to put an end to hazing. 1 Due in large part to the brave efforts of his
mother, petitioner Gerarda Villa, groups were organized, condemning his senseless and tragic death. This
widespread condemnation prompted Congress to enact a special law, which became effective in 1995, that
would criminalize hazing.2 The intent of the law was to discourage members from making hazing a
requirement for joining their sorority, fraternity, organization, or association. 3 Moreover, the law was
meant to counteract the exculpatory implications of "consent" and "initial innocent act" in the conduct of
initiation rites by making the mere act of hazing punishable or mala prohibita.4
Sadly, the Lenny Villa tragedy did not discourage hazing activities in the country. 5 Within a year of his
death, six more cases of hazing-related deaths emerged those of Frederick Cahiyang of the University of
Visayas in Cebu; Raul Camaligan of San Beda College; Felipe Narne of Pamantasan ng Araullo in
Cabanatuan City; Dennis Cenedoza of the Cavite Naval Training Center; Joselito Mangga of the
Philippine Merchant Marine Institute; and Joselito Hernandez of the University of the Philippines in
Baguio City.6
Although courts must not remain indifferent to public sentiments, in this case the general condemnation of
a hazing-related death, they are still bound to observe a fundamental principle in our criminal justice
system "[N]o act constitutes a crime unless it is made so by law." 7 Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine
lege. Even if an act is viewed by a large section of the populace as immoral or injurious, it cannot be
considered a crime, absent any law prohibiting its commission. As interpreters of the law, judges are called
upon to set aside emotion, to resist being swayed by strong public sentiments, and to rule strictly based on
the elements of the offense and the facts allowed in evidence.
Before the Court are the consolidated cases docketed as G.R. No. 151258 (Villareal v. People), G.R. No.
154954 (People v. Court of Appeals), G.R. No. 155101 (Dizon v. People), and G.R. Nos. 178057 and
178080 (Villa v. Escalona).
Facts
The pertinent facts, as determined by the Court of Appeals (CA) 8 and the trial court,9 are as follows:
In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University School of Law
signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity). They were Caesar
"Bogs" Asuncion, Samuel "Sam" Belleza, Bienvenido "Bien" Marquez III, Roberto Francis "Bert" Navera,
Geronimo "Randy" Recinto, Felix Sy, Jr., and Leonardo "Lenny" Villa (neophytes).
On the night of 8 February 1991, the neophytes were met by some members of the Aquila Fraternity
(Aquilans) at the lobby of the Ateneo Law School. They all proceeded to Rufos Restaurant to have dinner.
Afterwards, they went to the house of Michael Musngi, also an Aquilan, who briefed the neophytes on
what to expect during the initiation rites. The latter were informed that there would be physical beatings,
and that they could quit at any time. Their initiation rites were scheduled to last for three days. After their
"briefing," they were brought to the Almeda Compound in Caloocan City for the commencement of their
initiation.
Even before the neophytes got off the van, they had already received threats and insults from the Aquilans.
As soon as the neophytes alighted from the van and walked towards the pelota court of the Almeda
compound, some of the Aquilans delivered physical blows to them. The neophytes were then subjected to
traditional forms of Aquilan "initiation rites." These rites included the "Indian Run," which required the

neophytes to run a gauntlet of two parallel rows of Aquilans, each row delivering blows to the neophytes;
the "Bicol Express," which obliged the neophytes to sit on the floor with their backs against the wall and
their legs outstretched while the Aquilans walked, jumped, or ran over their legs; the "Rounds," in which
the neophytes were held at the back of their pants by the "auxiliaries" (the Aquilans charged with the duty
of lending assistance to neophytes during initiation rites), while the latter were being hit with fist blows on
their arms or with knee blows on their thighs by two Aquilans; and the "Auxies Privilege Round," in
which the auxiliaries were given the opportunity to inflict physical pain on the neophytes. During this
time, the neophytes were also indoctrinated with the fraternity principles. They survived their first day of
initiation.
On the morning of their second day 9 February 1991 the neophytes were made to present comic plays
and to play rough basketball. They were also required to memorize and recite the Aquila Fraternitys
principles. Whenever they would give a wrong answer, they would be hit on their arms or legs. Late in the
afternoon, the Aquilans revived the initiation rites proper and proceeded to torment them physically and
psychologically. The neophytes were subjected to the same manner of hazing that they endured on the first
day of initiation. After a few hours, the initiation for the day officially ended.
After a while, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity members 10 Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) and Artemio
Villareal (Villareal) demanded that the rites be reopened. The head of initiation rites, Nelson Victorino
(Victorino), initially refused. Upon the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, however, he reopened the
initiation rites. The fraternity members, including Dizon and Villareal, then subjected the neophytes to
"paddling" and to additional rounds of physical pain. Lenny received several paddle blows, one of which
was so strong it sent him sprawling to the ground. The neophytes heard him complaining of intense pain
and difficulty in breathing. After their last session of physical beatings, Lenny could no longer walk. He
had to be carried by the auxiliaries to the carport. Again, the initiation for the day was officially ended,
and the neophytes started eating dinner. They then slept at the carport.
After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lennys shivering and incoherent
mumblings. Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed these rumblings, as they thought he was just
overacting. When they realized, though, that Lenny was really feeling cold, some of the Aquilans started
helping him. They removed his clothes and helped him through a sleeping bag to keep him warm. When
his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was pronounced dead on arrival.
Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the following 35 Aquilans:
In Criminal Case No. C-38340(91)
1. Fidelito Dizon (Dizon)
2. Artemio Villareal (Villareal)
3. Efren de Leon (De Leon)
4. Vincent Tecson (Tecson)
5. Junel Anthony Ama (Ama)
6. Antonio Mariano Almeda (Almeda)
7. Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug)
8. Nelson Victorino (Victorino)
9. Eulogio Sabban (Sabban)
10. Joseph Lledo (Lledo)
11. Etienne Guerrero (Guerrero)
12. Michael Musngi (Musngi)
13. Jonas Karl Perez (Perez)
14. Paul Angelo Santos (Santos)
15. Ronan de Guzman (De Guzman)
16. Antonio General (General)
17. Jaime Maria Flores II (Flores)
18. Dalmacio Lim, Jr. (Lim)
19. Ernesto Jose Montecillo (Montecillo)
20. Santiago Ranada III (Ranada)
21. Zosimo Mendoza (Mendoza)
22. Vicente Verdadero (Verdadero)
23. Amante Purisima II (Purisima)
24. Jude Fernandez (J. Fernandez)
25. Adel Abas (Abas)
26. Percival Brigola (Brigola)
In Criminal Case No. C-38340

1. Manuel Escalona II (Escalona)

2. Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca)
3. Anselmo Adriano (Adriano)
4. Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos)
5. Reynaldo Concepcion (Concepcion)
6. Florentino Ampil (Ampil)
7. Enrico de Vera III (De Vera)
8. Stanley Fernandez (S. Fernandez)
9. Noel Cabangon (Cabangon)
Twenty-six of the accused Aquilans in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) were jointly tried.11 On the other
hand, the trial against the remaining nine accused in Criminal Case No. C-38340 was held in abeyance due
to certain matters that had to be resolved first.12
On 8 November 1993, the trial court rendered judgment in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91), holding the
26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide, penalized with reclusion temporal
under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. 13 A few weeks after the trial court rendered its judgment, or
on 29 November 1993, Criminal Case No. C-38340 against the remaining nine accused commenced
anew.14
On 10 January 2002, the CA in (CA-G.R. No. 15520)15 set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial
court in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) and modified the criminal liability of each of the accused
according to individual participation. Accused De Leon had by then passed away, so the following
Decision applied only to the remaining 25 accused, viz:
1. Nineteen of the accused-appellants Victorino, Sabban, Lledo, Guerrero, Musngi, Perez, De
Guzman, Santos, General, Flores, Lim, Montecillo, Ranada, Mendoza, Verdadero, Purisima,
Fernandez, Abas, and Brigola (Victorino et al.) were acquitted, as their individual guilt was
not established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
2. Four of the accused-appellants Vincent Tecson, Junel Anthony Ama, Antonio Mariano
Almeda, and Renato Bantug, Jr. (Tecson et al.) were found guilty of the crime of slight
physical injuries and sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor. They were also ordered to jointly
pay the heirs of the victim the sum of P30,000 as indemnity.
3. Two of the accused-appellants Fidelito Dizon and Artemio Villareal were found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code. Having found no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the CA sentenced them to an
indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor to 17 years of reclusion temporal. They
were also ordered to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of Lenny Villa in the sum
of P 50,000 and to pay the additional amount of P 1,000,000 by way of moral damages.
On 5 August 2002, the trial court in Criminal Case No. 38340 dismissed the charge against accused
Concepcion on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial. 16 Meanwhile, on different dates between
the years 2003 and 2005, the trial court denied the respective Motions to Dismiss of accused Escalona,
Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.17 On 25 October 2006, the CA in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 89060 &
9015318 reversed the trial courts Orders and dismissed the criminal case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca,
and Adriano on the basis of violation of their right to speedy trial.19
From the aforementioned Decisions, the five (5) consolidated Petitions were individually brought before
this Court.
G.R. No. 151258 Villareal v. People
The instant case refers to accused Villareals Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. The Petition
raises two reversible errors allegedly committed by the CA in its Decision dated 10 January 2002 in CAG.R. No. 15520 first, denial of due process; and, second, conviction absent proof beyond reasonable
doubt.20
While the Petition was pending before this Court, counsel for petitioner Villareal filed a Notice of Death
of Party on 10 August 2011. According to the Notice, petitioner Villareal died on 13 March 2011. Counsel
thus asserts that the subject matter of the Petition previously filed by petitioner does not survive the death
of the accused.
G.R. No. 155101 Dizon v. People
Accused Dizon filed a Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari, questioning the CAs Decision dated 10
January 2002 and Resolution dated 30 August 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520. 21 Petitioner sets forth two
main issues first, that he was denied due process when the CA sustained the trial courts forfeiture of his
right to present evidence; and, second, that he was deprived of due process when the CA did not apply to
him the same "ratio decidendi that served as basis of acquittal of the other accused." 22

As regards the first issue, the trial court made a ruling, which forfeited Dizons right to present evidence
during trial. The trial court expected Dizon to present evidence on an earlier date since a co-accused,
Antonio General, no longer presented separate evidence during trial. According to Dizon, his right should
not have been considered as waived because he was justified in asking for a postponement. He argues that
he did not ask for a resetting of any of the hearing dates and in fact insisted that he was ready to present
evidence on the original pre-assigned schedule, and not on an earlier hearing date.
Regarding the second issue, petitioner contends that he should have likewise been acquitted, like the other
accused, since his acts were also part of the traditional initiation rites and were not tainted by evil
motives.23 He claims that the additional paddling session was part of the official activity of the fraternity.
He also points out that one of the neophytes admitted that the chairperson of the initiation rites "decided
that [Lenny] was fit enough to undergo the initiation so Mr. Villareal proceeded to do the
paddling."24 Further, petitioner echoes the argument of the Solicitor General that "the individual blows
inflicted by Dizon and Villareal could not have resulted in Lennys death." 25 The Solicitor General
purportedly averred that, "on the contrary, Dr. Arizala testified that the injuries suffered by Lenny could
not be considered fatal if taken individually, but if taken collectively, the result is the violent death of the
victim."26
Petitioner then counters the finding of the CA that he was motivated by ill will. He claims that Lennys
father could not have stolen the parking space of Dizons father, since the latter did not have a car, and
their fathers did not work in the same place or office. Revenge for the loss of the parking space was the
alleged ill motive of Dizon. According to petitioner, his utterances regarding a stolen parking space were
only part of the "psychological initiation." He then cites the testimony of Lennys co-neophyte witness
Marquez who admitted knowing "it was not true and that he was just making it up." 27
Further, petitioner argues that his alleged motivation of ill will was negated by his show of concern for
Villa after the initiation rites. Dizon alludes to the testimony of one of the neophytes, who mentioned that
the former had kicked the leg of the neophyte and told him to switch places with Lenny to prevent the
latters chills. When the chills did not stop, Dizon, together with Victorino, helped Lenny through a
sleeping bag and made him sit on a chair. According to petitioner, his alleged ill motivation is contradicted
by his manifestation of compassion and concern for the victims well-being.
G.R. No. 154954 People v. Court of Appeals
This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 seeks the reversal of the CAs Decision dated 10 January 2002
and Resolution dated 30 August 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520, insofar as it acquitted 19 (Victorino et al.)
and convicted 4 (Tecson et al.) of the accused Aquilans of the lesser crime of slight physical
injuries.28 According to the Solicitor General, the CA erred in holding that there could have been no
conspiracy to commit hazing, as hazing or fraternity initiation had not yet been criminalized at the time
Lenny died.
In the alternative, petitioner claims that the ruling of the trial court should have been upheld, inasmuch as
it found that there was conspiracy to inflict physical injuries on Lenny. Since the injuries led to the
victims death, petitioner posits that the accused Aquilans are criminally liable for the resulting crime of
homicide, pursuant to Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code. 29 The said article provides: "Criminal liability
shall be incurred [b]y any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended."
Petitioner also argues that the rule on double jeopardy is inapplicable. According to the Solicitor General,
the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in setting aside
the trial courts finding of conspiracy and in ruling that the criminal liability of all the accused must be
based on their individual participation in the commission of the crime.
G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 Villa v. Escalona
Petitioner Villa filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari, praying for the reversal of the CAs
Decision dated 25 October 2006 and Resolution dated 17 May 2007 in CA-G.R. S.P. Nos. 89060 and
90153.30 The Petition involves the dismissal of the criminal charge filed against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca,
and Adriano.
Due to "several pending incidents," the trial court ordered a separate trial for accused Escalona, Saruca,
Adriano, Ramos, Ampil, Concepcion, De Vera, S. Fernandez, and Cabangon (Criminal Case No. C-38340)
to commence after proceedings against the 26 other accused in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) shall have
terminated. On 8 November 1993, the trial court found the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt. As
a result, the proceedings in Criminal Case No. C-38340 involving the nine other co-accused recommenced
on 29 November 1993. For "various reasons," the initial trial of the case did not commence until 28 March
2005, or almost 12 years after the arraignment of the nine accused.

Petitioner Villa assails the CAs dismissal of the criminal case involving 4 of the 9 accused, namely,
Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano. She argues that the accused failed to assert their right to speedy
trial within a reasonable period of time. She also points out that the prosecution cannot be faulted for the
delay, as the original records and the required evidence were not at its disposal, but were still in the
appellate court.
We resolve herein the various issues that we group into five.
Issues
1. Whether the forfeiture of petitioner Dizons right to present evidence constitutes denial of
due process;
2. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it dismissed the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano for
violation of the right of the accused to speedy trial;
3. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, when it set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial court and adjudicated the
liability of each accused according to individual participation;
4. Whether accused Dizon is guilty of homicide; and
5. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it pronounced Tecson, Ama,
Almeda, and Bantug guilty only of slight physical injuries.
Discussion
Resolution on Preliminary Matters
G.R. No. 151258 Villareal v. People
In a Notice dated 26 September 2011 and while the Petition was pending resolution, this Court took note
of counsel for petitioners Notice of Death of Party.
According to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability for personal penalties is totally
extinguished by the death of the convict. In contrast, criminal liability for pecuniary penalties is
extinguished if the offender dies prior to final judgment. The term "personal penalties" refers to the service
of personal or imprisonment penalties,31 while the term "pecuniary penalties" (las pecuniarias) refers to
fines and costs,32 including civil liability predicated on the criminal offense complained of (i.e., civil
liability ex delicto).33 However, civil liability based on a source of obligation other than the delict survives
the death of the accused and is recoverable through a separate civil action.34
Thus, we hold that the death of petitioner Villareal extinguished his criminal liability for both personal and
pecuniary penalties, including his civil liability directly arising from the delict complained of.
Consequently, his Petition is hereby dismissed, and the criminal case against him deemed closed and
terminated.
G.R. No. 155101 (Dizon v. People)
In an Order dated 28 July 1993, the trial court set the dates for the reception of evidence for accusedpetitioner Dizon on the 8th, 15th, and 22nd of September; and the 5th and 12 of October 1993. 35 The
Order likewise stated that "it will not entertain any postponement and that all the accused who have not
yet presented their respective evidence should be ready at all times down the line, with their evidence on
all said dates. Failure on their part to present evidence when required shall therefore be construed as
waiver to present evidence."36
However, on 19 August 1993, counsel for another accused manifested in open court that his client
Antonio General would no longer present separate evidence. Instead, the counsel would adopt the
testimonial evidence of the other accused who had already testified. 37 Because of this development and
pursuant to the trial courts Order that the parties "should be ready at all times down the line," the trial
court expected Dizon to present evidence on the next trial date 25 August 1993 instead of his
originally assigned dates. The original dates were supposed to start two weeks later, or on 8 September
1993.38 Counsel for accused Dizon was not able to present evidence on the accelerated date. To address the
situation, counsel filed a Constancia on 25 August 1993, alleging that he had to appear in a previously
scheduled case, and that he would be ready to present evidence on the dates originally assigned to his
clients.39 The trial court denied the Manifestation on the same date and treated the Constancia as a motion
for postponement, in violation of the three-day-notice rule under the Rules of Court. 40 Consequently, the
trial court ruled that the failure of Dizon to present evidence amounted to a waiver of that right. 41
Accused-petitioner Dizon thus argues that he was deprived of due process of law when the trial court
forfeited his right to present evidence. According to him, the postponement of the 25 August 1993 hearing
should have been considered justified, since his original pre-assigned trial dates were not supposed to start
until 8 September 1993, when he was scheduled to present evidence. He posits that he was ready to
present evidence on the dates assigned to him. He also points out that he did not ask for a resetting of any

of the said hearing dates; that he in fact insisted on being allowed to present evidence on the dates fixed by
the trial court. Thus, he contends that the trial court erred in accelerating the schedule of presentation of
evidence, thereby invalidating the finding of his guilt.
The right of the accused to present evidence is guaranteed by no less than the Constitution itself. 42 Article
III, Section 14(2) thereof, provides that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to be heard by himself and counsel" This constitutional right includes the right to present evidence in
ones defense,43 as well as the right to be present and defend oneself in person at every stage of the
proceedings.44
In Crisostomo v. Sandiganbayan,45 the Sandiganbayan set the hearing of the defenses presentation of
evidence for 21, 22 and 23 June 1995. The 21 June 1995 hearing was cancelled due to "lack of quorum in
the regular membership" of the Sandiganbayans Second Division and upon the agreement of the parties.
The hearing was reset for the next day, 22 June 1995, but Crisostomo and his counsel failed to attend. The
Sandiganbayan, on the very same day, issued an Order directing the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of
Crisostomo and the confiscation of his surety bond. The Order further declared that he had waived his
right to present evidence because of his nonappearance at "yesterdays and todays scheduled hearings." In
ruling against the Order, we held thus:
Under Section 2(c), Rule 114 and Section 1(c), Rule 115 of the Rules of Court, Crisostomos nonappearance during the 22 June 1995 trial was merely a waiver of his right to be present for trial on such
date only and not for the succeeding trial dates
xxx
xxx
xxx
Moreover, Crisostomos absence on the 22 June 1995 hearing should not have been deemed as a waiver of
his right to present evidence. While constitutional rights may be waived, such waiver must be clear and
must be coupled with an actual intention to relinquish the right. Crisostomo did not voluntarily waive in
person or even through his counsel the right to present evidence. The Sandiganbayan imposed the waiver
due to the agreement of the prosecution, Calingayan, and Calingayan's counsel.
In criminal cases where the imposable penalty may be death, as in the present case, the court is called
upon to see to it that the accused is personally made aware of the consequences of a waiver of the right to
present evidence. In fact, it is not enough that the accused is simply warned of the consequences of
another failure to attend the succeeding hearings. The court must first explain to the accused personally in
clear terms the exact nature and consequences of a waiver. Crisostomo was not even forewarned. The
Sandiganbayan simply went ahead to deprive Crisostomo of his right to present evidence without even
allowing Crisostomo to explain his absence on the 22 June 1995 hearing.
Clearly, the waiver of the right to present evidence in a criminal case involving a grave penalty is not
assumed and taken lightly. The presence of the accused and his counsel is indispensable so that the court
could personally conduct a searching inquiry into the waiver x x x.46 (Emphasis supplied)
The trial court should not have deemed the failure of petitioner to present evidence on 25 August 1993 as a
waiver of his right to present evidence. On the contrary, it should have considered the excuse of counsel
justified, especially since counsel for another accused General had made a last-minute adoption of
testimonial evidence that freed up the succeeding trial dates; and since Dizon was not scheduled to testify
until two weeks later. At any rate, the trial court pre-assigned five hearing dates for the reception of
evidence. If it really wanted to impose its Order strictly, the most it could have done was to forfeit one out
of the five days set for Dizons testimonial evidence. Stripping the accused of all his pre-assigned trial
dates constitutes a patent denial of the constitutionally guaranteed right to due process.
Nevertheless, as in the case of an improvident guilty plea, an invalid waiver of the right to present
evidence and be heard does not per se work to vacate a finding of guilt in the criminal case or to enforce
an automatic remand of the case to the trial court. 47 In People v. Bodoso, we ruled that where facts have
adequately been represented in a criminal case, and no procedural unfairness or irregularity has prejudiced
either the prosecution or the defense as a result of the invalid waiver, the rule is that a guilty verdict may
nevertheless be upheld if the judgment is supported beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence on record. 48
We do not see any material inadequacy in the relevant facts on record to resolve the case at bar. Neither
can we see any "procedural unfairness or irregularity" that would substantially prejudice either the
prosecution or the defense as a result of the invalid waiver. In fact, the arguments set forth by accused
Dizon in his Petition corroborate the material facts relevant to decide the matter. Instead, what he is really
contesting in his Petition is the application of the law to the facts by the trial court and the CA. Petitioner
Dizon admits direct participation in the hazing of Lenny Villa by alleging in his Petition that "all actions
of the petitioner were part of the traditional rites," and that "the alleged extension of the initiation rites was
not outside the official activity of the fraternity." 49He even argues that "Dizon did not request for the
extension and he participated only after the activity was sanctioned." 50

For one reason or another, the case has been passed or turned over from one judge or justice to another
at the trial court, at the CA, and even at the Supreme Court. Remanding the case for the reception of the
evidence of petitioner Dizon would only inflict further injustice on the parties. This case has been going
on for almost two decades. Its resolution is long overdue. Since the key facts necessary to decide the case
have already been determined, we shall proceed to decide it.
G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 (Villa v. Escalona)
Petitioner Villa argues that the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano should not have been
dismissed, since they failed to assert their right to speedy trial within a reasonable period of time. She
points out that the accused failed to raise a protest during the dormancy of the criminal case against them,
and that they asserted their right only after the trial court had dismissed the case against their co-accused
Concepcion. Petitioner also emphasizes that the trial court denied the respective Motions to Dismiss filed
by Saruca, Escalona, Ramos, and Adriano, because it found that "the prosecution could not be faulted for
the delay in the movement of this case when the original records and the evidence it may require were not
at its disposal as these were in the Court of Appeals." 51
The right of the accused to a speedy trial has been enshrined in Sections 14(2) and 16, Article III of the
1987 Constitution.52 This right requires that there be a trial free from vexatious, capricious or oppressive
delays.53 The right is deemed violated when the proceeding is attended with unjustified postponements of
trial, or when a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the case being tried and for no cause or
justifiable motive.54 In determining the right of the accused to speedy trial, courts should do more than a
mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case. 55 The
conduct of both the prosecution and the defense must be weighed.56 Also to be considered are factors such
as the length of delay, the assertion or non-assertion of the right, and the prejudice wrought upon the
defendant.57
We have consistently ruled in a long line of cases that a dismissal of the case pursuant to the right of the
accused to speedy trial is tantamount to acquittal. 58 As a consequence, an appeal or a reconsideration of
the dismissal would amount to a violation of the principle of double jeopardy. 59 As we have previously
discussed, however, where the dismissal of the case is capricious, certiorari lies. 60 The rule on double
jeopardy is not triggered when a petition challenges the validity of the order of dismissal instead of the
correctness thereof.61 Rather, grave abuse of discretion amounts to lack of jurisdiction, and lack of
jurisdiction prevents double jeopardy from attaching. 62
We do not see grave abuse of discretion in the CAs dismissal of the case against accused Escalona,
Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of the violation of their right to speedy trial. The court held thus:
An examination of the procedural history of this case would reveal that the following factors contributed
to the slow progress of the proceedings in the case below:
xxx
xxx
xxx
5) The fact that the records of the case were elevated to the Court of Appeals and the prosecutions failure
to comply with the order of the court a quo requiring them to secure certified true copies of the same.
xxx
xxx
xxx
While we are prepared to concede that some of the foregoing factors that contributed to the delay of the
trial of the petitioners are justifiable, We nonetheless hold that their right to speedy trial has been utterly
violated in this case x x x.
xxx
xxx
xxx
[T]he absence of the records in the trial court [was] due to the fact that the records of the case were
elevated to the Court of Appeals, and the prosecutions failure to comply with the order of the court a quo
requiring it to secure certified true copies of the same. What is glaring from the records is the fact that as
early as September 21, 1995, the court a quo already issued an Order requiring the prosecution, through
the Department of Justice, to secure the complete records of the case from the Court of Appeals. The
prosecution did not comply with the said Order as in fact, the same directive was repeated by the court a
quo in an Order dated December 27, 1995. Still, there was no compliance on the part of the prosecution. It
is not stated when such order was complied with. It appears, however, that even until August 5, 2002, the
said records were still not at the disposal of the trial court because the lack of it was made the basis of the
said court in granting the motion to dismiss filed by co-accused Concepcion x x x.
xxx
xxx
xxx
It is likewise noticeable that from December 27, 1995, until August 5, 2002, or for a period of almost
seven years, there was no action at all on the part of the court a quo. Except for the pleadings filed by both
the prosecution and the petitioners, the latest of which was on January 29, 1996, followed by petitioner
Sarucas motion to set case for trial on August 17, 1998 which the court did not act upon, the case

remained dormant for a considerable length of time. This prolonged inactivity whatsoever is precisely the
kind of delay that the constitution frowns upon x x x.63(Emphasis supplied)
This Court points out that on 10 January 1992, the final amended Information was filed against Escalona,
Ramos, Saruca, Ampil, S. Fernandez, Adriano, Cabangon, Concepcion, and De Vera. 64 On 29 November
1993, they were all arraigned.65 Unfortunately, the initial trial of the case did not commence until 28
March 2005 or almost 12 years after arraignment.66
As illustrated in our ruling in Abardo v. Sandiganbayan, the unexplained interval or inactivity of the
Sandiganbayan for close to five years since the arraignment of the accused amounts to an unreasonable
delay in the disposition of cases a clear violation of the right of the accused to a speedy disposition of
cases.67 Thus, we held:
The delay in this case measures up to the unreasonableness of the delay in the disposition of cases in
Angchangco, Jr. vs. Ombudsman, where the Court found the delay of six years by the Ombudsman in
resolving the criminal complaints to be violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right to a speedy
disposition of cases; similarly, in Roque vs. Office of the Ombudsman, where the Court held that the delay
of almost six years disregarded the Ombudsman's duty to act promptly on complaints before him; and in
Cervantes vs. Sandiganbayan, where the Court held that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion
in not quashing the information which was filed six years after the initiatory complaint was filed and
thereby depriving petitioner of his right to a speedy disposition of the case. So it must be in the instant
case, where the reinvestigation by the Ombudsman has dragged on for a decade already. 68 (Emphasis
supplied)
From the foregoing principles, we affirm the ruling of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 89060 that accused
Escalona et al.s right to speedy trial was violated. Since there is nothing in the records that would show
that the subject of this Petition includes accused Ampil, S. Fernandez, Cabangon, and De Vera, the effects
of this ruling shall be limited to accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.
G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals)
The rule on double jeopardy is one of the pillars of our criminal justice system. It dictates that when a
person is charged with an offense, and the case is terminated either by acquittal or conviction or in any
other manner without the consent of the accused the accused cannot again be charged with the same or
an identical offense.69 This principle is founded upon the law of reason, justice and conscience. 70 It is
embodied in the civil law maxim non bis in idem found in the common law of England and undoubtedly in
every system of jurisprudence.71 It found expression in the Spanish Law, in the Constitution of the United
States, and in our own Constitution as one of the fundamental rights of the citizen,72 viz:
Article III Bill of Rights
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is
punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act.
Rule 117, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, which implements this particular constitutional right, provides
as follows:73
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. When an accused has been convicted or
acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a
court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in
form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction
or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense
charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.
The rule on double jeopardy thus prohibits the state from appealing the judgment in order to reverse the
acquittal or to increase the penalty imposed either through a regular appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court or through an appeal by certiorari on pure questions of law under Rule 45 of the same Rules. 74 The
requisites for invoking double jeopardy are the following: (a) there is a valid complaint or information; (b)
it is filed before a competent court; (c) the defendant pleaded to the charge; and (d) the defendant was
acquitted or convicted, or the case against him or her was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the
defendants express consent.75
As we have reiterated in People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, "[a] verdict of acquittal is immediately
final and a reexamination of the merits of such acquittal, even in the appellate courts, will put the accused
in jeopardy for the same offense. The finality-of-acquittal doctrine has several avowed purposes.
Primarily, it prevents the State from using its criminal processes as an instrument of harassment to wear
out the accused by a multitude of cases with accumulated trials. It also serves the additional purpose of
precluding the State, following an acquittal, from successively retrying the defendant in the hope of

securing a conviction. And finally, it prevents the State, following conviction, from retrying the defendant
again in the hope of securing a greater penalty." 76 We further stressed that "an acquitted defendant is
entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal." 77
This prohibition, however, is not absolute. The state may challenge the lower courts acquittal of the
accused or the imposition of a lower penalty on the latter in the following recognized exceptions: (1)
where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, tantamount to a
deprivation of due process;78 (2) where there is a finding of mistrial;79 or (3) where there has been a grave
abuse of discretion.80
The third instance refers to this Courts judicial power under Rule 65 to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the government.81 Here, the party asking for the review must show the presence of a
whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; a patent and gross abuse
of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed
by law or to act in contemplation of law; an exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion and hostility; 82 or a blatant abuse of authority to a point so grave and so severe as to
deprive the court of its very power to dispense justice. 83 In such an event, the accused cannot be
considered to be at risk of double jeopardy.84
The Solicitor General filed a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari, which seeks the reversal of (1) the acquittal of
Victorino et al. and (2) the conviction of Tecson et al. for the lesser crime of slight physical injuries, both
on the basis of a misappreciation of facts and evidence. According to the Petition, "the decision of the
Court of Appeals is not in accordance with law because private complainant and petitioner were denied
due process of law when the public respondent completely ignored the a) Position Paper x x x b) the
Motion for Partial Reconsideration x x x and c) the petitioners Comment x x x." 85 Allegedly, the CA
ignored evidence when it adopted the theory of individual responsibility; set aside the finding of
conspiracy by the trial court; and failed to apply Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code. 86 The Solicitor
General also assails the finding that the physical blows were inflicted only by Dizon and Villareal, as well
as the appreciation of Lenny Villas consent to hazing.87
In our view, what the Petition seeks is that we reexamine, reassess, and reweigh the probative value of the
evidence presented by the parties.88 In People v. Maquiling, we held that grave abuse of discretion cannot
be attributed to a court simply because it allegedly misappreciated the facts and the evidence. 89 Mere
errors of judgment are correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, and not by an application for a writ of certiorari. 90 Therefore, pursuant to the rule on double
jeopardy, we are constrained to deny the Petition contra Victorino et al. the 19 acquitted fraternity
members.
We, however, modify the assailed judgment as regards Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug the four
fraternity members convicted of slight physical injuries.
Indeed, we have ruled in a line of cases that the rule on double jeopardy similarly applies when the state
seeks the imposition of a higher penalty against the accused. 91 We have also recognized, however, that
certiorari may be used to correct an abusive judgment upon a clear demonstration that the lower court
blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice. 92 The
present case is one of those instances of grave abuse of discretion.
In imposing the penalty of slight physical injuries on Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug, the CA reasoned
thus:
Based on the medical findings, it would appear that with the exclusion of the fatal wounds inflicted by the
accused Dizon and Villareal, the injuries sustained by the victim as a result of the physical punishment
heaped on him were serious in nature. However, by reason of the death of the victim, there can be no
precise means to determine the duration of the incapacity or the medical attendance required. To do so, at
this stage would be merely speculative. In a prosecution for this crime where the category of the offense
and the severity of the penalty depend on the period of illness or incapacity for labor, the length of this
period must likewise be proved beyond reasonable doubt in much the same manner as the same act
charged [People v. Codilla, CA-G.R. No. 4079-R, June 26, 1950]. And when proof of the said period is
absent, the crime committed should be deemed only as slight physical injuries [People v. De los Santos,
CA, 59 O.G. 4393, citing People v. Penesa, 81 Phil. 398]. As such, this Court is constrained to rule that the
injuries inflicted by the appellants, Tecson, Ama, Almeda and Bantug, Jr., are only slight and not serious,
in nature.93 (Emphasis supplied and citations included)
The appellate court relied on our ruling in People v. Penesa 94 in finding that the four accused should be
held guilty only of slight physical injuries. According to the CA, because of "the death of the victim, there
can be no precise means to determine the duration of the incapacity or medical attendance required." 95 The

reliance on Penesa was utterly misplaced. A review of that case would reveal that the accused therein was
guilty merely of slight physical injuries, because the victims injuries neither caused incapacity for labor
nor required medical attendance.96 Furthermore, he did not die.97 His injuries were not even
serious.98 Since Penesa involved a case in which the victim allegedly suffered physical injuries and not
death, the ruling cited by the CA was patently inapplicable.
On the contrary, the CAs ultimate conclusion that Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug were liable merely
for slight physical injuries grossly contradicts its own findings of fact. According to the court, the four
accused "were found to have inflicted more than the usual punishment undertaken during such initiation
rites on the person of Villa." 99 It then adopted the NBI medico-legal officers findings that the antecedent
cause of Lenny Villas death was the "multiple traumatic injuries" he suffered from the initiation
rites.100 Considering that the CA found that the "physical punishment heaped on [Lenny Villa was] serious
in nature,"101 it was patently erroneous for the court to limit the criminal liability to slight physical injuries,
which is a light felony.
Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code dictates that the perpetrator shall be liable for the consequences of
an act, even if its result is different from that intended. Thus, once a person is found to have committed an
initial felonious act, such as the unlawful infliction of physical injuries that results in the death of the
victim, courts are required to automatically apply the legal framework governing the destruction of life.
This rule is mandatory, and not subject to discretion.
The CAs application of the legal framework governing physical injuries punished under Articles 262 to
266 for intentional felonies and Article 365 for culpable felonies is therefore tantamount to a whimsical,
capricious, and abusive exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction. According to the Revised
Penal Code, the mandatory and legally imposable penalty in case the victim dies should be based on the
framework governing the destruction of the life of a person, punished under Articles 246 to 261 for
intentional felonies and Article 365 for culpable felonies, and not under the aforementioned provisions.
We emphasize that these two types of felonies are distinct from and legally inconsistent with each other, in
that the accused cannot be held criminally liable for physical injuries when actual death occurs. 102
Attributing criminal liability solely to Villareal and Dizon as if only their acts, in and of themselves,
caused the death of Lenny Villa is contrary to the CAs own findings. From proof that the death of the
victim was the cumulative effect of the multiple injuries he suffered, 103 the only logical conclusion is that
criminal responsibility should redound to all those who have been proven to have directly participated in
the infliction of physical injuries on Lenny. The accumulation of bruising on his body caused him to suffer
cardiac arrest. Accordingly, we find that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in finding Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug criminally liable for slight physical
injuries. As an allowable exception to the rule on double jeopardy, we therefore give due course to the
Petition in G.R. No. 154954.
Resolution on Ultimate Findings
According to the trial court, although hazing was not (at the time) punishable as a crime, the intentional
infliction of physical injuries on Villa was nonetheless a felonious act under Articles 263 to 266 of the
Revised Penal Code. Thus, in ruling against the accused, the court a quo found that pursuant to Article
4(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the accused fraternity members were guilty of homicide, as it was the
direct, natural and logical consequence of the physical injuries they had intentionally inflicted. 104
The CA modified the trial courts finding of criminal liability. It ruled that there could have been no
conspiracy since the neophytes, including Lenny Villa, had knowingly consented to the conduct of hazing
during their initiation rites. The accused fraternity members, therefore, were liable only for the
consequences of their individual acts. Accordingly, 19 of the accused Victorino et al. were acquitted; 4
of them Tecson et al. were found guilty of slight physical injuries; and the remaining 2 Dizon and
Villareal were found guilty of homicide.
The issue at hand does not concern a typical criminal case wherein the perpetrator clearly commits a
felony in order to take revenge upon, to gain advantage over, to harm maliciously, or to get even with, the
victim. Rather, the case involves an ex ante situation in which a man driven by his own desire to join a
society of men pledged to go through physically and psychologically strenuous admission rituals, just so
he could enter the fraternity. Thus, in order to understand how our criminal laws apply to such situation
absent the Anti-Hazing Law, we deem it necessary to make a brief exposition on the underlying concepts
shaping intentional felonies, as well as on the nature of physical and psychological initiations widely
known as hazing.
Intentional Felony and Conspiracy
Our Revised Penal Code belongs to the classical school of thought. 105 The classical theory posits that a
human person is essentially a moral creature with an absolute free will to choose between good and

evil.106 It asserts that one should only be adjudged or held accountable for wrongful acts so long as free
will appears unimpaired.107The basic postulate of the classical penal system is that humans are rational and
calculating beings who guide their actions with reference to the principles of pleasure and pain. 108 They
refrain from criminal acts if threatened with punishment sufficient to cancel the hope of possible gain or
advantage in committing the crime. 109 Here, criminal liability is thus based on the free will and moral
blame of the actor.110 The identity of mens rea defined as a guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or
criminal intent is the predominant consideration. 111 Thus, it is not enough to do what the law
prohibits.112 In order for an intentional felony to exist, it is necessary that the act be committed by means
of dolo or "malice."113
The term "dolo" or "malice" is a complex idea involving the elements of freedom, intelligence, and
intent.114 The first element, freedom, refers to an act done with deliberation and with power to choose
between two things.115The second element, intelligence, concerns the ability to determine the morality of
human acts, as well as the capacity to distinguish between a licit and an illicit act. 116 The last element,
intent, involves an aim or a determination to do a certain act.117
The element of intent on which this Court shall focus is described as the state of mind accompanying
an act, especially a forbidden act. 118 It refers to the purpose of the mind and the resolve with which a
person proceeds.119 It does not refer to mere will, for the latter pertains to the act, while intent concerns the
result of the act.120 While motive is the "moving power" that impels one to action for a definite result,
intent is the "purpose" of using a particular means to produce the result. 121 On the other hand, the term
"felonious" means, inter alia, malicious, villainous, and/or proceeding from an evil heart or
purpose.122 With these elements taken together, the requirement of intent in intentional felony must refer to
malicious intent, which is a vicious and malevolent state of mind accompanying a forbidden act. Stated
otherwise, intentional felony requires the existence of dolus malus that the act or omission be done
"willfully," "maliciously," "with deliberate evil intent," and "with malice aforethought." 123 The maxim is
actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea a crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing the
act complained of is innocent.124 As is required of the other elements of a felony, the existence of
malicious intent must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.125
In turn, the existence of malicious intent is necessary in order for conspiracy to attach. Article 8 of the
Revised Penal Code which provides that "conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it" is to be interpreted to refer
only to felonies committed by means of dolo or malice. The phrase "coming to an agreement" connotes
the existence of a prefaced "intent" to cause injury to another, an element present only in intentional
felonies. In culpable felonies or criminal negligence, the injury inflicted on another is unintentional, the
wrong done being simply the result of an act performed without malice or criminal design. 126 Here, a
person performs an initial lawful deed; however, due to negligence, imprudence, lack of foresight, or lack
of skill, the deed results in a wrongful act. 127 Verily, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act, which is a
requisite in conspiracy, is inconsistent with the idea of a felony committed by means of culpa. 128
The presence of an initial malicious intent to commit a felony is thus a vital ingredient in establishing the
commission of the intentional felony of homicide.129 Being mala in se, the felony of homicide requires the
existence of malice or dolo130 immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of injuries. 131 Intent
to kill or animus interficendi cannot and should not be inferred, unless there is proof beyond
reasonable doubt of such intent.132 Furthermore, the victims death must not have been the product of
accident, natural cause, or suicide.133 If death resulted from an act executed without malice or criminal
intent but with lack of foresight, carelessness, or negligence the act must be qualified as reckless or
simple negligence or imprudence resulting in homicide.134
Hazing and other forms of initiation rites
The notion of hazing is not a recent development in our society.135 It is said that, throughout history,
hazing in some form or another has been associated with organizations ranging from military groups to
indigenous tribes.136Some say that elements of hazing can be traced back to the Middle Ages, during which
new students who enrolled in European universities worked as servants for upperclassmen. 137 It is believed
that the concept of hazing is rooted in ancient Greece, 138 where young men recruited into the military were
tested with pain or challenged to demonstrate the limits of their loyalty and to prepare the recruits for
battle.139 Modern fraternities and sororities espouse some connection to these values of ancient Greek
civilization.140 According to a scholar, this concept lends historical legitimacy to a "tradition" or "ritual"
whereby prospective members are asked to prove their worthiness and loyalty to the organization in which
they seek to attain membership through hazing.141
Thus, it is said that in the Greek fraternity system, custom requires a student wishing to join an
organization to receive an invitation in order to be a neophyte for a particular chapter. 142 The neophyte

period is usually one to two semesters long. 143 During the "program," neophytes are required to interview
and to get to know the active members of the chapter; to learn chapter history; to understand the principles
of the organization; to maintain a specified grade point average; to participate in the organizations
activities; and to show dignity and respect for their fellow neophytes, the organization, and its active and
alumni members.144 Some chapters require the initiation activities for a recruit to involve hazing acts
during the entire neophyte stage.145
Hazing, as commonly understood, involves an initiation rite or ritual that serves as prerequisite for
admission to an organization.146 In hazing, the "recruit," "pledge," "neophyte," "initiate," "applicant" or
any other term by which the organization may refer to such a person is generally placed in embarrassing
or humiliating situations, like being forced to do menial, silly, foolish, or other similar tasks or
activities.147 It encompasses different forms of conduct that humiliate, degrade, abuse, or physically
endanger those who desire membership in the organization. 148 These acts usually involve physical or
psychological suffering or injury.149
The concept of initiation rites in the country is nothing new. In fact, more than a century ago, our national
hero Andres Bonifacio organized a secret society named Kataastaasan Kagalanggalangang Katipunan
ng mga Anak ng Bayan (The Highest and Most Venerable Association of the Sons and Daughters of the
Nation).150 The Katipunan, or KKK, started as a small confraternity believed to be inspired by European
Freemasonry, as well as by confraternities or sodalities approved by the Catholic Church. 151 The
Katipunans ideology was brought home to each member through the societys initiation ritual. 152 It is said
that initiates were brought to a dark room, lit by a single point of illumination, and were asked a series
of questions to determine their fitness, loyalty, courage, and resolve. 153 They were made to go
through vigorous trials such as "pagsuot sa isang lungga" or "[pagtalon] sa balon." 154 It would seem
that they were also made to withstand the blow of "pangherong bakal sa pisngi" and to endure a
"matalas na punyal."155 As a final step in the ritual, the neophyte Katipunero was made to sign
membership papers with the his own blood.156
It is believed that the Greek fraternity system was transported by the Americans to the Philippines in the
late 19th century. As can be seen in the following instances, the manner of hazing in the United States was
jarringly similar to that inflicted by the Aquila Fraternity on Lenny Villa.
Early in 1865, upperclassmen at West Point Academy forced the fourth classmen to do exhausting
physical exercises that sometimes resulted in permanent physical damage; to eat or drink unpalatable
foods; and in various ways to humiliate themselves. 157 In 1901, General Douglas MacArthur got involved
in a congressional investigation of hazing at the academy during his second year at West Point. 158
In Easler v. Hejaz Temple of Greenville, decided in 1985, the candidate-victim was injured during the
shriners hazing event, which was part of the initiation ceremonies for Hejaz membership. 159 The ritual
involved what was known as the "mattress-rotating barrel trick." 160 It required each candidate to slide
down an eight to nine-foot-high metal board onto connected mattresses leading to a barrel, over which the
candidate was required to climb.161Members of Hejaz would stand on each side of the mattresses and
barrel and fun-paddle candidates en route to the barrel.162
In a video footage taken in 1991, U.S. Marine paratroopers in Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, were seen
performing a ceremony in which they pinned paratrooper jump wings directly onto the neophyte
paratroopers chests.163 The victims were shown writhing and crying out in pain as others pounded the
spiked medals through the shirts and into the chests of the victims.164
In State v. Allen, decided in 1995, the Southeast Missouri State University chapter of Kappa Alpha Psi
invited male students to enter into a pledgeship program. 165 The fraternity members subjected the pledges
to repeated physical abuse including repeated, open-hand strikes at the nape, the chest, and the back;
caning of the bare soles of the feet and buttocks; blows to the back with the use of a heavy book and a
cookie sheet while the pledges were on their hands and knees; various kicks and punches to the body; and
"body slamming," an activity in which active members of the fraternity lifted pledges up in the air and
dropped them to the ground. 166 The fraternity members then put the pledges through a seven-station circle
of physical abuse.167
In Ex Parte Barran, decided in 1998, the pledge-victim went through hazing by fraternity members of the
Kappa Alpha Order at the Auburn University in Alabama. 168 The hazing included the following: (1) having
to dig a ditch and jump into it after it had been filled with water, urine, feces, dinner leftovers, and vomit;
(2) receiving paddlings on the buttocks; (3) being pushed and kicked, often onto walls or into pits and
trash cans; (4) eating foods like peppers, hot sauce, butter, and "yerks" (a mixture of hot sauce,
mayonnaise, butter, beans, and other items); (5) doing chores for the fraternity and its members, such as
cleaning the fraternity house and yard, being designated as driver, and running errands; (6) appearing
regularly at 2 a.m. "meetings," during which the pledges would be hazed for a couple of hours; and (7)

"running the gauntlet," during which the pledges were pushed, kicked, and hit as they ran down a hallway
and descended down a flight of stairs.169
In Lloyd v. Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity, decided in 1999, the victim Sylvester Lloyd was accepted to
pledge at the Cornell University chapter of the Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity.170 He participated in initiation
activities, which included various forms of physical beatings and torture, psychological coercion and
embarrassment.171
In Kenner v. Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity, decided in 2002, the initiate-victim suffered injuries from hazing
activities during the fraternitys initiation rites. 172 Kenner and the other initiates went through
psychological and physical hazing, including being paddled on the buttocks for more than 200 times.173
In Morton v. State, Marcus Jones a university student in Florida sought initiation into the campus
chapter of the Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity during the 2005-06 academic year. 174 The pledges efforts to join
the fraternity culminated in a series of initiation rituals conducted in four nights. Jones, together with other
candidates, was blindfolded, verbally harassed, and caned on his face and buttocks. 175 In these rituals
described as "preliminaries," which lasted for two evenings, he received approximately 60 canings on his
buttocks.176 During the last two days of the hazing, the rituals intensified.177 The pledges sustained roughly
210 cane strikes during the four-night initiation.178 Jones and several other candidates passed out.179
The purported raison dtre behind hazing practices is the proverbial "birth by fire," through which the
pledge who has successfully withstood the hazing proves his or her worth. 180 Some organizations even
believe that hazing is the path to enlightenment. It is said that this process enables the organization to
establish unity among the pledges and, hence, reinforces and ensures the future of the
organization.181 Alleged benefits of joining include leadership opportunities; improved academic
performance; higher self-esteem; professional networking opportunities; and the esprit dcorp associated
with close, almost filial, friendship and common cause.182
Anti-Hazing laws in the U.S.
The first hazing statute in the U.S. appeared in 1874 in response to hazing in the military. 183 The hazing of
recruits and plebes in the armed services was so prevalent that Congress prohibited all forms of military
hazing, harmful or not.184 It was not until 1901 that Illinois passed the first state anti-hazing law,
criminalizing conduct "whereby any one sustains an injury to his [or her] person therefrom." 185
However, it was not until the 1980s and 1990s, due in large part to the efforts of the Committee to Halt
Useless College Killings and other similar organizations, that states increasingly began to enact legislation
prohibiting and/or criminalizing hazing.186 As of 2008, all but six states had enacted criminal or civil
statutes proscribing hazing.187 Most anti-hazing laws in the U.S. treat hazing as a misdemeanor and carry
relatively light consequences for even the most severe situations. 188 Only a few states with anti-hazing
laws consider hazing as a felony in case death or great bodily harm occurs. 189
Under the laws of Illinois, hazing is a Class A misdemeanor, except hazing that results in death or great
bodily harm, which is a Class 4 felony.190 In a Class 4 felony, a sentence of imprisonment shall be for a
term of not less than one year and not more than three years. 191 Indiana criminal law provides that a person
who recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally performs hazing that results in serious bodily injury to a
person commits criminal recklessness, a Class D felony.192
The offense becomes a Class C felony if committed by means of a deadly weapon. 193 As an element of a
Class C felony criminal recklessness resulting in serious bodily injury, death falls under the category
of "serious bodily injury."194 A person who commits a Class C felony is imprisoned for a fixed term of
between two (2) and eight (8) years, with the advisory sentence being four (4) years. 195 Pursuant to
Missouri law, hazing is a Class A misdemeanor, unless the act creates a substantial risk to the life of the
student or prospective member, in which case it becomes a Class C felony.196 A Class C felony provides
for an imprisonment term not to exceed seven years.197
In Texas, hazing that causes the death of another is a state jail felony.198 An individual adjudged guilty of a
state jail felony is punished by confinement in a state jail for any term of not more than two years or not
less than 180 days.199 Under Utah law, if hazing results in serious bodily injury, the hazer is guilty of a
third-degree felony.200 A person who has been convicted of a third-degree felony may be sentenced to
imprisonment for a term not to exceed five years. 201 West Virginia law provides that if the act of hazing
would otherwise be deemed a felony, the hazer may be found guilty thereof and subject to penalties
provided therefor.202 In Wisconsin, a person is guilty of a Class G felony if hazing results in the death of
another.203 A Class G felony carries a fine not to exceed $25,000 or imprisonment not to exceed 10 years,
or both.204
In certain states in the U.S., victims of hazing were left with limited remedies, as there was no hazing
statute.205This situation was exemplified in Ballou v. Sigma Nu General Fraternity, wherein Barry Ballous

family resorted to a civil action for wrongful death, since there was no anti-hazing statute in South
Carolina until 1994.206
The existence of animus interficendi or intent to kill not proven beyond reasonable doubt
The presence of an ex ante situation in this case, fraternity initiation rites does not automatically
amount to the absence of malicious intent or dolus malus. If it is proven beyond reasonable doubt that the
perpetrators were equipped with a guilty mind whether or not there is a contextual background or factual
premise they are still criminally liable for intentional felony.
The trial court, the CA, and the Solicitor General are all in agreement that with the exception of Villareal
and Dizon accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug did not have the animus interficendi or intent to
kill Lenny Villa or the other neophytes. We shall no longer disturb this finding.
As regards Villareal and Dizon, the CA modified the Decision of the trial court and found that the two
accused had the animus interficendi or intent to kill Lenny Villa, not merely to inflict physical injuries on
him. It justified its finding of homicide against Dizon by holding that he had apparently been motivated by
ill will while beating up Villa. Dizon kept repeating that his fathers parking space had been stolen by the
victims father.207 As to Villareal, the court said that the accused suspected the family of Bienvenido
Marquez, one of the neophytes, to have had a hand in the death of Villareals brother. 208 The CA then ruled
as follows:
The two had their own axes to grind against Villa and Marquez. It was very clear that they acted with evil
and criminal intent. The evidence on this matter is unrebutted and so for the death of Villa,
appellants Dizon andVillareal must and should face the consequence of their acts, that is, to be held liable
for the crime of homicide.209(Emphasis supplied)
We cannot subscribe to this conclusion.
The appellate court relied mainly on the testimony of Bienvenido Marquez to determine the existence of
animus interficendi. For a full appreciation of the context in which the supposed utterances were made, the
Court deems it necessary to reproduce the relevant portions of witness Marquezs testimony:
Witness We were brought up into [Michael Musngis] room and we were briefed as to what to expect
during the next three days and we were told the members of the fraternity and their batch and we were
also told about the fraternity song, sir.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Witness We were escorted out of [Michael Musngis] house and we were made to ride a van and we were
brought to another place in Kalookan City which I later found to be the place of Mariano Almeda, sir.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Witness Upon arrival, we were instructed to bow our head down and to link our arms and then the driver
of the van and other members of the Aquilans who were inside left us inside the van, sir.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Witness We heard voices shouted outside the van to the effect, "Villa akin ka," "Asuncion Patay ka" and
the people outside pound the van, rock the van, sir.
Atty. Tadiar Will you please recall in what tone of voice and how strong a voice these remarks uttered
upon your arrival?
Witness Some were almost shouting, you could feel the sense of excitement in their voices, sir.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Atty. Tadiar During all these times that the van was being rocked through and through, what were the
voices or utterances that you heard?
Witness "Villa akin ka," "Asuncion patay ka," "Recinto patay ka sa amin," etc., sir.
Atty. Tadiar And those utterances and threats, how long did they continue during the rocking of the van
which lasted for 5 minutes?
xxx
xxx
xxx
Witness Even after they rocked the van, we still kept on hearing voices, sir.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Atty. Tadiar During the time that this rounds [of physical beating] were being inflicted, was there any
utterances by anybody?
Witness Yes sir. Some were piercing, some were discouraging, and some were encouraging others who
were pounding and beating us, it was just like a fiesta atmosphere, actually some of them enjoyed looking
us being pounded, sir.
Atty. Tadiar Do you recall what were those voices that you heard?
Witness One particular utterance always said was, they asked us whether "matigas pa yan, kayang-kaya pa
niyan."
Atty. Tadiar Do you know who in particular uttered those particular words that you quote?

Witness I cannot particularly point to because there were utterances simultaneously, I could not really pin
point who uttered those words, sir.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Atty. Tadiar Were there any utterances that you heard during the conduct of this Bicol Express?
Witness Yes, sir I heard utterances.
Atty. Tadiar Will you please recall to this Honorable Court what were the utterances that you remember?
Witness For example, one person particularly Boyet Dizon stepped on my thigh, he would say that and I
quote "ito, yung pamilya nito ay pinapatay yung kapatid ko," so that would in turn sort of justifying him in
inflicting more serious pain on me. So instead of just walking, he would jump on my thighs and then after
on was Lenny Villa. He was saying to the effect that "this guy, his father stole the parking space of my
father," sir. So, thats why he inflicted more pain on Villa and that went on, sir.
Atty. Tadiar And you were referring to which particular accused?
Witness Boyet Dizon, sir.
Atty. Tadiar When Boyet Dizon at that particular time was accusing you of having your family have his
brother killed, what was your response?
Witness Of course, I knew sir that it was not true and that he was just making it up sir. So he said that I
knew nothing of that incident. However, he just in fact after the Bicol Express, he kept on uttering those
words/statements so that it would in turn justify him and to give me harder blows, sir.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Atty. Tadiar You mentioned about Dizon in particular mentioning that Lenny Villas father stole the
parking space allotted for his father, do you recall who were within hearing distance when that utterance
was made?
Witness Yes, sir. All of the neophytes heard that utterance, sir.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Witness There were different times made this accusation so there were different people who heard from
time to time, sir.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Atty. Tadiar Can you tell the Honorable Court when was the next accusation against Lenny Villas father
was made?
Witness When we were line up against the wall, Boyet Dizon came near to us and when Lenny Villas
turn, I heard him uttered those statements, sir.
Atty. Tadiar What happened after he made this accusation to Lenny Villas father?
Witness He continued to inflict blows on Lenny Villa.
Atty. Tadiar How were those blows inflicted?
Witness There were slaps and he knelt on Lenny Villas thighs and sometime he stand up and he kicked
his thighs and sometimes jumped at it, sir.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Atty. Tadiar We would go on to the second day but not right now. You mentioned also that accusations
made byDizon "you or your family had his brother killed," can you inform this Honorable Court what
exactly were the accusations that were charged against you while inflicting blows upon you in particular?
Witness While he was inflicting blows upon me, he told me in particular if I knew that his family who had
his brother killed, and he said that his brother was an NPA, sir so I knew that it was just a story that he
made up and I said that I knew nothing about it and he continued inflicting blows on me, sir. And another
incident was when a talk was being given, Dizon was on another part of the pelota court and I was sort of
looking and we saw that he was drinking beer, and he said and I quote: "Marquez, Marquez, ano ang
tinitingin-tingin mo diyan, ikaw yung pamilya mo ang nagpapatay sa aking kapatid, yari ka sa akin," sir.
Atty. Tadiar What else?
Witness Thats all, sir.
Atty. Tadiar And on that first night of February 8, 1991, did ever a doctor or a physician came around as
promised to you earlier?
Witness No, sir.210 (Emphasis supplied)
On cross-examination, witness Bienvenido Marquez testified thus:
Judge Purisima When you testified on direct examination Mr. Marquez, have you stated that there was a
briefing that was conducted immediately before your initiation as regards to what to expect during the
initiation, did I hear you right?
Witness Yes, sir.
Judge Purisima Who did the briefing?
Witness Mr. Michael Musngi, sir and Nelson Victorino.

Judge Purisima Will you kindly tell the Honorable Court what they told you to expect during the
initiation?
Witness They told us at the time we would be brought to a particular place, we would be mocked at, sir.
Judge Purisima So, you expected to be mocked at, ridiculed, humiliated etc., and the likes?
Witness Yes, sir.
Judge Purisima You were also told beforehand that there would be physical contact?
Witness Yes, sir at the briefing.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Witness Yes, sir, because they informed that we could immediately go back to school. All the bruises
would be limited to our arms and legs, sir. So, if we wear the regular school uniforms like long sleeves, it
would be covered actually so we have no thinking that our face would be slapped, sir.
Judge Purisima So, you mean to say that beforehand that you would have bruises on your body but that
will be covered?
Witness Yes, sir.
JudgePurisima So, what kind of physical contact or implements that you expect that would create bruises
to your body?
Witness At that point I am already sure that there would be hitting by a paddling or paddle, sir.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Judge Purisima Now, will you admit Mr. Marquez that much of the initiation procedures is psychological
in nature?
Witness Combination, sir.211 (Emphasis supplied)
xxx
xxx
xxx
Atty. Jimenez The initiation that was conducted did not consist only of physical initiation, meaning body
contact, is that correct?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez Part of the initiation was the so-called psychological initiation, correct?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez And this consisted of making you believe of things calculated to terrify you, scare you,
correct?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez In other words, the initiating masters made belief situation intended to, I repeat, terrify you,
frighten you, scare you into perhaps quitting the initiation, is this correct?
Witness Sometimes sir, yes.
Atty. Jimenez You said on direct that while Mr. Dizon was initiating you, he said or he was supposed to
have said according to you that your family were responsible for the killing of his brother who was an
NPA, do you remember saying that?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez You also said in connection with that statement said to you by Dizon that you did not
believe him because that is not true, correct?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez In other words, he was only psychologizing you perhaps, the purpose as I have mentioned
before, terrifying you, scaring you or frightening you into quitting the initiation, this is correct?
Witness No, sir, perhaps it is one but the main reason, I think, why he was saying those things was
because he wanted to inflict injury.
Atty. Jimenez He did not tell that to you. That is your only perception, correct?
Witness No, sir, because at one point, while he was telling this to Villareal, he was hitting me.
Atty. Jimenez But did you not say earlier that you [were] subjected to the same forms of initiation by all
the initiating masters? You said that earlier, right?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez Are you saying also that the others who jumped on you or kicked you said something
similar as was told to you by Mr. Dizon?
Witness No, sir.
Atty. Jimenez But the fact remains that in the Bicol Express for instance, the masters would run on your
thighs, right?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez This was the regular procedure that was followed by the initiating masters not only on you
but also on the other neophytes?
Witness Yes, sir.

Atty. Jimenez In other words, it is fair to say that whatever forms of initiation was administered by one
master, was also administered by one master on a neophyte, was also administered by another master on
the other neophyte, this is correct?
Witness Yes, sir.212 (Emphasis supplied)
According to the Solicitor General himself, the ill motives attributed by the CA to Dizon and Villareal
were "baseless,"213 since the statements of the accused were "just part of the psychological initiation
calculated to instill fear on the part of the neophytes"; that "[t]here is no element of truth in it as testified
by Bienvenido Marquez"; and that the "harsh words uttered by Petitioner and Villareal are part of
tradition concurred and accepted by all the fraternity members during their initiation rites." 214
We agree with the Solicitor General.
The foregoing testimony of witness Marquez reveals a glaring mistake of substantial proportion on the
part of the CA it mistook the utterances of Dizon for those of Villareal. Such inaccuracy cannot be
tolerated, especially because it was the CAs primary basis for finding that Villarreal had the intent to kill
Lenny Villa, thereby making Villareal guilty of the intentional felony of homicide. To repeat, according to
Bienvenido Marquezs testimony, as reproduced above, it was Dizon who uttered both "accusations"
against Villa and Marquez; Villareal had no participation whatsoever in the specific threats referred to by
the CA. It was "Boyet Dizon [who] stepped on [Marquezs] thigh"; and who told witness Marquez, "[I]to,
yung pamilya nito ay pinapatay yung kapatid ko." It was also Dizon who jumped on Villas thighs while
saying, "[T]his guy, his father stole the parking space of my father." With the testimony clarified, we find
that the CA had no basis for concluding the existence of intent to kill based solely thereon.
As to the existence of animus interficendi on the part of Dizon, we refer to the entire factual milieu and
contextual premise of the incident to fully appreciate and understand the testimony of witness Marquez. At
the outset, the neophytes were briefed that they would be subjected to psychological pressure in order to
scare them. They knew that they would be mocked, ridiculed, and intimidated. They heard fraternity
members shout, "Patay ka, Recinto," "Yari ka, Recinto," "Villa, akin ka," "Asuncion, gulpi ka," "Putang
ina mo, Asuncion," "Putang ina nyo, patay kayo sa amin," or some other words to that effect. 215 While
beating the neophytes, Dizon accused Marquez of the death of the formers purported NPA brother, and
then blamed Lenny Villas father for stealing the parking space of Dizons father. According to the
Solicitor General, these statements, including those of the accused Dizon, were all part of the
psychological initiation employed by the Aquila Fraternity.216
Thus, to our understanding, accused Dizons way of inflicting psychological pressure was through hurling
make-believe accusations at the initiates. He concocted the fictitious stories, so that he could "justify"
giving the neophytes harder blows, all in the context of fraternity initiation and role playing. Even one of
the neophytes admitted that the accusations were untrue and made-up.
The infliction of psychological pressure is not unusual in the conduct of hazing. In fact, during the Senate
deliberations on the then proposed Anti-Hazing Law, former Senator Lina spoke as follows:
Senator Lina. -- so as to capture the intent that we conveyed during the period of interpellations on why
we included the phrase "or psychological pain and suffering."
xxx
xxx
xxx
So that if no direct physical harm is inflicted upon the neophyte or the recruit but the recruit or neophyte is
made to undergo certain acts which I already described yesterday, like playing the Russian roulette
extensively to test the readiness and the willingness of the neophyte or recruit to continue his desire to be a
member of the fraternity, sorority or similar organization or playing and putting a noose on the neck of the
neophyte or recruit, making the recruit or neophyte stand on the ledge of the fourth floor of the building
facing outside, asking him to jump outside after making him turn around several times but the reality is
that he will be made to jump towards the inside portion of the building these are the mental or
psychological tests that are resorted to by these organizations, sororities or fraternities. The doctors who
appeared during the public hearing testified that such acts can result in some mental aberration, that they
can even lead to psychosis, neurosis or insanity. This is what we want to prevent. 217(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, without proof beyond reasonable doubt, Dizons behavior must not be automatically viewed as
evidence of a genuine, evil motivation to kill Lenny Villa. Rather, it must be taken within the context of
the fraternitys psychological initiation. This Court points out that it was not even established whether the
fathers of Dizon and Villa really had any familiarity with each other as would lend credence to the veracity
of Dizons threats. The testimony of Lennys co-neophyte, Marquez, only confirmed this view. According
to Marquez, he "knew it was not true and that [Dizon] was just making it up." 218 Even the trial court did
not give weight to the utterances of Dizon as constituting intent to kill: "[T]he cumulative acts of all the
accused were not directed toward killing Villa, but merely to inflict physical harm as part of the fraternity
initiation rites x x x."219 The Solicitor General shares the same view.

Verily, we cannot sustain the CA in finding the accused Dizon guilty of homicide under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code on the basis of the existence of intent to kill. Animus interficendi cannot and should
not be inferred unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of such intent. 220 Instead, we adopt and
reinstate the finding of the trial court in part, insofar as it ruled that none of the fraternity members had the
specific intent to kill Lenny Villa.221
The existence of animus iniuriandi or malicious intent to injure not proven beyond reasonable doubt
The Solicitor General argues, instead, that there was an intent to inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa.
Echoing the Decision of the trial court, the Solicitor General then posits that since all of the accused
fraternity members conspired to inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa and death ensued, all of them
should be liable for the crime of homicide pursuant to Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code.
In order to be found guilty of any of the felonious acts under Articles 262 to 266 of the Revised Penal
Code,222the employment of physical injuries must be coupled with dolus malus. As an act that is mala in
se, the existence of malicious intent is fundamental, since injury arises from the mental state of the
wrongdoer iniuria ex affectu facientis consistat. If there is no criminal intent, the accused cannot be
found guilty of an intentional felony. Thus, in case of physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code,
there must be a specific animus iniuriandi or malicious intention to do wrong against the physical integrity
or well-being of a person, so as to incapacitate and deprive the victim of certain bodily functions. Without
proof beyond reasonable doubt of the required animus iniuriandi, the overt act of inflicting physical
injuries per se merely satisfies the elements of freedom and intelligence in an intentional felony. The
commission of the act does not, in itself, make a man guilty unless his intentions are.223
Thus, we have ruled in a number of instances224 that the mere infliction of physical injuries, absent
malicious intent, does not make a person automatically liable for an intentional felony. In Bagajo v.
People,225 the accused teacher, using a bamboo stick, whipped one of her students behind her legs and
thighs as a form of discipline. The student suffered lesions and bruises from the corporal punishment. In
reversing the trial courts finding of criminal liability for slight physical injuries, this Court stated thus:
"Independently of any civil or administrative responsibility [w]e are persuaded that she did not do what
she had done with criminal intent the means she actually used was moderate and that she was not
motivated by ill-will, hatred or any malevolent intent." Considering the applicable laws, we then ruled that
"as a matter of law, petitioner did not incur any criminal liability for her act of whipping her pupil." In
People v. Carmen,226 the accused members of the religious group known as the Missionaries of Our Lady
of Fatima under the guise of a "ritual or treatment" plunged the head of the victim into a barrel of
water, banged his head against a bench, pounded his chest with fists, and stabbed him on the side with a
kitchen knife, in order to cure him of "nervous breakdown" by expelling through those means the bad
spirits possessing him. The collective acts of the group caused the death of the victim. Since malicious
intent was not proven, we reversed the trial courts finding of liability for murder under Article 4 of the
Revised Penal Code and instead ruled that the accused should be held criminally liable for reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide under Article 365 thereof.
Indeed, the threshold question is whether the accuseds initial acts of inflicting physical pain on the
neophytes were attended by animus iniuriandi amounting to a felonious act punishable under the Revised
Penal Code, thereby making it subject to Article 4(1) thereof. In People v. Regato, we ruled that malicious
intent must be judged by the action, conduct, and external acts of the accused. 227 What persons do is the
best index of their intention.228 We have also ruled that the method employed, the kind of weapon used,
and the parts of the body on which the injury was inflicted may be determinative of the intent of the
perpetrator.229 The Court shall thus examine the whole contextual background surrounding the death of
Lenny Villa.
Lenny died during Aquilas fraternity initiation rites. The night before the commencement of the rites, they
were briefed on what to expect. They were told that there would be physical beatings, that the whole event
would last for three days, and that they could quit anytime. On their first night, they were subjected to
"traditional" initiation rites, including the "Indian Run," "Bicol Express," "Rounds," and the "Auxies
Privilege Round." The beatings were predominantly directed at the neophytes arms and legs.
In the morning of their second day of initiation, they were made to present comic plays and to play rough
basketball. They were also required to memorize and recite the Aquila Fraternitys principles. Late in the
afternoon, they were once again subjected to "traditional" initiation rituals. When the rituals were
officially reopened on the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, the neophytes were subjected to another
"traditional" ritual paddling by the fraternity.
During the whole initiation rites, auxiliaries were assigned to the neophytes. The auxiliaries protected the
neophytes by functioning as human barriers and shielding them from those who were designated to inflict
physical and psychological pain on the initiates. 230 It was their regular duty to stop foul or excessive

physical blows; to help the neophytes to "pump" their legs in order that their blood would circulate; to
facilitate a rest interval after every physical activity or "round"; to serve food and water; to tell jokes; to
coach the initiates; and to give them whatever they needed.
These rituals were performed with Lennys consent. 231 A few days before the "rites," he asked both his
parents for permission to join the Aquila Fraternity.232 His father knew that Lenny would go through an
initiation process and would be gone for three days.233 The CA found as follows:
It is worth pointing out that the neophytes willingly and voluntarily consented to undergo physical
initiation and hazing. As can be gleaned from the narration of facts, they voluntarily agreed to join the
initiation rites to become members of the Aquila Legis Fraternity. Prior to the initiation, they were given
briefings on what to expect. It is of common knowledge that before admission in a fraternity, the
neophytes will undergo a rite of passage. Thus, they were made aware that traditional methods such as
mocking, psychological tests and physical punishment would take place. They knew that the initiation
would involve beatings and other forms of hazing. They were also told of their right and opportunity to
quit at any time they wanted to. In fact, prosecution witness Navera testified that accused Tecson told him
that "after a week, you can already play basketball." Prosecution witness Marquez for his part, admitted
that he knew that the initiates would be hit "in the arms and legs," that a wooden paddle would be used to
hit them and that he expected bruises on his arms and legs. Indeed, there can be no fraternity initiation
without consenting neophytes.234 (Emphasis supplied)
Even after going through Aquilas grueling traditional rituals during the first day, Lenny continued his
participation and finished the second day of initiation.
Based on the foregoing contextual background, and absent further proof showing clear malicious intent,
we are constrained to rule that the specific animus iniuriandi was not present in this case. Even if the
specific acts of punching, kicking, paddling, and other modes of inflicting physical pain were done
voluntarily, freely, and with intelligence, thereby satisfying the elements of freedom and intelligence in the
felony of physical injuries, the fundamental ingredient of criminal intent was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt. On the contrary, all that was proven was that the acts were done pursuant to tradition.
Although the additional "rounds" on the second night were held upon the insistence of Villareal and
Dizon, the initiations were officially reopened with the consent of the head of the initiation rites; and the
accused fraternity members still participated in the rituals, including the paddling, which were performed
pursuant to tradition. Other than the paddle, no other "weapon" was used to inflict injuries on Lenny. The
targeted body parts were predominantly the legs and the arms. The designation of roles, including the role
of auxiliaries, which were assigned for the specific purpose of lending assistance to and taking care of the
neophytes during the initiation rites, further belied the presence of malicious intent. All those who wished
to join the fraternity went through the same process of "traditional" initiation; there is no proof that Lenny
Villa was specifically targeted or given a different treatment. We stress that Congress itself recognized that
hazing is uniquely different from common crimes.235 The totality of the circumstances must therefore be
taken into consideration.
The underlying context and motive in which the infliction of physical injuries was rooted may also be
determined by Lennys continued participation in the initiation and consent to the method used even after
the first day. The following discussion of the framers of the 1995 Anti-Hazing Law is enlightening:
Senator Guingona. Most of these acts, if not all, are already punished under the Revised Penal Code.
Senator Lina. That is correct, Mr. President.
Senator Guingona. If hazing is done at present and it results in death, the charge would be murder or
homicide.
Senator Lina. That is correct, Mr. President.
Senator Guingona. If it does not result in death, it may be frustrated homicide or serious physical injuries.
Senator Lina. That is correct, Mr. President.
Senator Guingona. Or, if the person who commits sexual abuse does so it can be penalized under rape or
acts of lasciviousness.
Senator Lina. That is correct, Mr. President.
Senator Guingona. So, what is the rationale for making a new offense under this definition of the crime of
hazing?
Senator Lina. To discourage persons or group of persons either composing a sorority, fraternity or any
association from making this requirement of initiation that has already resulted in these specific acts or
results, Mr. President.
That is the main rationale. We want to send a strong signal across the land that no group or association can
require the act of physical initiation before a person can become a member without being held criminally
liable.

xxx
xxx
xxx
Senator Guingona. Yes, but what would be the rationale for that imposition? Because the distinguished
Sponsor has said that he is not punishing a mere organization, he is not seeking the punishment of an
initiation into a club or organization, he is seeking the punishment of certain acts that resulted in death, et
cetera as a result of hazing which are already covered crimes.
The penalty is increased in one, because we would like to discourage hazing, abusive hazing, but it may be
a legitimate defense for invoking two or more charges or offenses, because these very same acts are
already punishable under the Revised Penal Code.
That is my difficulty, Mr. President.
Senator Lina. x x x
Another point, Mr. President, is this, and this is a very telling difference: When a person or group of
persons resort to hazing as a requirement for gaining entry into an organization, the intent to commit a
wrong is not visible or is not present, Mr. President. Whereas, in these specific crimes, Mr. President, let
us say there is death or there is homicide, mutilation, if one files a case, then the intention to commit a
wrong has to be proven. But if the crime of hazing is the basis, what is important is the result from the act
of hazing.
To me, that is the basic difference and that is what will prevent or deter the sororities or fraternities; that
they should really shun this activity called "hazing." Because, initially, these fraternities or sororities do
not even consider having a neophyte killed or maimed or that acts of lasciviousness are even committed
initially, Mr. President.
So, what we want to discourage is the so-called initial innocent act. That is why there is need to institute
this kind of hazing. Ganiyan po ang nangyari. Ang fraternity o ang sorority ay magre-recruit. Wala talaga
silang intensiyong makamatay. Hindi ko na babanggitin at buhay pa iyong kaso. Pero dito sa anim o pito
na namatay nitong nakaraang taon, walang intensiyong patayin talaga iyong neophyte. So, kung
maghihintay pa tayo, na saka lamang natin isasakdal ng murder kung namatay na, ay after the fact ho iyon.
Pero, kung sasabihin natin sa mga kabataan na: "Huwag ninyong gagawin iyong hazing. Iyan ay kasalanan
at kung mamatay diyan, mataas ang penalty sa inyo."
xxx
xxx
xxx
Senator Guingona. I join the lofty motives, Mr. President, of the distinguished Sponsor. But I am again
disturbed by his statement that the prosecution does not have to prove the intent that resulted in the death,
that resulted in the serious physical injuries, that resulted in the acts of lasciviousness or deranged mind.
We do not have to prove the willful intent of the accused in proving or establishing the crime of hazing.
This seems, to me, a novel situation where we create the special crime without having to go into the intent,
which is one of the basic elements of any crime.
If there is no intent, there is no crime. If the intent were merely to initiate, then there is no offense. And
even the distinguished Sponsor admits that the organization, the intent to initiate, the intent to have a new
society or a new club is, per se, not punishable at all. What are punishable are the acts that lead to the
result. But if these results are not going to be proven by intent, but just because there was hazing, I am
afraid that it will disturb the basic concepts of the Revised Penal Code, Mr. President.
Senator Lina. Mr. President, the act of hazing, precisely, is being criminalized because in the context of
what is happening in the sororities and fraternities, when they conduct hazing, no one will admit that their
intention is to maim or to kill. So, we are already criminalizing the fact of inflicting physical pain. Mr.
President, it is a criminal act and we want it stopped, deterred, discouraged.
If that occurs, under this law, there is no necessity to prove that the masters intended to kill or the masters
intended to maim. What is important is the result of the act of hazing. Otherwise, the masters or those who
inflict the physical pain can easily escape responsibility and say, "We did not have the intention to kill.
This is part of our initiation rites. This is normal. We do not have any intention to kill or maim."
This is the lusot, Mr. President. They might as well have been charged therefore with the ordinary crime of
homicide, mutilation, et cetera, where the prosecution will have a difficulty proving the elements if they
are separate offenses.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Senator Guingona. Mr. President, assuming there was a group that initiated and a person died. The charge
is murder. My question is: Under this bill if it becomes a law, would the prosecution have to prove
conspiracy or not anymore?
Senator Lina. Mr. President, if the person is present during hazing x x x
Senator Guingona. The persons are present. First, would the prosecution have to prove conspiracy?
Second, would the prosecution have to prove intent to kill or not?

Senator Lina. No more. As to the second question, Mr. President, if that occurs, there is no need to prove
intent to kill.
Senator Guingona. But the charge is murder.
Senator Lina. That is why I said that it should not be murder. It should be hazing, Mr.
President. 236 (Emphasis supplied)
During a discussion between Senator Biazon and Senator Lina on the issue of whether to include sodomy
as a punishable act under the Anti-Hazing Law, Senator Lina further clarified thus:
Senator Biazon. Mr. President, this Representation has no objection to the inclusion of sodomy as one of
the conditions resulting from hazing as necessary to be punished. However, the act of sodomy can be
committed by two persons with or without consent.
To make it clearer, what is being punished here is the commission of sodomy forced into another
individual by another individual. I move, Mr. President, that sodomy be modified by the phrase "without
consent" for purposes of this section.
Senator Lina. I am afraid, Mr. President, that if we qualify sodomy with the concept that it is only going to
aggravate the crime of hazing if it is done without consent will change a lot of concepts here. Because the
results from hazing aggravate the offense with or without consent. In fact, when a person joins a fraternity,
sorority, or any association for that matter, it can be with or without the consent of the intended victim.
The fact that a person joins a sorority or fraternity with his consent does not negate the crime of hazing.
This is a proposed law intended to protect the citizens from the malpractices that attend initiation which
may have been announced with or without physical infliction of pain or injury, Mr. President. Regardless
of whether there is announcement that there will be physical hazing or whether there is none, and
therefore, the neophyte is duped into joining a fraternity is of no moment. What is important is that there is
an infliction of physical pain.
The bottom line of this law is that a citizen even has to be protected from himself if he joins a fraternity, so
that at a certain point in time, the State, the individual, or the parents of the victim can run after the
perpetrators of the crime, regardless of whether or not there was consent on the part of the victim.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Senator Lina. Mr. President, I understand the position taken by the distinguished Gentleman from Cavite
and Metro Manila. It is correct that society sometimes adopts new mores, traditions, and practices.
In this bill, we are not going to encroach into the private proclivities of some individuals when they do
their acts in private as we do not take a peek into the private rooms of couples. They can do their thing if
they want to make love in ways that are not considered acceptable by the mainstream of society. That is
not something that the State should prohibit.
But sodomy in this case is connected with hazing, Mr. President. Such that the act may even be entered
into with consent. It is not only sodomy. The infliction of pain may be done with the consent of the
neophyte. If the law is passed, that does not make the act of hazing not punishable because the neophyte
accepted the infliction of pain upon himself.
If the victim suffers from serious physical injuries, but the initiator said, "Well, he allowed it upon himself.
He consented to it." So, if we allow that reasoning that sodomy was done with the consent of the victim,
then we would not have passed any law at all. There will be no significance if we pass this bill, because it
will always be a defense that the victim allowed the infliction of pain or suffering. He accepted it as part
of the initiation rites.
But precisely, Mr. President that is one thing that we would want to prohibit. That the defense of consent
will not apply because the very act of inflicting physical pain or psychological suffering is, by itself, a
punishable act. The result of the act of hazing, like death or physical injuries merely aggravates the act
with higher penalties. But the defense of consent is not going to nullify the criminal nature of the act.
So, if we accept the amendment that sodomy can only aggravate the offense if it is committed without
consent of the victim, then the whole foundation of this proposed law will collapse.
Senator Biazon. Thank you, Mr. President.
Senator Lina. Thank you very much.
The President. Is there any objection to the committee amendment? (Silence.) The Chair hears none; the
same is approved.237
(Emphasis supplied)
Realizing the implication of removing the states burden to prove intent, Senator Lina, the principal author
of the Senate Bill, said:
I am very happy that the distinguished Minority Leader brought out the idea of intent or whether there it
is mala inse or mala prohibita. There can be a radical amendment if that is the point that he wants to go to.

If we agree on the concept, then, maybe, we can just make this a special law on hazing. We will not
include this anymore under the Revised Penal Code. That is a possibility. I will not foreclose that
suggestion, Mr. President.238(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, having in mind the potential conflict between the proposed law and the core principle of mala in se
adhered to under the Revised Penal Code, Congress did not simply enact an amendment thereto. Instead, it
created a special law on hazing, founded upon the principle of mala prohibita. This dilemma faced by
Congress is further proof of how the nature of hazing unique as against typical crimes cast a cloud of
doubt on whether society considered the act as an inherently wrong conduct or mala in se at the time. It is
safe to presume that Lennys parents would not have consented 239 to his participation in Aquila Fraternitys
initiation rites if the practice of hazing were considered by them as mala in se.
Furthermore, in Vedaa v. Valencia (1998), we noted through Associate Justice (now retired Chief Justice)
Hilario Davide that "in our nations very recent history, the people have spoken, through Congress, to
deem conduct constitutive of hazing, [an] act[] previously considered harmless by custom, as
criminal."240 Although it may be regarded as a simple obiter dictum, the statement nonetheless shows
recognition that hazing or the conduct of initiation rites through physical and/or psychological suffering
has not been traditionally criminalized. Prior to the 1995 Anti-Hazing Law, there was to some extent a
lacuna in the law; hazing was not clearly considered an intentional felony. And when there is doubt on the
interpretation of criminal laws, all must be resolved in favor of the accused. In dubio pro reo.
For the foregoing reasons, and as a matter of law, the Court is constrained to rule against the trial courts
finding of malicious intent to inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa, there being no proof beyond
reasonable doubt of the existence of malicious intent to inflict physical injuries or animus iniuriandi as
required in mala in se cases, considering the contextual background of his death, the unique nature of
hazing, and absent a law prohibiting hazing.
The accused fraternity members guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean, however, that the accused fraternity
members are ultimately devoid of criminal liability. The Revised Penal Code also punishes felonies that
are committed by means of fault (culpa). According to Article 3 thereof, there is fault when the wrongful
act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
Reckless imprudence or negligence consists of a voluntary act done without malice, from which an
immediate personal harm, injury or material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution
or advertence on the part of the person committing it. 241 In this case, the danger is visible and consciously
appreciated by the actor.242 In contrast, simple imprudence or negligence comprises an act done without
grave fault, from which an injury or material damage ensues by reason of a mere lack of foresight or
skill.243 Here, the threatened harm is not immediate, and the danger is not openly visible. 244
The test245 for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an act is as follows: Would a
prudent man in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed foresee harm to the person
injured as a reasonable consequence of the course about to be pursued? If so, the law imposes on the doer
the duty to take precaution against the mischievous results of the act. Failure to do so constitutes
negligence.246
As we held in Gaid v. People, for a person to avoid being charged with recklessness, the degree of
precaution and diligence required varies with the degree of the danger involved. 247 If, on account of a
certain line of conduct, the danger of causing harm to another person is great, the individual who chooses
to follow that particular course of conduct is bound to be very careful, in order to prevent or avoid damage
or injury.248 In contrast, if the danger is minor, not much care is required. 249 It is thus possible that there are
countless degrees of precaution or diligence that may be required of an individual, "from a transitory
glance of care to the most vigilant effort." 250 The duty of the person to employ more or less degree of care
will depend upon the circumstances of each particular case.251
There was patent recklessness in the hazing of Lenny Villa.
According to the NBI medico-legal officer, Lenny died of cardiac failure secondary to multiple traumatic
injuries.252The officer explained that cardiac failure refers to the failure of the heart to work as a pump and
as part of the circulatory system due to the lack of blood. 253 In the present case, the victims heart could no
longer work as a pumping organ, because it was deprived of its requisite blood and oxygen. 254 The
deprivation was due to the "channeling" of the blood supply from the entire circulatory system including
the heart, arteries, veins, venules, and capillaries to the thigh, leg, and arm areas of Lenny, thus causing
the formation of multiple hematomas or blood clots. 255 The multiple hematomas were wide, thick, and
deep,256 indicating that these could have resulted mainly from injuries sustained by the victim from fist
blows, knee blows, paddles, or the like.257 Repeated blows to those areas caused the blood to gradually
ooze out of the capillaries until the circulating blood became so markedly diminished as to produce

death. 258 The officer also found that the brain, liver, kidney, pancreas, intestines, and all other organs seen
in the abdominals, as well as the thoracic organ in the lungs, were pale due to the lack of blood, which was
redirected to the thighs and forearms. 259 It was concluded that there was nothing in the heart that would
indicate that the victim suffered from a previous cardiac arrest or disease.260
The multiple hematomas or bruises found in Lenny Villas arms and thighs, resulting from repeated blows
to those areas, caused the loss of blood from his vital organs and led to his eventual death. These
hematomas must be taken in the light of the hazing activities performed on him by the Aquila Fraternity.
According to the testimonies of the co-neophytes of Lenny, they were punched, kicked, elbowed, kneed,
stamped on; and hit with different objects on their arms, legs, and thighs. 261 They were also "paddled" at
the back of their thighs or legs; 262 and slapped on their faces.263 They were made to play rough
basketball.264 Witness Marquez testified on Lenny, saying: "[T]inamaan daw sya sa spine." 265 The NBI
medico-legal officer explained that the death of the victim was the cumulative effect of the multiple
injuries suffered by the latter.266 The relevant portion of the testimony is as follows:
Atty. Tadiar Doctor, there was, rather, it was your testimony on various cross examinations of defense
counsels that the injuries that you have enumerated on the body of the deceased Lenny Villa previously
marked as Exhibit "G-1" to "G-14" individually by themselves would not cause the death of the victim.
The question I am going to propound to you is what is the cumulative effect of all of these injuries marked
from Exhibit "G-1" to "G-14"?
Witness All together nothing in concert to cause to the demise of the victim. So, it is not fair for us to
isolate such injuries here because we are talking of the whole body. At the same manner that as a car
would not run minus one (1) wheel. No, the more humane in human approach is to interpret all those
injuries in whole and not in part.267
There is also evidence to show that some of the accused fraternity members were drinking during the
initiation rites.268
Consequently, the collective acts of the fraternity members were tantamount to recklessness, which made
the resulting death of Lenny a culpable felony. It must be remembered that organizations owe to their
initiates a duty of care not to cause them injury in the process. 269 With the foregoing facts, we rule that the
accused are guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. Since the NBI medico-legal officer found
that the victims death was the cumulative effect of the injuries suffered, criminal responsibility redounds
to all those who directly participated in and contributed to the infliction of physical injuries.
It appears from the aforementioned facts that the incident may have been prevented, or at least mitigated,
had the alumni of Aquila Fraternity accused Dizon and Villareal restrained themselves from insisting
on reopening the initiation rites. Although this point did not matter in the end, as records would show that
the other fraternity members participated in the reopened initiation rites having in mind the concept of
"seniority" in fraternities the implication of the presence of alumni should be seen as a point of review in
future legislation. We further note that some of the fraternity members were intoxicated during Lennys
initiation rites. In this light, the Court submits to Congress, for legislative consideration, the amendment of
the Anti-Hazing Law to include the fact of intoxication and the presence of non-resident or alumni
fraternity members during hazing as aggravating circumstances that would increase the applicable
penalties.
It is truly astonishing how men would wittingly or unwittingly impose the misery of hazing and
employ appalling rituals in the name of brotherhood. There must be a better way to establish "kinship." A
neophyte admitted that he joined the fraternity to have more friends and to avail himself of the benefits it
offered, such as tips during bar examinations. 270 Another initiate did not give up, because he feared being
looked down upon as a quitter, and because he felt he did not have a choice. 271 Thus, for Lenny Villa and
the other neophytes, joining the Aquila Fraternity entailed a leap in the dark. By giving consent under the
circumstances, they left their fates in the hands of the fraternity members. Unfortunately, the hands to
which lives were entrusted were barbaric as they were reckless.
Our finding of criminal liability for the felony of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide shall cover
only accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda, Bantug, and Dizon. Had the Anti-Hazing Law been in effect then,
these five accused fraternity members would have all been convicted of the crime of hazing punishable by
reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment).272 Since there was no law prohibiting the act of hazing when
Lenny died, we are constrained to rule according to existing laws at the time of his death. The CA found
that the prosecution failed to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, Victorino et al.s individual participation in
the infliction of physical injuries upon Lenny Villa. 273As to accused Villareal, his criminal liability was
totally extinguished by the fact of his death, pursuant to Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code.
Furthermore, our ruling herein shall be interpreted without prejudice to the applicability of the AntiHazing Law to subsequent cases. Furthermore, the modification of criminal liability from slight physical

injuries to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide shall apply only with respect to accused Almeda,
Ama, Bantug, and Tecson.
The accused liable to pay damages
The CA awarded damages in favor of the heirs of Lenny Villa in the amounts of P 50,000 as civil
indemnity ex delicto and P 1,000,000 as moral damages, to be jointly and severally paid by accused Dizon
and Villareal. It also awarded the amount of P 30,000 as indemnity to be jointly and severally paid by
accused Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson.1wphi1
Civil indemnity ex delicto is automatically awarded for the sole fact of death of the victim. 274 In
accordance with prevailing jurisprudence,275 we sustain the CAs award of indemnity in the amount
of P 50,000.
The heirs of the victim are entitled to actual or compensatory damages, including expenses incurred in
connection with the death of the victim, so long as the claim is supported by tangible
documents.276 Though we are prepared to award actual damages, the Court is prevented from granting
them, since the records are bereft of any evidence to show that actual expenses were incurred or proven
during trial. Furthermore, in the appeal, the Solicitor General does not interpose any claim for actual
damages.277
The heirs of the deceased may recover moral damages for the grief suffered on account of the victims
death.278This penalty is pursuant to Article 2206(3) of the Civil Code, which provides that the "spouse,
legitimate and illegitimate descendants and the ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages
for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased." 279 Thus, we hereby we affirm the CAs award
of moral damages in the amount of P 1,000,000.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 155101 finding petitioner Fidelito Dizon guilty of
homicide is hereby MODIFIED and set aside IN PART. The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954
finding Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson guilty of
the crime of slight physical injuries is also MODIFIED and set aside in part. Instead, Fidelito Dizon,
Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson are found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide defined and penalized under
Article 365 in relation to Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. They are hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate prison term of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum. In addition, accused are ORDERED
jointly and severally to pay the heirs of Lenny Villa civil indemnity ex delicto in the amount of P50,000,
and moral damages in the amount of P 1,000,000, plus legal interest on all damages awarded at the rate of
12% from the date of the finality of this Decision until satisfaction.280 Costs de oficio.
The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954, acquitting Victorino et al., is hereby affirmed. The appealed
Judgments in G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080, dismissing the criminal case filed against Escalona, Ramos,
Saruca, and Adriano, are likewise affirmed. Finally, pursuant to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code,
the Petition in G.R. No. 151258 is hereby dismissed, and the criminal case against Artemio Villareal
deemed closed and TERMINATED.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives for possible consideration of the amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law to include the fact of
intoxication and the presence of non-resident or alumni fraternity members during hazing as aggravating
circumstances that would increase the applicable penalties.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 174056
February 27, 2007
[Formerly G.R. No. 138257]
THE
vs.

PEOPLE

OF

THE

PHILIPPINES, Appellee

ROGELIO GUMIMBA y MORADANTE alias ROWING and RONTE ABABO (acquitted),

Appellants,
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
For review before the Court is the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated 26 April 2006, affirming
with modification the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Ozamiz City, Branch 15, 3 dated 10
March 1999, finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide.
In an Information4 dated 17 April 1997, appellant Rogelio Gumimba y Morandante alias Rowing and coaccused Ronie Abapo (Abapo) were charged before the RTC, with the crime of rape with homicide of an
eight (8)-year old child, thus:
That on or about April 8, 1997, in Barangay Pantaon, Ozamiz City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating with each other, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and by means of force, violence and intimidation, to wit:
by then and there pinning down one [AAA], 5 a minor, 8 years of age, and succeeded in having carnal
knowledge with her and as a result thereof she suffered 6-12 o'clock lacerated wounds of [sic] the vagina
as well as fatal stab wounds on the different parts of her body and which were the direct cause of her death
thereafter.
CONTRARY to Article 335 in relation with Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
On 16 May 1997, appellant and Abapo both entered a plea of not guilty on arraignment. 6 Thereafter, the
case proceeded to trial with the prosecution first presenting two witnesses: (1) Emelio Magallano,
President of Purok I, Barangay Pantaon, Ozamiz City; and (2) Sofronio Araas, a Civilian Volunteer
Officer (CVO) of the same barangay.
Magallano and Araas testified that at around 9 o'clock in the evening of 10 April 1997, appellant went to
Magallano's home and confessed to him that he alone and by himself raped and killed his (appellant's)
niece, AAA, in Purok Pantaon, Ozamiz City. Subsequently, Magallano accompanied appellant to the
residence of Araas where he reiterated his confession. That same night, Magallano, Araas, appellant and
family members of the witnesses proceeded to the home of Barangay Captain Santiago Acapulco, Jr. who
conducted an investigation. Appellant repeated his narration and confessed to the barangay captain that he
had raped and killed the victim, and that he was alone when he committed the crime. As a result thereof,
Acapulco, Jr., in the company of the others, brought appellant to the Ozamiz City Hall and turned him
over to the police authorities.7
However, appellant manifested though counsel (before the court) at the following hearing on 22 May 1997
that he would like to change his earlier plea of not guilty to a plea of guilty.8 The RTC ordered appellant's
re-arraignment and the latter accordingly entered a plea of guilty. 9 The court conducted an inquiry to
ascertain the voluntariness of appellant's plea and his full comprehension of the consequences thereof.
Prosecution was likewise charged to establish the guilt and degree of culpability of appellant. 10
In accordance with the court's directive, the prosecution continued with the presentation of its evidence in
chief. It presented Dr. Pedrita Rosauro, the physician who conducted the autopsy on the body of the

victim, and who testified that the victim was raped before she was killed. The examination by Dr. Rosauro
revealed that AAA sustained four (4) stab wounds in front, two (2) stab wounds in her back and one (1)
lacerated wound each on her neck and on her middle upper extremity. Furthermore, she found 6 and 12
o'clock laceration wounds on the external genital organ of the victim.11
Before resting its case, the prosecution presented appellant as witness against his co-accused Abapo.
Appellant testified that he and Abapo raped and killed the victim. He likewise explained that he had
previously confessed to Magallano, Araas and Acapulco that he alone committed the crime in the hope
that the parents of the victim, who were relatives of his, might take pity on him.12
In his defense, Abapo testified that at the time the crime was allegedly committed, he was with his mother
and three (3) siblings at the Labo River, about two (2) kilometers away from Barangay Pantaon, washing
their clothes.13 In support thereof, Abapo presented his mother Virgencita Abapo, Elisa Carreon and
Raymundo Orot, all of whom corroborated his alibi. 14 The defense also presented witness Araas who
reiterated his earlier testimony that appellant confessed to him that he alone was responsible for the raping
and killing of the victim. 15Finally, Eugenio Bucog, a teacher at Capucao Elementary School, was
presented to demonstrate Abapo's good character when he was his student.16
On 10 March 1999, the RTC promulgated its Decision. On the basis of appellant's plea of guilty, the RTC
found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime as charged. Appellant was sentenced to suffer the
death penalty and ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amounts of P50,000.00 as indemnity
for the life of the victim,P30,000.00 as moral damages, and costs.17 On the other hand, the trial court
acquitted Abapo on the ground that his guilt was not established beyond reasonable doubt. Except for the
lone testimony of appellant, the RTC held that no other evidence was adduced to prove the participation of
Abapo. Moreover, the court a quo found that appellant's testimony implicating Abapo was not worthy of
credence coming as it did from a polluted source.18
With the death penalty imposed on appellant, the case was elevated to this Court on automatic review.
Pursuant to this Court's decision in People v. Mateo,19 the case was transferred to the Court of Appeals.
On 26 April 2006, the appellate court rendered its Decision 20 affirming the appellant's conviction, but with
modification as to damages awarded to the heirs of the victim. The dispositive portion of the said Decision
states:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Decision
dated March 10, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, of Ozami[s] City, is hereby AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION that the amount of civil indemnity ex delicto is hereby increased
from P50,000.00 to P100,000.00, including the award of moral damages from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00.
Conformably with the ruling of the Supreme Court in People of the Philippines v. Efren Mateo, We refrain
from entering judgment, and the Division Clerk of Court is hereby directed to elevate the entire records of
the case to the Honorable Supreme Court for its final disposition.
SO ORDERED."21
On 3 October 2006, the Court issued an order requiring the parties to simultaneously submit supplemental
briefs within thirty (30) days from notice should they so desire. 22 On 21 November and 24 November
2006, appellant and appellee filed similar manifestations that they are adopting the briefs they filed before
the Court of Appeals.23

Thus, appellant raises the following errors in this petition for review:

time.26 Accordingly, a plea of guilty to such charges calls into play the provisions of Section 3, Rule 116 of
the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, thus -

I
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT ON THE BASIS OF
HIS IMPROVIDENT PLEA OF GUILTY AND HIS ALLEGED SEPARATE CONFESSIONS TO ONE
EM[I]LIO MAGALLANO, AND ONE SOFRONIO ARAAS, THE LATTER BEING HEARSAY AND
WITHOUT PROBATIVE VALUE WHATSOEVER.
II
THE COURT A QUO LIKEWISE ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF RAPE
WITH HOMICIDE DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO ESTABLISH THE
LATTER'S GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, AND THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OWNING
UP ONLY TO THE CRIME OF SIMPLE RAPE.24
The ultimate issue is whether appellant's guilt was established by evidence beyond reasonable doubt.
It must be conceded at the outset that the trial court failed in its duty to conduct the prescribed "searching
inquiry" into the voluntariness of appellant's plea of guilty and full comprehension thereof. Consequently,
appellant's plea of guilty was made improvidently and it is rendered inefficacious. 25 Nevertheless, the
Court must rule against appellant as the evidence on record is ample to sustain the judgment of conviction
independent from his plea of guilty.
The crime of rape with homicide is punishable with death under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, which provides:
Article 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances:

Sec. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. - When the accused pleads guilty to a
capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension
of the consequences of his plea and shall require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree
of culpability. The accused may present evidence in his behalf.
Based on this rule, when a plea of guilty to a capital offense is entered, there are three (3) conditions that
the trial court must observe to obviate an improvident plea of guilty by the accused: (1) it must conduct a
searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension by the accused of the consequences of his
plea; (2) it must require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the
precise degree of his culpability; and (3) it must ask the accused whether he desires to present evidence on
his behalf, and allow him to do so if he so desires. 27
There is no hard and fast rule as to how a judge may conduct a "searching inquiry," or as to the number
and character of questions he may ask the accused, or as to the earnestness with which he may conduct it,
since each case must be measured according to its individual merit. 28 However, the logic behind the rule is
that courts must proceed with caution where the imposable penalty is death for the reason that the
execution of such a sentence is irrevocable and experience has shown that innocent persons have at times
pleaded guilty.29 An improvident plea of guilty on the part of the accused when capital crimes are involved
should be avoided since he might be admitting his guilt before the court and thus forfeit his life and liberty
without having fully comprehended the meaning and import and consequences of his plea. 30 Moreover, the
requirement of taking further evidence would aid this Court on appellate review in determining the
propriety or impropriety of the plea.31
In the instant case, when the accused entered a plea of guilty at his re-arraignment, it is evident that the
RTC did not strictly observe the requirements under Section 3, Rule 116 above. A mere warning
that the accused faces the supreme penalty of death is insufficient. 32 Such procedure falls short of the
exacting guidelines in the conduct of a "searching inquiry," as follows:

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

(1) Ascertain from the accused himself (a) how he was brought into the custody of the law; (b)
whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel during the custodial and preliminary
investigations; and (c) under what conditions he was detained and interrogated during the
investigations. This is intended to rule out the possibility that the accused has been coerced or
placed under a state of duress either by actual threats of physical harm coming from malevolent
quarters or simply because of the judge's intimidating robes.

The crime of rape is punishable by reclusion perpetua.

xxxx
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death.

(2) Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had conferred with, and
completely explained to, the accused the meaning and consequences of a plea of guilty.

xxxx

(3) Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his age, socioeconomic status, and educational background, which may serve as a trustworthy index of his
capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilty.

The Information, to which appellant pleaded guilty, alleged that homicide was committed by reason or on
the occasion of the rape of AAA. This, if proven, would warrant the penalty of death at that

(4) Inform the accused of the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty under the
law and the certainty that he will serve such sentence. For not infrequently, an accused pleads

guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or because of promises of the
authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or express remorse. It is the duty
of the judge to ensure that the accused does not labor under these mistaken impressions
because a plea of guilty carries with it not only the admission of authorship of the crime proper
but also of the aggravating circumstances attending it, that increase punishment.
(5) Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which he is charged and to fully explain to him
the elements of the crime which is the basis of his indictment. Failure of the court to do so
would constitute a violation of his fundamental right to be informed of the precise nature of the
accusation against him and a denial of his right to due process.
(6) All questions posed to the accused should be in a language known and understood by the
latter.

Was there cruelty done by the accused in picking [sic] the life of the minor girl?
xxxx
Pros. Edmilao:
May we ask that we will present her [sic] in the next hearing.1awphi1.net
Court:
The court will call the accused to the witness stand.
xxxx

(7) The trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused, in pleading guilty, is truly guilty. The
accused must be required to narrate the tragedy or reenact the crime or furnish its missing
details.33
An examination of the records of the proceedings will illustrate the court's treatment of appellant's change
of plea,viz:
Atty. Cagaanan:
Considering the voluntary plea of guilty of the accused[,] we pray that the mitigating circumstance to
prove his plea of guilty be appreciated in favor of the accused. We likewise pray that another mitigating
[circumstance] of voluntary surrender be appreciated in his favor.

(The witness after having administered an oath, took the witness stand and declared that he is:
ROGELIO GUMIMBA
20 years old
Single
Occupation- duck raising
Resident of Capucao, Ozamiz City)

Pros. Edmilao:
xxxx
Considering the gravity of the crime, may we ask your Honor that we will present evidence inorder [sic]
that it will give also justice to the victim.
Court:

Court:
The court will allow the prosecutor or the defense to profound [sic] question [sic] on the matter and the
accused understand [sic] and fully comprehend [sic] the consequence of his plea of guilty.

Present evidence to prove gravity of the crime.

xxxx
Pros. Edmilao:
Pros. Edmilao:
Our first witness is the ABC president.
Q Mr. Rogelio Gumimba[,] are you the same accused in this case in Crim. Case No. RTC 2074?
Court:
A Yes, sir.
What matter will Santiago Acapulco testify?
Court:

Q Now the victim in this case is [AAA], a minor, 8 years of age[.] Since you have admitted this in what
particular place wherein [sic] you raped and slew [AAA]?

A Purok Pantaon, Ozamiz City.

Court:

Q How far is that place wherein you slew and raped [AAA] from her house?

Sustained.

A Very near, sir.

Court:

Q Can you estimate how many meters?

Q When you said you raped her, you mean you inserted your penis inside the vagina of [AAA]?

A One meter, sir.

A No, Your Honor.

Q Was it committed inside or outside the house?

Q When you said you raped her, what do you mean?

A Outside.

A I was drank [sic] at that time.

Q In what particular place of the house[:] in front, at the side or at the back?

Q And you said you tied [AAA], what did you use in tying her?

A At the back of the house of the victim.

A Banana skin.

Q Will you please tell the court, how did you do it, will you please narrate.

Q How did you tie [AAA]?

A I raped her by tying her hand, then I killed her.

A I tied both her hands.

Q Before you raped and killed [AAA], where did you get her?

Q The hands of [AAA], you placed at the back?

A I saw her roaming around.

A In front of her.

Q In committing the crime, were you alone?

Q After tying her [,] what did you do to her?

Atty. Anonat:

A After that I went home.

Objection

Q You did not stab [AAA]?

Court:

A I stabbed her, Your Honor.

Sustained.

Q What weapon did you use in stabbing her?

Pros. Edmilao:

A A long bolo.

You stated that you pushed her and even tied her hand and raped her and stabbed her, were you the one
alone [sic]?

Q You mean you were bringing [a] long bolo at that time?
A Yes, Your Honor.

Atty. Anonat:
Q After stabbing her, what did you do to her?
Objection

A No more, Your Honor.

A I have sexed [sic] with her.

Q How many times did you stab [AAA]?

Q What do you mean by I "remedio" her, you mean you have inserted your penis into the vagina of
[AAA]?

A I could not count how many stab wounds I inflicted to [sic] her.
A No, Your Honor, my penis did not penetrate into the vagina of [AAA].
Q But you will agree that you have stabbed her many times?
Q Why your penis did [sic] not able to penetrate into the vagina of [AAA]?
A I could no longer count how many stab wounds, Your Honor.
A The vagina of [AAA] is very small.
Q When you were arraigned, you pleaded guilty, do you understand the consequence of your
pleading guilty?

Q Can you tell this Court how tall was [AAA]?

A I do not know Your Honor [,] the consequence.

A (The witness demonstrated that from the floor about 3 feet high was the height of [AAA])

Q You pleaded guilty to the offense of rape with homicide, did you understand?

Q If you are standing and [AAA] is also standing side by side with you, up to what part of your body is
the height of [AAA]?

A Yes, Your Honor, I understand.

A Up to my waist line.
Q That by your pleading guilty to the offense you will be sentenced to die?
Atty. Cagaanan:
A Yes, I am aware.
Q When you pleaded guilty [,] was it in your own free will?
Q Your act of pleading guilty to the offense charged is your voluntary will?
A Yes, sir.
A Yes, I admitted that crime, but we were two.
Q Were you not forced or coerced by anybody with this crime?
Q You mean to say there were two of you who raped [AAA]?
A No, sir.34
A Yes, your Honor.

A Yes, Your Honor.

The inefficacious plea of guilty notwithstanding, the totality of the evidence for the prosecution
undeniably establishes appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide. Apart
from his testimony upon changing his plea to a plea of guilty, appellant gave a subsequent testimony when
he was presented by the prosecution as a witness against his co-accused. This second testimony which
constitutes another judicial confession, replete with details and made consciously as it was, cured the
deficiencies which made his earlier plea of guilty improvident. The latter testimony left no room for doubt
as to the voluntariness and comprehension on appellant's part of his change of plea, as well as completed
his narration of how he raped and killed the victim. The pertinent portions of the second testimony follow,
thus:

Q Did you remove her panty before raping her?

Pros. Jose A. Edmilao:

A No, You Honor, I did not.

Q While you were gathering firewoods [sic] and Ronie Abapo was pasturing carabao, do you recall of any
untoward incident that happened?

Q Before raping her, was [AAA] wearing clothes?

A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Was [AAA] wearing [a] panty before you raped her?

Q How did you rape [AAA]?

A We raped and killed.

A Both of us.

Q Whom did you rape and kill?

Q After tying the hands of [AAA][,] with banana stalk where did you place her?

A [AAA].

A We brought her to the [sic] grassy place.

Q And when you said [AAA], who was then your companion, because you said we?

Q What happened then after [AAA] was brought to the [sic] grassy place?

A Ronie Abapo.

A We killed her.

xxxx

Q Before you killed her, what did you do to her?

Q While she [AAA] was there gathering oranges, you mean to say you were close to the place [AAA]
was?

A We raped her.
Q Who raped her first?

A I, together with Ronie Abapo go [sic] near to the place [AAA] was.
A It was Ronie Abapo, then followed by me.
Q When you were already near at [sic] the place where [AAA] was climbing, was she still up there at the
orange tree?

Q How did you rape her?

A She already came down.

A We undress[sed] her.

Q When she came down, what followed next then?

Q What was she wearing at that time?

A We held her hands.

A She wore a dress.

Q Who held her hands?

Q What about Ronie Abapo?

A The two of us.

A He did not undress.

Q You mean one hand was held by you and the other hand was held by Ronie Abapo?

Q How did you let your penis out?

Atty. Anonat:

A I removed my t-shirt.

Objection, leading.

Q How about your pants?

Pros. Edmilao:

A I also removed my pants.

Q You said that you were holding the hands of [AAA], how did you do it?

Q What was then the reaction of [AAA], when you first tied her hand?

A We held her hands and tied it [sic] with banana skin.

A She did not cry, because we covered her mouth.

Q Who tied the hands of [AAA]?

Q Who covered her mouth? You or Ronie?

A Ronie.

A We undressed her, because we want [sic] to do something to her.

Q What [sic] you said that it was Ronie Abapo, what did you do then when he was on [sic] the act of
raping her?

Q What is that something that you want [sic] top do to [AAA]?

A We raped her.

A I was just near to [sic] them.

Q When you said we raped her, you mean, you inserted your penis inside the vagina of [AAA]?
Q The after Ronie Abapo, what did you do then?
A No, sir.
A He told me that you will be the next [sic].
Q But you tried to insert your penis inside the vagina?
Q So when he told you that you will be the next [sic], what did you do next?
A Yes, sir.
A I also raped her.
Q And your penis touched the vagina of [AAA]?
Q Again, when you said you raped her, you inserted your penis into the vagina of [AAA]?
A Yes, sir.
A It did not enter [sic].
Q Only your penis was not able to enter the vagina because [AAA] is [sic] still a small girl?
Q Why?
A Yes, sir.
A It did not penetrate, because I was afraid.
Q After trying to insert your penis after Ronie Abapo, what did you do to [AAA]?
Q But your penis erected [sic]?
A I walked away, but he called me.
A No, Your Honor.
Q Who called you?
Q You said that Ronie was the first to have sexual intercourse, was he able to insert his penis into the
vagina of [AAA]?

A Ronie Abapo.

A No, sir, because he was watching, if there was person [sic] around.

Q Why did he call you?

Q Were you able to see the penis of Ronie inserted into the vagina of [AAA]?

A He asked me, what to do with [AAA]. It might be that she will tell us to somebody [sic], we will kill
her.

A I have [sic] not seen.

Q What did you do?
xxxx
A I did not answer.
Q You said that you and Ronie Abapo raped [AAA], what do you mean or what do you understand by the
word rape?

Q And what was your answer?

A We undressed her.

A Because he keep [sic] on persuading me.

Q Why did you undress her?

Q How did he persuade you?

A He persuaded me because we might be caught.

A In the stomach.

Q And what did he tell you to do?

Q How many times did Ronie Abapo strike her with the use of that bolo?

A That we will kill [AAA].

A I cannot remember anymore.

Q How did he tell you that?

Q Aside from the stomach, where were the other pants [sic] of [AAA] also hit?

A Rowing[,] we will kill her.

A At the left side.

Q And what was your reply?

Q How about you, did you made [sic] the following stab to [AAA]?

A I refused.

A I was hesitant to stab, but eventually I stabbed her.

Q When you refused, what did he do then?

Q How many times?

A He keep [sic] on persuading me.

A Only one.

Q And what did eventually came [sic] to your mind?

Q What part of her body was she hit?

A Evil came to my mind, so we killed her.

A At the stomach.

Q How did you kill her?

Q Do you mean to say that you also got the bolo from the hands of Ronie Abapo and also stabbed [AAA]?

A We stabbed her.

A Yes, sir.

Q What weapon you used [sic] when you killed her?

Q Why was [AAA] not killed, when Ronie Abapo made stabbed [sic] on her?

A A long bolo.

A He [sic] was already dead.

Q Whose [sic] the owner of that long bolo?

Q Why did you stab her, when she was already dead?

A Mine, but Ronie Abapo used it.

A I just stabbed her, because I thought that she was still alive.

Q Who was the first one to use it?

xxxx

A Ronie Abapo.

Q Do you know where is [sic] the bolo used in stabbing [AAA]?

Q But the bolo was in your hands, how did [sic] he be able to use it?

A No, sir.

A I put it on the ground and he got it.

Q After killing [AAA], where did you place the bolo?

Q You said that he made the first struck [sic]. Where was [AAA] first hit?

A In our place.

Q It [sic] it there in your home?

A According to Emilio that the mother of the victim might be [sic] pity enough to me, because I am related
to them.

A Already taken.
Q Who got?

Q When you reported to these persons you have mentioned, did you also tell them that you were together
with Ronie Abapo in killing and raping?

A The barangay captain.

A No, sir.35

Q Now, did you tell to [sic] anybody regarding the raping and killing of [AAA] aside from here in Court?

While the trial court found appellant's second testimony insofar as it implicated his co-accused to be
unworthy of credence, there is absolutely nothing on record which militates against its use as basis for
establishing appellant's guilt. In fact, in his Brief, appellant submits that he must be convicted of simple
rape alone and not rape with homicide. Thus, he admits in writing, albeit implicitly, that he raped the
victim.

A I have already told.

Q Who was the person whom you talked about [sic]?
A My neighbor.
Q Whose [sic] the name of that neighbor?
A Emilio Magallano.
Q After Emilio Magallano[,] to whom did you report?
A Sofronio Aranas.
Q Who else?
A Rico Magallano.
Q Who else?
A The wife of Panyong.
Q In the reporting [sic] this matter[,] were you together with Ronie Abapo telling these persons that you
raped [AAA]?
A I was alone.
Q And did you tell her that you were two in killing and raping with Ronie Abapo?
A No, sir.
Q Why not?

Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside only if such plea is the sole basis of the
judgment. If the trial court relied on sufficient and credible evidence to convict the accused, the conviction
must be sustained, because then it is predicated not merely on the guilty plea of the accused but on
evidence proving his commission of the offense charged.36 Thus, as we have ruled in People v. Derilo:37
While it may be argued that appellant entered an improvident plea of guilty when re-arraigned, we find no
need, however, to remand the case to the lower court for further reception of evidence. As a rule, this
Court has set aside convictions based on pleas of guilty in capital offenses because of improvidence
thereof and when such plea is the sole basis of the condemnatory judgment. However, where the trial court
receives evidence to determine precisely whether or not the accused has erred in admitting his guilt, the
manner in which the plea of guilty is made (improvidently or not) loses legal significance, for the simple
reason that the conviction is based on evidence proving the commission by the accused of the offense
charged.
Thus, even without considering the plea of guilty of appellant, he may still be convicted if there is
adequate evidence on record on which to predicate his conviction. x x x x
Here, the prosecution was able to establish, through the separate testimonies of appellant, that at around
1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 8 April 1997, appellant was gathering firewood not far from the house of
the victim AAA in Barangay Pantaon, Ozamiz City. He met co-accused Ronie Abapo who was then
pasturing his carabao also within the vicinity of the victim's home. They spotted the victim picking
oranges with her three (3)-year old brother at the back of their house and together approached her from
behind, tied her hands with banana skin and dragged her to a grassy place. 38 Abapo raped the victim
first.39 Thereafter, appellant followed suit. 40 Once they had finished with their dastardly acts, they stabbed
and killed the victim with a long bolo which belonged to appellant.41
Through the testimony of the physician who conducted the autopsy on AAA's body, it was established that
the victim had 6 and 12 o'clock lacerations on her external genital organ. Thus, it is clear that the rape was
consummated.
Appellant challenges the testimonies of the witnesses Magallano and Araas on what appellant had
confessed to or told them for being hearsay. The challenge fails. The testimonies, it should be conceded,
cannot serve as a proof of extrajudicial confession for an extrajudicial confession has to be in writing,
among others, to be admissible in evidence. 42 That is why the testimonies are of use in the case as

corroborative evidence only. Such utility, however, cannot be defeated by the hearsay rule. The
testimonies covered are independently relevant statements which are not barred by the hearsay
rule.1awphi1.net

Q What part of her body was she hit?

Under the doctrine of independently relevant statements, only the fact that such statements were made is
relevant, and the truth or falsity thereof is immaterial. The hearsay rule does not apply. The statements are
admissible as evidence. Evidence as to the making of such statement is not secondary but primary, for the
statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a
fact.43

Q Do you mean to say that you also got the bolo from the hands of Ronie Abapo and also stabbed AAA?

A At the stomach.

A Yes, sir.
Q Why was [AAA] not killed, when Ronie Abapo made stabbed [sic] on her?

Moreover, where, as in the case at bar, there is no evidence to show any dubious reason or improper
motive for a prosecution witness to bear false testimony against the accused or falsely implicate him in a
crime, his or her testimony should be given full faith and credit. 44

A He [sic] was already dead.

Q Why did you stab her, when she was already dead?

Next, we address appellant's contention that he can only be convicted of simple rape, as this is the only
crime to which he has owned up. Arguing that the victim may have already been dead after his co-accused
had allegedly hacked her first, appellant theorizes that he, at most, would be guilty of an impossible crime.
Appellant is clutching at straws. It is extremely doubtful that appellant could have known positively that
the victim was already dead when he struck her. The proposition not only completely contradicts his
judicial confession, it is also speculative as to cause of death. In light of the particular circumstances of the
event, appellant's mere conjecture that AAA had already expired by the time he hacked her cannot be
sufficient to support his assertion of an impossible crime. An examination of the testimony is again called
for, thus:
Pros. Edmilao:
Q You said that he (Abapo) made the first strike, where was [AAA] first hit?

A I just stabbed her, because I thought that she was still alive.45
Thus, the finding of guilt as pronounced by the RTC and the Court of Appeals should be sustained.
However, with the passage of R.A. No. 9346, entitled "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty
in the Philippines," the penalty of death can no longer be imposed. Accordingly, the penalty imposed upon
appellant is reduced from death to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.46
With respect to the civil liability of appellant, we modify the award in light of prevailing jurisprudence.
Accordingly, appellant is ordered to indemnify the heirs of AAA in the amount of P100,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as temperate damages and P100,000.00 as
exemplary damages.47

Q How many times did Ronie Abapo strike her with the use of that bolo?

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CR-HC No. 00193 is AFFIRMED
WITH MODIFICATION. Appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without
eligibility for parole and to pay the heirs of the victim, AAA, in the amounts of P100,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as temperate damages, and P100,000.00 as
exemplary damages, plus costs.

A I cannot remember anymore.

SO ORDERED.

A In the stomach.

Q Aside from the stomach, where were the other pants [sic] of [AAA] also hit?
A At the left side.
Q How about you, did you made [sic] the following stab to [AAA]?
A I was hesitant to stab, but eventually I stabbed her.
Q How many times?
A Only one.

ATTY.
ROBERTO
C.
PADILLA, Complainant,
vs.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE ELVI JOHN S. ASUNCION, COURT OF APPEALS, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
The Cases
Before Us are two (2) administrative cases against Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion of the Court of Appeals
[CA].
The first, docketed as A.M. No. 06-6-8-CA, stems from an unsigned letter dated February 17, 2006,
addressed to Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, complaining that Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion "has
been sitting on motions for reconsideration for six months to more than a year unless the parties come
across."1 On July 18, 2006, the Court resolved to refer the complaint to retired Supreme Court Justice
Bernardo P. Pardo for investigation, report and recommendation within 90 days from receipt thereof.
Subsequently, on August 29, 2006, the Court also referred to Investigator-designate Justice Pardo an
unsigned letter dated August 17, 2006, allegedly from an Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, fully
supporting the investigation of Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion, and citing "one particular case pending in
his division that will show how he operates." 2 The case mentioned in the letter is Bank of Commerce v.
Hon. Evelyn Corpus-Cabochan, et al., CA-G.R. No. 91258, allegedly involving an irregularly issued
temporary restraining order [TRO].
The second administrative case, A.M. No. 06-44-CA-J, is based on a verified complaint dated August 22,
20063filed by Atty. Roberto C. Padilla with the Office of the Court Administrator, charging Justice Elvi
John S. Asuncion with "culpable dereliction of duty, malicious delay in the administration of justice and
gross ignorance of the law" in connection with CA-G.R. SP No. 60573, entitled "Philippine National Bank
v. NLRC and Erlinda Archinas." The Court likewise referred this complaint to Justice Bernardo P. Pardo
for investigation, report and recommendation.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 06-6-8-CA

March 20, 2007

RE: COMPLAINT AGAINST JUSTICE ELVI JOHN S. ASUNCION OF THE COURT OF

APPEALS
x----------------------------x
A.M. No. 06-44-CA-J

March 20, 2007

On March 1, 2007, Justice Pardo submitted to this Court his Report and Recommendation [Report] dated
February 28, 2007.
Justice Pardo reports that he conducted an investigation of the cases on August 10 and 30, September 14
and 27, October 4, 16 and 26, December 8, all in 2006, and on January 18, 2007. On each of these dates,
the respondent was present, and in connection with A. M. No. 06-44-CA-J, respondent Justice Asuncion
was represented by counsel.
Justice Asuncions Antecedents
From the record, it appears that respondent Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion was appointed Associate Justice
of the Court of Appeals on May 24, 1999, and assumed office on May 25, 1999. On July 5, 2004, he was
assigned as Chairman, 18th Division of the CA, stationed in Cebu City. In an order dated July 7, 2004, CA
Presiding Justice Cancio C. Garcia directed that all "Manila cases left by Justice Asuncion shall

automatically be assigned to Justice [Monina Arevalo] Zenarosa." 4 On November 3, 2004, Justice

Asuncion was re-assigned to Manila, as Chairman, 17th Division, CA. From August 4, 2006 to date, he
has been Chairman, 11th Division, CA, Manila.

On September 11, 2006, respondent filed his Comment6 on the unsigned letter dated August 17, 2006 of an
alleged CA Associate Justice. He denied that there was any irregularity in the issuance of the temporary
restraining order and of the subsequent writ of preliminary injunction, stating that the same was done in
the "sound exercise of the Courts discretion." The respondent stressed that the cited case, CA-G.R. SP
No. 91258, was still pending in his division and not germane to the on-going investigation against him for
supposed deliberate inaction on pending motions for reconsideration.

The Investigation
A.M. No. 06-6-8-CA
The unsigned letter complaint, that gave rise to the instant case, reads:

In this connection, the Investigating Justice reports that after making inquiries, he found that the Court of
Appeals had not acted on the approval of the injunction bond in this case, thus, no writ of preliminary
injunction has been issued to date.7

"February 17, 2006

"Hon.
Chief
Padre Faura, Manila

assignments, especially in helping organize special events, given to him by the CA Presiding Justice,
which demanded time and attention.

Artemio
Justice,

V.
Supreme

Panganiban
Court

Meanwhile, in the August 31, 2006 investigation, Atty. Tessie L. Gatmaitan, Clerk of Court, CA en banc,
submitted to the designated Investigator the list of cases raffled to respondent since his assumption of
office in 1999, as follows:

"Sir:
"Please direct an immediate judicial audit on Court of Appeals Justice Elvi Asuncion.

"a) Master List of Criminal Cases Raffled to J. Asuncion from 11 June 1999 to 25 May 2006,
consisting of 112 cases;

"This magistrate has been sitting on motions for reconsideration for six months to more than a year unless
the parties come across.

"b) Master List of Heinous Crimes Raffled to J. Asuncion from 20 Nov. 2004 to 22 June 2006,
consisting of 33 cases;

"This CA Justice is an unmitigated disgrace to the judiciary. How he ever reached his lofty position is
truly disconcerting. He is a thoroughly CORRUPT person who has no shame using his office to extort
money from litigants. He is equally, if not more, deprave than Demetrio Demetria who was dismissed by
the Supreme Court. Asuncion deserves not only dismissal but DISBARMENT as well. Because the law
profession should also be purged of CROOKS like him.

"c) Master List of Civil Cases Raffled to J. Asuncion from 14 June 1999 to 16 August 2006,
consisting of 625 cases; and

"I hope you can terminate his service in the judiciary ASAP to save the institution. Thank you.

"d) Master List of Special Cases Raffled to J. Asuncion from 14 June 1999 to 31 July 2006,
consisting of 651 cases."
The Investigating Justice also required the respondent to submit a report on the status of the cases
contained in the handwritten list given to the respondent on September 14, 2006. In his written
compliance,8 the respondent reiterated his plea that justifiable reasons attended the delay in the resolution
of some cases.

"Very truly yours,

"AN AGGRIEVED PARTY"
5

To the foregoing complaint, respondent Justice Asuncion filed his Comment dated August 30, 2006 in
which he strongly denied the charge of deliberate inaction on pending motions for reconsideration in cases
assigned to him unless the parties came across. He adverted to the unsigned letter as the work of the same
group "that previously instigated false accusations which also resulted in my being investigated by the
Supreme Court through the Hon. Justice Carolina C. Grino-Aquino." He admitted, however, to "some
delays in the resolution of some motions for reconsideration", and cited the following "justifiable
reasons": (1) The heavy caseload initially assigned to CA justices, coupled with the newly assigned cases
raffled daily and the re-raffled cases originally handled by promoted or retired justices; (2) The
reorganization of the CA and his assignment as Chairman of the 18th Division based in Cebu City, which
"created some confusion" in the status of cases assigned to him; (3) The physical transfer of his office,
"aggravated by a lapse in the monitoring system of my office"; and (4) The various administrative

Subsequently, on October 4, 2006, the respondent submitted a report on the status of the cases in a new list
given to him after the September 27, 2006 investigation9
This, and earlier reports on the status of cases assigned to respondent Justice Asuncion, would be the basis
of the findings of the Investigating Justice.
A.M. No. 06-44-CA-J
As mentioned above, this second case is based on a verified complaint filed by Atty. Roberto C. Padilla,
charging Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion with "culpable dereliction of duty, malicious delay in the
administration of justice and gross ignorance of the law", in connection with CA-G.R. SP No. 60573,
entitled "Philippine National Bank vs. NLRC and Erlinda Archinas".

The facts, as culled from the Investigating Justices Report10, are as follows:
"On June 27, 2000, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) decided in her favor the claim of
Ms. Erlinda Archinas for reinstatement and payment of back wages against the Philippine National Bank
(PNB), affirming in toto the ruling of Labor Arbiter Celestino Daing ordering her reinstatement without
loss of seniority rights and payment of back wages.
"On August 25, 2000, PNB filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court assailing the decision of the NLRC (CA-G.R. SP No. 60573).

Respondent Justice Asuncion filed his Comment dated November 15, 2006 on the Padilla complaint,
raising the following arguments: [1] That the July 24, 2001 and October 30, 2001 resolutions in CA-G.R.
SP No. 60573 were collegial acts of the First Division, CA, duly concurred in by the two other CA justices
of the division; [2] That the July 24, 2001 resolution did not grant PNBs motion for issuance of a
temporary restraining order, and the October 30, 2001 resolution is not tantamount to a preliminary
injunction issued ex parte; and [3] The delay in resolving the motion for reconsideration was not
deliberate or maliciously motivated. The respondent restated therein the reasons he proffered in his
Comment in A.M. No. 06-8-08-CA.
The Findings of the Investigating Justice

"Meantime, the NLRC issued an Entry of Judgment making final and executory the decision of the labor
arbiter as of July 17, 2000, pursuant to Sec. 2[c], Rule VIII of the NLRC Rules. Ms. Archinas filed a
motion for a writ of execution for the uncontested amount of P1,096,233.97. PNB opposed the motion. In
view of the pending petition with the CA, the labor arbiter deferred action on the motion for execution.

In the first administrative case, A.M. No. 06-6-8-CA, the Investigating Justice submits the following
findings:

"On May 28, 2001, the Court of Appeals, through respondent Justice Asuncion, dismissed the petition of
PNB and affirmed in toto the decision of NLRC in favor of Ms. Archinas.

"After meticulous analysis of the record and the evidence submitted, the investigation would show that, as
related in the unsigned letter of February 17, 2006, there were indeed several cases assigned to respondent
Justice Asuncion with motions for reconsideration still remaining unresolved way beyond the ninety day
period prescribed in Rule 52, Section 3 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, there were also numerous
motions for reconsideration which respondent Justice resolved beyond the reglementary period.

"On June 13, 2001, PNB filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration of the decision, to
which Ms. Archinas filed, on June 25, 2001, an opposition. On June 25, 2001, PNBs motion for
reconsideration was deemed submitted for resolution.
"In the interim, on June 18, 2001, the labor arbiter granted Ms. Archinas motion for execution of the
uncontested amount of P1,096,233.97, for which the Sheriff of the NLRC levied upon personal property
of the PNB and scheduled an auction sale on July 25, 2001. Upon motion of PNB, on July 24, 2001,
respondent Asuncion issued the questioned resolution, which granted a temporary restraining order to stop
the auction sale by directing the labor arbiter to "temporarily enjoin" implementation of the writ of
execution. It likewise ordered the parties to maintain the status quo pending resolution of PNBs motion
for reconsideration.

"The master lists of cases submitted by the Clerk of Court, CA, en banc, disclose that, as of September 30,
2006, there were seventy one motions for reconsideration still pending resolution; further, there were one
hundred seventy nine motions for reconsideration which were resolved beyond the ninety-day period 11
xxxxxxxxx
"What is more, there are several cases assigned to respondent Justice Asuncion which are still undecided,
and those that were decided beyond the one (1) year period prescribed in the 1987 Constitution.
xxxxxxxxx

"On October 30, 2001, respondent Justice Asuncion issued another resolution which reiterated the July 24,
2001 resolution "ordering the parties to maintain the status quo in this case pending resolution" of PNBs
motion for reconsideration.
"On November 5, 2001, Ms. Archinas filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration of the
October 30, 2001 resolution.
"Despite Ms. Archinas filing with the Court of Appeals of numerous motions for early resolution of the
motion for reconsideration dated November 5, 2001, respondent Justice Asuncion failed to act and resolve
the motion.
"Finally, on August 7, 2006, respondent Justice issued a resolution denying PNBs motion for
reconsideration dated June 13, 2001. It, however, failed to directly address and resolve Archinas
November 5, 2001 motion for reconsideration. At any rate, it is noted that the denial of PNBs motion
would render moot Mrs. Archinas motion for reconsideration."

"As of September 30, 2006, the following eighty-two cases remain undecided12:
xxxxxxxxx
"Further, there were four hundred nine cases which had been decided beyond the twelve month period
prescribed in the 1987 Constitution (Article VIII, Section 15[1]), to wit13:
xxxxxxxxx
"In his comments dated August 30, 2006, and November 15, 2006, respondent Justice Asuncion admitted
delay in the resolution of some motions for reconsideration of cases assigned to him albeit with obvious
pride in his massive record of disposition of cases x x x In fact, respondent Justice Asuncion listed only
nine cases that were still unresolved and pending as of his reassignment to the CA-Cebu Station.
"However, the record would show that there were motions for reconsideration filed as far back as 2000
that were still pending resolution, as of the (sic) July 18, 2006, when the Supreme Court took cognizance

of the complaint. One was resolved on August 7, 2006, the PNB vs. NLRC and Ms. Erlinda Archinas
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 60573, which is the subject of the verified complaint of Atty. Roberto C.
Padilla (A. M. No. 06-44-CA-J). Such inaction in resolving motions for reconsideration for years in
contrast to the ninety day prescribed period in the Rules of Court constitutes gross inefficiency and serious
dereliction of duty that undermines the peoples faith in the judiciary. x x x
"There are also cases that were raffled to respondent Justice Asuncion before July 7, 2004, that remained
undecided. More so, there were several cases that were ordered transferred to Justice Monina ArevaloZenarosa but remained with, and unexplainedly decided by respondent Justice Asuncion, albeit beyond the
reglementary period. How such cases supposedly transferred to Justice Zenarosa remained or returned to
Justice Asuncion is not explained, obviously in contravention of Office Order No. 212-04-CG of the
Presiding Justice, CA (Annex E"). Indeed, respondent Justice Asuncion should have acted in such a
manner as to avoid suspicion in order to preserve faith in the administration of justice14
xxxxxxxxx
"As excuses or justification, respondent Justice stated that the delay in resolving cases is partly due to the
heavy initial caseloads of CA justices, the continuous raffling of new cases and the re-raffling of old cases
handled by promoted and retired CA justices. We find this position unacceptable. It is necessary for
newly-appointed justices to be assigned initial caseloads. No one is exempted. Further, in the raffling and
re-raffling of subsequent cases, these are more or less equally distributed to all justices. Hence, not only
respondent Justice, but all CA Justices are swamped with cases. This, however, is not a reason to violate
the clear mandate in the Constitution and the Rules of Court to decide cases promptly and resolve motions
for reconsideration within their reglementary period. x x x

reliance on Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 16 decided in 1988, to justify
the issuance of the two resolutions constitutes gross ignorance of the law, considering that the ruling
thereon was set aside by the Supreme Court in 1993 in the case of Santiago v. Vasquez 17. Further, he
averred that the Eternal Gardens ruling was superseded by Rule 65, Section 7 of the Rules of Court (1997
Rules of Civil Procedure) which states that "the petition [in the Supreme Court or in the Court of Appeals]
shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent from further proceeding in the case."
"Respondent Justice Asuncion stressed that the July 24, 2001 and October 30, 2001 resolutions were the
collegial acts of the First Division of the Court of Appeals, composed of three justices, unanimously
approved by them after due deliberation, and not the acts of respondent justice alone. He denied that the
July 24, 2001 resolution was, in fact, a TRO and maintained that the purpose thereof was merely to remind
the parties to observe the status quo while PNBs motion for reconsideration was pending resolution. He
also claimed that complainant Padilla mistook the October 30, 2001 resolution as extending the TRO,
whereas there was no indication in the July 24, 2001 resolution that a TRO was ever granted. Respondent
Justice stressed that the admonition to the parties to maintain the status quo was merely directory in view
of the pending motion in the CA, following the principle of hierarchy of courts. Respondent justice cited
Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corporation v. CA, Ibid., as basis for his action in issuing the July 24,
2001 and October 30, 2001 resolutions, which directed the parties to maintain the status quo pending
resolution of PNBs motion for reconsideration.
"We are not convinced. The July 24, 2001 resolution was in fact and in reality essentially a TRO and the
October 30, 2001 resolution effectively extended the same indefinitely. This dispositive portion of the July
24, 2001 resolution clearly states:

"Again, respondent Justice attributes his admitted delay in resolving pending motions for reconsideration
to various administrative functions assigned to him by the Court or Presiding Justice that took much of his
time and attention. x x x

WHEREFORE, to prevent irreparable injury, the public respondent is temporarily enjoined from
implementing the assailed Writ of Execution dated June 19, 2001. The parties are ordered to maintain the
status quo in this case pending the resolution of the petitioners motion for reconsideration.

"We are not impressed or swayed that these administrative functions greatly burdened respondent Justice
to the extent that he failed to discharge the basic duty of a justice with diligence and efficiency. It is
evident that such additional tasks are seasonal in nature, hence, need not consume too much of his time to
the detriment of pending cases. x x x

In the second case, A.M. No. 06-44-CA-J, the findings of the Investigating Justice are, as follows:

"Technically, status quo is "defined as the last actual, peaceful and uncontested status that precedes the
actual controversy, that which is existing at the time of the filing of the case" 18 However, the Supreme
Court has ruled that a status quo ante order has "the nature of a temporary restraining order" 19. Thus, the
decretal portion of the resolution of July 24, 2001, specifically ordered that the public respondent is
temporarily enjoined from implementing the assailed writ of execution. Respondent justice must be
playing with words. When a judge or justice uses technical or legal terms with a well-defined meaning,
such as a temporary restraining order or a status quo order, he must have intended those meaning; he
cannot impute a "directory" meaning to confuse the parties. x x x On the other hand, he ought to know that
a temporary restraining order cannot exist indefinitely; it has a lifetime of a non-extendible period of sixty
days and automatically expired on the sixtieth day 20. No judicial declaration that it has expired is
necessary21, and, the lower courts, including the Court of Appeals, have no discretion to extend the same 22.
A second TRO by the Court of Appeals after the expiration of the sixty day period is a patent nullity.23

"Complainant Padilla contends that respondent Justice Asuncion committed gross ignorance of the law in
issuing the October 30, 2001 resolution which extended indefinitely the duration of the TRO issued on
July 24, 2001, by ordering the parties to maintain the status quo, pending resolution of the PNBs motion
for reconsideration, in violation of Rule 58, Section 5 of the Rules of Court. Atty. Padilla further contends
that respondents failure to speedily resolve PNBs motion for reconsideration dated June 13, 2001,
Archinas motion for reconsideration dated November 5, 2001 and her numerous motions for early
resolution thereof constitute culpable dereliction of duty. Atty. Padilla stressed that respondent Justices

"Respondent Justice cannot seek refuge behind the Eternal Garden case to justify the October 30, 2001
resolution. The Eternal Garden case involves a petition for certiorari filed before the Supreme Court,
which could issue a temporary restraining order or a status quo order effective indefinitely or until further
orders (Rule 58, Section 5, par. 4, Rules of Court. On the other hand, a temporary restraining order issued
by the Court of Appeals is effective only for sixty days. (Ibid.) Hence, when respondent Justice Asuncion
issued the October 30, 2001 resolution ordering the parties to maintain the status quo pending the
resolution of PNBs motion for reconsideration, he extended the restraining order

"Consequently, respondent Justice Asuncion must be reminded that decision-making is the primordial duty
of a member of the bench. All other tasks must give way thereto. What is alarming is that respondent
Justice seemed to have reveled in his extra-curricular activities of spearheading various celebrations and
events that are not judicial functions. These cannot take precedence over decision-making." 15

until respondent could act on the PNB motion for reconsideration which he did only as late as August 7,
2006, a glaring five years from submission. His "interest" in the case is "manifest" in that, despite his
assignment to Cebu City on July 7, 2004, he did not unload the case to Justice Zenarosa. (Office Order
No. 212-04-CG, dated July 7, 2004). Worse, he recalled the case upon his return to the CA Manila station.
(Underscoring supplied.)
"We agree with complainant Padilla that the deliberate act of respondent Justice Asuncion in extending
indefinitely the temporary restraining order or the status quo order pending resolution of PNBs motion for
reconsideration, relying on the Eternal Gardens Memorial Park case, betrays his culpable gross ignorance
of the law. x x x
"x x x Judges are expected to exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural
laws. They must know the laws and apply them properly in all good faith. Judicial competence requires no
less. Unfamiliarity with the rules is a sign of incompetence. Basic rules must be at the palm of his hand. x
x x When a judge displays utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he erodes the confidence of the public in
the courts. Ignorance of the law is the mainspring of injustice. 24 Worse, respondent justices ignorance of
procedural law is exacerbated by his sloth in resolving PNBs motion for reconsideration (See
Garchitorena case, 422 Phil. 246 [2001], on reconsideration, 426 Phil. 01 [2002]) To compound matters,
Ms. Archinas motion for reconsideration date November 5, 2001, was not resolved at all." 25
THE COURTS RULING
We adopt the findings of the Investigating Justice.
The Constitution mandates lower collegiate courts to decide or resolve cases or matters within twelve
months from date of submission. 26 Section 3, Rule 52 of the Revised Rules of Court requires motions for
reconsideration to be resolved within ninety days. Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct provides that "(J)udges shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved
decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness."
Indeed, the essence of the judicial function, as expressed in Section 1, Rule 135 of the Revised Rules of
Court is that "justice shall be impartially administered without unnecessary delay."
In Arap v. Judge Amir Mustafa,27 We held that:
The Court has constantly impressed upon judges the need to decide cases promptly and expeditiously, for
it cannot be gainsaid that justice delayed is justice denied. Delay in the disposition of cases undermines
the peoples faith and confidence in the judiciary. Hence, judges are enjoined to decide cases with
dispatch. Their failure to do so constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative
sanction against them.
The record shows that, as of September 30, 2006, the respondent had not resolved seventy-one (71)
motions for reconsideration within the prescribed ninety-day period, and he had resolved one hundred
seventy-nine (179) motions for reconsideration beyond the reglementary period. As of the same date,
eighty-two (82) cases submitted for decision were still undecided, even after the lapse of the twelve-month
period prescribed by the Constitution. He had also decided four hundred nine (409) cases beyond the oneyear period.

Notably, of the seventy-one (71) motions for reconsideration pending resolution, forty-six were filed in
2004 or earlier, with one dating all the way back to 2000. Five were filed in 2001, sixteen in 2002, ten in
2003, and thirteen in 2004. Respondents proffered justification is that the delay was caused by the
reorganization of the CA, his assignment to the CA Cebu Station and his transfer back to Manila which,
allegedly, caused "some confusion" in the assignment of cases and "a lapse in the monitoring system." The
explanation miserably fails to persuade because the CA reorganization took place only in 2004, and at that
time, there were at least thirty-two (32) motions for reconsideration crying out for resolution..
This intolerable inaction is aggravated by misrepresentation. Upon his assignment to the CA Cebu Station,
respondent listed only nine (9) cases allegedly unresolved by and pending with him. The findings of the
Investigator belie this assertion.
The excuse that respondent was burdened by a heavy caseload, owing to the cases initially assigned to
him, those raffled daily and those re-raffled from among the cases originally handled by promoted or
retired justices, must also fall flat. As aptly stated by the Investigating Justice, other CA justices are
likewise subjected to such a heavy caseload, and yet, have not incurred such inexcusable delay. As to
respondents other administrative assignments, including organizing special events, the respondent should
only be reminded that decision-making is the primordial and most important duty of a member of the
judiciary.28
The delay incurred by respondent Justice Asuncion in deciding or resolving the numerous cases and
matters mentioned above is, therefore, unjustified. Even in the case of PNB v. NLRC and Archinas alone,
the respondents failure to resolve PNBs June 13, 2001 motion for reconsideration until after the lapse of
more than five (5) years, despite Archinas four (4) motions urging immediate resolution of the same, truly
smacks of gross inefficiency and serious dereliction of duty. Worse, it invites suspicion of malice, and
casts doubt on the justices fairness and integrity.
We have already ruled that the failure of a judge to decide a case within the required period constitutes
gross inefficiency29 which, if the case remains undecided for years, would become serious misconduct that
would justify dismissal from the service.30
In the case of respondent Justice Asuncion, the prolonged delay in deciding or resolving such a staggering
number of cases/matters assigned to him, borders on serious misconduct which could subject the
respondent to the maximum administrative sanction.
In A. M. No. 06-44-CA-J, We agree with the Investigating Justice that respondents "deliberate act of
extending indefinitely the temporary restraining order or the status quo order pending resolution of PNBs
motion for reconsideration, relying on the Eternal Gardens Memorial Park case, betrays his culpable gross
ignorance of the law."
As correctly put by Investigating Justice Pardo, Eternal Gardens is totally inapplicable. The July 24, 2001
resolution, which "temporarily enjoined" the public respondent from implementing the assailed writ of
execution, was a temporary restraining order, regardless of the nomenclature Justice Asuncion used to
characterize it. As such, its full life span can only be sixty (60) days. Section 5, par. 4, Rule 58 of the
Rules of Court is explicit: the Court of Appeals may issue a temporary restraining order only for a limited
period of sixty days which cannot be renewed or extended. After sixty days, the restraining order
immediately ceases, without need of any judicial order terminating it.

The October 30, 2001 resolution, which ordered the maintenance of the status quo, effectively extended
the temporary restraining order, in complete defiance of the aforesaid Rule. It was not a writ of
preliminary injunction, because respondent Justice Asuncion himself disclaims that it was such. Besides,
in the event of an injunctive writ, an injunction bond is required, unless exempted by the Court (Section 4,
Rule 58, Rules of Court). Furthermore, there would have been no cause to issue such a writ, because
earlier, on May 28, 2001, respondent Justice Asuncion had already dismissed the principal action for
certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
Yet, the purpose was clear; the October 30, 2001 resolution was intended to extend the effectivity of the
July 24, 2001 restraining order. It was, as the Investigating Justice would characterize it, "a renewed or
second temporary restraining order proscribed by the rule and extant jurisprudence."
Such failure to follow basic legal commands embodied in the law and the Rules constitutes gross
ignorance of the law, from which no one is excused, and surely not a judge. 31 In Genil v. Rivera,32 We
declared that judges owe it to the public to be knowledgeable, hence they are expected to have more than
just a modicum of acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules.

Using this pronouncement as the norm, We now must consider the totality of the charges against the
respondent, as well as the convergence of attendant and subsequent events. On May 28, 2001, with
respondent Justice as ponente, the First Division of the Court of Appeals dismissed the PNB petition for
certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, affirming in its entirety the
decision of the National Labor Relations Commission. On June 13, 2001, PNB filed a motion for
reconsideration. On June 25, 2001, Archinas (private respondent in the petition for certiorari) filed her
opposition to PNBs motion for reconsideration. On July 24, 2001, acting upon PNBs urgent motion for
issuance of a TRO, respondent issued the resolution enjoining the public respondent from implementing
the Writ of Execution. On October 30, 2001, the resolution ordering the maintenance of the status quo was
issued. On November 5, 2001, Archinas filed her motion seeking reconsideration of the October 30, 2001
resolution. Archinas filed four (4) urgent motions for early resolution of the pending motion/s for
reconsideration, on December 28, 2001, June 13, 2002, September 24, 2002, and August 23, 2005,
Meantime, on July 5, 2004, respondent Justice Asuncion was assigned to CA Cebu Station. With this
transfer, respondents caseload was assigned to Justice Zenarosa. On November 3, 2004, respondent was
reassigned back to Manila. It was only on August 7, 2006 that respondent finally resolved the PNB motion
for reconsideration.

Citing Castanos v. Escano, Jr.,34 this Court, in Macalintal v. Teh,35 had occasion to state:

From this sequence of events, a number of questions arise. If the respondent could issue the resolutions of
July 24, 2001 and October 30, 2001 why did respondent not simply resolve the PNB motion for
reconsideration of June 13, 2001? After all, he finally did so on August 7, 2006, with a mere three-page
resolution. Why did it take more than five years to resolve this PNB motion? Why were the four motions
for early resolution never addressed? If the Manila cases of respondent Justice Asuncion were
"automatically assigned to Justice Zenarosa," how did Justice Asuncion continue to hold on to this case
upon his reassignment in Manila?

"When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law or a
principle in the discharge of his functions, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the
position and title he holds or he is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad
faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority. In both cases, the judges dismissal is in order."

The Investigating Justice supplies the answer in his Report thus: "His (respondents) interest in the case
is manifest in that, despite his assignment in Cebu City on July 7, 2004, he did not unload the case to
Justice Zenarosa (Office Order No. 212-04-CG). Worse, he recalled the case upon his return to the CA
Manila station."

The respondent Justice would seek to extricate himself from any liability by invoking the convenient
excuse that the resolutions of July 24, 2001 and October 30, 2001 were the collegial acts of the First
Division of the Court of Appeals, composed of three justices, and not the acts of respondent justice alone.
This, in fact, was the only significant subject dwelt on by respondents lawyer in the cross-examination of
the complainant Atty. Padilla. What respondent Justice Asuncion, in effect, is saying is that if he, as
ponente in PNB v. NLRC and Archinas, were to be adjudged guilty of gross ignorance of the law, then the
two other justices in the Division should be held equally culpable. Perhaps, under ordinary circumstances,
such logic would be impeccable.

To the Court, these are badges of bad faith and manifest undue interest attributable only to the respondent,
and not to the other two justices of the CA Division. Accordingly, only the respondent must be made to
suffer the consequences.

While a judge is presumed to act with regularity and good faith in the performance of judicial functions, a
blatant disregard of the clear and unmistakable provisions of a statute, as well as Supreme Court circulars
enjoining strict compliance therewith, upends this presumption and subjects the magistrate to
administrative sanctions.33

However, what We said in Guerrero v. Villamor36 is instructive:

"For liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order, decision or actuation of the judge in the
performance of official duties must not only be found erroneous but, most importantly, it must also be
established that he was moved by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred, or some other like motive.37 x x x
"Conversely, a charge for either ignorance of the law or rendering an unjust judgment will not prosper
against a judge acting in good faith. Absent the element of bad faith, an erroneous judgment cannot be the
basis of a charge for any said offenses, mere error of judgment not being a ground for disciplinary
proceedings."38

Besides, the five-year delay in the resolution of the PNB motion for reconsideration would already
constitute serious misconduct that would justify dismissal from the service 39
Administrative Penalties
In A. M. No. 06-6-08-CA, respondent is charged with undue delay in rendering a decision or order. Under
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, 40 undue delay in rendering a decision or order is classified as a less serious
charge which may be penalized by (1) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less
than one nor more than three months; or (2) a fine of more than P10,000 but not exceeding P20,000.
On the other hand, gross ignorance of the law, for which respondent is being faulted in A. M. No. 06-44CA-J, is considered a serious charge, and carries the penalty of (1) dismissal from the service, forfeiture of
all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or
appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations: provided,
however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits; (2) suspension from

office without salary and other benefits for more than three but not exceeding six months; or (3) a fine of
more than P20,000 but not exceeding P40,000.
The Investigating Justice recommends the maximum penalty for each of the two offenses.
WHEREFORE, in A. M. No. 06-6-08, for having incurred undue delay in the disposal of pending motions
for reconsideration in several cases, as recommended by the Investigating Justice, Associate Justice Elvi
John S. Asuncion of the Court of Appeals is SUSPENDED from office without pay, allowances and other
monetary benefits for a period of THREE MONTHS.
In A. M. No. 06-44-CA-J, for gross ignorance of the law and manifest undue interest, Associate Justice
Elvi John S. Asuncion of the Court of Appeals is hereby ordered DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE
with forfeiture of retirement benefits, except leave credits.
This Decision is final and immediately executory.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
A.M. No. MTJ-08-1695
April 16, 2008
(formerly OCA IPI 03-1380-MTJ)
JULIANITO
M.
SALVADOR, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE MANUEL Q. LIMSIACO, JR. and JOHN O. NEGROPRADO, Clerk of Court, both of the
4th MCTC, Valladolid-San Enrique-Pulupandan, Negros Occidental, respondents.
RES OLUTIO N
CORONA, J.:
This treats of the administrative complaint for obstruction of justice, undue delay in rendering a decision
and gross inefficiency filed by the complainant Julianito M. Salvador against respondent Judge Manuel Q.
Limsiaco, Jr.
In his affidavit-complaint,1 the complainant averred that, on October 21, 2001, he filed an ejectment
case2 in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Valladolid-San Enrique-Pulupandan, Negros
Occidental. Respondent judge presided over that court.
After the defendants filed their answer, the case was heard on February 13, 2002. As the parties failed to
amicably settle the case, respondent judge required them to submit their respective position papers. The
complainant submitted his position paper on March 15, 2002 while the defendants failed to do so.

After two months, the complainant moved for the early resolution of the case but the defendants opposed
it claiming respondent judge was yet to issue a pre-trial order defining the issues to be discussed in the
position papers.
Respondent judge did not act on the motion. Instead, he again required the complainant to submit a copy
of his position paper. According to the complainant, respondent judge lost the original copy of his position
paper. On November 4, 2002, he complied with respondent judges directive. He filed two more motions
for the early resolution of the case. Respondent judge did not resolve both motions.
On May 21, 2003, respondent judge finally rendered a decision dismissing the ejectment case for lack of
cause of action.3
The complainant filed a notice of appeal which the MCTC granted. On follow-up, however, he was
informed that the records had not yet been transmitted to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). He also
discovered that the MCTC's clerk of court, respondent John O. Negroprado, failed to attach his position
paper to the cases records and to issue a certificate on the completeness of said records.

We adopt the OCAs recommendations, with modification.

Under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the court shall render its judgment within 30 days after its receipt of
the parties position papers or the expiration of the period for filing the same,8 whichever comes first.
The record shows that during the February 13, 2002 hearing, the parties were given 30 days (or until
March 15, 2002) within which to submit their respective position papers. Only the complainant complied
with the order.
Despite the expiration of the period granted by the court, however, respondent judge failed to decide the
case. It was only after more than one year from the lapse of the prescribed period that he rendered his
decision.
A judges foremost consideration is the administration of justice. 9 Thus, he should follow the time limit set
for deciding cases.10

In his comment,4 respondent judge contended that the complainant's accusations were baseless. According
to him, he had already decided the case on May 21, 2003. It was not also true that he lost the original copy
of complainants position paper. He insisted he neither received nor saw the document.

The Constitution mandates that all cases or matters filed before all lower courts shall be decided or
resolved within 90 days from the time the case is submitted for decision. 11 Judges are enjoined to dispose
of the courts business promptly and expeditiously and decide cases within the period fixed by
law.12 Failure to comply within the mandated period constitutes a serious violation of the constitutional
right of the parties to a speedy disposition of their cases. 13 It also undermines the peoples faith and
confidence in the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it to disrepute. 14 Decision making, among other
duties, is the most important duty of a member of the bench.15

Regarding the complainants notice of appeal, respondent judge stated that he had in fact ordered the
transmittal of the records to the RTC. On the other hand, respondent Negroprado maintained that he
transmitted the complete records on June 16, 2003.5 He, however, admitted that he failed to issue the
certificate relating to the completeness of the documents. 6

Under Rule 140, Section 9 (1), as amended by Administrative Matter No. 01-8-10-SC, respondent judges
undue delay in rendering a decision is classified as a less serious offense. It carries the penalty of
suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one nor more than three
months, or a fine of more than P10,000 but not exceeding P20,000.16

The complainant refuted respondents defense. He insisted the records of the case were transmitted to the
RTC only on July 10, 2003 as evidenced by the stamp mark made and initialed by the RTC's receiving
clerk.

Regarding respondent Negroprado, the complainant failed to provide sufficient evidence to show that he
had maliciously retained the original copy of the position paper or that he had custody of the same. The
complainant submitted the original copy of his position paper on March 15, 2002 while Negroprado
assumed his position only on May 5, 2003. Considering, however, that he failed to immediately transmit
the records of the case to the RTC and to certify their completeness upon transmittal, he is sternly warned
to be more circumspect in the discharge of his duties.

The complaint was amended to include Negroprado for undue delay in transmitting the complete records
of the case to the RTC and for not issuing the certificate.

In a report,7 the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) gave credence to the complainants version and
recommended that:
1. the case be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter;
2. respondent Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr., 4 th MCTC, Valladolid-San Enrique-Pulupandan,
Negros Occidental be administratively liable for undue delay in rendering a decision and
be FINED in the amount ofP1,000 with a warning that a repetition of similar infraction be
dealt with more severely; and[,]
3. respondent Clerk of Court John O. Negroprado, be ADMONISHED to be more circumspect
in the discharge of his functions.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr. is hereby found GUILTY of undue delay in
rendering a decision. Accordingly, he is FINED P20,000 with a warning that a repetition of the same or
similar infraction in the future shall be dealt with more severely. On the other hand, respondent Clerk of
Court John O. Negroprado is hereby sternly WARNED to be more circumspect in the discharge of his
functions.
SO ORDERED.