Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232,

5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am 6:00 pm 7-Flr.
Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE.

Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993

MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner,
vs.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.
R E SO L U T I O N

REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and
desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of the same tenor
as that of annexes "A" and "B" (of said petition) and to perpetually
prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining
to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by
law."
The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as
follows:
Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.

DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on
Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning
Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration
Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special
Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage
to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the
Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children.
Call Marivic.
THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita,
Manila nr. US Embassy CLINIC, INC. 1 Tel. 521-7232;
521-7251; 522-2041; 521-0767
It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above
reproduced are champterous, unethical, demeaning of the law
profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in
the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of
the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said
advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as
hereinbefore quoted.
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of
publication of said advertisement at its instance, but claims that it
is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal
support services" through paralegals with the use of modern

computers and electronic machines. Respondent further argues

that assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the
act of advertising these services should be allowed supposedly
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State
Bar of Arizona, 2 reportedly decided by the United States Supreme
Court on June 7, 1977.
Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the
issues raised herein, we required the (1) Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar Association (PBA), (3) Philippine
Lawyers' Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Womens Lawyers' Circle
(WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers Association of the Philippines
(WLAP), and (6) Federacion International de Abogadas (FIDA) to
submit their respective position papers on the controversy and,
thereafter, their memoranda. 3 The said bar associations readily
responded and extended their valuable services and cooperation of
which this Court takes note with appreciation and gratitude.
The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether
or not the services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as
advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in either case,
whether the same can properly be the subject of the
advertisements herein complained of.
Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this
case, we deem it proper and enlightening to present hereunder
excerpts from the respective position papers adopted by the
aforementioned bar associations and the memoranda submitted by
them on the issues involved in this bar matter.

services", common sense would readily dictate that

the same are essentially without substantial
distinction. For who could deny that document
search, evidence gathering, assistance to layman
in need of basic institutional services from
government or non-government agencies like birth,
marriage, property, or business registration,
obtaining documents like clearance, passports,
local or foreign visas, constitutes practice of law?
xxx xxx xxx
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not
wish to make issue with respondent's foreign
citations. Suffice it to state that the IBP has made
its position manifest, to wit, that it strongly
opposes the view espoused by respondent (to the
effect that today it is alright to advertise one's
legal services).
The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms
its opposition to respondent's act of establishing a
"legal clinic" and of concomitantly advertising the
same through newspaper publications.
The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative
supervision of this Honorable Court to perpetually
restrain respondent from undertaking highly
unethical activities in the field of law practice as
aforedescribed. 4

1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:

xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which
respondent endeavored to distinguish the two
terms,i.e., "legal support services" vis-a-vis "legal

A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc."

gives the impression that respondent corporation is
being operated by lawyers and that it renders legal
services.

While the respondent repeatedly denies that it

offers legal services to the public, the
advertisements in question give the impression
that respondent is offering legal services. The
Petition in fact simply assumes this to be so, as
earlier mentioned, apparently because this (is) the
effect that the advertisements have on the reading
public.
The impression created by the advertisements in
question can be traced, first of all, to the very
name being used by respondent "The Legal
Clinic, Inc." Such a name, it is respectfully
submitted connotes the rendering of legal services
for legal problems, just like a medical clinic
connotes medical services for medical problems.
More importantly, the term "Legal Clinic" connotes
lawyers, as the term medical clinic connotes
doctors.
Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published
in the advertisements subject of the present case,
appears with (the) scale(s) of justice, which all the
more reinforces the impression that it is being
operated by members of the bar and that it offers
legal services. In addition, the advertisements in
question appear with a picture and name of a
person being represented as a lawyer from Guam,
and this practically removes whatever doubt may
still remain as to the nature of the service or
services being offered.
It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is
merely offering "legal support services" as claimed
by it, or whether it offers legal services as any
lawyer actively engaged in law practice does. And
it becomes unnecessary to make a distinction
between "legal services" and "legal support

services," as the respondent would have it. The

advertisements in question leave no room for
doubt in the minds of the reading public that legal
services are being offered by lawyers, whether true
or not.
B. The advertisements in question are meant to
induce the performance of acts contrary to law,
morals, public order and public policy.
It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims,
the advertisements in question are only meant to
inform the general public of the services being
offered by it. Said advertisements, however,
emphasize to Guam divorce, and any law student
ought to know that under the Family Code, there is
only one instance when a foreign divorce is
recognized, and that is:
Article 26. . . .
Where a marriage between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine Law.
It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code
(defines) a marriage as follows:
Article 1. Marriage is special
contract of permanent
union between a man and woman
entered into accordance with law

for the establishment of conjugal

and family life. It is the foundation
of the family and an inviolable
social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are
governed by law and not subject to
stipulation, except that marriage
settlements may fix the property
relation during the marriage within
the limits provided by this Code.
By simply reading the questioned advertisements,
it is obvious that the message being conveyed is
that Filipinos can avoid the legal consequences of a
marriage celebrated in accordance with our law, by
simply going to Guam for a divorce. This is not only
misleading, but encourages, or serves to induce,
violation of Philippine law. At the very least, this
can be considered "the dark side" of legal practice,
where certain defects in Philippine laws are
exploited for the sake of profit. At worst, this is
outright malpractice.
Rule 1.02. A lawyer shall not
counsel or abet activities aimed at
defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.
In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that
advertisements such as that shown in Annex "A" of
the Petition, which contains a cartoon of a motor
vehicle with the words "Just Married" on its bumper
and seems to address those planning a "secret
marriage," if not suggesting a "secret marriage,"
makes light of the "special contract of permanent
union," the inviolable social institution," which is
how the Family Code describes marriage, obviously
to emphasize its sanctity and inviolability. Worse,

this particular advertisement appears to encourage

marriages celebrated in secrecy, which is
suggestive of immoral publication of applications
for a marriage license.
If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be
reviewed, it can readily be concluded that the
above impressions one may gather from the
advertisements in question are accurate. The
Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion example alone
confirms what the advertisements suggest. Here it
can be seen that criminal acts are being
encouraged or committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas)
with impunity simply because the jurisdiction of
Philippine courts does not extend to the place
where the crime is committed.
Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal
support services" respondent offers do not
constitute legal services as commonly understood,
the advertisements in question give the impression
that respondent corporation is being operated by
lawyers and that it offers legal services, as earlier
discussed. Thus, the only logical consequence is
that, in the eyes of an ordinary newspaper reader,
members of the bar themselves are encouraging or
inducing the performance of acts which are
contrary to law, morals, good customs and the
public good, thereby destroying and demeaning
the integrity of the Bar.
xxx xxx xxx
It is respectfully submitted that respondent should
be enjoined from causing the publication of the
advertisements in question, or any other
advertisements similar thereto. It is also submitted

that respondent should be prohibited from further

performing or offering some of the services it
presently offers, or, at the very least, from offering
such services to the public in general.
The IBP is aware of the fact that providing
computerized legal research, electronic data
gathering, storage and retrieval, standardized legal
forms, investigators for gathering of evidence, and
like services will greatly benefit the legal profession
and should not be stifled but instead encouraged.
However, when the conduct of such business by
non-members of the Bar encroaches upon the
practice of law, there can be no choice but to
prohibit such business.
Admittedly, many of the services involved in the
case at bar can be better performed by specialists
in other fields, such as computer experts, who by
reason of their having devoted time and effort
exclusively to such field cannot fulfill the exacting
requirements for admission to the Bar. To prohibit
them from "encroaching" upon the legal profession
will deny the profession of the great benefits and
advantages of modern technology. Indeed, a
lawyer using a computer will be doing better than a
lawyer using a typewriter, even if both are (equal)
in skill.
Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be
careful not to allow or tolerate the illegal practice
of law in any form, not only for the protection of
members of the Bar but also, and more
importantly, for the protection of the public.
Technological development in the profession may
be encouraged without tolerating, but instead
ensuring prevention of illegal practice.

There might be nothing objectionable if respondent

is allowed to perform all of its services, but only if
such services are made available exclusively to
members of the Bench and Bar. Respondent would
then be offering technical assistance, not legal
services. Alternatively, the more difficult task of
carefully distinguishing between which service may
be offered to the public in general and which
should be made available exclusively to members
of the Bar may be undertaken. This, however, may
require further proceedings because of the factual
considerations involved.
It must be emphasized, however, that some of
respondent's services ought to be prohibited
outright, such as acts which tend to suggest or
induce celebration abroad of marriages which are
bigamous or otherwise illegal and void under
Philippine law. While respondent may not be
prohibited from simply disseminating information
regarding such matters, it must be required to
include, in the information given, a disclaimer that
it is not authorized to practice law, that certain
course of action may be illegal under Philippine
law, that it is not authorized or capable of
rendering a legal opinion, that a lawyer should be
consulted before deciding on which course of
action to take, and that it cannot recommend any
particular lawyer without subjecting itself to
possible sanctions for illegal practice of law.
If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising
should be directed exclusively at members of the
Bar, with a clear and unmistakable disclaimer that
it is not authorized to practice law or perform legal
services.

The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot

be ignored. But nobody should be allowed to
represent himself as a "paralegal" for profit,
without such term being clearly defined by rule or
regulation, and without any adequate and effective
means of regulating his activities. Also, law
practice in a corporate form may prove to be
advantageous to the legal profession, but before
allowance of such practice may be considered, the
corporation's Article of Incorporation and By-laws
must conform to each and every provision of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and the Rules of
Court. 5
2. Philippine Bar Association:
xxx xxx xxx.
Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the
practice of law but engaged in giving legal support
services to lawyers and laymen, through
experienced paralegals, with the use of modern
computers and electronic machines" (pars. 2 and
3, Comment). This is absurd. Unquestionably,
respondent's acts of holding out itself to the public
under the trade name "The Legal Clinic, Inc.," and
soliciting employment for its enumerated services
fall within the realm of a practice which thus yields
itself to the regulatory powers of the Supreme
Court. For respondent to say that it is merely
engaged in paralegal work is to stretch credulity.
Respondent's own commercial advertisement
which announces a certain Atty. Don Parkinson to
be handling the fields of law belies its pretense.
From all indications, respondent "The Legal Clinic,
Inc." is offering and rendering legal
services through its reserve of lawyers. It has been
held that the practice of law is not limited to the

conduct of cases in court, but includes drawing of

deeds, incorporation, rendering opinions, and
advising clients as to their legal right and then take
them to an attorney and ask the latter to look after
their case in court See Martin, Legal and Judicial
Ethics, 1984 ed., p. 39).
It is apt to recall that only natural persons can
engage in the practice of law, and such limitation
cannot be evaded by a corporation employing
competent lawyers to practice for it. Obviously, this
is the scheme or device by which respondent "The
Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself to the public and
solicits employment of its legal services. It is
an odious vehicle for deception, especially so when
the public cannot ventilate any grievance
for malpractice against the business conduit.
Precisely, the limitation of practice of law to
persons who have been duly admitted as members
of the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised Rules of
Court) is to subject the members to
the discipline of the Supreme Court. Although
respondent uses its business name, the persons
and the lawyers who act for it are subject to court
discipline. The practice of law is not a profession
open to all who wish to engage in it nor can it be
assigned to another (See 5 Am. Jur. 270). It is
a personal right limited to persons who have
qualified themselves under the law. It follows that
not only respondent but also all the persons who
are acting for respondent are the persons engaged
in unethical law practice. 6
3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:
The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in
answer to the issues stated herein, are wit:

1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of

law;
2. Such practice is unauthorized;
3. The advertisements complained of are not only
unethical, but also misleading and patently
immoral; and
4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to
supress and punish the Legal Clinic and its
corporate officers for its unauthorized practice of
law and for its unethical, misleading and immoral
advertising.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the
practice of law. It claims that it merely renders
"legal support services" to answers, litigants and
the general public as enunciated in the Primary
Purpose Clause of its Article(s) of Incorporation.
(See pages 2 to 5 of Respondent's Comment). But
its advertised services, as enumerated above,
clearly and convincingly show that it is indeed
engaged in law practice, albeit outside of court.
As advertised, it offers the general public its
advisory services on Persons and Family Relations
Law, particularly regarding foreign divorces,
annulment of marriages, secret marriages, absence
and adoption; Immigration Laws, particularly on
visa related problems, immigration problems; the
Investments Law of the Philippines and such other
related laws.

Its advertised services unmistakably require the

application of the aforesaid law, the legal principles
and procedures related thereto, the legal advices
based thereon and which activities call for legal
training, knowledge and experience.
Applying the test laid down by the Court in the
aforecited Agrava Case, the activities of
respondent fall squarely and are embraced in what
lawyers and laymen equally term as "the practice
of law." 7
4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:
In resolving, the issues before this Honorable
Court, paramount consideration should be given to
the protection of the general public from the
danger of being exploited by unqualified persons or
entities who may be engaged in the practice of law.
At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take
a rigorous four-year course of study on top of a
four-year bachelor of arts or sciences course and
then to take and pass the bar examinations. Only
then, is a lawyer qualified to practice law.
While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many
jurisdiction as an aid to the administration of
justice, there are in those jurisdictions, courses of
study and/or standards which would qualify these
paralegals to deal with the general public as such.
While it may now be the opportune time to
establish these courses of study and/or standards,
the fact remains that at present, these do not exist
in the Philippines. In the meantime, this Honorable
Court may decide to make measures to protect the
general public from being exploited by those who
may be dealing with the general public in the guise

of being "paralegals" without being qualified to do

so.

corporation in the aforementioned "Starweek"

article." 9

In the same manner, the general public should also

be protected from the dangers which may be
brought about by advertising of legal services.
While it appears that lawyers are prohibited under
the present Code of Professional Responsibility
from advertising, it appears in the instant case that
legal services are being advertised not by lawyers
but by an entity staffed by "paralegals." Clearly,
measures should be taken to protect the general
public from falling prey to those who advertise
legal services without being qualified to offer such
services. 8

5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:

A perusal of the questioned advertisements of

Respondent, however, seems to give the
impression that information regarding validity of
marriages, divorce, annulment of marriage,
immigration, visa extensions, declaration of
absence, adoption and foreign investment, which
are in essence, legal matters , will be given to
them if they avail of its services. The Respondent's
name The Legal Clinic, Inc. does not help
matters. It gives the impression again that
Respondent will or can cure the legal problems
brought to them. Assuming that Respondent is, as
claimed, staffed purely by paralegals, it also gives
the misleading impression that there are lawyers
involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc., as there are
doctors in any medical clinic, when only
"paralegals" are involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc.
Respondent's allegations are further belied by the
very admissions of its President and majority
stockholder, Atty. Nogales, who gave an insight on
the structure and main purpose of Respondent

Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly

advertisements to solicit cases for the purpose of
gain which, as provided for under the above cited
law, (are) illegal and against the Code of
Professional Responsibility of lawyers in this
country.
Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it
is an advertisement to solicit cases, but it is illegal
in that in bold letters it announces that the Legal
Clinic, Inc., could work out/cause the celebration of
a secret marriage which is not only illegal but
immoral in this country. While it is advertised that
one has to go to said agency and pay P560 for a
valid marriage it is certainly fooling the public for
valid marriages in the Philippines are solemnized
only by officers authorized to do so under the law.
And to employ an agency for said purpose of
contracting marriage is not necessary.
No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada
and other countries the trend is towards allowing
lawyers to advertise their special skills to enable
people to obtain from qualified practitioners legal
services for their particular needs can justify the
use of advertisements such as are the subject
matter of the petition, for one (cannot) justify an
illegal act even by whatever merit the illegal act
may serve. The law has yet to be amended so that
such act could become justifiable.
We submit further that these advertisements that
seem to project that secret marriages and divorce

are possible in this country for a fee, when in fact it

is not so, are highly reprehensible.
It would encourage people to consult this clinic
about how they could go about having a secret
marriage here, when it cannot nor should ever be
attempted, and seek advice on divorce, where in
this country there is none, except under the Code
of Muslim Personal Laws in the Philippines. It is also
against good morals and is deceitful because it
falsely represents to the public to be able to do
that which by our laws cannot be done (and) by our
Code of Morals should not be done.
In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the
Supreme Court held that solicitation for clients by
an attorney by circulars of advertisements, is
unprofessional, and offenses of this character
justify permanent elimination from the Bar. 10
6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:
xxx xxx xxx
1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the
practice of law, such as management consultancy
firms or travel agencies, whether run by lawyers or
not, perform the services rendered by Respondent
does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that
Respondent is not unlawfully practicing law. In the
same vein, however, the fact that the business of
respondent (assuming it can be engaged in
independently of the practice of law) involves
knowledge of the law does not necessarily make
respondent guilty of unlawful practice of law.

. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . .
acting as a consultant can render
effective service unless he is
familiar with such statutes and
regulations. He must be careful not
to suggest a course of conduct
which the law forbids. It
seems . . . .clear that (the
consultant's) knowledge of the law,
and his use of that knowledge as a
factor in determining what
measures he shall recommend, do
not constitute the practice of law . .
. . It is not only presumed that all
men know the law, but it is a fact
that most men have considerable
acquaintance with broad features
of the law . . . . Our knowledge of
the law accurate or inaccurate
moulds our conduct not only when
we are acting for ourselves, but
when we are serving others.
Bankers, liquor dealers and laymen
generally possess rather precise
knowledge of the laws touching
their particular business or
profession. A good example is the
architect, who must be familiar
with zoning, building and fire
prevention codes, factory and
tenement house statutes, and who
draws plans and specification in
harmony with the law. This is not
practicing law.
But suppose the architect, asked by
his client to omit a fire tower,
replies that it is required by the

statute. Or the industrial relations

expert cites, in support of some
measure that he recommends, a
decision of the National Labor
Relations Board. Are they
practicing law? In my opinion, they
are not, provided no separate fee is
charged for the legal advice or
information, and the legal question
is subordinate and incidental to a
major non-legal problem.
It is largely a matter of degree and
of custom.
If it were usual for one intending to
erect a building on his land to
engage a lawyer to advise him and
the architect in respect to the
building code and the like, then an
architect who performed this
function would probably be
considered to be trespassing on
territory reserved for licensed
attorneys. Likewise, if the industrial
relations field had been preempted by lawyers, or custom
placed a lawyer always at the
elbow of the lay personnel man.
But this is not the case. The most
important body of the industrial
relations experts are the officers
and business agents of the labor
unions and few of them are
lawyers. Among the larger
corporate employers, it has been
the practice for some years to
delegate special responsibility in

employee matters to a
management group chosen for
their practical knowledge and skill
in such matter, and without regard
to legal thinking or lack of it. More
recently, consultants like the
defendants have the same service
that the larger employers get from
their own specialized staff.
The handling of industrial relations
is growing into a recognized
profession for which appropriate
courses are offered by our leading
universities. The court should be
very cautious about declaring
[that] a widespread, wellestablished method of conducting
business is unlawful, or that the
considerable class of men who
customarily perform a certain
function have no right to do so, or
that the technical education given
by our schools cannot be used by
the graduates in their business.
In determining whether a man is
practicing law, we should consider
his work for any particular client or
customer, as a whole. I can imagine
defendant being engaged primarily
to advise as to the law defining his
client's obligations to his
employees, to guide his client's
obligations to his employees, to
guide his client along the path
charted by law. This, of course,
would be the practice of the law.

10

But such is not the fact in the case

before me. Defendant's primarily
efforts are along economic and
psychological lines. The law only
provides the frame within which he
must work, just as the zoning code
limits the kind of building the limits
the kind of building the architect
may plan. The incidental legal
advice or information defendant
may give, does not transform his
activities into the practice of law.
Let me add that if, even as a minor
feature of his work, he performed
services which are customarily
reserved to members of the bar, he
would be practicing law. For
instance, if as part of a welfare
program, he drew employees' wills.
Another branch of defendant's
work is the representations of the
employer in the adjustment of
grievances and in collective
bargaining, with or without a
mediator. This is not per se the
practice of law. Anyone may use an
agent for negotiations and may
select an agent particularly skilled
in the subject under discussion,
and the person appointed is free to
accept the employment whether or
not he is a member of the bar.
Here, however, there may be an
exception where the business turns
on a question of law. Most real
estate sales are negotiated by
brokers who are not lawyers. But if

the value of the land depends on a

disputed right-of-way and the
principal role of the negotiator is to
assess the probable outcome of the
dispute and persuade the opposite
party to the same opinion, then it
may be that only a lawyer can
accept the assignment. Or if a
controversy between an employer
and his men grows from differing
interpretations of a contract, or of a
statute, it is quite likely that
defendant should not handle it. But
I need not reach a definite
conclusion here, since the situation
is not presented by the proofs.
Defendant also appears to
represent the employer before
administrative agencies of the
federal government, especially
before trial examiners of the
National Labor Relations Board. An
agency of the federal government,
acting by virtue of an authority
granted by the Congress, may
regulate the representation of
parties before such agency. The
State of New Jersey is without
power to interfere with such
determination or to forbid
representation before the agency
by one whom the agency admits.
The rules of the National Labor
Relations Board give to a party the
right to appear in person, or by
counsel, or by other representative.
Rules and Regulations, September

11

11th, 1946, S. 203.31. 'Counsel'

here means a licensed attorney,
and ther representative' one not a
lawyer. In this phase of his work,
defendant may lawfully do
whatever the Labor Board allows,
even arguing questions purely
legal. (Auerbacher v. Wood, 53 A.
2d 800, cited in Statsky,
Introduction to Paralegalism
[1974], at pp. 154-156.).
1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person
engaged in a lawful calling (which may involve
knowledge of the law) is not engaged in the
practice of law provided that:
(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental
to a major non-legal problem;.
(b) The services performed are not customarily
reserved to members of the bar; .
(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice
or information.
All these must be considered in relation to the work
for any particular client as a whole.
1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and nonlawyer, the Code of Professional Responsibility
succintly states the rule of conduct:
Rule 15.08 A lawyer who is engaged in another
profession or occupation concurrently with the
practice of law shall make clear to his client

whether he is acting as a lawyer or in another

capacity.
1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic appears
to render wedding services (See Annex "A"
Petition). Services on routine, straightforward
marriages, like securing a marriage license, and
making arrangements with a priest or a judge, may
not constitute practice of law. However, if the
problem is as complicated as that described in "Rx
for Legal Problems" on the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby
Concepcion-Richard Gomez case, then what may
be involved is actually the practice of law. If a nonlawyer, such as the Legal Clinic, renders such
services then it is engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law.
1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give
information on divorce, absence, annulment of
marriage and visas (See Annexes "A" and "B"
Petition). Purely giving informational materials may
not constitute of law. The business is similar to that
of a bookstore where the customer buys materials
on the subject and determines on the subject and
determines by himself what courses of action to
take.
It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside
from purely giving information, the Legal Clinic's
paralegals may apply the law to the particular
problem of the client, and give legal advice. Such
would constitute unauthorized practice of law.
It cannot be claimed that the
publication of a legal text which
publication of a legal text which
purports to say what the law is
amount to legal practice. And the

12

mere fact that the principles or

rules stated in the text may be
accepted by a particular reader as
a solution to his problem does not
affect this. . . . . Apparently it is
urged that the conjoining of these
two, that is, the text and the forms,
with advice as to how the forms
should be filled out, constitutes the
unlawful practice of law. But that is
the situation with many approved
and accepted texts. Dacey's book
is sold to the public at large. There
is no personal contact or
relationship with a particular
individual. Nor does there exist
that relation of confidence and
trust so necessary to the status of
attorney and client. THIS IS THE
ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL PRACTICE
THE REPRESENTATION AND
ADVISING OF A PARTICULAR
PERSON IN A PARTICULAR
SITUATION. At most the book
assumes to offer general advice on
common problems, and does not
purport to give personal advice on
a specific problem peculiar to a
designated or readily identified
person. Similarly the defendant's
publication does not purport to
give personal advice on a specific
problem peculiar to a designated or
readily identified person in a
particular situation in their
publication and sale of the kits,
such publication and sale did not
constitutes the unlawful practice of

law . . . . There being no legal

impediment under the statute to
the sale of the kit, there was no
proper basis for the injunction
against defendant maintaining an
office for the purpose of selling to
persons seeking a divorce,
separation, annulment or
separation agreement any printed
material or writings relating to
matrimonial law or the prohibition
in the memorandum of
modification of the judgment
against defendant having an
interest in any publishing house
publishing his manuscript on
divorce and against his having any
personal contact with any
prospective purchaser. The record
does fully support, however, the
finding that for the change of $75
or $100 for the kit, the defendant
gave legal advice in the course of
personal contacts concerning
particular problems which might
arise in the preparation and
presentation of the purchaser's
asserted matrimonial cause of
action or pursuit of other legal
remedies and assistance in the
preparation of necessary
documents (The injunction
therefore sought to) enjoin conduct
constituting the practice of law,
particularly with reference to the
giving of advice and counsel by the
defendant relating to specific
problems of particular individuals in

13

connection with a divorce,

separation, annulment of
separation agreement sought and
should be affirmed. (State v.
Winder, 348, NYS 2D 270 [1973],
cited in Statsky, supra at p. 101.).
1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its
services are "strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory.
"It is not controverted, however, that if the services
"involve giving legal advice or counselling," such
would constitute practice of law (Comment, par.
6.2). It is in this light that FIDA submits that a
factual inquiry may be necessary for the judicious
disposition of this case.
xxx xxx xxx
2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in
that it can give the impression (or perpetuate the
wrong notion) that there is a secret marriage. With
all the solemnities, formalities and other requisites
of marriages (See Articles 2, et seq., Family Code),
no Philippine marriage can be secret.
2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically
objectionable. The second paragraph thereof
(which is not necessarily related to the first
paragraph) fails to state the limitation that only
"paralegal services?" or "legal support services",
and not legal services, are available." 11
A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of
law" becomes exigent for the proper determination of the issues
raised by the petition at bar. On this score, we note that the clause
"practice of law" has long been the subject of judicial construction
and interpretation. The courts have laid down general principles

and doctrines explaining the meaning and scope of the term, some
of which we now take into account.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedures, knowledge,
training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to
perform those acts which are characteristic of the profession.
Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render any kind of
service that involves legal knowledge or skill. 12
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It
includes legal advice and counsel, and the preparation of legal
instruments and contract by which legal rights are secured,
although such matter may or may not be pending in a court. 13
In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law
generally engages in three principal types of professional activity:
legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their
rights and obligations, preparation for clients of documents
requiring knowledge of legal principles not possessed by ordinary
layman, and appearance for clients before public tribunals which
possess power and authority to determine rights of life, liberty, and
property according to law, in order to assist in proper interpretation
and enforcement of law. 14
When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as
a lawyer, he is in the practice of law. 15 One who confers with
clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the
business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in
court, is also practicing law. 16 Giving advice for compensation
regarding the legal status and rights of another and the conduct
with respect thereto constitutes a practice of law. 17 One who
renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and
receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law. 18
In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19 after citing the
doctrines in several cases, we laid down the test to determine
whether certain acts constitute "practice of law," thus:

14

Black defines "practice of law" as:

The rendition of services requiring the knowledge
and the application of legal principles and
technique to serve the interest of another with his
consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or
advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation,
but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and
other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of
legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all
legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to
clients and all actions taken for them in matters
connected with the law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on court.
(Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken , 129 Ohio St. 23,
193N. E. 650). A person is also considered to be in the practice of
law when he:
. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the
business of advising person, firms, associations or
corporations as to their right under the law, or
appears in a representative capacity as an
advocate in proceedings, pending or prospective,
before any court, commissioner, referee, board,
body, committee, or commission constituted by law
or authorized to settle controversies and there, in
such representative capacity, performs any act or
acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the
rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise
stated, one who, in a representative capacity,
engages in the business of advising clients as to
their rights under the law, or while so engaged
performs any act or acts either in court or outside
of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice
of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and
Co., 102 S. W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).

This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association

v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-177),stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident
to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on
behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in
addition, conveying. In general, all advice to
clients, and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law incorporation services,
assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial
body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement
of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency
proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters or estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law
practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the
legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p.
262, 263).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in
no small part of work performed outside of any
court and having no immediate relation to
proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing,
the giving of legal advice on a large variety of
subjects and the preparation and execution of legal
instruments covering an extensive field of business
and trust relations and other affairs. Although
these transactions may have no direct connection
with court proceedings, they are always subject to
become involved in litigation. They require in many
aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide
experience with men and affairs, and great

15

capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex

situations. These customary functions of an
attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate
relation to the administration of justice by the
courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the
question set forth in the order, can be drawn
between that part of the work of the lawyer which
involves appearance in court and that part which
involves advice and drafting of instruments in his
office. It is of importance to the welfare of the
public that these manifold customary functions be
performed by persons possessed of adequate
learning and skill, of sound moral character, and
acting at all times under the heavy trust
obligations to clients which rests upon all
attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules o Court,
Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], pp. 665-666, citing In Re Opinion
of the Justices [Mass], 194 N. E. 313, quoted in
Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc.
[R.I.] 197 A. 139, 144).
The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in
and out of court. Applying the aforementioned criteria to the case
at bar, we agree with the perceptive findings and observations of
the aforestated bar associations that the activities of respondent,
as advertised, constitute "practice of law."
The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support
services can neither be seriously considered nor sustained. Said
proposition is belied by respondent's own description of the
services it has been offering, to wit:
Legal support services basically consists of giving
ready information by trained paralegals to laymen
and lawyers, which are strictly non-diagnostic, nonadvisory, through the extensive use of computers
and modern information technology in the
gathering, processing, storage, transmission and

reproduction of information and communication,

such as computerized legal research; encoding and
reproduction of documents and pleadings prepared
by laymen or lawyers; document search; evidence
gathering; locating parties or witnesses to a case;
fact finding investigations; and assistance to
laymen in need of basic institutional services from
government or non-government agencies, like
birth, marriage, property, or business registrations;
educational or employment records or
certifications, obtaining documentation like
clearances, passports, local or foreign visas; giving
information about laws of other countries that they
may find useful, like foreign divorce, marriage or
adoption laws that they can avail of preparatory to
emigration to the foreign country, and other
matters that do not involve representation of
clients in court; designing and installing computer
systems, programs, or software for the efficient
management of law offices, corporate legal
departments, courts and other entities engaged in
dispensing or administering legal services. 20
While some of the services being offered by respondent
corporation merely involve mechanical and technical knowhow,
such as the installation of computer systems and programs for the
efficient management of law offices, or the computerization of
research aids and materials, these will not suffice to justify an
exception to the general rule.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out
legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its contention that such
function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than
real. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on
marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court
that all the respondent corporation will simply do is look for the
law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were
merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it

16

will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the

law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to be
taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what its
advertisements represent and for the which services it will
consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within
the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion
will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not
represent clients in court since law practice, as the weight of
authority holds, is not limited merely giving legal advice, contract
drafting and so forth.
The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article
published in the January 13, 1991 issue of the Starweek/The
Sunday Magazine of the Philippines Star, entitled "Rx for Legal
Problems," where an insight into the structure, main purpose and
operations of respondent corporation was given by its own
"proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales:
This is the kind of business that is transacted
everyday at The Legal Clinic, with offices on the
seventh floor of the Victoria Building along U. N.
Avenue in Manila. No matter what the client's
problem, and even if it is as complicated as the
Cuneta-Concepcion domestic situation, Atty.
Nogales and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors
are "specialists" in various fields can take care of it.
The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and
criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor,
litigation, and family law. These specialist are
backed up by a battery of paralegals, counsellors
and attorneys.
Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984.
Inspired by the trend in the medical field toward
specialization, it caters to clients who cannot afford
the services of the big law firms.

The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients.

"when they come, we start by analyzing the
problem. That's what doctors do also. They ask you
how you contracted what's bothering you, they
take your temperature, they observe you for the
symptoms and so on. That's how we operate, too.
And once the problem has been categorized, then
it's referred to one of our specialists.
There are cases which do not, in medical terms,
require surgery or follow-up treatment. These The
Legal Clinic disposes of in a matter of minutes.
"Things like preparing a simple deed of sale or an
affidavit of loss can be taken care of by our staff or,
if this were a hospital the residents or the interns.
We can take care of these matters on a while you
wait basis. Again, kung baga sa hospital, outpatient, hindi kailangang ma-confine. It's just like a
common cold or diarrhea," explains Atty. Nogales.
Those cases which requires more extensive
"treatment" are dealt with accordingly. "If you had
a rich relative who died and named you her sole
heir, and you stand to inherit millions of pesos of
property, we would refer you to a specialist in
taxation. There would be real estate taxes and
arrears which would need to be put in order, and
your relative is even taxed by the state for the
right to transfer her property, and only a specialist
in taxation would be properly trained to deal with
the problem. Now, if there were other heirs
contesting your rich relatives will, then you would
need a litigator, who knows how to arrange the
problem for presentation in court, and gather
evidence to support the case. 21
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its
services is not controlling. What is important is that it is engaged in

17

the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the services it renders

which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory
prohibitions against the advertisements which it has caused to be
published and are now assailed in this proceeding.
Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P.
WILOCI, said reported facts sufficiently establish that the main
purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts for
various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services
from simple documentation to complex litigation and corporate
undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the
domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers
engaged in the practice of law. 22
It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered
by private respondent which constitute practice of law cannot be
performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a
member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance
with the provisions of the Rules of Court, and who is in good and
regular standing, is entitled to practice law. 23
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those
individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The
permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an individual and
limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper
standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to
protect the public, the court, the client and the bar from the
incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law
and not subject to the disciplinary control of the court. 24
The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom
respondent would wish to draw support for his thesis. The
doctrines there also stress that the practice of law is limited to
those who meet the requirements for, and have been admitted to,
the bar, and various statutes or rules specifically so provide. 25 The
practice of law is not a lawful business except for members of the
bar who have complied with all the conditions required by statute
and the rules of court. Only those persons are allowed to practice

law who, by reason of attainments previously acquired through

education and study, have been recognized by the courts as
possessing profound knowledge of legal science entitling them to
advise, counsel with, protect, or defend the rights claims, or
liabilities of their clients, with respect to the construction,
interpretation, operation and effect of law. 26 The justification for
excluding from the practice of law those not admitted to the bar is
found, not in the protection of the bar from competition, but in the
protection of the public from being advised and represented in
legal matters by incompetent and unreliable persons over whom
the judicial department can exercise little control. 27
We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position
that the concept in the United States of paralegals as an
occupation separate from the law profession be adopted in this
jurisdiction. Whatever may be its merits, respondent cannot but be
aware that this should first be a matter for judicial rules or
legislative action, and not of unilateral adoption as it has done.
Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As
admitted by respondent, there are schools and universities there
which offer studies and degrees in paralegal education, while there
are none in the Philippines.28 As the concept of the "paralegals" or
"legal assistant" evolved in the United States, standards and
guidelines also evolved to protect the general public. One of the
major standards or guidelines was developed by the American Bar
Association which set up Guidelines for the Approval of Legal
Assistant Education Programs (1973). Legislation has even been
proposed to certify legal assistants. There are also associations of
paralegals in the United States with their own code of professional
ethics, such as the National Association of Legal Assistants, Inc.
and the American Paralegal Association.29
In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited
acceptance of what may be considered as paralegal service. As
pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly licensed to practice
law are or have been allowed limited representation in behalf of
another or to render legal services, but such allowable services are

18

limited in scope and extent by the law, rules or regulations

granting permission therefor. 30
Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in
the absence of constitutional or statutory authority, a person who
has not been admitted as an attorney cannot practice law for the
proper administration of justice cannot be hindered by the
unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized and unskilled person into
the practice of law. 31 That policy should continue to be one of
encouraging persons who are unsure of their legal rights and
remedies to seek legal assistance only from persons licensed to
practice law in the state. 32
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements,
the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in
making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair,
dignified and objective information or statement of facts. 33 He is
not supposed to use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent,
misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair
statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal
services. 34 Nor shall he pay or give something of value to
representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return
for, publicity to attract legal business. 35 Prior to the adoption of
the code of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of Professional
Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort to indirect
advertisements for professional employment, such as furnishing or
inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to be
published in connection with causes in which the lawyer has been
or is engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct, the
magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's
position, and all other like self-laudation. 36
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's
advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the
ethics of his profession. advertise his talents or skill as in a manner
similar to a merchant advertising his goods. 37 The prescription
against advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business
rests on the fundamental postulate that the that the practice of law

is a profession. Thus, in the case of The Director of Religious

Affairs. vs. Estanislao R. Bayot 38 an advertisement, similar to those
of respondent which are involved in the present proceeding, 39 was
held to constitute improper advertising or solicitation.
The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question
was a flagrant violation by the respondent of the
ethics of his profession, it being a brazen
solicitation of business from the public. Section 25
of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things
that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is
highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his
talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares.
Law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer
degrades himself and his profession who stoops to
and adopts the practices of mercantilism by
advertising his services or offering them to the
public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the
temple of justice with mercenary activities as the
money-changers of old defiled the temple of
Jehovah. "The most worthy and effective
advertisement possible, even for a young
lawyer, . . . . is the establishment of a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to
trust. This cannot be forced but must be the
outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27,
Code of Ethics.).
We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best
advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as
the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service
to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing
itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-

19

product of effective service which is right and proper. A good and

reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to
magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a
normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of
propaganda. 40
Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited.
The canons of the profession enumerate exceptions to the rule
against advertising or solicitation and define the extent to which
they may be undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad
categories, namely, those which are expressly allowed and those
which are necessarily implied from the restrictions. 41
The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists,
in a manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by
the canons, of brief biographical and informative data. "Such data
must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the
lawyer's name and the names of his professional associates;
addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law
practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools
attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational
distinction; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal
authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in
bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific
societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other
reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and,
with their written consent, the names of clients regularly
represented." 42
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that
purpose; it cannot be a mere supplemental feature of a paper,
magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally
for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly
publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper,
magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer
permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct,
management or contents of which are calculated or likely to

deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower the dignity or

standing of the profession. 43
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted.
The card may contain only a statement of his name, the name of
the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone
number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a
simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in
the partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for
the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may
likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not
under a designation of special branch of law. 44
Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the
advertisements for which respondent is being taken to task, which
even includes a quotation of the fees charged by said respondent
corporation for services rendered, we find and so hold that the
same definitely do not and conclusively cannot fall under any of
the above-mentioned exceptions.
The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of
Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly invoked and constitutes the
justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not applicable
to the case at bar. Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule
involved in said case explicitly allows a lawyer, as an exception to
the prohibition against advertisements by lawyers, to publish a
statement of legal fees for an initial consultation or the availability
upon request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee
to be charged for the specific services. No such exception is
provided for, expressly or impliedly, whether in our former Canons
of Professional Ethics or the present Code of Professional
Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case
contains a proviso that the exceptions stated therein are "not
applicable in any state unless and until it is implemented by such
authority in that state." 46 This goes to show that an exception to
the general rule, such as that being invoked by herein respondent,
can be made only if and when the canons expressly provide for

20

such an exception. Otherwise, the prohibition stands, as in the case

at bar.
It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar
Association after the decision in Bates, on the attitude of the public
about lawyers after viewing television commercials, it was found
that public opinion dropped significantly 47 with respect to these
characteristics of lawyers:
Trustworthy from 71% to 14%
Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%
Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our
legal and judicial systems, to allow the publication of
advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve to
aggravate what is already a deteriorating public opinion of the
legal profession whose integrity has consistently been under attack
lately by media and the community in general. At this point in
time, it is of utmost importance in the face of such negative, even
if unfair, criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that level of
professional conduct which is beyond reproach, and to exert all
efforts to regain the high esteem formerly accorded to the legal
profession.
In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer,
subject to disciplinary action, to advertise his services except in
allowable instances 48 or to aid a layman in the unauthorized
practice of law. 49 Considering that Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is
the prime incorporator, major stockholder and proprietor of The
Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member of the Philippine Bar, he is hereby
reprimanded, with a warning that a repetition of the same or
similar acts which are involved in this proceeding will be dealt with
more severely.
While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or
illegality of the purpose/s for which the Legal Clinic, Inc. was

created should be passed upon and determined, we are

constrained to refrain from lapsing into an obiter on that aspect
since it is clearly not within the adjudicative parameters of the
present proceeding which is merely administrative in nature. It is,
of course, imperative that this matter be promptly determined,
albeit in a different proceeding and forum, since, under the present
state of our law and jurisprudence, a corporation cannot be
organized for or engage in the practice of law in this country. This
interdiction, just like the rule against unethical advertising, cannot
be subverted by employing some so-called paralegals supposedly
rendering the alleged support services.
The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by
respondent is the concern and province of the Solicitor General
who can institute the corresponding quo warranto action, 50 after
due ascertainment of the factual background and basis for the
grant of respondent's corporate charter, in light of the putative
misuse thereof. That spin-off from the instant bar matter is referred
to the Solicitor General for such action as may be necessary under
the circumstances.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein
respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the
publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any form
which is of the same or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A"
and "B" of this petition, and from conducting, directly or indirectly,
any activity, operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code
of Professional Ethics as indicated herein. Let copies of this
resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the
Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office of the Solicitor General
for appropriate action in accordance herewith.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Davide,
Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

21

THIRD DIVISION
AC No. 99-634

other legal papers, for which services I have accordingly

paid; inasmuch, however, that I failed to secure a
settlement of the dispute, Atty. Magulta suggested that I
file the necessary complaint, which he subsequently
drafted, copy of which is attached as Annex A, the filing fee
whereof will require the amount of Twenty Five Thousand
Pesos (P25,000.00);

June 10, 2002

DOMINADOR P. BURBE, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ALBERTO C. MAGULTA, respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
After agreeing to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes
fidelity to both cause and client, even if the client never paid any
fee for the attorney-client relationship. Lawyering is not a business;
it is a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the
primary consideration.
The Case
Before us is a Complaint for the disbarment or suspension or any
other disciplinary action against Atty. Alberto C. Magulta. Filed by
Dominador P. Burbe with the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on June 14, 1999, the
Complaint is accompanied by a Sworn Statement alleging the
following:
"x x x

xxx

xxx

"That in connection with my business, I was introduced to

Atty. Alberto C. Magulta, sometime in September, 1998, in
his office at the Respicio, Magulta and Adan Law Offices at
21-B Otero Building, Juan de la Cruz St., Davao City, who
agreed to legally represent me in a money claim and
possible civil case against certain parties for breach of
contract;
"That consequent to such agreement, Atty. Alberto C.
Magulta prepared for me the demand letter and some

"That having the need to legally recover from the parties to

be sued I, on January 4, 1999, deposited the amount
of P25,000.00 to Atty. Alberto C. Magulta, copy of the
Receipt attached as Annex B, upon the instruction that I
needed the case filed immediately;
"That a week later, I was informed by Atty. Alberto C.
Magulta that the complaint had already been filed in court,
and that I should receive notice of its progress;
"That in the months that followed, I waited for such notice
from the court or from Atty. Magulta but there seemed to
be no progress in my case, such that I frequented his office
to inquire, and he would repeatedly tell me just to wait;
"That I had grown impatient on the case, considering that I
am told to wait [every time] I asked; and in my last visit to
Atty. Magulta last May 25, 1999, he said that the court
personnel had not yet acted on my case and, for my
satisfaction, he even brought me to the Hall of Justice
Building at Ecoland, Davao City, at about 4:00 p.m., where
he left me at the Office of the City Prosecutor at the ground
floor of the building and told to wait while he personally
follows up the processes with the Clerk of Court;
whereupon, within the hour, he came back and told me
that the Clerk of Court was absent on that day;
"That sensing I was being given the run-around by Atty.
Magulta, I decided to go to the Office of the Clerk of Court
with my draft of Atty. Magulta's complaint to personally

22

verify the progress of my case, and there told that there

was no record at all of a case filed by Atty. Alberto C.
Magulta on my behalf, copy of the Certification dated May
27, 1999, attached as Annex C;
"That feeling disgusted by the way I was lied to and
treated, I confronted Atty. Alberto C. Magulta at his office
the following day, May 28, 1999, where he continued to lie
to with the excuse that the delay was being caused by the
court personnel, and only when shown the certification did
he admit that he has not at all filed the complaint because
he had spent the money for the filing fee for his own
purpose; and to appease my feelings, he offered to
reimburse me by issuing two (2) checks, postdated June 1
and June 5, 1999, in the amounts of P12,000.00
and P8,000.00, respectively, copies of which are attached
as Annexes D and E;
"That for the inconvenience, treatment and deception I was
made to suffer, I wish to complain Atty. Alberto C. Magulta
for misrepresentation, dishonesty and oppressive conduct;"
xxx

xxx

x x x.1

On August 6, 1999, pursuant to the July 22, 1999 Order of the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline,2 respondent filed his
Answer3 vehemently denying the allegations of complainant "for
being totally outrageous and baseless." The latter had allegedly
been introduced as a kumpadre of one of the former's law
partners. After their meeting, complainant requested him to draft a
demand letter against Regwill Industries, Inc. -- a service for which
the former never paid. After Mr. Said Sayre, one of the business
partners of complainant, replied to this letter, the latter requested
that another demand letter -- this time addressed to the former -be drafted by respondent, who reluctantly agreed to do so. Without
informing the lawyer, complainant asked the process server of the
former's law office to deliver the letter to the addressee.

Aside from attending to the Regwill case which had required a

three-hour meeting, respondent drafted a complaint (which was
only for the purpose of compelling the owner to settle the case)
and prepared a compromise agreement. He was also requested by
complainant to do the following:
1. Write a demand letter addressed to Mr. Nelson Tan
2. Write a demand letter addressed to ALC Corporation
3. Draft a complaint against ALC Corporation
4. Research on the Mandaue City property claimed by
complainant's wife
All of these respondent did, but he was never paid for his services
by complainant.
Respondent likewise said that without telling him why, complainant
later on withdrew all the files pertinent to the Regwill case.
However, when no settlement was reached, the latter instructed
him to draft a complaint for breach of contract. Respondent, whose
services had never been paid by complainant until this time, told
the latter about his acceptance and legal fees. When told that
these fees amounted to P187,742 because the Regwill claim was
almost P4 million, complainant promised to pay on installment
basis.
On January 4, 1999, complainant gave the amount of P25,000 to
respondent's secretary and told her that it was for the filing fee of
the Regwill case. When informed of the payment, the lawyer
immediately called the attention of complainant, informing the
latter of the need to pay the acceptance and filing fees before the
complaint could be filed. Complainant was told that the amount he
had paid was a deposit for the acceptance fee, and that he should
give the filing fee later.

23

Sometime in February 1999, complainant told respondent to

suspend for the meantime the filing of the complaint because the
former might be paid by another company, the First Oriental
Property Ventures, Inc., which had offered to buy a parcel of land
owned by Regwill Industries. The negotiations went on for two
months, but the parties never arrived at any agreement.
Sometime in May 1999, complainant again relayed to respondent
his interest in filing the complaint. Respondent reminded him once
more of the acceptance fee. In response, complainant proposed
that the complaint be filed first before payment of respondent's
acceptance and legal fees. When respondent refused, complainant
demanded the return of the P25,000. The lawyer returned the
amount using his own personal checks because their law office was
undergoing extensive renovation at the time, and their office
personnel were not reporting regularly. Respondent's checks were
accepted and encashed by complainant.
Respondent averred that he never inconvenienced, mistreated or
deceived complainant, and if anyone had been shortchanged by
the undesirable events, it was he.
The IBP's Recommendation
In its Report and Recommendation dated March 8, 2000, the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) opined as follows:
"x x x [I]t is evident that the P25,000 deposited by
complainant with the Respicio Law Office was for the filing
fees of the Regwill complaint. With complainant's deposit
of the filing fees for the Regwill complaint, a corresponding
obligation on the part of respondent was created and that
was to file the Regwill complaint within the time frame
contemplated by his client, the complainant. The failure of
respondent to fulfill this obligation due to his misuse of the
filing fees deposited by complainant, and his attempts to
cover up this misuse of funds of the client, which caused

complainant additional damage and prejudice, constitutes

highly dishonest conduct on his part, unbecoming a
member of the law profession. The subsequent
reimbursement by the respondent of part of the money
deposited by complainant for filing fees, does not
exculpate the respondent for his misappropriation of said
funds. Thus, to impress upon the respondent the gravity of
his offense, it is recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1)
year."4
The Court's Ruling
We agree with the Commission's recommendation.
Main Issue:
Misappropriation of Client's Funds
Central to this case are the following alleged acts of respondent
lawyer: (a) his non-filing of the Complaint on behalf of his client
and (b) his appropriation for himself of the money given for the
filing fee.
Respondent claims that complainant did not give him the filing fee
for the Regwill complaint; hence, the former's failure to file the
complaint in court. Also, respondent alleges that the amount
delivered by complainant to his office on January 4, 1999 was for
attorney's fees and not for the filing fee.
We are not persuaded. Lawyers must exert their best efforts and
ability in the prosecution or the defense of the client's cause. They
who perform that duty with diligence and candor not only protect
the interests of the client, but also serve the ends of justice. They
do honor to the bar and help maintain the respect of the
community for the legal profession.5 Members of the bar must do
nothing that may tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of

24

the public in the fidelity, the honesty, and integrity of the

profession.6
Respondent wants this Court to believe that no lawyer-client
relationship existed between him and complainant, because the
latter never paid him for services rendered. The former adds that
he only drafted the said documents as a personal favor for
the kumpadre of one of his partners.
We disagree. A lawyer-client relationship was established from the
very first moment complainant asked respondent for legal advice
regarding the former's business. To constitute professional
employment, it is not essential that the client employed the
attorney professionally on any previous occasion. It is not
necessary that any retainer be paid, promised, or charged; neither
is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward handle
the case for which his service had been sought.
If a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any kind,
consults a lawyer with a view to obtaining professional advice or
assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces with
the consultation, then the professional employment is established. 7
Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the
close personal relationship between the lawyer and the
complainant or the nonpayment of the former's fees.8 Hence,
despite the fact that complainant waskumpadre of a law partner of
respondent, and that respondent dispensed legal advice to
complainant as a personal favor to the kumpadre, the lawyer was
duty-bound to file the complaint he had agreed to prepare -- and
had actually prepared -- at the soonest possible time, in order to
protect the client's interest. Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that lawyers should not neglect legal
matters entrusted to them.
This Court has likewise constantly held that once lawyers agree to
take up the cause of a client, they owe fidelity to such cause and
must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in

them.9 They owe entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm
zeal in the maintenance and the defense of the client's rights, and
the exertion of their utmost learning and abilities to the end that
nothing be taken or withheld from the client, save by the rules of
law legally applied.10
Similarly unconvincing is the explanation of respondent that the
receipt issued by his office to complainant on January 4, 1999 was
erroneous. The IBP Report correctly noted that it was quite
incredible for the office personnel of a law firm to be prevailed
upon by a client to issue a receipt erroneously indicating payment
for something else. Moreover, upon discovering the "mistake" -- if
indeed it was one -- respondent should have immediately taken
steps to correct the error. He should have lost no time in calling
complainant's attention to the matter and should have issued
another receipt indicating the correct purpose of the payment.
The Practice of Law -- a
Profession, Not a Business
In this day and age, members of the bar often forget that the
practice of law is a profession and not a business. 11Lawyering is not
primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy
is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. 12 The gaining of a
livelihood is not a professional but a secondary
consideration.13 Duty to public service and to the administration of
justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must
subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to
themselves. The practice of law is a noble calling in which
emolument is a byproduct, and the highest eminence may be
attained without making much money.14
In failing to apply to the filing fee the amount given by complainant
-- as evidenced by the receipt issued by the law office of
respondent -- the latter also violated the rule that lawyers must be
scrupulously careful in handling money entrusted to them in their
professional capacity.15 Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional

25

Responsibility states that lawyers shall hold in trust all moneys of

their clients and properties that may come into their possession.

SO ORDERED.
Puno, J.*, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.

Lawyers who convert the funds entrusted to them are in gross

violation of professional ethics and are guilty of betrayal of public
confidence in the legal profession.16 It may be true that they have a
lien upon the client's funds, documents and other papers that have
lawfully come into their possession; that they may retain them
until their lawful fees and disbursements have been paid; and that
they may apply such funds to the satisfaction of such fees and
disbursements. However, these considerations do not relieve them
of their duty to promptly account for the moneys they received.
Their failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct. 17 In any
event, they must still exert all effort to protect their client's interest
within the bounds of law.
If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted
privilege to practice law carries with it correlative duties not only to
the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the
public.18 Respondent fell short of this standard when he converted
into his legal fees the filing fee entrusted to him by his client and
thus failed to file the complaint promptly. The fact that the former
returned the amount does not exculpate him from his breach of
duty.
On the other hand, we do not agree with complainant's plea to
disbar respondent from the practice of law. The power to disbar
must be exercised with great caution. Only in a clear case of
misconduct that seriously affects the standing and the character of
the bar will disbarment be imposed as a penalty. 19
WHEREFORE, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta is found guilty of violating
Rules 16.01 and 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
one (1) year, effective upon his receipt of this Decision. Let copies
be furnished all courts as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant,
which is instructed to include a copy in respondent's file.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 77439 August 24, 1989
DONALD DEE petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and AMELITO MUTUC, respondents.
Tanjuatco, Oreta & Tanjuatco for petitioner.
Amelito R. Mutuc for and in his own behalf

REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner assails the resolution of respondent court, dated
February 12,1987, reinstating its decision promulgated on May 9,
1986 in AC-G.R. CV No. 04242 wherein it affirmed the decision of
the that court holding that the services rendered by private
respondent was on a professional, and not on a gratis et
amore basis and ordering petitioner to pay private respondent the
sum of P50,000.00 as the balance of the latter's legal fee therefor.
The records show that sometime in January, 1981, petitioner and
his father went to the residence of private respondent,
accompanied by the latter's cousin, to seek his advice regarding
the problem of the alleged indebtedness of petitioner's brother,
Dewey Dee, to Caesar's Palace, a well-known gambling casino at

26

Las Vegas, Nevada, U.S.A. Petitioner's father was apprehensive

over the safety of his son, Dewey, having heard of a link between
the mafia and Caesar's Palace and the possibility that his son may
be harmed at the instance of the latter. 1
Private respondent assured petitioner and his father that he would
inquire into the matter, after which his services were reportedly
contracted for P100,000. 00. From his residence, private
respondent called up Caesar's Palace and, thereafter, several long
distance telephone calls and two trips to Las Vegas by him elicited
the information that Dewey Dee's outstanding account was around
$1,000,000.00. Further investigations, however, revealed that said
account had actually been incurred by Ramon Sy, with Dewey Dee
merely signing for the chits. Private respondent communicated
said information to petitioner's a father and also assured him that
Caesar's Palace was not in any way linked to the mafia. 2
In June, 1981, private respondent personally talked with the
president of Caesar's Palace at Las Vegas, Nevada. He advised the
president that for the sake and in the interest of the casino it would
be better to make Ramon Sy answer for the indebtedness. The
president told him that if he could convince Ramon Sy to
acknowledge the obligation, Dewey Dee would be exculpated from
liability for the account. Upon private respondent's return to
Manila, he conferred with Ramon Sy and the latter was convinced
to acknowledge the indebtedness. In August, 1981, private
respondent brought to Caesar's Palace the letter of Ramon Sy
owning the debt and asking for a discount. Thereafter, the account
of Dewey Dee was cleared and the casino never bothered him. 3
Having thus settled the account of petitioner's brother, private
respondent sent several demand letters to petitioner demanding
the balance of P50,000.00 as attorney's fees. Petitioner, however,
ignored said letters. On October 4, 1982, private respondent filed a
complaint against petitioner in the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch CXXXVI, for the collection of attorney's fees and refund of
transport fare and other expenses. 4

Private respondent claimed that petitioner formally engaged his

services for a fee of P100,000.00 and that the services he rendered
were professional services which a lawyer renders to a client.
Petitioner, however, denied the existence of any professional
relationship of attorney and client between him and private
respondent. He admits that he and his father visited private
respondent for advice on the matter of Dewey Dee's gambling
account. However, he insists that such visit was merely an informal
one and that private respondent had not been specifically
contracted to handle the problem. On the contrary, respondent
Mutuc had allegedly volunteered his services "as a friend of
defendant's family" to see what he could do about the situation. As
for the P50,000.00 inceptively given to private respondent,
petitioner claims that it was not in the nature of attomey's fees but
merely "pocket money" solicited by the former for his trips to Las
Vegas and the said amount of P50,000.00 was already sufficient
remuneration for his strictly voluntary services.
After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment ordering herein
petitioner to pay private respondent the sum of P50,000.00 with
interest thereon at the legal rate from the filing of the complaint on
October 4, 1982 and to pay the costs. All other claims therein of
private respondent and the counterclaim of petitioner were
dismissed. 5 On appeal, said judgment was affirmed by the then
Intermediate Appellate Court on May 9, 1986. 6
Petitioner, in due time, filed a motion for reconsideration
contending that the Appellate Court overlooked two important and
decisive factors, to wit: (1) At the time private respondent was
ostensibly rendering services to petitioner and his father, he was
actually working "in the interest" and "to the advantage" of
Caesar's Palace of which he was an agent and a consultant, hence
the interests of the casino and private respondent were united in
their objective to collect from the debtor; and (2) Private
respondent is not justified in claiming that he rendered legal
services to petitioner and his father in view of the conflicting
interests involved.

27

In its resolution of July 31, 1986, respondent court reconsidered its

decision and held that the sum of P50,000.00 already paid by
petitioner to private respondent was commensurate to the services
he rendered, considering that at the time he was acting as counsel
for petitioner he was also acting as the collecting agent and
consultant of, and receiving compensation from, Caesar's
Palace. 7 However, upon a motion for reconsideration thereafter
filed by private respondent, the present respondent Court of
Appeals issued another resolution, dated February 12, 1987,
reinstating the aforesaid decision of May 9, 1986. 8
Petitioner is now before us seeking a writ of certiorari to overturn
the latter resolution.
It is necessary, however, to first clear the air of the questions
arising from the change of stand of the First Civil Cases Division of
the former Intermediate Appellate Court when, acting on the
representations in petitioner's undated motion for reconsideration
supposedly filed on May 28,1986, it promulgated its July 31, 1986
resolution reconsidering the decision it had rendered in AC-G.R. CV
No. 04242. Said resolution was, as earlier noted, set aside by the
Twelfth Division of the reorganized Court of Appeals which, at the
same time, reinstated the aforesaid decision.
Because of its clarificatory relevance to some issues belatedly
raised by petitioner, which issues should have been
disregarded 9 but were nevertheless auspiciously discussed
therein, at the risk of seeming prolixity we quote hereunder the
salient portions of the assailed resolution which demonstrate that it
was not conceived in error.
The reason for then IAC's action is that it deemed
the P50,000.00 plaintiff-appellee had previously
received from defendant-appellant as adequate
compensation for the services rendered by am for
defendant-appellant, considering that at the time
plaintiff-appellee was acting as counsel for
defendant-appellant, he was also acting as the

collecting agent and consultant of, and receiving

compensation from Caesar's Palace in Las Vegas,
Nevada, the entity with whom defendant-appellant
was having a problem and for which he had
engaged the services of plaintiff-appellee. The crux
of the matter, therefore, is whether or not the
evidence on record justifies this finding of the IAC.
Plaintiff-appellee maintains that his professional
services to defendant-appellant were rendered
between the months of July and September of
1981, while his employment as collection agent
and consultant of Caesar's Palace covered the
period from December 1981 to October 1982. This
positive testimony of plaintiff-appellee, however,
was disregarded by the IAC for the following
reasons:
1. In August l983, plaintiff-appellee testified that he
was a representative of Caesar's Palace in the
Philippines 'about two or three years ago.' From
this the IAC concluded that the period covers the
time plaintiff-appellee rendered professional
services to defendant-appellant.
We do not think that IAC's conclusion is necessarily
correct. When plaintiff-appellee gave the period
'about two or three years ago,' he was merely
stating an approximation. Considering that plaintiffappellee was testifying in August 1983, and his
employment with Caesar's Palace began in
December 1981, the stated difference of two years
is relatively correct. . . .
2. The plaintiff appellee had testified that he was
working for the sake,' 'in the interest,' and 'to the
advantage' of Caesar's Palace. x x x "We detect
nothing from the above which would support IAC's

28

conclusion that plaintiff-appellee was then in the

employ of Caesar's Palace. What is gathered is that
plaintiff-appellee was simply fulfilling a condition
which plaintiff-appellee had proposed to, and was
accepted by, Caesar's Palace, for the release of
Dewey Dee from his obligation to Caesar's Palace.
3. Caesar's Palace would not have listened to, and
acted upon, the advice of plaintiff-appellee if he
were no longer its consultant and alter ego.
Why not? We are witnesses to many successful
negotiations between contending parties whose
representing lawyers were not and were never in
the employ of the opposite party. The art of
negotiation is precisely one of the essential tools of
a good practitioner, and mastery of the art takes
into account the circumstance that one may be
negotiating, among others, with a person who may
not only be a complete stranger but antagonistic
as well. The fact that plaintiff-appellee was able to
secure a favorable concession from Caesar's Palace
for defendant-appellant does not justify the
conclusion that it could have been secured only
because of plaintiff-appellee's professional
relationship with Caesar's Palace. It could have
been attributable more to plaintiff-appellee's
stature as a former ambassador of the Philippines
to the United States, his personality, and his
negotiating technique.
Assuming, however, that plaintiff-appellee was
employed by Caesar's Palace during the time that
he was rendering professional services for
defendant-appellant, this would not automatically
mean the denial of additional attorney's fees to
plaintiff appellee. The main reason why the IAC
denied plaintiff-appellee additional compensation

was because the latter was allegedly receiving

compensation from Caesar's Palace, and, therefore,
the amount of P50,000.00 plaintiff-appellee had
previously received from defendant-appellant is
'reasonable and commensurate. This conclusion,
however, can only be justified if the fact and
amount of remuneration had been established.
These were not proven at all. No proof was
presented as to the nature of plaintiff-appellee's
remuneration, and the mode or manner in which it
was paid.. . . 10
Both the lower court and the appellate court concur in their
findings that there was a lawyer-client relationship between
petitioner and private respondent Mutuc. We find no reason to
interfere with this factual finding. There may be instances when
there is doubt as to whether an attorney-client relationship has
been created. The issue may be raised in the trial court, but once
the trial court and the Court of Appeals have found that there was
such a relationship the Supreme Court cannot disturb such finding
of fact, 11 absent cogent reasons therefor.
The puerile claim is advanced that there was no attorney-client
relationship between petitioner and private respondent for lack of a
written contract to that effect. The absence of a written contract
will not preclude the finding that there was a professional
relationship which merits attorney's fees for professional services
rendered. Documentary formalism is not an essential element in
the employment of an attorney; the contract may be express or
implied. To establish the relation, it is sufficient that the advice and
assistance of an attorney is sought and received in any matter
pertinent to his profession. An acceptance of the relation is implied
on the part of the attorney from his acting on behalf of his client in
pursuance of a request from the latter. 12
There is no question that professional services were actually
rendered by private respondent to petitioner and his family.
Through his efforts, the account of petitioner's brother, Dewey Dee,

29

with Caesar's Palace was assumed by Ramon Sy and petitioner and

his family were further freed from the apprehension that Dewey
might be harmed or even killed by the so-called mafia. For such
services, respondent Mutuc is indubitably entitled to receive a
reasonable compensation and this right cannot be concluded by
petitioner's pretension that at the time private respondent
rendered such services to petitioner and his family, the former was
also the Philippine consultant of Caesar's Palace.
On the first aspect, the evidence of record shows that the services
of respondent Mutuc were engaged by the petitioner for the
purposes hereinbefore discussed. The previous partial payments
totalling P50,000.00 made by petitioner to respondent Mutuc and
the tenor of the demand letters sent by said private respondent to
petitioner, the receipt thereof being acknowledged by petitioner,
ineluctably prove three facts, viz: that petitioner hired the services
of private respondent Mutuc; that there was a prior agreement as
to the amount of attorney's fees to be given to the latter; and there
was still a balance due and payable on said fees. The duplicate
original copy of the initial receipt issued and signed in this
connection by private respondent reads:
RECEIVED from Mr. Donald Dee, for professional
services rendered, the sum of THIRTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P30,000.00) as partial payment, leaving a
balance of SEVENTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P70,000.00), payable on demand.

petitioner's assumption that the interests of Caesar's Palace were

adverse to those of Dewey Dee. True, the casino was a creditor but
that fact was not contested or opposed by Dewey Dee, since the
latter, as verifications revealed, was not the debtor. Hence, private
respondent's representations in behalf of petitioner were not in
resistance to the casino's claim but were actually geared toward
proving that fact by establishing the liability of the true debtor,
Ramon Sy, from whom payment was ultimately and correctly
exacted. 15
Even assuming that the imputed conflict of interests obtained,
private respondent's role therein was not ethically or legally
indefensible. Generally, an attorney is prohibited from representing
parties with contending positions. However, at a certain stage of
the controversy before it reaches the court, a lawyer may
represent conflicting interests with the consent of the parties. 16 A
common representation may work to the advantage of said parties
since a mutual lawyer, with honest motivations and impartially
cognizant of the parties' disparate positions, may well be better
situated to work out an acceptable settlement of their differences,
being free of partisan inclinations and acting with the cooperation
and confidence of said parties.
Here, even indulging petitioner in his theory that private
respondent was during the period in question an agent of Caesar's
Palace, petitioner was not unaware thereof, hence he actually
consented to and cannot now decry the dual representation that he
postulates. This knowledge he admits, thus:

Makati, Metro Manila, July 25,1981. 13

Thereafter, several demand letters for payment of his fees, dated
August 6, 1981, December 2, 1981, January 29, 1982, March 7,
1982, and September 7, 1982 were sent by private respondent to
petitioner, 14 all to no avail.
On the second objection, aside from the facts stated in the
aforequoted resolution of respondent Court of Appeals, it is also
not completely accurate to judge private respondent's position by

It is a fair question to ask why, of all the lawyers in

the land, it was the private respondent who was
singled out by the petitioner's father for
consultation in regard to an apparent problem,
then pending in Caesar's Palace. The testimony of
Arthur Alejandrino, cousin to private respondent,
and the admission of the private respondent
himself supply the answer. Alejandrino testified
that private respondent was the representative of

30

Caesar's Palace in the Philippines (p. 23, t.s.n.,

Nov. 29, 1983).lwph1.t Private respondent
testified that he was such representative tasked by
the casino to collect the gambling losses incurred
by Filipinos in Las Vegas. (p. 5, t.s.n., Sept. 21,
1983). 17
A lawyer is entitled to have and receive the just and reasonable
compensation for services rendered at the special instance and
request of his client and as long as he is honestly and in good faith
trying to serve and represent the interests of his client, the latter is
bound to pay his just fees. 18
WHEREFORE, the resolution of respondent Court of Appeals, dated
February 12,1987, reinstating its original decision of May 9, 1986 is
hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against l petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, (Chairperson), Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ.,
concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
Adm. Case No. 2474

September 15, 2004

EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., complainant,

vs.
ATTY. LEO J. PALMA, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:

"The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who

measure up to certain rigid standards of mental and moral fitness.
For the admission of a candidate to the bar, the Rules of Court not
only prescribe a test of academic preparation but require
satisfactory testimonials of good moral character. These standards
are neither dispensed with nor lowered after admission: the lawyer
must continue to adhere to them or else incur the risk of
suspension or removal."1
Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. filed with this Court the instant complaint
for disbarment against Atty. Leo J. Palma, alleging as grounds
"deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct in office, violation of his
oath as a lawyer and grossly immoral conduct."
The facts are undisputed:
Complainant and respondent met sometime in the 70s.
Complainant was a client of Angara Concepcion Regala &
Cruz Law Offices (ACCRA) and respondent was the lawyer
assigned to handle his cases. Owing to his growing
business concerns, complainant decided to hire respondent
as his personal counsel.
Consequently, respondents relationship with complainants family
became intimate. He traveled and dined with them abroad. 2 He
frequented their house and even tutored complainants 22-year old
daughter Maria Luisa Cojuangco (Lisa), then a student of
Assumptionlavvphil.net
Convent.
On June 22, 1982, without the knowledge of complainants family,
respondent married Lisa in Hongkong. It was only the next
day that respondent informed complainant and assured him that
"everything is legal." Complainant was shocked, knowing fully well
that respondent is a married man and has three children. Upon

31

investigation, complainant found that respondent courted Lisa

during their tutoring sessions. Immediately, complainant sent his
two sons to Hongkong to convince Lisa to go home to Manila and
discuss the matter with the family. Lisa was persuaded.

business for complainant. To break down the final

resistance of Maria Luisa and assuage her pangs of guilt,
he made representations that there was no legal
impediment whatsoever to his marrying;

Complainant also came to know that: (a) on the date of the

supposed marriage, respondent requested from his (complainants)
office an airplane ticket to and from Australia, with stop-over in
Hong Kong; (b) respondent misrepresented himself as "bachelor"
before the Hong Kong authorities to facilitate his marriage with
Lisa; and (c) respondent was married to Elizabeth Hermosisima and
has three children, namely: Eugene Philippe, Elias Anton and
Eduardo Lorenzo.

c. With his moral ascendancy over Maria Luisa and his

misrepresentation that there was no legal impediment or
prohibition to his contracting a second marriage,
respondent succeeded in inducing and beguiling her into
marrying him. Without complying with the requirements of
Philippine law that he should first obtain a judicial
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Elizabeth H. Palma
and that the "advice" of Maria Luisas parents should first
be obtained she being only twenty-two (22) years of age,
respondent succeeded in contracting marriage with her in
Hongkong on June 22, 1982 by falsely representing himself
before the Hongkong authorities that he is a bachelor. x x
x."

On August 24, 1982, complainant filed with the Court of First

Instance, Branch XXVII, Pasay City a petition 3 for declaration of
nullity of the marriage between respondent and Lisa, docketed as
Civil Case No. Pq-0401-P. In the Decision4 dated November 2, 1982,
the CFI declared the marriage null and void ab initio.
Thereafter, complainant filed with this Court the instant
complaint5 for disbarment, imputing to respondent the following
acts:
"a. In grave abuse and betrayal of the trust and confidence
reposed in him by complainant and his family and taking
undue advantage of his tutoring sessions with Maria Luisa,
respondent secretly courted her. The great disparity in
intelligence, education, age, experience and maturity
between Maria Luisa and respondent gave the latter an
overwhelming moral ascendancy over Maria Luisa as to
overcome her scruples and apprehensions about
respondents courtship and advances, considering that he
is a married man with three (3) children;
b. Respondent courted Maria Luisa with persistence and
determination and even pursued her in her travels abroad
under false pretenses that he was traveling on official

Respondent filed a motion to dismiss6 on the ground of lack of

cause of action. He contended that the complaint fails to allege
acts constituting deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct or violation
of his lawyers oath. There is no allegation that he acted with
"wanton recklessness, lack of skill or ignorance of the law" in
serving complainants interest. Anent the charge of grossly
immoral conduct, he stressed that he married complainants
daughter with "utmost sincerity and good faith" and that "it is
contrary to the natural course of things for an immoral man to
marry the woman he sincerely loves."
In the Resolution7 dated March 2, 1983, we referred the case to the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) for investigation, report and
recommendation. Former Assistant Solicitor General Oswaldo D.
Agcaoili conducted the investigation.
Meanwhile, on December 28, 1983, the First Division of this Court
issued in G.R. No. 645388 a Resolution9 (a)setting aside the CFI
Decision dated November 2, 1982 in Civil Case No. Pq0401-P

32

declaring the marriage between respondent and Lisa null and void
ab initio; and (b) remanding the case to the CFI for proper
proceeding and determination. To this date, the records fail to
disclose the outcome of this case.

with a warning that should he fail to appear or present deposition,

the case will be deemed submitted for resolution. 15 Respondent
again failed to appear on January 24, 2002; hence, the case was
considered submitted for resolution.16

On March 19, 1984, respondent filed with the OSG an Urgent

Motion to Suspend Proceedings10 on the ground that the final
outcome of Civil Case No. Pq0401-P poses a prejudicial question
to the disbarment proceeding. It was denied.

On March 20, 2003, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San

Juan submitted a Report and Recommendation finding respondent
guilty of grossly immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a
lawyer. She recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of three (3) years. Thus:

Respondent sought refuge in this Court through an Urgent Motion

for Issuance of a Restraining Order.11 In the Resolution dated
December 19, 1984, we enjoined the OSG from continuing the
investigation of the disbarment proceedings.12
Thereafter, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline. On October 19, 1998,
Commissioner Julio C. Elamparo issued the following order:
"Considering the length of time that this case has
remained pending and as a practical measure to
ease the backlog of this Commission, the parties
shall within ten (10) days from notice, manifest
whether or not they are still interested in
prosecuting this case or supervening events have
transpired which render this case moot and
academic or otherwise, this case shall be deemed
closed and terminated."13
In his Manifestation,14 complainant manifested and confirmed his
continuing interest in prosecuting his complaint for disbarment
against respondent.
On the other hand, respondent sought several postponements of
hearing on the ground that he needed more time to locate vital
documents in support of his defense. The scheduled hearing of
December 4, 2001 was reset for the last time on January 24, 2002,

"The main issue to be resolved in this case is whether or

not respondent committed the following acts which warrant
his disbarment:
a) Grave abuse and betrayal of the trust and
confidence reposed in him by complainant;
b) His misrepresentation that there was no legal
impediment or prohibition to his contracting a
second marriage;
c) The acts of respondent constitute deceit,
malpractice, gross misconduct in office, grossly
immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a
lawyer.
Respondent admits that he married Maria Luisa in
Hongkong representing himself as a bachelor, however, he
claimed that the marriage certificate stated a condition no
different from term "spinster" with respect to Luisa.
There is no question that respondent as a lawyer well
versed in the law knew fully well that in marrying Maria
Luisa he was entering into a bigamous marriage defined
and penalized under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
The respondent betrayed the trust reposed in him by

33

complainant. He was treated as part of the family and was

allowed to tutor Maria Luisa.
For the foregoing reasons, it is submitted that respondent
committed grossly immoral conduct and violation of his
oath as a lawyer, and it is recommended that respondent
be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three
(3) years.
SO ORDERED."
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the above
Report and Recommendation, but it reduced respondents penalty
to only one (1) year suspension.
Except for the penalty, we affirm the IBPs Report and
Recommendation.
At the outset, it must be stressed that the law profession does not
prescribe a dichotomy of standards among its members. There is
no distinction as to whether the transgression is committed in the
lawyers professional capacity or in his private life. This is because
a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at
one time and a mere citizen at another.17 Thus, not only his
professional activities but even his private life, insofar as the latter
may reflect unfavorably upon the good name and prestige of the
profession and the courts, may at any time be the subject of
inquiry on the part of the proper authorities.18
Respondent claims that he had served complainant to the best of
his ability. In fact, the complaint does not allege that he acted with
"wanton recklessness, lack of skill and ignorance of the law."
While, complainant himself admitted that respondent was a good
lawyer,19 however, professional competency alone does not make a
lawyer a worthy member of the Bar. Good moral character is
always an indispensable requirement.

The ringing truth in this case is that respondent married Lisa while
he has a subsisting marriage with Elizabeth Hermosisima. The
Certification20 from the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City shows that
he married Elizabeth on December 19, 1971 at Cardials Private
Chapel, Cebu City. On the other hand, the Certificate of
Marriage21 from the Deputy Registrar of Marriages, Hong Kong,
proves respondents subsequent marriage with Lisa on July 9,
1982. That Elizabeth was alive at the time of respondents second
marriage was confirmed on the witness stand by Atty. Victor P.
Lazatin, Elizabeths classmate and family friend. 22
Undoubtedly, respondents act constitutes grossly immoral
conduct, a ground for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of
the Revised Rules of Court. He exhibited a deplorable lack of
that degree of morality required of him as a member of the Bar. In
particular, he made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred
institution demanding respect and dignity. His act of contracting a
second marriage is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and
morality.23
This is not the first occasion that we censure immorality. Thus, we
have somehow come up with a common definition of what
constitutes immoral conduct, i.e., "that conduct which is willful,
flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable
members of the community."24 Measured against this definition,
respondents act is manifestly immoral. First, he abandoned his
lawful wife and three children. Second, he lured an innocent young
woman into marrying him. And third, he misrepresented himself as
a "bachelor" so he could contract marriage in a foreign land.
Our rulings in the following cases are relevant:
1) In Macarrubo vs. Macarrubo,25 respondent entered into
multiple marriages and then resorted to legal remedies to
sever them. There, we ruled that "[S]uch pattern of
misconduct by respondent undermines the institutions of
marriage and family, institutions that this society looks to

34

for the rearing of our children, for the development of

values essential to the survival and well-being of our
communities, and for the strengthening of our nation as a
whole." As such, "there can be no other fate that awaits
respondent than to be disbarred."
(2) In Tucay vs. Tucay,26 respondent contracted marriage
with another married woman and left complainant with
whom he has been married for thirty years. We ruled that
such acts constitute "a grossly immoral conduct and only
indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental
ethics of his profession," warranting respondents
disbarment.
(3) In Villasanta vs. Peralta,27 respondent married
complainant while his first wife was still alive, their
marriage still valid and subsisting. We held that "the act of
respondent of contracting the second marriage is contrary
to honesty, justice, decency and morality." Thus, lacking
the good moral character required by the Rules of Court,
respondent was disqualified from being admitted to the
bar.
(4) In Cabrera vs. Agustin,28 respondent lured an innocent
woman into a simulated marriage and thereafter satisfied
his lust. We held that respondent failed to maintain that
degree of morality and integrity, which at all times is
expected of members of the bar. He is, therefore, disbarred
from the practice of law.
(5) In Toledo vs. Toledo,29 respondent abandoned his wife,
who supported him and spent for his law education, and
thereafter cohabited with another woman. We ruled that he
"failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected
and required of a member of the bar." For this, respondent
was disbarred.

(6) In Obusan vs. Obusan, Jr.,30 respondent abandoned his

lawful wife and child and resumed cohabitation with his
former paramour. Here, we ruled that "abandoning ones
wife and resuming carnal relations with a former paramour,
a married woman," constitute grossly immoral conduct
warranting disbarment.
The circumstances here speak of a clear case of betrayal of trust
and abuse of confidence. It was respondents closeness to the
complainants family as well as the latters complete trust in him
that made possible his intimate relationship with Lisa. When his
concern was supposed to be complainants legal affairs only, he
sneaked at the latters back and courted his daughter. Like the
proverbial thief in the night, he attacked when nobody was looking.
Moreover, he availed of complainants resources by securing a
plane ticket from complainants office in order to marry the latters
daughter in Hongkong. He did this without complainants
knowledge. Afterwards, he even had the temerity to assure
complainant that "everything is legal." Clearly, respondent had
crossed the limits of propriety and decency.
Respondent justified his conduct by professing he really loved Lisa
and since he married her, he cannot be charged with immorality.
His reasoning shows a distorted mind and a brazen regard on the
sanctity of marriage. In such relationship, the man and the woman
are obliged to live together, observe mutual respect and
fidelity.31How could respondent perform these obligations to Lisa
when he was previously married to Elizabeth? If he really loved her,
then the noblest thing he could have done was to walk away.
Respondents culpability is aggravated by the fact that Lisa was
just a 22-year old college student of Assumption Convent and was
under psychological treatment for emotional
immaturity.32 Naturally, she was an easy prey.
Anent respondents argument that since the validity of his
marriage to Lisa has not yet been determined by the court with
finality, the same poses a prejudicial question to the present

35

disbarment proceeding. Suffice it to say that a subsequent

judgment of annulment of marriage has no bearing to the instant
disbarment proceeding. As we held in In re Almacen,33 a
disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor
purely criminal but is rather an investigation by the court into the
conduct of its officers. Thus, if the acquittal of a lawyer in a
criminal action is not determinative of an administrative case
against him,34 or if an affidavit of withdrawal of a disbarment case
does not affect its course,35 then the judgment of annulment of
respondents marriage does not also exonerate him from a
wrongdoing actually committed. So long as the quantum of proof
--- clear preponderance of evidence --- in disciplinary proceedings
against members of the bar is met, then liability attaches. 36

Corollarily, the above responsibility is enshrined in the Attorneys

Oath which every lawyer in the country has to take before he is
allowed to practice.

The interdict upon lawyers, as inscribed in Rule 1.01 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility, is that they "shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." This is
founded on the lawyers primordial duty to society as spelled out in
Canon 1 which states:

Let respondents name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys

immediately. Furnish the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and all courts throughout the country with copies of this
Decision.

"CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey

the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
processes."
It is not by coincidence that the drafters of our Code of Professional
Responsibility ranked the above responsibility first in the
enumeration. They knew then that more than anybody else, it is
the lawyers -- the disciples of law -- who are most obliged to
venerate the law. As stated in Ex Parte Wall:37
"Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly
bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant; and
for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override
the laws, to trample them underfoot and to ignore the very
bonds of society, argues recreancy to his position and
office and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate
and dangerous elements of the body politic."

In sum, respondent committed grossly immoral conduct and

violation of his oath as a lawyer. The penalty of one (1) year
suspension recommended by the IBP is not commensurate to the
gravity of his offense. The bulk of jurisprudence supports the
imposition of the extreme penalty of disbarment.
WHEREFORE, respondent Leo J. Palma is found GUILTY of grossly
immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a lawyer, and is
hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law.

SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez*, Corona, Callejo, Sr.,
Carpio Morales*, Tinga, Azcuna, and Chico-Nazario**, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 6313

September 7, 2006

CATHERINE JOIE P. VITUG, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. DIOSDADO M. RONGCAL, respondent.

36

DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The allegations raised in this complaint for disbarment are more
sordid, if not tawdry, from the usual. As such, close scrutiny of
these claims is called for. Disbarment and suspension of a lawyer,
being the most severe forms of disciplinary sanction, should be
imposed with great caution and only in those cases where the
misconduct of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member
of the bar is established by clear, convincing and satisfactory
proof.1

services as counsel for the prospective claim for support against

Aquino. Complainant acknowledges that she succumbed to these
advances, assured by respondent's claim that the lawyer was free
to marry her, as his own marriage had already been annulled.

Under consideration is the administrative complaint for disbarment

filed by Catherine Joie P. Vitug (complainant) against Atty. Diosdado
M. Rongcal (respondent). A classic case of "he said, she said," the
parties' conflicting versions of the facts as culled from the records
are hereinafter presented.

On 9 February 2001, respondent allegedly convinced complainant

to sign an Affidavit of Disclaimer3 ("Affidavit") categorically stating
that even as Aquino was denoted as the father in the birth
certificate4 of her daughter, he was, in truth, not the real father.
She was not allowed to read the contents of the Affidavit, she
claims. Respondent supposedly assured her that the document
meant nothing, necessary as it was the only way that Aquino would
agree to give her daughter medical and educational support.
Respondent purportedly assured complainant that despite the
Affidavit, she could still pursue a case against Aquino in the future
because the Affidavit is not a public document. Because she
completely trusted him at this point, she signed the document
"without even taking a glance at it."5

Complainant narrates that she and respondent met sometime in

December 2000 when she was looking for a lawyer to assist her in
suing Arnulfo Aquino ("Aquino"), the biological father of her minor
daughter, for support. Her former classmate who was then a
Barangay Secretary referred her to respondent. After several
meetings with complainant, respondent sent a demand letter 2 in
her behalf to Aquino wherein he asked for the continuance of the
monthly child support Aquino used to give, plus no less
than P300,000.00 for the surgical operation their daughter would
need for her congenital heart ailment.

On 14 February 2001, respondent allegedly advised complainant

that Aquino gave him P150,000.00 cash andP58,000.00 in two (2)
postdated checks to answer for the medical expenses of her
daughter. Instead of turning them over to her, respondent handed
her his personal check6 in the amount of P150,000.00 and
promised to give her the balance of P58,000.00 soon thereafter.
However, sometime in April or May 2001, respondent informed her
that he could not give her the said amount because he used it for
his political campaign as he was then running for the position of
Provincial Board Member of the 2nd District of Pampanga.

At around this point, by complainant's own admission, she and

respondent started having a sexual relationship. She narrates that
this twist in the events began after respondent started calling on
her shortly after he had sent the demand letter in her behalf.
Respondent allegedly started courting her, giving her financial aid.
Soon he had progressed to making sexual advances towards
complainant, to the accompaniment of sweet inducements such as
the promise of a job, financial security for her daughter, and his

Complainant maintains that inspite of their sexual relationship and

the fact that respondent kept part of the money intended for her
daughter, he still failed in his promise to give her a job.
Furthermore, he did not file the case against Aquino and referred
her instead to Atty. Federico S. Tolentino, Jr. ("Atty. Tolentino").
Sometime in 2002, assisted by Atty. Tolentino, complainant filed a
criminal case for child abuse as well as a civil case against Aquino.

37

While the criminal case was dismissed, the civil case was decided
on 30 August 2004 by virtue of a compromise agreement. 7 It was
only when said cases were filed that she finally understood the
import of the Affidavit.
Complainant avers that respondent failed to protect her interest
when he personally prepared the Affidavit and caused her to sign
the same, which obviously worked to her disadvantage. In making
false promises that all her problems would be solved, aggravated
by his assurance that his marriage had already been annulled,
respondent allegedly deceived her into yielding to his sexual
desires. Taking advantage of the trust and confidence she had in
him as her counsel and paramour, her weak emotional state, and
dire financial need at that time, respondent was able to
appropriate for himself money that rightfully belonged to her
daughter. She argues that respondent's aforementioned acts
constitute a violation of his oath as a lawyer as well as the Code of
Professional Responsibility ("Code"), particularly Rule 1.01, Rule
1.02, Rule 16.01, Rule 16.02, and Canon 7. 8 Hence, she filed the
instant complaint9 dated 2 February 2004.
Expectedly, respondent presents a different version. According to
him, complainant needed a lawyer who would file the
aforementioned action for support. Complainant's former high
school classmate Reinilda Bansil Morales, who was also his fellow
barangay official, referred her to him. He admits sending a demand
letter to her former lover, Aquino, to ask support for the
child.10 Subsequently, he and Aquino communicated through an
emissary. He learned that because of Aquino's infidelity, his
relationship with his wife was strained so that in order to settle
things the spouses were willing to give complainant a lump sum
provided she would execute an affidavit to the effect that Aquino is
not the father of her daughter.
Respondent relayed this proposal to complainant who asked for his
advice. He then advised her to study the proposal thoroughly and
with a practical mindset. He also explained to her the pros and
cons of pursuing the case. After several days, she requested that

he negotiate for an out-of-court settlement of no less

thanP500,000.00. When Aquino rejected the amount, negotiations
ensued until the amount was lowered toP200,000.00. Aquino
allegedly offered to issue four postdated checks in equal amounts
within four months. Complainant disagreed. Aquino then proposed
to rediscount the checks at an interest of 4% a month or a total
ofP12,000.00. The resulting amount was P188,000.00.
Complainant finally agreed to this arrangement and voluntarily
signed the Affidavit that respondent prepared, the same Affidavit
adverted to by complainant. He denies forcing her to sign the
document and strongly refutes her allegation that she did not know
what the Affidavit was for and that she signed it without even
reading it, as he gave her the draft before the actual payment was
made. He notes that complainant is a college graduate and a
former bank employee who speaks and understands English. He
likewise vehemently denies pocketingP58,000.00 of the settlement
proceeds. When complainant allegedly signed the Affidavit, the
emissary handed to her the sum of P150,000.00 in cash and she
allegedly told respondent that he could keep the
remainingP38,000.00, not P58,000.00 as alleged in the complaint.
Although she did not say why, he assumed that it was for his
attorney's fees.
As regards their illicit relationship, respondent admits of his sexual
liaison with complainant. He, however, denies luring her with sweet
words and empty promises. According to him, it was more of a
"chemistry of (sic) two consensual (sic) adults," 11 complainant then
being in her thirties. He denies that he tricked her into believing
that his marriage was already annulled. Strangely, respondent
devotes considerable effort to demonstrate that complainant very
well knew he was married when they commenced what was to him,
an extra-marital liaison. He points out that, first, they had met
through his colleague, Ms. Morales, a friend and former high school
classmate of hers. Second, they had allegedly first met at his
residence where she was actually introduced to his wife.
Subsequently, complainant called his residence several times and
actually spoke to his wife, a circumstance so disturbing to

38

respondent that he had to beg complainant not to call him there.

Third, he was the Punong Barangay from 1994 to 2002, and was
elected President of the Association of Barangay Council ("ABC")
and as such was an ex-officio member of the Sangguniang Bayan
of Guagua, Pampanga. He ran for the position of Provincial Board
Member in 2001. Thus, he was known in his locality and it was
impossible for complainant not to have known of his marital status
especially that she lived no more than three (3) kilometers away
from his house and even actively helped him in his campaign.
Respondent further alleges that while the demand for support from
Aquino was being worked out, complainant moved to a rented
house in Olongapo City because a suitor had promised her a job in
the Subic Naval Base. But months passed and the promised job
never came so that she had to return to Lubao, Pampanga. As the
money she received from Aquino was about to be exhausted, she
allegedly started to pester respondent for financial assistance and
urged him to file the Petition for Support against Aquino. While
respondent acceded to her pleas, he also advised her "to look for
the right man"12 and to stop depending on him for financial
assistance. He also informed her that he could not assist her in
filing the case, as he was the one who prepared and notarized the
Affidavit. He, however, referred her to Atty. Tolentino.
In August 2002, respondent finally ended his relationship with
complainant, but still he agreed to give her monthly financial
assistance of P6,000.00 for six (6) months. Since then, they have
ceased to meet and have communicated only through an emissary
or by cellphone. In 2003, complainant begged him to continue the
assistance until June when her alleged fianc from the United
States would have arrived. Respondent agreed. In July 2003, she
again asked for financial assistance for the last time, which he
turned down. Since then he had stopped communicating to her.
Sometime in January 2004, complainant allegedly went to see a
friend of respondent. She told him that she was in need
of P5,000.00 for a sari-sari store she was putting up and she
wanted him to relay the message to respondent. According to this

friend, complainant showed him a prepared complaint against

respondent that she would file with the Supreme Court should the
latter not accede to her request. Sensing that he was being
blackmailed, respondent ignored her demand. True enough, he
alleges, she filed the instant complaint.
On 21 July 2004, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines ("IBP") for investigation, report and
recommendation.13 After the parties submitted their respective
position papers and supporting documents, the Investigating
Commissioner rendered his Report and Recommendation 14 dated 2
September 2005. After presenting the parties' conflicting factual
versions, the Investigating Commissioner gave credence to that of
complainant and concluded that respondent clearly violated the
Code, reporting in this wise, to wit:
Respondent, through the above mentioned acts, clearly
showed that he is wanting in good moral character, putting
in doubt his professional reputation as a member of the
BAR and renders him unfit and unworthy of the privileges
which the law confers to him. From a lawyer, are (sic)
expected those qualities of truth-speaking, high sense of
honor, full candor, intellectual honesty and the strictest
observance of fiduciary responsibility all of which
throughout the passage of time have been compendiously
described as MORAL CHARACTER.
Respondent, unfortunately took advantage and (sic) every
opportunity to entice complainant to his lascivious
hungerness (sic). On several occasions[,] respondent kept
on calling complainant and dropped by her house and
gave P2,000.00 as aid while waiting allegedly for the reply
of (sic) their demand letter for support. It signals the
numerous visits and regular calls all because of [l]ewd
design. He took advantage of her seeming financial woes
and emotional dependency.
xxxx

39

Without doubt, a violation of the high moral standards of

the legal profession justifies the impositions (sic) of the
appropriate penalty, including suspension and disbarment.
x x x15
It was then recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for six (6) months and that he be ordered to return
to complainant the amount of P58,000.00 within two months. The
IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the said Report and
Recommendation in a Resolution16 dated 17 December 2005,
finding the same to be fully supported by the evidence on record
and the applicable laws and rules, and "considering Respondent's
obviously taking advantage of the lawyer-client relationship and
the financial and emotional problem of his client and attempting to
mislead the Commission,"17 respondent was meted out the penalty
of suspension for one (1) year with a stern warning that a
repetition of similar acts will merit severe sanctions. He was
likewise ordered to return P58,000.00 to complainant.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Set
Case for Clarificatory Questioning18 ("Motion") dated 9 March 2006
with the IBP and a Motion to Reopen/Remand Case for Clarificatory
Questioning dated 22 March 2006 with the Supreme Court. He
reiterates his own version of the facts, giving a more detailed
account of the events that transpired between him and
complainant. Altogether, he portrays complainant as a shrewd and
manipulative woman who depends on men for financial support
and who would stop at nothing to get what she wants. Arguing that
the IBP based its Resolution solely on complainant's bare
allegations that she failed to prove by clear and convincing
evidence, he posits the case should be re-opened for clarificatory
questioning in order to determine who between them is telling the
truth.
In a Resolution19 dated 27 April 2006, the IBP denied the Motion on
the ground that it has no more jurisdiction over the case as the
matter had already been endorsed to the Supreme Court.

While we find respondent liable, we adjudicate the matter

differently from what the IBP has recommended.
On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he
had an extra-marital affair with complainant, albeit brief and
discreet, and which act is not "so corrupt and false as to constitute
a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high
degree"20 in order to merit disciplinary sanction. We disagree.
One of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an
applicant must possess good moral character. Said requirement
persists as a continuing condition for the enjoyment of the
privilege of law practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for
the revocation of such privilege.21 As officers of the court, lawyers
must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be
seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance
with the highest moral standards of the community. 22 The Court
has held that to justify suspension or disbarment the act
complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. 23 A
grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to
constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be
reprehensible to a high degree.24 It is a willful, flagrant, or
shameless act that shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the
good and respectable members of the community.25
While it is has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of
sexual relations between two unmarried adults is not sufficient to
warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior, 26 it is not
so with respect to betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity. 27 Even if
not all forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under penal
law, sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful
and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of
marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and
affirmed by our laws.28
By his own admission, respondent is obviously guilty of immorality
in violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code which states that a lawyer
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful

40

conduct. The next question to consider is whether this act is

aggravated by his alleged deceitful conduct in luring complainant
who was then in low spirits and in dire financial need in order to
satisfy his carnal desires. While the IBP concluded the question in
the affirmative, we find otherwise.
Complainant's allegations that she succumbed to respondent's
sexual advances due to his promises of financial security and
because of her need for legal assistance in filing a case against her
former lover, are insufficient to conclude that complainant
deceived her into having sexual relations with her. Surely, an
educated woman like herself who was of sufficient age and
discretion, being at that time in her thirties, would not be easily
fooled into sexual congress by promises of a job and of free legal
assistance, especially when there is no showing that she is
suffering from any mental or physical disability as to justify such
recklessness and/or helplessness on her part.29Respondent's
numerous visits and regular calls to complainant do not necessarily
prove that he took advantage of her. At best, it proves that he
courted her despite being a married man, precisely the fact on
which the finding of immorality is rooted. Moreover, the
circumstance that he gave her P2,000.00 as aid does not induce
belief that he fueled her financial dependence as she never denied
pleading with, if not badgering, him for financial support.
Neither does complainant's allegation that respondent lied to her
about his marital status inspire belief. We find credence in
respondent's assertion that it was impossible for her not to have
known of his subsisting marriage. She herself admitted that they
were introduced by her friend and former classmate, Ms. Morales
who was a fellow barangay official of respondent. She admitted
that she knew his residence phone number and that she had called
him there. She also knew that respondent is an active barangay
official who even ran as Provincial Board Member in 2001.
Curiously, she never refuted respondent's allegations that she had
met and talked to his wife on several occasions, that she lived near
his residence, that she helped him in his campaign, or that she
knew a lot of his friends, so as not to have known of his marital

status. Considering that she previously had an affair with Aquino,

who was also a married man, it would be unnatural for her to have
just plunged into a sexual relationship with respondent whom she
had known for only a short time without verifying his background,
if it were true that she preferred "to change [her] life for the
better,"30 as alleged in her complaint. We believe that her
aforementioned allegations of deceit were not established by clear
preponderant evidence required in disbarment cases.31 We are left
with the most logical conclusion that she freely and wittingly
entered into an illicit and immoral relationship with respondent
sans any misrepresentation or deceit on his part.
Next, complainant charged respondent of taking advantage of his
legal skills and moral control over her to force her to sign the
clearly disadvantageous Affidavit without letting her read it and
without explaining to her its repercussions. While acting as her
counsel, she alleged that he likewise acted as counsel for Aquino.
We find complainant's assertions dubious. She was clearly in need
of financial support from Aquino especially that her daughter was
suffering from a heart ailment. We cannot fathom how she could
abandon all cares to respondent who she had met for only a couple
of months and thereby risk the welfare of her child by signing
without even reading a document she knew was related to the
support case she intended to file. The Affidavit consists of four
short sentences contained in a single page. It is unlikely she was
not able to read it before she signed it.
Likewise obscure is her assertion that respondent did not fully
explain to her the contents of the Affidavit and the consequences
of signing it. She alleged that respondent even urged her "to use
her head as Arnulfo Aquino will not give the money for Alexandra's
medical and educational support if she will not sign the said
Affidavit of Disclaimer."32 If her own allegation is to be believed, it
shows that she was aware of the on-going negotiation with Aquino
for the settlement of her claim for which the latter demanded the
execution of the Affidavit. It also goes to show that she was
pondering on whether to sign the same. Furthermore, she does not

41

deny being a college graduate or that she knows and understands

English. The Affidavit is written in short and simple sentences that
are understandable even to a layman. The inevitable conclusion is
that she signed the Affidavit voluntarily and without any coercion
whatsoever on the part of respondent.
The question remains as to whether his act of preparing and
notarizing the Affidavit, a document disadvantageous to his client,
is a violation of the Code. We rule in the negative.
It was not unlawful for respondent to assist his client in entering
into a settlement with Aquino after explaining all available options
to her. The law encourages the amicable settlement not only of
pending cases but also of disputes which might otherwise be filed
in court.33 Moreover, there is no showing that he knew for sure that
Aquino is the father of complainant's daughter as paternity
remains to be proven. As complainant voluntarily and intelligently
agreed to a settlement with Aquino, she cannot later blame her
counsel when she experiences a change of heart. Besides, the
record is bereft of evidence as to whether respondent also acted as
Aquino's counsel in the settlement of the case. Again, we only have
complainant's bare allegations that cannot be considered
evidence.34 Suspicion, no matter how strong, is not enough. In the
absence of contrary evidence, what will prevail is the presumption
that the respondent has regularly performed his duty in
accordance with his oath.35
Complainant further charged respondent of misappropriating part
of the money given by Aquino to her daughter. Instead of turning
over the whole amount, he allegedly issued to her his personal
check in the amount ofP150,000.00 and pocketed the
remaining P58,000.00 in violation of his fiduciary obligation to her
as her counsel.
The IBP did not make any categorical finding on this matter but
simply ordered respondent to return the amount of P58,000.00 to
complainant. We feel a discussion is in order.

We note that there is no clear evidence as to how much Aquino

actually gave in settlement of complainant's claim for support. The
parties are in agreement that complainant received the amount
of P150,000.00. However, complainant insists that she should have
received more as there were two postdated checks amounting
toP58,000.00 that respondent never turned over to her.
Respondent essentially agrees that the amount is in fact more
than P150,000.00 but only P38,000.00 more and complainant
said he could have it and he assumed it was for his attorney's fees.
We scrutinized the records and found not a single evidence to
prove that there existed two postdated checks issued by Aquino in
the amount of P58,000.00. On the other hand, respondent admits
that there is actually an amount of P38,000.00 but presented no
evidence of an agreement for attorney's fees to justify his
presumption that he can keep the same. Curiously, there is on
record a photocopy of a check issued by respondent in favor of
complainant for P150,000.00. It was only in his Motion for
Reconsideration where respondent belatedly proffers an
explanation. He avers that he cannot recall what the check was for
but he supposes that complainant requested for it as she did not
want to travel all the way to Olongapo City with a huge sum of
money.
We find the circumstances rather suspicious but evidence is
wanting to sustain a finding in favor of either party in this respect.
We cannot and should not rule on mere conjectures. The IBP relied
only on the written assertions of the parties, apparently finding no
need to subject the veracity of the assertions through the question
and answer modality. With the inconclusive state of the evidence, a
more in-depth investigation is called for to ascertain in whose favor
the substantial evidence level tilts. Hence, we are constrained to
remand the case to the IBP for further reception of evidence solely
on this aspect.
We also are unable to grant complainant's prayer for respondent to
be made liable for the cost of her child's DNA test absent proof that
he misappropriated funds exclusively earmarked for the purpose.

42

Neither shall we entertain complainant's claim for moral damages

and attorney's fees. Suffice it to state that an administrative case
against a lawyer is sui generis, one that is distinct from a civil or a
criminal action.36 It is an investigation by the Court into the fitness
of a lawyer to remain in the legal profession and be allowed the
privileges as such. Its primary objective is to protect the Court and
the public from the misconduct of its officers with the end in view
of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and
honest administration of justice by requiring that those who
exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable and
reliable men and women in whom courts and clients may repose
confidence.37 As such, it involves no private interest and affords no
redress for private grievance.38 The complainant or the person who
called the attention of the court to the lawyer's alleged misconduct
is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome
except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration
of justice.39

Respondent's misconduct is of considerable gravity. There is a

string of cases where the Court meted out the extreme penalty of
disbarment on the ground of gross immorality where the
respondent contracted a bigamous marriage,40 abandoned his
family to cohabit with his paramour,41 cohabited with a married
woman,42 lured an innocent woman into marriage,43 or was found
to be a womanizer.44 The instant case can be easily differentiated
from the foregoing cases. We, therefore, heed the stern injunction
on decreeing disbarment where any lesser penalty, such as
temporary suspension, would accomplish the end
desired.45 In Zaguirre v. Castillo,46respondent was found to have
sired a child with another woman who knew he was married. He
therein sought understanding from the Court pointing out the
polygamous nature of men and that the illicit relationship was a
product of mutual lust and desire. Appalled at his reprehensible
and amoral attitude, the Court suspended him indefinitely.
However, in Fr. Sinnott v. Judge Barte,47 where respondent judge
consorted with a woman not his wife, but there was no conclusive
evidence that he sired a child with her, he was fined P10,000.00 for
his conduct unbecoming a magistrate despite his retirement during
the pendency of the case.
We note that from the very beginning of this case, herein
respondent had expressed remorse over his indiscretion and had in
fact ended the brief illicit relationship years ago. We take these as
signs that his is not a character of such severe depravity and thus
should be taken as mitigating circumstances in his
favor.48 Considering further that this is his first offense, we believe
that a fine of P15,000.00 would suffice. This, of course, is without
prejudice to the outcome of the aspect of this case involving the
alleged misappropriation of funds of the client.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find Atty. Diosdado M.
Rongcal GUILTY of immorality and impose on him a FINE
of P15,000.00 with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or
similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.

43

The charge of misappropriation of funds of the client is REMANDED

to the IBP for further investigation, report and recommendation
within ninety (90) days from receipt of this Decision.

He first met respondent in January 2000 when his (complainant's)

then-fiancee Irene Moje (Irene) introduced respondent to him as
her friend who was married to Marianne (sometimes spelled "Mary
Ann") Tantoco with whom he had three children.

Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal record of

respondent as an attorney and as a member of the Bar, and
furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
country.

After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, complainant

noticed that from January to March 2001, Irene had been receiving
from respondent cellphone calls, as well as messages some of
which read "I love you," "I miss you," or "Meet you at Megamall."

SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Chairperson, Carpio, Carpio-Morales, Velasco, Jr., J.J., ,
concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 7136

August 1, 2007

JOSELANO GUEVARRA, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL EALA, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Joselano Guevarra (complainant) filed on March 4, 2002 a
Complaint for Disbarment1 before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) against Atty.
Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala (respondent) for "grossly
immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyer's oath."
In his complaint, Guevarra gave the following account:

Complainant also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late
at night or early in the morning of the following day, and
sometimes did not go home from work. When he asked about her
whereabouts, she replied that she slept at her parents' house in
Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with her work.
In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and respondent
together on two occasions. On the second occasion, he confronted
them following which Irene abandoned the conjugal house.
On April 22, 2001, complainant went uninvited to Irene's birthday
celebration at which he saw her and respondent celebrating with
her family and friends. Out of embarrassment, anger and
humiliation, he left the venue immediately. Following that incident,
Irene went to the conjugal house and hauled off all her personal
belongings, pieces of furniture, and her share of the household
appliances.
Complainant later found, in the master's bedroom, a folded social
card bearing the words "I Love You" on its face, which card when
unfolded contained a handwritten letter dated October 7, 2000, the
day of his wedding to Irene, reading:
My everdearest Irene,
By the time you open this, you'll be moments away from
walking down the aisle. I will say a prayer for you that you
may find meaning in what you're about to do.
Sometimes I wonder why we ever met. Is it only for me to
find fleeting happiness but experience eternal pain? Is it

44

only for us to find a true love but then lose it again? Or is it

because there's a bigger plan for the two of us?

In his ANSWER,3 respondent admitted having sent the I LOVE YOU

card on which the above-quoted letter was handwritten.

I hope that you have experienced true happiness with me. I

have done everything humanly possible to love you. And
today, as you make your vows . . . I make my own vow to
YOU!

On paragraph 14 of the COMPLAINT reading:

I will love you for the rest of my life. I loved you from the
first time I laid eyes on you, to the time we spent together,
up to the final moments of your single life. But more
importantly, I will love you until the life in me is gone and
until we are together again.
Do not worry about me! I will be happy for you. I have
enough memories of us to last me a lifetime. Always
remember though that in my heart, in my mind and in my
soul, YOU WILL ALWAYS
. . . AND THE WONDERFUL THINGS YOU DO!
BE MINE . . . . AND MINE ALONE, and I WILL ALWAYS BE
YOURS AND YOURS ALONE!
I LOVE YOU FOREVER, I LOVE YOU FOR ALWAYS. AS LONG
AS I'M LIVING MY TWEETIE YOU'LL BE!"2

Eternally yours,
NOLI

Complainant soon saw respondent's car and that of Irene

constantly parked at No. 71-B 11th Street, New Manila where, as he
was to later learn sometime in April 2001, Irene was already
residing. He also learned still later that when his friends saw Irene
on or about January 18, 2002 together with respondent during a
concert, she was pregnant.

14. Respondent and Irene were even FLAUNTING THEIR

ADULTEROUS RELATIONSHIP as they attended social
functions together. For instance, in or about the third week
of September 2001, the couple attended the launch of the
"Wine All You Can" promotion of French wines, held at the
Mega Strip of SM Megamall B at Mandaluyong City. Their
attendance was reported in Section B of the Manila
Standard issue of 24 September 2001, on page 21.
Respondent and Irene were photographed together; their
picture was captioned: "Irene with Sportscaster Noli
Eala." A photocopy of the report is attached as Annex
C.4 (Italics and emphasis in the original; CAPITALIZATION of
the phrase "flaunting their adulterous relationship"
supplied),
respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:
4. Respondent specifically denies having ever
flaunted an adulterous relationship with Irene as alleged
in paragraph 14 of the Complaint, the truth of the matter
being that their relationship was low profile and known
only to the immediate members of their respective
families, and that Respondent, as far as the general public
was concerned, was still known to be legally married to
Mary Anne Tantoco.5 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On paragraph 15 of the COMPLAINT reading:
15. Respondent's adulterous conduct with the
complainant's wife and his apparent abandoning or
neglecting of his own family, demonstrate his gross moral
depravity, making him morally unfit to keep his
membership in the bar. He flaunted his aversion to the
institution of marriage, calling it a "piece of paper." Morally
reprehensible was his writing the love letter to
complainant's bride on the very day of her wedding,

45

vowing to continue his love for her "until we are together

again," as now they are.6 (Underscoring supplied),
respondent stated in his ANSWER as follows:
5. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in
paragraph 15 of the Complaint regarding
his adulterousrelationship and that his acts demonstrate
gross moral depravity thereby making him unfit to keep his
membership in the bar, the reason being that Respondent's
relationship with Irene was not under scandalous
circumstances and that as far as his relationship with his
own family:
5.1 Respondent has maintained a civil, cordial and peaceful
relationship with [his wife] Mary Anne as in fact they still
occasionally meet in public, even if Mary Anne is aware
of Respondent's special friendship with Irene.
xxxx
5.5 Respondent also denies that he has flaunted his
aversion to the institution of marriage by calling the
institution of marriage a mere piece of paper because his
reference [in his above-quoted handwritten letter to Irene]
to the marriage between Complainant and Irene as a piece
of paper was merely with respect to the formality of the
marriage contract.7 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Respondent admitted8 paragraph 18 of the COMPLAINT reading:
18. The Rules of Court requires lawyers to support the
Constitution and obey the laws. The Constitution regards
marriage as an inviolable social institution and is the
foundation of the family (Article XV, Sec. 2).9
And on paragraph 19 of the COMPLAINT reading:
19. Respondent's grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of
the Constitution and the laws he, as a lawyer, has
been sworn to uphold. In pursuing obsessively his illicit

love for the complainant's wife, he mocked the

institution of marriage, betrayed his own family, broke
up the complainant's marriage, commits adultery with his
wife, and degrades the legal profession.10 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied),
respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:
7. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in
paragraph 19 of the Complaint, the reason being thatunder
the circumstances the acts of Respondent with respect to
his purely personal and low profile special relationship
with Irene is neither under scandalous
circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral
conduct as would be a ground for disbarment pursuant to
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.11 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
To respondent's ANSWER, complainant filed a REPLY, 12 alleging that
Irene gave birth to a girl and Irene named respondent in the
Certificate of Live Birth as the girl's father. Complainant attached to
the Reply, as Annex "A," a copy of a Certificate of Live
Birth13 bearing Irene's signature and naming respondent as the
father of her daughter Samantha Irene Louise Moje who was born
on February 14, 2002 at St. Luke's Hospital.
Complainant's REPLY merited a REJOINDER WITH MOTION TO
DISMISS14 dated January 10, 2003 from respondent in which he
denied having "personal knowledge of the Certificate of Live Birth
attached to the complainant's Reply."15 Respondent moved to
dismiss the complaint due to the pendency of a civil case filed by
complainant for the annulment of his marriage to Irene, and a
criminal complaint for adultery against respondent and Irene which
was pending before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office.
During the investigation before the IBP-CBD, complainant's
Complaint-Affidavit and Reply to Answer were adopted as his
testimony on direct examination.16 Respondent's counsel did not
cross-examine complainant.17
After investigation, IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner Milagros V.
San Juan, in a 12-page REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 18 dated

46

October 26, 2004, found the charge against respondent sufficiently

proven.
The Commissioner thus recommended19 that respondent be
disbarred for violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility reading:
Rule 1.01: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Underscoring
supplied),
and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code reading:
Rule 7.03: A lawyer shall not engage
in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave
in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession. (Underscoring supplied)
The IBP Board of Governors, however, annulled and set aside the
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and
accordingly dismissed the case for lack of merit, by Resolution
dated January 28, 2006 briefly reading:
RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2006-06
CBD Case No. 02-936
Joselano C. Guevarra vs.
Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala
a.k.a. Noli Eala
RESOLVED to ANNUL and SET ASIDE, as it is hereby
ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE, the Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner, and to APPROVE
the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled case for lack of
merit.20 (Italics and emphasis in the original)
Hence, the present petition21 of complainant before this Court, filed
pursuant to Section 12 (c), Rule 13922 of the Rules of Court.
The petition is impressed with merit.

Oddly enough, the IBP Board of Governors, in setting aside the

Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and
dismissing the case for lack of merit, gave no reason therefor as its
above-quoted 33-word Resolution shows.
Respondent contends, in his Comment23 on the present petition of
complainant, that there is no evidence against him. 24 The
contention fails. As the IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner
observed:
While it may be true that the love letter dated October 7,
2000 (Exh. "C") and the news item published in the Manila
Standard (Exh. "D"), even taken together do not sufficiently
prove that respondent is carrying on an adulterous
relationship with complainant's wife, there are other pieces
of evidence on record which support the accusation of
complainant against respondent.
It should be noted that in his Answer dated 17 October
2002, respondent through counsel made the
following statements to wit: "Respondent specifically
denies having [ever] flaunted an adulterous relationship
with Irene as alleged in paragraph [14] of the Complaint,
the truth of the matter being [that]their relationship was
low profile and known only to immediate members of their
respective families . . . , and Respondent specifically denies
the allegations in paragraph 19 of the complaint, the
reason being that under the circumstances the acts of the
respondents with respect to his purely personal and low
profile relationship with Irene is neither under scandalous
circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral
conduct . . ."
These statements of respondent in his Answer are
an admission that there is indeed a "special"
relationship between him and complainant's wife,
Irene, [which] taken together with the Certificate of
Live Birth of Samantha Louise Irene Moje (Annex "H1") sufficiently prove that there was indeed an illicit
relationship between respondent and Irene which
resulted in the birth of the child "Samantha". In the
Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha it should be
noted that complainant's wife Irene supplied the

47

information that respondent was the father of the

child. Given the fact that the respondent admitted his
special relationship with Irene there is no reason to
believe that Irene would lie or make any
misrepresentation regarding the paternity of the
child. It should be underscored that respondent has not
categorically denied that he is the father of
Samantha Louise Irene Moje.25 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Indeed, from respondent's Answer, he does not deny carrying on
an adulterous relationship with Irene, "adultery" being defined
under Art. 333 of the Revised Penal Code as that "committed by
any married woman who shall have sexual intercourse with a man
not her husband and by the man who has carnal knowledge of her,
knowing her to be married, even if the marriage be subsequently
declared void."26 (Italics supplied) What respondent denies
is having flaunted such relationship, he maintaining that it was
"low profile and known only to the immediate members of their
respective families."
In other words, respondent's denial is a negative pregnant,
a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial
facts in the pleading responded to which are not squarely
denied. It was in effect an admission of the averments it
was directed at. Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a
form of negative expression which carries with it in
affirmation or at least an implication of some kind
favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with
an admission of the substantial facts alleged in the
pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or
modifying language and the words of the allegation as so
qualified or modified are literally denied, it has been held
that thequalifying circumstances alone are denied
while the fact itself is admitted.27 (Citations omitted;
emphasis and underscoring supplied)
A negative pregnant too is respondent's denial of having "personal
knowledge" of Irene's daughter Samantha Louise Irene Moje's
Certificate of Live Birth. In said certificate, Irene named respondent
a "lawyer," 38 years old as the child's father. And the phrase
"NOT MARRIED" is entered on the desired information on "DATE

AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE." A comparison of the signature

attributed to Irene in the certificate28 with her signature on the
Marriage Certificate29 shows that they were affixed by one and the
same person. Notatu dignum is that, as the Investigating
Commissioner noted, respondent never denied being the father of
the child.
Franklin A. Ricafort, the records custodian of St. Luke's Medical
Center, in his January 29, 2003 Affidavit30 which he identified at the
witness stand, declared that Irene gave the information in the
Certificate of Live Birth that the child's father is "Jose Emmanuel
Masacaet Eala," who was 38 years old and a lawyer. 31
Without doubt, the adulterous relationship between respondent
and Irene has been sufficiently proven by more than
clearly preponderant evidence that evidence adduced by one
party which is more conclusive and credible than that of the other
party and, therefore, has greater weight than the other32 which is
the quantum of evidence needed in an administrative case against
a lawyer.
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own.
They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of civil
and criminal cases.
. . . of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal
case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary; in an
administrative case for disbarment or suspension, "clearly
preponderant evidence" is all that is
required.33 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent insists, however, that disbarment does not lie because
his relationship with Irene was not, under Section 27 of Rule 138 of
the Revised Rules of Court, reading:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by
Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A member of the bar
may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney
by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath

48

which he is required to take before admission to practice,

or for a willful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.
The disbarment or suspension of a member of the
Philippine Bar by a competent court or other disciplinatory
agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been
admitted as an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or
suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the
acts hereinabove enumerated.

immoral conduct' depends on the surrounding

circumstances."35 The case at bar involves a relationship between a
married lawyer and a married woman who is not his wife. It is
immaterial whether the affair was carried out discreetly. Apropos is
the following pronouncement of this Court in Vitug v. Rongcal:36
On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny
that he had an extra-marital affair with complainant, albeit
brief and discreet, and which act is not "so corrupt and
false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to
be reprehensible to a high degree" in order to merit
disciplinary sanction. We disagree.
xxxx

The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or

disciplinary agency shall be prima facie evidence of the
ground for disbarment or suspension (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied),
under scandalous circumstances.34
The immediately-quoted Rule which provides the grounds for
disbarment or suspension uses the phrase "grossly immoral
conduct," not "under scandalous circumstances." Sexual
intercourse under scandalous circumstances is, following Article
334 of the Revised Penal Code reading:
ART. 334. Concubinage. - Any husband who shall keep a
mistress in the conjugal dwelling, or, shall have sexual
intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a
woman who is not his wife, or shall cohabit with her in any
other place, shall be punished by prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods.
x x x x,
an element of the crime of concubinage when a married man has
sexual intercourse with a woman elsewhere.
"Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or
without the benefit of marriage should be characterized as 'grossly

While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere

fact of sexual relations between two unmarriedadults is not
sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for such illicit
behavior, it is not so with respect tobetrayals of the
marital vow of fidelity. Even if not all forms of extramarital relations are punishable under penal law, sexual
relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and
immoral as it manifestsdeliberate disregard of the
sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected
by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws.37 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
And so is the pronouncement in Tucay v. Atty. Tucay:38
The Court need not delve into the question of whether or
not the respondent did contract a bigamous marriage . . . It
is enough that the records of this administrative case
substantiate the findings of the Investigating
Commissioner, as well as the IBP Board of Governors, i.e.,
that indeed respondent has beencarrying on an illicit
affair with a married woman, a grossly immoral conduct
and indicative of an extremely low regard for the
fundamental ethics of his profession. This detestable
behavior renders him regrettably unfit and
undeserving of the treasured honor and privileges
which his license confers upon him.39 (Underscoring
supplied)

49

Respondent in fact also violated the lawyer's oath he took before

admission to practice law which goes:
I _________, having been permitted to continue in the
practice of law in the Philippines, do solemnly swear that I
recognize the supreme authority of the Republic of the
Philippines; I will support its
Constitution andobey the laws as well as the legal orders of
the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will
not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless,
false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same;
I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct
myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge
and discretion with all good fidelity as well as to the courts
as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary
obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of
evasion. So help me God. (Underscoring supplied)
Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV (The
Family) of the Constitution reading:
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is
the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
State.
In this connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209),
which echoes this constitutional provision, obligates the husband
and the wife "to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity, and render mutual help and support."40
Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer from
engaging in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct,"
and Rule 7.03 of Canon7 of the same Code which proscribes a
lawyer from engaging in any "conduct that adversely reflects on
his fitness to practice law."
Clutching at straws, respondent, during the pendency of the
investigation of the case before the IBP Commissioner, filed a
Manifestation41 on March 22, 2005 informing the IBP-CBD that
complainant's petition for nullity of his (complainant's) marriage to

Irene had been granted by Branch 106 of the Quezon City Regional
Trial Court, and that the criminal complaint for adultery
complainant filed against respondent and Irene "based on the
same set of facts alleged in the instant case," which was pending
review before the Department of Justice (DOJ), on petition of
complainant, had been, on motion of complainant, withdrawn.
The Secretary of Justice's Resolution of January 16, 2004 granting
complainant's Motion to Withdraw Petition for Review reads:
Considering that the instant motion was filed before the
final resolution of the petition for review, we are inclined to
grant the same pursuant to Section 10 of Department
Circular No. 70 dated July 3, 2000, which provides that
"notwithstanding the perfection of the appeal, the
petitioner may withdraw the same at any time before it is
finally resolved, in which case the appealed resolution
shall stand as though no appeal has been
taken."42 (Emphasis supplied by complainant)
That the marriage between complainant and Irene was
subsequently declared void ab initio is immaterial. The acts
complained of took place before the marriage was declared null
and void.43 As a lawyer, respondent should be aware that a man
and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are
presumed, unless proven otherwise, to have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage.44 In carrying on an extra-marital affair with
Irene prior to the judicial declaration that her marriage with
complainant was null and void, and despite respondent himself
being married, he showed disrespect for an institution held sacred
by the law. And he betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer.
As for complainant's withdrawal of his petition for review before
the DOJ, respondent glaringly omitted to state that before
complainant filed his December 23, 2003 Motion to Withdraw his
Petition for Review, the DOJ had already promulgated a Resolution
on September 22, 2003 reversing the dismissal by the Quezon
City Prosecutor's Office of complainant's complaint for adultery. In
reversing the City Prosecutor's Resolution, DOJ Secretary Simeon
Datumanong held:

50

Parenthetically the totality of evidence adduced by

complainant would, in the fair estimation of the
Department, sufficiently establish all the elements of the
offense of adultery on the part of both respondents.
Indeed, early on, respondent Moje conceded to
complainant that she was going out on dates with
respondent Eala, and this she did when complainant
confronted her about Eala's frequent phone calls and text
messages to her. Complainant also personally witnessed
Moje and Eala having a rendezvous on two occasions.
Respondent Eala never denied the fact that he knew Moje
to be married to complainant[.] In fact, he (Eala) himself
was married to another woman. Moreover, Moje's eventual
abandonment of their conjugal home, after complainant
had once more confronted her about Eala, only served to
confirm the illicit relationship involving both respondents.
This becomes all the more apparent by Moje's subsequent
relocation in No. 71-B, 11th Street, New Manila, Quezon
City, which was a few blocks away from the church where
she had exchange marital vows with complainant.

It was in this place that the two lovers apparently

cohabited. Especially since Eala's vehicle and that of Moje's
were always seen there. Moje herself admits that she came
to live in the said address whereas Eala asserts that that
was where he held office. The happenstance that it was in
that said address that Eala and Moje had decided to hold
office for the firm that both had formed smacks too much
of a coincidence. For one, the said address appears to be a
residential house, for that was where Moje stayed all
throughout after her separation from complainant. It was
both respondent's love nest, to put short; their illicit affair
that was carried out there bore fruit a few months later
when Moje gave birth to a girl at the nearby hospital of St.
Luke's Medical Center. What finally militates against the
respondents is the indubitable fact that in the certificate of
birth of the girl, Moje furnished the information that Eala
was the father. This speaks all too eloquently of the
unlawful and damning nature of the adulterous acts
of the respondents. Complainant's supposed illegal
procurement of the birth certificate is most certainly beside
the point for both respondents Eala and Moje have not
denied, in any categorical manner, that Eala is the
father of the child Samantha Irene Louise
Moje.45 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It bears emphasis that adultery is a private offense which cannot
be prosecuted de oficio and thus leaves the DOJ no choice but to
grant complainant's motion to withdraw his petition for review. But
even if respondent and Irene were to be acquitted of adultery after
trial, if the Information for adultery were filed in court, the same
would not have been a bar to the present administrative complaint.
Citing the ruling in Pangan v. Ramos,46 viz:
x x x The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal
charge is not a bar to these [administrative] proceedings.
The standards of legal profession are not satisfied by
conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties
of x x x criminal law. Moreover, this Court, in disbarment
proceedings is acting in an entirely different capacity from
that which courts assume in trying criminal case47 (Italics in
the original),

51

this Court in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pools, Inc. v. Atty.

Naldoza,48 held:

RE: REGIDOR R. TOLEDO, RONALDO TOLEDO, AND JOEFFREY

TOLEDO* v. ATTY. JERRY RADAM TOLEDO, RTC, BRANCH 259,
PARAAQUE CITY.

Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of

their own. They are distinct from and they mayproceed
independently of civil and criminal cases.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Resolution No. XVII-200606 passed on January 28, 2006 by the Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is DISBARRED for
grossly immoral conduct, violation of his oath of office, and
violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately executory, be
made part of the records of respondent in the Office of the Bar
Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines. And let copies of the
Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
circulated to all courts.
This Decision takes effect immediately.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Chief Justice, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, SandovalGutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales,
Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Garcia, Velasco, Jr., Nachura,
JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
A.M. No. P-07-2403
February 6, 2008
(formerly OCA IPI No. 07-2598-P)

RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Complaint1 for violation of the lawyers oath,
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, oppression,
dishonesty, harassment, and immorality against Atty. Jerry Radam
Toledo, Branch Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Branch 259,
Paraaque City.
Complainants, all relatives of respondent, allege that the latter is
utilizing his profession as a lawyer and his position in the judiciary
to harass them and make them agree to an unequal distribution of
the estate of the late Florencia R. Toledo. 2
Florencia Toledo - mother of complainant Regidor, mother-in-law of
Zenaida, and grandmother of Ronaldo, Joeffrey, and respondent was the registered owner of a parcel of land in Tarlac covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 125017. She died intestate on
December 14, 2002.3
Complainants claim that respondent, after Florencias death, never
informed them that he was in possession of the Owners Duplicate
Copy of TCT No. 125017. As a result of such concealment,
complainants executed an Affidavit of Loss of the document on the
basis of which they filed a Verified Petition for the issuance of the
Owners Duplicate Copy before the RTC of Tarlac City. Respondent
opposed the petition on the ground that he had the subject
document in his possession allegedly because he bought part of
the land from Florencia. Thus, complainants withdrew the petition
before the Tarlac court.4

52

Subsequently, respondent filed a petition for the settlement of the

intestate estate of Florencia before the RTC of Paraaque City,
Branch 260. He prayed therein that he be appointed as the
administrator of the estate. During the conferences to settle the
case amicably, respondent proposed that he will give 7,681 sq. m.
to complainants, while 8,000 sq. m. will go to him and his sisters.
Complainants asked that they be given the bigger part instead
because there were more of them who will partition the property.
Respondent refused and said that complainants should be grateful
for the offer since the land had already been sold to him and his
sisters.5
Complainants objected to the petition on the ground that the
alleged conveyances to respondent and his siblings were "very
questionable" and done without the knowledge and consent of
complainants who, except for Zenaida, have legitimes over the
subject estate.
They allege that the Deed of Sale presented by respondent
contains erasures. The Deed of Sale states that the date of the
consummation of the transaction is January 17, 2002 but
Florencias community tax certificate is dated July 18, 2002. On the
later date also, complainants allege, it was impossible for Florencia
to have obtained a CTC because she had been sick and was often
in the hospital during that period. They also question the fact that
the Deed of Sale was allegedly signed by the parties at
complainants Regidor and Zenaidas house at Barangay Merville,
Paraaque City, when respondent has never been there.
Complainants also point to a Sinumpaang Salaysay6 executed by
Florencia attesting to the fact that she was made to sign by
respondents father a document the contents of which were
unknown to her and that if any document she purportedly signed
conveying her remaining Tarlac property should be presented, the
same is not true.

On March 9, 2004, complainants filed a Petition for Annulment of

the Deed of Sale before the RTC of Paraaque City, Branch 257.
The case is still pending.7
On the other hand, on October 28, 2003, respondent filed a
criminal complaint for perjury against complainants Regidor,
Ronaldo, and Joeffrey, and another relative, Gladdys Toledo, before
the Prosecutors Office in Tarlac for having executed an Affidavit of
Loss of Owners Duplicate Copy of TCT No. T-125017. The case was
subsequently dismissed for lack of probable cause. Respondents
Motion for Reconsideration was denied. Respondent appealed the
same to the Department of Justice, with the endorsement of the
Regional State Prosecutor. Complainants filed their Comment on
January 5, 2005. At present, they no longer have any definite
information on the status of said appeal.8
Meanwhile, on November 28, 2003, respondent filed another case
against complainants Regidor and Zenaida, and yet another
relative, Cresencia Agduma, this time for violation of Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 651. The case arose when Florencia died and was
to be buried in San Clemente, Tarlac. Complainants had to secure
her death certificate, which they failed to obtain in Paraaque City.
Complainants sought advice from respondent, he being the lawyer
in the family, who advised them to get a permit from the Local Civil
Registrar in San Clemente. They followed his advice. Because of
this, a case for violation of PD No. 651 was filed against the three.
On July 27, 2005, the 1st Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. IgnaciaMayantoc-San Clemente-San Jose rendered its Decision acquitting
Regidor and Cresencia, but finding Zenaida guilty of violation of PD
No. 651 for signing the application for the death certificate.
Lastly, complainants accuse respondent of immorality. They allege
that they have personal knowledge of the fact that respondent is
living with his common-law wife, Normita, whom he allegedly treats
as a "maid servant."9 They further allege that during the hearings
of their cases, respondent was seen with a woman, not Normita,
who was always at his side, and they were very sweet to each

53

other. They also attribute his unruly and bullying behavior to his
being a drunkard with a fondness for the "night life." 10
The complainants filed the present petition praying that this Court
conduct a formal investigation of respondents actions and impose
on him the proper penalty which, they submit, should be the
dismissal of respondent from the service as Branch Clerk of Court.
In his Comment,11 respondent calls the allegations "patently
malicious conjectures and surmises."
He states that 15,000 of the 18,681 square meters of the San
Clemente property in dispute had already been sold by the
decedent herself. Further, what was left of the property, about
2,800 sq.m., had already been sold by complainants to several
buyers. In fact, said buyers are now occupying the land. To prevent
further dissipation of the estate, he was prompted to file a petition
to settle the intestate estate of Florencia.
He alleges that it is the complainants who have shown their
propensity for criminal activities as evidenced by their execution of
an Affidavit of Loss to obtain a second copy of TCT No. T-125017,
and by Zenaidas declaration in Florencias death certificate that
the latter died in San Clemente, Tarlac. He also states that,
contrary to complainants assertion, the courts have painstakingly
been trying to have the parties amicably settle their cases.
As to the charges of immorality, he alleges that he has been the
sole breadwinner of their family, while Normita is in charge of the
household and taking care of their children. They have deferred
their "dream wedding" to give Normita the opportunity to advance
her career and to give way to the education of their children. In
support of this, he attached Normitas Affidavit12 where she states
the underlying reasons for their decision to remain unmarried,
thus:

1. That I am the common-law wife of Jerry R. Toledo by

whom I have been blessed with three (3) wonderful
children;
2. That we have been happily living together as a family at
our home at the above given address for twelve (12) years
now and in the length of time, we are extending to each
other mutual love, support, respect and understanding;
3. That taking into consideration the financial burdens of
having to provide quality and efficient education for our
children, Jerry and I have decided to defer our dream
wedding until it would already be financially and
economically feasible for us to do so;
4. That I also wanted to postpone our marriage to a later
date as I have personal plans of seeking employment
abroad considering that I used to work with an American
computer manufacturer;
5. That it would be easier for me to land a job abroad being
single and considering further that my father was a United
States Army veteran and also a former United States
government employee who used to work at the attached
office of the United States Embassy;
[6.] That we have already decided to have our dream
wedding (sic) when the time comes that the financial
constraints of providing for our childrens quality education
and support would have already lessened and have save
(sic) enough money to do so;
He denies that he uttered malicious words to complainants. He also
denies being a drunkard but admits to being a "moderate drinker."
He alleges that the complaint was filed merely to harass, malign,
and annoy him, and to pressure him to accede to their demands.

xxx

54

Upon evaluation of the records of this case, the OCA submitted the
following recommendations:
Complainants charges against the respondent and the
latters countercharges stem from their dispute over the
property left by their deceased relative, Florencia R. Toledo.
In fact, an intestate proceeding to settle the estate of the
above named deceased among the complainants and the
respondent has been filed in the RTC, Branch 260,
Paraaque City. Respondents claim that he had bought a
portion of the land left by the deceased Florencia R. Toledo,
which is the basis of his claim in the intestate proceeding,
is challenged by the complainants who have filed an action
to annul the alleged sale. There is also the perjury case
against the complainants for their execution of an Affidavit
of Loss of Owners Duplicate Copy of TCT No. 125017.
The pendency of the aforesaid cases render[s] the charges
hurled against respondent Atty. Toledo beyond the ambit of
administrative inquiry. The issues raised involve judicial
matters which should be addressed by the courts where
they are pending.
Anent the charge of immorality ascribed to respondent for
maintaining a common-law wife, although both respondent
and his partner Normita are single, and do not appear to be
suffering from any impediment to marry, it is worth to
note, however, that this arrangement was sought by them
in order not to prejudice Normitas employment
opportunities abroad, as stated in the latters affidavit.
(Annex "4"). In effect, the sacred institution of marriage
was sacrificed for the "American Dream[,]" and this shows
a personality that is unprincipled and undesirable. It is for
this reason, not the relationship per se, that we fault him
for perpetuating such kind of love affair. While we are not
in a position to dictate what his life agenda should be, we
can certainly prescribe the character of the personnel to
man the frontlines in the dispensation of justice. As it is oft-

repeated, a public office is a public trust and the conduct

and behavior of all those involved in the administration of
justice from the presiding judge to the lowliest utility
worker should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of
responsibility, accountability, integrity, uprightness[,] and
honesty (Violeta R. Villanueva vs. Armando T. Milan, A.M.
No. P-02-1642, September 27, 2002). As oft-stated by this
Court:
"It must be stressed that while every office in the
government is a public trust, no position exacts a
greater demand for moral righteousness and
uprightness from an individual than in the judiciary.
Indeed, the image of a court of justice is mirrored
in the conduct of the personnel who work thereat
from the judge to the lowest of its personnel. Court
employees are enjoined to adhere to the exacting
standards of morality and decency in their
professional and private conduct in order to
preserve the good name and integrity of the courts
of justice. The conduct of court personnel must be
free from any whiff of impropriety, not only with
respect to their duties in the judicial branch, but
also to their behavior outside the court as private
individuals. There is no dichotomy of morality; a
court employee is also judged by his or her private
morals. (Court Employees of the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court, Ramon Magsaysay, Zamboanga del Sur
vs. Earla C. Sy, A.M. No. P-93-808, November 25,
2005; Gamboa vs. Gamboa, A.M. No. P-04-1836,
July 30, 2004, 435 SCRA 436).["]
By living with a woman and begetting children with her
without the benefit of marriage, the respondent has
breached the standards of morality and uprightness
expected from a court employee. The judiciary cannot
afford to keep in its ranks one whose sense of propriety is
highly questionable. The respondent herein has to choose

55

between giving up his public position and legalizing his

relationship with the mother of his children by the bond of
matrimony. He cannot at the same time stay in the service
of the judiciary and maintain an illicit relation with a
woman who is not his wife.
RECOMMENDATION: We respectfully submit for the
consideration of the Honorable Court our recommendation:
1) That the charges of Violation of Attorneys Oath,
Code of Professional Responsibility, Oppression,
Dishonesty and Harassment against Atty. Jerry
Radam Toledo of RTC, branch 259, Paraaque City
be DISMISSED for being premature;

However, as to the charge of immorality, we find the OCAs

recommendations untenable.
This Court has previously defined immoral conduct as "that
conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a
moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable
members of the community."14
This Court has held that to justify suspension or disbarment the act
complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral15 and
the same must be established by clear and convincing proof,
disclosing a case that is free from doubt as to compel the exercise
by the Court of its disciplinary power. Likewise, the dubious
character of the act done as well as the motivation thereof must be
clearly demonstrated.16

2) That respondent Atty. Jerry Radam Toledo

be SUSPENDED for a period of three (3) months
for conduct unbecoming a public official and a
court employee; and

Thus, to warrant disciplinary action, we must examine if

respondents relationship with his common-law wife qualifies as
"grossly immoral conduct."

3) That after serving his suspension, respondent

Atty. Toledo be given thirty (30) days to either
marry his mistress (sic) and mother of his children
or resign his position in the judiciary. If he opts for
the former, he should submit to the court a
certified xerox copy of his marriage contract.13

In disbarment cases, this Court has ruled that the mere fact of
sexual relations between two unmarried adults is not sufficient to
warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior. 17 Whether
a lawyers sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without
the benefit of marriage should be characterized as "grossly
immoral conduct" will depend on the surrounding circumstances. 18

We find the OCAs report and recommendation partly meritorious.

We agree with the OCA that the charges and counter-charges
pertaining to the sale and partition of the property or properties of
Florencias estate would best be ventilated in the cases already
pending in the trial courts. Whether respondents claims are
meritorious or frivolous will be determined after judgment on the
merits has been rendered in each case.

This Court has further ruled that intimacy between a man and a
woman who are not married, where both suffer from no
impediment to marry, voluntarily carried on and devoid of any
deceit on the part of respondent, is neither so corrupt as to
constitute a criminal act nor so unprincipled as to warrant
disbarment or disciplinary action against a member of the Bar. 19
Based on the allegations in the Complaint and in respondents
Comment, we cannot conclude that his act of cohabiting with a

56

woman and begetting children by her without the benefit of

marriage falls within the category of "grossly immoral conduct."
It is not unwarranted for us to take judicial notice of the fact that
more and more Filipinos are finding it necessary to seek
employment abroad in order to provide their loved ones with better
lives. We find nothing "unprincipled and undesirable" with seeking
all means within the bounds of law and reason to uplift the lot
of ones family. It is not for us to inquire into our personnels
motivations for entering into such an arrangement or to judge how
they plan to accomplish their goals in life, unless it is shown that
they are violating the law in the process.
While the Court has the power to regulate official conduct and, to a
certain extent, private conduct, it is not within our authority to
make, for our employees, decisions about their personal lives,
especially those that will so affect their and their familys future,
such as whether they should or should not be married.
There is no allegation that the two have been flaunting their status
as common-law husband and wife, or that their cohabitation is
attended by scandalous circumstances. Thus, the comportment of
respondent and his common-law wife cannot be characterized as
"willful, flagrant, shameless, or show[ing] a moral indifference to
the opinion of the good and respectable members of the
community" as to warrant the exercise of this Courts disciplinary
power.
However, we take this occasion to remind the respondent of the
high standards of conduct imposed upon lawyers in the judiciary.
Lawyers in the government service are under an even greater
obligation to observe the basic tenets of the legal profession
because public office is a public trust.20 They should be more
circumspect in their adherence to their professional obligations
under the Code of Professional Responsibility, for their disreputable
conduct is more likely to be magnified in the public eye. 21

A clerk of court in particular, as an essential and ranking officer of

our judicial system who performs delicate administrative functions
vital to the prompt and proper administration of justice, must be
free from any form of impropriety. The conduct of court personnel
must be free from any whiff of impropriety or scandal, not only with
respect to their duties in the judicial branch but also to their
behavior outside the court as private individuals; it is in this way
that the integrity and the good name of the courts of justice shall
be preserved.22
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the complaint
against Atty. Jerry Radam Toledo isDISMISSED. However, he
is REMINDED to be more circumspect in his public and private
dealings. Costs against complainants.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, Chairperson, Austria-Martinez, Corona**, Reyes,
JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
Adm. Case No. 4749

January 20, 2000

SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., complainant,

vs.
ATTY. FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS, respondent.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar
membership dues filed against respondent Atty. Francisco R.
Llamas.

57

In a letter-complaint to this Court dated February 8, 1997,

complainant Soliman M. Santos, Jr., himself a member of the bar,
alleged that:
On my oath as an attorney, I wish to bring to your attention and
appropriate sanction the matter of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who,
for a number of years now, has not indicated the proper PTR and
IBP O.R. Nos. and data (date & place of issuance) in his pleadings.
If at all, he only indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" but he has been using
this for at least three years already, as shown by the following
attached sample pleadings in various courts in 1995, 1996 and
1997: (originals available).
Annex A "Ex-Parte Manifestation and Submission" dated
December 1, 1995 in Civil Case No. Q-95-25253, RTC, Br.
224, QC.

Among others, I seek clarification (e.g. a certification) and

appropriate action on the bar standing of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas
both with the Bar Confidant and with the IBP, especially its Rizal
Chapter of which Atty. Llamas purports to be a member.
Please note that while Atty. Llamas indicates "IBP Rizal 259060"
sometimes, he does not indicate any PTR for payment of
professional tax.
Under the Rules, particularly Rule 138, Sections 27 and 28,
suspension of an attorney may be done not only by the Supreme
Court but also by the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court
(thus, we are also copy furnishing some of these courts).
Finally, it is relevant to note the track record of Atty. Francisco R.
Llamas, as shown by:

Annex B "Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation Motion" dated

November 13, 1996 in Sp. Proc. No. 95-030, RTC Br. 259
(not 257), Paraaque, MM.

1. his dismissal as Pasay City Judge per Supreme Court

Admin. Matter No. 1037-CJ En Banc Decision on October
28, 1981 (in SCRA).

Annex C "An Urgent and Respectful Plea for extension of

Time to File Required Comment and Opposition" dated
January 17, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP (not Civil Case) No. 42286,
CA 6th Div.

2. his conviction for estafa per Decision dated June 30,

1994 in Crim. Case No. 11787, RTC Br. 66, Makati, MM (see
attached copy of the Order dated February 14, 1995
denying the motion for reconsideration of the conviction
which is purportedly on appeal in the Court of Appeals).

This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1

which qualifies that only a duly admitted member of the bar "who
is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law". There is
also Rule 139-A, Section 10 which provides that "default in the
payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of
membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for
one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the
delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys."

Attached to the letter-complaint were the pleadings dated

December 1, 1995, November 13, 1996, and January 17, 1997
referred to by complainant, bearing, at the end thereof, what
appears to be respondent's signature above his name, address and
the receipt number "IBP Rizal 259060."1 Also attached was a copy
of the order,2dated February 14, 1995, issued by Judge Eriberto U.
Rosario, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Makati, denying
respondent's motion for reconsideration of his conviction, in
Criminal Case No. 11787, for violation of Art. 316, par. 2 of the
Revised Penal Code.

58

On April 18, 1997, complainant filed a certification3 dated March

18, 1997, by the then president of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Atty. Ida R. Macalinao-Javier, that respondent's "last
payment of his IBP dues was in 1991. Since then he has not paid or
remitted any amount to cover his membership fees up to the
present."

Complainant need not even file this complaint if indeed the

decision of dismissal as a Judge was never set aside and
reversed, and also had the decision of conviction for a light
felony, been affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Undersigned
himself would surrender his right or privilege to practice
law.

On July 7, 1997, respondent was required to comment on the

complaint within ten days from receipt of notice, after which the
case was referred to the IBP for investigation, report and
recommendation. In his comment-memorandum4 dated June 3,
1998, respondent alleged:5

4. That complainant capitalizes on the fact that respondent

had been delinquent in his dues.

3. That with respect to the complainant's absurd claim that

for using in 1995, 1996 and 1997 the same O.R. No.
259060 of the Rizal IBP, respondent is automatically no
longer a member in good standing.
Precisely, as cited under the context of Rule 138, only an
admitted member of the bar who is in good standing is
entitled to practice law.
The complainant's basis in claiming that the undersigned
was no longer in good standing, were as above cited, the
October 28, 1981 Supreme Court decision of dismissal and
the February 14, 1995 conviction for Violation of Article
316 RPC, concealment of encumbrances.
As above pointed out also, the Supreme Court dismissal
decision was set aside and reversed and respondent was
even promoted from City Judge of Pasay City to Regional
Trial Court Judge of Makati, Br. 150.
Also as pointed out, the February 14, 1995 decision in
Crim. Case No. 11787 was appealed to the Court of
Appeals and is still pending.

Undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his

Income Tax Return, up to the present, that he had only a
limited practice of law. In fact, in his Income Tax Return, his
principal occupation is a farmer of which he is. His 30
hectares orchard and pineapple farm is located at Calauan,
Laguna.
Moreover, and more than anything else, respondent being
a Senior Citizen since 1992, is legally exempt under
Section 4 of Rep. Act 7432 which took effect in 1992, in the
payment of taxes, income taxes as an example. Being thus
exempt, he honestly believe in view of his detachment
from a total practice of law, but only in a limited practice,
the subsequent payment by him of dues with the
Integrated Bar is covered by such exemption. In fact, he
never exercised his rights as an IBP member to vote and be
voted upon.
Nonetheless, if despite such honest belief of being covered
by the exemption and if only to show that he never in any
manner wilfully and deliberately failed and refused
compliance with such dues, he is willing at any time to
fulfill and pay all past dues even with interests, charges
and surcharges and penalties. He is ready to tender such
fulfillment or payment, not for allegedly saving his skin as
again irrelevantly and frustratingly insinuated for vindictive
purposes by the complainant, but as an honest act of
accepting reality if indeed it is reality for him to pay such

59

dues despite his candor and honest belief in all food faith,
to the contrary.
On December 4, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors passed a
resolution6 adopting and approving the report and recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner which found respondent guilty,
and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for
three months and until he pays his IBP dues. Respondent moved
for a reconsideration of the decision, but this was denied by the IBP
in a resolution,7 dated April 22, 1999. Hence, pursuant to Rule 139B, 12(b) of the Rules of Court, this case is here for final action on
the decision of the IBP ordering respondent's suspension for three
months.
The findings of IBP Commissioner Alfredo Sanz are as follows:
On the first issue, Complainant has shown "respondent's
non-indication of the proper IBP O.R. and PTR numbers in
his pleadings (Annexes "A", "B" and "C" of the letter
complaint, more particularly his use of "IBP Rizal 259060
for at least three years."
The records also show a "Certification dated March 24,
1997 from IBP Rizal Chapter President Ida R. Makahinud
Javier that respondent's last payment of his IBP dues was in
1991."
While these allegations are neither denied nor categorically
admitted by respondent, he has invoked and cited that
"being a Senior Citizen since 1992, he is legally exempt
under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7432 which took effect
in 1992 in the payment of taxes, income taxes as an
example.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The above cited provision of law is not applicable in the

present case. In fact, respondent admitted that he is still in
the practice of law when he alleged that the "undersigned
since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income tax
Return up to the present time that he had only a limited
practice of law." (par. 4 of Respondent's Memorandum).
Therefore respondent is not exempt from paying his yearly
dues to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
On the second issue, complainant claims that respondent
has misled the court about his standing in the IBP by using
the same IBP O.R. number in his pleadings of at least six
years and therefore liable for his actions. Respondent in his
memorandum did not discuss this issue.
First. Indeed, respondent admits that since 1992, he has engaged
in law practice without having paid his IBP dues. He likewise admits
that, as appearing in the pleadings submitted by complainant to
this Court, he indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060" in the pleadings he filed
in court, at least for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus
misrepresenting that such was his IBP chapter membership and
receipt number for the years in which those pleadings were filed.
He claims, however, that he is only engaged in a "limited" practice
and that he believes in good faith that he is exempt from the
payment of taxes, such as income tax, under R.A. No. 7432, 4 as a
senior citizen since 1992.
Rule 139-A provides:
Sec. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the
Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the Board of
Governors shall determine with the approval of the
Supreme Court. A fixed sum equivalent to ten percent
(10%) of the collections from each Chapter shall be set
aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled members of the
Chapter and the compulsory heirs of deceased members
thereof.

60

Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. Subject to the

provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the
payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant
suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and
default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for
the removal of the name of the delinquent member from
the Roll of Attorneys.

Respondent's failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation

in the pleadings he filed in court indeed merit the most severe
penalty. However, in view of respondent's advanced age, his
express willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more temperate
application of the law,8 we believe the penalty of one year
suspension from the practice of law or until he has paid his IBP
dues, whichever is later, is appropriate.

In accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in the

practice of law only by paying his dues, and it does not matter that
his practice is "limited." While it is true that R.A. No. 7432, 4
grants senior citizens "exemption from the payment of individual
income taxes: provided, that their annual taxable income does not
exceed the poverty level as determined by the National Economic
and Development Authority (NEDA) for that year," the exemption
does not include payment of membership or association dues.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is SUSPENDED

from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR, or until he has paid his
IBP dues, whichever is later. Let a copy of this decision be attached
to Atty. Llamas' personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant
and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and to all courts in the land.1wphi1.nt

Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and

thereby misrepresenting to the public and the courts that he had
paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of
violating the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:

Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,

dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE
INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, AND
SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
CANON 10 A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND
GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any court; nor shall he mislead or
allow the court to be misled by any artifice.

EN BANC
B.M. No. 1370

May 9, 2005

LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR., REQUESTING

EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF IBP DUES.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a request for exemption from payment of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) dues filed by petitioner Atty. Cecilio Y.
Arevalo, Jr.

61

In his letter,1 dated 22 September 2004, petitioner sought

exemption from payment of IBP dues in the amount of P12,035.00
as alleged unpaid accountability for the years 1977-2005. He
alleged that after being admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1961, he
became part of the Philippine Civil Service from July 1962 until
1986, then migrated to, and worked in, the USA in December 1986
until his retirement in the year 2003. He maintained that he cannot
be assessed IBP dues for the years that he was working in the
Philippine Civil Service since the Civil Service law prohibits the
practice of one's profession while in government service, and
neither can he be assessed for the years when he was working in
the USA.
On 05 October 2004, the letter was referred to the IBP for
comment.2
On 16 November 2004, the IBP submitted its
comment3 stating inter alia: that membership in the IBP is not
based on the actual practice of law; that a lawyer continues to be
included in the Roll of Attorneys as long as he continues to be a
member of the IBP; that one of the obligations of a member is the
payment of annual dues as determined by the IBP Board of
Governors and duly approved by the Supreme Court as provided
for in Sections 9 and 10, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court; that the
validity of imposing dues on the IBP members has been upheld as
necessary to defray the cost of an Integrated Bar Program; and
that the policy of the IBP Board of Governors of no exemption from
payment of dues is but an implementation of the Court's directives
for all members of the IBP to help in defraying the cost of
integration of the bar. It maintained that there is no rule allowing
the exemption of payment of annual dues as requested by
respondent, that what is allowed is voluntary termination and
reinstatement of membership. It asserted that what petitioner
could have done was to inform the secretary of the IBP of his
intention to stay abroad, so that his membership in the IBP could
have been terminated, thus, his obligation to pay dues could have
been stopped. It also alleged that the IBP Board of Governors is in
the process of discussing proposals for the creation of an inactive

status for its members, which if approved by the Board of

Governors and by this Court, will exempt inactive IBP members
from payment of the annual dues.
In his reply4 dated 22 February 2005, petitioner contends that what
he is questioning is the IBP Board of Governor's Policy of NonExemption in the payment of annual membership dues of lawyers
regardless of whether or not they are engaged in active or inactive
practice. He asseverates that the Policy of Non-Exemption in the
payment of annual membership dues suffers from constitutional
infirmities, such as equal protection clause and the due process
clause. He also posits that compulsory payment of the IBP annual
membership dues would indubitably be oppressive to him
considering that he has been in an inactive status and is without
income derived from his law practice. He adds that his removal
from nonpayment of annual membership dues would constitute
deprivation of property right without due process of law. Lastly, he
claims that non-practice of law by a lawyer-member in inactive
status is neither injurious to active law practitioners, to fellow
lawyers in inactive status, nor to the community where the inactive
lawyers-members reside.
Plainly, the issue here is: whether or nor petitioner is entitled to
exemption from payment of his dues during the time that he was
inactive in the practice of law that is, when he was in the Civil
Service from 1962-1986 and he was working abroad from 19862003?
We rule in the negative.
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer
must belong, as distinguished from bar association organized by
individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary.
Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every
member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his shares in
carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his
portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of
the State, an Integrated Bar is an official national body of which all

62

lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject

to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including
the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the
effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a
code of professional ethics or professional responsibility, breach of
which constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and,
upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or
disbarment of the offending member. 5
The integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification
of the entire lawyer population. This requires membership and
financial support of every attorney as condition sine qua non to the
practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of
Attorneys of the Supreme Court.6
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with
anyone. He is free to attend or not to attend the meetings of his
Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as
he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the
payment of his annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to foster
the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of
professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving
the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and
beneficiaries of the regulatory program the lawyers.7
Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the
Court, under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules
concerning the admission to the practice of law and in the
integration of the Philippine Bar8 - which power required members
of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee
toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to
which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is, indeed,
imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for
carrying out the noble objectives and purposes of integration.
The rationale for prescribing dues has been explained in the
Integration of the Philippine Bar,9 thus:

For the court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members

does not mean that the Court is attempting to levy a tax.
A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction for
regulation, while tax purpose of a tax is a revenue. If the
judiciary has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows
that as an incident to regulation, it may impose a
membership fee for that purpose. It would not be possible
to put on an integrated Bar program without means to
defray the expenses. The doctrine of implied powers
necessarily carries with it the power to impose such
exaction.
The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the
privilege of law is that the regulation does not impose an
unconstitutional burden. The public interest promoted by
the integration of the Bar far outweighs the slight
inconvenience to a member resulting from his required
payment of the annual dues.
Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership
in the IBP, of which no one is exempt. This means that the
compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for as long as one's
membership in the IBP remains regardless of the lack of practice
of, or the type of practice, the member is engaged in.
There is nothing in the law or rules which allows exemption from
payment of membership dues. At most, as correctly observed by
the IBP, he could have informed the Secretary of the Integrated Bar
of his intention to stay abroad before he left. In such case, his
membership in the IBP could have been terminated and his
obligation to pay dues could have been discontinued.
As abovementioned, the IBP in its comment stated that the IBP
Board of Governors is in the process of discussing the situation of
members under inactive status and the nonpayment of their dues
during such inactivity. In the meantime, petitioner is duty bound to
comply with his obligation to pay membership dues to the IBP.

63

Petitioner also contends that the enforcement of the penalty of

removal would amount to a deprivation of property without due
process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights.
This question has been settled in the case of In re Atty. Marcial
Edillon,10 in this wise:
. . . Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the
sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a license
to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider
at length, as it [is] clear that under the police power of the
State, and under the necessary powers granted to the
Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to
practice law before the courts of this country should be and
is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the
power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is
recognize[d], then a penalty designed to enforce its
payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by
payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not
a property right but a mere privilege, and as such must
bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact
compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.
As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in the
bar is a privilege burdened with conditions,11 one of which is the
payment of membership dues. Failure to abide by any of them
entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof warrants
such drastic move.
WHEREFORE, petitioner's request for exemption from payment of
IBP dues is DENIED. He is ordered to pay P12,035.00, the amount
assessed by the IBP as membership fees for the years 1977-2005,
within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from receipt of this
decision, with a warning that failure to do so will merit his
suspension from the practice of law.

SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, CarpioMorales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
B.M. No. 1678

December 17, 2007

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW,

BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M.
Dacanay for leave to resume the practice of law.
Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He
practiced law until he migrated to Canada in December 1998 to
seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied
for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canadas free medical aid
program. His application was approved and he became a Canadian
citizen in May 2004.
On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship
Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his
Philippine citizenship.1 On that day, he took his oath of allegiance
as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in
Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and
now intends to resume his law practice. There is a question,

64

however, whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his

membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine
citizenship in May 2004. Thus, this petition.
In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar Confidant
cites Section 2, Rule 138 (Attorneys and Admission to Bar) of the
Rules of Court:
SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission
to the bar. Every applicant for admission as a member of
the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least
twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and a
resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the
Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral
character, and that no charges against him, involving
moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any
court in the Philippines.
Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that,
by virtue of his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, in 2006,
petitioner has again met all the qualifications and has none of the
disqualifications for membership in the bar. It recommends that he
be allowed to resume the practice of law in the Philippines,
conditioned on his retaking the lawyers oath to remind him of his
duties and responsibilities as a member of the Philippine bar.
We approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant
with certain modifications.
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. 2 It is so
delicately affected with public interest that it is both a power and a
duty of the State (through this Court) to control and regulate it in
order to protect and promote the public welfare. 3
Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the
highest degree of morality, faithful observance of the rules of the
legal profession, compliance with the mandatory continuing legal

education requirement and payment of membership fees to the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required
for membership in good standing in the bar and for enjoying the
privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these
conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence which
the courts and clients repose in him for the continued exercise of
his professional privilege.4
Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Who may practice law. Any person heretofore
duly admitted as a member of the bar, or thereafter
admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this
Rule, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to
practice law.
Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the
Philippine bar in accordance with the statutory requirements and
who is in good and regular standing is entitled to practice law.
Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules of
Court mandates that an applicant for admission to the bar be a
citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good
moral character and a resident of the Philippines.5 He must also
produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of good moral
character and that no charges against him, involving moral
turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the
Philippines.6
Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as
furnishing satisfactory proof of educational, moral and other
qualifications;7 passing the bar examinations;8 taking the lawyers
oath9 and signing the roll of attorneys and receiving from the clerk
of court of this Court a certificate of the license to practice. 10
The second requisite for the practice of law membership in good
standing is a continuing requirement. This means continued

65

membership and, concomitantly, payment of annual membership

dues in the IBP;11 payment of the annual professional
tax;12 compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education
requirement;13 faithful observance of the rules and ethics of the
legal profession and being continually subject to judicial
disciplinary control.14
Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino
citizenship still practice law in the Philippines? No.
The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the
Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens save in cases
prescribed by law.15 Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for
admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the
Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the
practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso
jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The
practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners. 16
The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of
naturalization as a citizen of another country but subsequently
reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because "all Philippine
citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed
not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of
[RA 9225]."17Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of
another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine
citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225.
Although he is also deemed never to have terminated his
membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law
practice accrues.
Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession
in the Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant
to its provisions "(he) shall apply with the proper authority for a
license or permit to engage in such practice." 18 Stated otherwise,
before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA
9225 can resume his law practice, he must first secure from this
Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:

(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual

membership dues in the IBP;
(b) the payment of professional tax;
(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory
continuing legal education; this is specially significant to
refresh the applicant/petitioners knowledge of Philippine
laws and update him of legal developments and
(d) the retaking of the lawyers oath which will not only
remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer
and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to
maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as
a member of the Philippine bar.
WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is
hereby GRANTED, subject to compliance with the conditions
stated above and submission of proof of such compliance to the
Bar Confidant, after which he may retake his oath as a member of
the Philippine bar.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, AustriaMartinez, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Velasco,
Jr., Nachura, Reyes, Leonardo-de Castro, JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., on leave.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

66

ADM. CASE No. 6595

April 15, 2005

JOSEPH SAMALA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ANTONUITTI K. PALAA, respondent.
RESOLUTION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a complaint filed by Joseph Samala against respondent Atty.
Antonuitti K. Palaa for alleged fraudulent activities that violate the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
Sometime in February 2001, complainant was looking for a
company where he could invest his dollar savings. He met
Raymond Taino, a trader-employee of First Imperial Resources, Inc.
(FIRI), a company located at Legaspi Village, Makati City. Taino
introduced him to FIRI Manager Jun Agustin, Chief Trader Diosdado
Bernal, and Legal Officer Antonuitti K. Palaa, the respondent
herein.
Complainant expressed his concern to the said three officers of FIRI
about having been warned of numerous fraudulent businesses in
the Philippines. Respondent assured him that through FIRI he
would be directly putting his investment with Eastern Vanguard
Forex Limited, a reputable company based in the Virgin Islands
which has been in the foreign exchange business for 13 years. The
three officers presented to him their company profile and
documents purporting to establish their relationship with Eastern
Vanguard Forex Limited.
Due to the personal representations and assurances of respondent,
Agustin, and Bernal, complainant was convinced and he invested
his dollar savings with FIRI on March 9, 2001.

Subsequently, complainant decided to pull out his investment. On

April 5, 2001, he sent FIRI a letter requesting the withdrawal of his
investment amounting to US$10,000 and giving FIRI 10 days to
prepare the money.
On April 15, 2001, complainant asked Agustin when his money
would be returned. Agustin told him that the request was sent to
Thomas Yiu of Eastern Vanguard at Ortigas Center. Complainant
went to see Thomas Yiu at his office. Yiu was surprised when he
saw the documents involving complainant's investment. Yiu
phoned Agustin and demanded an explanation as to where the
money was. Agustin said that he would return complainant's
investment at FIRI's office in Makati. On the same day, in the
presence of respondent, Agustin delivered to complainant a check
in the amount of P574,045.09, as the peso equivalent of
complainant's investment with FIRI. On May 2, 2001, the said
check was dishonored because it was drawn against insufficient
funds.
Complainant informed respondent of the dishonor of the check.
Respondent assured him that the check would be replaced. On
June 1, 2001, respondent, as legal officer of FIRI, gave
complainant P250,000 in cash and a check in the amount
of P329,045.09. Respondent told complainant that the check was
signed by FIRI President Paul Desiderio in his (respondent's)
presence and assured complainant that the check would be
funded. But on June 28, 2001, the check was dishonored because
it was drawn against insufficient funds.
On July 14, 2001, complainant charged Paul Desiderio of Estafa and
Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 at the Prosecutor's Office
of Makati. On November 4, 2001, Judge Evelyn Arcaya-Chua of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Makati City, issued a warrant of arrest
against Paul Desiderio.
On March 5, 2002, complainant joined three police officers in
serving the warrant of arrest against Paul Desiderio at No. 10
Damascus St., Northeast Executive Village, B.F. Homes, Paraaque

67

City. Complainant got the said address of Paul Desiderio from the
documents of FIRI. Although there was a street named Damascus
in the said village, there was no residence numbered "10." The
police officers checked the existence of the said address and
resident at the office of the subdivision association. They were told
that no such address existed and that no resident named Paul
Desiderio lived in the subdivision.

who handed personally to the herein complainant the

check which was dishonored due to insufficient funds,
when it was the very respondent, Atty. Palaa, who
allegedly assured that the check was funded. Respondent
was also one of those alleged officers of FIRI who assured
complainant that his investment was directly placed in a
re[p]utable company.

Complainant alleged that respondent's act of representing himself

to be the legal officer of FIRI and his assurance that the check he
personally delivered to him was signed in his presence by FIRI
Officer Paul Desiderio, when no such person appears to exist, is
clearly fraudulent and violative of the Canons of Professional
Ethics.1

Further investigation by the complainant with the

assistance of NBI officers showed that respondent Palaa
was also linked with Belkin's whose activity was the same
as the FIRI and the SEC has on file the By-Laws of FIRI
wherein it was stated that[,] to wit: "the primary purpose of
which is to act as consultant in providing professional
expertise and reliable data analysis related to partnership
and so on. And the corporation shall not engage in the
business as securities advisor, stockbroker or investment
house[:] Q. x x x A. First Imperial is prohibited from
engaging in foreign exchange business. Q. x x x A. And
despite [. . .] this prohibition, they went on and engaged in
activities which are prohibited specifically in their by-laws"
(TSN pages 16 and 17 of July 17, 2003, CBD Case No. 021048).

Complainant requested the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for a

thorough investigation of respondent as a member of the bar.
In an Order dated January 27, 2003, Director for Bar Discipline
Victor C. Fernandez required respondent to submit his Answer to
the Complaint within 15 days from receipt thereof. Despite receipt
of said order as evidenced by a registry return receipt dated
February 3, 2003, respondent did not submit an Answer.
The case was referred to Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro of the
Commission on Bar Discipline for investigation. Respondent failed
to appear when the case was set for hearing on April 8, 2003,
despite due notice. Hence, respondent was declared in default and
the case was heard ex parte.
Based on the evidence adduced, Commissioner Navarro reported,
thus:
[R]espondent was instrumental in the issuance of the
check signed by the alleged President of FIRI, Paul
Desiderio, whose whereabouts could not be located and
whose identity was unknown[,] for respondent was the one

It is evident from the foregoing that respondent and his

cohorts violated the main purpose of the FIRI By-Laws
particularly investment or foreign exchange business which
must have been the reason why Yiu was surprised and got
mad when complainant approached him about his dollar
savings investment of USD10,000 received by the
respondent as Legal Officer and the two (2) other alleged
officers Agustin and Bernal of the FIRI[,] a transaction
expressly prohibited by the FIRI By-laws.2
Respondent was found to have violated Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which states:

68

Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that

adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall
he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Commissioner Navarro thus recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months.
In its Resolution dated July 30, 2004, the Board of Governors of the
IBP adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner with the modification that respondent
should be suspended from the practice of law for three (3) years.
This Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors.
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that "a lawyer
shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession.3 To this end, nothing should be done by any member of
the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the
confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the
profession.4
In this case, respondent assured complainant that by investing his
dollar savings with FIRI, his investment was in a stable company,
even if, as it was later discovered, the by-laws of FIRI prohibited it
from engaging in investment or foreign exchange business and its
primary purpose is "to act as consultant in providing professional
expertise and reliable data analysis related to partnership and so
on."
When complainant decided to withdraw his investment from FIRI,
the first check given to him in the amount of his total investment
bounced. Thereafter, respondent, as legal officer of FIRI, gave
complainant P250,000 in cash and a check for P329,045.09.
Respondent assured complainant that the second check was a
"good check" and that it was signed by Paul Desiderio, the alleged
president of FIRI. However, the said check bounced because it was

drawn against insufficient funds, and the drawer of the check, Paul
Desiderio, could not be located when sought to be served a
warrant of arrest since his identity was unknown and his residential
address was found to be non-existent.
Hence, it is clear that the representations of respondent as legal
officer of FIRI caused material damage to complainant. In so
doing, respondent failed to uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession and lessened the confidence of the public in the
honesty and integrity of the same.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Antonuitti K. Palaa is found
GUILTY of violating Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and hereby suspended from the practice of law for a
period of three (3) years effective from receipt of this Resolution,
with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be
dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this resolution be spread on
the records of respondent, and furnished to all courts, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Bar
Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J. Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, CarpioMorales, Callejo, Sr., Tinga, Chico-Nazario, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 5333

October 18, 2000

69

ROSA YAP PARAS, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. JUSTO DE JESUS PARAS, respondent.
DECISION
MELO, J:
This has reference to a case for disbarment initiated by
complainant Rosa Yap Paras against her husband, Atty. Justo de
Jesus Paras. The parties exchanged tirades and barbs in their
copious pleadings, hurling invectives, cutting remarks and insults
at each other. Reduced to its essentials, Rosa Paras charged her
husband with dishonesty and falsification of public documents,
harassment and intimidation, and immorality for siring a child with
another woman. Respondent denied the allegations, contending
that his wife, in cahoots with her family, is out to destroy and strip
him of his share in their multi-million conjugal assets.
The parties come from wealthy families in Negros Oriental. They
were married on May 21, 1964 and have two grown-up children.
They have vast sugarlands and other businesses. Respondent was
a Municipal Judge for 14 years and served as Mayor in their town
for 2 terms during the administration of President Aquino.
Complainant is a businesswoman. Sometime in 1988, their
marriage fell apart when due to "marital strain that has developed
through the years," respondent left his wife and children to live
with his mother and sister in Dumaguete City and thence started
his law practice. Complainant, in the meantime, filed a case for the
dissolution of their marriage, which case is still pending in court.
The complaint charged:
DISHONESTY, FALSIFICATION and FRAUD
respondent obtained loans from certain banks in the name of
complainant by counterfeiting complainant's signature, falsely

making it appear that complainant was the applicant for said loans.
Thereafter, he carted away and misappropriated the proceeds of
the loans.
. . . to guarantee the above loans, respondent mortgaged some
personal properties belonging to the conjugal partnership without
the consent of complainant.
GROSSLY IMMORAL CONDUCT AND CONCUBINAGE
Respondent is . . . engaged in the immoral and criminal act of
concubinage as he maintained an illicit relationship with one Ms.
Jocelyn A. Ching, siring an illegitimate child with her while married
to complainant.
UNETHICAL AND UNPROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Respondent abused courts of justice and misused his legal skills to
frighten, harass and intimidate all those who take a position
diametrically adverse to his sinister plans by unethically filing
complaints and other pleadings against them. He utilized
strategies to obstruct justice.
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE
(Respondent) utilized strategies to obstruct justice. In the criminal
actions initiated against him, respondent used his legal skills not to
prove his innocence but to derail all the proceedings.
(Complaint, Rollo, p. 2)
In his Answer, respondent interposed the following defenses:
(1) On the Charge of Falsification of Public Documents:
That during the sugarboom in the 1970's, his wife executed in his
favor a Special Power of Attorney to negotiate for an agricultural or

70

crop loan authorizing him "to borrow money and apply for and
secure any agricultural or crop loan for sugar cane from the Bais
Rural Bank, Bais City . . ." (Rollo, Annex "3", p. 262)

The Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of

the Philippines investigated the complaint against respondent
summarizing the causes of action as follows:

(2) On the Charge of Forgery:

(1) Falsification of complainant's signature and misuse of conjugal

assets; and

That the Report of the National Bureau of Investigation which found

that "the questioned signatures (referring to the alleged forged
signatures of complainant) and the standard sample signatures
JUSTO J. PARAS were written by one and the same person"(Annex
"B" of the Complaint, Rollo, p. 26) was doctored, and that his wife
filed against him a string of cases for falsification of public
documents because he intends to disinherit his children and
bequeath his inchoate share in the conjugal properties to his own
mother.
(3) On the Charge of Grossly Immoral Conduct and Concubinage:
That this is a malicious accusation fabricated by his brother-in-law,
Atty. Francisco D. Yap to disqualify him from getting any share in
the conjugal assets. He cites the dismissal of the complaint for
concubinage filed against him by his wife before the City
Prosecutor of Negros Oriental as proof of his innocence.
Respondent, however, admits that he, his mother and sister, are
solicitous and hospitable to his alleged concubine, Ms. Jocelyn
Ching and her daughter, Cyndee Rose (named after his own
deceased daughter), by allowing them to stay in their house and
giving them some financial assistance, because they pity Ms.
Ching, a secretary in his law office, who was deserted by her
boyfriend after getting her pregnant.
(4) On the Charge of Obstruction of Justice:
That "the legal remedies pursued by (him) in defense and offense
are legitimate courses of action done by an embattled lawyer."

(2) Immorality and criminal acts of concubinage with one Ms. Ma.
Jocelyn A. Ching (for) siring an illegitimate child with her while
married to complainant, and, abandonment of his own family.
(Rollo, Report of the IBP, p. 34)
No actual hearing was conducted as the parties agreed to merely
submit their respective memoranda, depositions, and other pieces
of evidence attached to their pleadings.
Thereafter, the CBD found respondent guilty as charged and
recommended:
(1) Respondent's suspension from the practice of law for
three (3) months on the first charge; and
(2) Respondent's indefinite suspension from the practice of
law on the second charge.
(ibid., p. 57)
The CBD held that the dismissal of the criminal cases against
respondent for falsification and use of falsified documents
(Criminal Case No. 11768) and for concubinage (I.S. No. 93-578)
will not bar the filing of an administrative case for disbarment
against him. In a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is
required for conviction, while in an administrative complaint, only a
preponderance of evidence is necessary.

71

The CBD gave credence to the NBI Report that "the questioned
signatures (referring to the signatures appearing in the loan
agreements, contracts of mortgage, etc.) and the standard sample
signatures of respondent were written by one and the same
person." This affirms the allegation of complainant Rosa Yap Paras
that her husband forged her signatures in those instruments.
Respondent denies this but his denial was unsubstantiated and is,
therefore, self-serving.
In finding respondent liable for Immorality, the CBD relied heavily
on the uncontroverted sworn affidavit-statements of respondent's
children and three other eyewitnesses to respondent's illicit affair
with Ms. Jocelyn Ching. For a better appreciation of their
statements, their affidavits are hereby reproduced in full. Thusly,
"I, DAHLIA Y. PARAS, of legal age, single, resident of Bindoy, Negros
Oriental, but presently living in Dumaguete City, after being duly
sworn hereby depose and say:

5. Following delivery of the baby, my father built a house

for Jocelyn in Maayong Tubig, Dauin, Negros Oriental. My
father spend time there often with Jocelyn and their child.
6. I used to visit my father at San Jose Extension these past
years, and almost every time I was there, I would see
Jocelyn, sitting, watching TV, serving coffee in my father's
law office, and one time, she was washing my father's
clothes.
7. I first saw their child Cyndee Rose in 1992, about early
May, at San Jose Extension. I was there to ask for my
allowance. He was there at the time, and when I looked at
Cyndee Rose closely, I became convinced that she was my
father's daughter with Jocelyn.
8. Incidentally, I had an elder sister also named Cindy Rose
(now deceased).

1. I am a nurse by profession. I finished my BSN degree at

the College of Nursing, Silliman University.

9. In September 1992 when I went to visit my father, I saw

toys and child's clothes in my father's room.

2. My mother is Rosa Yap Paras and my father Justo J.

Paras. My father has left the family home in Bindoy and
now lives at his mother's house at San Jose Ext.,
Dumaguete City.

10. Whenever, I saw Jocelyn at San Jose Extension, I

wanted to talk to her or be alone with her, but she would
deliberately avoid me. I could see that she was hiding
something from me." p. 109, Records.

3. My father has a "kabit" or concubine by the name of Ma.

Jocelyn Ching.1wphi1 They have a child named Cyndee
Rose, who was delivered at the Silliman University Hospital
Medical Center on July 19, 1990.
4. Jocelyn used to be the secretary of my father and Atty.
Melchor Arboleda when they practice law together in 1988
to 1989. Their relationship started in 1989. When she
became pregnant, my father rented an apartment for her
at the Amigo Subdivision, Dumaguete City.

SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT
xxx

xxx

xxx

1. . . . sometime during the period of April-September,

1992, I made several visits to my father at his mother's
house in San Jose Extension, Dumaguete City, where he
had moved after he left our home in Bindoy;

72

2. That these visits were made on different times and

different days of the week;
3. That most of my visits, I would meet a woman who was
also living at my father's place. This woman is now known
to me to be Ma. Jocelyn Ching;
4. That my basis for observing that Ms. Ching was living in
my father's house is that during my visits, whether during
office hours or after office hours, I would meet her at my
father's place, not his office; she was wearing house
clothes and slippers, such as skimpy clothes, shorts and Tshirt, not street or office clothes; she was generally
unkempt, not made up for work or going out; on one
occasion, I even saw her, washing my father's clothes as
well as a small child's clothing; and she conducted herself
around the house in the manner of someone who lived
there;
5. That on one of my visits, I confirmed that Ms. Ching was
living with my father from Josie Vailoces, who was then a
working student living at my father's place;
6. Ms. Vailoces subsequently confirmed under oath the fact
that my father and Ms. Jocelyn Ching were living together
as husband and wife at my father's place in a deposition
taken in connection with Civil Case No. 10613, RTCDumaguete City, Branch 30, the Honorable Enrique C.
Garovillo, presiding. A copy of the transcript of the
deposition of Ms. Vailoces is already part of the record of
this case. For emphasis, photocopies of the pertinent
portion of the written deposition of Josie Vailoces is hereto
attached as Annexes "A"and "A-1." p. 111, Records
Respondent's son has this to say:

"I, RHOUEL Y. PARAS, 15 years old, single, resident of Bindoy,

Negros Oriental, but presently living in Dumaguete City, after being
duly sworn according to law, depose and say:
1. I am a high school student at the Holy Cross High
School, Dumaguete City.
2. My mother is Rosa Yap Paras, and my father Justo J.
Paras, a lawyer.
3. My father has left our home in Bindoy, and now lives at
his mother's house in San Jose Extension, Dumaguete City.
He is not giving us support any more.
4. However, from October 1991 to December 1992, I was
getting my allowance of P50.00 a week. I would go to their
house at San Jose Extension and personally ask him for it.
5. In October 1992, between 11:30 AM and 1:00 PM, I went
to San Jose Extension for my weekly allowance. I asked
Josephus, an adopted son of my father's sister, if my father
was around. Josephus said my father was in his room.
6. So I went direct to his room and because the door was
not locked, I entered the room without knocking. There I
saw my father lying in bed side by side with a woman. He
was only wearing a brief. The woman was wearing shorts
and T-shirt.
7. They both appeared scared upon seeing me. My father
hurriedly gave me P100.00 and I left immediately because I
felt bad and embarrassed.
8. Before that incident, I used to see the woman at my
father's house in San Jose Extension. Every time I went to
see my father, she was also there.

73

9. I later came to know that she was Ms. Jocelyn Ching, and
that she was my father's "kabit" or concubine.
10. I am no longer getting my weekly allowance from my
father." p. 112, Records
Added to the foregoing sworn statements of respondent's children
is the damaging statement under oath of Virgilio Kabrisante who
was respondent's secretary when respondent was a mayor of
Bindoy, Negros Oriental which reads as follows:
"I, VIRGILIO V. KABRISANTE, of legal age, married, Filipino, a
resident of Malaga, Bindoy, Negros Oriental, after having been
sworn in accordance with law, do hereby depose and state that:
1. I personally know Justo J. Paras, having been his
secretary during his incumbency as Mayor of Bindoy,
Negros Oriental. In fact, through the latter's
recommendation and intercession, I was later on appointed
as OIC Mayor of the same town from December 1986 to
January 1987.
2. When Justo J. Paras decided to practice law in
Dumaguete City, I became his personal aide and
performed various chores for the same. As his personal
aide, I stayed in the same house and room with the latter.
3. Sometime in January 1989, Justo J. Paras confided to me
that he felt attracted to my lady friend named Ma. Jocelyn
A. Ching. He then requested me to invite the latter to a
dinner date at Chin Loong Restaurant.
4. Conveying the invitation which was accepted by Ma.
Jocelyn Ching, the latter, Justo J. Paras and myself then had
dinner at the above-mentioned restaurant.

5. At the behest of Justo J. Paras, I invited Ma. Jocelyn A.

Ching, on several occasions, always to a picnic at a beach
in Dauin, Negros Oriental. Said invitations were always
accepted by the latter.
6. At each of the above-mentioned picnics, I observed that
Justo J. Paras and Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching had become more
and more intimate with each other.
7. Sometime in March 1989, at around 7:00 o'clock in the
evening on a Friday, I accompanied Justo J. Paras to the
area in front of the Silliman University Medical Center,
where he said he was going to meet someone.
8. After waiting for a few minutes, Ma. Jocelyn Ching
arrived and immediately boarded at the back seat of the
Sakbayan vehicle I was driving for Justo J. Paras. The latter
then requested me to drive both of them (Justo Paras and
Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching) to Honeybee Motel somewhere in
Sibulan, Negros Oriental.
9. When we arrived there, Justo J. Paras asked me to wait
for them outside the room, while he and Ma. Jocelyn A.
Ching entered the said room.
10. I waited outside the room for about two (2) hours after
which the two of them emerged from the room. We then
proceeded to Chin Loong to eat supper.
11. After eating supper, we dropped Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching
off in front of the Dumaguete City Cockpit.
12. This meeting was repeated two more times, at the
same place and always on a Friday.
13. On April 3, 1988, I went home to Bindoy and stopped
working for Justo Paras." pp. 56-57, Records.

74

SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT
xxx

xxx

xxx

1. Sometime in May 1989, I returned to Dumaguete City to

look for a job, having been jobless since I left Dumaguete
City to go home to Bindoy, Negros Oriental.
2. While looking for a job, I stayed at the house where my
friend, Bernard Dejillo was staying at Mangnao, Dumaguete
City. My friend Bernard Dejillo was occupying a room at the
second floor of the said house which he shared with me.
3. Sometime in the last week of May 1989, in the course of
my job hunting, I met Justo J. Paras. Having not seen each
other for some time, we talked for a while, discussing
matters about the barangay elections in Bindoy, Negros
Oriental.
4. When our discussion was finished, Justo J. Paras asked
me where I was staying, to which I answered that I was
staying at the aforementioned house. He then requested
me to find out if there was an available room at the said
house which he could rent with Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching. I told
him that I would have to ask my friend Bernard Dejillo
about the matter.
5. When I arrived at the house that evening, I asked my
friend Bernard Dejillo about the matter, to which the latter
signified his approval. He told me that a room at the first
floor of the same house was available for rental to Justo
Paras and Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching.
6. The next day, I immediately informed Justo J. Paras of
Bernard Dejillo's approval of his request.

7. Sometime in the first week of June 1989, Ma. Jocelyn

Ching moved in to the room she had rented at the first
floor of the house I was also staying at.
8. Almost every night thereafter, Justo J. Paras would come
to the house and stay overnight. When he came at night
Justo J. Paras and I would converse and while conversing,
drink a bottle of Tanduay Rum. Oftentimes, Ma. Jocelyn
Ching would join in our conversation.
9. After we finish drinking and talking, Justo J. Paras and
Ma. Jocelyn Ching would enter the room rented and sleep
there, while I would also go upstairs to my room.
10. The next morning I could always observe Justo J. Paras
came out of said room and depart from the house.
11. The coming of Justo J. Paras to the house I was staying
ceased after about one (1) month when they transferred to
another house.
12. I myself left the house and returned to Bindoy, Negros
Oriental some time in June 1989.
13. Sometime in January 1993, on a Saturday at about
noontime, I went to the house of Justo J. Paras to consult
him about a Kabataang Barangay matter involving my son.
When I arrived at his house, I noticed that the same was
closed and there was no one there.
14. Needing to consult him about the above-mentioned
matter, I proceeded to the resthouse of Justo J. Paras
located at Maayong Tubig, Dauin, Negros Oriental.
15. When I arrived at the said resthouse, Justo J. Paras was
not there but the person in charge of the said resthouse
informed me that Justo J. Paras was at his house at

75

Barangay Maayong Tubig, Dauin, Negros Oriental. The

same person also gave me directions so that I could locate
the house of Justo J. Paras he referred to earlier.

24. I am executing this affidavit as a supplement to my

affidavit dated 22 July 1993." pp. 58-60, Records
(ibid., pp. 44-52)

16. With the help of the directions given by said person, I

was able to locate the house of Justo J. Paras.
17. At the doorway of the said house, I called out if
anybody was home while knocking on the door.
18. After a few seconds, Ma. Jocelyn Ching opened the
door. Upon seeing the latter, I asked her if Justo J. Paras
was home. She then let me in the house and told me to sit
down and wait for a while. She then proceeded to a room.
19. A few minutes later, Justo J. Paras came out of the
same room and sat down near me. I noticed that the latter
had just woke up from a nap.
20. We then started to talk about the matter involving my
son and sometime later, Ma. Jocelyn Ching served us
coffee.
21. While we were talking and drinking coffee I saw a little
girl, about three (3) years old, walking around the sala,
whom I later came to know as Cyndee Rose, the daughter
of Justo J. Paras and Ma. Jocelyn Ching.
22. After our conversation was finished, Justo J. Paras told
me to see him at this office at San Jose Extension,
Dumaguete City, the following Monday to discuss the
matter some more.
23. I then bid them goodbye and went home to Bindoy,
Negros Oriental.

The CBD likewise gave credence to the sworn affidavits and the
deposition of two other witnesses, namely, Salvador de Jesus, a
former repairman of the Paras' household, and, Josie Vailoces, a
working student and former ward of the Paras' family, who both
gave personal accounts of the illicit relationship between
respondent and Jocelyn Ching, which led to the birth of Cyndee
Rose. De Jesus swore that while doing repair works in the Paras'
household he observed Ms. Ching and Cyndee Rose practically
living in the Paras' house (p. 85, Rollo, Annex "H"). Vailoces, on the
other hand, deposed that she was asked by respondent Paras to
deliver money to Ms. Ching for the payment of the hospital bill
after she gave birth to Cyndee Rose. Vailoces was also asked by
respondent to procure Cyndee Rose Paras' baptismal certificate
after the latter was baptized in the house of respondent; she
further testified that in said baptismal certificate, respondent
appears as the father of Cyndee Rose which explains why the latter
is using the surname "Paras." (p. 87, Annex "I", Rollo)
The findings and the recommendations of the CBD are
substantiated by the evidentiary record.
ON THE CHARGE OF FALSIFICATION OF COMPLAINANT'S SIGNATURE
The handwriting examination conducted by the National Bureau of
Investigation on the signatures of complainant Rosa Yap Paras and
respondent Justo de Jesus Paras vis--vis the questioned signature
"Rosa Y. Paras" appearing in the questioned bank loan documents,
contracts of mortgage and other related instrument, yielded the
following results:
CONCLUSION:

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1. The questioned and the standard sample signatures

JUSTO J. PARAS were written by one and the same person.
2. The questioned and the standard sample signatures
ROSA YAP PARAS were not written by one and the same
person.
(Annex "B", Rollo, p. 26, emphasis ours;)
The NBI did not make a categorical statement that respondent
forged the signatures of complainant. However, an analysis of the
above findings lead to no other conclusion than that the
questioned or falsified signatures of complainant Rosa Y. Paras
were authored by respondent as said falsified signatures were the
same as the sample signatures of respondent.
To explain this anomaly, respondent presented a Special Power of
Attorney (SPA) executed in his favor by complainant to negotiate
for an agricultural or crop loan from the Bais Rural Bank of Bais
City. Instead of exculpating respondent, the presence of the SPA
places him in hot water. For if he was so authorized to obtain loans
from the banks, then why did he have to falsify his wife's
signatures in the bank loan documents? The purpose of an SPA is
to especially authorize the attorney-in-fact to sign for and on behalf
of the principal using his own name.
ON THE CHARGE OF IMMORALITY AND CONCUBINAGE

The evidence against respondent is overwhelming. The affidavitstatements of his children and three other persons who used to
work with him and have witnessed the acts indicative of his
infidelity more than satisfy this Court that respondent has strayed
from the marital path. The baptismal certificate of Cyndee Rose
Paras where respondent was named as the father of the child
(Annex "J", Rollo, p. 108); his naming the child after his deceased
first-born daughter Cyndee Rose; and his allowing Jocelyn Ching
and the child to live in their house in Dumaguete City bolster the
allegation that respondent is carrying on an illicit affair with Ms.
Ching, the mother of his illegitimate child.
It is a time-honored rule that good moral character is not only a
condition precedent to admission to the practice of law. Its
continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice
of law (People vs. Tunda, 181 SCRA 692 [1990]; Leda vs. Tabang,
206 SCRA 395 [1992]). In the case at hand, respondent has fallen
below the moral bar when he forged his wife's signature in the
bank loan documents, and, sired a daughter with a woman other
than his wife. However, the power to disbar must be exercised with
great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously
affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the
Court and as a member of the bar (Tapucar vs. Tapucar, Adm. Case
No. 4148, July 30, 1998). Disbarment should never be decreed
where any lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, could
accomplish the end desired (Resurrecion vs. Sayson, 300 SCRA 129
[1998]).
In the light of the foregoing, respondent is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS on the charge of
falsifying his wife's signature in bank documents and other related
loan instruments; and for ONE (1) YEAR from the practice of law on
the charges of immorality and abandonment of his own family, the
penalties to be served simultaneously. Let notice of this decision be
spread in respondent's record as an attorney, and notice of the
same served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the
Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts
concerned.

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SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Panganiban, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

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