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SPECTRUM PHARMATECH CONSULTANTS PVT. LTD.

OVALA,
THANE 400607

CLIENT: M/s NAVIN FLUORINE INTERNATIONAL LTD


PROJECT TITLE: MANUFACTURING PLANT NO 2
PROJECT NO.: PJ-21113
DOCUMENT NO.: R-216
Rev No-0
TITLE: HAZOP OF HYDROGENATION REACTOR SSR-216
Basis for Hazop study
HAZOP studdy is done based on approved Piping and instrumentation diagrams (P&IDs) & approved facility
layout. In addition to this HAZOP, study to be done considering specifc product manufacturing since facility
will be used for multi purpose application.
Equipment layout
2
Men Material Movement layout
3
Hazardous area classification layout
4
HVAC classiifcation layout
5
Safety Shower & Fire Exit layout
6
Fire Hydrant layout
7
Gas Detection system layout
8
9
P&ID No: G-01-4-16, Rev-2
Study Node
1
Reactor
2
Line
3
Operating instructions
Guide word
1
No
2
Less
3
More
4
Reverse
5
Other than
Severity
1
No
2
Low
3
Moderate
4
High
5
High High
Parameters
1
Flow
2
Temperature
3
Pressure
4
Level
5
Contamination
6
Relief
7
Electrical
8
Corrosion
Consequence
1
Process hazard (financial, quality of product)
2
Safety Hazards (Life & health)
Safeguard measures
1
Prevent based on the design
2
Detect by giving early warning
3
Mitigate
Recommendations
1
Low priority
2
Medium priority
3
High priority
Points to be considered during node identification
1
Normal operation
2
Routine start-up
3
Routine shutdown
1

4
5

Emergency shutdown
Commissioning

SPECTRUM PHARMATECH CONSULTANTS PVT. LTD.


OVALA,
THANE 400607
CLIENT: M/s NAVIN FLUORINE INTERNATIONAL LTD
PROJECT TITLE: MANUFACTURING PLANT NO 2
PROJECT NO.: PJ-21113
DOCUMENT NO.: R-216
Rev No-0
TITLE: HAZOP OF HYDROGENATION REACTOR SSR-216

Sr.No
1

Study
Node
Reactor

Parameter
Temperature

Guideword(Deviation)
More temperature in reactor

Severity (Based
on set point)
High

Possible Cause(s)
Due to reaction exotherm (addition of
hydrogen)

Consequence/Risks
Pressurization & Loss of
strength due to high
temp.

Safeguards/Control
measures
high & high high temperature
alarm

Action Plan
Close the On/OFF vlave on
hydrogen line

Action By
Hydrogen ON/OFF valve will
operate based on interlocks from
DCS

Separate cooling water line with


Cooling water On/OFF valve to be
On/OFF valve to be provided on
provided on inlet & outlet through
inlet & outlet of external coil. will
external coil after and before
operate based on interlocks from
manifold.
DCS

Due to uncontrolled heating

Temperature

Less temperature in reactor

Low

Pressurization

Rupture disk followed by pressure


safety valve- 2 Nos

Pressurization

Exteranally separate cooling coil


on shell & Internal coil

open the cooling utility vavle on


external/Internal coil

Field operator

Pressurization

high & high high temperature


alarm

Close the steam control& ON/OFF


valve

Steam control & ON/OFF valve will


operate based on interlocks from
DCS

Rupture disc will burst followed by Equipment


opening of saftey valve

Due to failuar of cooling water ON/OFF valve Pressurization

Internal coiling coil with Liquid


start the cooling water/ liquid
Nitrogen or cooling water (Manual
Nitrogen through internal coil
control)

Field operator

Malfunctioning of Temperature indicator

Pressurization

Two nos of temperature


transmitters

Calibration & maintenance SOP

HOD / Shift incharge

Failure of Hydrogen ON/OFF valve

Pressurization

high & high high pressure alarm


and Manual isolation valve

Close the manual isolation valve

Failure of steam control valve or ON/OFF


valve

Pressurization

high & high high temperature


alarm

Failure of Hot water ON/OFF valve

Pressurization

high & high high temperature


alarm

Close the manual isolation valve

Due to failuar of cooling water ON/OFF valve

Reaction will slowdown


(Assumed)

Two nos of temperature


transmitters provided

Close the manual isolation valve

Due to failuar of Liquid Nitrogen manual


valve

Reaction will slowdown


(Assumed)

Two nos of temperature


transmitters provided

Hydrogen supply cutof

Reaction will slowdown


(Assumed)

Pressure transmitter provided with


Operator to investigate
low pressure alarm

Malfunctioning of Temperature indicator

Reaction will slowdown


(Assumed)

Two nos of temperature


transmitters provided

Due to reaction exotherm (addition of


hydrogen)

Pressurization

High & high high pressure alarm & Close the On/OFF vlave on
On/OFF Valve on hydrogen line
hydrogen line

Excess RM or catalyst addition

Pressurization

Rupture disk followed by pressure


safety valve- 2 Nos

Explosion

Separate section for


hydrogenation with three side RCC
Wall and one weak wall and roof

Fire

DCP flodding system, Fire hydrant operater to follow on site


network
emergency plan

Pressurization

high & high high pressure alarm

Field operator

Steam control & ON/OFF valve will


Close the ON/OFF or Steam control
operate based on interlocks from
valve
DCS

Change the manual valve

Calibration & maintenance SOP

Field operator

Field operator
Field operator
Field operator
HOD/Shift incharge

NO/REVERSE/OTHER THAN Are not applicable

Pressure

More pressure in reactor

High High

High

Failure of steam control valve or ON/OFF


valve

Hydrogen ON/OFF valve will


operate based on interlocks from
DCS

Equipment

Field Operator

Steam control & ON/OFF valve will


Close the ON/OFF or Steam control
operate based on interlocks from
valve
DCS

High

High

Pressure

Less pressure in reactor

Failure of Hot water ON/OFF valve

Failuar of cooling media

High

Malfunctioning of Pressure indicator

High

Failuar of Hydrogen PRV

High

Failuar of instrument air

Low

Due to excessive cooling


Hydrogen supply cutof
Malfunctioning of Pressure indicator

Reverse

Low

Emptying of Hydrogen cylinder

High

Internal coil leakage during operation

Pressurization

Pressurization

Pressurization
Pressurization
Operation of
instrumentation valve

high & high high pressure alarm

High & high high pressure alarm

Close the manual isolation valve


Close the On/OFF vlave on
hydrogen line

Hydrogen ON/OFF valve will


operate based on interlocks from
DCS

Close the hot water ON/OFF or


Steam control valve

Steam control & ON/OFF valve will


operate based on interlocks from
DCS

Close the On/OFF vlave on


hydrogen line

Hydrogen ON/OFF valve will


operate based on interlocks from
DCS

Two nos of pressure transmitters


provided
Safety valve in hydrogen line

Calibration & maintenance SOP


Equipment

Alarm is provided

Operator to investigate

ON/OFF & Control Valve on LPS


line is of fail to close type

Inbuild action by valve

Valve on Hydrogen line is fail to


close type

Inbuild action by valve

Valve on cold utility supply, return


lines are of fail to open type
Two nos of temperature
transmitters provided
Pressure transmitter provided with
low pressure alarm
Two nos of pressure transmitters
provided

Reaction will slowdown


(Assumed)
Reaction will slowdown
(Assumed)
Reaction will slowdown
(Assumed)
Reactant material can go
NRV provided
in to Hydrogen line

Field operator

HOD/Shift incharge

HOD/Shift incharge

Inbuild action by valve

Operator to investigate

Field operator

Operator to investigate

Field operator

Calibration & maintenance SOP

HOD/Shift incharge

Equipment

NO/OTHER THAN Are not applicable


5

Contamination

Less/More

Utility leakage inside the


Close the manual isolation valve
reactor
Pressurization

High & high high pressure alarm

close the isolation valve

Field operator

Close H2 line ON/OFF valve

Field operator & DCS

High temperature & High pressure


Runaway reaction due to
Equipment pressure testing before
HOD/Shift incharge
alarm through DCS & Safety Relief
utility content ingrace
batch
valve/Rupture Disk

Low
Moderate

Seal leakage
Improper opening of valves, or valve
passing of utilities

Process material addition, manual

H2 venting (Relief)

Less/More

High

High

flow of reaction mass


towards utility

Pressure transmitter to be
provided on cooling water return
line, close hydrogen On/OFF valve
and utility inlet outlet valve
through DCS

Fild operator to close manual


isolation valve on internal coil
utility line, SOP to address total
shutdown procedure

Batch contamination

Select suitable material which is


compatible

HOD/Shift incharge

Follow the SOP while applying


utility

Field operator

Follow the venting SOP

HOD/Shift incharge

loss of utility

double manual valve is provided


at both inlet & outlet

Process dependent

Vent of the reactor is passed


Due to pressurization or to release pressure Hydrogen will be present through water pot & vent of the
at the end of batch
& may catch fire
same to open atm along with the
steam purging
From PSV vent in case of high pressure

Hydrogen will be present Vent routed to safe location. No


& may catch fire
electrical installation nearby

Facility

Chocking of vent line

Venting will get afected Vent valve to open slowely

Follow the venting SOP

Field operator

Reverse flow of water in


to the reactor

Locat water pot at 5 mtr or


mezzanine level inside the
hydrogenation area, provision of
local level indicator and pressure
gauge

SPCPL to incorporate in layout and


P&ID, NFIL to encorporate in SOP

High

No water in venting pot

H2 will vent directly to


U loop given to venting pot for
atm without weting may
water hold up at all the time
cause fire

Follow the venting SOP

Field operator

High

No steam purging in vent

Steam and water provided as a


H2 will vent directly to
weting media and vent to be
atm without weting may
located at safe location, no
cause fire
electrical installation nearby

Follow the venting SOP

Field operator

Floor washing

Follow the unloading SOP

Field operator

Flame arrester is provided on PSV


vent, & release to safe location

Calibration & maintenance SOP

HOD/Shift incharge

Change over and check the utility


pump & unit

Field operator

Flow of flame

Reverse

High

External fire and venting simultaneously

Utility failure

Other than

High

Pump or utility unit trip

Leakage of gases

Other than

High

leakage from flange

Explosion
rise or decrease of
temperature
Unsafe working
environment

Pressure indication & alarm given


in DCS (On utility header)

Hydrogen & Oxygen Gas detection


Action to be taken as per SOP
system is provided

HOD/Shift incharge

Elephant trunk is provided out let


of which is directly connected to
scrubber

Field operator

Tounge & Groove flanges provided


9
10

Sharp edges inside


the equipment

Other than

High

Design flaw or improper manufacturing

Bottom valve
Leakage

Other than

High

Chocking
Valve passing

Personal injury during


equipment entry

Action to be taken as per SOP


Equipment

Joint inspection by NFIL & TPI

Point to be noted during inspection TPI / NFIL

Human hazard, loss of


material

Blind falnge provided after valve

Follow the operational SOP

Field operator

Human hazard, loss of


material

Blind falnge provided after valve

Follow the operational SOP

Field operator

11

Electrical/Static
electricity

No

High

Discontinuty or damage of earthing

Cause fire & may lead to Double earting provided on both


explosion
body and motor

Follow the operational SOP

Check list by field operator signed


by HOD

12

Electrical/Static
electricity

No

Hign

Jumper not provided

Cause fire & may lead to


explosion
Jumper provided in flange joint

Follow the operational SOP

Check list by field operator signed


by HOD

13

Electrical

No

High

Power failure at MCC or PCC

Process dependent

Operator to investigate

HOD/Shift incharge

14

Agitator RPM

More

Moderate

Malfunctioning of VFD

Reaction rate may


increase

RPM indicator provided, Local push


Follow the operational SOP
button for stop is provided

Field operator

Less

Low

Malfunctioning of VFD

Reaction rate may


decrease

RPM indicator provided

Follow the operational SOP

Field operator

No

Low

Decoupling of agitator, Jaming of agitator,


no power supply

Reaction rate may


decrease

At no load & overlaod, motor will


trip & alarm, On/OFF indication
provided on DCS

Operator to investigate

Field operator

Others

Low

Malfunctioning during the operation

Ajitator jam or damage,


excessive vibration,
Spark, abnormal sound

Switch of the motor

Field operator

Others

High

DCS operator strat the motor

Human hazard

Follow the operational SOP

Field operator

No auto start

DCS control

Before starting, connections to be


checked.

HOD/Shift incharge

Follow the operational SOP

Field operator

Follow the operational SOP

HOD/Shift incharge

On/OFF indications provided in


DCS

Local push button station to stop


the motor
Only local push button station is
provided to start the motor
Remote will have only stop
command

Reverse
15

Level

16

Low

Wrong connectons

No,More,less,other than

Process dependent Manual error

More

Process dependent Use of non compatible process material

Reaction will get afected


Process dependent

Leakages

Corrosion

Team members

SPCPL Name
1 Mr. Mahendra Sarvankar
2 Mr. Suhas Kadam

Sign

NFIL Name
1 Mr. T Bhaskar
2 Mr. Subba Reddy

Sign

3 Mr. Chaitanya Chabukswar


Note: * - Indicates Part Participants

3 Mr. Sanjeev Sheth


4 Mr. Shamkant Suryavanshi

Action Assingend to

Remark/ comments

SPCPL To Incorporate in
DCS

SPCPL to incorporate in
P&ID and DCS

NFIL Operating procedure


SPCPL To Incorporate in
DCS

Discussed and agreed


during HAZOP Dated 12
& 13 May 2014

NFIL Operating procedure


NFIL Operating procedure
NFIL Operating procedure
SPCPL To Incorporate in
DCS
NFIL Operating procedure

NFIL Operating procedure


NFIL Operating procedure
NFIL Operating procedure
NFIL Operating procedure

SPCPL to incorporate in
DCS

NFIL Operating procedure


SPCPL To Incorporate in
DCS

Discussed and agreed


during HAZOP Dated 12
& 13 May 2014

NFIL Operating procedure


SPCPL To Incorporate in
DCS
SPCPL To Incorporate in
DCS
SPCPL To Incorporate in
DCS
NFIL Operating procedure

NFIL Operating procedure


SPCPL to check valve
specification
SPCPL to check valve
specification
SPCPL to check valve
specification
NFIL Operating procedure
NFIL Operating procedure
NFIL Operating procedure

NFIL Operating procedure

SPCPL to add pressure


transmitter in P&ID. NFIL
operating procedure
NFIL Operating procedure
NFIL Operating procedure
Process dependent, HAZOP
to be carry out as per
process requirement by
NFIL
NFIL Operating procedure

To be confirmed during
PSSR

SPCPL & NFIL

NFIL Operating procedure

NFIL Operating procedure

NFIL Operating procedure

NFIL Operating procedure


NFIL Operating procedure
NFIL Operating procedure

TPI / NFIL
NFIL Operating procedure
NFIL Operating procedure
These procedures are
NFIL Operating procedure existing for loading and
unloading and to be used
for reactor charging
NFIL Operating procedure
Process dependent, HAZOP
NFIL Operating procedure to be carry out as per
process requirement by
NFIL
NFIL Operating procedure
NFIL Operating procedure
NFIL Operating procedure

NFIL Operating procedure

NFIL Operating procedure


NFIL Operating procedure
NFIL Operating procedure
HAZOP to be carry out as
per process requirement
by NFIL
HAZOP to be carry out as
per process requirement
by NFIL