SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 71137 October 5, 1989
SPOUSES FEDERICO FRANCO and FELICISIMA R. FRANCO, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ANTONIO REYES, MRS. SUSAN
CHUAY and LOLITA LUGUErespondents.
FERNAN, C.J.:
The instant petition for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals deals
mainly with the nature of an employer's liability for his employee's negligent
act.
At about 7:30 in the evening of October 18, 1974, Macario Yuro swerved the
northbound Franco Bus with Plate No. XY320-PUB he was driving to the left to
avoid hitting a truck with a trailer parked facing north along the cemented
pavement of the MacArthur Highway at Barrio Talaga, Capas Tarlac, thereby
taking the lane of an incoming Isuzu Mini Bus bearing Plate No. YL-735 being
driven by one Magdaleno Lugue and making a collision between the two (2)
vehicles an unavoidable and disastrous eventuality.
Dragged fifteen (15) meters from the point of impact (midway the length of
the parked truck with trailer), the mini bus landed right side down facing
south in the canal of the highway, a total wreck. The Franco Bus was also
damaged but not as severely. The collision resulted in the deaths of the two
(2) drivers, Macario Yuro and Magdaleno Lugue, and two (2) passengers of
the mini bus, Romeo Bue and Fernando Chuay.
Consequently, Antonio Reyes, the registered owner of the Isuzu Mini Bus,
Mrs. Susan Chuay, the wife of victim Fernando Chuay, and Mrs. Lolita Lugue,
the wife of driver-victim Magdaleno Lugue, filed an action for damages
through reckless imprudence before the Court of First Instance of Pampanga
in Angeles City, Branch IV, docketed as Civil Case No. 2154 against Mr. &
Mrs. Federico Franco, the owners and operators of the Franco Transportation
Company. The complaint alleged that: (a) the recklessness and imprudence
of the Franco Bus driver caused the collision which resulted in his own death
and that of the mini bus driver and two (2) other passengers thereof; (b) that
as a consequence of the vehicular mishap, the Isuzu Mini Bus became a total
wreck resulting in actual damages amounting to P50,000.00 and the loss of
an average net income of P120.00 daily or P3,600.00 monthly multiplied by a
minimum of one more year of serviceability of said mini bus or P40,200.00;
and, (c) that in view of the death of the three (3) passengers
aforementioned, the heirs of each should be awarded a minimum of
P12,000.00 and the expected average income of P6,000.00 each of the
driver and one of the passengers and P12,000.00 of the Chinese
businessman passenger.
In answer to the complaint, defendants set up, among others, the affirmative
defense that as owners and operators of the Franco Transportation Company,
they exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of all their
employees, including the deceased driver Macario Yuro.
Said defense was, however, rejected by the trial court in its decision 1 dated
May 17, 1978, for the reason that the act of the Franco Bus driver was a
negligent act punishable by law resulting in a civil obligation arising from
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code and not from Article 2180 of the Civil
Code. It said: "This is a case of criminal negligence out of which civil liability
arises, and not a case of civil negligence and the defense of having acted like
a good father of a family or having trained or selected the drivers of his truck
is no defense to avoid civil liability." 2 On this premise, the trial court ruled as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
in favor of the plaintiffs, Antonio Reyes, Lolita Lugue, and Susan
Chuay, and against the defendants Mr. and Mrs. Federico Franco,
ordering the latter:
(1) To pay Antonio Reyes, actual and compensatory damages in
the amount of P90,000.00 for the Isuzu Mini Bus;
(2) To pay Lolita Lugue, the widow of Magdaleno Lugue, actual
and compensatory damages in the total sum of P18,000.00;
Hence, the instant petition raising two (2) legal questions: first, whether the
action for recovery of damages instituted by herein private respondents was
predicated upon crime or quasi-delict; and second, whether respondent
appellate court in an appeal filed by the defeated parties, herein petitioners,
may properly increase the award of damages in favor of the private
respondents Chuay and Lugue, prevailing parties in the lower court, who did
not appeal said court's decision.
Petitioners contend that the allegations in paragraph 9 of the Amended
Complaint 8 of herein private respondents as plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2154
unequivocally claim that the former as the employers of Macario Yuro, the
driver of the Franco Bus who caused the vehicular mishap, are jointly and
severally liable to the latter for the damages suffered by them which thus
makes Civil Case No. 2154 an action predicated upon a quasi-delict under
the Civil Code subject to the defense that the employer exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their
employees.
We find merit in this contention. Distinction should be made between the
subsidiary liability of the employer under the Revised Penal Code and the
employer's primary liability under the Civil Code which is quasi-delictual or
tortious in character. The first type of liability is governed by Articles 102 and
103 of the Revised Penal Code which provide as follows:
Art. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavern-keepers
and proprietors of establishments. In default of the persons
criminally liable, innkeepers, tavern-keepers, and any other
persons or corporations shall be civilly liable for crimes
committed in their establishments, in all cases where a violation
of municipal ordinances or some general or special police
regulations shall have been committed by them or their
employees.
Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods
taken by robbery or theft within their houses from guests lodging
therein, or for the payment of the value thereof, provided that
such guests shall have notified in advance the innkeeper himself,
or the person representing him, of the deposits of such goods
within the inn; and shall furthermore have followed the directions
which such innkeeper or his representative may have given them
respects the factual findings of the appellate and trial courts and accord
them a certain measure of finality. 12 Consequently, therefore, we find
petitioners liable for the damages claimed pursuant to their primary liability
under the Civil Code.
On the second legal issue raised in the instant petition, we agree with
petitioners' contention that the Intermediate Appellate Court (later Court of
Appeals) is without jurisdiction to increase the amount of damages awarded
to private respondents Chuay and Lugue, neither of whom appealed the
decision of the lower court. While an appellee who is not also an appellant
may assign error in his brief if his purpose is to maintain the judgment on
other grounds, he cannot ask for modification or reversal of the judgment or
affirmative relief unless he has also appealed. 13 For failure of plaintiffsappellees, herein private respondents, to appeal the lower court's judgment,
the amount of actual damages cannot exceed that awarded by it. 14
Furthermore, the records 15 show that plaintiffs-private respondents limited
their claim for actual and compensatory damages to the supposed average
income for a period of one (1) year of P6,000.00 for the driver Magdaleno
Lugue and P12,000.00 for the Chinese businessman Fernando Chuay. We feel
that our award should not exceed the said amounts . 16
However, the increase in awards for indemnity arising from death to
P30,000.00 each remains, the same having been made in accordance with
prevailing jurisprudence decreeing such increase in view of the depreciated
Philippine currency. 17
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby modified
decreasing the award to private respondents of actual and compensatory
damages for loss of average income for the period of one year to P6,000.00
for the deceased Magdaleno Lugue and P12,000.00 for the deceased
Fernando Chuay. The rest of the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed.
Costs against the private respondents. This decision is immediately
executory.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
ruling that petitioner had the burden to prove that the employee was not
acting within the scope of his assigned task.
Jose Benjamin ABAD merely adopted the statement of facts of
petitioner which holds fast on the theory of negligence on the part of the
deceased.
On the other hand, respondents Spouses Vasquez argue that their
sons death was caused by the negligence of petitioners employee who
was driving a vehicle issued by petitioner and who was on his way home
from overtime work for petitioner; and that petitioner is thus liable for
the resulting injury and subsequent death of their son on the basis of the
fifth paragraph of Article 2180. Even if the fourth paragraph of Article
2180 were applied, petitioner cannot escape liability therefor. They
moreover argue that the Court of Appeals erred in reducing the amount
of compensatory damages when the award made by the trial court was
borne both by evidence adduced during the trial regarding deceaseds
wages and by jurisprudence on life expectancy. Moreover, they point out
that the petition is procedurally not acceptable on the following
grounds: (1) lack of an explanation for serving the petition upon the
Court of Appeals by registered mail, as required under Section 11, Rule
13 of the Rules of Civil Procedure; and (2) lack of a statement of the
dates of the expiration of the original reglementary period and of the
filing of the motion for extension of time to file a petition for review.
For its part, respondent Cebu Doctors Hospital maintains that
petitioner CASTILEX is indeed vicariously liable for the injuries and
subsequent death of Romeo Vasquez caused by ABAD, who was on his
way home from taking snacks after doing overtime work for
petitioner. Although the incident occurred when ABAD was not working
anymore the inescapable fact remains that said employee would not
have been situated at such time and place had he not been required by
petitioner to do overtime work. Moreover, since petitioner adopted the
evidence adduced by ABAD, it cannot, as the latters employer, inveigle
itself from the ambit of liability, and is thus estopped by the records of
the case, which it failed to refute.
We shall first address the issue raised by the private respondents
regarding some alleged procedural lapses in the petition.
was committed. It is only then that the employer may find it necessary
to interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision
of the employee.[8]
It is undisputed that ABAD was a Production Manager of petitioner
CASTILEX at the time of the tort occurrence. As to whether he was
acting within the scope of his assigned task is a question of fact, which
the court a quo and the Court of Appeals resolved in the affirmative.
Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that the factual
findings of the Court of Appeals are entitled to great respect, and even
finality at times. This rule is, however, subject to exceptions such as
when the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises, or
conjectures.[9] Such exception obtain in the present case to warrant
review by this Court of the finding of the Court of Appeals that since
ABAD was driving petitioners vehicle he was acting within the scope of
his duties as a manager.
Before we pass upon the issue of whether ABAD was performing acts
within the range of his employment, we shall first take up the other
reason invoked by the Court of Appeals in holding petitioner CASTILEX
vicariously liable for ABADs negligence, i.e., that the petitioner did not
present evidence that ABAD was not acting within the scope of his
assigned tasks at the time of the motor vehicle mishap. Contrary to the
ruling of the Court of Appeals, it was not incumbent upon the petitioner
to prove the same. It was enough for petitioner CASTILEX to deny that
ABAD was acting within the scope of his duties; petitioner was not under
obligation to prove this negative averment. Ei incumbit probatio qui
dicit, non qui negat (He who asserts, not he who denies, must
prove). The Court has consistently applied the ancient rule that if the
plaintiff, upon whom rests the burden of proving his cause of action, fails
to show in a satisfactory manner facts which he bases his claim, the
defendant is under no obligation to prove his exception or defense.[10]
Now on the issue of whether the private respondents have
sufficiently established that ABAD was acting within the scope of his
assigned tasks.
ABAD, who was presented as a hostile witness, testified that at the
time of the incident, he was driving a company-issued vehicle, registered
under the name of petitioner. He was then leaving the restaurant where
he had some snacks and had a chat with his friends after having done
overtime work for the petitioner.
No absolutely hard and fast rule can be stated which will furnish the
complete answer to the problem of whether at a given moment, an
employee is engaged in his employers business in the operation of a
motor vehicle, so as to fix liability upon the employer because of the
employees action or inaction; but rather, the result varies with each
state of facts.[11]
In Filamer Christian Institute v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[12] this
Court had the occasion to hold that acts done within the scope of the
employees assigned tasks includes any act done by an employee in
furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account of the
employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or damages.
The court a quo and the Court of Appeals were one in holding that
the driving by a manager of a company-issued vehicle is within the
scope of his assigned tasks regardless of the time and circumstances.
We do not agree. The mere fact that ABAD was using a service
vehicle at the time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to
charge petitioner with liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle
unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within the course or
scope of his employment.
The following are principles in American Jurisprudence on the
employers liability for the injuries inflicted by the negligence of an
employee in the use of an employers motor vehicle:
I. Operation of Employers Motor Vehicle in Going to or from Meals
It has been held that an employee who uses his employers vehicle in
going from his work to a place where he intends to eat or in returning to
work from a meal is not ordinarily acting within the scope of his
employment in the absence of evidence of some special business benefit
to the employer. Evidence that by using the employers vehicle to go to
and from meals, an employee is enabled to reduce his time-off and so
devote more time to the performance of his duties supports the finding
that an employee is acting within the scope of his employment while so
driving the vehicle.[13]
In the same vein, traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily
a personal problem or concern of the employee, and not a part of his
services to his employer. Hence, in the absence of some special benefit
to the employer other than the mere performance of the services
available at the place where he is needed, the employee is not acting
within the scope of his employment even though he uses his employers
motor vehicle.[14]
The employer may, however, be liable where he derives some special
benefit from having the employee drive home in the employers vehicle
as when the employer benefits from having the employee at work earlier
and, presumably, spending more time at his actual duties. Where the
employees duties require him to circulate in a general area with no fixed
place or hours of work, or to go to and from his home to various outside
places of work, and his employer furnishes him with a vehicle to use in
his work, the courts have frequently applied what has been called the
special errand or roving commission rule, under which it can be
found that the employee continues in the service of his employer until he
actually reaches home. However, even if the employee be deemed to be
acting within the scope of his employment in going to or from work in his
employers vehicle, the employer is not liable for his negligence where at
the time of the accident, the employee has left the direct route to his
work or back home and is pursuing a personal errand of his own.
III. Use of Employers Vehicle Outside Regular Working Hours
Since there is paucity of evidence that ABAD was acting within the
scope of the functions entrusted to him, petitioner CASTILEX had no duty
to show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in
providing ABAD with a service vehicle. Thus, justice and equity require
that petitioner be relieved of vicarious liability for the consequences of
the negligence of ABAD in driving its vehicle.[20]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the appealed decision
and resolution of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the modification
that petitioner Castilex Industrial Corporation be absolved of any liability
for the damages caused by its employee, Jose Benjamin Abad.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Kapunan, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-55963 December 1, 1989
SPOUSES JOSE FONTANILLA AND VIRGINIA FONTANILLA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE INOCENCIO D. MALIAMAN and NATIONAL IRRIGATION
ADMINISTRATION, respondents.
G.R. No. L-61045 December 1, 1989
NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION, appellant,
vs.
SPOUSES JOSE FONTANILLA and VIRGINIA FONTANILLA, appellees.
Cecilio V. Suarez, Jr. for Spouses Fontanilla.
Felicisimo C. Villaflor for NIA.
PARAS, J.:
In G.R. No. L-55963, the petition for review on certiorari seeks the affirmance
of the decision dated March 20, 1980 of the then Court of First Instance of
Nueva Ecija, Branch VIII, at San Jose City and its modification with respect to
the denial of petitioner's claim for moral and exemplary damages and
attorneys fees.
In G.R. No. 61045, respondent National Irrigation Administration seeks the
reversal of the aforesaid decision of the lower court. The original appeal of
this case before the Court of Appeals was certified to this Court and in the
resolution of July 7, 1982, it was docketed with the aforecited number. And in
the resolution of April 3, this case was consolidated with G.R. No. 55963.
It appears that on August 21, 1976 at about 6:30 P.M., a pickup owned and
operated by respondent National Irrigation Administration, a government
agency bearing Plate No. IN-651, then driven officially by Hugo Garcia, an
employee of said agency as its regular driver, bumped a bicycle ridden by
Francisco Fontanilla, son of herein petitioners, and Restituto Deligo, at
Maasin, San Jose City along the Maharlika Highway. As a result of the impact,
Francisco Fontanilla and Restituto Deligo were injured and brought to the San
Jose City Emergency Hospital for treatment. Fontanilla was later transferred
to the Cabanatuan Provincial Hospital where he died.
Garcia was then a regular driver of respondent National Irrigation
Administration who, at the time of the accident, was a licensed professional
driver and who qualified for employment as such regular driver of
respondent after having passed the written and oral examinations on traffic
rules and maintenance of vehicles given by National Irrigation Administration
authorities.
The within petition is thus an off-shot of the action (Civil Case No. SJC-56)
instituted by petitioners-spouses on April 17, 1978 against respondent NIA
before the then Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch VIII at San Jose
City, for damages in connection with the death of their son resulting from the
aforestated accident.
After trial, the trial court rendered judgment on March 20, 1980 which
directed respondent National Irrigation Administration to pay damages
(death benefits) and actual expenses to petitioners. The dispositive portion
of the decision reads thus:
jurisdiction,
sound
"proprietary" one, as to which there may be liability for the torts of agents
within the scope of their employment.
The National Irrigation Administration is an agency of the government
exercising proprietary functions, by express provision of Rep. Act No. 3601.
Section 1 of said Act provides:
Section 1. Name and domicile.-A body corporate is hereby
created which shall be known as the National Irrigation
Administration, hereinafter called the NIA for short, which shall
be organized immediately after the approval of this Act. It shall
have its principal seat of business in the City of Manila and shall
have representatives in all provinces for the proper conduct of its
business.
Section 2 of said law spells out some of the NIA's proprietary functions. ThusSec. 2. Powers and objectives.-The NIA shall have the following
powers and objectives:
(a) x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
(b) x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
(c) To collect from the users of each irrigation system constructed
by it such fees as may be necessary to finance the continuous
operation of the system and reimburse within a certain period
not less than twenty-five years cost of construction thereof; and
(d) To do all such other tthings and to transact all such business
as are directly or indirectly necessary, incidental or conducive to
the attainment of the above objectives.
Indubitably, the NIA is a government corporation with juridical personality
and not a mere agency of the government. Since it is a corporate body
performing non-governmental functions, it now becomes liable for the
damage caused by the accident resulting from the tortious act of its driveremployee. In this particular case, the NIA assumes the responsibility of an
ordinary employer and as such, it becomes answerable for damages.
later due to "vomiting of saliva." 2 The following day, on August 15, 1975, the
child died. The cause of death was certified as broncho-pneumonia. 3
Seven months later, the Uys sued for damages, alleging that the Vestils were
liable to them as the possessors of "Andoy," the dog that bit and eventually
killed their daughter. The Vestils rejected the charge, insisting that the dog
belonged to the deceased Vicente Miranda, that it was a tame animal, and
that in any case no one had witnessed it bite Theness. After trial, Judge Jose
R. Ramolete of the Court of First Instance of Cebu sustained the defendants
and dismissed the complaint. 4
ISSUE:
In the proceedings now before us, Purita Vestil insists that she is not the
owner of the house or of the dog left by her father as his estate has not yet
been partitioned and there are other heirs to the property.
RULING:
Pursuing the logic of the Uys, she claims, even her sister living in Canada
would be held responsible for the acts of the dog simply because she is one
of Miranda's heirs. However, that is hardly the point. What must be
determined is the possession of the dog that admittedly was staying in the
house in question, regardless of the ownership of the dog or of the house.
Article 2183 reads as follows:
The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is
responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or
be lost. 'This responsibility shall cease only in case the damages should
come from force majeure from the fault of the person who has suffered
damage.
Thus, in Afialda v. Hisole, 6 a person hired as caretaker of a carabao gored
him to death and his heirs thereupon sued the owner of the animal for
damages. The complaint was dismissed on the ground that it was the
caretaker's duty to prevent the carabao from causing injury to any one,
including himself.
While it is true that she is not really the owner of the house, which was still
part of Vicente Miranda's estate, there is no doubt that she and her husband
were its possessors at the time of the incident in question. She was the only
heir residing in Cebu City and the most logical person to take care of the
property, which was only six kilometers from her own house. 13 Moreover,
there is evidence showing that she and her family regularly went to the
house, once or twice weekly, according to at least one witness, 14 and used it
virtually as a second house. Interestingly, her own daughter was playing in
the house with Theness when the little girl was bitten by the dog. 15 The dog
itself remained in the house even after the death of Vicente Miranda in 1973
and until 1975, when the incident in question occurred. It is also noteworthy
that the petitioners offered to assist the Uys with their hospitalization
expenses although Purita said she knew them only casually. 16
ISSUE:
The petitioners also argue that even assuming that they were the possessors
of the dog that bit Theness there was no clear showing that she died as a
result thereof.
RULING:
On the contrary, the death certificate 17 declared that she died of bronchopneumonia, which had nothing to do with the dog bites for which she had
been previously hospitalized. The Court need not involve itself in an
extended scientific discussion of the causal connection between the dog
bites and the certified cause of death except to note that, first, Theness
developed hydrophobia, a symptom of rabies, as a result of the dog bites,
and second, that asphyxia broncho-pneumonia, which ultimately caused her
death, was a complication of rabies. That Theness became afraid of water
after she was bitten by the dog is established by the testimony of Dr. Tautjo.
On the strength of the testimony, the Court finds that the link between the
dog bites and the certified cause of death has beep satisfactorily established.
We also reiterate our ruling in Sison v. Sun Life Assurance Company of
Canada, 20 that the death certificate is not conclusive proof of the cause of
death but only of the fact of death. Indeed, the evidence of the child's
hydrophobia is sufficient to convince us that she died because she was bitten
by the dog even if the death certificate stated a different cause of death. The
petitioner's contention that they could not be expected to exercise remote
control of the dog is not acceptable. In fact, Article 2183 of the Civil Code
holds the possessor liable even if the animal should "escape or be lost" and
so be removed from his control. And it does not matter either that, as the
petitioners also contend, the dog was tame and was merely provoked by the
child into biting her. The law does not speak only of vicious animals but
covers even tame ones as long as they cause injury. As for the alleged
provocation, the petitioners forget that Theness was only three years old at
the time she was attacked and can hardly be faulted for whatever she might
have done to the animal.
According to Manresa the obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil
Code is not based on the negligence or on the presumed lack of
vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal causing the
damage. It is based on natural equity and on the principle of social interest
that he who possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or service must
answer for the damage which such animal may cause. 21
We sustain the findings of the Court of Appeals and approve the monetary
awards except only as to the medical and hospitalization expenses, which
are reduced to P2,026.69, as prayed for in the complaint. While there is no
recompense that can bring back to the private respondents the child they
have lost, their pain should at least be assuaged by the civil damages to
which they are entitled.