Unfortunately, Jackson never published a systematic account of his theory. The historian of psychology who
goes in search of Jacksons views will find bits and pieces of the theory scattered about among his writings.
For the sake of exposition, the major principles will be laid out here with some systematicity; but this was not
characteristic of Jacksons own work.
The first principle of Jacksons theory was continuity of sensori-motor function at all levels of the nervous
system. As Jackson put it, the cerebral centres are, like all lower centres, reflex. The more recent doctrines
of evolution of necessity imply that all nervous centres, even the highestthe substrata of consciousness
are (also) sensori-motor. 163
The second principle was that of the evolution and dissolution of brain systems. One of the best statements of
this principle appeared in Jacksons Croonian Lectures: Evolution, he wrote, is a passage from the most to
the least organised; that is to say, from the lowest, well organised, centres up to the highest, least organised,
centresfrom centres comparatively well organised at birthto thosewhich are continually organising
through lifeEvolution is a passage from the most simple to the most complexa passage from the most
automatic to the most voluntarythe highest centresare the least organised, the most complex, and the
most voluntaryDissolutionis a process of undevelopmentfrom the least organised, from the most
complex and most voluntary, towards the most organised, most simple, and most automatic. 164
According to the third principle, the nervous system is a representing system. 165 Parts of the body were
represented by different centers. In keeping with the sensori-motor hypothesis, Jackson argued that Even the
centres for mind represent parts of the bodyThe whole nervous system is a sensori-motor mechanism, a
coordinating system from top to bottom. 166
The fourth principle, which followed directly from the second and third, was that of the hierarchy of cerebral
centers, divided into lowest, middle, and highestto indicate different evolu-tionary levels. 167 A lowest
centre, in Jacksons view, is one which represents some limited part of the body most nearly directlyA
middle centre represents over again inmore complexcombinations what many or all of the lowest have
represented in comparatively simple combinationsThe middle centres are re-representativeThe highest
centresrepresent over again in more complexcombinations, the parts which all the middle centres have
re-represented, and thus they represent the whole organism; they are re-re-representative. 168 A corollary of
this principle was that the depth of dissolution in pathology would reflect the hierarchical level of the affected
center.
How this effect was manifested, however, would depend not only on depth of dissolution (severity of the
pathology) but on whether the symptomatology was viewed in terms of its negative or positive aspect. And
here we have the last of Jacksons major principles, that of the fundamental duality of all pathological states.
Each such state, in Jacksons view, was characterized by both negative and positive symptoms. Negative
symptoms were those directly caused by the pathological condition as it worked its effect in higher centers;
positive symptoms were those indirectly caused by removal of the influence of the higher centres. 169
The source of this duality, of course, was the nature of patho-logical dissolution itself. When the influence of
higher brain centers was removed (through disease, injury, exhaustion, temporary inhibition), the activity of the
next lower centers, normally under the control of the higher centers, was liberated. This led, in Jacksons
phrase, to a reduction to a more automatic condition 170 frequently characterized by overactivity of the lower
centers.
Jacksons most famous application of his evolutionary theory of brain systems was to the analysis of the postseizure disorders of epilepsy; and for the purpose of illustrating his theory, this application will be briefly
described. For Jackson, the epileptic discharge (a sudden and excessive discharge of certain nervous
arrangements, the cells of which are abnormally highly unstable 171 ) led to temporary exhaustion of
associated nerve fibers in the highest centers of the brain. Depending on the strength and rapidity of the
epileptic discharge and the consequent exhaustion of the relevant higher centers, three degrees of depth of
nervous dissolution might be observed.
In the least severe condition, the positive symptom was epileptic ideation, a somewhat dream-like state of
reverie. The negative symptom, attending the ideation, was a certain mental confusion and removal of
consciousness from reality. The patient as Jackson put it, tells us that he becomes dim to his surroundings
172
. In moderately severe dissolution, the positive symptom was action of different kinds and of different
degrees of elaborateness; 173 the negative symptom was loss of consciousness. The patient in this condition
exhibited a behavior pattern somewhat akin to somnambulism. Finally, in the most severe cases of
dissolution, the patient continued to exhibit the operation of vital processes such as respiration and circulation
(the positive symptom) but persisted in a coma (the negative symptom). While the patho-logical discharge of
epilepsy directly produced the negative symptoms, it had, as Jackson wrote, done nothing to the nervous
arrangements concerned in the positive state, except in the indirect way of removing controlby exhausting
their higher, or controlling, nervous arrangements. 174
While Jacksons specific contributions to our understanding of the etiology, course, and treatment of
neurological disorders such as epilepsy were of great importance, it was his evolutionary, hierarchical,
systemic, sensori-motor conception of cerebral function that was of greatest interest. How influential it was in
its day is somewhat difficult to say. In his discussion of perception in The Principles of Psychology, William
James, always alive to evolutionary, systemic thinking, referred to Jacksons theory as masterly and as
involving principles exactly like those which I am bringing forward here; 175 but for most late 19th century
psychologists, still burdened with a mechanistic metaphor for both the nervous system and consciousness,
Jacksons views may well have been hard to fathom.
154
Flourens, M-J-P. (1824). Recherches exprimentales sur les proprits et les fonctions du systme
nerveux, dans les animaux vertbrs. Paris: Crevot; the second edition was published in 1842.
155
Bain, A. (1855). The Senses and the Intellect. London: John W. Parker and Son; Spencer, H. (1855). The
Principles of Psychology. London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans. For a superb analysis of these
advances and of their relationship to the work of Jackson among others, see Young, R.M. (1970). Mind, Brain
and Adaptation in the Nineteenth Century. Cerebral Localization and Its Biological Context from Gall to Ferrier.
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970; for a general discussion of the work of Bain and Spencer, see the essays on
these authors in this volume.
156
157
158
18351911. For biographical information on Jackson, see Clarke, E. (1973). John Hughlings Jackson. In
C.C. Gillispie (Ed.). Dictionary of Scientific Biography (Vol. 7). New York: Scribners, pp. 4650.
159
Jackson, J.H. (1932). Selected Writings of John Hughlings Jackson (2 Vols.). Edited by J. Taylor. London:
Hodder and Stoughton; all page references to quotations from Jackson are keyed to the Selected Writings.
160
Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 3.
161
Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 6.
162
Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 5.
163
Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 6.
164
165
166
Ibid.
167
Ibid.
168
Ibid.
169
Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 6.
170
Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 8.
171
172
173
174
175
James, W. (1890). The Principles of Psychology (2 vols.). New York: Henry Holt, Vol. 2, pp. 1256.