Evidence Cases 3

[G.R. No. 143125. June 10, 2003.
]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. DIOSDADO CORIAL y REQUIEZ, Appellant.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
For automatic review is the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109, 1 imposing the death penalty on
convicted appellant Diosdado Corial y Requiez for the crime of qualified rape, 2 said to have been committed, according to
the indictment, against his own minor granddaughter Maricar Corial.
At his arraignment, appellant pleaded "not guilty" to the charge; 3 trial ensued shortly thereafter.
The Case for the Prosecution.
Maricar Corial was born to Marietta Corial, appellants daughter, but she did not come to know her father (now said to be
deceased). Maricar had two maternal sisters who lived with their mother and her "stepfather" in Balagtas, Bulacan. Maricar
lived with her grandparents, herein appellant and his wife Carmelita, in Pasay City.
One afternoon in July 1998, Maricar and appellant were left alone in the house. She was wearing a duster when her
grandfather forced himself on her. He first inserted his penis into her private part, and then into her mouth and, finally, into
her anus. When her mother, Marietta, arrived for Christmas in 1998, Maricar revealed the sexual abuse she had suffered
from her grandfather. Maricar went first to the barangay hall where she lodged a complaint against appellant and then to the
Philippine General Hospital where Maricar was physically examined. Still later, they repaired to the Pasay City Police station
where Maricar executed a sworn statement (salaysay).
chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
According to barangay captain Policarpio Tawat, Marietta and Maricar went to see him on the morning of 29 December 1998
at the barangay hall to seek assistance about the sexual assault. Along with a barangay kagawad, Tawat went to invite
appellant to the barangay hall and then had a medical examination conducted on Maricar. When the medical examination
proved positive for rape, Tawat turned appellant over to the Pasay City Police station.
The Provisional Medical Certificate, 4 dated 29 December 1998, showed the following findings of Dr. Mariella Sugue-Castillo,
viz:
jgc:chanroble s.com.ph
"GENITAL EXAMINATION:
chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
External genitalia: normal

Hymen: crescentic hymen, no discharge seen, (+) mound at 7 oclock position, (+) attenuation of posterior hymen
Anus: normal findings
"IMPRESSION
Disclosure of sexual abuse.
Genital finding of posterior hymen attenuation is suspicious for prior penetration injury" 5
On the afternoon of 29 December 1998, SPO3 Milagros Carrasco was at the Women and Children Desk of the Pasay City
Police station when Barangay Captain Tawat, Marietta, young Maricar, and Mariettas father arrived. After hearing the story,
SPO3 Carrasco contacted social worker Erlinda Aguila to assist her in conducting the interview with Maricar. The child
claimed that her maternal grandfather had sexually abused her. When confronted by SPO3 Carrasco, appellant remarked in
Tagalog that he was just having a "taste" of the child (tinitikman niya lang).
The Case for the Defense.

Testifying for her father, Nelly Corial stated that the 59-year-old appellant had six children, all of them female, by his wife
Carmelita. He was a mason and construction worker employed by D. M. Consunji while her mother was a dressmaker. Her
father was a responsible person with no vices. Her parents first took custody of Maricar because the latters father, Francisco
Amado and live-in partner of Marietta, would often inflict physical harm upon the child. After Franciscos death, Marietta
resided in Balagtas, Bulacan, with yet another live-in partner, Rene Malinao, who both for a while took Maricar into their
custody. Maricar was soon brought back to her grandparents residence in Pasay City because of the maltreatment she had
been getting from Malinao. According to Nelly, her parents loved Maricar, provided for her needs, and had her take up
schooling at the Pio del Pilar Elementary School. After the case against appellant was filed, Marietta confided to Nelly her
regrets (nagsisisi) for having filed the case. Marietta became "mentally deranged" and would harm herself for no reason at
all. She concluded that Mariettas complaint was fabricated (gawa-gawa lamang niya iyun). Menchu, another daughter of
appellant, also testified for him. Her residence in Pasay City was separated from appellants house only by a wall. She
confirmed that Maricar was brought to San Pedro, Laguna, at the instance of appellant who had wanted the child to have a
vacation there.
Appellant denied having raped Maricar. He took the child away from her parents because they were unable to properly care
for her. After Franciscos death, he took custody of Marietta and her child but only for four months when Marietta started to
live with another partner in Bulacan. Marietta was a good daughter and a good mother but she was mentally ill and
hardheaded (suwail). Marietta instigated the case against him because he had refused to allow her to live in their house in
Pasay City. From Monday to Saturday, he would leave the house at six oclock in the morning and return from work at seven
oclock in the evening. On Sundays, Nelly would always be at home.
The Assailed Decision.
The trial court debunked the defense of denial interposed by appellant and the assertion that the rape case was only
trumped-up by his daughter Marietta. It instead gave credence to what it so described as the "spontaneous and
straightforward" testimony of Maricar Corial. The trial court adjudged:
"In view of all the foregoing, the Court opines that the prosecution has proven the guilt of the accused, Diosdado Corial y
Requiez for rape as defined and penalized under Art. 266-A and 266-B of RA 8353 as amended, and the Court hereby
sentences the accused, Diosdado Corial y Requiez to death and to indemnify the complainant in the amount of P75,000.00
and moral and exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00." 6
Appellant, in this Courts review of his case, would consider erroneous his conviction for there was no opportunity for him
and his granddaughter to be alone in their residence, particularly on Sundays when all the members of the household stayed
home, and for Maricars failure to make an outcry during the alleged sexual assault that could have easily attracted the
attention of close kins whose house was only adjacent to theirs.
Quite often, this Court has held that rapists are not deterred from committing the odious act of sexual abuse by the mere
presence nearby of people or even family members. Rape is committed not exclusively in seclusion; 7 lust, it is said,
respects neither time nor place. The trial court has valued Maricars testimony as being "spontaneous and straightforward."
Indeed, when a victims testimony is straightforward and unflawed by any major inconsistency or contradiction, the same
must be given full faith and credit. 8 Appellant capitalizes on the so-called disparity between the declaration of Maricar in her
testimony in court and her sworn statement. He quotes a portion of her salaysay; viz.
"06. T: Natatandaan mo ba kung kailan at kung saan nangyari ang mga ginawa na sinasabi ng lolo mo sa iyo?
S: Opo, simula po ng Grade II ako. Tapos naulit po nuong July 1998 at nauulit po pag araw ng Linggo pag wala ang lola ko
at ang tita ko sa bahay namin. Kasi nagtatrabaho si Lolo ng Lunes hanggang Sabado. Pero pag wala siyang pasok ay
ginagalaw din niya ako. Sa bahay namin sa Dolores, Pasay. 9
He then labels it as being inconsistent with her testimony on cross-examination; viz:
"Atty. Casas:
jgc:chanrobles.com .ph
Now, it was in July 1998 which is finally the alleged (sic) contained in the information that you claimed you have been
sexually molested, is that correct?
"A: Yes, sir.
"Q: And you told the Court in your direct examination that it was the first time that the same was committed?
"A: Yes, sir." 10
Not only is her assailed statement that before the July 1998 incident she has also been subjected to sexual assault by
appellant inconsequential in a material point but it also does not necessarily take away her credibility at the witness
stand. It is acknowledged that affidavits, usually taken ex parte, are often held unreliable for being incomplete and
inaccurate. 11
Maricars failure to shout during the sexual assault is not all that strange. Not every witness to or victim of a crime can be
supposed to always act in conformity with the usual expectations of everyone; 12 in fact, there is no known and accepted
standard therefor. Moreover, to attribute to her the sophistication of an adult woman would be to brush aside the fact that
Maricar is just a young girl. Even then, it would be unreasonable to judge her actions on the traumatic experience by any
norm of behavior that, if at all, may be expected from mature persons. 13
The Court is not persuaded by the claim of appellant that Marietta, the victims mother, has fabricated the charge simply
because appellant did not allow her to stay with him. It just is not a convincing tale. It is difficult to believe that Marietta
would send his own father to jail, even to the gallows, sacrifice the honor and dignity of their family and subject her own
child to untold humiliation and disgrace if she were motivated by any desire other than to bring to justice the person
responsible for defiling her child. 14
Appellants claim that Marietta is deranged lacks unbiased evidentiary support. In any event, it hardly has any bearing on
the credibility of her own daughter. Nor would the failure of the prosecution to present Marietta at the witness stand
adversely affect the outcome of the case. The prosecution is not bound to present any witness other than the victim herself,
for as long as the testimony of the victim is credible, natural, convincing and otherwise consistent with human nature and
the course of things, 15 it may be the basis for a conviction. It is the prerogative of the prosecution, not much unlike that of
the defense, to determine which evidence to submit in support of its own case. 16
Maricar, on direct examination, testified thusly:
"Q: In the information filed to (sic) this Honorable Court, stated that you are complaining for rape perpetrated by your Lolo
Diosdado Corial that happened in July 1998. Do you still recall the date in July when this incident, the alleged incident
happened?
"A: It was in July but I do not know or remember the date, sir.
"Q: But could you still recall if that was in the morning or lunch time or evening of July 1998?
"A: It was in the afternoon of July 1998.
"Q: And in what place where this incident happened regarding the complaint (sic) that you were sexually molested by your
grandfather Diosdado Corial?
"A: The incident happened at 164 Dolores Street, Pasay City.
"Q: Was it inside your house?
"A: Yes, sir.
"Q: You earlier stated that the alleged rape happened in the afternoon, sometime in July 1998 inside your house at No. 164
Dolores Street, Pasay City. My question is, who were actually present inside your house when the incident happened?
"A: My grandmother was there, but she left.
"Q: And who was left behind in the afternoon of July 1998 when the incident happened?
"A: I and my grandfather was (sic) left inside the house.
"Q: And what actually were you doing in that afternoon of July 1998 when you were inside your house?
"A: None, sir.
"Q: What were you wearing then?
"A: I was wearing a duster, sir.
"Q: And so was there any unusual incident that happened in the month of July 1998? When you were left by your Lola inside
your house and left with your Lolo?
"A: Yes, there was.
"Q: Would you kindly tell to this Honorable Court, what happened to you on that month of July 1998?
"A: I was raped by my grandfather, sir.
"Q: Will you further explain to this Honorable Court, how were you raped by your grandfather?
"A: He inserted his penis into my private part, sir.
"Q: And what did you feel when your grandfather inserted his penis inside your private part?
"A: I felt pain, sir.
"Fiscal Barrera:
Besides inserting his penis at your private part, what else did your Lolo do to you?
"A: He was requesting me to suck his penis.
"Q: And did he actually put his penis inside your mouth?
"A: Yes, sir.
"Q: And what happen(ed) after he inserted his penis inside your mouth?
"A: He requested me to suck it, sir.
"Q: And what else happened aside (from) inserting his penis at your private part, and putting his penis inside your mouth
sometime in the month of July 1998?
"A: He inserted his penis inside my anus.
"Q: What did you feel when he inserted his penis inside your anus in the month of July 1998?
"A: It was painful, sir.
"Q: What else happened besides inserting his penis inside your anus or "Puwet" ?
"A: No more, sir.
"Q: And so after that, what did you do?
"A: When my mother arrived last Christmas, I told her what my grandfather did to me.
"Q: You mean that was last Christmas 1998?
"A: Yes, sir.
"Q: And so what actually did you tell your mother Marietta Corial?
"A: I told her that my grandfather put his penis inside my vagina. 17
On cross examination, she recounted:
"Q: You specifically mentioned the word rape when you were asked any unusual incident that happened on June 1998, is
that correct?
"A: Yes, sir.
"Q: Who told you or how did you learn the word rape?
"A: Nobody told me, sir.
"Court:
Pero alam mo ba ang meaning nang rape? Alam mo ba ang ibig sabihin nang rape?
"A: Rape means Pang gagahasa.
"x
"Q: And because the penis of your Lolo was inserted inside your vagina, you felt pain?
"A: Yes, sir.
"Q: But you did not shout, is that correct?
"A: I was boxing him.
"x
"Atty. Casas:
You also mentioned that your Lolo raped you by placing his penis inside your mouth, is that correct?
"A: Yes, sir.
"Q: Definitely, you did not like that idea or actuation by your Lolo?
"A: Yes, sir.
"x
"Q: By the way, Maricar, do you love your Lolo and Lola?
"A: I love my grandmother.
"Q: How about your grandfather, do you love him?
"A: I dont love him.
"Q: Why do you not love your grandfather?

"A: Because, he did something wrong to me." 18
The trial court has found appellant guilty of having violated Sections 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 8353 (Anti-Rape Law of 1997), 19 that read:
"Article 266-A. Rape; When And How Committed. Rape is committed

"1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances
mentioned above be present.
"2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual
assault by inserting his penis into another persons mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or
anal orifice of another person.
"Article 266-B. Penalties. Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
"x
"The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying
circumstances:
"1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian,
relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim."
cralaw virtua1aw library
The death penalty for the crime herein charged may be imposed only when the twin qualifying circumstances of relationship
between the appellant and the victim and the latters age are indubitably proven; otherwise, the appellant can only be held
liable for the crime of simple rape penalized by reclusion perpetua. 20 The relationship between appellant and the victim has
been adequately established. The prosecution evidence has shown that appellant is the grandfather of the victim, 21 a fact
that appellant himself has likewise maintained. 22 The same cannot, however, be said with respect to the age of the victim.
In People v. Pruna, 23 the Court, after noting the divergent rulings on proof of age of the victim in rape cases, has set out
certain guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance. The primary
evidence of age of the victim is her birth certificate. Age may also be proven by such authentic documents as a baptismal
certificate and school records only in the absence of a birth certificate. If the aforesaid documents are shown to have been
lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victims mother or a member of the
family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or
date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient but only
under the following circumstances: a) If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is
that she is less than 7 years old; b) If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is
that she is less than 12 years old; c) If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is
that she is less than 18 years old.
In the instant case, the prosecution did not offer the victims certificate of live birth or any similar authentic document in
evidence. The trial court, in convicting the appellant of the crime of rape and imposing upon him the death penalty even in
the absence of the necessary documents, relied on the sworn statement of Marietta Corial, the mother of the victim,
attesting to the fact that her daughter Maricar Corial was born on 26 May 1990. 24 Marietta Corial, however, did not testify
in court. Such sworn statement was thus inadmissible in evidence under the hearsay rule, 25 and unless the affiant had
been placed on the witness stand, the admission of the mere affidavit and the conviction of appellant on the basis thereof
would violate the right of the accused to meet witness face to face. 26
In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victims mother or relatives
concerning the victims age under the circumstances heretofore mentioned, the complainants sole testimony can suffice
provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused; to repeat, "provided that it is expressly and clearly
admitted by the accused." 27 There is no such declaration and admission on the part of appellant.
This Court cannot be overly strict as regards the proof of age of the victim particularly when, such as under Article 266-B of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Rep. Act No. 8353, age is an element of the crime that, if shown, would make it
punishable by death. As so frequently expressed by the Court, the severity of the death penalty, which by its nature is
irreversible when carried out, should behoove courts to apply the most exacting rules of procedure and evidence. The
prosecution is not excused from discharging its burden even when the defense lets itself loose about it.
The trial court ordered appellant to "indemnify the complainant in the amount of P75,000.00 and moral and exemplary
damages in the amount of P50,000.00." The award must be corrected. In consonance with prevailing jurisprudence,
appellant must be made to pay P50,000.00 civil indemnity, an award that is outrightly due the victim of rape by the mere
fact of its commission, P50,000.00 moral damages which is deemed concomitant with and which necessarily results from
this odious criminal offense, and P25,000.00 exemplary damages which are awarded under Article 2230 of the Civil Code
when the crime is committed with one or more aggravating circumstances 28 such as relationship between the offender and
the victim. 29
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo finding appellant Diosdado Corial y Requiez guilty of rape is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION in that he is hereby only adjudged guilty of simple, not qualified, rape and sentenced to suffer, instead of the
death penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The award of damages by the trial court is likewise modified by hereby
ordering appellant to indemnify the victim the amounts of P50,000.00 civil indemnity, P50,000.00 moral damages and
P25,000.00 exemplary damages. Costs de officio.
Vda de Jacob vs CA
chan
Accordingly, the primary evidence of a marriage must be an authentic copy of the marriage contract.
And if the authentic copy could not be produced, Section 3 in relation to Section 5, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides:
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court without bad faith on the part of
the offeror;
xxx
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Sec. 5. When the original document is unavailable. When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or
cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability
without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy. Or by a recital of its contents in some authentic
document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.
As required by the Rules, before the terms of a transaction in reality may be established by secondary evidence, it is
necessary that the due execution of the document and subsequent loss of the original instrument evidencing the
transaction be proved. For it is the due execution of the document and subsequent loss that would constitute the
foundation for the introduction of secondary evidence to prove the contents of such document.
In the case at bench, proof of due execution besides the loss of the three (3) copies of the marriage contract has not been
shown for the introduction of secondary evidence of the contents of the reconstructed contract. Also, appellant failed to
sufficiently establish the circumstances of the loss of the original document.
When Is Secondary Evidence Allowed?
"It is settled that if the original writing has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court, upon proof of its
execution and loss or destruction, or unavailability, its contents may be proved by a copy or a recital of its contents in
some authentic document, or by recollection of witnesses." 13 Upon a showing that the document was duly executed and
subsequently lost, without any bad faith on the part of the offeror, secondary evidence may be adduced to prove its
contents.14
The trial court and the Court of Appeals committed reversible error when they (1) excluded the testimonies of petitioner,
Adela Pilapil and Msgr. Florencio Yllana and (2) disregarded the following: (a) photographs of the wedding ceremony; (b)
documentary evidence, such as the letter of Monsignor Yllana stating that he had solemnized the marriage between Dr.
Jacob and petitioner, informed the Archbishop of Manila that the wedding had not been recorded in the Book of Marriages,
and at the same time requested the list of parties to the marriage; (c) the subsequent authorization issued by the
Archbishop through his vicar general and chancellor, Msgr. Benjamin L. Marino ordaining that the union between Dr.
Jacob and petitioner be reflected through a corresponding entry in the Book of Marriages; and (d) the Affidavit of
Monsignor Yllana stating the circumstances of the loss of the marriage certificate.
It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both constituting the conditio sine qua
non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by the very evidence they have disregarded.
They have thus confused the evidence to show due execution and loss as "secondary" evidence of the marriage.
In Hernaez v. Mcgrath,15 the Court clarified this misconception thus:
. . . [T]he court below was entirely mistaken in holding that parol evidence of the execution of the instrument was
barred. The court confounded the execution and the contents of the document. It is the contents, . . . which may
not be prove[n] by secondary evidence when the instrument itself is accessible. Proofs of the execution are not
dependent on the existence or non-existence of the document, and, as a matter of fact, such proofs precede
proofs of the contents: due execution, besides the loss, has to be shown as foundation for the introduction of
secondary evidence of the contents.
xxx
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Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last analysis, necessarily collateral or primary. It generally
consists of parol testimony or extrinsic papers. Even when the document is actually produced, its authenticity is
not necessarily, if at all, determined from its face or recital of its contents but by parol evidence. At the most, failure
to produce the document, when available, to establish its execution may affect the weight of the evidence
presented but not the admissibility of such evidence. (emphasis ours)
The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial court, tried to justify its stand on this issue by relying on Lim Tanhu
v.Ramolete.16 But even there, we said that "marriage may be prove[n] by other competent evidence." 17
Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the swearing officer, by witnesses who
saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by those to whom the parties have previously narrated the
execution thereof.18 The Court has also held that "[t]he loss may be shown by any person who [knows] the fact of its loss,
or by any one who ha[s] made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place or places where the
document or papers of similar character are usually kept by the person in whose custody the document lost was, and has
been unable to find it; or who has made any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument
[has] indeed [been] lost."19
In the present case, due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who was present during the
marriage ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a party to the event. The subsequent loss was shown by the testimony
and the affidavit of the officiating priest, Monsignor Yllana, as well as by petitioner's own declaration in court. These are
relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly
shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence testimonial and documentary may be admitted to prove the
fact of marriage.
[G.R. NO. 158033. July 30, 2004]

RAMIL CABUGAO y SISON,Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review of the decision1 and resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CR No. 24578, affirming
the decision3 of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 41, which found the petitioner Ramil S. Cabugao guilty of
violation of Article III, Section 15 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended.
The information against the petitioner Cabugao reads as follows:
rbl r l l lbrr
That on or about the 12th day of March, 1999, in the City of Dagupan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, RAMIL CABUGAO y Sison, did then and there, wil(l) fully, unlawfully and
criminally, sell and deliver to a customer Shabu weighing more or less .5 gram contained in a small plastic sachet, without
authority to do so.
Contrary to Article III, Sec. 15, R.A. 6425, as amended. 4
The petitioner pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. 5
rll
rll
During the trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of SPO2 Augusto P. Domingo, 6 Police Superintendent Theresa Ann
B. Cid, and SPO1 Rolando Lomibao.
SPO2 Domingo testified that he has been a policeman in Dagupan City from January 25, 1999. On March 12, 1999, at
around 8:40 p.m., the members of the Task Force Anti-Drug of the Dagupan City Police Station conducted a buy-bust
operation at M.H. Del Pilar Street in Dagupan City, against the petitioner Cabugao after fifteen (15) days of surveillance.
Fifteen (15) minutes before the buy-bust operation, he arranged to sell shabu to the petitioner. During the operation, he
approached the petitioner who was seated on a bench in front of Caliman Lodge along M.H. Del Pilar Street. He gave the
petitioner two P100 bills which he previously marked with his signature. He arrested the petitioner after the latter handed to
him a small plastic sachet of shabu. At the time of the arrest, the other members of the task force were scattered at a
distance of 3 to 5 meters away from him. The petitioner was then brought to the police station where the incident was
recorded in the police blotter.7
rll
SPO1 Rolando Lomibao, a member of the Dagupan City Police Stations Task Force Anti-Drug, also testified for the
prosecution. He said he has been in service as a policeman since 1987. He recalled that in the evening of March 12, 1999,
he, together with SPO2 Domingo, SPO1 Danilo Frias, SPO1 Allan Daus, and their team leader Senior Police Inspector Romeo
Caramat, went to M.H. Del Pilar Street to hold a buy-bust operation. SPO2 Domingo acted as the poseur buyer in the
operation as he was the one who arranged with the petitioner the sale ofshabu. They knew the location of petitioner
Cabugao because of their assets. When they arrived at M.H. Del Pilar Street, the petitioner was standing in front of Caliman
Lodge. SPO2 Domingo approached the petitioner and handed to him two marked P100 bills. At that time, he was about three
meters away from them. SPO2 Domingo arrested the petitioner after the latter gave him the plastic sachet
containing shabu. He helped in the apprehension of the petitioner. He bodily searched the petitioner and found a 9-inch
dagger in his possession. They turned over the petitioner to the police station and requested for a laboratory examination of
the contents of the plastic sachet.
Superintendent Wendy Garcia Rosario, the Chief of Police of the Dagupan City Police Station, sent a letter-request 8 to the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory of Lingayen, Pangasinan, for an examination of the contents of the sachet
handed over by the petitioner. He also reported to the Dangerous Drugs Board the buy-bust operation. 9 SPO2 Domingo and
SPO1 Rolando Lomibao, as members of the task force, executed a joint affidavit regarding the incident. 10
rll
Theresa Ann Bugayong-Cid, a forensic chemist at the PNP Crime Laboratory of San Fernando, La Union, testified that she
examined the specimen and found it to contain methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu).
11
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For his part, the petitioner denied that a buy-bust operation was conducted against him by the police. His testimony was
buttressed by witnesses Teresa Azurin, Maria Luz Villamil, and Romeo Cabugao.
Teresa Azurin was a waitress of the turo-turo (eatery) at the sidewalk along M.H. Del Pilar Street where the incident took
place. She testified that on March 12, 1999 at around 8:30 in the evening, two men came to their eatery, bought cigarettes
and asked for candies. One of them said he would get his money to pay for the candies. To her surprise, the man drew his
gun and poked it to her lone customer, the petitioner Cabugao. The two men then frisked the petitioner but found nothing
from him. They handcuffed the petitioner and forcibly took him away. She was shocked by the incident and went inside
the eskenita (alley). The following morning, the parents of the petitioner dropped by their eatery and paid the food bill of
their son. She gave them a receipt.12
rll
Maria Luz Villamil is the sister of the petitioners classmate Victorino Villamil. She testified that on March 12, 1999, at 8:30 in
the evening, she was at a store along M.H. Del Pilar Street when she saw a man approach the petitioner Cabugao while the
latter was eating. She was about two(-) arm(s) length 13 away from the petitioner at that time. The man poked a gun at the
petitioner and frisked him. Thereafter, some men forced him to go with them. She heard the petitioner say: why, what is my
fault; he also asked if they have a search warrant. He begged to be allowed to telephone his parents but was refused. He
called on the people around him to inform his parents, telling them his address and telephone number. She went to the
address given by the petitioner and informed his parents of the incident. 14
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The petitioner Cabugao, 32 years old, testified that while he was eating at a sidewalk store at M.H. Del Pilar Street on March
12, 1999 at around 8:30 in the evening, SPO1 Domingo suddenly poked a gun at him and warned him Dont move or else I
will shoot you. On the other hand, SPO1 Lomibao ordered him to raise his hands. He was bodily frisked but nothing was
found on him. He was handcuffed and pulled to an owner-type jeep. He resisted as they did not have a warrant of arrest but
to no avail. He begged to be allowed to call his parents but was refused. He then shouted for help so the people present
would know what was happening. He was kicked while a certain SPO1 Allan Daus fired his gun. He was then brought to the
police station, specifically to Senior Inspector Romeo Caramat. He was forced to sign a blank paper but he did not. After
that, he was incarcerated in the city jail. He denied that a buy-bust operation took place and that a sachet of shabu and a
dagger were recovered from his possession. He said that before the incident or on March 12, SPO2 Domingo and SPO1
Lomibao asked him to act as an asset in apprehending two of his neighbors suspected to be drug pushers. He agreed, but
before he could help them, the suspects were arrested by other members of the Dagupan City Police Station. He asked for
their forgiveness but they warned him: the time will come that you (the petitioner) will have your day.
Romeo Cabugao, 63 years old, the father of the petitioner, testified that after Villamil informed them of the March 12, 1999
incident, he, together with his wife, immediately went to M.H. Del Pilar Street. They talked to some people in the area,
including witness Azurin who related to them in detail the incident. The next day, they paid the food bill of P30.00 incurred
by the petitioner, for which an unofficial receipt was issued by Azurin. He declared that before the incident, SPO2 Domingo
and SPO1 Lomibao frequented their house looking for his son, Ramil. The two wanted his son to act as an asset to
apprehend suspected drug pushers living at the back of their house. He advised his son to refuse as the two police officers
have questionable background. SPO1 Lomibao has been involved in drug pushing while SPO2 Domingo has been found guilty
of acts of lasciviousness and dismissed from the service.
He also testified that his son was also charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 6 or illegal possession of deadly
weapon. The charge was dismissed for the repeated failure of SPO2 Domingo and SPO1 Lomibao to appear in court despite
due notice. A certified true copy of the resolution15 of the Summary Hearing Officer of the PNP Regional Office I imposing a
one-rank demotion against SPO1 Lomibao, an authenticated copy of the decision 16 of the Regional Director of the PNP
Regional Office I dismissing SPO2 Domingo from the PNP, and the order 17 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Dagupan
City, Branch 1, dismissing the case against the petitioner for illegal possession of deadly weapon, were marked and
submitted as exhibits for the defense. The information 18 filed against the two neighbors suspected of drug pushing,
Evangeline Mendoza and Dave Doe, and the order19 of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 40, convicting
Evangeline Mendoza upon her plea of guilty for violation of Article III, Section 16 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, were also
offered as exhibits.
After trial, the trial court convicted petitioner Cabugao, to wit:
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WHEREFORE, the accused is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Art. III, Section 15, RA 6425, as
amended, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months, as the minimum to four (4) years, two (2)
months and one (1) day, as the maximum, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.20
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The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which, however, affirmed his conviction on November 22, 2002. His motion
for reconsideration was also denied.
Undaunted, the petitioner Cabugao filed this petition and submits the following assignment of errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE INCONSISTENT AND INCREDIBLE STATEMENTS OF THE
PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES ASSERTION THAT THERE WAS A BUYBUST OPERATION.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 15, ARTICLE III OF
REPUBLIC ACT 6425, WHEN THE GUILT OF THE LATTER WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
We find the petition impressed with merit.
The decisions of both courts below failed to take into account vital pieces of evidence that engender serious doubt on the
guilt of the petitioner.
First, we shall consider the documentary evidence of the defense which cannot but erode the credibility of prosecution
witnesses SPO2 Augusto Domingo and SPO1 Rolando Lomibao. We refer to: (a) the authenticated copy of the Order of Police
Chief Superintendent Velasco dated February 28, 1997 showing that SPO2 Domingo was found guilty of grave misconduct
for acts of lasciviousness and ordered dismissed from service; and (b) the certified true copy of the Resolution of Police
Senior Inspector Sotero Lucas Soriano, Jr. dated December 8, 1997 showing that SPO1 Rolando Lomibao was convicted of
grave misconduct when he was found positive of metabolite (marijuana) and demoted from the rank of SPO1 to PO3.
The respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), tries to minimize the significance of these pieces of
documentary evidence. It contends that they are hearsay evidence because they are not certified and were only identified by
the petitioners father, Romeo Cabugao.21 It also argues that the demotion of SPO1 Lomibao and the dismissal from service of
SPO2 Domingo have no bearing on the culpability of the petitioner.22
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We disagree.
The contention of the respondent that the subject documents are uncertified is erroneous. Under the Rules of
Court, when the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its
contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof. 23 The Rules does not
require that the certification should be in a particular form. The four-page Resolution dated December 8, 1997
contains a stamped certification signed by Police Inspector David U. Ursua of the Legal Service, PNP Regional
Office I of Parian, San Fernando, La Union. 24 The three-page Decision dated February 28, 1997 has the
handwritten authentication of Police Inspector Mario L. Aduan, also from the same office, on each and every
page.25 They ought to satisfy the requirement of the Rules on certification.
Moreover, the respondent did not raise the hearsay objection when the subject documents were offered in evidence by the
defense. When the father of the petitioner was asked during direct examination if he had proof that SPO2 Domingo was
dismissed from service and that SPO1 Lomibao was involved in drug activities, the prosecution objected on other
grounds, i.e.,that the line of questioning is now irrelevant and immaterial and that (t) his is not (sic) the character of the
complainant which is in issue.26 When the subject documents were marked as exhibits, the prosecution again did not raise
any objection. When the documents were formally offered in evidence, the respondent once more did not object on the
ground of hearsay. The prosecution objected on the ground that the documents are off-tangent to the issue in this case. 27
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The Rules of Court requires that grounds for objection must be specified, whether orally or in writing. 28 The result of violating
this rule has been spelled out by this Court in a number of cases. In Krohn v. Court of Appeals,29 the counsel for the
petitioner objected to the testimony of private respondent on the ground that it was privileged but did not question the
testimony as hearsay. We held that in failing to object to the testimony on the ground that it was hearsay, counsel waived
his right to make such objection and, consequently, the evidence offered may be admitted. In Tan Machan v. De la
Trinidad,30 the defendant assailed as error the admission of plaintiffs book of account. We rejected the contention and ruled
that an appellate court will not consider any other ground of objection not made at the time the books were admitted in
evidence. In the case at bar, the respondent did not assail in the trial court the hearsay character of the documents in
question. It is too late in the day to raise the question on appeal.
At any rate, these documentary pieces of evidence cannot be cavalierly dismissed as irrelevant. They have a material
bearing on the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, SPO2 Domingo and SPO1 Lomibao. SPO2 Domingo has been
dismissed from the service as of February 28, 1997. At the time of the incident on March 12, 1999, he was no longer a
policeman and yet misrepresented himself as one. On the other hand, SPO1 Lomibao has been found guilty of drug use.
Their credibility as truth tellers leaves much to be desired.
Furthermore, the participation of SPO2 Domingo in the alleged buy-bust operation when he was no longer a member of the
police force speaks ill of the regularity of the operation. It is unusual for SPO2 Domingo to be given the role of poseur buyer
when he was at the time a dismissed policeman. As a dismissed policeman, he is not entitled to the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty. Yet this presumption was used as a crutch to convict the petitioner.
Second, there is a major inconsistency in the testimonies of SPO2 Domingo and SPO1 Lomibao. The petitioner stressed that
the two policemen could not agree on the reason that prompted them to conduct the buy-bust operation. SPO1 Lomibao
testified that they were tipped by their informants. In contrast, SPO2 Domingo declared that they conducted a 15-day
surveillance prior to the operation and that he personally made a pre-arrangement with the petitioner to buy shabu 15
minutes prior to the alleged operation. No informer was involved in the operation.
The pertinent excerpts of their testimonies follow:
SPO2 Domingo:
rbl r l l lbrr
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COURT:
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Q: Before you conducted the buy-bust, where did you made (sic) that pre-arrangement?
chanroble svirtualawlibrary
A: I acted as poseur buyer, your Honor.

Q: But before that, where did you make that arrangement?
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A: In that same place, your Honor.

Q: How many days before the buy-bust operation?
A: More or less 15 minutes, your Honor.31
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On the other hand, SPO1 Lomibao testified:
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Q: Arriving at M.H. del Pilar Street of (sic) March 12, 1999, what happened?
A: SPO3 Domingo who acted as pusher-buyer (sic) approached Ramil Cabugao, ma(a) m.
xxx
Q: You said that SPOe (sic) Augusto Domingo acted as pusher-buyer (sic), what did he actually do?
A: He approached Ramil Cabugao and handed (to) him P200.00 bills, ma(a) m.
Q: What happened?
A: And have arrangement with Ramil Cabugao and asked Ramil Cabugao if he (Cabugao) could sell (to) him P200.00 of
shabu, ma(a) m.
Q: At the time SPO3 Augusto Domingo was transacted (sic) with accused Ramil Cabugao being a pusher-buyer (sic), how far
were you from the two?
A: I was more or less three meters away, ma(a) m.32

During cross-examination, Lomibao testified:
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Q: You have no previous agreement with Ramil Cabugao that you will meet him in front of the Caliman Lodge in (sic) that
night?
A: None, sir.
Q: How did you know that Ramil Cabugao was there when you have no agreement with him?
A: We have informants and assets that gave information with (sic) us, sir.33
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Just recently, in People v. Ong ,34 we held that it is the duty of the prosecution to present a complete picture detailing the
buy-bust operation - - - from the initial contact between the poseur buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise
or payment of the consideration, until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal subject of sale. Failing in
this duty, the buy-bust operation will be greeted with furrowed brows.
Second, the story of the prosecution that a dagger was found in the possession of the petitioner further crushed the
credibility of their witnesses. SPO1 Lomibao testified that he bodily searched the petitioner and found a 9-inch dagger. In
contrast, SPO2 Domingo never testified that a dagger was found from the petitioner. Several witnesses for the defense
categorically declared that no dagger was found during the body frisk of the petitioner.
The records show that the charge for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 6 or illegal possession of dangerous weapon against
the petitioner was dismissed due to the repeated failure of SPO2 Domingo and SPO1 Lomibao to appear before the court
despite due notice. This repeated failure strengthens the impression that the prosecution story about the dagger taken from
the petitioner is false. The falsity is not of little significance. A witness who manufactures that kind of a lie that could lead to
the long time incarceration of the victim does not merit credence.
Third, the documentary and testimonial evidence showing ill motive on the part of the police officers who witnessed against
the petitioner cannot be shunted aside.
The petitioner claims that SPO2 Domingo and SPO1 Lomibao had reason to frame him up for he repeatedly refused to
become their police asset for the arrest of certain neighbors believed to be drug pushers. He alleged that because of his
refusal, other police officers were able to arrest the suspects ahead of SPO2 Domingo and SPO1 Lomibao. As result, other
police officers were promoted instead of SPO2 Domingo and SPO1 Lomibao. 35 His testimony was corroborated by his father,
Romeo Cabugao.
The prosecution did not rebut these allegations establishing the ill motive of SPO2 Domingo and SPO1 Lomibao. Their
testimonies cannot therefore be taken hook, line and sinker.
Finally, we note that the testimonies of defense witnesses Azurin and Villamil were not given any significance in the decisions
of the courts below. In fact, they were not even discussed. Of importance is the testimony of Azurin who witnessed the
entire incident from the time the police officer approached the petitioner up to the time he was handcuffed and carried away.
Her testimony has all the earmarks of truth. The incident took place in a small, sidewalk eatery where there was only one
table. The petitioner was then the lone customer and Azurin attended to his order. She testified that the petitioner was
merely eating and was not doing anything wrong when arrested by the policemen, viz:
Q: After the two men came and something happened(,) that is the time you left?
A: Not yet, ma(a) m.

Q: Did you not say during direct examination that when something happened you were shocked and you left and you went
to eskenita?
A: After he was poked with a gun and (they) handcuffed him(.) (T) hat was the time I left, ma(a) m.
xxx
Q: Now, according to you(,) you did not see anything that they got from Ramil Cabugao?
A: Yes, ma(a) m.
Q: You believed that Ramil Cabugao did not do anything wrong, is that it?
A: I did not say that, ma(a) m.

Q: You said that you have witnessed since the time Ramil Cabugao arrived in (sic) your store you did not see him do
anything wrong in your store?
A: Yes, ma(a) m.
xxx
Q: How far were you when these policemen frisked Ramil Cabugao?
A: I was about one and a half meter away, ma(a) m.

Q: Which took place first(,) the frisking of the body of Ramil Cabugao or the poking of the gun?
A: The poking of gun, ma(a) m.
Q: And they handcuffed him?
A: They frisked him, ma(a) m.

Q: The poking of the gun was first made by the policemen?
A: Yes, ma(a) m.
Q: And then they handcuffed him?
A: The handcuff was the last, ma(a) m.36
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We find Azurin to be an unbiased witness. She has no relation to the petitioner. She was a waitress in the eatery where the
incident took place. She testified at the risk of inviting the ire of police officers whose influence could very well affect their
livelihood and well-being.
It is well-settled that conviction must rest upon the strength of the evidence of the prosecution and not on the weakness of
the evidence for the defense.37 The prosecutions evidence, resting mainly on the testimonies of two police officers whose
authority and credibility are highly doubtful, cannot sustain the conviction of the petitioner.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals affirming the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 41, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner is ACQUITTED of
the crime of violation of Article III, Section 15 of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, as amended. Cost de oficio.
Roble vs Arbasa
As held by the trial court, when the terms of an agreement had been reduced to writing, it is
considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their
successor-in-interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement. [39]
We find no ambiguity in the terms and stipulations of the deed of sale. Contracts are the laws
between the contracting parties. It shall be fulfilled according to the literal sense of their stipulations. If
their terms are clear and leave no room for doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, the
contracts are obligatory no matter what their forms may be, whenever the essential requisites for their
validity are present.[40] Sale, by its very nature, is a consensual contract because it is perfected by mere
consent. The essential elements of a contract of sale are the following: (a) consent or meeting of the
minds, that is consent to transfer ownership in exchange for the price; (b) determinate subject matter; and
(c) price certain in money or its equivalent. [41] All these elements are present in the instant case.
Moreover, parol evidence rule forbids any addition to or contradiction of the terms of a written
instrument by testimony or other evidence purporting to show that, at or before the execution of the
parties written agreement, other or different terms were agreed upon by the parties, varying the purport
of the written contract. When an agreement has been reduced to writing, the parties can not be permitted
to adduce evidence to prove alleged practices, which to all purposes would alter the terms of the written
agreement. Whatever is not found in the writing is understood to have been waived and abandoned. [42]
The rule is in fact founded on long experience that written evidence is so much more certain and
accurate than that which rests in fleeting memory only, that it would be unsafe, when parties have
expressed the terms of their contract in writing, to admit weaker evidence to control and vary the
stronger and to show that the parties intended a different contract from that expressed in the writing
signed by them.[43]
The rule is not without exceptions, however, as it is likewise provided that a party to an action may
present evidence to modify, explain, or add to the terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue in his
pleadings: (a) an intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement; (b) the failure of
the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto; (c) the validity of
the written agreement; or (d) the existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in
interest after the execution of the written agreement. [44]
None of the aforecited exceptions finds application to the instant case. Nor did respondents raise this
issue at the proceedings before the trial court.
Pagsuyuin vs IAC
The main issue in the instant case is whether or not parol evidence is admissible to annul the deed of assignment on the
ground of fraud.
Petitioners Rafael Pagsuyuin, et al. contend that both lower courts gravely erred in voiding the Deeds of Assignment
based upon extrinsic evidence of alleged vitiated consent of the assignor-private respondent Salud Pagsuyuin in defiance
of the settled rule of parol evidence that a document reduced to writing is deemed to have contained all such terms and
conditions as contemplated by the parties and there can be, between the said parties and their successors in interest, no
evidence of the terms of the agreement other than the contents of the writing itself.
The contention is untenable.
The rule on parol evidence recognizes the following exceptions:
(a) where a mistake or imperfection of the writing, or its failure to express the true intent and agreement of
the parties, or the validity of the agreement is put in issue by the pleadings;
(b) . . . . (Sec. 7, Rule 130).
As can be clearly gleaned from the foregoing, the rule making a writing the exclusive evidence of the agreement therein
stated, is not applicable when the validity of such agreement is the fact in dispute. A contract may be annulled where the
consent of one of the contracting parties was procured by mistake, fraud, intimidation, violence or undue influence (Art.
1330, New Civil Code). In fact, as early as 1919 in the case of Bough v. Cantiveros, 40 Phil. 209, this Court laid down the
rule that where the validity of the agreement is the issue, parol evidence may be introduced to establish illegality or fraud.
In the case at bar, petitioners relied heavily on the fact of notarial certification of the Deeds of Assignment by Notary Public
Edmundo Tubio allegedly on the 13th of September, 1976 in the presence of witnesses Marietta Pagsuyuin-Javier and
Federico Javier to deflect the admissibility of parol evidence.
On the other hand, private respondent's evidence clearly shows that on September 7, 1976 a document was brought to
her at the Manila International, Airport, which she signed that same evening (when she returned to her house) in the
presence of witnesses Federico and Marietta Javier but they were not given copies thereof (Rollo, pp. 72-76). Then on
September 8, 1976 at around 6:00 a.m., Rafael Pagsuyuin went to the house of the private respondent Salud Pagsuyuin
with more documents for signature. Relying on the assurances of petitioner Rafael that the same were additional copies of
the documents they had signed in the evening of September 7, 1976 (TSN, Hearing of May 9, 1978, pp. 9-13; Rollo, pp.
73-74), Salud and her witnesses signed without reading as petitioner Rafael was in a hurry (TSN, Hearing of January 31,
1978; Rollo, pp. 74-75) and he only showed them the latter portion and refused to show the contents of the documents
(TSN, Hearing of October 13, 1977; Rollo, pp. 75-76). After he had obtained their signatures, Rafael left the house of
Salud again without leaving any copy of the document (TSN, Hearing of January 31, 1978, Ibid.). As it turned out, the
documents were denominated as Deeds of Assignment, contrary to the intent of private respondent. These testimonies
were never satisfactorily rebutted by the petitioners.
At this juncture, the findings of the trial court which were affirmed by the appellate court are quoted with approval:
. . . the instruments of sale (Exh. "A" and "B") lacked the valid consent of the transferor Salud Pagsuyuin
as there was fraud enlisted in making plaintiff sign the documents without understanding the contents
thereof. The authenticity and genuineness of the documents were attacked because . . . . . defendants
vitiated consent in the preparation and execution of said documents as plaintiff was misled into believing
the same is a deed of mortgage instead of a deed of assignment. The evidence had proven that plaintiff
was tricked and deceived into signing two (2) deeds of assignment which was not her intention to do so
(sic).
The trial court continued:
The person who could have enlightened this court as to the disputed facts is none other than Rafael
Pagsuyuin himself, but said witness developed cold feet and discontinued declaring against the plaintiff,
most probably because of deep-rooted fear of being discovered falsifying the truth and experiencing the
fangs of guilty conscience, he broke completely down in court and could not continue his declaration
against his cousin the herein plaintiff, so that his counsel withdrew him as a witness and his entire
testimony was disregarded by this court. Judging from his demeanor and attitude, the court had very well
observed that he could not explain the dubious circumstances that characterized the transfer of the
property between him and the plaintiff. The failure of defendant Rafael Pagsuyuin to give testimony was a
fatal defect that torpedoed the efforts of the defendants and witnesses to prove the defense that there was
a valid transfer of the properties. (C.A. Decision,Rollo, pp. 40-51).
While the writing itself may have been accompanied by the most solemn formalities, no instrument is so sacred when
tainted with fraud as to place it beyond the scrutiny of extrinsic evidence. This evidence overcomes the known
presumption fraus est odiosa et non praesumenda (Yturralde v. Vagilidad, 28 SCRA 393 [1969]).
The testimonies of private respondent Salud Pagsuyuin and her two instrumental witnesses which have not been
satisfactorily rebutted by the petitioners Rafael Pagsuyuin, et al. have made out a case of fraud by evidence clear,
convincing and more than merely preponderant.
PP vs Pardua
Accused-appellants fault the trial court for considering the testimony of Juanito, who was not among
those present at the scene of the crime by Orlando and Alfredo, and whose name was not listed in the
information as among the prosecution witnesses. According to accused-appellants, Juanitos testimony
is a fabrication, for he saw nothing of the incident which befell his uncle, Toribio.
The Court is not persuaded. As long as a person is qualified to become a witness, he may be
presented as one regardless of whether his name was included in the information or not.
Balayon vs Ocampo
8. ID.; RULES ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE; WITNESS WHO HAS NOT PROPERLY SUBMITTED AFFIDAVIT MAY TESTIFY ON
SPECIFIC FACTUAL MATTER RELEVANT TO THE ISSUE. In Orino v. Judge Gervasio, the Supreme Court ruled in a Minute
Resolution that even if a witness has not priorly submitted his/her affidavit, he may be called to testify in connection with a
specific factual matter relevant to the issue. Thus, a medical doctor whose medical certificate is among the evidence on
record may be called to testify. This also applies to a Register of Deeds or Provincial Assessor in connection with official
documents issued by his office.
Pp vs Golimlim
In the present case, no cogent reason can be appreciated to warrant a departure from the findings of the trial court with
respect to the assessment of Evelyns testimony.
That Evelyn is a mental retardate does not disqualify her as a witness nor render her testimony bereft of truth.
Sections 20 and 21 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provide:
SEC. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all persons who can
perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses.
xxx
SEC. 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. The following persons cannot be
witnesses:
(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, is such that they are incapable
of intelligently making known their perception to others;
(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which
they are examined and of relating them truthfully.
In People v. Trelles,24 where the trial court relied heavily on the therein mentally retarded private complainants testimony
irregardless of her "monosyllabic responses and vacillations between lucidity and ambiguity," this Court held:
A mental retardate or a feebleminded person is not, per se, disqualified from being a witness, her mental condition
not being a vitiation of her credibility. It is now universally accepted that intellectual weakness, no matter what form
it assumes, is not a valid objection to the competency of a witness so long as the latter can still give a fairly
intelligent and reasonable narrative of the matter testified to.25
It can not then be gainsaid that a mental retardate can be a witness, depending on his or her ability to relate what he or
she knows.26 If his or her testimony is coherent, the same is admissible in court.27
To be sure, modern rules on evidence have downgraded mental incapacity as a ground to disqualify a witness. As
observed by McCormick, the remedy of excluding such a witness who may be the only person available who knows the
facts, seems inept and primitive. Our rules follow the modern trend of evidence. 28
Thus, in a long line of cases,29 this Court has upheld the conviction of the accused based mainly on statements given in
court by the victim who was a mental retardate.
From a meticulous scrutiny of the records of this case, there is no reason to doubt Evelyns credibility. To be sure, her
testimony is not without discrepancies, given of course her feeblemindedness.
By the account of Dr. Chona Cuyos-Belmonte, Medical Specialist II at the Psychiatric Department of the Bicol Medical
Center, who examined Evelyn, although Evelyn was suffering from moderate mental retardation with an IQ of 46, 30 she is
capable of perceiving and relating events which happened to her.
PP vs Rama
Secondly, the accused points out that since Bryan and Benjamin were not presented as prosecution witnesses,
Diana Laviste's claim that these children pointed to the accused as the man who took away Joyce Ann does not bear
any weight in evidence. This therefore leaves only the testimony of Roxanne as the basis for the prosecution's
identification of the accused Rama as the culprit. The defense contends, however, that Roxanne's testimony, coming
from the mouth of a five-year old, does not deserve credit because she could not answer many questions and appeared
to have been coached by her grandmother, Diana.
We cannot subscribe to the accused's contention. The Rules of Evidence provide in Rule 130, Secs. 20 and 21:
"Sec. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. - Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all persons
who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perceptions to others, may be witnesses.
Sec. 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. - The following persons cannot
be witnesses:
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(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable pf perceiving the facts
respecting which they are examined and relating them truthfully."
In Dulla v. Court of Appeals and Andrea Ortega,[22] the Court, citing the above provisions, gave credence to the
testimony of a three-year old witness. It held:
"It is thus clear that any child, regardless of age, can be a competent witness if he can perceive, and
perceiving, can make known his perception to others and of relating truthfully facts respecting
which he is examined. In the 1913 decision in United States v. Buncad, this Court stated:
Professor Wigmore, after referring to the common-law precedents upon this point says: 'But this much
may be taken as settled, that no rule defines any particular age as conclusive of incapacity; in each
instance the capacity of the particular child is to be investigated.' (Wigmore on Evidence, vol. I, p. 638)
The requirements then of a child's competency as a witness are the: (a) capacity of observation, (b)
capacity of recollection, and (c) capacity of communication. And in ascertaining whether a child is of
sufficient intelligence according to the foregoing, it is setted that the trial court is called upon to make
such determination." (emphasis supplied)
In People v. Mendiola,[23] the Court gave credence to the testimony of the six-year old witness even if she failed to
answer some questions because of her tender age.
In the case at bar, while the five-year old witness, Roxanne, was not able to answer some questions such as which
was her left and her right, she was straightforward in identifying the accused Rama as the culprit,
We thus find no reason to disturb the trial court's assessment of the credibility of the child witness, Roxanne. The
determination of the competence and credibility of a child as a witness rests primarily with the trial judge as he had
the opportunity to see the demeanor of the witness, his apparent intelligence or lack of it, and his understanding of the
nature of the oath. As many of these qualities cannot be conveyed by the record of the case, the trial judge's
evaluation will not be disturbed on review, unless it is clear from the record that his judgment is erroneous.[26]
This conclusion is in accord with the spirit and letter of the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness (the "Rule")
which became effective last December 15, 2000. The following provisions are apropos:
"Section 1. Applicability of the Rule. -- Unless otherwise provided, this Rule shall govern the
examination of child witnesses who are victims of crime, accused of a crime, and witnesses to crime. It
shall apply in all criminal proceedings and non-criminal proceedings involving child
witnesses." (emphasis supplied)
"Section 3. Construction of the Rule. -- This Rule shall be liberally construed to uphold the best
interests of the child and to promote the maximum accommodation of child witnesses without
prejudice to the constitutional rights of the accused." (emphasis supplied)
"Section 6. Competence. -- Every child is presumed qualified to be a witness. However, the court shall
conduct a competency examination of a child, motu proprio or on motion of a party, when it finds that
substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of the child to perceive, remember, communicate,
distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court.
xxx
(a) Proof of necessity. -- A party seeking a competency examination must present proof of necessity of
competence examination. The age of the child by itself is not a sufficient basis for a competency
examination." (emphasis supplied)
Thirdly, the defense faults the trial court for relying on a single eyewitness account in convicting the accused
Rama. The Court has long held that the testimony of a sole eyewitness is sufficient to support a conviction so long as
it is clear, straightforward and worthy of credence by the trial court.
Bordalba vs CA
Thus, petitioner filed the instant petition, assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals. Petitioner contends that the
testimonies given by the witnesses for private respondents which touched on matters occurring prior to the death of her
mother should not have been admitted by the trial court, as the same violated the dead mans statute. Likewise, petitioner
questions the right of private respondents to inherit from the late Nicanor Jayme and Asuncion Jayme-Baclay, as well as the
identity between the disputed lot and the parcel of land adjudicated in the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition.
The contentions are without merit. It is doctrinal that findings of facts of the Court of Appeals upholding those of the trial
court are binding upon this Court. While there are exceptions to this rule, petitioner has not convinced us that this case falls
under one of them. 16
The Court sees no reason to deviate from the findings of the trial court that petitioner resorted to fraud and
misrepresentation in obtaining a free patent and title over the lot under scrutiny. The Court of Appeals correctly pointed out
that misrepresentation tainted petitioners application, insofar as her declaration that the land applied for was not occupied
or claimed by any other person. Her declaration is belied by the extrajudicial partition which she acknowledged, her mothers
aborted attempt to have the lot registered, private respondents predecessors-in-interests opposition thereto, and by the
occupancy of a portion of the said lot by Nicanor Jayme and his family since 1945.
It is a settled rule that the Land Registration Act protects only holders of title in good faith, and does not permit its provision
to be used as a shield for the commission of fraud, or as a means to enrich oneself at the expense of others. 17
As to the alleged violation of the dead mans statute, 18 suffice it to state that said rule finds no application in the present
case. The dead mans statute does not operate to close the mouth of a witness as to any matter of fact coming to his
knowledge in any other way than through personal dealings with the deceased person, or communication made by the
deceased to the witness. 19
Since the claim of private respondents and the testimony of their witnesses in the present case is based, inter alia, on the
1947 Deed of Extra-judicial Partition and other documents, and not on dealings and communications with the deceased, the
questioned testimonies were properly admitted by the trial court.
PP vs Sandiganbayan
People vs. Sandiganbayan

275 SCRA 505
FACTS
Paredes, was the Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sur, then Governor of the same province
and is at present a Congressman. Atty. Sansaet is a practicing attorney who served as counsel
for Paredes in several instances. In 1976, Paredes applied for a free patent over a piece of
land and it was granted to him. But later, the Director of Lands found out that Paredes obtained
the same through fraudulent misrepresentations in his application. A civil case was filed and
Sansaet served as counsel of Paredes. A criminal case for perjury was subsequently filed
against Paredes and Sansaet also served as counsel.
Later, Teofilo Gelacio, a taxpayer, initiated perjury and graft charges against Paredes and
Sansaet, claiming that they acted in conspiracy, by not filing an arraignment in the criminal
case. To evade responsibility for his own participation, he claimed that he did so upon the
instigation and inducement of Paredes, and to discharge himself as a government witness. The
Sandiganbayan claimed that there was an attorney-client privilege and resolved to deny the
discharge.
ISSUES
Whether or not the testimony of Atty. Sanset is barred by the attorney-client privilege
HELD
Statements and communications regarding the commission of a crime already committed,
made by a party who committed it, to an attorney, consulted as such, are privileged
communications. However, the communication between an attorney and client having to do
with the client's contemplated criminal acts, or in aid or furtherance thereof, are not covered by
the cloak of privilege ordinarily existing in reference to communications between an attorney
and a client. The falsification not having been committed yet, these communications are
outside the pale of the attorney client privilege.
Moreover, Sansaet himself was a conspirator in the commission of the falsification. For the
communication to be privileged, it must be for a lawful purpose or in furtherance of a lawful
end. The existence of an unlawful purpose prevents the privilege from attaching.
PP vs Invencion
We find no cogent reason to overturn the findings of the trial court on the culpability of Artemio.
It is doctrinally settled that the factual findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility of the witnesses, are accorded
great weight and respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. This is so because the trial court has the advantage of
observing the witnesses through the different indicators of truthfulness or falsehood, such as the angry flush of an insisted
assertion, the sudden pallor of a discovered lie, the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer, the forthright tone of a ready
reply, the furtive glance, the blush of conscious shame, the hesitation, the yawn, the sigh, the candor or lack of it, the scant
or full realization of the solemnity of an oath, or the carriage and mien. 17 This rule, however, admits of exceptions, as
where there exists a fact or circumstance of weight and influence that has been ignored or misconstrued by the court, or
where the trial court has acted arbitrarily in its appreciation of the facts. 18 We do not find any of these exceptions in the
case at bar.
As to the competency of Elven to testify, we rule that such is not affected by Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, 19
otherwise known as the rule on "filial privilege." This rule is not strictly a rule on disqualification because a descendant is not
incompetent or disqualified to testify against an ascendant. 20 The rule refers to a privilege not to testify, which can be
invoked or waived like other privileges. As correctly observed by the lower court, Elven was not compelled to testify against
his father; he chose to waive that filial privilege when he voluntarily testified against Artemio. Elven declared that he was
testifying as a witness against his father of his own accord and only "to tell the truth." 21
Neither can Artemio challenge the prosecutions act of propounding leading questions on Elven. Section 10(c) of Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court 22 expressly allows leading questions when the witness is a child of tender years like Elven.
cralaw : re d
The alleged ulterior motive of Elven in testifying against his father also deserves scant consideration. Such insinuation of illmotive is too lame and flimsy. As observed by the OSG, Elven, who was of tender age, could not have subjected himself to
the ordeal of a public trial had he not been compelled by a motive other than to bring to justice the despoiler of his sisters
virtue. There is no indication that Elven testified because of anger or any ill-motive against his father, nor is there any
showing that he was unduly pressured or influenced by his mother or by anyone to testify against his father. The rule is that
where there is no evidence that the principal witness for the prosecution was actuated by improper motive, the presumption
is that he was not so actuated and his testimony is entitled to full credence.
Simangan vs people
n February 24, 1980, Fernando and the petitioner were on their way home from their ROTC classes at the St. Louis
University. The petitioner then narrated to Fernando that at about 7:00 p.m. on February 10, 1980, after buying cigarettes
from a store, the store-owner agreed to go with him and his four companions. The petitioner revealed that they brought the
victim over to the place where twenty of his other comrades were waiting. He also told Fernando that he and his companions
stabbed the victim over and over again, and tasted the latters blood so that they would not get sick. The petitioner warned
that if Fernando divulged to anyone what he had just revealed, he (the petitioner), would drink his blood, too. 10
rll
The petitioner did not know that Fernando was the first cousin of Sofronia, the widow of Ernesto Flores, who was, in turn,
the store-owner referred to by Moises.11 Fernando immediately told Sofronia what the petitioner had told him.
On March 21, 24 and 25, 1980, Sofronia, Fernando and Lorna gave their respective statements 12 to Sgt. Quirino Espiritu of
the Philippine Constabulary in Tuguegarao, Cagayan, in which they identified Moises as one of Ernestos assailants.
The petitioner contends that the testimony of Fernando is hearsay, as he had no personal knowledge that he was one of
those who killed the victim.
The testimony of Fernando, that the petitioner admitted to him that he was one of the victims killers, is not
hearsay. The testimony of Fernando was offered to prove the petitioners extrajudicial admission of his
involvement in the killing of Ernesto. Such admission is an admission against personal interest, and is
admissible against the petitioner.27
rll
We note that the petitioner admitted during trial that he and Fernando were classmates in a civil engineering subject at St.
Louis University, and in the ROTC training. The petitioner also admitted that he and Fernando were friends. Hence, it was not
impossible for the petitioner to have revealed his involvement in the killing to Fernando. The petitioner did not hesitate to
inform Fernando that he and his companions had killed Ernesto because an informer had told them that Ernesto was bad.
The petitioners alibi and denial of the crime charged cannot prevail over the positive and straightforward identification made
by Lorna and Sofronia that he was one of the armed men who left with Ernesto, coupled with the petitioners own admission
that he was one of the victims assailants. We note that there is no evidence, nor any showing of any ill-motive on the part of
Lorna, Sofronia and Fernando to prevaricate. In fact, the petitioner and Fernando were close friends. Thus, the presumption
is that the said witness acted in good faith; hence, their testimonies must be accorded credence and full probative weight.
The three witnesses cannot be faulted, and their credibility denigrated for giving their statements to Sgt. Espiritu of the
Philippine Constabulary only on March 21 to 25, 1980. As copiously explained by the Court of Appeals:
Guttierez vs Palattao
Nevertheless, despite this incorrect interpretation of a rule on evidence, we do not find the same as
sufficiently constitutive of the charges of gross ignorance of the law and of knowingly rendering an unjust
decision. Rather, it is at most an error in judgement, for which, as a general rule, he cannot be held
administratively liable. In this regard, we reiterate the prevailing rule in our jurisdiction as established by
current jurisprudence:
We have heretofore ruled that a judge may not be held administratively accountable for
every erroneous order or decision he renders. To unjustifiably hold otherwise, assuming
that he has erred, would be nothing short of harassment and would make his position
doubly unbearable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the
process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. The error must be
gross or patent, malicious, deliberate or in evident bad faith. It is only in this latter
instance, when the judge acts fraudulently or with gross ignorance, that administrative
sanctions are called for as an imperative duty of this Court.
As a matter of public policy then, the acts of a judge in his official capacity are not
subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous. Good faith and
absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper consideration are sufficient defenses in
which a judge charged with ignorance of the law can find refuge. xxx xxx.[7]
Moreover, it must be stressed that in the case of De la Cruz vs. Concepcion[8] this Court declared that:
Mere errors in the appreciation of evidence, unless so gross and patent as to produce
an inference of ignorance or bad faith, or of knowing rendition of an unjust decision, are
irrelevant and immaterial in an administrative proceeding against him. No one, called
upon to try facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice, can be
infallible in his judgment. All that is expected of him is that he follow the rules
prescribed to ensure a fair and impartial hearing, assess the different factors that
emerge therefrom and bear on the issues presented, and on the basis of the
conclusions he finds established, with only his conscience and knowledge of the law to
guide him, adjudicate the case accordingly.[9]
In this case, the record is bereft of any evidence to conclusively show that the respondent Judges
actuations were tainted with malice and bad faith, hence the administrative charges against him must fail.
PP vs Gaudia
Fourth, he avers that the offer of compromise by his parents as tendered to Amalia Loyola should not be taken against
him,37 while the offer of compromise he allegedly made to Amalias husband, as relayed by Amalia in her testimony, should
be excluded as evidence for being hearsay.
Similarly, appellants charge that the offers of compromise allegedly made by the parents of the appellant to Amalia, and by
the appellant himself to Amalias husband should not have been taken against him by the trial court, even if sustained, will
not exculpate him. To be sure, the offer of compromise allegedly made by appellant to Amalia Loyolas husband is hearsay
evidence, and of no probative value. It was only Amalia who testified as to the alleged offer,46 and she was not a party to the
conversation which allegedly transpired at the Hagonoy Municipal Jail. A witness can only testify on facts which are based on
his personal knowledge or perception.47 The offer of compromise allegedly made by the appellants parents to Amalia may
have been the subject of testimony48 of Amalia. However, following the principle of res inter alios acta alteri nocere non
debet,49 the actions of his parents cannot prejudice the appellant, since he was not a party to the said conversation, nor was
it shown that he was privy to the offer of compromise made by them to the mother of the victim. They cannot be considered
as evidence against appellant but we reiterate that these errors are not enough to reverse the conviction of the appellant.
Pp vs Vda de Ramos
We find that the foregoing testimony of Dador was not based on his own personal
knowledge but from what Osabel told him. He admitted that he was never near appellant and
that he did not talk to her about the plan when they were at her house on July 15, 1992. Thus,
his statements are hearsay and does not prove appellants participation in the conspiracy.
Under Rule 130, Section 36 of the Rules of Court, a witness can testify only to those facts
which he knows of his own personal knowledge, i.e., which are derived from his own
perception; otherwise, such testimony would be hearsay. Hearsay evidence is defined as
evidence not of what the witness knows himself but of what he has heard from others. The
hearsay rule bars the testimony of a witness who merely recites what someone else has told
him, whether orally or in writing. In Sanvicente v. People, we held that when evidence is
based on what was supposedly told the witness, the same is without any evidentiary weight for
[10]
[11]
[12]
being patently hearsay. Familiar and fundamental is the rule that hearsay testimony is
inadmissible as evidence.
[13]
Osabels extrajudicial confession is likewise inadmissible against appellant. The res inter
alios acta rule provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or
omission of another. Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the
confessant and is not admissible against his co-accused. The reason for the rule is that, on a
principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a mans own acts are binding upon himself,
and are evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be
rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere
unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither
ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him.
[14]
[15]
The rule on admissions made by a conspirator, while an exception to the foregoing, does
not apply in this case. In order for such admission to be admissible against a co-accused,
Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court requires that there must be independent evidence
aside from the extrajudicial confession to prove conspiracy. In the case at bar, apart from
Osabels extrajudicial confession, no other evidence of appellants alleged participation in the
conspiracy was presented by the prosecution. There being no independent evidence to prove
it, her culpability was not sufficiently established.
Unavailing also is rule that an extrajudicial confession may be admissible when it is used as
a corroborative evidence of other facts that tend to establish the guilt of his co-accused. The
implication of this rule is that there must be a finding of other circumstantial evidence which,
when taken together with the confession, establishes the guilt of a co-accused beyond
reasonable doubt. As earlier stated, there is no other prosecution evidence, direct or
circumstantial, which the extrajudicial confession may corroborate.
[16]
In People v. Berroya, we held that to hold an accused liable as co-principal by reason of

conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of
the conspiracy. That overt act may consist of active participation in the actual commission of
the crime itself, or it may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at
the time of the commission of the crime, or by exerting moral ascendancy over the other coconspirators by moving them to execute or implement the conspiracy.
[17]
In the case at bar, no overt act was established to prove that appellant shared with and
concurred in the criminal design of Osabel, Dador and Purcino. Assuming that she had
knowledge of the conspiracy or she acquiesced in or agreed to it, still, absent any active
participation in the commission of the crime in furtherance of the conspiracy, mere knowledge,
acquiescence in or agreement to cooperate is not sufficient to constitute one as a party to a
conspiracy. Conspiracy transcends mere companionship.
[18]
[19]
Conspiracy must be proved as convincingly as the criminal act itself. Like any element of
the offense charged, conspiracy must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Direct proof of a previous agreement need not be established, for conspiracy may be
deduced from the acts of appellant pointing to a joint purpose, concerted action and community
of interest. Nevertheless, except in the case of the mastermind of a crime, it must also be
shown that appellant performed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy
[20]
PP vs Cui
Despite its ruling, the trial court used the statements of Basingan, as testified to by Sgt. Ouano, as proofs of the guilt of the
Cuis, Obeso and Sarte. Undeniably, they are hearsay for any oral or documentary evidence is hearsay by nature if its
probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witnesses but on the knowledge of some other person who
was never presented on the witness stand. 26
Conviction cannot be based on hearsay evidence. In the 1996 case of People v. Raquel, 27 we squarely addressed the issue
of whether or not the extra-judicial statements of an escaped accused implicating his co-accused may be utilized against the
latter. There we ordered an acquittal and held:
"A thorough review of the records of this case readily revealed that the identification of herein appellants as the culprits was
based chiefly on the extrajudicial statement of accused Amado Ponce pointing to them as his co-perpetrators of the crime.
As earlier stated, the said accused escaped from jail before he could testify in court and he has been at large since then.
chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com :chanrobles.com.ph
"The extra-judicial statements of an accused implicating a co-accused may not be utilized against the latter, unless these are
repeated in open court. If the accused never had the opportunity to cross-examine his co-accused on the latters extrajudicial statements, it is elementary that the same are hearsay as against said accused. That is exactly the situation, and the
disadvantaged plight of appellants, in the case at bar.
"Extreme caution should be exercised by the courts in dealing with the confession of an accused which implicates his coaccused. A distinction, obviously, should be made between extra-judicial and judicial confessions. The former deprives the
other accused of the opportunity to cross-examine the confessant, while in the latter his confession is thrown wide open for
cross-examination and rebuttal.
"The res inter alios rule ordains that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another.
An extra-judicial confession is binding only upon the confessant and is not admissible against his co-accused. The reason for
the rule is that, on a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a mans own acts are binding upon himself, and are
evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly
unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the
acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him." 28
The res inter alios has exceptions. Thus, Section 30 of Rule 130 provides:
"The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against
the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration."
chanrobles law library
For this provision to apply, the following requisites must be satisfied:
"a. That the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself;
"b. that the admission relates to the common objects; and
"c. that it has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy." 29
The general rule is that extra-judicial declarations of a co-conspirator made before the formation of the conspiracy or after
the accomplishment of its object are inadmissible in evidence as against the other co-conspirators, on the ground that the
accused in a criminal case has the constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against him and to cross-examine
them. 30
chanroble svirtuallawlibrary
In the case at bar, the alleged conspiracy among the accused was not priorly established by independent evidence. Nor was
it shown that the extra-judicial statements of Basingan were made while they were engaged in carrying out the conspiracy.
In truth, the statements were made after the conspiracy has ended and after the consummation of the crime. They were not
acts or declarations made during the conspiracys existence. Since the extra-judicial admissions were made after the
supposed conspiracy, they are binding only upon the confessant and are not admissible against his co-accused; as against
the latter, the confession is hearsay. 31 In fine, the extra-judicial statements of Basingan cannot be used against the Cuis,
Obeso and Sarte without doing violence against their constitutional right to confront Basingan and to cross-examine him. 32
Pp vs Garcia
The records show that Garcia and Bernabe admitted to Cortez and Ignacio that they were responsible for taking the vehicle
and killing the victim, Elis. On December 24, 1996, Cortez went to the Moncada Municipal Jail and talked to them while they
were detained. Both admitted to him that they forcibly took the said vehicle from Elis, stabbed him and thereafter dumped
him at San Rafael, Bulacan. 27 Subsequently, on December 26, 1996, Cortez and Ignacio went to Moncada and confronted
the two in their cells. Garcia admitted to Cortez and Ignacio that they stole the vehicle because they were in dire need of
money, while Bernabe kept quiet. 28
Appellant Bernabe maintains that the trial court erred in admitting in evidence his admission to Cortez and Ignacio on the
grounds that (a) he did not make such admission; (b) the admission made by Garcia should not prejudice him; and (c)
assuming he made such admission, it should be excluded for having been made under duress and intimidation. 29
In People v. Andan, 30 it was held that the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a
spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby
appellant orally admitted having committed the crime. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of
incriminating facts or confessions. The rights under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution are guaranteed to preclude the
slightest use of coercion by the state as would lead the accused to admit something false, and not to prevent him from
freely and voluntarily telling the truth. Hence, appellants voluntary admission to Cortez that he and his co-accused
conspired in killing the deceased when the latter opposed their plan to sell the vehicle is admissible as evidence against him.
Anent Garcias extrajudicial confession implicating appellant in the commission of the offense, it appears that the latter did
not oppose or affirm Garcias statement. Neither did he make an attempt to refute the same insofar as his participation in
the commission of the crime was concerned. As correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General, "he cannot invoke
his silence during this crucial moment as his right. He ought to speak and failing to do so, his silence weighs heavily on him.
Thus, it was not accused-appellants Garcias admission that prejudiced accused-appellant Bernabe, but his own silence when
it was such as naturally to call for action or comment if not true." 31
Rule 130, Section 32 of the Rules of Court provides that an act or declaration made in the presence and within the hearing
or observation of a party who does or says nothing when the act or declaration is such as naturally to call for action or
comment if not true, and when proper and possible for him to do so, may be given in evidence against him.
PP vs Satore
Confession before the barangay captain was admitted as evidence but is not sufficient to convict in the absence of other
corroborating evidence presented or adduced.
PP vs Nardo
During the trial, the defense endeavored to portray Lorielyn as an incorrigible liar. Occasions were cited wherein Lorielyn
supposedly lied in order to obtain money or her parents permission to leave the house. However, Rule 130, Section 34, of
the Rules of Court provides that: "Evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove
that he did nor did not do the same or a similar thing at another time; but it may be received to prove a specific intent or
knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like." While lying may constitute a habit, we
believe that the falsehoods committed by Lorielyn, assuming them for the moment to be true, are petty and inconsequential.
They are not as serious as charging ones own father of the sordid crime of rape, with all of its serious repercussions.
PP vs Preciados
On the second issue, appellant submits that the trial court erred when it admitted and gave much weight to the probative
value of the "ante mortem" statement of Antonio. 61 Appellant contends that the statement can neither be considered as
dying declaration under Rule 130, Sec. 37 62 nor part of the res gestae under Rule 130, Section 42 63 of the Rules of Court.
It is inadmissible for being hearsay. Furthermore, he avers it was error for the trial court to give weight to the first affidavit
of Antonio, 64 since Antonio repudiated the same, stating that its contents were false. According to appellant, Antonio
claimed said affidavit was given under duress.
The Solicitor General, for its part, argues that Antonios actions during and immediately after the incident were completely
inconsistent with those of a person who allegedly wanted to commit suicide. Hence, his retraction should be looked at with
jaundiced eye, following our ruling in People v. Junio, 237 SCRA 826 (1994), where we held that retractions are generally
unreliable and looked upon with considerable disfavor.
A dying declaration is the statement which refers to the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarants death, made
under the consciousness of an impending death." 65 It is admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule 66
because of necessity and trustworthiness. Necessity, because the declarants death makes it impossible for him to take the
witness stand 67 and trustworthiness, for when a person is at the point of death, every motive for falsehood is silenced and
the mind is induced by the most powerful consideration to speak the truth. 68 The requisites for the admissibility of a dying
declaration are: (1) the death is imminent and the declarant is conscious of that fact; (2) the declaration refers to the cause
and surrounding circumstances of such death; (3) the declaration relates to facts which the victim is competent to testify;
(4) the declarant thereafter dies; and (5) the declaration is offered in a criminal case wherein the declarants death is the
subject of inquiry. 69
In the present case, the foregoing requisites were not met. A dying declaration is essentially hearsay, because one person is
testifying on what another person stated. This is because the declarant can no longer be presented in court to identify the
document or confirm the statement, but more important, to be confronted with said statement by the accused and be crossexamined on its contents. 70 It was patently incorrect for the trial court to have allowed prosecution witness PO3 Leonardo
Inoc to testify on Antonios so-called "dying declaration" because Antonio was alive and later even testified in court.
But was the purported ante-mortem statement part of the res gestae? Where a victims statement may not be admissible as
an ante mortem declaration, it may nonetheless be considered as part of the res gestae, if made immediately after a
startling occurrence in relation to the circumstances thereof and when the victim did not have time to contrive a falsehood.
71 For res gestae to be allowed as an exception to the hearsay rule, the following requisites must be satisfied: (1) that the
principal act or res gestae be a startling occurrence; (2) the statement is spontaneous or was made before the declarant had
time to contrive or devise, and the statement is made during the occurrence or immediately prior or subsequent thereto;
and (3) the statement made must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances. 72
In this case, the element of spontaneity is lacking in the alleged ante-mortem statement. Antonios statement was taken by
PO3 Inoc at around 3:00 oclock P.M., May 14, 1992 or some thirty-nine (39) hours after the incident. Thirty-nine hours is
too long a time to be considered subsequent immediately (stress supplied) to the startling occurrence. Even as contemplated
by the rules, statements given a day after the incident in answer to questions propounded by an investigator cannot be
considered part of the res gestae. 73 Furthermore, the testimony of the declarant, that the statement was made under
threats and with coaching from losing candidates Ermac and Viva in order to get even with the winning candidate, Mayor
Aana, is uncontroverted. 74
Dying declarations and statements which form part of the res gestae are exceptions to the hearsay rule, thus they must be
strictly but reasonably construed and must extend only insofar as their language fairly warrants. 75 Thus, doubts should be
resolved in favor of applying the hearsay rule, rather than the exceptions. Under said rule, Antonios so-called ante-mortem
statement should not have been admitted in evidence, for it is neither a dying declaration nor a part of res gestae.
PP vs Bernal
Motive is generally irrelevant, unless it is utilized in establishing the identity of the perpetrator. Coupled with enough
circumstantial evidence or facts from which it may be reasonably inferred that the accused was the malefactor, motive may
be sufficient to support a conviction. 10 Openda, Jr.s revelation to Enriquez regarding his illicit relationship with Bernals wife
is admissible in evidence, pursuant to Section 38, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, viz.:
"Sec. 38. Declaration against interest. The declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify, against the
interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to declarants
own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true,
may be received in evidence against himself or his successors-in-interest and against third persons."
With the deletion of the phrase "pecuniary or moral interest" from the present provision, it is safe to assume that
"declaration against interest" has been expanded to include all kinds of interest, that is, pecuniary, proprietary, moral or
even penal. 11
A statement may be admissible when it complies with the following requisites, to wit:" (1) that the declarant is dead or
unable to testify; (2) that it relates to a fact against the interest of the declarant; (3) that at the time he made said
declaration the declarant was aware that the same was contrary to his aforesaid interest; and (4) that the declarant had no
motive to falsify and believed such declaration to be true. 12
Openda, Jr., having been missing since his abduction, cannot be called upon to testify. His confession to Enriquez, definitely
a declaration against his own interest, since his affair with Naty Bernal was a crime, is admissible in evidence 13 because no
sane person will be presumed to tell a falsehood to his own detriment.
PP vs Villarama
Appellant likewise asserts that the testimonies of the victims parents were hearsay since they did not witness the actual
rape and were only relating the rape as allegedly told to them by Elizabeth.
This too fails to convince us.
There are several well-entrenched exceptions to the hearsay rule under Sections 37 to 47 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Pertinent to the case at bar is Section 42 which provides:
SEC. 42. Part of the res gestae. Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately
prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae.
So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received
as part of the res gestae.
To be admissible as part of res gestae, a statement must be spontaneous, made during a startling occurrence or
immediately prior or subsequent thereto, and must relate to the circumstance of such occurrence. 29
In the case at bar, there is no doubt that the victim was subjected to a startling occurrence when she pointed to appellant as
her assailant. It is evident from the records that the statement was spontaneous because the time gap from the sexual
assault to the time the victim recounted her harrowing experience in the hands of appellant was very short. Obviously, there
was neither capability nor opportunity for the 4-year-old victim to fabricate her statement.
The critical factor is the ability or chance to invent a story of rape. At her age, the victim could not have had the
sophistication, let alone the malice, to tell her mother that her uncle made her lie down, took off her panties and inserted his
penis inside her vagina.
The shock of an unwelcome genital penetration on a woman is unimaginable, more so to a four-year-old child. Such a brutal
experience constituted unspeakable trauma. The fact that Elizabeth was still crying when her parents arrived reinforces the
conclusion that she was still in a traumatic state when she made the statements pointing to Appellant.
In People v. Moreno, 30 the Court, sustaining the conviction of an accused for robbery with rape, ruled that the affidavit of
the accused who was not available for trial was properly admitted in evidence as part of res gestae:
This exception is based on the belief that such statements are trustworthy because made instinctively, while the declarants
mental powers for deliberation are controlled and stilled by the shocking influence of a startling occurrence, so that all his
utterances at the time are the reflex products of immediate sensual impressions, unaided by retrospective mental action.
Said natural and spontaneous utterances are perceived to be more convincing than the testimony of the same person on the
witness stand.
Immediately after the three accused left the house where the crime was committed, and the threatening presence of the
accused was gone, both Mary Ann Galedo and Narcisa Sumayo told their employers, the Mohnani spouses, that they were
raped. The latter later testified in court as to these statements. These were thus part of the res gestae since they were
spontaneously made after their harrowing experience, as soon as the victims had the opportunity to make them without fear
for or threat to their lives."
The Court is not unmindful of its ruling in People v. Contreras, 31 wherein the accused was acquitted in one of the many
statutory rape charges against him because, among other things, the prosecution failed to present the child-victim.
At first blush, the facts of that case are deceptively similar to those of the case at bar. However, upon careful scrutiny and
analysis of the two cases, we rule that the instant case is not on all fours with the Contreras case.
In Contreras, the main witness for the prosecution, Nelene Diaz, was not deemed by the Court to be in a position to
categorically state that the accuseds genitals had penetrated the victims vagina. In fact, what she saw was merely the
accused, with his zipper open and his penis exposed, facing the six-year-old victim who was sitting on his lap with her legs
apart. Although the victim had no underwear, it was, nevertheless, established that the witness did not see any genital
contact between the two as the genital organs were visibly apart. However, in the case at bar, the eyewitness saw the
appellant, without his briefs and pants, on top of the naked victim a position conclusively indicating sexual intercourse.
In Contreras, there was positive testimony of the victims companions that the rape was prevented by the timely arrival of
the witness. This circumstance is not present in this case.
Furthermore, in Contreras, the victims statement that she had been sexually molested by the accused was not received
under the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule, because her statement did not refer to the incident witnessed by Nelene
but to a general pattern of molestation of her and her companions by the accused. In contrast, Elizabeths declaration to her
mother regarding the then just concluded assault were so full of details specific to the incident that there could be no doubt
she was referring to the same incident witnessed by Ricardo Tumulak.
Finally, in the Contreras case, the mother of the victim did not testify in court for no explainable reason. Here, Elizabeths
mother actively pursued the prosecution of appellant who is her own brother. No mother will falsely accuse a person of rape,
specially if it involves her own sibling, unless she is convinced it will vindicate the wrong done to her daughter.
Appellant attempts to cast doubt on Ricardo Tumulaks testimony, branding the same as self-serving and devoid of any
evidentiary weight on the ground that Ricardo is the victims uncle.
This argument is flimsy.
First of all, a self-serving declaration is one that is made by a party, out of court and in his favor. It does not include the
testimony he gives as a witness in court. 32
Second, Ricardo Tumulaks testimony was credible. He harbored no ill-motive against appellant which could have impelled
him to fabricate a story so repulsive as to attach a stigma on his niece, the victim, for the rest of her life. Appellant himself
admitted that, prior to the rape incident, he had been a friend of Ricardo.
Blood or conjugal relationship between a witness and the victim does not per se impair the credibility, of a witness. On the
contrary, relationship itself can strengthen credibility in a particular case, for it is unnatural for a relative of a victim to
falsely accuse someone other than the actual culprit.
Jimenez vs Emrupc
First Issue:
No Finding of Forgery
Petitioners claim that the CA erred when it disregarded the factual findings of the RTC which had given weight, credibility
and reliability to the handwriting experts from both the NBI and the PC. These experts had declared the signatures of
Francisca Ciriaco and Nicanor Teodoro in the 1936 Deed of Sale as forgeries.
We clarify. As a rule, this Court accords great weight and respect, sometimes even finality, to findings of fact of trial courts,
especially when affirmed by the CA. However, where the factual findings of the courts a quo are contrary to each other,
this Court may intervene to resolve the conflict.12
The reliance of appellate tribunals on the factual findings of the trial court is based on the postulate that the latter had
firsthand opportunity to hear the witnesses and to observe their conduct and demeanor during the proceedings. However,
when such findings are not anchored on their credibility and their testimonies, but on the assessment of documents that
are available to appellate magistrates and subject to their scrutiny, reliance on trial courts finds no application. In the
present case, the CA had the same opportunity as the RTC in examining and analyzing the questioned signatures.
In any event, since the CA reversed the RTC primarily because of their conflicting findings of fact, we now opt to pass
upon the factual antecedents.13 After a review of the records and the pleadings of the parties, we hold that the CA did not
err in overturning the RTC.
It is also hornbook doctrine that the opinions of handwriting experts, even those from the NBI and the PC, are not binding
upon courts. This principle holds true especially when the question involved is mere handwriting similarity or dissimilarity,
which can be determined by a visual comparison of specimens of the questioned signatures with those of the currently
existing ones.14
Handwriting experts are usually helpful in the examination of forged documents because of the technical procedure
involved in analyzing them. But resort to these experts is not mandatory or indispensable to the examination or the
comparison of handwriting.15 A finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimonies of handwriting experts,
because the judge must conduct an independent examination of the questioned signature in order to arrive at a
reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity. In an earlier case, this Court explained as follows:
"x x x. A finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimony of handwriting experts. Although such
testimony may be useful, the judge still exercises independent judgment on the issue of authenticity of the
signatures under scrutiny. The judge cannot rely on the mere testimony of the handwriting expert. In the case
of Gamido vs. Court of Appeals (citing the case of Alcon vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 162 SCRA 833), the
Court held that the authenticity of signatures
x x x is not a highly technical issue in the same sense that questions concerning, e.g., quantum physics or
topology or molecular biology, would constitute matters of a highly technical nature. The opinion of a
handwriting expert on the genuineness of a questioned signature is certainly much less compelling upon a
judge than an opinion rendered by a specialist on a highly technical issue.
"A judge must therefore conduct an independent examination of the signature itself in order to arrive at a
reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity x x x."16
Moreover, Section 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court explicitly authorizes the court, by itself, to make a comparison of
the disputed handwriting "with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered,
or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge."
In Lorenzo v. Diaz,17 the factors involved in examining handwritings were identified and explained in these words:
"x x x [T]he authenticity of a questioned signature cannot be determined solely upon its general characteristics,
similarities or dissimilarities with the genuine signature. Dissimilarities as regards spontaneity, rhythm, pressure of
the pen, loops in the strokes, signs of stops, shades, etc., that may be found between the questioned signature
and the genuine one are not decisive on the question of the formers authenticity. The result of examinations of
questioned handwriting, even with the benefit of aid of experts and scientific instruments, is, at best, inconclusive.
There are other factors that must be taken into consideration. The position of the writer, the condition of the
surface on which the paper where the questioned signature is written is placed, his state of mind, feelings and
nerves, and the kind of pen and/or paper used, play an important role on the general appearance of the signature.
Unless, therefore, there is, in a given case, absolute absence, or manifest dearth, of direct or circumstantial
competent evidence on the character of a questioned handwriting, much weight should not be given to
characteristic similarities, or dissimilarities, between that questioned handwriting and an authentic one."
Forgery cannot be presumed. It must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence. The burden of proof lies in the
party alleging forgery. Did petitioners succeed in proving that the signatures of Francisca Ciriaco and Nicanor Teodoro had
been forged?
After comparing the questioned signatures, the CA concluded that they were not forged. We affirm its finding. Indeed, the
best evidence of a forged signature in an instrument is the instrument itself showing the alleged forgeries. The fact of
forgery can be established by comparing the allegedly false signature with the authentic or genuine one.
This was exactly what the appellate court did. After comparing the allegedly forged signature of Francisca on the 1936
Deed of Sale with her authentic or genuine specimen, the CA made its independent conclusion that there was nothing
irregular in the signature on the questioned document. This right -- nay, duty -- of the RTC judge was exercised by the
justices of the appellate court when they overturned the formers findings. In the words of the CA:
"The findings of the handwriting experts from the NBI and PC are of doubtful correctness because the documents
from which the sample signatures were taken were either mere photocopies, or dated years away form the
questioned deed of sale of 1936. In its Questioned Document Report No. 241-780 (Exh. E), the NBI concluded
that the questioned signatures and sample ones of Francisca were NOT WRITTENby one and the same person,
but made no conclusion as to the signature of Nicanor due to the need for additional sample signatures as the
sample signatures submitted are in different style, which cannot be used as basis for a scientific analysis. The
questioned signatures on the deed of sale were compared by NBI with the sample/standard signatures on three
documents, to wit: 1) Exhibit F (Kasulatan ng Bileng Mabibileng Muli dated April 15, 1932), 2) Exhibit G
(Kasulatan ng Bileng Mabibileng Muli dated April 23, 1933), and 3) Exhibit H (Marriage Contract dated January
12, 1930). On the other hand, the PC Crime Laboratory in its Questioned Document Report No. 196-84 (Exh. S)
found that the sample and questioned signatures of both spouses were written by two different persons. In its
examination it used the standard signatures of Francisca on three documents, namely: Exhibits F, G, and R-2
(Contract of Surety dated March 16, 1933), while the sample signatures of Nicanor came from eight (8)
documents, to wit: Exhibits F, G, R-2, T (consisting of two pages from a book entitled Yearbook of Agriculture,
1936), U (consisting of two pages from a book entitled An Enumeration of Philippine Fungi, printed in 1937), V
(Secondary Report Card for the school year 1946-1947), W (An Order Blank of E.R. Moore Company dated
February 11, 1949). In sum there were actually nine (9) documents (Exhs. F, G, H, R-2, T, U, V. W, and
X) from which the standard signatures of both spouses came from. Three of these (Exhs. R-2, T and U)
however were but machine copies, and neither the originals nor the certified true copies were offered as evidence.
As such no probative value should be accorded to them and they should be disregarded in the appreciation of
signatures. While the remaining six (6) documents cannot be a good basis for accurate examination and
comparison of signatures because these standard signatures were not close in point of time to the questioned
signatures. Some of these documents were executed in 1930, 1932 and 1933 and the others in 1946 and 1949,
apparently several years apart from the 1936 subject deed of sale. The passage of time and a persons increase in
age may have decisive influences in ones (his) writing characteristics. Thus, authorities are of the opinion that in
order to bring about an accurate comparison and analysis, the standards of comparison must be as close as
possible in point of time to the suspected signature. (Causapin vs CA 233 SCRA 615)
"The findings of the handwriting experts are not conclusive upon the court. On the contrary, courts can totally
disregard them and make their own separate independent finding for themselves on the matter. As this Court has
once observed, the authenticity of signatures is not a highly technical issue in the same sense that questions
concerning, e.g., quantum physics or topology or molecular biology, would constitute matters of a highly technical
nature. The opinion of a handwriting expert is certainly much less compelling upon a judge than an opinion
rendered by a specialist of a highly technical issue. The signatures on a questioned document can be sighted by a
judge who can and should exercise independent judgment on the issue of authenticity of such signatures (Gamido
vs. CA 251 SCRA 101). And this exactly what we have done here. We have examined and analyzed the subject
signatures, and have found no substantial indicia or reason to suspect their authenticity. Contrary to the findings of
the NBI and PC, upon comparison of the questioned signature of Francisca with her sample signatures on Exh.
"F, G and H we find resemblances but no stark and distinguishing difference. The slight dissimilarities do not
indicate forgery for these are natural, expected and inevitable variations in genuine signatures made by one and
the same person. Even the sample signatures of Nicanor submitted by the appellees show clear variations in
structure, flourish, and style. Those found in Exhibits F, G, H, V and W are markedly different from that in
Exhibit X. It must be pointed out that the crux of the matter here is forgery and any positive assertion of it can not
just be accepted blandly. Forgery cannot be presumed; it must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Those
who make the allegation of forgery have the burden of proving it since a mere allegation is not evidence (TenioObsequio vs. CA 230 SCRA 550). The evidence of the appellees failed to prove the forgery they claim." 18
PP vs Baid
Notwithstanding her mental illness, complainant showed that she was qualified to be a witness, i.e., she could perceive and
was capable of making known her perceptions to others. 18 Her testimony indicates that she could understand questions
particularly relating to the incident and could give responsive answers to them.
Accused-appellant questions in this appeal the qualifications of Dr. Salangad as an expert witness. However, he cannot do
this now as he did not raise any objection to Dr. Salangads qualifications in the trial court. On the contrary, he even crossexamined her on the matters on which she testified. In accordance with Rule 132, 36, objections not timely raised are
deemed waived.
The fact that Dr. Salangad was hired by the family of complainant to give expert testimony as a psychiatrist did not by that
fact alone make her a biased witness and her testimony unworthy of consideration. As has been said:
. . . Although courts are not ordinarily bound by expert testimonies, they may place whatever weight they choose upon such
testimonies in accordance with the facts of the case. The relative weight and sufficiency of expert testimony is peculiarly
within the province of the trial court to decide, considering the ability and character of the witness, his actions upon the
witness stand, the weight and process of the reasoning by which he has supported his opinion, his possible bias in favor of
the side for whom he testifies, the fact that he is a paid witness, the relative opportunities for study and observation of the
matters about which he testifies, and any other matters which deserve to illuminate his statements. The opinion of the
expert may not be arbitrarily rejected; it is to be considered by the court in view of all the facts and circumstances in the
case and when common knowledge utterly fails, the expert opinion may be given controlling effect (20 Am. Jur., 10561058). The problem of the credibility of the expert witness and the evaluation of his testimony is left to the discretion of the
trial court whose ruling thereupon is not reviewable in the absence of an abuse of that discretion. 35
It has not been shown in this case that the trial court abused its discretion in appreciating the testimony of Dr. Salangad so
as to justify setting aside its findings.
Pp vs Duranan
First. Accused-appellant contends that he cannot be convicted of rape since the victims mental age was not proven. He
argues that under Art. 335(2) of the Revised Penal Code, an essential element for the prosecution for rape of a mental
retardate is a psychiatric evaluation of the complainants mental age to determine if her mental age is under twelve. 27 He
further claims that only in cases where the retardation is apparent due to the presence of physical deformities symptomatic
of mental retardation can the mental evaluation be waived.
The contention has no merit.
Rule 130, 50 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:
Opinion of Ordinary witnesses. The opinion of a witness for which proper basis is given may be received in evidence
regarding
(a) the identity of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge;
(b) a handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and
(c) the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.

Discussing this provision of the Rules on Evidence, Sen. Vicente J. Francisco writes in his treatise:
The mother of an offended party in a case of rape, though not a psychiatrist, if she knows the physical and mental condition
of the party, how she was born, what she is suffering from, and what her attainments are, is competent to testify on the
matter.
It is competent for the ordinary witness to give his opinion as to the sanity or mental condition of a person, provided the
witness has had sufficient opportunity to observe the speech, manner, habits, and conduct of the person in question.
Generally, it is required that the witness details the factors and reasons upon which he bases his opinion before he can
testify as to what it is. As the Supreme Court of Vermont said "A non-expert witness may give his opinion as to the sanity or
insanity of another, when based upon conversations or dealings which he has had with such person, or upon his appearance,
or upon any fact bearing upon his mental condition, with the witness own knowledge and observation, he having first
testified to such conversations, dealings, appearance or other observed facts, as the basis for his opinion. 28
Pp vs Lee
Accused-appellant makes capital of Josephs bad reputation in their community. He alleges that the victims drug habit led
him to commit other crimes -and he may have been shot by any of the persons from whom he had stolen. 30 As proof of
Josephs bad character, appellant presented Herminias letter to Mayor Malonzo seeking his assistance for Josephs
rehabilitation from drugs. On rebuttal, Herminia admitted that she wrote such letter to Mayor Malonzo but denied anything
about her sons thievery. 31
Character evidence is governed by Section 51, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, viz:
"Section 51. Character evidence not generally admissible; exceptions:

(a) In Criminal Cases:
(1) The accused may prove his good moral character which is pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged.
(2) Unless in rebuttal, the prosecution may not prove his bad moral character which is pertinent to the moral trait involved in
the offense charged.
(3) The good or bad moral character of the offended party may be proved if it tends to establish in any reasonable degree
the probability or improbability of the offense charged.
x
x"
Character is defined to be the possession by a person of certain qualities of mind and morals, distinguishing him from
others. It is the opinion generally entertained of a person derived from the common report of the people who are acquainted
with him; his reputation. 32 "Good moral character" includes all the elements essential to make up such a character; among
these are common honesty and veracity, especially in all professional intercourse; a character that measures up as good
among people of the community in which the person lives, or that is up to the standard of the average citizen; that status
which attaches to a man of good behavior and upright conduct. 33
The rule is that the character or reputation of a party is regarded as legally irrelevant in determining a controversy, so that
evidence relating thereto is not admissible. Ordinarily, if the issues in the case were allowed to be influenced by evidence of
the character or reputation of the parties, the trial would be apt to have the aspects of a popularity contest rather than a
factual inquiry into the merits of the case. After all, the business of the court is to try the case, and not the man; and a very
bad man may have a righteous cause. 34 There are exceptions to this rule however and Section 51, Rule 130 gives the
exceptions in both criminal and civil cases.
In criminal cases, sub-paragraph 1 of Section 51 of Rule 130 provides that the accused may prove his good moral character
which is pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged. When the accused presents proof of his good moral
character, this strengthens the presumption of innocence, and where good character and reputation are established, an
inference arises that the accused did not commit the crime charged. This view proceeds from the theory that a person of
good character and high reputation is not likely to have committed the act charged against him. 35 Sub-paragraph 2
provides that the prosecution may not prove the bad moral character of the accused except only in rebuttal and when such
evidence is pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged. This is intended to avoid unfair prejudice to the
accused who might otherwise be convicted not because he is guilty but because he is a person of bad character. 36 The
offering of character evidence on his behalf is a privilege of the defendant, and the prosecution cannot comment on the
failure of the defendant to produce such evidence. 37 Once the defendant raises the issue of his good character, the
prosecution may, in rebuttal, offer evidence of the defendants bad character. Otherwise, a defendant, secure from
refutation, would have a license to unscrupulously impose a false character upon the tribunal. 38
Both sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) of Section 51 of Rule 130 refer to character evidence of the accused. 39 And this evidence
must be "pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged," meaning, that the character evidence must be
relevant and germane to the kind of the act charged, 40 e.g., on a charge of rape, character for chastity; on a charge of
assault, character for peacefulness or violence; on a charge for embezzlement, character for honesty and integrity. 41 Subparagraph (3) of Section 51 of the said Rule refers to the character of the offended party. 42 Character evidence, whether
good or bad, of the offended party may be proved "if it tends to establish in any reasonable degree the probability or
improbability of the offense charged." Such evidence is most commonly offered to support a claim of self-defense in an
assault or homicide case or a claim of consent in a rape case. 43
In the Philippine setting, proof of the moral character of the offended party is applied with frequency in sex offenses and
homicide. 44 In rape and acts of lasciviousness or in any prosecution involving an unchaste act perpetrated by a man
against a woman where the willingness of a woman is material, the womans character as to her chastity is admissible to
show whether or not she consented to the mans act. 45 The exception to this is when the womans consent is immaterial
such as in statutory rape 46 or rape with violence or intimidation. 47 In the crimes of qualified seduction 48 or consented
abduction, 49 the offended party must be a "virgin," which is "presumed if she is unmarried and of good reputation," 50 or a
"virtuous woman of good reputation." 51 The crime of simple seduction involves "the seduction of a woman who is single or
a widow of good reputation, over twelve but under eighteen years of age . . ." 52 The burden of proof that the complainant
is a woman of good reputation lies in the prosecution, and the accused may introduce evidence that the complainant is a
woman of bad reputation. 53
In homicide cases, a pertinent character trait of the victim is admissible in two situations: (1) as evidence of the deceaseds
aggression; and (2) as evidence of the state of mind of the accused. 54 The pugnacious, quarrelsome or trouble-seeking
character of the deceased or his calmness, gentleness and peaceful nature, as the case may be, is relevant in determining
whether the deceased or the accused was the aggressor. 55 When the evidence tends to prove self-defense, the known
violent character of the deceased is also admissible to show that it produced a reasonable belief of imminent danger in the
mind of the accused and a justifiable conviction that a prompt defensive action was necessary. 56
In the instant case, proof of the bad moral character of the victim is irrelevant to determine the probability or improbability
of his killing. Accused-appellant has not alleged that the victim was the aggressor or that the killing was made in selfdefense. There is no connection between the deceaseds drug addiction and thievery with his violent death in the hands
of Accused-Appellant. In light of the positive eyewitness testimony, the claim that because of the victims bad character he
could have been killed by any one of those from whom he had stolen, is pure and simple speculation.
Moreover, proof of the victims bad moral character is not necessary in cases of murder committed with treachery and
premeditation. In People v. Soliman, 57 a murder case, the defense tried to prove the violent, quarrelsome or provocative
character of the deceased. Upon objection of the prosecution, the trial court disallowed the same. The Supreme Court
held:
". . . While good or bad moral character may be availed of as an aid to determine the probability or improbability of the
commission of an offense (Section 15, Rule 123), 58 such is not necessary in the crime of murder where the killing is
committed through treachery or premeditation. The proof of such character may only be allowed in homicide cases to show
"that it has produced a reasonable belief of imminent danger in the mind of the accused and a justifiable conviction that a
prompt defensive action was necessary (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1952 ed., Vol. 3, p. 126). This rule does
not apply to cases of murder." 59
In the case at bar, Accused-appellant is charged with murder committed through treachery and evident premeditation. The
evidence shows that there was treachery. Joseph was sitting in his living room watching television when accused-appellant
peeped through the window and, without any warning, shot him twice in the head. There was no opportunity at all for the
victim to defend himself or retaliate against his attacker. The suddenness and unexpectedness of the attack ensured his
death without risk to the assailant. Following the ruling in People v. Soliman, where the killing of the victim was attended by
treachery, proof of the victims bad character is not necessary. The presence of this aggravating circumstance negates the
necessity of proving the victims bad character to establish the probability or improbability of the offense charged and, at the
same time, qualifies the killing of Joseph Marquez to murder.
Pp vs Diopita
Fourth. We now deal with the more substantial arguments raised by accused-appellant in his brief. He tenaciously maintains
that it was impossible for him to have committed the crime charged since he is a person of good moral character, holding as
he does the position of "Ministerial Servant" in the congregation of Jehovahs Witnesses, and that he is a godly man, a
righteous person, a responsible family man and a good Christian who preaches the word of God.
We are not impressed. The fact that accused-appellant is endowed with such "sterling" qualities hardly justifies the
conclusion that he is innocent of the crime charged. Similarly, his having attained the position of "Ministerial Servant" in his
faith is no guarantee against any sexual perversion and plunderous proclivity on his part. Indeed, religiosity is not always an
emblem of good conduct, and it is not the unreligious alone who succumbs to the impulse to rob and rape. An accused is not
entitled to an acquittal simply because of his previous good moral character and exemplary conduct. The affirmance or
reversal of his conviction must be resolved on the basic issue of whether the prosecution had discharged its duty of proving
his guilt beyond any peradventure of doubt. Since the evidence of the crime in the instant case is more than sufficient to
convict, the evidence of good moral character of accused-appellant is unavailing.
Burden of proof
PP vs Macagaling
s virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
"Upon the question of whether or not appellant should also be convicted of the crime of illegal possession of a firearm, We
agree with both appellants counsel and the Solicitor General that the appealed decision should be reversed.
"It is true that People v. Lubo, 101 Phil. 179 and People v. Ramos, 8 SCRA 758 could be invoked to support the view that it is
incumbent upon a person charged with illegal possession of a firearm to prove the issuance to him of a license to possess
the firearm, but We are of the considered opinion that under the provisions of Section 2, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court
which provide that in criminal cases the burden of proof as to the offense charged lies on the prosecution and that a
negative fact alleged by the prosecution must be proven if it is an essential ingredient of the offense charged, the burden of
proof was with the prosecution in this case to prove that the firearm used by appellant in committing the offense was not
properly licensed.
"It cannot be denied that the lack or absence of a license is an essential ingredient of the offense of illegal possession of a
firearm. The information filed against appellant . . . specifically alleged that he had no license or permit to possess the .45
caliber pistol mentioned therein. Thus, it seems clear that it was the prosecutions duty not merely to allege that negative
fact but to prove it. . ." (Emphasis supplied.)
This doctrinal rule was reiterated in People v. Tiozon, 59 People v. Caling, supra, People v. Ramos, Et Al., 60 People v. Arce,
61 and People v. Deunida, 62 and this constitutes the present governing case law on this question. We cannot see how the
rule can be otherwise since it is the inescapable duty of the prosecution to prove all the ingredients of the offense as alleged
against the accused in an information, which allegations must perforce include any negative element provided by the law to
integrate that offense. We have reiterated quite recently the fundamental mandate that since the prosecution must allege all
the elements of the offense charged, then it must prove by the requisite quantum of evidence all the elements it has thus
alleged. 63
Applied to the cases at bar, we cannot conceive of how, under the demonstrated circumstances herein, we can sustain a
judgment of conviction on this particular charge. It may be well to recall that how the firearm came into appellants
possession is a seriously contested issue, with the prosecution witnesses merely stating that they saw the gun only when
appellant aimed and fired at the victims, but with appellant contending that he actually wrested it from Dennis Macagaling.
As to who in truth was the possessor of the firearm prior to the incident cannot be determined with certitude due to the
paucity of the evidence thereon. In fine, since all that can be deduced is that appellant was in possession of the gun only on
that occasion for a transitory purpose and for the short moment coeval therewith, it cannot be concluded that he had the
animus possidendi which is required for the offense charged.
The highly unsatisfactory identification of the gun, coupled with the intervening time between its retrieval from appellant to
its presentation in the court below, increases our misgivings on whether it was in fact the weapon involved. Indeed, such
lack of positive identification is virtually equivalent to the non-production of the real firearm in court and is analogous to the
situation in People v. Caling, supra, where the rifle allegedly involved in the case was not presented in evidence. We held
that such failure effectively closed the door to any proof of the negative fact that no license or permit therefor had been
issued to the accused therein.
Lorena vs Encomienda
SYNOPSIS
In a sworn letter-complaint received by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) on August 5, 1997, Spouses
Gregorio and Teresita Lorena charged Judge Adolfo V. Encomienda of the Municipal Trial Court of Pagbilao, Quezon
with grave abuse of authority by helping his nephew, Tadito Encomienda, in an ejectment case filed before the
Municipal Trial Court of Pagbilao, Quezon. Additionally, complainants accused herein respondent for being
responsible for their illegal arrest and subsequent detention which lasted for three days. After the respondent
submitted his comment, the OCA, in its report, recommended that the charge of grave abuse of authority against the
respondent be dismissed, but advised that he should be more prudent and more circumspect in his actions and
utterances.
The Supreme Court found merit to the instant complaint. The Court ruled that although the charge of grave abuse
of authority was not proven, respondent should be reprimanded for his failure to exercise greater circumspection in
dealing with the complainants. In the present case, respondent should have avoided talking to the complainants,
especially in the tone and in the manner reported by the complainants. In doing so, respondent steered away from the
heavy responsibility of judges to be circumspect in their public and private dealings. In light of the foregoing, the
Court reprimanded the respondent for failing to exercise greater care and circumspection in his action and warned that
a repetition of this or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS, THE COMPLAINANT HAS THE
BURDEN OF PROVING BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT; CASE AT BAR.
--- In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial evidence, the allegations in the complaint.
In the present case, we believe that the complainants were not able to do so. There is no showing that respondent judge used the powers
and influence of his office in an arbitrary and opprobrious manner. From the documents presented, it is apparent that he had no hand in
bringing the Lorenas to the police station. Likewise, it cannot be said that he had any participation in the conflict between his brothers
family and the Lorenas. The complainants may have surmised otherwise, but mere suspicion without proof cannot be the basis of
conviction.
People vs Estomaca
Likewise of very serious importance and consequence is the fact that the complaints were
supposedly read to appellant in Ilonggo/local dialect. Parenthetically, there was no statement
of record that appellant fully understood that medium of expression. This assumes added
significance since Ilonggo, or properly called Hiligaynon, is a regional language, spoken in a
major part of Iloilo province, Negros Occidental and, with variations, in Capiz. Within a
province or major geographical area using a basic regional language, there may be other local
dialects spoken in certain parts thereof. If said indication in the aforequoted portion of the
transcript intended to convey that Ilonggo is merely a local dialect and was also the idiom
referred to, the same is egregious error; it would be different if local dialect was used to
denote an alternative and different medium but, inexplicably, without identifying what it was.
[18]
The significance of this distinction is found right in the provisions of Section 1(a) of Rule 116
which, cognizant of the aforestated linguistic variations, deliberately required that the complaint
or information be read to the accused in the language or the dialect known to him, to ensure
his comprehension of the charges. The Court takes judicial notice, because it is either of public
knowledge or readily capable of unquestionable demonstration, that in the central and
northwestern part of Iloilo province and all the way up to and throughout Antique, including
necessarily San Joaquin where the offenses were committed and of which appellant and his
family are natives, the local dialect is known as kinaray-a.
[19]
Barring previous exposure to or as a consequence of extended social or commercial

intercourse, kinaray-a is not readily understandable to nor spoken by those born to the
Hiligaynon regional language or who have lived in the areas under its sway for an appreciable
period of time. The converse is true for those whose native tongue is the dialect of kinaraya, since they are generally not well-versed in Ilonggo, or Hiligaynon. Since all the complaints
are not only in English but in technical legal language, we are again at sea as to whether and
how the indictments were translated to Ilonggo and/or to kinaray-a, or that the appellant was
truly and honestly made of the charges and, especially, the consequences of his guilty plea
thereto. The records are silent and do not reveal anything on this point, nor how the dialogue
between the presiding judge and appellant was translated. Yet a mans life is at stake while
this Court wrestles with that dilemma created by an omission of official duty.
Estrada vs Desierto
Petitioner insists he is the victim of prejudicial publicity. Among others, he assails the Decision for adverting to newspaper
accounts of the events and occurrences to reach the conclusion that he has resigned. In our Decision, we used the totality
test to arrive at the conclusion that petitioner has resigned. We referred to and analyzed events that were prior,
contemporaneous and posterior to the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo as president. All these events are facts which are
well-established and cannot be refuted. Thus, we adverted to prior events that built up the irresistible pressure for the
petitioner to resign. These are: (1) the expos of Governor Luis "Chavit" Singson on October 4, 2000; (2) the "I accuse"
speech of then Senator Teofisto Guingona in the Senate; (3) the joint investigation of the speech of Senator Guingona by the
Blue Ribbon Committee and the Committee on Justice; (4) the investigation of the Singson expos by the House Committee
on Public Order and Security; (5) the move to impeach the petitioner in the House of Representatives; (6) the Pastoral
Letter of Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin demanding petitioners resignation; (7) a similar demand by the Catholic Bishops
Conference; (8) the similar demands for petitioners resignation by former Presidents Corazon C. Aquino and Fidel V. Ramos;
(9) the resignation of respondent Arroyo as Secretary of the DSWD and her call for petitioner to resign; (10) the resignation
of the members of petitioners Council of Senior Economic Advisers and of Secretary Mar Roxas III from the Department of
Trade and Industry; (11) the defection of then Senate President Franklin Drilon and then Speaker of the House of
Representatives Manuel Villar and forty seven (47) representatives from petitioners Lapiang Masang Pilipino; (12) the
transmission of the Articles of Impeachment by Speaker Villar to the Senate; (13) the unseating of Senator Drilon as Senate
President and of Representative Villar as Speaker of the House; (14) the impeachment trial of the petitioner; (15) the
testimonies of Clarissa Ocampo and former Finance Secretary Edgardo Espiritu in the impeachment trial; (16) the 11-10
vote of the senator-judges denying the prosecutors motion to open the 2nd envelope which allegedly contained evidence
showing that petitioner held a P3.3 billion deposit in a secret bank account under the name "Jose Velarde" ; (17) the
prosecutors walkout and resignation; (18) the indefinite postponement of the impeachment proceedings to give a chance to
the House of Representatives to resolve the issue of resignation of their prosecutors; (19) the rally in the EDSA Shrine and
its intensification in various parts of the country; (20) the withdrawal of support of then Secretary of National Defense
Orlando Mercado and the then Chief-of-Staff General Angelo Reyes together with the chiefs of all the armed services; (21)
the same withdrawal of support made by the then Director General of the PNP; General Panfilo Lacson, and the major
service commanders; (22) the stream of resignations by Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries, assistant secretaries and
bureau chiefs; (23) petitioners agreement to hold a snap election and opening of the controversial second envelope. All
these prior events are facts which are within judicial notice by this Court. There was no need to cite their news accounts.
The reference by the Court to certain newspapers reporting them as they happened does not make them inadmissible
evidence for being hearsay. The news account only buttressed these facts as facts. For all his loud protestations, petitioner
has not singled out any of these facts as false.
Laureano vs CA
At the outset, we find it necessary to state our concurrence on the assumption of jurisdiction by the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 9. The trial court rightly ruled on the application of Philippine law, thus:
"Neither can the Court determine whether the termination of the plaintiff is legal under the Singapore Laws because of the
defendants failure to show which specific laws of Singapore Laws apply to this case. As substantially discussed in the
preceding paragraphs, the Philippine Courts do not take judicial notice of the laws of Singapore. The defendant that claims
the applicability of the Singapore Laws to this case has the burden of proof. The defendant has failed to do so. Therefore, the
Philippine law should be applied."
In 1978, Menandro Laureano was hired as a pilot by the Singapore Airlines Limited (SAL). In 1982 however,
SAL was hit by recession and so it had to lay off some employees. Laureano was one of them. Laureano asked
for reconsideration but it was not granted. Aggrieved, Laureano filed a labor case for illegal dismissal against
SAL. But in 1987, he withdrew the labor case and instead filed a civil case for damages due to illegal
termination of contract against SAL. Laureano filed the case here in the Philippines. SAL moved for the
dismissal of the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The motion was denied. On trial, SAL alleged that the
termination of Laureano is valid pursuant to Singaporean law.
The trial court ruled in favor of Laureano. SAL appealed the case raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction, non
applicability of Philippine laws, and estoppel, among others. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Singaporean Law is applicable to this case.
HELD: No. The specific Singaporean Law which holds valid the dismissal of Laureano is not proved in court. As
such, the trial court cannot make a determination if the termination is indeed valid under Singaporean Law.
Philippine courts do not take judicial notice of the laws of Singapore. SAL has the burden of proof. SAL failed to
prove such law hence Philippine law shall apply. However, the case must be dismissed on the ground of
estoppel. Under our laws, all money claims arising from employer-employee relationships must be filed within
three years from the time the cause of action accrued. Laureanos cause of action accrued in 1982 when he
was terminated but he only filed the money claim in 1987 or more than three years from 1982. Hence he is
already barred by prescription.
Mercury drug vs Libunao
1.THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DISREGARDING THE JUDICIAL ADMISSION OF
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT RODRIGO LIBUNAO THAT REMIGIO SIDO IS NOT AN EMPLOYEE OF PETITIONER-DEFENDANT
MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION AND IN RULING CONTRARY TO SAID STIPULATION OF FACT OR JUDICIAL ADMISSION.
We have reviewed the records of the RTC and the Court of Appeals and found that there was a misapprehension of certain
facts; that findings contrary to the admissions of the parties and the evidence on record were made; and that the said
courts overlooked certain relevant facts which were not disputed by the parties, and, if properly considered, would
necessarily have altered the decision arrived at by both courts.
Pp vs Hermanes
A perusal of the manifestation filed by Atty. Nicolasora on behalf of appellant shows that it was signed only by Atty.
Nicolasora, not by appellant. While we stated in People v. Balisoro (307 SCRA 48 [1999]) that an admission made in the
pleadings cannot be controverted by the party making such admission and that the same is conclusive as to him, it is also
hornbook doctrine that the authority of an attorney to bind his client as to any admission of facts made by him is limited to
matters of judicial procedure. An admission which operates as a waiver, surrender, or destruction of the clients cause is
beyond the scope of the attorneys implied authority (People v. Maceda, 73 Phil. 679 [1942]). In this case, Atty. Nicolasoras
admission that appellant was heavily intoxicated at the time of the incident and that he had no intention to commit so grave
a wrong as that committed practically frittered away appellants case in favor of the prosecution. The manifestation cannot
thus be held as an admission by appellant of his guilt.
The inadmissibility of Atty. Nicolasoras manifestation notwithstanding, appellant nonetheless is still criminally liable for the
rape of Marina Hermanes. While appellant is not bound by the manifestation of guilt filed by Atty. Nicolasora, he is still
bound by the decision of the trial court to consider the case submitted for decision due to the inordinate delay and failure of
his counsel to present evidence on his behalf. It must be noted that the prosecution completed the presentation of its
evidence on January 14, 1998, and that the defense was given numerous opportunities to present evidence but, for almost
one year, and despite several warnings to that effect, they failed to do so, so much so that the trial court, on December 21,
1998, was constrained to consider the case submitted for decision. A client is bound by an adverse decision rendered as a
result of his attorneys inaction or negligence, such as failure to present sufficient evidence. The reason for this is that the
adverse judgment is a mere consequence of an omission on a procedural matter in regard to which an attorney has the
implied authority to bind his client. Too, the prosecution has more than sufficiently proven appellants guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
People vs Narca
SYNOPSIS
Defendants-appellants Rodencio, Benjamin, Rogelio all surnamed Narca and their brother-in-law Jaime Baldelamar were
charged with the murder of Mauro Reglos, Jr. Failing in their motion to quash the information, they filed a motion for bail.
During the bail hearings, the victims wife, Elizabeth, testified on direct examination. Defense counsel requested the court
that his cross-examination of Elizabeth be conducted on the next hearing. No cross-examination over took place because
Elizabeth was killed before the next hearing. After hearing, the court denied bail. When arraigned, appellants pleaded not
guilty. After trial, the appellants were convicted of the crime charged.
On appeal to this court, appellants (1) assail the validity of the preliminary investigation because they were not represented
therein by counsel, (2) argue that the testimony of Elizabeth in the bail hearings should not be given credence since she was
not cross-examined, and (3) claim that pending this appeal, Benjamin assumed sole responsibility for the victims death but
invoked self-defense.
There is nothing in the Rules which renders invalid a preliminary investigation held without defendants counsel. Preliminary
investigation if held within the statutory limitations cannot be voided. If appellants argument is sustained, it would make a
mockery of criminal procedure, since all that a party has to do to thwart the validity of the preliminary investigation is for
their counsel not to attend the investigation. The invalidity or absence of a preliminary investigation does not affect the
jurisdiction of the court which may have taken cognizance of the information nor impair the validity of the information.
On their second defense, lack of cross-examination due to the death of Elizabeth does not necessarily render the deceaseds
previous testimony expungible. Besides, mere opportunity and not actual cross-examination is the essence of the right to
cross-examine.
As to their third defense, appellant Benjamin admits that he killed the victim but only in self-defense. The foremost element
of unlawful aggression is absent in this case. If there by any such aggression, it came from appellants. Evidence on record
shows that the victim was only walking with his wife, when he was attacked without warning by appellants with bolos. There
was treachery in attack.
RIGHT TO CROSS-EXAMINE; FAILURE THEREOF OCCASIONED BY THE SUPERVENING DEATH OF THE WITNESS DOES NOT
RENDER THE PREVIOUS STATEMENT EXPUNGIBLE. On their second defense, it is to be noted that the defenses failure to
cross-examine Elizabeth Reglos was occasioned by her supervening death. Lack of cross-examination due to the death of the
witness does not necessarily render the deceaseds previous testimony expungible. Thus, this Court in Republic v.
Sandiganbayan, 19 citing Fulgado v. CA, 20 said that:
"The wholesale exclusion of testimonies was too inflexible a solution to the procedural impasse because it prejudiced the
party whose only fault was to die before he could be cross-examined. The prudent alternative should have been to admit the
direct examination so far as the loss of cross-examination could have been shown to be not in that instance a material loss.
And more compelling so in the instant case where it has become evident that the adverse party was afforded a reasonable
chance for cross-examination but through his own fault failed to cross-examine the witness.
"Where death prevents cross-examination under such circumstances that no responsibility of any sort can be ascribed to the
plaintiff or the witness, it seems a harsh measure to strike out all that has obtained in the direct examination." (Emphasis
supplied)
Besides, mere opportunity and not actual cross-examination is the essence of the right to cross-examine. 21 Appellants lost
such opportunity when they sought the deferment of their cross-examination of Elizabeth, and they only have themselves to
blame in forever losing that right by reason of Elizabeths demise. This Court held that the right to cross-examination
"is a personal one which may be waived expressly or impliedly by conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right of crossexamination. Thus, where a party has had the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but failed to avail himself of it, he
necessarily forfeits the right to cross-examine and the testimony given on direct examination of the witness will be received
or allowed to remain in the record. . . . (W)aiver of the right to cross-examine may take various forms. But the common
basic principle underlying the application of the rule on implied waiver is that the party was given the opportunity to confront
and cross-examine an opposing witness but failed to take advantage of it for reasons attributable to himself alone." 22
(Emphasis supplied)
We also find unmeritorious appellants argument that Elizabeths testimony, having been taken during the bail hearings,
cannot be used against them. Section 1(f) of Rule 115 provides that "either party may utilize as part of its evidence the
testimony of a witness who is deceased . . . given in another case or proceeding", and under Section 8 Rule 114 23 as
amended by Circular 12-94, 24 "evidence presented during the bail hearings," like the testimony of deceased witness
Elizabeth, are "considered automatically reproduced at the trial" subject only to the possible recall of the "witness for
additional examination unless the witness is dead, outside the Philippines or otherwise unable to testify."
Pp vs Fabre
c
cralaw vi
rt
The defense argues, rather desperately, that the testimony of appellant should acquire added strength for the
failure of the prosecution to conduct cross-examination on him and to present any rebuttal evidence. The crossexamination of a witness is a prerogative of the party against whom the witness is called.[5] The purpose of crossexamination is to test the truth or accuracy of the statements of a witness made on direct examination. [6] The party
against whom the witness testifies may deem any further examination unnecessary and instead rely on any other
evidence theretofore adduced or thereafter to be adduced or on what would be believed is the perception of the court
thereon. Certainly, the trial court is not bound to give full weight to the testimony of a witness on direct examination
merely because he is not cross-examined by the other party.
chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibr
Pp vs Plasencia
The use of memory aids during an examination of a witness is not altogether proscribed. Section 16, Rule 132, of the Rules
of Court states:
"Sec. 16. When witness may refer to memorandum. A witness may be allowed to refresh his memory respecting a fact, by
anything written or recorded by himself or under his direction at the time when the fact occurred, or immediately thereafter,
or at any other time when the fact was refresh in his memory and he knew that the same was correctly written or recorded;
but in such case the writing or record must be produced and may be inspected by the adverse party, who may, if he
chooses, cross-examine the witness upon it and may read it in evidence. So also, a witness may testify from such a writing
or record, though he retain no recollection of the particular facts, if he is able to swear the writing or record correctly stated
the transaction when made; but such evidence must be received with caution." (Emphasis supplied)
Allowing a witness to refer to her notes rest on the ground on the sound discretion of the trial court. 23 In the case, the
exercise of that the discretion has not been abused; the witness herself has explained that she merely wanted to be
accurate on dates and like details.
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Appellants see inadvertency on Franciscas appearing to be "jittery" on the witness stand. Nervousness and anxiety of a
witness is a natural reaction particularly in the case of those who are called to testify for the first time. The real concern, in
fact, should be when they show no such emotions.
Francisca did fail in immediately reporting the killing to the police authorities. Delay or vacillation, however, in making a
criminal accusation does not necessarily adulterate the credibility of the witness. 24 Francisca, in her case, has expressed
fears for her life considering that the assailants, being her neighbors, could easily exact retribution on her. 25 Also, the
hesitancy in reporting the occurrence of a crime in rural areas is not unknown. 26
Francisca inability to respond to the summons for another appearances in court further questioning was satisfactorily
explained by the prosecution. Francisca at the time just had a miscarriage and was found to be too week to travel. The recall
of the witness was, after all, at the sound discretion of the trial court. 27
Tabuena vs CA
EVIDENCE NOT FORMALLY OFFERED CANNOT BE CONSIDERED NOR GIVEN ANY EVIDENTIARY VALUE.
In sustaining the trial court, the respondent court held that, contrary to the allegations of the appellant, the said exhibits
were in fact formally submitted in evidence as disclosed by the transcript of stenographic notes, which it quoted at length. 2
The challenged decision also upheld the use by the trial court of testimony given in an earlier case, to bolster its findings in
the second case.
We have examined the record and find that the exhibits submitted were not the above-described documents but Exhibits "X"
and "Y" and their sub-markings, which were the last will and testament of Alfredo Tabernilla and the order of probate. It is
not at all denied that the list of exhibits does not include Exhibits "A", "B" and "C." In fact, the trial court categorically
declared that "Exhibits A, A-1, A-2, B, C, and C-1, were not among those documents or exhibits formally offered for
admission by plaintiff-administratrix." This is a clear contradiction of the finding of the appellate court, which seems to have
confused Exhibits "A," "B" and "C" with Exhibits "X" and "Y", the evidence mentioned in the quoted transcript.
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides in Section 35 thereof as follows:
Sec. 35. Offer of evidence. The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for
which the evidence is offered must be specified.
The mere fact that a particular document is marked as an exhibit does not mean it has thereby already been offered as part
of the evidence of a party. It is true that Exhibits "A," "B" and "C" were marked at the pre-trial of the case below, but this
was only for the purpose of identifying them at that time. They were not by such marking formally offered as exhibits. As we
said in Inter pacific Transit, Inc. v. Aviles, 3 "At the trial on the merits, the party may decide to formally offer (the exhibits) if
it believes they will advance its cause, and then again it may decide not to do so at all. In the latter event, such documents
cannot be considered evidence, nor can they be given any evidentiary value."
chanroble s lawlibrary : rednad
Chief Justice Moran explained the rationale of the rule thus:
. . . The offer is necessary because it is the duty of a judge to rest his findings of facts and his judgment only and strictly
upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. 4
We did say in People v. Napat-a 5 that even if there be no formal offer of an exhibit, it may still be admitted against the
adverse party if, first, it has been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, it has itself been incorporated in
the records of the case. But we do not find that these requirements have been satisfied in the case before us. The trial court
said the said exhibits could be validly considered because, even if they had not been formally offered, one of the plaintiffs
witnesses, Cunegunda Hernandez, testified on them at the trial and was even cross-examined by the defendants counsel.
We do not agree. Although she did testify, all she did was identify the documents. Nowhere in her testimony can we find a
recital of the contents of the exhibits.
PP vs Libnao
Appellant then faults the trial court for appreciating and taking into account the object and documentary evidence of the
prosecution despite the latters failure to formally offer them. Absent any formal offer, she argues that they again must be
deemed inadmissible.
The contention is untenable. Evidence not formally offered can be considered by the court as long as they have been
properly identified by testimony duly recorded and they have themselves been incorporated in the records of the case. 23 All
the documentary and object evidence in this case were properly identified, presented and marked as exhibits in court,
including the bricks of marijuana. 24 Even without their formal offer, therefore, the prosecution can still establish the case
because witnesses properly identified those exhibits, and their testimonies are recorded. 25 Furthermore, appellants counsel
had cross-examined the prosecution witnesses who testified on the exhibits. 26
PP vs Mariano
Accused-appellant Mariano contends that the trial court erred in convicting him on the basis of the uncorroborated
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. 21
The Solicitor General contends that the prosecution witnesses testimonies were credible and do not impair the fact that
342.4 grams of illegal drugs were seized from Accused-Appellant. 22
We find the appeal meritorious.
No less than the Constitution mandates that an accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. In criminal
cases, the quantum of evidence required to overturn this presumption is proof beyond reasonable doubt. 23 It is that proof
which produces moral certainty in an unprejudiced mind. 24 In a long line of cases, the Court has held consistently that
where the inculpatory facts admit of several interpretations, one consistent with accuseds innocence and another with his
guilt, the evidence thus adduced fails to meet the test of moral certainty.25
cralaw:red
It is incumbent upon the prosecution to prove, first, that a crime has been committed, and second, that the accused is
responsible therefor. 26 In the case at bar, it is undisputed that five (5) pieces of small plastic bags containing shabu were
seized during the buy-bust operation. However, there is want of evidence to establish the fact of possession of the same by
accused-appellant Mariano, the very crime for which he was charged with.
Dado vs People
The doubt entertained by NBI Ballistician Elmer D. Piedad, as to whether the 2 other metallic fragments (marked as exhibit
"SB-2" and "SB-3") are indeed parts of the lead core of the "SB-1", which is part of a copper jacket of a caliber 5.56 mm.
jacketed bullet, must be resolved in favor of petitioner; that is, said metallic fragments cannot be presumed to be particles
of a .45 caliber bullet fired from the .45 caliber pistol of petitioner. Under equipoise rule, where the evidence on an issue of
fact is in equipoise or there is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates, the party having the burden of proof loses.
The equipoise rule finds application if, as in the present case, the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or
more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, for
then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty, and does not suffice to produce a conviction. Briefly stated, the
needed quantum of proof to convict the accused of the crime charged is found lacking. 31
Evidently, the prosecution failed to prove that the metallic fragments found in the fatal wound of the victim are particles of
a .45 caliber bullet that emanated from the .45 caliber pistol fired by petitioner. For this reason, the Court cannot in good
conscience affirm his conviction for the crime of homicide.
In the same vein, petitioner cannot be held responsible for the wound inflicted on the victims right outer lateral arm for the
same reason that there is no evidence proving beyond moral certainty that said wound was caused by the bullet fired from
petitioners .45 caliber pistol.
Nevertheless, petitioner is not completely without liability. The Court sustains the finding of the trial court that petitioner
fired his .45 caliber pistol towards the victim. From the attendant circumstances, it appears that there is no evidence tending
to prove that petitioner had animus interficendi or intent to kill the victim. Note that the prosecution witnesses did not see
whether petitioner aimed to kill the victim. 32 Intent to kill cannot be automatically drawn from the mere fact that the use of
firearms is dangerous to life. 33 Animus interficendi must be established with the same degree of certainty as is required of
the other elements of the crime. The inference of intent to kill should not be drawn in the absence of circumstances
sufficient to prove such intent beyond reasonable doubt. 34
Pp vs Apawan
Accused-appellants claim they were not properly identified by prosecution witnesses, viz: Fe, Seremia, and Candelaria, as
there was no police line-up conducted before they were pinpointed as the culprits. Specifically, the defense assails Eddies
identification, claiming that the act of Pat. Buenvidez, i.e., in borrowing Eddies photograph and showing it to the victim, Fe,
prior to Eddies arrest, was pointed suggestive. The defense, further alleges, that using Eddies picture for identification
purposes departs from the standard police procedure of placing the offended party in identifying the real culprit. We are not
persuaded.
There is no rule requiring that before a suspect can be identified as the culprit, he should first be placed in a police line-up
and then pinpointed by the victim. what is important, is the positiveness of the victim that the persons charged were the
malefactors. Such identification goes to the credibility of the witness which was tested at the trial. 18
We have examined the records of this case and we agree with the findings of the trial court on the positive identification of
the Accused-Appellants.
The records reveal that accused-appellants stayed in victims house for almost an hour. 19 While searching for some
valuables to rob, the flashlight held by Ruben Sause was on, thus allowing prosecution witnesses Fe, Candelaria, and
Seremia to see the faces of Accused-Appellants. Moreover, Eddie Apawan constantly held Fe close to him, particularly during
the rape, thus giving her enough time to take a good look at him. As regards Ruben Sause, his shaved head left a distinctive
mark in the minds of the witnesses, not to mention that he, too, was seen at close range by witnesses Seremia and
Candelaria, while he was keeping an eye on them during the rape.
We have ruled that it is the most natural reaction for victims of criminal violence to strive to see the appearance of their
assailants and observe the manner in which the crime was committed. Most often, the face and body movements of the
assailants create a lasting impression which cannot be easily erased from their memory. 20
The records are bereft of any evidence that the prosecution witnesses have improper motives to falsely point to accusedappellants were not known to these women prior to the incident. Thus we adhere to the established rule that in the absence
of any evidence to show that the witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by any improper motive, their identification of
the accused-appellants as the assailants should be given full faith and credit. 21
Pp vs Barlis
To sustain a conviction for the crime of robbery with homicide, it is necessary that the robbery itself be proved as
conclusively as any other essential element of the crime. 32 The taking with intent to gain of personal property belonging to
another, by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or using force upon things are the essential elements of
robbery. 33 There is robbery with homicide when by reason or on occasion of a robbery with the use of violence against or
intimidation of person, the crime of homicide shall have been committed. 34
As shown above, the only evidence of the taking of the personal property of the victim is the extrajudicial confession of the
appellant. Under Section 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, "an extrajudicial confession made by an accused shall not be
sufficient ground for conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti." Corpus delicti is the body (material
substance) upon which a crime has been committed, e.g., the corpse of a murdered man or the charred remains of a house
burned down. In a derivative sense, it means the substantial fact that a crime was committed. 35 It is made up of two
elements: (a) that a certain result has been proved, for example, a man has died or a building has been burned; and (b)
that some person is criminally responsible for the act. 36 Section 3, Rule 133 does not mean that every element of the crime
charged must be clearly established by independent evidence apart from the confession. It means merely that there should
be some evidence tending to show the commission of the crime apart from the confession. Otherwise, utility of the
confession as a species of proof would vanish if it were necessary, in addition to the confession, to adduce other evidence
sufficient to justify conviction independently of such confession. 37 Otherwise stated, the other evidence need not,
independently of the confession, establish the corpus delicti beyond a reasonable doubt. 38
The prosecution failed to corroborate the extrajudicial confession of the appellant on the robbery with evidence of corpus
delicti. In short, the robbery was not conclusively proved. The instant case should be distinguished from People v. Mones. 39
In Mones, the four accused who were charged with robbery with homicide executed separate confessions of the crime
charged. Their confessions were also corroborated by the testimony of a witness. We held therein:
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" [W]here the accusation of robbery fails, but multiple homicide or murder is proved, the accused must be sentenced for the
several separate offenses of homicide or murder (U.S. v. Lahoylahoy and Madanlog, 38 Phil., 330); and in this case, if the
proof should be held insufficient as to the robbery, the result would be, under the Revised Penal Code, that each of the
accused would be sentenced for the four murders committed by them. In view of this fact we are constrained to sustain the
conviction for robbery with homicide, upon the concurrent confessions of each of the four accused to the effect that robbery
was the purpose of the crime and that P100 in money were taken from the trunk of Manuel Mico. As to the moral basis of
this fact we entertain no doubt whatever, although there is no independent evidence, apart from the confessions that
robbery was committed. In thus sustaining the trial court in its finding of robbery we do not wish to be understood as
declaring that this appreciation could prevail if the prosecution consisted of a charge of robbery only, or if the conclusion
reached were in fact unfavorable to the accused. 40
In Mones, the conviction of the four accused for robbery with homicide is sustainable under the doctrine of interlocking
confessions: "extra-judicial confessions independently made without collusion which are identical with each other in their
essential details and are corroborated by other evidence on record are admissible, as circumstantial evidence, against the
person implicated to show the probability of the latters actual participation in the commission of the crime." 41 Clearly, the
doctrine is inapplicable here for we only have the solitary confession of the Appellant.
The Office of the Solicitor General, as earlier observed, concedes that there was no proof of robbery. It argues, however, that
such is not fatal because the unrebutted fact remains that Adela Argate lost a wrist watch and cash of less than P100.00 on
the occasion of the robbery. We cannot sustain this proposition because of the rule enumerated in United States v.
Lahoylahoy, 42 to wit:
"To permit a defendant to be convicted upon a charge of robbing one person when the proof shows that he robbed an
entirely different person, when the first was not present, is violative of the rudimentary principles of pleading; and in
addition, is subject to the criticism that the defendant is thereby placed in a position where he could not be protected from a
future prosecution by a plea of former conviction or acquittal. If we should convict or acquit these defendants to-day of the
robbery which is alleged to have been committed upon the property of Roman Estriba, it is perfectly clear that they could be
prosecuted tomorrow for robbery committed upon the property of Juana; and the plea of former jeopardy would be of no
avail."
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The death of the victim has been sufficiently established by evidence independent of the appellants extrajudicial confession,
namely, the unrebutted testimonies of prosecution witnesses Adela Argate, Dr. Dario Gajardo, and Wilma Ballerda.
Finally, we agree with the trial court that the conspiracy among the appellant and his two companions was proved beyond
reasonable doubt by circumstantial evidence.
Since the alleged robbery was not conclusively proved in this case, the appellant could only be convicted of homicide under
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. The penalty prescribed therefor is reclusion temporal.
Pp vs Mansueto
Visibility is indeed a vital factor in the determination of whether or not an eyewitness could have identified the perpetrator of
a crime. However, it is settled that when conditions of visibility are favorable, and the witnesses do not appear to be biased,
their assertion as to the identity of the malefactor should normally be accepted. Illumination produced by kerosene lamp or
a flashlight is sufficient to allow identification of persons. Wicklamps, flashlights, even moonlight or starlight may, in proper
situations be considered sufficient illumination, making the attack on the credibility of witnesses solely on that ground
unmeritorious. 31
In lending added credence to CLEOFEs testimony, it is not amiss to state that "relatives of a victim of a crime have a natural
knack for remembering the face of the assailant and they, more than anybody else, would be concerned with obtaining
justice for the victim by the malefactor being brought to the face of the law." Indeed, family members who have witnessed
the killing of a loved one usually strive to remember the faces of the assailants. 32
Even assuming that CLEOFE did not actually identify OSCAR as the driver of the getaway motorcycle, sufficient
circumstantial evidence was established to uphold his conviction.
Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that:
Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from which the facts in issue may be
established by inference. Such evidence is founded on experience and observed facts and coincidences establishing a
connection between the known and proven facts and the facts sought to be proved. 33
The following circumstances based chiefly on Jose Pepitos testimony 35 were established by the State:
1. Jose Pepito saw OSCAR and a companion drinking beer at Myrnas store at Bo. Pitogo, Consolacion, Cebu in the evening of
26 October 1991, and then leaving towards Pag-utlan, Yati, Liloan, on board a motorcycle.
2. Several minutes later, an unidentified man shot JACINTO at the gate of his mothers house in Pag-utlan, Yati, Liloan,
Cebu.
3. On the road to Pag-utlan, Jose Pepito heard the shot, after which, he saw a man run to the other side of the road where
another man waited on a motorcycle. As soon as the gunman boarded, the duo fled.
4. Jose Pepito observed that the men and the motorcycle he had seen at Myrnas store were the same persons and
motorcycle he saw near Arnold Hernandezs vulcanizing shop immediately prior and after the shooting. Pepito saw the
gunman and OSCAR flee on board the motorcycle.
5. Jose Pepito positively identified OSCAR as the driver of the motorcycle.
Piecing this together with CLEOFEs undisputed testimony that she saw her fathers gunman run to a getaway motorcycle
driven by OSCAR, the State has successfully conjured up a murder picture attributable to an unidentified gunman and
OSCAR as the motorcycle driver.
Susa vs Pena
Administrative Liability
The conduct of every person connected with the administration of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowest clerk, is
circumscribed with a heavy burden of responsibility. 8 A public office is a public trust. 9 Since public officers are accountable
to the people at all times, 10 they must strictly perform their duties and responsibilities. 11 As the administration of justice
is a sacred task, this Court condemns any omission or act that may diminish the faith of the people in the judiciary. 12
According to respondent, she had no intention of delaying the transmittal of the appealed cases. However, supposedly
because of the heavy pressure of her work and her sickly condition, she had to set aside the preparation of the transmittals.
Consequently, she forgot all about them.
We find the explanation of respondent too insubstantial to excuse her from administrative liability. We have ruled that failure
to transmit the records of a case constitutes negligence and warrants disciplinary action. 13 For judges, undue delay in
transmitting the records of a case constitutes a less serious charge. 14 For clerks of court, on the other hand, failure or
delay to transmit records of a case has warranted penalties ranging from admonition 15 to a fine of P1,000 16 to P5,000 17
to one-month suspension. 18 The prompt transmittal of the records of appealed cases to the appellate court is required to
ensure the speedy disposition of cases. 19 For this reason alone, respondent should already be sanctioned administratively.
If she really had difficulty in performing her obligations because of the heavy pressure of work, she could have easily relayed
her dilemma to the branch clerk of court. Instead, she compounded her liability by keeping court documents in places known
only to her. Such action was aggravated by her intentional refusal to disclose to her superiors including the branch clerk of
court the status of the transmittals that she was supposed to accomplish.
Complainant avers that respondent intentionally and maliciously hid the documents, but he has failed to support this
allegation with evidence. In administrative proceedings, complainants have the burden of proving by substantial evidence
the allegations in their complaints. 20 Substantial evidence in an administrative case consists of that amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. 21 In the present case, other than the
bare allegations of complainant, no evidence was presented before the OCA to show that the documents had been covertly
and maliciously hidden by Respondent.
While there is no substantial evidence that respondent was intentionally hiding these documents, the fact remains that they
should not have been kept in the places where they were discovered. If she was not really hiding these documents, she
should have at the very least exercised more prudence in their care and custody, as they represented the pleadings of the
parties and the proceedings of the court.
At bottom, the Court notes that respondent does not deny the charges hurled against her by her own branch clerk of court.
Instead, she begs for this Courts indulgence and asks for a "second chance." Although she tries to justify her delay in
transmitting the appealed cases of the court, she proffers absolutely no explanation as to why certain records, pleadings and
documents were found in places where they should not have been.
Respondent claims that she failed to inform her superiors about the status of her tasks because of her fear that they might
get angry with her. 22 This explanation is utterly unacceptable. It shows the extent to which she was willing to prejudice
public service and sacrifice the speedy and orderly administration of justice, simply to avoid the possible ire of her superiors.
She has violated the norm of public trust and diminished the faith of the people in the judiciary. 23
All told, respondent was neglectful of her duty when she failed to transmit the cases appealed from the RTC. Further, she has
shown a propensity for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and warranting her suspension from office.
Such propensity is shown by her inordinate refusal to inform her superiors of the status of her tasks; and by the discovery of
records, pleadings, communications and similar documents of cases assigned to their sala in places known only to her.
Litonjua vs CA
After carefully evaluating the evidence on record, and the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Justice, this
Court now resolves the issue of whether respondent CA Justices Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and Bernardo P. Abesamis are guilty of
the serious charges leveled against them by complainant Antonio K. Litonjua.
To start with, the rule, even in administrative cases, is that to be disciplined for grave misconduct or any grave offense, the
evidence against respondents should be competent and be derived from direct knowledge. Respondents are entitled to be
judged only after due investigation and after presentation of competent evidence, especially since the charges are highly
penal in character.15
The evidence presented in this case is mainly testimonial, so the resolution of the issue boils down to the credibility of the
testimonies of both parties. The complainant has the burden of proof and such proof must at the least be clear, solid and
convincing to compel the exercise of disciplinary power over the persons indicted.
However, as we had pointed out earlier, the only evidence on the alleged P1.5 million extortion is Antonio's bare allegation to
that effect. Such evidence, in the face of respondent's staunch denial, comes far short of the reglementary requirement of
proof beyond reasonable doubt (Rule 115, Sec. 1 par. a). The following circumstances destroy the credibility of the
accusation against Justice Enriquez:
(a) Antonio and Aurelio contradicted each other as to the date of their visit to the office of Justice Enriquez in the Court of
Appeals, and the dates of payment of the bribe money.
(b) According to Antonio, their first visit to the office of Justice Enriquez, was in response to a phone call from Justice
Enriquez in "the late part of July, 2001". But according to Aurelio, it was in "the later part of June 2001". It was
during that visit that the alleged agreement to pay the sum of P1.5 million to Justice Enriquez was perfected.
(c) According to Antonio, their second visit to deliver the partial payment of P500,000 to Justice Enriquez, occurred between
9 and 10 A.M. on August 1, 2001 upon receiving a phone call from Justice Enriquez advising him that the draft of the
decision was ready. According to Aurelio, however, their second visit was on August 2, 2001.
(d) The balance of P1 million in cash was paid on August 9, 2001 according to Antonio because he received the call on
August 8, advising him that the decision was "issued" on August 7, so he and Aurelio went the next day, August 9, 2001 to
give the money to Justice Enriquez. On the other hand, Aurelio testified that he and Antonio delivered the balance of P1
million in cash to Justice Enriquez on August 11 or 12, 2001.
Since Antonio and Aurelio could not agree as to when they gave the installments of the P1.5 million to Justice Enriquez, our
conclusion is that the alleged bribery or extortion did not take place at all. In the case of Castanos v. Escano, Jr., 251 SCRA
174, 187, this Honorable Court held that "inconsistency between the allegation and proof as to the date and situs of the
alleged bribery, goes into the credibility of the accusation and the merits of the case." It dismissed the charge of bribery
against the respondent Judge "for lack of substantial proof."
As this Honorable Court remarked in Castaos v. Escano, Jr., (251 SCRA 174, 191 [1995]) in dismissing the charge of
extortion against the respondent judge:
"In order that the allegation of a charge of this nature (extortion) may not be considered a fairy tale, evidence other than
the doubtful and questionable verbal testimony of a lone witness should be adduced. Entrapment should have been pursued.
Evidence of a seasonable report to police authorities should have been presented. Record of where the bribe money came
from, its specific denominations and the manner respondent accepted and disposed of it should have been clearly shown."
Antonio's silence and inaction for a year after the alleged extortion was committed, weakens the credibility of his complaint
against Justice Enriquez. His laches in denouncing and reporting it to the authorities makes suspect his motive in filing it.
Greed, as pointed out by BA's lawyer, Atty. Lavadia, is the compelling force behind his viciousness toward Justice Enriquez
who penned the original, as well as the amended decision that foiled Antonio's bid to grab a share of the P99 million
judgment won by ARC (Eduardo) from BA, which he covets.
The records show that Litonjua is no stranger to trouble. He has accused and been accused of various crimes ranging from
grave threats, oral defamation, slander, serious illegal detention, maltreatment, slight physical injuries, coercion, malicious
mischief and violations of the SSS law, the Building Code, and some city ordinances (Annexes 16, 16-A, 16-A-1, 16-D, 16-D1 to 16-D-30 of Enriquez's Comment). He has filed petitions for disbarment of lawyers, including ARC's counsel, Atty. William
Veto, and especially the lawyers of the adverse party in his lawsuits, e.g., Attys. Antonio V. Agcaoili and John T. Lavadia,
counsel for BA in the prohibition cases, Atty. Francis Joseph Ampil, collaborating counsel for BA, and Atty. Melanio Elvis
Balayan, who replaced Atty. William Veto as counsel for ARC (Eduardo). (Annexes 14, 14-A, 14-B, 114-C, Enriquez
Comment). He has attempted to bully judges, namely, RTC Judge Renato A. Fuentes of Davao City and RTC Judge Alex
Quiros of Pasig City, by harassing them with charges of bias, grave abuse of discretion, gross ignorance of the law, and
conduct unbecoming which were later dismissed for lack of merit (Annexes15, 15-A, 15-B and 15-C of Enriquez Comment).
While this case against Justices Enriquez and Abesamis may not have been filed to bully or intimidate them, it is clearly
intended to harass them and destroy their reputations to avenge his disappointment and frustration in being stopped from
laying hands on the P99 million judgment for damages in favor of ARC (Eduardo) which, by his computation, would by now
have grown to more than P200 million, inclusive of interests.
However, the good character of Justice Enriquez and his unblemished record of service in the judiciary as cashier and budget
officer of the Supreme Court, and later, as a judge rising from the ranks until he reached the appellate court, with no taint of
corruption or misconduct until now, are an ample rebuttal to Antonio's charges against him. We should listen to the tributes,
awards, resolutions and certificates of recognition and appreciation that Justice Enriquez has received from various civic and
professional organizations over the years (Annexes 13-A to 13-S of J. Enriquez Comment) rather than to Antonio's
unsubstantiated and ill-motivated charges.

Evidence Cases 3

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[G.R. No. 143125. June 10, 2003.

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External genitalia: normal

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The Case for the Defense.

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Maricar, on direct examination, testified thusly:

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"Q: Why do you not love your grandfather?

"Article 266-A. Rape; When And How Committed. Rape is committed

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a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

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[G.R. NO. 158033. July 30, 2004]

A: I acted as poseur buyer, your Honor.

A: In that same place, your Honor.

On the other hand, SPO1 Lomibao testified:

A: I was more or less three meters away, ma(a) m.32

A: Not yet, ma(a) m.

A: I did not say that, ma(a) m.

A: I was about one and a half meter away, ma(a) m.

A: They frisked him, ma(a) m.

A: The handcuff was the last, ma(a) m.36

People vs. Sandiganbayan

In People v. Berroya, we held that to hold an accused liable as co-principal by reason of

For this provision to apply, the following requisites must be satisfied:

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(c) the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.

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"Section 51. Character evidence not generally admissible; exceptions:

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Barring previous exposure to or as a consequence of extended social or commercial

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Chief Justice Moran explained the rationale of the rule thus:

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We find the appeal meritorious.

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(a) There is more than one circumstance;

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