Pretending to

Communicate
Edited by
Herman Parret

w
DE

Walter de Gruyter
1994

Berlin - New York

Pragmatics and Rhetoric: A Collaborative

Approach to Conversation
Y UEGUO

1.

Gu (Beijing)

Preliminaries: Two Hot Issues in Current Linguistic Pragmatics

1.1. The Status of the Gricean CP

More than a decade has elapsed since the publication of Grices celebrated
paper (Grice 1975). What appears to be universally recognized as valuable
is Grice s proposal of conversational implicature. T he notion of conuersational implicatwe" , observes Levinson (1983, 97), is one of the single
most important ideas in pragmatic?. While the status of conversational
implicature seems to be well established in pragmatics, its close associates
- common purpose and the Cooperative Principle (and its maxims) prove
to be quite controversial.
Grice believes that conversational implicatures are specially related to
the particular purposes that talk exchanges are adapted to serve (19?5,47).
He assumes that each participant recognizes in them [i. e. talk exchanges],
to some extent, a common purpose.. . (ibid, 45). He states his maxims as
if this common purpose were a maximally effective exchange of information (ibid, 47). Since participants in talk exchanges share a common
purpose, they conduct talk exchanges cooperatively in order to achieve
their common purpose, hence the Cooperative Principle.
Recent development in pragmatics with regard to Grice s notions of
common purpose and the CP seems to fall into three groups, which can
be called, for the sake of easy reference, denialists, redstctionists and expansioniJts respectively. Denialists (e.g. Kasher 1976,1977; Pratt 1981; Sampson
1982) hold that it is incorrect to assume that participants share some
common goal, linguistic or otherwise, and that the Cooperative Principle
therefore ought to be abandoned. Reductionists (e.g. Wilson/Sperber 1981,
1986; SperberlWilson 1982,1986; Thomas 1986), on the other hand, adopt
the position that participants share a common linguistic goal, and that the
repertoire of maxims should be reduced. Expansionists (e.g. Leech 1981,
1983a, 198313; Gu 1987), in contrast, reinforce the CP with other conversational principles in order that various conversational goals can be accommodated.

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Yueguo Gu

The first hot issue therefore is: Which of the three holds true whereas
the other two are false? Or whether each has a bit of truth and a bit of
falsehood.
1.2. The expulsion of perlocution from linguistic pragmatics
In Austins conception of speech acts, the total speech act is incomplete
without the perlocutionary act. Nevertheless, Austin s devotion to illocution and Searles follow-up work encourage the assumption that the
illocutionary act can be performed independently of the perlocutionary
act. Van Dijk (1977, 198), Bach/Harnish (1979, 16) and Leech (1983a, 203)
argue that the perlocutionary act does not belong to linguistic pragmatics,
since it goes beyond linguistic communication. Similarly, Sperber/Wilson
(1986) expel per 1 ocutionary phenomenon from linguistic communication,
but from a different angle. It takes some space to spell out their position.
In his analysis of meaning, Grice (1957, 385) observes [S] meant something by x is (roughly) equivalent to [S] intended the utterance of x to
produce some effect in an audience by means of the recognition of this
intention. Strawson ( 1 9 6 4 )re f ormulates the Gricean intention into three
sub-intentions. To mean something by x, S must intend
(a) Ss utterance of x to produce a certain response r in a certain
audience A;
(b) A to recognize Ss intention (a};
(c) As recognition of Ss intention (a) to function as at least part
of As reason for As response r.
According to Schiffer (1972:10), a certain response r in (a) is equivalent
to a certain propositional or affective attitude or action r. Schiffer
construes propositional or affective attitude as referring, respectively, to
e.g. believing that p, or feeling distressed or humiliated and action r
including physical behaviour, such as jumping to a drowning mans rescue
at his shout H elp!
Now the connection between Austins notion of the perlocutionary act
and Grices S meaning something by x becomes only too obvious. In
Austinian language, one would say: S performed a perlocutionary act of
y by saying x through producing a certain perlocutionary effect in an
audience. In Gricean language, on the other hand, one would say: S meant
something by uttering x intending to produce some effect in an audience
by means of the audience s recognition of the intention (see also 5.1
below). The direction oriented by Sperber and Wilson however is reductive. They argue that, in Strawsons interpretation of the Gricean intention,
(a) is not the communicative intention. The true communicative intention
is (b). Communication can succeed without either (a) or (c) being fulfilled.

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and Rhetoric: A Collaborative Approach to Conversation

175

They therefore dropped out (c) and reformulate (a) into what they call
informative intention, namely, to inform the audience of something
(Sperber/ Wilson 1986, 28-29). Their view of successful communication
includes Ss ostensive behaviour which makes Ss informative intention
manifest and Hs inferential process through which H interprets Ss ostensive behaviour and correctly recognizes Ss information.
Now the second issue is: Is it justified to expel perlocutionary phenomenon and the Gricean sub-intentions (a) and (c) from linguistic communication? BJhat can be gained by doing so?
1.3. The argument of this paper
The two hot issues appear unrelated, but a closer look will soon reveal
that they are inextricably interwoven. This apparent muddle is largely due
to the failure to recognize the fact that there are three different, although
related, levels of interaction involved in conversation and that there are
two kinds of cooperation in a talk exchange, namely pragmatic cooperation
and rhetorical cooperation. The former can be assumed with great confidence whereas the latter cannot be taken for granted and is achieved rather
than assumed. The three-level analysis will shed illuminating light on these
two confused issues.
It is argued that apart from a few limited exceptions, linguistic communication becomes pointless without perlocutionary pursuit. Illocutionary acts, while making manifest the interlocutors communicative intention,
are performed also in fulfilling perlocutionary (or better to be called extralinguistic) purposes. It is to be shown that linguistic pragmatics operates
at the lower levels of interaction whereas conversational rhetoric occupies
the higher level of interaction. The former accommodates linguistic/
communicative goals while the latter accounts for extra-linguistic goals.
A fresh model is proposed which will not only enable us to see the Gricean
Cl? in a new perspective but will also be able to accommodate perlocutionary phenomenon and the Gricean sub-intentions (a) and (c).

2.

Review of the three positions on Grices CP

2.1. Denialists view of common purpose and the CP

Kasher, Pratt, Sampson and others argue that it is not normally the case
that conversationalists share some common purpose. To quote Pratt (1981,
14) ... only some speech situations are characterized by shared objectives
among participants. Clearly it is at least as common for speakers to have
divergent goals and interests in a situation.. . Since it is not normal that
conversationalists share some common purpose in talk exchanges, the CP

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Yueguo Gu

validity becomes questionable. The principle is too strong since it rests

on an assumption of cooperation and shared purposes rather than on the
weaker assumption of coordination and independent purposes (Kasher
1977, 232). Sampson even concludes that Grices view of conversational
cooperation impl[ies] a profoundly false conception of the nature of social
life (1982, 204).
2.2. Reductionists view of common purpose and the CP
Sperber/Wilson (1986) define their conception of common purpose as
follows: For us, the only purpose that a genuine communicator and a
willing audience necessarily have in common is to achieve stlccessful cornmunication: that is, to have the communicators informative intention recogni?ed by the
atldience. Grice assumes that communication must have a common purpose
or set of purposes, or at least a mutually accepted direction (Grice 1975,
45) over and above the aim of achieving successful communication [the
emphasis is mine] (1986, 161- 62). Here they have made quite explicit
that their notion of common purpose is different from that of Grices.
One consequence as a result of Sperber and Wilsons modification of
Grices common purpose is a drastic reduction of the Gricean maxims to
a single principle of relevance. We shall take up the notion of implicature
itself, and go on to argue that the maxims are not all independently
necessary for the generation of implicatures: that they may in fact be
reduced to a single principle, . . . the principle of relevance. : IWilson/
Sperber 1981, 155-56). Note that it is in order to do justice to utterance
interpretation that the reduction of the maxims to a single principle of
relevance is made. The enterprise of using a single principle of relevance
to account for utterance interpretation is pursued in Sperber/Wilson (1986)
and Wilson/ Sperber (1986).
2.3. Expansionists view of common purpose and the CP
In contrast to Sperber and Wilson s reductionist approach is Leech s
programme of expanding the repertoire of conversational principles. Unlike the previous two groups, Leech takes Grices conception of common
purpose and the CP for granted. There seem to be three sources which
contribute to Leechs expansion programme: (1) rhetorical interpretation
of the CP; (2) inadequacy of the CP; and (3) multiple and divergent goals
in conversation.
What is the nature of Grices CP and the maxims? Levinson sees it as
essentially a theory about how people use language (1983,102) efficiently
and effectively in conversation. His view can be referred to as a rhetorical
interpretation of Grice. An explicit spokesman of rhetorical interpretation
is Marpurgo-Tagliabue who argues that all the Gricean maxims are classical

Pragmatics and Rhetoric: A Collaborative Approach to Conversation

177

rhetorical rules in disguise: G rice . . . proposes nothing else than the rules
of classical rhetoric adapted to the modern position of speech . . . [iIgnoring
the rather comic whim of the author, of wanting to call his principles
c ategories and to put them into the Kantian classes of categories. ..
(1981, 505). Leech (1981, 1983a) simply calls the Gricean CP a rhetorical
principle and has gone much further than Levinson and Marpurgo-Tagliabue by enriching it with more rhetorical principles. Viewing the Gricean
Cl? and the maxims as representing g ood communicative behaviour
(1983a, xi), Leech puts forward a theory which incorporates grammatical
rules with the enriched repertoire of the conversational principles (and the
maxims) as main constraints on the correct, efficient and effective use of
language. This theory is termed general pragmatic?. As is traditionally
the case that the issue of correctness in the use of language is generally
regarded as a grammatical matter, whereas the issue of efficiency and
effectiveness is generally agreed to be a rhetorical concern, so it is quite
natural for Leech to rename the Gricean CP and the maxims as rhetorical
principles.
Another reason for the enrichment of Grices Cl? is that it is found to
be inadequate without being rescued by other principles such as the
Politeness Principle (Leech 1983a, 80). The third reason is that, as the
denialists point out, in conversation apart from common goals there are
many other goals. Grice himself admittedly remarks that the goal of
maximally effective exchange of information is too narrow, with regard
to talk exchanges: . . . the scheme needs to be generalized to allow for
such general purposes as influencing or directing the actions of others
(1975, 47). But Grice fails to tell us how to generalize his scheme in order
to account for these other general purposes. Leechs expansion programme
seems to be one of the ways to make Grices scheme more adequate.
2.4. Recapitulation
Denialists seems to take Grices CP in terms of social cooperation (see
also 4.1 below), which differs from the rhetorical construe of it as an
overarching constraint on the use of language. In Sperber and Wilsons
reduction programme, the CP is assigned an interpretive role: It provides
H with premises in interpreting conversational implicatures or Ss intention
or intended meanings in general. In Leechs expansion programme, on
the other hand, conversational principles have other roles to play: they
offer functional explanations to such phenomena as indirectness, syntactic
or semantic asymmetries, which cannot be accounted for in grammatical
terms.
Critical assessment of the three positions is postponed until we have
scrutinized Grices notion of talk exchange.

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3.

Yueguo Gu

,4n anatomy of a talk exchange

3.1. Three levels of interaction

Grices much neglected notion of talk exchange deserves close examination. It is normally the case that conversation is initiated by one
participant with another responding to it (who takes the initiative is by
no means trivial). It is rare that two people start talking to each other
simultaneously. Even if this does happen, one side will normally back
down and give up the right of talking so that the other can finish. One
crucial condition for the successful initiation of conversation is the potential addressee s willingness to talk ( w illing audience in Sperber and
Wilsons term). So before conversation starts at all, S has a pre-conversational goal: H (=potential addressee) is willing to listen to S (the
notion of goal will be dealt with in detail in 5.2 below). That S wants to
talk to H, and that H is willing to listen to S represent the initial stage of
starting a conversation.
With the initial stage being successful, S and H become engaged in the
first level of interaction, to be called S-,endi,,iH-interpreeting interaction.
That is, the speaker sends information while the addressee interprets to
get the information. Without this minimum cooperation there will be n o
such thing as a talk exchange. But the interaction of S-sending/H-interpreting information is still not a talk exchange, which requires H to
provide information in response to Ss. So a talk exchange involves another
level of interaction, viz information-exchanging interaction. That is, S gives
H information and H provides information in response to Ss One
exchange of information therefore consists of two pairs of sending/interpreting information (see Figure 1).
Figure 1
-lOne
Exchange
! 2-

H/responder: interpreting to get the information

S/initiator: interpreting to get the information

S/initiator: sending information

- H/responder: providing information in return

The two levels of interaction together with the initial preparatory stage
can occur independently in actual face-to-face situations. It is possible for
the willing-to-listen stage to be successful without the S-sending/H-interpreting interaction. For instance, the addressee is willing to listen to what
is said but is unable to interpret. It is also possible to have the S-sending/
H-interpreting interaction without the information-exchanging interaction.

Pragmatics and Rhetoric: A Collaborative Approach to Conversation

179

The speakers talk is interpreted, but the addressee is unwilling to provide

further information in return; or the speakers talk is overheard or eavesdropped, thus being interpreted by an intruder or an eavesdropper who
has no such goal as exchanging information.
The third level of interaction is an uha-linguihc interaction. This can be
illustrated with the following example (which actually took place in a
student kitchen).
Paul: Do you have any milk?
Roger: Yes (gives Paul some milk).
Pauls utterance is used not just to elicit information from Roger, but also
to get Roger to actually give him some milk. So what is involved in the
talk exchange is more than an exchange of information. This shows that
on top of the information-exchanging interaction there is yet another level
of interaction, viz an ultra-linguistic level of interaction. At this level, a
still higher degree of cooperation is required: For Roger to provide true
information (a verbal response-act) to Pauls question is one thing; for

Figure 2
Initiator Stage

S-sending/H-interpreting interaction

1st level

one talk
exchange -

- 2nd level

merging with
social action
( 3 r d

l e v e l :

S-initiator: sending a message 4

H-responder: interpreting the message

Information-exchanging

interaction

H-responder: sending a return messageS-initiator: interpreting the message

liltra-Linguistic interaction
H-responder: producing a certain ultralinguistic response

(Note: It is possible to have the first and the third levels of interaction
without the second.)

180
him to actually offer Paul some milk (a physical response-act at his own
cost) is another.
One may argue that the ultra-linguistic interaction ought not to be
included as a level of analysis of a talk exchange. Our quick defence of it
is this. It is a fact that talk exchanges are normally infiltrated by ultralinguistic motives and considerations. Pauls utterance Do you have any
milk was not merely aimed at eliciting a verbal response. Rogers verbal
response-act, on the other hand, was also constrained by his physical
response-act. If Roger did not want to give Paul any milk, although he
had some, this might lead him to give Paul a different verbal response:
He might tell Paul that he had run out of milk as well.
The three levels of interaction discussed so far is graphically represented
in Figure 2 (Figure 2 see p. 179).

3.2. Degrees and kinds of cooperation

It becomes apparent that the tripartite levels of interaction require different

degrees of cooperation. The initial willing-to-listen stage requires the

lowest but basic degree of cooperation between S and H (to be referred
to as the 1st degree of cooperation). The S-sending/H-interpreting interaction requires a higher degree of cooperation (i. e. the 2nd degree). The
information-exchanging interaction, in comparison, demands an even
higher degree of cooperation (i. e. the 3rd degree). The ultra-linguistic
interaction terminates at the highest degree of cooperation (i. e. the 4th
degree).
Conversational cooperation can be defined in terms of participants
contributions to goal attainment. If a participant makes more contribution
to goal attainment, s/he is said to be more cooperative. For instance, if H
just interprets Ss utterance without telling S the required information, H
makes less contribution to goal attainment than s/he does if s/he not only
interprets Ss utterance, but also provides S with some appropriate information. In the latter case, H is more cooperative. Thus we can differentiate
1 There is a difference, however, between Ss cooperation with H and Hs cooperation
with S. S (= S/initiator) cooperation with H is secured by his rational pursuit of his
own goals (i. e. if one pursues a goal, one will normally by rationality do things conducive
to the attainment of the goal.) Hs (=H/ respond er) cooperation with S, in contrast,
needs a motivational basis, for in principle H can refuse to interpret Ss utterance and
ignore Ss goals, if he wishes to. So Ss conversational cooperation can be assumed,
whereas Hs conversational cooperation cannot. Whether H is to be cooperative with S
depends on many factors, including situational contingencies. For instance, suppose that
S want to initiate conversation with H. It just happens that H wants to talk to S as well.
This coincidence makes Ss initiation of a conversation a great deal easier and less risky.
For another instance, a pedestrian who is asked to show a travellers way to the Victoria
Station cherishes an altruistic belief that he should help anyone who is in need of
assistance. This belief can be a decisive motivational force for the pedestrian to be
cooperative with the traveller.

Pragmatics

181

and Rhetoric: A Collaborative Approach to Conversation

two kinds of conversational cooperation: pragmatic cooperation and rhetorical cooperation. Pragmatic cooperation deals with attainment of informative goals. It operates at the S-sending/H-interpreting interaction.
Rhetorical cooperation, on the other hand, is concerned with the attainment of rhetorical and extra-linguistic goals. It operates at the levels of
the information-exchanging and the ultra-linguistic interaction. Table 1
summarizes the relations among levels of interaction, goals, Hs contribution and cooperation:
Table 1
Levels of
Interaction

Contribution

preparatory
stage

willing to listen to
each other

S-sending/Hinterpreting
interaction

S says something to H
while H interprets it

informationexchanging
interaction

Degrees of
Cooperation

Kinds of
Cooperation

1st

pragmatic

2nd

cooperation

3rd

rhetorical

S and H exchange in-

~formation with each

other by adopting
each others goals

ultra-linguistic S appeals to H to perinteraction

/ form a nonverbal act
and H does it

I
4th

cooperation

The differences between pragmatic cooperation and rhetorical cooperation lies (1) in the contributions made by the participants to goalattainment; (2) in the sensitivity of goals with regard to e.g. cost and
benefit, interpersonal relations; and (3) in the degree of confidence assumed
by the participants. Since pragmatic cooperation involves participants
willingness to listen to each other and their interpreting each other s
message, it in general enjoys stronger confidence than rhetorical cooperation, and is usually goal insensitive and situation-insensitive. In the
majority of social situations we can assume that participants are pragmatically cooperative. This is because the participants contributions cost little
effort and energy, and can also keep the participants interests and goals
intact. Even in confrontational situations such as a detective interrogating
a suspect, pragmatic cooperation can be taken for granted: We can be
assured that both the detective and the suspect will try their best to
interpret each others message.

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Yueguo Gu

Rhetorical cooperation, on the other hand, requires goal adoption and

is realized in Hs emotive, cognitive, verbal, and physical response-acts
(see Gu, 1993, for detailed analysis). These categories of response-acts are
highly sensitive to goal relations, intrapersonal and interpersonal factors,
and other situational contingencies. The goal sensitivity of rhetorical
cooperation can be illustrated in Table 2.
Table 2

Levels of Interaction

H is appealed to

information-exchanging
interaction

(a) to tell S the time

(a) to tell S Hs secret

ultra-linguistic
interaction

(b) to give S a piece of paper

(b) to give S $100

Ss confidence in Hs rhetorical cooperation in (a) can be as strong as

his/her confidence in Hs pragmatic cooperation, whereas his/her confidence in H s rhetorical cooperation in (a ) will be very weak. Similar
points can be made about (b) and (b). It must be emphasized that rhetorical
cooperation can only be assumed to be achievable. When it does occur, it
is not due to the participants observance of the Gricean CP, but achieved
and this is something to be explained. In general, linguistic pragmatics
requires lower degrees of cooperation with strong confidence in participants cooperation, while conversational rhetoric demands higher degrees
of cooperation with weaker confidence in participants cooperation.

4.

The Status of the Gricean CP revisited

4.1. Locating denialists, reductionists and expansionists

At this point we are ready to locate the two hot issues in our analytic
scheme of talk exchanges. Let us take up the first issue first. As pointed
out in 1.1 above, the common purpose Grice had in mind was maximally
effective exchange of information. Let us call it common goal (abbreviated as G-corn), which can be reformulated as follows:
G-corn: when S and H talk to each other, they exchange information in
a maximally effective manner.
Notice that G-corn is common in the sense that there are two goals
pursued by S and H which are identical: S has a goal of giving H some
information in an effective manner, while H has a goal of giving S some

Pragmatics and Rhetoric: h Collaborative Approach to Conversation

183

information in return in the same manner. This is the essence of exchanging

information.
Grices common purpose and the Cl? are formulated at the level of the
information-exchanging interaction. Let us recall Grices CP: Make your
conversational contribution such as is required... (1975, 45). Grices Cl?
is normally applied to the speaker in the second S-sending/H-interpreting
interaction, as shown in Figure 3:
Figure 3

FA:
B:

8:
A:

Can you tell me the time? - to ___

(interprets to get the information)
(S-sending/H-interpreting Interaction I)
Well, the milkman has come.
(interprets to get the information)
(S-sending/H-interpreting Interaction 2)

response -

Grices G-corn of e ffective exchange of information lies in the link

between the utterances by A and B qua speakers (as shown by the arrow
above). A in the first S-sendingjH-interpreting interaction sets up a conversational demand (Dascals words, 1977) by asking B: Can you tell me
the time? B, by the Gricean CP, makes his/her conversational contribution
such as is required by A. That is, B not only interprets As message, but
also gives A true, informative and relevant information in a perspicuous
manner.
In contrast, the reductionist programme operates at the level of Ssending/H-interpreting interaction. To continue with the previous example. The reductionists concern lies between As (qua speaker) utterance
and Bs (qua addressee) interpretation in the first S-sendingjH-interpreting
interaction; and between Bs (qua speaker) utterance and As (qua addressee) interpretation in the second S-sending/H-interpreting interaction.
One may point out that the difference noted above is merely a matter of
the alteration of discourse roles -B changes his/her discourse role as
addressee in the first S-sending/H-interpreting interaction to the role of
speaker in the second S-sending/H-interpreting interaction (with As role
also being reversed). I would like to argue that there is much more
involved. Bs change of his/her discourse role from addressee to speaker
involves goal-adoption and a change in the degree of cooperation. The
move from Bs (i. e. qua addressee) interpreting As utterance to Bs (i. e.
qua speaker) providing A with the required information is by no means
a matter of course.
Let us now turn to the denialists. None of them have clearly defined
what they mean by common purpose. They seem to have understood

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Yueguo Gu

Grices common purpose as referring to situations in which S shares with

H some common aim or purpose be_rond that of getting H to understand
which proposition is being expressed or implied (Thomas 1986, 27-28).
This interpretation is characterized by Thomas as s ocial goal-sharing .
Evidence from denialist writings does support Thomas understanding.
Denialist rejection of the Gricean common purpose seems to include
social goals (in our terminology, ultra-linguistic goals) as well as Grices
G-corn redefined above. So the denialists location in our tripartite scheme
occupies two levels of interaction: the information-exchanging and the
ultra-linguistic interactions.
Expansionists, in comparison, are all-embracing. They are concerned
with all three levels of interaction. Expansionists position will be examined
in 4.2 below. Table 3 summarizes the various positions discussed so far.
Table 3:

informationexchanging
interaction

ultralinguistic
interaction

(? = to be clarified later)
4.2. Critique
Now we are ready to evaluate the criticisms of Grice levied by denialists,
reductionists and expansionists. The denialists are correct in pointing out
that conversationalists pursue divergent goals. But they have failed to see
that Grice is very careful not to confuse G-corn with other goals such as
a goal of influencing or directing the actions of others (see Grice 1975,
47). Grice states, in unambiguous terms, that his scheme n eeds to be
generalized to allow for such general purposes (ibid, 47). Their criticism
of Grices CP seems to be based on the assumption that a common goal
is a necessary condition for conversational cooperation. This assumption
is to some extent defective: Participants may be cooperative with one

Pragmatics and Rhetoric: A Collaborative Approach to Conversation

185

another in order to attain collaborative goals rather than common goals.

For instance, when S talks to H, S may have goal of getting H to
understand the message; and when H is talked to, H may have a goal of
interpreting Ss utterance in order to obtain the message. Ss and Hs goals
hold a collaborative relation; that is, the attainment of Ss goal helps the
attainment of Hs goal and vice versa. This collaborative goal relation also
provides a motivational basis for the cooperation between S and II. So
the challenge of the generality of common goals in talk exchanges does
not necessarily weaken the position of the Cl?
Reductionists have contributed a great deal to the tendency in pragmatics
of shifting focus from the study of talk exchanges to the study of linguistic
communication in general (in this connection see also Schiffer, 1972, 1989;
Bach/Harnish, 1979). This focus-shifting is made through modifying
Grices G-corn and through filtering out extra-communicative goals from
the domain of linguistic pragmatics. They are all concerned with interpretation, that is, with what we have called the S-sending/H-interpreting
interaction. Note that it is in order to do justice to utterance interpretation
that the reduction of the maxims to a single principle of relevance is made.
The reductionist programme lead to at least two possibly misleading
consequences. The first is on the ensuing line. Since the concern with the
S-sending/H-interpreting interaction requires a lower degree of conversational cooperation than the concern with the information-exchanging
interaction, not surprisingly at all, Thomas, following Sperber and Wilson,
points out (1986, 63-64) that I mplicature-interpretation is possible on
the basis of a very weak notion of conversational cooperation. In fact
it is rendered so weak that the Gricean CP is in danger of being trivialized.
Thomas (ibid, p. 53) admittedly observes: I think that if one rejects the
social goal-sharing interpretation of Grice s theory (as I do), then the
concept of conversational cooperation does become trivially true. To my
mind, we can reject the social goal-sharing interpretation of Grices theory
(as Thomas and I do) without trivializing the concept of conversational
cooperation. Thomass version of CP does trivialize the concept of conversational cooperation, but not because of the rejection of the social goalsharerss interpretation, but because of her formulation of the CP from
the point of view of the speaker (Use your language in such a way that
your interlocutor can understand what you are saying and implying (1986,
47). If S has something to say to H (e.g. if A wants to ask B to tell him
the time), S will by hisjher rationality be cooperative with B. This is like
someone who wants to go to London by coach being cooperative with
Thomass very weak notion of conversational cooperation is likely to be w-hat we have
referred to as the 2nd degree of cooperation at the level of the S-sending, H-interpreting
interaction.

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Yueguo Gu

the coach driver. However, if we follow Grice by formulating the CP with

the participants contribution to talk exchanges in mind, conversational
cooperation at each of the four degrees above distinguished is by no means
trivial. The willingness of participants to listen to each other, interpret
each others message, exchanging information and adopt each others goals
are genuine cooperations.
The second consequence is Thomass argument that ...it is perfectly
possible to interpret implicatures withoz/t having any faith in your interloctltors
Vera+, [the emphasis is mine]. In other words, the maxim of quality,
etc. is not necessary for implicature-interpretation. This shows that Thomas
has gone even further than Wilson/Sperber (1981,155- 156), and Sperber/
Wilson (1986), who have not abandoned the maxim of quality, but merged
it into the Principle of Relevance. T o establish the relevance of an
utterance, the hearer has to make valid inferences from a set of premises
which are true, or assumed to be true (Wilson/Sperber 1981, 171). If Ss
ostension makes manifest an assumption that is false and that H too knows
that it is false, Ss ostension will yield no contextual effect, hence being
irrelevant (see Sperber and Wilson 1986, 128). If S s ostension makes
manifest an assumption which is contradictory to a contextual assumption,
no contextual effect will result, hence no relevance (Sperber/Wilson 1986,
128). This actually forces Sperber and Wilson to make a stronger assumption than Grice does that the speaker speaks truthfully. In the cases of
uttering falsehood, Grice will say that the speaker breaches the maxim of
quality, but Sperber and Wilson will have to say that s/he is irrelevant,
because s/he has made manifest a false assumption which fails to yield any
contextual effect. The merging of the maxim of quality into the principle
of relevance therefore does not gain anything.
Finally we come to the expansionists programme. Of the three, the
expansionists are the most sympathetic to Grice s theory. The whole
programme aims at generalizing Grices scheme so as to accommodate
more goals. Leechs expansion programme, however, vacillates between
the 1st and the 2nd levels of interaction, and equally between the 2nd and
the 3rd levels of interaction. Leech wants to know how utterances have
meanings in situations (Leech, 1983a, x). In this aspect, Leech is closer
to the implicature-interpretation enterprise pursued by reductionists. But
Leech also talks about dynamic goals and regulative goals (e.g. goals of
being polite). Among dynamic goals is the perlocutionary goal, which is
included in the domain of general pragmatics (ibid, 201, 202). However,
Leech seems to distinguish perlocutionary goals from perlocutionary effects, and moves to expel perlocutionary effects from linguistic pragmatics.
Furthermore, Leechs expansion scheme encounters some serious difficulties. Dillon et al (1985) correctly point out that Leechs rhetorical principles

Pragmatics and Rhetoric: A Collaborative Approach to Conversation

187

are formulated in a rather ad hoc manner and that he fails to give a

reasonable criterion according to which a certain rhetorical principle can
be justified.
4.3. Answer to the first hot issue
Now it is time to state our answer to the first hot issue. The answer is:
Denialists , reductionists and expansionists all have a bit of truth, and a
bit of falsehood. Denialists are correct in attacking Grices CP for being
too strong, but they are wrong in rejecting the CP all together. Grices
CP is still valid at the level of the S-sending/H-interpreting interaction.
Reductionists are right in narrowing down linguistic pragmatics to linguistic communication and calling for a weaker notion of Grices Cl?, but
go off the track in trivializing the CP. The expansionist programme a la
Leech is praiseworthy for generalizing Grices original scheme to accommodate more goals, but gets lost in the complexity of the matter.
The stance this paper advocates is: Use the tripartite distinction of levels
of interaction to allocate a division of labour. Linguistic pragmatics takes
care of the S-sending/H-interpreting interaction, leaving the informationexchanging and ultra-linguistic interaction to conversational rhetoric. In
this new perspective, none of the arguments, valid or otherwise, made
respectively by the denialists, the reductionists, and the expansionists will
be an argument against the other two. For instance, on the face of it, the
reductionist programme appears to be a direct denial of the expansionist
programme. With the anatomy of talk exchanges of ours, they are close
associates rather than life-or-death enemies.

5.

Linguistic communication vs purposeful interaction

5.1 Answer to the second hot issue

Now we are ready to come back to the question of whether it is justified
to expel perlocution and the Gricean sub-intentions (a) and (c) from
linguistic pragmatics. As pointed out in 1.2 above, van Dijk, Sach/Harnish
and Leech expel perlocution out of linguistic pragmatics on the ground
that perlocutionary effects go beyond linguistic communication. It is on
similar grounds that Sperber/lVilson erase the Gricean sub-intentions (a)
and (c) from their framework of linguistic communication. I have no
quarrel with the previous authors over their ousting perlocution from
linguistic pragmatics. The point I would like to drive home is that the
expulsion is justifiable on methodological ground only, but indefensible
against empirical evidence. Perlocutionary phenomenon is by no means
peripheral; in real life situations the performance of illocutionary acts is

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Yueguo

Gu

infiltrated with perlocutionary considerations. In theory the two can be

abstracted for the sake of linguistic analysis and for methodological convenience; in practice they are not separate and inseparable. Austin is
basically correct when he observes: T he total speech act in the total
speech situation is the on4 actual phenomenon which, in the last resort,
we are engaged in elucidating (Austin, 1980 [1962], 147). The total speech
act is incomplete without the perlocutionary act. In his extension of Grices
account of S-meaning to the Austinian notion of illocutionary force,
Strawson (1964) actually takes the position that one knows the particular
illocutionary force of an utterance just in case one knows the particular
perlocutionary effect S intends to achieve by means of the audience s
recognition of Ss intention. 3 The three sub-intentions Strawson reformulates are steps towards working out illocutionary force (see also Schiffer
1972, 92-94).
Our position that in real life face-to-face situations illocutionary acts are
performed to fulfil perlocutionary purposes invites immediate challenge.
Searle in his taxonomy of illocutionary acts treats the purpose or point
of the illocutionary act as the most important of his total 12 dimensions.
However, he loses no time in drawing our attention to the fact that the
terminology of point or p urpose is not meant to imply, nor is it based
on the view, that every illocutionary act has a definitionally associated
perlocutionary intent. For many, perhaps most, of the most important
illocutionary acts, there is no essential perlocutionary intent associated by
definition with the corresponding verb, e.g. statements and promises are
not by definition attempts to produce perlocutionary effects in hearers
(Searle 1979, 3). Searle (1991) in his response to Alstons criticism (Alston,
1991) further clarifies his notion of illocutionary point, observing that it
is the point that the act has in virtue of its being an act of that type
(Searle 1991, 101). Our notion of perlocutionary purpose is certainly
different from Searle s illocutionary point or purpose. Perlocutionary
purpose is the purpose(s) of the speaker s/he attempts to reach in performing an illocutionary act. It is contingent and dependent on the total
speech situation. When S makes a promise, Searle would say that the
illocutionary point or purpose will be an undertaking of an obligation by
the speaker to do something. However, we would like to know whether
S by doing so meant to please H or not (see 5.3 below for further
discussion). When Searle disassociates illocutionary point with perlocutionary purpose, he is thinking of illocutionary type and by definition,
not of the actual performance of an illocutionary act, nor of the contingent
purpose(s) of the speaker.
This scheme is not meant to account for highly institutionalized illocutionary acts.

Pragmatics and Rhetoric: ,4 Collaborative A4pproach to Conversation

189

Where does the ousted perlocution belong? In the remainder of this

paper I would like to outline a general framework in which perlocutionary
phenomenon can be fruitfully investigated. This brings us back to the
foresaid tripartite distinction of the three levels of interaction in talk
exchanges. Illocutionary phenomenon is primarily located at the level of
S-sending/H-interpreting interaction. Perlocutionary phenomenon resides
primarily at the levels of the information-exchanging and ultra-linguistic
interaction. Illocution is part of pragmatic concern whereas perlocution is
part of rhetorical concern. Linguistic pragmatics and conversational rhetoric work in collaboration to account for the complexity of talk exchanges.
5.2 Transactional nature of perlocutionary phenomenon
Elsewhere I have argued (see Gu, 1993) that the perlocutionary act has
been fundamentally misconceived since its very inception, and that there
is no such thing as perlocutionary act to be performed by S alone.
Perlocution is in fact a transaction involving at least one speech act
performed by S and one response-act performed by H. The relation
between the two acts are not causal, but rhetorical in the sense that S
influences H in adopting Ss goals. Successful perlocution therefore presupposes rhetorical cooperation between S and H. This understanding of
the transactional nature of perlocutionary phenomenon demands a fresh
approach to it, to be called rhetorical. The essential concepts of this new
approach include extra-linguistic goal, rhetorical goal and goal adoption, to which we now turn.
Some ground preparation is needed here. So far we have been talking
about intention, purpose and goal, relying on ordinary understanding of
the terms. I have redefined Grices common purpose in terms of two goals
which are identical. I assume, as Grice and many others do, that conversation is a purposeful activity, hence it is goal-directed. The relation
between purpose and goal is neatly expressed by Taylor (1980 [1966],
225): It is fairly natural to suppose that purposeful behavior is directed
toward some goal. Van Dijk (1977, 174) captures the tripartite relations
of intention, purpose and goal as follows: Whereas an intention has the
action itself as its scope, a purpose will be taken as a mental event in
which an agent represents the GOAL(s) of the action. To put it bluntly,
purpose goes beyond the action itself, hence beyond intention. To quote
Taylor again: Any descriptions of purposeful behavior must represent it
as the means to some end or goal; no description or analysis of that
relationship in terms of the concepts of physical science will work (ibid,
p. 225). In this paper, goal is defined narrowly as a state of affairs which
is consciously or unconsciously desired and pursued in an individuals

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Yueguo Gu

behaviour. 4 The individual is said to possess a goal when s/he has a mental
representation of it. S/he achieves the goal when the desired state is
reached or realized. S/he suffers from goal frustration if the desired state
fails to be attained. The notion of goal presupposes an initial state at
which the individual possesses the goal, and an end-state at which s/he
attains or fails to attain the goal. There is always a time span between
the possession of a goal and the realization of a goal. A goal is to be
described in two ways. One way is to describe it in terms of possession.
When we say that A has a goal A feels warm, that A feels warm does
not refer to the end-state wherein A feels warm, but describes the mental
representation of the goal that A feels warm. That A feels warm and
that A feels warm therefore capture two different concepts: the former
depicts a goal, whereas the latter the end-state, viz the state of goal
attainment. The other way to describe a goal is teleological: A does X in
order to G. For example, A switches on the heater in order to feel warm.
These two ways are both adopted in this paper.5
Figure 4
(G-attainment)

(G-possession)

(initial
state
at tl)

------ B interprets to know

What is said, meant
Would you please
and aimed at
switch on the
i
(at t4)
heater?
(at t3)
As speech act

4 This is different from that defined by Parisi/Castelfranchi (1981252) and by Leech

(1983x40), but close to that by Argyle et al. (1981:68-69).
5 For a general and philosophical treatment of teleological description of action and goal
see Woodfield (1976). The last decade or so has witnessed a promising revival of more
or less discredited teleology, e.g. Wright (1976) and Rescher (1986). Philosophers of
mind also begin to show strong interest in it, see Lycan (1990).

Pragmatics

and Rhetoric: A Collaborative Approach to Conversation

191

Now let us suppose that Individual A has a goal A feels warm and
that s/he wants to attain hisjher goal by performing a speech act, say, by
uttering Would you please switch on the heater? to Individual B. Thus
we obtain the ensuing flowchart (Figure 4 see p. 190).
At the initial state, A feels cold, which activates A to possess (with
mental representation) the goal which is the desired state that A feels
warm. This goal motivates A to take a certain action to attain the goal,
here a speech act. After processing As speech act, B realizes As goal by
switching on the heater. Notice that stages at t3 and t4 represent linguistic
communication. The remaining stages represent the merging of the linguistic communication into ultra-linguistic purposeful interaction.
5.3. Goal adoption and goal commitment
It is important to notice that Bs action of switching on the heater has As
goal A feels warm. We say that B has adopted As goal in switching on
the heater. So in performing the speech act, A not only has a goal A feels
warm, but has another goal, viz B adopts As goal. We call the first goal
an extra-linguistic goal (G-extra for short), and the second rhetorical
goal (G-rhet for short). G-extra thus defined is another way of saying
perlocutionary goal. However, a perlocutionary effect is not a G-extra.
It is an end-state at which G-extra is realized. Suppose that Individual A
says to Individual B: The earth is flat. Assuming that in saying this A
has a G-extra, B believes that the earth is flat. This G-extra is not an
effect. That B actually believes that the earth is flat is an effect. The actual
occurrence of an effect is already the attainment of G-extra. (Once a goal
is achieved, it ceases to be a goal.) Hence a goal in our sense of the term
can never be an effect in the Austinian sense of the term.
S has a G-extra (or more) in saying something to H in C (= the total
speech context). But the attainment of G-extra requires a rhetorical transaction, because it ultimately depends on the addressee s cooperation by
adopting a goal identical with G-extra. In essence the direct goal of S
saying something to H in C is the G-rhet: H adopts G-extra by doing
such and such. S saying something to H in C therefore is always an
indirect means to G-extra. The direct means to G-extra is the addressees
response-act performed to realize G-extra.
One important difference between the notion of the rhetorical transaction and that of perlocution is that the achieving of perlocutionary effects
becomes the issue of goal-attainment. The attainment of G-rhet and Gextra is a joint endeavour of both speaker and addressee. This joint
endeavour takes place through rhetorical force on the part of the speaker,
and adoption of an identical goal on the part of the addressee. The
addressees role in the rhetorical transaction is just as active and important

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Yueguo Gu

as the speakers. The relation between illocution and perlocution becomes

not by performing x I did y, but performing x in order to reach goal(s),
the description of which may involve y.
One objection to our view of the relation between illocution and
perlocution is the claim: I warn, I order, I request, etc., but I dont care
whether or not my addressee pays any heed to my warning, or carries out
my order, or fulfills my request. All in all, I dont have any perlocutionary
purpose to fulfil. At the first hearing, such a claim appears upholding,
but collapse to scrutiny. In real life social situations, it would be pointless
or even irrational to warn you, order you, etc., without any purpose.
It makes perfect sense to ask: Why do you (qua speaker) perform such
and such illocutionary act(s) in the first place? To look for an answer is
looking for G-rhet and G-extra defined above. But Ss attitude toward
his/her own G-rhet and G-extra varies from goal to goal, and from
situation to situation. We shall use the term goal commitment to refer
to Ss different attitudes toward G-rhets and G-extras. There are degrees
of goal commitment. Some G-rhets and G-extras are strongly desired to
be attained, and S invests more effort in reaching them. Consequently s/
he suffers from severe frustration if the goals are not attained (goal failure).
G-rhets and G-extras like these are goals with strong goal commitment.
Strong goal commitment exerts pressure on H for cooperative rather than
uncooperative responses. S may have very weak goal commitment (Idont-care attitude) to his G-rhets and G-extras. For instance, a librarian
says to a student: I just want to remind you that one of your books is
overdue. We can infer that the librarian has two extra-linguistic goals:
(1)
(2)

The student is aware that his book is overdue

The student returns the book

The adjunct just indicates that the librarian has weak goal commitment
to the second extra-linguistic goal: She cares little about the realization of
the goal, i. e. the student returns the book in fear of being interpreted as
imposing. 6
Some explanation of the notion of goal adoption is needed here, since
some counter-examples against this notion are not difficult to find. Take
D on t wake up! to awaken the sleeping H (Sadock 1974, 153; Bach/
Harnish 1979, 82) and Theres a spider on your lap (see Davis, 1980).
Suppose that in saying these S has the G-extras: H is awakened and H
is frightened. By our goal-attainment analysis, the achievement of these
G-extras will depend on Hs adopting them. One may wonder whether H
actually adopts them before being awakened or frightened. Instances like
6

The first extra-linguistic goal, here G-extra, is somehow unique. Its realization requires
Hs heuristic effort only. The adoption of the goal becomes automatic.

Pragmatics and Rhetoric: A Collaborative Approach to Conversation

193

these can be multiplied, and seem to have some force against the notion
of goal adoption, hence against the rhetorical transaction in general. Goal
adoption is meant to account for the inter-relatedness of one individuals
act to anothers act. One popular explanation is to evoke the notion of
convention. Would you please switch on the heater? counts as an act of
request. 14n act of request requires by social convention a reply. So Hs
switching on the heater is an act in conformity with social convention
(see Austin 1980 [1962], 117). Conversation analysts with ethnomethodological connections and advocates of speech act models of dialogue have
generally adopted this explanation (see Levinson 1981). The explanation
that we attempt to advance is in terms of motivation. If we say that Bs
switching on the heater is an act performed to fulfil As goal A feels
warm without the notion of goal adoption, it will cause considerable
confusion to the theory of action; for it would mean to say that one
agents goal motivates another agents action. In general a correct and
profitable explanation of Bs switching on the heater is to say that s/he
has adopted a goal identical to As goal. Bs adoption of an identical goal
is the link that relates Bs switching on the heater to As speech act.
In general Hs adoption of a goal identical to Ss is a form of social
cooperation. It may be due to some altruistic motive or other motives,
and it is quite normal for H to adopt goals the realization of which is at
his/her cost. Sjhe does so for some other reasons or in order to fulfil other
goals. In general Hs adoption of a goal identical to Ss can be the killing
of two or many birds with one stone. Hs switching on the heater realizes
Ss G-extra, and meanwhile it may also fulfil Hs own goal, viz H feels
warm, the goal H merely possesses without bothering to take any action
to realize it, or it may achieve some social goals such as S is pleased, and
so on.
Let us come back to the counter-examples above. In these instances,
goal adoption is unnecessary. But speech acts like these make a very small
subclass, which are even negligible. Hs response of being awakened or
frightened may very well take place before linguistic communication is
successfully completed (see Gu, 1993, for detailed criticism of the two
counter-examples). Another subclass of illocutionary acts which appear to
pose problems are those highly ritualized conventional acts like wedding,
christening, and sentencing at court. In these cases, goal adoption is
achieved before the actual ceremonies or procedures.

6. ,4 look at the future

Limited space does not allow us to elaborate the notion of rhetorical
transaction any further. To conclude this paper I would like to give a
contour map of future research. The pragmatics/ rhetoric collaborative

194

Yueguo Gu

approach to conversation (or talk exchanges) focuses on the developing

of speech acts, goal structure and goal attainment in the process of
conversationists rhetorical management of conversation. The development
of speech acts include propositional development and illocutionary force
development (cf Widdowson 1978). Goal structure refers to goal relations
between Ss goals and Hs goals, and goal relations among Ss own goals
and among Hs own goals. Goal attainment is to assess how successful
the conversation is being managed by the participants. (For preliminary
discussion of these notions interested readers may consult Gu 1987, 1989.)

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