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PENGUIN

CLASSICS

EARLY GREEK PH ILOSO PHY


ADVISORY EDITOR: BETTY RADICE

Jonathan Barnes was born in 1942 and educated at the City


o f London School and Balliol C ollege, O x fo rd . From 1968
to 1978 he was a Fellow o f Oriel C ollege, O x fo rd ; since then
he has been a Fellow o f Balliol C ollege, O x fo rd . He has
lectured in philosophy since 1968.
His visiting appointm ents have taken him to the U niver
sity o f Chicago, the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton,
the University o f Massachusetts at Am herst, the University
o f T exas at Austin and the W issenschaftskolleg zu Berlin.
He has published num erous articles in learned jou rnals and
his books include The Presocralic Philosophers (1979, second
edition 1982) and, in the Past Masters series, Aristotle ( 1982).
Jonathan Barnes has also written the introduction to Aris
totles Ethics in the Penguin Classics.

J O N A T H AN BARNES

EARLY GREEK
PHILOSOPHY

P E N G U IN

BOOKS

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on the subsequent p u rch aser

CONTENTS

M ap
In troduction

7
9

Synopsis
Note to the R ead er

PART
1
2
3
4
5
6

36
50

P recursors
T h a le s
A n a x im an d er
A n axim en es
Pythagoras
A lcm aeon

55
61
71
77
81
89

7 X en o p h an es
8 H eraclitus

93
100

PART
Parm enides
Melissus
11 Zeno

II
129
143
150

EARLY CREEK

PHILOSOPHY

P A R T III
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

E m pedocles
F ifth-century P ythagoreanism
H ippasus
Philolaus
Ion o f C hios
H ipp o
A n a x a go ras
A rch elau s
L eu cippu s
D em ocritus
D iogenes o f A po llo n ia

161
202
214
216
223
224
226
240
242

A p p en d ix : T h e Sources
F u rth er R ead ing

295
302

Subject In dex
In d ex to Q u o ted T e x t
In d ex to D iels-K ranz B -T exts

35
309
3 *5

244
289

INTRODUCTION

I The First Philosophers


A cco rd in g to tradition, G re e k p h ilosop h y b egan in 585 and
en ded in a d 529. It began w hen T h a le s o f M iletus, th e first
G reek ph ilosopher, p red icted an eclipse o f the sun. It en d ed
when the C hristian E m p ero r Justinian fo rb a d e the teach in g
o f pagan ph ilosoph y in the U niversity o f A th en s. T h e tradition
is a sim plification: G reek s had en tertain ed philosop h ical
thoughts b efo re 585 , and Ju stin ian s ed ict, w h atever its
intention, did not b rin g p agan p h ilosop h y to a su d den stop.
B u t the traditional dates stand as co n ven ien t and m em orable
boundaries to the ca reer o f ancien t philosophy.
T h e thousand years o f that ca reer d ivid e into th ree period s
o f u nequal d u ratio n . First, th ere w ere the salad years, from
585 until about 400 , w hen a sequ en ce o f g ree n and
genial individuals established th e scope and d eterm in ed the
problem s o f p hilosophy, an d b egan to d evelo p its con cep tu al
equ ipm ent and to fix its stru ctu re. T h e n cam e the p eriod o f
the Schools the p eriod o f Plato and A ristotle, o f the E p i
cureans and the Stoics, and o f the Sceptics - in w hich elab orate
systems o f th ou g h t w ere w orked o u t and subjected to stren u
ous criticism. T h is second period en d ed in about 100 . T h e
lon g third period was m arked in the m ain by sch olarsh ip and
syncretism : the later th in kers stu d ied their p red ecesso rs w rit
ings with assiduity; th ey p ro d u ced com m entaries an d in
terpretations; and they attem pted to extra ct a co h eren t and
u nified system o f th o u g h t w hich w ould in clu d e all th at was
best in the earlier d octrines o f th e Schools.

INTRODUCTION

T h e p resen t book is co n cern ed with the first o f the three


period s, with early G reek ph ilosop h y. T h is period is com
m only called the Presocratic phase o f G reek th ou gh t. T h e
ep ith et is inaccu rate, fo r Socrates was bo rn in 470 and died
in 399, so that m any o f the P resocratic p hilosophers w ere in
fact co n tem p o raries o f Socrates. B u t the label is well en tren
ch ed and it w ould be idle to attem pt to evict it.
T h e P resocratic p eriod itself d ivides into th ree parts. T h e r e
was first a cen tu ry o f bold and creative th ou g h t. T h e n the early
ad ven tu res w ere subjected to strin gen t logical criticism : the
d aw n th ey had h erald ed seem ed a false daw n, th eir discoveries
ch im erical, th eir hopes illusory. Finally, th ere w ere years o f
retren ch m en t and consolidation , in which thin kers o f very d if
feren t persu asions attem pted each in his ow n way to reconcile
the h opes o f the first th in kers with the rig o ro u s criticism s o f
th eir successors.
T h e s e schem atism s im pose a fixity on w hat was in reality
fluid an d irreg u la r. T h e G reek s them selves, w hen they cam e
to w rite th e history o f th eir ow n th o u g h t, w ere even m ore
schem atic. T h e y liked to talk ab o u t Schools and about Succes
sions, in w hich each th in k er had a m aster an d a p u p il, and
each p h ilosop h y a set place. T h e s e constructions, artificial
th o u g h they are, su p p ly an intellectual fra m ew o rk w ithout
w hich the h istory o f th ou g h t can n ot readily be co m p reh e n d ed .
M oreo ver, it is at least ap p ro x im ately tru e that the Presocratics
form a u nitary g ro u p , that they d iffe r in fu n d am en tal ways
both fro m th eir u nph ilosop hical p red ecessors and from their
g re a t successors, and that w ithin the era w hich their fortu nes
span th ree m ain p eriod s can be distin gu ished.
Su ch n aked abstractions req u ire a co verin g o f d ecen t histori
cal robes. W h en w e thin k o f G reece we habitually thin k first o f
A th en s, su p p o sin g that th e city o f Pericles an d the P arthenon,
o f Socrates an d A ristop h an es, was the cen tre an d focus o f the
G re ek w o rld , artistically, intellectually an d politically. In fact
n on e o f th e earliest p h ilosoph ers was A th en ia n . Philosophy
b loom ed first on the eastern shores o f th e A e g e a n , in small
in d e p en d e n t city-states w hich had at that tim e no political ties
with A th en s. T h e G re e k states o f Ionia, on the south-west

10

INTRODUCTION

coastal strip o f A sia M in or (m o d em T u rk e y ), w ere torn by


internal strife and th reatened by ex tern a l en em ies. Y e t fo r a
cen tury and a half, fro m about 650 to 500 , they en jo yed a
rem arkable efflorescence: they b u rg eo n e d econom ically, they
bloom ed politically, in art and in literatu re they flo u rish ed ,
p ro d u cin g m ajestic a rch itectu re, noble scu lp tu re, exqu isite
poem s, elegan t vase-paintings.
It was at M iletus in th e south o f Ionia that G re e k ph ilosoph y
was born. T h e M ilesians w ere an u n co m m on ly vigoro u s lot.
Internally, th eir politics w ere tu rb u len t - they knew faction ,
strife and blood y revo lu tion . E xtern ally, they w ere n e ig h
b ou red by two p o w erfu l em p ires, first the Lydian s, with w hom
they m aintained an u neasy sym biosis, and a fter 546 th e P er
sians, by w hom they w ere eventually d estroyed in 494. D espite
these un p ro p itio u s circum stances, the M ilesians w ere co m m er
cially in d efatigable. T h e y trad ed not o n ly with the eastern
em pires bu t also with E gyp t, establishing a tra d in g em p o riu m
at N aucratis on the N ile delta. In add ition th ey sent n u m erou s
colonies to settle in T h r a c e , by th e B o sp h o ru s and a lo n g the
coast o f the Black Sea; and they also had conn ection s with
Sybaris in south Italy. It was in this g ifte d tow nship that T h a le s,
A n a x im an d er and A n a xim en es, th e first th ree philosop h ers,
lived and w orked.
H ow soon and how w id ely th eir ow n w ork becam e know n
we cannot say. B u t the intellectual activity which they p io n
eered soon sp read . H eraclitus cam e from the city o f E phesus,
a p rosperou s state som e m iles to the north o f M iletus. X e n
oph an es cam e from n earby C o lo p h o n . P ythagoras was born
on the island o f Sam os, w hich lies close to the m ain land h a lf
way betw een Ephesus and C o lo p h o n . L ater, A n a x a g o ra s cam e
from C lazo m en ae, M elissus fro m Sam os an d D em ocritu s fro m
A b d era in th e north-east.
T h e west too m ad e its contrib ution. P ythagoras em igrated
from Sam os to the G reek colon y o f C ro to n in south Italy.
A lcm aeon was a native o f C ro to n . P arm enid es and Z en o w ere
born in Elea on the west coast o f Italy. E m ped ocles cam e fro m
A cragas in Sicily.
T h is geograph ical d iversity d id not m ean that the Pre-

INTRODUCTION

socratics w ere in d ep en d e n t w orkers, w ritin g in ign orance o f


o n e a n o th e rs th ou gh ts. A lth o u g h com m unications w ere slow
and freq u en tly d an gero u s, m any o f the early philosophers w ere
itin eran t. P ythagoras, as I said, m igrated fro m the east to the
west. X en o p h an es a n d E m ped ocles both tell us that they trav
elled. P arm enid es an d Z en o are su p p o sed by Plato to have
visited A th en s. A n a x a go ras sp ent m uch o f his life in A thens
b e fo re h e retired in ex ile to L am psacu s in the T r o a d . It is true
that th ere is little d irect evid en ce o f fru itfu l intellectual converse
a m o n g the various ph ilosoph ers, and the influences and inter
actions which scholars com m only assum e a re speculative. B ut
the sp eculation s a re plausible. F or m uch in the history o f Preso
cratic th o u g h t is m ost intelligible on the hypothesis o f m utual
contact.
O n e p articu lar case is w orth m ention ing. M elissus cam e
fro m Sam os in the eastern A e g e a n , P arm enid es from Elea in
west Italy. M elissus was w o rk in g at m ost a d ecad e o r so a fter
P arm enides. Y e t it is qu ite certain that M elissus knew P arm en
ides w ork intim ately: eith er he had m et Parm enides, o r he
had d isco vered a co py o f his w ork, o r h e had learn ed o f it from
som e th ird p arty. T h e r e was n o Eleatic S ch oo l: Parm enides,
Z en o an d M elissus d id not m eet regu larly, discuss th eir
th ou gh ts togeth er, give lectures, h ave students, hold sem inars.
N onetheless, they w ere not w o rk in g an d th in kin g in isolation.

T h u s fa r I h ave sp oken o f the Presocratics as philosop h ers o r


th in kers. It is tim e to be a little m ore precise. Philosophy is
a G re e k w o rd , th e etym ological m ean in g o f which is love o f
w isdom . T h e G reeks them selves ten d ed to use th e term in a
b road sense, to co ver m ost o f w hat w e now thin k o f as the
sciences and the liberal arts. T h e School p h ilosophers o f the
secon d p eriod regu larly d ivid ed th eir subject into th ree parts:
logic, ethics an d physics. L o g ic in clu d ed the study o f lan gu age
a n d m ea n in g as well as the study o f th o u g h t an d argu m ent.
Ethics in clu d ed m oral and political th eorizin g, bu t it also
em braced topics which would now fall u nd er the head o f socio
logy and ethnography. Physics was d efined very generously:

12

INTRODUCTION

it was the study o f n atu re and o f all the p h en o m en a o f the


natural world.
In term s o f this later th reefo ld distinction, the Presocratics
w ere rega rd ed prim arily as physicists. T h e r e are ethical and
logical parts to som e o f th eir w orks, bu t th eir c h ie f interest
was physics: A ristotle calls them the phusikoi and th eir activity
phusiologia; they w ere students o f n a tu re and th eir subject was
the study o f n a tu re. T o the m od ern read er that m ay sou n d
m ore like science than p h ilosop h y - and in d eed o u r m od ern
subject o f physics derives its content no less than its nam e
from the G reek phusikoi. But the m odern disdnction between
em pirical science and sp ecu lative ph ilosoph y is not readily
ap plied to the earliest phase o f western th o u g h t, w hen aca
dem ic specializations and intellectual b o u n d aries had not been
th ou gh t o f.
Thales, then, was the first phusikos, the first student o f nat
u re o r natural philosopher. T h e written works o f the early
thinkers frequ en tly b o re the title On Nature (Peri Phuseos); and
although the titles w ere bestow ed not by the au th o rs but by
later scholars, they w ere largely ap p ro p riate. F or th e gen eral
en terprise o f the early p h ilosoph ers was to tell th e w h ole truth
about n atu re : to d escribe, to o rg a n ize, an d to ex p lain the
universe and all its contents. T h e en terp rise in volved , at on e
end o f the scale, detailed accounts o f n u m erou s natural
ph en om en a - o f eclipses and the m otions o f th e h eaven ly b o d
ies, o f th u n d e r and rain and hail and w ind and in g en era l o f
m eteorological events, o f m inerals and o f plants, o f anim als their procreation an d gro w th and n o u rish m en t an d d eath and, eventually, o f m an - o f the biological, psychological,
social, political, cu ltu ral and intellectual aspects o f h u m an life.
A ll this we m igh tju stly co u n t as science; and we sh o u ld regard
the Presocratics as the first investigators o f m atters which
becam e the special objects o f astron om y, physics, chem istry,
zoology, botany, p sych o logy and so o n . A t the o th e r en d o f
the scale, the Presocratic en terp rise involved m uch la rg e r and
m ore obviously p h ilosoph ical questions: d id th e universe
have a beginn in g? A n d i f so, how d id it begin? W hat a re its
basic constituents? W hy d oes it m ove and d evelo p as it does?

INTRODUCTION

W h at, in the m ost g en eral term s, is th e n atu re and the unity


o f the universe? A n d w hat can we h o p e to learn about it?
N o t all the Presocratics asked all these questions, and not all
o f them w rote in such co m p rehen sive term s about n atu re.
B u t they all w rote w ithin that g en eral fram ew ork, and they all
d eserve the h o n o rific title o f phusikos. W h eth er we shou ld now
call them p h ilosoph ers o r scientists o r both is a m atter o f no
im portan ce.
T h e sequ en ce o f phusikoi w ho a re th e h eroes o f this book
w ere not the only intellectual a d ven tu rers o f early G reece in d eed , they w ere not the only thin kers to e n g a g e in phusiologia. T h e didactic poets o f the a ge som etim es in d u lged in
ph ilosophical reflection . T h e playw rights o f the fifth cen tury
indicate a w id esp read interest in philosophical m atters: the
tragedian E u ripid es show s a keen aw areness o f Presocratic
speculation , and the com ic p o et A ristop h an es will p aro d y
p h ilosophical and scientific notions. T h e g reat historians,
H ero d otu s and T h u cy d id es, a re tou ch ed by philosophical
th ou gh t. Several o f the early m edical w ritings associated with
the nam e o f H ipp ocrates a re th o ro u g h ly Presocratic in their
concerns. In the second h a lf o f the fifth cen tu ry the so-called
Sophists - m en such as P rotagoras, G o rgias, H ippias - who
p rofessed to teach rh etoric, virtu e and practical success, w ere
closely allied to the philosophical tradition. T h u s a history o f
Presocratic phusiologia is not a history o f early G re e k th ou gh t
in its en tirety. N onetheless, as A ristotle saw, th e Presocratics
a re th e m ost im portan t an d influential represen tatives o f the
ea rly p eriod : it was they w h o b egan p hilosophy, they w ho p re
p ared the way fo r Plato an d fo r the g rea t ph ilosophical schools
o f th e fo llo w in g generations.
Presocratic p h ilosop h y d id not sp rin g into existen ce ex nihilo.
T h e com m ercial and political relations betw een Ionia and the
M id d le East b ro u g h t cu ltu ral conn ection s a lo n g with them .
N o t all observers a p p ro v ed o f these ties.
T h e C olophonians, according to Phylarchus, originally practised a
tough m ode o f life, but when they contracted ties o f friendship and

INTRODUCTION

alliance with the Lydians they turned to luxury, grow ing their hair
long and adorning it with gold ornam ents. X enophanes says the
same:
Learning useless soft habits from the Lydians
when they were free from hateful despotism
they went to the town square in purple robes,
not less than a thousand o f them in all,
haughty, with elegant hair-styles,
drenched in the perfum e o f synthetic ointments.
(Athenaeus, Deipnosopliists 526)

B ut effem in acy was not th e o n ly L yd ian g ift. T h e r e a re clear


lines o f contact betw een Ionian p o ttery and scu lp tu re on the
o n e hand and L yd ian art on the o th er. T h e L yd ian lan gu age
had som e influ en ce on Ionian poetry. A n d scholars both m o d
ern and ancient have su p p o sed that th ere w ere also co n n ec
tions betw een the earliest G reek th o u g h t an d the intellectual
concerns o f the eastern em pires.
T h e advanced astron om y o f the B abylonians, fo r ex a m p le,
m ust surely have becom e know n on the sh ores o f A sia M in or
and have stim ulated th e Ionians to study astron om y fo r th em
selves. T h a le s k n o w led ge o f th e eclipse o f the sun o f 585
m ust have been d erived fro m B abylonian learn in g. O th e r,
m ore speculative, parts o f Presocratic th o u g h t h ave parallels,
o f a sort, in eastern texts. In add ition , th ere was the E gyptian
connection. T h e G reeks them selves later su p p o sed th at th eir
own ph ilosophy ow ed m uch to the lan d o f the Pharaohs. B u t
alth o ugh som e eastern fertilization can scarcely be d en ied , the
proven parallels a re su rprisin gly few and su rprisin gly im
precise. W hat is m ore, m any o f the m ost characteristic and
significant featu res o f early G reek th o u g h t have no know n
antecedents in eastern cultures.
T h e G reek ph ilosophers also had G re e k predecessors.
E arlier poets had w ritten ab o u t th e n atu re and the o rigin s o f
the universe, telling stories o f how Zeus m arried Earth and
t rod u ced the w orld o f natu re, an d o ffe r in g m ythical histories
o f the hum an race. T h e r e a re sim ilarities betw een certain
aspects o f these early tales and certain parts o f the ea rly p h ilo
sop h ers writings. B u t A ristotle m ad e a sh arp distinction

15

INTRODUCTION

betw een w hat he called the m ythologists and the philo


sop h ers; and it is tru e that the d ifferen ces are fa r m ore m arked
and fa r m ore significant than the sim ilarities.
J u st as the early thin kers so u gh t fo r the o rigin s o f the uni
verse, so later scholars have so u gh t fo r the origin s o f these first
th ou gh ts about the universe. It w ould be silly to claim that
th e Presocratics began som ethin g en tirely novel and totally
u n p rece d en te d in the history o f h u m an intellectual en d eav
o u r. B u t it rem ains tru e that the best researches o f scholarship
have p ro d u ced rem arkably little by way o f tru e antece
dents. It is reasonable to co n clu d e that M iletus in the early
sixth cen tu ry saw the birth o f science and philosophy. T h a t
conclusion does not ascribe any su p ern atu ral talent to T h a le s
and his associates. It m erely su pposes that they w ere m en o f
genius.

II First Philosophy
In w hat d id th eir gen iu s consist? W hat are the characteristics
that d efin e the new discipline? T h r e e things in particu lar m ark
o f f the phusikoi fro m th eir predecessors.
First, and m ost sim ply, the Presocratics invented the very
idea o f science and p h ilosophy. T h e y hit u pon that special way
o f lo o k in g at the w orld w hich is the scientific o r rational way.
T h e y saw the w orld as so m eth in g o rd e re d and intelligible, its
history fo llo w in g an ex p licab le co u rse and its d iffe re n t parts
arra n g ed in som e co m p rehen sib le system . T h e w orld was not
a ran dom collection o f bits, its history was not an arbitrary
series o f events.
Still less was it a series o f events d eterm in ed by the will - o r
the cap rice - o f the gods. T h e Presocratics w ere not, so fa r as
we can tell, atheists: they allow ed the god s into their b rave new
w orld , an d som e o f them attem pted to p ro d u ce an im proved,
ration alized, th eolo gy in place o f the an th ro p o m o rp h ic divini
ties o f the O lym p ian pan th eo n . B u t they rem oved som e o f the
traditional fu n ctio n s fro m the gods. T h u n d e r was exp lain ed
scientifically, in naturalistic term s - it was n o lo n ger a noise

16

INTRODUCTION

m ade by a m inatory Zeus. Iris was the god d ess o f th e rain bow ,
but X en o ph an es insisted that Iris o r the rain bow was in reality
nothing but a m u lticolou red clou d . M ost im portan tly, th e Pre
socratic god s - like the god s o f A ristotle an d even o f that arch
theist Plato - d o not in terfere with the natural w orld .
T h e w orld is o rd erly w ithou t bein g divinely ru n . Its o rd e r
is intrinsic: the internal principles o f n a tu re a re su fficien t to
explain its stru ctu re and its history. F or th e h a p p en in gs that
constitute the w o rld s history a re not m ere b ru te events, to be
record ed and adm ired. T h e y are stru ctu red events w hich fit
togeth er and interconnect. A n d the patterns o f th eir in terco n
nections provid e the tru ly ex p lan a to ry acco u n t o f the w orld .
In the first book o f his Metaphysics A ristotle w rote a sh o rt
account o f th e early history o f G re e k p hilosoph y. H e discussed
the subject exclusively in term s o f exp lan atio n s o r causes. H e
h im self held that th ere w ere fo u r d iffe re n t types o f e x p la n
ation (or fo u r causes) and he th o u g h t that the fo u r had been
slowly d iscovered , o n e by o n e, by his predecessors. T h e history
o f ph ilosophy was thus th e history o f the con ceptu al u n d e r
standing o f ex p lan a to ry schem es. A ristotles a cco u n t o f this
history has been criticized fo r bias and partiality. B u t in essence
A ristotle is right; at any rate, it is in the d evelo p m en t o f the
notion o f explan ation that we m ay see o n e o f the p rim ary
features o f Presocratic philosophy.
Presocratic explan ation s a re m arked by several ch aracter
istics. T h e y are, as I have said, internal: they exp lain the u n i
verse from w ithin, in term s o f its ow n con stitu en t featu res,
and they d o not appeal to arb itrary interven tion fro m w ithout.
T h e y are systematic: they explain the w hole sum o f natural
events in the sam e term s and by the sam e m ethods. T h u s the
general principles in term s o f w hich they seek to accoun t fo r
the origins o f the w orld are also ap p lied to the exp lan atio n s o f
earthquakes o r hailstorm s o r eclipses o r diseases o r m onstrous
births. Finally, Presocratic explan ation s a re economical: they
use few term s, invoke few o p eration s, assum e few u n kn ow n s.
A naxim enes, fo r exam p le, th o u g h t to explain ev e ry th in g in
term s o f a sin gle m aterial elem en t (air) and a p a ir o f co
ordinated o peration s (rarefaction and condensation). T h e

*7

INTRODUCTION

n atural w orld exhibits an ex tra o rd in a ry variety o f phen om en a


and events. T h e variety m ust be reduced to o rder, and the order
m ad e sim ple - fo r that is th e way to intelligibility. T h e Preso
cratics attem pted the m ost ex tre m e fo rm o f sim plicity. I f their
attem pts som etim es look com ic w hen they are com pared with
the elab orate stru ctu res o f m od ern science, nonetheless the
sam e d esire in form s both the ancien t and the m odern
en d ea vo u rs - the d esire to explain as m uch as possible in term s
o f as little as possible.
Science today has its own ja r g o n and its own set o f specialized
concepts - mass, fo rce, atom , elem ent, tissue, n erve, parallax,
ecliptic and so on. T h e term in o logy and the conceptu al equ ip
m ent w ere not god -given : they had to be invented. T h e Preso
cratics w ere a m o n g the first inventors. Plainly, the very attem pt
to p ro v id e scientific exp lan atio n s presu p p o ses certain con
cepts; equ ally plainly, the prosecu tion o f the attem pt will bring
o th e r concepts to birth. T h e process will not - o r not o ften be a self-conscious one. T h e scientists will not o ften say to
them selves: H ere is a cu rio u s p h en om en on ; we m ust elab or
ate new concepts to u nd erstan d it and devise new nam es to
exp ress it. B u tco n ce p t fo rm ation , and the con sequ en td evelop m ent o f a technical vocabu lary, is a constant corollary o f scien
tific stru ggle.
L et m e illustrate th e point briefly by way o f fo u r central
exam p les.
First, th ere is the co n cep t o f the u n iverse o r the world itself.
T h e G ree k w ord is kosmos, w h en ce o u r cosm os and cosm o
lo g y . T h e w ord was certainly used by H eraclitus, and it m ay
p erh a p s have been used by the first M ilesian philosophers.
It is rem arkable en o u g h that these th in kers should have felt
the n eed fo r a w ord to d esign ate the u n iverse - everyth ing,
th e w hole w orld. N orm al conversation and norm al business
d o not req u ire us to talk ab o u t ev eryth in g , o r to form the
co n cep t o f a totality o r universe o f all things. F ar m ore note
w o rth y, h o w ever, is th e choice o f th e w ord kosmos to designate
the u niverse. T h e n o u n kosmos d erives from a verb which
m eans to o rd e r , to a rra n g e , to m arshal - it is used by H om er

18

INTRODUCTION

o f the G reek generals m arshallin g th eir troops fo r battle. T h u s


a kosmos is an o rd erly a rran gem en t. M oreo ver, it is a b eau tifu l
arrangem ent: the w ord kosmos in o rd in a ry G re e k m eant not
only an o rd e rin g but also an a d o rn m en t (hence the English
w ord cosm etic), so m eth in g w hich beautifies and is pleasant to
contem plate.
T h e cosm os is the universe, the totality o f things. B u t it is
also the ordered u niverse, and it is the elegant u niverse. T h e
concept o f the cosm os has an aesthetic aspect. (T h a t, in d eed ,
it is som etim es said, is w hat m akes it characteristically G reek .)
B ut also, and from o u r point o f view m o re im portan tly, it
has an essentially scientific aspect: the cosm os is, necessarily,
o rd ered - and h en ce it m ust be in p rin cip le explicab le.
T h e second term is phusis o r n a tu re. T h e Presocratics, as I
have said, w ere later reg a rd e d as phusikoi, and th eir w orks w ere
generally given the title Peri Phuseos. T h e y them selves used
the term phusis: it is p resen t in several o f th e fragm en ts o f
H eraclitus, and it is plausible to su p p o se that it was also used
by the Milesians.
T h e w ord d erives from a verb m ean in g to g ro w . T h e
im portance o f the co n cep t o f n atu re lies partly in the fact that
it introduces a clear distinction betw een the n atural and the
artificial w orld, betw een things which have g ro w n an d things
which have been m ade. T a b les an d carts and p lo u g h s (and
perhaps societies and laws and justice) are artefacts: th ey have
been m ade by d esigners (hum an d esigners in these cases) and
they are not natural. T h e y have no natu re, fo r they d o not
grow . T re e s and plants and snakes (and p erh a p s also rain and
clouds and m ountains), on th e o th er hand, have not been
m ade: they are not artefacts but natural objects they grew ,
they have a nature.
But the distinction betw een the natural and the artificial (in
G reek, between phusis and techne) does not exhaust the signi
ficance o f the notion o f nature. In one sense the w ord nature
designates the sum o f natural objects and natural events; in
this sense to discourse O n N ature is to talk about the whole
o f the natural w o r ld -phu sis and kosmos com e to m uch the sam e
thing. B ut in an o th er, an d m ore im portan t, sense th e w ord

INTRODUCTION

serves to d en o te so m eth in g within each natural object: in the


first fra gm en t o f H eraclitus, the term phusis designates not
th e cosm os as a w hole but rath er a prin ciple within each nat
ural p art o f the cosm os. W h en the Presocratics inqu ired into
n a tu re, they w ere in q u irin g into the n atu re o f things.
A n y natural object - an yth in g that grow s and is not m ad e has, it was assum ed , a n atu re o f its ow n. Its n atu re is an intrinsic
fe a tu re o f it, an d it is an essential fea tu re not an accidental
o r ch an ce fact ab o u t it. M oreo ver, it is an ex p lan a to ry feature:
the n atu re o f an object explain s why it behaves in the ways it
d oes, w h y it has th e various accidental p rop erties it does.
A ll scientists a re in terested , in this sense, in th e phusis o f
things. A chem ist, investigating som e s tu ff - say, gold is con
cern ed to fin d o u t the u n d erly in g o r basic p rop erties o f gold ,
in term s o f w hich its o th e r p rop erties can be exp lain ed . Per
haps the basic p ro p erties o f g o ld a re those associated with its
atom ic w eight. T h e s e p rop erties will then exp lain w hy gold is,
say, m alleable an d d uctile, w hy it is soft and yellow , w hy it
dissolves in su lp h u ric acid, and so on. T h e chem ist is lookin g
fo r th e fu n d am en tal p ro p erties o f go ld , fo r its essence - fo r
its n a tu re o r phusis. T h is indispensable scientific co n cep t was
first established by th e Presocratics.
N a tu re is a p rin cip le an d o rig in o f gro w th . T h e notions o f
p rin cip le an d o rig in in tro d u ce us to a third Presocratic term :
arche. T h e w o rd , w e a re told, was first used by A n a x im an d er.
It is a d ifficu lt term to translate. Its co gn ate ve rb can m ean
e ith e r to b eg in , to co m m en ce, o r else to ru le, to g o v e rn .
A n arche is thus a b eg in n in g o r origin ; an d it is also a rule o r a
ru lin g p rin cip le. (Arche is in fact the norm al G re e k w ord fo r
an o ffice o r m agistracy.) W riters on an cien t ph ilosoph y often
use th e w ord p rin cip le o r the p hrase first p rin cip le to ren d er
arche, and I shall follow th e practice. T h e term is apt, p rovid in g
that th e re a d e r keeps in m ind th e Latin etym o logy o f the E n gl
ish w ord: a prin ciple is a principium o r a begin n in g.
T h e in qu iry into th e natu res o f thin gs leads easily to a search
fo r principles. N a tu re is grow th: what, th en, d oes gro w th start
fro m ? W h at are the principles o f gro w th , th e origin s o f natural
p h en om en a? T h e sam e qu estions w ere readily asked o f the

20

INTRODUCTION

cosm os as a w hole: how d id it begin? W hat a re its first p rin c


iples? W hat are the fu n d am en tal elem ents fro m w hich it is
m ade and the fu n d am en tal op eration s w hich d ete rm in e its
structure and career?
T h e inquiry into archai was in this way closely associated with
cosm ology, and also with abstract physics o r chem istry. T h e
principles o f the u niverse will in clu d e its basic s t u ff o r stu ffs.
B ut evidently ev ery th in g m ust be m ad e o u t o f the basic s tu ff
o r stu ffs o f the universe. in q u irin g into th e princip les
o f the cosm os m eans in q u irin g into th e fu n d a m en ta l constitu
ents o f all natural objects. T h e Presocratic inquiries w ere inevit
ably cru de. T h a le s, i f we a re to believe the later testim ony,
held that everyth in g is m ad e o f w ater. T h e arche o f th e cosm os
is water (or p erh ap s liquid), so that e v ery th in g in th e cosm os
is, at bottom , m ad e o f w ater. (C u cu m b ers a re 100 p e r cen t
water, not 99 p e r cen t as m od ern cu lin ary pu nd its say.) T h e
d iffe ren t stu ffs we see an d feel are, in T h a le s view , m erely
m odifications o f w ater - m uch as we now th in k coal an d d ia
m onds to be m odifications o f carbon . T h a le s su ggestion is
false in fact; but it is not foolish in p rin cip le - o n th e co n trary,
it is th oro u gh ly scientific in spirit.
T h e fo u rth o f my illustrative exam p les is th e co n ce p t o f
logos. T h e w ord logos is ev en h a rd er to translate than arche. It
is cognate with the verb legein, w hich n orm ally m eans to say
o r to state. T h u s a logos is so m eth in g said o r stated. W h en
H eraclitus begins his bo ok with a referen ce to this logos, h e
probably m eans o n ly this statem ent o r this acco u n t : m y logos
is sim ply w hat I am g o in g to say. B u t the w ord also has a rich er
m eaning than that. T o g ive a logos o r an acco u n t o f so m eth in g
is to exp lain it, to say why it is so; so that a logos is o ften a reason.
W hen Plato says that an intelligen t m an can give a logos o f
things, he m eans not that an in telligen t m an can describe things,
but rath er that he can explain o r give the reason fo r things.
T h en ce, by an intelligible tran sferen ce, logos com es to be used
o f the faculty with w hich w e g ive reasons, i.e. o f o u r h um an
reason. In this sense logos m ay be contrasted with p ercep tio n ,
so that Parm enides, fo r ex a m p le, can u rg e his read ers to test
his argu m en t not by th eir senses bu t by logos, by reason. (T h e

INTRODUCTION

English term logic d erives ultim ately from this sense o f the
w ord logos, by way o f the later G reek term logike.)
It cann ot be said that the Presocratics established a single
clear sense fo r the term logos o r that they invented the concept
o f reason o r o f rationality. B u t th eir use o f the term logos consti
tutes the first step tow ards the establishm ent o f a notion which
is central to science and philosophy.
T h e term logos brings m e to th e third o f th e th ree great
achievem ents o f the Presocratics. I m ean their em phasis on
th e use o f reason, on rationality and ratiocination, on a rg u
m ent and evid en ce.
T h e Presocratics w ere not dogm atists. T h a t is to say, they did
not rest con ten t with m ere assertion. D eterm ined to exp lain as
well as d escribe the w orld o f natu re, they w ere acutely aw are
that exp lan atio n s req u ired the giv in g o f reasons. T h is is evi
d e n t even in the earliest o f the Presocratic thinkers and even
w hen th eir claim s seem m ost stran ge and leastju stified . T h a les
is su p posed to have held that all things possess souls o r are
alive. H e d id not m erely assert this bizarre d octrine: he argu ed
fo r it by a p p ea lin g to the case o f the m agnet. H ere is a piece
o f stone - w hat cou ld ap p ea r m ore lifeless? Y et the m agnet
possesses a p o w er to move o th er things: it attracts iron filings,
which m ove tow ards it w ithout the interven tion o f any external
pushes o r pulls. N ow it is a noticeable fea tu re o f living things
that they a re capable o f p ro d u cin g m otion. (A ristotle later took
it as o n e o f the d efin in g characteristics o f things with souls or
living things that they possess such a m otive pow er.) H ence
T h a le s co n clu d ed that the m agn et, d esp ite appearances, has a
soul.
T h e a rg u m e n t m ay not seem very im pressive: certainly we
d o not believe that m agnets a re alive, nor should we regard
the attractive pow ers o f a p iece o f stone as evid en ce o f life. B ut
m y p o in t is not that the Presocratics o ffe r e d good argu m ents
bu t sim ply that th ey o ffe r e d arguments. In the thinkers o f the
secon d Presocratic p hase this love o f a rg u m en t is m ore obvious
and m ore p ro n o u n ced . In them , in d eed , a rg u m en t becom es
the sole m eans to tru th , and p erception is rega rd e d as
22

INTRODUCTION

fun dam entally illusory. T h e w ritings o f P arm enid es, M elissus


and Zeno w ere n oth in g m ore than chains o f argu m en ts.
T h e Presocratic ach ievem en t h ere is evid en t in th eir lan
guage. G reek is ideally suited fo r rational discourse. It is rich
in particles, and it can exp ress nuances and niceties o f th o u g h t
which in Latin o r English are n orm ally co n veyed by the tone
o f voice o r the m an n er o f d elivery. T h e G reek p a rtic le s -w h ic h
are part o f the natural lan gu age an d not devices p ecu liar to
academ ic w riters - m ake ex p licit and o bvious w hat o th e r lan
guages norm ally leave im plicit and obscure. Little w ords like
so, th e re fo re , fo r , which English custom arily om its (or
includes at the cost o f tedious pedantry), a re n orm ally
expressed in a G reek text. T h e fragm en ts o f M elissus, fo r
exam p le, are p ep p ered with such in feren tial particles. P reso
cratic w riting wears its rationality on its sleeve.
It is im portan t.to see exactly w hat this rationality consisted
in. A s I have already indicated, the claim is not that the P reso
cratics w ere pecu liarly g oo d at a rg u in g o r that th ey regu larly
p rod u ced sou n d argu m en ts. O n th e co n trary, m ost o f th eir
theories a re false, and m ost o f th eir a rg u m en ts a re unsou n d.
(This is not as harsh a ju d g e m e n t as it m ay seem , fo r th e sam e
could be said o f virtually every scientist an d p h ilo so p h e r w ho
has ever lived.) Secon dly, the claim is not that the Presocratics
studied logic o r d evelo p ed a theory o f in fere n ce an d argu m en t.
Som e o f them , it is tru e, d id reflect on the p o w ers o f th e m ind
and on the nature, scope and limits o f hu m an k n o w led ge. B u t
the study o f logic was in ven ted by A ristotle, an d A ristotle
rightly boasted that no o n e b e fo re him had attem p ted to m ake
explicit and system atic the rules and p ro ced u res w hich g o v ern
rational th ought.
N or, thirdly, am I su ggestin g that the Presocratics w ere con
sistently critical thinkers. It is som etim es said th at the essence
o f science is criticism , inasm uch as science lives by th e constant
critical appraisal o f theories an d argu m en ts. W h eth er o r not
that is so, the Presocratics w ere not avid critics. A lth o u g h w e
m ay talk o f the influence o f o n e Presocratic o n an o th er, no
Presocratic (as fa r as w e know) ev er in d u lg ed in the exposition
and criticism o f his pred ecesso rs views. P arm en id es u rg e d his
23

INTRODUCTION

read ers to criticize his views, but his u rg in g s went unansw ered.
C ritical reflection d id not com e into its own until the fo u rth
cen tu ry .
W hat, th en, is the substance o f the claim that the Presocratics
w ere ch am pion s o f reason and rationality? It is this: they
o ffe r e d reasons fo r their opinion s, th ey gave argu m en ts for
th eir views. T h e y did not u tter ex cathedra pron oun cem ents.
P erhaps that seem s an u n rem arkable achievem ent. It is not.
O n the co n trary, it is the m ost rem arkable and the m ost praise
w orth y o f the th ree achievem en ts I have rehearsed . T h o se
w h o d o u b t the fact should reflect on the m axim o f G eo rge
B erkeley, the eigh teen th -cen tu ry Irish p hilosopher: All m en
have opinion s, but few think.

I l l The Evidence
A few Presocratics w rote nothing, but m ost p u t th eir thoughts
to p ap er. Som e w rote in verse and som e in prose. Som e wrote
a sin gle w ork, o thers several - D em ocritus, w hose w orks w ere
a rra n g e d and catalogu ed by a scholar in the first cen tury a d ,
ap p aren tly com posed som e fifty books. A ll told, the collected
w orks o f the Presocratic thin kers w ould have m ad e an im press
ive row on the library shelves.
O f all those w orks not o n e has su rvived intact fo r us to read.
Som e o f them en d u red fo r at least a thousand years, fo r the
sch olar Sim plicius, w ho w orked in A th en s in the sixth century
a d , was able to consult texts o f Parm enides, M elissus, Zeno,
A n a x a go ras, D iogenes o f A p o llo n ia and others. B u t Sim plicius
h im self rem arks that P arm en id es book was a rarity, and it is
not d ifficu lt to im agin e that by his tim e m any o th e r Presocratic
works had actually d isap p eared . T h e Presocratics w ere never
bestsellers. B o oks w ere easily d estroyed .
O u r k n o w led ge o f the Presocratics, then, unlike o u r know
led ge o f Plato o r A ristotle, is not gained directly from the books
th ey w rote. R ather, it d ep en d s u pon ind irect inform ation o f
two d iffe re n t types.
First, th ere a re n u m erou s referen ces to Presocratic th ou gh t

24

INTRODUCTION

in the su rvivin g works o f later authors. Som e o f these r e fe r


ences are b r ie f and casual allusions, m ere em bellishm ents to a
text w hose c h ie f aim was not the transm ission o f historical
inform ation about early philosoph y. M any o f the referen ces
are em bed d ed in later philosophical texts - fo r ex a m p le, in
A ristotles Metaphysics and in his Physics. T h e s e accounts have
a historical p u rp ose and they are written with a philosop h ical
intention; but they are not, p ro p erly sp eakin g, histories o f
ph ilosop h y. Finally, th ere a re g en u in e attem pts at the history
o f philosophy. W e can now read such histories in b r ie f h an d
books (for exam p le, in the History o f Philosophy w hich goes
u n d er G a len s nam e), in the am bitious but uncritical Lives o f the
Philosophers by D iogenes L aertius, in several w orks o f C h ristian
polem ic (such as the Refutation o f A ll Heresies by H ipp olytus),
in scholarly w ritings o f late antiquity (most notably in the co m
m entary on A ristotles Physics by Sim plicius).
T h e se histories - o r d o x o g ra p h ie s, as they a re com m only
called - have been the subject o f subtle scholarly investigation.
In them selves they are o f u ncertain value. T h e y w ere w ritten
centuries a fter the th o u g h t they ch ron icle, and they w e re w rit
ten by m en with d iffe re n t interests and d iffe re n t outlooks.
I f Bishop H ippolytus, fo r exam p le, ascribes a certain view to
H eraclitus, we shou ld not believe him b e fo re an sw erin g two
im portant questions. First, from w hat sou rce d id he d raw his
inform ation? For the ch ann el w hich w inds fro m H eraclitus to
H ippolytus is lon g, and w e m ust w o n d er i f th e in form ation
flow ing dow n it was not som etim es contam in ated with false
hood o r poisoned by inaccuracy. Secon dly, w hat w ere H ip p o
lytus own philosophical predilections, an d w hat w ere the aim s
o f his own book? F or these m ay h ave biased him consciously
o r unconsciously - in his rep o rtin g . T h e argu m en ts on these
issues are intricate. T h e y rarely issue in certainty.
In addition to later referen ces and reports, we still possess
som e actual fragm en ts o f th e origin al w orks o f the P reso
cratics. T h e w ord fra g m en t p erh ap s suggests a sm all scrap o f
paper, torn o u t o f a P resocratic bo ok and su rvivin g by som e
fluke o f tim e. T h a t su ggestion is in a p p ro p ria te h ere , w h ere
the w ord fra g m en t is used in a m ore g en ero u s sense: it refers
25

INTRODUCTION

to passages from the Presocratics own w ritings - words,


phrases, sentences, p a ra g ra p h s -w h ic h have been preserved as
quotations in the w ritings o f later authors. T h e s e fragm en ts
constitute o u r most precious testim ony to th e views o f the Pre
socratics. T h e ir n u m b er and th eir ex ten t vary greatly from
o n e th in k er to an other. Som etim es th ey a re sh ort and sparse.
In a few cases we possess en o u g h fragm en ts to form a tolerably
d eterm in ate idea o f the original w ork. T h e fu ller the fra g
m ents, the less we need to rely on the d o x o gra p h ical m aterial
B u t even in the m ost favou rable cases, the d o x o gra p h ie s are
o f im portan ce: they p ro vid e indirect evid en ce w h ere direct
evid en ce is m issing, and they give invaluable aid in the
in terp retation o f the fragm en ts them selves.
F or it sh ou ld not be th o u g h t that these fragm en ts a re readily
extracted from th eir contexts o r read ily u n d erstoo d and inter
p reted . T h e r e is a sequ ence o f d ifficu lties o f w hich every seri
ous stu d en t o f early G reek ph ilosoph y becom es quickly aware.
It is necessary to say a little about these d ifficu lties h ere - and
th ey have, in any case, an intrinsic interest o f th eir own. L et us
co n sid er the gen eral issues th ro u gh the m edium o f a particular
exam p le. T a k e the fo llo w in g passage (which will reap p ea r in
the ch a p ter on A n axagoras):
In the first book o f the Physics Anaxagoras says that uniform stuffs,
infinite in quantity, separate o f f from a single m ixture, all things
being present in all and each being characterized by what predom in
ates. He makes this clear in the first book o f the Physics at the begin
ning o f which he says: T o g eth e r w ere all things, infinite both in
quantity and in smallness . . .
(Simplicius, Commentary on the Physics 155.23-27)

Sim plicius was born in Cilicia in the latter part o f the fifth
cen tu ry a d . H e stu d ied p h ilosop h y first at A lex a n d ria and
then at A th en s, w h ere he becam e o n e o f the lead in g figures o f
the N eop latonist school. A fte r Ju stin ian s ed ict he left A th en s
and w ent, with som e o f his associates, to the royal co u rt in
Persia, but the eastern life p ro ved u nattractive and he
retu rn ed to A th en s about 533. T h e r e he co n tin u ed his
26

INTRODUCTION

researches (though he was prob ably b a rred from teaching),


w riting lon g and learn ed com m en taries on A risto tles works
and using the resources o f the A th en ian libraries. His co m m en
tary on the Physics was p rob ably co m p leted in abo u t 540. It is a
h u ge w ork, ru n n in g to m ore than a thousan d large pages; in
it Sim plicius preserves n u m erou s Presocratic fra gm en ts and in
addition presents valuable d o x o gra p h ical accounts o f early
G reek thought.
Sim plicius h im self w ro te m ore than a m illenn ium a fter
A n axagoras. B u t that is not the full m easu re o f o u r distance
from A n a x a go ras as we read Sim plicius texts; fo r w e d o not
possess Sim plicius ow n a u to g ra p h co p y o f his com m entary.
So m eth in g like sixty m anuscript copies o f the w o rk are extan t,
the earliest o f w hich dates fro m the tw elfth cen tu ry and is
th ere fo re som e six h u n d re d years later than Sim pliciu s text.
A ll these m anuscripts d erive ultim ately fro m Sim pliciu s au to
graph ; but they a re copies o f copies o f copies. Each act o f
copyin g introduces erro rs (fo r h o w ever ca refu l a scribe m ay
be, he will certainly m ake m istakes), and no two m anuscripts
a gree w ord fo r w ord with o n e an o th er. T h e first task, th en , is
to d eterm ine, on the evid en ce o f these late and con flictin g
m anuscripts, w hich w ords Sim plicius h im self actually w rote.
(In o u r illustrative text som e o f the m anuscripts give the G reek
fo r a single m ixtu re, and that is the G re e k I have translated;
oth er m anuscripts give the G reek fo r som e m ix tu re . H ere the
variants d iffe r little in sense, and the choice betw een them is
not o f great m om ent. In m any cases, how ever, the read in gs
o f d iffe ren t m anuscripts g ive radically d iffe r e n t senses.) T h e
discipline o f textual criticism has p ro ced u res an d tech niqu es
whose aim is to p ro d u ce the best text o r th e tex t closest to w hat
the au th o r origin ally w rote. O fte n it is possible to d ecid e w hich
o f several variant read in gs o ffe r e d by the d iffe re n t m an u
scripts is the origin al read in g. O ccasionally it is clear that non e
o f the m anuscript read in gs can be correct, and conjectu ral
em endation m ay, with g rea ter o r less plausibility, resto re the
original text. Q u ite o ften we are obliged to confess that w e d o
not really know what precise w ords Sim plicius w ro te d ow n .
O n ce Sim plicius tex t is established, w e m ay tu rn to the

27

INTRODUCTION

A n a x a g o rea n m aterial em b ed d ed in it. H ere the first question


is w h eth er o r not Sim plicius p u rp o rts to be quoting A n a x a g
oras. T h is question is easy in the case o f Presocratics who wrote
in verse, as Parm enides and E m ped ocles d id ; fo r if Sim plicius
rem arks that P arm enid es says this . . and then breaks into
verse, we can be su re that he is p u rp o rtin g to quote Parm enides
and not m erely to p arap h rase him . W ith prose auth ors the
question is m uch h ard er. O ccasionally Sim plicius will say X
says, in these very w ords, t h a t . . . : and then we know that he
p u rp o rts to qu ote. B ut such explicitness is rare. Far m ore often
he like any o th er sou rce - will sim ply say X says that . . .. In
G reek as in English, phrases o f that sort m ay as well introd u ce
a p arap h rase - even a rem ote parap h rase - as a verbatim
citation. T o distinguish citations fro m parap h rase we m ust rely
on various linguistic signs. F or exam p le, i f Sim plicius writes,
A n a x a go ras says that . . . and follow s it with a p aragrap h o f
prose in an archaic style, it is plausible to in fe r that he is p u r
p o rtin g to quote A n a x a go ras. So it is in o u r illustrative text.
B u t i f the saying is short th ere m ay be n o th in g to distinguish
quotation from paraph rase.
Su p pose, then, that we have established Sim plicius text and
have d eterm in ed that he p u rp o rts to q u o te A n axago ras. N ot
all p u rp o rted quotations are actual quotations. (A n d not all
actual quotations a re p u rp o rted quotations. B u t in this context
the possibility o f d isguised o r u n an n ou n ced quotations need
not exercise us.) W h en Sim plicius p u rp o rts to q u o te from a
w ork w ritten a th ou san d years b efo re his tim e, he could be in
erro r. T h e w ork he cites cou ld be a fo rgery : the co u n terfeitin g
o f early texts was a p o p u la r pastim e in the ancient w orld, and
am o n g the Presocratics P ythagoras an d his im m ediate fol
low ers had n u m erou s w orks falsely fa th ere d on them . A g ain ,
th ere m ay have been a sim ple m istake: the bo ok from which
Sim plicius quotes m ay have been w ro n gly labelled o r m isidentified. Som e scholars have th o u g h t that Sim plicius d id not
have a p ro p e r text o f A n a x a go ras available to h im ; and his qu ot
ations, th ey think, com e from a later epitom e o f A n a x a go ras
book, not (as he thou ght) fro m the book itself. In this particular

28

INTRODUCTION

case I d o not think that scepticism is ju stified ; bu t the possibility


o f such e rro r d em an ds contem plation .
Suppose, now, that we have a g en u in e quotation o f A n a x a g
oras before us: the n ext questions concern its conten ts and
first, its contents in the m ost literal sense o f the term . W hat
words did A n a x a go ras use? F or th ere is no reason to assum e
that Simplicius w ords m ust accurately rep resen t Anaxagoras
words. O n the contrary, th ere is every reason to th in k that
they d o not. Sim plicius m ay be qu o tin g from m em ory and
m isrem em bering; o r he m ay be q u o tin g fro m a tex t he has in
fro n t o f his eyes - and m iscopying. E rrors o f both sorts are
easy and com m on. M ore im portan tly, even i f Sim plicius is
accurately transcribing the text h e h im self has in fro n t o f him ,
there is no g u a ran tee that his tex t is fa ith fu l to th e o rigin al.
D u rin g the m illennium separatin g Sim plicius fro m the P reso
cratics, the w orks o f A n a x a go ras m ust have been co p ied m any
times over. Ju st as we read copies o f copies o f Sim plicius a u to
g rap h , so Sim plicius will have read copies o f copies o f A n a x
agoras a u to grap h . T h e probability that Sim plicius read a p u re
text o f A n a xa go ras is zero.
W hat can a m od ern scholar d o about this? So m e Presocratic
passages are qu o ted m ore than once. T h e first ph rase o f the
quotation in o u r illustrative text becam e the T o be, o r n o t to
be o f P resocratic th ou gh t: it is cited som e sixty tim es by som e
twenty a u th o r s . In such cases th ere are alw ays varian t versions
o f the text, but th ere is o ften reason to p r e fe r o n e version to
another. F or exam p le, an a u th o r w ho quotes a b r ie f passage
was probably q u o tin g fro m m em ory, an d he is th e re fo re m ore
likely to have m ad e an e rro r than an a u th o r w ho qu otes a
lon g portion o f the origin al and was presu m ably tran scribin g it
from his copy o f the text. O r again, we m ay b e able to constru ct
a plausible story to acco u n t fo r the d iffe r e n t read in gs in the
d iffe ren t citations, and h ence to establish th e g en u in e P reso
cratic text. In o u r illustrative case we can, by these m eans, be
reasonably co n fid en t that w e know w hat w ords A n a x a g o ra s
h im self wrote.
B u t m ost su rvivin g fra gm en ts are qu o ted o n ly o n ce. H ere
there is less ch ance o f g ettin g back to the o rigin al text. V ario u s

29

INTRODUCTION

philosophical tests an d techniques can be ap p lied . Som etim es,


fo r exa m p le, a linguistic anachron ism will betray itself, and we
m ay suspect that an exp lan ato ry note o r gloss has insinuated
itself into the text. Som etim es we m ay co n jectu re that the old
tex t was retailored to fit its later co n text - and plausible guesses
m ay som etim es hit u p o n the o rigin al read in gs. T h e case is
rarely hopeless, but it always requ ires e x p e rt diagnosis and
som etim es d em an d s subtle th erap y. M ost o ften we m ust be
con ten t with so m eth in g less than certainty.
O n ce w e have b efo re us the w ords o f A n a x a go ras, o r as close
an a p p roxim ation to them as we can reach, we m ust n ext try
to u n d erstan d them . T h is task has two distinct but closely con
nected aspects. First, and m ost o bviously, th ere is the elem en t
ary m atter o f g ra sp in g the sense o f the w ords and phrases
w hich the text contains. Som etim es this is su rprisingly hard.
A n a x a g o ra s is, it is true, on the w h ole an intelligible author;
bu t the sam e cann ot be said fo r all the Presocratics - and som e
o f them (H eraclitus an d E m ped ocles, fo r exam p le) are o ften
h igh ly obscure. T h e ir obscurity fo r us is d u e in part to the
ravages o f tim e: had m ore G reek o f the early period survived,
w e sh ou ld possess m ore co m p arative m aterial and so ex p eri
en ce less d ifficu lty in u n d erstan d in g the Presocratics. B u t in
part the obscurity is intrinsic to the texts them selves: the Preso
cratics w ere w ritin g in a new idiom on a new subject it is only
to be exp e cted that they sh o u ld som etim es h ave been less than
pellucid.
S econ d ly, even i f w e can grasp w hat, at a literal level, the
w ords o f a fra g m en t m ean, we m ay still be fa r from u n d er
stan d in g the passage. Sentences taken o u t o f co n text a re often
h ard to in terp ret, an d isolated p h rases, w hich are som etim es
all we h ave, m ay be virtually senseless. W e need, in o th er
w ords, to ask w hat sense the fra g m en t had in its origin al con
text, w hat contrib ution it m ad e to the g en era l econ om y o f the
p h ilo so p h ers w ork, how it fitted into his a rg u m e n t o r into the
exposition o f his views.
T h is is the point at w hich serious philosophical in terpre
tation begins. It is a testing and an elusive business. T h e r e are
som e ex tern a l aids. In particu lar, th ere is the co n text in which

30

INTRODUCTION

the fragm en t is cited. Som etim es, it is tru e, this co n tex t is o f


little use: fo r the fragm en ts cited by J o h n Stobaeus, fo r ex a m
ple, all we have to g o on a re the section headin gs u n d er w hich
he arran g ed them in his an th olo gy. Som etim es the co ntext
may be actually m isleading. C lem en t o f A lex a n d ria , fo r e x a m
ple, cites the Presocratic pagans fo r his ow n C h ristian ends,
and he does not p u rp o rt to p reserve the o rigin al settings o f
the passages he add u ces (why shou ld he?). N onetheless, the
context is som etim es h elp fu l - especially so, I thin k, in the case
o f Sim plicius, w ho was an able sch olar o f g reat learn in g. (A
good exam p le o f this is the lo n g passage from the co m m en tary
on A ristotles Physics w hich contains all the su rvivin g fragm en ts
o f Zeno.) A t the very least, the co n tex t o f citation will give us
an idea o f how a fra g m en t could h ave fu n ctio n ed in its origin al
hom e.
A gain , com parison o f o n e fra g m en t with an o th er, an d com
parison o f the fragm en ts with the d o x o gra p h ical trad itio n , will
yield fu rth e r evid en ce. T h e collocation o f fragm en ts is o ften
a risky m atter: it is too easy to im agin e that we have en o u g h
bits and pieces to recon stru ct the o rigin al pictu re w hen in fact
we m ay well possess only en o u g h to give o n e sm all p art o f the
original. (This is certainly tru e o f A n a x a go ras, w h ere alm ost
all the su rvivin g fragm en ts a p p e a r to com e fro m the early part
o f his book.) T h e d an gers n eed to be a ck n o w led ged . T h e y can
som etim es be o vercom e.
In sum , the task o f in terpretation is full o f d ifficu lty. (T h a t
is on e reason w hy it is fu ll o f excitem ent.) Som etim es we m ay
fairly claim success. F req u en tly w e shou ld be co n ten t with a
Scottish verdict: non liquet, It is not clea r. B u t these questions
take us beyond the scope o f the p resen t book, w hose fu n ction
is not to o ffe r an exegesis o f Presocratic th o u g h t b u t to exh ibit
the m aterial on w hich any exegesis m ust be based.

IV The Texts
T h is book contains E n glish translations o f all th e su rvivin g
philosophical fragm en ts o f th e Presocratic th in kers. In each

31

INTRODUCTION

ch a p ter the fragm en ts have been su p p lem en ted by extracts


from th e d o x o gra p h ical m aterial. T h e su rvivin g d o xo gra p h y
is vast (and very repetitive). A co m p rehen sive translation
w ou ld fill several tedious and co n fu sin g volum es. T h e selec
tion o f texts h ere does not p reten d to convey all we can glean
fro m the d o x o g ra p h y , bu t it is in ten ded to in clu de all the most
im p ortan t item s and to give a fa ir sam ple o f the u nim portant
items.
T h e m ain chapters o f the bo ok thus p resent a partial view
o f th eir subjects relative to the evid en ce we possess. T h e y also,
an d inevitably, p resen t a partial view relative to the sum total
o f the origin al evid en ce; fo r it is not to be su pposed that the
su rvivin g in form ation represen ts a balanced accoun t o f the
origin al w orks. Som e parts o f the Presocratic writings hap pen
to have been well rep o rted ; others w ere only sketchily
described ; still others w ere en tirely fo rgo tten . W e can d o little
to redress things.
T h e in form ation w hich we d o possess is contain ed in a large
n u m b er o f d iffe re n t and d isparate texts, and it cann ot readily
be set o u t in a m an n er w hich reveals the gen eral d rift and tenor
o f the ph ilosoph ies it describes. From the m aterial exhibited in
the ch a p ter on H eraclitus, fo r exam p le, it is no easy business
to fo rm a gen eral im pression o f the overall shape and intention
o f his th ou g h t. T h e n ext ch a p ter is d esign ed to m itigate this
d ifficulty. It contains a sequ ence o f b r ie f synopses o f the m ain
view s o f each th in ker, in sofar as they can be know n. T h e
synopses a re not substitutes fo r the texts in the m ain chapters,
n o r d o th ey claim to convey definitive interpretation s o r incon
testable truths. R ather, th ey a re in ten d ed to p ro vid e a m od er
ately intelligible fra m ew o rk w ithin w hich the texts m ay first be
read . I h o p e that the rea d er will fo rg e t them as soon as he has
fo u n d his ow n way th ro u gh the texts. T h e y are fixed ropes
on a d ifficu lt rock face, placed th ere fo r the in exp erien ced
clim ber. U se them o n ce o r twice and then clim b free.
T h e fragm en ts a re presen ted in the contexts in which they
h ave been p reserved . T h is m od e o f presentation, w hich is not
cu stom ary, has certain disadvantages: it m akes fo r occasional
32

INTRODUCTION

repetition, and it m eans that the texts a p p e a r in a d iffe re n t


o rd e r from that o f the standard m od ern editions. B u t those
disadvantages are, I think, decisively o u tw eigh ed by th ead van tages. A presentation o f the texts shorn o f th eir contexts gives
a wholly m isleading im pression of the n atu re o f o u r evid en ce
fo r Presocratic p h ilosophy. T ran slatio n in co n text avoids that
erro n eou s im pression, and at th e sam e tim e it en ables the E n g
lish read er to see how d ifficu lt it o ften is, especially in the
case o f prose fragm en ts, to d istin guish g en u in e citations from
paraphrases o r m ere allusions. In add ition , as I have already
rem arked , the con text o f a quotation o ften helps us to u n d e r
stand the fragm en ts better - o r at least to see how the ancien t
authors u n d erstood them . A n d in any case, the con texts are,
o r so I believe, in terestin g in th eir ow n right.
E very translator, and in particu lar every translator o f ph ilo
sophical texts, has two desires. H e wants to be fa ith fu l to his
original: he wants to co n vey all and only w hat it conveys, and
he wants to rep ro d u ce so m eth in g o f the fo rm , as well as the
content, o f the o rigin al. B u t he also wants to p ro d u ce read able
and tolerably elegan t sentences o f his ow n lan gu a ge . T h e s e
two desires usually conflict; fo r d iffe r e n t lan gu a ges have d if
feren t idiom s and d iffe re n t m odes o f expression . Fidelity, if
pressed to the limit, will result in barbarous, o r even un in telli
gible, English. E legan ce will disguise the sense and the a rg u
m entative flow o f the o rigin al. M oreo ver, the first desire is
essentially unsatisfiable. It is a com m on p lace that so m eth in g
is lost in translation - a co m m o n p lace w hich applies to prose
no less than to po etry. It is equally tru e that any translation
will add som eth in g to the o rigin al, i f o n ly by virtu e o f the
d iffe re n t resonances and overton es o f syn on ym ous e x
pressions in dif feren t languages.
In the face o f these d ifficu lties a translator m ust a d o p t som e
w orkin g principle. O n the w hole I have chosen to g ive m ore
w eight to the first desire than to the second. I have p u t fidelity
above elegan ce, bein g m ore co n cern ed to transm it the sense o f
the G reek texts than to p ro vid e an aesthetic feast fo r the E n gl
ish reader.

33

INTRODUCTION

M y translations are in con sequ en ce som etim es obscure o r


am bigu ou s. B u t I should stress that these infelicities are not
invariably faults in the translation. P resocratic G reek is som e
tim es co n to rted , and it is o ften obscure o r am biguous. It is no
d u ty o f a translator to polish his a u th o rs w ork. O n the con
trary, fidelity d em an d s that the translation be as uncouth as
the origin al.
T h e translated texts are lin ked tog eth er by b r ie f b rid ge pass
ages, an d each ch a p ter is in trod u ced by a short p a ra g ra p h o r
two. B u t I have tried to keep such editorial m atter to a m ini
m um . T h e r e are n u m erou s com m entaries and interpretations
in print: this b o o k is not an add ition to that large literature.
T h e sou rce o f each translated passage is given. T h e A p p e n
d ix sup plies som e elem en tary in form ation about the dates and
the c h ie f interests o f the auth ors to whom we ow e o u r surviving
k n o w led ge o f the Presocratic texts.
T h e fragm en ts are also e q u ip p ed with D iels-K ran z re fe r
ences (these are the cip h ers which a p p ea r in square brackets
a fter th e texts). T h e s e referen ces key the passages to the stan
d ard collection o f the G re e k texts, ed ited by H erm an n Diels
an d W alth er K ran z, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker (Berlin,
1952 [10th edition]). I add these referen ces because th ey are
invariably used by scholars w ho w rite about early G reek p hilo
soph y: an yon e w ho wants to follow up o n e o f the fragm en ts in
the m od ern literatu re will find his task sim plified if he notes the
the p ertin en t D iels-K ran z nu m ber.
R eaders o f this b o o k will, I suspect, be freq u en tly p erp lexed
and som etim es an n oyed . It is as th o u g h on e is presen ted with
a jig sa w p u zzle (or rath er, with a set o f jig sa w puzzles) in which
m any o f the pieces are m issing and m ost o f the su rvivin g pieces
are fa d ed o r torn. O r, to take a closer an alogy, it is as th ou gh
o n e w ere loo kin g at a m useum case co n tain in g broken and
ch ip p ed fragm en ts o f on ce eleg an t p ottery. M any o f the pieces
a re sm all, som e o f them d o not seem to fit at all, and it is
d ifficu lt to en visage the shape and fo rm o f the origin al pot.
B u t the vexation w hich this m ay p ro d u ce will, I h op e, be
accom p an ied and o u tw eig h ed by o th er, m ore pleasing,
em otions. F ragm ents o f b eau tifu l p ottery m ay, a fter all, be

34

INTRODUCTION

them selves objects o f beauty; and certain ly m any o f the P reso


cratic texts a re fascinating and stim ulatin g pieces o f th ou g h t.
M oreover, fragm en ts a re ch allen gin g in a way that w holes are
not: they appeal to the intellectual im agination, and they excite
the read er to construct fo r him self, in his own m ind, som e
picture o f the w hole from w hich they cam e.
For my part, I find the Presocratic fragm en ts objects o f
inexhaustible and in trig u in g d eligh t. I ho p e that the rea d er o f
this book m ay com e to find a sim ilar p leasu re in co n tem p latin g
the battered rem ains o f the first h eroes o f w estern science and
philosophy.

35

SYNOPSI S

G re ek ph ilosophy began with the th ree m en fro m M iletus.


was a practical statesm an, and perh aps also a
geom eter. W hat he d id in p h ilosop h y is uncertain : he is said
to have a rg u ed that m agnets have souls (that they are alive),
and that e v ery th in g is full o f gods. H e su ggested that the earth
floated on a vast w ater-bed. M ost fam ously, he conjectured
that ev ery th in g was m ade from w ater o r even that every
th in g is m ade o f w ater, that w ater is the m aterial p rin cip le or
arche o f everyth in g. W h eth er o r not he inqu ired fu rth e r into
n a tu re we d o not know.

t h a l e s

was certainly a fu ll-blood ed phusikos, and he


certain ly sp oke o f the prin ciple o r arche o f all natural things.
B u t he d id not id en tify this basic prin ciple with any fam iliar
sort o f stu ff: the arche was described sim ply as the infinite infinite in exten t and also ind efin ite in its characteristics. From
this infin ite the fam iliar stu ffs o f the w orld - earth, air, w ater,
and so on - w ere gen erated by a process in w hich the twin
notions o f h eat and cold played som e part. T h e gen erated
stu ffs en croach on o n e an o th e r and have in the course o f time
to p ay com pensation fo r th eir injustice. (W e m ay think o f the
altern atin g en croachm en ts o f su m m er and w inter, o f the hot
an d d ry and the cold and wet.) T h u s the w orld is law -governed.
A n a x im a n d er also g ave a detailed accotm t o f natural p h en o
m ena. T h e two m ost rem arkable featu res o f his accoun t lie in
biology (w h ere he sp ecu lated on the origin s o f m ankind)
a n a x i m a n d e r

and in astron om y (w h ere he d evelo p ed an ingenious account

SYNOPSIS

o f the celestial system and o ffe r e d the su ggestion that the earth
rem ains u n su p p orted in m id-universe because it is equ id istan t
from every part o f the o u ter heaven).
a n a x i m e n e s is a pallid reflection o f A n a x im a n d er. H e too
provided a d etailed accoun t o f nature, in w hich he ven tu red
to correct A n a x im a n d er on certain points; and he also p ro
posed a cosm ogony. His arche was infinite, like A n a x im a n d e rs,
but it was not indeterm in ate: rather, it was infinite air. A n d
A naxim enes m aintained that a pair o f op eration s - rarefaction
and condensation - was su fficient to g en era te all the fam iliar
things o f the w orld from the origin al and u n d erly in g air.
A d iffe ren t tradition was initiated by p y t h a g o r a s . H e had
indeed a reputation fo r vast learn in g, but he seem s not to have
concern ed him self particu larly with natu re. His interest was
the soul: he held that the soul was im m ortal, and that it u n d er
goes a sequence o f incarnations in various types o f creatu res
(this was later known as the th eory o f m etem psychosis). M ore
over, this process - and the w hole history o f the w orld - is
endless and u n ch an gin g, the sam e things rep ea tin g them selves
in cycles o f eternal recu rren ce. T h e th eory o f m etem psychosis
suggested that all creatu res w ere fu n d am en tally the sam e in
kind, inasm uch as they a re hosts to the sam e souls: P ythagoras
probably m ade this the g ro u n d fo r certain d ietary reco m
m endations.
P ythagoras was also a political fig u re o f som e im portan ce,
and he attracted a band o f disciples w h o fo llo w ed a P yth ago
rean way o f life and w ho fo rm ed a sort o f secret society. W hat
else he did we d o not know . Scholars are now g en era lly scepti
cal o f the ancien t tradition w hich associates him with various
m athem atical and m usical discoveries.
a l c m a e o n had P ythagorean connections. H e h eld that the
soul was im m ortal, and he advan ced a new a rg u m e n t fo r this
belief. H e was a d o cto r with an interest in n atu re, and
especially in h um an n atu re - h e sp ecu lated , fo r exa m p le, on
the structure and fu n ctio n in g o f the sense-organs. H e seem s
to have held that all things - o r at least all things in hum an
life - are to be exp lain ed in term s o f pairs o f opposites: hot
and cold, light and d ark , w et and d ry , etc.

37

SYNOPSIS

T h e p o et X e n o p h a n e s knew so m eth in g about Pythagoras


and his o th er Presocratic predecessors. H e h im self en ga ge d in
inquiries into nature, even if he d id not speculate O n N a tu re
in th e th o ro u g h -g o in g M ilesian way. H e m ay possibly have
h eld that the m aterial arche o f things is earth . B u t his most
o rigin al ideas co n cern o th er m atters. R eflectin g on the p reten
sions o f the new science o f the phusikoi, he was led to p o n d er
the possible limits on hum an kn ow led ge. L ater tradition held
him to have been a sceptic, and o n e fra gm en t does a p p ea r to
en tertain a h ighly sceptical position; but o th er texts suggest
that he was a gradualist: k n o w led ge is doubtless d ifficu lt to
com e by, bu t it is not beyon d all en d eavo u r.
X en o p h a n es second claim to o rigin ality lies in the field o f
natural th eology. H e criticized the im m oral god s o f H om er
a n d the poets; m ore g en erally, he rega rd e d custom ary
religiou s beliefs as gro u n d less and foolish. In the place o f this
folly h e o ffe r e d a rational th eology. T h e later tradition ascribes
to him a h igh ly articulated system : the tradition m ay ex a g g e r
ate, bu t the fragm en ts show that X en o p h an es believed in a
sin gle g o d , w ho was m oral and m otionless, all-know ing and
all-pow erfu l. N o r was the god an th ro p o m o rp h ic: rather, he
was an abstract and im personal fo rce; not a god from the
O lym p ian pan th eo n , but a g o d accom m odated to the new
w orld o f the Ionian philosophers.
T h e m ajo r fig u re in the first phase o f Presocratic philosophy
is h e r a c l i t u s . H e is in som e respects a b a fflin g thinker,
w hose w ritings won him an ea rly repu tation fo r obscurity. N ot
all his w ork was n ew fa n g led o r rid d lin g. H e stood in the Ionian
tradition, m akin g fire the arche o f th e u n iverse, and o ffe rin g
an acco u n t o f n atu re an d th e n atu ral w orld. T h e account
in clu ded a novel astron om y, an d it m ad e m uch use o f ex h a l
ations; but it follow ed the M ilesian m o d e l- a n d , like A n a x im
a n d er, H eraclitus stressed that the u niverse o f n atu re was
law -governed . H e also had w hat m igh t be called a P ythagorean
side: the fragm en ts betray an interest in the soul and in hum an
p sych o logy, an d som e o f the.m hint at an existen ce fo r the soul
a fte r d eath . H e advan ced som e m oral and political notions
w hich are p erh a p s co n n ected with this. A g a in , H eraclitus, like

38

SYNOPSIS

X enophanes, criticized received religious practices and


o ffe re d the world a new and m ore scientific g o d , now iden
tified with the cosm ic fire. A n d , again like X en o p h an es, H era
clitus reflected on the possibility o f know led ge: he th o u g h t that
know ledge about the n atu re o f things was not easy to com e by,
that m ost o f his con tem poraries w ere ign oran t and stupid, that
most o f his predecessors had been a rro g a n t and m isguid ed .
But he believed that he him self had attained to tru th , and
he supposed that the book o f nature could be read by m en
p rovided that they m ade p ro p e r use o f th eir senses and th eir
understanding.
T h e novelty o f H eraclitus lies in w hat we m ay call his m eta
physical views. H ere th ree fea tu res are w orth em ph asizin g.
First o f all, he rejected cosm ogony: the M ilesians had told stor
ies about the origin s o f the w orld; H eraclitus held that the
world had always existed, and that th ere was no cosm ogonical
story to tell. Secondly (his m ost celebrated notion), he h eld that
everyth in g flows: the w orld and its fu rn itu re are in a state o f
perpetual flux. W h at is m ore, things d ep en d on this flu x fo r
their continuity and identity; fo r if the riv er ceases to flow it
ceases to be a river. Finally and m ost stran gely H eraclitus
believed in the unity o f o pposites. T h e path u p is th e sam e as
the path dow n, and in gen eral, existin g things a re ch aracter
ized by pairs o f co n trary p rop erties, w hose bellicose coexist
ence is essential to th eir co ntinu ed being.
T h e fu n dam en tal truth about n atu re is this: the w orld is
an eternal and ever-ch a n g in g m odification o f fire, its various
contents each unified and held togeth er by a d yn am ic tension
o f contrarieties. T h is truth is the accoun t in acco rd an ce with
which everyth in g h appens, and it u n d erlies and explain s the
whole o f nature.

II
T h e early philosophers had taken the first totterin g steps d ow n
the road to science. T h e sceptical suggestion s o f X en o p h a n es
perh aps cast a sm all shadow o v e r th eir inquiries, b u t the sun
o f H eraclitus soon b u rn ed it away. In the secon d p h ase o f

39

SYNOPSIS

p h ilosoph y, a th icker an d d a rk e r cloud loom ed: it threatened


to cu t o f f all ligh t fro m em pirical science, and it m ust have
seem ed alm ost im penetrab le. T h e clou d blew in from Elea fro m P arm enid es, M elissus, Zeno.
P a r m e n i d e s h im self actually w rote at som e length on
n atu re. H e d evelo p ed a novel system in vokin g two principles
o r archai, an d he sp oke in detail on biology and on astronom y.
(H e was the first G reek to say that the earth was spherical, and
p erh a p s also the first to iden tify the ev en in g and the m ornin g
star.) B u t the discou rse on nature occu pied the second h a lf
o f his g rea t poem , which described the W ay o f O p in ion and
w hich was self-confessed ly false and d eceitfu l. T h e first part
o f the poem was a g u id e to th e W ay o f T r u th , and that W ay
led th ro u g h stran ge and arid territory.
P arm enid es began by co n sid erin g the possible subjects o f
inquiry: you can in qu ire into w hat exists, o r you can inquire
into w hat does not exist. B u t in fact the latter is not a genuine
possibility fo r you can n ot thin k o f, and hen ce cann ot inquire
into, the non -existen t. So every subject o f inquiry m ust exist.
B u t e v ery th in g that exists m ust, as P arm enides proceed s to
a rg u e, possess a certain set o f p rop erties: it m ust be u n g en e r
ated and in d estru ctib le (otherw ise it w ould, at som e tim e, not
exist bu t that is im possible); it m ust be continu ous w ithout
spatial o r tem poral gaps; it m ust be en tirely changeless - it
can n ot m ove o r alter o r gro w o r dim inish; and it m ust be
b o u n d ed o r finite, like a sp h ere. Reason - the logical p ow er o f
ineluctable d ed u ctio n shows that reality, w hat exists, must be
so: i f sense-perception suggests a w orld o f a d iffe re n t sort,
th en so m uch the w orse fo r sense-perception.
m e l i s s u s rew rote the P arm en id ean system in plain prose.
B u t he was not w ith ou t origin ality. First, he p ro d u ced som e
new argu m en ts fo r P arm en id es old positions - m ost notably,
he a rg u e d that the existen ce o f a vacuum was not logically
possible, that the w orld was th e re fo re full o r a plenum, and that
m otion th ro u gh a plenum was m anifestly im possible. Secondly,
he d iffe r e d on tw o im p ortan t points fro m his m aster. F or
w h ereas P arm en id es w orld was finite, M elissus held that what
ev e r exists m ust be infinitely ex ten d ed in all directions.

40

SYNOPSIS

M oreover, he in ferred that th ere can be at m ost one th in g in


existence. M elissus also p resented an ex p licit argu m en t to show
that sense-perception is illusory, an d that th e w o rld is u tterly
d iffe re n t from the way it a p p ears to o u r senses.
z e n o p ro d u ced no system atic p h ilosophy. H e co n trived a
series o f argu m en ts (fo rty in all, w e a re told), each o f w hich
con clu d ed that plu rality is parad oxical: i f m ore th in gs than
on e w ere to exist, then contradictions w o u ld follow . T w o o f
the forty argu m en ts survive: in them Z en o arg u es th at i f m ore
things than o n e exist, then th ey m ust be both la rg e an d sm all,
and that if m ore things than o n e exist, th en they m ust be both
finitely and infinitely m any. Z en o also d evised fo u r celebrated
argu m ents p ro v in g th e im possibility o f m otion: it is not clear
w h eth er these a re to b e n u m bered a m o n g th e fo rty a rg u m en ts
against plurality.
Z en o s puzzles a re both en tertain in g an d serious. H is a rg u
m ents m ay seem at first sight m erely jo c u la r; b u t th ey all
involve concepts - notably the co n cep t o f infinity - w hich con
tinue to p erp lex an d ex ercise ph ilosoph ers. Z en o s o w n aim
in d evisin g his pu zzles is u ncertain . Plato re g a rd e d him as a
su p p o rter o f Eleatic m onism : M elissus had a rg u e d th at th ere
existed only o n e th in g, Z en o d en ied that th ere existed m ore
than o n e - tw o sides o f th e sam e coin. O th e rs h ave suspected
that Z en o was an intellectual nihilist.

Ill
T h e third phase o f P resocratic p h ilosop h y is best u n d erstoo d
as a reaction against the P arm en id ean position. I f th e Eleatics
w ere right, then science was im possible. T h e post-Eleatics tried
in their d iffe re n t ways to d o ju stic e to the fo rce o f P arm en id es
argu m ents w hile retain in g th e rig h t to fo llo w th e pathw ays o f
science. T h e p eriod p ro d u ced th ree m ajo r figu res (E m p ed o
cles, A n a x a go ras, D em ocritus) an d som e in terestin g m in o r
characters.
e m p e d o c l e s prom ised his read ers kn o w led ge, a n d w ith it
som e stran ge pow ers. H e insisted, against th e Eleatics, th at th e
senses, i f p ro p erly u sed , w e re rou tes to k n o w led ge. H e a g re e d

41

SYNOPSIS

with P arm enid es that n o th in g cou ld really com e into existence


o r perish , an d he a greed with M elissus that vacuum s could not
exist. T h e u n iverse was fu ll o f etern al stu ff. B u t nonetheless,
E m p ed ocles a rg u ed , m otion was possible, and hen ce ch an ge
too was possible; fo r the eternal stu ffs cou ld m ove and inter
m in gle w ith o n e an o th er, th ereby e ffe c tin g the ch anges we
observe.
T h e basic stu ffs o f the u niverse, a cco rd in g to Em pedocles,
w ere fo u r: ea rth , air, fire, w ater. E veryth in g in the w orld is
m ad e u p fro m these fo u r roots o r elem ents. In add ition there
w ere tw o o p p o sin g pow ers, love and strife, o r attraction and
rep u lsion , w hose o peration s w ere aid ed by, o r m anifested in,
the n atural pow ers o f the stu ffs them selves an d govern ed ,
w ith ou t inten tion o r p ro v id en ce, by th e forces o f chance and
necessity. T h e pow ers d eterm in ed the d evelo p m en t o f the uni
verse, w hich d evelo p m en t was cyclical and eternal. In the
battle betw een love and strife each w arrio r period ically d om in
ated: u n d er the d om inion o f love, all th e elem ents cam e
to g eth er into a unity, a h o m o g en eo u s sp here. A s strife
regain ed po w er, th e sp h ere b ro k e u p, the elem ents separated,
and (after a co m p lex series o f stages) o u r fam iliar w orld cam e
to be articu lated . T h e n the process reversed itself: fro m the
articu lated w o rld , th ro u g h the several stages, back to the
h o m o gen eo u s sp h ere again. T h e infinite alternations betw een
sp h ere an d w orld , w o rld and sp h ere, m ark th e eternal and
n e ve r ch a n g in g history o f the universe.
M uch o f E m p ed ocles p oem On Nature gave detailed d escrip
tion o f th e articu lated w orld w e live in. B u t a notoriou s featu re
was his accoun t o f the various m onstrosities w hich, he believed,
com e into existen ce in an ea rly stage o f cosm ic history, b e fo re
the w orld attains its p resen t state. T h e d escription o f the p re
sent w orld was rich - it co vered ev ery subject fro m astronom y
to zo o lo gy. L o n g accounts o f the stru ctu re o f th e eye an d o f
the m echanism o f b rea th in g survive. E m ped ocles m ajor o rig in
ality h ere lies less in m atters o f detail than in o n e general
a n d u n ify in g notion. H e believed that all thin gs always give o f f
efflu en ces, and that they a re all p erfo ra ted by chann els o r
p o res o f variou s sh apes an d sizes. T h e s e efflu en ces and pores

42

SYNOPSIS

are E m ped ocles fu n d am en tal ex p lan a to ry concepts: that


efflu en ces fit, o r fail to fit, pores o f a p a rticu lar typ e accounts
fo r physical and chem ical reactions, fo r biological a n d psych o
logical p h en om en a - fo r p ercep tio n , fo r m agnetism , fo r the
sterility o f m ules.
In addition to his poem on natu re, E m ped ocles w rote a w ork
which was later called Purifications. T h e story o f th e p o em was
the story o f the Fall: o rigin ally the spirits en jo yed a life o f
bliss; then they e rre d (the e r ro r is un specified , but it is usually
su pposed to have been bloodshed); and th eir p u n ish m en t is a
sequence o f m ortal incarnations. W e a re all such fallen spirits,
clothed tem porarily and pu nitively in hu m an flesh. A nim als
and som e plants a re also fallen spirits. (E m pedocles h im self,
he says, has alread y been a bush, a bird, an d a fish. B u t he has
now reached th e highest point in the cycle o f incarnations he
is not only a hu m an , but a seer and a god .) F or E m ped ocles,
as fo r Pythagoras, m etem psychosis had m oral im plications:
the anim als (and certain plants) a re o u r kin; ea tin g them is
th ere fo re cannibalism , and m ust be assiduously a vo id ed . T h e
Fall was tragic, an d o u r life h ere is p a in fu l; bu t the fu tu re
shines: i f we follow E m p ed ocles advice w e too m ay h o p e to
becom e fellow feasters at the table o f the gods.
It is m uch d ispu ted w h eth er Purifications is consistent with
On Nature, and th e question is co m plicated by the fact that
m any fragm en ts can n ot be secu rely assigned to e ith e r poem .
T h e two poem s w ere p rob ably very d iffe r e n t in spirit an d in
content. B u t they certain ly em p lo yed th e sam e g en era l ideas.
W h eth er o r not they w ere strictly consistent with o n e an o th er,
it seem s clear that the an cien t com m entators and prob ab le
that E m pedocles h im self - th o u g h t o f th em as twin parts o f a
single scientifico-m ystical system .
E m pedocles is som etim es called a P yth ago rean , an d his
views have P yth ago rean connections. P yth ago ras follow ers
soon d ivided into two g ro u p s, th e A p h o rists an d the Scientists.
T h e A ph orists have little claim on o u r attention: they a p p e a r
to have believed that w isdom - an d by that th ey m ean t the
wisdom o f P ythagoras cou ld be ca p tu red in gn o m ic u tter
ances, and they had no d esire to in qu ire o r to reason. T h e ir

43

SYNOPSIS

aph orism s w ere fo r the m ost p art religiou s o r ritualistic in


conten t th ey co n cern ed diet, o r sacrifice, o r burial: m ost o f
them a re e ith er bizarre o r silly. T h e Scientists fell into d iffe re n t
factions; bu t they w ere united by a b e lie f in the scientific and
p h ilosophical im p ortan ce o f m athem atics. T h e y w ere not
them selves technical m athem aticians, bu t they hypothesized
th at the w orld was, in som e sense, fu n d am en tally com posed
o f num bers: nu m bers, o r rath er the prin ciples o f num bers,
w ere th e principles o f all things. Su ch a view can d ege n erate
into nonsense; it can also rep resen t th e insight that science is
essentially ap p lied m athem atics. In th e case o f the P yth agor
eans sense and nonsense w ere p resen t in equal m easure.
T h e only P yth agorean o f this p eriod w ho has a face is p h i l o l>
a u s (fo r I p p a s u s is little m ore t h a n a n a m e ) .lf the survivin g
fragm en ts a re g en u in e (and th eir authen ticity has o ften been
d ou bted ), then it seem s that P hilolaus was attem ptin g to p ro
d u ce a P yth agorean version o f n atural science, a version which
w ould be in vu ln erable to the Eleatic objections.
Philolaus holds that we can know little ab o u t the w orld. B ut
w e can see th at it m ust have been m ad e u p o u t o f two types o f
th in g - unlim ited things and lim iters. (R o u gh ly, these are
stu ffs and shapes: a p o n d , fo r exa m p le, consists o f unlim ited
stu ff, w ater, d eterm in ed by a lim iter, its shape.) S o m eth in g we can n ot tell exactly w hat - was req u ired to harm onize lim it
ers an d u nlim ited s in o rd e r to g en era te the w orld. So fa r the
schem e is essentially M ilesian in fo rm . P yth agorean elem ents
e n te r w hen Philolaus introd u ces num bers: the w orld w hen
g en era te d is d eterm in ed by n u m bers, in the sense that it is
describable in qu antitative term s oth erw ise it cou ld not be
know n by us. O n these fo u n d atio n s Philolaus h o p ed to erect
th e stru ctu re o f natural science. Few details o f his views are
rep o rted : we know , h o w ever, that h e had theories in biology
(in clu d in g an acco u n t o f th e n a tu re o f diseases), and that he
em b raced th e th eory o f th e co u n ter-ea rth (an oth er planet,
b alan cin g the earth , a n d b rin g in g th e heaven ly bodies u p to
the p e rfe c t n u m ber, ten). In add ition , h e exp ressed an opinion
ab o u t th e n atu re and fu tu re o f the soul.
L ike E m ped ocles, a n a x a g o r a s accepted th e Eleatic a rg u

44

SYNOPSIS

m ents to the e ffe ct that gen eratio n and d estru ctio n w ere
im possible, but m aintained that m otion was non eth eless poss
ible, and hence that ch an ge cou ld take place in the w orld. A g ain
like Em pedocles, he believed that o u r faculties, if p ro p erly used,
w ould yield reliable in form ation about the natural w orld . B u t
in his conception o f the natu re o f things he d iffe r e d fu n d a m e n t
ally from Em pedocles.
A n axago ras believed that every substance o r s t u ff was e te r
nal : he had no th eory o f basic stu ffs, n o elem en ts. A s P arm en
ides had show n, n o th in g can com e from n oth in g. H ence
everyth in g always existed. In the b eg in n in g ev ery th in g was
to g eth er in an infinite gaseous toh u -boh u , w h erein e v e ry th in g
was present and n o th in g was clear. (By e v e ry th in g A n a x a g
oras probably m eant all stu ffs and all qualities - stu ffs such as
earth, gold, flesh, cheese; qualities, them selves con ceived o f as
stu ffs, such as the hot and the cold , the sw eet and th e bitter.)
T h e cosm os form ed w hen stu ffsa n d th in gs g ra d u a lly separated
out from this u n d ifferen tia ted mass. A n d h ere com e A n a x a g o
ras two m ost o rigin al and influential doctrines.
First, he held that the origin al cosm ogonical fo rce was m ind.
M ind, he said, a lth o u g h d iffe re n t fro m all o th er things and
not m ixed with them , nonetheless p erva d ed ev ery th in g and
was responsible fo r everyth in g. L ater th in kers saw this as a
great leap forw ard : A n a x a go ras, they believed, had seen that
the universe was plan n ed by an intelligent d esign er. B u t they
then fo u n d fault with A n a x a g o ra s and co m p lain ed that h e had
not invoked m ind at the level o f p articu lar scientific e x p la n
ations - th ere he had rem ained con ten t with the stand ard
Ionian explan ations in term s o f m aterial forces. It is in any
case uncertain to w hat ex ten t A n a x a g o ra s m ind was th o u g h t
o f as a personal, p lan n in g faculty w hich d eterm in ed th e his
tory o f the w orld in a ben evolent, o r at least an inten tional,
fashion: p erhaps it was an im personal fo rce, co m p arab le to
the love and strife o f E m pedocles.
A n a x a go ras second innovation concern s his co n cep tio n o f
stuffs. A s stu ffs separate out, n on e is e v e r entirely se gre g ated ,
no pure s tu ff ever com es into bein g. In d ee d , ev ery p iece o f
s tu ff always contains a portion o f every o th er stu ff. W hat

45

SYNOPSIS

we call g o ld is not w holly g old en : rath er, g o ld is the nam e


we g ive to lum ps o f s t u ff w hich a re predominantly gold. A n a x
a go ras g ro u n d s fo r h o ld in g this d octrin e are d ispu ted; two o f
its consequ ences a re clear. A n a x a g o ra s h im self d rew the first
consequence: th ere is no sm allest p iece o f s tu ff o f any sort h o w ever sm all a p iece o f g o ld you m ay take, th ere is always a
sm aller; fo r w ithin y o u r p iece o f gold th ere is a portion o f, say,
blood - an d th at blood will itself contain a sm aller portion o f
go ld . T h e secon d con sequ en ce is not explicitly p resen t in the
fragm en ts: stu ffs cann ot consist o f particles o r be in o n e
a n o th e r in the way in w hich d iffe r e n t sorts o f seeds m ay be
m ixed in a packet; rath er, A n a x a g o ra s view d em an ds that
stu ffs b e m ixed th ro u g h and th ro u g h that they be associated
in so m eth in g m o re like chem ical com bination than physical
ju x ta p o sitio n .
A n a x a g o ra s views w ere largely ad o p ted by a r c h e l a u s ,
w ho stood to him as A n axim en es to A n a xim an d er. B ut A rc h e
laus has the repu tation o f bein g th e first p h ilosop h er to reflect
on ethics: he m ain tain ed we no lo n g er know on what g ro u n d s
that m oral qualities w ere con ven tion al and not natural.
In th e lo n g run , the physics o f A n a x a g o ra s p roved infertile.
F ar m ore influen tial w ere the views o f L e u c i p p u s and D e m o
c r i t u s , th e two Atom ists. T h e y tackled Parm enides head on.
F or th ey d en ied that w hat d oes not exist cann ot be th ou gh t
o f - in d eed , th ey m aintained, parad oxically en o u g h , that what
d oes not exist is no less real than w hat does exist. W hat does
n ot exist is void, em pty space. W h at exists a re bodies, the things
w hich o ccu p y space an d m ove th ro u g h its em ptinesses. T h e
void is infinite in ex ten t, the bodies a re infinite in num ber.
B odies, in the p ro p e r sense, a re atom ic o r indivisible. T h e
A tom ists a rg u ed that th ere must be indivisible bodies, fo r they
th o u g h t that the supposition that bodies can be d ivided ad
infinitum led to p a ra d o x . T h e s e indivisibles w ere very sm all,
solid, and w ithou t any qualities: th ey have size and shape and
h ard ness o r solidity, the so-called p rim a ry qualities, bu t they
lack the secon d ary qualities co lo u r, sm ell, taste, etc. T h e
atom s exist fo r ev er and are un ch an geable. T o this e xten t each

46

SYNOPSIS

atom is a Parm enidean entity. B u t atom s m ove - in d eed , they


m ove constantly and have been m ovin g fo r all eternity.
A tom ic m ovem ents create the w orld . F or atom s som etim es
collide, and a fter som e collisions th ey stick to g eth er, w h en the
hooks on o n e atom m ay h ap p en to lock with the eyes on
another. In this way co m p o u n d bodies a re even tu ally fo rm ed .
E veryth in g happens by m echanical chance; b u t given infinite
space and infinite tim e, it is o n ly to be ex p ected that the com
plex stru ctu re o f the w orld ab o u t us will so m ew h ere and som ewhen be fo rm ed .
D em ocritus was an enthusiastic and p rolific scientist. H e
w rote on a w ide variety o f topics, and in som e cases at least he
attem pted to apply his atom ism to d etailed scientific e x p la n
ations. T h e best exam p les o f this com e in his acco u n t o f p e r
ception and the objects o f p ercep tio n . O f his rem ain in g
scientific w ritin g little rem ains. P erhaps th e m ost in terestin g
portion o f his w ork was that w hich d ealt with a n th ro p o lo g y the history and d escription o f th e h u m an race as a social and
cultural object. D em ocritus discussed, a m o n g o th er things, th e
origins o f religion an d the n atu re o f lan gu age. H is rem arks
here are alm ost en tirely speculative (and they have little co n
nection with atom ism ), but his speculation s b egan a lo n g tra
dition o f arm chair an th ro p o lo g y.
M ore interesting fro m a ph ilosophical p o in t o f view a re
D em ocritus opinion s on the possibility o f h u m an kn o w led ge.
D espite his scientific am bitions, h e a p p ears to h ave en tertain ed
an extrem e fo rm o f scepticism . H is reasons fo r this a re m ostly
missing, but som e o f them at least w ere closely co n n ected with
his atom ism . T h e only real things a re atom s an d vo id , and
neither void nor atom s can be co lo u red . H en ce co lo u rs - an d
all o th er secon d ary p rop erties - a re illusory. H en ce the w orld
is very d iffe re n t fro m the way o u r senses take it to be, an d o u r
senses a re fu n d am en tally m isleading. B u t i f we distrust o u r
senses, how can w e say an y th in g about the stru ctu re o f reality?
T h e atom ist th eory itself, th o u g h largely an a priori co n stru c
tion, seem ed to p resu p p o se the validity o f sense-perception
and to gain its su p p o rt from its capacity to ex p lain the

47

SYNOPSIS

p h en o m en a o f p ercep tio n . I f atom ism is righ t, perception is


illusory; bu t i f perception is illusory, w hy em brace atom ism ?
D em ocritus was aw are o f this p u zzle. H ow h e attem p ted to
solve it we d o not know .
Finally, D em ocritus w rote at len gth on m atters o f m oral and
political philosophy. Som e scholars have attem pted to find
conn ection s betw een his ethics an d his atom ism , bu t th ere is
p rob ably n on e. Som e scholars have attem pted to d iscern a
m oral system behin d th e fragm en ts. It is clear that D em ocritus
was a h ed on ist o f sorts: the goal o f life is conten tm en t, o r
im p ertu rbability, and this is som ehow equated with jo y o r
p leasu re. D em ocritean pleasures, h o w ever, a re on the whole
som ew hat d ry an d severe, m ental rath er than physical in their
objects: D em ocritus was no advocate o f a life o f Riley. It is
p erh ap s a m istake to look fo r an y th in g m ore system atic than
that in the fragm en ts. T h e y a re p resented as m axim s o r a p h o r
isms, an d aphorism s d o not typically com m u n icate system atic
th ou gh t. O f the m axim s, som e a re sane, som e are am usin g,
som e a re banal, som e are o u trag eo u s they are, in fact, a
typical collection o f m oralistic aphorism s.
T h e last o f the Presocratics was d i o g e n e s o f A p o llo n ia. His
was not an origin al gen iu s, and he is o ften , with som e ju stice,
described as an eclectic. His treatm en t o f n atu re was in m any
respects close to that o f th e ea rly M ilesians: h e took a single
arche, in his case air, and g en era ted the w orld from it by
rarefaction an d cond en sation. H e ex p lain ed the various nat
ural p h en om en a by referen ce to this origin al s tu ffa n d its m ani
fold m odifications. A n d he ad o p ted A n a x a g o ra s cosm ogonic
m ind. B u tin D iogen es system , m ind was identified with eternal,
all-know ing air, and it was th e co n tro llin g and g o v ern in g force
o f the u niverse. D iogen es certain ly held that the w orld was well
d esign ed . I f h e can claim o rigin ality in his physics it m ust lie in
his attem pt to ju s tify the positing o f a single u n d erly in g s tu ff o r
arche: unless all things w ere fu n d am en tally the sam e, he argu ed ,
th e ch an ges w hich we observe in th e w orld co u ld not com e
about.
T h e m ost rem arkab le fra g m en t o f D iogen es w ork is a
d etailed description o f the blood vessels o f the hum an body.

48

SYNOPSIS

H ere we can read at first hand w hat in the case o f th e o th er


Presocratics we know o f only indirectly: an attem pt to d escribe
in scientific detail the stru ctu re an d o rgan ization o f the p hysi
cal w orld. T h e Presocratics w ere ph ilosoph ers, an d th ey co n
cerned them selves with the m ost g en eral questions ab o u t the
n atu re and o rigin s o f th e universe. B u t th ey w ere also scien
tists. T h e abstractions o f their cosm ogonical th o u g h t a re co m
plem ented and co m pleted by the con crete detail o f th eir
p articular descriptions and explan ations. In this way they w ere
the fo reru n n ers o f A ristotle and th ro u g h him o f m od ern
science an d philosophy.

49

N O T E T O T HE
READER
T h e m ain ch apters o f this bo ok em p loy a variety o f typo
grap h ical devices.
Italics, in add ition to m ark in g stress an d id en tifyin g booktitles, p erfo rm two special fun ctions: (1) all p u rp o rted citations
from the Presocratics and (2) all editorial com m ents are set in
italics. C itations a re typ o grap h ically distin gu ished from com
m ents inasm uch as they are invariably indented.
Roman typ e m arks all quotations from ancien t authors except
p u rp o rte d citations from the Presocratics. T h u s th e contexts
o f citations will be set in rom an, an d so too will allusions to and
p arap h rases o f Presocratic views.
Brackets o f th ree d iffe re n t styles a p p ea r in the quoted
m aterial. (1) O rd in a ry parentheses, (. . .), are used in the nor
mal way as punctu ation signs. (2) S q uare brackets, [. . .],
en close trivial ed itorial alterations to the qu o ted texts. (For
ex a m p le, an u nspecific p ro n o u n , h e, in the origin al is som e
tim es replaced by the a p p ro p riate p ro p e r nam e.) T h e y also
en close ed itorial comments. (For exam p le, they enclose the m od
ern equ ivalen t o f the ancien t system o f d atin g by O lym p ic
years.) (3) P ointed brackets, < . . . > , m ark lacun ae in the
G re e k tex t - i.e. places w h ere th e ancien t scribes have
accidentally om itted som ethin g. W h ere the pointed brackets
en close w ords, these rep resen t w hat we m ay guess to have been
om itted.
Asterisks,
su rro u n d passages w h ere eith er the trans
lation o r the tex t itself is w holly uncertain. W ords betw een the
asterisks a re at best an optim istic guess.
References follow each q u o ted passage. T h e y a re o f two sorts.
50

NOTE TO

THE

READER

(1) T o each text qu o ted th ere is a p p en d ed the a u th o rs nam e,


the title o f the w ork, an d su fficien t auxiliary in form ation to
enable the passage to be located in any stan d ard edition.
Square brackets abo u t an a u th o rs nam e are a sign o f sp u rio u s
ness. (E.g. [Aristotle], Problems refers to the book called
Problems which the m an u script tradition falsely ascribes to
A ristotle.) (2) T o each Presocratic fra gm en t qu o ted th ere is
ap p en d ed a D iels-K ran z referen ce, enclosed in sq uare b rack
ets. T h is n orm ally consists o f the letter follow ed by a n u m
ber. T h e n u m b er is th e n u m b er o f the fra g m en t in H . Diels
and W . K ran z, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker (B erlin , 1952
[ lo th edition]). T h e first D iels-K ran z referen ce in any ch a p ter
p refixes a n u m b er to the letter . T h is is the n u m b er o f the
relevant ch a p ter in D iels-K ranz. T h u s [59 1] refers to fr a g
m ent 1 in ch a p ter 59, the ch ap ter on A n a x a g o ras, o f DielsK ranz. A su bsequ en t [ 2 1a] refers to fra g m en t 2 1a in the
sam e ch apter. In principle, th e passages in D iels-K ran z are
g en u in e fragm en ts (in contrast to parap h rases and allusions
which ap p ea r in separate sections labelled a ). In fact DielsK ran z o ften in clu d e passages a m o n g their texts w hich are
certainly not fragm en ts. W hen the read er finds a D iels-K ran z
referen ce fo r a passage w hich is not set in italic typ e, he sh ou ld
in fer that D iels-K ran z falsely p resen t the passage as a fr a g
m ent.

PART
I

1
PRECURSORS
Thales, the first o f the canonical line o f Presocratic philosophers, no
doubt had his predecessors, and scholars have speculated on the sources
and influences behind him. Two varieties o f influence have been dis
cerned.
First, there are native Greek antecedents. Homers poems, the earliest
surviving works o f Greek literature, contain occasional references to
what were later to become scientific and philosophical topics. The poems
presuppose a certain vague conception o f the nature and origins o f the
universe (how could they not?), and that conception finds echoes, both
verbal and substantial, in Presocratic thought. More influential,
became more explicit, was the view o f the universe expressed by the
seventh-century poet Hesiod. A short passage from his T h e o g o n y
'The Birth o f the Gods merits quotation.
H ail, ch ildren o f Zeus, g ra n t a sw eet so n g
and celebrate the holy race o f the im m ortals w h o exist fo rever,
those w ho w ere born o f Earth an d o f starry H eaven
and o f d ark N igh t, and those the salt Sea reared .
T ell how first god s and earth cam e into bein g,
and rivers and the bou nd less sea with its seethin g sw ell,
and shining stars and th e b road sky above,
and tell how th ey d ivid ed th eir wealth and shared o u t th eir
honours
and how first th ey gained O ly m p u s with its m an y glades.
T ell m e this, you M uses w ho have y o u r h o m e on O ly m p u s,
from the begin n in g, and tell which o f them first cam e into
being.
First o f all cam e the C hasm ; and then

55

EARLY

GREEK PHILOSOPHY

w ide-bosom ed E arth, the eternal safe seat o f all


the im m ortals w ho hold the h eights o f snow y O lym pus,
and m u rky T a rta ru s in the recesses o f the w ide-pathed land,
and L ove, w ho is fairest a m o n g th e im m ortal gods,
loosen er o f lim bs, by w hom all god s and all m en
find th eir thou ghts and wise cou nsels overco m e in their breasts.
From the C hasm cam e black D arkness and N igh t;
and from N igh t cam e E th er and Day
w hom she conceived and b o re a fte r m in glin g in love with
Darkness.
E arth b o re first, equal to h erself,
starry H eaven, to veil h er all about
that th ere m igh t be an etern al safe seat fo r the blessed gods.
A n d she gave birth to tall M ountains, the g ra cefu l haunts o f
the god desses o f the N ym p h s w ho dw ell on the w ooded m ountains.
A n d she also bore the restless d eep with its seethin g swell,
Sea, w ithout d esirable love; and then
she lay with H eaven an d bore d eep -ed d y in g O cean
and C o iu s and C reiu s and H yperion and Iapetus
and T h e ia an d R heia and R ight and M em ory
and gold e n -crow n ed P h oebe an d lovely T eth ys.
A n d a fter them , the you n gest, wily C ro n u s, was born ,
m ost terrible o f h er ch ild ren ; and he hated his stron g father.
(H esiod, Theogony 10 4 -13 8 )
A ll this is myth, not science; but it is, as it were, scientific myth: many
ofHesiods gods are personifications o f naturalfeatures or phenomena,
and in telling the birth o f the gods Hesiod is telling, in picturesque
form, the origins o f the universe.
The Greeks themselves were well aware o f this. The Sicilian comic
poet Epicharmus, who wrote at the beginning o f the fifth century,
presents a mock philosophical criticism o f Hesiods story in a little
dialogue preserved by Diogenes Laertius:
- T h e god s w ere alw ays th ere: they w ere never yet m issing;
and th ese things a re alw ays th ere, the sam e and in the sam e
way always.
56

PRECURSORS

- B u t the C hasm is said to h ave been th e first g o d to be b orn .


- H ow could that be? H e had n o th in g to co m e fro m and
n ow h ere to go to i f h e was the first.
- T h e n d id n t anything com e first? N o, n o r a n y th in g secon d,
by Zeus,
o f the things w ere now talkin g about: they existed always.
(D iogenes L aertius, Lives o f the Philosophers III 10)
A story from a later century is also worth retelling:
T h e poet w ho writes
First o f all cam e the C h asm ; and then
w ide-bosom ed E arth, seat o f all . . .
refu tes him self. F or i f som eone asks him w hat th e C h asm cam e
from, he will not be able to answ er. Som e p eo p le say that this
is the reason why E picu rus tu rn ed to ph ilosop h y. W h en he
was still very y o u n g he asked a schoolm aster w h o was read in g
out
First o f all cam e the C hasm . . .
what the C hasm cam e from i f it cam e first. T h e schoolm aster
replied that it wasnt his jo b , but the jo b o f the so-called p hilo
sophers, to teach that sort o f thing. W ell, th en , said E picurus,
I m ust g o a lo n g to them , i f they a re th e on es w ho know the
truth about the th in gs that exist.
(Sextus E m piricus, Against the Mathematicians x 1819)

In the final book o f his M etaphysics Aristotle discusses the place o f


'the good and the beautiful in the world. Some thinkers, he says, hold
that goodness and beauty only make their appearance as the world
progresses,
and the early poets say so m eth in g sim ilar in so far as th ey hold
that it is not the first co m e rs N ig h t an d H eaven , o r th e C h asm
o r O cean - w ho ru le an d hold sw ay, but Zeus. B u t they in fact
say this because th eir w o rld -ru lers ch an g e: th e hybrids a m o n g

57

EARLY

GREEK PHILOSOPHY

th em , w h o d o not say e v ery th in g in a m ythical vein - I m ean


P h erecyd es an d som e o th ers - d o m ake the first g en eratin g
prin ciple th e best thin g.
(A ristotle, Metaphysics 1091 b.4-10)
Pherecydes o f Syrus, whom Aristotle here distinguishes from Hesiod
and his fellows, is probably to be dated to the early sixth century . He
was therefore a contemporary o f thefirst Presocratic philosophers.
Aristotlesjudgement that he was a hybrid, part mythologist and part
natural philosopher, is scarcely borne out by the surviving remnants
his writings. Here are the two most philosophical pieces:
T h e bo ok w hich P h erecyd es w ro te has been preserved ; it
begins like this:
Zas and Time always existed, and so did Chthonie; and Chthonie
acquired the name Earth when Zas gave her the earth as a bridal
gift- [7 1]
(D iogen es L aertius, Lives o f the Philosophers I 119)
P h erecyd es o f Syrus says that Zas and T im e and C h th on ie
existed alw ays as th e th ree first principles (the on e b e fo re the
two, I say, an d th e two a fter th e one). T im e from his ow n seed
created fire an d air and w ater (I take this to be the th ree fo ld
natu re o f the intelligible): they w ere d ivid ed into five nooks
and fro m them w ere constituted th e rest o f the n u m erou s race
o f the god s w hich is called the race o f th e five nooks (m eaning,
p erh ap s, o f the five worlds).
(Dam ascius, On First Principles 124)
The other reports o f Pherecydes work contain nothing but fanciful
mythology.
Many o f the Greeks themselves believed that philosophy began among
the barbarians - in Egypt, in Persia, in Babylonia. They credited the
early Presocratics with journeys to Egypt and the Near East, and
supposed that they returned with philosophy among their souvenirs.
It is plausible to suppose that there was some intellectual contact
between the Greeks and their eastern neighbours. But in philosophy,
or the theoretical approach to science, it is difficult tofin d a single clear
58

PRECURSORS

case o f influence. (It should be said that where some scholars see striking
parallels between a Greek and an eastern text, others see no more than
superficial coincidence.) Here, fo r what they are worth, are two brief
passages from eastern creation stories, one from Babylonia and the
other from Egypt.
The E num a Elishu, the Babylonian creation epic, was probably
composed early in the second millennium . It begins as follows:
W hen on high the heaven had not been nam ed ,
firm gro u n d below had not been called by nam e,
n au gh t but prim o rdial A p su , th eir b egetter,
and M um m u -T iam at, she w h o b o re them all,
their waters co m m in glin g as in a sin gle body:
no reed hut had b een m atted, no m arsh land had a p p ea re d ,
when no god s w hatever had been b ro u g h t into bein g,
uncalled by nam es, th eir destinies u n d eterm in ed then it was that the god s w ere fo rm ed within them .
L ahm u and L aham u w ere b ro u g h t fo rth , by nam e w ere
they called.
B e fo re they had grow n in a ge an d stature,
A n sh ar and K ishar w ere fo rm ed , su rpassin g the others.
T h e y p rolo n g ed the days, a d d ed on the years.
A n u was their heir, o f his fathers the rival;
yea, A n sh a rs first-born, A n u , was his equal.
A n u bego t in his im age N u d im m u d .
(James B. P ritchard, Ancient Near Eastern Texts, third ed ition ,
P rinceton, 1969, p. 61)
(The text is written in Akkadian, and the translation o f the lines is in
many places uncertain - at all events, different scholars have produced
remarkably different versions.) A nu and Nudimmud are the sky and
the earth; Apsu and Mummu-Tiamat are primordial waters, the fresh
waters and the sea. The identities o f the other divinities are uncertain.
The Egyptian creation myth is known in a number o f variant forms.
The following text probably dates from about 2,000 :
I am he w ho cam e into b ein g as K h ep ri. W h en I had com e
into being, bein g cam e into bein g, and all bein gs cam e into

59

EARLY GREEK

PHILOSOPHY

b e in g a fte r I cam e into bein g. M an y w ere th e bein gs w hich


cam e fo rth fro m m y m ou th , b e fo re heaven cam e into being,
b e fo re ea rth cam e into bein g, b e fo re th e g ro u n d an d creep in g
th in gs h ad b een created in this place. I p u t to g eth er som e o f
them in N u n as w eary ones, b e fo re I co u ld find a place in
w hich I m igh t stand. It seem ed ad van tageo u s to m e in my
heart; I p lan n ed with m y face; an d I m ad e every fo rm when I
was alo n e, b e fo re I h ad sp at o u t w hat was Sh u , b e fo re I had
sp u ttered o u t w h at was T e fn u t, and b e fo re any o th e r had
co m e in to b ein g w ho co u ld act with me.
I p lan n ed in m y ow n h eart, and th ere cam e into bein g a
m u ltitu d e o f fo rm s an d bein gs, th e fo rm s o f ch ildren and the
fo rm s o f th eir ch ild ren . I was the o n e w ho copu lated with m y
fist, I m asturbated with m y h and . T h e n I sp ew ed with m y own
m ou th : I spat o u t w h at was S h u , I sp u ttered o u t w hat was
T e fn u t. It was m y fa th er N u n w ho b ro u g h t them u p . . .
T h e n S h u and T e fn u t b ro u g h t fo rth G eb and N ut. T h e n
G eb a n d N u t b ro u g h t fo rth O siris, H oru s Khenti-en-irti, Seth,
Isis, an d N ep h th ys fro m the bo d y, o n e o f these a fter another;
a n d th ey b ro u g h t fo rth th eir m ultitudes in this land.
(Pritchard , Ancient Near Eastern Texts, p. 6)
Khepri, the speaker, is the morning sun-god; N un is the primordial
water; Shu and Tefnut are the air-god and the moisture-goddess; Geb
and N ut are earth and sky.
Both the Babylonian and the Egyptian stories bear comparison with
Hesiod as examples o f mythical cosmogony. Many scholars compare the
stories more directly with Greek philosophy, suggesting (for example)
that Thales' ideas about the importance o f water may derive from the
primordial significance o f Mummu-Tiamat and Nun. They may be
right; but to me Thales seems to live in a different and a more luminous
world.

60

2
THALES
According to Aristotle, Thales o f Miletus was' t h e fo u n d e r o f natural
p h ilosop h y. He is dated by the eclipse o f the sun which he allegedly
predicted and which modem astronomers place on 28 May 585 .
The other known facts about his life suggest that he was bom in about
625 and died in about 545. Simplicius reports that
T h a le s is said to h ave been the first to in tro d u ce th e stu d y o f
nature to the G reeks: a lth o u g h m an y oth ers p reced ed him , as
T h eo p h rastu s h im self adm its, yet he so fa r ex celled th em as
to eclipse all his predecessors. B u t he is said to h ave le ft n o th in g
behind in w ritin g ex cep t the so-called Nautical Astronomy.
(Sim plicius, Commentary on the Physics 23 .29-3 3 )
Other sources ascribe other writings to him, and there were certainly
books circulating under his name in antiquity. But it seems most prob
able that he wrote nothing or at least nothing which survived even
to the time o f Aristotle. For our knowledge o f his views, then, we depend
entirely on later reports; and those reports must themselves have been
based on oral tradition.
Thales was not simply, or even primarily, a philosopher. H e was a
man o f practical wisdom, one o f the so-called Seven Sages o f early
Greek history, and he was regarded by posterity not only as an original
contributor to science and philosophy, but also as an astute statesman.
Herodotus, the fifth-century historian, tells several stories which illus
trate his political sagacity.
U seful advice had b een given , even b e fo re th e d estru ctio n o f
Ionia, by T h a le s, a M ilesian w hose fam ily o rigin ally cam e fro m

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Phoenicia: h e u rg ed the Ionians to establish a single councilch am ber, saying that it should be located in T e o s, w hich was
the cen tre o f Ionia, and that the o th er cities should continue
to be inhabited but shou ld be treated as th o u g h they w ere
parishes.
(H ero do tus, Histories I 170.3)
W h en C roesu s cam e to the R iver H alys, then - acco rd in g to
m y acco u n t he crossed his arm y by way o f the existing
b ridges; bu t a cco rd in g to m ost o f the G reeks, T h a le s o f M iletus
crossed the arm y fo r him . F or it is said that C roesu s was at a
loss how his arm y sh o u ld cross th e river, since these bridges
d id not yet exist at that tim e, and that T h a le s, w ho was in the
cam p, m ade th e river w hich flow ed o n th e left o f the arm y
flow on the rig h t too, and that h e d id so in the fo llo w in g way.
B e g in n in g upstream o f the cam p, he d u g a d e e p channel
w hich he d rew in the shape o f a crescent so that it ran rou n d
the back o f w h ere the cam p was sited, b ein g d iverted from its
o rigin al cou rse d ow n the ch ann el, and th en , havin g passed the
cam p, d eb o u ch ed again into its origin al course. T h u s as soon
as the river was d ivided it becam e fo rd a b le in both its parts.
(1ibid I 7 5 .4 -5 )
Herodotus also reports the famous eclipse:
T h e w ar [betw een the L yd ian s and the Persians] was equally
b alan ced, until in the sixth yea r an en ga ge m e n t took place in
w hich, a fte r battle had been jo in e d , th e d ay su d d en ly turn ed
to night. T h is ch a n g e in the d ay had been fo reto ld to the Ion
ians by T h a le s o f M iletus, w ho had fixed as its term the very
y ea r in w hich it actually o ccu rred .
(ibid I 74.2)
(Modem scholars conjecture that Thales had learned something o f
Babylonian astronomy; even so, it is generally doubted that he could
actually have p red icted the eclipse.)
O f Thalesphilosophico-scientific doctrines, the most celebrated concern

62

THALES

water. First, he held that the earth rests upon water (a notion which
has some Egyptian antecedents). Here is Aristotles critical report:
Som e say that [the earth] rests on w ater. T h is in fact is the
oldest view that has been transm itted to us, an d they say that
it was advanced by T h a le s o f M iletus w ho th o u g h t th at the
earth rests because it can float like a lo g o r so m eth in g else o f
that sort (fo r n on e o f these things can rest on air, b u t th ey can
rest on water) - as th ou gh the sam e m ust n o t hold o f th e w ater
su p p o rtin g the earth as h old s o f th e earth itself.
(A ristotle, On the Heavens 29482834)
(Note Aristotles non-committal 'some say and 'they say: this cautious
approach to Thales is yet more pronounced in the next few passages.)
In addition, and more strikingly, Thales held that everything was
made from water, or that water, in Aristotles later jargon, was the
'material principle o f the world. Aristotle again is our best source:
M ost o f the first p h ilosoph ers th o u g h t that prin ciples in the
form o f m atter w ere the o n ly principles o f all things. F or th ey
say that the elem en t and first p rin cip le o f the thin gs that exist
is that from w hich they all are and from w hich they first com e
into bein g and into w hich th ey a re finally d estroyed , its su b
stance rem ain in g and its p rop erties ch a n g in g . . . T h e r e m ust
be som e nature - eith er o n e o r m ore than o n e - fro m w hich
the o th er things com e into bein g, it b ein g p reserved . B u t as
to the n u m ber and form o f this sort o f p rin cip le, they d o not
all agree. T h ales, the fo u n d e r o f this kind o f ph ilosop h y, says
that it is w ater (that is w hy he declares that th e earth rests on
water). H e p erh ap s cam e to acqu ire this b e lie f fro m se e in g that
the nou rishm ent o f e v ery th in g is m oist an d that heat itself
com es from this and lives by this (fo r that fro m w hich an y th in g
com es into bein g is its first principle) - h e cam e to his b e lie f
both fo r this reason and because the seeds o f ev ery th in g have
a m oist nature, an d w ater is the n atu ral p rin cip le o f m oist
things.
(A ristotle, Metaphysics 8 - 1 1* 1 7 -2 7 )

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Aristotle elsewhere reports something about Thales views on the


nature o f the soul:
S o m e say that < s o u l> is m ixed in the w hole u niverse. Perhaps
th at is w hy T h a le s th o u g h t that e v ery th in g was full o f gods.
(A ristotle, O n the Soul 4 1 ia7~8)
T h a le s, ju d g in g b y w hat they rep o rt, seem s to have believed
that the soul was som ethin g w hich prod u ces m otion, inasm uch
as he said that the m agn et has a soul because it m oves iron.
(ibid 405a 19 -2 1)
There is also some evidence that Thales made geometrical discover
ies. The source, Proclus, wrote in the fifth century, but he is relying
on the work o f Eudemus, a pupil o f Aristotle. Nonetheless, scholars
have been reluctant to credit Eudemus reports. Here, for what they
are worth, are the fou r passages in question.
T h e y say that T h a le s was the first to d em on strate that a circle
is bisected by its diam eter.
(Proclus, Commentary on Euclid 1 5 7 .1 0 - 1 1 )
W e a re ind ebted to old T h a le s fo r m any discoveries and fo r
this th eorem in particu lar; fo r he is said to have been the first
to have reco gn ized and stated that in every isosceles triangle
the an gles at the base a re equ al, and to have called the equal
angles sim ilar in the archaic style.
(ibid 250 .20 -251.2)
T h is th eorem p roves that w h en two straigh t lines intersect with
o n e a n o th e r the angles at the ve rtex a re equal - acco rd in g to
E u d em u s, it was first d isco vered by T h ales.
(ibid 29 9 .1-4 )
E u d em u s in his History o f Geometry ascribes this th eorem [that a
pair o f triangles with one equal side and two equal angles are equal]
to T h a le s; fo r he says that he m ust h ave m ade use o f it in the
64

THALES

p roced u re by w hich he is said to have d eterm in ed th e distance


o f ships at sea.
{ibid, 3 5 2 .1 4 -1 8 )
I append part o f the discussion o f Thales in Diogenes Laertius
Lives o f the P hilosophers. Some o f the statements in this discussion
certainly false, and many are at best dubious: it should be read not as
a reliable guide to the views o f Thales but rather as a specimen o f the
sort o f material which we now depend on fo r our knowledge o f the
philosophy o f the Presocratics. The passage is a good illustration o f the
complex and controversial nature o f much o f our evidence fo r the
Presocraticsand it does also contain som e important and trustworthy
pieces o f information.
T h a le s fa th er (accord in g to H ero d otu s, D uris an d D em o
critus) was Exam yes and his m oth er was C leo b u lin a, fro m th e
fam ily o f T h e le u s (they a re Phoenicians, the m ost n oble o f the
descendants o f C a d m u s an d A g en o r). < H e was o n e o f the
Seven Sages,> acco rd in g to Plato, an d he was the first to be
called a Sage - d u rin g the archo n sh ip o f Dam asias a t A th en s
[582-580 ], at which tim e, acco rd in g to D em etrius o f
Phaleron in his List o f Archons, the Seven Sages w ere in fact
nam ed. H e was en ro lled as a citizen at M iletus w hen he cam e
th ere with N eileus w ho had been ex p elled from P h oen icia but m ost authorities say that he was a native M ilesian o f a
fam ous fam ily.
A fte r his political activities he tu rn ed to scientific sp ecu
lation. A cco rd in g to som e he left n o w ritin g beh in d; fo r the
Nautical Astronomy ascribed to him is said to be by P h ocu s o f
Samos. B u t C allim achu s know s him as th e d isco verer o f the
Little B ea r and writes as follow s in his Iambi-.
A n d he is said to have m easu red o u t
the little stars o f the W ain by w hich the Phoenicians sail.
A cco rd in g to others, h e w ro te ju s t two w orks, On the Solstice
and On the Equinox, "ju d g in g that e v ery th in g else was u n k n o w
able*.
H e is th ou gh t by som e to have been the first to study

65

EARLY

GREEK

PHILOSOPHY

astron om y an d to have p red icted eclipses o f the sun and sol


stices, as E u dem u s says in his History o f Astronomy that is why
X en o p h a n es and H ero d otu s a d m ire him. H eraclitus and
D em ocritus also give a g oo d rep o rt o f him. Som e (am ong them
the p o et C hoerilu s) say that he was also the first to say that
souls a re im m ortal. H e was the first to d iscover the period from
o n e solstice to the next, and the first, acco rd in g to som e, to
state that the size o f the sun is a seven h u n d red and twentieth
part < o f the solar orbit, ju s t as th e size o f the m oon is a seven
h u n d re d and tw en tieth > o f th e lu n a r orbit. H e was the first
to call the last d ay o f the m onth th e thirtieth. A n d he was the
first, a cco rd in g to som e, to discou rse about nature.
A ristotle an d H ipp ias say that he ascribed souls to lifeless
things too, takin g the m agn et and am b er as his evid en ce.
Pam phila says that he learn ed g eom etry from the Egyptians
and was th e first to inscribe a righ t-an gled triangle inside a
circle, fo r which he sacrificed an o x. (O thers, inclu din g
A p o llo d o ru s the calculator, ascribe this to Pythagoras, who
d evelo p ed to their greatest exten t the discoveries which C alli
m achus in his Iambi attributes to E u p h o rbu s the P hrygian - fo r
ex a m p le, scalenes and triangles and w hat b elongs to the study
o f geom etry.)
H e is also th ou g h t to have given excellen t advice in political
affairs. F or exam p le, w hen C roesu s sent en voys to the
M ilesians to m ake an alliance he p reven ted it - and that saved
the city w hen C y ru s cam e to pow er. B u t he h im self actually
says, as H eraclides recoun ts, that he lived a solitary life as a
p rivate citizen. Som e say that he m arried and had a son, Cybisthus, o th ers that he rem ain ed a b ach elor but adop ted his
sisters son - so that w hen he was asked w hy he had no children
he rep lied , B ecau se I love ch ild ren . A n d they say that when
his m oth er pressed him to m arry he said, Its too ea rly, and
that then, w hen he had passed his p rim e and she insisted again,
he said Its too late. H ieronym us o f R hodes, in the second
book o f his Miscellanies, says that, w anting to show how easy it
is to be rich, he foresaw that th ere was about to be a g oo d crop
o f olives, hired the olive presses, and m ade a h u g e sum o f
m oney.
66

THALES

H e supposed that w ater was th e first p rin cip le o f all things,


and that the w orld has a soul and is fu ll o f spirits. T h e y say he
d iscovered the seasons o f the yea r and d iv id ed it into th ree
h u n d red and sixty-five days.
N o-one tau g h t him , a lth o u g h he w ent to E gyp t an d spent
tim e with the priests th ere. H iero n ym u s says th at he actually
m easured the pyram ids from th eir shadow s, h a vin g observed
the tim e w hen < o u r sh ad ow s> are the sam e size as we are.
H e lived with T h rasy b u lu s, the ru le r o f M iletus, a cco rd in g to
M inyes.
T h e r e is a celebrated story about the tripod w hich was dis
covered by the fisherm en and sent ro u n d to the Sages by the
p eo p le o f M iletus. T h e y say that som e y o u n g m en fro m Ionia
bo u gh t a net from som e M ilesian fisherm en . W h en the tripod
was fished u p th ere was a d isp u te until th e M ilesians sent to
D elphi. T h e g o d gave this oracle:
O ffs p rin g o f M iletus, d o you ask A p o llo ab o u t a tripod ?
I d eclare that the tripod belongs to him w h o is first in
wisdom .
So they gave it to T h a le s. B u t h e g ave it to o n e o f the o th er
Sages, and so it was passed on until it reach ed Solon , w h o said
that the god was first in w isdom and sent it to D elph i. [T h e re
follow a n u m ber o f d iffe r e n t versions o f the trip o d story.]
H erm ippu s in his Lives ascribes to T h a le s w hat o th ers say o f
Socrates. H e used to say, they rep o rt, that he th an ked F ortu n e
fo r three things: first, that I am a h u m an and n o t a beast;
secondly, that I am a m an and not a w om an; th ird ly, th at I am
a G reek and not a fo reign er.
H e is said to h ave been taken fro m his h o u se by an old
wom an to look at the stars, an d to have fallen into a ditch:
when he cried out, the old w om an said: D o you thin k, T h a le s,
that you will learn w hat is in th e heavens w h en yo u can n ot see
w hat is in fro n t o f y o u r feet? T im o n too know s him as an
astron om er and praises him in his Silli in the fo llo w in g words:
Such was T h a le s o f the Seven Sages, a sage astron om er.
Lobon o f A rg o s says that his w ritings stretched to tw o h u n d re d

67

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PHILOSOPHY

lines and that th e fo llo w in g ep ig ra m was inscribed on his


statue:
T h is is T h a le s w hom Ionian M iletus bred and show ed
an astron om er, the highest o f all in wisdom .
H e adds that his poem s in clu d e these verses:
It is not m any w ords w hich show an intelligent opinion:
search o u t o n e wise th in g,
choose o n e g oo d thing;
fo r thus you will stop the ceaseless ton gu es o f babbling
m en.
T h e fo llo w in g aphorism s are ascribed to him . O f existing
things, god is the oldest fo r he is u n g en e ra ted . T h e w orld is
the m ost b eau tifu l - fo r it is g o d s creation. Space is the g reat
e s t - fo r it includes everyth in g. M ind is the s w ifte s t- fo r it runs
th ro u g h ev eryth in g . N ecessity is the stron gest - fo r it controls
everyth in g . T im e is the wisest - fo r it discovers everyth in g. H e
said that d eath is no d iffe re n t fro m life. T h e n why d o n t you
d ie? som eone asked him . Because it m akes no d iffe re n c e , he
replied. W h en so m eo n e asked him w hich cam e first, d ay o r
n igh t, he an sw ered , N ig h t cam e first - by a d a y . W hen som e
o n e asked him w h eth er a m an can escape the notice o f the
god s i f he d oes w ro n g, he replied: N o t even i f he thinks o f
d o in g w ro n g . A n a d u lte rer asked him i f he sh ou ld sw ear that
he had not com m itted adu ltery: h e rep lied , P erju ry is no
w orse than a d u lte ry . W hen asked w hat is d ifficu lt, he said, T o
know y o u r s e lf; w h at is easy, T o g ive advice to som eone else;
w hat m ost pleasant, Success; w hat d ivin e, W hat has neith er
b eg in n in g n o r e n d . W h en asked w hat was the strangest thing
he had seen, he said: A n old tyran t. H ow can we bear mis
fo rtu n e m ost e a s i l y ? - I f we see o u r en em ies fa rin g worse. H ow
can we live best and m ost ju stly ? - I f we d o not ourselves d o
th e things we blam e o th ers fo r d oin g. W h o is happy? - O n e
w ho has a healthy b o d y, a w ell-stocked soul, and an educable
natu re. H e says that we sh o u ld rem em b er o u r frien d s both
p resen t and absent, and that we shou ld not beau tify o u r faces
bu t be b eau tifu l in o u r practices. Do not be rich by evil m eans,
68

THALES

he says, and let not w ords estrange you from those w ho have
shared you r trust. E xpect from y o u r ch ildren the sam e
benefits that you gave to y o u r p arents.
H e said that the N ile floods w hen its stream s are ch ecked by
the contrary etesian winds.
A p o llo d o ru s in his Chronicles says that he was born in the
first year o f the thirty-ninth O lym p iad [624 ]. H e d ied at
the age o f seven ty-eight (or, as Sosicrates says, at ninety); fo r
he died in the fifty-eighth O lym p iad [5 4 8 -54 5 ] , h avin g
lived d u rin g the tim e o f C roesu s, w hom he u n d erto o k to trans
port across the H alys w ithou t a b rid g e by d iv ertin g its cou rse.
T h e r e w ere o th er m en called T h a le s - five, a cco rd in g to
D em etrius o f M agnesia in his Homonyms', an o ra to r fro m Callatis, who had a p o o r style; a pain ter from Sicyon, o f g reat
talent; the third is very early, a co n tem p o ra ry o f H esiod,
H om er, and L ycu rgu s; the fo u rth is m ention ed by D uris in
his w ork On Painting-, the fifth, m ore recen t and o bscu re, is
m entioned by D ionysius in his Critical Essays.
T h e Sage d ied o f heat and thirst and weakness w hile w atch
in g a gym nastic contest. H e was by then an old m an. O n his
tom b is inscribed:
His tom b is sm all, his fam e is heaven -high:
behold the g ra ve o f the wise and ingeniou s T h a le s.
In the first book o f m y Epigrams o r Poems in A ll Metres th ere is
an epigram on him:
W hen on ce he was w atching a gym nastic contest,
Zeus o f the Sun,
you stole T h a le s the Sage fro m th e stadium .
I praise you fo r takin g him n ear to you ; fo r th e old
man
could no lo n ger see the stars fro m the earth.
T h e m otto K now T h y s e lf is his, th o u g h AntistH enes in his
69

EARLY CREE K P H IL O SOP H Y

Successions says that it was P h em on oes and that C h ilo n ap p ro


priated it.
(D iogen es L aertius, Lives o f the Philosophers I 22-28 , 33-40)

70

3
ANAXIMANDER
Anaximander, like Thales, came from Miletus. A p o llo d o ru s o f
A th en s says in his Chronicles that h e was sixty-fo u r in the secon d
year o f the fifty-eigh th O lym p ia d [547/546 ] and that he
died shortly afterw ard s (D iogenes L aertius, Lives o f the Philo
sophers II 2). I f Apollodorus is right, Anaximander was bom in 610
and died in about 540 . Unlike Thales, he wrote a book, which was
later in circulation under the title O n N atu re. He also produced a
star-map and a map o f the world:
A n a x im an d er o f M iletus, a pu pil o f T h a le s, was th e first m an
bold en o u g h to d raw the inhabited w orld on a tablet; a fter
him , H ecataeus o f M iletus, a g re a t traveller, m ad e it m ore
accurate so that it was greatly ad m ired .
(A gath em eru s, Geography I i)
The leading ideas o f Anaximanders work O n N atu re are summa
rized by a late doxographer as follows:
A n a x im an d er was a pu pil o f T h a le s - A n a x im a n d er, son o f
Praxiades, a M ilesian. H e said that a certain infin ite n a tu re is
first principle o f the things that exist. From it com e th e h eavens
and the w orlds in them . It is etern al and ageless, and it contains
all the w orlds. H e speaks o f tim e, since gen eratio n an d exist
en ce and destruction a re determ inate.
A n a x im an d er said that th e infinite is prin ciple an d elem en t
o f the things that exist, b e in g the first to call it by th e n am e o f
principle. In add ition, th ere is an eternal m otion in w hich the
heavens com e into being.

7i

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PHILOSOPHY

T h e earth is alo ft, not su p p o rted by an yth in g but resting


w h ere it is because o f its equal distance from everyth ing. Its
sh ap e is ro u n d ed , circular, like a stone pillar. O f its surfaces,
we stand on o n e w hile the o th er is opposite. T h e heavenly
bodies com e into bein g as a circle o f fire, separated o f f from
the fire in the w orld and en closed by air. T h e r e are certain
tub ular chann els o r breathin g-holes th ro u gh which the heav
en ly bodies a p p ear; hen ce eclipses o ccu r w hen the breathingholes a re blocked , and the m oon ap pears som etim es w axing
and som etim es w anin g a cco rd in g to w h eth er the channels are
blocked o r o p en . T h e circle o f th e sun is tw enty-seven times
g rea ter C th a n the earth and th e circle > o f the m oon e i g h t
een tim es g re a te r > . T h e sun is highest, the circles o f th e fixed
stars lowest.
A n im als com e into bein g < fr o m m o istu re> evap o rated by
the sun. H um ans origin ally resem bled an o th e r type o f anim al,
nam ely fish.
W inds com e into b ein g w hen the finest vapou rs o f air are
separated o ff, collect tog eth er and m ove. Rain com es from
va p o u r sent u p by the things beneath the sun. L ig h tn in g occurs
w hen w ind breaks o u t and parts the clouds.
H e was bo rn in th e third year o f the forty-second O lym piad
[610/609 ].
(H ippolytus, Refutation o f A ll Heresies I vi 17)
A second doxographical report contains some supplementary
material:
A n a x im an d er, an associate o f T h a le s, says that the infinite
is the universal cause o f the g en eratio n and destruction o f the
u niverse. From it, h e says, the heavens w ere separated o f f and
in g en era l all the w orlds, infinite in n u m ber. H e asserted that
destruction and, m uch earlier, g en eratio n o ccu r fro m tim e
im m em orial, all the sam e things bein g renew ed .
H e says that the earth is cylindrical in shape and is a third
as d e e p as it is broad.
H e says that at th e gen eration o f this w orld that which is
p ro d u ctiv e fro m th e eternal o f hot and cold separated o f f and

72

ANAXIMANDER

from it a ball o f flam e grew rou n d the air ab o u t th e earth , like


bark on a tree. W hen th e ball burst and was enclosed in certain
circles, the sun and the m oon and the stars cam e into bein g.
Furth er, he says that origin ally hum ans w ere b o rn fro m an i
mals o f a d iffe re n t kind, because the o th er anim als can soon
look a fter them selves w hile hum an s alon e requ ire a lo n g p eri
od o f nursing; that is w hy if they had been like this origin ally
they w ould not have su rvived.
([Plutarch], Miscellanies fra g m en t 179 .2, in Eusebius,
Preparation fo r the Gospel I vii 16)
Anaximander's most striking thoughts concern biology, astronomy
and the conception o f the infinite. In biology, the remarks o f Hippo
lytus and pseudo-Plutarch can be eked out by three further texts:
A n a x im an d er says that the first anim als w ere born in m oist
ure, su rrou n d ed by prickly barks. A s th ey grew o ld e r they
em erged on to d rie r parts, the b ark burst, and fo r a sh o rt tim e
they lived a d iffe re n t kind o f life.
([Plutarch], On the Scientific Beliefs o f the Philosophers 908D)
A n a x im an d er o f M iletus says he thinks that fro m h o t w ater
and earth th ere arose fish, o r anim als very like fish, that
hum ans grew in them , an d that the em bryos w ere retained
inside u p to p u b erty w h ereu p o n th e fish-like anim als burst
and m en and w om en e m erg e d a lread y able to look a fte r th em
selves.
(C en sorin us, On Birthdays IV 7)
T h e descendants o f old H ellen actually sacrifice to Poseidon
the A ncestor, believin g that m en g rew fro m th e m oist su b
stance - as do the Syrians. T h a t is w hy th ey revere fish, as bein g
o f the sam e species and the sam e n u rtu re as them selves. H ere
their p h ilosoph y is b etter than that o f A n a x im a n d er. F or he
says, not that fish and m en w ere bo rn in th e sam e su rro u n d
ings, bu t that at first m en cam e into b ein g inside fish an d w ere
nourished th ere - like sharks - o n ly e m e rg in g an d tak in g to
the land w hen th ey w ere able to look a fte r them selves. So ju s t

73

EARLY CREEK

PHILOSOPHY

as fire consum es the m atter fro m w hich it was kindled (its own
m oth er and fath er, as the p o et w h o inserted the m arriage o f
C e y x into H esiod s poem s said), so A n a x im a n d er, having
d eclared that fish a re at o n ce fath ers and m others o f m en,
u rges us not to eat them .
(Plutarch, Table Talk 730DF)
The astronomical theory described by Hippolytus can be given a little
more colour:
A n a x im a n d er holds that th ere is a circle tw enty-eight tim es as
g rea t as the earth . It is like the w heel o f a cart, with a hollow
rim full o f fire, w hich at a certain p o in t reveals the fire th ro u gh
a m ou th p iece, as th ro u g h the tube o f a bellows. T h is is the sun.
([Plutarch], On the Scientific Beliefs o f the Philosophers 889F)
The heavenly bodies are concentric hollow wheel-rims, filled with fire
and perforated. They circle a stationary earth. Aristotle adds to Hippo
lytus account o f the stability o f the earth:
Som e say that [the earth] rests w h ere it is because o f the simi
larity (so, a m o n g the ancients, A n a x im an d er). F or th ere is no
reason w hy w hat is situated in the m idd le and is sim ilarly
related to the ed ges shou ld m ove upw ards rath er than d ow n
w ards o r sideways. B u t it can n ot m ove in o pposite directions
at the sam e tim e. So it necessarily rests w h ere it is.
(A ristotle, On the Heavens 295b! 1-16 )
As for the infinite principle or element o f all things, we have a few
words from Anaximander's book preserved in a passage o f Simplicius.
These are the earliest surviving words o f western philosophy. Un
fortunately, it is uncertain - and a matter o f vigorous scholarly contro
versy - exactly how extensive Simplicius citation is.
O f those w h o hold that the first p rin cip le is o n e, m oving, and
infinite, A n a x im a n d er, son o f P raxiades, a M ilesian, w ho was
a successor and pupil o f Thales, said that the infinite is princ
iple and elem ent o f the things that exist. H e was the first to

74

ANAXIMANDER

introduce this word principle'. H e says that it is neither water nor


any other o f the so-called elem ents but som e d ifferen t infinite
nature, from which all the heavens and the worlds in them com e
into being. A nd the things from which existing things com e into
being are also the things into which they are destroyed, in accord
ance with what must be. For they give justice and reparation to one
anotherfor their injustice in accordance with the arrangement o f time [ 12
l ] (he speaks o f them in this way in som ewhat poetical words). It
is clear that he observed the change o f the fo u r elem ents into one
another and was unwilling to m ake any on e o f them the underly
ing stu ff but rather chose som ething else apart from them . H e
accounts fo r com ing into being not by the alteration o f the elem ent
but by the separating o f f o f the opposites by the eternal motion.
(Simplicius, Commentary on the Physics 24.1325)
Simplicius explains why Anaximanders element was different from
the four traditional elemental stuffs (earth, air, fire, water). H e does
not explain why it was unlimited or infinite. A passage in Aristotle's
Physics alludes to Anaximander and lists some reasons fo r belief in
infinitude: it is possible that one or more o f those reasons originally
came from Anaximander.
It is with reason that they all m ake [the infinite] a principle;
fo r it can neith er exist to no p u rp o se n o r h ave any p o w er
excep t that o f a prin ciple. F or e v ery th in g is e ith er a prin cip le
o r d erived from a principle. B u t th e infinite has no p rin cip le fo r then it w ould h ave a limit. A g ain , it is u n g en e ra ted and
indestructible and so is a principle. F or w hat com es into b ein g
m ust have an en d , an d th ere is an en d to every d estruction.
H ence, as I say, it has no prin ciple but itself is th o u g h t to be a
principle fo r ev ery th in g else an d to g o v ern ev e ry th in g . . .
A n d it is also the divine; fo r it is deathless an d u n p e rish in g, as
A n a x im an d er and m ost o f th e n atural scientists say.
B e lie f in th e existen ce o f so m eth in g infin ite com es m ainly
from five considerations: fro m tim e (since this is infinite), fro m
the division o f m agn itu d es (m athem aticians actually use the
infinite); again, because gen eratio n an d d estruction will give
ou t unless th ere is so m eth in g infin ite fro m w hich w hat com es

75

EARLY GREEK

PHILOSOPHY

into bein g is subtracted; again, because w hat is finite is always


lim ited by som ethin g, so that th ere cann ot be an [ultimate] limit
i f one th in g m ust always be lim ited by an oth er; last and most
im portan tly, th ere is so m eth in g w hich raises a pu zzle fo r every
one alike: because they d o not give o u t in thought, num bers
seem to be infinite, and so d o m athem atical m agnitudes and
the region outside the heavens. B u t if the region outside is
infinite, then body and w orlds also seem to be infinite - fo r
why sh ou ld they be h ere rath er than th ere in the void? H ence
i f body is an yw h ere, it is everyw h ere. A g ain , i f void and space
are infinite, body too m ust be infinite - fo r with eternal things
th ere is n o d iffe re n c e betw een b ein g possible and b ein g actual.
(Aristotle, Physics 20} 6 - 1 1, 13-30)

76

4
A N A XI MENE S
Anaximenes was a younger contemporary o f Anaximander, and like
him a Milesian. Our sources offer some precise dates, but their
interpretation is controversial: we may be satisfied with the thought
that Anaximenes was active in the middle o f the sixth century . H e
is said to have been a pupil o f Anaximander. Whether or not that is
literally true, his work certainly followed the same general pattern as
that o f Anaximander. According to Diogenes Laertius, he wrote in a
sim ple and econom ical Ionian style - in contrast, perhaps, to
Anaximanders som ew hat poetical w o rd s.
O f the various doxographical accounts o f his views, the fullest is the
one given by Hippolytus:
A naxim enes, son o f Eurystratus, was also a M ilesian. H e said
that the first principle is infinite air, from w hich w h at is co m in g
into bein g and w hat has com e into b ein g an d w hat will exist
and god s and divinities com e into bein g, w hile ev ery th in g else
com es into bein g from its o ffsp rin g . T h e form o f the air is this:
w hen it is m ost u n ifo rm it is invisible, but it is m ad e a p p a ren t
by the hot and th e cold and the m oist and th e m ovin g. It is
always in m otion; fo r the things that ch a n g e w ould not ch an ge
i f it w ere not in m otion. F or as it is co n d en sed an d rarefied
it ap pears d ifferen t: w hen it dissolves into a m o re rarefied
condition it becom es fire; and w inds, again, a re co n d en sed air,
and clou d is p ro d u ced from air by com pression. A g a in , w hen
it is m ore con d en sed it is w ater, w hen still fu rth e r con d en sed
it is earth, and w hen it is as d en se as possible it is stones. T h u s
the m ost im portan t factors in co m in g into b ein g are opposites hot and cold.

77

EARLY

GREEK

PHILOSOPHY

T h e earth is flat and rides on air; in the sam e way the sun
an d th e m oon and the o th er h eaven ly bodies, which are all
fiery, rid e th e air because o f th eir flatness. T h e h eaven ly bodies
h ave com e into bein g from ea rth , because mist rose from the
earth an d was rarefied an d p ro d u ced fire, and the heavenly
bodies are com posed o f this fire w hen it is aloft. T h e r e are also
som e earth y substances in the region o f the heavenly bodies
which orbit with them . H e says that the heaven ly bodies m ove
not u n d er the earth , as others have su pposed, but rou n d the
earth - ju s t as a felt cap turn s on the head. A n d the sun is
h idd en not because it goes u n d e r the earth but because it is
screen ed by the h ig h er parts o f the earth and because o f its
grea ter distance fro m us. T h e heaven ly bodies d o not heat us
because o f th eir g rea t distance.
W inds a re g en era ted w h en the air is con d en sed and driven
along. A s it collects to g eth er and is fu rth e r thickened , clouds
a re g en era ted and in this way it ch an ges into w ater. H ail com es
ab o u t w h en the w ater fallin g from the clouds solidifies, and
snow w hen these sam e things solidify in a m ore w atery form .
L ig h tn in g o ccu rs w hen the clou d s a re parted by the force o f
winds; fo r w hen they part a b righ t and fiery flash occurs. Rain
bows are gen erated w hen the su n s rays fall on com pacted air;
earth q u akes w h en the earth is considerably altered by heating
an d cooling.
T h e s e a re the views o f A n axim en es. H e flo urish ed in the
first year o f the fifty-eigh th O lym p iad [548/547 ].
(H ippolytu s, Refutation o f A ll Heresies I vii 1-9)
The curious reference to felt caps may go back to Anaximenes himself,
as may the notion o f the stars riding on air. Anaximenes seems to have
liked such similes: he also held that the sun is flat like a l e a f and
(perhaps) that the stars are fixed into the crystalline like nails
([Plutarch], On the Scientific Beliefs o f the Philosophers 890D,

889).
Hippolytus account o f the earths flatness can be supplemented by a
passage from Aristotle:
A n a x im e n es and A n a x a g o ra s and D em ocritus say that the

78

ANAXIMENES

flatness [o f the earth] causes it to rest w h ere it is. F or it does


not cut the air beneath bu t covers it like a lid. Flat bodies are
observed to d o this - fo r they are not easily m oved even by the
winds because o f th eir resistance. T h e y say that becau se o f its
flatness the earth does the sam e th in g in relation to the air
und erneath it (which, not havin g en o u g h room to m ove away,
stays m otionless in a mass below), like the w ater in a clepsydra.
(A ristotle, On the Heavens 294b 1 3 -2 1 )
Three texts have been supposed to contain a few ofAnaximenes own
words.
O r should we, as old A n a x im en es th o u g h t, treat the hot and
the cold not as substances bu t rath er as com m on p ro p erties o f
m atter which su p e rv en e u p o n changes? F or he says that m atter
which is concentrated and con d en sed is cold , while that w hich
is rare and slack (that is the w ord he uses) is hot. [ 13 1] H en ce
it is not unreasonably said that m en release both hot and cold
from their m ouths; fo r the breath is cooled w hen it is com
pressed and cond en sed by the lips, bu t w hen the m ou th is
relaxed and it is ex h a led it becom es hot by reason o f its rare
ness.
(Plutarch, The Primary Cold 947F)
A naxim enes, son o f E urystratus, a M ilesian, asserted that air
is the first prin ciple o f the things that exist; fo r ev ery th in g
com es into b ein g fro m air an d is resolved again into it. F or
exam p le, our souls, h e says, being air, hold us together, and breath
and air contain the whole world (air and b reath are used syn on y
m ously). [ 2]
([Plutarch], On the Scientific Beliefs o f the Philosophers 876 )
A n axim en es believes that th ere is a single, m oving, infinite first
principle o f all existing things, nam ely air. F or he says this:
Air is close to the incorporeal; and because we come into being by
an outflowing o f air, it is necessary fo r it to be both infinite and
rich because it never gives out. [ 3]
([O lym piodorus], On the Divine and Sacred Art o f the
Philosophers Stone 25)

79

EARLY CREEK PHILOSOPHY

In the Plutarch passage the only word that can be ascribed to Anaxi
menes is slack, but the content o f the text may be Anaximenean. The
parenthetical comment at the end o f pseudo-Plutarch shows that he
purports to quote Anaximenes; but the citation can hardly be literal
(and its sense is obscure). The fragment quoted by pseudo-Olympiodorus is regarded as spurious by most scholars.

80

5
PYTHAGORAS
We are told more about Pythagorashis life, his character, his beliefs
than about any other Presocratic philosopher. For the school o f thought
to which he gave his name lasted fo r more than a millennium, and
several works by later Pythagoreans have survived. Yet in many ways
Pythagoras is the most obscure and perplexing o f all the early thinkers.
Pythagoras himself did not set down his notions in writing, nor did
his early followers. (This is the orthodox modem view; but, as we shall
see, there was disagreement among the ancients on the point.) In the
fifth century there occurred a division among the Pythagoreans, each
group claiming to be the genuine heirs o f the Master. Later, in the
fourth century, the histories o f Pythagoreanism and o f Platonism
became closely connected, and as a result accounts o f Pythagorean
philosophy became contaminated with Platonic material. Later still,
various Pythagorean documents were produced and circulated, pro
jecting back on to Pythagoras himself philosophical ideas o f a more
recent age. It is difficult to cut through this jungle and discover the
original Pythagoras.
Legends rapidly collected about his name. I f we attempt to disen
tangle the few threads o f historical truth, we shall conclude that
Pythagoras was bom on the island o f Samos, in about 5 70 . Some
thirty years later he left the island, which was then ruled by the culti
vated autocrat Polycrates, and emigrated to Croton in south Italy. H e
appears to have become a figure o f consequence in the political life o f
Croton, and to have aroused some hostility among the citizens. A t all
events, he was eventually obliged to leave town: he settled in the nearby
city o f Metapontum, where he died.
This chapter sets out the most important o f the early texts which refer

81

EARLY CREEK

PHILOSOPHY

to Pythagoras, and reports the few doctrines which can be ascribed to


him with any confidence. Later chapters will deal with fifth-century
Pythagoreanism, and with Hippasus and Philolaus, the only Preso
cratic Pythagoreans about whom we have any substantial evidence.
Pythagoras is mentioned by Xenophanes, Heraclitus, Ion and (per
haps) Empedocles:
A s to [P ythagoras] h avin g becom e d iffe re n t p eo p le at d iffe r
en t tim es, X en o p h a n es bears witness in a n eleg y w hich begins
with th e line:
Now I will attempt another theme and show the path . . .
W h at he says ab o u t him goes like this:
A nd once when he passed a puppy that was being whipped
they say he took pity on it and made this remark:
Stop, do not beat it; fo r it is the soul o f a dear friend I recognized it when I heard the voice. [21 7]
(D iogen es L aertius, Lives o f the Philosophers V I I I 36)
[H eraclitus] was u n com m on ly a rro g a n t and contem ptuou s, as
in d eed is clear fro m his treatise itself, in w hich he says:
M uch learning does not teach sense otherwise it would have
taught Hesiod and Pythagoras, and again Xenophanes and,
Hecataeus. [22 40]
{ibid IX 1)
Som e say that P ythagoras d id not leave a single w ritten w ork
beh in d him . T h e y a re in erro r; at any rate, H eraclitus the
natural scientist pretty well shouts it o u t w hen he says:
Pythagoras, son o f Mnesarchus, practised inquiry more than any
other man, and selecting from these writings he manufactured a
wisdom fo r himself much learning, artful knavery. [22 126]
'
{ibid V III 6)
Ion o f C h io s in his Triads says that P ythagoras w rote som e
things an d attrib uted them to O rp h eu s.
{ibid VIII 8)

82

PYTHAGORAS

Ion o f Chios says ab o u t [Pherecydes]:


Thus he, excelling in courage and also in honour,
even after death possesses in his soul a pleasant life i f indeed Pythagoras is truly wise, who above all
men learned and gained knowledge. [36 4]
(ibid I 120)
E m pedocles bears witness to this w hen he says o f [Pythagoras]:
Among them was a man o f immense knowledge
who had obtained the greatest wealth o f mind,
an exceptional master o f every kind o f wise work.
For when he stretched out with all his mind
he easily saw each and every thing
in ten or twenty human generations. [31 129]
(P o rp h yry, Life o f Pythagoras 30)
Pythagoras is referred to by the fifth-century historian Herodotus:
A s I learn fro m th e G reek s w h o live on the H ellesp on t a n d the
Black Sea, this Salm oxis was hu m an a n d lived as a slave in
Sam os - he was a slave to P yth agoras, th e son o f M nesarchus.
T h e n h e gained his freed o m and accu m ulated a la rg e sum o f
m oney, and h avin g d o n e so retu rn e d to his ow n co u n try . B u t
since the T h racia n s led m iserable lives and w ere ra th e r stu p id ,
Salm oxis, w ho was acqu ain ted with th e Ion ian w ay o f life an d
with m anners m ore civilized than those o f th e T h ra c ia n s (he
had, a fte r all, associated with G reek s - an d w ith P yth agoras
w ho was b y n o m eans th e feeblest o f th e G re e k sages), p re
p ared a banqueting-hall w h ere h e en tertain ed an d feasted the
lead in g citizens. A n d h e tau g h t th em that n e ith er h e n o r his
fellow -drin kers n o r any o f th eir d escend an ts w ou ld d ie but
w ould com e to a co u n try w h ere th ey w o u ld live fo r e v e r in
possession o f all g o o d things. In th e place w h ere h e h ad d o n e
and said w hat I have rep o rted h e bu ilt an u n d e rg ro u n d
cham ber. W h en the ch a m b er was co m p leted h e van ish ed from
am o n g the T h racia n s, d esce n d in g into th e u n d e rg ro u n d
cham ber and stayin g th ere fo r th ree years. T h e y m issed him
and m ou rn ed fo r him as th o u g h h e w e re d ea d . B u t in th e

83

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY

fo u rth y e a r he a p p ea red to th e T h ra cia n s - and in this way


w hat Salm oxis had said a p p ea re d plausible to them . T h a t is
w hat th ey say he d id . A s fo r th e m an an d his u n d erg ro u n d
ch am ber, I n eith er disbelieve the story n o r place too m uch
cred it in it - and I thin k that Salm oxis lived m any years earlier
than Pythagoras.
(H ero d o tu s, Histories IV 9 5 - )
Plato mentions Pythagoras once:
W ell, th en, i f H om er did no public service, is he said to have
becom e d u rin g his lifetim e an ed u cational lead er in private,
with p u p ils w ho loved him fo r his co m p an y and w ho handed
d ow n a H om eric way o f life to their successors - like Pythag
oras, w h o was h im self particu larly loved on this accoun t and
w hose successors even now talk o f a P yth agorean m ode o f life
and are th o u g h t to stand o u t fro m o th er m en?
(Plato, Republic 600 )
Isocrates the orator, who was a contemporary o f Plato, has the follow
ing account:
I am not the only m an o r the first to have observed [the piety
o f th e Egyptians]: m any, both now and in the past, have d on e
so, in clu d in g P ythagoras o f Sam os, w h o w ent to E gyp t and
studied with the Egyptians. H e was the first to brin g philo
sop h y to G reece, and in p articu lar he was co n cern ed , m ore
conspicu ou sly than a n yon e else, with m atters to d o with sacri
fices and tem ple purification s, th in k in g that even if this w ould
gain him n o advan tage fro m the god s it w ould at least bring
him h igh rep u te a m o n g m en. A n d that is w hat h ap p en e d . For
he so e x cee d ed o th ers in rep u tation that all th e y o u n g m en
d esired to be his pupils, w hile the o ld e r m en w ere m ore
pleased to see th eir ch ild ren associating with him than looking
a fte r th eir ow n a ffairs. N o r can w e distrust th eir ju d g e m e n t;
fo r even now those w ho claim to be his pupils receive fo r their
silence m ore adm iration than those w h o have th e greatest
repu tation fo r speaking.
(Isocrates, Busiris 28-29)

84

PYTHAGORAS

Some o f the legends about Pythagoras were collected by Aristotle in


his lost work O n the P ythagorean s. Here is a representative sample:
Pythagoras, the son o f M nesarchus, first stu d ied m athem atics
and num bers bu t later also in d u lg ed in the m iracle-m o n g erin g
o f Pherecydes. W hen at M etapontu m a ca rgo ship was e n te r
ing h arbo u r and the o n loo kers w ere p ra y in g that it w ould d ock
safely because o f its cargo , he stood u p and said: Y o u will
see that this ship is ca rry in g a co rp se. A g ain , in C a u lo n ia , as
A ristotle says, < h e fo reto ld the ap p ea ra n ce o f th e w hite shebear; and A risto tle> in his w ritings abo u t him tells m any stor
ies in clu din g the o n e ab o u t the poisonous sn ake in T u sca n y
which bit him and w hich he bit back and killed. A n d he fo r e
told to the P ythagorean s the co m in g strife - which is w hy he
left M etapontum w ithou t b ein g observed by an ybody. A n d
while he was crossin g th e river Casas in co m p an y with o th ers
he heard a su p erh u m an voice sayin g H ail, P yth ago ras and
those w ho w ere th ere w ere terrified . A n d o n ce he a p p ea re d
both in C ro to n an d in M etapon tu m o n th e sam e d ay a n d at
the sam e h o u r. O n ce, w h en he was sitting in th e th eatre, h e
stood u p , so A ristotle says, an d revealed to th e au d ien ce his
own thigh, which was m ad e o f g old . Several o th er p arad oxical
stories are told o f him ; but since I d o not w ant to be a m ere
transcriber, en o u g h o f P ythagoras.
(A p o llon iu s, Marvellous Stones 6)
A large body o f teachings came to be ascribed to Pythagoras. They
divide roughly into two categories, the mathematico-metaphysical and
the moral - as the poet Callimachus put it, Pythagoras
was the first to draw triangles and p o lygon s
and *to bisect* the circle - and to teach m en to abstain
from livin g things.
{Iambi fra g m en t 19 1.6 0 -6 2 P feiffer)
Most modem scholars are properly sceptical o f these ascriptions, and
their scepticism is nothing new. The best ancient commentary on
Pythagoras doctrines is to be found in a passage o f Porphyry:

85

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY

P ythagoras acqu ired a g reat repu tation : he w on m any fol


low ers in the city o f C ro to n itself (both m en and w om en, one
o f w hom , T h e a n o , ach ieved som e fam e), and m any from the
nearby fo reign territory, both kings and n o b 'em en . W hat he
said to his associates no-on e can say with any certainty; fo r they
p reserved n o o rd in a ry silence. B u t it becam e very well known
to everyo n e that he said, first, that the soul is im m ortal; then,
that it ch an ges into o th e r kinds o f anim als; and fu rth e r, that at
certain p eriod s w h atever has h a p p en e d h appen s again, th ere
b ein g n o th in g absolutely new; an d that all living things should
be co n sidered as b elo n g in g to the sam e kind. P ythagoras seem s
to have been th e first to in trod u ce these d octrines into G reece.
(P o rp h yry, Life o f Pythagoras 19)
The theory o f metempsychosis, or the transmigration o f the soul, is
implicitly ascribed to Pythagoras by Xenophanes in the text quoted
above. Herodotus also mentions it:
T h e E gyptians w ere the first to ad van ce the idea that the soul
is im m ortal an d that w hen the body dies it en ters into an oth er
anim al w hich is then bein g born ; w hen it has g o n e rou n d all
the creatu res o f th e land, th e sea and th e air, it again enters
into th e b o d y o f a m an which is then b ein g born ; an d this
cycle takes it th ree thou san d years. So m e o f the G reek s - som e
earlier, som e later p u t fo rw a rd this idea as th ou gh it w ere
th eir ow n: I know their nam es bu t I d o not transcribe them .
(H ero d o tu s, Histories II 123)
The names Herodotus coyly refrains from transcribing will have
included that o f Pythagoras. Two later passages are worth quoting
even though they belong to the legendary material.
H eraclides o f Pontus reports that [Pythagoras] tells th e follow
in g story o f him self: h e was o n ce born as A eth alid es and was
co n sid ered to be the son o f H erm es. H erm es invited him to
ch oose w h atever h e w anted, e x cep t im m ortality; so he asked
that, alive and d ead , he shou ld rem em b er w hat h a p p en ed to
him . T h u s in his life he rem em b ered ev eryth in g , and w h en he
86

PYTHAGORAS

died he retained the sam e m em ories. Som e tim e later he


becam e E u p h o rb u s an d was w o u n d ed by M enelaus.
E u p h orbu s used to say that he had o n ce been A eth a lid es an d
had acquired the g ift from H erm es and learn ed o f th e circu l
ation o f his soul - how it had circu lated, into w hat plants and
anim als it h ad passed, w hat his soul had su ffe re d in H ades a n d
what o th e r souls e x p erien ced . W h en E u p h o rb u s d ie d , his soul
passed into H erm otim us, w ho h im self w anted to g ive a p r o o f
and so w ent to B ran ch id ae, en tered the tem p le o f A p o llo and
pointed to the shield w hich M enelaus had d ed ica ted (he said
that he had d edicated the shield to A p o llo w hen h e sailed back
from T ro y ); it had by then d ecayed an d all that was le ft was
the ivory boss. W h en H erm otim u s d ied , h e becam e P yrrh u s,
the Delian fisherm an; an d again h e rem em b ered e v e ry th in g how he had been first A eth a lid es, th en E u p h o rb u s, then
H erm otim us, then Pyrrhus. W h en P yrrh u s d ie d , h e becam e
Pythagoras and rem em b ered e v ery th in g I h ave related .
(D iogenes L aertius, Lives o f the Philosophers V I I I 4 -5 )
Pythagoras believed in m etem psychosis an d th o u g h t th at eat
ing m eat was an abom in able th in g, saying that the souls o f all
anim als en ter d iffe r e n t anim als a fter d eath . H e h im se lf used
to say that he rem em b ered bein g, in T ro ja n tim es, E u p h o rb u s,
Panthus son, w ho was killed by M enelaus. T h e y say th at on ce
when h e was staying at A rg o s he saw a shield fro m th e spoils
o f T r o y nailed u p, and bu rst into tears. W h en th e A rg iv e s
asked him the reason fo r his em otion , h e said th at h e h im self
had bo rn e that shield at T r o y w h en h e was E u p h o rb u s. T h e y
did not believe him an d ju d g e d him to be m ad , b u t h e said he
w ould p rovid e a tru e sign that it was in d eed th e case: on the
inside o f the shield th ere had been inscribed in archaic letter
ing e u p h o r b u s . B ecau se o f the ex tra o rd in a ry n a tu re o f his
claim they all u rg e d that the shield be taken d ow n an d it
turn ed ou t that on the inside the inscription was fo u n d .
(D iodoru s, Universal History X vi 1 -3 )
The theory o f transmigration was later adopted by Empedocles: further
texts will be found in the chapter under his name.

87

EARLY GREEK

PHILOSOPHY

The idea o f eternal recurrence had a wide currency in later Greek


thought. It is ascribed to the P yth ago rean s in a passage from Sim
plicius:
T h e P yth agorean s too used to say that numerically the sam e
things o ccu r again and again. It is w o rth setting dow n a passage
fro m the third bo ok o f E u d em u s Physics in w hich he p ara
phrases th eir views:
O n e m igh t w o n d er w h eth er o r not the sam e dm e recurs as
som e say it does. N ow we call th in gs the sam e in d ifferen t
ways: things the sam e in kind plainly r e c u r e.g. sum m er
a n d w in ter and the o th e r seasons and periods; again,
m otions recu r th e sam e in kind fo r the sun com pletes
the solstices and th e eq u in o x es and the o th er m ovem ents.
B u t i f we a re to believe the P yth agorean s and hold that
things the sam e in n u m b er recu r - that you will be sitting
h ere and I shall talk to you , h o ld in g this stick, and so on
fo r ev ery th in g else - then it is plausible that the sam e tim e
too recurs.
(Sim plicius, Commentary on the Physics 73 2.2 3 -3 3 )
Eternal recurrence, like metempsychosis, will be found again in con
nection with Empedocles.

88

6
ALCMAEON
Alcmaeon came from Croton. The township was famous fo r its doctors
and Alcmaeon himself was a medical man, the first o f a distinguished
line o f Greek philosopher-physicians. No dates are recordedfo r his life;
but he is said to have been a younger contemporary o f Pythagoras, and
he was probably active in the early part o f the fifth century .
The short notice on Alcmaeon by Diogenes Laertius is worth quoting
in full:
A lcm aeon o f C ro to n : he too h ea rd P ythagoras. M ost o f w hat
he says concern s m edicin e; nevertheless h e som etim es en gages
in natural science too - w hen he says:
Most human things come in pairs.
H e is th ou g h t to have been the first to co m pose a treatise on
natural science (as F avorinus says in his Universal History), and
to have h eld that the m oon and ev ery th in g a bove it possess an
eternal nature.
H e was the son o f P eirithous, as he h im self says at th e b e g in
nin g o f his treatise:
Alcmaeon o f Croton, son ofPeirithous, said this to Brontinus and
Leo and athyllus: A bout matters invisible the gods possess clarity,
but as fa r as humans may judge etc. [24 i]
H e said that the soul is im m ortal an d that it m oves con tin u ously
like the sun.
(D iogenes L aerd u s, Lives o f the Philosophers V I I I 83)
Brontinus, Leo, and athyllus are elsewhere said to have been
Pythagoreans - Brontinus being a relation by marriage o f Pythagoras
himself.

89

EARLY

GREEK

PHILOSOPHY

Diogenes first quotation, about things coming in pairs, is in fact


taken from a report in Aristotle:
A lcm aeo n held sim ilar views to [the P ythagoreans]. F or he says
that m ost hu m an things com e in pairs, sp eakin g not, like them ,
o f a d eterm in ate set o f opposition s bu t rath er o f a haphazard
collection - such as black an d w hite, sw eet an d b itter, g oo d and
bad, g rea t and sm all.
(A ristotle, Metaphysics 986330-34)
These oppositions had a medical application:
A lcm aeo n says that health is co n served by egalitarianism
a m o n g th e p o w e rsw et and d ry , cold and hot, bitter an d sweet
and the re stan d that autocracy am o n g them prod u ces illness;
fo r the au to cracy o f e ith er p a rtn er is d estructive. A n d illness
com es about by an excess o f heat o r cold , from a su rfeit o r
d eficien cy o f n ou rish m en t, and in the blood o r the m arrow o r
the brain. It som etim es o ccu rs in them fro m extern a l causes
too - w ater o f a particu lar kind, o r locale, o r fatigu e, o r con
straint, o r so m eth in g else o f that sort. H ealth is the p ro p o rtio n
ate b len d in g o f the qualities.
([Plutarch], On the Scientific Beliefs o f the Philosophers 9 1 1 a )

Alcmaeons ideas about the immortality o f the soul, mentioned in


Diogenes, are reported at slightly greater length by Aristotle:
A lcm aeo n seem s to have held a sim ilar view ab o u t the soul.
F or he says th at it is im m ortal because it is like the im m ortals a n d that it is like them in sofar as it is alw ays in m otion. F or the
divinities too a re always in co n tin u o u s m otion the m oon, the
sun , the stars an d the w hole heaven.
(A ristotle, On the Soul 4 0 5 3 2 9 ^ 1)
A t the same time, he held that men, unlike their souls, perish:
A lcm aeo n says that m en d ie because they can n ot attach the
90

ALCMAEON

b egin n in g to th e en d a cleve r sayin g i f you take it to have


been m eant loosely an d d o n o t try to m ake it precise.
([Aristotle], Problems 9 16 3 3 3 -3 7 )

Theophrastus essay on the senses contains a summary o f Alcmaeon's


views on perception:
O f those w h o d o not exp lain p ercep tio n by sim ilarity, A lc
m aeon first d efines the d ifferen ces a m o n g anim als. F or he says
that hum ans d iffe r fro m the o th e r anim als because they a lo n e
u n d erstan d , w h ereas th e o thers p erceive bu t d o not u n d e r
stand. (H e su pposes that th in kin g and p erceiv in g a re distinct,
not - as E m ped ocles hold s - the sam e thing.)
T h e n he discusses each o f th e senses. H e says that we h ea r
with o u r ears because th ere is an em p ty space inside them
w hich echoes: the cavity sou nd s and the air ech oes in retu rn .
W e sm ell with o u r noses at the sam e tim e as we b rea th e in,
d raw in g th e b reath tow ards th e brain . W e d iscrim in ate fla
vours with o u r ton gu es; fo r, b ein g so ft and w arm , th ey dissolve
things with th eir heat, an d th ey accept and transm it them
because they are loose-textured an d delicate. T h e eyes see
th ro u gh the w ater su rro u n d in g them . It is clear that th ey co n
tain fire; fo r w hen th ey a re struck it flashes out. T h e y see by
the gleam in g and tran sp aren t part, w hen it reflects an d the
p u re r it is, th e b etter th ey see.
A ll the senses a re som ehow co n n ected to th e brain . T h a t is
w hy they a re incapacitated i f it is m oved o r d isplaced; fo r it
obstructs the passages th ro u g h w hich the senses w ork.
A s fo r tou ch, h e said n eith er how n o r by w hat m eans it
works.
So m uch fo r A lcm aeo n s views.
(T h eo p h ra stu s, On the Senses 2 5 -2 6 )
In this connection the following report deserves mention (although
scholars have doubted its veracity):
W e m ust now g ive an acco u n t o f the n atu re o f th e eye. O n this

9l

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY

subject m an y scientists, in clu d in g A lcm aeo n o f C ro to n (who


busied h im self with natural science and w h o was the first to
u n d erta ke d isse ctio n s). . . pu blished m uch o f value.
(Calcidius, Commentary on the Timaeus ccxlvi 279)
Finally, there is an isolated moral maxim:
A lcm aeo n o f C ro to n says that it is easier to be on y o u r gu ard
against an en em y than against a frien d .
(C lem ent, Miscellanies V I ii 16.1)

92

7
XE N OP HA NE S
Xenophanes, who came from Colophon in Ionia, was a man o f many
parts. H e was a peripatetic poet, who travelled about Greece reciting his
own and other mens verses. H e wrote on traditional poetical subjects drink, love, war, games - and also on historical themes. A number o f
his verses are philosophical in content. The later tradition regarded him
as a serious philosopher, the teacher o f Parmenides and the founder o f
the Eleatic school o f thought. Many modem scholars have doubted
whether he was a systematic thinker, and some have denied that he ever
wrote a properly philosophical poem. However that may be, there are
enough surviving fragments to warrant our calling him a philo
sopher and indeed to justify our regarding him as one o f the early
philosophical geniuses o f Greece.
According to Diogenes Laertius,

he w rote in verse, both elegiac an d iam bic, against H esiod and


H om er, cen su rin g th em fo r th eir rem arks ab o u t th e gods. H e
also recited his ow n poem s. H e is said to h ave d isa greed with
T h a le s and with P yth agoras, and to have attacked E pim enides.
H e lived to an ad van ced age, as he h im self says:
By now have seven and sixty years
been tossing my thought about the land o f Greece;
and from my birth there were twenty five to add to them
i f I know how to speak truly about these things. [21 8]
(D iogenes L aertius, Lives o f the Philosophers IX 18)

Xenophanes, by his own reckoning, was ninety-three when he wrote


these lines. H e is said to have lived to be over a hundred, and the rest

93

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY

o f our evidence suggests that his life spanned the century from 580 to
480 .
Not all his surviving verses deserve a place here, but I shall translate
all the extant fragments which have philosophical content. (The frag
ment on Pythagoras has already been cited in Chapter Five.) They
divide roughly into three groups: on knowledge, on the gods, on nature.
In the later tradition, Xenophanes acquired a reputation fo r sceptic
ism. It rested primarily on the first o f the following three fragments.
A c c o rd in g to som e, X en o p h a n es takes this sceptical position,
sayin g that e v ery th in g is in ap p reh en sible w hen he writes:
A nd the clear truth no man has seen nor will anyone
know concerning the gods and about all the things o f which I speak;
fo r even i f he should actually manage to say what was indeed the
case,
nevertheless he himselfdoes not know it; but beliefisfound over all.
[ 34]
(Sextus E m piricus, Against the Mathematicians V 11 49)
A m m on iu s p refa ced his rem arks, as h e usually does, with the
line o f X en oph an es:
Let these things be believed as similar to the truth, [ 35]
a n d invited us to state and say w hat we believed.
(Plutarch, Table Talk 746B)
N o com p aratives e n d in g in -on h ave a p en u ltim ate upsilon;
h en ce X en o p h a n es glusson [sw eeter] is rem arkable:
I f god had not made yellow honey, they would say
that the fig was fa r sweeter, [ 38]
(H ero d ian , On Singularities o f Language 946.22-24)
But Xenophanes also spoke in a modestly optimistic way about the pro
gress o f human knowledge:
X en o p h an es:
Not from the start did the gods reveal all things to mortals,
but in time, by inquiring, they make better discoveries, [ 18]
(Stobaeus, Anthology I viii 2)

94

XENOPHANES

In verbs en d in g in -si the p en u ltim ate syllable is n aturally


lon g . . . B u t the poets o ften m ake it short, as in X en o p h an es:
Since all at first have learned, from Homer . . . [ ]
and again:
As many things as are clear for mortals to see . . . [ 36]
(H ero d ian , On Double Quantities 16. 17 -2 2 )
Among the theological fragments there are several which are sharply
critical o f traditional religious notions:
[T h e m yths o f the th eologians and poets] a re full o f im piety;
h ence X en o p h an es in his criticism o f H om er and H esiod says:
Homer and Hesiod attributed to the gods all the things
which among men are shameful and blameworthy theft and adultery and mutual deception, [ 11 ]
(Sextus Em piricus, Against the Mathematicians IX 193)
H om er and H esiod, a cco rd in g to X en o p h a n es o f C o lo p h o n ,
told many lawless deeds o f the gods
theft and adultery and mutual deception, [ 12]
(ibid I 289)
X enoph anes o f C o lo p h o n , claim in g that g o d is o n e and in co r
poreal, says:
There is one god, greatest among gods and men,
similar to mortals neither in shape nor in thought, [ 23]
A n d again:
But mortals think that the gods are bom,
and have clothes and speech and shape like their own. [ 14]
A n d again:
But i f cows and horses or lions had hands
or could draw with their hands and make the things men can
make,
then horses would draw the forms o f gods like horses,
cows like cows, and they would make their bodies
similar in shape to those which each had themselves, [ 15]
(Clem ent, Miscellanies V xiv 10 9 .1-3 )

95

EARLY

GREEK PHILOSOPHY

T h e G reeks su ppose that the god s have not only hum an shapes
but also h um an feelings: ju s t as each race depicts th eir shapes
as sim ilar to their ow n, as X en o p h a n es o f C o lo p h o n says (the
E thiopians m akin g them d ark and snub-nosed, the T h racian s
red-h aired and blue-eyed), so too they invent souls fo r them
sim ilar to th eir own.
(Clem ent, Miscellanies V I I iv 22.1: c f 16)
Further fragments reveal a positive side to Xenophanes' thought
about the gods, and the doxography suggests (perhaps anachron
istically) that his views were elaborated with some sophistication and
detail.
I f the d ivine exists, it is a living th in g; if it is a living thin g, it
sees fo r
he sees as a whole, he thinks as a whole, he hears as a whole.
[ 24]
I f it sees, it sees both w hite things and black.
(Sextus E m piricus, Against the Mathematicians IX 144)
T h eo p h ra stu s says that X en o p h a n es o f C o lo p h o n , the
teach er o f P arm enides, su pposed that the first prin ciple, o r
the existin g u niverse, was on e and neith er finite n o r infinite,
n eith er ch a n g in g n o r changeless. T h eo p h ra stu s allows that the
accoun t o f his view s belongs to a d iffe r e n t inquiry from the
study o f n atu re; fo r X en o p h an es said that this o n e universe
was go d . H e shows that g o d is o n e fro m the fact that he is most
p o w erfu l o f all things; fo r i f th ere w ere m ore than one, he
says, they w ould all have to possess equ al pow er, bu t w hat is
m ost p o w erfu l and best o f all things is go d . H e show ed that it
was u n g en e ra ted fro m the fact that w hat com es into bein g
m ust d o so eith er from w hat is sim ilar o r fro m w hat is dissim i
lar; but sim ilar things, he says, can n ot be a ffected by one
an o th e r (fo r it is no m ore fitting that w hat is sim ilar should
g en era te than that it sh o u ld be g en era ted by what is sim ilar to
it), and i f it com es into bein g from w hat is dissim ilar, then what
is will com e fro m w hat is not. In this way he show ed it to be
u n g en e ra ted and eternal. It is n eith er infinite n o r finite

96

XENOPHANES

because it is w hat does not exist w hich is infin ite (h avin g no


beginn in g, no m idd le and no en d ), w hile it is several th in gs
which are finite, bein g lim ited by o n e an o th er. H e d oes aw ay
with ch an ge and changelessness in a sim ilar fashion: it is w hat
d oes not exist w hich is ch angeless (fo r n o th in g else passes into
itan d it does not pass into a n yth in gelse), w hile it is several things
which ch an ge (fo r o n e th in g ch an ges into an oth er). H en ce
when he says that it rem ains in the sam e state an d d oes not
ch an ge Always he remains in the same slate, changing not at all,
nor is it fitting fo r him to move now here now there [ 26]
- he m eans not that it rests in virtu e o f the stationariness w hich
is o p p o sed to ch a n g e bu t in virtu e o f the rest w hich is distinct
from ch an ge and from stationariness. A cco rd in g to N icolaus
o f Dam ascus in his w ork On Gods, h e says that the first prin ciple
is infinite and changeless, and a cco rd in g to A le x a n d e r he says
that it is finite and spherical. B u t it is clear fro m w hat I have
said that he shows it to be neith er infinite n o r finite. ([A lex
a n d er supposes that] it is finite and spherical because
[X enophanes] says th at it is sim ilar from all directions.) A n d he
says that it thinks o f all things, w hen he writes:
But fa r from toil he governs everything with his mind, [ 25]
(Sim plicius, Commentary on the Physics 22.26-23.20)
The fragments dealing with natural science are sparse, and require
no comment.
P orp h yry says that X en o p h a n es held the d ry an d th e m oist i.e. earth and w ater to be first principles, and h e quotes an
exam p le which indicates this:
.
Earth and water are all things which grow and come into being.
[ 29]
(Philoponus, Commentary on the Physics 125.2730)
X en op h an es, a cco rd in g to som e, hold s that ev ery th in g has
com e into bein g from earth:
For all things are from earth and in earth all things end. [ 27]
. . . the poet H o m er holds that ev ery th in g has com e into bein g

97

EARLY

GREEK

PHILOSOPHY

from tw o thin gs, earth and w ater, . . . and a cco rd in g to som e


X en o p h a n es o f C o lo p h o n agrees with him . F or he says:
For we all come into being from earth and water, [ 33]
(Sextus E m piricus, Against the Mathematicians x 3 1 3 -3 1 4 )
X en o p h a n es in On Nature:
Sea is source o f water and source o f wind;
fo r neither in the clouds <would the force o f the wind come about,
breathing out> from inside, without the great ocean,
nor would the streams o f the rivers nor the rain-water o f the air;
but the great ocean is generator o f clouds and winds
and rivers, [ 30]
(G en eva scholium on H om er, Iliad X X I 196)
X en o p h an es thinks that the earth is not alo ft but reaches
d ow n w ards ad infinitum; fo r he says:
O f the earth this, the upper limit, is seen at our feet
next to the air; but below, it proceeds to infinity, [ 28]
(A chilles, Introduction to Aratus 4)
O n e sh o u ld u n d erstan d the sun to be g o in g abo ve inasm uch
as it always passes above the earth - as I thin k X en o p h an es o f
C o lo p h o n also says:
And the sun, passing above and warming the earth, . . . [ 31 ]
(H eraclitus, Homeric Questions 44.5)
X en o p h a n es says:
A nd in certain caves [speatessi] the water drips down . . .

[ 37]
B u t the fo rm speas does not occur.
(H ero d ian , On Singularities o f Language 936.18 -2 0 )
R em em ber that X en o p h a n es describes the rainbow in his
h exam eters thus:
What men call Rainbow, that too is a cloud,
purple and scarlet and yellow to see. [ 32]
(Eustathius, Commentary on the Iliad X I 24)

98

XENOPHANES

It is worth appending the brief doxographical account which Hippo


lytus transmits:
H e says that n o th in g com es into b ein g o r is d estroyed o r
changes, and that the u n iverse is o n e and changeless. H e also
says that god is eternal and unique and h o m o g en eo u s in every
way and lim ited and spherical and capable o f p ercep tio n in all
his parts.
T h e sun com es into existen ce each d ay fro m sm all sparks
which co n gregate. T h e earth is infinite and su rro u n d e d
neith er by air n o r by the heavens. T h e r e a re infin itely m an y
suns and m oons. E veryth in g is m ad e fro m earth.
H e said that th e sea is salty because m any m ixtu res flow
togeth er in it. (M etrodoru s holds that it is salty because it is
filtered in th e earth , but X en o p h a n es thinks that the earth
m ixes with the sea.) H e holds that the earth in tim e is dissolved
by the m oisture, u rg in g as p r o o f the fact that shells a re fo u n d
in the m iddle o f the land and on m ountains; and he says that
in the qu arries in Syracuse th ere w ere fo u n d im pressions o f
fish and o f seaw eed, on Paros the im pression o f a b a y -lea f d e ep
in the rock, and on M alta shapes o f all sea-creatures. H e says
that these w ere fo rm ed lon g a go w hen ev ery th in g was co vered
in m ud - the im pressions d ried in th e m u d. A ll m en are
destroyed w hen the earth is carried d ow n into th e sea and
becom es m ud; then they begin to be born again and this is
the fo u n d atio n o f all the worlds.
(H ippolytu s, Refutation o f A ll Heresies I xiv 2-6)

99

8
HERACLITUS
Heraclitus came from Ephesus in Asia Minor; he belonged lo an emi
nent family; he flourished about 500 . His thought and his
writings were notorious fo r their difficulty: he was nicknamed 'The
Obscure and 'The Riddler. One anecdote, no doubt apocryphal, is
worth repeating:
T h e y say that E u ripid es g ave [Socrates] a co py o f H eraclitus
bo ok an d asked him w hat he th o u g h t o f it. H e rep lied : W hat
I u n d erstan d is sp len did ; and 1 thin k that w hat I d o n t u n d er
stand is so too - bu t it w ou ld take a Delian d iver to get to the
bottom o f it.
(D iogen es L aertius, Lives o f the Philosophers II 22)
Socrates attitude o f puzzled admiration has been shared by many later
students o f Heraclitus.
It is hard to know how best to present the surviving fragments o f
Heraclitus' work. The Greek texts are uncertain in more cases than
usual; and since Heraclitus wrote in prose it is frequently difficult to
tell which words i f any in a given passage purport to be his.
But the chief problem concerns the arrangement o f the texts; fo r any
arrangement will insinuate some general interpretation o f Heraclitus
thought, and every such interpretation is controversial. (A random
ordering is no solution; for that will suggest that Heraclitus was not a
systematic thinker at all, a suggestion which has itself had several
scholarly advocates.)
It will be uncontroversial to begin with the opening words o f Hera
clitus book. After that, it may prove most helpful to quote two long and
complementary doxographical texts, which incidentally have a number

100

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o f important fragments embedded in them. Then the remaining frag


ments will be collected under various thematic headings.
First, then, the opening passage o f Heraclitus book. It is referred to
by Aristotle:
It is d ifficu lt to pu n ctu ate H eraclitus w ritings becau se it is
unclear w h eth er a w ord goes with w hat follow s o r with w hat
preced es it. E.g. at the very b eg in n in g o f his treatise, w h ere he
says:
O f this account which holdsforever men prove uncomprehending,
[cf 22 l]
it is u n clear w hich fo re v e r goes with.
(A ristotle, Rhetoric 1 4 0 7 ^ 4 - 1 8 )
A longer quotation is preserved by Hippolytus (see below) and by Sextus
Empiricus. I cite the passagefrom Sextus because it isfu ller (but I have
tacitly altered his text once or twice in the light o f Hippolytus readings).
A t the b egin n in g o f his w ritings o n n atu re, an d p o in tin g in
som e way at the en viro n m en t, [H eraclitus] says:
O f this account which holds forever men prove uncomprehending,
both before hearing it and when first they have heard it. For
although all things come about in accordance with this account,
they are like tiros as they try the words and the deeds which I
expound as I divide up each thing according to its nature and say
how it is. Other men fa il to notice what they do when they are
awake, just as they forget what they do when asleep, [ 1]
H avin g thus explicitly established that e v ery th in g w e d o o r
think d ep en d s u pon participation in th e d iv in e accoun t, he
continues and a little later on adds:
For that reason you must follow what is common (i.e. w h at is
universal - fo r co m m o n m eans u n iversal). But although
the account is common, most men live as though they had an
understanding o f their own. [ 2]
(Sextus Em piricus, Against the Mathematicians V I I 13 2 -1 3 3 )
The first doxographical passage comes from the R efu tatio n o f A ll

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PHILOSOPHY

H eresies. In it Hippolylus presents what is supposed to be a rounded


summary o f Heraclitus main ideas.

H eraclitus says that the universe is divisible and indivisible,


g en era te d and u n g en e ra ted , m ortal and im m ortal, W ord and
E ternity, F ath er an d Son, G o d an d Justice.
Listening not to me but to the account, it is wise to agree that all
things are one, [ 50]
says H eraclitus. T h a t ev ery o n e is ign oran t o f this and does not
a g re e h e states as follows:
They do not comprehend how, in differing, it agrees with itself a backward-turning connection, like that o f a bow and a lyre.
[ 5 *]
T h a t an accoun t exists always, bein g the u niverse and eternal,
h e says in this way:
O fthis account which holdsforever men prove uncomprehending,
both before hearing it and when first they have heard it. For
although all things come about in accordance with this account,
they are like tiros as they try the words and the deeds which I
expound as I divide up each thing according to its nature and say
how it is. [ 1]
T h a t th e u niverse is a child and an eternal kin g o f all things
fo r all etern ity he states as follows:
Eternity is a child at play, playing draughts: the kingdom is a
childs, [ 52]
T h a t the fa th er o f ev ery th in g that has com e a bout is g enerated
and u n g en era ted , crea tu re and creato r, we h ear him saying:
War is father o f all, king o f all: some it shows as gods, some as
men; some it makes slaves, some free, [ 53]
That <. . .
. . . > connection, like that o f a bow and a lyre, [c f 51 ]
T h a t G o d is u n a p p a ren t, u nseen, u n kn ow n to m en, he says in
these words:
Unapparent connection is better than apparent [ 54]
- h e praises and adm ires the u nkn ow n and unseen part o f his
p o w er abo ve the know n part. T h a t h e is visible to m en and not
u nd iscoverable he says in th e fo llo w in g w ords:

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I honour more those things which are learned, by sight and hear

ing tB 55l
he says - i.e. the visible m o re than the invisible. < T h e sa m e>
is easily learn ed from such w ords o f his as these:
Men have been deceived, he says, as to their knowledge o f what
is apparent in the same way that Homer was - and he was the
wisest o f all the Greeks. For some children who were killing lice
deceived him by saying: 'What we saw and caught we leave
behind, what we neither saw nor caught we take with us, [ 56]
T h u s H eraclitus gives equ al ran k and h o n o u r to th e a p p a ren t
and u n ap p aren t, as th ou gh th e a p p a ren t an d th e u n a p p a re n t
w ere confessedly o n e. For, he says,
unapparent connection is better than apparent; [ 54]
and:
I honour more those things which are learned by sight and hearing

[ 55]
(i.e. the organs) - an d he d oes not h o n o u r the u n a p p a re n t
m ore.
H ence H eraclitus says that d ark an d light, bad an d g o o d ,
are not d iffe re n t but o n e and the sam e. F or ex a m p le, h e re
proaches H esiod fo r not kn o w in g d ay an d n ig h t - fo r d a y and
night, he says, a re o n e, ex p ressin g it thus:
A teacher o f most is Hesiod: they are sure he knows most who did
not recognize day and night - f o r they are one. [ 57]
A n d so are g oo d and bad. F or ex a m p le, d octo rs, H eraclitus
says,*w ho cut and cau terize an d w retch ed ly torm en t the sick
in every way are praised - they d eserve no fee fro m the sick,
fo r they have th e sam e effects as the diseases* [ 58]. A n d
straight and twisted, he says, a re the sam e:
The path o f the carding-combs, he says, is straight and crooked
[ 59]
(the m ovem ent o f th e in stru m en t called the screw -press in a
fu lle rs sh op is straigh t an d cro o k ed , fo r it travels u pw ard s and
in a circle at the sam e tim e) he says it is o n e an d the sam e.
A n d u p and d ow n a re o n e and th e sam e:
The path up and down is one and the same, [ 6o]
A n d he says that th e p o llu ted an d th e p u re a re o n e a n d the

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PHILOSOPHY

sam e, a n d that the d rin kab le an d the u n d rin kab le a re o ne and


the sam e:
The sea, he says, is most pure and most polluted water: for fish,
drinkable and life-preserving; fo r men, undrinkable and deathdealing. [ 6 1 ]
A n d he explicitly says that the im m ortal is m ortal and the m or
tal im m ortal in th e fo llo w in g w ords:
Immortals are mortals, mortals immortals: living their death,
dying their life, [ 62]
H e also speaks o f a resu rrection o f this visible flesh in which
we a re b orn , and he is aw are that g o d is the cause o f this
resu rrection - he says:
There they are said to rise up and to become wakeful guardians
o f the living and the dead, [ 63]
A n d he says that a ju d g e m e n t o f the w orld and o f everyth in g
in it com es about th ro u gh fire; fo r
fire, he says, will come and judge and convict all things, [ 66]
H e says that this fire is intelligent an d th e cause o f the m an age
m en t o f th e universe, ex p ressin g it thus:
The thunderbolt steers all things [ 64]
(i.e. d irects everythin g) - by the th u n d erb o lt he m eans the
eternal fire, and he calls it need and satiety [ 65] (the establish
m ent o f the w orld acco rd in g to him bein g need and the con
flagration satiety).
In the fo llo w in g passage he has set d ow n all o f his own
th ou g h t - an d at the sam e tim e that o f the sect o f N oetus,
w hom I have briefly show n to be a disciple not o f C h rist but o f
H eraclitus. F or he says that the created u niverse is itself the
m aker and crea to r o f itself:
God is day and night, winter and summer, war and peace, satiety
and famine (all the opposites - that is his m eaning); but he
changes like olive oil which, when it is mixed with perfumes, gets
its name from the scent o f each, [ 67]
It is clear to ev ery o n e that th e m indless follow ers o f N oetus
and th e ch am pion s o f his sect, even if they d en y they are dis
ciples o f H eraclitus, yet in subscribing to th e opinion s o f
N oetu s evid en tly confess the sam e beliefs.
(H ippolytu s, Refutation o f A ll Heresies IX ix i - x 9)

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HERACLITUS

Diogenes Laertius L ife also offers a summary account, with sup


porting quotations and paraphrases, o f Heraclitus thought:
H eraclitus, son o f Bioson (or, as som e say, o f H eracon ), from
Ephesus. H e flourished in th e sixty-ninth O lym p ia d [504/501
]. H e was u n co m m on ly a rro ga n t and co n tem p tu o u s, as
ind eed is clear from his treatise itself, in which he says:
Much learning does not teach sense otherwise it would have
taught Hesiod and Pythagoras, and again Xenophanes and
Hecataeus. [ 40]
For he says that the wise is o n e, g ra sp in g the k n o w led ge how all
things are steered th ro u gh all [ 41]. A n d he said that H om er
d eserved to be throw n o u t o f the gam es an d flo g g ed - and
A rch ilo ch u s too. [ 42] H e also said:
You should quench violence more quickly than arson, [ 43]
And:
The people should fight fo r the law as fo r the city wall, [ 44]
H e also assails the Ephesians fo r e x p ellin g his frien d H erm odorus. H e says:
The Ephesians deserve to be hanged to the last man, every one o f
them: they should leave the city to the young. For they expelled
Hermodorus, the best man among them, saying: Let no one o f us
be best: i f there is such a man, let him be elsewhere and with
others. [ 1 2 1]
W hen they asked him to w rite laws fo r them , h e refu se d on the
gro u n d s that the city had a lread y been m astered by a w icked
constitution. H e retired into the tem ple o f A rtem is a n d played
d ice with th e ch ild ren . W hen th e Ephesians stood ro u n d him ,
he said: W h y a re you staring? Isnt it better to d o this than to
play politics with you ?
In the en d he becam e a m isan th rope, leavin g th e city and
living in the m ountains w h ere h e fed o n plants and herbs.
Because o f this he contracted d ro p sy an d retu rn ed to the tow n.
H e asked the d octors in his rid d lin g fashion i f th ey cou ld
ch an ge a rainstorm into a d ro u g h t. W h en th ey failed to u n d e r
stand him , he b u ried h im self in a byre, h o p in g that the d ro p sy
w ould be vaporized by th e heat o f th e d u n g . B u t h e m et with
no success even by this m eans an d d ied at th e a ge o f sixty . . .

105

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CREEK

PHILOSOPHY

H e was rem arkable fro m an ea rly age: as a y o u n g m an, he


used to say that he knew n othin g, and w hen he had becom e
adu lt that he had learn ed everyth in g . H e was no-on es pupil,
bu t said that he had inqu ired into h im self [cf 101] and
learn ed e v ery th in g from him self. Sotion reports that som e say
that he was a pu pil o f X en o p h an es, an d that A risto, in his book
On Heraclitus, says that h e was actually cu red o f the d ro p sy and
d ied o f an o th e r disease. H ipp obo tu s too says this.
T h e bo ok o f his which is in circulation is, as fa r as its general
ten o r goes, on nature; but it is d ivid ed into th ree accounts o n e on the u niverse, o n e political, o n e theological. H e
d ep osited it in the tem ple o f A rtem is (having, as som e say,
written som ew hat unclearly) in o rd e r that the p o w erfu l should
have access to it and it shou ld not easily be despised by the
people. T im o n gives a sketch o f him as follows:
A m o n g them H eraclitus the m ocker, the reviler o f the
m ob,
.
the rid d ler, rose up.
T h e o p h ra stu s says that because o f his im pulsive tem peram en t
he w rote som e things in a half-fin ished style and others in
d iffe re n t ways at d iffe re n t tim es. A s a sign o f his a rro gan ce
A ntisth en es says in his Successions that he resigned from the
kingship in fa vo u r o f his b roth er. H is treatise gained such a
high rep u tation that it actually p ro d u ced disciples, the socalled H eracliteans.
His views, in gen eral, w ere the follow ing. A ll things are con
stituted fro m fire and resolve into fire. A ll thin gs com e about
in acco rd an ce with fate, and th e things that exist a re fitted
to g eth er by the transform ation o f opposites. A ll things are full
o f souls and spirits. H e sp o k e also ab o u t all the events that
o ccu r in the w orld, a n d h e said that the sun is the size it app ears
[cf 3]. H e also said:
I f you travel every path you will not fin d the limits o f the soul, so
deep is its account, [ 45]
H e said th at conceit is a sort o f epilepsy, an d that sight is fal
lacious [ 46]. Som etim es in his treatise he expresses h im self
brilliantly an d clearly, so that even th e m ost stupid easily
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HERACLITUS

understand him and gain an en la rgem en t o f soul; an d the


brevity and w eight o f his style a re incom parable.
In detail, his d octrines a re these. Fire is an elem en t, and all
things are an ex ch a n g e fo r fire [cf go], co m in g ab o u t by
rarefaction and cond en sation. (B u t he expresses n o th in g
clearly.) A ll things co m e about th ro u g h opposition, and the
universe flows like a river [cf i 2]. T h e u n iverse is finite, and
there is on e w orld [cf 30]. It is gen erated from fire and it is
consum ed in fire again, altern atin g in fixed p eriod s th ro u g h
ou t the w hole o f tim e. A n d this hap p en s by fate.
O f the opposites, that w hich leads to gen eratio n is called w ar
and strife [cf 80], and that w hich leads to co n flagratio n is
called agreem en t and peace. T h e ch a n g e is a path u p and
dow n [cf 60], and the w orld is gen erated in acco rd an ce with
it. F or fire as it is co n d en sed becom es m oist, and as it co h eres
becom es w ater; w ater as it solidifies turns into earth this is
the path d ow nw ards. T h e n again the earth dissolves, and
w ater com es into bein g fro m it, and ev ery th in g else fro m w ater
(he refers pretty well e v ery th in g to the exh alation given o f f by
the sea) - this is the path upw ards.
Exhalations a re given o f f by the earth an d by th e sea, som e
o f them brigh t an d p u re, o thers d ark . Fire is increased by
the brigh t exhalations, m oisture by the others. H e d oes not
indicate w hat the su rro u n d in g heaven is like. B u t th ere are
bowls in it, their hollow side tu rn ed tow ards us. T h e brigh t
exhalations gath er in them and p ro d u ce flam es, an d these are
the heavenly bodies. T h e flam e o f the sun is the b rightest and
hottest. F or the o th er heaven ly bodies a re fu rth e r aw ay fro m
the earth and fo r that reason give less light an d heat, w hile the
m oon, th ou gh it is n earer the earth , does not travel th ro u g h
a p u re region. T h e sun , h o w ever, lies in a tran slu cen t and
uncontam inated region , and it preserves a p ro p o rtio n a te d i
stance from us; that is why it gives m ore heat and light. T h e
sun and the m oon a re eclipsed w hen the bowls tu rn u p w ards.
T h e m oons m onthly chan ges o f sh ape com e ab o u t as its bowl
grad ually turns. D ay an d n igh t, the m onths and seasons and
years, rains and w inds an d the like, com e abo u t in virtu e o f the
d iffe re n t exhalations. F or the b righ t exh alatio n , w hen it bursts

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EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY

into flam e in th e circle o f th e sun, m akes d ay, and the o pposite


exh alatio n , w hen it has g ain ed p o w er, prod u ces night. A s the
heat fro m th e brightness increases it m akes su m m er, and as
the m oisture from the d arkn ess m ounts u p it effects winter.
H e gives exp lan atio n s o f the o th e r p h en om en a in the sam e
way, bu t he does not say an yth in g about w hat the earth is like,
n o r even ab o u t the bowls. T h o s e w ere his views.
T h e story ab o u t Socrates and w hat he said w hen he looked
at th e treatise (having g o t it from E u ripid es, a cco rd in g to
A risto), I h ave reco u n ted in the Life o f Socrates. Seleucus the
g ram m arian , h ow ever, says that C ro to n relates in his Diver that
a certain C rates first b ro u g h t the book to G reece and that it
was he w ho said that it w ould take a D elian d iv er not to get
d ro w n ed in it. So m e en title it Muses, o th ers On Nature;
D iodotus calls it
A certain steera ge to the goal o f life;
oth ers Judgement, Manners, Turnings, One World fo r A l l . . .
D em etrius in his Homonyms says that he despised even the
A th en ian s, th ou gh he had th e highest rep u tation < a m o n g
th e m > , and that th ou gh he was scorned by the Ephesians he
p re fe rre d w h at was fam iliar to him . D em etrius o f Phaleron
m entions him too in his Apology o f Socrates. V e ry m any p eo p le
have o ffe r e d interpretation s o f his treatise: A ntisth en es, H eraclides o f Pontus, C lean th es, Sp h a eru s the Stoic, Pausanias
(w ho was called th e H eraclitean), N icom ed es, D ionysius - and
o f the gram m arian s, D iodotus, w h o says that the treatise is not
ab o u t n atu re bu t ab o u t politics and th at the rem arks on nature
a re th ere by way o f illustrations. H iero n ym u s says that Scythinus the iam bic p o et attem pted to p u t his acco u n t into verse.
(D iogen es L aertius, Lives o f the Philosophers IX 1 - 3 ,5 - 1 2 ,1 5 )
The rest o f the chapter assembles the remaining fragments, together
with some paraphrastic texts. Let me stress again that the distinction
between quotation and paraphrase is often hard to make out, and
that the reliability o f purported paraphrases and quotations is often
uncertain. After two short passages from Stobaeus, the texts are
grouped roughly by subject matter, the main themes o f which have been
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HERACLITUS

indicated in the passages already cited. But assignment to these groups


is fairly arbitrary; in addition, when two texts are quoted together in
an ancient source I have kept them together even i f they deal with
different issues.
First, there are two short sequences o f quotations, or purported quot
ations, in the A n th o lo g y o f John Stobaeus.
H eraclitus:
O f those whose accounts I have heard, no-one has come so fa r as
to recognize that the wise is set apart from all things, [ io8]
It is better to hide folly than to make it public, [ 109]
It is not good fo r men to get all they want, [ n o ]
Sickness makes health sweet and good, hunger plenty, weariness
rest, [ 1 1 1 ]
To be temperate is the greatest excellence. And wisdom is speaking
the truth and acting with knowledge in accordance with nature.
[B 1 1 2 ]

Thinking is common to all. [ 113]


Speaking with sense one should rely on what is common to all, as
a city on its law - and with yet greater reliance. For all human
laws are nourished by the one divine; fo r it is as powerful as it
wishes, and it suffices fo r all, and it prevails, [ 114]
Socrates:
Soul has a self-increasing account, [ 115 ]
(Stobaeus, Anthology III i 17 4 -18 0 )
H eraclitus:
A ll men can know themselves and be temperate, [ 1 16]
A man when he is drunk is led by a boy, stumbling, not knowing
where he goes, his soul moist, [ 117 ]
A dry soul is wisest and best, [ 1 18]
(ibid III v 6-8 )
[Despite Stobaeus heading, 1 1 5 is universally ascribed by scholars
to Heraclitus rather than to Socrates. On the other hand, the authen
ticity o f 1 09, 1 12, i 13 and 1 1 6 has frequently been doubted.]
The first group o f texts documents Heraclitus attitude to ordinary
mortals and to other thinkers.
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PHILOSOPHY

L et th y fo u n tain s be d ispersed abroad , and rivers o f waters in


th e streets [Proverbs 5:16]. For
most people do not understand the things they meet ivith, nor do
they know when they have learned; but they seem to themselves to
do so, [ 17]
a cco rd in g to the g o o d H eraclitus. So you see that he too finds
fau lt with unbelievers.
(Clem ent, Miscellanies II ii 8.1)
T h e Ionian M uses [i.e. H eraclitus] say explicitly that m ost m en
w h o th in k them selves wise follow the p o p u la r singers and
*obey the laws*, not kn o w in g that m ost m en a re bad and few
goo d [cf 104], but that the best p u rsu e repu tation . For
the best, he says, choose one thing in return fo r all: everflowing fame from mortals; but most men satisfy themselves like
beasts, [ 29]
m easu rin g happiness by the belly and the genitals and the
m ost sh am efu l parts in us.
(ibid V ix 5 9.4 -5)
H eraclitus caustically rem arks that som e p eo p le are w ithout
faith,
not knowing how to hear or even to speak [ 19]
- he was a id ed h ere, no d ou bt, by Solom on: I f thou desire
to hear, thou shalt receive; an d i f thou incline thine ear,
thou shalt be wise [Ecclesiasticus 6:33].
(ibid II v 24.5)
T h e excellen t H eraclitus rightly exco riates the m ob as un
intelligent and irrational. For
what sense or thought, he says, do they have? They follow the
popular singers and they take the crowd as their teacher, not
knowing that most men are bad and few good, [ 104]
T h u s H eraclitus - which is w hy T im o n called him the reviler
o f the m ob .
(Proclus, Commentary on the First Alcibiades 2 5 6 .1-6 )
T h e co n tem p tu o u s and the brash get little ben efit from what

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HERACLITUS

they hear, while those w h o a re cred u lo u s and guileless are


harm ed - they confirm H eraclitu s saying:
A foolish man is put in a flutter by every word, [ 87]
(Plutarch, On Listening to Lectures 40F)
Iam blichus, On the Soul: H ow m uch better, then, is H era
clitus, who regard s h u m an opinion s as ch ild ren s toys, [ 70]
(Stobaeus, Anthology l l i 16)
Som e say that P ythagoras d id not leave a sin gle w ritten w ork
behind him. T h e y a re in erro r; at any rate, H eraclitu s the
natural scientist pretty well shouts it o u t w hen he says:
Pythagoras, son o f Mnesarchus, practised inquiry more than
any other man, and selecting from these writings he manufact
ured a wisdom fo r himself much learning, artful knavery.
[ 129]
(D iogenes L aertius, Lives o f the Philosophers V I II 6)
Bias is also m ention ed b y H ip p o n ax , as I said b e fo re , and
the fastidious H eraclitus g ave particu lar praise to him w hen
he wrote:
In Priene lived Bias, son o f Teutames, who is o f more account
than the others, [ 39]
(ibid I 88)
H eraclitus says that H om er is an a stro n om er on the basis o f
this line [nam ely / fta d X V III 25> ]and [Iliad V I 488]. [ 105]
(Scholiasts A and T to H om er, Iliad X V I I I 251)
T h e orators Introduction ben ds all its th eorem s to this en d [sc.
deception] and is, a cco rd in g to H eraclitus, the lead er o f cheats,
[ 81]
(Philodem us, Rhetoric I 3 5 1S)
The second group o f passages, closely connected with the first,
indicates Heraclitus attitude to the scope and nature o f human
knowledge.
N evertheless, [Celsus] w anted to show that this too was a

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PHILOSOPHY

fiction w e [Christians] had taken fro m the G reek philo


sop h ers w h o said that h u m an w isdom is o n e th in g, d ivine wis
d om an o th er. A n d he quotes rem arks o f H eraclitus, in on e o f
w hich h e says:
For human nature has no insights, divine nature has; [ 78]
and in another:
A man is called foolish by a god as a child is by a man. [ 79]
(O rigen , Against Celsus V I xii)
In all respects su p e rio r to us, [god] is especially u nlike and
d iffe re n t from us in his acts; but o f d ivin e acts, the m ajority,
a cco rd in g to H eraclitus,
escape our knowledge through lack o f faith, [ 86]
(Plutarch, Coriolanus 232D)
Those who search fo r gold, says H eraclitus, dig over much
earth and fin d little, [ 22]
(C lem ent, Miscellanies IV ii 4.2)
P erh ap s g o d is not w illing that such h arm o n y should ever
be fo u n d a m o n g m en. For
nature, acco rd in g to H eraclitus, likes to hide itself [r 123]
- and still m ore so the crea to r o f n atu re, w hom we especially
revere and a d m ire because k n o w led ge o f him is not readily
gained.
(T hem istius, Speeches V 69B)
A cco rd in g to th e P yrrh on ian sceptics, X en o p h an es and Zeno
o f E lea an d D em ocritu s w ere sceptics . . . A lso H eraclitus,
w h o said:
Let us not make aimless conjectures about the most important
things, [ 47]
(D iogen es L aertius, Lives o f the Philosophers IX 73)
T h u s th e p ro p h e ts rem ark, I f ye will not believe, su rely ye
shall n o t be established [Isaiah 7:9], is p ro ved abundan tly
true. A n d H eraclitus o f Ephesus was parap h rasin g it w hen
h e observed:
112

HERACLITUS

I f you do not expect the unexpected you will not discover it;
for it cannot be tracked down and offers no passage, [ 18]
(Clem ent, Miscellanies II iv 17.8)
H eraclitus says, as th ou gh he had achieved so m eth in g g re a t
and noble,
I inquired into myself, [ 101]
and o f the proverbs at D elph i K now th y s e lf is th o u g h t the
m ost divine.
(Plutarch, Against Colotes 1 118 c )
K n o w led ge and ign oran ce are the bou n d aries o f hap piness
and unhappiness. For
philosophical men must be versed in very many things, [ 35]
accord ing to H eraclitus, and it is in d eed necessary to m ake
m any jo u rn e y s in the search to be goo d .
(Clem ent, Miscellanies V xiv 14 0 .5-6 )
H eraclitus rejects p ercep tio n w hen he says, in these very
words:
Bad witnesses fo r men are the eyes and ears o f those who have
foreign souls [ 107]
- i.e. it is the m ark o f a fo reign soul to trust in non-rational
perceptions.
(Sextus Em piricus, Against the Mathematicians V I I 126)
W e have two n atural instrum ents, as it w ere, by w hich we
learn ev ery th in g and co n d u ct o u r business, nam ely h ea rin g
and sight; and sight, a cco rd in g to H eraclitus, is not a little
tru er - fo r
eyes are more accurate witnesses than ears, [ 101a]
(Polybius, Histories X II x x vii 1)
H ence the apostle ex h o rts us that y o u r faith sh o u ld not
stand in the wisdom o f m en w ho prom ise to p ersu a d e you ,
but in the p o w er o f C o d [I C o rin th ian s 2:5] w hich in itself
and w ithout p ro o fs has the p o w er to save by faith alone.

1*3

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY

For the most esteemed o f men knows and guards what he


believes, [ 28a]
and m o reo ver
justice will convict the fashioners and witnesses o f falsehoods,
[ 28b]
as ih e Ephesian says. For he too learn ed from fo reign p hilo
sop h y about the purification th ro u gh fire o f those w ho have
lived evil lives.
(C lem ent, Miscellanies V i 9.2 -3)
The third group o f texts can be given the vague label 'metaphysics':
these fragments begin with some general reflections on the nature o f
things and then illustrate three more specific aspects o f Heraclitus
thought - his notion o f the unity o f opposites, his concept o f relativity,
his ideas about instability or flux.
[Celsus] says that the ancients re fe r rid d lin gly to a w ar am ong
the god s, as w hen H eraclitus says:
One should know that war is common, that justice is strife, that
all things come about in accordance with strife and with what
must be. [ 80]
(O rigen , Against Celsus V I xlii)
Su rely n a tu re lon gs fo r the opposites and effects h e r h ar
m ony fro m them . , . T h a t was also said by H eraclitus the
O bscu re:
Combinations wholes and not wholes, concurring differing,
concordant discordant, from all things one and from one all
things, [ 10]
In this w ay th e stru ctu re o f the u n iverse - I m ean, o f the
h eavens and the earth an d the w hole w orld - was arran g ed
b y o n e h a rm o n y th ro u g h the b len d in g o f the m ost opposite
principles.
([Aristotle], On the World 3 9 6 b 7 -8 , 20-25)
O n this top ic [i.e. frien d sh ip] som e seek a d e e p e r and m ore
scientific accoun t. E u rip id es says that th e earth w hen d ried
u p lon gs fo r rain, an d th e m ajestic heaven w hen filled with
11 4

HERACLITUS

rain longs to fall to the earth . H eraclitus says that opposition


concurs and the fairest conn ection com es fro m th in gs that
d iffe r [ 8] and e v ery th in g com es about in acco rd an ce with
strife [cf. 8].
(A ristotle, Nicomachean Ethics H 5 5 b 2 -6 )
O ld H eraclitus o f Ephesus was called clever because o f the
obscurity o f his rem arks:
Cold things grow hot, the hot cools, the wet dries, the parched
moistens, [ 126]
(T zetzes, Notes on the Iliad p. 1 )
It seem s that the ancients used the w ord bios am b igu ou sly to
m ean bow and life*. F or exa m p le, H eraclitus the O bscu re:
The name o f the bow is bios, its function death, [ 48]
(Etymologicum Magnum, s.v. bios)
B ut the circu m feren ce o f a circle as a w hole no lo n g e r has
a direction; fo r w hatever point on it you thin k o f is both a
begin n in g and an en d - fo r
beginning and end are common
on the circum ference o f a circle [ 103], according to H era
clitus.
(P o rp h yry, Notes on Homer, on Iliad X I V 200)
T h e y say it is in d ecen t i f th e sight o f w a rfa re pleases the
gods. B u t it is not indecen t; fo r the noble d eed s please the
gods. A g ain , w ars and battles seem terrible to us, bu t to god
not even they a re terrible. F or g o d m akes all thin gs co n trib
ute to the harm ony o f th e universe, m an a gin g it co m m o d i
ously - so H eraclitus says that to god all things a re fa ir and
ju st but m en have su p p o sed som e thin gs u nju st o th ers ju s t
[ 102].
(P o rp h yry, Notes on Homer, on Iliad IV 4)
D ont you realize the tru th o f H eraclitus rem ark that the
most beau tiful ape is u gly w hen co m p ared with a n o th e r
species . . .? [ 82] D oesnt H eraclitus say th e sam e th in g,

EARLY

GREEK PHILOSOPHY

that the wisest o f m en, w h en co m p ared to a go d , will seem


an ap e in wisdom and beauty and ev ery th in g else? [ 83]
(Plato, Hippias Major 289)
It seem s that each anim al has its own p leasu re . . . T h e
pleasures o f horses, dogs, and men are d ifferent - so H era
clitus says that d on keys w ould p r e fe r rubbish to gold [ 9] (for
food is m ore pleasing to d on keys than gold).
(A ristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 117633, 5-8)
D ry dust and ash . . . shou ld be pu t in the p ou ltry-ru n so
that the birds can sp rin kle them selves with it; fo r this is how
they wash th eir feath ers and w ings, i f w e a re to believe
H eraclitus o f Ephesus w ho says that pigs wash in m ud and
farm yard birds in dust o r ashes [ 37].
(C olum ella, On Agriculture V III iv 4)
[Vetch] is the cow s favo u rite pasture, and the cow eats it with
pleasure. H en ce H eraclitus said that i f happiness resided in
bodily pleasures, w e shou ld call cows hap p y w hen they dis
co ver som e vetch to eat [ 4].
(A lb ert the G reat, On Vegetables V I ii 14)
O n the subject o f the soul, C lean th es sets o u t the doctrines
o f Zen o [the Stoic] in o rd e r to co m p are them to those o f
the o th er natural scientists. H e says that Zen o, like H eraclitus,
holds the soul to be a p ercip ien t exhalation . For, w anting to
show that souls as they are ex h a led alw ays becom e new, he
likened them to rivers, saying:
On those who enter the same rivers, ever different waters flow and souls are exhaled from the moist things, [ 12]
N ow Zeno, like H eraclitus, says that the soul is an exhalation;
but he holds th at it is percipien t, fo r the follow in g reasons.
(A riu s D idym us, fra gm en t 39 Diels, qu o ted by Eusebius,
Preparation fo r the Gospel X V x x 2)
H eraclitus the O b scu re th eologizes the natural w orld as

116

HERACLITUS

som ething u nclear and to be co n jectu red about th ro u gh


symbols. H e says:
Gods are mortal, humans immortal, living their death, dying their
life, [cf 62]
A n d again:
We step and do not step into the same rivers, we are and we
are not. [ 49a]
E verything he says about n atu re is en igm atic an d allegorized .
(H eraclitus, Homeric Questions 2 4 .3 -5)

For it is not possible to step twice into the sam e river,


acco rd in g to H eraclitus, n o r to touch m ortal substance twice
in any condition: by the sw iftness and speed o f its ch an ge,
it scatters and collects itself again - o r rath er, it is not again
and later but sim ultaneously that it com es to g eth er and
departs, approach es and retires [ 8 9 1 ] .
(Plutarch, On the E at Delphi 392B)

T h in g s which have a natural circu lar m otion are preserved


and stay to g eth er because o f it - i f in d eed , as H eraclitus
says, the barley-drink separates if it is not m o vin g [ 125].
(T h eo p h rastu s, On Vertigo 9)

H eraclitus, w ho u rges us to inqu ire into [how the soul com es


to be within the body], posits necessary exch an ges from the
opposites and talks o f a path u p and d ow n [cf 60], and
changing, it rests, [ 84a]
and
it is weariness fo r the same to labour and be ruled [ 84b]
- he leaves us to con jectu re and om its to m ake his a rg u m e n t
clear to us, no d o u b t because we sh o u ld in qu ire fo r ourselves
as he h im self in qu ired an d fo u n d [cf 101].
(Plotinus, Enneads IV viii 1)

The fourth group collects further fragments o f a religious or


theological significance.
117

EARLY

GREEK

PHILOSOPHY

H eraclitus o f E phesus, fin d in g fau lt with those who sacrifice


to the spirits, says:
They vainly purify themselves with blood when they are defiled: as
though one were to step in the mud and try to wash it off with mud.
Any man who saw him doing that would think he was mad. And
they pray to these statues as though one were to gossip to the houses,
not knowing who the gods and who the heroes are. [ 5]
T h e sam e m an said to the Egyptians:
I f they are gods, why do you grieve? I f you grieve, no longer think
them gods, [ 127]
(anonym ous Theosophia 68-69)
A s a m ystical rem in d e r o f that a ffa ir, phalluses a re set up
th ro u g h o u t the cities to D ionysus. F or
i f they did not make a procession fo r Dionysus and sing a
paean to the penis, they would act most shamelessly, H eraclitus
says, and Hades is the same as Dionysus fo r whom they rave
and celebrate their rites [ 15]
- not, I thin k, from d ru n k en n ess o f the bo d y so m uch as
from th eir d isgra cefu l d octrin es o f licentiousness.
(C lem ent, Protreptic 34 5)
H en ce H eraclitus reasonably called [phallic cerem onies] rem
edies, since they will cu re o u r troubles and d rain o u r souls
o f the m isfortu n es o f m ortal life [ 68].
(lam blich us, On the Mysteries I 119)
The Sibyl's raving mouth, a cco rd in g to H eraclitus, speaks
without mirth [ 92]
o r a d o rn m en t o r p erfu m e: with th e h elp o f the g o d h er
voice con tin u es fo r a thou san d years.
(Plutarch, Why the Pythia No Longer Prophesies in Verse
397 )
I thin k that you too know H eraclitus rem ark that the king
w hose is th e o racle at D elphi n eith er speaks n o r conceals but
indicates [ 93] - atten d to these wise w ords an d suppose
118

HERACLITUS

that the god h ere uses the priestess with reg a rd to h ea rin g
in the sam e way as the sun uses the m oon with reg a rd to
sight.
(ibid 404 de)
All anim als are born , flourish, and d ie in o b ed ien ce to the
ordinances o f g o d ; fo r
every beast is pastured by blows, [ 11]
as H eraclitus says.
([Aristotle], On the World 4 o i a 8 - i 1)
A m an m ay perh aps escape the attention o f the visible fire,
but the invisible he can n ot - fo r, as H eraclitus says,
how could anyone escape the attention o f that which never sets?
[ 16]
'
T h e n let us not w rap ourselves in darkness; fo r th e ligh t is
within us.
(Clem ent, Pedagogue II x 99.5)
I know that Plato, too, su p p o rts H eraclitus w h en he writes:
One alone is the arise, unwilling and willing to be called by
the name o f Zeus, [ 32]
A n d again:
It is law also to follow the counsel o f one. [ 33]
A n d if you want to b rin g in th e saying H e that hath ears
to hear, let him h ea r [L u ke 14 :3 5 ], you will find it exp ressed
som ew hat as follow s by the Ephesian:
The uncomprehending, when they hear, are like the deaf: the
saying applies to them though present they are absent, [ 34]
(Clem ent, Miscellanies V xiv 1 1 5 .1 - 3 )
In the fifth group come passages bearing upon psychology: most
o f them deal with the linked topics o f sleep and death.
Does not H eraclitus, like P yth agoras and Socrates in the
Gorgias, call birth d eath w hen h e says:
Death is what we see awake, sleep what we see abed? [ 21]
(ibidV xiv 1 1 5 .1 - 3 )

1*9

EARLY

GREEK PHILOSOPHY

H eraclitus says that aw ake we have a com m on w orld , asleep


each en ters a p rivate w orld [ 89] - but th e superstitious
have no com m on an d n o private w orld.
(Plutarch, On Superstition 166c)
W e a re all fellow -w orkers to o n e en d , som e know in gly and
consciously, o th ers u n kn ow in gly - ju s t as H eraclitus, I think,
says that even those asleep a re w orkers an d fellow -w orkers
in w hat h ap p en s in the w orld [ 75].
(M arcus A u re liu s, Meditations V I 42)
A n d when is death not present in o u r very selves? A s H era
clitus says,
the same thing is present living and dead, awake and asleep,
young and old; fo r the latter change and are the former, and
again the former change and are the latter, [ 88]
([Plutarch], Consolation to Apollonius i o 6 e )
W h at is said o f sleep shou ld be u n d erstoo d also o f death.
F or each o f them - o n e m ore, the o th er less - shows the
absence o f the soul, as we can also learn fro m H eraclitus:
A man in the night kindles a light fo r himself, his sight being
quenched: living, he kindles the dead; awake, he kindles the
sleeping, [ 26]
(C lem ent, Miscellanies IV x xii 1 4 1 .1 2)
H eraclitus seem s to a g ree with [Socrates in the Phaedo] w hen,
sp eak in g o f m en, he says:
There await men when they die things they neither expect nor
even think of. [ 27]
(ibid IV xxii 144.3)
For w hom d oes H eraclitus prop hesy? F or night-prow lers,
m agicians, bacchants, revellers, initiates. F or them he th reat
ens ju d g e m e n t a fte r d eath , fo r them he prop hesies fire.
F or the m ystery rites practised a m o n g m en have im pious
initiations [ 14].
(C lem ent, Protreptic II xxii 1-2 )
120

HERACLITUS

H eraclitus is clearly b era tin g birth w hen h e says:


Being bom, they wish to live and to meet their fates (or rath er,
to rest) and they leave behind children, bom fo r their fates.
[ 20]
(C lem ent, Miscellanies III iii 14 .1)
[Food w ithout salt] is heavy an d nauseous to th e taste; fo r
corpses should be thrown out more readily than dung, [ 96]
a cco rd in g to H eraclitus, and m eat is co rp se o r p a rt o f a
corpse.
(Plutarch, Table Talk 669A)
O rp h e u s w rote:
W ater is d eath fo r souls, . . .
B u t from w ater com es ea rth , from earth again w ater,
and thence soul, ru sh in g to all th e eth er.
H eraclitus p u t to g eth er th e w ords fro m th ese lines and w rote
som ew hat as follows:
For souls it is death to become water, fo r water death to become
earth; but from earth water comes into being, from water soul.
[ 36]

'
(C lem ent, Miscellanies V I ii 1 7 .1 - 2 )

H eraclitus says that fo r souls it is p leasu re o r d eath to b ecom e


moist, and that fo r them th e fall into m ortal life is p leasu re
[ 77]; and elsew h ere that w e live th eir d eath an d th ey live
o u r death [cf 62].
(N u m eniu s, fra g m en t 30 des Places, in P o rp h y ry , The
Cave o f the Nymphs 10)
[Souls on the m oon] a re n o u rish ed by variou s exhalations,
and H eraclitus was rig h t in saying th at souls sm ell th in gs in
H ades [ 98].
(Plutarch, O n the Face in the M oon 943E)
H eraclitus well com pares the soul to a sp id er a n d th e b o d y
to a sp id ers web. Ju st as a sp id er, h e says, stan d in g in the
121

EARLY

CREEK

PHILOSOPHY

m idd le o f its w eb, is aw are as soon as a fly has broken one


o f its th read s and run s th ere qu ickly as th ou gh griev in g over
th e cu ttin g o f the th read , so a m ans soul, when som e part
o f his b o d y is h u rt, hu rries quickly th ere as i f unable to bear
the h u rt to the body to w hich it is firm ly and prop ortionately
jo in e d [ 67a].

(H isdosus, O n Plato's World-Soul 1 7 v)

The sixth group o f fragments and reports consists o f a few texts


which bear upon the issues o f natural science - issues which are
sketched more fully in the doxographical report in Diogenes Laertius
Life.

H eraclitus o f E phesus is m ost clearly o f this opinion [i.e. that


ev ery th in g will ch a n g e into fire]. H e holds that th ere is a
w orld w hich is etern al and a w orld w hich is perishing, and
h e is aw are that th e created w orld is the fo rm e r in a certain
state. N ow that he reco gn ized that the w orld which is
u n iqu ely ch aracterized by the totality o f substance is eternal,
is evid en t w hen he says:
The world, the same fo r all, neither any god nor any man made;
but it was always and is and will be, fire ever-living, kindling in
measures and being extinguished in measures, [ 30]
A n d that he believed it to be gen erated and destructible is indi
cated by the fo llo w in g words:
Tumings o f fire:first, sea; ofsea, h a lf is earth, h a lf lightning-flash.
[ 31a]
- H e says in e ffe ct that, by reason and god which rule
everyth in g, fire is tu rn ed by way o f air into m oisture, the
seed, as it w ere, o f creation, w hich he calls sea; and from
this, again, com e earth and h eaven an d w hat they contain.
H e shows clearly in the fo llo w in g w ords that they are
restored again and becom e fire:
Sea is dissolved and measured into the same proportion that
existed at first, [ 31b]
A n d the sam e holds fo r the o th er elem ents.
(Clem ent, Miscellanies V xiv 10 4 .1-5 )
122

HERACLITUS

T h e first prin ciple altern ately creates th e w o rld fro m itself


and again itself from the w o rld , and
all things, H eraclitus says, are an exchange fo r fire and fire
for all things, as goods are fo r gold and gold fo r goods, [ go]
(Plutarch, On the E a t Delphi 388DE)
T h e y w ould thin k it u nreasonable if, w hile the w h ole h eaven
and each o f its parts all h ave o rd e r an d reason in th eir
shapes and pow ers and p eriod s, th ere is n o such th in g in
the first principles bu t th e m ost b eau tifu l w o rld , as H eraclitus
says, is like a h eap o f rubbish aim lessly piled up. [ 1 24]
(T h eo p h ra stu s, Metaphysics 7 3 1 0 -1 5 )
Each o f the planets revolves in a sin gle sp h ere , as th o u g h
on an island, and p reserves its station. F or
the sun will not overstep its measures, H eraclitus says, otherwise
the Furies, ministers o f justice, will fin d it out. [ 94]
(Plutarch, On Exile 604)
T h e sun is o verseer an d g u ard ian o f these p erio d s, d e fin in g
and arb itrating and revealin g an d illu m in stin g the ch a n g es
and the seasons w hich b rin g all things, a cco rd in g to H era
clitus. [ 100]
(Plutarch, Platonic Questions 1007D)
If, as they say, [the sun] w ere n ou rish ed in th e sam e w ay [as
flam es are], then it is clear that the sun is not o n ly, as
H eraclitus says, new each d ay [ 6], bu t alw ays an d co n tin u
ously new.
(A ristotle, Meteorology 3 5 53 13 15)
H eraclitus . . . [says that th e sun] ss to its size has th e b rea d th
o f a h um an foot, [ 3]
(Stobaeus, Anthology I x x v lg )
W ater m akes fo r collaboration an d frien d sh ip . H eraclitu s
indeed says th at i f the sun d id not ex ist it w o u ld b e nigh t
123

EARLY GREEK

PHILOSOPHY

[ 99]; but we m ay say that i f the sea d id not exist man


w ould be the m ost wild and destitute o f anim als.
([Plutarch], Is Fire or Water the More Useful? 957)
I have discussed elsew h ere w h eth er o n e shou ld suppose
that certain days are u nlu cky, o r w h eth er H eraclitus rightly
rebu ked H esiod, w h o m akes som e g oo d and o thers bad, fo r
not reco gn izin g that the n atu re o f every d ay is the sam e
[ 106].
(Plutarch, Camillus 138)
H eraclitus is better an d m ore H om eric (and like H om er he
calls the arctic circle th e bear):
Limits o f morning and evening are the bear and, opposite the
bear, the boundary o f bright Zeus [ 1 20]
- fo r the arctic circle, not the bear, is the b o u n d ary o f the
su n s rising an d setting.
(Strabo, Geography I i 6)
Som e thin k that the sm oky exhalation is sm ell, since it is
com p osed o f earth and air. T h a t is w hy H eraclitus said that
i f all the things that exist w ere to becom e sm oke the nose
w ould distinguish them [ 7].
(A ristotle, On the Senses and their Objects 443822-25)
Finally, there are some items which could be reckoned as belonging
to moral and political philosophy:
F or T h e law is not m ad e fo r a righ teou s m an , say the
Scriptu res [I T im o th y 1:9]. T h u s H eraclitus rightly says:
They would not know the name o f justice i f these things did
not exist, [ 23]
an d Socrates says that law w ould not have com e into being
fo r the sake o f the good.
(Clem ent, Miscellanies IV iii 10.1)
H eraclitus said that a m ans ch aracter is his fate, [ 1 19]
(Stobaeus, Anthology IV xl 23)
124

HERACLITUS

W orse m en have co n q u ered better, bu t to set u p in y o u r


soul a victory m on u m en t o v e r a n g e r - with w hich H eraclitus
says it is hard to fight, fo r
whatever it wants, it buys with soul [ 85]
- that is a m ark o f g reat and victorious pow er.
(Plutarch, The Control o f Anger 457D)
N ext, H eraclitus says:
Gods and men honour those slain in battle, [ 24]
(C lem ent, Miscellanies IV iv 16.1)
For
greater fates win greater shares, [ 25]
acco rd in g to H eraclitus.
(ibid IV vii 49.3)
Envy, the greatest o f political ills, scarcely attacks old age;
fo r
dogs bark at those they do not know, [ 97]
accord ing to H eraclitus, and en vy attacks the b eg in n er at
the d o o r o f office.
(Plutarch, Should Old M en Take Part in Politics? 78 7c)
I f we h ear that o n e sw allow does not m ake a su m m er, yet
you d o so fo r you excel all the o th e r swallows. F or if, as
H eraclitus says, o n e m an is w orth ten thousan d i f he is the
best [ 49], then surely o n e swallow should be recko n ed as
w orth ten thousan d if it is well chosen.
(T h eo d o ru s P ro d ro m us, Letters 1 [Patrologia Graeca
X X X I II 1240A])
A lw ays rem em b er H eraclitus view that the d eath o f earth is
to becom e w ater, and the d eath o f w ater to becom e air, and
o f air fire, and th e reverse. R em em ber too the m an who
forgets w h ere the road leads [ 71]; and that m ost a re at
odds with that with w hich they m ost constantly associate the account which govern s the u niverse and that w hat they
m eet with every d ay seem s fo reig n to them [ 72]; an d that

*25

EARLY GREEK

PHILOSOPHY

we sh ou ld not act an d speak like those asleep [ 73] - fo r


th en too we thin k w e act and speak; and that we should not
behave like ch ild ren o f o u r parents [ 74] - i.e., in plain
prose, in the way in w hich w e h ave been b ro u g h t up.
(M arcus A u reliu s, Meditations IV 46)

126

PART
II

9
PARMENIDES
Parmenides, son o f Pyres, came from Elea, a Greek foundation in
southern Italy. H e was o f a noble family, and it is reported that he
organ ized his ow n co u n try by the best laws, so that each year
the citizens still g et the officials to sw ear that they will abid e by
Parm enides laws (Plutarch, Against Colotes 1 12 6 a b ). His dates
are uncertain: the Greek chroniclers put his birth in 540 , but a
passage in Plato (which will be quoted in the chapter on Zeno) suggests
that he was bom in about 5 /5.
According to Diogenes Laertius,

H e was a pu pil o f X en o p h an es but d id n o t follow him . H e was


also associated (as Sotion said) with A m ein ias, son o f
Diochaitas, the P yth agorean , a p o o r m an but o f g o o d ch arac
ter. It was rath er A m ein ias that he follo w ed , an d w hen he d ied
he set u p a shrin e fo r him , since h e cam e fro m a fam ou s and
wealthy fam ily, an d h e was led to calm by A m ein ias an d not by
X enophanes.
(D iogen es L aertius, Lives o f the Philosophers IX 21)

The story about Ameinias has led some scholars to look (in vain) for
Pythagorean elements in Parmenides thought.
Parmenides produced one short work written in ungainly hexameter
verse. A substantial proportion o f the poem survives. It opened ivith a
fanciful prologue, after which the main body o f the work divided into
two parts: the first part, the Way o f Truth, gives Parmenides own
views about the true nature o f reality, the second part, the Way o f
Opinion, followed the traditional Ionian pattern o f works O n N atu re.
129

EARLY

GREEK

PHILOSOPHY

The prologue and most o f the Way o f Truth survive; there are frag
ments o f the Way o f Opinion.
11 should be said at the outset that Parmenides poem is in many ways
a bizarre and puzzling production. He presents an account the second
h a lf o f which, the Way o f Opinion, is confessedly 'deceitful' or false,
and he does not clearly explain why he has written these lies. The Way
o f Truth is not intended to be deceitful, but the views it advocates are
paradoxical in the extreme. Moreover, Parmenides is never an easy
writer. His meaning is rarely plain to the first glance, and some lines
o f the poem are obscure to the point o f unintelligibility. There are
also textual uncertainties. Nonetheless, Parmenides had, through the
medium o f Plato, an unrivalled influence on the course o f western
philosophy.
The prologue is preserved by Sextus Empiricus, who also offers an
allegorical interpretation o f Parmenides' verses which I shall not tran
scribe.
X en o p h a n es frien d P arm enid es co n d em n ed the reason
associated with belief, which has w eak opinion s, an d , since he
also g ave u p trust in the senses, su p p o sed that the reason
associated with kn ow led ge, o r infallible reason, was the crit
erion o f truth. T h u s at the b eg in n in g o f his OnNature he writes
in this way:
The mares that carry me as fa r as my heart may aspire
were my escorts: they had guided me and set me on the celebrated
road
o f the god which carries the man o f knowledge*. . .*
There was I being carried; fo r there the wise mares were carrying
me,
straining at the chariot, and maidens were leading the way.
The axle in the axle-box roared from its socket
as it blazed fo r it was driven on by two whirling
wheels on either side - while the maidens, daughters o f the sun,
hastened to escort it, having left the house o f Night
fo r the light and pushed back with their hands the veils from their
heads.
Here are the gates o f the paths o f Night and Day,
and a lintel and a stone threshold enclose them.
130

PARMENIDES

They themselves, high in the air, are filled by great doors,


and all-avenging Justice holds their alternate keys.
Her the maidens appeased with soft words,
skilfully persuading her to push back fo r them the bolted bar
swiftly from the gates. They flew back
and made a yawning gap between the doors, swinging
in turn in their sockets the bronze pivots,
fitted with pegs and pins. And through them
the maidens held the chariot and mares straight on the highway.
And the goddess graciously received me, taking
my right hand in hers; and she spoke thus and addressed me:
'Young man, companion to the immortal charioteers
with the mares who carry you as you come to my house,
I greet you. For no evil fate was sending you to travel
this road (for indeed it is fa r from the tread o f men)
but Right and Justice. You must learn all things,
both the unwavering heart o f persuasive truth
and the opinions o f mortals in which there is no true trust.
[28 1.1-3 0 ]
(Sextus E m piricus, Against the Mathematicians V I I 1 1 1 )
Simplicius adds two further lines:
Parm enides says:
You must learn all things,
both the unwavering heart o f well-rounded truth
and the opinions o f mortals in which there is no true trust.
But nevertheless you will learn these things too - how what seems
had reliably to be, forever traversing everything, [ 1.2 8 -3 2 ]
(Sim plicius, Commentary on On the Heavens 5 5 7.2 4 -5 5 8 .2 )
A couplet from the prologue is quoted by Proclus, who then cites a
further eight lines:
Plato explicitly d istin guishes d iffe r e n t types o f reason and
know ledge, co rresp o n d in g to the d iffe re n t objects o f kn ow
ledge. Parm enides too, th o u g h his po etry m akes him obscure,
nevertheless points in this d irection h im self w hen he says:

EARLY CREEK PHILOSOPHY

Both the unwavering heart o f well-lit truth


and the opinions o f mortals in which there is no true trust;
[ 1.29-30 ]
an d again:
But come, I will tell you preserve the account when you hear
ti
the only roads o f enquiry there are to be thought of:
one, that it is and cannot not be,
is the path o f persuasion (for truth accompanies it);
another, that it is not and must not be
this I say to you is a trail devoid o f all knowledge, [ 2 .16]
And:
For you could not recognize that which is not (for it is not to be
done),
nor could you mention it. [ 2.78]
(P ro d u s, Commentary on the Timaeus I 3 4 5 .1 1 -2 7 )
[Note that in i . 29 Sextus, Simplicius and Proclus attach different
adjectives to the noun truth.]
The half-line at the end o f fragment 2 can be completed, both metr
ically and philosophically, by a half-line preserved elsewhere:
A t an earlier d ate, P arm enides too tou ch ed on this doctrine
inasm uch as he identified bein g and th o u g h t and d id not locate
bein g in sensible objects. H e said:
For the same things can be thought o f and can be. [ 3]
(Plotinus, Enneads V i 8)
The next surviving lines o f the poem can be patched together from
two separate passages in Simplicius. One o f them, which assembles a
few short quotations from Parmenides, includes these sentences:
T h a t th ere is o n e an d th e sam e acco u n t o f ev eryth in g , the
acco u n t o f w hat is, P arm enid es states in th e fo llo w in g words:
What is for being and fo r thinking must be; fo r it can be,
and nothing can not. [ 6 .12]
N ow i f w h atever ?n yo n e says o r thinks is b ein g, then th ere will
b e o n e a cco u n t o f ev eryth in g , th e accoun t o f w h at is.
(Sim plicius, Commentary on the Physics 86.25-30)
132

PARMENIDES

The second passage begins by quoting 2 (except fo r the first line) and
continues thus:
T h a t contrad ictories a re n o t tru e to g eth er he show s in the
verses in w hich he finds fa u lt with those w ho iden tify
opposites. F or havin g said:
fo r it can be,
and nothing can not. This I bid you say.
For from this first road o f inquiry < / restrain> you, [ 6 .1 3]
C h e a d d s:>
and then from the road along which mortals who know nothing
wander, two-headed; for impotence in their
breasts guides their erring mind. And they are borne along
alike deaf and blind, amazed, undisceming crowds,
fo r whom to be and not to be are deemed the same
and not the same; and the path o f all turns back on itself.
[ 6.4 -9 ]
(ibid 117 .2 13)
A continuous passage o f some sixty-six verses, which includes per
haps the whole o f the Way o f Truth, can be put together from three
sources. The first two lines are quoted by Simplicius, and also, much
earlier, by Plato:
W hen we w ere boys, m y boy, the g rea t Parm enides w ould tes
tify against this [nam ely the view that w hat is not is] from b eg in
ning to en d, constantly saying both in prose and in verse that:
Never will this prevail, that what is not is:
restrain your thought from this road o f inquiry, [ 7 .1 2]
(Plato, Sophist 237)
Plato's quotation is continued by Sextus (though Sextus himself quotes
the lines as though they were continuous with 1):
Restrain your thought from this road o f inquiry,
and do not let custom, based on much experience, force you along
this road,
directing unobservant eye and echoing ear

>33

EARLY

CREEK PHILOSOPHY

and tongue; but judge by reason the battle-hardened proof


which I have spoken. Only one story, one road, now
is left, [ 7.2 -6 ]
(Sextus E m piricus, Against the Mathematicians V II 1 1 1 )
Sextus' quotation in turn is continued by Simplicius:
A t the risk o f seem in g p rolix, I w ould like to transcribe in this
com m entary P arm enid es verses on th e o n e bein g (they are
not m any), both to ju s tify w hat I have said about the m atter
and because o f the rarity o f P arm en id es treatise. A fte r he has
d o n e aw ay with w hat is not, he writes:
Only one story, one road, now
is left: that it is. And on this there are signs
in plenty that, being, it is ungenerated and indestructible,
whole, o f one kind and unwavering, and complete.
Nor was it, nor will it be, since now it is, all together,
one, continuous. For what generation will you seek fo r it?
How, whence, did it grow ? That it came from what is not I shall
not allow
you to say or think fo r it is not sayable or thinkable
that it is not. A nd what need would have impelled it,
later or earlier, to grow i f it began from nothing?
Thus it must either altogether be or not be.
Nor from what is will the strength o f trust permit it
to come to be anything apart from itself. For that reason
Justice has not relaxed her fetters and let it come into being or
perish,
but she holds it. Decision in these matters lies in this:
it is or it is not. But it has been decided, as is necessary,
to leave the one road unthought and unnamed (for it is not a true
road), and to take the other as being and being genuine.
How might what is then perish? How might it come into being?
For i f it came into being it is not, nor is it i f it is ever going to be.
Thus generation is quenched and perishing unheard of.
Nor is it divided, since it all alike is
neither more here (which would prevent it from cohering)
nor less; but it is all fu ll o f what is.

134

PARMENIDES

Hence it is all continuous; fo r what is approaches what is.


And unmoving in the limits o f great chains it is beginningless
and ceaseless, since generation and destruction
have wandered fa r away, and true trust has thrust them o ff
The same and remaining in the same state, it lies by itself,
and thus remains fixed there. For powerful necessity
holds it enchained in a limit which hems it around,
because it is right that what is should be not incomplete.
For it is not lacking - i f it were it would lack everything.
The same thing are thinking and a thought that it is.
For without what is, in which it has been expressed,
you will not fin d thinking. For nothing either is or will be
other than what is, since fate has fettered it
to be whole and unmoving. Hence all things are a name
which mortals lay down and trust to be true coming into being and perishing, being and not being,
and changing place and altering bright colour.
And since there is a last limit, it is completed
on all sides, like the bulk o f a well-rounded ball,
equal in every way from the middle. For it must not be at all
greater
or smaller here or there.
For neither is there anything which is not, which might stop it
from reaching
its like, nor anything which is in such a way that it might be
more here or less there than what is, since it all is, inviolate.
Therefore, equal to itself on all sides, it lies uniformly in its limits.
Here I cease fo r you my trustworthy argument and thought
about the truth. Henceforward learn mortal opinions,
listening to the deceitful arrangement o f my words, [ 8 .152]
T h ese, then, a re P arm enid es verses abo u t th e o n e. A fte r them
he next discusses the objects o f o p in ion , layin g d ow n fo r them
d iffe ren t first principles.
(Sim plicius, Commentary on the Physics 14 4 .2 5 -14 6 .2 7 )

Two other short fragments have been thought to come from the Way
o f Truth, though it is hard to see where they should be inserted.

>35

EARLY

CREEK

PHILOSOPHY

P arm enides too in his poem rid d les about H o p e in these


w ords:
Look at things which, though absent, are yet present firmly to the
mind;
fo r you will not cut o ff fo r yourself what is from holding to what
is,
neither scattering everywhere in every way about the world
nor coming together, [ 4]
For o n e w ho hopes, like o n e with faith, sees with his m ind the
objects o f th o u g h t and the things to com e.
(C lem en t, Miscellanies V iii 15.5)
P arm enides, as I have said b e fo re , saw bein g itself in that which
is sep arated from all and the high est o f all beings, in which
bein g was prim arily m an ifested; bu t he was not u naw are o f
the plu rality o f intelligible objects. F or it is he w ho says:
For what is approaches what is, [ 8.25]
an d again:
it is indifferent to me
whence I begin, fo r there again shall I return, [ 5]
and elsew here:
equal from the middle [ 8.43]
- in all these passages he shows that he actually supposes there
to be many intelligible objects.
(Proclus, Commentary on the Parmenides 708.722)
The first lines o f the Way o f Opinion are preserved by Simplicius:
H avin g co m pleted his accoun t o f the intelligible realm , Par
m enides con tin u es thus:
Here I cease fo r you my trustworthy argument and thought
about the truth. Henceforward learn mortal opinions,
listening to the deceitful arrangement o f my words.
For they determined in their minds to name two forms,
o f which one they should not and that is where they have erred.
And they distinguished them as opposite in form and set up signs
fo r them
separately from one another, here the ethereal flame o f fire,
gentle, very light, in every direction the same as itself
136

PARMENIDES

and not the same as the other; and that other in itself
is opposite - unknowing night, dense inform and heavy.
This whole fitting arrangement I tell you
so that a mortal mind may never outstrip you. [ 8 .5 0 -6 1]
Now he calls this acco u n t a m atter o f opin ion an d d eceitfu l not
because it is sim ply false but because he has m oved from the
intelligible w orld o f truth into the p ercep tib le realm o f
ap pearan ce and seem in g. A little later, h avin g discussed the
two elem ents, he continues by m en tion in g the active cause:
The narrower [bands] are fu ll o f unmixed fire,
the next with night (but a portion o f flame is emitted),
and in the middle o f them, a goddess who governs all things.
[ 12 .1-3 ]
H e says that she is actually the cause o f th e god s First o f all the gods she devised Love [ 13]
etc. H e says that she sends souls som etim es from ligh t to d a rk
ness and som etim es in the o th er d irection .
I am com pelled to w rite at length on this po in t because
people now are gen erally ign oran t o f the ancien t w ritings.
(Sim plicius, Commentary on the Physics 3 8 .2 9 -3 9 .2 1)
Some idea o f the contents o f the Way o f Opinion can be gained from
a passage in Plutarch:
But Parm enides did not abolish fire o r w ater o r precipices
o r - pace C o lotes - the cities o f E u ro p e and Asia. A fte r all, he
com posed a cosm ology, and by m ixin g the b righ t an d th e d ark
as elem ents he prod u ces from them and by them all the
phen om en a. H e has m uch to say ab o u t the earth an d th e sky
and the m oon and the stars, and he has an acco u n t o f the
origins o f men: like an old natural p h ilosop h er, w ho is co m p os
ing a book o f his ow n and not criticizin g a bo ok o f som eone
else, he has left n o th in g o f any im portan ce unsaid.
(Plutarch, Against Colotes 1 1 1 4 c)
Simplicius had earlier quoted a slightly longer version o f fragment
12:
The next with night (but a portion o f flame is emitted),

137

EARLY

GREEK

PHILOSOPHY

and in the middle o f them, a goddess who gdvems all things.


For she rules the hateful birth and copulation o f all things,
sending female to mingle with male and again conversely
male to female, [ 1 2]
(Sim plicius, Commentary on the Physics 3 1 .1 3 - 1 7 )
The 'bands o f 12 are described in more detail in a doxographical
passage:
Parm enid es says that th ere is a sequ en ce o f bands em bracin g
o n e an o th er, o n e fro m the rare, o n e from the d en se, and
oth ers betw een them m ixed from ligh t an d darkness. W hat
su rro u n d s them all, like a wall, is solid, and beneath it is a fiery
band. So too w hat is in th e m idd le o f them all, a ro u n d which
is a fiery band. O f the m ixed bands th e m idd lem ost is cause o f
all m otion an d co m in g into bein g fo r all o f them : this he calls
the g o v e rn in g god dess and the key h o ld er, Justice and N eces
sity. T h e air is a secretion o f the ea rth , vaporized by its m ore
violent com pression. T h e sun and th e circle o f the M ilky W ay
are exh alation s o f fire. T h e m oon is a m ixtu re o f both - air
and fire. T h e eth e r su rro u n d s th em , above everyth in g; u n d er
it is a rra n g ed the fiery p a rt w e call the sky, and u n d e r that the
regions a ro u n d the earth.
(Stobaeus, Anthology I xxii 1a)
There are a few further fragments from the Way o f Opinion. Sim
plicius reports a curiosity:
In the m idd le o f th e verses a sh o rt passage in prose is inserted
w hich p u rp o rts to com e fro m P arm enid es him self. It goes like
this:
Next to this are the rare and the hot and brightness and the soft
and the light; next to the dense are named the cold and darkness
and hard and heavy; fo r these have been separated off, each group
in its own way.
(Sim plicius, Commentary on the Physics 3 1 .3 -7 )
No doubt Simplicius is right to be sceptical about the authenticity o f
this prose fragment.
138

PARMENIDES

Simplicius quotes the beginning o f the Way in another passage; there


he adds:
A n d again a little later:
And since all things have been named light and night
and things corresponding to their powers [have been named] for
each,
everything is fu ll alike o f light and invisible night,
both equal since nothing has a share in neither. [ 9]
(ibid 18 0 .8 -12 )
B u t they both [sc. P arm enides and Melissus] clearly r e fe r to
the generation o f p ercep tible objects - M elissus w hen he says
that the cold becom es hot etc . . .; and Parm enides, b e g in n in g
his rem arks about p ercep tible objects, says he will tell
how earth and sun and moon
and the common ether and the Milky Way and outermost Olympus
and the hot force o f the stars were impelled
to come into being, [ 11]
A n d they have described the gen eratio n o f things that a re born
and die, right dow n to the parts o f anim als.
(Sim plicius, Commentary on On the Heavens 5 5 9 .18 27)
O n ce he has attained to the tru e teach in g [sc. o f Christ] let w h o
will listen to th e prom ises o f P arm enides o f Elea:
You will know the nature o f the ether and all the signs
in the ether and the bright suns pure
torch and its destructive works and whence they came into being,
and you will learn the circling works o f the round-faced moon
and its nature, and you will know too the sky which encloses it
whence it grew and how necessity led and fettered it
to hold the limits o f the stars, [ ]
(Clem ent, Miscellanies V x iv 138.1)
S om eone w ho d enies that red-h ot iron is fire o r that the m oon
is a sun - th in kin g it rather, with Parm enides,
another's light, night-shining, wandering about the earth
[ 14] -

39

EARLY GREEK

PHILOSOPHY

d oes not abolish th e use o f iron o r the reality o f the m oon.


(Plutarch, Against Colotes 1 1 i6 a )
O f the things in the h eavens, n u m erou s th ou gh they are, only
[the m oon] goes a b o u t in need o f a n o th e rs light, as P arm en
ides says,
always gazing at the rays o f the sun. [ 15]
(Plutarch, On the Face in the Moon 929 )
Two short passages from the doxography are worth quoting here.
[Parm enides] was the first to say that the earth is spherical and
lies in the m idd le [ o f the universe].
(D iogen es L aertius, Lives o f the Philosophers IX 21)
P arm enid es places th e M o rn in g Star first in o rd e r in the eth er
(he thinks that it is the sam e as the E ven in g Star). A fte r it com es
the sun, ben eath w hich are the stars in the fiery p art w hich he
calls the sky.
(Stobaeus, Anthology 1 xxiv 2e)
Next, two fragments on biology, the second o f which survives only
in a Latin translation.
O th ers o f th e oldest g en eratio n h ave also said that the m ale is
co n ceived in the rig h t p art o f the w om b. P arm enides p u t it like
this:
In the right boys, in the left girls, [ 17]
(G alen, Commentary on Hippocrates' Epidemics X V I I A 1002K)
In th e books he w rote On Nature P arm enid es says that as the
result o f co n ceptio n m en a re som etim es born soft o r sm ooth.
Since his G re e k is in verse, I too shall p u t the point in verses fo r I h ave co m posed som e Latin verses, as close to his as I
co u ld , so as to avoid a m ixtu re o f lan gu ages:
When a man and a woman together mix the seeds o f Love,
a power which forms in the veins from the different bloods
produces well-built bodies by preserving the blending.
For if, when the seed is mixed, the powers fight
140

PARMENIDES

and do not combine into one power in the mixed body, then cruelly
will they trouble .he sex that is being bom from a twin seed, [ 18]
(Caelius A u relia n u s, Chronic Diseases IV 9)

Theophrastus gives an account o f Parmenides ideas about thought.

Parm enides really said n o th in g at all ab o u t [the senses] only


that th ere are two elem ents and that kn o w led ge d e p en d s on
which is excessive. For as th e h ot o r th e cold exceeds, so
th ou gh t becom es d iffe re n t - better and p u re r w h en it d ep en d s
on the hot, th ou gh this too requ ires a certain p ro p o rtio n
ality:
For as on each occasion, he says, is the blending o f the wandering
limbs,
so stands the mind fo r men; fo r it is the same thing
which thinks the nature o f the limbs
for each and every man; for what exceeds is thought, [ 16]
For he speaks o f p erceiv in g and th in kin g as the sam e th in g that is why he thinks that m em ory an d fo rgetfu ln ess d e riv e
from these things th ro u gh th eir blen d in g. (B u t he said n o th in g
fu rth e r about what h app ens i f th ey a re equal in the m ixtu re
w h eth er o r not it will be possible to thin k, an d w hat the d isp o
sition will be.) T h a t he m akes p ercep tio n too o ccu r by
opposites in their ow n rig h t is clear from th e passage w h ere
he says that corpses d o not p erceive light, heat and sound
because o f the d eficien cy o f fire, bu t that th ey do perceive th eir
opposites - cold and silence and so on. A n d in gen eral, ev e ry
th in g which exists has som e kn ow led ge.
(T h eo p h rastu s, On the Senses 3 -4 )

Finally, Simplicius preserves three lines from the end o f Parmenides


poem:

H avin g described the w orld o f p ercep tio n , he adds:


Thus, according to opinion, these things grew and now are,
141

EARLY CREEK

PHILOSOPHY

and then, after this, having matured they will cease to be:
and fo r each o f them men laid down a distinctive name, [ 19]
(Sim plicius, Commentary on On the Heavens 5 5 8 .8 -11)

142

10

MELISSUS
Melissus came from the island o f Samos. In 441 Athens made war
upon Samos and despatched a fleet to the island. At some point during
the protracted operations, Pericles, the Athenian commander, led some
o f his ships away on an expedition.
W hen he had sailed o ff, M elissus, son o f Ithagen es, a ph ilo
sop h er who was then in com m and at Sam os, despisin g the small
n u m ber o f their ships o r the in exp erien ce o f th eir co m
m anders, persu ad ed his fellow -citizens to attack th e A th e n
ians. In the battle that follow ed the Sam ians w ere victorious.
T h e y cap tured m any m en an d d estroyed m an y ships, th ereby
gainin g control o f the sea and a cq u irin g m any su pplies fo r the
prosecution o f the w ar w hich they had not previou sly pos
sessed. A ristotle says that Pericles h im self had ea rlier been
d efeated by M elissus in a sea-battle.
(Plutarch, Pericles i 6 6 c d )
The Samians were eventually defeated. But Melissus had made a mark
on history unusual in a philosopher.
The year o f the battle gives us the only known date in Melissus life:
we may suppose that he flourished in the third quarter o f the fifth
century. In philosophy, he was a follower o f Parmenides. His book
indeed is in effect a modified version, in clear prose, o f Parmenides
poem. Substantial fragments o f Melissus work have survived, all o f
them preserved by Simplicius. In addition, there are two paraphrases
o f his whole argument, one in the essay O n M elissus, X en o p h a n es
and G orgias, falsely ascribed to Aristotle, the other in Simplicius
commentary on Aristotles Physics. It is worth transcribing the latter
as a convenient introduction to the fragments.

43

EARLY

CREEK

PHILOSOPHY

M elissus uses the axiom s o f the natural philosophers and


begins his treatise on g en eratio n and destruction as follows:
I f it is n oth in g, w hat could be said about it as th ou gh it
w ere som ethin g? I f it is som eth in g, eith er it cam e into
bein g o r it has always existed. B ut i f it cam e into being, it
d id so eith er fro m the existen t o r from the non-existent.
B u t it is not possible fo r an yth in g to com e into bein g either
from the non-existent (not even so m eth in g else which is
n oth in g, let alone som eth in g actually existent) o r from the
existen t (fo r in that case it w ould have existed all along
and w ould not have co m e into being). W hat exists, th ere
fo re , has not com e into being. T h e r e fo r e it has always
existed. N o r will w hat exists be d estroyed . F or w hat exists
can ch a n g e n eith er into th e non-existent (the natural
scientists a g ree on this) n o r into th e existen t (for in that
case it w ould still rem ain and not be destroyed ). T h e r e fo r e
it always has existed and will exist.
Since w hat com es into existen ce has a begin n in g, what
does not com e into existen ce has not g o t a begin n in g. B ut
w hat exists has not com e into bein g. T h e r e fo r e it has not
g o t a b egin n in g. A g ain , w hat is d estroyed has an end,
and i f so m eth in g is indestructible it has not got an end.
T h e r e fo r e w hat exists, b ein g indestructible, has not got
an en d. B u t w hat has n eith er b eg in n in g n o r en d is in fact
infinite. T h e r e fo r e w hat exists is infinite.
I f so m eth in g is infinite, it is u niqu e. F or i f th ere w ere
two things they co u ld not be infinite bu t w ould have limits
against o n e an o th er. B u t w hat exists is infinite. T h e r e fo r e
th ere is n o t a plu rality o f existents. T h e r e fo r e w hat exists
is unique.
I f it is u niqu e, it is also changeless. F or w hat is unique
is alw ays h o m o gen eo u s with itself, and w hat is hom o
g en eo u s can n eith er perish n o r gro w n o r ch an ge its
a rra n g em en t n o r s u ffe r pain n o r su ffe r anguish. F or i f it
u n d e rw en t an y o f th ese th in gs it w ould not be h om o
gen eou s. F or an yth in g that u n d erg o es any ch an ge o f
w h atever sort m oves fro m o n e state into a d iffe re n t one.
B u t n o th in g is d iffe r e n t fro m w hat exists. T h e r e fo r e it

44

MELISSUS

will not ch ange. A g ain , n o th in g that exists is em p ty; fo r


what is em pty is n othin g, and w hat is n o th in g can n ot exist.
So what exists does not m ove - fo r it has n o w h ere to m ove
to if n oth in g is em pty. N o r can it contract into itself. For
in that case it w ould be both ra rer and d en ser than itself,
and that is im possible. R ather, w hat is rare is th ereb y
em p tier than w hat is dense - bu t w hat is em p ty does not
exist. O n e sh ou ld ju d g e w h eth er w hat exists is fu ll o r not
by seeing w h eth er o r not it accom m odates an y th in g else:
if it does not, it is fu ll; i f it does, it is not fu ll. N ow i f it is
not em pty it is necessarily full; and i f so it can n ot m ove not because it is not possible to m ove th ro u g h w h at is fu ll,
as we say in the case o f bodies, bu t because the w h ole o f
what exists can m ove neith er into the existen t (fo r th ere
exists n o th in g a p art from it) n o r into the non -existen t (fo r
the non-existent does not exist).
(Sim plicius, Commentary on the Physics 1 0 3 .13 -10 4 .15 )
A ll the surviving fragments o f Melissus deduction are preserved by
Simplicius.
Melissus show ed the u n gen erability o f w hat exists, u sin g this
com m on axiom [i.e. the axiom that n o th in g com es into bein g
from nothing]. H e writes as follows:
Whatever existed always existed and always will exist. For i f it
had come into being, then necessarily before coming into being it
would have been nothing. Now i f it had been nothing it would in
no way have come to be anything from being nothing. [30 i ]
(ibid 162 .2 3 -2 6 )
Melissus puts the point as follows:
Now since it did not come into being but exists, it always existed
and always will exist, and it has no beginning and no end but is
infinite. For i f it came into being it would have a beginning (for
it would at some time have begun coming into being) and an end
(for it would at some time have ceased coming into being). A nd i f
i f neither began nor ended and always existed and always will

45

EARLY

CREEK

PHILOSOPHY

exist, it lias no beginning and no end. For what does not exist
wholly cannot exist always, [ 2]
. . . Ju st as he asserts that w hat has com e into b ein g is finite in
its bein g, so h e says that w hat always exists is infinite in its
being. H e has m ad e this clear w hen he writes:
But just as it exists always, so in magnitude too it must always be
infinite, [ 3]
By m agn itu d e he does not m ean extension ; fo r he him self
shows that what exists is indivisible:
I f what exists has been divided, he says, it is moving; but i f it is
moving it does not exist, [ b i o ]
R ather, by m agn itu de he m eans the em inen ce o f its reality. For
he has indicated that he m eans w hat exists to be incorporeal in
saying:
Now i f it exists, it must be one; but being one it must fa il to possess
a body, [cf 9]
A n d he co-ordinates infinity in bein g with eternity when he
says:
Nothing which has a beginning and an end is either eternal or
infinite, [ 4]
so that w hat does not have them is infinite.
From infinity he in ferred uniqueness, by way o f the notion
that i f it w ere not on e it w ould be lim ited against som ethin g
else, [ 5]
(Sim plicius, Commentary on the Physics 10 9 .19 -110 .6 )
Elsewhere, Simplicius reports the inference to uniqueness in Melissus
own words:
A n d i f M elissus entitled his w ork On Nature or on What Exists,
it is clear that he th o u g h t n atu re to be w hat exists and natural
objects, i.e. percep tible objects, to be the things that exist. Per
haps that is w hy A ristotle said that, in d eclarin g w hat exists to
be one, h e su p p o sed that th ere was n o th in g else ap art from
p ercep tible substances. F or given that w hat is perceptible
plainly seem s to exist, then i f w hat exists is u n iqu e th ere will
not exist an yth in g else ap art fro m w hat is p erceptible. Melissus
says:
146

MELISSUS

For i f it is infinite it will be one. For i f it is two, they cannot be infi


nite, but they will have limits against one another, [ 6]
(Sim plicius, Commentary on On the Heavens 5 5 7 .1 0 - 1 7 )
B u t since M elissus w rote in an archaic style b u t n o t unclearly,
let us set d ow n those archaic sentences them selves so that those
w ho read them m ay m ore accu rately ju d g e a m o n g the m ore
ap p rop riate interpretation s. N ow , co n clu d in g his earlier
rem arks and in tro d u cin g his treatm ent o f ch an ge, M elissus
says:
In this way, then, it is eternal and infinite and one and wholly
homogeneous. And it will neither perish nor grow larger nor
change its arrangement nor suffer pain nor suffer anguish. For
i f it underwent any o f these things it would no longer be one.
For i f it alters, necessarily what exists will not be homogeneous
but what previously existed will perish and what did not exist will
come into being. Now i f it were to become altered by a single hair
in ten thousand years, it would perish wholly in the whole o f time.
Nor can it change in arrangement. For the arrangement which
previously existed is not destroyed nor does that which did not exist
come into being. And since nothing is added or perishes or alters,
how could anything which exists change its arrangement? For i f
it altered in any way it would thereby also change its arrangement.
Nor does it suffer pain. For i f it were in pain it would not exist
wholly; for a thing that is in pain cannot exist always, nor does it
have equal power with what is healthy. Nor would it be homo
geneous were it to suffer pain; for it would suffer pain by the loss
or the addition o f something, and it would no longer be homo
geneous. Nor could what is healthy suffer pain; fo r the health that
existed would perish and that which did not exist would come into
being.
A s for suffering anguish, the same argument holds as fo r being
in pain.
Nor is it empty in any respect. For what is empty is nothing;
and so, being nothing, it would not exist.
Nor does it move. For it has no way to retreat but is fu ll. For
i f it were empty it would retreat into the empty part, but since it is
not empty it has nowhere to retreat. And it will not be dense and

47

EARLY

CREEK

PHILOSOPHY

rare. For what is rare cannot be as fu ll as what is dense, but what


is rare thereby becomes emptier than what is dense. You should
distinguish between what is fu ll and what is not fu ll in this way:
i f it yields at all or receives, it is not fu ll; i f it neither yields nor
receives, it is fu ll. Now necessarily it is fu ll i f it is not empty. So
i f it is fu ll it does not move, [ 7]
T h a t is w hat M elissus says.
(Sim plicius, Commentary on the Physics 1 1 1 .1 5 - 1 1 2 .1 5 )
T h e ir u niqu e existen t, b ein g indivisible, will not be finite o r
infinite in the way bodies are. For Parm enides places bodies
a m o n g th e objects o f op in ion , and M elissus says:
Being one, it must fail to possess a body. But i f it had bulk it would
have parts and would no longer be one. [cf g]
(ibid 8 7 .4 -7 )
The fin al fragment shows that Melissus book contained a critical as
well as a constructive section.
M elissus, inasm uch as he w rote in prose, gave a clea rer account
[than Parm enides] o f his ow n view s on [perceptible objects],
both im plicitly th ro u g h o u t his a rg u m e n t an d explicitly in the
fo llo w in g passage. H avin g said abo u t w hat exists that it is one
an d u n g en era ted and m otionless an d in terru p ted by no em pti
ness but is w holly fu ll o f itself, he continues:
Now this argument is the greatest sign that there existsjust one
thing; but there are also the following signs. I f there existed many
things, they would have to be such as 1 say the one thing is. For
i f there exist earth and water and air and fire and iron and gold
and living things and dead and black and white and the other
things that men say are true - i f these things exist and we see and
hear correctly, then each o f them must be such as it seemed to us
at first, and they cannot change or come to be different, but each
must always beju st what it is. But now we are saying that we see
and hear and understand correctly. But what is hot seems to us to
become cold, and what is cold hot, and what is hard soft, and what
is soft hardr and living things seem to die and to come into being
from what is not alive, and all these things seem to change, and
148

MELISSUS

whatever was and is now seems to be in no way homogeneous, but


iron, which is hard, is rubbed away by contact with the fingers,
and so are gold and stones and anything else that seems to be
strong; and earth and stones seem to come into being from water.
[[So that it results that we neither see nor know the things that
exist.]]*
Now these things do not agree with one another. For we said
that there are many eternal things with forms and strength o f their
own, but they all seem to us to alter and to change from what they
were each time they were seen. So it is clear that we do not see
correctly, and that those many things do not correctly seem to exist.
For they would not change i f they were true, but each would be as
it seemed to be; fo r nothing is stronger than what is true. A nd i f
they changed, what exists would have perished and what does not
exist would have come into being. In this way, then, i f there exist
many things, they must be such as the one thing is. [ 8]
Melissus thus clearly explain s why they [i.e. Parm enides and
Melissus] say that perceptible objects d o not exist bu t seem to
exist.
(Sim plicius, Commentary on On the Heavens 5 5 8 .17 5 5 9 .13 )

* T he sentence enclosed in double square brackets appears here in


our manuscripts o f Simplicius; but it is clearly out o f place and should
probably be deleted.

49

11

ZENO
Zeno came from Elea. He was a friend, and in some sense a disciple, o f
Parmenides. We know nothing about his life and a precise chronology
escapes us. Plato tells a story o f an encounter between Zeno and
Socrates: although the reliability o f the narrative is a matter o f dispute,
the passage is worth quoting at length.

A cco rd in g to A n tip h o n , P yth o do rus said that Z en o and Par


m enides o n ce cam e [to A th ens] fo r the festival o f the G reat
P an athen aea. P arm enid es was a lread y a very old m an, w hite
h aired bu t o f d istin gu ish ed ap p ea ra n ce - he was about sixtyfive years old . Z en o was then nearly fo rty, tall and pleasing to
look at he was said to have been P arm en id es lover. T h e y
w ere stayin g with P yth odorus, o utsid e the city wall in the C eram icus. T h e r e Socrates a n d a few o th ers visited them , eager
to h ear Z en o s w ritings - fo r this was the first tim e they had
been b ro u g h t by them to A th en s. Socrates was then very
youn g.
Z en o h im self read to them , w hile Parm enides h ap p en ed to
be o ut. T h e r e was o n ly ve ry little o f th e a rg u m e n t still left to
be read , P yth o d o ru s said, w hen he h im self cam e back and with
him P arm enid es an d A risto d e (who becam e o n e o f the thirty
tyrants); so they h ea rd ju s t a little o f th e w ritings - alth ough
P yth o do rus h im self had actually h eard Z en o b efore.
W h en Socrates had h eard him o u t, h e asked Z en o to read
again th e first hypothesis o f the first argu m en t. W h en it had
b een read he said: Z en o , w hat d o you m ean? A r e you saying
th at i f m ore things than o n e exist, th en they m ust be both

150

ZENO

sim ilar and dissim ilar, bu t that is im possible - fo r dissim ilar


things cann ot be sim ilar o r sim ilar thin gs dissim ilar?
Y es, said Zeno.
So that if it is im possible fo r dissim ilar th in gs to be sim ilar
and sim ilar things dissim ilar, it can n ot be th at m ore things
than on e exist. F or i f several things d id exist, th ey w ou ld have
im possible p rop erties. Is this w hat y o u r a rg u m en ts a re aim in g
a t - a t contesting, against ev ery th in g that p eo p le say, that th ere
d o not exist m ore thin gs than one? A n d d o you take each o f
you r argu m en ts to be evid en ce fo r that very conclu sion, so that
you suppose y o u rse lf to p ro v id e as m any pieces o f evid en ce as
you have com posed argu m en ts to show that th ere d o not exist
several things? Is th at w hat you m ean, o r have I m isu nd erstood
you?
N o , said Zen o, you h ave g rasp ed p erfectly th e o verall aim
o f the b ook.
I see, P arm enid es, said Socrates, that Z en o h ere wants to
be associated with you not only by his love fo r you b u t also by
his treatise. F or he has in a way w ritten the sam e th in g as you ,
alth o ugh by ch a n g in g it he is try in g to m islead us into th in kin g
that he is saying so m eth in g d iffe re n t. You say in y o u r poem s
that the u niverse is o n e, an d you p ro d u ce excellen t evid en ce
fo r that view. H e says that th ere d o not exist several things, and
he too p rod u ces m any im pressive pieces o f evid en ce. O n e o f
you says that o n e th in g exists, th e o th er that th ere d o not exist
several things, a n d each o f you expresses h im self in such a way
that you seem n o t to be sayin g th e sam e thin gs at all even
th ou gh you are sayin g pretty well the sam e th in gs - so m eth in g
which seem s to be above the heads o f the rest o f u s.
Y es, Socrates, said Zeno; but you h a ven t alto geth er
grasp ed the tru th ab o u t m y book. L ik e a Spartan h o u n d , you
are goo d at chasin g an d trackin g d ow n w hat I h ave said. But,
first, you h aven t seen that m y book isnt really so very co n
ceited - 1 did not w rite with the intention you d escribe o n ly to
hide the fact from p eo p le, as th ou gh that w ere a g rea t ach ieve
m ent. Y o u have m ention ed an accidental fea tu re o f the book:
in truth it is a sort o f d efen ce o f P arm enid es argu m en ts against
those w h o try to rid icu le him on the g ro u n d s that i f th ere exists

EARLY CREEK

PHILOSOPHY

o n ly o n e th in g then the a rg u m e n t leads to m any absurd and


co n trad ictory conclusions. M y book attacks those w ho say that
several things exist, aim in g to show that th eir hypothesis, that
several things exist, leads to even m ore ridiculous results, if
you exam in e it p ro p erly , than the hypothesis that only on e
th in g exists. It was with that sort o f am bition that I w rote it
w hen I was yo u n g. A fte r it was w ritten som eone stole it, so that
I co u ld not even co n sid er w h eth er it shou ld be b ro u g h t out
into the ligh t o r not.
(Plato, Parmenides 127A-1 28 d)

Zeno's treatise consisted o f a series o f arguments designed to show


that the common sense 'hypothesis' that there are several things in
existence leads to absurdity. Later sources say that there were forty
arguments in all. There are substantial fragments o f two o f those
arguments; Aristotle provides a critical paraphrase o f fou r more o f
thejn; and we possess accounts o f a further two.
The fragments are all preserved in Simplicius commentary on the
Physics. Simplicius is discussing a passage where Aristotle refers to
two arguments, the argument that 'everything is one and the argument
f rom dichotomy. The passage was understood in different ways by
Aristotles commentators, and Simplicius citations o f Zeno occur in his
survey o f their dispute.

A le x a n d e r says that the second a rg u m en t, from the d icho


tom y, is Z en o s and that he claim s that if w hat exists has m agni
tu d e and is d ivid ed , then it will be m any and no lon ger one,
thus p ro v in g that the o n e does not exist . . . A le x a n d e r seem s
to have taken his o p in ion that Z en o d oes aw ay with the one
fro m E u d em u s w ritings. For in his Physics E u dem u s says:
T h e n d oes this n o t exist a lth o u g h som e o n e th in g does
exist? T h a t was the p u zzle. T h e y re p o rt that Z en o said
that he w ou ld be able to talk about w hat exists i f only
so m eo n e w ould exp lain to him w hat on earth th e on e was.
H e was p u zzled , it seem s, because each percep tible item is
called m any th in gs both by way o f pred ication and by
b ein g divisible into parts, w hereas points a re n o th in g at

>52

ZENO

all (fo r he th o u g h t that w hat n eith er increases w hen a d d ed


nor d ecreases w hen subtracted was not an existen t thing).
N ow it is indeed likely that Z en o a rg u ed on both sides by way
o f intellectual exercise (that is why he is called tw o -to n g u ed )
and that he actually published argu m en ts o f this sort to raise
puzzles a bout the one. B u t in his treatise, which contains m any
argum ents, he shows in each case that a n yon e w ho says that
several things exist falls into inconsistencies.
T h e r e is on e a rg u m en t in w hich he show s that i f several
things exist they are both large and sm all - so larg e as to be
infinite in m agnitu de, so sm all as to have no m agn itu d e at all.
H ere he shows that w hat has no m agn itu de, no m ass, and no
bulk, does not even exist. For, he says,
i f it were added to anything else, it would not make it larger. For
i f it is o f no magnitude but is added, [the other thing] cannot
increase at all in magnitude. Thus what is added will therefore
be nothing. And i f when it is subtracted the other thing is no
smaller and will not increase when it is added again then
clearly what was added and subtracted was nothing. [29 2]
Zeno says this not to d o away with the o n e but in o rd e r to show
that the several things each possess a m agn itu d e a m agn itu d e
which is actually infinite by virtu e o f th e fact that, because
o f infinite divisibility, th ere is alw ays so m eth in g in fro n t o f
w hatever is taken. A n d he shows this h avin g first show n that
they possess no m agn itu d e from the fact that each o f the sev
eral things is the sam e as itself and o n e. (T hem istius actually
says that Z en o s a rg u m e n t establishes that w hat exists is o n e
from the fact that it is continu ous and indivisible; fo r if it w ere
d ivid ed , he says, it w ould not strictly sp eak in g be o n e because
o f the infinite divisibility o f bodies. B u t Z en o seem s rath er to
say that there d o not exist several things.)
P orp h yry holds that the a rg u m e n t fro m d ich otom y
belonged to Parm enides w ho a ttem pted to show by it that w hat
exists is one. H e writes as follows:
Parm enides had a n o th e r a rg u m en t, the o n e based on
d ich otom y, w hich p u rp o rts to show that w hat exists is o n e
th in g only and, m oreo ver, partless and indivisible. For
w ere it divisible, he says, let it have been cu t in tw o - and

53

EARLY GREEK

PHILOSOPHY

then each o f its parts in two. Since this goes on fo r ever,


it is clear, he says, that e ith er som e final m agnitudes will
rem ain w hich a re m inim al and atom ic and infinite in num
ber, so that the whole thing will be constituted from infin
itely m any minima; o r else it will disappear and be
dissolved into n othin g, and so be constituted from
nothing. B u t these consequences a re absurd. T h e r e fo r e it
will not be d ivided but will rem ain one. A g a in , since it is
e v eryw h ere alike, if it is really divisible it will be divisible
e v eryw h ere alike, and not divisible in o n e place and not
in an oth er. T h e n let it have been d ivided everyw h ere. It
is clear, again, that n o th in g will rem ain bu t that it will
d isap pear; and i f it is constituted at all, it will again be
constituted from noth ing. F or i f an yth in g rem ains, it will
not yet have been d ivid ed everyw h ere. T h u s from these
considerations too it is evid en t, he says, that what exists
will be indivisible and partless and o n e . . .
P o rp h yry is righ t h ere to r e fe r to th e a rg u m en t from d icho
tom y as in trod u cin g the indivisible o n e by way o f the absurdity
co nsequ ent u pon division; but it is w orth asking w h eth er the
a rg u m e n t is really P arm enid es rath er than Z en o s, as A le x
a n d er thinks. F or n oth in g o f the sort is stated in the Parm enidean w ritings, and m ost scholars ascribe the a rg u m en t from
d ich otom y to Zen o - indeed it is m ention ed as Z en o s in A ris
totles w o rk On Motion [i.e. Physics ]. A n d why say m ore
w hen it is actually fo u n d in Z en o s ow n treatise? For, show ing
that i f several things exist the sam e things are finite and infinite,
Z en o writes in the fo llo w in g w ords:
I f several things exist, it is necessary fo r them to be as many as they
are, and neither more norfewer. But i f they are as many as they are,
they will be finite. I f several things exist, the things that exist are
infinite. For there are always others between the things that exist,
and again others between them. And in this way the things that exist
are infinite, [ 3]
A n d in this way he has p roved infinity in quantity from the
d ich otom y. A s fo r infinity in m agn itu de, he proved that earlier
in the sam e arg u m en t. F or h avin g first p ro ved that i f what
exists had n o m agn itu d e it w ould not even exist, he continues:

154

ZENO

But i f it exists, it is necessary fo r each thing to have some hulk and


magnitude, and fo r one part o f it to be at a distance from the
other. And the same argument applies to the protruding part. For
that too will have a magnitude, and a part o f it will protrude.
Now it is all one to say this once and to say it fo r ever. For it will
have no last part o f such a sort that there is no longer one part in
front o f another. In this way i f there exist several things it is
necessary fo r them to be both small and large so small as not to
have a magnitude, so large as to be infinite, [ l ]
Perhaps, then, the a rg u m e n t from d ich otom y is Z e n o s, as
A lex a n d e r holds, b u t he is not d o in g away with th e o n e but
rather with the m any (by show in g that those w ho h ypoth esize
them are com m itted to inconsistencies) and is thus co n firm in g
Parm enides a rg u m e n t that w hat exists is one.
(Sim plicius, Commentary on the Physics 13 8 .3 -6 ,
13 8 .2 9 -14 0 .6 , 1 4 0 .1 8 -1 4 1 .1 1 )
Aristotle discusses fou r o f Zenos arguments in the Physics. The
account is concise, and the text in crucial places is uncertain.
Zeno argu es fallaciously. F or if, he says, e v ery th in g is alw ays
at rest w hen it is in a space equal to itself , an d i f w hat is travel
ling is always in such a space at any instant, then the travellin g
arrow is m otionless. T h a t is false; fo r tim e is n o t co m posed o f
indivisible instants - n o r is any o th er m agn itu de.
Zen os argu m en ts ab o u t m otion w hich p ro v id e tro u ble fo r
those who try to resolve them a re fo u r in n u m ber.
T h e first m aintains that n o th in g m oves because w hat is
travelling m ust first reach the half-w ay point b efo re it reaches
the end. W e have discussed this earlier.
T h e second is the so-called A chilles. T h is m aintains that the
slowest th in g will n ever be ca u gh t w hen ru n n in g by the fastest.
F or the p u rsu er m ust first reach the p o in t fro m w hich the
pu rsu ed set out, so that th e slow er m ust alw ays be ah ead o f it.
T h is is the sam e a rg u m e n t as the d ich oto m y, bu t it d iffe rs in
that the additional m agnitu des a re n o t d ivid ed in half. N ow
it follows from the a rg u m en t that the slow er is n o t cau gh t,
and the sam e e rro r is com m itted as in the d ich oto m y (in both

155

EARLY

GREEK

PHILOSOPHY

argu m en ts it follow s that you d o not reach the en d i f the m agni


tu d e is d ivided in a certain way - but h ere th ere is the additional
point that not even the fastest ru n n er in fiction will reach his
goal w hen he p u rsu es the slowest); hen ce the solution must
also be the sam e. A n d it is false to claim that the o n e ahead is
not cau gh t: it is not ca u gh t while it is ahead, but nonetheless
it is ca u gh t (provid ed you g ra n t that th ey can co ver a finite
distance).
T h o se , then, are two o f the argu m ents. T h e third is the on e
we have ju s t stated, to the e ffe ct that the travelling arrow
stands still. It d ep en d s on the assum ption that tim e is com
posed o f instants; fo r if that is not g ra n ted the in fere n ce will
not go th ro u gh .
T h e fo u rth is the a rg u m en t about the bodies m ovin g in the
stadium fro m o pposite d irections, an equal n u m b er past an
equal nu m ber; the o n e g ro u p starts from the en d o f the
stadium , the o th er from the m iddle; and they m ove at equal
speed. H e thinks it follow s that h a lf the tim e is equal to its
d ou b le. T h e fallacy consists in claim in g that equal m agnitudes
m ovin g at equal speeds, the o n e past a m ovin g object and the
o th er past a stationary object, travel fo r an equal length o f
tim e. B u t this is false.
F or ex a m p le, let the stationary equ al bodies be a a ; let
be those b eg in n in g fro m the m idd le, equ al in n u m b er and in
m agn itu d e to them ; a n d let c c be those b eg in n in g from the
en d , equ al in n u m b er and in m agn itu d e to them and equal in
sp eed to the b s . It follow s that, as they m ove past on e anoth er,
the first and the first a re at the en d at the sam e tim e. A n d
it follow s that the has travelled past all o f them but the past
h a lf o f them . H en ce the tim e is h a lf fo r each o f the two is
alo n gsid e each fo r an equ al tim e. A t the sam e tim e it follows
that the first has travelled past all the cs; fo r the first and
the first will be at o p p o site en d s at the sam e tim e (being, as
he says, a lo n gsid e each o f the b s fo r a tim e equ al to that fo r
which it is alon gsid e each o f th e a s ) - because both a re alo n g
side the a s fo r an equ al tim e. T h a t is th e a rg u m en t, and it rests
u p on the falsity w e have m ention ed.
(A risto d e, Physics 2 3 ^ 5 -2 4 0 8 18 )
156

ZENO

Aristotle refers back to his earlier discussion o f thefirst o f Zenos argu


ments:
Zen os a rg u m en t assum es that it is im possible to traverse an
infinite nu m ber o f things, o r to touch an infinite n u m b er o f
things individually, in a finite tim e. B u t this is false. F or both
lengths and lim es - and indeed all continua are said to be
infinite in two ways: e ith er by division o r in respect o f th eir
extrem ities. N ow it is not possible to touch a quantitatively
infinite nu m ber o f things in a finite tim e, but it is possible so
to touch things infinite by division. F or tim e itself is infinite in
this way. H ence it follow s that w hat is infinite is traversed in
an infinite and not in a finite tim e, and that the infinite things
are touched at infinitely not at finitely m any instants.
(ibid 2 3 3 8 2 1-3 1)
Later authors add nothing to Aristotles account o f these paradoxes.
Diogenes Laertius purports to quote a sentence o f Zenos, but most
scholars doubt his evidence:
Zeno does away with m otion by saying:
What is moving is moving neither in the place in which it is nor
in the place in which it is not. [ 4]
(D iogenes L aertius, Lives o f the Philosophers IX 72)
Two further Zenonian arguments are referred to by Aristotle and
explained in more detail by Simplicius:
It is clear that n o th in g can be in itself as its p rim ary place.
Zenos puzzle - that if places exist then they will be in som e
th in g - is not d ifficu lt to resolve. F or n o th in g preven ts the
prim ary place o f a th in g fro m bein g in so m eth in g else - but
not in it as in a place.
(A ristotle, Physics 2 io b 2 2 -2 5 )
Z en os a rg u m en t seem ed to d o aw ay with th e existen ce o f
place. It was p ro p o u n d ed as follow s: I f places exist, th ey will
be in som ething; fo r e v ery th in g that exists is in som ethin g. B u t

EARLY

GREEK PHILOSOPHY

w hat is in so m eth in g is in a place. T h e r e fo r e places are in


places and so ad infinitum. T h e r e fo r e places d o not exist . . .
E u dem u s relates Z en o s view as follows:
Z en o s p u zzle seem s to lead to the sam e conclusion. For
h e claim s that ev ery th in g that exists is som ew here. B ut if
places are a m o n g the things that exist, w h ere will they be?
S u rely in a n o th er place - and that in an other, and so on.
(Sim plicius, Commentary on the Physics 5 6 2 .3 -6 , 5 6 3 .17-2 0 )
Z en o s a rg u m e n t - that any part o f a m illet-seed m akes a
sound - is false; fo r n o th in g prevents it from having no effect
at all, in any length o f tim e, on th e air which the w hole bushel
sets in m otion.
(A ristotle, Physics 250319-22)
H av in g ssid that if the w hole fo rce m oved the w hole w eight a
certain distance in a certain tim e it does not thereby follow that
h a lf the fo rce will in the sam e tim e m ove the w hole w eight
h a lf o r any part o f the distance (nor will every part o f the
fo rce w hich m oved the w hole w eight be capable o f m oving
the w hole w eigh t fo r a given tim e and o v e r a given distance),
[A ristotle] thus solves the problem w hich Z en o o f Elea pu t to
P rotagoras the sophist. T e ll m e, P rotagoras, he said, does
o n e m illet-seed - o r the ten-thousan dth p art o f a seed - m ake
a sound w hen it falls? P rotagoras said that it did not. B u t, he
said, d oes a bushel o f m illet-seed m ake a sound when it falls
o r not? W hen he replied that a bushel does m ake a sound,
Z en o said: W ell, then, isnt th ere ratio betw een the bushel o f
m illet-seed 3nd th e sin gle seed - o r th e ten-th ou ssnd th p art o f
a single seed? H e a greed . W ell, th en , said Zeno, will there
not be similar ratios between the sounds? For as are the sound
ers so are the sounds. A n d if that is the case, then if the bushel
o f m illet-seed m akes a sou n d , the single seed - and the tenth ou san dth p art o f a sin gle seed - will also m ake a so u n d . T h a t
was Z en o s argu m en t.
(Sim plicius, Commentary on the Physics 110 8 .14 28)

158

PART
III

12
EMPEDOCLES
Empedocles came from Acragas in Sicily. His family was rich and
distinguished his grandfather won a victory in the horse-racing at
the Olympic Games o f 496 . His dates are uncertain, since the vari
ous figures cited by our sources do not tally with one another. Aristotle
allegedly said that he died at the age o f sixty: the remainder o f our
evidence suggests that the period from about 495 to about 4 35 may
be roughly right fo r his life-span.
He was apparently a person o f some political importance (the trad
ition makes him a keen democrat), and in addition he may have worked
as a doctor. He wrote several works, all o f them in verse, o f which the
most important were later entitled O n N atu re and Purifications.
Numerous fragments o f these works survive, some o f them quite leng
thy; but the sources rarely ascribe them to one poem rather than the
other and rarely indicate the order in which they appeared within their
original poem. Questions o f ascription and arrangement have greatly
exercised scholars, but little progress has been achieved.
I shall translate first the passages which certainly or probably or
perhaps come from O n N atu re, and then the passages which certainly
or probably or perhaps come from the Purifications. I should stress
that many o f the ascriptions implicit in the following pages are highly
uncertain.

On Nature
The dedication and perhaps thefirst line o/O n N a tu re are preserved:
Pausanias, a cco rd in g to A ristip p u s an d Satyrus, was [E m p ed o
cles] lover, to w hom he ad d ressed On Nature, thus:
161

EARLY GREEK P H IL O S O P H Y

Pausanias, son o f wise Anchitus, listen . . . [31 1]


(D iogenes L aertius, Lives o f the Philosophers V I II 60)

Empedocles promised Pausanias remarkable powers, and urged him


to guard his knowledge carefully:

A cco rd in g to Satyrus, G orgias says that he h im self was present


w hen E m ped ocles p erfo rm ed m agical d eed s, and Em pedocles
h im self p rofesses as m uch - and m uch else beside - in his
poem s w h ere he says:
What drugs there are for ills and what help against old age
you will learn, since for you alone shall I accomplish all this.
And you will stop the power o f the tireless winds which sweep over
the earth
and destroy the crops with their breath,
and again, i f you wish, you will bring on compensating breezes.
And after black rain you will produce a seasonable drought
fo r men, and after the summer drought you will produce
tree-nurturing streams which live in the ether.
A nd you will lead from Hades the power o f dead men. [ i n ]

(ibid V III 59)

. . . Such acco rd in g to E m ped ocles is th e generation and


destruction o f o u r w orld an d its com position fro m g oo d and
evil. H e says that th ere is also a third intelligible pow er which
again can be m ade fro m these. H e writes:
For i f you press them into your throbbing mind
and watch over them in kindly fashion with pure attentions,
these will indeed all remain with you throughout your life,
and you will gain many others from them; for they themselves will
increase
each into its character as is the nature o f each.
But should you reach out fo r things o f a different kind which
among men
are numberless and trifling and blunt their thoughts,
they will leave you at once as time revolves,
162

EMPEDOCLES

desiring to come to their own dear kind;


for know that they all have thought and a share o f mind, [ 1 10]
(H ippolytus, Refutation o f A ll Heresies V I I x x ix 2 5 -2 6 )
[Em pedocles] advises Pausanias, in P ythagorean fashion, to
guard his doctrines within a silent mind [ 5]; and in gen eral,
those m en think that silence is divine.
(Plutarch, Table Talk 728E)
Empedocles superior understanding depended on a proper appreci
ation o f the sources o f human knowledge:
A s fo r the view that the discern m en t o f truth does n o t lie with
the senses, [Em pedocles] writes as follows:
For narrow are the devices dispersed over the limbs,
and there are many wretched impediments which blunt the
thought.
Having seen a small part o f life,
swift to die, men rise and fly away like smoke,
persuaded only o f what each has met with
as they are driven in every direction. Who then claims to fin d the
whole?
These things are not in this way to be seen by men nor to be heard
nor to be grasped in their minds, [ 2.18]
A s fo r the view that truth is not co m p letely u nattainable but
can be grasped in sofar as hum an reason reaches it, he m akes
this clear when he continues the lines ju s t q u oted :
So you, since you have come here,
will learn no more than mortal mind attains to. [ 2.89]
In the follow in g lines he attacks those w h o p reten d to know
m ore and establishes that w hat is g rasp ed th ro u g h each sense
is trustw orthy p ro v id ed that reason is in ch a rg e o f it (even
th ou gh he had earlier ru n dow n the reliability o f the senses).
For he says:
But, 0 gods, turn the madness o f these men from my tongue,
and from holy mouths channel forth a pure spring.
And you, Muse o f long memory, white-armed maiden,
163

EA RL Y GREEK P H I L O S O P H Y

I beseech: what it is right for mortals to hear,


send to me, driving the well-reined chariot o f piety.
She will not compel you to accept the flowers o f reputation and
honour
from mortals on condition that you say more than is holy
with temerity. A nd then indeed do you sit on the summit o f wisdom.
But come, observe with every device in the way in which each
thing is clear:
neither hold sight higher in trust than hearing
or resounding hearing above the clarities o f the tongue,
nor let any o f the other limbs by which thought has a way
be deprived o f trust, but think in the way in which each thing is
clear, [ 3]
(Sextus Em piricus, Against the Mathematicians V II 12 2 -12 5 )
F or the divine, as the p oet from A cragas says,
cannot be approached by the eyes
o f men or grasped by their hands, by which the greatest
path to persuasion leads to the minds o f men. [ 133]
(C lem ent, Miscellanies V xii 81.2)
F or m ost p eo p le req u ire p r o o f as a p led g e o f the tru th , not
bein g satisfied with the bare security w hich com es from faith:
But whereas those who are very evil when in power have no trust,
you, as the assurances from our Muse enjoin,
must learn, once you have sifted the argument in your breast.
[ 41

For evil m en, says E m pedocles, custom arily w ant to have


p o w er o v e r the tru th by d istru stin g it.
(ibid V iii 18.3-4)
Happy,
then, it seem s, a cco rd in g to E m pedocles,
is he who has gained the wealth o f divine thoughts,
wretched he whose beliefs about the gods are dark, [ 132]
(ibid V xiv 140.5)
With the invocation to the M use in fragment 3 compare:
164

EMPEDOCLES

T h e ju s t account which strives on the side o f Love is called the


Muse by Em pedocles, and he invokes h er to strive on his side,
in these lines:
I f ever fo r the sake o f some creature o f a day, immortal Muse,
it pleased you that my cares should pass through your mind,
now, as I pray, stand by me again, Calliope,
as I reveal a good account about the blessed gods, [ 131]
(H ippolytus, Refutation o f A ll Heresies V I I x x x i 4)
O n N atu re described a complex, cyclical history o f the universe.
Everything is compounded from four elements or roots. The primary
moving factors are two powers, Love and Strife. The elements period
ically unite into a divine and homogeneous Sphere. The Sphere then
dissolves and the world is established in a series o f stages. History then
reverses itself, and the universe gradually returns to the state o f the
Sphere. The cosmic cycle rolls on repeatedly, without beginning and
without end.
Empedocles poem contained repetitions and reprises. This is clear
in the surviving fragments, and Empedocles himself avows it:
But, lest, as E m pedocles puts it, I shall be th ou g h t
to attach one heading to another
and not complete a single path in my tales, [ 24]
let m e b rin g my in trod u cto ry rem arks to th eir a p p ro p ria te
end.
'
(Plutarch, On the Decline o f Oracles 4 1 8c)
T w ice and thrice fo r the fin e: a p roverb, m ean in g that o n e
should speak o ften about w hat is fine. T h e verse fro m which
the p roverb com es is by E m pedocles, H e says:
For it is fine to speak twice o f what one should, [ 25]
(Scholiast to Plato, Gorgias 498E)
Two long extracts from Simplicius commentary on the Physics pro
vide good accounts o f the general structure o f Empedocles cosmic
history.
In the first book o f his Physics E m ped ocles talks about
the o n e and the finitely m any and the p eriod ic creation and
165

EARLY CREEK PHILOSOPHY

gen eration and destruction by association and dissociation in


the follow ing way:
I will tell a two-fold story. At one time they grew to be one alone
from being many, and at another they grew apart again to be
many from being one.
Double is the generation o f mortal things, double their passing
away:
one is bom and destroyed by the congregation o f everything,
the other is nurtured and flies apart as they grow apart again.
And these never cease their continual change,
now coming together by Love all into one,
now again all being carried apart by the hatred o f Strife.
< Thus insofar as they have learned to become one from many>
and again become many as the one grows apart,
to that extent they come into being and have no lasting life;
but insofar as they never cease their continual change,
to that extent they exist forever, unmoving in a circle.
But come, hear my words; fo r learning enlarges the mind.
As I said before when I revealed the limits o f my words,
I will tell a two-fold story. At one time they grew to be one alone
from being many, and at another they grew apart again to be
many from being one
fire and water and earth and the endless height o f air,
and cursed Strife apart from them, balanced in every way,
and Love among them, equal in length and breadth.
Her you must regard with your mind: do not sit staring with your
eyes.
She is thought to be innate also in the limbs o f mortals,
by whom they think thoughts o f love and perform deeds o f union,
calling her Joy by name and Aphrodite,
whom no-one has seen whirling among them no mortal man. Listen to the course o f my argument, which does
not deceive:
these are all equal and o f the same age,
but they hold different offices and each has its own character;
and in turn they come to power as time revolves.
And in addition to them nothing comes into being or ceases.
166

EMPEDOCLES

For i f they were continually being destroyed, they would no longer


exist.
And what could increase this universe? and whence might it
come?
And where indeed might it perish, since nothing is empty o f them?
But these themselves exist, and passing through one another
they become different at different times and are ever and always
the same, [ 17]
H ere h e says that that w hich com es fro m m any - fro m th e fo u r
elem ents - is one, an d h e shows that it exists som etim es w hen
L ove is d om in an t and som etim es w hen S trife is. F o r that
neith er o f these com pletely passes away, is show n by the fact
that they a re all equ al and o f the sam e a g e and that n o th in g
com es into bein g in add ition to them o r ceases. T h e m an y from
which the on e derives a re plu ral - fo r L ove is not the on e, since
Strife too brings them into unity.
H aving m entioned the m any o th er things, he con tin u es by
sketching the ch aracter o f each o f them , callin g fire Su n , air
Brightness an d H eaven, and w ater Rain and Sea. T h is is w hat
he says:
But come, consider these witnesses to my former words,
i f anything I said before was incomplete in form:
the sun, hot to see and radiant everywhere,
the divine bodies flooded in heat and shining brightness,
rain everywhere, dark and cold,
and from earth flow forth things firm and solid.
In Anger they have different forms and are all apart,
but in Love they come together and are desired by one another.
For from these comes everything which was and which is and will
be trees spring up, and men and women
and beasts and birds and fish that live in the water
and even gods, long-lived and highest in honour.
For these themselves exist, and passing through one another
they become different; fo r the mixture interchanges them, [ 21]
H e gave a clear illustration o f how d iffe r e n t things co m e fro m
the sam e elem ents:
Just as painters, when they decorate offerings
167

EARLY CREEK PH ILOSOPHY

men well taught by skill in their art


take the many-coloured pigments in their hands,
and, harmoniously mixing them, some more some less,
make from them shapes resembling all things,
creating trees and men and women
and beasts and birds and fish that live in the sea
and even gods, long-lived and highest in honour:
so let not deceit persuade your mind that there is any other source
fo r the countless mortal things we see.
But know this clearly, having heard the tale from a god. [ 23]
H e considers these m any things, and not ju s t L ove and Strife,
to be in the gen erated w o rld , as is clear w hen he says that trees
and m en an d w om en an d beasts have com e into bein g from
them . A n d th ey ch a n g e into o n e an o th er, as he show s when
he says:
In turn they come to power as the circle revolves,
and they decline into one another and increase in their allotted
turn, [ 26.12]
H e indicates that even w hat com es into bein g and is destroyed
possesses im m ortality by way o f succession w hen he says:
But insofar as they never cease their continual change,
to that extent they exist forever, unmoving in a circle, [ 17 .12
3]
H e also hints at a d o u b le w orld - o n e intelligible and the
o th e r p erceptible, o n e d ivin e and the o th e r m ortal, o n e con
tain in g thin gs as parad igm s an d the o th e r as copies. He
show ed this w hen he said that not o n ly gen erated and perish
able th in gs are co m posed o f these bu t so too a re the gods
(unless this sh ou ld be ex p lain ed in term s o f E m pedoclean
usage). In the fo llo w in g verses too you m igh t thin k he is hint
in g at a d o u b le w orld:
For they are all in union with their own parts
Sun and Earth and Heaven and Sea
which have been separatedfrom them and grown in mortal things.
In the same way, those that are more ready to blend
are made similar by Aphrodite and love one another.
But most hostile are the things which differ most from one another
in birth and blending and moulded shape,
168

EMPEDOCLES

quite unaccustomed to come together and deeply dismal


*at their strife-birth because they were bom in anger * [ 22]
H e shows that they a re h arm on ized even in m ortal things, but
in the intelligible w orld th ey a re m ore u nited and
are made similar by Aphrodite and love one another, [ 22.5]
A n d even i f this happens everyw h ere, nevertheless in
telligible things are m ad e sim ilar by L ove w hereas p e rce p
tible things are o verp o w ered by S trife and torn fu rth e r ap art
and in the blen d in g o f th eir birth they subsist in sh apes w hich
are m oulded and copied , strife-born an d u naccustom ed to
union with o n e another.
H e also su pposed that gen eration takes place in virtu e o f
som e association and dissociation, as is show n by the first pass
age I set dow n:
At one time they grew to be one alone
from being many, and at another they grew apart again to be
many from being one. [ 1 7 .1 2]
See also his rem ark to the e ffe ct that g en eratio n and d estru c
tion are nothing
but there is only mixing and interchange o f what is mixed [ 8.3]
and allotted con gregatio n and flyin g apart.
(Sim plicius, Commentary on the Physics 15 7 .2 5 -1 6 1 .2 0 )
Most think that a cco rd in g to E m ped ocles L o v e a lo n e m ad e
the intelligible w orld and S trife alon e the p ercep tib le w orld.
But in fact he gives both o f them th eir a p p ro p riate fu n ction s
everyw h ere, as we can see from his w ords in th e Physics, w h ere
he says that A p h ro d ite o r L o v e is a cause o f th e creative co m p o
sition o f this w orld too. H e calls fire H eph aestu s and Su n and
Flam e, w ater Rain, air E ther. H e says this in m an y places,
includin g the fo llo w in g verses:
Earth, roughly equal to them, happened together with
Hephaestus and Rain and shining Ether,
anchored in the perfect harbours o f Aphrodite,
either a little more earth or less where they were more.
And from them came blood and different forms o f flesh, [ 98]
B e fo re these lines he refers in o thers to the activity o f both
[Love and Strife] in the sam e things, as follows:
169

EARLY CREEK

PHILOSOPHY

When Strife reached the lowest depth


o f the vortex, and Love comes to be in the middle o f the whirl,
in her all these things come together to be one thing only,
not suddenly, but coming together at willfrom different directions.
As they mingle, innumerable types o f mortal things pour forth.
But many stand unmixed among them as they blend those which Strife holds, still aloft; fo r not completely
does it all yet stand out at the furthest limits o f the circle,
but parts o f it remain in the limbs, and parts have stepped out.
And as it ever runs out ahead, so ever pursues
the gentle, immortal onrush o f complete Love.
And at once become mortal those things which formerly learned
to be immortal,
and mixed those which formerly were unmixed, interchanging
their paths.
As they mingle, innumerable types o f mortal things pour forth,
fitted with every sort o f shape, a wonder to see. [ 35.317]
H ere he clearly says both that m ortal things w ere constructed
by L ove and that S trife d id not yet all stand outside the areas
w h ere L o v e pred om in ated .
A g a in , in the lines w h ere he gives the characteristics o f each
o f the fo u r elem ents and o f S trife and L ove, he clearly refers
to the m ixtu re o f both - o f S trife and o f L o v e - in all o f them .
T h e lines a re these:
The sun, hot to see and radiant everywhere;
the divine bodies, flooded in heat and shining brightness;
rain everywhere, dark and cold;
and from earth flow forth things firm and solid.
In Anger they have different forms and are all apart,
but in Love they come together and are desired by one another.
For from these comes everything which was and which is and will
be trees sprang up, and men and women
and beasts and birds and fish that live in the water,
and even gods, long-lived and highest in honour, [ 2 1 .3 -12 ]
A little fu rth e r o n h e says:
In turn they come to power as the circle revolves,
170

EMPEDOCLES

and they decline into one another and increase in their allotted
turn.
For these themselves exist, and passing through one another
they become men and the other kinds o f animals,
now by Love coming together into one arrangement,
now again each carried apart by the hatred o f Strife,
until, having grown together as one, they are completely subdued.
Thus insofar as they have learned to become one from many
and again become many as the one grows apart,
to that extent they come into being and have no lasting life;
but insofar as they never cease their continual change,
to that extent they exist forever, unmoving in a circle, [ 26]
T h u s both the o n e-from -m an y (which com es ab o u t because
o f Love) and the m an y-fro m -o n e (which o ccu rs w hen S trife
predom inates) a re located by him in this su blu n ary w orld too
in w hich m ortal things a re fo u n d , it bein g clear that at d iffe r
en t tim es and fo r d iffe r e n t p eriod s now S trife and now L ove
dom inates.
(Sim plicius, Commentary on the Physics 3 1 .3 1 34.8)
The remaining fragments can best be read as supplements to and
expansions upon the texts quoted by Simplicius in these two passages.
Certain lines in the passages show that Empedocles was aware o f the
Parmenidean objections against generation and change, and that he
hoped to have evaded them. Some further fragments have a Parmen
idean background.
T h e n Colotes, as th ou gh he w ere talking to an u n lettered king,
fastens n ext on E m pedocles:
Another thing I will tell you: there is no birth fo r any
mortal thing, nor any cursed end in death.
But there is only mixing and interchange o f what is mixed but men name these things birth, [ 8]
(Plutarch, Against Colotes 1 1 1 1 f )
[Em pedocles] was so fa r from u psettin g w hat exists and
figh tin g against the ap pearan ces that h e d id not even banish
the expressions fro m o rd in a ry lan gu age: rath er, h e rem oved
171

E A RL Y GREEK P H I L O S O P H Y

the h arm fu l factual m isu n d erstan d in g w hich they cause and


then restored them to cu rren t use, in these lines:
When they come into the air mixed in the form o f a man
or o f a kind o f wild beast or o f a plant
or o f a bird, then people call this coming into being;
and when they have separated off, this they call wretched fate.
They do not call things as they should, but I myself also subscribe
to the convention, [ 9]
C o lotes h im self cites these lines but does not notice that
E m pedocles did not d o away with m en and beasts and plants
and birds, w hich he says a re p ro d u ced as the elem ents mix;
and h avin g pointed o u t th eir m istake to those w ho call this
association and dissociation birth and wretchedfate and evil death
[ 10], he did not disallow the use o f the custom ary expressions
fo r them .
N ow I d o not think that E m ped ocles is here upsetting o u r
m od e o f expression ; rath er, as 1 said earlier, he is in substantial
d isagreem en t o v e r g en eratio n from the non-existent, which
som e call birth. H e shows this m ost clearly in the follow ing
verses:
Fools they have no far-ranging thoughts:
they suppose that what did not exist before comes into being
or that something may die and perish entirely, [ 11 ]
T h e s e a re verses o f o n e w ho shouts alo u d to all w ho have ears
that h e is not d o in g aw ay with co m in g into b ein g but only
with co m in g into b ein g from w hat does not exist, n o r with
destruction but only with co m p lete d estruction, i.e. destruction
into w hat does not exist. I f you wish som eth in g gen tler than
that savagely sim ple d en u n ciation , the fo llo w in g passage m ight
lead you to accuse him o f excessive kindness. T h e r e E m p ed o
cles says:
No man wise in these things would suppose in his mind
that while men live what they call life
for so long do they exist and experience ill and good,
but that before they were made men and after they are dissolved
they are nothing, [ 15]
T h o se a re th e w ords not o f o n e w ho d enies that those w ho
h ave b een bo rn and a re livin g exist, bu t rath er o f on e who
172

EMPEDOCLES

thinks that both those w ho have not yet been born and those
who have alread y d ied exist.
(Plutarch, Against Colotes 1 1 1 3 a d ]
A gain , even if it is quite im possible both fo r w hat d oes not exist
to com e into bein g and fo r w hat exists to perish , w hy sh ou ld
not som e things nevertheless be gen erated and o th ers eternal,
as E m pedocles says? For he too, havin g adm itted all this nam ely that
from what does not exist nothing can come into being,
and fo r what exists to be destroyed is impossible and
unaccomplishable
for it will always remain wherever anyone may fix it [ 12]
- nevertheless he says that som e things a re etern al (fire, w ater,
earth, air) while o th ers com e and have com e into b ein g from
them .
([Aristotle], On Melissus, Xenophanes, Gorgias 975336b6)
Sim ilarly, E m pedocles says that all the things that exist a re
always continuously m ovin g as they associate, and n o th in g is
em pty - he says:
No part o f the universe is empty: whence, then, might anything
come? [ 13]
A n d when they have been associated to g eth er into a single
form , so as to be o n e, he says that
in no respect is it empty, nor yet overfull, [ 14]
For what prevents them from bein g carried into o n e an o th e rs
places and fro m m ovin g rou n d sim ultaneously, o n e into the
place o f an o th er, the o th er into that o f an o th er, and so m eth in g
else always ch a n g in g into that o f the first?
(ibid 9 7 - )
The four 'roots or elements are described more than once.
E m pedocles [derives everyth in g] fro m fo u r elem ents:
Hear first the fou r roots o f all things:
bright Zeus, life-bringing Hera, Aidoneus,

173

EARLY CREEK PHILOSOPHY

and Nestis, who waters with her tears the mortal fountains, [ 6]
(Sextus Em piricus, Against the Mathematicians X 315)
T h e r e will be no such th in g as grow th a cco rd in g to E m p ed o
c l e s - ex cep t by way o f addition; fo r fire increases by fire
and earth increases her own form, ether ether, [ 37]
B u t these are additions, and w hat grow s is not th ou gh t to grow
in this way.
(A ristotle, On Generation and Corruption 333335)
It is better to think o f the e th er as co n tain in g and binding
everyth in g , as E m pedocles says:
Come and I will tell you *. . .*
from which all the things we now see came to be:
earth and the billowy sea and the damp air
and the Titan ether, binding everything in a circle, [ 38]
(Clem ent, Miscellanies V viii 48.3)
Som e think that [the w ord anopaia] is used instead o f u p w ard .
T h e y r e fe r to E m pedocles, w h o says o f fire
swiftly upward [ 51].
(Eustathius, Commentary on the Odyssey I 321)
Love and Strife are generally presented as the twin causal powers
in the universe:
T h e crea to r and m aker o f the gen eratio n o f all generated
things is d ead ly Strife, while the ch a n g e and d ep a rtu re o f g en
erated things from the w orld and the establishm ent o f the O n e
is the w ork o f Love. E m ped ocles says o f both that they are
im m ortal and u n gen erated and never had a b egin n in g o f g en
eration he writes as follows:
For they are as they were before and as they will be, nor ever, /
think,
will boundless eternity be emptied o f these two. [ 16]
A n d w ho are these two? - L ove and Strife.
(H ippolytus, Refutation o f A ll Heresies V II x xix 9 -10 )

*74

EMPEDOCLES

Perhaps even th ou gh S trife p red om inates in this w orld and


Love in the S p h ere, yet both a re said to be p ro d u ced by both.
T h e r e is no reason why we should not set d ow n som e o f
E m pedocles verses which m ake this clear:
B u t ! shall return to the path o f songs
which I traced before, channelling this account from that:
when Strife reached the lowest depth . . . [ 3 5 .1 -3 ]
. . . H ere it is m ade clear that in the creation o f the w orld S trife
draws back and L ove p red om inates w hen it
comes to be in the middle o f the whirl, [ 35.4]
i.e. o f the vortex; hen ce th e vortex exists even w hen L ove
predom inates. It is clear too that som e o f the elem ents rem ain
unm ixed by Strife, while those that a re m ixin g m ake m ortal
anim als and plants, since w hat is m ixin g is again dissolved.
A n d sp eakin g about the creation o f these co rp oreal eyes, he
says:
From which divine Aphrodite fashioned tireless eyes, [ 86]
and a little later:
Aphrodite, fitting them with pegs o f affection, [ 87]
A n d ex p lain in g w hy som e see better by d ay an d o th ers by
night, he says:
When first they grew together at the hands o f Cypris. [ 95]
- H e is sp eakin g about the things in this w orld , as a p p ears
from the follow ing verses:
I f your trust was at all deficient on any o f these matters
how when water and earth and ether and sun
were blended, and the forms and colours o f mortal things came
into being
as many as there are now, fitted together by Aphrodite, [ 71 ]
A n d a little later:
So then Cypris, when she had moistened earth with rain,
busily making forms, gave it to swift fire to harden, [ 73]
A n d again:
Those which are dense inside but loose outside,
chancing upon such a fluidity in the hands o f Cypris . . . [ 75]
I have set dow n these verses from the first few I hit u pon.
(Sim plicius, Commentary on On the Heavens 5 2 9 .2 1 -5 3 0 .1 1 )

175

EARLY CREEK PHILOSOPHY

F or E m p ed ocles says that h ere too [i.e. in the su blu nary world]
L ove and S trife p red om in ate by turn s o ver m en and fish and
beasts an d birds. H e writes as follows:
This is plain in the bulk o f mortal members:
somtimes by Love they all come together into one,
limbs which the body acquires when life is thriving at its peak;
sometimes again, divided by evil Conflicts,
each wanders apart along the shore o f life.
So too is it with plants and fish o f the watery halls
and beasts o f the mountain lairs and flying gulls, [ 20]
(Sim plicius, Commentary on the Physics 1 124.918)
But, as the ancient scholars noted, Empedocles sometimes ascribes
causal powers to the elements themselves, he sometimes invokes theforce
o f necessity and he sometimes appears to allow room in the universe for
chance events.
In gen eral, fire divides and separates, w ater is adhesive and
retentive, h o ld in g and g lu in g by its m oisture. Em pedocles
alluded to this every tim e he refe rre d to fire as cursed Strife [cf
17.19 ] anc* to w ater as tenacious Love [ 19].
(Plutarch, The Primary Cold 952)
[Friendship] collects and com pacts and conserves, b rin gin g
m en to g eth er by conversation and g oo d will
as when rennet pegs and ties white milk, [ 33]
as E m ped ocles says.
(Plutarch, On Having Many Friends 95A)
T h e m oist causes the d ry to be b o u n d ed , and each is a sort o f
g lu e fo r the o th er, as E m ped ocles said in his Physics,
gluing barley with water [ 34]
- an d fo r this reason th e b o u n d ed b o d y is m ad e o f both.
(A ristotle, Meteorology 3 8 ^ 3 1 -3 8 2 3 3 )
E u dem u s takes it that the p erio d o f m otionlessness occurs
u n d e r the d om in an ce o f L ove d u rin g the S p h e re, w hen e very
th in g has been collected togeth er,
where neither the swift limbs o f the sun are discerned, [ 27.1]
176

EMPEDOCLES

but, as he says,
in this way it is held fast in the close covering o f Harmony,
a rounded Sphere, rejoicing in its pleasant rest, [ 27.34]
W hen Strife has again b egu n to p red om in ate, then again
m otion occurs in the S p h ere:
For all the limbs o f the god shook, one after another, [ 3 1 ]
W hat is the d iffe re n c e betw een sayin g 'becau se th at is its
nature and saying by necessity, without a d d in g any explan
ation? T h a t is what Em pedocles appears to say in the line:
In turn they come to power as time revolves, [ 17.29]
and again w h ere he m akes necessity th e cause o f w h at com es
into being:
There is an oracle o f necessity, an ancient seal o f the gods,
eternal, sealed by broad oaths, [ 1 1 5 . 1 - 2 ]
For he says that each pred om in ates in turn because o f necessity
and these oaths. E m ped ocles says this too o f the p red o m in a n ce
o f Strife:
But when Strife had grown great in the limbs
and rose to office as the time was completed,
which was laid down fo r them in turn by the broad oath . . .
[ 3]
N ow [Aristotle] says that to say this w ithout any ex p lan a tio n is
sim ply to say that that was its n a tu re.
(Sim plicius, Commentary on the Physics 118 3 .2 8 -1 18 4 .18 )
Necessity is unm usical, Persuasion m usical - she loves the
M uses fa r m ore, I sh ou ld say, than E m p ed ocles G ra ce an d
hates intolerable necessity, [ 1 16]
(Plutarch, Table Talk 7 4 5 D )
E m pedocles says that air does not alw ays sep arate o f f to the
highest point, but as ch an ce has it. A t all events, h e says in his
cosm ogony that
Then it happened to be running in this way, but often otherwise.
[ 53]
A n d he says that the parts o f anim als are m ostly fo rm ed by
chance.
(Aristotle, PA^jtcs 196320-24)
177

EA RLY GREEK PH IL O SO P H Y

E th er was carried u p w ard s not by S trife but, as he som etim es


says, as i f by ch an ce Then it happened to be running in this way, but often otherwise
[ 53]
- and som etim es he says that fire is naturally carried upw ards,
w hile eth er, h e says,
sank with long roots into the earth, [ 54]
(Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 334a 15)
T h a t [the early n atural scientists] had som e notion o f things
h a p p e n in g by chance is show n by the fact that they som etim es
use the w ord - as E m ped ocles says that fire does not always
sep arate o f f upw ards but as ch an ce has it. T h u s he says in his
cosm ogony that
Then it happened to be running in this way, but often otherwise,

[ 53]
and elsew here:
. . . as each happened, [ 59.2]
A n d he says that m ost o f the parts o f anim als com e about by
chance, as w hen he writes:
Earth, roughly equal to them, happened together . . ., [ 98. l]
an d again:
Gentle flame chanced on a little earth, [ 85]
and elsew here:
Chancing upon such a fluidity in the hands o f Cypris. [ 75.2]
Y o u co u ld p ro d u ce m an y o th e r exam p les o f this sort from
E m ped ocles Physics, such as:
Thus by the will o f chance all things think, [ 103]
an d a little later:
And insofar as the most flne-textured things happened to fa ll
together, [ 104]
B u t E m ped ocles, w ho seem s to use ch an ce only in sm all m at
ters, does not m erit m uch atten tion, not h avin g exp lain ed what
ch an ce is.
(Sim plicius, Commentary on the Physics 3 3 0 .3 1-3 3 1.16 )
The divine and homogeneous Sphere is described in several frag
ments.
178

EMPEDOCLES

A bo u t the form w hich the w orld has w hen it is b ein g arra n g ed


by L ove h e says this:
There are no two limbs branching from its back,
no feet, no swift legs, no generative organs:
it was a Sphere, equal to itself from all directions, [ 29]
(H ippolytus, Refutation o f A ll Heresies V I I x x ix 13)
But he, from all directions equal to himself and completely
boundless,
a rounded Sphere, rejoicing in his pleasant rest, [ 28]
(Stobaeus, Anthology I x v 2)
T h a t is why the wise m an o f A cragas, in his criticism o f the
stories o f a n th ro p o m o rp h ic god s told by th e poets, said
sp eakin g in the first instance about A p o llo (with w hom his
argu m en t was prim arily con cern ed ) but also in the sam e way
about all the god s For no human head is fitted to his limbs,
no two branches spring from his back,
no feet, no swift legs, no hairy genitals:
he is merely a mind, holy and wonderful,
rushing xvith rapid thought over the whole world, [ 134]
(A m m onius, Commentary on On Interpretation 2 4 9 .1-10 )
B ew are that you d o not in trod u ce E m ped ocles S trife, o r
rather stir u p the old T ita n s and the G iants against natu re,
o r lon g to see that m ythical and fe a rfu l chaos an d h o rro r,
separating ev ery th in g heavy and e v ery th in g light,
where neither the bright form o f the sun is seen
nor the shaggy power o f the earth, nor the sea, fc f 2 7 .12]
as E m pedocles says.
(Plutarch, On the Face in the Moon 926E)
The development o f the world included a bizarre phase in which
monstrosities o f various sorts came into being:

[Aristotle] asks w h eth er th ere co u ld n o t then h ave been a


79

EARLY GREEK PH IL O SO P H Y

d iso rd erly m otion which p ro d u ced m ixtures . . . o f the sort


which E m pedocles says cam e about in the reign o f Love:
Here many neckless heads sprang up. [ 5 7.1 ]
. . . B u t how co u ld a neckless h ea d and the o th er things
d escribed by E m ped ocles in th e lines:
Naked arms strayed about, devoid o f shoulders,
and eyes wandered alone, begging for foreheads, [ 57.23]
a n d m any o th er thin gs - how co u ld these signify mixtures, when
th ey a re certain ly not exam p les o f m ixtures from which natural
objects a re co m p ou n d ed ? . . . B u t p erh ap s E m pedocles does
not m ean that these things com e about u n d er the p red om in
a n ce o f L ove (as A le x a n d e r th ou gh t) but rather at the time
w hen S trife does not yet
all stand out at the furthest limits o f the circle,
but parts o f it remain in the limbs, and parts have stepped out.
A nd as it (he m eans Strife) ever runs out ahead, so ever pursues
the gentle, immortal onrush o f complete Love, [ 3 5 .10 -1 3 ]
So in this w orld the lim bs, still sin gle-m em b ered from the
dissociation o f S trife, w an d ered about and desired to m ix with
o n e an oth er.
But when, he says, god mingled more with god
- w hen L ove achieved co m p lete p red om in an ce o ver Strife these things came together as each happened,
and many others in addition to these were continuously bom.

[ 59]
T h u s E m ped ocles said that the fo rm e r p h en om en a occu r in
the reign o f L o v e not in the sense that L ove was alread y p re
d om in an t bu t in the sense that she was about to p red om inate
an d was still sh ow in g u n m ixed an d single-lim bed things.
(Sim plicius, Commentary on On the Heavens 5 8 6 .6 -7 , 1 0 -1 2 ,
29 587-4. 12-26)
In the secon d book o f his Physics, b efo re discussing the
articulation o f m ale and fem ale bodies, Em pedocles has these
lines:
Come now, hear how the shoots o f men and pitiable women
were raised at night by fire, as it separated,
thus fo r my story does not miss the mark, nor is it ill-informed.
180

EMPEDOCLES

First, whole-natured forms sprang up from the earth,


having a portion o f both water and heat.
Fire sent them up, wishing to come to its like,
and they showed as yet no desirable form in their limbs,
nor any voice, nor member native to man. [ 62]
(Sim plicius, Commentary on the Physics 3 8 1.29382.3)
E m pedocles the natural scientist, w ho also speaks o f the p ecu li
arities o f anim als, says that som e hybrid s w ere g en era te d , d if
feren t in the b len d in g o f their fo rm s but co n n ected by the
unity o f their bodies. T h e s e are his words:
Many grew double-headed, double-chested man-faced oxen arose, and again
ox-headed men creatures mixed partly from male
partly from female form, fitted with dark limbs, [ 61]
(A elian , The Nature o f Animals X V I 29)
T h e s e things - and m any o th ers m ore d ram atic - a re like the
m onsters o f E m ped ocles they lau gh at - th e lumberers with
countless hands [ 60] and the man-faced oxen, [ 61.2]
(Plutarch, Against Colotes 1 123B)
Within the natural world, Empedocles 'physics and his chemistry
depend on a theory o f effluences and channels:
C o n sid er the m atter, th en , h avin g with E m p ed ocles reco g
nized that
there are effluences from all things that have come into being
[ 89]
- fo r not only anim als and plants and earth and sea, bu t stones
too, and bron ze and iron , continu ously give o f f n u m erou s
streams.
(Plutarch, Scientific Explanations 91 6 d)
E m pedocles said that in all su blu nary things - w ater, oil,
etc. - channels an d solid parts a re m in gled . H e called the
channels hollow and th e solid parts d ense. W h ere the solid
parts and the channels, i.e. the hollow and th e d en se parts, a re
181

EA RL Y GREEK P H I L O S O P H Y

com m en su rate in such a way as to pass th ro u gh o n e an oth er, he


said that m ixin g and b len d in g take place (e.g. w ater and wine),
bu t w h ere th ey a re incom m ensurate, he said they d o not mix
(e.g. w ater and oil); fo r he says
water is more suited to wine, but with oil
it will not. [ 91]
A n d a p p lyin g this to all bodies, he attem pted to explain the
sterility o f m ules.
([Philoponus], Commentary on the Generation o f Animals
1 2 3 .13 -2 1)
A varied d iet sends fro m itself into the mass o f the body
n u m erou s qualities and gives to each part w hat is app rop riate;
so that th ere occurs w hat E m ped ocles described:
thus sweet grasped sweet and bitter set upon bitter,
sharp went to sharp, and hot rode on hot. [ 90]
(Plutarch, Table Talk 663)
D iffe re n t thin gs a re a p p ro p riate and fitting to d iffe re n t things,
as beans and p u rp le o r nitre an d sa ffro n seem to m ake a m ixed
dyeThe gleam o f bright saffron is mixed with dark purple, [ 93]
as E m p ed ocles said.
(Plutarch, On the Decline o f Oracles 433B)
The remainingfragments o f O n N atu re describe the natural world.
I group them here under seven thematic headings.

Astronomy
E m p ed ocles expresses th eir d iffe re n c e charm ingly:
sharp-arrowed sun and gentle moon, [ 40]
(Plutarch, On the Face in the Moon 920c)
A p o llo is called Eleleus because he turns [elittesthai] rou n d the
earth . . . o r because he orbits in a collected mass o f fire, as
E m ped ocles says:
182

EMPEDOCLES

Hence, collected together, he orbits the great heaven, [ 4 1]


(M acrobius, Saturnalia I xvii 46)
T h e m oon h e rse lf is invisible then, an d she o ften hides th e sun
and m akes it d isap p ear she cuts o ff his rays,
as E m pedocles says,
as he travels above, and casts a shadow on the earth
as great as the breadth o f the bright-eyed moon, [ 42]
(Plutarch, On the Face in the Moon 929c)
Just as sounds w hen reflected g ive an ech o d u lle r than the
original voice, and the blows o f ricoch etin g missiles strike with
less violence,
so the light, having struck the broad circle o f the moon, [ 43]
flows weakly and dim ly to us.
(ibid 929E)
Y o u Stoics lau gh at E m ped ocles w h en h e says that the sun,
which is p ro d u ced about the earth by th e reflection o f h eaven ly
light, again
shines back on Olympus with fearless face, [ 44]
(Plutarch, Why the Pythia No Longer Prophesies in Verse 400B)
T h e general view hold s that the m oon is nearest, since th ey say
that it is actually a fra g m en t from the sun so Em pedocles:
In a circle round the earth she winds, anothers light, [ 45]
(A chilles, Introduction to Aratus 16)
[T h e m oon] pretty well tou ches the ea rth a n d , o rb itin g n ear
her,
*
turns like the track* o f a chariot, [ 46]
as E m pedocles puts it.
(Plutarch, On the Face in the Moon 925B)
H oly [ages] : this is taken fro m the co m p o u n d euages o r pan
ages. Em pedocles:
She observes the holy circle o f her king opposite her. [ 47]
(Anecdota Graeca [ed. B ekker] 1 3 3 7 .1 3 - 1 5 )
183

EA R L Y GREEK P H I L O S O P H Y

Part o f the earth blocks th e su n as it travels ben eath it and, as


E m ped ocles says:
Earth makes night by standing in the way o f the light, [ 48]
(Plutarch, Platonic Questions i o o 6e)
In th e d ark a ir
o f deserted, blind-eyed night, [ 49]
as E m ped ocles puts i t . . .
(Plutarch, Table Talk 720E)

The Earth
Som e say that the region below the earth is infinite (e.g. X eno
p hanes o f C o lo p h o n ), so that th ey n eed not take the trouble
to look fo r an exp lan atio n [o f w hy the earth is at rest]. T h a t is
w hy E m ped ocles criticized them , saying:
I f the depths o f the earth are boundless and the ether immense,
as the tongues o f many mouths have vainly
poured forth, seeing little o f the whole . . . [ 39]
(A ristotle, On the Heavens 294321-28)

T h e r e a re stream s o f fire u n d e r the earth , as E m ped ocles says:


Many fires bum beneath the threshold, [ 52]
(Proclus, Commentary on the Timaeus 118.26-28)
W h y does w ater look w hite on the su rfa ce but black in the
depths? Is it because d ep th is the m oth er o f blackness inas
m uch as it blunts and w eakens the rays o f th e sun b efo re they
d escen d , w h ereas the su rface, because it is im m ediately a ffe c
ted by the sun , can receive the w hiteness o f the light? T h is is
the view that E m ped ocles assents to:
In the bottom o f the river the shadows make the colour black,
and the same is seen in hollow caverns, [ 94]
(Plutarch, Scientific Explanations 39)
184

EMPEDOCLES

It is equally absurd fo r an yon e to think, like E m ped ocles, that


when he says that sea is ea rth s sweat [ 55], he has said so m e
th in g illum inating.
(Aristotle, Meteorology 35732526)
E m pedocles:
Salt was compacted, forced by the rays o f the sun. [ 56]
(H ep h aestion, Handbook I iii 4)
Poseidon is su m m on ed by Iris w ho calls him e ith er to th e sea
o r to the gods, as E m ped ocles o r so m eo n e else says:
Iris brings a wind or a great rainstorm from the sea. [ 50]
(T zetzes, Allegories in the Iliad X V 86)

Botany
I f the air continu ously fa vo u re d the trees, then p erh a p s even
what the poets say w ould not seem u n r e s s o n a b le -a s E m p ed o
cles says that, everg reen an d ev er-fru itin g [ 77], they flourish
throughout the year with abundant fruit, thanks to the air. [ 78]
(H e supposes that a certain b len d in g o f the s ir - the sp rin g
blending - is com m on to all seasons.)
(T h eo p h ra stu s, Causes o f Plants I xiii 2)
[Plants] rep ro d u ce fro m them selves, 3nd th e so-called seeds
which they p ro d u ce a re not sem en but em bryos E m pedocles
puts this well w hen he says
Thus tall trees first lay olives, [ 79]
For what is laid is an em bryo.
(A ristotle, Generation o f Animals 73 18 1-6 )
E m pedocles says that
This is why pomegranates are late-fruiting and apples exception
ally sweet, [ 80]
(Plutarch, Table Talk 683D)
185

EARLY CREEK PHILOSOPHY

C o n co ction seem s to be a sort o f rottin g, as Em pedocles indi


cates w h en h e says:
Wine from the bark is water that has rotted in the wood, [ 81]
(Plutarch, Scientific Explanations 9 12 c)

Zoology
I am aw are that E m ped ocles the natural scientist used the word
kamasenes to co ver all fish in gen eral:
How the tall trees and fish [kam asenes] o f the sea . . . [ 7 2 ]
(A th en aeu s, Deipnosophists 3 3 4 B )

A s fo r anim als them selves, you cou ld not find any crea tu re o f
land o r air as prolific as all the creatu res o f the sea are. W ith
that in m ind, E m ped ocles w rote:
Leading the unmusical tribe o f fertile fish . . . [ 7 4 ]
(Plutarch, Table Talk 685F)

Y o u see that g o d , o u r fin e craftsm an as P in dar called him , did


not ev ery w h e re send fire u p a n d ea rth d ow n , bu t he arran g ed
them as the needs o f bodies d em an d ed .
This is found in shell-fish, heavy-backed sea-dwellers
yes, and in limpets and stone-skinned turtles,
says E m ped ocles,
where you will see earth dwelling on top o f flesh, [ 7 6 ]
(ibid 61 8b )

Som e anim als a re a rm o u red with h orn s an d teeth and stings,


and as fo r hedgehogs,
E m p ed ocles says,
sharp-arrowed hairs bristle on their backs, [ 83]
(Plutarch, On Fortune 98D)

186

EMPEDOCLES

Biology
E m pedocles, by placin g S trife an d L o v e a m o n g th e principles
as causes o f fo rm , . . . d efines fo rm , I su ppose, by the ratio in
which each is m ade; fo r h e m akes flesh and bo n e and the rest
by a certain ratio. In the first book o f th e Physics h e says:
Kindly earth in her well-made hollows
received o f the eight parts two o f bright Nestis
and four o f Hephaestus. And they became white bones,
wonderfully fitted together by the glue o f Harmony, [ 96]
(Sim plicius, Commentary on the Physics 3 0 0 .16 -2 4 )
I am talking o f bones and hair and e v ery th in g else o f that sort.
T h e y have not got a nam e in com m on, b u t non eth eless they
are all the sam e by an alogy, as E m ped ocles says:
The same are hair and leaves and the thick feathers o f birds
and scales on strong limbs, [ 82]
(A ristotle, Meteorology 387b 1-6 )
T h e body o f the sem en can n ot be separated, p art in the fem ale
and part in the m ale, as E m ped ocles says But the nature o f the members is separated, part in a mans . . .
[ 63]
(A ristotle, Generation o f Animals 764b 1 5 -18 )
I f m ale and fem ale a re d ifferen tia ted d u rin g gestation, as
E m pedocles says poured into pure places, some grow as women,
i f they meet with cold . . . [ 65]
(ibid 723 3 2 3 -2 5 )
O th ers o f the o ld er g en eratio n have also said that th e m ale is
conceived in the righ t p s rt o f th e w om b. P arm enid es p u t it like
this:
In the right boys, in the left girls, [28 17]
3nd E m pedocles ssys this:
For in the warmer part was the male portion [ 67]
187

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY

and fo r that reason m en a re d a rk and m ore m asculine and


m ore hairy.
(G alen, Commentary on Hippocrates Epidemics X V I I A
1002 )
E m pedocles the natural scientist allegorizes and speaks o f
the divided meadows o f Aphrodite [ 66]
w h erein th e g en eratio n o f ch ild ren takes place.
(Scholiast to E u ripid es, Phoenician Women 18)
M ilk is concocted blood , not rotten blood . E m ped ocles eith er
m isu nd erstood this o r else used a p o o r m etap h o r w hen he said
that
On the tenth day o f the eighth month comes white pus. [ 68]
(A ristotle, Generation o f Animals 77 73 8 -10 )
W h en the sows live 3nd fee d to g eth er with the hogs it puts
them in m ind o f sex and stim ulates th eir desire. Em pedocles
says the sam e o f hum ans:
And on him came desire, *reminding him through sight*, [ 64]
(Plutarch, Scientific Explanations 9 17 c )
[E m pedocles] ssys that inhalation and exhalation occu r
because th ere are certain vessels w hich contain blood (but are
not fu ll o f blood) and w hich h ave chann els lead in g into the
extern a l air, n a rro w er than th e parts o f the flesh bu t broad er
than those o f th e air. H ence, since the blood naturally m oves
u p and d ow n , w hen it m oves dow n the air flows in and inha
lation occu rs, and w hen it m oves u p th e air flows outside the
bo d y an d exhalation occurs. H e m akes an an alo gy with what
h ap p en s in a clepsydra:
Everything inhales and exhales like this: all have bloodless
tubes o f flesh stretched over the surface o f their bodies
and at their mouths close-packed holes pierce
right through the outer surface o f the skin, so that the blood
remains inside but channels are cut to give easy exit to the ether.
Whenever the gentle blood rushes from them
the bubbling air rushes down with a wild swell,
188

EMPEDOCLES

and when it runs back, it exhales again. As when a girl


plays with a clepsydra o f shining bronze when she covers the neck o f the tube with her pretty hand
and dips it into the soft body o f shining water,
no moisture enters the vessel, but it is held back
by the mass o f air which presses from within on the close-packed
perforations
until she uncovers the compressed stream. A nd then,
as the air leaves, the water enters in proportion.
Just so, when she holds the water in the depths o f the bronze,
the neck and channel being blocked by a mortal hand,
the air outside eagerly keeps the moisture within
at the gates o f the harsh-sounding strainer, controlling the
surface,
until she releases her hand. Then again, the reverse o f before,
as the air enters, water runs out in proportion.
Just so with the gentle blood pulsing through the limbs
whenever it rushes back inside,
a stream o f air at once comes down swelling and surging,
and when it runs back, it exhales again in equal quantity, [ l oo]
(A ristotle, On Respiration 4 7 3 5 1-4 7 4 3 5 )

Perception
E m pedocles [says that the soul] is co m posed o f all th e elem ents
and that each o f them actually is a soul. H e says:
For by earth we see earth, by water water,
by ether bright ether, and by fire flaming fire,
love by love and strife by mournful strife, [ 109]
(A ristotle, On the Soul 40 4b ! 115)
Em pedocles seem s to thin k, as I said b e fo re , that som etim es
we see w h en ligh t leaves th e eyes. A t any rate, h e says this:
As when someone, intending a journey, prepares a light,
a flame o f flashing fire through the winter night,
fitting a lantern as protection against all the winds,

189

EA RL Y GREEK P H I L O S O P H Y

which stops the breeze when the winds blow,


but the light passes through to the outside, inasmuch as it is
finer-textured,
and illuminates the ground with its tireless rays:
so then the ancient fire, imprisoned in the membranes
and fin e tissues, lies in ambush in the round pupil;
and they hold back the deep water which flows around,
but let thefire pass through inasmuch as it isfiner-textured. [ 84]
Som etim es he says we see in this w ay, som etim es by efflu en ces
fro m the objects seen.
(A ristotle, On the Senses and their Objects 437b23-438a5)
A s E m ped ocles says,
from both [nam ely eyes] comes a single vision, [ 88]
(Strabo, Geography V III v 3)
D o h o u n d s, as E m ped ocles says,
tracking with their nostrils the fragments o f animal limbs,
[ 10 1.1]
pick u p the efflu en ces w hich the beasts leave on the m atter?
(Plutarch, Scientific Explanations 9 1 7 E )
W h y d o h o u n d s not sm ell the tracks w hen th e h are is dead? . . .
W h en it is alive they p erceive it becau se the sm ell is con tin u
ously given o f f by th e anim al; bu t w hen it is d ead the smell
ceases to flow. F or th e sm ell is not left beh in d, in the way in
which E m ped ocles says
it leaves from its paws in the soft grass, [ 101.2]
([A lexan d er], Problems 22.7)
B rea th in g is a cause o f sm ell not in itself bu t accidentally, as is
clear fro m the case o f anim als an d fro m the facts ju s t m en
tioned. B u t again at the en d o f his w o rk E m ped ocles - as it
w e re settin g his seal on it - speaks as th o u g h this w ere the
cause:
Thus are all things allotted breath and smell, [ 102]
(T h eo p h ra stu s, On the Senses 22)
190

EMPEDOCLES

Thought
E m pedocles seem s to treat th e blood as th e o rg a n o f u n d e r
standing:
Nourished in a sea o f churning blood
where what men call thought is especially found
for the blood about the heart is thought fo r men. [ 105]
(P o rp h yry, in Stobaeus, Anthology I x lix 53)
In gen eral, th ey su p p o sed that th o u g h t was p ercep tio n and
perception an alteration . . . T h u s E m ped ocles says th at o u r
th ou gh ts ch a n g e as o u r con d ition changes:
For men's wisdom grows in relation to what is present, [ 106]
A n d elsew here he says that:
Insofar as they become different, to that extent always
does their thought too present different objects, [ 108]
(A ristotle, Metaphysics 1009b 1 2 - 1 3 , 17- 2 1 )
T h o u g h t d ep en d s on sim ilars, ign o ra n ce on dissim ilars, as
th ou gh th in kin g w ere the sam e as o r sim ilar to p erceivin g. F or
h aving en u m erated the ways in w hich we reco gn ize each th in g
by its like, at the en d h e ad d s that fro m these
all things are fitted together and constructed,
and by these they think and feel pleasure and pain, [ 107]
T h a t is why w e think especially with o u r blood; fo r in this the
elem ents o f the parts are best blen d ed .
(T h eo p h ra stu s, On the Senses 1 o)

Purifications
The Purifications were addressed to the citizens o f Acragas, Empedo
cles own city. His candid greeting to them survives:
H eraclides says that th e w om an w ho d id not b rea th e was
in such a state that h er body rem ained w ithou t b reath and
w ithout a pulse fo r thirty days. T h a t is w hy H eraclides calls

EARLY GREEK P H IL O S O P H Y

[Em pedocles] both a d o cto r and a seer, relyin g also on the


fo llo w in g lines:
0 friends who live in the great town o f yellow Acragas
on the heights o f the citadel, caring fo r good deeds,
greetings: an immortal god, no longer mortal,
1 travel, honoured by all, as is fitting,
garlanded with bands and fresh ribbons.
Whenever I enter a thriving town
I am revered by men and women. They follow me
in their thousands, asking where lies the path to gain:
some want prophecies, others for diseases
o f every sort request to hear a healing word, [ 1 1 2 .1 - 2 , 4 - 1 1 ]
(D iogen es L aertius, Lives o f the Philosophers V III 61)

E m ped ocles says [ o f the A cragantines]:


Honourable harbours fo r strangers, knowing no ill. [ 112.3]
(D iodorus, Universal History X III lxxxiii 2)
G ram m arian s a re blind in these m atters - and also with regard
to the verses w ritten ab o u t them . E m ped ocles says:
Greetings: an immortal god, no longer mortal,
I travel, honoured by all. [ 1 12 .4 -5 ]
A n d again:
But why do I attack them as though I were achieving something
great
i f I prove superior to much-perishing men? [ 113]
G ram m arians and o rd in a ry read ers will suppose that the
p h ilosop h er said this fro m boastfulness and contem pt fo r
o th er m en - so m eth in g which is alien even to o n e m oderately
versed in p hilosoph y, let alon e to a m an o f Em pedocles
stature.
(Sextus Em piricus, Against the Mathematicians I 302-303)
A n d it com es u p o n m e to praise h igh ly the A cra ga n tin e poet
w ho hym ns faith in these words:
My friends, I know that there is truth in the stories
which I shall tell; but hard indeed
192

EMPEDOCLES

fo r men and unwanted is the onrush o f trust to their minds.


[ 114]
(C lem en t, Miscellanies V i 9.1)
The main theme o f the P urifications was the fa ll o f the spirits from
an original state o f blessedness, and their subsequent punishments. The
introduction to the story is preserved by Plutarch:
E m pedocles at the b eg in n in g o f his p h ilosop h y says by way o f
p reface that:
There is an oracle o f necessity, an ancient decree o f the gods,
that whenever anyone errs and defiles in fear his dear limbs
- one o f the spirits who have been allotted long-lasting life he shall wander thrice ten thousand seasons awayfrom the blessed
ones.
Such is the road I now follow, a fugitive from the gods and a
wanderer, [ 1 15 .1, 3, 5 - 6 , 13]
H e then shows from his ow n case that not ju s t h e h im self but
all o f us a re im m igrants h ere and stran gers an d fu gitives. F or
it is not blood, m y frien d s, n o r b len d ed b rea th (he says) w hich
provides the substance and principle o f o u r souls: fro m these
the body is co m p o u n d ed , earth -born an d m ortal; bu t the
soul has com e h ere from elsew h ere - and h e calls birth by the
gentlest o f term s, a jo u r n e y abroad.
A n d what is m ost tru e, the soul flees an d w and ers, d riven
by the d ecrees and laws o f th e god s . . . W h en it is tied to the
body, it cannot recall o r rem em b er
from what honour and from what height o f bliss [ 119]
it has fallen, h avin g ex ch a n g ed not Sardis fo r A th en s, n or
C orin th fo r L em nos o r Scyros, bu t th e h eaven s an d the m oon
fo r earth and an earth ly life. A n d then it com plains an d su ffers
like a feeb le w ilting plan t i f h ere it is m oved a little way fro m
one place to anoth er.
(Plutarch, On Exile 6 0 7 e)
There is a more detailed description o f the same events in Hippolytus
account o f Empedocles philosophy. (The lines quoted by Plutarch are

193

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY

usually amalgamated with those in Hippolytus and turned into the


single fragment, 115.)
A b o u t his ow n birth E m ped ocles speaks as follows:
Among them am I too now, a fugitive from the gods and a
wanderer, [cf 1 15.13 ]
i.e. he calls g o d th e o n e an d its unity in w hich he existed b efo re
bein g torn aw ay by S trife and co m in g to be am o n g the m any
things h ere in the w orld o f S trife. For, h e says,
I trusted in mad Strife [ 1 15.14]
- by S trife, m ad and d isturbed an d unstable, E m pedocles
m eans the crea to r o f this w orld. F or this is the sentence and
the necessity im posed on souls w hom S trife tears fro m the one
an d creates and prod u ces. H e says:
< . . . > whoever having erred swears a false oath
one o f the spirits who have been allotted long-lasting life
[ 1 1 5 .4 -5 ]
(he call souls lon g-lastin g spirits because they are im m ortal
an d live lo n g lives)
he shall wander thrice ten thousand seasons away from the
blessed ones, [ 1 15.6]
(H e calls blessed those w ho a re g ath ered to g eth er by L ove
fro m the m any into the unity o f th e intelligible w orld.) T h ese,
th en , he says m ust w an d er and
become in time all sorts o f mortals,
changing the painful paths o f life; [ 1 15 .7 -8 ]
fo r th e souls ch a n g e fro m b o d y to bo d y, altered and punished
by S trife an d not allow ed to rem ain in unity. R ath er, the souls
u n d e rg o ev ery p u n ish m en t at th e h an d s o f S trife as they
ch a n g e fro m b o d y to body:
The ethereal power, he says, pursues souls to the sea,
the sea spits them up onto the threshold o f the earth, the earth into
the rays
o f the bright sun, and the sun hurls them into the whirls o f the
ether:
each receives them from another: all hate them, [ 1 15 .9 -12 ]
T h is is the p u n ish m en t w hich th e crea to r visits on them , like a
sm ith resh a p in g iro n and takin g it fro m the fire to p lu n g e it

194

EMPEDOCLES

in water. F or e th er is fire, w hen ce the crea to r hu rls th e souls


into the sea, and earth is the land; so he m eans: fro m w ater to
land, from land to air. T h is is w hat he says:
. . . the earth into the rays
o f the bright sun, and the sun hurls them into the whirls o f the
ether:
each receives them from another: all hate them, [ 1 1 5.1 o - 12]
T h u s o u r souls a re hated and to rtu red and pu n ish ed in this
world, acco rd in g to E m pedocles, and then g ath ered to g eth er
by L ove, w ho is g o o d and w h o takes pity o n th eir lam entation
and on the d iso rd erly and vile arran gem en ts o f m ad Strife;
she soon hastens to lead them fro m the w orld and to fashion
them ap p ro p riately fo r the o n e, lab ou rin g to en su re that
everyth ing, led by h er, com es to unity.
Such bein g the dispositions m ad e by fatal S trife in this
divided w orld, Em pedocles u rg ed his follow ers to abstain from
all living things; fo r he says that the bodies o f the anim als we
eat are the dw elling-places o f p u n ished souls. A n d h e teaches
those who h ear these w ords o f his to exh ib it self-control in
their dealings with w om en so that they m ay not becom e fellow w orkers and fellow -labou rers in the en terprises w hich S trife
creates, as it continu ously destroys and pu lls ap art the w ork o f
Love. T h is, acco rd in g to E m pedocles, is the greatest law fo r
the o rd e rin g o f the universe. H e says:
There is an oracle o f necessity, an ancient decree o f the gods,
eternal, sealed with broad oaths [ 1 1 5 .1 - 2 ]
- by necessity he m eans the ch a n g e fro m o n e to m an y by S trife
and from m any to o n e by L ove; and by the god s, as I said, he
m eans the fo u r m ortal g o d s (fire, w ater, earth , air) a n d the two
im m ortals, w ho are u n g en e ra ted and etern ally at w ar w ith o n e
another: S trife and Love.
(H ippolytus, Refutation o f A ll Heresies V I I x x ix 14 -2 3 )
After the fall, the spirits thus undergo various incarnations.
Empedocles here embraces the Pythagorean notion o f metempsychosis.
T h e fate o r natu re which d eterm in es the m etem psychosis itself
is called by E m pedocles a spirit w hich
wraps in an unrecognizable garment o f flesh [ 126]

*95

EARLY CREEK PHILOSOPHY

and gives the souls th eir new cloth ing.


(P orphyry, in Stobaeus, Anthology I xlix 60)
E m pedocles says that the best m ove fo r a h um an is to becom e
a lion, i f d eath chan ges him into an anim al, and a laurel, i f into
a plant. T h is is w hat he says:
Among the beasts they become lions, mountain-laired, sleeping on
the ground,
and laurels among fair-tressed trees, [ 127]
(A elian, The Nature o f Animals X II 7)
A b o ve all, [Em pedocles] assents to the idea o f m etem psychosis,
saying:
For already have I once been a boy and a girl
and a bush and a bird and a silent fish in the sea. [ 117]
H e said that all souls ch a n g e into every sort o f anim al.
(H ippolytus, Refutation o f A ll Heresies I iii 2)
E m ped ocles too says that the souls o f th e wise becom e gods.
T h is is w hat he writes:
In the end they are seers and hymn-writers and doctors
and princes among earth-dwelling men;
and then they arise as gods, highest in honour, [ 146]
(Clem ent, Miscellanies IV xxiii 150.1)
I f we live in a holy and ju s t fashion, w e shall be blessed here
an d m ore blessed w h en we have left h ere, not possessing hap
piness fo r a p eriod o f tim e bu t bein g able to rest fo r eternity
at the same hearth and table as the other immortals,
relieved o f mortal pains, tireless, [ 147]
as E m p ed ocles philosophical poem puts it.
(ibid V xiv 122.3)
The cycle o f incarnations thus ends in a return to blessedness. But life
in this world now is miserable:
H eraclitus evid en tly vilifies gen eratio n . . . and E m pedocles
clearly agrees with him w hen he says:
196

EMPEDOCLES

/ wept and I lamented as I saw the unfamiliar place, [ 1 1 8]


A n d again:
For from living things he made corpses, changing their forms.
[ >25]
A n d again:
Alas, poor race o f mortals, unhappy ones,
from what conflicts and what groans were you bom. [ 1 24]
(ibid III iii 1 4 .1-2 )
T h e P ythagorean s, and a fte r them Plato, d eclared that the
w orld was a cave o r cavern . F or in E m pedocles the pow ers that
gu id e souls say:
We have come to this roofed cave, [ 1 20]
(P orphyry, The Cave o f the Nymphs 8)
For m an descends and leaves the place o f h appiness, as
Em pedocles the P yth agorean says:
a fugitive from the gods and a wanderer,
1 trusted in mad Strife, [ 1 15 .13 14]
B u t he ascends and resum es his old con d ition , i f h e escapes
earthly things an d the pleasureless country [ 12 1.1], as the
sam e man says,
where are Slaughter and Rage and the tribes o f other Plagues.
[ 121.2]
T h o se who fall into this place
wander in the darkness on the meadows o f Ruin, [ 121.4]
(H ierocles, Commentary on the Golden Verses X X I V 2)
It is not true, as M en an d er says, that
By every m an a spirit stands,
as soon as he is born . A g o o d g u id e fo r his life.
B u t it is rath er as E m ped ocles says: two fates o r spirits take
o ver and govern each o f us w h en we a re born there were Earth and far-seeing Sun,
bloody Discord and soft-faced Harmony,
Beauty and Ugliness, Speed and Slowness,
desirable Truth and black-eyed Obscurity, [ 122]
(Plutarch, On Tranquillity o f M ind 474 )

*97

EARLY GREEK PH ILOSOPHY

A fte r th at com es the birth o f the so-called T itan s. T h e y must


rep resen t the d ifferen ces a m o n g things. F or Em pedocles en u
m erates them in scientific term s Birth and Death, Sleep and Wakefulness,
Motion and Rest, much-garlanded Greatness
*
and Lowliness, Silence and Speech*, [ 123]
a n d m an y o thers - he is clearly h in tin g at the variety o f things.
(C o rn u tu s, Theology 17)

Y o u r own p oet, E m ped ocles o f A cragas, says the sam e:


For that reason, troubled by cruel evils,
you will never relieve your heart from wretched pains, [ 145]
(C lem en t, Protreptic II xxvii 3)

The Purifications appears also to have contained a description o f


a Utopia or a Golden Age:

E m pedocles, w h en h e tells o f the birth o f th e gods, also indi


cates his view s on sacrifices w hen he says:
Among them was no god Ares, nor Tumult,
nor was Zeus king, nor Cronus, nor Poseidon,
but Cypris was queen
i.e. L ove whom they worshipped with holy statues
and painted animals and subtly perfumed oils,
with offerings o f unmixed myrrh and o f pungent frankincense,
pouring libations o f yellow honey on to the threshold
[ 12 8 .1-7 ]
- custom s w hich even now a re still p reserv ed a m o n g som e
p eo p le, bein g as it w ere traces o f the truth.
But with the fo u l slaughter o f bulls their altars were not washed.
[ 128.8]
(P o rp h yry, On Abstinence II 21)

B y such [i.e. vegetarian] o ffe rin g s n atu re and every sense o f


the h u m an soul was pleased -

198

EMPEDOCLES

But with the fo u l slaughter o f bulls their altars were not washed,
but this was the greatest defilement among men:
to bereave o f life and eat the noble limbs, [ x 2 8 .8 -10 ]
(ibid II 27)
E m pedocles bears witness to this w hen he says o f [Pythagoras]:
Among them was a man o f immense knowledge
who had obtained the greatest wealth o f mind,
an exceptional master o f every kind o f wise work.
For when he stretched out with all his mind
he easily saw each and every thing
in ten or twenty human generations, [ 129]
(P o rp h yry, Life o f Pythagoras 30)
For reason, which leads to virtu e by way o f ph ilosop h y, always
m akes a m an consistent with h im self and u nblam ed by h im self
and full o f peace and g oo d will tow ards h im self there is no faction and no fateful conflict in his members, [ 27a]
(Plutarch, Philosophers and Princes 7 7 7 c )
E m pedocles uses the w ord [ktilos] o f tam e an d g en tle things:
A ll were gentle and amenable to men,
both beasts and birds; and kindness glowed, [ 130]
(Scholiast to N ican d er, Theriaca 452)
In the second bo ok o f E m p ed ocles Purifications o n e can find
the alpha lon g, as is clear fro m a critical com parison - fo r he
uses manoteros as th ou gh it w ere tranoteros:
O f those which, with closer set roots beneath
and fewer [m anoterois] branches, thrive . . .
(H ero d ian , On Accentuation in General fragm en t)
The story o f the fa ll and the doctrine o f metempsychosis had impli
cations for practical ethics.
A s everyon e som ehow surm ises, th ere is by n atu re a com m on
ju stice and injustice, even in the absence o f com m u n ity and
com pacts . . . T h is is w hat E m pedocles says ab o u t not killing

*99

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY

an im ate creatu res: it is n o t th e case that this is ju s t fo r som e


an d n o t ju s t fo r others,
but, a law fo r all, through the broad
air it endlessly extends and through the boundless light, [ 135]
(A ristotle, Rhetoric 13731)6^-9, 14 -1 7 )
P yth agoras an d E m p ed ocles an d the rest o f the Italians say
th at we h ave a fellow ship n o t o n ly with o n e an o th er and with
th e g o d s bu t also with th e irration al anim als. F or th ere is a
sin gle spirit w hich p erva d es th e w hole w orld as a sort o f soul
an d w hich unites us with th em . T h a t is why, i f we kill them
and eat th eir flesh, we com m it injustice and im piety, inasm uch
as we a re killin g o u r kin. H en ce these philosophers u rg ed us
to abstain fro m m e a t . . . E m p ed ocles som ew here says:
Will you not cease from ill-sounding slaughter ? Do you not see
that you tear at one another in the carelessness o f your thought?
[ 136]
And:
A father lifts his son who has changed his shape
and slaughters him as he prays, the fool, while he cries pitifully,
beseeching his sacrificer. But he, d eaf to his cries,
slaughters him in the halls and prepares a fo u l feast.
In the same way a son takes his father, children their mother:
they bereave them o f life and eat their dear flesh, [ 137]
(Sextus E m piricus, Against the Mathematicians IX 12 7 -12 9 )
Since no-on e is w ithou t sin, we can o n ly atone fo r o u r earlier
sins ab o u t fo o d by later pu rification s. T h a t will h ap p en if we
keep the h o rro r before o u r eyes and cry aloud with Em pedo
cles:
Alas that the pitiless day did not first destroy me
before I contrived with my lips the terrible deed o f eating flesh.
[ 139]
(P o rp h yry, On Abstinence II 31)
It seem s that o n e sh o u ld not only, with E m pedocles,
keep altogether from the leaves o f the laurel, [ 140]
bu t also sp are all o th er trees.
(Plutarch, Table Talk 646D)
200

EMPEDOCLES

T h e m istake about not eatin g beans seem s to h ave arisen


because in a poem o f E m pedocles, w ho follow ed th e teach in gs
o f P ythagoras, the fo llo w in g verse is fo u n d :
Wretches, utter wretches, keep your hands from beans, [ 141]
(A u lu s G ellius, Attic Nights IV x i 9)
[Gellius discussion o f the prohibition on bean-eating is quoted in fu ll
in Chapter / 5 .]
The last fou r short fragments are o f uncertain location and import.
T h e teach in g o f Platos d octrines requ ires, first, a sort o f p u ri
fication, i.e. train in g from ch ild h o o d in the a p p ro p ria te sub
jects. For a cco rd in g to E m ped ocles, we sh ou ld
cut with long-bladed bronze from five springs, [ 143]
and wash ourselves; and Plato says that th e pu rification com es
from five branches o f study.
(T h e o o f S m yrn a, Mathematics 15 .712)
[M etap h or m ay involve a transferen ce] fro m species to species:
e.g.
drawing o ff life with bronze [ 1 38]
or
cutting with long-bladed bronze [c f 143],
w h ere d ra w is used to m ean cu t an d cu t to m ean d ra w ,
both b ein g fo rm s o f tak in g away.
(A ristotle, Poetics 1 4 5 7 3 -1 6 )
T h e sam e [gram m atical construction] is also fo u n d in E m p ed o
cles w hen h e says:
Him neither the roofed halls ofsceptre-bearing Zeus . . .[ 142]
(H ercu lan eu m p a p y ru s 10 12 , co lu m n X V II I)
In all things I have th o u g h t E m p ed ocles p h rase,
to abstain from evil [ 144],
im portant and divine.
(Plutarch, The Control o f Anger 464B)
201

13
FIFTH-CENTURY
PYTHAGOREANISM
Pythagoras followers in south Italy appear to have organized them
selves into secret societies - a sort o f freemasonry. They practised some
communal way o f life; for

[Pythagoras], a cco rd in g to T im ae u s, was the first to say that


frien d s possessions a re held in com m on and that frien d sh ip is
equality. A n d his pu pils contrib uted th eir goods to a com m on
store.
(D iogenes L aertius, Lives o f the Philosophers V I II 10)
Pythagoras was revered, and a ll Ihings were aUributed to him: the
Pythagorean phrase 'He said it himself became a proverb. The
Pythagoreans practised no ordinary silence and their esoteric views
were not divulged to ordinary men.
The society is said to have had some political ambitions and interests.
In the middle o f the fifth century disaster struck
A t that tim e, in the region s o f Italy w hich w ere then called
G re a t G reece, th e P yth ago rean m eetin g places w ere b u rn ed
d o wn and gen eral constitutional u nrest en su ed - a not unlikely
event, g iven th at the lead in g m en in each state had been thus
u n ex p ected ly killed. T h e G reek cities in these region s w ere
filled with blood sh ed and revolution an d turm oil o f every
kind.
(Polybius, Histories II x x x ix 1-3 )
202

FIFTH-CENTURY PYTHAGOREANISM

The Pythagoreans who survived dispersed, some o f them eventually


settling in mainland Greece.
At an early stage, Pythagorasfollowers divided into two groups, the
acusm atici or Aphorists and the m athem atici or Scientists.
T h e r e w ere two fo rm s o f his p h ilosoph y; fo r th e re w ere
two kinds o f p eo p le w ho practised it, th e A p h o rists a n d the
Scientists. T h e A p h o rists w ere allow ed by the o th ers to be
P ythagorean, bu t th ey d id not allow that the Scientists w ere
Pythagoreans, sayin g that th eir w o rk d eriv ed not fro m P yth ag
oras but fro m H ippasus. (Som e say that H ipp asus cam e fro m
C ro to n , o thers that he cam e fro m M etapontum .)
T h e ph ilosoph y o f th e A p h o rists consists o f u n p ro v e n and
u n argu ed aphorism s that o n e sh o u ld act in such an d su ch a
way, and they attem pt to p reserve the o th er th in gs [Pythag
oras] said as th ou gh they w ere d ivin e doctrines. T h e y d o not
claim to say an yth in g on th eir ow n b eh alf, n o r d o th ey think
that they o u g h t to say a n yth in g, bu t they ho ld that those o f
their n u m ber are best fitted fo r w isdom w ho possess the m ost
aphorism s.
A ll these so-called aphorism s a re d ivided in to th ree kinds:
som e o f them indicate w hat so an d so is, o th ers w hat is m ost
such and such, o th ers w hat o n e m ust o r m ust not do.
T h o se w hich indicate w hat so an d so is a re o f th e fo llo w in g
sort. W hat a re the Isles o f the Blessed? - T h e sun an d the
m oon. - W hat is the oracle at D elphi? - T h e tetractys, w hich is
the h arm ony in w hich th e Sirens sing.
W hat is m ost such and such: W h at is m ost ju st? - Sacrific
ing. - W hat is m ost wise? N u m b er (and secon d ly, w hat
assigned nam es to things). - W hat is m ost wise o f th e things
am ong us? - Medicine. - W hat is most fine? - H arm ony. - W hat
is most pow erful? - W isdom . W hat is most good? H ap
piness. - W hat is m ost tru ly said? - T h a t m en a re w retch ed . . .
T h e aphorism s in d icatin g w h at sh o u ld o r sh o u ld not be
d on e are o f the fo llo w in g sort. O n e m ust h ave ch ild ren (fo r
one m ust leave servants o f the god s in o n e s place); o n e m ust
p u t on o n es rig h t shoe first; o n e m ust not w alk a lo n g the
highw ays o r d ip things in th e fon ts o r wash in th e bath -h ouse
203

EARLY GREEK PH IL O SO P H Y

(fo r in all these cases it is u n clear w h eth er o n e s fellow s are


pure). A n d others such as: D o not help a n yon e to p u t dow n a
b u rd en (fo r o n e m ust not becom e a cause o f idleness), but help
him to take it up. D o not h ave in tercourse fo r the p u rp ose o f
sirin g ch ildren with a wom an w ho w ears gold . D o not speak in
the d ark. P ou r libations to the god s fro m n ear the hand le o f
the cu p fo r the sake o f the om en and so that no-one will
d rin k fro m the sam e place. D o not have an im age o f a god as
a seal on y o u r rin g lest it b e pollu ted ; fo r it is a likeness w hich
o n e sh ou ld set u p in o n e s h ouse. D o n o t prosecu te y o u r own
w ife; fo r she is a su pplian t (that is w hy at w edd in gs w om en are
led fro m the hearth and a re g ra sp ed by th e rig h t hand). Do
not sacrifice a w hite cockerel; fo r it is a su ppliant, sacred to the
M onth (which is w hy it signifies the hour). G ive no advice
w hich is not fo r the g oo d o f the receiver; fo r advice is sacred.
L ab o u r is g oo d : pleasu res o f every sort a re bad; fo r those who
h ave com e fo r pu n ish m en t m ust b e p u n ished. O n e should
sacrifice and ap p ro a ch the tem ples w ithout shoes. O n e m ust
not tu rn aside into a tem ple; fo r o n e m ust not treat the gods
as digressions. It is g oo d to stand fast, receive w ounds in the
fro n t, and so die: the op p o site is bad. H um an souls e n ter all
anim als e x cep t those w hich it is rig h t to sacrifice; that is why
on e m ust only eat those sacrificial anim als w hich it is p ro p er to
eat and no o th er anim al.
Som e o f the aphorism s a re o f this sort. B u t the m ost exp an s
ive o f them a re co n cern ed with sacrifices o n various occasions
a n d how they should be p e rfo rm e d , with the o th er ways o f
h o n o u rin g the god s, with o u r rem oval fro m this life, and with
burials an d how w e m ust be b u ried . In som e cases a reason is
a d d ed - fo r exam p le, that you m ust have ch ildren in o rd e r to
leave beh in d an o th e r servan t o f the god s in y o u r place. B u t
o th ers h ave n o reason a n n ex ed to them . O f th e additions,
som e will be th o u g h t to h ave been n atu rally attached, others
to be fa r-fetch ed - fo r exam p le, not to break bread because it
is disadvan tageou s with rega rd to th e ju d g e m e n t in H ades.
T h e con jectu ral explan ation s a d d ed to such aphorism s a re not
P yth ago rean bu t com e fro m certain outsiders w ho m ake soph
isticated attem pts to attach conjectu ral reasons to them . For
204

FIFTH-CENTURY PYTHAGOREANISM

exam p le, in the case ju s t m ention ed (why you m ust not break
bread), som e say that you shou ld not d ivide w hat b rin gs p eo p le
togeth er (in the old days, a fter the fo reig n fashion, all frien d s
cam e tog eth er o v e r a sin gle lo a f o f bread), o th ers that o n e
must not m ake such an om en at th e b eg in n in g by b rea k in g
and cru m b lin g it.
N ow all the aphorism s w hich deal with w hat to d o and w hat
not to d o focus on the divine, and that is th eir sou rce. T h e
whole o f their way o f life is o rd e re d with a view to fo llo w in g
god. T h is is th e rationale o f their philosoph y. F or th ey th in k
it absurd fo r m en to look fo r the g o o d fro m any so u rce o th e r
than the gods: it is as i f you w ere living in a m on arch y and paid
service to som e su bordin ate a m o n g the citizens, ig n o rin g the
ruler o f all - that, they think, is ju s t w hat m en actually do. F or
since god exists and is sovereign o ver everyth in g , it is clear that
on<?must ask fo r the g oo d from the so vereign ; fo r ev ery o n e
gives good things to those w hom they love an d in w hom they
delight, and the opposite to those to w hom they a re disposed
in the opposite way.
(lam blichus, On the Pythagorean Way o f Life 8 1-8 7 )
There are numerous other accounts o f the Pythagorean aphorisms, and
o f the modes o f behaviour which they accompanied. One o f the earliest
is in Herodotus:
[T h e Egyptians] d o not take w oollen th in gs into th eir tem ples
o r bury them with them : that is not holy. In this th ey a re in
agreem en t with those w ho a re called O rp h ics and P yth ago r
eans. F or it is not holy fo r o n e w ho partakes in these rites to
be buried in w oollen clothes. T h e r e is a sacred story told about
this.
(H ero do tus, Histories II 8 1)
lamblichus' main source is likely to have been Aristotle. We know that
Aristotle also wrote on Pythagorean dietary practices. There was an
ancient controversy over this issue. Here is one text on the subject:
A false opinion o f lo n g stan d in g has gain ed g ro u n d and
205

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY

increased in strength - the opin ion that Pythagoras the philo


so p h er d id not eat m eat and also abstained from beans (for
which th e G re e k is kuamoi). F ollow ing this o p in ion the poet
C allim ach u s w rote:
K e ep y o u r hands from beans, a p a in fu l fo o d :
so as P ythagoras en jo in ed 1 too u rge.
F ollow ing the sam e o p in ion C icero said th e fo llo w in g in the
first bo ok o f his On Divination:
,
So Plato bids us g o to bed with o u r bodies so com posed
that th ere is n o th in g w hich m ay m ake the m ind stray o r
be d isturbed . T h a t is why it is th o u g h t that the P yth agor
eans a re fo rb id d en to eat beans which cause considerable
flatu lence an d a re thus inim ical to those w ho seek peace
o f m ind.
T h u s C icero . B u t the m usical sch olar A ristoxen u s, an e x cee d
ingly ind u striou s rea d er o f old texts an d a pu pil o f A ristotle
the p h ilosop h er, says in his bo ok about P ythagoras that
P yth agoras ate no vegetable m ore freq u en d y than beans,
because they soothe an d gen tly relieve the bowels. T h e s e are
his very words:
P yth agoras esteem ed the bean above all o th er vegetables;
fo r h e said that it was both so o th in g and laxative - that is
w hy h e m ad e p a rticu lar use o f it.
T h e sam e A risto x en u s also reports that [Pythagoras] used to
eat su ck in g pigs and ten d er y o u n g kids. H e seem s to have
a cq u ired his in form ation fro m the P yth ago rean X en oph ilus,
w ho was his frien d , an d fro m certain o th er o ld e r m en who
w ere closer in tim e to P ythagoras. A lex is the poet, in his com
ed y The Pythagorean Woman, also m akes th e rem ark about
anim als.
T h e m istake about not eatin g beans seem s to have arisen
because in a p oem o f E m pedocles, w h o follow ed the teachings
o f P yth agoras, the fo llo w in g verse is fo u n d :
Wretches, utter wretches, keep your hands from beans. [31 141]
F or m ost p eo p le h ave su p p o sed that the w ord beans is bein g
used, as it n orm ally is, to r e fe r to the vegetable. B u t those who
have co n sidered E m p ed ocles poem s m ore closely and in a m ore
scholarly way assert that in this passage the w ord beans signifies
206

FIFTH-CENTURY PYTHACOREANISM

the testicles: they w ere called beans, covertly and sym bolically in
the P ythagorean style, because they are the cause o f p reg n a n cy
[the Greek, kuein, to be p reg n a n t, is fa n cifu lly co n n ected with
kuamos] and p ro v id e th e im petus to h u m an rep ro d u ctio n .
H ence in this verse E m ped ocles w anted to restrain p eo p le not
from eatin g beans bu t fro m sexual in d u lgen ce.
Plutarch, too, w ho has considerable au th o rity in scholarly
m atters, says in the first bo ok o f his On Homer th at A ristotle
w rote the very sam e about the P yth ago rean s nam ely, that
they d id not abstain fro m eatin g anim als (excep t fo r a few
sorts o f flesh). Since the point is su rp risin g I have w ritten o u t
P lutarchs ow n words:
A ristotle says that the P ythagorean s abstain fro m wom b,
heart, sea-nettle, and certain o th er things o f that sort, but
eat the rest.
(T h e sea-nettle is a sea crea tu re w hich w e call a sea-urchin.)
B ut in his Table Talk Plutarch says that th e P yth ago rean s also
abstain from m ullet.
(A u lu s G ellius, Attic Nights I V xi 1 - 1 3 )
Such practices were easily mocked. Several fourth-century comedies
like Alexis T h e P yth agorean W om an - ridiculed the Pythagorean
way o f life. Here are two samples.
A lexis in The Men from Tarentum:
- T h e P ythagorean s, o r so w e h ear,
eat no fish n o r an y th in g else
alive; and th eyre the o n ly ones w ho d o n t d rin k w ine.
- B ut E pich arides eats dogs,
and h es a P yth agorean . - A h , b u t h e kills them first
and then th eyre n o lo n g er alive.
A little fu rth e r on h e says:
Pythagorism s and fine
argu m ents an d close-ch op ped thou ghts
feed them . T h e ir d aily bread is this:
o n e plain lo a f each, and a cu p
o f water. T h a ts all. A prison
diet! D o all the wise m en
207

E A R L Y GREEK P H I L O S O P H Y

live like this an d s u ffe r such pains?


- N o: these a re lu x u rio u s co m p ared to oth ers. D o n t you
know
that M elan ipp id es is o n e o f th em , an d Phaon
and P h yrom achu s an d Phanos: they d in e
e very fo u r days on a sin gle cu p o f bran.
(A th enaeu s, Deipnosophists i 6 i b c )
In The Pythagorean [A ristoph on] says:
A s fo r g o in g h u n g ry and not eatin g anythin g,
im agin e you can see T ith ym a llu s o r Philippides.
F or d rin k in g w ater th ey re fro gs; fo r en jo y in g thym e
a n d vegetables, caterpillars; fo r not bein g w ashed,
cham ber-pots;
fo r stayin g o u t o f d oors all w inter, blackbirds;
fo r w ith stand in g the heat an d ch a tterin g a t noon,
cicadas; fo r not u sin g o r seein g olive oil,
d u st-d ou d s; fo r w alking ab o u t at daw n w ithout any shoes,
cranes; fo r not sleep in g at all, bats.
{ibid 238CD)
Among the Scientists or m ath em a tid are Hippasus and Philolaus,
who have chapters o f their own. Here I shall cite a few texts o f a more
general nature about the mathematical side o f Pythagorean philosophy.
The most important passage comes from Aristotle.
A t the sam e tim e as [L eu cip p u s an d D em ocritus] and earlier
than th em , th e so-called P yth ago rean s tou ch ed on m athem at
ics: th ey w e re the first to b rin g it fo rw a rd an d , h avin g been
b ro u g h t u p in it, to thin k that its prin ciples w ere the principles
o f all the things that exist. Since nu m bers a re by n atu re the first
o f these, and since they th o u g h t they o b served in num bers
m any sim ilarities to the things that exist and com e into bein g
(m ore so than in fire an d ea rth an d water) fo r exam p le, that
ju stice is such and such a m odification o f nu m bers, soul and
m ind such and such, o p p o rtu n ity so m eth in g else, an d so on
fo r p retty well ev ery th in g else (and they also saw that th e m odi
fications and ratios o f harm o n ies d ep en d on num bers): since,
208

FIFTH-CENTURY PYTHAGOREANISM

then, all oth er things a p p ea re d to have been m od elled o n n u m


bers in their nature, w hile n u m bers seem ed to be th e first
things in the w hole o f natu re, they su pposed that the elem ents
o f num bers w ere the elem ents o f all the thin gs that exist, an d
that the whole heaven was h arm o n y and n u m ber. E very th in g
in num bers and h arm onies that co h ered with th e p rop erties
and parts o f th e heavens and with the w hole o f th e created
w orld, they collected an d fitted together; an d i f th ere was any
th in g m issing a n yw h ere they ea gerly m ad e add itions so that
the w hole o f th eir th eo ry shou ld be con n ected . F o r exam p le,
since the n u m b er ten is th ou g h t to be p e rfe c t an d to in clu d e
the w hole n atu re o f nu m bers, they say that the bodies m ovin g
in the heavens a re ten in nu m ber; an d since o n ly n in e are
apparen t, fo r that reason th ey in ven t the co u n ter-earth as the
tenth.
I
have given a m ore detailed acco u n t o f these th in gs else
w here: h ere my aim is to g rasp in the case o f the P yth ago rean s
too what first principles they posit and how th ey fit into the
causes I have described. N ow they, too, evid en tly believe that
nu m ber is a first p rin cip le both as m atter fo r ex istin g things
and as th eir p rop erties and states; th ey hold that the elem ents
o f nu m ber are the even and the o d d , o n e o f these b ein g finite
and the o th er infinite; that th e n u m b er o n e d erives fro m both
elem ents (it is both even an d odd) and nu m bers d eriv e from
the nu m ber one; an d that the w hole heaven , as I h ave said, is
num bers.
O th er m em bers o f the sam e school say that th e princip les
are ten in num ber, and com e in co-ordin ate pairs: lim it infin
ite, odd - even , o n e - quantity, rig h t - left, m ale fem ale,
resting - m oving, straight cro o k ed , light d arkness, g o o d bad, square - o b lo n g . . . H ow [these principles] sh o u ld be
collected u n d er the types o f cause I have d escribed they d o not
clearly articulate. B u t they seem to ran ge th e elem ents u n d e r
the head o f m atter; fo r they say that th ey a re in h eren t in the
substances w hich a re co m posed an d fash ioned fro m them .
(A ristotle, Metaphysics 9 8 5b 23-g8 6a26, g 8 6b4 -8 )
Aristotle says that the Pythagoreans touched on mathematics. Later
209

EARLY CREEK PH ILOSOPHY

authors ascribe considerable mathematical achievements to them. For


example:
E u dem u s the Peripatetic ascribes to th e P ythagorean s the
d iscovery o f this th eorem (that ev ery trian gle has internal
an gles equ al to two rig h t angles), and he says that they p rove
th e prop osition in this w ay: L et be a trian gle, and let d e
be d raw n th ro u g h a parallel to . T h e n since and d e are
p arallel, the altern ate an gles a re equ al; so d a b is equ al to a b c
an d e a c to a c b . L et be a d d ed in com m on . T h e n angles
d a b , , c a e , i.e. an gles d a b , b a e , i.e. two rig h t angles, are
equ al to th e th ree an gles o f the triangles a b c . H ence the three
an gles o f the trian gle a re equ al to tw o rig h t angles.
(Proclus, Commentary on Euclid 3 79 .116)
The mast celebrated piece o f Pythagorean mathematics is the theorem
still known as Pythagoras theorem:
In a righ t-an gled trian gle, the sq u are on the h ypoten use is
equ al to the squares on the o th er two sides : i f we listen to those
w h o like to reco rd the ancien t history o f the subject we shall
find them ascribing this th eorem to P ythagoras and saying that
h e sacrificed an o x on its discovery.
(ibid 4 2 6 .1-9 )
The story is not generally believed; and indeed most scholars are now
inclined to think that the Pythagoreans contributed little to the technical
side o f mathematics.
According to Aristotle, they applied numbers to astronomy. In the
chapter on Philolaus we shall rediscover the counter-earth. Here, in
another extractfrom Aristotle, is the theory o f the M usic o f the Spheres:
It is clear fro m this that to say th at [the h eaven ly bodies] pro
d u c e a h a rm o n y as they m ove, th eir sou n d s b ein g concordant,
is a clev e r and in gen io u s th eo ry b u t is nevertheless untrue.
Som e th in k that w hen bodies o f such a size m ove they must
p ro d u ce a sou n d since this h ap p en s with bodies h ere even
th o u g h th ey a re not o f th e sam e m ag n itu d e an d d o not m ove
210

FIFTH-CENTURY

PYTHAGOREANISM

with such speed. W h en the sun and the m oon, and th e stars o f
such n u m b er and such size, m ove at sp eed , it is im possible
that they shou ld not p ro d u ce a sound o f im m en se m agnitu de.
Positing this, an d su p p o sin g that th eir speeds, ju d g in g by th eir
distances, have the ratios o f the concords, they say that as the
heavenly bodies m ove in a circle they p ro d u ce a co n co rd an t
sound. Since it seem s unreasonable that we d o not h ea r this
sound, they say that the cause lies in the fact that the noise is
with us from the m om en t o f o u r birth so that it can n ot be
distinguished by re feren ce to a co n trary silence (fo r so u n d and
silence a re d iscrim in ated by referen ce to one another). T h u s
m en are in the sam e case as blacksm iths w hom habit m akes
im pervious to the sound.
(A ristotle, On the Heavens 290b 12 -2 9 )
It is worth adding four further passages from Aristotle here, three
on cosmogony and one on the soul.
A ll those w ho a re th o u g h t to have m ad e a significant co n tri
bution to [natural ph ilosophy] h ave given som e acco u n t o f the
infinite, and all posit it as a sort o f first p rin cip le o f the things
that exist. Som e, like the P yth ago rean s and Plato, m ake it a
p rinciple in its ow n right, su p p o sin g that the infinite exists in
itself as a substance and not as an attribute o f so m eth in g else.
T h e P ythagoreans locate it am o n g p ercep tible objects (fo r they
d o not m ake num bers separate), and say that the sp ace outsid e
the heavens is infinite.
(A ristotle, Physics 203a 18)
T h e P ythagoreans too said that void exists, and that it en ters
the heavens fro m th e infinite breath, as th o u g h th e h eavens
actually inhale the void w hich d istin guishes n atural things and
is a sort o f separation an d distinction o f con tigu o u s things.
T h e y hold that this o ccu rs first a m o n g num bers; fo r the void
separates their natures.
{ibid 21 2227)
A ristotle in the fo u rth bo ok o f the Physics writes;

211

EARLY GREEK PH IL OSO P H Y

T h e P ythagorean s too said that void exists, and that it


en ters the h eavens fro m the infinite breath, as th ou gh the
h eavens inhale.
A n d in th e first b o ok o f On the Philosophy o f Pythagoras he writes
that th e heaven s a re o n e an d that fro m the infinite they take
in tim e an d b reath and void which distinguishes the places o f
each th in g fo r ever.
(Stobaeus, Anthology I x v i i i i c )
W h at the P ythagorean s say seem s to have the sam e m eaning.
F or som e o f them said that the m otes in the air are soul, others
that w hat m oves them is soul. W e h ave said how they can be
seen to m ove continu ously even if th ere is a co m plete calm.
(A ristotle, On the Soul 404316-20)
The Aphorists and the Scientists seem to approach one another in
the field o f number mysticism. Some Pythagoreans played the numbers
game in an extravagantly detailed form:
T h e y d id not even d ete rm in e in w hat way nu m bers causes
o f substances and o f th eir bein g. A r e th ey b ou n d aries (3 s
points a re o f m agnitudes)? - T h is is how E u rytu s d eterm ined
w hat was the n u m b er o f w hat (this the n u m b er o f m an, that
the n u m b er o f horse) - h e m od elled the shapes o f plsn ts with
p ebbles, ju s t as p eo p le a rra n g e nu m bers into squares and
oblongs.
(A ristotle, Metaphysics - ^ )
A t the centre o f the numerology was the tetrsctys or 'group o f four',
consisting o f the first fou r numbers, which together add up to ten. Ten
is the perfect number: it contains the important musical ratios, and it
can be arranged to form a perfect triangle:

The Pythagoreans allegedly swore


212

F I F T H - C E N T U R Y P Y T H A G O R E A N ISM

By him w ho h an d ed to o u r gen eratio n th e tetractys,


sou rce o f the roots o f ever-flo w in g nature.
(lam blichus, On the Pythagorean Way o f Life 162)

213

14
HIPPASUS
Hippasus was a Pythagorean. His birthplace is variously reported,
and our sources record no dates fo r him. It seems likely that he was
active in the middle o f the fifth century. H e was an unorthodox
Pythagorean, perhaps a rebel, and he is said to have been the first o f
the Pythagorean m athem atici or Scientists. Simplicius treats him as
a conventional Presocratic cosmogonist:
H ippasus o f M etapontu m and H eraclitus o f Ephesus also said
that [the universe] is u niqu e, in m otion, and finite; but they
m ad e the first prin ciple fire, an d they p ro d u ce the things that
exist from fire by cond en sation and rarefaction , and resolve
them into fire again, this b ein g the sin gle u n d erly in g nature.
(Sim plicius, Commentary on the Physics 23.33-24.4)
We are ill-informed about the more distinctively Pythagorean aspects
o f Hippasus' thought. Two stories are worth setting down, though
neither o f them deserves fu ll credence. First, Hippasus name is associ
ated with musical theory:
A certain H ippasus constructed fo u r bron ze discs in such a
way that they all had equal d iam eters but the thickness o f the
first was o n e and a th ird tim es that o f the secon d, o n e and a
h a lf tim es that o f the third, and twice that o f the fo u rth ; and
w hen they w ere struck they m ad e a concord.
(Scholium to Plato, Phaedo i o 8 d )
The story plainly means to ascribe to Hippasus the discovery o f the
fundamental musical ratios, 4:3, 3:2, and 2:1.
214

HIPPASUS

The second story concerns the alleged mathematical achievements o f


the Pythagoreans. I quote two short passages:
A bo u t H ippasus they say that he was o n e o f the P yth agorean s
but that because he was the first to publish an d con stru ct the
sphere o f the tw elve pen tagon s he d ie d a t sea as an im pious
m an. H e acquired the repu tation fo r d isco verin g it, a lth o u g h
everyth in g belongs to T h a t M an (that is how they r e fe r to
Pythagoras, n ever calling him by his nam e).
(lam blich us, On the Pythagorean Way o f Life 88)
Som e say that the divinity p u n ish ed those w ho m ad e P yth ago
ras views public. F or the m an w ho revealed the construction
o f the vigin tan gle perish ed at sea as an im pious m an. (T h e
vigintangle is the d o d eca h ed ro n , o n e o f the so-called five solid
figures, w hen it exten d s into a sp h ere.) O th ers said that it was
the m an w ho spoke ab o u t irrationality and in com m en sura
bility who su ffered this fate.
(ibid 247)
The dodecahedron is the fifth o f the five regular solids; it has twelve
faces, each o f which is a regular pentagon. The reference to irration
ality and incommensurability is again geometrical: the diameter o f a
square is irrational, or incommensurable with its sides; that is to say,
i f each side is one unit long, then there is no fraction o f the form n/m
which gives the length o f the diameter. Some scholars have supposed
that these two geometrical discoveries were indeed made by the Pythago
reans and had some philosophical importance for them; other scholars
are sceptical.

2*5

15
P HI L O L A U S
Philolaus was probably bom in Croton in the 4 70s. He was a Pythago
rean. When the Pythagorean school in Croton was destroyed and its
members dispersed, he retired to mainland Greece, spending some time
in Thebes. These events cannot be dated with any precision, but it is
clear that Philolaus flourished in the latter part o f the fifth century .
We possess several passages purporting to come from Philolaus'
writings. Many scholars have regarded all o f them as spurious: numer
ous Pythagorean forgeries were put together in the ancient world, o f
which many survive. Recently, however, there has been a swing in
scholarly opinion, and some at least o f the passages are widely thought
to be genuine. In this chapter I shall omit the texts which are uncontroversially spurious and include only those which the new consensus is
inclined to accept.
One o f Philolaus works was later called O n N atu re. The opening
sentence is preserved:

D em etrius in his Homonyms says that P hilolaus was the first o f


the P yth agorean s to publish an On Nature. It begins as follows:
Nature in the world was connected from things unlimited and
things limiting, both the whole world and everything in it. [44
l]

(D iogen es L aertius, Lives o f the Philosophers V I II 85)

[The Greek word here translated by 'unlimited is elsewhere given as


infinite. The contrast with limiters makes the variant translation
preferable.]
216

P H 1L O L A U S

Stobaeus transcribes a sequence o f passages which, despite the different


title, probably come from O n N atu re.
From Philolaus, On the World:
It is necessary that the things that exist should all be either
limiting or unlimited or both limiting and unlimited. But they
cannot be only unlimited. Now since it is evident that existing
things come neither from limiting things only norfrom unlimited
things only, it is thus clear that the world and the things in it were
connected together from both limiting and unlimited things. The
facts too make this clear: some o f them, coming from limiting
things, limit; some, coming from both limiting and unlimited
things, both limit and do not limit; some, coming from unlimited
things, are evidently unlimited, [ 2]
And all the things that are known have a number fo r without
this nothing could be thought o f or known, [ 4]
Now number has two proper forms, odd and even (and a third,
even-odd, mixed from both); and o f each form there are many
shapes which each thing in itself signifies, [ 5]
On nature and connection, matters stand thus: the essence o f
things, being eternal, and nature itself admit o f divine and not
o f human knowledge except that it was not possible that any o f
the things which exist and are known by us should have come into
being unless there subsisted the essence o f the things from which
the universe was constituted, both the limiting things and the
unlimited things. And since the subsisting principles were neither
similar nor homogeneous, it would therefore have been impossible
fo r them to have been arranged had not a connection supervened
(in whatever way it may have done so). Now similar and homo
geneous things had no need at all o f a connection; but things
dissimilar and neither homogeneous nor equally matched must
necessarily be linked by a connection i f they are to be held together
in the world, [ 6a]
The magnitude o f a scale is a fourth and a fifth. A fifth is
greater than a fourth by a lone; fo r from the top to the middle is
a fourth, from the middle to the bottom a fifth, from the bottom to
the third a fourth, from the third to the top a fifth; and between
middle and third there is a tone. A fourth is 3:4, a fifth 2:3, an
217

EARLY GREEK P H IL O S O P H Y

octave i :2. Thus the scale is five tones and two semi-tones, a fifth
is three tones and a semi-tone, a fourth is two tones and a semi
tone. [ 6b]
The first thing to have been connected, the one, in the middle
o f the sphere is called the hearth, [ 7]
(Stobaeus, Anthology I xxi 7-8 )
The arithmetical remarks in 4 and 5 fin d echoes in the following
reports:
Plato teaches us m any rem arkab le d octrin es about the gods
by m eans o f m athem atical form s, and th e ph ilosoph y o f the
P yth ago rean s uses these h an gin gs to conceal the m ysteries o f
its d ivin e dbctrines. F or that is the case th ro u g h o u t the Sacred
Discourse, in Philolaus Bacchae, and in the w hole o f Pythagoras
tea ch in g a b o u t the gods.
(Proclus, Commentary on Euclid 2 2 .9 -16 )
A ll th e so-called m athem atical sciences a re like sm ooth flat
m irrors in w hich traces and im ages o f intelligible truth are
reflected . B u t it is above all g eo m etry w hich, a cco rd in g to
Philolaus, bein g the o rig in and native city o f the others, turns
an d elevates the m ind w hich is p u rifie d and gen tly released
fro m p erception .
(Plutarch, Table Talk 718E)
T h e P yth ago rean s say that reason [is the stand ard o f truth] not reason in g en era l, bu t m athem atical reason, as Philolaus
too used to say, w hich, inasm uch as it considers the n atu re o f
th e universe, has a certain a ffin ity to it (fo r like is naturally
a p p re h e n d e d by like).
(Sextus E m piricus, Against the Mathematicians V I I 92)
E lsew h ere th ere will be occasion to in qu ire fu rth e r how , when
n u m bers a re serially sq u ared , no less plausible results follow by n a tu re and not by con ven tion , as Philolaus says.
(Iam blichus, Commentary on Nicomachus Introduction to
Arithmetic 19 .2 1-2 5 )
218

P H 1L O L A U S

A m o n g the P ythagorean s w e shall find d iffe r e n t an gles


assigned to d iffe re n t gods. T h u s Philolaus m ade the a n g le o f
a triangle sacred to som e, that o f a square to others, an d so on,
assigning the sam e an gle to d iffe re n t god s and d iffe r e n t angles
to the sam e god s acco rd in g to th eir d iffe re n t pow ers.
(Proclus, Commentary on Euclid 130.814)
Philolaus, too, plausibly assigned the a n g le o f a trian gle to fo u r
gods - C ron u s, H ades, A res and D ionysus, since h e includes
in their scope the en tire fo u rfo ld o rd e rin g o f the elem ents
above, w h ether they d eriv e fro m the h eavens o r fro m the fo u r
segm ents o f the zodiac. F or C ro n u s provid es all th e m oist cold
substances, A res all the fiery natures, w hile H ad es conserves
the whole o f earth y life and D ionysus supervises m oist w arm
creation (o f which wine, bein g moist an d w arm , is a sym bol).
A ll these are distinct with rega rd to th eir secon d ary actions,
but they a re united with o n e an other. T h a t is w hy Philolaus
brings them to unity u n d er a sin gle angle.
{ibid 1 6 7 .1 -1 4 )
There are a few further fragments:
M agnitude is divisible to infinity bu t only finitely exten d ible;
plurality, on the o th er h and , is exten d ib le to infinity bu t only
finitely divisible - th ou gh by n atu re, as fa r as th eir concepts
are con cern ed , both are infinite and th e re fo re n o t cap able o f
bein g scientifically a p p reh en d ed . F or
there will be nothing that can have any knowledge at all i f all
things are unlimited, [ 3]
as Philolaus says.
(lam blichus, Commentary on Nicomachus Introduction to
Arithmetic 7 .18 25)
Philolaus Bacchae:
The world is one. It began to come into being from the middle,
and from the middle upwards and downwards in the same way;
and what is above the middle is the opposite way about from what

219

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY

is below. For to those below the lowest part is like the highest, and
so on; fo r each has the same relation to the middle, except that
they are reversed, [ i 7]
(Stobaeus, Anthology I x v 7)

Compare here the notion o f the counter-earth, which has already


appeared in Chapter /3:

P hilolaus the P yth ago rean says that fire is cen tral (fo r this is
the h earth o f th e universe), the co u n ter-earth second, and
th ird the earth we inhabit, w hich is located and orbits opposite
the co u n ter-earth (that is w hy the p eo p le on that earth are not
seen by those o n this one).
([Plutarch], On the Scientific Beliefs o f the Philosophers 895E)

Philolaus also had something to say on biological matters. In


addition to a short fragment it is worth offering two paraphrastic
reports.

T h e r e are fo u r first principles o f rational anim als, as Philolaus


says in his On Nature - brain , h eart, navel, genitals:
Head o f thought, heart o f soul and perception, navel o f rooting
and first growth, genitals o f depositing o f seed and generation.
Brain signifies the first principle o f man, heart that o f animal,
navel that o f plant, genitals that o f all together (for all shoot and
sprout from seed), [ 13]
([Iam blichus], Theological Arithmetic 2 5 .17 -2 6 .3 )

In g en era l [the Pythagoreans] thin k that w ell-being and jo y


d ep e n d on health, and they d e n y that health d ep en d s eith er
on w ell-being o r on jo y . Som e o f them Philolaus included actually called the tetractys, their m ost solem n oath, w hich they
th in k com pletes the p erfect n u m ber, the first princip le o f
health.
(Lucian, On Falling Down While Addressing People 9)
220

PHILOLAUS

Philolaus o f C ro to n says that o u r bodies a re co m p o u n d e d


from heat. F or th ey have n o sh are in coldness, as h e arg u es
from such considerations as these. Sem en is hot, a n d it is w hat
constitutes < a n im a ls > ; the place into w hich sem en is
d eposited, i.e. < th e w o m b > , is h o tter an d sim ilar to it; < w h a t
is sim ilar to so m eth in g has th e sam e p o w er as w hat it is sim ilar
to > ; but since what constitutes anim als has no sh are in co ld
ness and the place in which < it is d e p o site d > has n o sh are in
coldness, clearly the anim al that is b ein g con sdtu ted will also
be o f the sam e sort. T o establish this he uses th e fo llo w in g
argu m ent: im m ediately a fte r birth the anim al d raw s in the
extern al air, which is cold , and then exp els it as th o u g h p ayin g
o f f a debt. N ow it desires the ex tern a l air in o rd e r that, by
d raw in g in breath from outside, its b o d y, w hich is hotter,
should be cooled by it. T h e constitution o f o u r bodies, he says,
d ep en d s on these things.
H e says that diseases o ccu r becau se o f bile an d blood and
p h legm , and that these a re the first p rin cip le o f diseases. H e
says that blood is tu rn ed thick w hen th e flesh is com pressed
internally, and that it becom es thin w h en the vessels in the
flesh a re en larged . H e says that p h legm is co m p o u n d ed fro m
u rine. H e says that bile is a d isch arge fro m th e flesh. < T h e
sam e> m an m akes a p arad oxical rem ark on this subject: he
says that bile is not fo u n d n ear th e liver and yet th at it is a
d isch arge o f the flesh. A n d again, w hile m ost say that p h legm
< is c o ld > , h e supposes that it is by n atu re hot. F or it is called
p h legm from the verb phlegein [to b u rn ], an d h en ce inflam in g
agents inflam e by sh arin g in p h legm . T h e s e he su pposes a re
the first p rinciples o f diseases; co n trib u to ry causes a re excesses
o f heat o r fo o d o r co o lin g an d d eficiencies < o f these o r > o f
things like them .
(A nonym u s L on din ensis, Medical Writings X V I I I 8 - X I X 1)
Finally there are two passages, o f different purpose, which bear on
ethics.
It is w orth reco rd in g P hilolaus w ords; fo r the P yth ago rean
says this:
221

EARLY GREEK P H IL O S O P H Y

The old theologians and prophets testify that the soul has been
yoked to the body as a punishment and that it is buried in it as
though in a tomb, [ 14]
(C lem ent, Miscellanies III iii 17.1)
C ertain th o u g h ts and feelin gs - o r else th e actions based on
such th ou gh ts and feelin gs - a re not in o u r po w er, but, as
Philolaus said, som e reasons a re too stron g fo r us.
(A ristotle , Eudemian Ethics 1225330-33)

222

16
ION OF CHI OS
Ion, son o f Orchomenes, came from the Aegean island o f Chios, but he
spent much o f his life in Athens where he was a friend o f many leading
political and literary figures. H e was bom in about 485 and died
in about 425. In his lifetime he was celebrated as a poet and a drama
tist, his first tragedy being produced at Athens in about 450.
Ion has already been quoted in connection with Pythagoras, but he
deserves a brief chapter o f his own.
H e com posed m an y poem s an d traged ies an d also a ph ilo
sophical treatise en titled Triad. C allim achu s says th at its
auth orsh ip is d ispu ted, and in som e copies it is en titled Triads,
in the plu ral (accord ing to D em etrius o f Scepsis an d A p o llo n ides o f Nicaea). In it h e w rites thus:
This is the beginning o f my account: all things are three, and
there is nothing more or less than these three things. O f each
one thing the excellence is threefold: intelligence and power and
fortune. [36 l]
(H arp ocratio n , Lexicon s.v. Ion)
We have at most one other piece o f information about Ions philosophi
cal thought. Plutarch may well be referring to the T r ia d when he
reports that
Ion the poet, in the w ork he w ro te w ithout m etre and in prose,
says that fo rtu n e, alth o u gh a th in g m ost dissim ilar to wisdom ,
p rod u ces very sim ilar results.
(Plutarch, On the Fortune o f the Romans 3 1 6 D )

223

17
HIPPO
Hippos dates are unknown; hut he was lampooned by the comic poet
Cratinus in the 42 os and was therefore presumably active in the latter
part o f the fifth century. Cratinus attacked him fo r impiety, and at
same point he won the epithet atheist. Aristotle regarded him as a
tawdry thinker: O n e w ould not p rop ose to place H ip p o am ong
these m en because o f the p o verty o f his th o u g h t (Metaphysics
98433). But a fragment o f his work survives, and he deserves a page
or two.
Simplicius gives a brief report o f Hippos view on the under
lying nature o f things:
O f those w ho say that the first p rin cip le is o n e and in m otion
([Aristotle] calls them n atural scientists in the n arrow sense),
som e assert that it is finite. T h u s T h a le s, son o f Exam yes, a
M ilesian, and H ip p o, w ho is actuslly th o u g h t to have been an
atheist, said that the first p rin cip le is w ater. T h e y w ere led
to this view by the evid en ce o f p ercep tio n . F or heat lives by
m oisture, d y in g things d ry up, th e seeds o f all things are moist,
and all fo o d is ju ic y (each th in g is n aturally nou rish ed by that
fro m w hich it is constituted). B u t w ster is the first principle o f
nstu rai m oisture sn d conserves all m oist things. T h a t is why
th ey su p posed th st w ater was the first p rin cip le o f everyth in g
and d eclared that the earth rests on water.
(Sim plicius, Commentary on the Physics 23.2 1-2 9 )
Hippo seems to have written at some length on biological matters, and
his biological speculations had some connection with his view o f the
first principle o f things. Here is one extract:
224

HIPPO

H ip p o o f C ro to n thinks that th ere is an a p p ro p ria te m oist


ure in us in virtue o f w hich we perceive an d by w hich w e live.
W hen this m oisture is in an a p p ro p ria te con d ition , th e anim al
is healthy; when it d ries up, the anim al ceases to p erceiv e and
dies. T h a t is w hy old m en are d ry and have w eak p ercep tio n
because they lack m oisture. In the sam e way the soles o f the
feet d o not have any perceptio n because th ey h ave n o sh are o f
m oisture. T h a t is as fa r as he goes on these points.
In an o th er bo ok the sam e m an says that w hat h e calls m oist
ure ch anges th ro u g h excess o f heat and excess o f cold an d in
this way introduces diseases. H e says that it ch a n g es eith e r to
bein g m ore m oist o r to bein g d rie r o r to b ein g th icker tex tu red
o r to bein g th in n er tex tu red o r in o th er directions. T h is is how
he explain s diseases - bu t he d oes not nam e the diseases w hich
com e about.
(A nonym u s L on din ensis, Medical Writings X I 2 2 -4 2 )
The surviving fragment is preserved in a scholium or note in the
Geneva manuscript o f Homers Iliad. Homer refers to 'Ocean, from
which flow all rivers and all seas and all springs and the deep wells.
The scholium quotes the opinion o f the scholar Crates on these lines:
T h e n in the third book [o f his Homeric Studies, Crates] says that
the later natural scientists also a g reed that the w ater w hich
su rrou nd s the earth fo r m ost o f its exten t is O cea n , and that
fresh water com es from this. H ippo:
A ll drinking waters come from the sea. For the wells from, which
we drink are surely not deeper than the sea is. I f they were, the
water would come not from the sea but from somewhere else. But
in fact the sea is deeper than the waters. Now all waters that are
higher than the sea come from the sea. [38 l]
H om er said the sam e as this.
(G en eva scholium on H o m er, Iliad X X I 195)

225

18
ANAXAGORAS
Anaxagoras was bom in Clazomenae on the coast o f Asia Minor in
about 500 . H e spent much o f his life in Athens, where he was
associated with Pericles, the leading statesman o f the age, and with
Euripides, the writer o f tragedies. The dates o f his stay in Athens are
disputed: it is perhaps most probable that he came to the city in 480
and remained there until about 430 when he was tried on trumped up
charges and condemned. H e fled Athens and settled in Lampsacus in
the Troad where he died, an honoured guest, in 428.
Anaxagoras is said to have written only one book, which appears to
have offered a complete account o f the natural world on the old Mile
sian model. H e was called a follower o f Anaximenes, and there can be
little doubt that he was attempting to revive, in the post-Parmenidean
period, the enterprise which the Milesians had carried out in the age
o f intellectual innocence.
The surviving fragments o f Anaxagoras book deal almost exclus
ively with the most general and abstract part o f his thought. Anaxago
ras universe began as an undifferentiated mass o f stuff. M ind then
worked on the mass, and the articulated world developed. Anaxagoras'
stuffs are continuous, not particulate. The cosmic development does
not, and cannot, produce any pure stuffs - every stu ff always contains
a portion or share, however small, o f every other stuff. Such is the
general conception o f things which the fragments convey. They can be
supplemented from the doxography, which gives cursory information
about Anaxagoras more particular scientific theories.
Simplicius is again our chief source. Most o f what currently pass as
fragments o f Anaxagoras are modem reconstructions based on distinct
passages in Simplicius. Here the fragments are presented in the
226

ANAXAGORAS

disjointed form in which they are preserved. This introduces some


repetitiveness, but it gives a proper picture o f the evidence.
In the first book o f th e Physics A n a x a g o ra s says that u n ifo rm
stu ffs, infinite in qu antity, separate o f f fro m a sin gle m ixtu re,
all things b ein g p resen t in all and each b ein g ch a racterized by
what predom inates. H e m akes this clea r in th e first b o o k o f
the Physics at the b eg in n in g o f w hich he says:
Together were all things, infinite both in quantity and in small
ness fo r the small too was infinite. A nd when all things were
together, none was patent by reason o f smallness; fo r air and ether
covered all things, being both infinite fo r in all things these are
the greatest both in quantity and in size. [59 l ]
A n d a litde later:
For air and ether are separating o ff from the surrounding mass.
And what surrounds is infinite in quantity, [ 2]
A n d a little later:
This being so, one should believe that in everything that is combin
ing there are present many things o f every sort and seeds o f all
things having all kinds o f shapes and colours and savours, [cf
4a]
But before they separated off, he says, when all things were
together, not even any colour was patent; fo r this was prevented
by the commixture o f all things o f the wet and the dry and the
hot and the cold and the bright and the dark and much earth
present therein and seeds, infinite in quantity, in no way like one
another. For o f the other things too, none is like any other, [ 4b]
H e m akes it clear that n o n e o f the u n ifo rm stu ffs co m e into
bein g o r is d estroyed but that they a re alw ays th e sam e:
These things being thus dissociated, one should recognize that all
things are neither fewer nor more numerous. For it is impossible
fo r them to be more numerous than all, but all are always equal.
[ 5]
So m uch fo r the m ixtu re and the u n ifo rm stu ffs. O n m ind
he has written as follows:
M ind is something infinite and self-controlling, and it has been
mixed with no thing but is alone itself by itself. For i f it were not
by itself but had been mixed with some other thing, it would share
227

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY

in all things, i f it had been mixed with any. For in everything


there is present a share o f everything, as I have said earlier,
and the things commingled with it would have prevented it from
controlling anything in the way in which it does when it is actually
alone by itself. For it is the finest o f all things and the purest, and
it possesses all knowledge about everything, and it has the greatest
strength. And mind controls all those things, both great and small,
which possess soul. And mind controlled the whole revolution, so
that it revolved in the first place. And first it began to revolve in
a small area, and it is revolving more widely, and it will revolve
yet more widely. A nd mind recognizes all the things which are
commingling and separating o ff and dissociating. And mind
arranged everything what was to be and what was and what
now is and what will be - and also this revolution in which revolve
the stars and the sun and the moon and the air and the ether
which are separating o ff But the revolution itself made them
separate them off. A nd the dense is separating o ff from the rare,
and the hot from the cold, and the bright from the dark, and the
dry from the wet. And there are many shares o f many things, but
nothing completely separates o ff or dissociates one from another
except mind. A ll mind, both great and small, is alike. Nothing
else is alike, but each single thing is and was most patently those
things o f which it contains most, [ 1 2]
T h a t h e su pposes a tw o-fold w orld , o n e intelligible and the
o th er (derivative fro m it) percep tible, is clear both from what
w e have a lread y cited an d fro m th e follow ing:
M ind, *which always exists, now assuredly* is where all the other
things also are in the surrounding mass and in the things that
have associated and in the things that have separated off. [ 14]
N ow h a vin g said that:
There are present in everything that is combining many things o f
every sort and seeds o f all things having all kinds o f shapes and
colours and savours, and m en were compacted and the other
animals that possess soul,
h e continues:
and the m en possess inhabited cities and constructed goods, as
xvith us, and there is a sun present among them and a moon and
the rest, as with us, and the earth grows many things o f every sort
228

ANAXAGORAS

for them, the most useful o f which they gather into their houses
and use. [ 4a]
T h e p hrase as with us, w hich h e uses m ore th an o n ce, shows
that he is hinting at a n o th e r w orld ap art fro m o urs. H e does
not think that it is p ercep tib le and ea rlier than o u rs in tim e, as
is shown by the sen ten ce the m ost u seful o f w hich th ey g ath er
into their houses an d use fo r he said use, n o t u se d . N o r is
he re ferrin g to a presen t state o f affa irs sim ilar to o u rs with
o th er houses, fo r h e said n ot the sun and th e m oon are p resen t
to them as th ey a re to us, bu t a sun and a m oon, as with us,
as th ou gh h e m eant a d iffe re n t su n an d m oon. B u t w h eth er
that is so o r not d em an ds fu rth e r en qu iry.
(Sim plicius, Commentary on the Physics 1 5 5 .2 1 -1 5 7 .2 4 )
A t the very beg in n in g o f his bo ok [A n axagoras] says that things
w ere infinite:
Together were all things, infinite both in quantity and in small
ness. [c f l]
A m o n g the principles th ere is n eith er a sm allest n o r a largest:
For o f the small, he says, there is no smallest, but there is always
a smaller. For what is cannot not be. And again o f the large there
is always a larger, and it is equal to the small in quantity. B ut in
relation to itself each thing is both large and small, [ 3]
For i f everyth in g is in e v ery th in g an d e v ery th in g separates o f f
from everyth in g, then fro m w hat is taken to be th e sm allest
thin g som ethin g sm aller will be separated o ff, an d w h at is
taken to be the largest has been separated o f f fro m so m eth in g
larger than itself. H e says clearly that:
In everything there is present a share o f everything except m ind
and in some things mind too is present, [ 11 ]
A n d again:
Other things possess a share o f everything, but mind is something
infinite and self-controlling, and it has been mixed with no thing.

[cf 12]
Elsew here he puts it like this:
Now since there are equal shares o f the great and o f the small in
quantity, for this reason too all things will be in everything; nor
can they be separate, but all things possess a share o f everything.
229

EARLY GREEK PH ILOSO PHY

Since there cannot be a smallest, things cannot be separated or


come to be by themselves, but as they were in the beginning so too
now are all things together. In all things there are many even o f
the things that are separating off, equal in quantity in the larger
and smaller, [ 6]
A n a x a g o ra s also stipulates that each o f th e perceptible uni
fo rm stu ffs com es about and is ch aracterized in virtue o f the
com position o f sim ilars. F or he says:
But each single thing is and was most patently those things o f
which it contains most, [cf 12]
H e seem s, too, to say that m ind attem pts to dissociate them but
can n ot d o so.
(Sim plicius, Commentary on the Physics 16 4 .14 -1 6 5 .5 )
A n a x a go ras says at th e b eg in n in g o f his treatise:
Together were all things, infinite both in quantity and in small
ness fo r the small too was infinite. And when all things were
together, none was patent by reason o f smallness, [cf l]
And:
One should believe that all things were present in the whole, [cf
4b]
P erh aps by in fin ite h e m eans w h at is u n grasp ab le and
u n k n ow ab le to us; fo r this is ind icated by th e phrase
so that we do not know the quantity either in word or in deed o f
the things that are separating off. [ 7]
(T h a t he th o u g h t them lim ited inform h e m akes clear by saying
that m ind know s th em all.)
(Sim plicius, Commentary on On the Heavens 60 8.21-28 )
[Aristotle] was n o t r e fe rrin g to A n a x a g o ra s, a cco rd in g to A le x
a n d er, even th o u g h A n a x a g o ra s placed m ind a m o n g th e first
principles - p erh ap s, h e says, becau se h e m akes no use o f it in
g en era tin g things. B u t it is plain that he does use it, since he
says that gen era tio n is n o th in g b u t sep aratin g o ut, that separat
in g o u t com es about by m otion, an d that m ind is responsible
fo r th e m otion. F or this is w hat A n a x a g o ra s says:
A nd when mind began to move things, things were separating o ff
from everything that was being moved, and everything that mind
230

ANAXAGORAS

moved was dissociated. A nd as they were moving and dissociating,


the revolution made them dissociate fa r more, [ 13]
[Aristotle] d id not m en tion A n a x a go ras because A n a x a g o ra s
d id not m ake m ind an en m attered form (which is w hat he is
investigating here) bu t a cause o f dissociation an d a rra n g e
m ent, sep arate fro m the things that a re b e in g a rra n g ed and
b elo n g in g to a d iffe r e n t o rd e r from the thin gs bein g a rra n g e d .
For
M ind, he says, is something infinite and self-controlling, and it
has been mixed with no thing, but is alone itself by itself, [cf 12]
A n d he ad d s the reason fo r this. P erhaps this is an o th e r reason
why [A ristotle] d id not m ention A n a x a g o ra s - that his m ind
seem s not to m ake the fo rm s but to dissociate them w h en th ey
exist.
(Sim plicius, Commentary on the Physics 3 0 0 .2 7-3 0 x.10 )
A n axago ras o f C lazo m en ae seem s to have co n ceived o f all
the form s in th ree d iffe r e n t ways. First, they a re g ath ered
togeth er in an intelligible unity - as w h en he says:
Together were all things, infinite both in quantity and in small
ness. [cf x]
A n d again he says:
But before these things separated off, when all things were
together, not even any colour was patent; fo r this was prevented
by the commixture o f all things o f the wet and the dry and the
hot and the cold and the bright and the dark and much earth
present therein and seeds, infinite in quantity, in no way like one
another. This being so, one should believe that all things were
present in the whole, [ 4b]
(A nd this totality will be th e o n e existin g th in g o f Parm enides.)
Secondly, h e con ceived o f them in an intellectual d is
sociation on w hich the dissociation about us has been m od
elled. For in the first b o o k o f On Nature, shortly a fte r the
beginn in g, A n a x a g o ra s says this:
This being so, one should believe that in everything that is combin
ing there are present many things o f every sort and seeds o f all
things having all kinds o f shapes and colours and savours, and
men were compacted and the other animals that possess soul. And
231

EA RLY GREEK P H IL O S O P H Y

the m en possess inhabited cities and constructed goods, as with


us and they have a sun and a moon and the rest, as with us, and
the earth grows many things o f every sort fo r them, the most use
f u l o f which they gather into their houses and use. ThisI have said
about the separating off, because it will not have occurred with
us only but also elsewhere, [ 4a]
T o som e h e will no d o u b t seem not to be contrastin g a gen erat
ive dissociation with an intellectual o n e b u t to be co m p arin g
o u r habitation to o th er places o n th e earth. B u t he w ould not
h ave said o f o th e r places that they h ave a sun and a m oon and
th e rest, as with us, n o r w ould h e have called the things there
seeds o f all th in gs an d shapes. C o n sid er w hat he says a little
later on w hen he com pares the two:
5 these things thus revolve and are separating o ff by force and
speed (the speed produces the force), their speed is similar in speed
to none o f the things that now exist among men, but is certainly
many times faster, [ 9]
A n d i f this is his con ception , he holds that all things a re in all
things first in respect o f intelligible unity, secon dly in respect
o f intellectual consubstantiality, an d th ird ly in respect o f p er
ceptible conjunction s and th eir g en eratio n s and dissolutions.
(Sim plicius, Commentary on the Physics 3 4 .18 -3 5 .2 1)
W h en A n a x a g o ra s says:
One thing neither separates o ff nor dissociates from another [cf
12]
because e v ery th in g is in ev eryth in g , an d elsew here:
They have not been cut o ff by an axe, neither the hot from the cold
nor the cold from the hot [ 8]
(fo r th ere is n o th in g p u re by itself), this, says A ristotle, is not
based on kn ow led ge.
(ibid 1 7 5 .1 1 - 1 5 )
In th e first b o o k o f the Physics A n a x a g o ra s plainly says that
g en eratio n and destruction a re com bination and dissociation.
T h is is w hat he writes:
The Greeks do not have a correct notion o f generation and
destruction; fo r no things are generated or destroyed, but they are
232

ANAXAGORAS

commingled, and dissociated from things that exist. A nd fo r this


reason they would be correct to call generation commingling and
destruction dissociation, [ 17]
A ll this - that to g eth er w ere all things and that g en eratio n
takes place in virtue o f alteration (or com bination an d dis
sociation) - was assum ed in o rd e r to en su re that n o th in g com es
into bein g from w h at does not exist.
(ibid 16 3 .18 -2 6 )
Perhaps A n a x a go ras posited the co m p ou n d s, an d n o t the
sim ple and origin al qualities as elem ents w hen he said:
But the revolution itself made them separate off. And the dense is
separating o ff from the rare, and the cold from the hot, and the
bright from the dark, and the dry from the wet. [c f 12]
A n d a little later he says:
The dense and the wet and the cold and the dark congregated here
where now is the earth, and the rare and the hot and the dry and
the bright moved out to the farther part o f the ether, [ 15]
A n d he says that these o rigin al an d very sim ple things are
separatin g o ff, and he says that o th er things, m o re co m p o u n d
than these, som etim es b ecom e com pacted like co m p o u n d s and
som etim es separate o f f like the earth. F or he says:
In this way from these as they separate o ff earth is compacted; for
water is separated o ff from the chuds, earth from the water, and
stones are compacted from the earth by the cold, [cf 16]
(ibid 17 8 .3 3 -17 9 .1 0 )
Perhaps all the opposites a re actually in th e elem ents, i f the
elem ents a re first principles, bu t not d irectly (as in the case o f
uniform stuffs). For sw eet and bitter, e .g ., on the hypothesis
o f the elem ents d o not in h ere prim arily in th e elem ents, but
on the hypothesis o f un ifo rm stu ffs they in h ere p rim arily and
in th eir ow n righ t - as d o th e co lo u r opposites. O r p erh ap s
even in the case o f u n ifo rm stu ffs som e opposites a re p rio r to
others, the secon d ary on es in h erin g because o f th e p rim ary
ones. A t any rate, A n a x a g o ra s says in th e first bo ok o f his
Physics:
For water is separated o ff from the clouds, earth from the water,
233

EARLY GREEK PH IL OSO P H Y

and stones are compacted from the earth by the cold. And these
move out further than the water, [c f 16]
(Sim plicius, Commentary on the Physics 15 5 .13 -2 3 )
Some scholars have found a further fragment in the following text:
A n a x a g o ra s hit u pon the old d octrin e that n o th in g com es into
b ein g fro m w hat is not, an d d id aw ay with gen eratio n , intro
d u c in g d issociation in its place. F or he said that all things have
been m ixed with o n e a n o th e r and that as they g ro w they dis
sociate. F o r in the sam e seed th ere a re hairs and nails an d veins
an d arteries an d ten d on s and bones, an d they a re invisible
because o f the sm allness o f th eir parts; but as they gro w they
gra d u a lly dissociate. F or how , h e says, cou ld h air com e into
bein g fro m w hat is not hair, o r flesh fro m w hat is not flesh?
[ 10] A n d he says this not o n ly o f bodies but also o f colours;
fo r black is p resen t in w hite and w hite in black. A n d he posited
the sam e fo r w eights, b elievin g that the ligh t was com m ingled
with th e heavy an d vice versa. A ll this is false - fo r how can
op posites co-exist?
(Scholiast to G re g o ry o f N azianzus [Patrologia Graeca
X X X V I 9 11 BC])
In fact, the only author apart from Simplicius who preserves any o f
Anaxagoras words is Sextus Empiricus.
T h e d istin gu ish ed natural scientist A n a x a g o ras, attacking the
senses fo r th eir w eakness, says:
We are not capable o f discerning the truth by reason o f their
feebleness, [ 21]
an d h e o ffe r s as a p r o o f o f th eir u ntrustw orthiness the gradual
ch a n g e o f colours. F or i f we take tw o colours, black an d white,
an d then p o u r fro m o n e to the o th e r d ro p by d ro p , o u r sight
will not be able to d iscrim in ate th e g ra d u a l chan ges even
th o u g h th ey exist in nature.
(Sextus E m piricus, Against the Mathematicians V I I 90)
D iotim us said that [D em ocritus] su pposed th ree standards: fo r

234

ANAXAGORAS

the ap p reh en sion o f w hat is u n clear the stan d ard is the a p p a r


ent; fo r
what appears is the sight o f what is unclear, [ 2 1 a]
as A n a x a go ras says - an d D em ocritus praised him fo r this.
(ibid. V I 1 140)
One o f the most celebrated parts o f Anaxagoras' philosophy was his
conception o f the controlling power o f mind in the universe. According
to Aristotle,
som eone said that ju s t as in anim als so in n atu re m ind is p re
sent and responsible fo r th e w orld and its w h ole o rd erin g : he
a p p eared as a sober m an co m p ared to his p red ecessors w h o
spoke at random .
(A ristotle, Metaphysics 984b 1518)
Socrates had the same view when he first read Anaxagoras book:
I on ce heard som eone rea d in g fro m a bo ok o f A n a x a g o ra s
and saying that it is m ind w hich arran g es an d is responsible
fo r everyth in g. T h is exp lan atio n d elig h te d m e an d it seem ed
to m e som ehow to be a goo d th in g that m ind was responsible
fo r everyth in g - I th o u g h t that in that case m ind, in a rra n g in g
things, w ould a rra n g e them all, an d place each, in th e best way
possible. So i f an yon e w anted to d isco ver the exp lan atio n o f
anyth in g - why it com es into bein g o r perish es o r exists - h e
would have to d isco ver how it is best fo r it to be o r to be acted
u pon o r to act . . . N ow , m y frien d , this sp len d id h o p e was
d ashed; fo r as I co ntinu ed rea d in g 1 saw that the m an d id n t
use his m ind at all - he d id n t ascribe to it any exp lan atio n s fo r
the a rra n g in g o f things but fo u n d exp lan atio n s in air and e th er
and w ater and m any o th er absurdities.
^
(Plato, Phaedo 97 , 98 )
S ocrates' disappointment was echoed later by A ristotle and by A ristotle 5
pupil Eudemus.
On the details o f Anaxagoras views we are less well informed. Here

235

EARLY CREEK PHILOSOPHY

are, first, two short samples, and then the bulk o f Diogenes Laertius
life o f Anaxagoras.
In all o th e r respects w e are m ore u n fo rtu n ate than the beasts.
B u t by e x p erien ce and m em ory an d w isdom and skill, acco rd
in g to A n a x a go ras, w e use them , takin g their h on ey and their
m ilk, h e rd in g them to g eth er and d o in g what we will with them ,
so that h ere n o th in g d ep en d s on fo rtu n e but ev ery th in g on
p lan n in g and fo resigh t, [ 21b]
(Plutarch, On Fortune 98F)
A n a x a g o ra s in his Physics says that w hat is called b ird s m ilk is
th e w hite o f the e g g . [ 22]
(A th en aeu s, Deipnosophists 57D)
A n a x a go ras, son o f H egesibu lu s (or o f E ubulus), o f Clazom enae. H e was a fo llo w er o f A n a x im en es, and was the first to
p u t m ind in ch a rg e o f m atter. His treatise, which is written in
a pleasant and lofty style, begins as follows:
A ll things were together. Then mind came and arranged them.
[cf l]
H en ce h e was n icknam ed M in d , an d T im o n in his Silli says
this about him :
A n d th ere, they say, is A n a x a g o ras, a stout hero,
T h e M ind (fo r he had a m ind), w h o su d d en ly rose u p
and tied to g eth er all that had b e fo re been in disarray.
H e was rem arkab le fo r his g o o d birth an d his wealth - and
also fo r his gen ero sity inasm uch as he ced ed his inheritan ce to
his frien d s. F or w h en they accused him o f n eglectin g it h e said:
T h e n w h y d o n t you look a fter it? In th e en d he went into
retirem en t and spent his tim e in scientific study, giv in g no
th o u g h t to politics. W h en som eone asked him i f he had no
care fo r his co u n try, h e rep lied : B e q u iet - 1 have the greatest
care fo r m y co u n try , p o in tin g to the heavens.
H e is said to have been tw enty w hen X erxe s invad ed G reece
[480 ], and to have lived to be seventy-tw o. A p o llo d o ru s
in his Chronicles says that he was born in the seventieth O lym
piad [500-497] an d that he d ied in th e first year, o f the eighty236

ANAXAGORAS

eigh th O lym p iad [428]. H e began to p h ilosop h ize in A th en s


in the archon sh ip o f Callias w hen he was tw enty, a cco rd in g to
D em etrius o f P haleron in his List o f Archons. T h e y say that he
stayed th ere fo r thirty years.
H e said that the sun is a fiery lu m p , la rg er than th e P eloponnese (but som e ascribe this to T an talu s), and that the m oon is
inhabited and also contains hills and ravines. T h e u n ifo rm
stu ffs a re first principles; fo r ju s t as g o ld is co m p o u n d ed from
gold-dust, so the u niverse is co m bin ed fro m sm all u n ifo rm
bodies. M ind is the first p rin cip le o f m ovem ent. H eavy bodies,
like earth, occu py the low er regions, ligh t bodies, like fire, th e
u p p er; w ater and air, th e m iddle. F or in this way the sea rests
on the earth , which is flat, and its m oistu re is vap o rized by the
sun. A t first the heaven ly bodies m oved as th o u g h in a rotu n d a
so that the pole which is always visible was d irectly o v e r the
earth ; later they acqu ired a tilt. T h e M ilky W ay is a reflection
o f light from stars which a re not illum in ated by the sun. C o m
ets are conjunctions o f planets which em it flam es. S h o o tin g
stars are, as it w ere, sparks shaken from th e air. W inds o ccu r
w hen the air is rarefied by the sun. T h u n d e r is a clash o f
clouds. L ig h tn in g is friction in the clouds. E arth qu akes a re a
subsiding o f a ir into the earth . A n im als w ere g en era te d from
the moist, the hot and the earth y; and later fro m o n e an o th er.
Males com e from the righ t, fem ales fro m th e left.
T h e y say that he p red icted the fall o f the m eteorite which
occu rred at A eg osp o tam i - h e said that it w ould fall fro m the
sun. T h a t is why E u ripid es, w ho was his p u p il, says in the
Phaelhon that the sun is a g o ld e n clou d . W h en he was g o in g to
O lym p ia h e sat dow n u n d e r a m ackintosh as th o u g h it w ere
g o in g to rain - and it d id . W h en som eone asked him i f the
m ountains at L am psacus w ou ld e v e r becom e sea, th ey say he
replied: Y es, i f tim e d o esn t g ive o u t. A sk ed fo r w hat en d he
had been b orn , he said: F o r the study o f the sun an d the m oon
and the h eavens. W h en som eone said, Y o u have been ex iled
from the A th en ia n s, h e replied: N o - th ey h ave been exiled
from m e. W hen he saw the tom b o f M ausolus, he said: A
rich tom b is the im age o f a substance tu rn ed to ston e. W h en
som eone com plained that h e was d y in g in a fo reig n co u n try,
237

EARLY GREEK PH IL OSO P H Y

h e rep lied : T h e d escen t to H ades is the sam e w h ere v er you


start fro m .
H e seem s to h ave been the first - a cco rd in g to Favorinus in
his Miscellaneous Inquiries - to have said that H om ers p oetry is
a b o u t virtu e an d vice. T h is th eory was taken fu rth e r by his
frien d , M etro d o ru s o f Lam psacus, w ho was th e first to occu py
h im self with th e p o ets ideas on n atural science. A n axago ras
was also th e first to publish a book with d iagram s. Silenus says
in the first bo ok o f his Histories that the m eteorite fell from the
sky in the archo n sh ip o f D em u lus, and that A n a x a g o ra s said
that th e w hole heavens w ere constituted o f stones they are
held u p by the rapid rotation an d they fall to earth w hen it
slackens.
D iffe re n t stories a re told about his trial. Sotion, in his Suc
cession o f Philosophers, says that h e was co n d em n ed fo r im piety
by C le o n because he said that th e sun was a fiery lum p, and
that w h en his pu pil Pericles co n d u cted his d efen ce he was
fin ed five talents an d exiled . Satyrus in his Lives says that the
case was b ro u g h t by T h u cy d id e s, Pericles political op p o n en t;
that the ch a rg e was not o n ly im piety bu t also M edism ; and that
he was co n d em n ed to d eath in absentia. W h en he was told both
o f the con d em n atio n and o f th e d eath o f his ch ild ren , he said
o f th e co n d em n atio n that N atu re lo n g ago co n d em n ed both
them an d m e, and o f his ch ild ren that I knew th ey w ere m or
tal w hen I fa th ere d th em . (Som e ascribe this to Solon , others
to X en o p h o n .) D em etrius o f P h aleron , in his bo ok On Old Age,
says that he b u ried them with his ow n hands. H erm ip p u s in
his Lives says that he was incarcerated in the prison to await his
d eath . Pericles arrived and asked them if they had any ch arge
to b rin g against him fo r his way o f life. T h e y said they had
none. Y e t I am his p u p il, h e said. T h e n d o not yield to cal
um n y an d kill him , b u t listen to m e and free him . H e was
fre ed , bu t h e co u ld n o t b ea r the sham e and killed him self.
H iero n ym u s, in th e secon d bo ok o f his Miscellanies, says that
Pericles led him to th e co u rtroo m feeb le and thin fro m disease,
so that it was pity rath er than ju d g e m e n t w hich freed him. So
m uch fo r his trial.
H e is th o u g h t som eh ow to h ave been hostile to D em ocritus
238

ANAXAGORAS

because he was not able to have conversation with him . In


the end he retired to L am psacus an d d ied th ere. W h en the
m agistrates o f the city asked him w hat h e w ould like to be d o n e
fo r him , he said: L et the ch ildren have a holid ay each yea r in
the m onth o f m y d eath . T h e custom is still observed.
(D iogenes L aertius, Lives o f the Philosophers II 6 -1 4 )

239

19
ARCHELAUS
Archelaus was a minor figure in the history o f Greek philosophy, and
no fragment o f his works has survived. Yet he deserves a brief mention:
he was the first native-born Athenian philosopher; he was a pupil o f
Anaxagoras and a teacher o f Socrates; and he made at least one strik
ing, and apparently original, remark (on the subject o f ethics). Here,
then, are the two fullest ancient accounts o f his thought.

A rch elau s cam e from A th en s o r M iletus. His fath er was


A p o llo d o ru s o r, a cco rd in g to som e, M idon. H e was a pupil o f
A n a x a g o ra s and a teach er o f Socrates. H e was the first to b rin g
natu ral p h ilosoph y fro m Ionia to A th en s, and he was called a
natural p h ilo so p h er in d eed n atu ral philosoph y actually
e n d ed with him , w h en Socrates in trod u ced the subject o f eth
ics. B u t he too seem s to have touched upon ethics; for he philo
sophized about laws and about the noble and the just.
(Socrates too k this o v e r from him and was su pposed to have
in ven ted the subject because he d evelo p ed it to its height.)
H e said that th ere a re two causes o f gen eratio n , hot and
cold , an d that anim als w ere g en era ted fro m the m ud. A n d that
things a re ju s t o r ign ob le not by n atu re bu t by convention.
(D iogen es L aertius, Lives o f the Philosophers II 16)

A rch ela u s was o f an A th en ia n fam ily, the son o f A p o llo


d oru s. H e sp oke o f th e m ixin g o f m atter in the sam e way as
A n a x a g o ra s (and sim ilarly with the first principles o f things),
but he m aintained that th ere is a m ixtu re p resent in m ind from
the start. T h e o rig in o f m ou o n is th e sep aratin g o f f from one
240

ARCHELAUS

an oth er o f the hot and the cold: the hot is in m otion, the cold
at rest.
A s w ater liquefies it flows into the m idd le w h ere it bu rn s and
becom es air and earth , the fo rm e r o f w hich travels u pw ard s
w hile the latter rem ains below. T h u s the earth is at rest and
com es into existen ce fo r these reasons, and it lies at the m iddle,
being the m erest fraction o f the u niverse. < T h e a ir > g iven o f f
by the co n flagratio n < su p p o rts the e a rth > ; fro m it as it is first
burned o f f com es the substance o f the h eaven ly bodies, o f
which the greatest is the sun and the second the m oon ( o f the
rest som e are greater, som e sm aller).
H e says that the heavens are tilted, and that in this way the
sun sheds light on the earth and m akes the air tra n sp a ren t and
the earth dry. F or at first the earth was a m arsh, h igh at the
circu m feren ce and hollow in the m iddle. H e o ffe r s as evid en ce
fo r its hollow ness the fact that the sun does not rise an d set at
the sam e tim e fo r everyo n e - so m eth in g w hich w ou ld be bo u n d
to occu r w ere the earth level.
O n the subject o f anim als, he says that, as th e ea rth grew
w arm , it was first in the low er part, w h ere the hot an d th e cold
w ere m ixin g, that m an y anim als in clu d in g m en a p p ea re d , all
o f them h avin g the sam e way o f life inasm uch as th ey w ere
nourished by the m ud. T h e y w ere short-lived. L a te r th ey cam e
to rep rod u ce from o n e an o th er. M en w ere sep arated fro m the
o th er anim als and established leaders an d laws and skills and
cities and the rest. H e says th at m ind is inn ate in all anim als
alike; fo r each o f th e anim als uses its m ind, som e m ore slowly
and others m ore quickly.
(H ippolytu s, Refutation o f all Heresies I ix 1-6 )

241

20

LEUCIPPUS
Leucippus is a shadowy figure: his dates are not recorded, and even
his birthplace is uncertain. H e was the first to develop the theory o f
atomism, which was elaborated in fa r greater detail by his pupil and
successor, Democritus o f Abdera. Democritus overshadowed his master
in the later tradition. The Greek historians o f philosophy rarely dis
tinguish between the views o f the two men: they often refer, conjunc
tively, to 'Leucippus and Democritus. We are rarely in a position to
separate the contributions o f Democritus from those o f Leucippus.
The atomist philosophy, then, will be presented more fully in the next
chapter under the name o f Democritus. Here it is enough to cite one o f
the few doxographical passages which speak specifically o f Leucippus,
and to transcribe the one short fragment which is all that survives o f
Leucippus writings.
L eu cip p u s o f Elea o r o f M iletus (both places are m entioned in
conn ection with him ) shared P arm en id es philosophy but did
not take th e sam e path as P arm enid es an d X en o p h an es about
the things that exist but rath er, as it seem s, the opposite one.
For w h ereas they m ade the u n iverse o n e and m otionless and
u n g en e ra ted an d lim ited, and d id not allow an yon e even to
in q u ire into w hat does not exist, he posited infinite and eter
nally m ovin g elem ents, the atom s, an d an infinite quantity o f
shapes a m o n g them (because th ere is no m ore reason fo r them
to be thus than thus) su p p o sin g that gen eratio n and ch an ge
are u n failin g a m o n g the things that exist. A g ain , he held that
b ein g no m ore exists than non -bein g, and both are equally
causes o f the things that com e into being. F or su p p o sin g that
the substance o f the atom s is solid and fu ll, he said that it was
242

LEUCIPPUS

bein g and that it was carried about in the void, w hich he called
non-being and w hich he says exists no less than being.
(Sim plicius, Commentary on the Physics 2 8 .4 -15 )
Leucippus: e v ery th in g h appens in acco rd an ce with necessity,
and necessity is the sam e as fate.
L eucippus: he says in On Mind:
No thing happens in vain, but everything fo r a reason and by
necessity. [67 2]
(Stobaeus, Anthology I iv 7c)

243

21

DE MOC R I T US
Democritus was bom in Abdera in the north o f Greece. He was the
most prolific, and ultimately the most influential, o f the Presocratic
philosophers: his atomic theory may be regarded from a certain point
o f view as the culmination o f early Greek thought. Although Plato
fails, remarkably, to mention his name, he was highly regarded by
Aristotle, and his fundamental ideas were taken up and developed by
Epicurus in the fourth century . None o f Democritus' writings has
survived intact, and there are, moreover, very few fragments bearing
on what we now think o f as the central and most important part o f his
thought. M uch o f Epicurus work, however, was preserved, so that by
way o f Epicureanism Democritus has had a lasting effect on western
science and philosophy.
Little is known o f his life. He is said to have travelled to Egypt, to
Persia, and to the Red Sea. H e is supposed to have learned from
Leucippus and from Anaxagoras and from Philolaus. In a fragment
o f uncertain authenticity he allegedly writes:
I came to Athens and no-one knew me.
(D iogenes Laertius, Lives o f the Philosophers IX 36
= 68 1 1 6)
H e hirnself offered a little chronological information:
A s to his dates, he was, as he hirnself says in The Little Worldordering, a y o u n g m an w hen A n a x a go ras was o ld , bein g forty
years y o u n g e r than him . A n d he says that The Little Worldordering was com posed 730 years a fte r the ca p tu re o f T ro y . So
he was b o rn , a cco rd in g to A p o llo d o ru s in his Chronicles, in the
244

DEMOCRITUS

eightieth O lym p iad [460 -457 ] - o r , a cco rd in g to T h rasy llu s


in his w ork entitled Prolegomena to the Reading o f the Books o f
Democritus, in the third yea r o f the seventy-seventh O lym p iad
[470/469 ], being, he says, o n e yea r o ld er than Socrates. So
he will have been a co n tem p o rary o f A rch elau s, the p u p il o f
A n axagoras, and o f O en o p id es (whom he m entions). H e also
m entions, in conn ection with their beliefs about the o n e, P ar
m enides and Z en o as b ein g particu larly celebrated in his tim e and also Protagoras o f A b d era, w ho is a g reed to have been a
co n tem p o rary o f Socrates.
(ibid IX 4 1)
Some idea o f Democritus productivity, and o f the breadth o f his
professional interests, may be gained from the list o f his books which
Diogenes Laertius preserves:
His books w ere catalogu ed and a rra n g ed in tetralogies by
T h rasyllu s in the sam e way as he a rra n g ed Platos w orks. His
ethical works are these:
Pythagoras, On the Disposition o f the Wise M an, On the Things in
Hades, Tritogeneia (so called because fro m h e r co m e th ree
things which con serve all hum an affairs), On Manliness o r On
Virtue, The Horn o f Amaltheia, On Contentment, Ethical Commen
taries. {Well-being is lost.)
T h e se are his ethical w orks; his w orks on natural science
are:
The Great World-ordering (which T h eo p h ra stu s says was w ritten
by Leucippus), The Little World-ordering, Cosmography, On the
Planets, On Nature (one book), On the Nature o f M an o r On Flesh
(two books), On M ind, On the Senses (som e p u t these to g eth er
u n d er the title On the Soul), On Flavours, On Colours, On Different
Shapes, On Changing Shape, Buttresses (which su p p o rts th e p r e
vious works), On Images o r On Providence, On Logic o r The Rule
(three books).
T h e se are about nature. (N ot integrated into th e catalogu e
are the follow ing:
Heavenly Causes, Atmospheric Carnes, Terrestrial Causes, Causes
Concerned with Fire and Things in Fire, Causes Concerned with

45

EA RL Y GREEK P H I L O S O P H Y

Sounds, Causes Concerned with Seeds and Plants and Fruits, Causes
Concerned with Animals (three books), Miscellaneous Causes, On
Magnets. T h ese are the non-integrated works.)
T h e mathematical works are these:
On Different Angles o r On Contact o f Circles and Spheres, On
Geometry, Geometry, Numbers, On Irrational Lines and Solids (two
books), Planispheres, On the Great Year o r Astronomy (a calendar),
Contest o f the Waterclock, Description o f the Heavens, Geography,
Description o f the Poles, Description o f Rays o f Light.
T h e s e a re the m athem atical w orks; th e literary w orks are
the follow ing:
On Rhythms and Harmony, On Poetry, On the Beauty o f Verses,
On Euphonious and Harsh-sounding Letters, On Homer o r Correct
Language and Glosses, On Song, On Verbs, Names.
Such a re his literary w orks; his technical w orks a re these:
Prognosis, On Diet o r Dietetics, MedicalJudgement, Causes Concern
ing Appropriate and Inappropriate Occasions, On Farming o r Farm
ing, On Painting, Tactics and Fighting in Armour.
Such are these. Som e o rd e r separately the fo llo w in g works
fro m the Commentaries:
On the Sacred Writings in Babylon, On Those in Meroe, Circumnavi
gation o f the Ocean, On History, Chaldaean Account, Phrygian
Account, On Fever and Coughing Sicknesses, Legal Causes, Artefacts
o r Problems.
T h e o th er books w hich som e ascribe to him a re eith er com
pilations o f his w orks o r else a greed to be by others.
(D iogen es L aertius, Lives o f the Philosophers IX 4 5 -4 9 )

The remainder o f this chapter is divided into fou r sections. First


comes a selection o f texts, none o f them fragments o f Democritus, which
describe the atomic theory. Secondly come the texts which record Demo
critus views on knowledge and scepticism. There follows a short section
on Democritus scientific and literary studies. Finally, the longest sec
tion is given to the ethical fragments. The relative lengths o f the four
sections are determined by the amount o f available material: they do
not reflect the importance which Democritus - o r w e - might ascribe to
the different aspects o f his thought.
246

DEMOCRITUS

I Atomism
For Democritus most celebrated doctrine, his atomism, we are obliged
to rely on second-hand reports.

I f the sam e atom s en d u re, bein g im passive, it is clear that [the


Dem ocriteans] too will say that the w orlds are a ltered rath er
than d estroyed - ju s t as Em pedocles and H eraclitus seem to
think. A n extract fro m A ristotles w ork On Democritus will show
what the view o f these m en was:
D em ocritus thinks that the n atu re o f etern al things con
sists in small substances, infinite in quantity, and fo r them
he posits a place, distinct from them and infinite in extent.
H e calls place by the nam es vo id , n o th in g an d infin ite;
and each o f the substances he calls th in g , so lid and
bein g. H e thinks that the substances a re so sm all that they
escape o u r senses, and that they possess all sorts o f form s
and all sorts o f shapes and d ifferen ces in m agnitu de.
From them , as fro m elem ents, he was able to g e n era te
and co m p ou n d visible and p ercep tible bodies. T h e atom s
stru ggle and are carried about in the void because o f th eir
dissim ilarities and th e o th er d ifferen ces m en tion ed , and
as they are carried about they collid e an d are bo u n d
togeth er in a bin d in g w hich m akes them touch and be
contigu ou s with o n e an o th e r but w hich does not g e n u
inely p ro d u ce any o th er single n a tu re w h a tever from
them ; fo r it is utterly silly to thin k that two o r m ore things
could ev er becom e one. H e explain s how the substances
rem ain to g eth er in term s o f the ways in w hich th e bodies
en tangle with and grasp hold o f o n e a n o th er; fo r som e
o f them a re u neven, som e h o o k ed , som e con cave, som e
convex, and others have in n um erable o th er d ifferen ces.
So h e thinks that th ey hold on to o n e a n o th e r a n d rem ain
togeth er u p to the tim e w hen som e stro n g e r fo rce reaches
them fro m their en viro n m en t and shakes them an d scat
ters them apart. H e speaks o f gen era tio n and o f its co n
trary, dissolution, not o n ly in conn ection with anim als but
247

EARLY CREEK PHILOSOPHY

also in connection with plants and w orlds - and in general


with all p ercep tible bodies. [A ristotle, fra gm en t 208]
(Sim plicius, Commentary on On the Heavens 294.30-295.22)
The excerpt from Aristotles lost essay on Democritus can be sup
plemented from his extant M etaphysics:
L eu cip p u s and his co llea g u e D em ocritu s say that the full and
the void a re elem ents, calling the o n e b ein g and the o th er
n o n -bein g; and o f these th e fu ll and solid is bein g, the void
n o n -bein g (that is w hy they say that b ein g no m ore exists than
n on -bein g - because void no m ore exists than body), and these
a re the m aterial causes o f the thin gs that exist. A n d ju s t as
those w h o m ake the u n d erly in g substance sin gle gen erate
o th er things by its p rop erties, m akin g th e rare and the dense
origin s o f th e p rop erties, so these m en say that the d ifferen ces
[am ong the atom s] are the causes o f the o th er things. T h e y say
that the d ifferen ces a re th ree in n u m b er - shape, o rd e r, and
position. F or they say that bein gs d iffe r only by rh yth m , con
tact and m o d e - w h ere rh ythm is shape, contact is o rd e r and
m od e is position. T h e letter a d iffe rs fro m N in shape; a n
d iffe rs fro m n a in o rd er; and n d iffe rs from z in position. A s
fo r m otion (w hence and how existin g things acqu ire it), they
too, like the others, n egligen tly om itted to in qu ire into it.
(A ristotle, Metaphysics g8 5 b4 -2 o)
Aristotles fin al remark is echoed by Simplicius:
D em ocritus too, w hen he says that a w hirl o f ev ery kind o f
fo rm s was separated o f f fro m th e w h ole [ 167] but does not
say how an d by w hat cause, seem s to g en era te it spontaneously
an d by chance.
(Sim plicius, Commentary on the Physics 3 27.2 3 -2 6 )
The same commentary contains a brief doxographical section which
adds a little to what we learn from Aristotle.
In the sam e way [L eu cip p u s] associate D em ocritus o f A b d era
posited th e fu ll and the void as first principles, o n e o f which

248

DEMOCRITUS

he called b ein g and th e o th er non -bein g; fo r he posits the


atom s as m atter fo r th e things that exist and g en erates e v e ry
th in g else by th eir d ifferen ces. T h e s e a re three: rh yth m , co n
tact, m ode - w hich is to say, shape and position an d o rd e r. F or
by nature like is m oved by like and things o f the sam e kind a re
carried tow ards o n e an o th er, and each o f the shapes w h en
arran ged in a d iffe r e n t co m p ou n d prod u ces a d iffe r e n t co n
dition. T h u s since the principles are infinite, they reasonably
un d erto o k to accoun t fo r all prop erties and substances and fo r
how and by w hat cause they com e into bein g. T h a t is w h y they
say that only those w ho m ake the elem ents infinite p ro d u ce a
reasonable accoun t o f things. A n d they say that th e quantity
o f shapes in the atom s is infinite because th ere is n o m ore
reason fo r them to be thus than thus. T h e y them selves give
this as the exp lan atio n o f the infinitude.
(ibid 2 8 .15 -2 7 )
Democritus' idea that like is moved by like is illustrated in the
following passage:
T h e r e is an ancien t opin ion w hich, as I h ave a lread y said, has
long been cu rren t a m o n g the n atural scientists to the e ffe ct
that like recognizes like. D em ocritus is th o u g h t to h ave p ro
d u ced confirm ation o f this o p in ion an d Plato to have tou ch ed
on it in his Timaeus. D em ocritus bases his a rg u m e n t on both
anim ate and inanim ate things. F or anim als, h e says, c o n g re
gate with anim als o f the sam e kind - d oves with doves, cranes
with cranes, and so with the o th er irrational anim als. Sim ilarly
in the case o f inanim ate things, as we can see fro m seeds that
are bein g rid d led and fro m pebbles on th e sea-shore. F o r in
the one case the w hirlin g o f the sieve separately a rra n g es lentils
with lentils, barley with barley, w h eat with w heat; an d in the
oth er case, by the m otion o f the waves, oval pebbles a re fo rced
into the sam e place as oval pebbles, and ro u n d pebbles as
roun d pebbles, as th ou gh the sim ilarity in things contain ed
som e sort o f fo rce fo r collecting things togeth er, [ 164] T h a t
is D em ocritus view.
(Sextus Em piricus, Against the Mathematicians V I I 1 1 6 - 1 1 8 )

249

EA RL Y GREEK P H I L O S O P H Y

The texts so fa r cited do not explain w hy Democritus thought that


the world consisted o f atoms and void. The following Aristotelian pass
age does not purport to represent Democritus actual arguments, but it
is generally supposed to be an adaptation o f Democritean material.
D em ocritus seem s to h ave been p ersu ad ed by app rop riate
an d scientific argu m en ts. W hat I m ean will be clear as we p ro
ceed.
T h e r e is a d ifficu lty i f o n e supposes that th ere is a bo d y o r
m agn itu d e w hich is divisible ev ery w h e re an d that this division
is possible. F o r w hat will th ere be that escapes the division? I f
it is divisible everyw h ere, and the division is possible, then it
m igh t be so d ivided at o n e and th e sam e tim e even i f the div
isions w ere not all m ade at the sam e tim e; and i f this w ere
to h ap p en no im possibility w ould result. So i f it is by nature
ev ery w h e re divisible, th en i f it is d ivid ed - w h eth er at success
ive m id-points o r by any o th er m ethod - n o th in g im possible
will h ave com e about. (A fte r all, i f it w ere d ivid ed a thousand
dm es into a thousan d parts, n o th in g im possible w ould result,
even th o u g h no-on e w ould actually so d ivid e it.)
N ow since the bo d y is ev ery w h e re divisible, su ppose it to
have been d ivid ed . W hat will be left? A m agnitu de? T h a t is
n ot possible; fo r th en th ere will be so m eth in g that has not been
d ivid ed , bu t we su p p o sed it divisible everyw h ere. B u t i f there
is to be n o b o d y o r m agn itu d e left an d yet the division is to
take place, it will e ith er consist o f points an d its com pon ents
will have no m agn itu d e, o r else they will be n o th in g at all so
that it w ould com e to be, and be com posed , fro m n oth in g and
the w h ole b o d y w ould be n o th in g b u t an ap p earan ce.
Sim ilarly, i f it is m ad e o f points it will not be a quantity. For
w h en the points w ere in contact an d w ere a single m agnitude
and w ere togeth er, th ey d id not m ake th e w h ole at all larger.
F or i f it is d ivid ed into two o r m ore parts the w hole is no sm aller
o r la rg e r th an it was b e fo re , so that even i f all the points are
p u t to g e th er they will not m ake any m agnitu de.
I f som e sawdust, as it w ere, is created w h en the b o d y is bein g
d ivid ed , and in this way som e bo d y escapes fro m the m agni
tude, the sam e a rg u m e n t applies: how is this bo d y divisible?
250

DEMOCRITUS

P erhaps it is not a b o d y b u t a separable fo rm o r p ro p e rty


which escapes, and the m agn itu d e consists o f points o r contacts
with such and such a p rop erty? B u t it is absu rd to th in k that a
m agnitu de consists o f w hat a re not m agnitudes.
A g ain , w here will these points be, and a re they m otionless
o r m oving?
A n d a single contact always involves two things, so that th ere
is som ethin g a p a rt fro m the contact an d the division an d the
point.
I f on e posits that any body o f w hatever size is ev ery w h e re
divisible, all these things follow .
A g ain , i f I d ivid e a lo g o r an yth in g else and th en p u t it
togeth er, it is again a unit o f the sam e size. T h is is so at w h atever
point I cu t the log. So it has potentially been d ivid ed e v e ry
where. T h e n w hat is th ere ap art from the division? E ven i f it
has p rop erties, how is the bo d y dissolved into these an d how
does it com e into bein g fro m them ? A n d how a re they se p ar
ated? So i f it is im possible fo r m agn itu des to consist o f contacts
o r points, necessarily th ere a re indivisible bodies a n d m ag n i
tudes.
(A ristotle, On Generation and Corruption 3 i 6 a i 3 - b i 6 )

II Knowledge
Democritus atomism was the framework within which he tried to
understand the nature o f the world. At the same time it was a theory
which appeared to have strongly sceptical implications. It is best to
approach this topic by setting down the passages in which Plutarch
records and criticizes two objections made against Democritus by Epi
curus pupil Colotes.
[Colotes] first accuses [D em ocritus] o f saying that each o bject
is no m ore such-and-such than so-and-so, an d th ereb y th ro w
in g life into confusion . B u t D em ocritu s is so fa r fro m th in kin g
that each subject is n o m o re such-and-such than so-and-so that
251

E ARL Y GREEK P H I L O S O P H Y

h e attacked P rotagoras the sophist fo r saying ju s t this and


w rote m any persuasive things against him . C olotes, h avin g not
the slightest acquaintance with these w ritings, has m isunder
stood D em ocritu s words: w hen he lays it dow n that things no
m ore exist than n othin g, he m eans body by things and the
void by n o th in g , ind icating that the latter too has a sort o f
n atu re an d existen ce o f its own.
(Plutarch, Against Colotes 1 i o 8 f - i )
A n d even m ore in his second accusation [Colotes] fails to notice
that he drives E picu rus ou t o f life a lo n g with D em ocritus. For
D em ocritu s claim - by con ven tion co lo u r and by convention
sw eet and by convention co m pou n ds, etc, in reality the void
an d th e atom s [cf 125] - was, he says, an attack on the senses;
an d h e holds that an yon e w ho sticks by this a rg u m en t and uses
it can n ot even thin k that he is h im self a m an and alive.
B u t w hat does D em ocritus say? T h a t substances infinite in
quantity, indivisible an d indestructible, and also qualityless
and im passive, are carried about scattered in the void. W hen
th ey a p p roach o n e a n o th er o r collide o r a re en tan gled , the
aggre gates appear as w ater o r fire o r plants o r m en, but all
things really are w hat he calls these indivisible form s and
n o th in g else. F or th ere is no gen eration fro m w hat does not
exist, w hile from the things that exist n o th in g can be generated
in virtue o f the fact that, because o f their hardness, the atoms
n eith er are a ffected n o r ch an ge. H ence no co lo u r can em erge
from things w hich a re colourless, and no n atu re o r soul from
things w hich are qualityless and im passive.
(ibid 1 1 1 0 F - 1 1 1 i a )
The most important text is found in Sextus Empiricus. It contains
most o f the fragments which bear on the issue.
D em ocritus som etim es does away with w hat appears to the
senses and says that n o th in g o f this sort appears in truth but
only in o p in ion , tru th a m o n g the things that exist lyin g in the
fact that th ere a re atom s and void. F or he says:
By convention sweet and by convention bitter, by convention hot,
252

DEMOCRITUS

by convention cold, by convention colour: in reality atoms and


void, [cf 125]
T h a t is to say, objects o f perception are th o u g h t an d believed
to exist but they d o not exist in truth - only atom s and void
do.
In his Buttresses, a lth o u g h he u n d ertakes to ascribe reliable
p ow er to the senses, he is fo u n d nonetheless co n d em n in g
them . F or he says:
We in reality know nothingfirmly but only as it changes in accord
ance with the condition o f the body and o f the things which enter
it and o f the things which resist it. [ 9]
A n d again he says:
That in reality we do not know how each thing is or is not has
been shown in many ways, [ b i o ]
A n d in On Ideas he says:
And a man must recognize by this rule that he is removed from
reality; [ 6]
and again:
This argument too shows that in reality we know nothing about
anything, but our belief in each case is a changing o f shape;

[ 7]
and again:
Yet it will be clear that to know how each thing is in reality is a
puzzle, [ 8]
Now in these passages h e does aw ay in e ffe ct w ith all know l
ed ge, even if it is o n ly the senses which he explicitly attacks.
But in the Rules he says that th ere a re two form s o f kn o w led ge ,
one by way o f the senses and the o th er by way o f th e u n d e r
standing. T h e o n e by way o f the u n d erstan d in g he calls g e n u
ine, ascribing reliability to it with reg a rd to the d iscrim ination
o f truth; the o n e by way o f the senses he nam es d ark , d e n y in g
that it is u n errin g with rega rd to the d iscern m en t o f w hat is
true. T h e s e a re his words:
There are two forms o f knowledge, one genuine and the other
dark. To the dark belong all these: sight, hearing, smell, taste,
touch. The dark, separated from this < . . .> . [ 11a]
T h e n , setting the g en u in e above th e d ark , he con tin u es thus:
253

EARLY CREEK PHILOSOPHY

When the dark can no longer see more finely or hear or smell or
taste or perceive by touch, *but somethingfiner* < . . .> . [ l lb]
So a cco rd in g to D em ocritus, reason, w hich he calls gen u in e
kn o w led ge, is the stand ard o f truth.
B u t D iodm us said that he su pposed th ree standards: fo r the
ap p reh en sion o f w hat is u n clear the stan d ard is the ap p aren t
(fo r w hat a p p ears is the sight o f w hat is u n clear, as A n a x a go ras
says [59 B 21a] - and D em ocritus praised him fo r this); fo r
investigation, it is the co n cep t (fo r in every case, my frien d ,
on e p rin cip le is to know w hat the investigation is abo u t [Plato,
Phaedrus 273B]); o f choice and avoidance, it is the p a s s io n s - fo r
that w hich we find congenial is to be chosen and that w hich we
find alien is to be avoided .
(Sextus Em piricus, Against the Mathematicians V I I 13 5 -14 0 )
Diogenes Laertius expresses the same sequence o f thoughts more briefly:
A cco rd in g to som e, X en o p h an es an d Z en o o f E lea and
D em ocritus w ere sceptics . . . D em ocritus, w ho does away with
qualities w h ere he says:
By convention hot, by convention cold: in reality atoms and void.
[c f 125]
A n d again:
In reality we know nothing fo r truth is in the depths, [ 117]
(D iogen es L aertius, Lives o f the Philosophers IX 72)
Several other texts refer to Democritus celebrated claim that 'by conven
tion colour' etc.
E veryo n e knows that the greatest ch a rg e against any argu m e n t
is that it conflicts w ith what is evid en t. F or argu m en ts cannot
even start w ithout self-eviden ce: how then can they be credible
if th ey attack that fro m w hich they took th eir beginnings?
D em ocritus too was aw are o f this; fo r w hen he had b rou gh t
ch arges against the senses, saying:
By convention colour, by convention sweet, by convention bitter:
in reality atoms and void,
he had the senses rep ly to th e intellect as follows:

254

DEMOCRITUS

Poor mind, do you lake your evidence from us and then try to
overthrow us? Our overthrow is your fall, [ 125]
So one should co n d em n the unreliability of an a rg u m e n t
which is so bad that its m ost persuasive p art conflicts with the
eviden t propositions fro m which it took its start.
(G alen, On Medical Experience X V 7 -8 )

A ll these people p resu p p o se that the prim ary elem en t is qu al


ityless, h aving no natural w hiteness o r blackness o r any o th er
colou r w hatever, and no sw eetness o r bitterness o r heat o r cold
o r in general any o th er quality w hatever. For, says D em ocritu s,
by convention colour, by convention bitter, by convention sweet:
in reality atoms and void, [cf 125]
A n d he thinks that it is fro m the co n g regatio n o f atom s that
all the p erceptible qualities com e to be - they a re relative to us
who perceive them , and in n atu re th ere is n o th in g w hite o r
black o r yellow o r red o r bitter o r sweet. F or by the term by
convention he m eans som eth in g like by cu stom , relatively to
us, not in virtue o f th e n atu re o f the things them selves. T h is
in turn h e calls in reality, d eriv in g the w ord fro m real w hich
m eans tru e. So the sense o f his theory, taken as a w h ole, will
be this: M en thin k that th ere are w hite things and black things
and sweet things and bitter things; but in tru th ev ery th in g is
things and n o th in g - this is ju s t w hat he said him self, callin g
the atom s things and void n o th in g . N ow all the atom s, bein g
sm all bodies, lack qualities. T h e void is a sort o f space in w hich
all these bodies m ove u p and d ow n fo r the w hole o f tim e, and
eith er en tan gle with o n e a n o th er o r strike and reb o u n d , and
in these m eetings they dissociate and again associate with o n e
an oth er and fro m this they m ake all co m p ou n d s, in clu d in g
o u r own bodies and th eir p rop erties and perceptions.
(G alen, The Elements according to Hippocrates I 4 1 7 - 4 1 8 k )

D em ocritus w ent w ro n g in a m an n er u n w orth y o f h im self


when he said that in tru th o n ly the atom s a re existen t, all the
rest bein g by custom . F or a cco rd in g to y o u r theory, D em o
critus, not only shall we not be able to d isco ver th e tru th , we

255

EARLY GREEK PH IL O SO P H Y

shall not be able to live, takin g no precau tion against fire o r


d eath < . . .>
(D iogen es o f O en o an d a , fra gm en t 6 11 )
Aristotle offers a brief and puzzling analysis o f what he took to be
Democritus' error:
M any o th e r anim als receive co n trary im pressions to ours from
the sam e things, an d in d eed thin gs d o not seem always the
sam e to the perceptio n o f a single individual. So it is unclear
which o f them is tru e o r false; fo r th ere is no m ore reason for
this to be tru e than fo r that - they are on a par. T h a t is why
D em ocritus says that eith er n o th in g is tru e o r to us at least it
is u nclear. In gen eral, because they take u n d erstan d in g to be
p ercep tio n and p ercep tio n to be alteration, they say that what
a p p ears in perception is o f necessity true.
(A ristotle, Metaphysics io o g b 7 - i5 )

Finally, it should be stressed that not everything in Democritus sits


well with the sceptical musings o f the last pages.
W e know that w hat is h ard to acqu ire is unnecessary and that
w hat is necessary G o d has g en ero u sly m ad e easy to acquire.
H en ce D em ocritus well says that
Nature and teaching are similar,
and h e briefly adds the reason:
fo r teaching changes a mans shape and nature acts by changing
shapes, [ 33]
(Clem ent, Miscellanies IV xxiii 149.3-4)
And the writings attacking Protagoras (to which Plutarch refers) con
tained the first occurrence o f an influential argument against relativ
ism:
Y o u can n ot say that every im pression is tru e, because o f the
reversal - as D em ocritus an d Plato show ed in th eir reply to
P rotagoras. F or i f every im pression is tru e, then it will also be

256

DEMOCRITUS

tru e that not every im pression is tru e (since that is an


im pression), and thus it will be false that ev ery im pression is
true.
(Sextus E m piricus, Against the Mathematicians V I I 389-390)

III Scientific and Literary Studies


D em ocritus, so they say, used to claim that he w ou ld rath er
d iscover a single causal exp lan atio n than becom e k in g o f the
Persians [ i 18] - alth o u gh his exp lan atio n s w ere fu tile and
groundless inasm uch as h e started fro m an em p ty prin cip le
and an erro n eou s hypothesis.
(Dionysius, in Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel X I V x xvii 4)
Like his predecessors, Democritus was concerned to understand and
explain the varied phenomena o f the world o f nature. As the catalogue
o f his writings shows, he wrote at length on scientific topics.
Given his views on knowledge and sensible qualities, we should not
be surprised to fin d that he devoted much attention to the nature o f
sense-perception. His ideas on this subject were described in detail by
Theophrastus. The following two passages are only a representative
sample.
D em ocritus does not state w h eth er p ercep tio n takes place
by opposites o r by likes. I f he m akes p erceiv in g co m e ab o u t by
alteration, then he w ould seem to have it take place by things
that are d iffe re n t - fo r like is not altered by like. B u t i f p erceiv
i n g - and alteration in g en era l - takes place by b ein g a ffe cte d ,
and if, as he says, it is im possible fo r thin gs that a re not the
sam e to be a ffected (even i f things w hich a re d iffe r e n t h ave an
effect, they d o so not in sofar as they a re d iffe r e n t but in sofar
as they have som eth in g the sam e in com m on), then it w ou ld
seem to take place by likes. So w e can take him in e ith er way.
H e attem pts to accoun t fo r each o f the senses in turn . H e
has sight o ccu r by reflection , but h e talks o f reflection in a

257

E A RL Y GREEK P H I L O S O P H Y

special way. T h e reflection d oes not take place im m ediately in


th e pu p il; rath er, the air betw een the eye and the seen object
is im prin ted w hen it is com pressed by w hat is seen and what
sees (fo r th ere are always efflu en ces co m in g o f f everything).
T h e n this air, w hich is solid and has a d iffe re n t colou r, is
reflected in the eyes, which are moist. W hat is dense does not
receive it, but w hat is m oist lets it pass th ro u gh . T h a t is why
m oist eyes a re better at seein g than h ard eyes - p rovided that
the ex tern al in tegu m en t is e x trem ely fine and dense, the inter
nal parts are as sp on gy as possible and em pty o f any dense and
stro n g flesh an d also o f any thick and oily liquid, and the vessels
lead in g to the eyes a re straigh t and d ry so as to take the sam e
sh ap e as the objects im p rin ted - fo r each th in g best recognizes
w hat is akin to it.
(T h eo p h ra stu s, On the Senses 49-50)
F lavours are sharp if th eir shapes [i.e. their constituent
atom s] a re a n g u la r and crin kled and small and fine. For
because o f th eir asperity they qu ickly pass th ro u gh every
w h ere, and b ein g ro u g h and a n g u la r they g ath er and hold
things togeth er. T h a t is w hy they heat the body, by m aking
em ptinesses in i t - fo r w hat is m ost em p ty is m ost easily heated.
Sw eet flavo u r is constituted by ro u n d shapes which a re not
too sm all. T h a t is w hy they rela x th e b o d y com pletely w ithout
d o in g so violently o r quickly passing th ro u gh all o f it. T h e y
d isturb the o th er shapes because as they pass th ro u gh they
m ake the o th ers d rift about and m oisten them ; and w hen these
a re m oistened an d m ove o u t o f o rd e r, they flow to g eth er into
the stom ach - that is the m ost accessible p art since it is the
em ptiest.
S o u r flavo u r is constituted by large shapes with m any angles
an d as little rou n d n ess as possible. F or w hen these en ter the
body th ey clo g and stop th e vessels an d p reven t the shapes
fro m flo w in g togeth er. T h a t is w hy they also settle the bowels.
B itter fla vo u r is constituted by sm all, sm ooth, rou n d ed
shapes, w h ere the rou n dn ess also contains crinkles. T h a t is
w hy it is viscous an d sticky.
Salty fla vo u r is constituted by la rg e shapes w hich are not

258

DEMOCRITUS

rou n d ed *n o r yet u n even bu t a n g u la r and crin kled * - h e calls


uneven those w hich en tan gle and intertw ine with o n e an o th er.
T h e y are large, because salt rises to the su rface - i f they w ere
small and w ere struck by the shapes about th em , they w ould
m ix with the w hole. T h e y a re not ro u n d , because w hat is salty is
rou gh while what is ro u n d ed is sm ooth. T h e y a re not u n even ,
because they d o not en tan gle with o n e an o th e r - that is w hy it
is friable.
P un gent flavo ur is sm all, ro u n d ed and an g u la r, bu t not
uneven. For the p u n g en t, bein g a n g u la r, heats by its ro u g h
ness, and it relaxes because it is sm all and ro u n d ed and a n g u
lar. For that is what the a n g u la r is like.
H e treats the o th er pow ers o f each th in g in the sam e way,
red u cin g them to th e shapes. O f all the shapes n o n e is p u re
and unm ixed with any others, but th ere a re m any in each the sam e flavour contains sm ooth an d ro u g h , ro u n d e d and
sharp, and the rest. T h e shape which p rep o n d era te s has a
very great influ en ce with rega rd to o u r p ercep tio n and its ow n
effect - so too has the condition in w hich it finds us. F or this
too m akes no little d iffe re n c e , since som etim es the sam e th in g
has opposite effects and opposites the sam e effect.
T h is is what he has said about flavours.
(ibid 6 5 -6 7 )

The next few pages contain one or two passages which testify to
Democritus other scientific and literary interests. These included math
ematics, geography, and biology:

C o n sid er the way in w hich [C hrysippus] answ ered th e p u zzle


which D em ocritus stated in such a vivid and scientific fashion:
I f a cone is cut by a plan e parallel to its base, w hat sh o u ld
we think o f the surfaces o f the segm ents - a re they equ al o r
unequal? I f unequal, they will m ake th e co n e irreg u la r, fo r it
will acquire a n u m ber o f step-like notches o r rou gh nesses; if
equal, the segm ents will be equal and the con e will plain ly have
acquired the prop erties o f a cylin d er, since it will consist o f
circles which are equal and not u n eq ual - and that is u tterly

259

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY

absu rd, [ 155] H ere [C hrysippus] declares that D em ocritus is


ig n o r a n t . . .
(Plutarch, On Common Notions 1 0 7 9 E )
L ater D em ocritus a n d E u d o x u s and o th ers w rote u p circum
navigations an d jo u r n e y s ro u n d the earth. T h e old thinkers
p ictu red th e inhabited ea rth as ro u n d , placin g G reece in its
cen tre an d D elp h i in the cen tre o f G reece (for D elph i holds
the navel o f th e earth). D em ocritus, a m an o f wide experien ce,
was the first to ap p reciate that the earth is elon gated , its length
b ein g o n e an d a h a lf tim es its bread th .
(A gath em eru s, Geography I 1-2 )
T h e w om b accepts the seed w hich has fallen into it and protects
it as it takes roo t - fo r first th e navel grow s in the wom b, as
D em ocritu s says [ 148], as an a n ch o rag e against rollin g and
d riftin g , as a ro p e a n d a b ran ch fo r the fru it which is being
g en era te d an d co m in g to be.
(Plutarch, On Love fo r Ones Offspring 4 9 5 E )
Democritus also had a strong interest in his own species - in the
natural and social history o f man. A late source contains a striking
passage which has generally been thought to reflect Democritean ideas
(even though it does not explicitly mention Democritus).
T h e y say that the first m en lived an an arch ic and anim al sort
o f life, g o in g o u t to fo ra g e in d ivid u ally and livin g o f f the most
palatable herbs a n d th e fru it w hich grew wild on the trees.
T h e n , since th ey w ere attacked by w ild anim als, they h elped
o n e a n o th e r (instructed by th eir ow n self-interest); and thus
gath erin g together because o f fear, they slowly cam e to recog
nize o n e a n o th e rs shapes.
T h e sou nd s they m ad e had no sense a n d w ere con fused ; but
g ra d u a lly th ey articu lated th eir expression s, and by establish
in g sym bols a m o n g them selves fo r e v e ry sort o f object they
m ad e the in terpretation in each case intelligible to on e
an o th er. Su ch g ro u p s cam e into existen ce th ro u g h o u t the
inh abited w o rld , an d not all m en had the sam e lan gu age, since

260

DEMOCRITUS

each g ro u p o rg a n ized its expression s as ch an ce had it. H ence


there are lan gu ages o f ev ery type, and th e g ro u p s w h o first
cam e into existen ce w ere the fo u n d ers o f all th e d iffe r e n t
races.
N ow the earliest m en lived laboriously, n o n e o f the utilities
o f life h avin g been d iscovered : they w ore n o clothes, th ey knew
noth ing o f d w ellin g-places o r o f fire, th ey had not th e slightest
conception o f cultivated p ro d u ce. A n d not k n o w in g h ow to
harvest wild p ro d u ce, they d id not lay aside any fru its against
need. H ence m any o f them d ie d in w in ter fro m co ld an d fro m
lack o f food. L ater, g ra d u a lly instructed by e x p e rie n c e , they
took re fu g e in caves d u rin g the w in ter, and stored those fruits
that cou ld be p reserved . O n ce fire and o th e r utilities w ere
recogn ized , the crafts and w hatever else can b en efit co m m u n al
life w ere slowly d iscovered . F or in g en era l it was n eed itself
which instructed m en in ev eryth in g , a p p ro p riately in tro d u c
in g kn o w led ge o f each th in g to a crea tu re w hich was wellequ ip p ed and w hich had assistants fo r ev ery p u rp o se in its
hands, its reason, an d its keenness o f m ind.
(D iodoru s, Universal History I viii 1 -7 )
The following texts represent different aspects o f Democritus anthropo
logical studies.
D em ocritus, w ho is co m p ared to the voice o f Z eu s and w h o
speaks in this way about all things, tried to exp lain th e co n cep t
[o f m an] but co u ld g et no fu rth e r than an a m a teu r assertion,
saying:
M an is what we all know, [ 165]
(Sextus E m piricus, Against the Mathematicians V I I 265)
D em ocritus righ tly says that:
A few o f the wise men, stretching up their hands to the place we
Greeks now call the air, said: 'Zeus is held to be all things, and
he knows everything and bestows and takes away, and he is king
o f everything. [ 30]
(C lem ent, Protreptic V I lxviii 5)
261

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY

It is absu rd to pay ca refu l attention to th e caw in g o f rooks and


th e crow in g o f cocks and to pigs ro o tin g a m o n g the rubbish,
as D em ocritus puts it [ 147], an d to treat these things as signs
o f w ind and rain . . .
(Plutarch, On Preserving Health 129)
Perhaps we a re foolish to ad m ire anim als fo r their learning,
alth o u gh D em ocritus asserts [ 154] that we are th eir pupils
in all the m ost im portan t things - o f the sp id er in w eavin g and
healin g, o f th e swallow in b u ild in g, o f the song-birds (the swan
and the nightin gale) in singing.
(Plutarch, On the Intelligence o f Animals 9 7 4 A )
D em ocritus, a m an w ho was not only the m ost scientific o f the
ancients but also the m ost in dustrious o f all those o f w hom we
have rep o rt, says that m usic is a y o u n g art, and he explain s this
by saying that it was not separated o f f by necessity but cam e
into bein g from su perflu ity.
(Philodem us, On Music IV xxxvi)
D em ocritus sim ilarly says:
What a poet writes with enthusiasm and holy inspiration is very
fine, [ 18]
(C lem ent, Miscellanies V I xviii 168.2)
D em ocritus says this ab o u t H om er:
Homer, having a divine nature, fashioned a world o f words o f
every sort, [ 21]
im p lyin g that it is not possible to p ro d u ce verses so fine and
wise w ithout a d ivin e o r su p erh u m an nature.
(Dio o f Prusa, On Homer [Discourses liii] 1)
Y o u r sons sh o u ld be kept aw ay fro m bad lan gu age; fo r the
w ord is shadow o f the d eed , a cco rd in g to D em ocritus.
(Plutarch, On Educating Children 9F)

262

DEMOCRITUS

D em ocritus said that nam es a re con ven tion al, an d he tried to


establish this by fo u r argum ents:
From hom onym y: d iffe re n t things are called by the sam e
nam e; th ere fo re nam es are not natural.
From polyonym y: d iffe re n t nam es will fit o n e an d the sam e
thing, and vice versa, which is im possible i f nam es a re natural.
T h ird ly , from the changes o f nam es - w hy d id w e ren a m e
Aristocles Plato and T y rta m u s T h e o p h ra s tu s i f nam es are
natural?
From the absence o f sim ilar fo rm s - w hy d o w e say to th in k
from th ou g h t w h en we d o not d eriv e an yth in g fro m j u s tic e ?
T h e r e fo r e nam es a re d u e to chance, not to nature.
H e calls th e first a rg u m e n t polysemy, the second equipollence, < th e third metonymy>, and th e fo u rth anonymy. [ 26]
(Proclus, Commentary on the Cratylus 6.207.6)

I V M oral Philosophy
Numerous purported fragments o f Democritus' moral and political
philosophy survive. They are puzzling on two counts. First, it is in
many cases uncertain whether or not the ascription to Democritus is
trustworthy. Secondly, it is not clear to what extent the fragments rep
resent the remains o f a system atic moral theory, or to what extent
that theory (i f it existed) was connected to Democritus atomism.
Most o f the fragments are preserved in two collections. I shall first
set doxvn the remaining scattered fragments and then transcribe the
collected items.
T h e A bd erites too say that th ere is a goal o f action. D em ocritus,
in his w ork On the Goal, says th at it is con ten tm en t, w hich he
also calls w ell-being; and he o ften rem arks:
For joy and absence o f joy is the boundary < o f advantage and
disadvantage, [ 4; c f i 88]
T h is, he says, is the goal in life fo r m en both y o u n g > an d old.
H ecataeus holds that the goal is self-sufficiency, A p o llo d o tu s
263

EARLY GREEK PH IL O S O P H Y

o f C yzicu s that it is am u sem ent, N au siphanes that it is u n ru f


fledness an d he says that this was called im perturbability by
D em ocritus.
(Clem ent, Miscellanies II x xi 130.4-5)
T h e d isp u te betw een b o d y and soul o v e r th e passions seem s
to be an old one. D em ocritus, ascribing u nhappiness to the
soul, says:
I f the body were to take the soul to court for the pains and suffer
ings it had endured throughout its life, then i f he were to be on
thejury fo r the case he would gladly cast his vote against the soul
inasmuch as it had destroyed some parts o f the body by negligence
or dissipated them by drunkenness, and had ruined and ravaged
other parts by its pursuit ofpleasures - ju s t as he would blame the
careless user i f a tool or utensil were in a bad condition, [ 159]
([Plutarch], On Desire and G rief 2)
D em ocritus:
M en enjoy scratching themselves they get the same pleasure as
those who are having sexual intercourse, [ 127]
(H ero d ian , On Accentuation in General 4 4 5 .9 -1 1 )
L et us then say to ourselves that y o u r b o d y, M an, p rod u ces
m any diseases and afflictions by n atu re from within itself and
receives m any that strike it fro m w ithout, and that i f you open
y o u rse lf u p , w ithin you will find a large and varied storehouse
and treasury o f evils, as D em ocritus says [ 149], which d o not
flow in fro m o utsid e bu t have, as it w ere, internal and native
springs.
(Plutarch, On Afflictions o f M ind and Body 5 0 0 D E )
D em ocritus u rg es us to be instructed in the art o f w ar, which
is o f the greatest im portan ce, and to seek o u t labour, w hich is
a sou rce o f g rea t and glo rio u s things fo r m en.
(Plutarch, Against Colotes 1 126)
W h en a m an lives in his ow n o p in ion and thinks not ill but well
o f h im self as a reliable witness and sp ectator o f w hat is good,
then he show s that reason is a lread y n o u rish ed and rooted

264

DEMOCRITUS

within him an d , as D em ocritus says [ 145], is accustom ed to


take its pleasures from itself.
(Plutarch, Progress in Virtue 81 a )

M edicine, a cco rd in g to D em ocritus, cu res the diseases o f the


body, and wisdom clears the soul o f passions.
(Clem ent, Pedagogue I ii 6.2)

Stobaeus A n th o lo g y is the source fo r the first o f the two collections


o f ethical fragments. I cite them in the order in which they appear in
the A n th o lo gy. I cite all the texts which are ascribed to Democritus
(or to Dernocrates or to Democ): many ascriptions are at best
dubious.

D em ocritus:
Do not be eager to know everything lest you become ignorant o f
everything.
( H i 12 = 169)

Dem ocritus:
Reason is a powerful persuader.
(II iv 12: c f 51)

D em ocritus and Plato both place happiness in the soul. D e m o


critus writes thus:
Happiness and unhappiness belong to the soul, [ 170]
Happiness does not dwell in herds, nor yet in gold: the soul is the
dwelling place o f a mans lot. [ 171]
H e calls happiness conten tm en t, w ell-being, h arm o n y, o rd e rli
ness, tranquillity. It is constituted by d istin gu ish in g and dis
crim in ating a m o n g pleasures, and this is the noblest an d m ost
advantageous th in g fo r m en.

'

265

( vii 3i)

EARLY CREEK PHILOSOPHY

D em ocritus:
M en fashioned the image o f chance as an excuse fo r their own
thoughtlessness; fa r chance rarely fights with wisdom, and a man
o f intelligence will, byforesight, set straight most things in his life.
(II viii 16 = 1 19)
D em ocritus:
From the same sources from which good things come to us we may
also draw bad; but we may avoid the bad. For example, deep water
is useful fo r many purposes, and then again it is bad for there
is danger o f drowning. So a device has been discovered: teaching
people to swim, [ 172]
idem :
For men bad things spring from good, when one does not know
how to manage the good or to keep it resourcefully. It is not just
to count such things bad: they are good, but it is possible, for
anyone who wishes, to use good things fo r bad ends too. [ 173]
A contented man who is led to deeds which are just and lawful
rejoices night and day and is strengthened and free o f care; but
the man who pays no heed to justice and does not do what he
ought, finds all his deeds joyless when he remembers any o f them,
and he is afraid and he reproaches himself, [ 174]
The gods, both in the past and now, give men all things except
those which are bad and harmful and useless. Neither in the past
nor now do the gods bestow these on men, but they come upon
them themselves because o f the blindness and folly o f their minds.
[ 175]
Fortune offers many gifts, but is unstable: nature is self-sufficient:
that is why, being smaller but stable, she conquers the greater
forces o f hope, [ 176]
(II ix 1 -5 )
D em ocritus:
Many men perform the foulest deeds and practise the fairest
words.
(II X V 33 = 53a)

266

DEMOCRITUS

Dem ocritus:
One must emulate the deeds and actions o f virtue, not the words.
(II x v 36 = 55)
D em ocritus:
Fine words do not hide fo u l actions nor is a good action spoiled
by slanderous words.
(II xv 40 = 177)
D em ocrates:
Indulgence is the worst o f all things with regard to the education
ofyouth; fo r it is this which gives birth to the pleasures from which
badness originates, [ 178]
idem :
< . . .> children who are given free rein will learn neither letters
nor music nor gymnastics nor yet what most sustains virtue - a
sense o f shame; for it is precisely from this that shame usually
originates, [ 179]
idem :
Education is an ornament fo r the fortunate, a refuge fo r the
unfortunate, [ 180]
idem :
The use o f exhortation and the persuasion o f reason will appear
a stronger inducement to virtue than law and necessity. For one
who has been kept from injustice by law is likely to do wrong in
secret, while one who has been led to duty by persuasion is unlikely
to do anything improper either in secret or in public. That is why
a man who acts uprightly from wisdom and knowledge is at the
same time both courageous and right-thinking, [ 181]
(II x x x i 5 6 -5 9 )
Dem oc:
Learning produces fine things by labour: fo u l things come tofruit
spontaneously without labour. For even one who is unwilling is
often prevented < . . .>
(II x x x i 66 = 182)
Democ:
Neither skill nor wisdom is attainable unless you learn, [ 59]

267

EARLY CREEK PHILOSOPHY

idem :
There is surely intelligence among the young and lack o f intelli
gence among the old; fo r it is not time that teaches good sense but
timely upbringing and nature, [ 183]
idem :
Those who contradict and babble on are ill-equipped fo r learning.
[ 85]

'
(II x x xi 7 1 - 7 3 )
D em oc:
Frequent association with the wicked increases a disposition to
vice.
(II x x x i 90 = 184)
Dem oc:
The hopes o f the educated are better than the wealth o f the ignor
ant.
(II x x x i 94 = 185)
D em ocritus:
Similarity o f mind makes friendship.
(II xxxiii 9 = 186)
D em ocritus:
It is fitting fo r men to set more store by their souls than by their
bodies; fo r perfection o f soul rights wickedness o f body, but
strength o f body without reasoning makes the soul no better at all.
( I l l i 27 = 187 = 36)
D em ocritus:
It is fitting to yield to the law, the rulers, the wiser, [ 47]
D em ocritus:
The boundary o f advantage and disadvantage is joy and absence
o f joy. [ 188]
It is best fo r a man to live his life with as much contentment and
as little grief as possible; this will come about i f he does not take
his pleasures in mortal things, [ 189]

(III i 45-47)
268

DEMOCRITUS

D em ocritus:
One should avoid even speaking o f evil deeds.
( I l l i 91 = 190)
D em ocrates:
One should refrain from wrong-doing not because o f fear but
because o f duty.
( I l l i 95 = 4 1)
D em ocritus:
For men gain contentment from moderation in joy and a meas
ured life: deficiencies and excesses tend to change and to produce
large movements in the soul, and souls which move across large
intervals are neither stable nor content. Thus you must set your
judgement on the possible and be satisfied with what you have,
giving little thought to things that are envied and admired, and
not dwelling on them in your mind; and you must observe the
lives o f those who are badly off, considering what they suffer, so
that what you have and what belongs to you may seem great and
enviable and, by no longer desiring more, you may not suffer in
your soul. For one who admires those who possess much and are
deemed blessed by other men and who dwells on them every hour
in his memory is compelled always to plan something new and,
because o f his desire, to set himself to do some pernicious deed that
the laws forbid. That is why you must not seek certain things and
must be content with others, comparing your own life with that o f
those who do worse and deeming yourself blessed, when you reflect
on what they undergo, in faring and living so much better than
they do. For i f you hold fast to this judgement you will live in
greater contentment and will drive away those not inconsiderable
plagues o f life, jealousy and envy and ill-will.
( I l l i 210 = 191)
Dem ocritus:
To praise and to blame what one should not are both easy, but
each is a mark o f a wicked character.

( I ll ii 36 = 192)
269

EARLY GREEK P H IL O S O P H Y

Dem ocritus:
It is the mark o f good sense to guard against future injustice, and
o f insensibility not to defend oneself when it has occurred.
( I l l iii 43 = 193)
D em ocritus:
Great joys come from contemplating noble works.
( I l l iii 46 = 194)
D em ocritus:
Images are by their dress and adornment magnificent to observe,
but they are empty o f heart, [ 195]
Forgetting ones own misfortunes generates boldness, [ 196]
Fools are shaped by the gifts o f fortune, those who understand
such things by the gifts o f wisdom, [ 197]
*That which is in need knows how much it needs: he who needs
does not recognize the fa c t* [ 198]
Fools, though they hate life, wish to live from fear o f Hades.
[ 199]
Fools live without enjoying life, [ 200]
Fools desire longevity but do not enjoy longevity, [ 201]
Fools desire what is absent: what is present, although it is more
beneficial than what is past, they squander, [ 202]
In fleeing death men pursue it. [ 203]
Fools give no pleasure in the whole o f their lives, [ 204]
Fools, fearing death, desire life, [ 205]
Fools, fearing death, want to grow old. [ 206]
Many who have learned much possess no sense, [ 64]
Without intelligence, reputation and wealth are not safe pos
sessions. [ 77]
(III iv 69-82)

D em ocritus:
One should choose not every pleasure but that concerned with the
noble, [ 207]
Rightful love is longing xvithout violence fo r the noble, [ 73]

270

DEMOCRITUS

A fathers temperateness is the greatest precept fo r his children.


[ 208]
For those brought up in self-sufficiency there are never any short
nights, [ 209]
Fortune provides a rich table, temperateness a self-sufficient one.
[ 210]
Temperateness increasesjoys and makes pleasure greater, [ 2 1 1 ]
(III v 2 2 -2 7 )
D em ocritus:
Some men rule cities and are slaves to women, [cf 214]
Sleeping during the day indicates a diseased body or a troubled
soul or idleness or lack o f education, [ 212]
Coition is mild madness; fo r a man rushes out o f a man. [ 32]
(III vi 26-28)
D em ocritus:
Courage makes misfortunes small.
( I l l vii 21 = 213)
D em ocritus:
The courageous are not only those who conquer their enemies but
also those who are superior to pleasures: some men rule cities and
are slaves to women.
( I l l vii 25 = 214)
Dem ocritus:
The glory o f justice is confidence o f judgement and imperturb
ability: the prize o f injustice is fear o f disaster.
( I l l vii 31 = 215)
D em ocritus:
Imperturbable wisdom, being most honourable, is worth every
thing.
( I ll vii 74 = 216)
D em ocritus:
To be good is not to refrain from wrongdoing but not even to
want to commit it. [ 62]
271

EARLY GREEK PH IL O SO P H Y

D em ocritus:
Only those who hate injustice are loved by the gods, [ 2 17]
(III ix 29-30)
D em ocritus:
When wealth comes from bad activity it makes the disgrace more
conspicuous.
( I l l x 36 = 218)
D em ocritus:
It is a waste o f labour to offer advice to those who think they possess
sense, [ 52]
idem :
Desire fo r money, i f it is not limited by satiety, is fa r heavier than
extreme poverty; fo r greater desires create greater needs, [ 219]
D em ocritus:
E v il gains bring loss o f virtue, [ 220]
(III x 42-44)
D em ocritus:
Hope o f evil gain is the beginning o f loss.
( I l l x 58 = 221)
D em ocritus:
The excessive accumulation o f money fo r ones children is an
excuse fo r avarice which displays its peculiar character, [ 222]
idem :
Whatever the body needs can readily befound by everyone without
trouble or misery: the things which need trouble and misery and
make life painful are craved not by the body but by misapprehen
sion o f judgement, [ 223]
(III x 64 -65)
Dem ocritus:
The desire fo r more destroys what is present - like Aesops dog.
( I ll x 68 = 224)

272

DEMOCRITUS

Demotfritus:
One should tell the truth, not speak at length.
( I l l xii 13 = 44 = 225)
Dem ocritus:
It is better to examine your own mistakes than those o f others.
[ 60]
D em ocritus:
Frankness is a mark o f liberty, but discerning the right occasion
is hazardous, [ 226]
(III xiii 4 6 -4 7 )
Dem ocritus:
To praise someone for noble deeds is noble; fo r to praise for bad
deeds is the mark o f a cheat and a deceiver.
( I l l xiv 8 = 63)
D em ocritus:
The thrifty behave like bees, working as though they are to live for
ever, [ 227]
idem :
The children o f the thrifty who are ignorant are like those dancers
who leap over knives they are killed i f they fa il to land on the
one place where they should rest their feet (and it is difficult to
land on the one place, fo r there is only room fo r their feet there).
In the same way they too, i f they fa il to acquire their fathers
careful and thrifty character, are likely to be destroyed, [ 228]
idem:
Thrift and fasting are good: so too is extravagance on occasion:
it is the mark o f a good man to recognize the occasion, [ 229]
(III xvi 16 -19 )
D em ocritus:
A life without feasts is a long road without inns.
( I l l xvi 22 = 230)
Dem ocritus:
A man o f sound judgement is not grieved by what he does not
possess but rejoices in what he does possess.
( I l l xvii 25 = 231)

273

EARLY CREEK PHILOSOPHY

D em ocritus:
O f pleasant things those that occur most rarely give most joy.
[ 232]
idem :
I f you exceed the measure, what is most enjoyable becomes least
enjoyable, [ 233]
(III xvii 3 7-38 )
D em ocritus:
Men ask fo r health in their prayers to the gods: they do not realize
that the power to achieve it lies in themselves: lacking self-control,
they perform contrary actions and betray health to their desires.
( I l l xviii 30 = 234)
D em ocritus:
For those who get their pleasures from their bellies, exceeding the
measure in food and drink and sex, the pleasures are brief and
short-lived, lasting as long as they are eating or drinking; but the
pains are many. For they always have the same desire for the same
things; and when they obtain what they desire, the pleasure swiftly
departs, there is nothing good in them but a briefjoy, and they
need the same things again.
( I l l xviii 35 = 235)
D em ocritus:
It is hard to fight against anger: to master it is the mark o f a
rational man.
( I l l x x 56 = 236)
D em ocritus:
Ambition is always foolish: with its eye on what harms its enemy
it does not see its own advantage.
( I l l x x 62 = 237)
D em ocritus:
For one who compares himself to his betters ends with a bad
reputation.

(Ill xxii 42 = 238)


274

DEMOCRITUS

D em ocritus:
Oaths made under compulsion are not kept by bad men once they
have escaped.
( I l l xxviii 13 = 239)
D em ocritus:
Voluntary labours make it easier to sustain involuntary labours.
[ 240]
idem:
Continuous labour becomes lighter by custom, [ 2 4 1 ]
(III x x ix 6 3 -6 4 )
Dem ocritus:
More men are good by practice than by nature, [ 242]
idem :
Actions always planned are never completed, [ 81 ]
(III x x ix 6 6 -6 7 )
D em ocritus:
A ll labours are more pleasant than rest when men achieve what
they labour fo r or know that they will achieve it. *But ifyou shun
them and fail, everything* is both painful and miserable.
( I l l x x ix 88 = 243)
D em ocritus:
Even when you are alone, neither say nor do anything bad: learn
to feel shame before yourself rather than before others.
( I l l x x x i 7 = 244)
D em ocritus:
It is greedy to say everythine: and to want to listen to nothing.
...............................
( I l l x x x v i 24 = 86)
Dem ocritus:
One should either be or imitate a good man.
( I l l xx x v ii 22 = 39)

275

EARLY CREEK PHILOSOPHY

Dem ocritus:
I f your character is orderly, your life too will be well-ordered.
( I l l xxxv ii 25 = 61)
D em ocritus:
A good man pays no heed to the censures o f the bad. [ 48]
idem :
Envious men pain themselves as though they were their own
enemies, [ 88]
(III xxxviii 4 6 -4 7)
D em ocritus:
The laws would not forbid each o f us to live at his own pleasure
i f one man did not harm another; fo r envy makes the beginning
o f strife.
( I l l xxxviii 53 = 245)
D em ocritus:
Mercenary service leaches self-sufficiency in life; fo r bread and a
straw mattress are the sweetest cures foi hunger and exhaustion.
[ 246]
idem :
To a wise man the whole earth is accessible; fo r the home country
o f a good soul is the whole world, [ 247]
(III xl 6 -7 )
D em ocritus:
The law means to benefit the life o f men: it can do so when they
themselves mean to fare well - for to those who obey, it indicates
their own virtue, [ 248]
idem :
Internecine strife is bad fo r both parties; fo r victor and van
quished suffer the same destruction, [ 249]
(IV i 33-34)
D em ocritus:
From concord come great deeds, and from concord states can fight
wars - and in no other way.

(IV i 40 = 250)
276

DEMOCRITUS

D em ocritus:
Poverty in a democracy is preferable to what is called prosperity
among tyrants by as much as liberty is preferable to slavery.
[ 251]
One should think it o f greater moment than anything else that the
affairs o f the state are conducted well, neither being contentious
beyond what is proper nor allotting strength to oneself beyond the
common good. For a state which is conducted well is the best means
to success: everything depends on this, and i f this is preserved
everything is preserved and i f this is destroyed everything is
destroyed, [ 252]
It is not advantageous fo r good men to neglect themselves and
look to other things; for their own affairs will go badly. But i f
anyone neglects public affairs he comes to have a bad reputation,
even i f he steals nothing and commits no injustice. For even i f he
takes care and does no wrong, there is still a danger that he will
get a bad reputation and indeed fare badly: wrong-doing is
inevitable and forgiveness is not easy fo r men. [ 253]
When bad men gain office, the more unworthy they are the more
heedless they become and the more they are filled with folly and
rashness, [ 254]
When those in power take it upon themselves to lend to the poor
and to aid them and to favour them, then is there pity and no
isolation but companionship and mutual defence and concord
among the citizens and other good things too many to catalogue.
[ 255]
(IV i 4 2 -4 6 )
Dem ocritus:
It is better for fools to be ruled than to rule, [ 75]
idem:
Justice is doing what should be done, injustice not doing what
should be done but turning away from it. [ 256]
idem:
In the case o f certain animals, it stands thus with killing and not
killing: one who kills those who do or wish injustice suffers no
penalty, and to do so conduces more to well-being than not to do
so. [ 257]

277

EARLY CREEK PHILOSOPHY

One should kill at any cost anything that offends against justice;
and anyone who does this *will in every society have a greater
share o f contentment and justice and boldness and property.*
[ 258]
As I have -written about dangerous beasts and animals, so I think
one should act in the case o f humans too: one should kill an enemy
in accordance with the traditional laws in every society, in which
law does not prohibit it: it is prohibited by the sacred customs o f
different countries, by treaties, by oaths, [ 259]
Anyone who kills a highwayman or a pirate should be free from
penalty, whether he does it by his own hand, by issuing an order,
or by casting a vote, [ 260]
"
(IV ii 13 -18 )
D em ocritus:
It is hard to be ruled by an inferior.
(IV iv 27 = 49)
D em ocritus:
One should avenge injustices to the best o f ones ability and not
pass them by; fo r to do so is just and good, not to do so is unjust
and bad. [ 261]
D em ocritus:
.
Those who do deeds worthy o f exile or imprisonment or who are
worthy o f punishment should be condemned and not acquitted;
anyone who acquits them contrary to the law, judging by gain or
by pleasure, acts unjustly and this must lie heavy on his heart.
[ 262]
idem :
Those who *worthily fu lfil the greatest offices* have the greatest
share o f justice and virtue, [ 263]
idem :
Feel shame before others no more than before yourself: do wrong
no more i f no-one is to know about it than i f all men are: feel
shame above all before yourself and set this up as a law in your
soul so that you may do nothing unsuitable, [ 264]
idem :
M en remember wrongs better than benefits. And that is just; for

278

DEMOCRITUS

as those who repay their debts should not be praised whereas those
who do not should be blamed and suffer, so too is it with rulers.
For they were elected not to do wrong but to do right, [ 265]
There is no means, as things are now constituted, whereby rulers
may be protected from injustice, even i f they are very good men.
< . . .> These things too, I think, should be so arranged that one
who commits no injustice, even i f he severely examines doers o f
injustice, should not come under their power: rather, a statute, or
something else, should protect those who do what is just, [ 266]
(IV v 4 3 -4 8 )
D em ocritus:
Ruling is by nature appropriate to the superior.
(IV vi 19 = 267)
Dem ocritus:
Fear produces flattery: it does not gain good-will.
(IV vii 13 = 268)
D em ocritus:
Boldness is the beginning o f action: fortune controls the end.
(IV x 28 = 269)
Dem ocritus:
Use servants like parts ofyour body, one fo r one task and another
fo r another.
(IV x ix 45 = 270)
D em ocritus:
I f a woman is loved she is not blamed fo r lust.
(IV x x 33 = 271)
D em ocritus: D em ocritus said that o n e w ho is lucky in his sonin-law gains a son, o n e w ho is u nlu cky loses a d au g h ter.
(IV xxii 108 = 272)

279

EARLY GREEK P H IL O S O P H Y

D em ocritus:
A woman is fa r sharper than a man when it comes to foolish
counsels.
(IV x x ii 199 = 273)
D em ocritus:
To speak little is an adornment in a woman - and it is best to be
sparing with adornments, [ 274]
D em ocritus:
To be ruled by a woman is the fin al insult fo r a man. [ 1 11]
(IV xxiii 38-39)
D em ocritus:
H aving children is dangerous: success is fu ll o f trouble and care,
failure is unsurpassed by any other pain.
(IV xx iv 29 = 275)
D em ocritus:
I think one should not have children; fo r in the having o f children
I see many great dangers, many pains, few advantages and
those thin and weak, [ 276]
idem :
Anyone who has a need fo r children would do better, I think, to
get them from his friends. He will then have a child o f the sort he
wishes - f o r he can choose the sort he wants, and one that seems
suitable to him will by its nature best follow him. There is this
great difference: here you may choose among many as you will
and take a child o f the sort you need; but i f you produce a child
yourself there are many dangers fo r you must make do with the
one you get. [ 277]
idem :
M en think that, by nature and some ancient constitution, it is a
matter o f necessity to get children. A nd so, it is plain, do other
animals too; fo r they all acquire offspring by nature and not with
any useful end in view when they are bom, the parents suffer
and rear each as best they can, and they fear fo r them as long as
they are small, and i f they are hurt they grieve. Such is the nature
o f all living creatures; but for men it has been made a custom that
some gain actually comes from offspring, [ 278]
(IV xxiv 3 1 -3 3 )

280

DEMOCRITUS

D em ocritus:
You should share your goods with your children so fa r as possible,
and at the same time care for them lest they do any mischief with
what they have in their hands. For then they become at the same
time fa r more thrifty with their money and keener to acquire it,
and they compete with one another. For common expenditure does
not grieve us as much as private, nor common acquisition content
us - but far less, [ 279]
idem:
It is possible, without spending much money, to educate your child
ren and to build a wall and a protection about their goods and
their persons, [ 280]
(IV x x v i 2 5 -2 6 )

D em ocritus:
For beasts, good breeding consists in bodily strength: fo r men, in
grace o f character.
(IV x x ix 18 = 57)

Dem ocritus:
Just as among injuries cancer is the worst disease, so in goods
<. . >
(IV x x x i 49 = 281)

D em ocritus:
Money when used with sense promotes generosity and charity:
when used with folly it is *a common expense*, [ 282]
idem :
It is not useless to make money, but to do so as a result o f wrong
*doing is the worst o f all things, [ 78]
(IV x x x i 12 0 -1 2 1 )

Dem ocritus:
Poverty and wealth are names fo r lack and satiety; so one who
bcks is not wealthy and one who does not lack is not poor, [ 283]

281

EARLY GREEK P H I L O S O P H Y

D em ocritus:
I f you do not desire much, a little will seem much to you; for a
small appetite makes poverty as powerful as wealth, [ 284]
(IV xxxiii 23-24)
D em ocritus:
Those who seek good things fin d them with difficulty: bad things
come even to those who do not seek them.
(IV x x xiv 58 = 108)
D em ocritus:
A ll men, aware o f the wretchedness o f life, suffer for their whole
lives in troubles and fears, telling false stories about fear after
death.
(IV x xxiv 62: c f 297)
D em ocritus:
You must recognize that human life is fra il and brief and con
founded by many plagues and incapacities: then you will care
fo r moderate possessions and your misery will be measured by
necessity.
(IV x x xiv 65 = 285)
D em ocritus:
Fortune is being content with moderate goods, misfortune being
discontent with many.
(IV x x x ix 17 = 286)
D em ocritus:
I f you are to be content you must not undertake many activities,
whether as an individual or in concert with others, nor choose
activities beyond your own power and nature; but you must be on
your guard so that even when fortune strikes you and leads you
to excess by your beliefs, you put it aside and do not attempt more
than you can. For a modest cargo is safer than a great.
(IV x x x ix 25 = 3)

282

DEMOCRITUS

Dem ocritus:
Shared poverty is harder than private poverty; fo r no hope o f
relief remains, [ 287]
Your house and your life, no less than your body, may suffer
disease, [ 288]
(IV xl 2 0 -2 1)
Dem ocritus:
It is irrational not to accommodate yourself to the necessities o f
life.
(IV xliv 64 = 289)
D em ocritus:
Drive out by reasoning the unmastered pain o f a numbed soul.
[ 290]
idem:
It is important to think as you should in times o f misfortune.
[ 42]
idem:
Magnanimity is bearing wrongs lightly, [ 46]
idem:
It is a mark o f the temperate to bear poverty well, [ 201]
(IV xliv 6 7 -7 0 )
D em ocritus:
The hopes o f those who think aright are attainable: the hopes o f
the unintelligent are impossible, [ 58]
D em ocritus:
The hopes o f the unintelligent are irrational, [ 292]
(IV xlvi 18 -19 )
D em ocritus:
Those who take pleasure in the disasters o f their neighbours do
not understand how the affairs o f fortune are common to all
and they lack any joy o f their own.

(IV xlviii 10 = 293)

283

EARLY CREEK PHILOSOPHY

D em ocritus:
Strength and shapeliness are the good things o f youth: temperance
is the flower o f age.
(IV 1 20 = 294)
D em ocritus:
Old men were once young, but it is uncertain i f young men will
reach old age. Now a completed good is better than one which is
still to come and is uncertain.
(IV 1 22 = 295)
D em ocritus:
Age is a general mutilation: it retains everything but everything
is defective.
(IV I 76 = 296)
Dem ocritus:
Some men who do not know how mortal nature dissolves but are
aware o f the wretchedness o f life spend their whole lives in troubles
and fears, fashioning false stories about the time after death.
(IV Iii 40 = 297)
We also possess a long list o f maxims ascribed in the manuscripts to
'Democrates'. Some o f these are certainly Democritean and many others
may derive ultimately from Democritus. Although some are certainly
not by Democritus, it seems best to translate the list as a whole and to
let it stand as an Appendix to the fragments o f Democritus.
I f anyone listens to these maxims o f mine with intelligence, he
will do many deeds worthy o f a good man and he will leave undone
many bad deeds, [ 35]
It is fitting for men to set more store by their souls than by
their bodies; fo r perfection o f soul rights wickedness o f body, but
strength o f body without reasoning makes the soul no better at all.
[ 36 = 187]
H e who chooses the goods o f the soul chooses the more divine:
he who chooses the goods o f the body, the human, [ 37]
It is noble to prevent a wrong-doer; or i f not, not to do wrong
with him. [ 38]

284

DEMOCRITUS

One should either be a good man or imitate one. [ 39]


M en flourish neither by their bodies nor by their wealth but by
uprightness and good sense, [ 40]
Refrain from error not out o f fear but out o f duty, [ 41 ]
It is important to think as you should in times o f misfortune.
[ 42]
Remorse for fo u l deeds is the salvation o f life, [ 43]
One should tell the truth, not speak at length, [ 44]
A man who does wrong is more wretched than one who is
wronged, [ 45]
Magnanimity is bearing wrongs lightly, [ 46]
It is fitting to yield to the law, the rulers, the wiser, [ 47]
A good man pays no heed to the censures o f the bad. [ 48]
It is hard to be ruled by an inferior, [ 49]
A trtan completely enslaved to money will never bejust, [ 50]
Reason is often a more powerful persuader than gold, [ 51 ]
It is a waste o f labour to offer advice to those who think they
possess sense, [ 52]
Many do not learn reason but live in accordance with reason.
[ 53]
Many perform the foulest deeds and practise the fairest words.
[ 53a]
The unintelligent come to their senses by suffering misfortune.
[ 54]
One should emulate the deeds and actions o f virtue, not the
words, [ 55]
It is those well-equipped fo r it who recognize and emulate the
noble, [ 56]
For beasts, good breeding consists in bodily strength: for men,
in grace o f character, [ 57]
The hopes o f those who think aright are attainable: the hopes
o f the unintelligent are impossible, [ 58]
Neither skill nor wisdom is attainable unless you learn, [ 59]
It is better to examine your own mistakes than those o f others.
[ 60]
I f your character is orderly, your life too will be well-ordered.
[ 61]

285

EARLY GREEK P H I L O S O P H Y

To be good is not to refrain from wrong-doing but not even to


want to commit it. [ 62]
To praise someone fo r noble deeds is noble; for to praise for bad
deeds is the mark o f a cheat and a deceiver, [ 63]
Many who have learned much possess no sense, [ 64]
One should cultivate much sense, not much learning, [ 65]
It is better to plan before acting than to repent after, [ 66]
Trust not everyone but the reliable: the former is foolish, the
latter is the mark o f a man in his senses, [ 67]
M en are reliable and unreliable not only on the basis o f what
they do but also on the basis o f what they wish, [ 68]
Goodness and truth are the same fo r all men: fo r different men
different things are pleasant, [ 6g]
Immoderate desire is the mark o f a child, not o f a man. [ 70]
Inopportune pleasures give birth to pains, [ 71]
Violent appetite fo r anything blinds the soul to everything else.
[ 72]
Rightful love is longing without violence for the noble, [ 73]
It is pleasant to get nothing which is not to your advantage.
[ 74]
It is better fo r fools to be ruled than to rule, [ 75]
Silly people are taught not by reason but by misfortune, [ 76]
Without intelligence, reputation and wealth are not safe pos
sessions. [ 77]
It is not useless to make money, but to do so as a result o f wrong
doing is the worst o f all things, [ 78]
It is wretched to imitate bad men and not even to wish to imitate
good, [ 79]
It is disgraceful to busy yourself over the affairs o f others and
neglect your own. [ 8o]
Actions always planned are never completed, [ 81 ]
Cheats and hypocrites are those who promise everything and do
nothing, [ 82]
Happy is the man who has property and sense; fo r he uses it
nobly on what he should.
The cause o f error is ignorance o f what is better, [ 83]
One who does shameful deeds should first be ashamed o f him
self. [ 84]

286

DEMOCRITUS

Those who contradict and babble on are ill-equipped fo r learn


ing what they should, [ 85]
It is greedy to say everything and to want to listen to nothing.
[ 86]
.....................

One should be on guard against bad men lest they lake their
opportunity, [ 87]
Envious men pain themselves as though they were their own
enemies, [ 88]

Your enemy is not he who wrongs you but he who wishes to.
[ 89]
'
Enmity among kin is fa r worse than enmity among strangers.
[ 90]
Do not suspect everyone - but be prudent and safe, [ 91 ]
You should accept favours only i f you expect to give greater
favours in return, [ 92]
When doing a favour keep watch on the receiver lest he prove
a cheat and return evil for good, [ 93]
Small favours at the right lime are very great for those who
receive them, [ 94]
Honours count much with the wise who understand that they
are being honoured, [ 95]
A generous man is not one who looks to a return but one who
has chosen to confer a benefit, [ 96]
Many who seem to be friends are not: many who do not seem
to be are. [ 97]
The friendship o f one intelligent man is better than that o f all
the unintelligent, [ 98]
A man who has not a single good friend does not deserve to
live, [ 99]
A man whose well-tried friends do not long stand by him has a
graceless character, [ ]
Many avoid theirfriends when theyfa ll from wealth to poverty.
[ 101]
Equality is everywhere noble: excess and deficiency do not to
me seem so. [ 102]
A man who loves no-one seems to me to be loved by no-one.
[ 103]
Old men are charming i f they are wily and earnest, [ 104]
287

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY

Beauty o f body is an animal attribute i f there is no sense behind


it. [ 105]
In times o f good fortune it is easy to fin d a friend, in times o f
bad fortune nothing is harder, [ 106]
Not all our kindred are our friends, but those who agree with
us over what is advantageous, [ 107]
Being men, it is fitting that we should not laugh at human
misfortunes but weep at them, [ 107a]
Those who seek good thingsfin d them with difficulty: bad things
come even to those who do not seek them, [ 108]
Those who like fault-finding are not well-equipped for
friendship, [ lo g ]
Let not a woman argue: that is terrible, [ 110]
To be ruled by a woman is the fin al insult fo r a man. [ i n ]
It is a mark o f a divine mind to think always o f what is fine.
[ 112]
I f you believe that the gods observe everything, you will err
neither secretly nor in public.
Great harm is done to the unintelligent by those who praise
them, [ 113]
It is better to be praised by another than by oneself, [ 114]
I f you do not understand the praise, suppose that you are being
flattered, [ 115 ]
The world is a stage, life is our entrance: you came, you saw,
you went away.
The world is change: life is opinion.
A little wisdom is more honourable than a reputation fo r great
folly.
(D em ocrates, Maxims 1-86)

288

22
DIOGENES OF
APOLLONIA
The Presocratic Diogenes, the first o f several ancient philosophers to
bear that name, came from a town called Apollonia either Apollonia
in Crete or Apollonia on the Black Sea. H e is said to have been the last
o f the Presocratic natural philosophers: that remark, together with the
various parodies o f his views found in the comic playwrights, suggests
that he was active in the 430s and 420s. (There is no evidence fo r a
more precise chronology.)
Theophrastus wrote a monograph on Diogenes. His general line o f
interpretation emerges from the following short passage:

D iogenes o f A p o llo n ia, p erh a p s th e last o f those w ho stu d ied


these subjects, w ro te fo r the m ost p art in a m u d d led fash ion,
som etim es fo llo w in g A n a x a go ras and som etim es L eu cip p u s.
H e too says that the n atu re o f the u niverse is air, infin ite and
eternal, from w hich, as it conden ses an d rarefies an d ch anges
its prop erties, th e o th er fo rm s com e into b ein g. T h a t is w hat
T h eo p h rastu s says ab o u t D iogenes, a n d th e b o o k o f his
entitled On Nature, which I h ave seen, clearly says that it is air
from w hich ev ery th in g else com es into bein g. B u t N icolaus
records that he posited as the elem en t so m eth in g b etw een fire
and air.
(Sim plicius, Commentary on the Physics 2 5 .1-9 )

The opening words o f O n N a tu re are twice cited by Diogenes Laertius:


289

EARLY CREEK PHILOSOPHY

T h is is how his book begins:


When beginning any account it seems to me that one should make
the starting-point incontrovertible and the style simple and digni
fied. [64 1]
(D iogen es L aertius, Lives o f the Philosophers IX 57: c f V I 81)
Most o f our information about Diogenes' thought derives from Sim
plicius, who describes it in the course o f a long discussion o f the dis
agreement among earlier interpreters o f Diogenes.
M ost scholars say that D iogenes o f A p o llo n ia, like A n a x i
m enes, posited air as the prim ary elem ent. B u t N icolaus in
his treatise On the Gods reco rd s that h e d eclared the elem ent
betw een fire and air to be the first prin ciple; an d P orph yry,
the m ost learn ed o f ph ilosoph ers, has follow ed N icolaus. N ow
you sh ou ld know that this D io gen es w ro te several w orks, as he
h im self reco rd s in his b o o k On Nature, w h ere he says that he
has w ritten against the n atural scientists (whom he h im self
actually calls sophists) and that he has com posed a Meteorology
(in w hich he says he has discussed th e first prin ciple and also
the n atu re o f m an). In On Nature, w hich is the only o n e o f his
w orks w hich I have seen, h e p rop oses to show in m any ways
that th ere is m uch intelligence in th e first p rin cip le w hich he
posits. Im m ed iately a fte r th e p re fa ce he writes as follows:
It seems to me, in a word, that all existing things are alterations
o f the same thing and are the same thing. This is quite clear. For
i f the things that now exist in this world - earth and water and
air and fire and the other things that plainly exist in this world i f any one o f them were different from any other, being different
in its own peculiar nature, and were not the same thing changed
in many ways and altered, then they could in no way mix with one
another, nor could benefit or harm accrue to one from another;
nor indeed could plants grow from the earth, or animals or any
thing else come into being, unless they were so constituted as to be
the same thing. But all these things, alteringfrom some one thing,
become different at different times and return to the same thing.
[ 2]
I too, w h en I read those first rem arks, th o u g h t that h e had in

290

D IO G E N E S OF A P O L L O N I A

m ind as the com m on substrate so m eth in g o th e r than th e fo u r


elem ents, since he says th at these w ould not m in gle with o r
ch an ge into on e a n o th e r i f som e o n e o f them , h a vin g a p ecu liar
nature o f its ow n, w ere th e first prin ciple, and i f th e re w ere
not som e o n e th in g u n d erly in g them all, o f w hich all w ere
alterations. B u t next, h a vin g show n that th ere is m uch intelli
gen ce in this first p rin cip le fo r, he says,
Without intelligence it could not have been so distributed as to
preserve measures o f all things o f summer and winter and night
and day and rain and wind and good weather; and all other
things, i f you are willing to apply your intelligence, you will find
to be disposed in the finest possible way [ 3]
- h e continues by u rg in g that hu m an s and o th e r anim als
d ep en d fo r th eir life an d th eir soul and th eir intelligen ce on
this first prin ciple w hich is air. H e says:
Again, in addition to these there are the following important
indications. Humans and other animals, inasmuch as they
breathe, live by the air. And this is fo r them both soul and intelli
gence, as will have been shown clearly in this treatise; and i f this
departs, they die and their intelligence is lost, [ 4]
T h e n a little later he ad d s clearly:
And it seems to me that that which possesses intelligence is what
men call air, and that by this everyone both is governed and has
power over everything. For it is this which seems to me to be god
and to have reached everything and to arrange everything and to
be in everything. And there is not a single thing which does not
share in it.
But no one thing shares in it in the same way as any other:
there are many forms both o f the air itself and o f intelligence. For
it is multiform: hotter and colder, drier and wetter, more stable
and with a swifter motion, and there are many - infinitely many other alterations in it both o f flavour and o f colour.
The souls o f all animals are indeed the same air hotter than
the external air in which we exist but much colder than the air by
the sun. But this heat is not similar in different animals (for it is
not even so in different men) but it differs - not greatly, however,
but to such an extent that they are still like one another. Yet none
o f the things that alter can become absolutely similar to any other

291

EARLY GREEK PH IL OSO P H Y

without becoming the same thing. Thus inasmuch as the alteration


is multiform, so too are the animals multiform and many, and
they resemble one another neither in shape nor in habits nor in
intelligence because o f the multitude o f the alterations. Neverthe
less, it is by the same thing that they all live and see and hear, and
they all get the rest o f their intelligence from the same thing, [ 5]
N e x t he shows that the seed o f anim als is also breath-like and
that acts o f in telligence o ccu r w hen th e air to g eth er with the
blood p ervad es the w h ole body th ro u gh the vessels (here he
gives a precise anatom y o f the vessels).
H ere, then, he plainly says qu ite clearly that w hat m en call
air is the first principle. It is n o tew orthy that, while he says that
o th er things com e into bein g by virtu e o f alterations in it, he
nevertheless asserts that it is eternal:
And this itself is an eternal and immortal body; but by it some
things come into being and others disappear, [ 7]
A n d elsew here:
But this seems to me to be clear that it is great and strong, eternal
and immortal, and knows many things, [ 8]
So m uch fo r D iogenes.
(Sim plicius, Commentary on the Physics 15 1.2 0 -15 3 .2 2 )
Aristotle preserves Diogenes precise anatomy o f the vessels. (The
text is in some places uncertain, and it is not clear whether Aristotles
quotation is always verbatim..)
D iogen es o f A p o llo n ia gives the fo llo w in g account:
The vessels in men are as follows. There are two very large ones.
They extend through the belly along the backbone, one to the right
and the other to the left, into the legs, each on its own side, and
upwards into the head past the collar-bones through the throat.
From these, vessels extend throughout the whole o f the body, from
the right vessel to the right and from the left to the left, the largest
two passing into the heart near the backbone itself, and others, a
little higher up, passing through the chest under the armpits, each
into the hand on its own side. One o f these is called the spleenvessel, the other the liver-vessel. Each o f them divides at its
extremity, one branch going into the thumb, one into the palm;

292

D IO G E N E S OF A P O L L O N I A

and from them fine, many-branched vessels pass into the rest o f
the hand and the fingers. Other finer ones extend from the first
vessels, from the right vessel into the liver and from the left into
the spleen and the kidneys. Those which extend into the legs divide
at the junction and extend throughout the thighs. The largest o f
them extends down the back o f the thigh and is seen to be thick;
another passes inside the thigh, a little less thick than the former.
Then they extend past the knee into the shin and the foot (just like
those which extend into the hands), descending in the direction o f
the sole o f the foot and thence extending into the toes. Many fine
vessels divide from them in the direction o f the belly and theflanks.
Those which extend into the head through the throat appear large
in the neck. From each o f them, where it ends, many vessels divide
o ff into the head, those from the right towards the left and those
from the left towards the right. Each ends at the ear. There is
another vessel in the neck, next to the large vessel on each side
and a little smaller than it, with which most o f the vesselsfrom the
head itself connect. These extend through the throat inside. From
each o f them, vessels extend under the shoulder-blades and into
the hands, and they are seen alongside the spleen-vessel and the
liver-vessel, a little smaller in size. These are the vessels which are
lanced when anything causes pain beneath the skin it is the
liver-vessel and the spleen-vessel which are lanced when anything
causes pain in the belly. Others extend from these under the
breasts. Other vessels extend from each o f these through the spinal
marrow into the testicles; these are fine. Others extend under the
skin and through the flesh into the kidneys, and end in the case o f
males in the testicles and in the case o f females in the womb. These
are called the spermatic vessels. The vessels are broader as they
first leave the belly, and then become finer until they change from
the right to the left and vice versa. The thickest part o f the blood
is absorbed by thefleshy parts; that which overflows into the regions
just mentioned becomes fine and hot and frothy, [ 6]
(A ristotle, History o f Animals 51 ^ 3 0 - 5 1 2b 11)
Finally, the way in which air affects our mental lives may be illus
trated by a passage from Theophrastus account o f Diogenes psycho
logical views:
293

EARLY CREEK PHILOSOPHY

Pleasure and pain com e ab o u t in the fo llo w in g way. W hen


the air in considerable quantity m ixes with the blood and
lightens it, bein g in a n atural cond ition and p ervad in g the
w hole body, th ere is pleasu re; w hen th e air is in an u nn atural
condition and d oes not m ix, a n d the blood settles and becom es
w eaker and thicker, th ere is pain. Sim ilarly with co u ra g e and
health an d their opposites. T h e to n g u e is the best ju d g e o f
pleasure, fo r it is very so ft and rare and all the vessels lead into
it. T h a t is w hy th e to n gu e p rovid es a ve ry larg e n u m b er o f
signs in the case o f the sick - and indicates the colou rs o f o th er
anim als (fo r th eir varieties and characters a re all reflected in
it) . . .
W e th in k by air that is p u re and d ry ; fo r m oisture inhibits
the m ind. T h a t is w hy w h en w e a re asleep o r d ru n k o r fu ll we
th in k less. T h e r e is a sign that m oistu re destroys the m ind in
the fact that the o th er anim als have w eaker intellects; fo r they
b rea th e air fro m the earth and the fo o d they take is m oister.
B irds breath e p u re air, but th eir n a tu re is like that o f fish; fo r
th eir flesh is firm an d th e b reath d oes not pass th ro u gh the
body but com es to a stop in the belly. H en ce they digest their
fo o d quickly bu t a re them selves stupid. In add ition to their
fo o d , th eir m ou ths and ton gu es contrib ute to this; fo r they
can n ot u n d erstan d o n e an o th er. Plants, because they are not
hollow and d o not take in air, a re co m p letely incapable o f
thinking.
T h e sam e cause accounts fo r the fact that infan ts are stupid.
F or they contain a g rea t quantity o f m oistu re with the result
that [the air] can n ot pass th ro u g h th e w hole body but is
secreted in the chest. H en ce they a re d u ll an d stupid. T h e y
a re p ro n e to a n g er, and in g en era l im petuou s an d volatile
because th e air is m oved in la rg e r quantities from sm all bodies.
T h a t is also th e cause o f fo rg ettin g . F or because the air does
not g o th ro u g h o u t the b o d y we can n ot u n d erstan d things. A
sign o f this is the fact that w h en w e try to rem em b er som eth in g
th ere is a constriction in the chest and w hen w e su cceed it is
d ispelled and we a re relieved o f the pain.
(T h eo p h ra stu s, O n the Senses 4 3 -4 5 )

294

Appendix
THE SOURCES
T h e follow in g telegra p h ic notes are d esign ed to co n vey som e
m inim al idea o f each o f the authorities w ho a re q u oted in the
course o f this book. T h e list also includes the m ost im portan t o f
the sources w ho are now available to us only indirectly th ro u gh
quotation in later authors. T h e notes gen erally give, first, the
dates o f the source; then his place o f birth (p reced ed by the
letter b .) and the location o f his m ain activities (preced ed by
an arrow); thirdly, a hint o f his intellectual allegiances;
fou rth ly, an indication - w here apposite - o f those o f his works
which are m ost pertin en t to the study o f the Presocratics. T h e
letter Q in square brackets indicates that the sou rce is h im self
known to us only indirectly; the letter L in square brackets
indicates that the sou rce w rote in Latin (all sources not so stig
m atized w rote in G reek).
T h e most im portan t sources a re in trod u ced by bold type.
T h e length o f a note is not p rop ortio n al to the im p ortan ce o f
its subject.
T h e sources are listed in alphabetical o rd e r, an o n ym ou s and
pseudonym ous works bein g collected at the end.
Achilles: third century a d (?); astronom er
Aelian: second h alf o f second century a d ; b. Praeneste; > Rome;
wrote The Nature of Animals and Miscellaneous Inquiries
Agathemerus: first century a d (?); geograph er
Albert the Great: a d 1200-1280; theologian and scholar; teacher o f
Thom as Aquinas

Alexander o f Aphrodisias: flourished c. 200 a d ; Athens; Peripatetic


philosopher; author o f acute com m entaries on Aristotle

295

appen d ix

the sources

Ammoniiis; fifth century

a d ; > Alexandria; pupil o f Proclus; com


m entator on Aristotle
Apollodorus [Q]: second century ; b. Athens; Alexandria; scholar
and polymath, his lost Chronicles are a major source for Presocratic
chronology
Apollonius: second century (?); com piler o f Marvellous Stories
Aristotle: 384-322 ; b. Stagira; > Athens (also worked at Assos,
and at Pella, where he tutored A lexand er the Great). Pupil o f Plato;
foun d er o f the Peripatetic school o f philosophy. An unsurpassed
polymath scientist, philosopher, historian, scholar. He was inter
ested in the history o f philosophy and science; several o f his surviv
ing works (notably the Physics and the Metaphysics) contain
invaluable inform ation about the Presocratics
Aristoxenus: fourth century ; b. T arentu m ; Athens; associate o f
Aristotle; musical theorist, biographer, with interest in Pythagoreanism
Anus Didymus [Q]: first century b c / a d ; b. Alexandria; friend o f the
Em peror Augustus, author o f philosophical handbooks
Athenaeus: flourished c. 200 ; b. Naucratis in Egypt; his Deipnosophists - Professors at the Dining Table - is an encyclopaedic farrago
in the form o f table-talk
Marcus Aurelius Antoninus: a d 121-18 0 ; b. Rome; Em peror and
Stoic; his Meditations occasionally allude to the Presocratics

Caelius Aurelianus [L]: fifth century

a d ; b. Num idia; medical trans


lator o f Soranus (second century ad)
Calddius [L]: fourth century a d ; Christian philosopher and author
o f influential com m entary on Platos Timaeus
Callimachus: third century ; b. C yrene; * Alexandria; eminent
poet and scholar
Censorinus [L]: third century a d ; Rome; gram m arian, his On Birth
days was written in 238
Marcus T ullius Cicero [L]: 106-43 BC! b. A rpinum ; > Rome; orator,
politician, statesman; leading literary figure o f his age; keen and
learned philosopher
Clement o f Alexandria: a d c . 150-c. 215; b. Athens ( ? ) . Educated as
a G reek, he converted to Christianity and became the first Christian
philosopher. His Miscellanies com pares G reek and Christian
thought, unsystematically but with a wealth o f quotation
Columella [L]: first century ad ; b. Cadiz; writer on agriculture

296

a ppen d ix

the sources

Lucius Annaeus Cumulus: first century a d ; Stoic philosopher,


scholar, friend o f the poet Persius

Damascius: a d c. 458-c. 540; b . Damascus; Athens; N eoplatonic


philosopher

Dio o f Prusa:

a d c . 40-c. 120; b. Prusa in Bithynia; * Rome. Friend


o f the Em peror Trajan, leading orator, prolific author, many o f
whose writings are Stoic-Cynic homilies
Diodorus: first century ; b. A gyrium in Sicily; * Alexandria and
Rome; author o f a Universal Histury
Diogenes Laertius: third century a d ( ? ) . N othing is known o fh iso w n
life, but he survives in his Lives o f the Philosophers. T h e w ork, in ten
books, is derivative; it contains simplifications, confusions and some
nonsense. But it remains a valuable source, both for the Presocratics
and for later G reek philosophy
Diogenes o f Oenoanda: second century a d ; Epicurean philosopher
who had his views carved on stone
Dionysius [Q]: third century a d ; Bishop o f Alexandria

Eudemus [Q]: fourth century ; b. Rhodes; * Athens; pupil o f


Aristotle; philosopher and historian o f science; used by Simplicius

Eusebius: a d c. 260- c . 340; Bishop o f Caesarea, political figure,


voluminous author; his Preparation for the Gospel includes many
quotations from otherwise lost works o f pagan philosophy

Eustathius: twelfth century a d ; b. Constantinople; Archbishop o f


Thessalonica; wrote, am ong much else, a com m entary on H om er

Galen: a d c. 129-c. 200; b. P ergam u m ;> Rome; em inent doctor and


medical writer who was trained as a philosopher; his num erous writ
ings make frequent reference to earlier philosophy
Aulus Gellius [L]: second century a d ; from Rome; his Attic Nights,
written in Athens, is a miscellany o f essays on literary, historical
and philosophical subjects

Harpocration: second century a d (?); * A lexandria; literary scholar


Hephaeslion: second century a d ; - * A lexandria; literary scholar
Heraclides [Q]: c. 390-c. 310 ; b. H erad ea on the Black Sea; *
Athens; pupil o f Plato: litterateur and lightweight philosopher
Heraclitus: first century a d (?); author o f allegorizing interpretations
o f Hom er

297

appen d ix

the sources

Herodian: second century a d ; b. A lexandria; Rome; works on


linguistics and literary theory

Herodotus: c. 485-c. 420 ; b. Halicarnassus, travelled widely; the


father o f history

Hierocles: flourished early fifth century a d ; - A lexandria; Neoplatonist philosopher, author o f com m entary on the so-called Golden
Verses o f Pythagoras
Hippolylus: a d c. 18 0 -2 3 5;Rome; Christian, fierce controversialist,
chosen as anti-Pope, exiled to Sardinia. His Refutation of All
Heresies, in ten books, contains much inform ation about pagan philo
sophy
Hisdosus: flourished a d c . 1100; wrote on Platos psychology

lamblichus: a d c . 250-c. 325; b. Chalcis; > Syria; Neoplatonist philo


sopher, pupil o f Porphyry. W rote at length on Pythagoreanism
Isocrates: 436-338 ; from Athens; leading orator, political com m ent
ator, educational figure

Lucian:

a d c . 120-c. 185; b. Samosata in Syria; * Athens; prolific


author o f satirical sketches

Macrobius [L]: early fifth century ad ; scholar, his Saturnalia contains


literary, scientific and philosophical discussions

Nicolaus o f Damascus: first century ; scholar and author o f com


mentaries on A ristotle

Numenius [Q]: end o f second century a d ; from Apam ea in Syria;


Platonico-Pythagorean philosopher

Olympiodorus: sixth century a d ; A lexandria; Neoplatonist philo


sopher, author o f com m entaries on Plato and A ristotle
(higen: a d c . 185-c. 250; b. A lex a n d ria; Caesarea; most influential
o f early Christian theologians; his Against Celsus contains frequent
allusions to pagan philosophy

Philodemus: first century ; b. G adara; * Naples; Epicurean philo


sopher, many o f whose works survive am ong the Herculaneum
papyri
John Philoponus: flourished in the sixth century a d ; Alexandria;
Christian Neoplatonist, author o f com m entaries on A ristotle
Plato: 428348 ; b. Athens; philosopher o f all-pervasive influence;
his works often allude to the Presocratics

298

appen d ix

the sources

Plotinus: a d c. 205-270; b. Egypt; Rome; leading philosopher o f


his age (founder o f Neoplatonism); his Enneads contain occasional
allusions to Presocratic thought
Plutarch: a d c . 45 -c. 120; b. C haeronea; a man o f learning and letters
(history, biography, literary criticism, philosophy); several o f his
moral essays contain quotations from and allusions to the Preso
cratics
Polybius: c. 200c. 115 ; b. M egalopolis; Rome (as a prisoner o f
war); leading historian
Porphyry: a d 234-c. 305; b. T y re ; Rome; pupil o f Plotinus, whose
works he edited; Neoplatonist philosopher and volum inous author
Proclus: a d 412485; b. Constantinople; * Athens; N eoplatonic
philosopher; his com m entary on Euclid contains inform ation about
the early history o f G reek mathematics

Sextus Empiricus: second century a d (?); m ajor figure in sceptical


philosophy; his Outlines of Pyrrhonism and Against the Mathematicians
contain much inform ation about earlier philosophers
Sim plicius: flourished c. 500-540 a d ; trained in Alexandria, *
Athens (529-534 in Persia); pagan, Neoplatonist philosopher (an
enemy o f Philoponus). His com m entaries on A ristotle, all written
towards the end o f his life, are rem arkable for their learning; his
commentary on the Physics is the single most im portant source for
Presocratic philosophy
John Stobaeus: fifth century a d ; from Stobi in Macedonia; his
Anthology, in four books, is a collection o f excerpts from earlier
Greek authors arranged by subject-matter
Strabo: 64 - a d c. 25; b. Am asia in Asia Minor; * Rom e; leading
geographer

Themistius: a d 317-388; Constantinople; renow ned orator, com


mentator on A ristotle

Theo o f Smyrna: early second century a d ; Platonist and m athem a


tician

TheodorusProdromus: twelfth century a d ; Constantinople; novelist


and multifarious author

Theophrastus: 3 7 1-2 8 7 ; b. Lesbos; Athens; A risto tles leading


pupil and successor, m atching his m aster in the range o f his inter
ests. Had a profound influence on the historiography o f G reek
philosophy. Most o f his works are lost; the essay On the Senses, dis
cussing various pre-Aristotelian theories, survives
299

appen d ix

the sources

Thrasyllus [Q]: first century a d ; b. A lexandria; Rome; astrologer


to the Em peror Tiberius; catalogued the works o f Plato and Dem o
critus
Timon [Q]: c. 320-c. 230 ; b. Phlius; satirical poet o f sceptical bent
John Tzetzes; a d 1 1 10-c. 118 0 ;>Constantinople; scholar, polymath,
prolific author

Anonym ous works


Anecdota Graeca: title (Unpublished Greek Texts) given to various
miscellaneous collections o f often anonym ous texts
Etymologicum Magnum: encyclopedic dictionary, com piled c. a d 1100
H erculaneum papyrus no. 1012: fragm ents o f work by (?) Demetrius
o f Laconia, second century Epicurean
Anonymus Londinensis: nam e given to the unknown author o f a m edi
cal text, found on papyrus, the contents o f which contain material
from the fourth century
Theosophia: a d c . 500; Christian compilation o f pagan material bear
ing on oracles, etc

Pseudonym ous works

[Alexander], Problems: late compilation o f ultimately Peripatetic


material

[Arislolle], On the World: b rie f sum m ary o f Aristotelian philosophy,


dating from first century (?)

[Aristotle], On Melissus, Xenophanes, Corgias: essays o f exposition and


criticism; date unknown

[Aristotle], Problems: Peripatetic compilation o f uncertain date


[lamblichus]. Theological Arithmetic: essay on number-mysticism, per
haps by a contem porary o f lamblichus
[Olympiodorus], On the Divine and Sacred Art of the Philosophers Slow,
late essay on alchemy

[Philoponus], Commentary on the Generation of Animals: perhaps written


by Michael o f Ephesus, eleventh century a d

[Plutarch], Consolation to Apollonius: date uncertain


[Plutarch], Is Fire or Water the More Useful?
[Plutarch], Miscellanies: fragm entary doxographical notes
[Plutarch], On Desire and Grief: fragm ent o f uncertain origin

300

a ppen d ix

the sources

[Plutarch], On the Scientific Beliefs of the Philosophers: superficial but

valuable com pilation, probably from second century

a d

Scholiasts
Scholia are notes. Many manuscripts o f ancient authors have scholia
in their margins. T h ese notes vary greatly in value and in date. T h is
book has cited scholia to:
Euripides, Phoenician Women [tragedy, c. 410 ]
G regory o f Nazianzus [Bishop, a d 330-390]
Hom er
Nicander [didactic poet, second century (?)]
Plato

301

FU RTHER READING

T h e literature on the Presocratics is extensive, and much o f it is for


midably technical. T h is list mentions a few o f the m ore accessible
items.
T h e best b rief and general introduction to the subject in English is
E. Hussey, The Presocratics (London, 1972)
A larger and m ore philosophical treatm ent can be found in
J. Barnes, The Presocratic Philosophers (London, 1982 [2nd edition])
A larger and m ore literary treatm ent can be found in
H. Fraenkel, Early Greek Poetry and Philosophy, trans. M. Hadas and
J. Willis (O xford , 1975)
T h e re is a learned and sane discussion o f all aspects o f Presocratic
thought in the first three volum es o f
W. . C . G uthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy (Cam bridge, 1962,
1965, 1969)
Most o f the G reek texts are collected in
H. Diels and W. K ranz , Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker (Berlin, 1952
[10th edition])
T h e re is a useful anthology
M. R. W right, The Presocratics (Bristol, 1985)
and a selection o f G reek texts, together with translations and com
mentary, is printed in
G. S. K irk.J. E. Raven, and M. Schofield, The Presocratic Philosophers
(Cam bridge, 1983 [2nd edition])
Much o f the best work on the subject has appeared in article form.
Some o f this can be found in
D. J. Furley and R. E. Allen (eds), Studies in Presocratic Philosophy
(London, 1970, 1975)

302

FURTHER

READING

A. P. D. M ourelatos (ed.), The Presocratics (Garden C ity N .Y ., 1974)


On the Milesian philosophers there is an outstanding study
. H. Kahn, Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmology (New
Y ork, i960)
On Heraclitus see
C. H. Kahn, The Art and Thought of Heraclitus (Cam bridge, 1979)
For everything to do with Pythagoras and Pythagoreanism consult
W. Burkert, Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism (Cam bridge
Mass., 1972)
T h ere is a new edition, with com m entary, o f Parm enides
D. Gallop, Parmenides o f Elea (T oronto, 1984)
For Zeno see the various essays collected in
W. C . Salmon (ed.), Zenos Paradoxes (Indianapolis Ind., 1970)
T h ere are helpful notes on Empedocles in
M. R. W right, Empedocles-the Extant Fragments (New Haven C onn.,
1981)
For Anaxagoras see
M. Schofield, An Essay on Anaxagoras (Cam bridge, 1980)
O n the Atomists it is still necessary to refer to
C. Bailey, The Greek Atomists and Epicurus (O xford , 1928)
Further bibliography can be found in G uthrie and Barnes.

303

SUBJECT INDEX

Air. 7 7 . 79 - 289-92

Alcm aeon, 11, 37 89-92


Alexander, 152, 230
Anaxagoras, 11, 2 6 -3 1 ,4 4 -4 6 ,
78, 226-39, 24 . 244. 24 5
289
Anaxim ander, 11, 3 6 -3 7, 7 1
7 6 .7 7

Anaxim enes, 11, 17, 37, 77-80,


226, 236, 290
Aphorism s, 68-69, 9 2> lo 9 *
125-26, 222, 265-88
Archelaus, 46, 240-41, 244
Aristode, 13, 15, 17, 22, 25, 85,
2 3 5 >2 4 4
Astronom y, 15, 65-66, 67-68,
72, 74, 78, 107-108, 124,
>37-38. 139, 182-84, 2og.
219-20, 237-38, 241 (see also
Earth, T h e , Eclipse, Moon,
Planets, Sun)
Athens, 10, 12, 26, 226, 240
Atoms, 242-43, 24 7-51 (see also
Indivisibility)
Babylonia, 15, 59, 246
Biology, 73 -74 , 187-89, 225,
292-93 (see also Evolution,
Monsters, Reproduction,
Zoology)

Botany, 185-86
Causation, 1 7 -18 , 137, 235,
246-47, 257 (see also Love,
Necessity, Strife)
C hance, 177 -7 8 , 266, 282
C han ge, 7 5 ,7 7 , 1 1 6 - 1 7 , 135,
143, 147, 166, 169, 170, 223,
290
(see also G eneration, Motion)
C hrysippus, 259-60
Colotes, 132, 1717 2 ,2 5 1 -5 2
Colours, 227, 252-53, 254-55
Cosm os, 1819
Croesus, 62, 66
C roton, 11, 81, 86, 89, 216, 225
Death, 86, 9 0 - 9 1 ,1 1 9 - 2 1 , 125,
172 (see also Immortality)
Dem ocritus, 11, 24, 46-48, 66,
78, 112, 234-35, 238-39, 242,
24488
Diogenes o f Apollonia, 48-49,

28&-94
D oxography, 25
Earth, 9 7-98 , 232-33
Earth, T h e , 63, 72, 74, 77, 78,
7 9 ,9 8 , 140, 184-85
Eclipse, 62, 66, 72
Effluences, 181-82

3 5

SUBJECT

Egypt, 1 1 , 1 5 , 5 9 - 6 - 6 3 - 6 7 - 69.
84, 86, 205, 244
Elements, 63, 7 1 , 7 4 -7 5 , 122,
137, 167, 169, 170, 173-74 ,
188-89, 29 (see also Air,
Earth, Fire, Principles, Water)
Empedocles, 11, 1 2 ,4 1 - 4 3 ,8 2
83,
9 1, 161201, 247
Epicharm us, 5 6 -57
Epicurus, 57, 252
Eternal recurrence, 88, 166-67,
170 -71 (see also Immortality)
Ethics, 68-69, lo 5 >24 > 263-88
(see also Aphorism s, J ustice,
Vegetarianism )
Eudem us, 64, 152 -53, 158, 210,

INDEX

G olden A ge, 198


G orgias, 14, 162
Health, 90, 220-21 (see also
Medicine)
Heraclitus, 11, 18, 19, 20, 21,
3 8 -3 9 ,6 6 ,8 2 , 100-126, 196,
214, 247
Hesiod, 5 5 -5 6 , 74, 82, 9 3 ,9 5,
124
Hippasus, 44, 203, 21415
H ippo, 224-25
H om er, 55, 84, 93, 95, 105, 111,
124 ,225
H om ogeneity, 134, 144, 147,
179 (see also Change)

235
Euripides, 14, 100, 108, 114,
226, 237
Eurytus, 211
Evolution, 72, 73, 241, 260-61
(see also Monsters)
Existence, 132-33, 143, 145,
153, 248, 254
Fate, see Necessity
Fire, 104, 106-107, 12 2 -2 3 ,2 14
Flavours, 258-59
Fossils, 99
G eneration, 134, 143, 145-46,
165-66, 17 1, 1 7 3 ,2 3 2 -3 3 (5 ^
also Change, Existence)
G eography, 7 1 , 260
G eom etry, 6 4-65 , 66, 85, 210,
2 1 8 -1 9 ,2 59-60 (see also
Mathematics)
Gods, 1 6 -1 7 , 5 5 - 5 7 . 6 4 , 9 5 - 9 7 .
104, 119, 179, 193, 196, 218,
261, 266 (see also Myth,
Ritual)

Immortality o f the soul, 66, 86,


90-91 (see also Death,
Metempsychosis)
Indivisibility, 146, 153 -5 4 ,2 50
5 1 (see also Atoms)
Infinity, 7 1, 72, 74 -76 , 77, 143,
146 -47, 154, 2 1 1 , 2 1 6 -17 , 219,
227, 229-30
Ion o f Chios, 82-83, 223
Justice, 75, 114, 124, 1 3 1,2 6 7 ,
270, 2 7 1, 277, 278
Know ledge, 103, 105, 1 1 0 - 1 1 ,
132, 2 5 1 -5 7 (see also
Perception, Scepticism)
Leucippus, 46, 242, 245, 248,
289
Logos, 2 1-2 2 , 101
Love, 137, 166, 16 8 -71, 174 -77
Lydia, 11, 15, 62
Magnet, 64

SUBJECT

Mathematics, 215, 2 1 8 -1 9 (see


also Geom etry, Numbers)
Meaning, 262-63
Medicine, 89, 16 1-6 2 , 192 (see
also Health)
Melissus, 11, 12, 22, 4 0 -4 1, 139,

4 3 -4 9
Metempsychosis, 82-83, 86-87,
194-96 (see also Eternal
recurrence)
M eteorology, 72, 77, 78
Miletus, 11, 65, 67, 7 1 , 77, 226
Mind, 227-28, 23 0 -31, 235,
236, 240 (see also Soul)
Miracles, 85, 162
Monism, see Unity
Monsters, 180-81
Moon, 66, 139-40, 183
Motion, 135, 145, 147-48, 155
57 (see also C hange, Void)
Music, 214, 2 1 7 -1 8
Music o f the spheres, 2 10 -11
Myth, 1516, 55-60 (see also
Ritual)
Nature, 19-20
Necessity, 75, 107, 114, 177,

INDEX

Pericles, 143, 226, 238


Persia, 11, 62
Pherecydes, 58
Philolaus, 44, 216-222
Physics, 1 2 -1 4 (see also Nature)
Place, 157-58
Planets, 140
Plato, 17, 21, 65, 13 1, 197, 201,
2 1 1 , 218, 244, 245, 249, 254,
256, 263, 265
Politics, 1 0 - 1 1 ,1 4 1 5 ,6 1 -6 2 ,
65, 66, 86, 105, 143, 161, 202,

277
Porphyry, 153-54, 290
Principles, 20 -2 1, 63, 7 1 , 74 7 5
77, 9 6-97, 209, 224, 290 (see
also Elements)
Protagoras, 14, 158, 245, 252,
256
Psychology, see Perception, Soul,
Thought
Pythagoras, 11, 12, 28, 37, 81
88, 89, 93, 1 1 1 ,1 1 9 , 201, 202,
210, 215
Pythagoreans, 4344, 81, 88,
129, 163, 197, 202-203, 214
15, 216-22

- ,

93- 243
Numbers, 208-209, 217
Opposites, 72 -73 , 79, 90, 104, 107, 1 1 4 -1 5 , 136, 138
39, 209, 227
O rpheus, 121, 205
Parmenides, 11, 1 2 ,2 1 ,2 2 ,4 0 ,
93,96, 129-42, 150-52, 153
54- 87. 23. 242, 245
Perception, 9 1-9 2 , 113, 133-34,
141, 148-49, 163-64, 189-90,

257- 59. 294

Rainbow, 98
Rationality, 22-24
Relativity, 11516
Reproduction, 14 0 -4 1, 187-88,
220, 260
Respiration, 188-89
Ritual, 8 4 ,118 ,120 ,20 0 ,20 3-20 5
Rivers, 1 1 6 -1 7
Scepticism, 89, 9495, 112, 217,
233-34. 2 5 1 -5 7 (see also
Knowledge)
Simplicius, 25, 2629

307

SUBJECT

Socrates, 10, 67, 100, 108, 119,


120, 15 0 -5 2 ,2 3 5 , 240,

245
Solidity, 145, 148, 155, 247
Soul, 64, 66, 67, 79, 89, 106,
109, 116, 12 1-2 2 , 212, 220,
222, 264, 284, 290 (see also
Death, Immortality,
Metempsychosis, Mind,
Perception, T h ough t)
Strife, 166, 16 8 -71, , 7 4 - 7 7 (see
also War)
Sun, 66, 72, 98, 123-24, 183
T hales, 9, 11, 13, 15, 21, 22, 36,
6 1 - 7 0 ,7 1 ,7 2 ,7 4 ,9 3 ,2 2 4
T h eo lo gy, see Gods
T h o u g h t, 132, 136, 141, 191,
290 (see also Mind)
T hrasyllus, 245

INDEX

T im e, 58, 75, 88, 102, 134, 145


Unity, 102, 146-47, 1 5 1-5 5
Vegetarianism , 198-201, 205
208, 2 77-78
V oid, 145, 147, 173, 2 1 1 - 1 2 ,
248, 25455 (see a^ Motion)
W ar, 102, 107, 114, 264
W ater, 6 3 ,6 7 , 9 7-98 , 122, 224
25. 233
X enophanes, 11, 12, 15, 17, 38,
66, 82, 93-99, 106, 112, 129,
130, 184, 242, 254
Zeno, 11, 12, 22, 4 1, 112, 150
58, 245, 254
Zoology, 186

INDEX T O
QUOTED TEXTS
Achilles, Introduction to Aralus 4,
98; 16, 183
Aelian, The Nature o f Animals
X II 7, 196; X V I ag, 181
Agathemerus, Geography 1 1, 71;
1 1 -2 , 260
Albert the Great, On Vegetables
VI

ii 14, 116

[Alexander], Problems 22.7, 190


Ammonius, Commentary on On
Interpretation 249.110, 179
Anecdota Graeca I 33 7*13 -15.
18384
Anonymus Londinensis, Medical
Writings X I 22-42, 225;
X V III 8 -X IX 1 ,2 2 1

anonymous, Theosophia 68-69,


118
Apollonius, Marvellous Stories
6, 85
Aristotle, Eudemian
Ethics 1225330-33, 222.
Fragments 208, 247-48.
Generation of Animals 723323
*5. i87; 73ia i_ 6> *85;
7 6 4 ^ 5 1 8 , 187; 7 7 7 a 8 -io ,
188. On Generation and
Corruption 3 i6 a i3 ~ b i6 , 250
5 *; 333*35-^ 3. 174; 334a l - 5>
178. On the Heavens 2 g o b i2

29, 2 1 0 -1 1 ; 29432128, 184;


294328-34, 63; 2 9 4 b i3 - 2 i,
79; 2 9 5 b n 16, 74. History of
Animals 5 1 ^ 3 0 - 5 1 * b i 1, 292

93. Metaphysics 8 6 - , 63;


9 8 3 ^ 7 -2 7 ,6 3 ; 98 4 b i5-i8 ,
235; 985b4- * o . 248; g85b23866, 208; 986330-34, 90;
g86b4-8, 209; io o g b 7 15,
256; io o g b i2 13, 191;
io o g b i7 2 1 , 191; i o g i b 4 - i o ,
58; io g 2 b 8 - i3 , 212.
Meteorology 335a i 3*5> ,2 3:
3 5 7 3 2 5 -2 6 , 1 8 5 :3 8 ^ 3 1 38233, 176; 3 8 7 b i-6 , 187.
Nicomachean Ethics 115 5 6 2 -6 ,
115; 117633, 116; 1176 3 5-8 ,
116. Physics 196320-24, 177
78; 20331-8, 2 1 1 ; 11,
75; 203bl3~30, 76; 2 10 b 22 25, 57I *13b2227, 2 11;
2 3 3 3 2 1 -3 1 ,1 5 7 ; 2 3 g b 5 240a 1 8 ,1 5 5 -5 6 ; 250319-22,
158. Poetics I4 5 7 b i3 ~ i6 , 201.
On Respiration 4 7 3 ^ -4 7 4 3 5 ,
188-89. Rhetoric I3 73 b 6 -g ,
9 9 : 1 3 7 3 b i 4 ~ * 7 . 200;
I4 0 7 b i4 ~ i8 , 101 .O n the

Senses and their Objects


4 3 7 * 3 4 3 8 5

. 189-90;

INDEX TO QUOTED T E X T S

443822-25, 124. On the Soul


404816-20, 212; 4041*11-15,
189; 4 0 5 8 19 -2 1,6 4 ; 405829b i , 90; 4 118 78, 64
[Aristotle], On Melissus,
Xenophanes, Gorgias 9753 36 b6, 173; 976b23~30, 173.
Problems 91683337, 9 0 -91.
On the World 3961*7-8, 114;
3g6b20-25, 114; 40 ia811,

V iii 18.34, 164; V v iii 48.3,


174; V ix 59.4-5, 110; V x ii
81.2, 164; V x iv 138.1, 139;
V x iv 104.15, 122; V x iv
1 0 9 .1-3 ,9 5 ; V x iv 1 1 5 .1 -3 ,
119; V x iv 122.3, 196; V x iv
140.5, 164; V x iv 140.5-6,
113; V I ii 16.1, 92; V I ii
1 7 .1 - 2 ,
121; V I x v iii 168.2,
262; V II iv 22.1, 96.
Pedagogue I ii 6.2, 265; II x
99.5, 119. Protreptic II x x ii
12, 120; II x x v ii 3, 198; II
x x x iv 5, 118; V I Ix v iii 5, 261
Colum ella, On Agriculture V III
iv
4, 116
C ornutus, Theology 17, 198

1*9
Arius Didym us, fragm ent 39,
116
Athenaeus, Deipnosophisls 57D ,
236; 16 1B C , 207-208;
238CD, 208; 334B, 186;
526A , 15
Marcus Aurelius, Meditations IV
46, 125-26; V I 42, 120

Damascius, On First Principles

Caelius Aurelianus, Chronic


Diseases I V 9, 140-41
Calcidius, Commentary on the
Timaeus c c x lv i *79, 9 1-9 2
Callim achus, fragm ent 191.60
62, 85
Censorinus, On Birthdays I V 7,
73

Clem ent, Miscellanies II ii 8.1,


110; II iv 17.8, 1 1 2 -1 3 ; v
24.5, 110; II x x i 130.4-5,
263-64; III iii 14 .1, 121; III
iii 1 4 .1 -2 , 196-97; I I I iii
1 7 .1 , 2 2 1-2 2; H I iii 2 1 .1 ,
119; I V ii 4.2, 112; I V iii
10.1, 124; I V iv 16 .1, 125; IV
v ii 49.3, 125; I V x x ii 14 1 .1
2, 120; I V x x ii 144.3, 12; IV
x x iii 149 .3-4, 256; I V x x iii
150 .1, 196; V i 9 .1, 192-93; V
i 9 .2-3, 114; V iii 15.5, 136;

*2 4 . 5 8
Democrates, Maxims 186, 284
88
Dio o f Prusa, On Homer
[Discourses liii] 1, 262
Diodorus, Universal History I v iii
1 - 7 , 260-61; X v i 1 -3 , 87;
X I I I lx x x iii 2, 192
Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the
Philosophers I 21-28 , 6 5-67; I
3 3 -4 0 ,6 7 - 7 0 :1 8 8 , 1 1 1; I
119 , 58; I 120, 83; I I 6 -14 ,
236-39; I I 16, 240; II 22,
100; II I 10 ,5 7 ; V III 45 , 86
87; V I I I 6, 82, 1 1 1 ; V III 8,
82; V I I I 10, 202; V III 36, 82;
V III 59, 162; V I I I 6 0 ,1 6 1
62; V I I I 6 i, 19 1-9 2 ; V I I I 83,
89; V III 85, 216; IX 1,8 2 ; IX
1 -3 . 105; I X 5 - 1 2 , 106-108;
IX 15, 108; IX 18, 93; IX 21,
129, 140; I X 3 6 , 244; I X 4 1 ,

310

INDEX TO QUOTED TEXTS

205; I I 123, 86; I V 9 5-96 ,


83-84
Hesiod, Theogony 10 4-138 , 56
H ierodes, Commentary on the
Golden Verses X X IV 2, 197
Hippolytus, Refutation of All
Heresies I iii a, 196; I v i 17,
7 1 - 7 2 ; I v ii 1-9 , 7778; I ix
1 -6 , 240-41; I x iv 26 ,9 9 ;
V I I x x v iii 2526, 162-63;
V I I x x ix 9 -1 0 , 174; V I I xxiX
3 - * 7 9 ; V II x x ix 14 -2 3 ,
9 4 - 9 5 ^ 1 1 x x x i 4, 165; IX
ix l - x g , 102-104
Hisdosus, On Platos World-Soul
17 V , 121-22

2 4 4 -4 5 ;IX 4 5 - 4 9 * 2 4 5 - 4 6 ;
IX 57, ago; IX 7a, 157, 254;
IX 73, 112
Diogenes o f O enoanda,
fragm ent 6 II, 255-56

Etymologicum Magnum s.v. bios,


1 *5
Eusebius, Preparation for the
Gospel X IV x x v ii 4, 257; X V
x x a, 116
Eustathius, Commentary on the
Iliad X I 84, 98. Commentary on
the Odyssey I 321, 174
Galen, Commentary on

Hippocrates Epidemics X V I I A
, 140, 187-88. The
Elements according to
Hippocrates I 4 1 7 418 K , 255.
On Medical Experience X V 78,
254-55
Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights I V x i
1 - 1 3 , 205-207; IV x i 9, 201

lam blichus, On the Mysteries I


119 , 118. Commentary on

Nicomachus Introduction to
Arithmetic 7.8-25, 219; 19.21
25, 218. On the Pythagorean
Way of Life 8187, 203205;
88, 215; 162, 213; 247, 215
[lamblichus], Theological
Arithmetic 2 5 .17-2 6 .3 , 220
Isocrates, Busiris 28-29, 84

Harpocration, s.v. Ion, 223


Hephaestion, Handbook I iii 4,
185
Heraclitus, Homeric Questions
24.35, 1 17; 44.5, 98
Herculaneum Papyrus 1012
X V III, 201
Herodian, On Accentuation in
General 4 4 5 .9 -11, 264;
fragm ent, 199. On Double
Quantities 16 .17 -2 2 , 95. On

Lucian, On Falling Down While


Addressing People 9, 220
Macrobius, Saturnalia I x v ii 46,
182-83
N um enius, fragm en t 30, 121
[Olym piodorus], On the Divine

Singularities of Language
9 36.18 -20,98; 946.22-24, 94
Herodotus, Histories I 74.2, 62; I
7 5 -4 5 >62; 1 170.3, 62; II 81,

and Sacred Art of the


Philosophers Slone 25, 79
O rigen, Against Celsus V I x ii,
1 1 1 - 1 2 ; V I x lii, 114

INDEX TO QUOTED TEXTS

Philodemus, On Music IV
x x x v i, 262. Rhetoric I 3 5 S,

111
Philoponus, Commentary on the
Physics 125.87-30, 97
[Philoponus], Commentary on the
Generation of Animals 123.13
s i , 18182
Plato, Hippias Major 89AB , 1 15
16. Parmenides 187A ia8 D ,
150-52. Phaedo 9 7B C , 235;
98BC, 235. Republic 600AB,
84
Plotinus, Enneads IV viii 1, 117;
V i 8, 132
Plutarch, On Afflictions of Mind
and Body 500DE, 264. Camillus
138A, 124. Against Colotes
110 8 F -110 9 A , 252; m o F
1 1 1 1 A , 252; 1 1 1 1 F , 171;
11 13 A D , 1 7 1 -7 3 ; 1 1 14 B C ,
1 3 7 ; 1 1 1 6 A , 139-40; 1 118 C ,
113; 1123B , 181; 112 6 A , 264.
On Common Notions 1079E,
259-60. The Control of Anger
457D , 125; 464B, 201,
Coriolanus 232D, 112 .O n the
Decline of Oracles 418 C , 165;
433B, 182. On the E at Delphi
388DE, 123; 392B, 117. On
Educating Children gF, 262. On
Exile 604A, 123; 607CE, 193.
On the Face in the Moon 920C,
182; 925, 183; 986E, 179;
989AB, 140; 989C, 183;
929E, 183; 943E, 121. On
Fortune 98D, 186; 98F, 236.

On the Fortune of the Romans


316D , 223. On Having Many
Friends 9 5A , 176. On the
Intelligence of Animals 974A ,
312

262. On Listening to Lectures


40F, 1 1 1 . On Love for Ones
Offspring 495E, 260. Pericles
166CD , 143. Philosophers and
Princes 7 7 7 C , 199. Platonic
Questions 1006E, 184; 1007D,
123 .O n Preserving Health
129A , 261-62. The Primary
Cold 947F, 79; 9 5aA , 176.
Progress in Virtue 81 A , 265.
Scientific Explanations 912E,
186; 916D , 181; 9 17 C , 188;
9 17E , ig o ; 39, 184. Should Old

Men Take Part in Politics ?


78 7C , 125. On Superstition
166C, 120. Table Talk 618A ,
186; 646D, 200; 663A, 182;
66gA , 121; 683D, 185; 685F,
186; 718 E , 218; 7aoE, 184;
7a8E, 163; 730DF, 74; 745D,
177; 746B , 94. On Tranquillity
of Mind 474B C , 197. Why the

Pythia No Longer Prophesies in


Verse 7 , 118; 400B, 183;
404DE, 1 18 -1 g
[Plutarch], Consolation to
Apollonius 106E, 120. On
Desire and Grief 2, 264.
Miscellanies fragm ent 179.8,
73. On the Scientific Beliefs of
the Philosophers 876A B, 79;
889F, 74; 895E, 220; 909D,
73; 9 11 A , 90. Is Water or Fire
the More Useful? 9 5 7 , 123-24
Polybius, Histories II x x x ix 13,
202; X II x x v ii 1 ,1 1 3
Porphyry, On Abstinence II a i ,
198; II 87, 198 -gg; II 31,
200. The Cave of the Nymphs 8,
ig 7 ; 10, 121. Life of Pythagoras
19. 86; 30, 83, lg g . Notes on

INDEX TO QUOTED TEXTS

Homer Iliad I V 4, 115 ; Iliad

Heavens 2 g4 .3 0 -29 5.3 2,24 7-

X IV
200, 115
Proclus, Commentary on the
Cratylus 6.20-7.6, 262-63.
Commentary on Euclid 2 2 .9 -16 ,
218; 130.8 -14, 219; 16 7 .114,
219; 1 5 7 .1 0 - 1 1 ,6 4 ; 250.20
25 1.2,6 4 ; 2 9 9 .1-4 ,6 4 ;
3 5 2 .14 -18 ,6 5 ; 3 7 9 .1 -1 6 , 210;
42 6.1-9 , 210. Commentary on
the First Alcibiades 2 5 6 .1-6 ,
110. Commentary on the
Parmenides 70 8.7-22, 136.
Commentary on the Timaeus I
3 4 5 .11-2 7 , 13 1-3 2 ; II 8.2fr28, 184
Scholiasts, to Euripides,
Phoenician Women 18, 188.
to G regory o f Nazianzus,
X X X V I 91 iB C , 234. to
Hom er; Iliad X V I II 251,
111; Iliad X X I 195, 225. to
Nicander, Theriaca 452, 199.
to Plato, Gorgias 498E, 165;
Phaedo 108D, 214.
Sextus Empiricus, Against the
Mathematicians I 289, 95; I
302-303. 192; V I I 49, 94; V II
90, 234; V II 92, 218; V II
1 1 1 , 1 3 0 - 3 1 ,133 - 34 ; V I I
1 1 6 -1 1 8 , 249; V I I 12 2 -12 5 ,
163-64; V I I 126, 113; V II
13 2 -13 3 , 101; V I I 13 5 -14 0 ,
25254; V I I 140, 234-35; V II
265, 261; V I I 389-390, 256
57; IX 12 7 -12 9 , 200; IX 144,
96; IX 19 3 ,9 5 ; X 18 -1 9 , 57;
X 3 3 - 3 4 . 97-98; X 315,
>73774
Simplicius, Commentary on On the
33

48; 5 2 9 .2 1 -5 3 0 .1 1 ,1 7 5 ;
5 5 7 -1 0 - 1 7 * >4 6 - 4 7 ; 5 5 7 -*4 -

558.2, 131; 5 5 8 .8 - 1 1 ,1 4 1 - 4 2 ;
5 5 8 .17 -5 5 9 .13 ,14 8 -4 9 ;
5 5 9 .18 -2 7 .13 9 ;
5 8 6 .6 -7,18 0
5 8 6 .10 -12 , 180; 586.29
587-4. 180; 587*1226, 180;
608.2128, 230. Commentary
on the Physics 22.26-23.20, 97;
2 3 .21-29 , 224; 2 3 .2 9 -3 3 ,6 1;
* 3 -3 3 * 4 -4 - 214: * 4 -1 3 *5.
* 5 -1 - 9 . 289; 28 .4-15,
242-43; 2 8 .15 -2 7 , 248-49;
3 1 .3 -7 , 1 3 8 :3 1 .1 3 -1 7 , 137
3 8 :3 1.3 4 -3 4 .8 , 16 9 -7 1;
3 4 .18 -3 5 .2 1,
2 3 1-3 2 ; 38.29
39.21, 13 6 -3 7:8 6 .2 5 -3 0 , 132;
874-^7, 148; 10 3 .13 -10 4 .15 ,
144-45; 1 0 9 .1 9 - 1 1 0 .6 ,145
46; 1 1 1 .1 5 - 1 1 2 .1 5 , 147-48;
1 1 7 .2 - 1 3 , 133; 138.3-6, 152;
13 8 .2 9 -14 0 .6 ,15 2 -5 4 ;
1 4 0 .1 8 -1 4 1 .1 1 ,1 5 4 - 5 5 ;
1 4 4 .2 5 -14 6 .2 7 ,13 4 -3 5 ;
15 1.2 0 -15 3 .2 2 ,8 9 0 -9 2 ;

74- 75:

* 5 5 -* 3 - * 3 . * 3 3 - 3 4 ; * 5 5 -**
157.24, 227-29; 155 .2 3 -2 7,
26; 15 7 .2 5 -16 1.2 0 , 165-69;
16 2 .2 3 -2 6 ,14 5 ; 16 3 .18 -2 6 ,
2 3 2- 3 3 ; i 4 *4 - 6 5 *5 >229
30; 1 7 5 .1 1 - 1 5 , 232; 178.33
179.10, 233; 18 0 .8 -12 , 139;
300.16-24, 187; 300.27
301.10, 23 0 -31; 327.23-26,
248; 3 3 0 .3 1 -3 3 1 .1 6 ,17 8 ;
3 8 1.2 9 -3 8 2 .3 ,18 0 -8 1; 562.3

6. 5 7 - 5 8 ; 5 6 3 -l 7 - * o . >5 8:
7 3 * * 3 -3 3 - 88; 110 8 .14 -2 8
158; 1 12 4 .9 -18 , 176;
1 1 8 3 .2 8 -1 18 4 .1 8 ,17 6 -7 7

INDEX TO QUOTED TEXTS

Stobaeus, Anthology I iv 7c, 243;


276; IV i 33-34, 276; IV i 40,
I v iii 2, 94; I x v 2, 179; I x v
276; IV i 42-46, 277; IV ii
7, 219-20; I x v iii ic , 2 1 1 - 1 2 ;
13 -18 , 277-78 ; IV iv 27, 278;
I x x i 78, 21718; I x x ii 1a,
I V v 43-48, 278-79; IV v i 19,
138; I x x iv *e, 140; I x x v lg ,
279; IV v ii 13, 279; IV x 28,
279; I V x ix 45, 279; IV x x
123; I x lix 53, 191; I x lix 60,
'9 5 -9 6 ; II i 12, 265; II i 16,
3 3 - 2 7 9 ; IV x x ii 108, 279; IV
1 1 1; II iv 12, 265; II v ii 3i,
x x ii 199, 280; IV x x iii 38-39,
265; II v iii 16, 266; II ix 15,
280; IV x x iv 29, 280; IV
266; II x v 33, 266; II x v 36,
x x iv 3 1 -3 3 , 280; IV x x v i 25
267; II x v 40, 267; II x x x i
26, 281; IV x x ix 18, 281; IV
5 6 -59 , 267; I I x x x i 66, 267;
x x x i 49, 281; I V x x x i 120
II x x x i 7 1 - 7 3 , 268; II x x x i
12 1,
281; I V x x x iii 23-24,
90, 268; II x x x i 94, 268; II
281-82; IV x x x iv 58, 282; IV
x x x iii 9, 268; III i 27, 268;
x x x iv 62, 282; IV x x x iv 65,
282; IV x x x ix 17, 282; IV
II I i 4 5 -4 7 , 268; III i 9 1, 269;
II I i 95, 269; III 1 174 -18 0 ,
x x x ix 25, 282; IV x l 20 -21,
109; III i 210, 269; II I ii 36,
283; IV x l 23, 124; IV x liv
269; II I iii 43, 270; III iii 46,
64, 283; IV x liv 6 7-70 , 283;
270; III iv 69-82, 270; III v
IV x lv i 1819, 283; IV x lv iii
fr-8, 109; II I v 2227, 270
10, 283; IV 1 20, 284; IV 1 22,
7 1; III v i 26-28, 271; III vii
284; IV 1 76, 284; IV Iii 40,
21, 271; III v ii 25, 271; III
284
v ii 3 1 , 271; III v ii 74, 271;
Strabo, Geography 1 1 6 , 124;
III ix 29-30, 2 7 1-7 2 ; III x
V III v j , 190
36, 272; III x 42 -44, 272; III
x 58, 272; III x 6 4-65, 272;
III x 68, 272; III x ii 13, 273;
Them istius, Speeches V 69B, 112
T h e o o f Sm yrna, Mathematics
III x iii 4 6 -4 7, 273; II I x iv 8,
273; III x v i 1 6 -1 9 , 273; III
1 5 .7 -12 ,2 0 1
x v i 22, 273; II I x v ii 25, 273;
T heo d oru s Prodrom us, Letters
X X X III 1240 A , 125
III x v ii 37-38 , 274; II I x v iii
T heophrastus, Causes of Plants I
30,
274; III x v iii 35, 274; III
x x 56, 274; III x x 62, 274;
x iii 2, 185. Metaphysics 7 a i o III x x ii 42, 274; III x x v iii
15, 123. On the Senses 3-4,
13, 275; III x x ix 63-64, 275;
141; 10, 191; 22, 190; 25-26,
III x x ix 6 6-67, 275; III x x ix
9 >; 43- 4 5 . 294 ; 49 - 50 . 257
58; 6 5-6 7, 258-59. On Vertigo
88, 275; III x x x i 7, 275; III
x x x v i 24, 275; III x x x v ii 22,
9 - '7
Tzetzes, Allegories in the Iliad X V
275; II I x x x v ii 25, 276; III
86, 185. Notes on the Iliad
x x x v iii 4 6 -4 7, 276; III
126H , 115
x x x v iii 53, 276; III x l 6 -7 ,

34

INDEX T O DIELSKRANZ B- T E X T S
Alcm aeon 24 B, 1, 89
Anaxagoras 59 B, i , 2 6 -3 1, 227,
229, 230, 231, 236; a, 227; 3,
229; 4, 227, 228-29, 230, 231,
2 3 '-3 2 ; 5> 227; 6 ,2 2 9 -3 0 ; 7,
230; 8, 232; 9, 232; 10, 234;
lk , 229; 1a, 227-28, 229, 230,
231, 232, 233; 13, 230-31; 14,
228; 15, 233; 16, 233, 233
34; 17, 232-33; s i , 234; 21a,
235, 254; s ib , 236; s s , 236
Anaxim ander 12 B, 1, 75
Anaxim enes 13 B, 1, 79; s , 79;
3

. 79

Democritus 68 B, 3, 282; 4, 264;


6. 253; 7 . 253; 8- 253; 9 . 253;
10, 253; 1 1 , 253-54; *8, 262;
s i , 262; a6, 263; 30, 261; 38,
27 ; 33 - 256 ; 35 - 284 ; 36 ,
268,284; 37,28 4; 38,284;
3 9 ,2 7 5 ,2 8 5 ; 40 ,28 5; 4 1,
269, 285; 48, 283, 285; 43,
285; 44, 273, 285; 45, 285;
46, 283, 285; 47, 268, 285;
48, 276, 285; 49, 278, 285;
50, 285; 5 1, 265, 285; 5a,
272, 285; 53, 285; 53a, 266,
285; 54, 285; 55, 267, 285;
56, 285; 57, 281, 285; 58,

283, 285; 59, 267, 285; 60,


273, 285; 6 1, 276, 285; 6a,
2 7 1, 286; 63, 273, 286; 64,
270, 286; 65, 286; 66, 286;
67,28 6; 68,286; 69,286; 70,286;
7 1 , 286; 7a, 286; 73, 270, 286;
74, 286; 75, 277, 286; 76,
286; 77, 270, 286; 78, 281,
286; 79, 286; 80, 286; 81,
275, 286; 82, 286; 83, 286;
84, 286; 85, 268, 287; 86,
275, 287; 87, 287; 88, 276,
287; 89, 287; 90, 287; 9 1,
287; 9a, 287; 93, 287; 94,
287; 95, 287; 96, 287; 97,
287; 98, 287; 99, 287; 100,
287; 101, 287; lo a , 287; 103,
287; 104, 287; 105, 288; 106,
288; 107, 288; 107a, 288;
108, 282, 288; 109, 288; 110,
288; 1 1 1 , 280, 288; 118 , 288;
113 , 288; 114 , 288; 1 1 5 , 288;
l l 6 , 244; l l 8 , 257; 119 , 266;
125, 252, 253, 25 4 -5 5; 127,
264; 145, 264; 147, 262; 148,
260; 14 9 ,2 6 4 ; 15 4 ,2 6 2 ; 155,
259-60; 159 ,2 6 4 ; 164,
2 4 9 :16 5 ,2 6 1; 167, 248; 169,
265; 170, 265; 1 7 1 , 265; 172,
266; 173 ,2 6 6 ; 17 4 ,2 6 6 ; 175,

INDEX TO DIE LS -K RA NZ B- T E X TS

266
267
267
268
268
268
269
270
270
270
270
270
271
271
271
272
272

176, 266
267
182, 267
185, 268
284; 188
9 - 269
9 3 - 270
196, 270
*9 9 - 270
202, 270
205, 270
208, 271
2 11, 271
214. 271
217, 272
220, 272
223. 272
226,
273
273
273 229, 2 7 3
273 23*. 2 7 4
274 * 3 5 . 2 7 4
274 238, 2 7 4

275
275
276
276
277
277
278
278
278
267
270
*73

276
*79

282
*85
288
291

179.

177, 267
180, 267
183, 268
186, 268
264,268
1 9 1 , 269
19 4 ,2 70
197, 270
200, 270
203, 270
206, 270
209, 271
212, 271
215, 271
218, 272
221, 272
224, 272
227, 273
230, 273

178,
181,
184,
187,
189,
*9 2 .
9 5 .
198,
201,
204,
207,
210,
213216,
219.
222,
225,
228,

*3 1.
2 3 3 . 274 2 3 4 .
236, 274 * 3 7 .
* 3 9 . 275 240,
242, 275 * 4 3 .
245, 276 246,
248, 276 * 4 9 .
251, 277 * 5 *.

* 4 *. 2 7 5
*4 4 - 2 7 5
* 4 7 . 276
*50, 276
* 5 3 . 277 * 5 4 . 277 * 5 5 *56. 277 2 5 7 . 277 *58.
* 5 9 - 278 260, 278 261,
262, 278 263, 278 264,
265, 27879; 266, 279;
279; 268 279; 269 2 7 9 ;
2 7 9 ; 271 2 79 ;2 72 2 7 9 ;
280; 274 280; 275 280;
280; 277 280; 278 280;
281; 280 281; 281 281;
281; 283 281; 284 282;
282; 286 282; 287 283;
283; 289 283;290 283;
283; 292 283; 293 283;

294, 284; 295, 285; 896, 286;


297, 282, 287
D iogenes o f Apollonia 64 B, 1,
290; , 290; 3, 291; 4, 291; 5,
2 9 1-92; 6, 292-93; 7, 292; 8,
292
Empedocles 31 B, i , 162; 2,
163; 3, 163-64; 4, 164; 5,
163; 6, 173-74; 8, 169, 171;
9, 172; jo , 172; 11, 172; 12,
' 7 3 : * 3 . >7 3 ! * 4 . *7 3 ; *5
172; 16, 174; 17, 166-67, >68,
169, 177; 19, 176; 20, 176;
21, 167, 170; 22, 168-69; 23>
167-68; 24, 165; 25, 165; 26,
168, 170 -7 1; 27, 177, 179;
27a, 199; 28, 179; 29, 179;
3 0 , 1 7 7 : 3 1 ,1 7 7 : 3 3 . ' 7 6 ; 34.
*76; 35. ' 7 . >7 5 - l8 ; 37.
174; 38, 174; 39, 18 1:4 0 ,
180; 4 1, 180; 42, 180; 43,
180; 44, 180; 45, 180; 46,
180; 47, 180; 48, 18 1:4 9 ,
181; 50, 185; 5 1, 174; 52,
181; 53, 177, 178; 54, 178;
55, 182; 56, 182; 57, 180; 59,
179, 180; 60, 180; 6 1, 180;
62, 180; 63, 187; 64, 188; 65,
187; 66, 188; 67, 187; 68,
188; 7 1 , 175; 7 2 ,1 8 6 ; 73,
175; 74, 186; 75, 175, 178;
76, 186; 77, 185; 78, 185; 79,
185; 80, 185; 81, 186; 82,
187; 83, 186; 84, 189-90; 85,
178; 86, 175; 87, 175; 88,
190; 89, 180; 90, 180; 9 1,
180; 93, 180; 94, 181; 95,
175; 96, 187; 98, 169, 178;
100, 1887-89; 101, 190; 102,
190; 103, 178; 104, 178; 105,

INDEX T O D 1 E LS- KR ANZ B - T E X T S

i g i ; 106, 191; 107, i g i ; 108,


191; 109, 189; 110, 162-63;
1 1 1 , 162; 112, 192; 113 , 192;
114 , 192-93; 115 , 177, 193,
94196;
197;
198;

l l 6 - 4 7 >, I 7 118, 197; 119, 193; 120,


i s i , 197; 123, 197; 133,
134, 197; 135, 197; 136,

9 5 - *9 7 ;

9 5 ! * 7 - ' 9 6 ; *8, 9 8 - 9 9
139, 83, 199; 130, 199; 131,
165; 133, 164; 133, 164; 134,
179; 135, 200; 136, 200; 137,
200; 138, 201; 139, 200; 140,
200; 14 1, 201, 206; 142, 201;
14 3 ,2 0 1; 144, 201; 145, 198;
146, 196; 147, 196
Heraclitus 22 B, 1, 101, 102; 2,
101; 3, 106, 123; 4, 116; 5,
118; 6, 123; 7, 124; 8, 115; 9,
116; 10, 114; 11, 119; 12,
107, 116; 14, 120; 15, 118;
16, 119; 17, 110; 18, 113; 19,
1 10; 2 0 , 121; 21, 1 19; 3 3 ,
112; 23, 124; 24, 125; 35,
125; , 120; 27, 120; 28,
114; 39, 110; 30, 107, 122;
31, 122; 32, 119; 33, 119; 34,
ng: 35116; 39,
105:42,
105; 45,
112 :4 8 ,
117; 50,
102: 53,

: 3 6- 121; 3 7
1 1 1 :4 0 ,8 2 , 1 0 5 :4 1 ,
10 5:4 3, 10 5:4 4,
106; 46, 106; 47,
1 1 5 :4 9 , 125:49 a,
102: 5 1, 102: 52,
102: 54, 102, 103:

io 3 - 5 6- io 3 ! 5 7 - * 3 ; 5 8 ; 59, 103; 6o, 103, 107,


117; 6 1, 104; 62, 104, 117,
121; 63, 104; 64, 104; 65,
104; 66, 104; 67, 104; 67a,
122; 68, 118; 70, 1 1 1 ; 7 1 ,

1 2 5 :7 2 , 1 2 5 :7 3 , 12 5 :7 4 ,
125; 75, 120; 77 , 121; 78,
112; 79, 112; 80, 107, 114,
115; 81, 1 11; 82, 115; 83,
1 16 :8 4 , 117; 85, 12 5 :8 6 ,
112; 87, 1 1 1; 88, 120; 89.
120; 90, 107, 123; 9 1, 117;
92, 118; 93, 118; 94, 123; 96,
121; 97, 125; 98, 121; 99,
123; 100, 123; 101, 106, 113,
1 17; lO ia , 1 13; 102, I 15;
103, I 15; 104, 1 IO; 105, 1 1 1;
I06, 124; 107, 1 13; 108, log;
109, 109; 110 , 109; 1 1 1 , lo g ;
112 , 109; 113 , 109; 11 4 , 109;
115 , 109; 116 , 109; 1 1 7 , 109;
118, 109; 119 , 124; 120, 124;
131,
105; 133, 112; 134, 123;
125, 117; 126, 115; 127, 1 18;
129, 82, 111
H ippo 38 B, 1 , 225
Ion o f Chios 36 B, 1, 223; 4, 83
Leucippus 67 B, 2, 243
Melissus 30 , l , 145; 2, 145
46; 3, 146; 4, 146; 5, 146; 6,
' 47; 7- 4 7 - 48; 8, 1 4 8 -4 9 :9 ,
146, 148; 10, 146
Parm enides 28 B, 1 ,1 3 0 - 3 1 ,
1 3 2 ,2 , 13 2 :3 , 13 2 :4 , 1 3 6 ,5 ,
136; 6, 132, 133; 7, 133-34;

8. 34- 35- 36- 37 : 9- 39: *>39;


39; *2. 137- 38; * 3 -

55-

137; 4 - 39'- *5- 4: *6,


141; 17, 140, 187; 18, 140
41; 19, 141-42
Pherecydes 7 B, 1, 58
Philolaus 44 B, 1, 216; 2, 217;

3*7

INDEX TO DIELS-KRANZ B -TEXTS

3 ,2 1 9 ; 4 , 2 1 7 : 5 , 2 1 7 : 6 , 2 1 7
18; 7, 2 l8 ; 13, 220; 14, 222;
17, 219 -20
Xenophanes 21 B, 3, 15; 7, 82;
8 ,9 3 ; 10, 95; 1 1 ,9 5 ; * 95;
1 4 .9 5 ; *5 *9 5 ;

9 6;

* 3 . 9 5 ; * 4 - 9 6 ; * 5 . 9 7 ; * 6 . 9 7 .
28, 98; *9, 97; 30, 98; 31, 98;
32, 98; 33, 98; 34, 94; 35, 94;
36. 9 5 ; 3 7 . 9 8; 3 8 . 9 4
Zeno 29 B, l , 155; a, 153; 3,

154; 4 . 157

l8 >9 4 ;

318

P E N G U I N

(Q j C L A S S I C S

Ea r l y G r e e k
P h il o s o p h y
T R A N S L A T E D A N D E D IT E D W I T H A N
IN T R O D U C T IO N B Y J O N A T H A N B AR N ES
In p a vin g the w a y fo r P la to and A risto tle , the preS ocratics w ere the true creato rs o f W estern p h ilo so p h y .
Z e n o s e x tra o rd in a ry and d istu rbing p a ra d o x es, the
a to m ic th eo ries o f D em o critu s th a t so strikingly
an ticip ate co n tem p o ra ry physics, the en ig m atic and
h au ntin g epigram s o f H eraclitu s these are ju st som e
o f the riches to be found in this co lle ctio n o f the w ritings
o f the early G reek p h ilo sop h ers. Jo n a th a n B a rn e ss
m asterly In tro d u ctio n show s h ow the m o st skilled
d etective w ork is often needed to re co n stru ct th e ideas o f
these th in kers fro m the surviving fragm ents o f their
w o rk . B u t the e ffo rt is alw ays w o rth w h ile. In forging
the first tru ly scien tific v o cabu lary and offerin g
ratio n al argu m en ts fo r th eir view s, the p re-S o cra tics
w ere d oing som eth in g new and p ro fou n d ly im p o rta n t;
they also posed the q u estions th a t have rem ained a t the
cen tre o f p h ilo sop hy to this day.
T h e c o v e r sh o w s a d eta il o f a m o s a ic c o n ta in in g a fig u re th o u g h t to represent
A n a x im a n d e r h o ld in g a sun dial in th e R h ein isch es L a n d esm u se u m , Trier.

Philosophy

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