Copyright
2003
Contents
SECTION 1 General
1.1 Introduction
1.2 Scope
Annex
Annex
Annex
Annex
1
2
3
4
SECTION 1. General
1.1 Introduction
Failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) is a method of reliability analysis intended to identify failures
which have consequences affecting the functioning of a system within the limits of a given application, thus
enabling priorities for corrective action to be set.
Generally, failures or failure modes of any component will adversely affect system performance. In the study
of system reliability, safety and availability, both qualitative and quantitative analyses are needed and these
complement one another. Quantitative analysis methods allow the calculation or prediction of performance
measures of the system while fulfilling a specific task or in long-term operation under specific conditions.
Typical measures denote reliability, safety, availability, failure rates and mean time to failure (MTTF). The
quantitative assessment of postulated failure modes in terms of the plausibility of their occurrence allows the
rational decision ofwhether corrective actions are required.
1.2 Scope
These Guidance Notes describe failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA), and give guidance as to how they
may be applied to achieve various objectives connected with the development of reliable designs.
Annex 1 to Annex 4 address more specific guidance for the following systems for which ABS rules require
FMEA be carried out.
Annex-1
Annex-2
Annex-3
Annex-4
Figure 1
FMEA worksheet
Name of system..
References
Mode of operation..
Sheet No..
Date..
Name of analyst..
Equipment
name or
number
Function
Ident.
No.
Failure
mode
Failure
cause
Drawings
Failure effect
Local effect
End effect
Failure
detection
Corrective
action
Severity of
failure effect
Probability
of failure
(if applicable)
Remarks
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Restricted flow
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
False actuation
Fails to stop
Fails to start
Fails to switch
Premature operation
Delayed operation
Erroneous input (increased)
Erroneous input (decreased)
Erroneous output (increased)
Erroneous output (decreased)
Loss of input
Loss of output
Shorted (electrical)
Open (electrical)
Leakage (electrical)
Other unique failure conditions
as applicable to the system
characteristics, requirements
and operational constraints
In the FMEA, the definitions of failure modes, failure causes and failure effects depend on the level of
analysis. As the analysis progresses, the failure effects identified at the lower level may become failure modes
at the higher level. Similarly, the failure modes at the lower level may become the failure causes at the higher
level, and so on. For example, the hydraulic line of a steering gear system might have a failure mode of
"external leakage" (10). This failure mode of the hydraulic line could become a failure cause of the steering
gear system's failure mode "loss of output" (29).
2.4.1 Level of Analysis It is recommended that each system be considered in a top-down approach,
starting from the system's functional output, and failure is assumed by one possible cause at a time. Since a
failure mode may have more than one cause, all potential independent causes for each failure mode are
identified. FMEA then progresses to the subsystem level, and on down to the equipment level or component
level until all plausible failure modes are identified and the systems responses to failures are examined.
However, if it can be shown that a system being analyzed can fail without any adverse effect, then there is no
need to consider them further unless the failure can go undetected by an operator (see 2.6.1 Hidden failure).
To decide that there is no adverse effect does not mean just the identification of system redundancy. The
redundancy should be shown to be immediately effective or brought on line with negligible time lag.
Particular attention is to be paid to fault detestability for all plausible modes of failure, and to the integrity of
the mechanism that bring the redundant system on line upon failure detection (see 2.7.1 Integrity of
changeover mechanism). In deciding the level of analysis, it should be kept in mind that the aim of
conducting FMEA is to demonstrate that the risk associated with the failures in the system being examined
have been reduced as far as reasonably practicable.
2.4.2 Common-cause failure Common-cause (or common mode') failures (CCF) that may exist in
functionally redundant systems are also to be identified. A CCF is the result of an event that, because of
logical dependencies, causes a coincidence of failure states in two or more components (excluding secondary
failures caused by the effects of a primary failure).
Examples of common cause of failures are:
1. Simultaneous failure of two cooling water pumps due to simultaneous power failure caused by the
damage to an electrical cableway, which contained power supply cables for the pumps, resulting in
blackout conditions.
2. Simultaneous failure of two computer networks due to software-related failure, resulting in the total
loss of computer functionality.
2.4.3 Human intervention Where human intervention is an integral part of system design, the
consequence of the failure of the required human intervention should be evaluated. For instance, if the
sequence is:
failure
alarm
operator action
start of back-up
back-up in service",
the effects of delay is to be considered.
2.4.4 Software error Malfunctions due to software errors or inadequacies will have effects whose
significance will be determined by both hardware and software design. The effects upon associated hardware
of possible errors in software or inadequacies should be analyzed for all hardware products involving
software. The analysis should include but not be limited to the following:
Hardware-software interaction analysis that examines software reactions to hardware failures.
Overloading conditions (e.g., abnormally large number of hardware malfunction messages sent to a
monitoring system, or abnormally large number of spurious signals generated in optical network.).
10
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Error is an occurrence arising as a result of incorrect action by the operating crew, maintenance personnel or
software.
3.2.2 Probability of occurrences
Frequent is one which is likely to occur often during the operational life of a particular craft.
Reasonably probable is one which is unlikely to occur often, but which may occur several times during the
total operational life of a particular craft.
Recurrent is a term embracing the total range of frequent and reasonably probable.
Remote is one which is unlikely to occur to every craft, but may occur to a few craft of a type over the total
operational life of a number of craft of the same type.
Extremely remote is one which is unlikely to occur when considering the total operational life of a number of
craft of the type, but nevertheless shall be considered as being possible.
Extremely improbable is one which is so extremely remote that it shall not be considered as possible to
occur.
3.2.3 Effects
Effect is a situation arising as a result of an occurrence.
Minor effect is an effect which may arise from a failure, an event or an error, as defined in 3.2.1, which can
be readily compensated for by the operating crew. It may involve:
5. a small increase in the operational duties of the crew or in their difficulty in performing their duties;
or
6. a moderate degradation in handling characteristics; or
7. slight modification of the permissible operating conditions.
Major effect is an effect which produces:
1. a significant increase in the operational duties of the crew or in their difficulty in performing their
duties which by itself shall not be outside the capability of a competent crew, provided that another
major effect does not occur at the same time; or
2. significant degradation in handling characteristics; or
3. significant modification of the permissible operating conditions, but will not remove the capability to
complete a safe journey without demanding more than normal skill on the part of the operating crew.
Hazardous effect is an effect which produces:
1. a dangerous increase in the operational duties of the crew or in their difficulty in performing their
duties of such magnitude that they cannot reasonably be expected to cope with them and will
probably require outside assistance; or
2. dangerous degradation of handling characteristics; or
3. dangerous degradation of the strength of the craft; or
4. marginal conditions for, or injury to, occupants; or
5. an essential need for outside rescue operations.
Catastrophic effect is an effect which results in the loss of the craft and/or in fatalities.
3.2.4 Numerical values
Where numerical probabilities are used in assessing compliance with requirements using the terms similar to
those given above, the following approximate values may be used as guidelines to assist in providing a
common point of reference. The probabilities quoted shall be on an hourly or per-journey basis, depending on
which is more appropriate to the assessment in question.
Frequent
Reasonably probable
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Remote
Extremely remote
Extremely improbable
10-5 to 10-7
10-7 to 10-9
While no approximate numerical probability is given for
this, the figures used shall be substantially less than 10-9
Note: Different occurrences may have different acceptable probabilities, according to the severity of
their consequences.
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1. General
This annex provides additional guidance specific to dynamic positioning systems, and therefore, should be
read in conjunction with the Guidance Notes, section 1 through 3.
2. Objectives
The section 4-3-5/15.1.4 of the Rules requires that a failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) is to be
conducted and submitted to ABS for review. This requirement is applicable for DP systems for which DPS-2
or DPS-3 class notation is requested.
The objective of the FMEA is to demonstrate that:
1. sufficient redundancy is provided in the dynamic positioning system, in accordance with the rules,
such that no single failure and its consequential series of events will result in the total loss of DP
capability, but certain reduced capability remains available even if a worst case single failure occurs.
This reduced capability should be verified to be sufficient to keep the DP ship / DP offshore unit
within the desired position under the declared maximum operating environmental conditions (i.e.,
wind speed, wave height and current speed).
2. the redundancy would be immediately effective or brought into service with negligible time lag such
that the DP ship / offshore unit will not drift off outside the safe distance from the initial target
position.
3. Single-failure Concept
FMEA is based on a single-failure concept under which each system at various levels of a systems functional
hierarchy is assumed to fail by one probable cause at a time. The rule stipulates that, for the purpose of
classification, the extent of single failure, which must be considered in FMEA, varies depending on the
classification notation requested, as summarized in Table-1.
Any failure mode which could cause the loss of station keeping capability must be guarded against by
redundancy, unless the probability of postulated failure is extremely remote. In general, the failure of robust
static components, such as pipes or pipe manifolds, need not be considered, unless they are subjected to the
threat of mechanical damages due to the location where they are installed.
Where it is not possible to provide redundancy to a single component, such as a changeover switch, a case
should be made to demonstrate that the probability of failure is extremely remote.
Since DP control systems are of a complex nature involving computer hardware and software, particular
attention should be paid to the possible sources of common cause failure and software error, as described in
2.4.2 and 2.4.4 of the Guidance Notes.
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DP notation
Failure to be considered
DPS-2
DPS-3
- end of Annex 1-
15
Notation without
+
(such as R1)
The vessel must be able to advance at a speed of at least onehalf its design speed or seven knots, whichever is less, for at
least 36 hours.
3. Single-failure Concept
FMEA is based on a single-failure concept under which each system at various levels of a systems functional
hierarchy is assumed to fail by one probable cause at a time. The Propulsion Redundancy Guide stipulates
that, for the purpose of classification, the extent of single failure which must be considered in FMEA varies
depending on the classification notation requested, as summarized Table-2.
Any failure mode which could cause the loss of station keeping capability must be guarded against by
redundancy, unless the probability of postulated failure is extremely remote. In general, the failure of robust
static components, such as pipes or pipe manifolds, need not be considered, unless they are subjected to the
threat of mechanical damages due to the location where they are installed.
Where it is not possible to provide redundancy to a single component, such as a changeover switch, a case
should be made to demonstrate that the probability of failure is extremely remote.
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R-2
R2+
R1-S
R1-S+
As for R1, but the total loss of machinery space or steering flat
due to fire or flood should also be considered.
R2-S
R2-S+
As for R2, but the total loss of machinery space or steering flat
due to fire or flood should also be considered.
- End of Annex 2 -
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Introduction
This annex provides additional guidance specific to HSC machinery systems, and therefore, should be read in
conjunction with the Guidance Notes, section 1 through 3. This part of guidance is largely based on the IMO
HSC Code, Annex 3 and 4, and it is applicable to HSCs where they are to be built to IMO HSC Code.
1.1
In the case of traditional craft, it has been possible to specify certain aspects of design or construction
in some level of detail, in a way which was consistent with some level of risk which had over the years been
intuitively accepted without having to be defined.
1.2
With the development of large high-speed craft, this required experience has not been widely
available. However, with the now broad acceptance of the probabilistic approach to safety assessments within
the industry as a whole, it is proposed that an analysis of failure performance may be used to assist in the
assessment of the safety of operation of high-speed craft.
1.3
A practical, realistic and documented assessment of the failure characteristics of the craft and its
component systems should be undertaken with the aim of defining and studying the important failure
conditions that may exist.
1.5
FMEA for high-speed craft is based on a single-failure concept under which each system at various
levels of a system's functional hierarchy is assumed to fail by one probable cause at a time. The effects of the
postulated failure are analyzed and classified according to their severity. Such effects may include secondary
failures (or multiple failures) at other level(s). Any failure mode which may cause a catastrophic effect to the
craft should be guarded against by system or equipment redundancy, unless the probability of such failure is
extremely improbable (refer to 6 of this Annex). For failure modes causing hazardous effects, corrective
measures may be accepted in lieu. A test program should be drawn to confirm the conclusions of FMEA.
1.6
While FMEA is suggested as one of the most flexible analysis techniques, it is accepted that there are
other methods which may be used and which in certain circumstances may offer an equally comprehensive
insight into particular failure characteristics.
2.
Objectives
2.1
The primary objective of FMEA is to provide a comprehensive systematic and documented
investigation which establishes the important failure conditions of the craft and assesses their significance
with regard to the safety of the craft, its occupants and the environment, and to demonstrate that the risk
associated with the failures in the system being examined have been reduced as far as reasonably practicable.
2.2
3.
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FMEA should be conducted for each high-speed craft before its entry into service in respect of the following
systems, as per IMO HSC code, Annex 4/3.1.
1. Direction control system (see 3.1)
2. Propulsion machinery system (see 3.2)
3. Electrical system (see 3.3)
4. Stabilization system (see 3.4)
5. Propulsion redundancy for category-B craft (see 3.5)
3.1
Directional Control System
5.2 of the IMO HSC code stipulates that a design incorporating a power drive or an actuation system
employing powered components for normal directional control is to provide a secondary means of actuating
the device, unless an alternative system is provided. The secondary means of actuating the directional
control device may be manually driven, if it is found to be adequate, bearing in mind the craft's size and
design and any limitations of speed or other parameters that may be necessary.
Given these design conditions, the purpose of FMEA is to demonstrate that:
1. the directional control systems have been constructed so that a single failure in one drive or
system, as appropriate, will not render any other one inoperable or unable to bring the craft to a
safe situation (the Administration may allow a short period of time to permit the connection of a
secondary control device when the design of the craft is such that such delay will not, in their
opinion, hazard the craft), and
2. the probability of total failure of all directional control systems is extremely remote when the craft
is operating normally, i.e., excluding emergency situations such as grounding, collision or a major
fire.
3.2
Machinery Systems
The purpose of FMEA is to demonstrate that means have been provided so that normal operation of
propulsion machinery can be sustained or restored even though one of the essential auxiliaries becomes
inoperative. Special consideration should be given to the malfunctioning of:
1. a generating set which serves as a main source of electrical power;
2. the fuel oil supply systems for engines;
3. the sources of lubricating oil pressure;
4. the sources of water pressure;
5. an air compressor and receiver for starting or control purposes; and
6. the hydraulic, pneumatic or electrical means for control in main propulsion machinery, including
controllable-pitch propellers.
Having regard to overall safety considerations, a partial reduction in propulsion capability from normal
operation may be accepted.
3.3
Electrical System
12 of the IMO HSC code stipulates that electrical installations should be such that:
1. all electrical auxiliary services necessary for maintaining the craft in normal operation and
habitable conditions will be ensured without recourse to the emergency source of electrical power;
2. electrical services essential for safety will be ensured under various emergency conditions ,and
3. the safety of passengers, crew and craft from electrical hazards will be ensured.
Furthermore, where loss of a particular essential service would cause serious risk to the craft, the service
shall be fed by at least two independent circuits in such a way that no single failure in the electrical supply
or distribution systems would affect both supplies.
Given these design conditions, the purpose of FMEA is to demonstrate that:
The electrical system shall be designed and installed so that the probability of the craft being at risk of
failure of a service is extremely remote.
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3.4
Stabilization system
The purpose of FMEA is to demonstrate that:
1. stabilization systems have been so designed that, in case of failure or malfunctioning of any one of
the stabilization devices or equipment, it would be possible either to ensure maintaining the main
parameters of the craft's motion within safe limits with the aid of working stabilization devices or
to put the craft into the displacement or other safe mode, and
2. in case of failure of any automatic equipment or stabilization device, or of its power drive, the
parameters of craft motion shall remain within safe limits.
3.5
Category B Craft
(i) 9.7 of the IMO HSC code stipulates that Category B craft is provided with at least two independent
means of propulsion so that the failure of one engine or its support systems would not cause the failure of
the other engine or engine systems and with addition machinery controls in or close to the machinery space.
(ii) Furthermore, 9.8 of the IMO HSC code stipulates that Category B craft is capable of maintaining the
essential machinery and control so that, in the event of a fire or other casualties in any one compartment on
board, the craft can return to a port of refage under its own power.
Given these design conditions, the purpose of FMEA is to demonstrate that these two requirements for
propulsion redundancy are met under stipulated failure conditions.
4.
System failure mode and effects analysis
Before proceeding with a detailed FMEA into the effects of the failure of the system elements on the system
functional output, it is necessary to perform a functional failure analysis of the craft's important systems. In
this way, only systems which fail the functional failure analysis need to be investigated by a more detailed
FMEA.
When conducting a system FMEA, the following typical operational modes within the normal design
environmental conditions of the craft should be considered;
1. normal seagoing conditions at full speed;
2. maximum permitted operating speed in congested waters; and
3. maneuvering alongside.
The functional interdependence of these systems should also be described in either block diagrams or faulttree diagrams or in a narrative format to enable the failure effects to be understood. As far as applicable, each
of the systems to be analyzed is assumed to fail in the following failure modes:
1 complete loss of function;
2 rapid change to maximum or minimum output;
3 uncontrolled or varying output;
4 premature operation;
5 failure to operate at a prescribed time; and
6 failure to cease operation at a prescribed time.
Depending on the system under consideration, other failure modes may have to be taken into account.
If a system can fail without any hazardous or catastrophic effect, there is no need to conduct a detailed FMEA
into the system architecture. See 2.4.1, Level of analysis, of the Guidance Notes. For systems whose
individual failure can cause hazardous or catastrophic effects and where a redundant system is not provided, a
detailed FMEA as described in the following paragraphs, should be followed. Results of the system
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functional failure analysis should be documented and confirmed by a practical test program drawn up from
the analysis.
Where a system, the failure of which may cause a hazardous or catastrophic effect, is provided with a
redundant system, a detailed FMEA may not be required, provided that:
1. the redundant system can be put into operation or can take over the failed system within the timelimit dictated by the most onerous operational mode in 4.2 without hazarding the craft;
2. the redundant system is completely independent from the system and does not share any common
system element, the failure of which would cause failure of both the system and the redundant
system. Common system elements may be acceptable if the probability of failure complies with
section 13; and
3. the redundant system may share the same power source as the system. In such case, an alternative
power source should be readily available with regard to the requirement of .1.
See further guidance in 2.4.1, Level of analysis, of the Guidance Notes. Furthermore, in assessing the
redundancy system, special attention is to be paid to the means of failure detection and the integrity of change
over mechanism provided between redundant systems. See section 2.6 and 2.7 of the Guidance Notes.
The probability and effects of operator error to bring in the redundant system should also be considered.
5.
Equipment failure mode and effects analysis
The systems to be subject to a more detailed FMEA investigation at this stage should include all those that
have failed the system FMEA and may include those that have a very important influence on the safety of the
craft and its occupants and which require an investigation at a deeper level than that undertaken in the system
functional failure analysis. These systems are often those which have been specifically designed or adapted
for the craft, such as the craft's electrical and hydraulic systems.
6.
Use of probability concept
If corrective measures or redundancy as described in section 2.7 of the Guidance Notes are not provided for
any failure, as an alternative, the probability of occurrence of such failure should meet the following criteria
of acceptance:
1. a failure mode which results in a catastrophic effect should be assessed to be extremely improbable;
2. a failure mode assessed as extremely remote should not result in worse than hazardous effects; and
3. a failure mode assessed as either frequent or reasonably probable should not result in worse than
minor effects.
Numerical values for various levels of probabilities are laid down in section 3 of the Guidance Notes.
7.
Documentation
It is helpful to perform FMEA on worksheet(s) as shown in figure-1.
The worksheet(s) should be organized to first display the highest system level and then proceed down
through decreasing system levels.
8.
Test program
An FMEA test program should be drawn up to prove the conclusions of FMEA. It is recommended that the
test program should include all systems or system elements whose failure would lead to:
major or more severe effects;
restricted operations; and
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22
Inter-independence between control, monitoring and safety systems. This allows, in the
event of control system failure, the safety system to automatically safeguard the machinery
systems. In other cases, it allows crew to intervene based on the information provided by
monitoring system.
Provisions for local control and means of communication from the bridge.
Control system to fail in the least dangerous way (fail safe concept). For instance, in the
event of remote control system failure, the main engine is to continue to operate according to
the last command.
Therefore the objective of conducting FMEA is to confirm that the above safety provisions would be
available under any single failure conditions, hence minimizing the chance of undesirable situations
from occurring.
- End of Annex 4 -
23