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Meetingof the AristotelianSocietyat 55, RussellSquare,London,
W.C.1, on 4pril 6th, 19364at 8 p.m.
By BERTRAND RUSSELL.
asymmetrical, and that our knowledge of this fact has not the
merely probable character of a generalization from a number
of instances. It seems that, when we perceive that A
precedes B, we can attend to the relation " preceding," and
perceive that it has the characters of transitiveness and
asymmetry. Wittgenstein and Carnap attempt to explain
such propositions as merely grammatical, but I am not
satisfied that their attempt is successful.
That it is possible to perceive facts about universals
appears also in many other ways. In looking at the rain-
bow, we can perceive that blue and green are more similar
than blue and yellow; moreover, it is evident that this is
not merely a relation between three particular patches of
colour, but between their shades, which are universals. We
can perceive, again, that a semitone is a smaller interval
than a tone, which is also a relation of universals.
These things are known empirically in one sense, but
not in another. Take the case of blue, green, and yellow.
It is only through sense that we know green to be between
blue and yellow: when we see all three colours simul-
taneously, we can also see their resemblances and differences,
and we can see that these are properties of the shades, not
of the particulars. The sensible fact must be held to
include not only particulars, but their predicates and rela-
tions, with their predicates and relations. Our knowledge
of all this depends upon the occurrence of a suitable sensible
fact, and is in that sense empirical. But in so far as the
knowledge concerns universals, it is knowledge which may
be exemplified in other sensible facts, and which gives us
hypothetical knowledge concerning such facts. That is to
say, having carefully observed blue, green, and yellow in
one sensible fact, we can say : Wherever these shades may
occur, green will be intermediate in colour between blue
and yellow. In this way attention to the facts of sense can
give rise to general knowledge. One perceived instance
of three events in a time-order can enable us to know that
preceding is a transitive relation. Hence, from the two
facts " A precedes B " and " B precedes C " we can infer
" A precedes C," which is contrary to what Wittgenstein
THE LIMITSOF EMPIRICISM. 141