European Journal of Social Psychology

Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 37, 141151 (2007)

Published online 18 August 2006 in Wiley InterScience
(www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI: 10.1002/ejsp.339

The impact of perceived experience on likelihood judgments for

self and others: An experimental approach
PETER HARRIS*
University of Shefeld, Shefeld, UK

Abstract
This study examines the effect of an experimental manipulation of perceived experience on self and
others likelihood ratings for a set of relatively commonplace misfortunes. Participants were randomly
assigned to a condition in which they were asked whether they had ever experienced the events
(designed to induce higher perceived experience) or whether they had done so frequently, typically, etc.
(designed to induce lower perceived experience). The manipulation led to increases in ratings of both
perceived self-likelihood and others likelihood, in ease of imagining the outcome and recall of a past
occurrence, and to decreases in perceived control over the events in the higher perceived experience
condition. The increases in ease of imagining mediated the impact of manipulated experience on
comparative likelihood whereas the decreases in perceived control did not. There was little evidence
that event controllability moderated the impact of experience on comparative likelihood for these
events. Copyright # 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

People are typically comparatively optimistic about the future, tending to judge their risk of future
negative life events to be lower than that of their peers. This has been shown for a wide range of events,
from colon cancer through divorce to catching a cold or getting a parking ticket (Shepperd, HelwegLarsen, & Ortega, 2003). The term optimistic bias has been coined for the robust nding that the
comparative likelihood judgments of samples of participants are typically skewed in an optimistic
direction.1 Comparative optimism is widespread, hard to undermine (Weinstein & Klein, 1995) and has
been proposed to be core to normal psychological functioning (Taylor & Brown, 1988). The current
study addresses the impact of perceived experience on the component judgments of comparative
optimism, self and others likelihood.
Theoretical and empirical research on comparative optimism has focussed on a small number of
potential moderators of the phenomenon, such as perceived outcome severity (e.g. Weinstein, 1987),
preventability (e.g. Harris, 1996) and the focus of the current study, personal experience (e.g. Burger &
Palmer, 1992). Understanding more about the moderators of optimism is a step towards understanding
why people are comparatively optimistic (Helweg-Larsen & Shepperd, 2001).
*Correspondence to: P. Harris, Department of Psychology, University of Shefeld, Western Bank, Shefeld S10 2TP, UK.
E-mail: p.harris@shefeld.ac.uk
1
See Armor and Taylor (1998) for other denitions of optimism.

Copyright # 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Received 29 June 2005

Accepted 29 December 2005

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Peter Harris
EXPERIENCE AND COMPARATIVE LIKELIHOOD

Most studies of personal experience and comparative optimism have employed the direct method of
assessing comparative likelihood. In the direct method participants are explicitly asked how their risk
compares with others and use a single scale to provide their answer (anchored, e.g., at much less likely
and much more likely). Using this method, studies have generally found that personal experience is
associated with less optimism (e.g. Weinstein, 1980, 1987), although not necessarily its absence (e.g.
McKenna & Albery, 2001; Weinstein, Lyon, Rothman, & Cuite, 2000) and occasional studies nd no
evidence of reductions in optimism at all (e.g. Welkenhuysen, Evers-Kiebooms, Decruyenaere, & van
den Berghe, 1996).
Why might experience eliminate or at least reduce comparative optimism? In a review, HelwegLarsen and Shepperd (2001) suggest two main mechanisms. First, experience might reduce perceived
personal control, leading people to believe that they have no more control over events than others.
Second, experience makes it easier for people to imagine themselves as victims. The current study tests
these two hypothesised mediators of self and others likelihood.
One implication of the rst mechanism is that experience should primarily affect events perceived to
be controllable (i.e. that event controllability should moderate the relationship between experience and
comparative optimism). In contrast, imagination should affect risk perceptions regardless of event
controllability. Indeed, this is the mechanism by which Weinstein, in his seminal 1980 paper
introducing optimistic bias, posited that experience might moderate it: personal experience should
make it easier to recall past occurrences of the event and to imagine situations in which the event could
occur, leading to greater perceived probability through the mechanism of availability (p. 807). There is
good research evidence that imagination increases risk perception (Anderson, 1983; Kahneman &
Tversky, 1982) and some evidence that experience increases imagination (Greening, 1997). However,
less is known about the impact of imagination on comparative likelihood (Sparks, Harris, & Raats,
2003).
For experience to moderate comparative optimism, it has to reduce or eliminate the relative
difference between perceived self-risk and perceived others risk by, for example, increasing self-risk
more than others risk. Unfortunately, the direct method of measuring comparative likelihood does not
tell us what changes occur in self and others risk following experience, as neither component of the
comparative judgment is measured independently.2 However, in the indirect method participants make
separate judgments for themselves and others and comparative likelihood is given by the difference
between the ratings. Using this method, therefore, researchers can assess the impact of experience on
the separate components of the comparative judgment.
To date relatively few studies on comparative optimism have examined this question using the
indirect method. From these there appears to be support for the claim that experience typically serves to
increase self-risk (Burger & Palmer, 1992; Greening, 1997; Stapel & Velthuijsen, 1996; van der Velde,
van der Pligt, & Hooykaas, 1994), but less clear evidence about its effect on others risk: Some studies
do not report judgments for this target (e.g. Greening, 1997; Shepperd, et al., 2003; Stapel &
Velthuijsen, 1996) others report no change (e.g. Absetz, Aro, Rehnberg, & Sutton, 2000; Weinstein
et al., 2000) yet others nd others risk also increases with experience (e.g. Higgins, St. Amand, &
Poole, 1997).
The nding that experience can increase the perception of others risk is consistent with the rst of
Weinsteins tentative propositions from his 1989 review of the impact of personal experience:
2
Moreover, several researchers have argued that the direct method, despite its high face validity, primarily assesses self-risk (e.g.
Chambers, Windschitl, & Suls, 2003; Covey & Davies, 2004; Price, Pentecost, & Voth, 2002). It may therefore be a less adequate
measure of comparative likelihood than once thought (see also Weinstein & Klein, 1996).

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143

personal experience generally leads people to see hazards as more frequent and to view themselves as
potential future victims (p. 46); seeing something as more frequent is formally equivalent to seeing
average likelihood as higher. In support of this, Weinstein (1989) cites 12 studies, in 10 of which
experience was associated with increases in perceived likelihood for people in general (Table 5, p. 42).
Moreover, although Helweg-Larsen and Shepperd (2001) conclude that the (very limited) evidence
available from research on comparative likelihood suggests experience affects self rather than others
risk judgments, they accept that it may also affect others risk (p. 87). Clearly, there is uncertainty
concerning the impact of experience on judgments of others likelihood.
Therefore, the current study attempts to manipulate perceived experience and to examine the impact
of this manipulation on judgments of self and others likelihood, event controllability and ease of
imagination of future events. It is one of the few studies to address the potential mechanisms by which
experience is hypothesised to affect comparative optimism and the only one to date to do so
experimentally.

MANIPULATING PERCEIVED EXPERIENCE

It is, of course, both practically difcult and ethically unacceptable to manipulate whether someone will
experience misfortune. Consequently, an attempt is made here to manipulate peoples perceptions of
their experience, in this case by using a series of relatively commonplace misfortunes of the sort that we
typically try to avoid but experience from time to time.
Researchers interested in comparative risk (especially optimistic bias) have traditionally tended to
focus on major life events, such as attempted suicide, cancers and HIV. However, such major life events
represent only a subset, albeit an important one, of the negative life events that typically confront us.
Moreover, participants typically have little personal experience of these more traditional events and it
would be hard to persuade them that they had experienced such things when they have not.
More recently, researchers have turned their attention also to more commonplace events and shown
that comparative risk judgments for such events have features in common with the more traditional
negative events (e.g. Chambers et al., 2003; Shepperd et al., 2003). For example, Shepperd et al. (2003)
have shown that both types of event elicit comparative optimism and show similar levels of consistency
over time. Nevertheless, clearly there are differences between commonplace and traditional events and
caution will be needed in extrapolating from the current study to the broader literature on optimistic
bias.
In the current study, participants were assigned randomly to one of two conditions. In the higher
perceived experience condition, they were asked whether they had ever experienced the event in
question. In the lower perceived experience condition, they were asked whether they had done so
frequently, typically and so on. The wording of this question was the only difference between
conditions. The rationale was that most participants should be able to bring to mind an instance of most
of the events, but the threshold for a yes response is lower when the adverb is ever. For example, most
of those asked if they had ever missed a train or plane would be able to bring to mind an example and
answer yes; more of those asked whether they did so quite often would recall insufcient examples to
meet their threshold for the adverb and answer no. Consequently, participants in the higher perceived
experience condition should tend to answer the experience questions afrmatively whereas those in the
lower perceived experience condition should do so less often. Salancik (1974) and Salancik and
Conway (1975) have used a similar manipulation in their research on attitudes (see also Weinstein &
Klein, 1995, Study 2, for a conceptually similar manipulation).
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Peter Harris

The predictions are that, compared with participants in the lower perceived experience condition,
those in the higher perceived experience condition will have higher ratings of self-likelihood and ease
of imagination and lower ratings of control over the events. Less clear is whether perceived experience
will affect others likelihood and whether it will moderate comparative optimism. As described earlier,
perceived event controllability can be considered as a potential moderator of the effect of experience on
comparative likelihood and a potential mediator of these effects. (For more on this distinction and
testing combined mediation and moderation, see Baron & Kenny, 1986.) Consequently, both
possibilities were tested as was the hypothesis that increases in ease of imagination mediated the effect
of experience on likelihood judgments.

METHOD
Participants
The sample comprised 99 students of various disciplines at the University of Shefeld, of whom 50
were female and 46 were male (3 did not disclose their sex). The mean age of the sample was 20.6 years
(SD 2.0 years).

Materials and Procedure

A separate sample of 30 second year undergraduate psychology students rated a pool of 24 everyday
events for perceived controllability using a 7-point scale anchored at no control at all and total control,
with intermediate points labelled hardly any control, a little control, moderate control, high control and
almost total control. From these ratings, ve lower (M 2.81), ve moderate (M 3.51) and ve
higher control events (M 4.08) were selected for use in this study (Table 1). Events varied
signicantly in rated controllability, F(2, 56) 44.9, p < 0.001.
Table 1. The events
Higher control
Typically turning up to the wrong place to meet people
Typically turning up late to meet people
Quite often oversleeping when it is important not to
Rarely being sufciently conscientious or reliable
Often being unkind or rude to family members
Moderate control
Quite often missing or nearly missing trains and planes
Often forgetting anniversaries or birthdays
Typically not keeping in touch with friends
Frequently misplacing or losing keys
Generally not keeping resolutions
Lower control
Typically failing to impress special people
Generally nding it hard to reverse into tight parking spaces
Typically choosing the wrong queue at the supermarket
Typically getting lost in unfamiliar places
Often not sticking to plans
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In the experimental study, participants were instructed to answer the questions honestly and
accurately, working through them in order. Immediately following the instructions came the
manipulation. In the lower perceived experience condition the participants were asked, Have you
experienced any of these events in the past? followed by the 15 events, in random order, with an adverb
for each event (i.e. worded exactly as in Table 1). In the higher perceived experience condition the
participants were asked, Have you EVER experienced any of these events in the past? again followed
by the 15 events, but without any other adverb (e.g. misplacing or losing a set of keys, getting lost in an
unfamiliar place). Responses were given by ticking yes or no.
This was the only difference between the conditions: the remainder of the questionnaire was
identical in both conditions.
Immediately following the experience question was a mood rating: Before you continue, could you
please rate your CURRENT MOOD. That is, your mood RIGHT NOW. Responses were given on a 7point scale (very bad/down, moderately bad/down, slightly bad/down, neither good nor bad, slightly
good, moderately good, very good). At the top of the next page came the recall question: How easy is it
for you to RECALL a past occasion on which you, followed by the events (e.g. misplaced or lost a set
of keys, got lost in an unfamiliar place). Next came the imagine question: How easy is it for you to
IMAGINE a FUTURE occasion in which you might, followed by the events (e.g. misplace or lose a set
of keys, get lost in an unfamiliar place). Responses were given on a 6-point scale (not at all easy,
slightly easy, quite easy, moderately easy, very easy, extremely easy). For the recall question the
response option have never experienced was also provided.
Next came the likelihood questions, on two separate pages, with the events described using the
wording in Table 1. First were the self-likelihood ratings: Please use the following rating scale to
indicate how likely it is that you will experience each of the following events sometime in the future.
The following page contained the likelihood ratings for the average other: Please use the following
rating scale to indicate how likely it is that the average University of Shefeld student of your age and
sex will experience each of the following events sometime in the future. Ratings were given on an 11point scale anchored at impossible (0) and extremely likely (10).
Finally came the control question: Please indicate how much control you think you have over
whether you are likely to experience each of the following events sometime in the future. Tick the point
on the scale that best reects your control as you see it. Ratings to the events (misplacing or losing
keys, getting lost in an unfamiliar place, etc.) were given on the same 7-point scale of controllability
described earlier.
Participants were approached in a coffee bar of the students union at the University. Questionnaires
were completed in situ.

RESULTS
An alpha level of 0.05 was used for all analyses. For post hoc comparisons (paired t tests with
Bonferroni-correction, Howell, 2002) individual comparisons used an alpha of 0.017, giving a family
wise error rate of 0.05.
The mean ratings of experience and recall were calculated for each participant over all 15 events
(Table 2). One-way analysis of variance for unrelated samples, with condition (higher or lower
perceived experience) as the independent variable conrmed that participants in the higher perceived
experience condition answered yes more often to the experience question, F(1, 97) 70.5, p < 0.001.
Thus the manipulation was successful. Participants in the higher perceived experience condition also
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Peter Harris

Table 2. Mean ratings by experience condition

Experience
Recall
Mood

Lower (n 49)

Higher (n 50)

0.43 (0.2)
2.70 (0.9)
5.30 (1.4)

0.77 (0.2)
3.20 (1.0)
5.50 (1.2)

Note: Standard deviations in brackets. Recall scored 0 to 6, mood 1 to 7.

reported nding it easier to recall a past occurrence of the events, F(1, 97) 7.0, p 0.009. Condition
did not affect mood, F(1, 97) < 1, p 0.56.
The data for imagination, self-likelihood, average other likelihood and perceived control are in
Table 3. Likelihood ratings were analysed using 4-way analysis of variance for mixed designs.
Between-participants IVs were condition and sex, and within-participants IVs were target (self or
other) and event controllability (lower, moderate, or higher). Event controllability was included to
assess whether control moderates the experience/likelihood relationship (which would be shown by
signicant condition
controllability interactions) and also whether it is a potential mediator of this
relationship (which would be shown by a signicant main effect of controllability or interaction with
target, Baron & Kenny, 1986, p. 1179).
There were signicant main effects of condition, F(1, 79) 11.7, p 0.001, target, F(1,
158) 34.7, p < 0.001 and event controllability, F(2, 158) 24.7, p < 0.001: likelihood ratings were
higher for higher (M 5.7) than lower perceived experience (M 4.8) and for other (M 5.3) than for
self (M 4.4). Post hoc tests revealed signicant differences between higher (M 4.9) and moderate
(M 5.7) control events but not between these and lower control events (M 5.3). The main effects of
condition and event controllability indicate that further analysis of the possible mediating role of
perceived control on the experience/likelihood relationship is appropriate (Baron & Kenny, 1986).3
The condition
target interaction was not signicant, F(1, 158) < 1, p 0.50, indicating that
condition did not moderate optimistic bias.4 However, the event controllability
target interaction was
signicant, F(2, 158) 10.0, p < 0.001; Thus, event controllability moderated optimistic bias. Post hoc
Table 3. Principal-dependent variables by condition and event controllability
Higher (n 50a)

Lower (n 49a)
Event
controllability
Likelihood
Imagination
Control

Lower
Self
Other

4.53a
5.31a
2.07a
3.38a

(2.08)
(1.63)
(1.06)
(0.92)

Moderate

Higher

Lower

Moderate

Higher

5.05a (2.10)
5.48a (1.60)
2.36a (1.20)
3.87b (0.90)

3.53b (2.04)
4.89b (1.59)
1.74b (1.14)
4.13c (0.87)

5.24a,b (2.01)
6.03a (1.94)
2.76a,b (1.12)
2.89a (0.96)

5.72a (2.27)
6.43a (1.91)
3.00a (1.20)
3.53b (1.22)

4.90b (2.30)
6.08a (2.05)
2.49b (1.23)
3.69c (1.22)

Note: Standard deviations in brackets. Means with different subscripts in each condition within rows differ signicantly on post
hoc tests. Likelihood scored 0 to 10, imagination 0 to 5, control 0 to 6.
a
Maximum ns.

The main effects of condition and target were both qualied by two-way interactions with sex. Males (M 4.3) had lower
likelihood ratings overall than females (M 5.3) in the lower perceived experience condition, but not in the higher (M 6.0,
M 5.6 respectively). Likewise, males (M 4.4) had lower self-likelihood ratings than females (M 5.2), but there were no sex
differences in others ratings (M 5.8, M 5.7 respectively).
4
The event controllability
condition
target
sex interaction approached signicance, F(2, 158) 2.6, p 0.076, potentially
indicating some qualication to this position. However, it was not close enough to signicance to warrant further analysis.
3

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tests revealed that optimistic bias (other minus self-likelihood) was signicantly greater for higher
(M 1.3) than for moderate (M 0.6) or lower (M 0.9) control events, but that moderate and lower
control events did not differ signicantly. The event controllability
target
condition interaction was
not signicant, indicating that event controllability did not moderate the impact of experience on
comparative likelihood. However, the event controllability
condition interaction approached
signicance, F(2, 158) 2.9, p 0.058. This is potentially indicative of moderation of the
experience/overall likelihood relationship by event controllability. If subsequent analysis reveals a
signicant controllability
condition interaction on ratings of perceived control, then further analysis
of combined mediation and moderation would be warranted (Baron & Kenny, 1986).
Ratings of ease of imagination and perceived control were analysed using 3-way analysis of
variance for mixed designs, with IVs of condition, sex and event controllability. There was a signicant
main effect of condition on ease of imagination with, as predicted, greater ease reported in the higher
(M 2.8) than the lower (M 2.1) perceived experience condition, F(1, 90) 11.2, p 0.001. Ease of
imagination was also affected by event controllability, F(2, 180) 20.3, p < 0.001, (higher M 2.1,
moderate M 2.7, lower M 2.4; all means differed signicantly on post hoc tests) and was higher
among females (M 2.6) than males (M 2.1), F(1, 90) 4.6, p 0.035. These main effects were not
qualied by any signicant interactions. There was also a signicant main effect of condition on ratings
of perceived control with, as predicted, lower control ratings in the higher (M 3.4) than in the lower
(M 3.8) perceived experience condition, F(1, 84) 5.0, p 0.028. There was also a signicant main
effect of event controllability on control ratings, F(2, 168) 49.1, p < 0.001, (higher M 3.9,
moderate M 3.7, lower M 3.1; all means differed signicantly on post hoc tests).5 The event
controllability
condition interaction was not signicant, F(2, 168) <1, p 0.63. Consequently,
further analysis of a combined mediation and moderation model of perceived controllability is not
appropriate.

Analyses of Mediation
To conrm that experience mediated the main effect of condition on overall likelihood, three
regressions were run (Baron & Kenny, 1986). Not surprisingly, the rst conrmed the main effect of
condition on overall likelihood, R2 0.08, F(1, 94) 7.6, b 0.27, p 0.007, and the second
conrmed the main effect of condition on experience, R2 0.42, F(1, 97) 70.5, b 0.65, p < 0.001.
Experience also predicted overall likelihood, R2 0.37, F(1, 94) 54.5, b 0.61, p < 0.001. When
overall likelihood was regressed on condition and experience simultaneously, R2 0.39, F(2,
93) 30.0, p < 0.001, condition was no longer signicant, b 0.21, p 0.053, but experience was,
b 0.74, p < 0.001. Thus experience mediated the main effect of condition on overall likelihood
(Sobel z 5.4, p < 0.001).
A second set of regressions was run to assess whether imagination and perceived controllability
mediated the effect of experience on comparative likelihood judgments irrespective of experimental
condition. That is, comparative likelihood was calculated for each participant regardless of which
condition s/he had been in. This was done by subtracting their mean self-likelihood from their mean
others likelihood so that positive numbers indicated comparative optimism. Scores ranged from 3.2
to 4.9, with 76% being positive (median 0.67). When comparative likelihood was regressed on mean
ratings of personal experience of the events, the effects were signicant, R2 0.10, F(1, 94) 10.4,
b 0.32, p 0.002. When imagination was regressed on experience, the effects were also signicant,
R2 0.48, F(1, 97) 89.1, b 0.69, p < 0.001. Imagination also predicted comparative likelihood,
5

The only other signicant effect was a control
sex interaction, F(2, 168) 8.2, p < 0.001.

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Peter Harris

R2 0.41, F(1, 94) 18.7, b 0.41, p < 0.001. Finally, when comparative likelihood was regressed
on experience and imagination simultaneously, R2 0.17, F(2, 93) 9.4, p < 0.001, experience was no
longer signicant, b 0.07, p 0.61, but imagination was, b 0.36, p 0.007. Thus imagination
mediated the effect of experience on comparative likelihood (Sobel z 2.7, p 0.008).
When perceived control was regressed on experience, the effects were signicant, R2 0.18, F(1,
94) 20.0, b 0.42, p < 0.001. Control also predicted comparative likelihood, R2 0.06, F(1,
94) 6.3, b 0.25, p 0.014. However, when comparative likelihood was regressed on experience
and perceived control simultaneously, R2 0.12, F(2, 93) 6.1, p 0.003, perceived control was not
signicant, b 0.14, p 0.19 while experience remained a signicant predictor, b 0.26, p 0.019.
Thus perceived control did not mediate the effect of experience on comparative likelihood (Sobel
z 1.3, p 0.20).

DISCUSSION
The experimental manipulation was successful: participants in the higher perceived experience
condition responded afrmatively to the experience question more often than did those in the lower
perceived experience condition. They also reported nding it easier to recall a past occasion on which
they had experienced the event. The effects of the manipulation are not attributable to mood, as there
was no effect of condition on mood.
Following the manipulation, ratings of perceived control were signicantly lower among those in
the higher perceived experience condition. It has often been assumed that personal experience of an
event can reduce perceived control over that event and the current study has nally demonstrated this
effect experimentally. The manipulation also resulted in higher ratings of ease of imagining future
occasions on which the event might be experienced. Thus, the ndings support both elements of
Weinsteins (1980) original hypothesis that experience will affect likelihood by making it easier to
recall past occurrences and imagine situations in which the event could occur.
The manipulation also conrmed that perceived experience can increase both self and others
likelihood ratings. Previous research using the indirect method has produced inconsistent evidence
concerning the impact of experience on others risk. The current ndings are, however, consistent with
the ndings reviewed by Weinstein (1989) in which he showed that experience often results in
perceptions of increased likelihood for people in general. Theoretically, it is possible to posit both
cognitive and motivational mechanisms to account for the increases in others risk found here. For
example, the manipulation may have heightened the perceived frequency of the events and thus the
perception of increased vulnerability for both self and others. On the other hand, maintaining the sense
that others are more prone to negative events, even of the kind examined here, could serve a variety of
motivational goals, such as maintaining self-esteem or reducing anxiety, and thus be hard to shake.6
Future research should address the event and individual difference moderators of the impact of
experience on others risk, given the current ndings.
That the manipulation thus maintained rather than eroded optimistic bias is consistent with some
previous ndings using the indirect method of assessing the bias but largely at odds with research that
has employed the direct method. One reason for this may lie in the nature of the direct method: Several
6
Although the current study was not designed to tease apart possible explanations for an effect of experience on others risk, it was
possible to rule out one candidate explanation: there was no more evidence that people derived their others likelihood ratings
from their self-ratings than the reverse. That is, the inuence of the manipulation on others likelihood was rendered nonsignicant when self-likelihood was included as a covariate. However, the same was also true with self-likelihood as the
dependent variable and others likelihood as the covariate.

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recent theoretical accounts (e.g. Chambers et al., 2003) have suggested that likelihood judgments made
with the direct method are heavily determined by self-risk judgments. It may well be that studies using
the direct method, therefore, primarily assess the impact of experience on self-likelihood rather than
comparative likelihood. To avoid such ambiguity, studies should employ the indirect method whenever
possible when investigating the impact of experience on optimistic bias.
As well as testing for differences on the dependent variables, the study was designed to test two of
the principal mediating mechanisms that have been suggested for how experience might affect
comparative optimism: reductions in perceived control and increases in imagination. The evidence here
supports imagination but not control. This is an important nding, as there have been several attempts
to explain the apparent effect of experience on comparative likelihood by the impact of experience on
perceived control (e.g. Helweg-Larsen & Shepperd, 2001; Higgins et al., 1997). Researchers interested
in more major life events should test for changes in control perceptions following personal experience
and examine whether these mediate any effects of experience on comparative risk perceptions; the
current ndings suggest they may not. Indeed, the nding that imagination but not control mediated the
impact of experience is consistent with Greening (1997) who found the same for self-risk perception
following experience of an electrocution accident (see also Greening, Dollinger, & Pitz, 1996).
Weinstein (1989) also points out that the effects of experience on perceived control will vary with the
type of situation encountered.
Theoretically, the current ndings suggest future studies might also usefully examine the impact of
experience on the nature of the mental simulations people construct for themselves and others. In doing
so researchers could protably draw on Kahneman and Tverskys (1982) seminal analyses of the ways
in which simulated scenarios can change (also Kahneman & Miller, 1986).
Some other aspects of the ndings are also worthy of comment. For example, as with traditional
events (Harris, 1996), here event controllability moderated optimistic bias (the event controllability
target interaction was signicant). However, whereas signicantly more optimistic bias
was displayed for higher control events, moderate control events did not differ from lower control
ones. More signicantly, there was little evidence here that event controllability moderated the impact
of the manipulation on comparative likelihood (the condition
event controllability
target
interaction was not signicant). Thus, the ndings of this experiment do not support either a
moderating or mediating role for perceived control after experience, at least for the sorts of events
investigated here.
Of course, the current ndings must not be overgeneralised, particularly in their implications for the
literature on optimistic bias. Research on optimistic bias has typically focussed on events such as
cancers, divorce and attempted suicide, and there are clear differences between such events and those
used here. Some of these differences might affect the way in which experience inuences self and
others risk perceptions. This may include the severity of the consequences and increased knowledge,
gained though victimisation, about risk factors, base rates and objective self-risk. Nevertheless, there
are important things in common as well as important differences between these commonplace events
and those used more typically in research on optimistic bias (Shepperd et al., 2003). Moreover, these
commonplace events represent a sizeable proportion of the future events that we judge and anticipate.
In conclusion, the current study is one of few to address the potential mechanisms by which
experience is hypothesised to affect comparative optimism and the only one to date to do so
experimentally. The experimental manipulation led to signicant increases in likelihood and
imagination and decreases in perceived control. The evidence suggests that the increase in imagination
is one of the mechanisms that lead to the changes in perceived likelihood for both self and others
produced by experience. Future studies should explore which variables determine when experience
also moderates others risk.

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Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 37, 141151 (2007)

150

Peter Harris
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I thank Ellie Martin for her assistance in collecting the data and Dale Grifn and Bill Klein for their
helpful comments on previous drafts.

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