Similarities between Conflict and Cooperation

in the Marketing Channel

Robert H. Ross, Wichita State University
Robert F. Lusch, Oklahoma University

This article examines the relationship between two causes of conflict: domain dissensus
andperceptual incongruity, and the levels of conflict and cooperation within a marketing
channel dyad. Utilizing a national sample of food broker-food wholesaler dyads, four
hypotheses were tested-two
relating domain dissensus and two relating perceptual
incongruity to conflictlcooperation.
Results indicated no significant relationship
between either perceptual incongruities or domain dissensus and the level of conflict
found in the dyad, while a significant negative relationship was found between both
perceptual incongruities and domain dissensus and the level of cooperation in the dyad.

Most recent studies of the interactions between members of a marketing

channel have taken Aldersons [l] perspective of the channel as an
interorganizational
system. These studies assume that channels are
superorganizations
. . [which] have the characteristics of complex
social organizations, even though comprised of collectivities rather than
individuals
[19, p. 4061. Thus within a channel there are activities
aimed at attaining both collective and self-interest goals; a division of
functions and tasks resulting in interdependent processes; and integrated
actions that result in channels developing a unique identity separate from
their members [ 19, p. 4061.
The interdependent relations between channel members are important
to the development of research regarding channel conflict in that
interdependency has been identified as a precondition for the existence
of conflict [4]. To date, most research on channel conflict has focused on
vertical channel conflicts causes [5, 8, 9, 12, 20, 26, 27, 321,
consequences
[ 11, 13, 16, 231, mechanisms of conflict resolution
[2, 13,26,27,30].
Channel interdependence also creates the need for cooperation to
assure effective channel management. Cooperation has received less
attention in intrachannel studies, with Pearsons [ 151 the only reported
empirical example. There are divergent views of the relationship
Address correspondence to Robert H. Ross, Department of Administration,
State University, College of BusinessAdministration, Wichita, KS 6 7208.
JOURNAL OFBUSINESSRESEARCH
10, 237-250 (1982)
0 Elsevier Science Publishing Co., Inc. 1982
52 Vanderbilt

Ave., New York, NY 10017

0148-2963/82/020237-14$2.75

Wichita

237

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Robert H. Ross and Robert F. Lusch

between conflict and cooperation in channels. Pearson [ 151 indicates that

conflict and cooperation are at opposite ends of a single scale, whereas
Mallen [ 131, Stem and Heskett [27], and Robicheaux and El-Ansary
[20] view conflict and cooperation as separate constructs. Stem and
Reve [28] suggest that the degree of conflict or cooperation in a given
channel is the result of the degree of power balance present, as well as the
aggregate amount of power in the channel [28, p. 581.
There has been no reported research investigating the effect of the
presence of causes of conflict with the levels of conflict and of
cooperation in a channel, even though these concepts appear to share
similar antecedents. An empirical investigation of these relationships is
the objective of this research.
Channel Conflict
Conflict has been defined as a state when incompatable activities
occur. . . an action that is incompatible with another action, prevents,
obstructs, interferes, injures, or in some way makes the latter less likely
or less effective [7, p. lo]. Within the channel, conflict may be defined
as an action by one channel member which is inconsistent with the
goals of some other member or members at a different channel level
[30, p. 61. This definition is adopted for this research, since it implies the
presence of a vertical linkage in the channel and also implies that actions
need not be planned as conflictual to be perceived as such.
The effect of various levels of conflict on the functioning of a channel
can be either productive or destructive. Managerially, it is important to
develop strategies to manage conflict and identify what sort of conflict
behavior is most likely to lead to constructive outcomes and which
behaviors tend to be either nonproductive or destructive [29, p. 8921.
After isolating these behaviors it is necessary to identify the variable
which influence the occurrence of these behaviors. . . [to] develop
productive intervention strategies and tactics [29, p. 8921.
To assist in understanding the conflict process, several models have
been developed. Pondy [ 171 in his model indicates the presence of four
(not necessarily sequential) stages: a latent stage (causes of conflict
present); a perceived stage (awareness of conflict); a felt stage
(conflictual parties experience tension or stress); and a manifest stage
(actual conflictual behavior takes place). The outcome of one conflictual
episode sets the stage for the next. Similar models have been developed
by Thomas [29] and in a channel setting by Rosenberg and Stem [21,
Rosenberg and Stem [21] suggested in their empirically tested model
that interdependence,
perceptual incongruity, domain dissensus, and

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239

goal incompatibility were the causes of conflict in a channel. These

causes react with structural and attitudinal factors to create a measurable
level of conflict. The behavior occurring at this point determines the
eventual outcome of the conflict episode.
It appears that interdependency provides the foundation for the other
causes [26, p. 1561, in that each channel member will have its own goals
and preferred method of their achievement. However, none can pursue
the goals without concern for how this pursuit will affect other members
goal attainment [26, p. 1601. Domain dissensus is also related to
interdependency in that it involves disagreement regarding the range of
products, population to be served and the services rendered and/or
functions performed [27, p. 2941 between the member of a channel.
Lastly perceptual incongruities become particularly significant when
interdependent channel members must work together to reach channelwide goals.
Cooperation
Cooperation may be defined as a situation where the individuals
composing a group are pursuing promotably interdependent goals [6,
p. 1501. In the channel, cooperation may be defined as a state or
condition characterized by members willingness to coordinate their
activities in an effort to help all channel members achieve superordinate
goals [20, p. 221. This definition is utilized in the research at hand.
Conflict versus Cooperation
Interdependence
is an antecendent of both cooperation and conflict.
Therefore knowledge of ways to manage conflict and cooperation in
interdependent channel settings has significant managerial impact since
it affects the channels ability to function effectively. In addition,
empirically based knowledge of the relationship between conflict and
cooperation in a channel has theoretical value, since analyses of this
relationship have been somewhat ambiguous to date. As examples,
Schermerhom [24] is representative of authors suggesting that conflict
and cooperation share common roots in organizational interdependence,
domains, and goals-with
the outcome situationally determined.
Bonama [3], on the other hand, indicates that the relation between
conflict and cooperation varies with the relative power of the involved
parties. The former opinion indicates that conflict and cooperation are
antithetical, while the latter indicates that they should be considered as
separate constructs.

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Rohert

H. Ross and Robert

F. Lusch

If conflict and cooperation are considered as separate constructs,

channel member behavior could be classified along one continuum from
cooperative to noncooperative,
and along a second continuum from
functional to dysfunctional conflict [20, pp. 22-231. Stem [25] indicates
that the cooperative orientation in channels is obtained in a setting within
which the potential for conflict is present.
Given the common root ot interdependency,
if perceptual incongruities and domain dissensus result in higher levels of channel conflict,
do congruent perceptions and domain consensus lead to higher levels of
cooperation? If conflict and cooperation have similar roots, it would
seem logical that these elements in the conflict process would also bear
on cooperation.
Hypotheses
Based on this background an empirical study was conducted that allowed
testing of the relationship between two of the primary causes of conflict
in the channel: domain dissensus and perceptual incongruity, and the
level of both conflict and cooperation in a channel dyad.
HI : the greater the domain dissensus between channel members A & B,
the higher the level of conflict in the A-B dyad.
HI: the greater the perceptual incongruity between channel members A
& B, the higher the level of conflict in the A-B dyad.
H,: the greater the domain dissensus between channel members A & B,
the lower the level of cooperation in the A-B dyad.
H,: the greater the perceptual incongruity between channel members A
& B, the lower the level of cooperation in the A-B dyad.
Research Design
Data and Sampling
Data utilized to test the research hypotheses were
collected as part of a nationwide study of the relationships between food
brokers and food wholesalers.
A sample of 100 broker-wholesaler pairs (matches) was randomly
chosen from a nationwide list of broker and wholesaler participants in the
grocery channel. Two criteria were used: the broker-wholesalers must be
involved in the general grocery trade and they must do business with
each other. The 100 matched pairs of brokers and wholesalers were first
contacted by telephone and asked to take part in a study of operating
policies in their marketing channel. Although no mention was made of
the behavioral focus of the study, responsents were informed that they

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241

would be rating only their business relationship with the oposite member
of their dyad. They were then mailed a questionnaire. As an incentive,
all participants were promised a copy of a managerial summary. After
one followup there were 54 usable responses. The data are unique in
terms of channels research since 1) both sides of a specific dyad are
surveyed, and 2) the 54 percent response rate indicates a high interest
level among participating subject in the results of the research.
Measurement
Channel Conflict and Cooperation.
Rosenberg and
Stem [21] used as a measure of conflict the absolute difference between
channel members evaluation of the performance of the dyad on conflictrelated issues. This approach fails to distinguish between a cause of
conflict and conflict itself, as no measure of actual conflict was
performed. Lusch [lo] operationalized the measure of conflict in the
marketing channel as the frequency of intramember disagreements.
Although frequency of disagreement was measured, the intensity of the
disagreements was not measured.
Pearson [ 151 measured the conflictual and cooperative orientation in
the channel by generating a list of 30 adjectives, 15 having content
validity in the measurement of conflict and 15 having content validity in
the measurement of cooperation. Each adjective was accompanied by a
Stapel scale ranging from + 5 to + 1 and from - 1 to -5. Respondents
assigned a positive number to those adjectives that were good descriptors
of the situation in their channel, and a negative number to those that were
poor descriptors, with the magnitude of goodness or poorness reflected
in the absolute size of the assigned number. The extent to which the
conflictually based adjectives were deemed to be good descriptors
indicated the level of conflict in the channel, while the extent to which
the cooperatively
based adjectives were deemed good descriptors
indicated the level of cooperation in the channel. This measure
corresponds to Pondys felt conflict stage. It is in this stage that
conflict affects the way in which the parties involved in a conflict episode
feel about each other, and therefore might be expected to color their
working relationship.
Pearson tested this procedure on two channel segments, one known to
be conflictual, the other cooperative. Through discriminant analysis 10
of the 30 adjectives were found to be statistically significant in their
predictive power regarding membership in cooperative or conflictual
dyads. This set of ten adjectives had criterion validity. This list of
adjectives consisted of five that were cooperative (coordination, coalition of interests, respectfulness, mutual confidence, companionship)
and five that were conflictual (unreasonable demands, crossness,
inconsistency, emotional outbursts, dissension).

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Robert

H. Ross and Robert

F Lusch

In the study at hand, these ten adjectives, with a lo-point Stapel scale,
were used to measure the level of felt channel conflict and cooperation.
A major concern with this methodology is that channel members might
resist making responses that would indicate the presence of conflict out
of fear of damaging their business relationships with the opposite
member of the dyad. To overcome this concern, respondents were
assured both during the original telephone contact and in writing on the
questionnaire as to the confidentiality of their response.
Domain Dissensus.
Domain dissensus in a channel dyad refers to the
absence of agreement between members of the dyad regarding their
respective performance of functions, activities, or decision makingspecifically, whose domain these functions, activities, or decision fall
within. After consulting with food brokers and food wholesalers and
reviewing the trade literature, a list of ten activities or functions
involving wholesalers marketing policies was developed. These policy
areas related to wholesalers of product line, pricing policies, inventory
levels, sales promotion policies, product mix, addition of new products,
in-bound transportation decisions, product deletion, order size, and
overall operation. For each of these areas, the food broker and food
wholesaler may not reach a consensus regarding who should have
primary influence, both feeling that their position or expertise should
allow them to influence the policy.
To assess whether dissensus was present in these areas, dyad members
responded to a 5-point rating scale regarding their relative influence in
each area. A Wilcoxon Matched Pairs Test allowed an evaluation of
differences between the broker and wholesalers position, and indicated
in which of the ten policy areas significant differences existed between
brokers and wholesalers. At the .05 significance level, dissensus was
found in the following areas: pricing policies, product mix, order size,
product deletion, and overall operations. In each case brokers felt they
should have more influence than wholesalers were willing to grant.
Domain dissensus scale scores were constructed by summing together
the absolute values of the differences in these five areas for each dyad.
Thus in a particular wholesaler-broker dyad, a higher domain dissensus
score would result if there is considerable disagreement as to who has the
major influence on each of the five domain dissensus areas.
The domain dissensus scale has content validity since the domain
areas were obtained through field discussions with wholesalers and
brokers and from the trade literature. Additionally, the scale was limited
to areas in which there was consensus between the members of the dyad.
Criterion validity was assessed by testing hypotheses one and three in
which the domain dissensus scale was correlated with the conflict and the
cooperation scales. Although no relationship was found between domain

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Channel

243

dissensus and conflict, a significant negative relationship was found with

cooperation. Control validity, or the degree to which a concept is
manipulatable and capable of influencing other variables [31, p. 441,
also is present. This is the case because the areas (pricing, product mix,
order size, and the like) that we refer to in the domain dissensus scale
have direct empirical referents that management can understand and
effect, and therefore control. Finally, reliability was assessed by
computing coeficient alpha for the Sitem domain dissensus scale. The
alpha level was .67, which is generally considered adequate for basic
research.
Perceptual Incongruity.
Perceptual incongruity in a channel exists
when each party to the dyad views a particular event, phenomenon, or
aspect of the channels internal or external environment differently. In
the broker-wholesaler dyad one critical aspect of the relationship is the
extent to which brokers provide wholesalers with assistance. In deciding
which assistances to provide and emphasize, brokers must know how
important the various assistances are to wholesalers. In so doing brokers
will develop perceptions of which assistances are most important. At the
same time, food wholesalers also have perceptions of the importance of
these assistances. To the extent that these entities differ in their
evaluation of the importance of these assistances, perceptual incongruities will be present.
In developing the list of assistances a variety of sources were
consulted, including Daniel Padbergs [14] book on the role of food
brokers in the distribution cycle, as well as a study by Progressive
Grocer [ 181 on the tasks performed by salespeople in the grocery
industry. An initial list of over 40 assistances were reduced to 24 after

Table 1: Correlations between Perceptual Incongruities

Domain Dissensus and Channel Conflict
and Cooperation
Dependent
Independent
Domain
Perceptual

Nofe:
level.

Conflict

Variables

dissensus

scale

incongruity

76 = 0.05
Q! = 0.30
76 = 0.01
01 = 0.45

scale

~b refers to Kendalls

Scale

tau measure

of correlation

and

Variables
Cooperation

Scale

TV= -0.26
01 = 0.007
7* = -0.25
01 = 0.007
and o refers to the significance

244

Robert

H. Ross and Robert

F. Lusch

discussions with food brokers and food wholesalers. The final set of 24
assistances is provided in the Appendix.
Both wholesalers and brokers rated the importance of these assistances to the wholesalers on a 9-point scale. A nonapplicable category
was provided to allow respondents to indicate assistances that were not
provided. Each party was told to evaluate only the other member of his or
her dyad. A Wilcoxon Matched Pairs Test was performed on
wholesalers and brokers responses to each of the 24 assistances. The
results, at the .05 level, showed significant differences in importance
ratings on five of the asistances: 1) describing requirements necessary for
payments of advertising, display, or trade allowance; 2) describing
advertising ideas successfully used elsewhere; 3) arranging for disposition of damaged merchandise; 4) resetting sections within retail
outlets; and 5) providing coordination with transportation or warehousing intermediaries.
To construct the perceptual incongruities scale, the absolute values of
the difference scores for each of these five assistances were summed for
each dyad. As an example, in a specific dyad, if the wholesaler rates an
assistance of low importance but the broker rates it high, this dyad would
be characterized by a high score on the perceptual incongruities scale.
The perceptual incongruities scale has content validity since it was
drawn from discussions with industry representatives and a trade journal
study. The final scale included only the five assistances on which brokers
and wholesalers had incongruent perceptions. The criterion validity of
the scale was assessed through testing hypotheses two and four, thus
revealing that the perceptual incongruities scale correlates with the
cooperation but not the conflict scale. As was true of the domain
dissensus scale, the perceptual incongruities scale has control validity.
There exists a direct empirical referent for the scale in terms of the broker
assistances. If there are perceptual incongruities regarding the importance of these assistances, the broker and wholesaler can in principle
rectify the situation and thus control the degree of perceptual incongruity.
Finally, the perceptual incongruity scale is reliable as
evidenced by the computed coefficient alpha of .78.
Results
Table I provides a summary of the results of testing hypotheses 1 through
4.
To test hypothesis one, that the greater the domain dissensus, the
greater the level of felt conflict, r, was computed between the domain
dissensus and conflict scales. The obtained r6 of .05 was not statistically
significant at the .05 level. Although no relationship can be dem-

Marketing

Channel

245

onstrated, the sign of the correlation coefficient was in the expected

positive direction.
The second hypothesis, that the greater the perceptual incongruity, the
greater the level of felt conflict, was tested by measuring the correlation
between the perceptual incongruity scale and the conflict scale. The
positive rb of .Ol was again in the direction hypothesized but was not
statistically significant at the .05 level.
The third hypothesis, that the greater the dyads domain dissensus, the
lower the level of cooperation, was empirically investigated by correlating the domain dissensus scale with the cooperation scale. A
negative correlation was expected, indicating low levels of domain
dissensus should be related to high levels of cooperation. The TVwas
- .26 and significant statistically at the ,007 level.
The final hypothesis, that the greater the dyads perceptual incongruities, the lower the level of cooperation, was addressed by
correlating the perceptual incongruity scale with the cooperation scale.
The expectation was a negative correlation that would suggest low levels
of perceptual incongruity being tied to high levels of cooperation. The
results supported this expectation. A rb of - .25 was obtained that was
statistically significant at the .OO7level.
In summary, the statistical analysis provided evidence that perceptual
incongruities and domain dissensus among members in a channel dyad
are inversely related to cooperation in the dyad. On the other hand,
perceptual incongruities and domain dissensus were not found to be
related to conflict in the channel dyad.
Discussion
Although the results are probably not generalizable to all channel types
and/or systems, they do suggest that at least certain premises and
propositions in the channel theory literature be questioned and carefully
scrutinized.
At least four possible conclusions can be drawn from the finding that
domain dissensus and perceptual incongruity are not related to felt
channel conflict. The first is that there existed a problem in the research
design and/or measurements. Although this is a possibility, the authors
believe all proper precautions were taken in the survey research design
and in the construction of the measurement instruments.
Second, perhaps the domain dissensus and perceptual incongruity that
existed in the channel was not as yet perceived. Conflict might still be in
a latent stage, not affecting the feelings one number had about the other.
This is not very probable since the average wholesaler-broker dyad inthe

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Robert H. Ross and Robert F. Lusch

study had been dealing with each other for 20 years and domain
dissensus and perceptual incongruity should have already surfaced.
Third, response bias may have been operative, in that only the more
cooperative dyads may have completed their questionnaires. Although
the response rate is high enough to minimize this concern, if more
conflicting dyads had been included as respondents, it might have been
possible to demonstrate a more significant relationship between conflict
and perceptual incongruities and/or domain dissensus.
Fourth, domain dissensus and perceptual incongruity may have been
perceived but had not resulted in any feelings of stress, tension, or
hostility (i.e., felt conflict). We believe this fourth possible explanation
to be the most likely one. Significant dissensus was found in only five of
the ten domain areas investigated. Similarly, 24 areas were investigated
for perceptual incongruity and in only 5 were perceptions significantly
different between broker and wholesaler. A rather cooperative set of
brokers and wholesalers was selected, which is somewhat surprising
since exploratory interviews with brokers and wholesalers in Kansas and
Oklahoma indicated that the potential for considerable domain dissensus
and perceptual incongruity existed.
Surprisingly, although not found to be related to conflict, domain
dissensus and perceptual incongruity were related to cooperation.
Domain dissensus and perceptual incongruity could have been expected
to be related to conflict and nor cooperation, since the conflict literature
identifies them as causes of conflict, while the cooperation literature
does not directly identify them as causes of cooperation.
A possile explanation of this finding is that by reducing domain
dissensus and perceptual incongruity, cooperation in the channel can be
fostered because members of the channel become more able to
coordinate
their activities when they agree on domains and the
importance of assistances. But the opposite does not necessarily hold.
When they do not agree on domains or the importance of assistances,
they may not feel conflict or behave in a conflictual way because they
may not get frustrated. They may view some (probably low) level of
domain dissensus and perceptual incongruity as healthy since their
diversity of opinion may help the dyad make better channel decisions.
This could be especially true in this research setting since relatively little
domain dissensus and perceptual incongruity was present in the broker
and wholesaler dyad.
Conclusions
The results of this study seem to provide support for Schermerhoms [24]
observation that conflict and cooperation have common roots, with the

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247

outcome in a particular episode determined by the situation. This

conclusion is based on our results, which show that clearly specified
domains and congruent perceptions of reality are associated with higher
levels of cooperation. Managerially, this suggests the need for concentrated attention to establishing mutually agreedto domains as well as
congruent perceptions of reality. As Stem and Haskett [27] suggest,
these functions can be successfully accomplished through a bargaining
process enhanced by the presence of an agreed upon power structure to
govern the channel. Therefore it appears important for channel managers
to focus on strategies to develop such a structure.
An important question remaining to be answered regards the direction
of the relationship between domain consensus, perceptual congruity,
and cooperation. For example, in this dyad, was the presence of a
cooperative orientation the cause of congruent perception and domain
consensus, or did these phenomena create the cooperative orientation
noted? There appears to be intuitive support for each position,
particularly when one considers that food brokers success is enhanced
by their ability to maintain cooperative relations with a diverse group of
wholesalers.
Because of the small number of empirical studies of cooperation in
channels, it is difficult to draw conclusions based on this research for
channels in which specialized intermediaries (such as food brokers) are
not present. Future research needs to deal with the relationship between
causes of conflict and the levels of cooperation and conflict in other types
of channel dyads, as well as with potential contributors to the climate of
cooperation in a channel. Additionally, further techniqaues should be
developed to measure empirically the consequences of various levels of
cooperation on the effectiveness and efficiency of a channel.

Appendix: Assistances and Services the Food Broker Provides

the Food Wholesaler
1. Communicate with wholesaler as to the content as well as the timing
of upcoming promotional plans.
2. Inform wholesaler of the existence of new products.
3. Provide descriptions of unique qualities or selling features of new
products.
4. Suggest retail pricing.
5. Schedule the arrival of in-bound shipments.
6. Provide information
concerning changes in the competitive
environment for products handled.

248

Robert

H. Ross and Robert

F. I,usch

7. Advise as to events causing potential fluctuations in the expected

order cycle time for the product (including order processing time,
order handling time, and transit time).
8. Provide information regarding sales variations that may be expected
owing to seasonality or changes in the competitive environment.
5. Advise when manufacturer is out or nearly out of stock.
10. Describe requirements
necessary for payment of advertising,
display, or other forms of trade allowance.
11. Report competitive retail pricing.
12. Arrange for disposition of damaged merchandise.
13. Provide adequate retail store coverage.
14. Provide logistical coordination for the introduction of new products,
as to start-ship dates, handling characteristics, and so forth.
1.5. Recommend order quantities on new products.
16. Present manufacturer or broker research on new products as to
specific needs/requirements of local customers.
17. Reset sections within retail outlets.
18. Offer economies of time by presenting offerings of multiple
manufacturers on one call.
15. Provide coordination with various transportation or warehousing
intermediaries.
20. Communicate manufacturers sales policies.
21. Describe merchandising ideas successfully used elsewhere.
22. Provide logistical coordination for upcoming promotional events,
assuring that adequate product is on hand to support projected sales
levels.
23. Offer suggestions to facilitate ease in storage and handling and
minimize damage in the sale of products.
24. Describe advertising ideas successfully used elsewhere.
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