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Mikael Hrnqvist on the introduction of the new

militia in Florence in 1506

The best available account of how the new militia


was introduced in Florence is in Francesco
Guicciardini's Storie fiorentine, written before
1512. Guicciardini here relates how Piero
Soderini let himself be persuaded by Machiavelli,
"in whom he had great confidence," to reform
the Republic's militia and to return the city to the
military orders of the past. Preparations had
been made for the new ordinances, Guicciardini
writes, but:
since it was necessary for the reputation and
conservation of a thing of such proportion that it
passed through the council, and considering that
it was a new and unusual thing, which the people
would not support without first having seen some
proof of it ... the Gonfalonier began, with the
authority of the signoria, but without
consultation, to enroll soldiers in the contado ...
in the city nothing was done, because it was such
a new and unusual thing that it had to be
conducted little by little.
Guicciardini emphasizes thus the fact that
Soderini took the decision to initiate the project
without first summoning the leading citizens to a
pratica, as was the established practice. He gives
no clear indication, though, whether the idea to
begin the venture without going through the
traditional channels originated with Soderini or
Machiavelli.
After the proposal had won the support of the
signoria, Machiavelli was dispatched on 30
December 1505 to the Mugello and the Casentino
regions to enroll, equip and exercise conscripts
aged fifteen to forty. Through the
correspondence between him and the Ten, the
Florentine war committee, one can follow the
early development of the project in some detail.
In his first report, dispatched from Borgo San
Lorenzo on 2 January, Machiavelli commented on
the progress made and the local population's
reaction to a new militia ordinance. Most
villagers who had been summoned to the
enrollment turned up quite willingly, while those
who failed to present themselves had not done
so mainly out of fear of being assessed for new

taxes. In the local podesteria, he estimated that


it would be possible to recruit about 180 men of
good quality. The general reception of the militia
was also encouraging: "This thing pleases all the
citizens I have encountered here, and everyone
counts on it to succeed; and for my own part I
believe so more than ever, under the condition
that one here applies that diligence that the task
of reforming a province demands." On 5
February, Machiavelli wrote to the Ten from
Pontassieve, complaining about the problems he
had met with recently in Dicomano and San
Godenzo. In thepodesteria of Dicomano he had
after great hardship been able to recruit 200
men, but this number would eventually have to
be reduced considerably. The difficulty of the
undertaking, he attributed to the inveterate
disobedience of the people of the region and to
the hostile relations between the various villages.
His excuse at the end of the letter breathed
frustration: "I have not been able to do these
things more quickly, and he who believes
otherwise, should try it himself, and he will see
what it means to bring together peasants and
men of this sort." In their reply of 6 February,
the Ten accepted Machiavelli's excuse while
emphasizing the urgency of the matter. A letter
of the same date addressed to him by Marcello
Virgilo, the secretary of the First Chancery, that
Piero Soderini was following the progress of the
militia with keen interest and that the project
now had begun to gain support among the
citizenry.
In spite of the progress achieved in the contado
and the positive reactions of the rural population,
strong opposition continued in the city. During
February influential citizens convened in several
pratiche to discuss the arming of the
countryside. According to the chronicler
Cerretani, many of the assembled were opposed
to the innovative idea for the simple reason that
the city's past rulers had refused to adopt this
policy. In the face of this conservative opinion,
Piero Soderini argued that a new militia
ordinance would not only lessen the city's
dependence on hired troops and on the French,
but also increase its chances of recovering Pisa.
Soderini's view won the day and the talks
resulted in the decision to create an infantry
force of twelve thousand men. Five constables
with experience from serving under Paolo Vitelli
were appointed, and five battalions (bandiere) of
two hundred men each were officially set up in
the Valdisieve and the Mugello regions.
On 15 February 1506, a display of four hundred
infantry men from the Mugello took place in the
Piazza della Signoria in the course of the

traditional Carnival festivities. The event was a


great success, and the diarist Luca Landucci
could enthusiastically report that it had come to
be viewed as "the most beautiful thing ever to
have been arranged in the city of Florence." The
discipline of the peasants and their colorful white
and red uniforms, the traditional colors of the
Florentine popolo, appear to have made a
particularly strong impression on the audience.
From Landucci's account we also learn that the
fundamental principles underlying the project
now had become public knowledge: "And these
were soldiers who were to stay at home under
obligation, until need arose for them to be
deployed; and in this way it had been ordered
that many thousands should be created in the
entire contado so that there would be no need of
foreigners."
On 21 February, Leonardo Bartolini wrote to
Machiavelli from Rome congratulating him on his
achievement: "Concerning the new militia, I am
very glad that it is turning out as well as you
indicated to me in the past. If it is helped along
as is its due, I judge that it will turn out to be a
wonderful thing and I shall be very happy when I
see it completed, both for the good of the public
and also because it is your invention." Around
this time, Machiavelli wrote to Cardinal Soderini
exhorting him to persuade his brother, the
gonfalonier, to place a forceful and severe
military captain in command of the militia. The
cardinal, who approved of the idea, passed on
Machiavelli's recommendation in a letter of 4
March. The gonfalonier promptly heeded the
advice, and shortly afterwards the notoriously
cruel Spanish condottiere don Michele di don
Giovanni da Coriglia da Valenza, better known as
don Michelotto, was contracted to lead the newly
created militia. Guicciardini relates how Piero
Soderini charged Machiavelli to seek out
beforehand the opinions of leading members of
the reggimento such as Giovanbattista Ridolfi,
Piero Guicciardini and Francesco Gualterotti. But
when it turned out that they opposed the
appointment of the Spaniard, the Gonfalonier
took the proposal before the Eighty, where it was
passed after a third ballot.' Due to strong
opposition from the ottimati, the original plan to
appoint don Michelotto bargello del contado had
to be abandoned, though, and on 1 April he was
elected capitano di guardia del contado e
distretto di Firenze instead by the Eighty. The
Spaniard was soon called into action. After a
series of poor performances by the militia
battalions at the Pisan front, Machiavelli wrote on
12 June to inform Giovanni Ridolfi, the Florentine
commissioner at the camp in Cascina, that don
Michelotto and a company of one hundred men

were to be dispatched there to reinforce the


militia and to inspire fear in the Pisans.

Mikael Hrnqvist: "Perch non si usa allegare i Romani:


Machiavelli and the Florentine militia of 1506," Renaissance
Quarterly LV:1 (2002), pp. 148-91; quotes from pp. 154-57.

Niccol Machiavelli(1469-1527)

Machiavellis brev om Savonarola frn 1498

Machiavelli och Savonarola

Machiavelli och Cesare Borgia

Om hur den nya milisen introducerades i Florens 1506

Anders Ehnmark om Machiavellis liv efter avskedandet 1512

Machiavellis brev till Francesco Vettori 10 december 1513

Machiavelli om 1494
Redan i sin tidiga verskrnika p terza rime,Decennale

Niccol Machiavelli - den kontroversielle statssekreteraren


24
Niccol Machiavelli r en av idhistoriens mest kontroversiella
frfattare. Florentinarens stridbarhet beror dels p hans
tnkande som mnga uppfattar som provocerande eller
frnsttande, men andra ser som insiktsfullt och klarsynt, dels
p de enorma tolkningsproblem som hans verk gett upphov till.
Machiavelli har tolkats msom som realist och uttalad antiutopist, msom som idealist eller utopist. Det finns de som
menar att han var fursteideolog och de som ser honom som
hngiven republikan. Hans metod har ibland beskrivits som
induktiv, ibland som deduktiv. Han har uppfattats som den
frste moderne ateisten, men ocks som en fromt troende, om
n ngot egensinnig, kristen. En del har i honom velat se en
strng moralist, medan andra menar att han inte har ngon
moral alls. Man har tillskrivit honom ett politiskt system, men
ocks gjort gllande att hans tnkande r helt osystematiskt och
fyllt av motsgelser, ja, att han helt enkelt saknar principer. Han
har varit en inspirationsklla fr Benito Mussolini, den
italienska fascimens fader, men ocks fr Antonio Gramsci,
grundaren av det italienska kommunistpartiet. Moderna liberaler
som Sir Isaiah Berlin och Quentin Skinner rknar honom till en
av de sina.
Att reda ut denna hrva av motstridiga tolkningar lter sig
givetvis inte gras inom det begrnsade utrymme som hr
bjuds. Vi kommer drfr att koncentrera oss p att frska
identifiera ngra av de principiella utgngspunkter som ligger
till grund fr Machiavellis politiska tnkande. I denna nod
behandlas Machiavellis biografi, medan hans tv
huvudverk, Fursten ochDiscorsi (eller Liviuskommentaren)
kommer att diskuteras i nod25 och 26.
Det lilla vi vet om Machiavellis uppvxt och ungdomstid
grundar sig p hans rttslrde fars bevarade dagbok. Ur den kan
vi bland annat utlsa att sonen tidigt sattes i skola, dr han bland
annat fick lra sig aritmetik och latin, och att fadern var
humanistiskt intresserad, bland annat terfanns
Aristoteles Nichomachiska etiken, Ciceros Om plikten och
Livius romerska historia i
Detta har ... i vr tid
familjebiblioteket.
fra Girolamo
Machiavellis uppdykande p den hnt
Savonarola, som med sina
historiska scenen lt vnta p sig nyordningar bringades p fal,
till vren 1498. Frn denna tid
s snart mnniskorna slutade
hrstammar det ldsta av honom tro p honom. Han hade
mjlighet att hlla dem
bevarade brevet. Det r stllt till ingen
som hade trott kvar i tron
Riccardo Becchi, den
och inte heller ngon
florentinske Romambassadren, mjlighet att f de
klentrogna att tro.
och innehller en rapport
om Girolamo Savonarolas
senaste predikningar. Den vid det
hr laget 29-rige Machiavelli
Niccol
framtrder i brevet som en
Machiavelli,Fursten 6

Primo(1504), uppehller Machiavelli sig vid den franska


invasionen 1494 och dess terverkningar p de politiska
frhallandena i Italien. Machiavelli tycks hr uppfatta Karl VIII:s
intg som den frmsta orsaken till det lidande och den nd som
Italien tvingats utst under den tiorsperiod (1494-1504) som
krnikan behandlar.

Vgbeskrivning till Machiavellis villa i San Casciano

Niccol Machiavellis komediLa mandragola i italienskt


orginal.
- Niccol Machiavelli: La mandragola

Niccol Machiavellis grav, Santa Croce, Florens

perceptiv och illusionsfri iakttagare, vl frtrogen med Florens


inrikespolitiska frhllande, och han tar hr ppet avstnd frn
vad betecknar som dominikanerns "kolorerade lgner" och
manikeistiska synstt. Brevet fregriper Machiavellis
diskussion i kapitel 6 av Fursten dr han behandlar Savonarola
som den potientielle grundaren av en ny stat i Florens. Att
dominakern misslyckades tillskriver han hr det faktum att han
var en "obevpnad profet", som saknade den vpnade
uppbackning som fordrats fr att "hlla dem som hade trott kvar
i tron" ... sedan de "slutat tro p honom".
Om Machiavelli och Savonarola
Ngra veckor senare arresterades Savonarola och dmdes till
dden. Efter ddsdomens verkstllan rensades hans anhngare,i
piagnoni, ut ur stadens styrande och administrativa organ, och i
samband med denna utrensing, valdes Machiavelli till
statsekreterare (segretario della Repubblica) och chef fr Andra
kansliet (seconda cancelleria), som svarade fr stadens
inrikesstyrelse. Han erhll ocks posten som sekreterare fr De
tios rd (i Dieci), som i kristid hade till uppgift att skta Florens
utrikespolitiska relationer. Machiavelli tilltrdde sina
befattningar vid en tidpunkt d Florens nskade bryta den
utrikespolitiska isolering som uppsttt till fljd av den
Savonarola-inspirerade regimens franskvnliga politik.
Med Machiavellis administrativa mbeten, vars ansvarsomrden
aldrig var srskilt vl definierade, fljde ocks en lng rad
diplomatiska uppdrag, som skulle ge honom tillfllen att p nra
hll iaktta och analysera det storpolitiska spel som fr lng tid
framver skulle komma att avgra Italiens den. Dessa uppdrag
frde honom under de fjorton r han tjnade republiken bl a till
Frankrike (fyra gnger), Tyskland, Rom, Milano och till en rad
stder i Florens mer omedelbara nrhet. Han stiftade
personligen bekantskap med Ludvig XII av Frankrike, Cesare
Borgia och kejsar Maximilian av Habsburg. Det r av allt att
dma dessa erfarenheter Machiavelli beropar, d han i
dedikationen avFursten (1513), stlld till Lorenzo de' Medici
den yngre, talar om sin "lnga erfarenhet av moderna ting", och
d han i det bermda brevet till Francesco Vettori (10.12.1513)
hvdar att han gnat femton r t att "studera statskonsten (l'arte
dello stato)".
Hgst p den politiska dagordning under dessa
dramatiska r stod konsolideringen av den
florentinska territorialstaten. Pisa hade i samband
med den franska invasionen 1494 frigjort sig frn den
florentinska verhgheten, i Pistoia rasade
inbrdesstrider mellan Panciatichi- och Cancellieriklanerna, och under hsten 1502 gjorde Arezzo och
en rad mindre stder i den ostligt belgna
Valdichiana-regionen uppror. Machiavelli, som
beskte Arezzo kort efter att resningen i staden slagits
ned med hjlp av franska trupper, misstnkte att
revoltens verkliga anstiftare var pven Alexander VI
och dennes relystne son, Cesare Borgia, som enligt
den florentinske sekreterarens uppfattning strvade
efter att gra sig till Toskanas hrskare.
Senare under hsten 1502 skickades Machiavelli som
L.
Bartolini: diplomatiskt sndebud till Cesare Borgia som slagit
Niccol lger med sin arm utanfr Imola p andra sidan
Machiav
Apenninerna. Under de dryga tre mnader som
elli (184
Machiavelli vistades vid Borgias hov i Imola, Cesena
6),
utanfr och Sinigaglia stiftade han ven bekantskap
Uffiziern medLeonardo da Vinci som vid denna tid tjnstgjorde
a,
som militringenjr hos hertigen. Av Machiavellis
Florens
diplomatiska rapporter och senare skrifter frstr vi
att Cesare Borgia mste ha gjort ett djupt intryck p honom. I

den unge hertigen tyckte han sig se en hrskargestalt som i allt


vsentligt utgjorde de tvehgsna, frsiktiga och notoriskt
handlingsfrlamade florentinarnas motsats. Till skillnad frn
dem var Cesare Borgia djrv och fretagsam. Med list och stor,
men kalkylerad och alltid vl avvgd, grymhet var han vid
denna tid p god vg att terervra Kyrkostatens besittningar
och skapa sig ett eget furstendme i centrala Italien. Senare
i Fursten skulle Machiavelli komma att framhlla Cesare Borgia
och hans metoder som det exempel som varje ny furste br
flja:
Nr jag ... skrskdar hertigens alla handlingar vet jag inte vad
jag skulle klandra honom fr, tvrtom anser jag att man, som
jag hr har gjort, kan fresl honom som frebild fr alla dem
som har kommit till makten p grund av tur eller med hjlp av
andras vapen. (Fursten, kap. 7)
Om Machiavelli och Cesare Borgia
Cesare Borgias meteorlika politiska bana skulle dock snart
vnda nedt och i och med hans far, pven Alexander VI, avled
i augusti 1503 var hertigens de beseglat. Trots att Cesare
Borgia nu var ut ur bilden, kvarstod de flesta av Florens
utrikespolitiska problem. Framfr allt fortsatte Pisas envisa
kamp fr ett bevarat oberoende att utgra en nagel i
florentinarnas gon. Efter ytterligare ett misslyckat frsk av
den inhyrda florentinska legoarmn att inta grannstaden,
brjade de styrande, och dribland gonfalonieren Piero
Soderini, att lyssna till Machiavellis ider om en tergng till
senmedeltidens militrsystem baserat p inhemska trupper. P
Machiavellis initiativ inrttades 1506 en stende bondehr i
Florens, bestende av soldater rekryterade frn den
kringliggande landsbygden. I egenskap av sekreterare fr De
nios rd, den myndighet som hade till uppgift att vervaka
styrkan, var Machiavelli intensivt engagerad i projektet. Han
kte runt i bergstrakterna ster om Florens och inspekterade
rekryter, ansvarade fr provianteringen och tillbringade lnga
perioder i flt. Sin politiska karrirs kanske strsta gonblick
upplevde han i samband med terervringen av Pisa 1509.
Om hur den nya milisen introducerades i Florens 1506
Men den respit som denna framgng sknkte var blott tillfllig.
Den florentinska republikens dagar var rknade. Medicerna,
som aldrig gett upp hoppet om att en dag kunna tervnda till
Florens, lyckades till slut utverka spanskt och pvligt std fr
ett militrt angrepp p staden. I september 1512 fick
Machiavellis bondehr se sig gruvligt slagen av den pvliga
armn vid Prato och vgen in till Florens lg nu ppen. Sedan
gonfalonieren Piero Soderini tagit till flykten, kunde
medicerna, anfrda av Giuliano de' Medici, Lorenzo il
Magnificos andre son, tga in i staden och terkrva sina forna
privilegier.
Fr Machiavellis vidkommande innebar Medicifamiljens
terkomst slutet p mbetsmannakarriren. Han blev inom kort
avsatt frn posten som sekreterare fr Andra kansliet och
befriad frn samtliga sina offentliga uppdrag. Varfr han
avskedades r och torde frblir oklart. Uppenbart r dock att
den kontroversielle sekreteraren under sina r i maktens
omedelbara nrhet kommit att skaffa sig mnga mktiga fiender
inom Florens ledande skikt. I november samma r portfrbjds
han under frdmjukande former frn Palatset och gjordes till
freml fr en utredning rrande misstankar om frskingring av
offentliga medel. Senare under vintern fngslades han anklagad
fr delaktighet i en sammansvrjning mot medicerna.
Machiavelli riskerade nu ddsstraff och han utsattes under
fngelsevistelsen fr tortyr enligt den fruktade strappadometoden. Denna innebar att fngen hissades upp till hg hjd
och hlls hngande dr i bakbundna hnder, med kroppen fritt

svvande i nstan horisontell stllning, och med allt tryck vilade


p de baktvridna axlarna. Efter att ha tillbringat en tid i denna
plgsamma position, slpptes offret ned och fick falla fritt mot
marken till dess att repet tog emot och hejdade fallet med ett
hftigt ryck. Fyra omgngar av denna omilda behandling, som i
regel resulterade i att den torterades axlar slets ur led, ansgs
vara mer n vad de flesta tlde. Efter frigivningen skryter
Machiavelli med att ha uthrdat sex sdana slpp.
Machiavelli frigavs i mars 1513 som ett led i den allmnna
amnesti som utfrdades i samband med kardinal Giulio de'
Medicis val till pve (Leo X). Hans medverkan i den sk
Boscoli-sammansvrjningen har aldrig kunnat belggas. Hur
fngelsevistelsen pverkade honom som person och frfattare r
en omstridd frga, och torde s frbli.
Av allt att dma pbrjade Machiavelli Fursten, historiens mest
bermda traktat om furstemakten, under sin frvisning till
lantgodset i Sant'Andrea in Percussina strax sder om Florens
sommaren 1513.
Trots entrgna frsk att vinna de nya makthavarnas
frtroende - vilket bde dedikationen avFursten och
de mnga breven till Francesco Vettori vittnar om var nu Machiavellis politiska och diplomatiska
grning i princip till nda. Han kom visserligen mot
slutet av sitt liv att erhlla ngra mindre uppdrag av Epitaf p
Machiave
officiell och halvofficiell karaktr, men hans
llis grav
verksamhet skulle fortsttningsvis i huvudsak
domineras av hans politiska, historiska och sknlitterra
frfattarskap.
Frutom de tv politisk traktat som ligger till grund fr hans
bermmelse - Fursten (1513) och den lnga
Liviuskommentaren,Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito
Livio ("Diskurser om de tio frsta bckerna av Titus Livius", c
1514-18) - skrev Machiavelli ven ett omfattande
historieverk, Istorie fiorentine (1520-25), en traktat om
krigskonsten, Arte della guerra (1521), ett mindre antal dikter
och noveller, samt tv komedier, La mandragola("Alruna",
1520) och Clizia (1525), varav den frstnmnda ofta brukar
betecknas som den italienska renssansens frmsta.
Machiavellis Fursten

The militia
The ideals of the citizen militia and the armed republic were at the heart of the civic humanist
ideology. The Florentine Quattrocento humanists admired the ancient Roman republic, its military
system, and its citizen-soldier army, based on the male citizen's obligation to render military service
and his right to keep and bear arms. For the civic humanists the Roman self-armed
citizen, civis armatus, was a paragon of patriotism, military virtue and love of liberty.
Extremely critical about the Florentine republic's reliance on hired mercenary forces
for its defence, they called for military reform and a return to old virtuous ways of the
medieval commune.

Back in the Dugento, Florence had waged their limited wars with
indigenuos troops. At the turn of the Trecento, the city had been able to
put into the field an army of 800 fully equipped militia cavalrymen and
6,000 or perhaps even 15,000 foot soldiers. But the days of the civic
militia were numbered. In the course of the Trecento, Florence and
other Italian city-republics came increasingly to depend on hired
mercenaries companies - under the command of so
called condottieri (from condotta, Italian for "contract").

Daniel Waley: "There is no evidence


that the Florence of 1300 was a city of soft,
decadent businessmen who preferred to
pay others to fight on their behalf." (1968,
99)

The Italian condottieri have become the stuff of myth and legend. While
it is true that their chief motivations were self-interest and financial
gain, and that they on many occasioned changed sides and loyalties, it
is equally true that some mercenary captains were recognized for their
military valor and for their service to the republic. Two of them, the
Englishman Sir John Hawkwood (c. 1320-94, or Giovanni Acuto as he
was commonly known in Italy) andNiccol da Tolentino (c. 1350-1435),
were on their deaths given state funerals and commemorated with
equestrian portraits in the Florentine Duomo.

C.C. Bayley on the decline of the


citizen militia in Florence: "The
decline was occasioned by the harsh
lessons learned on the field of battle, the
fierce inner conflicts which divided the
citizen body, the growing wealth of the
community, and the pursuit of a policy of
territorial expansion which increased the
duration and burden of war." (1961, 3)

The growth of the mercenary system did not mean that military service
was completely abandoned. Throughout the Renaissance, native troops
continued to fight alongside the hired professional soldiers. In times of
external aggression the republic continued to avail itself of temporary
troop levies for its defense by imposing a so called comando on the
subject population, requiring them to provide one armed infantrymen
for every household. Such gente comandatawere used in the effort to
reconquer Pisa in 1499 and played an important role in the ambitious
attempt to overcome the Pisan defenses in 1505. However, the citizens
of Florence itself, its merchants, bankers, craftsmen and other
professional men, remained unarmed and continued to pay others for
their xxx.
Many Florentine humanists were strongly critical of this practice.
Inspired by the example of the ancient Roman militia, they argued that
Florence ought to revive the military spirit of the past by returning to
the civic militia of the medieval commune. In his Laudatio (1402-3),
Leonardo Bruni celebrated Florence's military achievements with explicit
reference to the city's Roman heritage and the military system of the
Roman republic. Later, in De militia(1421), he advocated a return to a
classically inspired citizen militia based on a combination of elements
derived from the military systems envisaged by Greek philosophers like
Plato and Hippodamus and Romulus's Roman militia.
The ideal of the armed citizen, civis armatus, reappears in Matteo
Palmieri's dialogue Vita civile ("On the civil life," 1430-35). Palmieri
devotes much space to the Roman military system, arguing that the
ancient Romans had been so animated by their love of liberty that they
had had "no other thing on their mind than the health and the
augmentation of the republic." (126) Their internal unity and their
virtuous customs had enabled them to defeat their enemies, extend
their empire, and bring a great part of the world under their sway.
Later in the Quattrocento, Alamanno Rinuccini recalled in hisDe
libertate ("On liberty", 1479) with nostalgy the good old days when
Florentine citizens had been willing to give their blood in defence of
their patria and its liberty:

Leonardo da Vinci: The Battle of


Anghiari (detail)

By the end of the twelfth century, the city of


Volterra legislated against their citizens
serving in foreign armies.

Cavallata - obligation in medieval times


to keep a horse for service

During the war against Milan in 1424, the


hired mercenary captain Niccol Piccinino
deserted with all his troops from Florence
to Milan, bringing the republic to the brink
of capitulation.

Yet this same people once fought powerful republics and


great tyrants. They defended their liberty with success,
first by sacrifice of bood and second by expenditure of vast
wealth. We know how boldly, with what might and military
cunning they made war against their neighbors when they
saw themselves invaded or when, goaded by injuries and
excessive provocations, they crossed the orders of others.
(Humanism and Liberty, p. 208)
These critical voices notwithstanding, the Florentine republic continued
to rely on hired condottieri and their disloyal mercenary bands for its
defence.
Sir John Hawkood - English
condottiere, also known as Giovanni Acuto,
in employment with the Florentine
republic (Paolo Uccello, Funeral
monument , Santa Maria del Fiore,
Florence, 1436)

Leonardo Bruni in De militia: "the


aim of a soldier must be to acquire glory,
not wealth."

Michelangelo: Battle of Cascina (part), 1505, Cartoon, Private


collection
Contributing to the Quattrocento humanists' critical view of the
mercenary system was their frustration over Florence's failure to
expand its territory after the conquests of Pisa and Livorno at the
beginning of the century. Following the unsuccessful attempt on Lucca
in the 1430s, Florence took a predominantly defensive stance in the
Italian power-game and concentrated its efforts on maintaining control
over its subject cities.

Niccol Machiavelli in
theDiscourses II.10: "not gold .. but
good soldiers are the sinew of war; for gold
is not sufficient to find good soldiers, but
good soldiers are quite sufficient to find
gold." (1996, 148)

In his Dialogue on the Government of Florence (1521-26),Franscesco


Guicciardini has the elderly statesman Bernardo del Nero comment on
this development and the Medici regime's responsibility for the decline
of Florentine militaryvirtue:

Lodovico Alamanni on the decline


of Florentine military virtue: "We
owe our forefathers very little .." >>>

the Medici family, like all narrow regimes, always tried to


prevent arms being possessed by the citizens and to
extinguish all their virility. For this reason we have become
very effeminate, and we also lack the courageousness of
our forefathers. Anyone who has considered how different
it is to wage war with one's own arms and to wage it with
mercenary troops can judge how harmful this is to a
republic. (1994, 34)
Bernardo's reproach echoes Machiavelli's attack on the mercenary
system in chapters 12 and 13 of The Prince, theDiscourses and The Art
of War. It should also be seen in connection to Machiavelli's most
ambitious military and political project during his time in office, the
introduction of the new Florentine militia of 1506. >>>

Jacopo Pontormo: Portrait of a

Halberdier

Related themes: empire, greatness, virtue, patria, liberty

MIKAEL HRNQVIST

Niccol Machiavelli on own arms


in The Prince: "I conclude, therefore,
that no principality is secure without having
its own forces ..." >>>

Jakob Burckhardt on the Renaissance condottiere as Renaissance


man

In his classical work The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy("Die Kultur der Renaissance in Italien," 1860),
the Swiss historian Jakob Burckhardt traced the origins of modern individualism back to the Italian
Renaissance. Burckhardt portrayed the condottieri, the Italian mercenary captains, as a "highly developed"
audacious and immoral personality, who by challenging the medieval tradition and the ideals of political
legitimay, personified this new type of individual. As creators of their own states and
founders of "independent dynasties of their own," the condottieriwere the self-made men of
the Renaissance.

But the highest and the most admired form of illegitimacy in the fifteenth century was presented by
the Condottiere, who whatever may have been his origin, raised himself to the position of an
independent ruler. At bottom, the occupation of Lower Italy by the Normans in the eleventh century
was of this character. Such attempts now began to keep the peninsula in a constant ferment.
It was possible for a Condottiere to obtain the lordship of a district even without usurpation, in the case
when his employer, through want of money or troops, provided for him in this way; under any
circumstances the Condottiere, even when he dismissed for the time the greater part of his forces,
needed a safe place where he could establish his winter quarters, and lay up his stores and provisions.
The first example of a captain thus portioned is John Hawkwood, who was invested by Gregory XI with
the lordship of Bagnacavallo and Cotignola. When with Alberigo da Barbiano Italian armies and leaders
appeared upon the scene, the chances of founding a principality, or of increasing one already acquired,
became more frequent. The first great bacchanalian outbreak of military ambition took place in the
duchy of Milan after the death of Giangaleazzo (1402). The policy of his two sons was chiefly aimed at
the destruction of the new despotisms founded by the Condottieri; and from the greatest of them,
Facino Cane, the house of Visconti inherited, together with his widow, a long list of cities, and 400,000
golden florins, not to speak of the soldiers of her first husband whom Beatrice di Tenda brought with
her. From henceforth that thoroughly immoral relation between the governments and their Condottieri,
which is characteristic of the fifteenth century, became more and more common. An old story--one of
those which are true and not true, everywhere and nowhere--describes it as follows: The citizens of a
certain town (Siena seems to be meant) had once an officer in their service who had freed them from
foreign aggression; daily they took counsel how to recompense him, and concluded that no reward in
their power was great enough, not even if they made him lord of the city. At last one of them rose and
said, 'Let us kill him and then worship him as our patron saint.' And so they did, following the example
set the Roman senate with Romulus. In fact the Condottieri had reason to fear none so much as their
employers: if they were successful, they became dangerous, and were put out of the way like Roberto
Malatesta just after the victory he had won for Sixtus IV (1482); if they failed, the vengeance of the
Venetians on Carmagnola showed to what risks they were exposed (1432). It is characteristic of the

moral aspect of the situation that the Condottieri had often to give their wives and children as
hostages, and notwithstanding this, neither felt nor inspired confidence. They must have been heroes
of abnegation, natures like Belisarius himself, not to be cankered by hatred and bitterness; only the
most perfect goodness could save them from the most monstrous iniquity. No wonder then if we find
them full of contempt for all sacred things, cruel and treacher- ous to their fellows men who cared
nothing whether or no they died under the ban of the Church. At the same time, and through the force
of the same conditions, the genius and capacity of many among them attained the highest conceivable
development, and won for them the admiring devotion of their followers; their armies are the first in
modern history in which the personal credit of the leader is the one moving power. A brilliant example
is shown in the life of Francesco Sforza; no prejudice of birth could prevent him from winning and
turning to account when he needed it a boundless devotion from each individual with whom he had to
deal; it happened more than once that his enemies laid down their arms at the sight of him, greeting
him reverently with uncovered heads, each honoring in him 'the common father of the men-at-arms.'
The race of the Sforza has this special interest that from the very beginning of its history we seem able
to trace its endeavors after the crown. The foundation of its fortune lay in the remarkable fruitfulness
of the family; Francesco's father, Jacopo, himself a celebrated man, had twenty brothers and sisters, all
brought up roughly at Cotignola, near Faenza, amid the perils of one of the endless Romagnole
'vendette' between their own house and that of the Pasolini. The family dwelling was a mere arsenal
and fortress; the mother and daughters were as warlike as their kinsmen. In his thirtieth year Jacopo
ran away and fled to Panicale to the Papal Condottiere Boldrino -- the man who even in death
continued to lead his troops, the word of order being given from the bannered tent in which the
embalmed body lay, till at last a fit leader was found to succeed him. Jacopo, when he had at length
made himself a name in the service of different Condottieri, sent for his relations, and obtained
through them the same advantages that a prince derives from a numerous dynasty. It was these
relations who kept the army together when he lay a captive in the Castel dell'Uovo at Naples; his sister
took the royal envoys prisoners with her own hands, and saved him by this reprisal from death. It was
an indication of the breadth and the range of his plans that in monetary affairs Jacopo was thoroughly
trustworthy: even in his defeats he consequently found credit with the bankers. He habitually protected
the peasants against the license of his troops, and reluctantly destroyed or injured a conquered city. He
gave his well-known mistress, Lucia, the mother of Francesco, in marriage to another, in order to be
free for a princely alliance. Even the marriages of his relations were arranged on a definite plan. He
kept clear of the impious and profligate life of his contemporaries, and brought up his son Francesco to
the three rules: 'Let other men's wives alone; strike none of your followers, or, if you do, send the
injured man far away; don't ride a hard-mouthed horse, or one that drops his shoe.' But his chief
source of influence lay in the qualities, if not of a great general, at least of a great soldier. His frame
was powerful, and developed by every kind of exercise; his peasant's face and frank manners won
general popularity; his memory was marvelous, and after the lapse of years could recall the names of
his followers, the number of their horses, and the amount of their pay. His education was purely
Italian: he devoted his leisure to the study of history, and had Greek and Latin authors translated for
his use. Francesco, his still more famous son, set his mind from the first on founding a powerful State,
and through brilliant generalship and a faithlessness which hesitated at nothing, got possession of the
great city of Milan (1450).
His example was contagious. Aeneas Sylvius wrote about this time: 'In our change-loving Italy, where
nothing stands firm, and where no ancient dynasty exists, a servant can easily become a king.' One
man in particular, who styles himself 'the man of fortune,' filled the imagination of the whole country:
Giacomo Piccinino, the son of Niccolo;. It was a burning question of the day if he, too, would succeed in
founding a princely house. The greater States had an obvious interest in hindering it, and even
Francesco Sforza thought it would be all the better if the list of self-made sovereigns were not
enlarged. But the troops and captains sent against him, at the time, for instance, when he was aiming
at the lordship of Siena, recognized their interest in supporting him: 'If it were all over with him, we
should have to go back and plough our fields.' Even while besieging him at Orbetello, they supplied him
with provisions: and he got out of his straits with honour. But at last fate overtook him. All Italy was
betting on the result, when (1465) after a visit to Sforza at Milan, he went to King Ferrante at Naples.
In spite of the pledges given, and of his high connections, he was murdered in the Castel Nuovo. Even
the Condottieri who had obtained their dominions by inheritance, never felt themselves safe. When
Roberto Malatesta and Federigo of Urbino died on the same day (1482), the one at Rome, the other at
Bologna, it was found that each had recommended his State to the care of the other. Against a class of
men who themselves stuck at nothing, everything was held to be permissible. Francesco Sforza, when
quite young, had married a rich Calabrian heiress, Polissella Ruffo, Countess of Montalto, who bore him
a daughter; an aunt poisoned both mother and child, and seized the inheritance.

From the death of Piccinino onwards, the foundations of new States by the Condottieri became a
scandal not to be tolerated. The four great Powers, Naples, Milan, the Papacy, and Venice, formed
among themselves a political equilibrium which refused to allow of any disturbance. In the States of
the Church, which swarmed with petty tyrants, who in part were, or had been, Condottieri, the
nephews of the Popes, since the time of Sixtus IV, monopolized the right to all such undertakings. But
at the first sign of a political crisis, the soldiers of fortune appeared again upon the scene. Under the
wretched administration of Innocent VIII it was near happening that a certain Boccalino, who had
formerly served in the Burgundian army, gave himself and the town of Osimo, of which he was master,
up to the Turkish forces; fortunately, through the intervention of Lorenzo the Magnificent, he proved
willing to be paid off, and took himself away. In the year 1495, when the wars of Charles VIII had
turned Italy upside down, the Condottiere Vidovero, of Brescia, made trial of his strength; he had
already seized the town of Cesena and murdered many of the nobles and the burghers; but the citadel
held out, and he was forced to withdraw. He then, at the head of a band lent him by another scoundrel,
Pandolfo Malatesta of Rimini, son of the Roberto already spoken of, and Venetian Condottiere, wrested
the town of Castelnuovo from the Archbishop of Ravenna. The Venetians, fearing that worse would
follow, and urged also by the Pope, ordered Pandolfo, 'with the kindest intentions,' to take an
opportunity of arresting his good friend: the arrest was made, though 'with great regret,' whereupon
the order came to bring the prisoner to the gallows. Pandolfo was considerate enough to strangle him
in prison, and then show his corpse to the people. The last notable example of such usurpers is the
famous Castellan of Musso, who during the confusion in the Milanese territory which followed the battle
of Pavia (1525), improvised a sovereignty on the Lake of Como.

Jakob Burckhardt: The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy

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