Additional Thoughts about the of

(some micro and some macro)

Keep in mind that the main players are a) ;' b) ;' c) ( the ;)and d)
(wife of ' and sister of ) .
1. The Dispute Serves as a Critique of Enlightenment Values (esp. Democracy)
The central values of the Enlightenment are: Democracy (including the principle of majority rule); Reason; and Individual rights (sometimes
called individual freedom or the pursuit of happiness).
In the story, Democracy (the will of the majority of Sages) is opposed to Reason (represented by R. Eliezer, who made numerous rational
arguments for his position). In some objective sense, R. Eliezer was right- he offered every possible answer to the claims of the rabbis, but
they simply didnt accept what he had to say. Moreover, the bat kol that emerges says that R. Eliezer is right. We are left with the conclusion
that sensible (compelling?) views can be numerically drowned out. This idea is also reflected in the dispute between Beit Hillel and Beit
Shammai (Eruvin 13b): Beit Hillel were more numerous, but the Gemara notes that Shammai was sharper (capable of deeper analytical
reasoning, apparently). While there are other considerations involved (such as the fact that Beit Hillel taught their views and Beit Shammais),
the end result is that we rule in favor of the majority and against the more correct opinion. [Similarly, on the same page in the Talmud we
learn that R. Meir was the most brilliant Sage of his generation, but his opinions were not generally followed because others couldnt follow
his reasoning (i.e. they knew he was right, but couldnt articulate why he was right). Once again, Reason/Objective Truth is trumped by
other considerations. This is also reflected in the laws of Lashon haRa: truth is no defense to speaking derogatorily about someone (by
definition, Lashon haRa has to be true - a false statement is Motzi Shem Ra). If your purpose is to hurt, we ignore Truth. The flip side of
this appears in the famous argument between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai about dancing before the bride. Beit Hillel argues that even if the
bride is objectively ugly, one should tell her how beautiful she is. Beit Hillel know that the Torah prohibits falsehood, but apparently do not
consider this a false statement as the Torah understands it. The message is clear: if ones purpose is to hurt, truth is no defense. If ones
purpose is to help, falsehood presents no obstacle.]
Also, Democracy can be hostile/indifferent to the rights/happiness of the individual (feelings can be hurt). Tanur shel Achnai is often read as
a declaration of 'people power', the right of the majority to interpret the text (as opposed to Divine voices) - but the majority commits ona'at
devarim against the individual (R. Eliezer, who is treated badly). Most of the fourth chapter of Bava Metzia is concerned with the concept of
Onaah (a difficult term to define, but one suggesting an abuse of an interpersonal relationship). Onaah can take the form of Onaat Mamon
(overcharging in commercial transactions), or Onaat Devarim (hurting someone with words). In brief, Onaat Devarim is related to, but
different from Lashon haRa in that the latter requires three people (the speaker, the listener, and the one spoken about), whereas Onaat
Devarim can involve humiliating/hurting someone to their face even when no one else is around. Before the passage of Tanur shel Achnai,
the Gemara had been discussing the idea that since the Beit haMikdash was destroyed, the Gates of Prayer are closed. Only the Gates of
Tears are open (i.e. God pays attention only to deeply felt hurt, not standard, formulaic requests), and the Gemara will refer to the Gates of
Tears as the Gates of Onaah. On the previous amud, Onaah was discussed in the context of David haMelech, who was verbally abused by
others for his sin with Bathsheva, and this is preceded by the idea that publicly embarrassing another person is so egregious a sin, that it may
be considered as one of the cardinal sins (murder, idolatry, sexual immorality). So the Gemara has been making the case for a long time that
Onaah is one of the most significant offenses that a person can be guilty of. Most of the page before Tanur shel Achnai focuses on Onaat
Ishto - the severity with which a husband will be judged for hurting his wifes feelings.
2. The Dispute is about Rabbinic Authority, and Demonstrates that the Sages Have the Exclusive Power to Interpret Torah
Most people seem to use this as the take-away from the whole passage, based upon the statement and . This
is undoubtedly an important idea, but if you read on in the text you see how humiliated R. Eliezer was, and the destruction that ensued as a
result of the harsh way he was treated (he was excommunicated). Everywhere he looked he caused damage, and Ima Shalom was forced to
watch him closely to prevent him from saying Tahanun - because the intense, heartfelt plea that is Tahanun would likely cause even greater
harm. Now, it is clear that none of this damage could have occurred without God's support, which forms a counterweight to the view that God
approved of the Sages clever argument for rabbinic authority - God isnt on any one side here. God avenges the hurt that R. Eliezer has
endured in the destruction of crops, and also the wave that nearly killed Rabban Gamliel (who, as Rashi explains, would have had primary
responsibility for the majoritys decision as he was the Nasi). Ultimately, Rabban Gamliel does die as a consequence of R. Eliezers outcry in
Tahanun. When R. Eliezer asked his wife how she knew about her brothers death, she answered So I have received a tradition from the
house of my fathers father: All gates are closed except the gates of Onaah. Majority rule needs to be exercised very carefully

3. The Dispute Reflects a Disagreement About the Application of Halakha: Liberalism vs. Conservatism
R. Eliezer is often seen as having a Conservative approach to halakha (following Beit Shammai), whereas R. Yehoshua is considered to have a
Liberal approach (following Beit Hillel). The Conservative approach seeks to limit innovation through intuition in favor of
extrapolating wherever possible from known laws (this is Moshe Koppels formulation, in his book Meta-Halakhah), while the Liberal
approach favors the use of intuition (an individual's sense of what is right) rather than try to extrapolate the law when it is unclear whether
there is enough data to do so. Since R. Eliezer is more likely to hold that there is a correct view (ala Shammai), he argues endlessly for the
correctness of his position. [Recall that Beit Hillel taught both their view and Beit Shammais, indicating that they believed both views had
merit]. For R. Eliezer, there is an objective truth that overrides even the principle of majority rule.
Mishnah Rosh HaShanah 2:9 relates that Rabban Gamliel publicly embarrassed R. Yehoshua after the latter objected to Rabban Gamliels
proclamation of the New Moon on a certain day. Rabban Gamliel forced R. Yehoshua to come to him with his staff and wallet on the day that
he (R. Yehoshua) regarded as Yom Kippur. For Koppel, the fact that R. Yehoshua could accept Rabban Gamliels view (i.e. the majority)
(while maintaing his own) is further proof that he follows Hillel. One year later, we read (Berachoth 27b) that R. Yehoshua disagreed with
Rabban Gamliel about whether Arvit is optional or mandatory (interestingly, R. Yehoshua initially said that he agreed with Rabban Gamliel!),
and again Rabban Gamliel publicly embarrassed him (by forcing him to admit that he held a different opinion). This was apparently too much
for the other Sages (there was even one more past incident), and they decided to depose him and replace him with R. Elazar ben Azaryah.
Interestingly, R. Eliezer - in the case of Tanur shel Achnai - found himself in the same situation that R. Yehoshua was in vis-a-vis Rabban
Gamliel (i.e. opposing the majority). He behaved differently, continuing to argue instead of accepting the majority decision. R. Eliezer
disdains dispute, tending to see a simple interpretation of the law to decide a particular case. R. Yehoshua is more open to a multiplicity of
views, and so is not bothered by dispute.
R. Akiva mediated the dispute over the New Moon (speaking to R. Yehoshua), and also the dispute over the Tanur shel Achnai (speaking to R.
Eliezer).
4. The Role of Ima Shalom
Ima Shalom also mediates here, between her husband and her brother. Consider the following from Nachman Levine:
"Ima Shaloms role is emblematic in this context. Structurally, she mediates between the the storys beginning and end. The dispute
about the contents of an oven effects the dough in the hand of a woman and is resolved as she, a woman, goes to give bread to a poor
man, causing R. Gamliel to die for invoking the ban. But in the narrative itself, Ima Shalom, R. Eliezers wife and R. Gamliels sister,
mediates between them, the two modes of authority, the banner and the banned. In one reading, Ima Shalom, Mother Peace, mediates
between peace and truth, between principles and relationships. This is intriguing because some interpret the dispute as one between
Hillelite and Shammaite modes of interpretation or authority. Indeed, A. Heiman points out that Ima Shalom, as sister of R. Gamliel
(Beit Hillel) and wife of R. Eliezer (Beit Shamai), is the embodiment and referent of the Mishnaic tradition (m Yevamot 1:4): Though
Beit Hillel and Beit Shamai disagreed they did not desist from marrying each other. Indeed the Tosefta Yevamot 1:10-11 version is:
Beit Shamai did not desist from marrying women from Beit Hillel nor Beit Hillel from Beit Shamai, but practiced the truth and the
peace among each other, as it says (Zach. 8:19) the truth and the peace you shall love. Strikingly, the Tosefta expands this: Even
though these forbid and these permit, they did not desist from making their Toharot [purities] on top of each other. In this way Ima
Shalom, personally embodies mediation between peace and truth.

Levine also points to commentaries which suggest that the olive, barley and wheat crops afflicted by R. Eliezer represent the elements of
bread; perhaps bread is also a symbol of Peace?