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CASTILLO VS CRUZ

MARCH 30, 2013

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Castillo vs Cruz
GR 182165

Facts:

Respondent Amanda Cruz (Amanda) who, along with her husband Francisco
G. Cruz (Spouses Cruz), leased a parcel of land situated at Barrio Guinhawa,
Malolos (the property), refused to vacate the property, despite demands by
the lessor Provincial Government of Bulacan (the Province) which intended to
utilize it for local projects.

Several cases were filed by both parties to enforce their rights over the
property. The pertinent case among the filed cases was the issuance by the
MTC an alias Writ of Demolition in favor of the Province. Respondents filed a
motion for TRO in the RTC, which was granted. However, the demolition was
already implemented before the TRO issuance.

On February 21, 2008, petitioners Police Superintendent Felixberto Castillo et


al., who were deployed by the City Mayor in compliance with a memorandum
issued by Governor Joselito R. Mendoza instructing him to protect, secure
and maintain the possession of the property, entered the property.

Amanda and her co-respondents refused to turn over the property, however.
Insisting that the RTC Order of Permanent Injunction enjoined the Province
from repossessing it, they shoved petitioners, forcing the latter to arrest them
and cause their indictment for direct assault, trespassing and other forms of
light threats.

Thus, respondents filed a Motion for Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data.

Issue:

WON Amparo and Habeas Data is proper to property rights; and,


WON Amparo and Habeas Data is proper when there is a criminal case
already filed.

Held:

On the 1st issue:

Section 1 of the Rules of Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data provides that the
coverage of the writs is limited to the protection of rights to life, liberty and
security, and the writs cover not only actual but also threats of unlawful acts
or omissions.

Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo teaches: As the Amparo Rule was


intended to address the intractable problem of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances. Tapuz v. Del Rosario also teaches: What it is not
is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither
is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds.

To thus be covered by the privilege of the writs, respondents must meet the
threshold requirement that their right to life, liberty and security is violated or
threatened with an unlawful act or omission. Evidently, the present
controversy arose out of a property dispute between the Provincial
Government and respondents. Absent any considerable nexus between the
acts complained of and its effect on respondents right to life, liberty and
security, the Court will not delve on the propriety of petitioners entry into the
property.

It bears emphasis that respondents petition did not show any actual
violation, imminent or continuing threat to their life, liberty and security. Bare
allegations of petitioners will not suffice to prove entitlement to the remedy
of the writ of amparo. No undue confinement or detention was present. In

fact, respondents were even able to post bail for the offenses a day after their
arrest.

On the 2nd issue:

Respondents filing of the petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data
should have been barred, for criminal proceedings against them had
commenced after they were arrested in flagrante delicto and proceeded
against in accordance with Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Validity
of the arrest or the proceedings conducted thereafter is a defense that may
be set up by respondents during trial and not before a petition for writs of
amparo and habeas data.

CARBONNEL VS CSC
MARCH 30, 2013

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Carbonnel vs Civil Service Commission


G.R. No. 187689, September 07, 2010

Facts: On May 21, 1999, petitioner went to the CSCRO IV to secure a copy of
the result of the Computer Assisted Test (CATS) Career Service Professional
Examination given on March 14, 1999, because she lost the original copy of
her Career Service Professional Certificate of Rating (hereafter referred to as
certificate of rating). Petitioner was directed to accomplish a verification slip.
The Examination Placement and Service Division noticed that petitioners
personal and physical appearance was entirely different from the picture of
the examinee attached to the application form and the picture seat plan. It
was also discovered that the signature affixed on the application form was
different from that appearing on the verification slip. Because of these
discrepancies, the Legal Affairs Division of the CSCRO IV conducted an
investigation.

In the course of the investigation, petitioner voluntarily made a statement


before Atty. Rosalinda S.M. Gepigon, admitting that, sometime in March 1999,
she accepted the proposal of a certain Bettina J. Navarro (Navarro) for the
latter to obtain for petitioner a Career Service Professional Eligibility by

merely accomplishing an application form and paying the amount of


P10,000.00. Petitioner thus accomplished an application form to take the
CATS Career Service Professional Examination and gave Navarro P5,000.00 as
down payment. Upon receipt of the original copy of the certificate of rating
from Navarro, petitioner gave the latter the remaining P5,000.00. Petitioner,
however, misplaced the certificate of rating. This prompted her to secure
another copy from the CSCRO IV.
Hence, the formal charge against petitioner.

Denying her admissions in her voluntary statement before the CSCRO IV,
petitioner, in her Answer, traversed the charges against her. She explained
that after filling up the application form for the civil service examination, she
asked Navarro to submit the same to the CSC. She, however, admitted that
she failed to take the examination as she had to attend to her ailing mother.
Thus, when she received a certificate of eligibility despite her failure to take
the test, she was anxious to know the mystery behind it. She claimed that
she went to the CSCRO IV not to get a copy of the certificate of rating but to
check the veracity of the certificate. More importantly, she questioned the
use of her voluntary statement as the basis of the formal charge against her
inasmuch as the same was made without the assistance of counsel.

After the formal investigation, the CSCRO IV rendered its March 25, 2002
Decision No. 020079 finding petitioner guilty of dishonesty, grave
misconduct, and falsification of official documents. The penalty of dismissal
from the service, with all its accessory penalties, was imposed on her.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by CSCRO IV on November
14, 2003.

Petitioner appealed, but the CSC dismissed the same for having been filed
almost three years from receipt of the CSCRO IV decision. The CSC did not
give credence to petitioners explanation that she failed to timely appeal the
case because of the death of her counsel. The CSC opined that
notwithstanding the death of one lawyer, the other members of the law firm,
petitioners counsel of record, could have timely appealed the decision.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in Resolution No. 072049
dated November 5, 2007.

Unsatisfied, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA. On November 24, 2008,

the CA rendered the assailed decision affirming the decisions and resolutions
of the CSCRO IV and the CSC. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was
denied by the CA on April 29, 2009.
Hence, the instant petition based on the following grounds:

Issue: Serious error of fact and law amounting to grave abuse of discretion
was committed by the Court of Appeals in its assailed decision dated
November 24, 2008 because petitioners finding of guilt was grounded
entirely on her unsworn statement that she admitted the offenses charged
and without the assistance of a counsel.

Ruling: The petition is without merit.

Petitioner faults the CSCs finding because it was based solely on her
uncounselled admission taken during the investigation by the CSCRO IV. She
claims that her right to due process was violated because she was not
afforded the right to counsel when her statement was taken.

It is true that the CSCRO IV, the CSC, and the CA gave credence to
petitioners uncounselled statements and, partly on the basis thereof,
uniformly found petitioner liable for the charge of dishonesty, grave
misconduct, and falsification of official document.
However, it must be remembered that the right to counsel under Section 12
of the Bill of Rights is meant to protect a suspect during custodial
investigation. Thus, the exclusionary rule under paragraph (2), Section 12 of
the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation
but not to those made in an administrative investigation.

While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be


akin to a criminal proceeding, the fact remains that, under existing laws, a
party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel,
irrespective of the nature of the charges and of petitioners capacity to
represent herself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish the person being
investigated with counsel. The right to counsel is not always imperative in
administrative investigations because such inquiries are conducted merely to
determine whether there are facts that merit the imposition of disciplinary

measures against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of
maintaining the dignity of government service.

As such, the admissions made by petitioner during the investigation may be


used as evidence to justify her dismissal. We have carefully scrutinized the
records of the case below and we find no compelling reason to deviate from
the findings of the CSC and the CA. The written admission of petitioner is
replete with details that could have been known only to her. Besides,
petitioners written statement was not the only basis of her dismissal from
the service. Records show that the CSCRO IVs conclusion was reached after
consideration of all the documentary and testimonial evidence submitted by
the parties during the formal investigation.

BEDOL VS COMELEC
MARCH 30, 2013

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LINTANG BEDOL v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,


G.R. No. 179830/ December 3, 2009

FACTS: As Chair of the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) for the province
of Maguindanao, the respondent [petitioner] discharged his official functions
and was able to ensure the PBOCs performance of its ministerial duty to
canvass the Certificates of Canvass coming from the twenty two (22) city and
municipalities in the province.

At that time, respondent [petitioner] also was charged with the burdensome
and gargantuan duty of being the concurrent Provincial Elections Supervisor
for the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan a neighboring province of Maguindanao.

Respondent [petitioner] Bedol failed to attend the scheduled canvassing of


the Provincial Certificates of Canvass (PCOC) of Maguindanao of which he is
the Provincial Election Supervisor which was slated on May 22, 2007.

On May 25, 2007, respondent appeared before the Commission, en banc


sitting as the National Board of Canvassers (NBOC) for the election of

senators to submit the provincial certificate of canvass for Maguindanao,


pursuant to his functions as Provincial Elections Supervisor and chair of the
PBOC for Maguindanao. Due to certain observations on the provincial
certificates of canvass by certain parties, canvassing of the certificate was
held in abeyance and respondent was queried on the alleged fraud which
attended the conduct of elections in his area.

He was already informed of the resetting of the canvassing for May 30, 2007,
but failed to appear despite prior knowledge.

Respondents [petitioner] contention:

Bedol explained before the Task Force during its June 11, 2007 fact finding
activity that, while in his custody and possession, the election paraphernalia
were stolen sometime on May 29, 2007, or some fifteen (15) days after the
elections. This was the first time such an excuse was given by the respondent
[petitioner] and no written report was ever filed with the Commission
regarding the alleged loss.

Due to absences in the next scheduled investigative proceedings and due to


failure and refusal to submit a written explanation of his absences,
respondent [petitioner] was issued a contempt charge by COMELEC.

Petitioner was later arrested by members of the Philippine National Police on


the basis of an Order of Arrest issued on June 29, 2007 by the COMELEC after
petitioner repeatedly failed to appear during the fact-finding proceedings
before Task Force Maguindanao.

Petitioner questioned the COMELECs legal basis for issuing the warrant of
arrest and its assumption of jurisdiction over the contempt charges.
Nevertheless, he was declared in contempt by COMELEC.

Petitioner, then, filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the
COMELEC in the other assailed Resolution dated August 31, 2007.

ISSUE:Whether or not the initiation and issuance of contempt order is within


the constitutional powers of the COMELEC.

RULING:

Powers of COMELEC

The COMELEC possesses the power to conduct investigations as an adjunct to


its constitutional duty to enforce and administer all election laws, by virtue of
the explicit provisions of paragraph 6, Section 2, Article IX of the 1987
Constitution, which reads:

Article IX-C, Section 2. xxx

(6) xxx; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of


election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds,
offenses, and malpractices.

The powers and functions of the COMELEC, conferred upon it by the 1987
Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code, may be classified into
administrative, quasi-legislative, and quasi-judicial. The quasi-judicial power
of the COMELEC embraces the power to resolve controversies arising from
the enforcement of election laws, and to be the sole judge of all preproclamation controversies; and of all contests relating to the elections,
returns, and qualifications. Its quasi-legislative power refers to the issuance of
rules and regulations to implement the election laws and to exercise such
legislative functions as may expressly be delegated to it by Congress. Its
administrative function refers to the enforcement and administration of
election laws. In the exercise of such power, the Constitution (Section 6,
Article IX-A) and the Omnibus Election Code (Section 52 [c]) authorize the
COMELEC to issue rules and regulations to implement the provisions of the
1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code.

The quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power is the power to hear


and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply, and
to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in
enforcing and administering the same law.

The exercise of judicial functions may involve the performance of legislative


or administrative duties, and the performance of and administrative or
ministerial duties, may, in a measure, involve the exercise of judicial
functions. It may be said generally that the exercise of judicial functions is to
determine what the law is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with
respect to a matter in controversy; and whenever an officer is clothed with
that authority, and undertakes to determine those questions, he acts
judicially.

The language of the Omnibus Election Code and the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure is broad enough to allow the initiation of indirect contempt
proceedings by the COMELEC motu proprio. Furthermore, the above-quoted
provision of Section 52(e), Article VII of the Omnibus Election Code explicitly
adopts the procedure and penalties provided by the Rules of Court.

Findings of guilt of indirect contempt

Petitioner was found guilty of contempt on four (4) grounds.

First, he repeatedly failed to attend, despite notice of the scheduled[12]


canvassing of the Provincial Certificates of Canvass, the hearing of the Task
Force Maguindanao; and refused to submit his explanation for such absences,
which he had undertaken to submit, in violation of paragraphs (b) and (f) of
Section 2, Rule 29 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

Second, he unlawfully assumed custody of accountable election documents,


which were lost while in his possession, and consequently failed to deliver the
same, in violation of paragraphs (a), (c) and (d) Section 2, Rule 29 of same
Rules.

Third and fourth, he publicly displayed disrespect for the authority of the
COMELEC through the media (interviews on national television channels, and
in newspapers and radios) by flaunting an armory of long firearms and side
arms in public, and posing for the front page of a national broadsheet, with a
shiny pistol tucked in a holster, in violation of paragraphs (a) and (d), Section
2, Rule 29 of same Rules.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the prayer for a


Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is hereby
DENIED. No costs.

BAYAN MUNA VS. ROMULO


MARCH 30, 2013

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Bayan Muna vs Romulo


G. R. No. 159618, February 01, 2011

Facts:

Petitioner Bayan Muna is a duly registered party-list group established to


represent the marginalized sectors of society. Respondent Blas F. Ople, now
deceased, was the Secretary of Foreign Affairs during the period material to
this case. Respondent Alberto Romulo was impleaded in his capacity as then
Executive Secretary.

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court

Having a key determinative bearing on this case is the Rome Statute


establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC) with the power to exercise
its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international
concern x x x and shall be complementary to the national criminal
jurisdictions. The serious crimes adverted to cover those considered grave
under international law, such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war
crimes, and crimes of aggression.

On December 28, 2000, the RP, through Charge dAffaires Enrique A. Manalo,
signed the Rome Statute which, by its terms, is subject to ratification,
acceptance or approval by the signatory states. As of the filing of the instant
petition, only 92 out of the 139 signatory countries appear to have completed
the ratification, approval and concurrence process. The Philippines is not
among the 92.
RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement

On May 9, 2003, then Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone sent US Embassy


Note No. 0470 to the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) proposing the terms
of the non-surrender bilateral agreement (Agreement, hereinafter) between
the USA and the RP.
Via Exchange of Notes No. BFO-028-037 dated May 13, 2003 (E/N BFO-02803, hereinafter), the RP, represented by then DFA Secretary Ople, agreed with
and accepted the US proposals embodied under the US Embassy Note
adverted to and put in effect the Agreement with the US government. In esse,
the Agreement aims to protect what it refers to and defines as persons of
the RP and US from frivolous and harassment suits that might be brought
against them in international tribunals.8 It is reflective of the increasing pace
of the strategic security and defense partnership between the two countries.
As of May 2, 2003, similar bilateral agreements have been effected by and
between the US and 33 other countries.

The Agreement pertinently provides as follows:

1. For purposes of this Agreement, persons are current or former


Government officials, employees (including contractors), or military personnel
or nationals of one Party.

2. Persons of one Party present in the territory of the other shall not, absent
the express consent of the first Party,

(a) be surrendered or transferred by any means to any international tribunal


for any purpose, unless such tribunal has been established by the UN

Security Council, or

(b) be surrendered or transferred by any means to any other entity or third


country, or expelled to a third country, for the purpose of surrender to or
transfer to any international tribunal, unless such tribunal has been
established by the UN Security Council.

3. When the [US] extradites, surrenders, or otherwise transfers a person of


the Philippines to a third country, the [US] will not agree to the surrender or
transfer of that person by the third country to any international tribunal,
unless such tribunal has been established by the UN Security Council, absent
the express consent of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
[GRP].

4. When the [GRP] extradites, surrenders, or otherwise transfers a person of


the [USA] to a third country, the [GRP] will not agree to the surrender or
transfer of that person by the third country to any international tribunal,
unless such tribunal has been established by the UN Security Council, absent
the express consent of the Government of the [US].

5. This Agreement shall remain in force until one year after the date on which
one party notifies the other of its intent to terminate the Agreement. The
provisions of this Agreement shall continue to apply with respect to any act
occurring, or any allegation arising, before the effective date of termination.

In response to a query of then Solicitor General Alfredo L. Benipayo on the


status of the non-surrender agreement, Ambassador Ricciardone replied in
his letter of October 28, 2003 that the exchange of diplomatic notes
constituted a legally binding agreement under international law; and that,
under US law, the said agreement did not require the advice and consent of
the US Senate.
In this proceeding, petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to
respondents in concluding and ratifying the Agreement and prays that it be
struck down as unconstitutional, or at least declared as without force and
effect.

Issue: Whether or not the RP-US NON SURRENDER AGREEMENT is void ab


initio for contracting obligations that are either immoral or otherwise at
variance with universally recognized principles of international law.

Ruling: The petition is bereft of merit.

Validity of the RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement

Petitioners initial challenge against the Agreement relates to form, its


threshold posture being that E/N BFO-028-03 cannot be a valid medium for
concluding the Agreement.

Petitioners contentionperhaps taken unaware of certain well-recognized


international doctrines, practices, and jargonsis untenable. One of these is
the doctrine of incorporation, as expressed in Section 2, Article II of the
Constitution, wherein the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles
of international law and international jurisprudence as part of the law of the
land and adheres to the policy of peace, cooperation, and amity with all
nations. An exchange of notes falls into the category of inter-governmental
agreements, which is an internationally accepted form of international
agreement. The United Nations Treaty Collections (Treaty Reference Guide)
defines the term as follows:

An exchange of notes is a record of a routine agreement, that has many


similarities with the private law contract. The agreement consists of the
exchange of two documents, each of the parties being in the possession of
the one signed by the representative of the other. Under the usual procedure,
the accepting State repeats the text of the offering State to record its assent.
The signatories of the letters may be government Ministers, diplomats or
departmental heads. The technique of exchange of notes is frequently
resorted to, either because of its speedy procedure, or, sometimes, to avoid
the process of legislative approval.

In another perspective, the terms exchange of notes and executive


agreements have been used interchangeably, exchange of notes being
considered a form of executive agreement that becomes binding through

executive action. On the other hand, executive agreements concluded by the


President sometimes take the form of exchange of notes and at other times
that of more formal documents denominated agreements or protocols. As
former US High Commissioner to the Philippines Francis B. Sayre observed in
his work, The Constitutionality of Trade Agreement Acts:

The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other


governments ends and agreements whether denominated executive
agreements or exchange of notes or otherwise begin, may sometimes be
difficult of ready ascertainment. x x x
It is fairly clear from the foregoing disquisition that E/N BFO-028-03be it
viewed as the Non-Surrender Agreement itself, or as an integral instrument of
acceptance thereof or as consent to be boundis a recognized mode of
concluding a legally binding international written contract among nations.

Agreement Not Immoral/Not at Variance


with Principles of International Law

Petitioner urges that the Agreement be struck down as void ab initio for
imposing immoral obligations and/or being at variance with allegedly
universally recognized principles of international law. The immoral aspect
proceeds from the fact that the Agreement, as petitioner would put it, leaves
criminals immune from responsibility for unimaginable atrocities that deeply
shock the conscience of humanity; x x x it precludes our country from
delivering an American criminal to the [ICC] x x x.63

The above argument is a kind of recycling of petitioners earlier position,


which, as already discussed, contends that the RP, by entering into the
Agreement, virtually abdicated its sovereignty and in the process undermined
its treaty obligations under the Rome Statute, contrary to international law
principles.

The Court is not persuaded. Suffice it to state in this regard that the nonsurrender agreement, as aptly described by the Solicitor General, is an
assertion by the Philippines of its desire to try and punish crimes under its
national law. x x x The agreement is a recognition of the primacy and

competence of the countrys judiciary to try offenses under its national


criminal laws and dispense justice fairly and judiciously.

Petitioner, we believe, labors under the erroneous impression that the


Agreement would allow Filipinos and Americans committing high crimes of
international concern to escape criminal trial and punishment. This is
manifestly incorrect. Persons who may have committed acts penalized under
the Rome Statute can be prosecuted and punished in the Philippines or in the
US; or with the consent of the RP or the US, before the ICC, assuming, for the
nonce, that all the formalities necessary to bind both countries to the Rome
Statute have been met. For perspective, what the Agreement contextually
prohibits is the surrender by either party of individuals to international
tribunals, like the ICC, without the consent of the other party, which may
desire to prosecute the crime under its existing laws. With the view we take
of things, there is nothing immoral or violative of international law concepts
in the act of the Philippines of assuming criminal jurisdiction pursuant to the
non-surrender agreement over an offense considered criminal by both
Philippine laws and the Rome Statute.

BALAO VS GMA
MARCH 30, 2013

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BALAO et al vs. GMA


G.R. No. 186050
December 13, 2011

FACTS: The siblings of James Balao, and Longid (petitioners), filed with the
RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo in
favor of James Balao who was abducted by unidentified armed men earlier.
Named respondents in the petition were then President GMA, Exec Sec
Eduardo Ermita, Defense Sec Gilberto Teodoro, Jr., ILG Secretary Ronaldo
Puno, National Security Adviser (NSA) Norberto Gonzales, AFP Chief of Staff
Gen. Alexander . Yano, PNP Police Director General Jesus Verzosa, among
others.

James M. Balao is a Psychology and Economics graduate of the UP-Baguio. In


1984, he was among those who founded the Cordillera Peoples Alliance (CPA),

a coalition of NGOs working for the cause of indigenous peoples in the


Cordillera Region.

According to witnesses testimony, James was abducted by unidentified men,


saying they were policemen and were arresting him for a drugs case and then
made to ride a white van.

petitioners prayed for the issuance of a writ of amparo and likewise prayed
for (1) an inspection order for the inspection of at least 11 military and police
facilities which have been previously reported as detention centers for
activists abducted by military and police operatives; (2) a production order
for all documents that contain evidence relevant to the petition, particularly
the Order of Battle List and any record or dossier respondents have on James;
and (3) a witness protection order.

the RTC issued the assailed judgment, disposing as follows:

ISSUE a Writ of Amparo Ordering the respondents to (a) disclose where James
is detained or confined, (b) to release James considering his unlawful
detention since his abduction and (c) to cease and desist from further
inflicting harm upon his person; and

DENY the issuance of INSPECTION ORDER, PRODUCTION ORDER and WITNESS


PROTECTION ORDER for failure of herein Petitioners to comply with the
stringent provisions on the Rule on the Writ of Amparo and substantiate the
same

ISSUE: WON the totality of evidence satisfies the degree of proof required by
the Amparo Rule to establish an enforced disappearance.

HELD: NO; The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was promulgated on October 24,
2007 amidst rising incidence of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances. It was formulated in the exercise of this Courts expanded
rule-making power for the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights

enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, albeit limited to these two situations.


Extralegal killings refer to killings committed without due process of law,
i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings. On the other hand,
enforced disappearances are attended by the following characteristics: an
arrest, detention, or abduction of a person by a government official or
organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect
acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate
or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the
deprivation of liberty which places such person outside the protection of law.

**
The trial court gave considerable weight to the discussion in the petition of
briefing papers supposedly obtained from the AFP indicating that the antiinsurgency campaign of the military under the administration of President
Arroyo included targeting of identified legal organizations under the NDF,
which included the CPA, and their members, as enemies of the state.

We hold that such documented practice of targeting activists in the militarys


counter-insurgency program by itself does not fulfill the evidentiary standard
provided in the Amparo Rule to establish an enforced disappearance.

In the case of Roxas v. Macapagal-Arroyo, the Court noted that the similarity
between the circumstances attending a particular case of abduction with
those surrounding previous instances of enforced disappearances does not,
necessarily, carry sufficient weight to prove that the government
orchestrated such abduction. Accordingly, the trial court in this case cannot
simply infer government involvement in the abduction of James from past
similar incidents in which the victims also worked or affiliated with the CPA
and other left-leaning groups.

**
The petition further premised government complicity in the abduction of
James on the very positions held by the respondents. The Court in Rubrico v.
Macapagal-Arroyo had the occasion to expound on the doctrine of command
responsibility and why it has little bearing, if at all, in amparo proceedings.

It may plausibly be contended that command responsibility, as legal basis to


hold military/police commanders liable for extra-legal killings, enforced
disappearances, or threats, may be made applicable to this jurisdiction on the
theory that the command responsibility doctrine now constitutes a principle
of international law or customary international law in accordance with the
incorporation clause of the Constitution. Still, it would be inappropriate to
apply to these proceedings the doctrine of command responsibility, as the CA
seemed to have done, as a form of criminal complicity through omission, for
individual respondents criminal liability, if there be any, is beyond the reach
of amparo. In other words, the Court does not rule in such proceedings on any
issue of criminal culpability, even if incidentally a crime or an infraction of an
administrative rule may have been committed. As the Court stressed in
Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo (Manalo), the writ of amparo was
conceived to provide expeditious and effective procedural relief against
violations or threats of violation of the basic rights to life, liberty, and security
of persons; the corresponding amparo suit, however, is not an action to
determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt x x x or
administrative liability requiring substantial evidence that will require full and
exhaustive proceedings. Of the same tenor, and by way of expounding on
the nature and role of amparo, is what the Court said in Razon v. Tagitis:

It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the
disappearance [threats thereof or extrajudicial killings]; it determines
responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced disappearance
[threats thereof or extrajudicial killings] for purposes of imposing the
appropriate remedies to address the disappearance [or extrajudicial killings].

xxxx
As the law now stands, extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances in
this jurisdiction are not crimes penalized separately from the component
criminal acts undertaken to carry out these killings and enforced
disappearances and are now penalized under the Revised Penal Code and
special laws. The simple reason is that the Legislature has not spoken on the
matter; the determination of what acts are criminal x x x are matters of
substantive law that only the Legislature has the power to enact. x x x[

Assessing the evidence on record, we find that the participation in any


manner of military and police authorities in the abduction of James has not
been adequately proven. The identities of the abductors have not been

established, much less their link to any military or police unit. There is
likewise no concrete evidence indicating that James is being held or detained
upon orders of or with acquiescence of government agents. Consequently,
the trial court erred in granting amparo reliefs. Such pronouncement of
responsibility on the part of public respondents cannot be made given the
insufficiency of evidence. However, we agree with the trial court in finding
that the actions taken by respondent officials are very limited, superficial
and one-sided. Its candid and forthright observations on the efforts exerted
by the respondents are borne by the evidence on record.

**
An inspection order is an interim relief designed to give support or strengthen
the claim of a petitioner in an amparo petition, in order to aid the court before
making a decision. A basic requirement before an amparo court may grant an
inspection order is that the place to be inspected is reasonably determinable
from the allegations of the party seeking the order. In this case, the issuance
of inspection order was properly denied since the petitioners specified several
military and police establishments based merely on the allegation that the
testimonies of victims and witnesses in previous incidents of similar
abductions involving activists disclosed that those premises were used as
detention centers. In the same vein, the prayer for issuance of a production
order was predicated on petitioners bare allegation that it obtained
confidential information from an unidentified military source, that the name
of James was included in the so-called Order of Battle. Indeed, the trial court
could not have sanctioned any fishing expedition by precipitate issuance of
inspection and production orders on the basis of insufficient claims of one
party.

IN RE: PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF CAPT. GARY ALEJANO ET AL


MARCH 30, 2013

~ LEAVE A COMMENT

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF CAPT. GARY


ALEJANO, PN (MARINES) CAPT. NICANOR FAELDON, PN (MARINES) CAPT.
GERARDO GAMBALA, PA LT. SG JAMES LAYUG, PN CAPT. MILO
MAESTRECAMPO, PA LT. SG ANTONIO TRILLANES IV, PN HOMOBONO ADAZA,
and ROBERTO RAFAEL (ROEL) PULIDO
vs.
GEN. PEDRO CABUAY, GEN. NARCISO ABAYA, SEC. ANGELO REYES, and SEC.
ROILO GOLEZ

G.R. No. 160792 August 25, 2005

FACTS: Early morning of 27 July 2003, some 321 armed soldiers, led by the
now detained junior officers, entered and took control of the Oakwood
Premier Luxury Apartments (Oakwood), an upscale apartment complex,
located in the business district of Makati City. The soldiers disarmed the
security officers of Oakwood and planted explosive devices in its immediate
surroundings. The junior officers publicly renounced their support for the
administration and called for the resignation of President Gloria MacapagalArroyo and several cabinet members.

Around 7:00 p.m. of the same date, the soldiers voluntarily surrendered to
the authorities after several negotiations with government emissaries. The
soldiers later defused the explosive devices they had earlier planted. The
soldiers then returned to their barracks. On 31 July 2003, Gen. Abaya, as the
Chief of Staff of the AFP, issued a directive to all the Major Service
Commanders to turn over custody of ten junior officers to the ISAFP Detention
Center. The transfer took place while military and civilian authorities were
investigating the soldiers involvement in the Oakwood incident.

On 1 August 2003, government prosecutors filed an Information for coup


detat with the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61, against the
soldiers involved in the 27 July 2003 Oakwood incident. The government
prosecutors accused the soldiers of coup detat as defined and penalized
under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, as amended.
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-2784. The trial court later
issued the Commitment Orders giving custody of junior officers Lt. SG Antonio
Trillanes IV (Trillanes) and Capt. Gerardo Gambala to the Commanding
Officers of ISAFP. On 2 August 2003, Gen. Abaya issued a directive to all Major
Service Commanders to take into custody the military personnel under their
command who took part in the Oakwood incident except the detained junior
officers who were to remain under the custody of ISAFP.

Petitioners filed a petition for Habeas Corpus before the CA, however the
same was denied. The Court of Appeals found the petition bereft of merit. The
appellate court pointed out that the detainees are already charged of coup
detat before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Habeas corpus is unavailing
in this case as the detainees confinement is under a valid indictment, the

legality of which the detainees and petitioners do not even question.

ISSUE: WON the denial of the petition for Habeas Corpus was valid

HELD: YES

For obvious reasons, the duty to hear the petition for habeas corpus
necessarily includes the determination of the propriety of the remedy. If a
court finds the alleged cause of the detention unlawful, then it should issue
the writ and release the detainees. In the present case, after hearing the
case, the Court of Appeals found that habeas corpus is inapplicable. After
actively participating in the hearing before the Court of Appeals, petitioners
are estopped from claiming that the appellate court had no jurisdiction to
inquire into the merits of their petition.

The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the remedy of habeas corpus is not
the proper remedy to address the detainees complaint against the
regulations and conditions in the ISAFP Detention Center. The remedy of
habeas corpus has one objective: to inquire into the cause of detention of a
person. The purpose of the writ is to determine whether a person is being
illegally deprived of his liberty.If the inquiry reveals that the detention is
illegal, the court orders the release of the person. If, however, the detention
is proven lawful, then the habeas corpus proceedings terminate.

The use of habeas corpus is thus very limited. It is not a writ of error. Neither
can it substitute for an appeal.
A mere allegation of a violation of ones constitutional right is not sufficient.
The courts will extend the scope of the writ only if any of the following
circumstances is present: (a) there is a deprivation of a constitutional right
resulting in the unlawful restraint of a person; (b) the court had no jurisdiction
to impose the sentence; or (c) an excessive penalty is imposed and such
sentence is void as to the excess.

AS TO DENIAL OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL: The scheduled visiting hours provide


reasonable access to the detainees, giving petitioners sufficient time to

confer with the detainees. The detainees right to counsel is not undermined
by the scheduled visits. Even in the hearings before the Senate and the
Feliciano Commission, petitioners were given time to confer with the
detainees, a fact that petitioners themselves admit.23 Thus, at no point were
the detainees denied their right to counsel.

AS TO INHUMANE PUNISHMENT: The boarding of the iron grills is for the


furtherance of security within the ISAFP Detention Center. This measure
intends to fortify the individual cells and to prevent the detainees from
passing on contraband and weapons from one cell to another. The boarded
grills ensure security and prevent disorder and crime within the facility. The
diminished illumination and ventilation are but discomforts inherent in the
fact of detention, and do not constitute punishments on the detainees.

The limitation on the detainees physical contacts with visitors is a


reasonable, non-punitive response to valid security concerns.
AS TO RIGHT TO PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION: The letters alleged to have
been read by the ISAFP authorities were not confidential letters between the
detainees and their lawyers. The petitioner who received the letters from
detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo was merely acting as the detainees
personal courier and not as their counsel when he received the letters for
mailing. In the present case, since the letters were not confidential
communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the officials of the
ISAFP Detention Center could read the letters. If the letters are marked
confidential communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the
detention officials should not read the letters but only open the envelopes for
inspection in the presence of the detainees.

PP VS NG
MARCH 30, 2013

~ LEAVE A COMMENT

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES


vs.
NG YIK BUN, KWOK WAI CHENG, CHANG CHAUN SHI, CHUA SHILOU HWAN,
KAN SHUN MIN, and RAYMOND S. TAN
January 10, 2011; G.R. No. 180452

FACTS:

On August 24, 2000, around 9pm, Capt. Danilo Ibon of Task Force Aduana
received information from an operative that there was an ongoing shipment
of contraband in Barangay Bignay II, Sariaya, Quezon Province. Upon
instructions from his superior, Major Carlo Magno Tabo, Capt. Ibon formed a
team in coordination with a PNP detachment, and, along with the operative,
the team then proceeded to Villa Vicenta Resort in Barangay Bignay II,
Sariaya.

The members of the team were able to observe the goings-on at the resort
from a distance of around 50 meters. They spotted six Chinese-looking men
loading bags containing a white substance into a white van. Having been
noticed, Capt. Ibon identified his team and asked accused-appellant Chua
Shilou Hwan (Hwan) what they were loading on the van. Hwan replied that it
was shabu and pointed to accused-appellant Raymond Tan as the leader. A
total of 172 bags of suspected shabu were then confiscated.

A laboratory report prepared later by Police Inspector Mary Jean Geronimo on


samples of the 172 confiscated bags showed the white substance to be
shabu.

On January 10, 2001, an Amended Information for violation of Sec. 16, Article
III of RA 6425 was filed against accused-appellants, who entered a plea of not
guilty upon re-arraignment.

RTC convicted accused-appellants of the crime charged. In questioning the


RTC Decision before the CA, accused-appellants alleged that the trial court
erred when it held as valid the warrantless search, seizure and subsequent
arrest of the accused-appellants despite the non-concurrence of the requisite
circumstances that justify a warrantless arrest. CA affirmed decision of RTC.
Hence this appeal to the SC. Accused-appellants claim that no valid in
flagrante delicto arrest was made prior to the seizure and that the police
officers placed accused-appellants under arrest even when there was no
evidence that an offense was being committed. Since there was no warrant of

arrest, they argue that the search sans a search warrant subsequently made
on them was illegal. They contend that a seizure of any evidence as a result
of an illegal search is inadmissible in any proceeding for any purpose.

ISSUE:Whether there was a valid warrantless search.

RULING:

YES.

Art. III, SEC. 2 of the Constitution provides that The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.

A settled exception to the right guaranteed in the aforequoted provision is


that of an arrest made during the commission of a crime, which does not
require a warrant. Such warrantless arrest is considered reasonable and valid
under Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which
states:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private


person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;XX

The foregoing proviso refers to arrest in flagrante delicto. In the instant case,
contrary to accused-appellants contention, there was indeed a valid
warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto.

Consider the circumstances immediately prior to and surrounding the arrest


of accused-appellants: (1) the police officers received information from an
operative about an ongoing shipment of contraband; (2) the police officers,
with the operative, proceeded to Villa Vicenta Resort in Barangay Bignay II,
Sariaya, Quezon; (3) they observed the goings-on at the resort from a
distance of around 50 meters; and (4) they spotted the six accusedappellants loading transparent bags containing a white substance into a
white L-300 van.

The arresting police officers had probable cause to suspect that accusedappellants were loading and transporting contraband, more so when Hwan,
upon being accosted, readily mentioned that they were loading shabu and
pointed to Tan as their leader. Thus, the arrest of accused-appellantswho
were caught in flagrante delicto of possessing, and in the act of loading into a
white L-300 van, shabu, a prohibited drug under RA 6425 is valid.

In People v. Alunday, we held that when a police officer sees the offense,
although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby, and
proceeds at once to the scene, he may effect an arrest without a warrant on
the basis of Sec. 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as the offense is
deemed committed in his presence or within his view. In the instant case, it
can be argued that accused-appellants were committing the offense of
possessing shabu and were in the act of loading them in a white van when
the police officers arrested them. As aptly noted by the appellate court, the
crime was committed in the presence of the police officers with the
contraband, inside transparent plastic containers, in plain view and duly
observed by the arresting officers.

The Court also notes that accused-appellants are deemed to have waived
their objections to their arrest for not raising the issue before entering their
plea.

Moreover, present in the instant case are all the elements of illegal
possession of drugs: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object
which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not
authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possesses the
said drug. Accused-appellants were positively identified in court as the

individuals caught loading and possessing illegal drugs. They were found to
be in possession of prohibited drugs without proof that they were duly
authorized by law to possess them. Having been caught in flagrante delicto,
there is, therefore, a prima facie evidence of animus possidendi on the part of
accused-appellants. There is, thus, no merit to the argument of the defense
that a warrant was needed to arrest accused-appellants.

Accused-appellants were not able to show that there was any truth to their
allegation of a frame-up in rebutting the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses. They relied on mere denials, in contrast with the testimony of
Capt. Ibon, who testified that he and his team saw accused-appellants
loading plastic bags with a white crystalline substance into an L-300 van at
the Villa Vicenta Resort. Accused-appellants, except for Tan, claimed that they
were ordered by the police officers to act like they were loading bags onto the
van. Accused-appellant Tan told a different tale and claims he was arrested
inside a restaurant. But as the trial court found, the persons who could have
corroborated their version of events were not presented in court. The only
witness presented by Tan, a tricycle driver whose testimony corroborated
Tans alone, was not found by the trial court to be credible.

As no ill motive can be imputed to the prosecutions witnesses, we uphold the


presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties and affirm the
trial courts finding that the police officers testimonies are deserving of full
faith and credit. Appellate courts generally will not disturb the trial courts
assessment of a witness credibility unless certain material facts and
circumstances have been overlooked or arbitrarily disregarded.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED.

POLLO VS DAVID
MARCH 30, 2013

~ LEAVE A COMMENT

Pollo vs David
G. R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011

Facts: Petitioner is a former Supervising Personnel Specialist of the CSC

Regional Office No. IV and also the Officer-in-Charge of the Public Assistance
and Liaison Division (PALD) under the Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Na
program of the CSC.

On January 3. 2007, CSC Chairperson Karina Constantino-David received an


unsigned complaint letter which was marked Confidential and was sent
through a courier service (LBC) from certain Allan San Pascual of Bagong
Silang, Caloocan City. The letter contain allegations that the petitioner have
been helping many who have pending cases in the CSC and the letter sender
pleas that the CSC should investigate this anomaly to maintain the clean and
good behaviour of their office.

Chairperson David immediately formed a team of four personnel with


background in information technology (IT), and issued a memo directing them
to conduct an investigation and specifically to back up all the files in the
computers found in the Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and Legal divisions.

After some briefing, the team proceeded at once to the CSC-ROIV office at
Panay Avenue, Quezon City. The backing-up of all files in the hard disk of
computers at the PALD and Legal Services Division (LSD) was witnessed by
several employees, together with Directors Castillo and Unite who closely
monitored said activity. At around 6:00 p.m., Director Unite sent text
messages to petitioner and the head of LSD, who were both out of the office
at the time, informing them of the ongoing copying of computer files in their
divisions upon orders of the CSC Chair.

Issue: Legality of the search conducted in the petitioners office computer and
the copying of his personal files without his knowledge and consent, alleged
as a transgression of his constitutional right to privacy.

Ruling: Yes.

In sum, we conclude that the special needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement make theprobable-cause requirement impracticable, x x x for
legitimate, work-related noninvestigatory intrusions as well as investigations
of work-related misconduct. A standard of reasonableness will neither unduly

burden the efforts of government employers to ensure the efficient and


proper operation of the workplace, nor authorize arbitrary intrusions upon the
privacy of public employees. We hold, therefore, that public employer
intrusions on the constitutionally protected privacy interests of government
employees for noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, as well as for
investigations of work-related misconduct, should be judged by the standard
of reasonableness under all the circumstances. Under this reasonableness
standard, both the inception and the scope of the intrusion must be
reasonable:

Determining the reasonableness of any search involves a twofold inquiry:


first, one must consider whether theaction was justified at its inception, x
x x ; second, one must determine whether the search as actually conducted
was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the
interference in the first place, x x x

Ordinarily, a search of an employees office by a supervisor will be justified


at its inception when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the
search will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related
misconduct, or that the search is necessary for a noninvestigatory workrelated purpose such as to retrieve a needed file. x x x The search will be
permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related
to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the
nature of the [misconduct]. x x x39 (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)

Under the facts obtaining, the search conducted on petitioners computer was
justified at its inception and scope. We quote with approval the CSCs
discussion on the reasonableness of its actions, consistent as it were with the
guidelines established by OConnor:
Even conceding for a moment that there is no such administrative policy,
there is no doubt in the mind of the Commission that the search of Pollos
computer has successfully passed the test of reasonableness for warrantless
searches in the workplace as enunciated in the above-discussed American
authorities. It bears emphasis that the Commission pursued the search in its
capacity as a government employer and that it was undertaken in connection
with an investigation involving a work-related misconduct, one of the
circumstances exempted from the warrant requirement. At the inception of
the search, a complaint was received recounting that a certain division chief
in the CSCRO No. IV was lawyering for parties having pending cases with

the said regional office or in the Commission. The nature of the imputation
was serious, as it was grievously disturbing. If, indeed, a CSC employee was
found to be furtively engaged in the practice of lawyering for parties with
pending cases before the Commission would be a highly repugnant scenario,
then such a case would have shattering repercussions. It would undeniably
cast clouds of doubt upon the institutional integrity of the Commission as a
quasi-judicial agency, and in the process, render it less effective in fulfilling
its mandate as an impartial and objective dispenser of administrative justice.
It is settled that a court or an administrative tribunal must not only be
actually impartial but must be seen to be so, otherwise the general public
would not have any trust and confidence in it.

Considering the damaging nature of the accusation, the Commission had to


act fast, if only to arrest or limit any possible adverse consequence or fall-out.
Thus, on the same date that the complaint was received, a search was
forthwith conducted involving the computer resources in the concerned
regional office. That it was the computers that were subjected to the search
was justified since these furnished the easiest means for an employee to
encode and store documents. Indeed, the computers would be a likely
starting point in ferreting out incriminating evidence. Concomitantly, the
ephemeral nature of computer files, that is, they could easily be destroyed at
a click of a button, necessitated drastic and immediate action. Pointedly, to
impose the need to comply with the probable cause requirement would
invariably defeat the purpose of the wok-related investigation.

Worthy to mention, too, is the fact that the Commission effected the
warrantless search in an open and transparent manner. Officials and some
employees of the regional office, who happened to be in the vicinity, were on
hand to observe the process until its completion. In addition, the respondent
himself was duly notified, through text messaging, of the search and the
concomitant retrieval of files from his computer.

All in all, the Commission is convinced that the warrantless search done on
computer assigned to Pollo was not, in any way, vitiated with
unconstitutionality. It was a reasonable exercise of the managerial
prerogative of the Commission as an employer aimed at ensuring its
operational effectiveness and efficiency by going after the work-related
misfeasance of its employees. Consequently, the evidence derived from the
questioned search are deemed admissible.

Petitioners claim of violation of his constitutional right to privacy must


necessarily fail. His other argument invoking the privacy of communication
and correspondence under Section 3(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution is
also untenable considering the recognition accorded to certain legitimate
intrusions into the privacy of employees in the government workplace under
the aforecited authorities.

CHAVEZ VS GONZALES
MARCH 30, 2013

~ LEAVE A COMMENT

FRANCISCO CHAVEZ
vs.
RAUL M. GONZALES, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of
Justice; and NTC
G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008

FACTS: Sometime before 6 June 2005, the radio station dzMM aired the Garci
Tapes where the parties to the conversation discussed rigging the results of
the 2004 elections to favor President Arroyo. On 6 June 2005, Presidential
spokesperson Bunye held a press conference in Malacaang Palace, where he
played before the presidential press corps two compact disc recordings of
conversations between a woman and a man. Bunye identified the woman in
both recordings as President Arroyo but claimed that the contents of the
second compact disc had been spliced to make it appear that President
Arroyo was talking to Garcillano.
However, on 9 June 2005, Bunye backtracked and stated that the womans
voice in the compact discs was not President Arroyos after all.3 Meanwhile,
other individuals went public, claiming possession of the genuine copy of the
Garci Tapes. Respondent Gonzalez ordered the NBI to investigate media
organizations which aired the Garci Tapes for possible violation of Republic
Act No. 4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping Law.
On 11 June 2005, the NTC issued a press release warning radio and television
stations that airing the Garci Tapes is a cause for the suspension, revocation
and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorizations issued to them. On 14
June 2005, NTC officers met with officers of the broadcasters group KBP, to
dispel fears of censorship. The NTC and KBP issued a joint press statement

expressing commitment to press freedom


On 21 June 2005, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez (petitioner), as citizen, filed
this petition to nullify the acts, issuances, and orders of the NTC and
respondent Gonzalez (respondents) on the following grounds: (1)
respondents conduct violated freedom of expression and the right of the
people to information on matters of public concern under Section 7, Article III
of the Constitution, and (2) the NTC acted ultra vires when it warned radio
and television stations against airing the Garci Tapes.

ISSUE: The principal issue for resolution is whether the NTC warning
embodied in the press release of 11 June 2005 constitutes an impermissible
prior restraint on freedom of expression.

1. Standing to File Petition


Petitioner has standing to file this petition. When the issue involves freedom
of expression, as in the present case, any citizen has the right to bring suit to
question the constitutionality of a government action in violation of freedom
of expression, whether or not the government action is directed at such
citizen. Freedom of expression, being fundamental to the preservation of a
free, open and democratic society, is of transcendental importance that must
be defended by every patriotic citizen at the earliest opportunity.

2. Overview of Freedom of Expression, Prior Restraint and Subsequent


Punishment

Freedom of expression is the foundation of a free, open and democratic


society. Freedom of expression is an indispensable condition8 to the exercise
of almost all other civil and political rights. Freedom of expression allows
citizens to expose and check abuses of public officials. Freedom of expression
allows citizens to make informed choices of candidates for public office.

Section 4, Article III of the Constitution prohibits the enactment of any law
curtailing freedom of expression:
No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or the
press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the

government for redress of grievances.

Thus, the rule is that expression is not subject to any prior restraint or
censorship because the Constitution commands that freedom of expression
shall not be abridged. Over time, however, courts have carved out narrow
and well defined exceptions to this rule out of necessity.

The exceptions, when expression may be subject to prior restraint, apply in


this jurisdiction to only four categories of expression, namely:

pornography,
false or misleading advertisement,
advocacy of imminent lawless action, and
danger to national security.
All other expression is not subject to prior restraint.

Expression not subject to prior restraint is protected expression or high-value


expression. Any content-based prior restraint on protected expression is
unconstitutional without exception. A protected expression means what it
says it is absolutely protected from censorship. Thus, there can be no prior
restraint on public debates on the amendment or repeal of existing laws, on
the ratification of treaties, on the imposition of new tax measures, or on
proposed amendments to the Constitution.
If the prior restraint is not aimed at the message or idea of the expression, it
is content-neutral even if it burdens expression. A content-neutral restraint is
a restraint which regulates the time, place or manner of the expression in
public places without any restraint on the content of the expression. Courts
will subject content-neutral restraints to intermediate scrutiny. An example of
a content-neutral restraint is a permit specifying the date, time and route of a
rally passing through busy public streets. A content-neutral prior restraint on
protected expression which does not touch on the content of the expression
enjoys the presumption of validity and is thus enforceable subject to appeal
to the courts.

Expression that may be subject to prior restraint is unprotected expression or


low-value expression. By definition, prior restraint on unprotected expression
is content-based since the restraint is imposed because of the content itself.
In this jurisdiction, there are currently only four categories of unprotected
expression that may be subject to prior restraint. This Court recognized false
or misleading advertisement as unprotected expression only in October 2007.

Only unprotected expression may be subject to prior restraint. However, any


such prior restraint on unprotected expression must hurdle a high barrier.
First, such prior restraint is presumed unconstitutional. Second, the
government bears a heavy burden of proving the constitutionality of the prior
restraint.

Prior restraint is a more severe restriction on freedom of expression than


subsequent punishment. Although subsequent punishment also deters
expression, still the ideas are disseminated to the public. Prior restraint
prevents even the dissemination of ideas to the public.

While there can be no prior restraint on protected expression, such


expression may be subject to subsequent punishment,27 either civilly or
criminally. Similarly, if the unprotected expression does not warrant prior
restraint, the same expression may still be subject to subsequent
punishment, civilly or criminally. Libel falls under this class of unprotected
expression.
However, if the expression cannot be subject to the lesser restriction of
subsequent punishment, logically it cannot also be subject to the more
severe restriction of prior restraint. Thus, since profane language or hate
speech against a religious minority is not subject to subsequent punishment
in this jurisdiction, such expression cannot be subject to prior restraint.

If the unprotected expression warrants prior restraint, necessarily the same


expression is subject to subsequent punishment. There must be a law
punishing criminally the unprotected expression before prior restraint on such
expression can be justified.
The prevailing test in this jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of
government action imposing prior restraint on three categories of
unprotected expression pornography,31 advocacy of imminent lawless

action, and danger to national security is the clear and present danger
test.32 The expression restrained must present a clear and present danger of
bringing about a substantive evil that the State has a right and duty to
prevent, and such danger must be grave and imminent.

Prior restraint on unprotected expression takes many forms it may be a law,


administrative regulation, or impermissible pressures like threats of revoking
licenses or withholding of benefits.34 The impermissible pressures need not
be embodied in a government agency regulation, but may emanate from
policies, advisories or conduct of officials of government agencies.

3. Government Action in the Present Case


The government action in the present case is a warning by the NTC that the
airing or broadcasting of the Garci Tapes by radio and television stations is a
cause for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or
authorizations issued to radio and television stations. The NTC warning,
embodied in a press release, relies on two grounds. First, the airing of the
Garci Tapes is a continuing violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law and the
conditions of the Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of Authority issued to
radio and TV stations. Second, the Garci Tapes have not been authenticated,
and subsequent investigation may establish that the tapes contain false
information or willful misrepresentation.

The NTC does not claim that the public airing of the Garci Tapes constitutes
unprotected expression that may be subject to prior restraint. The NTC does
not specify what substantive evil the State seeks to prevent in imposing prior
restraint on the airing of the Garci Tapes. The NTC does not claim that the
public airing of the Garci Tapes constitutes a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil, of grave and imminent character, that the State has a right
and duty to prevent.

The NTC did not conduct any hearing in reaching its conclusion that the airing
of the Garci Tapes constitutes a continuing violation of the Anti-Wiretapping
Law. There is also the issue of whether a wireless cellular phone conversation
is covered by the Anti-Wiretapping Law.

Clearly, the NTC has no factual or legal basis in claiming that the airing of the
Garci Tapes constitutes a violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law. The radio and
television stations were not even given an opportunity to be heard by the
NTC. The NTC did not observe basic due process as mandated in Ang Tibay v.
Court of Industrial Relations.

The NTC concedes that the Garci Tapes have not been authenticated as
accurate or truthful. The NTC also concedes that only after a prosecution or
appropriate investigation can it be established that the Garci Tapes
constitute false information and/or willful misrepresentation. Clearly, the
NTC admits that it does not even know if the Garci Tapes contain false
information or willful misrepresentation.

4. Nature of Prior Restraint in the Present Case


The NTC action restraining the airing of the Garci Tapes is a content-based
prior restraint because it is directed at the message of the Garci Tapes. The
NTCs claim that the Garci Tapes might contain false information and/or
willful misrepresentation, and thus should not be publicly aired, is an
admission that the restraint is content-based.

5. Nature of Expression in the Present Case


The public airing of the Garci Tapes is a protected expression because it does
not fall under any of the four existing categories of unprotected expression
recognized in this jurisdiction. The airing of the Garci Tapes is essentially a
political expression because it exposes that a presidential candidate had
allegedly improper conversations with a COMELEC Commissioner right after
the close of voting in the last presidential elections.

Obviously, the content of the Garci Tapes affects gravely the sanctity of the
ballot. Public discussion on the sanctity of the ballot is indisputably a
protected expression that cannot be subject to prior restraint. In any event,
public discussion on all political issues should always remain uninhibited,
robust and wide open.

The rule, which recognizes no exception, is that there can be no contentbased prior restraint on protected expression. On this ground alone, the NTC

press release is unconstitutional. Of course, if the courts determine that the


subject matter of a wiretapping, illegal or not, endangers the security of the
State, the public airing of the tape becomes unprotected expression that may
be subject to prior restraint. However, there is no claim here by respondents
that the subject matter of the Garci Tapes involves national security and
publicly airing the tapes would endanger the security of the State.

The airing of the Garci Tapes does not violate the right to privacy because the
content of the Garci Tapes is a matter of important public concern. The
Constitution guarantees the peoples right to information on matters of public
concern. The remedy of any person aggrieved by the public airing of the
Garci Tapes is to file a complaint for violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law
after the commission of the crime. Subsequent punishment, absent a lawful
defense, is the remedy available in case of violation of the Anti-Wiretapping
Law.

While there can be no prior restraint on protected expression, there can be


subsequent punishment for protected expression under libel, tort or other
laws. In the present case, the NTC action seeks prior restraint on the airing of
the Garci Tapes, not punishment of personnel of radio and television stations
for actual violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law.

6. Only the Courts May Impose Content-Based Prior Restraint


The NTC has no power to impose content-based prior restraint on expression.
The charter of the NTC does not vest NTC with any content-based censorship
power over radio and television stations.

In the present case, the airing of the Garci Tapes is a protected expression
that can never be subject to prior restraint. However, even assuming for the
sake of argument that the airing of the Garci Tapes constitutes unprotected
expression, only the courts have the power to adjudicate on the factual and
legal issue of whether the airing of the Garci Tapes presents a clear and
present danger of bringing about a substantive evil that the State has a right
and duty to prevent, so as to justify the prior restraint.

Any order imposing prior restraint on unprotected expression requires prior

adjudication by the courts on whether the prior restraint is constitutional. This


is a necessary consequence from the presumption of invalidity of any prior
restraint on unprotected expression.

7. Government Failed to Overcome Presumption of Invalidity


Respondents did not invoke any compelling State interest to impose prior
restraint on the public airing of the Garci Tapes. The respondents claim that
they merely fairly warned radio and television stations to observe the AntiWiretapping Law and pertinent NTC circulars on program standards.
Respondents have not explained how and why the observance by radio and
television stations of the Anti-Wiretapping Law and pertinent NTC circulars
constitutes a compelling State interest justifying prior restraint on the public
airing of the Garci Tapes.

Violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law, like the violation of any criminal


statute, can always be subject to criminal prosecution after the violation is
committed. Respondents have not explained how the violation of the AntiWiretapping Law, or of the pertinent NTC circulars, can incite imminent
lawless behavior or endanger the security of the State.

8. The NTC Warning is a Classic Form of Prior Restraint


The NTC press release threatening to suspend or cancel the airwave permits
of radio and television stations constitutes impermissible pressure amounting
to prior restraint on protected expression. Whether the threat is made in an
order, regulation, advisory or press release, the chilling effect is the same:
the threat freezes radio and television stations into deafening silence. Radio
and television stations that have invested substantial sums in capital
equipment and market development suddenly face suspension or
cancellation of their permits. The NTC threat is thus real and potent.

9. Conclusion
In sum, the NTC press release constitutes an unconstitutional prior restraint
on protected expression. There can be no content-based prior restraint on
protected expression. This rule has no exception.

CITY OF MANILA VS. LAGUIO


MARCH 30, 2013

~ LEAVE A COMMENT

CITY OF MANILA, HON. ALFREDO S. LIM as the Mayor of the City of Manila,
HON. JOSELITO L. ATIENZA, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila
and Presiding Officer of the City Council of Manila, et.al vs. HON. PERFECTO
A.S. LAGUIO, JR., as Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila and MALATE TOURIST
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005

FACTS: Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is


a corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels
and lodging houses. It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was
licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the DOT as a hotel. On 28
June 1993, MTDC filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ
of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order7 with the lower
court impleading as defendants, herein petitioners City of Manila, Hon.
Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito L. Atienza, and the members of the City
Council of Manila (City Council). MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as
it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be
declared invalid and unconstitutional.

Enacted by the City Council and approved by petitioner City Mayor, the said
Ordinance is entitled

AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF


BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT,
SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING
PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Judge Laguio rendered the assailed Decision (in favour of respondent).

On 11 January 1995, petitioners filed the present Petition, alleging that the
following errors were committed by the lower court in its ruling:

(1) It erred in concluding that the subject ordinance is ultra vires, or

otherwise, unfair, unreasonable and oppressive exercise of police power;


(2) It erred in holding that the questioned Ordinance contravenes P.D. 499
which allows operators of all kinds of commercial establishments, except
those specified therein; and
(3) It erred in declaring the Ordinance void and unconstitutional.

ISSUE: WON the ordinance is unconstitutional.

HELD: The Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the lower court did not
err in declaring the Ordinance, as it did, ultra vires and therefore null and
void.

The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions
has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the
corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed
according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the
following substantive requirements:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.
The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise of its police
power, an enactment of the City Council acting as agent of Congress. This
delegated police power is found in Section 16 of the LGC, known as the
general welfare clause.
The inquiry in this Petition is concerned with the validity of the exercise of
such delegated power.

A. The Ordinance contravenes

the Constitution

The enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power


as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.
The police power granted to LGUs must always be exercised with utmost
observance of the rights of the people to due process and equal protection of
the law. Due process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering
with the rights of the person to his life, liberty and property.

Requisites for the valid exercise


of Police Power are not met

To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the
enactment of the Ordinance, and to free it from the imputation of
constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear that the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an
interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals.60 It must be evident that no other alternative for the
accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. A
reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the police measure
and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of
protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private
property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.

Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure shall be


struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights a violation of the
due process clause.

The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion and protection
of the social and moral values of the community. Granting for the sake of
argument that the objectives of the Ordinance are within the scope of the
City Councils police powers, the means employed for the accomplishment
thereof were unreasonable and unduly oppressive.

The worthy aim of fostering public morals and the eradication of the
communitys social ills can be achieved through means less restrictive of
private rights; it can be attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an
absolute prohibition. The closing down and transfer of businesses or their
conversion into businesses allowed under the Ordinance have no
reasonable relation to the accomplishment of its purposes. Otherwise stated,
the prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per se protect and
promote the social and moral welfare of the community; it will not in itself
eradicate the alluded social ills of prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it
arrest the spread of sexual disease in Manila.

The enumerated establishments are lawful pursuits which are not per se
offensive to the moral welfare of the community. While a motel may be used
as a venue for immoral sexual activity, it cannot for that reason alone be
punished. It cannot be classified as a house of ill-repute or as a nuisance per
se on a mere likelihood or a naked assumption.

If the City of Manila so desires to put an end to prostitution, fornication and


other social ills, it can instead impose reasonable regulations such as daily
inspections of the establishments for any violation of the conditions of their
licenses or permits; it may exercise its authority to suspend or revoke their
licenses for these violations; and it may even impose increased license fees.
In other words, there are other means to reasonably accomplish the desired
end.

It is readily apparent that the means employed by the Ordinance for the
achievement of its purposes, the governmental interference itself, infringes
on the constitutional guarantees of a persons fundamental right to liberty
and property.

Modality employed is
unlawful taking

It is an ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it can


not be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be
recognized as a taking of the property without just compensation.78 It is

intrusive and violative of the private property rights of individuals.

There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A possessory
taking occurs when the government confiscates or physically occupies
property. A regulatory taking occurs when the governments regulation
leaves no reasonable economically viable use of the property.

What is crucial in judicial consideration of regulatory takings is that


government regulation is a taking if it leaves no reasonable economically
viable use of property in a manner that interferes with reasonable
expectations for use. When the owner of real property has been called upon
to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good,
that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a taking.

The Ordinance gives the owners and operators of the prohibited


establishments three (3) months from its approval within which to wind up
business operations or to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate
area or convert said businesses to other kinds of business allowable within
the area. The directive to wind up business operations amounts to a
closure of the establishment, a permanent deprivation of property, and is
practically confiscatory. Unless the owner converts his establishment to
accommodate an allowed business, the structure which housed the
previous business will be left empty and gathering dust. It is apparent that
the Ordinance leaves no reasonable economically viable use of property in a
manner that interferes with reasonable expectations for use.
The second and third options to transfer to any place outside of the ErmitaMalate area or to convert into allowed businessesare confiscatory as well.
The penalty of permanent closure in cases of subsequent violations found in
Section 4 of the Ordinance is also equivalent to a taking of private property.

Petitioners cannot take refuge in classifying the measure as a zoning


ordinance. A zoning ordinance, although a valid exercise of police power,
which limits a wholesome property to a use which can not reasonably be
made of it constitutes the taking of such property without just compensation.
Private property which is not noxious nor intended for noxious purposes may
not, by zoning, be destroyed without compensation. Such principle finds no
support in the principles of justice as we know them. The police powers of
local government units which have always received broad and liberal

interpretation cannot be stretched to cover this particular taking.

Further, The Ordinance confers upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted
power to close down establishments. Ordinances such as this, which make
possible abuses in its execution, depending upon no conditions or
qualifications whatsoever other than the unregulated arbitrary will of the city
authorities as the touchstone by which its validity is to be tested, are
unreasonable and invalid. The Ordinance should have established a rule by
which its impartial enforcement could be secured. Similarly, the Ordinance
does not specify the standards to ascertain which establishments tend to
disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect the
social and moral welfare of the community.

The cited case supports the nullification of the Ordinance for lack of
comprehensible standards to guide the law enforcers in carrying out its
provisions.

Petitioners cannot therefore order the closure of the enumerated


establishments without infringing the due process clause. These lawful
establishments may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their
business.

B. The Ordinance violates Equal


Protection Clause

In the Courts view, there are no substantial distinctions between motels,


inns, pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments.
By definition, all are commercial establishments providing lodging and usually
meals and other services for the public. No reason exists for prohibiting
motels and inns but not pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other
similar establishments. The classification in the instant case is invalid as
similar subjects are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and
obligations imposed. It is arbitrary as it does not rest on substantial
distinctions bearing a just and fair relation to the purpose of the Ordinance.

The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business and
operation of motels in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside of this area. A
noxious establishment does not become any less noxious if located outside
the area.

The standard where women are used as tools for entertainment is also
discriminatory as prostitutionone of the hinted ills the Ordinance aims to
banishis not a profession exclusive to women. Both men and women have
an equal propensity to engage in prostitution. Thus, the discrimination is
invalid.

C. The Ordinance is repugnant


to general laws; it is ultra vires

The Ordinance is in contravention of the Code (Sec 458) as the latter merely
empowers local government units to regulate, and not prohibit, the
establishments enumerated in Section 1 thereof.

With respect to cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension


houses, lodging houses, and other similar establishments, the only power of
the City Council to legislate relative thereto is to regulate them to promote
the general welfare. The Code still withholds from cities the power to
suppress and prohibit altogether the establishment, operation and
maintenance of such establishments.

It is well to point out that petitioners also cannot seek cover under the
general welfare clause authorizing the abatement of nuisances without
judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se, or one which
affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be summarily
abated under the undefined law of necessity. It can not be said that motels
are injurious to the rights of property, health or comfort of the community. It
is a legitimate business. If it be a nuisance per accidens it may be so proven
in a hearing conducted for that purpose. A motel is not per se a nuisance
warranting its summary abatement without judicial intervention.

Not only does the Ordinance contravene the Code, it likewise runs counter to
the provisions of P.D. 499. As correctly argued by MTDC, the statute had
already converted the residential Ermita-Malate area into a commercial area.
The decree allowed the establishment and operation of all kinds of
commercial establishments except warehouse or open storage depot, dump
or yard, motor repair shop, gasoline service station, light industry with any
machinery or funeral establishment. The rule is that for an ordinance to be
valid and to have force and effect, it must not only be within the powers of
the council to enact but the same must not be in conflict with or repugnant to
the general law.

Conclusion
All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property
rights and impairs personal privileges. It is constitutionally infirm. The
Ordinance contravenes statutes; it is discriminatory and unreasonable in its
operation; it is not sufficiently detailed and explicit that abuses may attend
the enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten, the City Council
under the Code had no power to enact the Ordinance and is therefore ultra
vires, null and void.
petition denied

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