~ LEAVE A COMMENT
Castillo vs Cruz
GR 182165
Facts:
Respondent Amanda Cruz (Amanda) who, along with her husband Francisco
G. Cruz (Spouses Cruz), leased a parcel of land situated at Barrio Guinhawa,
Malolos (the property), refused to vacate the property, despite demands by
the lessor Provincial Government of Bulacan (the Province) which intended to
utilize it for local projects.
Several cases were filed by both parties to enforce their rights over the
property. The pertinent case among the filed cases was the issuance by the
MTC an alias Writ of Demolition in favor of the Province. Respondents filed a
motion for TRO in the RTC, which was granted. However, the demolition was
already implemented before the TRO issuance.
Amanda and her co-respondents refused to turn over the property, however.
Insisting that the RTC Order of Permanent Injunction enjoined the Province
from repossessing it, they shoved petitioners, forcing the latter to arrest them
and cause their indictment for direct assault, trespassing and other forms of
light threats.
Thus, respondents filed a Motion for Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data.
Issue:
Held:
Section 1 of the Rules of Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data provides that the
coverage of the writs is limited to the protection of rights to life, liberty and
security, and the writs cover not only actual but also threats of unlawful acts
or omissions.
To thus be covered by the privilege of the writs, respondents must meet the
threshold requirement that their right to life, liberty and security is violated or
threatened with an unlawful act or omission. Evidently, the present
controversy arose out of a property dispute between the Provincial
Government and respondents. Absent any considerable nexus between the
acts complained of and its effect on respondents right to life, liberty and
security, the Court will not delve on the propriety of petitioners entry into the
property.
It bears emphasis that respondents petition did not show any actual
violation, imminent or continuing threat to their life, liberty and security. Bare
allegations of petitioners will not suffice to prove entitlement to the remedy
of the writ of amparo. No undue confinement or detention was present. In
fact, respondents were even able to post bail for the offenses a day after their
arrest.
Respondents filing of the petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data
should have been barred, for criminal proceedings against them had
commenced after they were arrested in flagrante delicto and proceeded
against in accordance with Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Validity
of the arrest or the proceedings conducted thereafter is a defense that may
be set up by respondents during trial and not before a petition for writs of
amparo and habeas data.
CARBONNEL VS CSC
MARCH 30, 2013
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Facts: On May 21, 1999, petitioner went to the CSCRO IV to secure a copy of
the result of the Computer Assisted Test (CATS) Career Service Professional
Examination given on March 14, 1999, because she lost the original copy of
her Career Service Professional Certificate of Rating (hereafter referred to as
certificate of rating). Petitioner was directed to accomplish a verification slip.
The Examination Placement and Service Division noticed that petitioners
personal and physical appearance was entirely different from the picture of
the examinee attached to the application form and the picture seat plan. It
was also discovered that the signature affixed on the application form was
different from that appearing on the verification slip. Because of these
discrepancies, the Legal Affairs Division of the CSCRO IV conducted an
investigation.
Denying her admissions in her voluntary statement before the CSCRO IV,
petitioner, in her Answer, traversed the charges against her. She explained
that after filling up the application form for the civil service examination, she
asked Navarro to submit the same to the CSC. She, however, admitted that
she failed to take the examination as she had to attend to her ailing mother.
Thus, when she received a certificate of eligibility despite her failure to take
the test, she was anxious to know the mystery behind it. She claimed that
she went to the CSCRO IV not to get a copy of the certificate of rating but to
check the veracity of the certificate. More importantly, she questioned the
use of her voluntary statement as the basis of the formal charge against her
inasmuch as the same was made without the assistance of counsel.
After the formal investigation, the CSCRO IV rendered its March 25, 2002
Decision No. 020079 finding petitioner guilty of dishonesty, grave
misconduct, and falsification of official documents. The penalty of dismissal
from the service, with all its accessory penalties, was imposed on her.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by CSCRO IV on November
14, 2003.
Petitioner appealed, but the CSC dismissed the same for having been filed
almost three years from receipt of the CSCRO IV decision. The CSC did not
give credence to petitioners explanation that she failed to timely appeal the
case because of the death of her counsel. The CSC opined that
notwithstanding the death of one lawyer, the other members of the law firm,
petitioners counsel of record, could have timely appealed the decision.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in Resolution No. 072049
dated November 5, 2007.
Unsatisfied, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA. On November 24, 2008,
the CA rendered the assailed decision affirming the decisions and resolutions
of the CSCRO IV and the CSC. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was
denied by the CA on April 29, 2009.
Hence, the instant petition based on the following grounds:
Issue: Serious error of fact and law amounting to grave abuse of discretion
was committed by the Court of Appeals in its assailed decision dated
November 24, 2008 because petitioners finding of guilt was grounded
entirely on her unsworn statement that she admitted the offenses charged
and without the assistance of a counsel.
Petitioner faults the CSCs finding because it was based solely on her
uncounselled admission taken during the investigation by the CSCRO IV. She
claims that her right to due process was violated because she was not
afforded the right to counsel when her statement was taken.
It is true that the CSCRO IV, the CSC, and the CA gave credence to
petitioners uncounselled statements and, partly on the basis thereof,
uniformly found petitioner liable for the charge of dishonesty, grave
misconduct, and falsification of official document.
However, it must be remembered that the right to counsel under Section 12
of the Bill of Rights is meant to protect a suspect during custodial
investigation. Thus, the exclusionary rule under paragraph (2), Section 12 of
the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation
but not to those made in an administrative investigation.
measures against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of
maintaining the dignity of government service.
BEDOL VS COMELEC
MARCH 30, 2013
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FACTS: As Chair of the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) for the province
of Maguindanao, the respondent [petitioner] discharged his official functions
and was able to ensure the PBOCs performance of its ministerial duty to
canvass the Certificates of Canvass coming from the twenty two (22) city and
municipalities in the province.
At that time, respondent [petitioner] also was charged with the burdensome
and gargantuan duty of being the concurrent Provincial Elections Supervisor
for the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan a neighboring province of Maguindanao.
He was already informed of the resetting of the canvassing for May 30, 2007,
but failed to appear despite prior knowledge.
Bedol explained before the Task Force during its June 11, 2007 fact finding
activity that, while in his custody and possession, the election paraphernalia
were stolen sometime on May 29, 2007, or some fifteen (15) days after the
elections. This was the first time such an excuse was given by the respondent
[petitioner] and no written report was ever filed with the Commission
regarding the alleged loss.
Petitioner questioned the COMELECs legal basis for issuing the warrant of
arrest and its assumption of jurisdiction over the contempt charges.
Nevertheless, he was declared in contempt by COMELEC.
Petitioner, then, filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the
COMELEC in the other assailed Resolution dated August 31, 2007.
RULING:
Powers of COMELEC
The powers and functions of the COMELEC, conferred upon it by the 1987
Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code, may be classified into
administrative, quasi-legislative, and quasi-judicial. The quasi-judicial power
of the COMELEC embraces the power to resolve controversies arising from
the enforcement of election laws, and to be the sole judge of all preproclamation controversies; and of all contests relating to the elections,
returns, and qualifications. Its quasi-legislative power refers to the issuance of
rules and regulations to implement the election laws and to exercise such
legislative functions as may expressly be delegated to it by Congress. Its
administrative function refers to the enforcement and administration of
election laws. In the exercise of such power, the Constitution (Section 6,
Article IX-A) and the Omnibus Election Code (Section 52 [c]) authorize the
COMELEC to issue rules and regulations to implement the provisions of the
1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code.
The language of the Omnibus Election Code and the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure is broad enough to allow the initiation of indirect contempt
proceedings by the COMELEC motu proprio. Furthermore, the above-quoted
provision of Section 52(e), Article VII of the Omnibus Election Code explicitly
adopts the procedure and penalties provided by the Rules of Court.
Third and fourth, he publicly displayed disrespect for the authority of the
COMELEC through the media (interviews on national television channels, and
in newspapers and radios) by flaunting an armory of long firearms and side
arms in public, and posing for the front page of a national broadsheet, with a
shiny pistol tucked in a holster, in violation of paragraphs (a) and (d), Section
2, Rule 29 of same Rules.
~ LEAVE A COMMENT
Facts:
On December 28, 2000, the RP, through Charge dAffaires Enrique A. Manalo,
signed the Rome Statute which, by its terms, is subject to ratification,
acceptance or approval by the signatory states. As of the filing of the instant
petition, only 92 out of the 139 signatory countries appear to have completed
the ratification, approval and concurrence process. The Philippines is not
among the 92.
RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement
2. Persons of one Party present in the territory of the other shall not, absent
the express consent of the first Party,
Security Council, or
5. This Agreement shall remain in force until one year after the date on which
one party notifies the other of its intent to terminate the Agreement. The
provisions of this Agreement shall continue to apply with respect to any act
occurring, or any allegation arising, before the effective date of termination.
Petitioner urges that the Agreement be struck down as void ab initio for
imposing immoral obligations and/or being at variance with allegedly
universally recognized principles of international law. The immoral aspect
proceeds from the fact that the Agreement, as petitioner would put it, leaves
criminals immune from responsibility for unimaginable atrocities that deeply
shock the conscience of humanity; x x x it precludes our country from
delivering an American criminal to the [ICC] x x x.63
The Court is not persuaded. Suffice it to state in this regard that the nonsurrender agreement, as aptly described by the Solicitor General, is an
assertion by the Philippines of its desire to try and punish crimes under its
national law. x x x The agreement is a recognition of the primacy and
BALAO VS GMA
MARCH 30, 2013
~ LEAVE A COMMENT
FACTS: The siblings of James Balao, and Longid (petitioners), filed with the
RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo in
favor of James Balao who was abducted by unidentified armed men earlier.
Named respondents in the petition were then President GMA, Exec Sec
Eduardo Ermita, Defense Sec Gilberto Teodoro, Jr., ILG Secretary Ronaldo
Puno, National Security Adviser (NSA) Norberto Gonzales, AFP Chief of Staff
Gen. Alexander . Yano, PNP Police Director General Jesus Verzosa, among
others.
petitioners prayed for the issuance of a writ of amparo and likewise prayed
for (1) an inspection order for the inspection of at least 11 military and police
facilities which have been previously reported as detention centers for
activists abducted by military and police operatives; (2) a production order
for all documents that contain evidence relevant to the petition, particularly
the Order of Battle List and any record or dossier respondents have on James;
and (3) a witness protection order.
ISSUE a Writ of Amparo Ordering the respondents to (a) disclose where James
is detained or confined, (b) to release James considering his unlawful
detention since his abduction and (c) to cease and desist from further
inflicting harm upon his person; and
ISSUE: WON the totality of evidence satisfies the degree of proof required by
the Amparo Rule to establish an enforced disappearance.
HELD: NO; The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was promulgated on October 24,
2007 amidst rising incidence of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances. It was formulated in the exercise of this Courts expanded
rule-making power for the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights
**
The trial court gave considerable weight to the discussion in the petition of
briefing papers supposedly obtained from the AFP indicating that the antiinsurgency campaign of the military under the administration of President
Arroyo included targeting of identified legal organizations under the NDF,
which included the CPA, and their members, as enemies of the state.
In the case of Roxas v. Macapagal-Arroyo, the Court noted that the similarity
between the circumstances attending a particular case of abduction with
those surrounding previous instances of enforced disappearances does not,
necessarily, carry sufficient weight to prove that the government
orchestrated such abduction. Accordingly, the trial court in this case cannot
simply infer government involvement in the abduction of James from past
similar incidents in which the victims also worked or affiliated with the CPA
and other left-leaning groups.
**
The petition further premised government complicity in the abduction of
James on the very positions held by the respondents. The Court in Rubrico v.
Macapagal-Arroyo had the occasion to expound on the doctrine of command
responsibility and why it has little bearing, if at all, in amparo proceedings.
It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the
disappearance [threats thereof or extrajudicial killings]; it determines
responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced disappearance
[threats thereof or extrajudicial killings] for purposes of imposing the
appropriate remedies to address the disappearance [or extrajudicial killings].
xxxx
As the law now stands, extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances in
this jurisdiction are not crimes penalized separately from the component
criminal acts undertaken to carry out these killings and enforced
disappearances and are now penalized under the Revised Penal Code and
special laws. The simple reason is that the Legislature has not spoken on the
matter; the determination of what acts are criminal x x x are matters of
substantive law that only the Legislature has the power to enact. x x x[
established, much less their link to any military or police unit. There is
likewise no concrete evidence indicating that James is being held or detained
upon orders of or with acquiescence of government agents. Consequently,
the trial court erred in granting amparo reliefs. Such pronouncement of
responsibility on the part of public respondents cannot be made given the
insufficiency of evidence. However, we agree with the trial court in finding
that the actions taken by respondent officials are very limited, superficial
and one-sided. Its candid and forthright observations on the efforts exerted
by the respondents are borne by the evidence on record.
**
An inspection order is an interim relief designed to give support or strengthen
the claim of a petitioner in an amparo petition, in order to aid the court before
making a decision. A basic requirement before an amparo court may grant an
inspection order is that the place to be inspected is reasonably determinable
from the allegations of the party seeking the order. In this case, the issuance
of inspection order was properly denied since the petitioners specified several
military and police establishments based merely on the allegation that the
testimonies of victims and witnesses in previous incidents of similar
abductions involving activists disclosed that those premises were used as
detention centers. In the same vein, the prayer for issuance of a production
order was predicated on petitioners bare allegation that it obtained
confidential information from an unidentified military source, that the name
of James was included in the so-called Order of Battle. Indeed, the trial court
could not have sanctioned any fishing expedition by precipitate issuance of
inspection and production orders on the basis of insufficient claims of one
party.
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FACTS: Early morning of 27 July 2003, some 321 armed soldiers, led by the
now detained junior officers, entered and took control of the Oakwood
Premier Luxury Apartments (Oakwood), an upscale apartment complex,
located in the business district of Makati City. The soldiers disarmed the
security officers of Oakwood and planted explosive devices in its immediate
surroundings. The junior officers publicly renounced their support for the
administration and called for the resignation of President Gloria MacapagalArroyo and several cabinet members.
Around 7:00 p.m. of the same date, the soldiers voluntarily surrendered to
the authorities after several negotiations with government emissaries. The
soldiers later defused the explosive devices they had earlier planted. The
soldiers then returned to their barracks. On 31 July 2003, Gen. Abaya, as the
Chief of Staff of the AFP, issued a directive to all the Major Service
Commanders to turn over custody of ten junior officers to the ISAFP Detention
Center. The transfer took place while military and civilian authorities were
investigating the soldiers involvement in the Oakwood incident.
Petitioners filed a petition for Habeas Corpus before the CA, however the
same was denied. The Court of Appeals found the petition bereft of merit. The
appellate court pointed out that the detainees are already charged of coup
detat before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Habeas corpus is unavailing
in this case as the detainees confinement is under a valid indictment, the
ISSUE: WON the denial of the petition for Habeas Corpus was valid
HELD: YES
For obvious reasons, the duty to hear the petition for habeas corpus
necessarily includes the determination of the propriety of the remedy. If a
court finds the alleged cause of the detention unlawful, then it should issue
the writ and release the detainees. In the present case, after hearing the
case, the Court of Appeals found that habeas corpus is inapplicable. After
actively participating in the hearing before the Court of Appeals, petitioners
are estopped from claiming that the appellate court had no jurisdiction to
inquire into the merits of their petition.
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the remedy of habeas corpus is not
the proper remedy to address the detainees complaint against the
regulations and conditions in the ISAFP Detention Center. The remedy of
habeas corpus has one objective: to inquire into the cause of detention of a
person. The purpose of the writ is to determine whether a person is being
illegally deprived of his liberty.If the inquiry reveals that the detention is
illegal, the court orders the release of the person. If, however, the detention
is proven lawful, then the habeas corpus proceedings terminate.
The use of habeas corpus is thus very limited. It is not a writ of error. Neither
can it substitute for an appeal.
A mere allegation of a violation of ones constitutional right is not sufficient.
The courts will extend the scope of the writ only if any of the following
circumstances is present: (a) there is a deprivation of a constitutional right
resulting in the unlawful restraint of a person; (b) the court had no jurisdiction
to impose the sentence; or (c) an excessive penalty is imposed and such
sentence is void as to the excess.
confer with the detainees. The detainees right to counsel is not undermined
by the scheduled visits. Even in the hearings before the Senate and the
Feliciano Commission, petitioners were given time to confer with the
detainees, a fact that petitioners themselves admit.23 Thus, at no point were
the detainees denied their right to counsel.
PP VS NG
MARCH 30, 2013
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FACTS:
On August 24, 2000, around 9pm, Capt. Danilo Ibon of Task Force Aduana
received information from an operative that there was an ongoing shipment
of contraband in Barangay Bignay II, Sariaya, Quezon Province. Upon
instructions from his superior, Major Carlo Magno Tabo, Capt. Ibon formed a
team in coordination with a PNP detachment, and, along with the operative,
the team then proceeded to Villa Vicenta Resort in Barangay Bignay II,
Sariaya.
The members of the team were able to observe the goings-on at the resort
from a distance of around 50 meters. They spotted six Chinese-looking men
loading bags containing a white substance into a white van. Having been
noticed, Capt. Ibon identified his team and asked accused-appellant Chua
Shilou Hwan (Hwan) what they were loading on the van. Hwan replied that it
was shabu and pointed to accused-appellant Raymond Tan as the leader. A
total of 172 bags of suspected shabu were then confiscated.
On January 10, 2001, an Amended Information for violation of Sec. 16, Article
III of RA 6425 was filed against accused-appellants, who entered a plea of not
guilty upon re-arraignment.
arrest, they argue that the search sans a search warrant subsequently made
on them was illegal. They contend that a seizure of any evidence as a result
of an illegal search is inadmissible in any proceeding for any purpose.
RULING:
YES.
Art. III, SEC. 2 of the Constitution provides that The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
The foregoing proviso refers to arrest in flagrante delicto. In the instant case,
contrary to accused-appellants contention, there was indeed a valid
warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto.
The arresting police officers had probable cause to suspect that accusedappellants were loading and transporting contraband, more so when Hwan,
upon being accosted, readily mentioned that they were loading shabu and
pointed to Tan as their leader. Thus, the arrest of accused-appellantswho
were caught in flagrante delicto of possessing, and in the act of loading into a
white L-300 van, shabu, a prohibited drug under RA 6425 is valid.
In People v. Alunday, we held that when a police officer sees the offense,
although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby, and
proceeds at once to the scene, he may effect an arrest without a warrant on
the basis of Sec. 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as the offense is
deemed committed in his presence or within his view. In the instant case, it
can be argued that accused-appellants were committing the offense of
possessing shabu and were in the act of loading them in a white van when
the police officers arrested them. As aptly noted by the appellate court, the
crime was committed in the presence of the police officers with the
contraband, inside transparent plastic containers, in plain view and duly
observed by the arresting officers.
The Court also notes that accused-appellants are deemed to have waived
their objections to their arrest for not raising the issue before entering their
plea.
Moreover, present in the instant case are all the elements of illegal
possession of drugs: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object
which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not
authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possesses the
said drug. Accused-appellants were positively identified in court as the
individuals caught loading and possessing illegal drugs. They were found to
be in possession of prohibited drugs without proof that they were duly
authorized by law to possess them. Having been caught in flagrante delicto,
there is, therefore, a prima facie evidence of animus possidendi on the part of
accused-appellants. There is, thus, no merit to the argument of the defense
that a warrant was needed to arrest accused-appellants.
Accused-appellants were not able to show that there was any truth to their
allegation of a frame-up in rebutting the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses. They relied on mere denials, in contrast with the testimony of
Capt. Ibon, who testified that he and his team saw accused-appellants
loading plastic bags with a white crystalline substance into an L-300 van at
the Villa Vicenta Resort. Accused-appellants, except for Tan, claimed that they
were ordered by the police officers to act like they were loading bags onto the
van. Accused-appellant Tan told a different tale and claims he was arrested
inside a restaurant. But as the trial court found, the persons who could have
corroborated their version of events were not presented in court. The only
witness presented by Tan, a tricycle driver whose testimony corroborated
Tans alone, was not found by the trial court to be credible.
POLLO VS DAVID
MARCH 30, 2013
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Pollo vs David
G. R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011
Regional Office No. IV and also the Officer-in-Charge of the Public Assistance
and Liaison Division (PALD) under the Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Na
program of the CSC.
After some briefing, the team proceeded at once to the CSC-ROIV office at
Panay Avenue, Quezon City. The backing-up of all files in the hard disk of
computers at the PALD and Legal Services Division (LSD) was witnessed by
several employees, together with Directors Castillo and Unite who closely
monitored said activity. At around 6:00 p.m., Director Unite sent text
messages to petitioner and the head of LSD, who were both out of the office
at the time, informing them of the ongoing copying of computer files in their
divisions upon orders of the CSC Chair.
Issue: Legality of the search conducted in the petitioners office computer and
the copying of his personal files without his knowledge and consent, alleged
as a transgression of his constitutional right to privacy.
Ruling: Yes.
In sum, we conclude that the special needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement make theprobable-cause requirement impracticable, x x x for
legitimate, work-related noninvestigatory intrusions as well as investigations
of work-related misconduct. A standard of reasonableness will neither unduly
Under the facts obtaining, the search conducted on petitioners computer was
justified at its inception and scope. We quote with approval the CSCs
discussion on the reasonableness of its actions, consistent as it were with the
guidelines established by OConnor:
Even conceding for a moment that there is no such administrative policy,
there is no doubt in the mind of the Commission that the search of Pollos
computer has successfully passed the test of reasonableness for warrantless
searches in the workplace as enunciated in the above-discussed American
authorities. It bears emphasis that the Commission pursued the search in its
capacity as a government employer and that it was undertaken in connection
with an investigation involving a work-related misconduct, one of the
circumstances exempted from the warrant requirement. At the inception of
the search, a complaint was received recounting that a certain division chief
in the CSCRO No. IV was lawyering for parties having pending cases with
the said regional office or in the Commission. The nature of the imputation
was serious, as it was grievously disturbing. If, indeed, a CSC employee was
found to be furtively engaged in the practice of lawyering for parties with
pending cases before the Commission would be a highly repugnant scenario,
then such a case would have shattering repercussions. It would undeniably
cast clouds of doubt upon the institutional integrity of the Commission as a
quasi-judicial agency, and in the process, render it less effective in fulfilling
its mandate as an impartial and objective dispenser of administrative justice.
It is settled that a court or an administrative tribunal must not only be
actually impartial but must be seen to be so, otherwise the general public
would not have any trust and confidence in it.
Worthy to mention, too, is the fact that the Commission effected the
warrantless search in an open and transparent manner. Officials and some
employees of the regional office, who happened to be in the vicinity, were on
hand to observe the process until its completion. In addition, the respondent
himself was duly notified, through text messaging, of the search and the
concomitant retrieval of files from his computer.
All in all, the Commission is convinced that the warrantless search done on
computer assigned to Pollo was not, in any way, vitiated with
unconstitutionality. It was a reasonable exercise of the managerial
prerogative of the Commission as an employer aimed at ensuring its
operational effectiveness and efficiency by going after the work-related
misfeasance of its employees. Consequently, the evidence derived from the
questioned search are deemed admissible.
CHAVEZ VS GONZALES
MARCH 30, 2013
~ LEAVE A COMMENT
FRANCISCO CHAVEZ
vs.
RAUL M. GONZALES, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of
Justice; and NTC
G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008
FACTS: Sometime before 6 June 2005, the radio station dzMM aired the Garci
Tapes where the parties to the conversation discussed rigging the results of
the 2004 elections to favor President Arroyo. On 6 June 2005, Presidential
spokesperson Bunye held a press conference in Malacaang Palace, where he
played before the presidential press corps two compact disc recordings of
conversations between a woman and a man. Bunye identified the woman in
both recordings as President Arroyo but claimed that the contents of the
second compact disc had been spliced to make it appear that President
Arroyo was talking to Garcillano.
However, on 9 June 2005, Bunye backtracked and stated that the womans
voice in the compact discs was not President Arroyos after all.3 Meanwhile,
other individuals went public, claiming possession of the genuine copy of the
Garci Tapes. Respondent Gonzalez ordered the NBI to investigate media
organizations which aired the Garci Tapes for possible violation of Republic
Act No. 4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping Law.
On 11 June 2005, the NTC issued a press release warning radio and television
stations that airing the Garci Tapes is a cause for the suspension, revocation
and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorizations issued to them. On 14
June 2005, NTC officers met with officers of the broadcasters group KBP, to
dispel fears of censorship. The NTC and KBP issued a joint press statement
ISSUE: The principal issue for resolution is whether the NTC warning
embodied in the press release of 11 June 2005 constitutes an impermissible
prior restraint on freedom of expression.
Section 4, Article III of the Constitution prohibits the enactment of any law
curtailing freedom of expression:
No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or the
press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
Thus, the rule is that expression is not subject to any prior restraint or
censorship because the Constitution commands that freedom of expression
shall not be abridged. Over time, however, courts have carved out narrow
and well defined exceptions to this rule out of necessity.
pornography,
false or misleading advertisement,
advocacy of imminent lawless action, and
danger to national security.
All other expression is not subject to prior restraint.
action, and danger to national security is the clear and present danger
test.32 The expression restrained must present a clear and present danger of
bringing about a substantive evil that the State has a right and duty to
prevent, and such danger must be grave and imminent.
The NTC does not claim that the public airing of the Garci Tapes constitutes
unprotected expression that may be subject to prior restraint. The NTC does
not specify what substantive evil the State seeks to prevent in imposing prior
restraint on the airing of the Garci Tapes. The NTC does not claim that the
public airing of the Garci Tapes constitutes a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil, of grave and imminent character, that the State has a right
and duty to prevent.
The NTC did not conduct any hearing in reaching its conclusion that the airing
of the Garci Tapes constitutes a continuing violation of the Anti-Wiretapping
Law. There is also the issue of whether a wireless cellular phone conversation
is covered by the Anti-Wiretapping Law.
Clearly, the NTC has no factual or legal basis in claiming that the airing of the
Garci Tapes constitutes a violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law. The radio and
television stations were not even given an opportunity to be heard by the
NTC. The NTC did not observe basic due process as mandated in Ang Tibay v.
Court of Industrial Relations.
The NTC concedes that the Garci Tapes have not been authenticated as
accurate or truthful. The NTC also concedes that only after a prosecution or
appropriate investigation can it be established that the Garci Tapes
constitute false information and/or willful misrepresentation. Clearly, the
NTC admits that it does not even know if the Garci Tapes contain false
information or willful misrepresentation.
Obviously, the content of the Garci Tapes affects gravely the sanctity of the
ballot. Public discussion on the sanctity of the ballot is indisputably a
protected expression that cannot be subject to prior restraint. In any event,
public discussion on all political issues should always remain uninhibited,
robust and wide open.
The rule, which recognizes no exception, is that there can be no contentbased prior restraint on protected expression. On this ground alone, the NTC
The airing of the Garci Tapes does not violate the right to privacy because the
content of the Garci Tapes is a matter of important public concern. The
Constitution guarantees the peoples right to information on matters of public
concern. The remedy of any person aggrieved by the public airing of the
Garci Tapes is to file a complaint for violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law
after the commission of the crime. Subsequent punishment, absent a lawful
defense, is the remedy available in case of violation of the Anti-Wiretapping
Law.
In the present case, the airing of the Garci Tapes is a protected expression
that can never be subject to prior restraint. However, even assuming for the
sake of argument that the airing of the Garci Tapes constitutes unprotected
expression, only the courts have the power to adjudicate on the factual and
legal issue of whether the airing of the Garci Tapes presents a clear and
present danger of bringing about a substantive evil that the State has a right
and duty to prevent, so as to justify the prior restraint.
9. Conclusion
In sum, the NTC press release constitutes an unconstitutional prior restraint
on protected expression. There can be no content-based prior restraint on
protected expression. This rule has no exception.
~ LEAVE A COMMENT
CITY OF MANILA, HON. ALFREDO S. LIM as the Mayor of the City of Manila,
HON. JOSELITO L. ATIENZA, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila
and Presiding Officer of the City Council of Manila, et.al vs. HON. PERFECTO
A.S. LAGUIO, JR., as Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila and MALATE TOURIST
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005
Enacted by the City Council and approved by petitioner City Mayor, the said
Ordinance is entitled
On 11 January 1995, petitioners filed the present Petition, alleging that the
following errors were committed by the lower court in its ruling:
HELD: The Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the lower court did not
err in declaring the Ordinance, as it did, ultra vires and therefore null and
void.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions
has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the
corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed
according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the
following substantive requirements:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.
The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise of its police
power, an enactment of the City Council acting as agent of Congress. This
delegated police power is found in Section 16 of the LGC, known as the
general welfare clause.
The inquiry in this Petition is concerned with the validity of the exercise of
such delegated power.
the Constitution
To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the
enactment of the Ordinance, and to free it from the imputation of
constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear that the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an
interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals.60 It must be evident that no other alternative for the
accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. A
reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the police measure
and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of
protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private
property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion and protection
of the social and moral values of the community. Granting for the sake of
argument that the objectives of the Ordinance are within the scope of the
City Councils police powers, the means employed for the accomplishment
thereof were unreasonable and unduly oppressive.
The worthy aim of fostering public morals and the eradication of the
communitys social ills can be achieved through means less restrictive of
private rights; it can be attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an
absolute prohibition. The closing down and transfer of businesses or their
conversion into businesses allowed under the Ordinance have no
reasonable relation to the accomplishment of its purposes. Otherwise stated,
the prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per se protect and
promote the social and moral welfare of the community; it will not in itself
eradicate the alluded social ills of prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it
arrest the spread of sexual disease in Manila.
The enumerated establishments are lawful pursuits which are not per se
offensive to the moral welfare of the community. While a motel may be used
as a venue for immoral sexual activity, it cannot for that reason alone be
punished. It cannot be classified as a house of ill-repute or as a nuisance per
se on a mere likelihood or a naked assumption.
It is readily apparent that the means employed by the Ordinance for the
achievement of its purposes, the governmental interference itself, infringes
on the constitutional guarantees of a persons fundamental right to liberty
and property.
Modality employed is
unlawful taking
There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A possessory
taking occurs when the government confiscates or physically occupies
property. A regulatory taking occurs when the governments regulation
leaves no reasonable economically viable use of the property.
Further, The Ordinance confers upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted
power to close down establishments. Ordinances such as this, which make
possible abuses in its execution, depending upon no conditions or
qualifications whatsoever other than the unregulated arbitrary will of the city
authorities as the touchstone by which its validity is to be tested, are
unreasonable and invalid. The Ordinance should have established a rule by
which its impartial enforcement could be secured. Similarly, the Ordinance
does not specify the standards to ascertain which establishments tend to
disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect the
social and moral welfare of the community.
The cited case supports the nullification of the Ordinance for lack of
comprehensible standards to guide the law enforcers in carrying out its
provisions.
The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business and
operation of motels in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside of this area. A
noxious establishment does not become any less noxious if located outside
the area.
The standard where women are used as tools for entertainment is also
discriminatory as prostitutionone of the hinted ills the Ordinance aims to
banishis not a profession exclusive to women. Both men and women have
an equal propensity to engage in prostitution. Thus, the discrimination is
invalid.
The Ordinance is in contravention of the Code (Sec 458) as the latter merely
empowers local government units to regulate, and not prohibit, the
establishments enumerated in Section 1 thereof.
It is well to point out that petitioners also cannot seek cover under the
general welfare clause authorizing the abatement of nuisances without
judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se, or one which
affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be summarily
abated under the undefined law of necessity. It can not be said that motels
are injurious to the rights of property, health or comfort of the community. It
is a legitimate business. If it be a nuisance per accidens it may be so proven
in a hearing conducted for that purpose. A motel is not per se a nuisance
warranting its summary abatement without judicial intervention.
Not only does the Ordinance contravene the Code, it likewise runs counter to
the provisions of P.D. 499. As correctly argued by MTDC, the statute had
already converted the residential Ermita-Malate area into a commercial area.
The decree allowed the establishment and operation of all kinds of
commercial establishments except warehouse or open storage depot, dump
or yard, motor repair shop, gasoline service station, light industry with any
machinery or funeral establishment. The rule is that for an ordinance to be
valid and to have force and effect, it must not only be within the powers of
the council to enact but the same must not be in conflict with or repugnant to
the general law.
Conclusion
All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property
rights and impairs personal privileges. It is constitutionally infirm. The
Ordinance contravenes statutes; it is discriminatory and unreasonable in its
operation; it is not sufficiently detailed and explicit that abuses may attend
the enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten, the City Council
under the Code had no power to enact the Ordinance and is therefore ultra
vires, null and void.
petition denied