a r t i c l e
i n f o
Keywords:
Presentism
Whig history
Philosophical hermeneutics
Gadamer
a b s t r a c t
This article examines how Hans G. Gadamers philosophical hermeneutics can contribute to contemporary debates on the concept of presentism. In the eld of the history of science, this term is usually
employed in two ways. First, presentism refers to the kind of historiography which judges the past to
legitimate the present. Second, this concept designates the inevitable inuence of the present in the
interpretation of the past. In this paper, I argue that both dimensions of the relationship between the
present and the past are explored by Hans G. Gadamer in Truth and Method and other texts. In the rst
place, Gadamers critique of historicism calls into question the anti-presentist ideal of studying the past
for its own sake. In the second place, Gadamers thesis that all understanding inevitably involves some
prejudice poses the question of the inherent present-centredness of historical interpretations. By examining Gadamers hermeneutics, I seek to provide historians with new arguments and perspectives on the
question of presentism.
2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
When citing this paper, please use the full journal title Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
1. Introduction
During the last fty years, the concept of presentism has been
extensively used by philosophers and historians of science. In the
case of the history of science, presentism is a polysemous word
which can adopt different meanings depending on the context.
For instance, the notion of whig history, which is often equated
to that of presentism (e.g. Mayr, 1990; Pickstone, 1995, p. 203,
pp. 301302; Hull, 2000, p. 71; Jardine, 2003, p. 125), can refer
to the distortion wrought by describing and evaluating past science from the perspective of present science (Hardcastle, 1991,
p. 323), to the imposition of our categories on the deeds and
works of past agents who lacked such categories (Jardine, 2003,
p. 126) and to the belief that any historian who becomes professionally interested in current problems commits the sin of being
a Whig historian (Graham, 1981, p. 5). While not seeking to deny
the polysemous nature of presentism, I have distinguished two
primary ways in which historians have used this concept: (A)
Presentism as a kind of historiography and (B) Presentism as an
inherent trait of historical research (Moro Abada, 2009, p. 55). In
Address: Memorial University of Newfoundland, St. Johns, NL, Canada AIC 5S7.
E-mail address: oscar_moro_abadia@yahoo.es
0039-3681/$ - see front matter 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2010.12.003
the rst place, presentism is a term generally employed to designate and denigrate the kind of historiographical approach in which
past science and scientists are judged and evaluated in the light of
modern knowledge. In this setting, presentism, whig history and
anachronistic history are frequently considered as synonymous
(e.g. Kragh, 1987, p. 93; Nickles, 1995, p. 151; Stocking, 1968
[1965], p. 4; Trout, 1994, p. 39). Furthermore, most historians agree
that the best way to counteract this kind of presentism is studying
the past in its own terms. In the second place, presentism also refers to the many ways in which the present inuences the interpretation of the past, including the fact that historians are constricted
by the linguistic, conceptual and cultural codes of their time. In this
case, specialists also use the notions present-centredness and
present-mindedness to refer to this condition of historical research (Ashplant & Wilson, 1988, p. 253; Brush, 1995, p. 220;
Cunningham, 1988, p. 367; Wilson & Ashplant, 1988, p. 11).
In this paper I argue that the analysis of these two dimensions of
the relationship between the present and the past is at the heart of
Gadamers hermeneutical project. Hans G. Gadamer (19002002)
was a central gure in the development of philosophical
373
1
In this article, I refer both to Gadamers original publications and to their English translations. Following a long-established convention, I use in this paper the abbreviation
GW to refer to Gadamers Gesammelte Werke (Gadamer, 1986) and GS for Diltheys Gesammelte Schriften (Dilthey, 19591968).
374
emphasis on the biased nature of science and, of course, an unrelenting antipathy to presentism or whiggism (Hull, 2000, p. 71;
see also Graham, 1981; Jardine, 2003, p. 128; Nickles, 1995, p. 151,
pp. 34). By the beginning of the 1970s, British and American historians employed these two terms simultaneously to denigrate
grand narratives of scientic progress (Jardine, 2003, p. 127). In
this sense, presentism and whiggism did not designate a specic
trait of the old history of science, but a number of historiographical problems associated to such historiography. Among these
presentist malpractices, new historians identied the anachronistic use of modern categories to dene the works of those who
lacked such concepts (Jardine, 2000; Jardine, 2003, p. 127128),
the radical distinction between those who contributed and those
who opposed scientic progress (Russell, 1984), the use of the history of science in contemporary debates (Graham, 1981), and the
description of the history of science as the inevitable conquest of
myth by truth (Stocking, 1968 [1965]). Indeed, most of these critiques were not new. For instance, the term whig history had been
used in 1931 by Herbert Buttereld to call into question the tendency among several British political historians to write on the
side of the Protestants and Whigs, to praise revolutions provided
they have been successful, to emphasize certain principles of progress in the past and to produce a story which is the ratication if
not the glorication of the present (Buttereld, 1973 [1931], p. 9).
Similarly, in the 1930s, French historians of science such as Hlne
Metzger criticized traditional positivist approaches which judge
the value of an outdated science in the shining light of our contemporary theories, considered as denitive acquisitions (Metzger,
1974 [1930], p. 6). However, it was only in the 1960s, under the
inuence of Kuhns work, that the critique of presentism became
commonplace among Anglo-Saxon historians of science.
To counteract presentism, new historians of science adhered
to the old historicist principle of studying the past in its own
terms. The term historicism (Historismus) was rst used by Friedrich Schlegel in 1797 to refer to Winkelmanns work. According to
Schegel, Winkelmanns Historismus had introduced a new epoch in
recognized the immeasurable distinctness and the unique nature
of Antiquity (Iggers, 1995, p. 130). In Schegels initial denition,
the concept already referred to the uniqueness of the past as distinct from the present. Later historicism was applied to the nineteenth- and twentieth-century German Historical School of Ranke
and Dilthey (Iggers, 1995, p. 142). This tradition was closely tied to
the view that human ideas and values are historically conditioned
and, therefore, they must be understood in the context of their own
time. This principle was adopted by many twentieth-century historians, including the aforementioned Buttereld and Metzger. In the
case of the history of science, it became fashionable for the Englishspeaking historians of the 1960s and the 1970s to assume the historicist commitment to understand past science without reference
to the present. It was at that time when renowned historians and
philosophers made historicist statements such as today we try
to establish [. . .] what the meaning of what they themselves wrote
was for Galileo, or Boyle, or Theodor Schwann (Hall, 1969, p. 220),
if we do not understand a problem in its own terms as it was seen
in a different period [. . .] then we shall lose the benet of transcending our own assumption and our current vantage point
(Young, 1966, p. 19), and the historian may rightly be more interested in the coherence of the alien systems in its own terms than in
interpreting its truth in our terms (Hesse, 1976, p. 269). In short,
this generation praised all-round historian[s], interested, not only
in analyzing the contribution to science of the gure [they are]
studying but also in placing his scientic thought in the context
of the philosophical and religious ideas informing his general outlook (Yates, 1973, p. 286).
To understand Gadamers position on presentism, it is important to keep in mind that his main project was to clarify the conditions in which understanding takes place (Gadamer, 2006a
[1960], p. 295; GW I, p. 300)2. In fact, he did not intend to determine
the rules guiding the right understanding, but to discover what is
common to all modes of understanding. To do so, Gadamer focused
on the analysis of the human sciences (Geisteswissenschaften), a kind
of knowledge in which research questions are motivated in a special way by the present and its interests (Gadamer, 2006a [1960],
p. 285; GW I, p. 289). It is in this context that he posed the problem
of historical understanding and, in so doing, the question of presentism. To begin, I posit it is not an exaggeration to state that Gadamer
would have shared with the new historians of science a rejection of
whig history. In fact, Gadamer dened the historical sense (sens
historique) as the talent for understanding the past, sometimes even
the exotic past, from within its own genetic context (Gadamer,
1979 [1963], p. 110). Acquiring an historical sense, then, requires
two complementary movements: First, it involves overcoming the
presentism related to the natural naivet which makes us judge
the past by the so-called obvious scales of our current life, in the perspective of our institutions and from our acquired values and truths
(Gadamer, 1979 [1963], p. 110). Second, it equally implies an
endorsement of the legitimate demand of historical consciousness
of understand[ing] a period in terms of its own concepts
(Gadamer, 2006a [1960], p. 398; GW I, p. 400). This demand is nothing more than the application to historical understanding of the old
hermeneutical principle that a text must be understood in its own
terms (Gadamer, 2006a [1960], p. 292; GW I, p. 297). In short,
Gadamer supported the historicist claim to see the past in its
own terms, not in terms of our contemporary criteria and prejudices
but within its own historical horizon (Gadamer, 2006a [1960], p.
302; GW I, p. 308).
The question is, of course, how this hermeneutical principle can
be fullled. Here, the divergences between Gadamer and historicism began. To understand Gadamers critique of historicism, I will
rst reconstruct his dialogue with Dilthey, an author to whom
Gadamer devoted a close reading in Truth and Method. Wilhelm
Dilthey (18331911) was best known for his project of establishing
the human sciences (Geisteswissenschaften) as equally scientic
and as rigorous as the natural sciences. To accomplish such a task,
Dilthey did not propose a supercial adaptation of the method of
the human sciences to the procedures of the natural sciences but,
rather, he explored a genuine community between both methods
(Gadamer, 1979 [1963], p. 123). In other words, while Dilthey
established a sharp distinction between the natural and the human
sciences, he also discovered something common to both sciences:
the aspiration to attain objective understanding beyond the contingencies of purely subjective observation (Gadamer, 1979
[1963], p. 123).
This scientic commitment to objectivity is at the heart of Diltheys critique of historical reason. According to Dilthey, historians
main aim is to describe how the relative concepts of value, meaning and purpose of a nation and epoch [. . .] have expanded into
something absolute (Dilthey, 2002 [1910], p. 310, GS VII: 290,
my emphasis). This search for the absolute is, however, determined
by the fact that we are historical beings before being observers of
history, and only because we are the former do we become the latter (Dilthey, 2002 [1910], p. 297; GS VII: 278). In other words, the
condition for the possibility of historical science is that the one
who investigate history is the same as the one who makes history
2
There is a fundamental difference between Gadamers and the historians respective aims. On the one hand, Gadamers main project was to explore the conditions of
understanding and of historical knowledge. In this sense, his project can be considered Kantian. On the other hand, this perspective clearly contrasts with the historians concern
with the truthfulness of their account of the past. In this sense, their project can be considered Rankean.
375
376
the sciences (Jardine, 2003, p. 128). In other words, antiwhiggism played an essential role in the establishment of
professional standards of scholarship. However, by the 1980s,
many authors argued that the discipline has achieved its maturity
and, therefore, that the doctrinaire anti-whiggism was no longer
necessary (Graham, 1981, p. 4; Nickles, 1995, p. 151). In the second
place, the 1960s and the 1970s had been marked by the historicist
claim that the historian must attempt, insofar as possible, to put
himself literally in his subjects place (Pearce Williams, 1975, p.
246). This commitment posed a fundamental dilemma to the next
generation of professionals: How far can historians go in the reconstruction of the past for its own sake? The exploration of this
question led many historians to realize that the account of the
past [. . .] is inevitably inuenced by the changing present (Hall,
1983. p. 48). In this setting, the ambition of studying the past from
the viewpoint of historical agents was considered as unrealistic
and undesirable (Winsor, 2001, p. 235).
We can distinguish a number of arguments put forward by historians of science during the 1980s and the 1990s to refer to the
present-centredness of historical practice. To begin, many authors
pointed out that the interpretation of the past is conditioned by the
historians language in several ways. First, historians are necessarily limited by the conceptual apparatus available to them (Hull,
1979, p. 6; Hardcastle, 1991, p. 322; Pickstone, 1995, p. 205). In this
sense, historians always impose their linguistic or conceptual
framework upon their accounts of the past (Hardcastle, 1991,
p. 322). Second, historical understanding is a translation process
(Hardcastle, 1991, p. 334). In fact, whether the historical text is
written in a foreign language or in an earlier version of the historians own language, he/she begins by translating their utterances
into his [/her] own language (Hull, 1979, p. 6). For this reason,
presentism appears as an integral part of historical science
(Hardcastle, 1991, pp. 338341). Third, the people about whom
a history is written lived in the past, but the historians and his
readers live in the present (Hull, 1979, p. 5). The historian shares
a language with his/her readers that makes possible for him/her to
communicate successfully with them (Hull, 1979, p. 5). In this
sense, it was suggested that there is an unavoidable presentism
[. . .] in the communication of historical knowledge (Hardcastle,
1991, p. 342). Linguistic arguments were not alone in referring to
the impact of the present upon interpretations of the past. Historians also mentioned a number of additional reasons to explain the
present-centredness of history writing, including that each historian brings with him his own set of biases (Hull, 1979, p. 653);
that historians cannot avoid the burden of superior knowledge
(Hall, 1983, p. 57; see also Tosh, 2003, p. 653) and that selection
has to be at work in the constitution of any and every piece of
investigation; and such selection is necessarily based upon some
prior pattern or set of principles (Wilson & Ashplant, 1988, p. 7).
Most of these arguments were explored in depth by Gadamer in
Truth and Method as well as in several papers. In fact, the idea that
history is present-minded is related to Gadamers primary thesis
that all understanding inevitably involves some prejudice
(Gadamer, 2006a [1960], p. 272; GW I, p. 274). According to
Gadamer, a prejudice is a judgment that is rendered before all
the elements that determine a situation have been nally examined (Gadamer, 2006a [1960], p. 273; GW I, p. 275). Gadamer
distinguishes several ways in which historical interpretations are
prejudiced. In the rst place, he argues that historical understanding is always conditioned by the tradition to which it belongs. This
tradition denes the questions that can be asked and those that are
excluded, the themes to be investigated and the legitimate forms of
understanding. The important point here is that, according to Gadamer, tradition cannot be equated to something belonging to the
past for there is a constant effect (Wirkung) of tradition in the present: We are always situated within traditions, and this is no
by proposing and revising, in a back-and-forth movement, projections of meaning that have their origins in the interpreters own
prejudices.
In sum, Gadamers thesis that all interpretation is prejudiced led
him to explore many of the arguments put forward by the historians of science about the present-mindedness of historical research.
However, there is a fundamental difference between Gadamer and
most of these historians concerning the very meaning of this present-centredness. In fact, historians have the tendency to conceptualize this sort of presentism as an obstacle for attaining historical
knowledge. For instance, they refer to the present-centredness of
historical research as a far wider set of problems inherent in the
activities of each and every historian (Wilson & Ashplant, 1988,
p.11), as something that cannot be totally eliminated of the historical accounts of the past (Mayr, 1990, p. 6) and as the origin of a
misapprehension consisting in looking at the past with both eyes
in the present (Cunnigham, 1988, p. 367). Some of these historians
argue that until the historian can, in some way, get out of the
present, then the history he or she produces can never be (or be
known to be) authentically about the past and true to what happened in the past (Cunningham, 1988, p. 367). Other authors suggest that present-centredness of this sort should not be regarded
as a problem [for] its methodological consequences are minimal
(Tosh, 2003, p. 647). In this case, presentism is not considered
an ultimate obstacle for historical research, but remains conceptualized as a constraint or limitation of historical knowledge.
Gadamer differs from these authors for he considers the conditionedness of understanding as a productive possibility for historical research. Gadamer argues there is no interpretation which does
not bring into play the interpreters own prejudices, whether or not
we are conscious of these or are so arrogant as to think we can begin without presupposition (Palmer, 2001, p. 45). For this reason,
Gadamer stresses the need for self-understanding: The important
thing is to be aware of ones own bias (Gadamer, 2006a [1970], p.
271; GW I, p. 274). The recognition of the conditionedness of
understanding does not mean, however, that historians are denitively constrained or limited by their own preconceptions. On
the contrary, the concept of prejudice is where we can start
(Gadamer, 2006a [1960], p. 273; GW I, p. 276). On this point, Gadamer distances himself of the normative denition of prejudice as
an unfavorable opinion formed beforehand or without reason. In
fact, Gadamers aim was to restore to its rightful place a positive
concept of prejudice (Gadamer, 1976 [1966], p. 9, GW II, p. 224).
According to Gadamer, prejudice does not necessarily mean a
false judgment, but [. . .] it can have either a positive or a negative
value (Gadamer, 2006a [1960], p. 273; GW I, p. 275). Gadamer distinguishes then between false prejudices (i.e. beliefs without basis
that, when confronting to the object of interpretation, are discarded) and legitimate prejudices (i.e. preconceptions that are
conrmed by the object of interpretation itself). In so doing, Gadamer is not only suggesting that there are genuine prejudices
but, more importantly, that these presumptions are the very condition of historical understanding. There is a signicant difference
here between the historians of science and Gadamer. While the
former often seek to neutralize [their] own preconceptions (Hull,
1979, p. 7), the latter states that the constant task of understanding is to work out the proper, objectively appropriate projections
(Gadamer, 1988 [1959], p. 72; GW II, p. 60). In other words, for
Gadamer, the historians aim is not, as David Hull suggests, to decrease the bias that ones own conceptual scheme can introduce
(Hull, 1979, p. 7), but to nd out which of his/her pre-opinions
are genuine, i.e. are conrmed by the things themselves
(Gadamer, 2006a [1960], p. 270; GW I, p. 272).
Another fundamental difference between Gadamer and the historians of science refers to the meaning of the temporal distance
separating the past from the present. Historians of science have
377
378
latter to the historical context from which the past text speaks. At
this point, it is important to remember that for Gadamer the idea of
a horizon that is supposed to enclose a culture is an abstract concept (Gadamer, 2006a [1960], p. 303; GW I, p. 309). In fact, he
argues that the continuity between the past and the present makes
it impossible to consider the existence of well-dened horizons.
Furthermore, horizons cannot be clearly delimited for they are always in motion, i.e. they are something into which we move and
that moves with us (Gadamer, 2006a [1960], p. 303; GW I, p. 309).
Therefore, Gadamers distinction between past and present horizons does not refer to two separate entities but, rather, to the
experience of a tension between the text and the present
(Gadamer, 2006a [1960], p. 305; GW I, p. 311). This experience occurs in the hermeneutical situation in which the historian stands
between the strangeness of the text and the familiarity of his/her
viewpoint. The task of historical understanding is, precisely, to
mediate between strangeness and familiarity, between past and
present: Then and today are mediated in the researchers workthe historical heritage with which he or she is dealing is mediated
through his or her own present time (Palmer, 2001, p. 48). This
process of mediation is what Gadamer calls fusion of horizons
(Horizontverschmelzung, GW I, p. 380). Such kind of fusion involves
the formation of a new context of meaning in which the interpreter
is able to integrate what is otherwise foreign. In this sense, the new
horizon is neither that of the present nor that of the past, but it is a
new space dened by the agreement between the present and the
past. This agreement, which can only be reached through the
medium of language (Gadamer, 1994b [1957] 45; GW II, p. 56),
constitutes genuine understanding.
4. Conclusions
I have sought to demonstrate in this article that there are significant similarities between Gadamers philosophical hermeneutics
and the prevalent discourse of the historians of science on presentism. For instance, Gadamer shared with the new historians
of the 1960s the antipathy towards any kind of history that judge
the past to legitimize the present. Similarly, he agreed with those
historians of science who, during the 1980s and 1990s, established
the unavoidable role of the present in constituting historical
knowledge. However, there also exist important differences in
the ways in which Gadamer and the historians of science thought
about the relationship between the present and the past. For example, Gadamer calls into question the historicist ideal, so widespread
among most historians of science during the 1960s, of studying the
past for its own sake. Similarly, Gadamer differs from the historians of science of the 1980s and the 1990s on the meaning of the
inuence of the present in the interpretation of the past. Gadamer
argues that historians present-centredness is not an obstacle for
attaining historical knowledgeas many historians of science suggestbut a condition of historical research.
Given these analogies and differences, one can legitimately
wonder why Gadamers work is rarely invoked by historians of science and, vice versa, why Gadamer never became interested in historiographical debates concerning presentism. The answer to the
rst question is likely related to the reception of Gadamers work in
England and the United States, the countries in which discussions
on presentism have been more intense. In fact, the reception [of
Truth and Method] in the English speaking world was slowed and
complicated by the fact that the work was rst published in English translation in 1975 and that this rst [. . .] edition was marred
by numerous errors and omission (Dostal, 2002, p. 4). Furthermore, Gadamers thought has had a much broader impact on philosophy, literary theory, theology and biblical criticism than on
the eld of the history of science. In this latter area, the problem
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