The

Roman Art

A Study

of War:

Theory

and Practice

of the Roman Military

Writers

Thesis submitted for the degree

of London.
of PhD in the University
1I;( ,;
CATHERINE

Institute
University

M. GILLIVER

of Archaeology
College, London

BI&
WM[i4t
1

yj{tN

p<

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank

The British

research,

The Institute

of Archaeology,

I finished

the thesis.

A great

Mark Hassall,
to discuss
reading

papyrological

evidence,

from other

out

my mathematical

School at Rome and The Institute

my research

Studies

of Classical

library,

for their

and written,
to work.

and I am especially

easier,

Earlier

Postgraduate

help,

forms

where the majority

and for making

of three

Work in Progress

and I am grateful

chapters

seminar

to all the postgraduate

Thanks

Roger Pitcher

for valuable

advice

encouragement

and to

helped

staff
make

of the Institute

of this thesis

was researched

thesis

place in which

Stears
stages.

were

given

of Classical

for their

over the last four

the

to the staff

at the Institute

in the final

with

The library

of Archaeology

of this

students

for

errors,

it such a pleasant

are also due to Karen

and criticism.

for their

grateful

matters

Alston

helping

of the thesis,

Roxan for always being ready to listen to my ideas.

of The British

my parents

pointing

and

is owed to my supervisor,

are also due to Richard

sections

of my

part

School at Rome where

to be sidetracked

thanks

on large

and commenting

Margaret

debt of gratitude

Particular

the greater

and The British

who was always prepared

my work.

who funded

Academy

for

valuable
her

Finally
years.

at the

Studies,
discussion

support,

and

I wish to thank

ABSTRACT

This

thesis

is a comparative
The content

warfare.
described,

along

following

consider

historical

with fully

a discussion

various

evidence

practical

organization

The

use.
for

and which

exists

'is

of textbook

traditions

Roman warfare

of

The size and internal

and lost,

extant

possible

aspects

and archaeological

in the treatises.

ancient

and their

of Roman

and practices
both

treatises,
of the

role in education

chapters

sufficient

of the various

with

their

composition,

of the theory

study

which

are dealt

of the different

de
to
the
of the Roman army we- discussed
reference
with particular
munitionibus
castrorum
and Vegetius;
a discussion of marching camps follows
units

which considers

the origins

of these camps and an estimation

per acre through

soldiers
castrorum

the application

to examples in Britain.

are dealt with in the next three

The first

and siege warfare.

of march and the relationship

whilst

battles

that on pitched

the early
in the
offensive
the "rules
treatises

AD.

century

the order

chapters.,

of these includes

of march,

battles,

pitched
of Arrian's

order

of march and the line of battle

the role of auxiliaries

reintroduction

The

of the de munitionibus

a discussion

between the order

considers

of

of the Roman army in the field

The practices

Empire and the suggested

second

of the rules

at the density

development

in the battles

of the Greek style

of siege

of

phalanx

techniques,

both

i.5 discussed,
and this is followed by an analysis of
it is difficult
to argue how much influence
the
Although

and defensive,
of war".

may have had on actual

close correlation

between

army and shows that

practices,

the treatises

the thesis

and actual field

some of the treatises

illustrates

practices

were of practical

the very

of the Roman

value.

CONTENTS

Acknowledgements

Abstract

.....

......................

.....

..........................

List of Figures

.....

........................

1.

Introduction

2.

The Literary

Evidence

3.

The Size and

Organization

4.

Temporary

Camps

5.

The

of March

6.

Pitched

7.

Siege

8.

Morality

9.

Conclusions

Order

.....

.....................

Battles
Warfare

....

................
of Units

....

.........

....

..................
.................

....

....................

....
....

.....................

in Warfare

....

..................

....

......................

3
5
6
11
27
59
104
131
176
207
226

Appendices:
1.

Translation

2.

Catalogue

of selected

pitched

3.

Catalogue

of selected

sieges

Bibliography

of the de Munitionibus

Castrorum

battles
.................

............

.......

233
246
256

292

.............................

Figures

Details

of selected

Application

marching

of the

Rey Cross

and

camps

.............

de munitionibus

Durno

97

...................

Reconstruction

iv.

Hypothetical

reconstruction

of Rey Cross

V.

Hypothetical

reconstruction

of Durno

vi

Orders

vii.

Hypothetical

viii.

of the de munitionibus

of march from the literary

reconstruction

of march

Suggested

castrorum

camp

.........

...........

sources

.........

..

101
102
103
127

of Arrian's
129

........................

deployment

line of battle

to

castrorum

iii.

line

88

of Arrian's

line of march to
130

........................

Chapter

1: Introduction

para bellum"

"Si vis pacem,

Latin

of Polybius,
less

inhabited

bringing

(1 1).

world"

themselves,

in

The

army

military

system

and its operations

military

system

led many later

from

inspiration
Vegetius,

his

to look

theorists

Guerra

on this

during

were produced

and it is these treatises

the

of the Roman

all his generals

della

Romans

concerning

The success

required

of the

whole

to the

produced

and military

Arte

writers

wars and as late as World War II,

of interest

of treatises

generals

the

almost

in the field.

based

of Roman military

rule

also

was

Charlemagne

time;

Machiavelli

and

Translations

this

their

under

by the number

evidenced

in

"by what means

the Romans succeeded
...

who was interested

53 years

than

for people from the time

of the Roman army has had a fascination

The subject

proverb.

for

to read
treatise.

the Napoleonic

that are the principal

topic of this thesis.

Apart

from an introductory

been no comprehensive
of the
reference

army
to,

in

the

these

Roman

military

without

considering

article

of Roman military

study
field

from

treatises.

theorists

when

the context

Most of the time the treatises

together

they

form

a fairly

large

the

point

Historians
the

handbooks,

of view

of the quotation

suited

of , and

their

or the nature

seem to be ignored
of information

there

has

or of the workings
with

have had a tendency

evidence

corpus

1987),

(Campbell

on the subject

particular

to quote the
but

arguments,

of the source.

or dismissed,
on military

yet

taken

theory.

This

thesis

will attempt

from

their

position

analysis

and

particular

of the

comparison

of warfare

treatises

are in the advice

influence

of the treatises,

This

information

with

theory,

be done

out

through

treatises

literary

to evaluate

they give and whether

the treatises

in the

to other

will attempt

and military

will

contained

reference

The thesis

evidence.

and bring

situation

obscurity.

of comparative

aspects

archaeological

this

to remedy

on

sources

and

how realistic

the

there is any evidence

on the field

of the
of the

practices

Roman army.

I believe

it is essential

context

and so this

thesis

of the ancient

all aspects

information,

of all available

or literary,

to study

it is archaeological,

whether
does not

evidence;

it is not an 'archaeological'

the study

of Roman warfare

world

deal exclusively

thesis

epigraphical

with

but one that,

the

within

one type

of

I hope, approaches

making full use of all the varieties

that

of evidence

are available.

I will consider

Chapter

range of information

have.

briefly,
role.

the declared

The role

the treatises
for constructive
the recorded
aspects

chapters

categories

of military

will then consider

comparison
field

practices.

which

practices

are dealt

Since

it would

within
with

and other

treatises

will

of the

uses they

be examined

might fulfil

this

evidence

that

is available

and advice in the treatises

not

the thesis,

more fully

and the

topics individually

selected

between the theory

and lost,

by a discussion

in Roman education

cover in some detail and for which sufficient

of Roman field

campaigning,

both extant

aims of the authors,

of textbooks

and how the different

The ensuing

themselves,

This will be followed

they contain.

of treatises,

categories
might

the treatises

be possible
the principal

in the treatises,

and

to cover
elements
have

all
of

been

chosen for discussion

such as logistics

The first

whilst

the

and

papyrological

archaeological

castrorum
The origins

on camps.

as will the defences

remains

in Britain,

which

in marching

of troops

camps

sites,

the advice

and in the latter

of the treatises

camps will be considered

castrorum

and

implications

therefore,

with reference

the

archaeological
the

concerning

the

and

size of field

density

armies

on

in Britain.

campaign

The order

of march and pitched

chapters,

both

of deploying

of major

pitched

as Appendix

problems

arising

centuries

AD;

Tacitus'

famous

Mons Graupius

2.

battles

of the late

of battles

the use of auxiliaries

comment about

Republic

during

Empire

is
two

the late 1st and early

2nd

the lives

35), and the suggestion

and early

A short

also addresses

as the main striking

preserving

two

'Alavwv,
KaT'

to line of battle.

of these chapters

The second

of the following

Exm&tC

to Arrian's

f rom line of march

battles

from accounts

(Agric.

are the subjects

reference

particular

with

and the question

catalogue

and,

de

the

camp will be discussed

camps and their

has important

of

used in the third

treatise

of the Roman marching

de munitionibus

of the

a translation

is also the principal

will be seen between

epigraphic,

with

1.

as Appendix

The size of marching

precepts

along

and

evidence,

of marching

case a clear comparison

actual practice.

Vegetius,

of

is included

castrorum

The de munitionibus
chapter,

lec ji

of the size and

subject

use of the de munitionibus

and will make particular

antiqua

and

munitionibus

included

have been omitted -

and foraging,

of army units

castrorum

to the

others

briefly,

only consider

of these will cover the somewhat controversial

organization

here,

which the treatises

force

of citizen

that the battle

in the light

of

legionaries

at

line reverted

to

formation

a phalangic
these

issues

during

this

and show that

they

military

thought

Chapter

6 discusses

and

under

the attitude

3 contains

precis

authors

like

subject

relates

Cicero

the examples

contained

treatises.

Chapter

fighting

could be the subject

5 on pitched

or pursuit.

such as circumvallations,
writers,

In conclusion,
between

the

evidence

to suggest

advice

thesis
given

as well as on other
on this

and evidence

to

will again make reference

and so

primarily

in the light

of the contents

of the

battles,

for example,

the

treatises

This

is especially

usually

siege ramps etc.

only

treatises

deal with

associated

are barely

the

deployment,
chapter

6 on

with Roman sieges,

touched

upon by the

briefly.

and field

that manuals were available

does not discuss

the case with

and discuss

will illustrate
in the

and this draws

in its own right

so they are only considered

this

modes of

of a thesis

many of the contrivances

siege warfare;

treatise

since

the period

3.

in Appendix

of battles

and retreat

Most of the advice

no

makes

and

accepted

commanders,

so the discussion

are discussed

topics

particularly

subjects

both literary

of all Roman sieges during

considers

and

siege warfare,

is selective

such as Onasander,

and Seneca.

Each of these chapters

the various

in Roman

changes

in the text using

on morality,

writers

to siege warfare

towards

catalogue

survey

chapter,

on the more philosophical

reserves

the

on the part of Roman armies,

conduct

actual

but

an exhaustive

The final

study.

major

advice on this than on other

of sieges mentioned

sources,

to provide

of the treatises

less practical

provide

archaeological

attempt

do not represent

or practice.

why the theorists

Appendix

will be made to explain

An attempt

period.

the strong
practices.

correlations
There

to assist those directing

is

field

oPerations,

and that

with personal
commander

under

experience

in making

certain

circumstances

and the advice

of experienced

some of his decisions.

10

they

might
officers,

be used,

along

to assist

the

Chapter

2: The Literary

Information

commentaries
types

briefly

Roman period
treatises

literary

of

number

after

and a discussion

This chapter

of the purposes

the first

their

order

of their

or de Disciplina

Militari

two

dating

to the

compilation.

The

treatises

behind

can be

histories,

particular

will consider

of known

a description

in approximate

are considered

in

sources,

treatises.

and military

of sources

field
the
in
Roman
the
army
of

the activities

concerning
from

obtained

Evidence

production.

The Treatises
Cato the Elder - de Re Militari,
the first

Roman to compile

(1978 185) suggests

auspices,

de Acfri

Asclepiodotus

Posidonius
earliest

sections

discipline,

made.

Frontinus

march

(1 8).

of
and

that examples

Cato (Strat.

quotes

him as one of bis sources

TEXvn

Tarawn'.

Greek

IV i

Cato also wrote

philosopher

(Seneca Nat. Quaest. 11 26 6), writing

surviving

military

description

on the disposition

and elephants

on the taking

He suggests

troops.

Astin

survive.

organization,

unit

Possibly

Cultura.

is a detailed

'It

lists

and Vegetius

treatise

the points

information

included

and the uses of specialist

were used to illustrate

10),

the treatise

of maintaining

methods

battle formations

that

15 fragments

treatise.

a military

(Veg. 1 15).

treatise

in the lst

and its

Greek

phalanx

of light

troops

and cavalry,

century

pupil
BC.

Asclepiodotus'

of the Roman period,

of the

and

tactics,

of
The

work

including

and the use of chariots

in warfare.

be
noted
should
accents are not.

that

although

breathings

11

are included

in Greek

texts,

Cincius

Alimentus
that

probably
Augustus.

de
Re
Militari.
-

of the constitutional

declarations

of

organization

of army units.

Vitruvius

de
Architectura.
-

a treatise

on architecture.

Athenaeus

Architect
During

a detailed

Mechanicus

Vitruvius.

TEE12t

His treatise

of Aegesistratus

working

the

Probably

who wrote
as a military
Bookten,
pieces.

a contemporary

of

on military

section

based their

probably

the

sixth

artillery

to Vitruvius'

whom they mention as a source

including

Augustus

under

of various

pjj Xqvnpq-uwv .
similar

the time of

(de Arch. Pref. ).

in particular

and Vitruvius

and

is

GeUius,

with the third

wars he had served

the civil

description

is very

Both Athenaeus

engines.

writing

at about

of troops

levying

the

with artillery

includes

on mechanics,

fifth

the

war,

and worked

antiquarian

cited

by Aulus

was at least six books long,

The treatise

engineer

The work,

works

on that

Mech. 7 6; Vit. de Arch

(Athen.

vii Pref . 14) .

Comelius

Celsus

fragments

Schenk

of

(1930) believed

The Elder

Pliny

ala in Germany
work

his

briefly

de

the military

of which

the military

treatise

History,

under

whilst

12

was a part;
though

he was prefect

advice

Pliny

of an

quotes the

on the best type

horse could assist the rider

159,162).

an

one based on Cato.

Claudius.

and it included

Writing

survive,

was a general

written
,

Ep. 111 5), probably

in the Natural

Medicamentorum

treatise

equest

of horse and ways in which a trained

VIII

(1 8).

Compositione

de
iaculatione
-

(Pliny

cited

by Vegetius

unknown;

at the time of Tiberius

encyclopedia
only

Title
-

in battle

(NH

Onasander

A Greek

E-cQq-cjj!
jj&qC.
-

to Quintus

dedicated

generalship
consul

in AD 49 and died whilst

Agric.

14; AE 1953 251).

philosopher

Veranius,

different

works as it lays great emphasis on the moral qualities

the author
on how

considered

the

situations,

fairly

Empire to have survived.

three

consulship

Rome.

times,

surviving

The author,

on the art of war (de Scientia

Sextus

(de Mag. 147)),

in the manuscript
The de Aquis
administration

works,

of

unlike

Frontinus
reduced

Strategemata

Rome's

rules

to be the only
to

to Vegetius

According
and Lydus

a system

to be completing

claims

(de

strategy

(de Maq. 1 47).

subject

of siege machinery

Mihtari

),

man interested

in military

I Pref. ),
begun

information

and

on siege

himself

in the Strategemata

because

13

(treatises

understand
and

his

by an expert.

science

thought

did

the

military

to have

he considered

machinery

Frontinus

However,

works

to Frontinus).

by his treatise
highly

in

to Lydus

according

are ascribed

Pref.

the

held the

producing

were written

the task

down

Aquarum

and
surveying
,

Aquis

(Il 3), the work was very

it included

Curator

philosophers,

(Strat

of

from

in Latin

him and his successors

supply

water

those of the Greek

claims
its

to help

was written

a variety

Frontinus,

of handbooks,

of the Agrimensores

collections

Julius

of Rome (de Aquis)

on the aqueducts

which

than laying

work

and

or de Officio

Militari,

in

rather

milita-ry

He seems to have been a keen author

abilities

does.

of Britain,

was governor

surviving

then gives advice

proceed

and

as Vegetus

The only

and other

guidelines

general

for each situation

Strateqemata.
-

Frontinus

himself

conduct

should

very often giving

instructions

strict

early

general

to other

The author

should possess.

a general

xiv 29;

in c. AD 58 (Annals

is rather

The treatise

on

the same man who was

probably

of Britain

governor

a treatise

who wrote

his

on warfare.
of by Trajan,
as well as on

not include

he believed

that

the
the

development

of machines and engines

its ]in-dt (Strat

III

Pref

.)-

The Strateqemata

comprised

stratagems

mostly

taken from historians

Hellenistic

and

Roman

for

preparations

had long since reached

for siege warfare

battle

four

books

sieges (book 3); general

book

1); battles,

(book

400 examples

topics including

covers

ambushes
discipline,

of military
Greek,

to the classical

and referring

Each

periods.

over

with

topic;

a particular

(book

and retreats
justice

and sayings

2);

(book

4).

de Munitionibus
Gromaticus
land

Castrorum.

because the text

Probably

surveying.

century

2nd century

- early

A detailed

work

Aelian

Frontinus

who dedicated

Ascribed

of a manuscript

by a military

AD (for

arguments

surveyor

to Hyginus

of treatises

on

in the late

lst

on date of DMC, see chapter

for temporary

a new method of organization

on camp defences.

Greek

ph: Uosopher

his work to an emperor,

like that of Asclepiodotus,

treatise,

as part

written

@Ew pla.

Talc-uirTI

survives

explaining

and some information

camps,

and date disputed.

Author

and

contemporary

probably

was a description

Trajan.

of the workings

of

Aelian's
of the

Greek phalanx.

Heron
technician

of

Alexandria
writing

in the

based on a 3rd century

usages

(Marsden

1971

MtpoOaXta-cp

BEXoTtottica;
late

lst

BC work
1-2),

or early

2nd century

by Ctesibius
but

the

developments.

14

.G
AD.

and therefore

XEtpoOajtcvT;

reek

artillery

BE), onottKa

reflects
includes

is

earlier
recent

ApoUodorus

of Damascus

of Trajan

reigns

the

over

and Hadrian,

Danube
by

emperor's

designs

needed

for

defence

of strongholds.

assaulting

TEXvn
-.

military

of Cappadocia

two of which survive,

works,

the Greek phalanx,

to contemporary

to Hadrian

is a description

Stadter

two writers

were using a common source,

were using

manuscripts

The

EjaqZjr,

Cappadocia.

probably
It describes

dates

to the early

132 when
order

He wrote

primarily

and Aelian above.

three

about
Arrian

references

The last section

carried

exercises

the very

of

out by

close similarities
accepted

that the

from Posidonius.

Arrian

or march,

Alan invasion.

to the Roman period

army dating

descended

his proposed

of its kind

was a Greek

and that both they and Asclepiodotus

to c. AD

with a threatened

dating

gymnasia,

the

r,
first
The
and the
-cql I r,.

and it is generally

ultimately

plans for dealing

deal with

Arrian

Hadrian.

a book on

of equipment

however,

chariotry.

(1978 118) illustrates

of Aehan and Arrian,

that

a variety

more up to date by including

of the hippica

the

criticizing

in AD 137 and was a treatise

such as the British

practices,

the texts

under

to that of Asclepiodotus

similar

the Roman cavalry.

He wrote

the Tactica

to make his treatise

made some attempt

and Rome.

) 'EKualtC iKa-cAlavwv.

(Tactic

TqK-cjrn

for

He does not,

bridge

of Trajan's

supposedly

describes

which

a stronghold.

of these was dedicated

between

of Venus

to Hadrian

who was governor

the Tactica

4),

the

in AD 129 and later

He was exiled

Epit. Ixix

during

working

was the designer

Forum.

for the Temple

dedicated

siege machinery

senator

(Dio

Hadrian

An architect

Apollodorus

and Trajan's

executed

Arrian

JjbjjopjKEi;
i
-

battle

15

governor

of

line and battle

This is the only document

and the most detailed

Empire.

was

description

of an

Polyaenus
Aurelius

and Lucius

containing

eight

the exploits

like

matter

random

selection

Tarruntenus

treason

useful

Commodus.

included

The

his

though,
definition

the emperor

survived.

except

Digest

xxiv

did indeed

this
Vegetius

time
it

the

iuris

Aurelius
on

or
the

use of Paternus
is known

Little

and list

militaris

based

the author's

army

of the

knowledge

of examples

of
was

(50 6 7).

On siege

a helepolis

machinery.

(Bandy

during

2) and I see no reason

The reading

1983 282 n. 74),

the siege of Pirisabora

to dismiss

the possibility

of

but
in
that

such a treatise.

or Epitoma. de Militari.

is the only

for

Marcus

of

of the legion.

in

was executed

made extensive

that it illustrated

built

write

who

and

was largely

is not genera. Uy accepted

de
Militari,
Re
-

4th century,

whilst

Legal expert

as diligentissimus

that

and that Vegetius

states that Julian

AD 363 (Ammianus

Commodus

to the

believed

(? ) - MnXavt-Kot.

Julian

the name in the text

Ammianus

dated

of immunes

in Justinian's

Emperor

Vegetius

(1930)

under

book on the organization

actual contents,

by

a seemingly

to be simple anecdotes

or de Re Militarium.

by Vegetius

treatise

of Hadrian

in his second

the law;

The

Schenk

Constitutiones

Prefect

5), described

(1 8).

adsertor

each book contains

some appearing

de
Re
Militari
-

Praetorian

(Dio lxxii

are not arranged

precedents.

Paternus
the

but

work,

and including

periods

The examples
-

of Frontinus

those

of stratagems,

provide

probably

heroes

of gods and mythical

subject

others

taken from different

books of examples

to Frontinus'

It is similar

in c. AD 162.

Verus

to Marcus

and dedicated

by a philosopher

Written
E-upq-cE!
jEpq-u .
-

Written

manual on Roman military

made extensive

use of earlier

16

writers

probably
institutions

in the late
to have

whom he lists at one

(11 3).

point

training;

on the

battle;

because it is often

warfare

difficult

to determine

to which

and

on recruitment

and of

of march

can be problematic

Vegetius

books;

on the order

of the legion;

organization

on siege and naval

four

into

is divided

The treatise

as a source

the information

period

he is

belongs.

using

The Role of Treatises

Campbell

(1987)

handbooks

from at least the late Classical

together

period
including

that

notes

agriculture

and

as from practical

experience

military

manuals

other

system,

of subjects

part

played

quoting

from textbooks

here.

may have been of some use for

as well

He does conclude

prospective

between the military

generals

treatises

by

evidence

42; Pro Balbo 47; Lucullus

his discussion

that there is a difference

suggests

range
the

irdlitary

in the Roman

which continued

be acquired

could

practical

on a wide

(Cic. Pro Fonteio

to repeat

of

He outlines

architecture.

knowledge

2), and I do not intend

period

in the Roman education

subjects

from Cicero that military

a tradition

was

of textbooks

a series

with

manuals on various

there

1 1that
but

and those on

subjects:
"Apart
from
the writers
Frontinus
of military
and Arrian,
had
handbooks,
the
no
agricultural
most
of
writers,
unlike
Furthermore,
advice on
experience
of what they wrote about.
helpful
to a
farming
be more directly
procedure
could perhaps
"
farm owner than examples of stratagems
to an army commander.
(1987 19)

There are, however,

does

not

discuss

problems
treatises

fragmentary

form,

discussion

of practical

18 treatises

and Cornelius
authors

Celsus,

of military

which

or the artillery
experience,

are described

above,

no longer

are

manuals.
though,

without

the situation

evidence

article
only

are included

Once these

the relevant
17

or exist

extant

and with the exception

for whom insufficient

handbooks

Campbell's

with both these statements.

in
in a

changes

somewhat.

of Cincius

Alimentus

is available,

practical

the only

experience

are

Asclepiodotus,

Onasander,
therefore,

experience,

were

in some cases)

closely

literary

a strong

Greek

in origin

(see below p. 20).

giving

practical

advice

(1987 19),

always

a part

played

and unsuccessful,

own plans

and strategies

important

experts

Stratecfemata

However,
the only

out

help

of young

was considered

"felt

that

officers

to explain

is still

art"

8 1),

played

.)-

of the Greek

was not
points

and that

later

for

their

claim to universality
(1933 657-669 )3

an

manuals

Spaulding

authority

of a

Frontinus'

and

I Pref

his

part

along with

treatises.

to be a military

the treatises

history

in the art of generalship

of the military

the military

to formulate

(Strat.

purpose

to make good their

they must treat

general

and generals,
(xi

both

campaigns,

books of examples

experience
first

this

for the compilation

Homer

doctrines,

of officers

that

and how not to, has

of past

of military

states

personal
for

written

the instruction

philosophers

would

were

reason

that

Polybius

and

study

can help the aspiring

part in the education

by

The

suggests

to be justified.

of how to do something,

and the study

training2.

modern officer's

Campbell
as
,

topo

was
to be

The claim in many of the treatises

in education.

successful

that

tradition

and philosophical

but in most cases it would appear

of past examples

(very

following

philosophers

may be part of a literary

The importance

written

Greek

primarily

Those without

and Vegetius.

Polyaenus

Aelian,

This statement
.

philosophers

who had no

2eg: Sandhurst
history
& West Point include
courses in military
and the
Russian
emphasis
on the study
of
place particular
military
academies
campaigns of the Second World War. I am grateful to Mr Oliver Gilkes for this
An example of how this such knowledge
information.
could be applied
"Stormin'
"
Schwarzkopf
Norman
General
Gulf
War
in
the
claimed
when
occurred
his classic pincer movement against the Iraqi army was based on the tactics of
Hannibal at Cannae.
3Both Arrian
(Tact.
affairs.
military

31 5) and Vegetius

18

(1 5) quote

Homer as an expert

on

experience

of military

of the glories

while

Greek

earlier

The 'Greek

be writing

the other

for

same claim

treatise

hardly

his treatise

to the use of treatises

to see much potential

not surprisingly,

have been encouraged

Tact. 12),

were

but are

).

A clearly

no doubt

would

have

been

but it would

engineers,

tactics

on phalanx

written

because

use for them anyway.

Aelian doubted
by a visit

which

Heron makes the

Pref.

of and use by military

claim to

and Arrian

13; Arrian

and use of artillery

genre that

treatises

of previous

(Aelian

of

phalanx.

Both Aelian

(BElonolliga

on artillery

for the education

it is so difficult

in the tradition

as that of Asclepiodotus.

of technicality

make any difference

Perhaps

the obscurity

knowledgeable

on the construction

useful

on the Greek

treatises.

military

the work to remedy

of the same level

his Roman patron

of honouring

seems to have been part of a literary

treatise

phalanx'

for those already

written

very

who wrote

audiences

have
to
seems

Onasander

are c-01following

and Arrian

Aelian

philosophers

does not include

intention

with the genuine

Asclepiodotus,

1987 19).

past (Campbell

of Greece's

his treatise

written

but were also eager to ren-dnd their

affairs,

but claims to

the value of his work,

to Frontinus

and states:

"So I ceased to hesitate about writing

For I
on military tactics.
thought that Frontinus
about such
would hardly be enthusiastic
Roman military
that it lagged behind
a work if he believed
practice"
(Aehan Pref
Campbell

suggested

practical

benefit

likely

that

antiquarian,

that Frontinus'

to be derived

Frontinus

from it"

encouraged

"no less interested

interest

(1987 17).

Aehan

in the military

19

"may suggest

that there

However,

because
principles

he

3)

was some

it seems more

was

himself

of the Greeks"

an
(than

those of the Romans;

Strategemata'.

Aelian

Later,

Aelian

in his

are illustrated

Pref 3), and these interests

.
states:

"As to the mode of drawing up chariots and elephants in order of

lest
this
battle,
little
be
find
to
them
yet
of
use,
although
we
treatise
should seem deficient,
we will add the terms used by
27.1)
(Aelian
"
those writers
who prec eded us.
Thus

Aelian

knows

includes

is useless.

against

description
evidence

contemporary

heavy

of Roman cavalry
from both treatises,

Heron,

a practical

and Aelian's

treatise

specialist
soldiers

hand,

Vitruvius'

architectural

treatises

the civil

engineer
wars

and

included

that

siege

11 1-2;

more

with

33 ff. ).

his
The

that their

suggests

attempt

to

what he promised;

than a serious

exercise

1)

to non-experts,

a layman could

in Book

it was part

whether

gain "an excellent

construction"

machinery

because

that he was following,

Pref

4 7;

in particular,

of artillery

and had been particularly

(de Arch

(Tact.

was accessible

states

on artillery

was probably

a military

that

Marsden

Architectura

and finishing

chariotry,

does seem to have provided

of the basic principles

section

to make his treatise

handbook.

on artillery

or civilians.

understanding

and literary

military

on the other

exercises

he

which

warfare

to enemies of Rome and Roman

references

the British

cavalry,

work is more of a philosophical

provide

and elephant

on chariot

at least made some effort

Arrian

by including

relevant
tactics

information

(1971 1-2).

10 of his

of the tradition

de
of

but also because he was primarily

concerned

with artillery

during

in 1814, the translator

4When an English translation
of Aelian was published
discipline,
be
Roman
it
that
as
an
example
of
which was
of
use
could
suggested
for
1814
(Di-Uon
their
Pref
the
reasons
success
principal
of
one
considered
.).

20

Another

specialist

followed

all the previous

to explain
45).

hinted

(1979 ix)

at in the text,

that in addition

The technicality

author

surveyor

it was probably

to a superior,
author

a military

based on the number

"usual
Polybius

took

his

seem to be written
artillery

of

Roman

for specialists,

primarily
(as appears

officers

and he believes

for marching

camps

it is better

from

camp

surveyors,

to be the case with Pliny's

and so would have a much more specific

equestri),

The

than the

(1934 157) has suggested

Fraccaro

the

that the

surveyors.

use by other

a book

along with those of the artillery

and these works,

regulations

present,

( 47).

account

description

the book is addressed

a new system of measuring

of legions

method of measuring"

for

treatises

to earlier

of the work suggests

and although

intended

claims to have developed

instructions

may have made use of Polybius'

the author

of the Roman camp (vi 26-32).

was probably

and claims to be the

in written

from the beginning

has suggested

claims to have

The author

who wrote on this subject

authors

the

on

castrorum

munitionibus

of summer camps.

all the measuring

Lenoir

de

the

was

and fortifications

arrangements

first

treatise

military

would

writers,

tribunes,
treatise

purpose

of

that

and

cavalry

de iaculatione

than the general

treatises.

Vegetius,

the only

experience,
direct

the Greek tradition

Roman period.

writer

appears

descendant

of a Latin

to be writing

treatise

for a number

of the Greek and earlier

was taken

point5 .
chariots

in warfare

(cf:

even included
the treatises

5They are: Cato the Elder,

Constitutiones
of Augustus,

to have had no military

authors
a section

writers

whom Vegetius

in the

lists

at one

on the use of elephants

20),
p.

Tarruntenus
Celsus,
Frontinus,
(1 8).
Trajan
and Hadrian

and sections

Paternus

is a
that

suggesting

by the Latin

on the phalanx

21

The work

of reasons.

Roman treatises,

up and continued

The work draws on earlier

The de Re Militari

known

and
on

and the

who wrote

on all aspects

is much discussed
placed
treatise

tends

defence

1982),

half

5th century

of the

over attack,

but it generally

during

which

textbook

for

times

work

The

AD.

in Book 4 on siege

particularly

the uncertain

may reflect

The date of Vegetius'

1977, Birley

or first

4th century

to stress

and this

warfare,

1974, Goffart

of Aeneas Tacticus

the tradition

(see below).

of warfare

(Gordon

in the later

following

no doubt

siege and naval warfare,

the author

lived.

The de Re Militari

became the

Roman Empire and remained

describes

it as the soldier's
"Arte

his own treatise

Clarke's

translation

several

other

All the military

writing

deIla Guerra"

treatises

one of the earliest

on a variety
of these

is certainly

tradition.

He is believed

collections

(1977)

Machiavelli

based

and Lt John

in the 18th century,

USA along

of examples

derived

of different
writers,

the oldest

including

for many of the later

western

Goffart

on Vegetius,

published

in the

century

are ultimately

Positions"

on warfare,

heavily

very

originally

Requla,

the

with

was

translations

of

treatiseS6.

ancient

handbooks

of Benedict's

equivalent

present

military

well into the Middle Ages.

so until

of Vegetius,

in the

republished

standard

surviving

castrametation

some eight

naval
.

defence

belonging

on both individual

may be

to the military

pamphlets

tactics,

of

of Fortified

general

and treatises
tactics

These may well have formed

A la Frontinus.

treatises

" On the

work

tradition

Aeneas Tacticus

subjects.

and his

to have written

from the Greek

and

the basis

topics such as castrametation

6Ancient military
treatises seem to have become especially popular in the late
the Napoleonic
Wars; Shepherd's
translation
18th century
of
and during
in 1793, and Dillon's 1814 translation
Polyaenus was first published
of Aelian,
for
by
textbook
intended
military
schools and colleges,
was circulated
as a
Minister.
War
the
of
order
22

like the de munitionibus

and for the more general

castrorum,

works

like that

of Vegetius.

Whatever

justifications

the authors

themselves

give for writing,

and virtually

the treatises

can be divided

all of them hope or claim to be of practical

use,

into three

some instruction

principal

for officers

by general

Hist. xi 8 1-2);
as artillery

Other

those providing

textbooks

those providing

and collections

more detailed

Literary

Hellenistic

a particular

in the art of war

(cf : Polybius

of examples

topics

manuals on specialist

those which are a literary

and camp surveying;

following

exercise

types;

such

and philosophical

tradition

Sources

Commentarii
Of the other
commentarii,
and

accurate

types

of literary

evidence

because of their
information

very

than

dealing

nature,

with the Roman army in detail,

are likely

histories.

Syme

to provide

more detailed

(1958 157) explains

this

contrast:
"Accurate
intelligence
the detail
about numbers and regiments,
both principal
the times and stages
of operations
and subsidiary,
in the reports of
of a march, such were the facts to be registered
generals or the commentarii of military emperors. 11
Thus commentarii
account

could later

of a campaign

and only surviving

be published

and source

material

to provide

a detailed

for historians.

chronological

The best known,

examples of these are Caesar's

de Bello Gallico and de Bello

did not have to relate

campaign.

Civili,

but commentarii

wrote

commentarii

on his

consulship

to a military

and Vitruvius

states

that

Cicero

architects

belong to both the

like those of Onasander
Some treatises,
and Arrian,
instruction
that
Heron
tradition
of
providing
and
whilst
philosophical
his
treatise
to
specialist
more accessible to the layman.
make
attempted
23

be literate

should

it was the
Cicero's

was

(Ad Att. 11),

for Caesar's
the

also

works

propaganda

value

V 14),

in Mauretania

of Britain

the Aqricola

published

that

to write

Josephus

Finally,

record
Trajan

fragment

written

claim the same

there

of course

victories,

a similar

work

concerning

the campaigns,

Agricola

commentarii

which the historian

of both Vespasian

342,358;

on his campaigns
grammarian

for

Corbulo

that

and Titus

and his presence

he claims to have produced

(Vita

his

would no doubt

Tacitus

in Armenia

used the commentarii

in the 6th century

of the area (NH

by his father-in-law

of his campaign

on his

commentarii

wrote

and Syme has suggested

any of his rivals

than

published

survives

for others

military

of the Jewish war and because of this,

in the Roman camp during

authentic

Paulinus

he produced

and the Histories

his account

material

though

which was used by Tacitus.

some kind of account

used (1958 297).

Pref

Hirtius

one's

18).

14; VII

used for his description

Pliny

which

have made use of any commentarii

both

publicizing

Suetonius

that

and it is possible

governorship

1),

that

Republic.

Syme (1958 297) suggests

campaign

262; BG VIII
in

-1

as source

both he and Aulus

while

implying

work,

(de Arch

them

was intended

(Brutus

in the late

especially

on their

commentarii

to publish

of his consulship

history

motive

duty

architect's

account

writing

so they can write

Contra
in Dacia,

a more

Apion

of which one

which Cassius

Priscius,

49).

Dio

may have used.

flistories
Livy,

Polybius

their

histories.

on the Servian
included

and Josephus
Livy's

descriptions

Constitution;

as part

each included

VIII

of his annalistic

an excursus

of army organization
8 on the reforms
history,

24

on the Roman army in

and reforms

attributed

and were

(142-43

to Camillus)

are

inspired

by

probably

Polybius'

on the

section
his history

writing

Pref. 1) and Walbank

(1957 698) describes

on the Roman military

framework".

success,

workings
form

as "an essential

Because

of the army's

of its workings

an explanation

non-Roman

to be accurate,

considered

partly

of the Roman army,

for

of textbook

influenced
of camping,

which includes

and integral

because

had personal

of his

of Polybius'

part

but his is far less detailed,

above

p. 21).

probably

of the Roman method

his explanation

especially

some

using

on campaign,

army

of the

experience

(see

been

is generally

account

description

of the

the section

and may have

was essential,
Polybius'

part

(i

world"

role in Rome's imperial

central

readers.

a description

by that of Polybius,

in less than 53

but also because he was probably

at least

also included

Josephus

Book six,

system

for the author's

useful

system -

in

main object

rule almost the whole of the inhabited

their

under

Polybius'

how "the Romans succeeded

was to explain

years in bringing

overall

Roman military

and he is prone

to exaggeration

at

on campaign

are

times'.

Other

authors

Sallust,
their

providing
Tacitus,

Appian,

historians

but will do so later

on the army

Dio and Ammianus

Cassius

I do not at this

histories.

information

useful

wish to discuss

point

Marcellinus

as part

the accuracy

of

of these

when and if necessary.

Conclusions
The military

treatises

according

machinery

were written

to the Roman army rather

Those pertaining
how,

for a number

to their

worked,

authors,

of reasons

than the Greek

the army should

the introduction

or are advocating

"Eg:

BJ 111 245-6, on the effectiveness

3
furlongs.
flying
head
sending a man's

25

discussed
phalanx

function,

above.
describe

or how complex

of new techniques,

of the Roman artillery

the

at Jotapata,

latter

two types

commentaries
words,

describe

how they

army in the field

how realistic
could

being

concerning

really

Analysis

did things.

using all the forms of evidence

certain

procedures

of the activities
available

used,

and may provide

and techniques

26

and

in other

of the Roman

will help to ascertain

there are any indications

are, whether

or were actually

The histories

of manual.

field,
in
the
Roman
the
army
of

the procedures

the treatises

be of use,

types

more technical

further

of the army.

that treatises
information

Chapter

3: The Strength

of UnitS

Orqanization

and

Introduction
The strength

and internal

the more debated

numerous
in great

it is not the intention

However,

some information

on these matters

of this chapter

of the ancient

several

and they

of the line of march and the disposition

The ancient

treatises

organization

of army units.

the detailed

deals exclusively
provided

limited

organization

is that

the legion.

with

in the de munitionibus

castrorum

The author

to the work itself.

use by contemporary

surveyors

military

aware of the usual organization

it unnecessary

to give

himself

to providing

number

of men in a century

'DMC 1,3
units.

&5 refer

for the imperial

given

only

which

( 1), the number

to legionary

organization;

27

and this

equally

his handbook
presumably

who would

of horses

16,26-28

the author

units

relevant

is
brief

units'.

As a result,

directly

and Livy

on unit organization

of these

of

information,

also contains

claims to be writing
( 45-47)

period

of the army

(Book II),

of auxiliary

description

the information

by Polybius

description

castrorum

of army units.

a detailed

size and internal

on the

much briefer,

organization

The comments made in the de munitionibus

to the arrangement

by Vegetius

given

Additional,

comments on the size and internal

incidental

data

The most comprehensive

period

at least

provide

in the line of battle.

There is no equivalent

army.

to the imperial

treatises

of

the matter

to consider

are relevant

of forces

very

of legionary

explanation

for the Republican

relating

provide

units is one of

and auxiliary

As it has been the subject

of the Roman army.

topics

studies,
detail.

of legions

organization

are
for
be
finds

and confines

to his work:

in each cavalry

the
unit

deal with auxiliary

16,26),

because

for

space

each

these

numbers

particular

have a direct

in the

unit

that some kind of description

suggesting
given

( 1),

units

later

but comparison
in

the

of legionary

the author's

with

that

suggest

work

The

camp.

on the allocation

affect

itself

work

descriptions

it would

by

begins

has already

cohorts

of

been

of the auxiliary

not have

been particularly

lengthy.

Vegetius

is the only treatise

the strength
account

that

by the

given

to an organization

referring

7), and that he is actuaUy

for

him

to

organization
introduction

provide

more

to Vegetius'

Some information

is obsolete

third

in their

as noted above

works.

to explain

does not include

.),
of

the

legion's

is a necessary

the deployment

it necessary

Despite -this,

Josephus'

(chapter

2), is similar

the workings

the detailed

excursus

in emulation

by military

and role

there

to provide

28

details

are a few references

to

as a source for the operations

on the Roman army

in structure

of the earlier

of the different

(PJ 111 70-

to that of Polybius
work.

of the army to non-Romans

description

such

writers

for an informed

Caesar was writing

did not consider

and may have been written

was partly

II

it is necessary

description

is also included

Caesar is much more useful

of an army on campaign.
109),

legi

antiqua

of battle.

and so probably

though

(the

to (I Pref

book, which considers

about unit size and organization.

unit sizes,

this

of

he is

Since

castrorum.

description

comprehensive

on unit organization

as Caesar and Josephus

a return

description

and this is a much fuller

in his time

In addition,

and equipment.

of the legion cn the field

audience,

that

de munitionibus

recommending

a detailed

of the Roman legion,

and organization

than

to have included

writer

forces

Their

purpose

but Josephus
that Polybius

did,

though

(BJ

forces

he does make a few comments on the size of auxiliary

11167).

The Legion
The writer

Cincius

he stated

that

Ap4a Aulus
(r2

the legion

Gelhus

to the legionary
of Marius

Alimentus

organization

illustrate

clearly

tactical

The transition

between

the 2nd Punic

in this role,

tactical

and more flexible

than

in Spain.

reforms

of three

maniples
of Caesar

more important

tactically

the legion

Polybius

the accounts

1992 7),

has frequently

and
in

been attributed

(1965 411) has argued

Bell

as a tactical

but larger

the maniple

than

from

unit was developed

that is the need for tactical

appears

of Livy

BC when Caesar was campaigning

of the cohort

problem,

seems to have taken place

War, to which

that the use of the cohort

to solve a specific

campaigns

to the military

The commentaries

the two forms of organization

1928 28; Speidel

of Livy

in a treatise

reference

the cohort

of the army.

unit

the introduction

(Parker

the evidence

by which

and the mid lst century

refer,

Although

to Marius

attributed

and 10 cohorts

at some time between

Gaul.

BC,

the use of the cohort

even than the legion

Polybius

traditionally

in the late 2nd century

30 maniples

is the earliest

This

Empire in which

in the early

60 centuries,

contained

NA xvi

became the principal

a treatise

produced

to state that the cohort

units

smaller

for the Roman

contained

three

maniples

(gnEj par. ) 4. However,

'Servius

(ix 461) provide the same information,

(Aen 11 463) and Isidorus
the latter states that the legion contained 12 cohorts.

although

3Eg: Thapsus
wing.

(B. Mr.

79-80)

because there

where five cohorts

4Polybius
23;
-upEIC cynEtpaC
xi
'Pwpatotr.
icoo-p-c".
TEaga

was no Greek word for cohort

of a single

6E
-cou-co
raIE-ual
-

29

legion

-co oj)v-cayia

held each

-uwv nEC(ov

at this

time

simply

to three

(Polybius
cohorts,

does by the early

the cohort

(Acts

to being

Marius'

campaigns

he may be referring

10 1; BJ 11142; IGRom 110).

from being a formation

evolved

),

as

the word gnE t pa C to mean cohort

using

Empire

above,

it

transliterates

the principal

tactical

in Africa

(1965 416).

as it certainly

Bell argues

for the purpose

introduced

that

stated

of the Roman army by the time of

unit

He states

that by the time of Caesar,

There was a tendency

to think of the cohort as the basic unit,
in any number of ways, of which the formation
employable
of
legions with groups of ten was only one. 11
(1965 412),
as Caesar's
pitched

tactics

at Thapsus

battles).

tactically,

Although

it was the legion

the

reform

of the legionary

Parker

(1932

138-9)

organization

that the maniple

existence

in the Republican
suggests

that

'For

camp described

the different
castrorum

each other -

He adds

consideration

but there

Parker

design;

the empire

the theory

of the date of this

is evidence

work,

to suggest
a tactical

neither

sees as evidence
castrorum

for

retained
two

the same as

was essentially

(vi 27-32).

the

( 1-5)

the method of camping

Lenoir

(1979 119)

to camp mentioned

in the de

that two centuries

the importance

30

the

type of organization,

by Polybius

that

that

of the maniple to

much earlier,

ways for a cohort

disprove

munitionibus
opposite

during

by

suggest

the abolition

trace of the earlier

each other

illustrated

NH x 5).

in the de munitionibus

of the maniple

important

very

de corps,

6 on

at the time of the de munitionibus

what

of Roman camp and fort

opposite

been

45 & 69)

(1887

and indeed

and that

unit,

was in fact only a residual

by the traditions

(Pliny

army reforms

was by this time,

nor an administrative

centuries

in force

have

the 6sprit

(1930 18-26) attributes

of his general

as part

continued

Domaszewski

(see below chapter

prove

might

standards

was still

Schenk

castroruM5.
Hadrian

and

cohort

that fostered

Marius'

manipular

and elsewhere

always camped

of the term

see below p. 36ff.

hendstricr,,,.,

than striga

rather

centuries

proves
than

rather

fortresses

are found

traditional

method

legionary

maniples.
in pairs,

of the

appears

to

been

Gaul

such as manipulos
is not found

and

he

the

uses

to use the

or any

Latin

other

used in battle,

term

term

above,

actual
Caesar

during

his
his

In

PUIUS7.

contexts

the term

Although

on military

the terminology

the

in technical

(BG ii 25).

and

subjects,

it may

for which had not been

and cohorts

out the

carrying

maniples".

than a legion,

to denote

manipulus

and generally

smaller

to the line of battle

uses the term centuria,

(eg:

than a cohort,

Annals

and this is usually

6Since a cohort contained

six centuries,
in
them
pairs.
was
camping
five
term
the
only
uses
equivalent

times;

is 6tac-unpl,

particularly

when
Tacitus

when he wishes to emphasize

and a maniple;

a century

of soldiers

iv 25; Hist. iv 78).

to differentiate

between

a group

simply

of men he is referring

The Greek

mani

usually

the small size of the unit or group

Caesar

Tacitus

tactics

cohort

writers

have been centuries

seems to use the term

he is referring

rarely

for

As stated

precise.

to open out the ranks

it would

than

rather

rarely

contemporary

by historians

contexts

though

developed

appears

to an actual drill
although

Caesar,

fully

using

laxare,

in Livy

and

has become less

word

Caesar

commentaries,

smaller

about

and
of the

a continuation

anything

and not prove

as Tacitus

have
in

campaigns

Tacitus

be simply

also could

in forts

blocks

most barrack

to be used in military

continued

such

meaning

order

this

was organized

system

Although

in terms of

organization'.

commentators

altered,

the camping

of camping

The term manipulus

refer

that

to

He does not seem

-

to him they seem to be simply

the easiest

and neatest

method

of

BG ii 25; vi 34; vi 40; BC i 76; ii 28.

Appian
31

Mithr.

42; PC 11 79; Dio 37 4.

Tacitus

The

felt

of the

cohort

is never

contrast,

form

compound

belonged

used

which

or tactical

of sources.
contained

4000-5000

indicates

4200 infantry

legion also very;

and
to

infantry

247; Isidorus

the legion

Orig

a strength

during

the Republic

considerably.

300 cavalry,

could be increased

manipulus,

is only

found

mean

by
in its

'fellow

simply

use the

to refer

states

of the legion

to an

According

numbered

8;

(vid

whereas

Polybius

to Suidas,

(vi

17),
20)

just over

totals

Isidorus

Servius,

11519; Servius

Alexander

xxi

to the imperial

relating

castrorum

6000 (Suidas

de Mag. 140).

by a number

to Livy

The numbers

of the de munitionibus

XI 346; Lydus

Polybius

term

such as Tacitus

strength

according

and 300 cavalry.

each with

However,

legion,
and

the Roman legion

and Lydus,

and some provided

10) and it does not appear

6000
(116).
over
weU

5000, Vegetius'

the

unit.

Republican

The

very often record

The

appears

is given on the total numerical

Information

legions,

century

9.

size;

was an obsolete

maniple

Inscriptions

inscriptions,

on such

commanipularis

the

as well as the legion,

as the

as well

information

technical

that

period.

(Hist. iv 46; SHA Pesc. Niger

administrative

10eg:

further

This also seems to be the way historians

soldiers"O.

9eg:

Imperial

are of indeterminate

sub-units

also suggests

to which the soldier

century

term

evidence

by the early

organization

and these

to provide

no necessity

epigraphic

details

force,

of a larger

sub-units

Severus

Aen. VII
raised

six

50).
Sev.
5000
(SHA
Alex.
men
of

the actual

strength

of the legion

that in times of particular

to 5000 (vi 20) and Livy

notes the fluctuations

CIL 111 6594,6605,6611,12054.

CIL 111 6577; VI 30881; VIII

9615; X 1766,1775,6069.

32

danger

could

very

the infantry
in legionary

size,

particularly

when

in 216 BC the legions

emergency;
cavalry

occasions

an infantry

giving

legions

are increased

by 1000 infantry

were increased

of 5000 and 300 cavalry

strength

and in 204 13C Scipio increased

two of his Cannae legions

300 cavalry

(Ldvy

Whatever

legion

be much smaller.

could

been greatly

under

of the Imperial
giving

strength

a cohort

strength

enough

legions
accounts

during

legions

the imperial

under

25, and basing

(1966),

Alston

discharge.

century,

his units

a mortality
concludes

discharge

and these

Alston

to have

22,000 men,

strength

of about

low because Caesar's

up to their

to ascertain

army

Taking

number

strength.

the actual

strength

the age of recruitment

about

surviving

may not provide

50% of

sample

of inscriptions

in a suitable
an accurate

state,

dedications

and strength
as between

on Hopkins'

recruits

of

in historians'

discharge

of recruits

rate for the 25 years service

that

theoretical

has used legionary

the approximate

the available

lists

the

by the writers

because of the lack of detail

period

battles.

the Empire.

However,

only seven

to bring

to calculate

appear

totalled

legionary

and

war for some years and he may have been unable to

to use the same method

of ancient

in an attempt

may be especially

xxii

in practice

cohorts

at the battle

300 and total

36),

to 6200 infantry

strength,

Caesar's

to an
and 100

(Livy

with the size suggested

80 cohorts

of under

in civil

recruits

It is impossible

compared

These numbers

had been engaged

its paper

At Pharsalus,

Caesar's

period.

3000 (BC 11189).

obtain

24)".

xxix

in reaction

15 and

UN figures

would

survive

is very

small,

aU dating

assessment

of

to
with

to the 2nd

of the strength

"Although
this fluctuation
may have been due to residual custom since the
legions were in theory of a set number for each consul, in times of crisis it was
increase
the
to
legions
the
simply
size
quicker
of
and
rather than
easier
much
from
scratch.
more
raise

33

of all legions 12
.

the inscriptions

The information

may be tabulated

contain

as follows:

Reference

Legion

CIL 1116178

V Macedon.

AE 1955 238/
1969 633

total

114+

11 T raiana

132/133

133

CIL 111 8110

VII

Claudia

134/135

239

CIL VIII

111 Augusta

140/141

90+

11 Traiana

168

C. 100

CIL 111 14507

VII

Claudia

169

c. 180

CIL VIII

111 Augusta

173

90+

(CIL

111 8110) represents

that

castrorum

of

considerably,

18068

of 239 men from Legion

for a legion

is slightly
veterans
with

under

whereas

the large discharge

111 14507) suggests

and I carried

This

paper
for

corresponds
described

each
for

suggesting

and suggests
well with

what

by the de munitionibus

year

of

points

out,

recruitment

II Traiana

a legionary

from Legion VII Claudia

a legion

very

As Alston

Legion

in AD

who were recruited

of two years

strength.

c. 66 per year

(AE 1955 238; 1969 633),

12Dr Alston
together.

the recruits

discharged

only

Claudia

of the type

century

169 (CIL

VII

of c. 4500.

strength

be expected

numbers

18067

CIL 111 6580

legionary

might

Veteran
numbers

C. 109

The discharge
134/135

Year (s) of
recruitment

varies

in the n-dd 2nd

strength

of c. 2500

who were recruited

that is greatly

out much of the epigraphic

overstrength

work

the

for

in AD

13
.

this

study

13Alston rejects the theory that Legion II Traiana suffered very high casualties
in small numbers of veterans,
in the Bar Kokba revolt resulting
and explains
in AD 194 (recruited
in AD 169) as
the large Legion VII Claudia discharge
legion
the
in
for
Marcus
of
reinforcement
massive
preparation
a
representing
These calculations
do not take into account the
Danubian wars.
Aurelius'
due
to
illness,
high
the
during
the
mortality
rates
such
as
plague
of
possibility
Aurelius
Marcus
reign of
-

34

Alston

further

provides

evidence

have been understrength

discharge

list

Of the 22 centuries

8 are identified

named in this inscription,

form indicating

by the adjectival

that the delay in filling

showed there

to keep the number

theoretical

paper

lacked

the century

that

14
Alston suggests
centurion
.
was no pressure

may well

194
in
AD
the
named

in the form of the centuries

(CIL 111 6580).

II Traiana

that Legion

to illustrate

the posts of centurion

of officers

up to

and troops

strength.

The Treatises
The two principal

treatises

the de munitionibus
known

to what date the descriptions

organization

munitionibus

castrorum

The de munitionibus
This treatise

by Webster

implies

that there

was of double

a legion
(eg:

this

details

the principal
organization

80 men ( 1).

double

18 refers

to

refers

and the date of the de

cohort

The author

to each legionary
the first

does not indicate

never

is also fairly
is discussed

camping

by the porta

common
by Birley

35

that

states

actually

cohort
cohort

states

that

comments

decumana).

on the centurial
(1951 71-72).

how many

but this may be assumed from other

to the 10th cohort

form
14This adjectival
Wall and this
Hadrian's

The author

the author

(accepted

period

( 2), whilst

to a cohort

contained.

ten cohorts,

imperial

of the early

The area assigned

( 4), although

by many to

of what is considered

1976 fig. 1.1).

were six centuries

strength

contained

leclio (114),

simply

is much disputed.

1985 110 and Luttwak

contained

because it is not

Vegetius

are relevant.

as the antiqua

legionary

century

are problematic

strength,

castrorum.

provides

be the standard

on legionary

information

provide

and Vegetius,

castrorum

his legionary

centuries

which

stones

from

Dating
have been made to date the de munitionibus

Many attempts
suggestions
various
Much

range

of dating

elements
of the

argument

work with a particular

1981,1982)
Danube,

four

of

and

of the

presence

miWary

in

89, whilst

alae

here,

Birley

(1982 279)

reign.
army,

though

Lenoir

(1979 111) is generally

Frere

also uses archaeological

different
of the
AD 85-

between

arguments
mentioned,

the

about

and prefers

evidence.

of these attempts

critical

war of campaign

characteristics

of the work

war is unlikely

to be the time for the introduction

because
the force

of the inevitable

of a certain

show that

teething

serving

to tie the treatise

He suggests

emperor.

it is military

problems.

is not a real field

described

of unit

theory

that

and believes

the
that

of a new method of camping

Lenoir

goes on to suggest

This

that

of all the different

army but a mixture

in the Roman army.

down

argument

neatly

solves

the

believes

that no such

time,
this
8
known
alae
at
an army containing
milliary
only
(Holder
1980
Appendix
concentration
massive
a
represent

four of them
III).

problem

would

two

on the

of composition

some of Frere's

rejects

himself

The

wars of Domitian,

to a particular

"With

15
army
.

the

a war on the

with

emperor

date of some of the units

at such an early

(1953,

the middle years of Marcus Aurelius'

the Marcommanic wars during
tar
Birley argues this later date almost solely on the composition
of the
^

instead

types

the work

of the

the

this to associate

but on the grounds

dates the text to the Danubian

Frere

on the

centres

work

and using

who both associate

will not be repeated

arguments

existence

(1980)

in the text,

of the

This method has been used by Birley

campaign.

because

partly

campaign,

force,

concerning

and Frere

dating

the

The

AD.

(1979 111-133).

by Lenoir

are discussed

evidence

of the army described

composition

to the mid 4th century

from the late lst century

and

castrorum,

four
the
of

milliary

alae serving

together;

36

Lenoir

army

would

ever

as dating

composition

in the treatise,
are that

evidence,

including

a 2nd century

and the

the use of particular

because

this was the only

classici,

metator,

of a leqatus

presence

and the epithets

supposed

for miEiary

implied

(veredari-i

to the emperor)

referring

preference

legionis

date

a Trajanic

and

evidence

His conclusions
-

when all the terms he considers

period

vexillarii

as well as Trajan's

use,

cohorts,

praetorian

dating

other

vocabulary

by the

date is required

of the

strength

then considers

Lenoir

the use of force

dismissed

Having

have been constituted.

were in

alae (Lenoir

1979

126).

The work itself

is theoretical

hoped and probably

( 45/47).

tested

least intended

However

criticisms

not be introduced
logical

frequently

that his new method of camping

would be field-

to

date

times of war rather

that

the de munitionibus

the

the author

Although

treatise

to

believed

a particular

than peace.
castrorum

( 45/47)

equipment

and

it

and practices

There is therefore

is
are

no reason

to any period

relates

would

that his method was

methods

in military

at

I agree

that a new way of camping

on other

improvements

today,

application.

The author

wartime.

an improvement

the case that

points

the work may be categorized

of attempts

during

and

made during
suggest

but the author

I do not agree with his suggestion

campaign,

more

expected

out,

as Lenoir

the work to have some practical

Lenoir's

with

in nature,

to

of war or

peace.

Since the army of the de munitionibus

the

work

particular

must

be dated

using

the use of the clavicula

mentions.

The de munitionibus

claviculae

( 55) and tituli

the

castrorum
kind

of evidence

in camp defences
castrorum

( 49) to defend

37

appears

appears

to be hypothetical,

Lenoir

which Frere
to suggest

camp gates.

considers,

in

(1980 57) also

the use of both

As with the literary

Lenoir

evidence,

and specificaUy

2nd century

that the work dates to the early

concludes

of Trajan'6

to the reign

AD,

Vegetius
Vegetius'

description

as it is not known

of problems
information

infantry

of the

de Re Militari

commanding
Vegetius

Livy

that

since

of Livy
the

cohort

work

system

reforms

two legions

However,
is

Vegetius

illustrate

the

is therefore

a late Republican

likely

or later

manipular
dating

to

consul

had suggested

that

As stated

seems to have

to which the accounts

of

BC, when the commentaries

as the

to be using a Republican
for his section

complete

as each

of his treatise.

the 2nd Punic war,

cohort

such

of organization

and the late lst century

source

the

of treatises

(1930 25-36)

the two forms

use of the

before

written

this section

The

from Cato's treatise

directly

comments

simply

legion.

of the

the influence
in

evident

his

particulars

to the more traditional

(11 4) and Schenk

place at some time between

of Caesar

be derived

Vegetius

and provides

of each cohort

as opposed

between

refer,

(114)

for

was using

is relevant.

was probably

made use of Cato in compiling

and Polybius

legio

strength

and Polybius.

the transition

above,

cavalry

of the cohort

formation
before

and

as the antiqua

gives rise to a number

the author

sources

which

of the legion cannot itself

organization

adoption

detailed,

although

or the date for which the description

to the organization

refers

taken

of the legion,

principal

tactical

unit.

source for some parts

on legionary

but

organization.

(1979) 132 on dating of claviculae.

16Lenoir
For further
(1977) 697-727;
4
defences,
below,
Marching
discussion
chapter
and
camp
see
on
claviculae
of
the de munitionibus
is
that
Birley's
Camps.
castrorum
suggestion
(1982)
the
basic
Vegetius
seems
since
very
unlikely
with
contemporary
(Vegetius'
five
different
is
totally
legion
the
centuries per cohort
of
structure
DMC).
the
the
of
cohort
per
six
against

38

According

to Vegetius

as it contained
cavalry
from

from

consists

of book II,

the

auxiliary

help on anything

legion

auxiliary

units.

light

contained

above,

description

contained
contained

726
cavalry
and

that Vegetius

555 infantry

or to

of the army in the

the legion

worshipped

for outside

Vegetius

information

probably

on the

used Republican

and as the Republican

be referring

may simply

only a

and so tends to emphasize

detailed

of any

is fairly

of which

selected

1105 infantry

(though

any f urther

legion

to these (Veg. I

vi 20).

the first

soldiers

Vegetius

may have been using

section,

Vegetius

of the legion

10 cohorts,

and also contained

for this

8; Polybius

Vegetius'

cohorts

works

armed troops
viii

of fighting.

to the legion,

the disposition

Vegetius

As suggested

Livy

cohort

attached

absence

20; 11.15;

into

than

11 However,

different

Although

he does not give

that

to

establishment

in detail,

in the

as well as later

having

and methods

(11 1).

navy

On the

referring

that the military

as a source for this section

of the legion

(11 1).

to admit that the legion was dependent

himself

essential.

of the

role

other

the

(1968 60) suggests

Cooper

and "could not bring

description

cavalry

states

and

empire

customs

not even when describing

units,

line of battle.

and

and the legion

navy
to the

consideration

Vegetius

any support

for the auxiliaries,

of the

parts

infantry

of cavalry,

describes

divided

different

each with its own organization,

At the beginning

sources

any size of enemy without

by allies and confederates

supplied

and

artillerymen

as weU as archers,

does not have much regard

as coming

strengths,

the

of defeating

auxiliaries,

Vegetius

whole,

for
Rome's greatness
the
main reason
was

and heavy infantry

light

and was capable

'foreign'

them

the legion

and

was of double

for particular

giving

His legion

strength

qualities

132 cavalry.

and 66 cavalry,

Vegetius

complicated.

(11 6).

(milliary),
The first
9

Each of the remaining

6100
infantry
total
of
a

seems to get his calculations

39

was

wrong

and

gives

that

statement
number

these were the minimum numbers

was sometimes

Vegetius

He ends the description

730).
of

total

a cavalry

provides

more information

in his 2nd book when explaining

8).

According

men, the hastatus

prior

the primus

2 centuries,

each commanded

posterior

presumably

According

to this arrangement,

centurion

first

cohort.

but later

though

(II

or 400

and hastatus

and the triarius

or

had 10 centuries

distribution

the

later

cohort

4 centuries,

1 century

prior)

cohort

description

the number

prior

100 men.

of 100 men,

of centuries

is the numerical

to each

strength

that Vegetius

totals

would

1000 (118).

However,
caput

including

of the

the

at this point

contubernii"

each

have been 100 of these in that cohort,

of the 1105 Vegetius

invented

strength

presumably

"who are now called

decani

10 men, and there

a total cohort

suggests

princeps

the first

in Vegetius'

also mentions

commanding
giving

or 150 men,

cohorts

17
-

in this cohort

or 200 men, the princeps

At one point he states it is 1105 (116),

5 centurions,
Vegetius

of the first

commanded

the

was uneven.

inconsistency

Another

means the

by 5 centurions,

commanded

pilus

and that

miWary

of the centurions

lk centuries,

(Vegetius

of other

on the structure

the duties

to the author,

for the legion,

by the addition

increased

the interesting

with

mentions.

the rank of caput contubernii

Cooper (1968 41)

to make up the

numbers"

"Cooper
that Vegetius
(1968 55) suggests
was confusing
cohorts
auxiliary
be
cohorts
could
quingenary
made MiEdary,
legionary
auxiliary
and while
with
56.
below
but
see
p.
not,
the legionary
cohorts could
Messoris,
to the contubernium
from Usk, however,
"'An inscription
referring
kind
been
hierarchy
have
the
there
some
of
that
within
may
suggests
Vegetius
contubernium,
as
suggests
caput
a
possibly
and
contubernium,
66).
391,
No.
(1976)
7
(Britannia
griftof%'
Is
t-r;
4
ICO4V-6QIrr;,.
e%s
%j
40
S&M4V-!!

Okt

After

describing

officers

to

attached

(formerly

a legate),
There

(1112).

Vegetius

well qualified

or other
The

commanders.

only

in this section

organization
the troops

of cavalry

(11 25).

As stated

attached

to particular
first

The milliary
each.

According

above,

each legion.

tribune

specia. Uy chosen
pieces

to the legion

in Vegetius'

century

suggesting

his cohort

emperor

information

about

and there

as cohort
legionary

are about the size of turmae,

the units

artillery
are

of cavalry

in each turma
had two

the nine other cohorts

of the legion

each century

had a ballista

served

55 of these engines

are therefore

or stone throwing

which

machines,

of 550 from the size of legionary

with

of one cohort

in
one

mathematical

juggling.
vexillations

However,
varied

vexillations

support

antiqua

by the writer

that Vegetius

what he thought

and from this basis devised

of Vegetius'

but was invented

He suggests

he had available.

consisted

legionary

the origin

to explain

that it never in fact existed,

strength

medics etc.

castrorum

by the

description

were also ten onagri,

from what information

through

nine were commanded

(11 14) and the legionary

had four turmae whilst

to Vegetius

was commanded

and with 32 men and a decurion

(1968 chap. 3) has attempted

Empire

treatise

of

to each cohort.

attached

Cooper

of

(II

fabrum
and duties

cohort

while the other

of Vegetius'

cohorts,

cohort

There

states that the first

legion

the

commanded

who

of the qualifications

account

other

attached

by ten men from that

legio,

officers

prefect

of the camp and the praefectus

the prefect
a brief

by a particularly
by tribunes

the

then follows

tribunes

military

legion,

the

then lists the different

Vegetius

of the cohorts,

the strength

obtained

of the early

of engineers

and

was the antiqua

legio

staff

at the time of the de munitionibus

in size".

In addition,

Vegetius'

work

is made on the grounds of the 550 men mentioned by Dio

"' This suggestion
30.
figures
de
in
5&
the
from
the
12)
munitionibus
castrorum
(lxxv
and
(continued...
)

41

is
partly
.

a compilation

had access

describes;

works

describing

to treatises

so there

periods,

of earlier

The author

presumably
in earlier

of the legion

the organization

the legion
from

his information

have obtained

simply

1930).

for him to have invented

is no reason

he could

(Schenk

which

he

the earlier

works.

Dating
One of the major difficulties
made extensive
2).

chapter.
since

There

is little

reign

of the legionary

of Diocletian,

all the evidence

with

suggests
antiqua
repetition
and that

legio,

believe

of Vegetius'

suggests

all cohorts

that Vegetius

the

later

as described

3rd

century

that Vegetius

but

the

first

by Livy

legio.

of some information,

Tarruntenus

and Polybius.

2nd century

20
.

of the

Paternus,

but

of the early empire was still in

containing

for 118-13,

Silhanek

centuries.

six

for his section

presumably

and it seems quite likely

this may be one of the major problems

reflects

his description

may have been using two sources

one for 117 and another

of these works

It has been placed

and the

copied

named sources,

that the organization

(see above

own

in the line of battle

on the date of the antiqua

agreement

legion from the latest

force,

his

writing

dispositions

in the Republic

(1930) and others

Schenk

when

Cato seems to have been one of the most influential

the situation

in the

legio is that Vegetius

of the antiqua

treatises

use of earlier

his account

strongly

in the dating

on the

because of the

that this was the case,

in dating

and using

Vegetius'

19

(
continued)
...
Speidel (1984 307) has since shown that the 550 mentioned by Dio
However,
7449
CIL
111
On
the
to
of
size
vexillations:
belonged
unit.
an auxiliary
5829,
three
CIL
V
75
and
a
milliary
vexillations,
strong;
one
mentioned
Italy
to
legions
to
British
from
three
8000
sent
was
strong
vexillation
22).
57;
111
II
(Tac.
Hist.
Vitellius
support
20For the arguments
(1940 382-391).

concerning

these

dates,

42

see Parker

(1932)

and Sander

description

periods

of the antiqua

and amalgamating

something

that

Auxiliary

treatises

as that
or other

beginning

them,

Vegetius

may well have ended

of sources

different

up producing

1.

fictitioUS2

organization

literary

of Book II,

works,

Vegetius

however,

papyrological

Josephus

mentions

invading

1000 strong

equitata,

referring

although

date,

see no reason
epigraphic

mentioning

them briefly

at the

role

to the auxiliaries,

reference

in the line

for the auxiliary

of battle.

units

There

is,

which is for the most

his

infantry

whether
Josephus'

units

Alston

has been most recently

assuming

cohorts

tendency

cohors
of 100.

units

existed

at

to exaggerate

figures,

grounds
this

for discussing

Josephus

a century

auxiliary

on the

that

the

earliest

reference.

this section

and comprehensively

43

ten infantry

and quingenary

cohort

miDiary

postdates

the Roman

and 120 cavalry.

strength,

statement

for mWiary

included

had 600 infantry

theoretical

but despite

when describing

units

The force

to the milliary

2'1 am grateful
to Dr Richard
making this suggestion.
22The subject
(1980).

and after

of auxiliary

which

at their

to reject

evidence

in the

their

(1966 55) has questioned

such an early

is included

(BJ 111 67).

and 13 cohorts

is undoubtedly

information

two types

Judaea

and

Little

makes no further

evidence

for the legions

lacking

units is as problematic

of auxiliary

of the legionS22 .

and does not consider

or socii,

Birley

a number

was almost totaUY

and internal

contentious

force

by using

Units

The strength

part

from

leqlo;

with

me and

dealt with by Holder

The de munitionibus
to the subject,
different

Table

castrorum

though

types

the author

of auxiliary

illustratinq

unit

the most detailed

provides

evidence

in the six

the basic numbers

only provides

relating

units -

to the

according

strenqth

Quingenary

de munitionibus

Milliary

Infantry

cohort

6 centuries

( 28)

10 centuries

Cohors

equitata

6 centuries
120 cavalry

+
( 27)

10 centuries
240 cavalry

Ala

castrorum

16 turmae

( 16)

24 turmae

( 28)
+
( 16)
( 16)
-11

Unfortunately

the

auxiliary

century

strength

of these

be inferred

Attempts

or turma

been

made to give

(CIL 1116627),

the de munitionibus

on the inscription

a century

size of 78 (Holder

the 10 officers

(5 decurions,

size of 42 (Domaszewski

no reason
infantry
definite
or the

the cohors

number

century

the exact

are divided

at least,

equitata

turma

and

sizes

from

the

between the ten centurions

I duplicarius

at random,

to provide

between the number of infantry

and decurions

However,

44

and there
and number

and junior

among

to give a turma
the legionaries

one from each century,

ten centuries,

in

cohorts

are divided

and 4 sesquiplicarii)

Coptos

strengths

and there

that the same was not done with the auxiliaries;

of cavalrymen

more can

in the text.

and the 424 equites

1980 7),

theoretical

the 788 men from 7 auxiliary

Thus

do not have to represent

correlation

given

1887, but see below p. 47).

to have been chosen

to suppose

to tell

of the

strength

and to fit these in with the theoretical

castrorum.

mentioned

appear

for

the

about

so it is impossible

However,

units.

no details

provides

from the space allocations

have

inscription

author

is

the 788

may not be any

of centurions,

officers,

and this

inscription

little

provides

for the organization

evidence

useful

of auxiliary

units.

The pridianum
81 (1991) 62-73)

can be used to illustrate

size from the number

or century

had been sent from

thus

337 were

number

the

cohort,

the

cavalry

( 25-26).

calculation

author

The total

760 infantry

space

infantry
27).
milliary
Lenoir

This

each.

to the number

The figure
which

1979 74).

unit

total

of the 10
1 ft,

receive

of 76 per century
that

spaces .

strength

they

1360

the infantry

or 600 infantry

since

and it seems likely

that

the

quingenary

is very

in theory

cohors

the de munitionibus
by halving

of 380 is obtained

However,

2.5 ft whilst

the

for

is that

unit

give the approximate

to this

infantry"

or I

near

at least

to
the

to be about the same.

quoting

is implied

into

this

take up 600 ft,

approximate

state

writers

and 120 cavalry,

unit

thus

of the legions

for

part-mounted

a milliary

"transferring

each receive

spaces

sizes were supposed

modern

by

space required

belonging

of infantry

for

required

formula

the

supplies

the 80 per century

Many

may not bear any relation

of space

The 240 cavalry

1 ft.

The remaining

century

under

It is clear from this that the

a centurion.

The 240 cavalrymen

infantrymen.

centuries

6 at' London

in these vexillations.

To facilitate

receive

else under

detachments

the command of one centurion;

2 centurions;

1 or

under

Various

JRS
turma

of establishing

and troops.

each under

in vexffiations

of centurions

of soldiers

infantry

Coria.

at

Inv. no. 88/841;

tablet

the difficulties

of officers

Vindolanda,

9 somewhere

centurion;

(Vindolanda

of Cohors I Tungrorum

in the text
I believe

this

45

in 25-26

equitata

castrorum

is a misinterpretation

380

to prove this

the 760 infantry

(Cheesman

had

for

the

1914 29-30;
of the text.

27 states

that

organization
rationem

states

cohors

din-dda.

point,

quam

cohors

of infantry

80 per century

(1980

different

8)

however,

the same size and that

strengths.

This

seems

strengths

relative

situation

presumably

centuries

of 80 men according
cohors

a quingenary

is

There

century.

Polybius

in

a quingenary

that

that

a Roman ala contained

castrorum

gives

16 turmae

for

111 6581, listing

evidence

(CIL

suggests

a turma

of 32.

the

this

unit

Arrian

46

if

anyway,

and

the

this would surely

centurions;
infantry

for

in this

cohort,

with

to a centurion

turma

auxiliary

( 16),

than

for

of 300 was divided

and since

the 16 decurions

However,

were

were based on legionary

of 30. Arrian

512 men (18.3),

cohort,

in

of c. 60 men.

the Roman cavalry

turmae, (vi 25); this gives a turma strength

cohorts,

centuries

would be superior

of

that the six

Davies (1971 110) and

were different

of auxiliary

size

at this

infantry

auxiliary

seniority

the

pr

relicfua

to the cavalry

suggestion,

centuries
with
,

for

VI,

sizes in the auxiliary

units

centuries

the

with 62 per century.

all

sensible

to Birley,

equitat

states

that

eandem

same section

centurias

equitata.

auxiliary

a centurion

evidence

more

most

of auxiliary

in the

problems

the

in the

and quingenary

cohors

suggest

in dimidio

he is not stating

century

in the quingenary

the same

and that it is only the cavalry

cohort;

cohors equitat

theoretically

cause

habet

380 soldiers,

only contained

in the miWary

and 60 per century

theoretical

later

is only referring

of the milliary

(1966 54) does suggest

Holder

cfuinqenaria

that the author

that had half the numbers

Birley

but

but

the numbers

quingenaria

by the use of the word reliqua,

signified

centuries

equitata

milliaria)

equitata

I believe

had half

cohort

(Cohors

as the milliary

continet

author

parte

the quingenary

in the Tactica

into

10

states

the de munitionibus

confirmed

by epigraphic

of two alae in Egypt),

is at this

the

point

describing

this
Greek

cavalry

may be an approximation,
'diploma'

of Pompeius

Spanish

auxiliary

Salluitana

(ILS

Vegetius

8888).

This

could

he obtained

of the turma

suggested

to the

on

Turma

size of 30 or 32, whilst

turma at 32, which Cooper

is unknown,

turma.

Although

the evidence

for a milliary

suggested

clearly

turma

the other

23 turmae

and cites

DMC 16 to prove

"96 horses

over

the 1000,

are discounted".

the milliary
which

established

in a milliary

which

is the number

are calculated

at 1000 so that the prefect

has used that

principales

number

because

to camp and it is an easy round

and that

a milliary
when

there

their

number

47

ala has

the extra

be sufficient

is

number

an area in the

way. " The milliary

of the de munitionibus
would

1000,

to read the rest of

of the ala can be assigned

the author
then

strength

each trooper;

can camp in a more spacious

1000 troopers;

(1968 31)

taken this as proof that

and has failed

for

Cooper

calculated

Cooper seems to have simply

goes on " 3ft

that

states

(DMC

of larger

a total of exactly

each, giving

The treatise

too low

in this unit

1980 9).

ala was double

this.

1000 troopers,

does not contain

the 24 turmae

see Holder

ala contained

space and their

of the Coptos

of only 768, hence the suggestions

40 troopers

contained

As stated

because 32 per turma was considered

partly

the arguments,

the first

that

disputed.

of 42 on the basis

ala; at 32 per turma,

at 42 or 40 (for

turmae,

ala is, however,

a strength

24) would give a total strength

officers

of the legionary

of the turma in the milliary

(CIL 1116627),

a number

16,

belonging

from the size of the auxiliary

strength

Domaszewski

inscription

horses

Roman citizenship

a turma

suggest

The

accurate.

to 30 or 32.

The strength
above,

31 cavalrymen

lists

(1114) gives the strength

the exact theoretical

numerically

of c. 89 BC conferring

cavalrymen

(1968 60) believes

points

and is not necessarily

Strabo

with the Roman ala

of the size of the Greek

and his comparison

units

ala

castrorum
space for the

for use in his formulaic

method

ala, this section

milliary

weU under

this

Since

papyrological

the

(Holder

the evidence
divided
below

their

each

anomalous

1).

offered
centuries

by

like

and

suggests

that

were

cohors

61-4)
the

and

it to say that

the 120 cavalry

in these units
pridianum

the

unit

was

were
to be

appear
Cohors

of

XX
its

above

vastly

to explain

attempted

(1983 99),

Hassall

Suffice

elsewhere

of 140-150 men and 5 turmae of c. 70 men

(1967 108-11)

5 turmae,

that there

in detail

suggests

The

strength

(1971

it here.

but the infantry

as a milliary

Mazzarino

this

equitat

with

outposted

1 prefer

the

simpler

that

the

size

of these

original

seemingly
centuries

explanation

establishment
had

been

6
was

increased

to

the cohort.

strengthen

The evidence
in an auxiliary
equitata

Davies

but

equitatae

with 6 centuries

arrangement

and turmae,

cohortes

25

however,

strength,

(Fink

has been considered

1 shall not repeat

30 strong,

theoretical

Palmyrenorum,
theoretical

1983),

in the

Urlit24.

evidence

for quingenary

into 4 turmae

can be used to suggest

of the treatise
in the

number

1980; Hassall

of 1000 troopers

Far from being used as proof

of camp arrangement".

from Valkenburg
unit;

the fort

and excavations

may also suggest

was occupied

revealed

four

the enlargement

of centuries

40
by Cohort
AD
c.

pairs of infantry

III

barracks,

23The arrangement
of the camp described in the de munitionibus
be discussed in detail in the following
chapter.

Gallorum
each pair

castrorum

will

24Assuming a turma strength

of 720, this would
of 30 and total unit strength
leave 280 man spaces for the decurions and commander, perhaps 10 man spaces
for
Since
40
the
the
the
decurion
commander.
spaces
man
remaining
and
per
1),
(DMC

legionary
this
the
times
ten
space
of
a
legionary
received
centurion
be
correct.
approximately
may
calculation
25Cohors
Praetoria
50-61).

63), Cohors I Augusta

(Fink
Equitata
Veterana
I Hispanorum
64)
QRS
1977
(Fink
Equitata
cohort
and
an unidentified
Lusitanorum

48

having

one centurion's

contubernia.
infantry
(1977

115-7).

enlarged

62-73

The

Cohors

quingenary

as

in the de munitionibus

Vegetius

states

numbers

for the legion,

addition
possibility

that

Vegetius'

milliary

cohorts

legionary

rather

The epigraphic
contained

cohorts

evidence

suggests

five double centuries

was augmented,

as Vegetius

by increasing

during

the Republic

reason

to suppose

great advantages

cohort,

QRS 1991

the

information

rather
suggests

with five centuries

to increase

the

if necessary.
if they are
each (118).
the size of the

would be unnecessary.
first

cohort

than ten single centuries,

of the legion
so if a legion

it may have been done

happen,
Legions

were increased

(see above p. 32) and there

did not also happen

by the

so that it would at least

centurions

could

the minimum

provides

extra centurions

that the milliary

in times of crisis

of the cohort

had

cohorts were not as

from

to the cohort

the size of the centuries.

this

have

seems no reason to reject

be simpler

and additional

structure

of c. 112 men each

are recorded

legi

do not require

than add more centuries

its original

of

also be strengthened

it would probably

units,

pairs

was sometimes increased

There

could

as the first

on the same establishment

In the auxiliary

of the antiqua

(11 6).

cohorts

auxiliary

the four

may also

expected

and that the number

miUiary

14

centuries

I Tungrorum

been

and

castrorum.

his description

that

of other

centuries

have

might

fabriculae

that

as 761 men and only 6 centurions

arranged

contained

simply

has suggested

Hassall

This evidence suggests that perhaps auxiliary

.

uniformly

retain

py-incipales,

may have housed four enlarged

centuries

)26

quarters,

In his review,

barracks

rooms for

during

system was its flexibility,

the Empire.

in size

seems no
One of the

and perhaps

this also

in century size were caused by

that the fluctuations
26It has been suggested
from
to milliary status QRS 1991
the
quingenary
unit
the gradual change of
67).

49

included

flexibility

in the size of the units

both legionary

and sub-units,

and

auxiliary.

Archaeoloaical
Various

vidence

attempts
fort

using

and Unit Size and Orqanization

have been made to illustrate

unit

strength

and the number,

type

and groupings

sizes and plans,

blocks within

forts

forts

particular

and fortresses.

to the different
"type

then went on to suggest

of auxiliary

described

units

information

sites"

auxiliary

suggests

that a1LIthe auxiliary

of fort

units

with forts

size and unit

units
type

forts

Richmond

for the different

was

and
types
the

primarily

using

as his basis for associating

castrorum

given in this treatise

and the information

were of standard
are usuaUy

to assign

unit using this method,

of auxiliary

above.

of barrack

(1955 304-6) attempted

types of auxiliary

given in the de munitionibus

different

Studies

Richmond

and organization

sizes and organizations.

based on the hypothesis

that:

the
in
through
"If Roman auxiliary
standardized
size
were
units
between
be
then
there
should
a
correlation
early principate
...
1986 707)
(Bennett
fort size and primary garrison"
There

are numerous

purpose,
such

many of which have been fully

of barrack

however,

major problems,
a handful

of forts

the remainder

blocks

considered

is that the available

plans

excavated
have

and the
forts.

been mainly

or Valkenburg

reconstructed

J,

huge

One of the

sample is very small,

like Elginhaugh

this

(1989 168-74)

of garrison,
different

for

evidence

by Davison

both between and within

being fully

of fort

the archaeological

changes

and outpostings,

as vexillations

variety

problems

in using

from

with only
whilst
selective

excavation.

Bennett

(1986) compared

cases where

the primary

fort

areas in the N-W.

garrison

was known,

50

provinces

with

regard

with

garrisons

to the hypothesis

in

mentioned

above

conclusion

is that:

fort

between

correlation

concerning

and

size.

unit

His

"In the European part of the Empire there does not seem to have
been any direct correlation
between fort size and the majority of
the units known. "
(Bennett
1986 711)
Bennett's

hypothesis,

outpostings,

however,

vexillations

his primary

etc.

hypotheses

does

mentioned

include

not

by Davison,

the

of

possibilities

and indeed

admits

that

are incorrect:

"Either Roman auxiliary

in size...
units were not standardized
or
there
is the possibility
that
forts
some auxiliary
actually
contained
a composite garrison,
perhaps more than one unit or
"
parts of several units being brigaded together.
Both these comments are quite possibly
the latter.

claim,

that

suggests

munitionibus
likely

As Bennett

units

and, I would

the papyrological

evidence
the de

in the way that

were organized
Bennett

suggests.

the former

certainly

goes on to point out:

not all auxiliary

castrorum

true,

by stating

concludes

that

it is

that:
" The Roman army, like any other army, had units that could very
in size and composition
from place to place and from period to
(Bennett
1986 716).
period. "

To obtain
their

information

overall

on the actual

it becomes necessary

strength,

of forts,

and particularly

horses.

The number

unit

at full

Studies
(1983)
reasons
garrisons

basis

and Davison
for

his

through

and legionaries

strength

in forts

and the latter

(1989),
of

Roman barrack

differences

blocks

out

(1989 252).

51

for

for each type

blocks

that

than

simply

arrangement

both

by Holder

by Richmond

states

between barracks

rather

the internal

has been calculated

been carried

have

study

and stable

of units

to study

the accommodation

of barrack

theoretical

on this

organization

soldiers

and

of auxiliary
(1980 10).

(1955),

Hassall

one of the principal

was the

of the various

identification
auxiliary

of
units

Very

few excavated

Points

forts

'type

to Richmond's

conform

As Davison

sites'.

out:
"A small number of forts may come into this category:
but the
in the evidence
great disparity
tends to call into
presented
"
(198955)
question the concept of the type-sites.

For those

sites

do not appear

which

made for

the type

of garrison

type

barrack

blocks,

of

identifications

periods
appear

and number

and Antonine
centuries

are often

from the number

of stables

these

when

(Frere

to be based

primarily

contained

construction

the variations

equitatae,

made as to the identity

detachments

from
unless

the type

27On the difficulties

& Wilkes

and
be

can

strength

which

28 Although
.

29

garrison

of units

of a fort's

in identification

and other
It

or

suggestions

brigaded

papyrological

garrison,

of stables,

been

attempts

see Johnson

of barrack

some of the

were variations

does seem quite

may have

epigraphic

contemporary
or strength

there

The

that the Flavian

to two different

were attributed

were not enormous

a number

dimensions

of more than one unit whilst

parts

of the

on the

the garrisons

1989 117-138).

and it has been suggested

of contubernia,

II forts

has been made to identify

of occupation

may have been under

in the barrack

indicate

may have held,

number

is such a site and an attempt

three

However,

the

and

suggestions

Strageath

blocks

the fort

sites',

27

identified

of the

to be 'type

cohortes
be

could
likely

that

together.

evidence

can

to identify

the

1983 176-182.

'8 The Flavian period garrison

is suggested at a cohors equitata minus one of
four turmae and three centuries
its centuries
of a
and two of its turmae;
fort
legionary
The
Antonine
II
as one
century.
equitat
;a
cohors
second
full
part of a second cohors equitata,
strength;
at
almost
with
cohors equitata
being under strength
four turmae and two centuries,
one of these centuries
by two contubernia.
'9Eg: for the Flavian period a single overstrength
cohors equitat
in attempting
garrison
is a good example of the great difficulties
alone.
from archaeological
evidence

52

Strageath
.
identification

al I cases be little

Theoretically,

guesswork.

if one accepts

in

accurate

more than

practice

organizational

the figures

some idea of the approximate

usually

the indicators

the number

(1989 figs. 9-9.7),

and centuries.

forts

infantry

blocks

Davison's

this,

size of the century

that

in this

the size of the century

Davison

general

forts,

smaller

the

barracks

may be significant,

equita

However,

analysis

fortresses
in the

variation

that

contubernia
different
at

the

throughout
size and

the number
per century,
times.

number

period

being

may have varied

The study

units

With

per

barrack

between

and indeed
different

of the size and divisions

53

of

are not

in

that the

suggesting

units,

studied.

of men per contubernia,

However,

equitatae

(1989 253).

areas (1989

contubernium

of contubernia

above

the type of garrison

at both forts

in the size of contubernia.

shows the great variation

fig. 10-10.7)

on the probable

(p. 45).

cohortes

illustrating

figures

of Davison's

to

but
(1989 187).

It was stated

to identify

of other infantry

enormously
is known

garrison

disputed
was

unit

of quingenary

than the barracks

can vary

in this unit were not smaller than in other auxiliary

centuries

possible

cohors

has shown that where it is possible

particular

and

in the quingenary

and fortresses

some information

has provided

types

that:

He suggests

or cavalry.

work

blocks

rigid

These are

garrison

in both forts

the entire

where

"The different
numbers of contubernia,
so. "
are not necessarily
Despite

to identify

in these

of contubernia,

even within

have been solely

size of turmae
attempting

and

block should

in a barrack

of barrack

analysis

a fixed

had

army

as

castrorum

of contubernia

used by those

thorough

shows that

the

the number

provide

Davison's

in the de munitionibus

assuming

and

structure,

can in almost

in a fort

buildings

and type of internal

from the number

garrison

such

a wide

block,

it is

the number

units

of barrack

of

and legions
blocks

may

therefore

provide

centuries

Similar

little

very

fortresses.

has been made of the layout

Thus,

for this

is partly

Inchtuthil

of the legion

organization

The fortress

described

at Inchtuthil

centurions

in having

this

former

rejected

Inchtuthil.

most other

fully

excavated

Attempts

by Vegetius

for a double

the

need

for

(1969),

the latter

blocks,

first

houses

cohort

with

may be unique

and various

have

attempts

such

as that
soldiers,

veteran
(1980).

by Frere

six

each with

Inchtuthil

and for

for
the

However,

with none of the rebuilding

only one phase of occupation,

fortresses

date for the work.

accommodation,

by Breeze

and it is one of the most

went through,

fortresses.

been

made to

evidence

accommodation
Caerleon,

1980; Davison

reduced

extra

and it

castrorum,

for a milliary

cohort

duties,

illustrate

of other legionary
cohorts.

space to one side of the principia

eg: Chester,

first

size and

with five courtyard

(11 6).

technical

of the different

groupings

blocks

as the accommodation

legionary

have

archaeological

of barrack

of legionary
the

perfectly

a 1st century

prefers

and

contains

that

to illustrate

series of barrack

provision

mde to explain
rsoldiers
with clerical

cohort

of

organization

blocks

in the de, munitionibus

Frere

mentioned

been

Frere

and

and barrack

has nine groups

has been identified

the five

appears

that

reason

and a further

centuries,

barrack

size

and turmae -

analysis

which

on the

information

was milliary,
size first

A number

of fortresses

that is reflected

54

in

the

first

have sufficient
cohort,

of a quingenary

amongst others

It has been suggested

reduced

cohort

and to show the barrack

to house a miHiary

Neuss, Nijmegen,

but was then

first

milliary

fortresses,

for the six centuries

1989).

cohort

the

cohort

(Petrikovits

that at some point

to quingenary
in the remains

size,

but only
remain,
1975 38;
the first

and it is this

of barrack

blocks

at

most legionary
first

fortresses
is usually

cohort

dated to the Flavian

and elsewhere

However

is no evidence

at any one time.

cohorts

the legion's

contained
cohorts
likely

may simply

the strength

Assuming

that

this

have been doubled

in provinces

such as Britain

way of increasing
that other
(11 6).

of the legion
to increase

presumably

only

cohorts
This

because

it

first

p. 54),

where legions

in the Flavian

were more
It may

period.

strength.

As stated

can be made milliary

to increase

thinking

the size of the first

have

(see above

the legionary

first

had milliary

was not double

cohort

or veterans

mentions

to tie in with the evidence

all legions

workers

decision

original
would

to suggest

skilled

have been a convenient

Vegetius

period

the

doubling

to have been on campaign,

above,

This Ireform'of

30

from Inchtuthil

there

1989 57).

(eg: Davison

may have been behind

and such an increase

cohort,

been necessary

the

if a legion

was likely

to see

action.

Neuss

Groupings
clearly
at

at some fortresses

they

difficult

illustrates

units
(Alfbld

are

more

these problems

periods
attested
20),

appears

at Neuss
a Cohors

or

even

impossible

occupying

been accompanied

are the

Lusitanorum

Ala Parthorum
(Alf6ld

first
barracks
of quingenary
fortresses
and
usually
of
constructions
Caerleon.
Chester,
eg:
onwards,
"Excavated

55

first

cohort,

and Caerleon,

such as Inchtuthil

The legion

well.

to have

or milliary

a quingenary

definable

others

stone

including

of cohorts,

by auxiliaries.
(Alf6ld-b

though

to define.

this fortress

54),

are

Neuss
in the two
Auxiliary

Ala Afrorum

140) and the Ala Picentiana

(Tac

cohorts usually belong to the stone

date to the later Flavian period

Hist iv 62),

to have been brigaded

which appears

XIV at Neuss in

with Legion

7031.

AD

Auxiliary

units
of forts,

number

W1

particular

to Legion

attached

tum

auxilia,

(octo

discordia

Batavorum

temporum

between

legions

of

legions

is

auxiliaries

strategically
presence
for

the

excess

infantry

barracks

and 27 'cavalry'

a legion,

cohort,

of barracks

number

cohorts

the 20 infantry

on whether

18/20 infantry
by Koenen
barracks

and as advocated
barracks

Praetentura
from

another

mentioned
infantry

legion,

However,

is perhaps

the

are,

in Stone

barracks

it is
1,62

are required

or milliary

first

to two milliary

it is impossible

to say whether

of barracks

other

two milliary

sense

units - The

there

are for auxiliaries

groups

Attempts

or legionaries.

for each cohort

as at

( 2).

The

castrorum

troops

legionary

the suggestion

more likely.

made

an explanation

barracks

in the de munitionibus

or possibly

phases;

of

are assigned

which

may have contained

by Vegetius.

stone

infantry

However,

arranged

and

it had a quingenary

barracks

(1904).

Because

the brigading

units,

surprising,

28 'cavalry'

in the praetentura

Neuss does not have neatly

Inchtuthil

and

i 59).

at Neuss provides

in both

cohorts

decimae legionis

were among the auxiliary

in Stone 11.60/62

depending

leaving

not

the fortress

within

80 'infantry'

'infantry'

perhaps

auxiliary

associated

Batavian

cruartae
Hist.

the Jewish

closely

eight

digressae,

and Itheir'

if cavalry

as well, especially
of auxiliaries

claimed,

for

with

cohortes,

a legione

the close association

during

and Adida

mentions

at a

vexillations

seem to have been very

Tacitus

units.

XIV

or legionary

and Jericho

and some legions

auxiliary

legions

with

such as Exeter,

(BJ IV 486),

revolt

brigaded

were

such as a vexillation
cohorts

of the type

that they are for auxiliary

have

been made to assign

fortress
for
layout
Neuss is not entirely
the
" The reconstruction
complete
of
doubt
to
is
the
there
attempting
of
when
reconstruct
an
element
so
certain,
garrison
-

56

barrack

blocks

to do this

with

legionary

to the different

fortresses

legionary

than auxiliary

forts,

Davison's

much in fortresses

as in auxiliary

gauge from archaeological

its theoretical

in arrangement

legions

did not very

as auxiliary

units.

block and contubernium

forts,

evidence

that perhaps

organization

has shown that barrack

study

usua. Uy to one

cohort,

to be more regular

tend

and this might suggest

in size and internal

as greatly

the first

with

(DMC 3; Inchtuthil)

side of the praetorium/principia

On the whole,

than

other

any certainty

cohorts

is
impossible
but
it
Neuss
at

as

sizes vary

and it is therefore

alone whether

However,

impossibly

to

a legion was above or below

strength.

Conclusions
Most of the

evidence

that

suggests
Polybius

both

could

vary

shoms how greatly

the

according

response

to a military

These variations

there

Empire,

or

emergency,
where
their

there

of veterans

strength

of army
of Livy

evidence

situation.

be

This was either

in

legion

for a particular

or in preparation

and

could

of the Republican
military

units

campaign.

in size appear to have had no e ffect on the organization

of the

for the army of the Empire is much less detailm,

that legion

to suggest

at least

brought

was no particular
strength.

from Legion

up

to

be increased

sizes could

either

strength,

for war 32 Conversely,

.

or in preparation

theoretical

The

considerably.

emergency,

The information
is evidence

size and organization

to the contemporary

changed

legion.

to the

relating

threat

of warfare,

This would explain

II Traiana,

stationed

in

reaction

to

the
an

in areas of the Empire

units

might

the relatively
in Egypt,

during

but

remain

under

small discharge

in AD 157.

into the legions in AD 9 after the Varian disaster

32Slaves were conscripted
for Marcus
(Annals 1 31), and Legion VII Claudia may have been reinforced
(see
13).
Danubian
above,
note
campaigns
Aurelius'
57

There

is no reason

legions,

this

and

Tungrorum

at

why the same should

would

Vindolanda

Palymrenorum

at Dura.

of regularity

amongst

.on

organiza
p. 46).

the

appears

to enable

a surveyor

those

vastly

at least,

overstrength

of Cohors

since

Cohors

of

their

assumes that all auxiliary

easily

size

units

or understrength,

or with

were

for the
possibly

cavalryman,

the space required

and

(see above

the space allocations

and auxiliary

XX

degree

a certain

to be based on that of the legion

infantryman

to calculate

turmae

especially

but also provides

auxiliary

and

one would expect

units,

castrorum

size and type,

legionary,

centuries

as well as

units

centuries

overstrength

the

auxiliary

The de munitionibus

individual

even

and

In theory

structure

of a standard

the

explain

to auxiliary

not apply

for every

unit,

'non-standard'

organizationS33.

Vegetius
it would
units

hints

at flexibility

be possible

which

to apply

did not conform

BeU (1965 410) states

cohort

in the strength

systems

that

the rules

one of the great

flexibility,
of the units

33For details
below.

allocations,

space

described

advantages

and perhaps

in the size and organization

of these

types

58

(11 6),

cohorts

of the de munitionibus

to the standard

was its great

of legionary

and
to

castrorum
in the treatise.

of the manipular
this included

and

flexibility

as well.

see chapter

4 on Marching

Camps

:hinq

Camps

-oduction
Roman marching
the subject

sometimes described

camps,

of much discussion,

of camps with individual

groups
literary

As a result

sources.

entrenched

particularly

the attempt

campaigns,

especially

of this,

by some to be of particular

as 'temporary

the dating

importance.

to identify

camps and

those mentioned

According

to Polybius,

the Romans

of this statement,

might

expect

vast

numbers

of such camps to have been detected.

nately

whi-Ist large

numbers

of camps have been recorded

England

and Scotland,

Empire.

This

circumstances

deficiency

& 1970) has begun

The descriptions
known,
ments

though

of

that

to reveal

munitionibus
Although

the work

of Agache

assignment

de

(VI 27-32)

advice

areas of the

and
only

eastern

agricultural
comparatively
(1966

France

munitionibus

that

castrorum

the marching

with the internal

subject,

are well
arrange-

Onasander

sketchy.

and it is from

most of our
concentrates

information
on

the

camp, at the end the author

for a temporary

59

(BJ III 86ff)

is somewhat

on the

and Vegetius

of the best location

in north

and Josephus

of Josephus

little

of space within

in other

is

Unfortu-

in Wales, Northern

geological
it

one

such camps in this area.

deals almost exclusively

Polybius

castrorum
the

to

photography;

by Polybius

surprisingly

be related

aerial

of the camp and that

provides

details

may

a lack

or

for example,

recently,

few have been detected

very

by the

of camps has been considered

(VI 41), and in the light

a camp each night

have been

camps,

camp and the different

the

de

comes.
size

and

provides
types

of

defence.

Vegetius

covers

frequently

repeating

his advice

This chapter

internal

locations

allocations

of

camps

concerning

the

of Marching

Camp

section

and elsewhere'.

of the Roman marching

This will be followed

particular

with

by a discussion

of the

to the

space

reference

castrorum

size of armies

111 8),

(1 21-25;

sections

and development

in the de munitionibus

advocated

implications

two

in the second

and defence.

arrangements

in

subject

the origins

will consider

camp, their

the

has important

which

occupying

camps

and series

of

camps.

The

Origins

Frontinus

that

claims

Pyrrhus

the same fortifications

within

at Maleventum
agrees

14).

Plutarch,

disciphne

conflicting

that

general,

the arrangement

and

accounts

methods

his

entire

army

his camp

capturing

IV i 14).

(Strat.

(35

to teach the art of castrametation

Pyrrhus'

Roman

the difficulty

camp

at the Roman

surprise
(Plut.

of establishing

16).

Pyrrh.

the origins

These

of the

camp and its introduction.

is particularly
(VI

and that after

describes

of the

illustrate

who expresses

Roman camp

hand,

on the other

to concentrate

his method of entrenchment

was the first

Pyrrhus

Roman marching

Polybius,

in the field,

the Romans adopted

Livy

first

was the

great

admiration

impressed

26,42;

XVIII

for

Roman military

and defence

by the organization
18),

and

contrasts

institutions

the

Greek

in

of the

and Roman

of entrenching.

The Greeks, when they choose, think above all of the security
the natural strength
they can achieve by exploiting
of position,
in entrenching,
first because they grudge the labour involved
because
they
think
that
defence
man-made
are
secondly
and

'1 22 and 111 2, for example,

for camps.

both deal with

60

suitable

and unsuitable

locations

features
inferior
by the natural
to those provided
of the site.
And so as regards
the plan of the camp as a whole they are
compelled to adopt all kinds of shapes to conform to the lie of the
ground. .. with the result that everyone is uncertain
as to the
details of the camp and his own position in it.
The Romans, on
the other hand, prefer to undergo
the fatigue of digging
and
for the sake of having a consistent
other defensive preparations
and uniform plan for a camp which is familiar to everybody.
(Polybius
VI 42)
The use of fortified

7 on Siege Warfare),

chapter

the 9th century

fortified

BC.

The palace reliefs

camps are round,

are fortified

have a formalized

internal

VII),

in the centre.
and

chapter

camp at Plataea,

the Persian

army

be defeated

Persians

in the 4th century

entrenching
Messenians
failing

from as early

of siege

but

two roads intersecting

camps

are

the

and appear to
at right

siege camps at Syracuse

mentions

as

Assyrian

stylized,

intervals

at regular
with

illustrate

fairly

are no doubt

arrangement

examples

Nimrud

below (see

(Book

below

discussed

(see

7 on Siege Warfare).

The Persian
protect

at from

with turrets

Thucydides

early

other

sieges will be discussed

and these are well documented

the representations

camps;

angles

during

encampments

for

to protect

and to provide

(Herodotus

BC fortified

in allied

was fortified

however,

territory

not bothering

IX 15)'.

somewhere
Plutarch

it with a palisade

and palisade

and Polybius

a favourable

site for

or trench

should

the

that Iphicrates

187.2),

(Moralia
to find

to retreat

mentions

ditch

his camps with

to

with a wooden palisade

even when

criticizes

their

camp,

the
and

(V 20)'.

2Some of the defeated Persian forces took ref uge in this encampment and
Athenian
Spartans
the
arrived
keeping
reinforcements
in
out
until
succeeded
IX 70).
(Herodotus
for
Kleitos
king
Illyrian
the
a similar
3Arrian criticizes
6)
(Anab
describes
as an act of carelessness
-1
-

61

failure

which the author

Xenophon's
that

comments on encampments

it was a standard

ditch

(Cyropaedia

1113 26), and the statement

done on a nightly
detail.

basis.

The king's

Xenophon

in an organized

arranged

fashion

implies

describes

was in the centre

tent

to fortify

of the Assyrians

practice

interesting.

are particularly

around

He states

their

camp with a

that this may have been

Cyrus'

method

of the camp with

in

of camping

troops

various

it.

Everything
that every one knew his own
else was so organized
place in camp - both its size and its location...
He himself
(Cyrus)
took up his position in the middle of the camp in the
belief that this situation
Then came his
was the most secure.
followers...
most trusty
and next to them, in a circle, he had his
horsemen and charioteers...
The hoplites and those armed with
the large shields he arranged
around all the rest like a wall.
Xenophon Cyr. viii
These

6th

BC

century

contemporary
details

Persia,

method

or Greece.

fortifications

Xenophon's

etc.

for the origin

Plutarch's,

though

actually
that

which

Despite

'Tacticus'

by

this,

the

and suggest

that
in

whether
a treatise

wrote

included

probably

advice

as well as the disposition

absence

of any
this

on

of guards

though

archaeological

have

catalogued

that castrametation
the rationalization

62

that Frontinus'

camp may be more likely

argument

may simply

The evidence

in implying

(1972 158),

BC suggests

of the Roman marching

on castrametation

is correct

Aeneas

in the 4th century

fortifications

put into practice.

development

2)

arrangements

in the

BC temporary

Garlan

in Persia.

influenced

he mentions.

which

explanation

work

been

was in use at this time,

contemporary

of such treatises

The existence

have

of the camp are interesting

(Aen. Tact. xxi

own day than

to Xenophon's

perhaps

of camp organization

and internal

and patrols

Aeneas'

he may

and

of the caref ul arrangement

on castrametation

century

to be more relevant

or his own experiences

practices

some logical
Persia

are likely

observations

3.

been
above,

of 4th

evidence

can only

than

be conjecture;

theory

and

however,

was not simply

never

suggests
a Roman

of camp organization

may

have been taking

Keppie

than Garlan's

place earlier

(1984 38) sees the possible

of Roman camps and Josephus

mushrooming

(BJ

up

to the

regular

camps

colonies

(eg:

practice

of camping

to organize
Knidos

their

Keppie

Livy

in Britain

out

camps (IV-V),
B C, are fairly

defendable

Polybius

that a regular

Roman fortified

(I-III),

of the hill

the Greek
being

the examples

unable

of Priene,

be imposed

plan could

of

Greek

of planned
criticizes

even on

dated evidence

fortifications

may, indeed,

outlines.

camp V enclosing

rectangles,
Although

against

Polybius'
outline,

and it is certainly

this

description
would

illustrate

hilltop

The defencesof

to the mid 2nd century

may date to the campaigns

Roman

camps so common

camp from the Greek defended

and so have irregular

for

of these do not have

of the later

The camps at Renieblas

or rectangular

as 480 BC (11 47), as

camps as early

BC, and the earliest

dating

well surveyed

terrain,

development

and therefore

is no securely

or square

slope of La Gran Atalaya.

case on uneven

are plenty

form of the Roman period.

which

the

confine

hilltops

on the lay-out

the Roman camp to a town

(see above p. 60),

of the temporary

a square

as there

and although

(1984 38) there

rectangular

the contours

would

period.

1991 64-66).

(see below p. 75).

camps at Renieblas

suggests

not

illustrate

rectangular

the development
standard

This

the mid 2nd century

camps before
the regular

compares

camps properly

mentions

points

of town planning

incidentally

Priene),

on easily

(Owens

a steep slope

influence

Roman period

Miletus,

and Soluntum

Although

111 86 )4

of the Hellenistic

proposal

to the

the earliest

BC, follow
However

closely

the later

Sertorius

in the 80s

the fairly

steep S. W

of the Roman camp

not necessarily

not so at Renieblas.

be the

Although

the

21).
fortified
(1
Others
to
the
a
marching
camp
city
also compares
towns,
though
influence
the
of
architecture
on
military
more with
consider
forum/basilica
North
Western
(cf:
the
to
complexes
of
provinces
reference
Wheeler 1964 114).
"Vegetius

63

absence

of reliable

and introduction
many other
which

of the Roman marching

military

camp,

for which

Arrian

praises

the origins

concerning

it seems likely

the Romans adopted

procedures,

be of use,

might

any firm conclusions

data precludes

that

as with

techniques

and adapted

them (Tact-33).

site
The comments

Romans on choosing

importance

obvious
give little

attention

According

to the

of the siting

of wood and grain

advises

air and water

plateau

will

by a higher

The ability

camps,

by

to choose a
Despite

modern studies

writers,
(Polyb.

the temporary

the

tend to

VI 27; Veg. 1 22),

not be on marshy
The site should

against

remaining

become polluted
of the plain

and to a water

supply

or on land liable

ground

be healthy,

particularly

Veg. 1 22; 111 2),

The camp should

(DMC 56) and should

or near to forests,

be on a rise or

not be overlooked
gullies

or valleys

5An ability that is ascribed to Caesar (Cicero Pro Rab. 42), Vespasian (Hist.
(Acrric. 20) and Hadrian (SHA Hadrian X 6) among others.
5), Agricola
6Hanson deals with the subject in a couple
(1969
&
Richmond
Collingwood
chapter
neither
subject -

64

to

too long in the same camp because the

(111 2).

place (DMC 57; Veg. 122),

be near

camp should

for more than a few days (Onas. viii;

above the level

placed

of the good generaI5 .

of temporary

(DMC 57; Veg. II 2& 8).

and Vegetius

the great importance

place to camp.
assets

but it should

if it is to be occupied

with which historians

topiC6.

treatise

(DMC 57; Veg. 122),

to flood

a suitable

to the

and the frequency

camps indicates

is one of the ubiquitous

campsite

supplies

writers

the site of temporary

mention
the

of the treatise

II

(1978 141) whilst

of sentences
2) nor Wilson (1974) mention the

which

might

praetoria

the enemy in a sudden

assist

should

down any slope

face towards

always

the enemy

or in the direction

(DMC 56),

(DMC 57)7.

attack

The porta

(DMC 56; Veg. 1 23),

of the intended

or

(Veg

march

23).

Appian

sums up all this advice

Brutus

and Cassius

that

with

very

in his comparison

neatly

before

of Antony

of the camps of

(BC IV 107):

Philippi

The former (Brutus

& Cassius) were camped on high ground, the
latter (Antony)
fuel from the
on the plain; the former procured
the latter from the marsh; the former obtained water
mountains,
from a river,
the latter from wells freshly
dug; the former drew
their supplies
from Thasos, requiring
carriage
of only a few
Still it
stades, while the latter was 350 stades from Amphipolis.
seems that Antony was compelled to do so as he did, for there was
no other hill, and the rest of the plain, lying in a sort of hollow,
was liable to flood at times.
One imagines
category

that this camp would come under

of Imother in law',

the de munitionibus

but the passage indicates

castrorum's

the main points of a good

and a bad campsite.

Although

it is the latter

water,
were

the treatises

water

made every
army

whilst

(B. Afr. 69),

that

to

the

secure

(BC 1 73; B. Hisp. 13),

supply

line

on the

march

later

to force

in the

of wood, grain and

him

Labienus

to camp

same campaign

between

where

Caesar

there

(B. Afr.

79).

other

hand,

Marius

is supposed

was

was obliged

from the enemy than he wanted to for lack of an adequate

and

the

seem to have

harassed

further

On the

Ramparts

a camp

and commanders

to camp near a water supply.

attempt

and

camping near to supplies

to have had the most importance.

appears

constructed

occasionally

nearest

recommend

Caesar's
no water

to camp

water supply

to have deliberately

by
Hyginus,
'step-mother'
termed
'Camps in such positions
novercae,
are
Such
be
translation.
law'
'mother
in
a
more
appropriate
would
though perhaps
if
be
possible.
at
all
avoided
should
positions

65

soldiers

to fight

Clearly

access

choosing

(Plut.

a camp site,

important

Mar. 18)

perhaps

for

off

(Hist.

V 24).

flat ground

several

days

(BC 1 18),

also warn against

writers

of temporary

construction

providing

taken

by surprise

under

other

there

during

were other

The dangers
Caesar's

then flooded

which

of

campaign

and cut his

of Civilis

the revolt

to have had no choice

but to camp on

the camps were washed away.

additional

factors

Rivers,

for camps and to

security

for

the labour

camps.

this

extra

camping

too near to forests,

in forest

involved

Some generals

security,

clearing

attempted
Caesar.

most notably

by the Gauls (BG 11128) and Germans

gullies

etc.

for the

to get away
He was twice

(BG VI 37), because

and the enemy were able to advance

cover.

Historical
the nature
this

However,

and also during

on the edge of a forest

he was camping

in

(BG 11 5).

and Hanson (1978 141) considers

without

two rivers

also be used to provide

in supplies

The treatise

importance

overriding

to flood are illustrated

Here the Romans appear

could

his

had to be considered.

and when the Rhine flooded

however,

79).

B. Mr.

that

in Spain when he camped between

army

to encourage

was of great

importance,

of primary

features

oo near land liable

camping

supply

water

to the enemy (eg:

topographical

supply

to an adequate

such as proximity

bring

from a water

a site for his camp some distance

chosen

sources

frequently

of the ground

no doubt

refers

When the topographical

is usually

(eg:

camp was protected

by

BG V 57; BC 1131; B. Hisp. 28; Hist. 1119),

and

mention that a temporary

to the rise

or plateau

surroundings

the case that it is situated

recommended

by the treatises.

of a camp are mentioned

on a rise (eg:

66

by a writer,

it

BG 118; BG 111 19; BC III

37).

Caesar mentions

slope a mile long

the hill,

they

situated

beneath

higher

(BG 111 19),

a hill

The archaeological
in the treatises
details

beside

ground

and was presumably

of marching
marching

topographical
or other

defendable

water

supply.

Those camps without

to a steep

close

usually

situated

therefore,

sided

are

further

river

valley).

to ensure

very

within

as the treatises

recommend.
as well as the

are ensured
immediately

Rey Cross,
Marching

good visibility
from

away

camps for

are on rising

a water supply
(eg:

i below provides

half

and nearly

supply,

from a supply

well the advice

very

41 are stationed

site and good visibility

on plateaux

camps

supply,

water

an easily

fairly

but the

with a small

Of the 51 marching

camps".

water

or other

not too distant

secured

Figure

camps.

data wp-rpavailable,

Thus

generally

one camp

do not recommend,

for the most part illustrates

on the siting

a river

mentions

up

of the camp below.

evidence

of a river

it and charged

Livy

properly.

which the treatises

the safety

of particular

which adequate
easy reach

to fight

had been captured,

to ensure

certain

(44.3)

at the top of a gentle

so when the Gauls attacked

were too exhausted

ground

garrison

that one camp was on high ground

available

the camp is

where
camps

in

Wales

supplies

defendable

ground,

(eg:

are

Here,

on all sides.

water

are

Pigwn,

Ystradfellte).

A number
valleys,

of camps are on less easily

eg:

Bromfield

with a few exceptions

ground.

However,

and Marcus,
such as Ythan

but good visibility

usually

is still

in river

possible,

Wells, camps are not overlooked

it is often the case that the defence of temporary

and

by higher
camps are

first
because
in
the
the
instance
these
various
chosen
were
camps
of
defences.
The
details
dimensions
of
of
provided
reports
archaeological
being
basis
information
the
of
provided
sufficient
on
picked
were
remainder
for
for
bibliographical
For
references
analysis.
reports
in the archaeological
i.
fig.
below
these sites, see
"Many

67

extended

to maximize

the defensive

camps are not always

have

been

enclosing

camp

down

put

particular

at Renieblas

enclose

have been discussed

is much

that

ground

more

According

for a camp to occupy

Most camps,

high

ground

or knolls

Ardoch

III

and Dolau.

camps

were

above

on two

sided gully

between

As stated

there

position

of marching
Camps could

river.

passes,

and mountain
Rey

9Eg:

Cross

on

Pennymuir

"Probably

the

noted

line

C, PSA Newc

the bracchia

of

area,

within

such

precautions

were

factors

over

a knoll
a steep
unseen.

to the west of the

could

of occupying

influence

the

a rise above a

and fords,

valleys

commanding

vaUeys;

crossings

the

felt

(1929 144-5)'0.

which

and Pen-y-Gwyrd,

march

covered

an enemy to approach
Merdancho

as

here the

and although

by Schulten

to command river

eg: YstradfeUte
main

immediate

and in addition

camps beside the importance

be sited

enclosed

An annexe of Camp III enclosed

be other

might

this might

seem to have been sited

additional

camp IV and the river

by a bracchium,

above,

the

have enabled

site were ensured

the

this was to

nearby,

or fully

however,

to the south,

river

which might otherwise

Communications

(1924 108),

high ground

within

sides,

to secure the water supply.

the Aldehuela

camps

is an irregular

there

plan,

of

purpose

p. 63), and although

This is the case at Renieblas,

rivers

the

plans

the camp defence.

Kerse.

any

overlooking

in

irregular

of the Republican

to Crawford

eg: Little

to enclose

necessary

defence

regular

for

than

rather

by the camp as at Esgairperfedd,

enclosed

an annexe,

some slightly

above (see above,

strengthen

would

If it was not convenient

be partly

errors

The irregular

in the N. E corner.

extension

though

shape,

to surveying
ground9.

Raedykes

at

of a regular

As a result,

of the ground.

potential

Pennines;

Wooden

r
o)ep,

the

(1935-6)
107-12.
vu

used by Caesar were similar

68

(! Q 1 73; B. Hisp. 13).

confluence

and Annan Hill,

of two major rivers,

beside

important

might

have arisen

command

rivers,

a pass,

archaeological
it seems that

high

between occupying
being

and

to a water

close

that this

suggests

evidence

in such cases a compromise

might be provided

(eg:

camp III;

On the whole it is impossible

during

necessary

Finally,

although
this

ground,

a couple

marshy

advice

the

treatises,

usually

hills

ground,

Camp

whether

tree clearance

ground

is generally

are

camps

marching

or knolls,

avoided

(RCAHM

of pollen sampling

is available.
some marshy

enclosed

avoided

generally

took place if

This may have been

camps.

from the results

been

surprise

wherever

possible"

in keeping

because,

situated

usually

with

the

on higher

above rivers.

defences

Polybius,
other

against

and protect

of the camps considered

seems to have

However,
of

camps III and IV,

but this is the only site for which such information

Brecknock),

for

defence

Additional

(eg: Renieblas

of marching

indicated

the case at Ystradfellte,

and

Kerse).

to determine

the construction

The literary

be made.

ground

Little

defence or to

was not a common occurrence,

to secure the water supply

Renieblas

for improved
supply.

would

BC 173; B. Hisp. 13), or to enclose higher

attacks

ground

and Wandel,

In some cases a conflict

crossings.

river

probably

Kintore

Eskbank,

Onasander

than fairly

and Josephus

general

provide

ditch.
defence

in detail,

potential

danger

both writers

about camp defence,

about the use of a rampart

statements

It is the de munitionibus

few details

castrorum
indicating

and the type of soil.

and Vegetius
that

these varied

The de munitionibus

or palisade

and

who describe

the

according

castrorum

to the

suggests

and Chew Green III all enclose marshy ground

"Arosfa
Careg, Esgairperfedd
lack
be
this
to
through
in
of space.
seems
though
case
each
in one corner,

69

five

methods

lines

men (DMC 48).

of armed

friable

for the construction

author

suggests

armed

guards

discipline

3ft deep,

vulnerable
and ditch
extensions

(DMC 51-53).

or ditch
trench

a single

to the de munitionibus

according

V-shaped

and either

or Punic,

or a single

The
row of

seems to be to maintain

covering

each entrance
following

of the rampart

dimensions
castrorum

are

and Josephus

by a palisade

of pointed

wooden stakes
(1 24).

camp, carried

60 ft in front

of it,

an arc around

camp defence
with

stakes

part

stretch

of the

for either

notes

that

empty

bags to fill

conditions.

FinaUy,

Vegetius

(I

de munitionibus
were topped
(111 8) 13; the

method were carried

who copied

by the

the Roman

of sand bags could be made if the camp

(111 10) and it seems quite

have carried

The various

The ramparts

the Persians,

12

in two sections

he considers.

those

at the

of rampart

of the gateway

and ditch

purposes.

used presumably

or rubble

and by claviculae,

(1 24; 1118) or wooden caltrops

bags so a rampart

area

of rampart

along

of turf

defencer were provided

a short

for comparative

Vegetius

empty

was in a sandy

below,

tabulated

the rampart

whilst

be 5ft wide and

should

and titulum,

dimensions

are the only

castrorum,

Additional

by the sanctum

gateways

24; 111 8) and these

desert

and

stockade

are used if the soil is too

(DMC 52) and this

was sufficient

lists the different

Vegetius

would

three

rampart

place,

be 8ft wide and 6ft high.

should

soldiers

of a regular

stakes,

rampart,

as much as security.

The ditch,

strong

The last

in a secure

that

ditch,

for a camp;

of protection

with

likely

that

sand and construct

twice mentions

the Romans too

a rampart

in

that if the camp is being

12The interpretation
of the clavicula
of the description
76-78.
below
disputed;
is
pp.
see
castrorum

in the de munitionibus

for origins

and below pp. 78-80 for

"See above pp-60-64

palisade stakes -

of marching
70

camps,

pitched
drawn

up in battle

line to protect

from Virgil

a quotation

Table illustrating

of the infantry

all the cavc-dry and part

near the enemy,

4-

on the same matter'

recommended
BJ III

of defences"

dimensions

DMC

1118), and includes

(125;

those entrenching

Veg. i

.
Veg.

Veg.
6
jil

iji

17

Ditch

depth

6ft

3ft

7ft

9ft

3ft

Ditch

width

6ft

5ft

9ft

12ft

5ft

6ft

3ft

4ft

Rampart
eig t
Rampart

of entrenching

ing in the presence

attacked

a protective

procedure
The number

of the enemy.

entrenching

whilst
labour

in this

camp behind

seems to have been a standard

cavalry

Veg.
11

ivl

9-17ft

8ft

width

The practice

be

should

illustrates

and

for a Roman army entrenchof times Roman armies

the vulnerability

(BG 11 19; BG 111 28; Appian

screen of infantry

BC V 110),

were

of an army engaged
and Tacitus

explains

why:
business in such close
Even entrenching
camp was a perilous
to the enemy, for there was the threat that scattered
proximity
disorder
into
in
digging
be
thrown
would
parties of men engaged
by a sudden sortie.
Hist. 111 26.
The standard

first
for
been
the
have
to
seems

practice

acies to be drawn

up for battle

whilst

the third

two lines of the triplex

line fortified

the camp (BG I

49; BC 1 41; B. Afr. 51).

14

Veg. 1 19; the quotation

'5 For discussion

p. 75.
16

For camp likely

"For

ditch

"'Camp

of the

is from Georgics
archaeological

111 346-8.

evidence,

see below

to be attacked.

dug in friable

for long-term

soil.

occupation

(summer
71

or winter).

p. 74 and

graph,

Commanders
by ancient

who failed

of the Roman army in Africa

that

to entrench

recruit's

training

adlocutio

(Veg. I 21).

(CIL VIII

exercise

2532/18042

The treatise

writers

or hostile

territory,

of a

aspects

in Britain,

and Hadrian's

was a fairly
However,

that

states

most important

of practice

demoralized
each

African

common

military

(1968) has

since Davies

I do not intend

camps,

to

recommends,
necessary
munitionibus

or

"with
)20

when entrenching

in friendly

when camping
castrorum
in

explanation

palisade

the

light

were criticized

ac si hostes adessat;
- see chapter
circumstances

territory

of Appian's

"as though

and trench

could

that

this

was bringing

the

sources

were

defence

were

mean that

and

The latter
criticism

ditch

as Vegetius
might

place,

not

be

as the de

seems to be the more

of Antony

alongside

for the same failing,

night,

as if the enemy

or a secure

he were camping

for

camping

a friend

" (B C

see above p. 61.

the agmen quadratum

was used
5 on The Order of March.

72

every

near to the enemy,

as a rampart

(DMC 52).

suqcfests

and ditch

commanders

statement

such

literary

camps were entrenched

a rampart

This

defence

that

the camp was in friendly

that when Metellus

mentions

camp defence

of marching

in the other

army up to scratch,

more substantial

generally

is a hint

Sallust

(Jucr. 45

strength

of the enemy, and whether

one was fortified

at hand"

the

that

and there

may have been the case.

"iuxta

2487).
ILS
=

suggest

on the proximity

19Greek

a comment

Vegetius

Common and Tomen-y-Mur,

with the subject

depended

without

included

camps are well known

camp building

criticisms

them here.

consider

likely

Practice

that

dealt comprehensively

close

45)
J
U-g
!
.

(Sallust.

a camp was one of the

indicates

also

were often criticized

of Metellus

the arrival

in Wales, at Landidrodd

particularly

and

before

the camps were not fortified

learning

armies at night

BC IV 130; Hist. IV 75), and the general

(Appian

writers

their

to entrench

under

the

same

83).

Although

Iphicrates

like

some generals

above p. 61), it seems from this evidence

a camp every

This

in southern

particularly

Augusta

is known

to have

St Joseph

as the result

of destruction

of some of the soils

through

may have been considered

not

be dismissed

fortifications

or simply

fortifications

or

on the sides

palisades

protection

the palisade

21
.

with the exception

include

at all

and the failure

to produce

crop

marks.

However,

or client

kings,

This would not explain

of titulum

the absence

may have

must

had very

slight

was not felt to be much

that

Tacitus

states

had earthworks

to front

and rear,

1 50).

A palisaded

but only
would

be

for a camp were the rampart

and ditch,

the

for the vulnerable

gateways,

and

generally

(Polybius

line of defence

one of

trace.

or clavicula

of the palisade

a long excursus

camps

but the possibility

Britain,
areas

it is

marching

(see above)
and
,

(Annals

Historians

Roman

of the

years

II

Legion

Roman armies do seem to have camped with slight

of defence

main forms

The three

early

(DMC 48) if there

a palisade

to leave any archaeological

unlikely

the

where

and building,

areas of southern

camps in Germany

Germanicus'

additional

none

Britain

camps in some

agriculture

of pro-Roman

from the enemy.

of a threat

of marching

place.

the absence of camps in these areas

the camps in these

that

(see

it safe

or a secure

western
in

unnecessary.

camps in other

of marching

areas

in the territory

that

and south

campaigned

in these

territory

the absence

(1958 94) explains

occupation.

possible

for

be one explanation

could

areas,

night,

played

that arn-des may not have entrenched

friendly
in
were

if they

clearly

provide

stakes,
XVIII

few details

about which
18; Livy

archaeological
2'Because
of the lack of accurate
discuss
this
to
intend
do
matter
I
not
dimensions,
73

about these defence

both Polybius

and Livy

33 5; see also p. 70 & pp. 78-

data concerning
here.

rampart

80).

Caesar only

twice

of his camp defence

the width

mentions

(PG 11 5; jjC

141),

and at 18ft and 15ft these are much wider than most of the recommenda-

tions

tabled

attack

upon

where

his

the

evidence,

under

trenches.

At Carlops,

are not continuous

is fairly

wider

and deeper,

Durno,

small,

camps should,

states

all

shaped,

though

and Ardoch
ditch

III,

has never

of

there
whilst

marching

are a couple
that

been recorded

of the ditch

side,

of semi-permanent

the

side,

the ditch

is

Secure

camps

were
in

of the possibilities

to identify

features

vary

of the soil.

nature

possible

be based on other

of

because of solid rock

eastern

1969 14), in the light

it is not

the

on the dimensions

affect

north

ditches

the

of ballistaria

pits and the presence

Almost

on the sandy

that

to know

On the clay of the western

of the more friable

above,

perhaps,

trenches

of the

Malham and Rey Cross the ditches

on the size of the defence.

solely

permanent

case

and the geological

than elsewhere

it stands.

& Richmond

mentioned

because

screen

at Gogar Green the dimensions

whereas

because

(Collingwood

variation

Clyde,

Little

whereas

Richmond

Although
larger

also have a considerable

of the soil on which

ditch

an

in the latter

it is impossible

of course,

or are much shallower

near to the surface,

because

a protective

the camps were constructed,

which

of the site could

nature

likely

seems very

behind

may have expected

army.

archaeological

circumstances

and this

entrenched

of Afranius'

proximity

With

his fortifications,
troops

Caesar

in both cases,

However,

above.

a camp as semi-

identification

of such

such as lines of rubbish

defence.
the
the
size
of
on
much
as
as

camps

which

at Dunning

which

have

been

are flat-bottomed,
is U-shaped.

are

V-

such as Finavon

The use of the Punic

in the defence of a marching

74

examined

camp, and the only

two

known

examples

(CoDingwood

from

are

& Richmond

forts

the

at

Hod

Hill

and

Cawthorn

1969 p. 13).

3. M

Z. 5a

2.84

1. se

B. &S

a.88I
0.60

e. so

1.08

1. se

Be

Z. 50

WIDI14

Graph

to illustrate

The dimensions

depth

where ditches
around

the 3ft recommended

almost

all

treatise.

the

ditches

In a large

approximately

are

much

the advice

in the literary

munitionibus

castrorum

recommended

dimensions
obviously

22
.A

have.

5ft

the

comparison
suggests

recommended

figures

for a ditch

"Because

The

only

but

in this
trench

is

than the 1.6: 1 ratio

evidence

with the exception

are considerably

was safe.

of the

width

of the archaeological
that,

metres deep,
or deeper,

castrorum,

the

examples,

and Vegetius'

thought

than

even bearing

are 0.8-1.5

a ratio of 2: 1 rather

giving

of ditches

S.

With a few exceptions,

most ditches

wider

of the

sources

4.58

considerably,

by the de munitionibus

twice its depth,

suggested

vary

might

shallow,

number

in the treatise

commanders

soil types

are particularly

4. ae

MIR

camp trenches

differing

3. se

of camp trenches.

arid width

of marching

in mind the affect

IN

3.08

larger

in friable

with

of the de
soil,

the

than what Roman

examples

with

defence

of the edges, many of these ditches

of erosion
were probably
these
to
depth
have been
ratios
of
width
so
may originally
wider
originally
by
the
treatises.
that
to
recommended
closer

75

anywhere

Bernhardsthal
France.

camps in Britain

to argue

The de munitionibus
defence

titulum

this

that

to have come under

be used

could

is straightforward,

than any

attack

sample available

for this

with any certainty.

is the only treatise

castrorum

in

which have been dated

but because of the tiny

at any time,

it is impossible

gateway

were more likely

wars,

are

and Liercourt-Erondelle

It may be the case that those on the Danube,

to the Marcommanic

area,

Danube

on the

Kollnbrunn

and

(i & ii)

and Vegetius

by Josephus

the sizes suggested

near

to describe

(DMC 49-50;

but the description

55).

the additional

The design

of the clavicula

of the

is somewhat

ambiguous;
The clavicula is traced round a circle from a line on the inside of
the rampart from a point in the middle of the gate, the compasses
wide open to the edge of the gate; from this centre point you
draw an arc in front of the road following
the same line which is
fixed at the centre of the gate.
Then with the compasses in the
same place you add the width of the rampart and draw another
arc on the same line so that those going in are always unprotected
line are kept out.
DMC 55
and those coming in a straight
Lenoir

(1979 89-90)

with

extensions

that

these

structions

Lenoir

unlike

allow

castrorum
ly.

around

the arc as Domaszewski

additional
clearly

defence

refers

The use of a single

of the rampart

titulum

(1912 fig p. 119),

of the trench

clavicula
76

castrorum

only;

of the clavicula
although

to the use of both clavicula

internal

the recon-

the

the ditch

is

and Stolle suggest.

his interpretation
of the

He dismisses

to the de munitionibus

is an extension

that

of the camp, and

and exterior

with a continuation

claviculae.

According

the titulum,

to a double clavicula,

1 fig. 8) and Stolle

(1887 Tafel

extension.

(1979 93) admits

the

on the interior

internal

are single

along the rampart

is referring

were an arc of 90 degrees.

of Domaszewski

not extended

that the writer

of the rampart

extensions

both of which

clavicula,

believes

could,

the

not

de munitionibus

and titulum
however,

would

simultaneous-

easily

be used in

conjunction

a titulum,

with

Domaszewski
reconstructions
castrorum,

of the

would

and the length

double

of the rampart

described

traced

Since Lenoir

castrorum.

the treatise

of the gateway

the single
own study
marching
double

is referring

internal

clavicula

of gate types

the circle

suggests

external

Stolle's

interpretation

ological

traces

as stated
of either

As stated

above,

Stolle

above,

be considered

treatise.

However,

experimentation

in the

does

design

Lenoir
is very

Stolle no doubt

and Lenoir's
in

claviculae

2), and

(1979 88) admits

that

to the archae-

similar

used the archaeological

in the de munitionibus
of this treatise

alone,

castrorum,

the interpreta-

may be correct.

clavicula
odd that

slightly

used type,

shows that

3, Dalswinton

or Domaszewski

there

in the survey

(eg: Troutbeck

on the evidence

use of an internal

it might

and titulum.

clavicula

clavicula

and

to suggest

rare

the description

to explain

clavicula

External

of the internal

by

mentioned

(1977 tab 1).

of these gate types.

to try

evidence

or external,

it seems reasonable

2).

in the

ambiguities

this

even more so (Troutbeck

likely

most

is internal

was the most frequently

confirms

of

de munitionibus

around

of the camps included

camps are comparatively

claviculae

though

to an internal

types

in the

the clavicula

extension

be the

The only

clavicula.

to be whether

The suggestions

to

appear

could not be easily used simultaneously,

Analysis

tions

would

defence

gateway

appear

the de munitionibus

that

therefore,

and not Lenoir's

paragraph

titulum

although

Stolle,

and

'.
2
rare

this is very

and titulum
this

seem to have

of fort

should
been

is extremely

rare and

be advocated
a certain

and camp gateways

by the

amount

in the later

of
1st

23Lenoir cites only two examples - Glenwhelt Leazes and Chapel Rigg (1979 9091), both of which may be practice camps (Wilson 1974 344). Chew Green IV
(1934
50-61)
though
Richmond
internal
titulum
both
clavicula,
and
also has
camp.
this as a semi-permanent
identified
77

century

AD (eg:

Newstead,

the de munitionibus

castrorum

of camp organization
also suggest

Additional

defence

mentioned
Polybius

and

although

the latter's

Livy

not the primary

both

describe

description,

one, it is slightly

an innovative

the

use

of

wooden

not

wooden

stakes

based heavily

palisades

(see above p. 70).

and Vegetius

castrorum

being

should

by

the

method

24

defence

be provided

by the de munitionibus

and since

seems no reason why the treatise

of gateway

could

type entrances),

claims to be propounding

( 45), there

a new type

Stracathro

Crawford,

their

and

use,

and
is

on that of Polybius,

clearer:

The Romans cut light forked stakes with three or perhaps four
branches,
as a general rule, so that each soldier could comfortably carry several at once, with his arms hanging on his back;
the boughs
and they plant them so close together and interweave
to tell to which branch each trunk
so completely that it is difficult
is joined or to which trunk each branch belongs.
Moreover, the
branches
little space for
are so sharp as to leave, interlaced,
inserting
the hand, so that there is nothing that can be grasped
branches bind one another
and pulled out, since the interwoven
together;
and, if one is by chance pulled out, it leaves a small
gap and is easily replaced.
Livy 33.5.
Various
(Livy

sources

mention

Per. 57; Dio xvii

7 valli

carried

camps (Cicero

63; Cicero

each (Livy
Tusc. 2 16).

for a camp stockade

142),

soldiers

with

24The use of
(Llandidrod
been to give
little doubt
114).

Caesar,

bundles

Tusc. 2 16);

on the other

that soldiers

of wooden stakes

Scipio's

soldiers

or valli

at Numantia

for use in the entrenchment

specificaUy

fetched
have
be
to
would

and it seems possible

palisade

Per. 57),

carrying

hand,

mentions

from a considerable

did not always carry

of

that materials
distance

materials

(BC

for the

them.

the internal clavicula and titulum together on a few practice camps

Common xvi, Chapel Rigg, Glenwhelt Leazes) may simply have
the troops practice with both types of defence since there seems
that they were in use at the same time (St Joseph 1958 93; 1969

78

Bennett

(1982)

identified

discusses

defence,

here 25 Bennett
.

either

form of the wooden caltrops

a camp wit
these

(DMC 51-53),

used in Germany

or a camp of the type

how they

could
that

obstacle

used is difficult

any attacker

have been positioned

Vegetius

describes

Chesters

type,

prove

Although

the valli
several

other

the

could

which

after

stakes

branches

than

caltrops

(111 8) do form the palisade

an affect

similar

to that

a spiked

stakes

as

of the Great
an effective

be moved and yet would

were palisade

be a prefabricated
and Livy

stakes

version

of

and mentioned

by
in

have been much easier to carry

by

Polybius

and

on top of the rampart,

and their

79

These may

or on ramparts

would prove

that the stakes

of barbed

25For a description
of these objects
Warfare.
Siege
7
on
chapter

to provide

(1982 204).

use"

described

bundles

create

'grip'

not easily

would

such stakes

explains

(1982 204).

"three

that

by Polybius

described

Bennett

suggests,

may well indeed

they

that

authors;

states

the suggestion

rejects

or palisade

as Bennett

at the central

and dismantle

1 believe

in twos or threes

Bennett

together

or picket,

Bennett

(1982 203),

would

(111 8).

easy to erect

for

to have

is reported

though

have to negotiate

in gateways,

lashed

fence

temporary

to determine,

be tied together

easily

or to defend

the soil was too friable

Germanicus

As

1 50).

(Annals

How they were actually

to the rampart,

for example,

if,

in the

(1982 204; Veg. 1118).

by Vegetius

mentioned

and ditch

of the various

defence or as a type of palisade

gateway

they could be used in addition

out rampart

erroneously

fort
for
in
or
are
use
camp

the stakes

believes

as an additional

a type of palisade,

his discussion

and I shall not repeat

as pila muralia,

explanations

of the wooden stakes

the identification

wire,

though

identification

Livy.

Vegetius'

and these would

Bennett

is no doubt

as pila muralia,

see

correct

to dismiss

rampart

and tied together

173;

use of these

the

stakes

to have provided

ProPortions

a very

to width

or

and Josephus

castrorum

depending

rectangular,

VI 32).

Vegetius,

mentioned

ratio

(1 23),

or oval

The influence

86ff),
the

number

although

of

advocating

legions

or oblong,

encamped

the 3: 2 length

to

triangular

depending

above (p. 68), and although

on the

the siting

of towns

influenced

by the emphasis

the greater

by the topography

(IV

Vegetius

1-2),

on defence that pervades

of ditches

that

or rectangles.

Wilson (1974 343) states that

in proportion,

though

he does point

camps

dated

by

Flavian

out that
Hanson

80

when discussing

camp shapes

his work.

may be

This may also

he recommends.

camps are for the most part

of marching

120 acre

about

that the lines

of the site (eg:

and contours

and his statement

dimensions

examples

gives the same advice

camps

in the shapes of

irregularities

it is only in the earliest

dictated

are totally

The majority

of the site on the shape of marching

of the topography

see above p. 63).

series

is either

and that of Polybius

triangular

round,

camps are frequent,

of

both recommend a rectangu-

states that the camp could be square,

above,

Renieblas,

explain

on

however,

or square,

has been discussed

of defence

are

of the site (111 8).

topography

marching

19) and which

be 3: 2 (DMC 21; Veg. III

camp should

lar shape for the camp (DMC 21; Bj III

width

1985

(Webster

solid protection.

ratio of a marching

The de munitionibus

(Polyb.

the

of camps

The length

square

simply

1989 fig

Le Bohec

into

thrust

have suggested

(1982 203), as others

Junk@Amann 1986 fig. 18 p. 228;

unlikely

as being

there

fairly

squares

regular

camps tend to be square

were exceptions.

(1987 132-3)

to the

The

Agricolan

campaigns
the

near

included
width

in Scotland

3: 2 recommended
in the tables

3: 2.

Interestingly,

squares.

to be unique

sample used was relatively

method

of

munitionibus

of the camp should

defence

of this
of the

properly
a pitched

battle

Under

normal

(BC 111 95, after

form up outside

size

of a particular

differing

opinions

camps,
army

the

of many

too few soldiers

therefore,

on campaign.

of the number

is the

26-9,
to hold

after
the

the entrenched

enemy attack

can provide
However,

not

be

a defeat

in

could

the second
perimeter.
army would

(BG 111 19).

some indications
historians

have

of men per acre to be used in calculating

81

and

The principal

for example following

that

size

of men and supplies,

Hist. III

de

the

so the overall

a camp perimeter

Pharsalus;

were

by

size of army and encampment

necessary;

the camp if it came under

The sizes of marching

Although

be the case (1 22 & 111 8).

it seems likely

circumstances

and Inchtuthil

described

arrangement

between

when

if there

have

by the treatises.

suggested

in times of desperation,

of Cremona),

fortresses

that the surveyors

to the number

should

relationship

ramparts

defended

and

be proportionate
this

to be slightly

fortress.

is based upon the size of the army,

also suggests

importance

battle

surveying

castrorum

of approxi-

and the size of camps

castrorum

camp

to

(eg:
1.2:
1
of

ratio

Lambaesis),

it appears

small,

camps

(length

square

of legionary

for a legionary

ratio

marching

and so appear

Neuss,

camps did not use the 3: 2 ratio

The de munitionibus

Vegetius

very

to width

have a ratio

to width

a number

(Caerleon,

the same ratio

with its 1: 1 ratio appears

The

has a length

group

of the

or almost

and the two camps at Y Pigwn),

approximately

marching

(fig. i) are square

below

The largest

Esgairperfedd
elongated

Nine

by the treatises.

of 1: 1 or 1: 1.1) , and the same number

ratios

mately

with a length

rectangular

are all roughly

of the
very
the

strength

in this

of an army

Suggestions

and

including

also

the number

way.

points

some of the

out

of 'dead space' within

possibility

might

that

is an attempt

force

(eg:

Onasander

x 16; Front.

such a ruse would be necessary

have taken
(Roy's

place in Britain.

interpretation

Richmond
Hanson

suggests

prefers

According

It

whereas
ing
has

been

Because
extension

that

the

basic

of Rey Cross,

lay-out

1969 11) whilst

& Richmond

for one legion

in

infantry

1934 50-61),

by St Joseph

interior
the
of

within

the camp

completely

when he

held

one legion

as the

arrangements

(St Joseph

cavalry"

force"

(St Joseph

possible

site

of camps

from
the gateways,
roads

82

and a

"an
legion
additional
a
with
and

camp at Durno has been described

of almost overwhelming

internal

cavalry

the same allocation.

received

camp at Rey Cross

no doubt

auxiliary

space allocations

(1981 48) seems to ignore

partly

the 58 ha (143 acre)

identified

the

& McIntyre

of auxiliaries,

"a concentration

from 240 men per acre

the legionaries,

different

and auxiliary

suggested

(Richmond

complement

that seems to

of the de munitionibus

internal

castrorum,

all received

the legionaries

vexillation

whether

castrorum.

infantry

has been

camp, and

one wonders

based on the space allocation

(DMC 1; 16; 25) which Maxwell

suggests

range

300 men per acre (Collingwood

to the de munitionibus

and auxiliary

though

to 480 (Grillone's

of the presumed

of space ,

the size of his

small scale warfare

The suggestions

380 per acre,

the de munitionibus

5),

Ii

exercise,

assignment

the enemy about

in the fairly

of Polybius)

On the basis

castrorum).

Strat.

this

in a marching

of troops

to deceive

by the general

in

He does not mention one other

camps.

the density

affect

the different

lists

problems
a larger

which required

of cavalry,

and the inclusion

which

(1980 142-3)

Hanson

can

1983 24),

as represent1978 281) and

of Mons Graupius.
be traced

it is possible

by the

to apply

the

rules

of the de munitionibus

suitable

examples.

to them,

castrorum

of the figures,

For explanations

Rey Cross (7.53 ha, 18.6 acres)

Total forces:
Infantry
1 legion with (v lst coh
5120

ala

oD

1 coh eq
1 coh eq
2 coh quing
scouts

800
480
960
200

Total:
Density

Durno

7560
of troops

per acre = c.

see figure

ii below

are
-

Cavalry
720
240
120

1080

8640

46016.

(58 ha, 143 acres)

Totalforces:
2 legions
with oDIst coh
15 cohort
vexillation
with 2 aD1st cohorts
1 ala. aD
11 quingenary
alae
1 coh eq -m
17 quingenary
coh eq
5 milliary
infantry
cohorts
25 quing.
infantry
cohorts
marines
scouts
guards
equites
sinqulares
pedites
sinqulares.

Infantry
10240

of troops

Cavalry

7840

800
8160
4000
12000
600
200
160

720
5632
240
2040

600
300
44300

Total

Density

and Rey Cross and Durno

9232

53532

374"'
acre
c.
per
=
-

Imperial measurements
261t should be noted that for ease of comparison
in
troops
density
discussion
during
marching camps.
of
of
used

are

the calculations,
the size
27Because of the irregularity
of Durno, to facilitate
fit,
largest
that
the
to
has
been
possible
square
could
reduced
of each plot
800
880
840
ft
600
has
been
to
dimensions
5,
reduced
x
a
x
of
x
thus plot
with
15 acres of unused
in approximately
This has resulted
600 x 800 ft area.
density
be
troops
the
thus
the
could
actually
of
much
camp;
within
ground
Durno
be
Severan
believes
Hassall
415
to
may
(up
per acre).
higher
c.
1.5
),
but
Durno
is
times
the
the
(pers.
huge
size
its
of
comm.
size
because of
(probably
the
de
contains
which
the
castrorum
munitionibus
camp in
is
large
by
imperial
and
so
even
campaign,
such
an
theoretical)
army of
standards -

83

According

to these theoretical

have

one legion

held

perhaps

not

campaign

Durno,

time

province

(AD
it

withdrawn,

however,
known

to garrison

units
barely

that

defences

of camp III

one giant

at Ardoch

and again this

calculations

munitionibus

acre.

that

of Durno

entire

leaving

had
army

been

of one

a bare handful
much of which

castrorum

although

of the camp defences

of
was

are fully

at Durno

is

of more than one camp have been

camp of unrealistic
known

castrorum

size.

However,

and at 48.6 ha, this

camp.

Like Durno,

army (up to c. 50,000 assuming

the
is 1.3

Ardoch

III

of c. 400

a density

seems unlikely.

of

the

density

giving

the reconstruction

seems improbable,

of

troops

leading

an exact

de

army in this treatise

is

acre

figure

of Rey Cross

to the

from

the

per

the hypothetical

are correct;

c. 41,000 and the camp c. 86.3 acres,

However,

Although

auxiliaries
the

almost

on

could have held

period.

of the province,

of the defences

could have held a very large

Grillone's

that

on one campaign,

times the size of the de munitionibus

per acre)

accompanying

cavalry,

on one legion

of the Hadrianic

the reconstruction

to form

reconstructed

based

could

territory2ll.

and that fragments

wrong,

plus

the whole of the rest

consolidated

It is conceivable

including

to the same theories,

to believe

be concentrated

would

Rey Cross

units,

an army

of Britain

garrison

hard

for

according

122) one legion

seems

of auxiliary

force

an unreasonable

almost the entire

by this

a number

with

therefore,

reconstructions,

of 475 men per

may be acceptable,

suggestion

that

the space

3
2"The AD 122 diploma (CIL XVI 64 lists 1 milliary ala and 12 quingenary,
My
Durno
has
1
34
reconstruction
of
quingenary.
milliary
milliary cohorts and
42
6
11
cohorts
n-dBiary
and
quingenary.
quingenary,
ala and

84

allowances

advocated
it

practice,

Units

However,

as implied

Clearly

there

(Onasander
Any figure
is that

the

of troops

between

(150

Fendoch
ha

per

)31
.

this is of little

in a marching

use

camp.

size of camp and size of army

guess at the density

by the de munitionibus

in marching

acre

castrorum,
of troops

number

but one can only

propounded

more generous

about twice as much space

required

from 300 to 350 per acre seems reasonable.

the theory

the density

a much

60 per

Heidenheim

was some relationship

x 16),

by the de munitionibus

to establish

attempting

of

30

received

that cavalry

than

men per length

c. 100 men per acre (240 per ha),

ha),

per

than proving

other

as infantry,
when

(530

acre

In

more spaciously

meant fewer

this

fortifications

eg: Inchtuthil

of space,

much

camped

even though

treatise,

in permanent

camped

c. 200 per

troops

that

are

castrorum

the camp have to be defended

should

allocation

likely

seems

in this

suggested
rampart

by the de munitionibus

unrea]iStiC29.

of troops

per acre.

What does seem likely

castrorum

camps was not practised

concerning

in the field.

Conclusions
There is a clear agreement
literary
advise

and archaeological,
that camps should

2'These allocations
ydS2.
10
cavc-dry

the situation

concerning
be situated

are as follows:

and the other evidence,

the treatises

between

on rising

legionary

ground

ydS2

of camps.

both

The treatises

near to a water supply

auxiliary
,

infantry

ydS2,

12.2
be
there
30However,
in
cm of rampart per
the
would
given
examples
since
to
Durno,
this
3.05
seem
not
would
man
at
Cross
per
cm
Rey
only
and
at
man
be a serious problem.
full
fortress
&
forts
these
at
are
at
"Assuming
that
units
presumed
22
Inchtuthil,
50
figures
These
man
at
give
ydS2
per
theoretical
strength.
do
Heidenheim
Thus
the
Heidenheim.
1112
at
cavalry
at
Fendoch
and
ydS2 at
is
Inchtuthil
proportionate
legionary
which
at
the
allocation
double
receive
de
in
the
munitionibus
castrorum.
figures
suggested
the
with
the

85

and

not

Statements
were

in other

taken

treatises
steps

by higher

overlooked

into

literary

the safest

have been considered

are simply

was chosen .

and most convenient

Indeed,

general

well known

repeating

32

Although

are fairly

they

campsite

obvious

for to camp is

It would seem likely

.

advice,

the

and would always

the location

choosing

of a 'good'

qualities

and

evidence

prove that for the most part these factors

of these precautions

essential.

one of the standard

archaeological

when a campsite

the importance

in locating

the treatises

sources

consideration

stress

The

ground.

not suggesting

that

anything

new.

The literary
defence

sources

depended
The

attack digging

Durno

dug when

in rocky

allowed

considerably

and are frequently

munitionibus

castrorum,

ment

of each

on this

conclusions

cal record

castrorum
types.

also mentions

and the evidence

Although

than

greater

cannot

be known,
There

matter.

cannot

it

which

might

vary

in the de

the entrench-

concerning

is impossible

were only

of ditches

recommended

be any reflection

in camp defence

of

of camps such as Rey

that trenches

those

of an

difficulties

the

the dimensions

because the circumstances

of the variations

were present

Problems

camp

it.

of a camp's

and the likeJihood

(see above p. 74) indicates

and others

the ground

the strength

of the enemy

castrorum

ground

that

suggest

on the proximity

de munitionibus

trenches

Cross,

treatises

and

to make any

firm

in the archaeologi-

occur

if the enemy

or not.

in interpreting

do not facilitate
I believe

of the clavicula

the description

in the de munitionibus

of the theoretical

comparison

this gate type is a single internal

Agricola and Hadrian

32Caesar, Vespasian,
5.
note
see above
sites personally,

86

and archaeological

clavicula,

are among those

the most common

who chose camp

type

found

of clavicula
33

provinces

However,

of

camp

defence

use is disputed

treatise

agree with the 3: 2 length

to width

the

in

encampment

and

between

solely

the

density

was obviously

from

castrorum,

munitionibus

a new

type

of

may be
but their

its

many forts

suggested

however

some correlation,

camp.

but
the

concerning

to be

has been shown

of troops

rough,

to assess accurately

A large

may weU be military

therefore,

by the treatises.

castrorum

it is impossible

marching

and camps do

of the

proportion
theory

which

the
de

was not

to apply.

practicable

Finally,

although

uniquely

Roman,

used

proportions

size of camp and size of army,

size of an army

night

there

as with the

as pila muralia,

is concerned,

de munitionibus

the

particularly

Although

unlikely.

with a tituluM

by Vegetius

mentioned

other

and

be suggested.

and can only

propounded

in conjunction

genera. Uy known

As far as camp size and organization

theory

Britain

is suggesting

of caltrops

by the wooden stakes

represented

in

It may well be that,

suggests.
the

arrangement,

found

rarely

castrorum

The additional

gateway.

fortifications

temporary

it is very

as the de munitionibus
method

in

the

regularity

and

it has been shown

that

abundance

of

marching

the idea of entrenching

form
internal
Roman
by
of
some
one
and
no means a
was
by the Assyrians.

the

stated

that

(Strat.

IV i 14).

Romans

It seems that

took

camps

perhaps

the idea of the

are

a camp at

organization

was

Frontinus

was correct

when he

marching

camp from

Pyrrhus

in
Gaul,
Masada
in
found
Mauchamp
internal
at
are
"Examples
the
clavicula.
of
127).
(scene
Column
Trajan's
illustrated
on
Israel,
and it is also
87

a)
u

4
4-4
ty)

-4

$4

L)
$4
44
0

1
4)

10
9

44

-4
4

C:

(D

ol

w
4-J

>
0

41)

(1)

(1)

>

>

-4

-4

$4
cc
4)

4J

wa

9z
>

-4

0
a4
.

.0(a

1.1

bd

to
>

co

41

CO

>
0

1-4
4-4

Q
to

4-4
0>

U)

tn

w
4)

114

Im

4-)
41

cn
r. 4
W

am

ty)
0

od

04

0
C:

54

--4

-4

.,. I

E-4

4-1
co

1-4

4-J
4

X0

CO

41
(1)

. 1.1
10

CQ

04 0

-4

C14
06

a4

E-4

Ei
0

w
E-4

rz

0
5

75

41

41

E-4

E-4

4
4J

E--4
a
o
r
-4
4 (1)
n

.,.
:

cq

c)

04-)
6-4 0

EE

Ei E

m C>

OD

E- 0 :

EE
coo
CD

Ln ON

C 4

00

ko

_: C;

144

aj

'.0

%D

02

U) b
Z 4a)

W
0

0
kD

CY)
V-4

cq

r4 E

IZ4

rz

U-)OD
r6
C

it)

a,
1.1
.

Ln

cn
OD

LO

C%4-4
dd

OD
0

CD
CC)

Lo
r-

rM

(Y)
C)

C4
I'D

co

U-)

(N

rq

U')

E
:j
&J

CN

Ln

Ln

Cn
r-4

31
14:
Co

CD

z
z

z
z

a)
z
z

CN

(Ij

rCo

ri

CC) U-)
En
Z
(n

4-4

E
o

(n

00

r-

1q,
0

-A
E-

U)

E
0
W

8
r.
M
$-4

>1
ro
9

X:

zrij

10

8
Fo

8
to

4-4

(n
0

U)

Figure

i:

Details

of

selected

E-

U)
ro
4
(0

4P:
4

-4

a)
4-)
(1)
4
Co

marching

0
4
IM

0
W

-4

camps

::3
(0
U

88

>

41
Co

r=

I
1

9)

CD)
0
0

c:

D4
(Z

a)
41

tu

(1)
>
0
in
tu

J:

14

c:

U)

:i

>
0
Q
co

tm

c:

44
0

..0.-4 tn

a)
4.1

64
M
3:
0
4-J
a;
>

1-4
1-4

(1)
CL

a)
QL4
>4

E-4
w
E-

EZ,
0 (d
j1 -0.5

4-)

41

E-4

&j

E-4

E
0
4-)

E-4

EE
4-)

E-4 o

-4
-e.

4J
0
-q t))
E-4

4-)

0.
4)
6

E cz

in -4

rz E

C,4 0

..
r-4 -4

r:: EEE

C) m

C;

:s

(7) (n

EEEE"

C) 00

'D
C;

66

EE
"

C C

E
ch

66
_;

-4

-4

--4

1-4

(0
J.,
(0

<
w

JZ

LO

od

r.

r-

tu

t-

0
%.

tz
-4

EEE
10

:
-4

(N

-4

-4

C:

W >

10
-1
0

-I r.

CI!
m

-4

(0

(0
x3
rq

J.,
m

J.,
Co

(n

OD

rz
rz

r-1

CD

r-1

x
0

LO
r-4
x
m

0
OD
OD
r-

OD
0
Co
OD
1-

Co
0
00
OD
t-

EZ

E--4
Z

a)

a)

Co

9--4

c
0

Ln
m
x
0
CD
Ln

%Z

(1)

LO
o
tCY%

%M
ND
re-i
CD

o
te
le
r-

%0
te

LO
rrq

rli
Co

a)

a)

0)

--4

ro

-. 4

(a
0,

'r4
a)

3:

(L )

Ic

vo

IQ

OD

Co

no

B:

C)
r,
r- 1

C)
(Z
%0
rr-

(D
(D

r-

14

Ln
CD

ul
V-4
c9
x

in

(a

0
n

89

4-)

ro

4-J

(0

i
U)

U)

41)
0
14

(D
>

>
CD
>
H
4

$4

WO

co

(1)
>

tv
2c

ul

0
C:
.

21:

0
w

bg

44
0

t"

tn
-4

04

r-4
M

CIA
0

Q)

r-4

41

E-4

0
41

14
(1)

>

44
0

W
>
0

o
.0

-4

(L)
r_

ffo

0
$4
b)

lz
-r-4
Cl
0
-4
C/)

0: 4

=01

$-4

>
0

(n
-4

4-J
41
(0

.0
(o

-4
fZ4

(a
4

W
3:

a)
-4

0
0

0
14
t"

00
$4

(a

ro

0
4

0
w

a)

fn

> ro
..,
q: l

Q)

ul
>4

W
>

C:

0
.0

As

b, )

U)

>

0
>4

C14

r=

>

-4

4
4

(a

0
4

4J
M

(A
64

4
EX4

(a
r: z

>

4-)

4J
0

tn
44

tn
(D
>

41
U)
0

4J
4
t: n
U)

(D

cc)

E-4

X
u
E-4,0:0 :
04

EC)

5L
C) (-)
C

04,64

E-4

E-

EE
C> M

Ei
9 rz

rz
%0

CN

C14N

E-

E
E
LO
r OC)

C*4 m

EE
Ul)LO
0N

CN

Ln

",
E-4

>

r-4

C4
4

(11

(13

CY)
:
V
AW

a)
in

cn
z

Ul)

14
U)

44

(N
C14

rq

C>
r-

C'4
r-4

N
01,

Ln
m
rqw

ON
(7%
ko
r,

CQ

U)
z

CC)
tD
W

co
to
%D

r-4

9-4

N
m

E-4
z

LO
rLn

%D

Ln
CC)

CC)
co

ON

0
z

4)

%0
tE-4
z

0
U)

(L)
10

0
4
M

4)

E-4

co

r-

P
0

U-)
clq

u
c
0)

Ch

C)
LO
m

rz

r%0

v
N

X.,

co

14

lz

r%0

co

(0

(0

%D

aj

4-)

V)

(d
Q

0)
U)

90

tv

.X

U)

(13
in

r.

-4

tic

1
a)

04
(1)

. r. 4
$4

0)

ul
wo

1:

0)

>

41
>

>4
4
CL,
0

0
W

cn

0
04
0

(1)

:1

>

0
$4

CL)

E-4

>
0
Q
cli

10

Cl)
CL

$4
4-)
(1)

4-)
al
--4 (N
4A
Z

4-J
CL

10

3:

rq
Q,4

110

r-I

ty,

.,. J,

>
w

(L)

a)

0)

-4

>.

4
U)

-4
co

: R:

.0

rs.

(a

1-4
4

.1

CL
(0

cr

E-4

w
E-4

Ei
01

El

4-J

E7-i

E-4,

E
E71

cy,
ri

E
Co

-lo

r=
-lo

0
1-4

E-4

r::

Ei E

U r-4

rq 0

All

Clq

LO

rz rz

5E
0 6to

E-p

Lr)

ro
Z- :

(0

c:

'
x.
.

it

rq

Lo

rq

Ei
LO
rUl)
x

%0

00

Ln

(P,

tr.

%I0

Ln

r-

C: )

t-

ql,

r-

:
Z

f-)

E-4

(D

4
ty)

Y-4
Co

CD

0%

to

Lr)

tt')
00

1--4

lie

cy

A
zi
9
im
4-4

E
0

r-4
Lr

0%
ul

OD

r-4

r-

-4
CO

016

(7%1

le
Ln
OD

U)
(n
Z
Z

rO

(1)

%0

CY%

IZ
r1q
(n

(n

%0

>4
10

(a

E-4
-q
(1)

ul

>
lz
1-4

44

;:1

91

(L) -4

4-)

41

a)

(0

$4
4)

>
$4

>

., q
1-4

(10

$4

>
04
0

-4
$4

-4

(n

44
0

0
444

41

C14

4-J
r_

to
s

(1)
tn

0
64

>4
-4

t:n

42)
r.

U)

e
1-4

>4

(1)
Q

0
44
4J

-, -4
to
4

C:

-4
1-4

(1)

. 4

e
W
0
44
41

r=
w
0
44
4-)

-4

>
1-4

CO

C:

>
0

:>
0
Q
co

(tj
4-4

(L)

to

0)

0
w

>

9z

Q
to

9
0
0
$4

(0
w
$4
w

4-;

tn
tn

.I

>

ca
(D

a)

:I

>4

E-4

E-4
4-J
... 4
E-4

E-4

X
n
E-4ni t24 L,
i rq

CDCo

-4 64

(5

u"

(D m

LenLL2) Wn
%0

g E
L M
r-- i

4--)
...4
E-1

4
A-)
Y3

E
E
DL
O
%
C:) %IEO
t-

u
(13

ma

"

fjtn

CN

'o
-A

LO

Ic
r-

Lo

in

U
N

Ln

rr)
co

E
0
rq

$4

(a

E
":r

E
0
x
LO

00
CN

r, r,

0
CIO
LO

LO

cq

q: 31

Iraq

ko
U')

m
N

Ln
Lo

00
4

4-J

a)

.0

co
U')

l
ul
0

0
lq4
Ln

0
CN
E-4

r-I
U-)

LO
r,
E-4
z

m
r-I

U')

Ln
r-

(a

r-I
LO
LO

4-4

r-

to

>4

En

E--4

LO

U-)
0
110

04

C)
4

ul

>4

C)
4

WMQ,
>1

rj)

(n

>4

4
u

0o

EEI
>1

>1

0M

E-4
124

ri)

92

a)
u
9:
d)

3
0
d)

>

44
9z
0

$-4
(1)

0
0

ty)

4-)
(0

10
cz

>
., -j

>, (n

to

41

in

0
--1
-

>q

10
-4

10

>4

4J

U2
4

10
9

:>
0
Q

a.

4)
>
0

(d

E-4

U)

04C

0
w
t7l

.0

U)
4

0
Q)
t7)

4-4

4-4

04

W
>

>4 -, 1

4-)

U)

tv
-4

w
-f
(1)

cx.

>

1-4
-4

C:
4-J
w

aj

>
0
4

4ol
-4

(L)
10
-, 1

-4
=% 4-4

04

W
>
0

0
.0

al

cn

ul

0)

r_

r-

1-4

(o

(0

,
C
4-1
.

04

m
U)

C,4

(D

(o

u
5

(o

a4
>4

u
-, -4

EW

>

(0

(1)

li

l
0

4
u
4J

E-i

(o

(1)
o

0
0

4--)

E
co

4-1

EEE
Ln u-)
C c:>

kD m
-4 a

LF
r,

$4
41

EE
c)

4-)

E
ZEEEE
11:C9 1 1.9
40

--4 0

'1,:1
rf)

4 a)

<
w

. -1

%D
%0
1-4

Z
0

E
C)

(U
JZ

(0
J.,

CZ

ul

r4

(0
Ic

le,

rI

1-4

1.

r13

%Z

Lr)

#Z
(n

Co

r4

Co
j

f
1-4

(0

_A
t31

rz

Ln
x

b--4

lx

u4
w

-4
u c;
r-4

(0
c:

rl

r%I0
%ID
ul

m
r"
(N
r,
CO
(n
>
Z

ul
"

(D
ul

m
r,

m
r,

ri
rq

OD
m

r-

Co
(n

r-i
e

:
Z

:
Z

(n
Z

E-4
Z

r-

G K

cwi
trq
Co

m
r(N
CD

N
Ol

Z
(n

Z
U)

Z
(n

%0
r-i

le

(n
OD

(n
OD

U)

tn
Ln
UD

>--i

t31
i2

.Q
Z:

A
zi

-(
Q
v
:i

93

01

--q

Notes to tables
Ardoch

III:

above

Ditch

flat-bottomed
cut -

incompletely

Arosfa Careg: Absence

the soil.

of ditch

Carlops:

on rocky

Ditch

slighter

does not seem to be because

Chew Green IV: May be a semi-permanent

strong defences.

labour

Corbridge:

than a temporary

May be a labour

camp rather

Dolau: May be a semi-permanent

Dullatur

II: Later

Durno-Benachie:
outcrop.

camp,
Ditch

of

hills.

towards

ground

of the nature

camp which would explain

the

camp.

camp.
fortifications

reuses

does not surround

of earlier.
camp completely

because

of rocky

Esgairperfedd:
Site seems to have been laid out specifically
to incorporate
a
Location may be to get maximum
small rise in one corner for enhanced vision.
from the prevailing
protection
winds.
Dated to Marcommanic

Kollnbrunn:
Little

Clyde:

Ditch

probably

wars -

rock-cut

Malham: Ditch apparently

the surface.

lacking

Mancetter:

uncertain;

Identification

in places.

round parts of circuit,

Irregular

outline

wars.

to suit the terrain

Rey Cross: Rock close to surface

probably

Summerston:

Wall construction

May be an Antonine

is near

may be a camp or a fort.

Plank am Kamp: Dated to Marcommanic

Raedykes:

where bedrock

explains

the absence

of ditch.

camp.

Sunny Rigg: This has been described

as a camp of the Vegetian type with no
WaU and the Valium, and is
ditch (111 8) though it is sited between Hadrian's
camp than a marching one.
more likely to be a construction
Y Pigwn II: This camp is inside
tions.

Y Pigwn

Pollen sampling suggests

Ystradfellte:
in the area during camp construction.

I but there

was no reuse of fortifica-

there may have been some tree clearance

94

Biblioq-raiphical

Annan Hill
Ardoch
Arosfa Gareg
Balmuildy
Bernhardsthal
Bretueil
Bromfield
Carlops
Chausde
-Tirancourt
Chew Green
Cleghorn
Corbridge
Dolau
Dullatur
Dunblane
Dun,

-"pace

Dunning
Durno
Easter Cadder
Esgairperfedd
Eskbank
Finavon
Folleville
Garnhall
Girvan
Gogar Green
Greenlee Lough
Inverquharity
Kintore
Kirkhouse
Kollnbrunn
Liercourt
-Erondelle
Little Clyde
Lochlands
Malham
Mancetter
Marcus
Meldon Bridge
Pennymuir
Pen-y-Gwyrd
Plank am Kamp
Rey Cross
Stracathro,
Sunny Rigg
Summerston.

references

for

marching

camps

JRS 51 (1961) 122; Brit

Brit 1 (1970) 163-78.
YRS 50 (1960) 213; JRS
(1969)
Williams/Jarrett
Brit 3 (1972) 303; Brit
RCAHMS Lanarks.
(1986)
Kandler/Vetters
Agache (1970) fig 392;
JRS 46 (1956) 130.
Brit 17 (1986) 371; Brit

mcluded

in table

above.

17 (1986) 374.
55 (1965) 199; Nash124.
5 (1974) 405; Brit 6 (1975) 227;
244-247.
Wightman

(1985) 35,38.

18 (1987) 32.

Agache (1970 38).

Richmond 1940.
Brit 3 (1972) 304.
Brit 6 (1975) 330.
JRS 56 (1966) 196.
Brit 7 (1976) 301; Brit 8 (1977) 364; Brit 16 (1985) 264.
An quity 25 (1951) 95; JRS 57 (1967) 175; JRS 58 (1968)
178.
Brit 15 (1984) 275; Brit 18 (1987) 37; Brit 20 (1989) 271;
Brit 21 (1990) 312; Brit 22 (1991) 230.
Brit 20 (1989) 269-70.
JRS 67 (1977) 141; Brit 9 (1978) 271-287.
RCAHMS Lanarks 1978.
JRS 57 (1967) 174.
Brit 4 (1973) 275.
JRS 63 (1973) 224; JRS 67 (1977) 140; Brit 19 (1988) 425.
Agache (1970) fig. 387-388; Whightman (1985) 38,49.
Brit 9 (1978) 415; Brit 21 (1990) 312.
Brit 9 (1978) 397-400; Brit 13 (1982) 339; Brit 18 (1987) 34.
Brit 16 (1985) 265; Brit 18 (1987)38.
Brit 15 (1984) 278.
Brit 15 (1984) 274; Brit 16 (1985) 263; Brit 18 (1987) 15,
29.
JRS 67 (1977) 140; Brit 19 (1988) 425.
Brit 15 (1984) 276; Brit 17 (1986) 371-4; Brit 18 (1987) 33.
(1986) 241-2.
Kandler/Vetters
Agache (1970) fig 376-7; Whightman (1985) 38,40.
Brit 15 (1984) 275.
Brit 20 (1989)
Brit 15 (1984) 275; Brit 18 (1987) 29,39.;
271.
JRS 58 (1968) 180.
Brit passim.
Brit 19 (1988) 425-6.
Brit 7 (1976) 306; Brit 9 (1978) 418.
4
PSAN vii 107ff
.
JRS 45 (1955) 121; JRS 54 (1964) 152.
(1986) 236.
Kandler/Vetters
& Richmond (1969)
TCW'pAS2 34 (1934) 50-61; Collingwood
13; Frere & St Joseph (1983) 23-5.
Brit 1 (1970) 163-178.
Brit 13 (1982) 343.
Brit 12 (1981) 320; Brit 14 (1983) 288; Brit 18 (1987) 28.

95

Troutbeck
Wandel
Wooden
Ystradfellte
Ythan

Wells

TCWAAS 1956 28-36; JRS 45 (1955) 83-4; JRS 63 (1973)

215; Brit 5 (1974) 412-3.
JRS 51 (1961)
Brit 14 (1983)
JRS 50 (1960)
153
JRS 63 (1973)
1-6-3-178.

34.
18
(1987)
Lanarks;
Brit
RCAHMS
;
289; Brit 18 (1987) 32.
213; JRS 55 (1965) 199; RCAHM Brecknock
216-233;

96

JRS 67 (1977) 131-45;

Brit

1 (1970)

Fiqure
Durno

ji:

Rev Cross
Dimensions:
Intervallum:

Application

goo X
35 ft

of the de munitionibus

gooft34

18.6
acres
=

(7.53

castrorum

to Rey Cross

and

ha).

Plot 1: 150 x 150 ft, 6 hemistrigae.

1 legionary
cohort (DMC 2)
Plot 2: 200 x 150 ft, 6 hemistrigae
1 legionary
cohort (DMC 2)

per striqas.

Plot 3: 200 x 120 ft, 6 hemistrigae

I legionary
cohort (DMC 2)

per strigas.

Plot 4: 250 x 120 ft, 8 hemistrigae

per strigas.
1 legionary
cohort (DMC 1) + 200 scouts (DMC 30)
Plot 5: 150 x 150 ft, 6 hemistrigae.
I legionary
cohort (DMC 2)
200 x 200 ft + 200 x 200 ft, 12 hemistrigae
Plot 6&7:
200 ft long per scamnum
Each hemistriga
(200 -?- 3 ft per cavalryman
DMC
could take 66 cavalrymen
16), or 2 turmae of 30 - 32 men.
Total of 24 turmae, or a mi1liary ala.
20 ft remain which is assigned to the tribunes
(DMC 36 which suggests 60
ft).
Plot 8: 220 x 220 ft, 14 hen-dstrigae per strigas,
each 10 ft shorter
(DMC 1).
recommended
I legionary
cohort (DMC 2), the remaining 8 hemistrigae could provide
for one quingenary
(DMC 40).
cohort camped fairly spaciously
Plot 9: 150 x 250 ft, 10 hemistrigae
per strigas.
1 legionary
cohort (DMC 2), leaving 4 hemistrigae,

see entry

than
space

for plot 10.

400 x 250 ft.

Plot 10: Praetorium.
150 ft wide (DMC 9), leaving 8 hemistrigae
Praetorium
(4 x 2) on each
6 hemistrigae,
Latera sinistra:
together with the 4 remaining hemistrigae
plot 9- Quingenary
part mounted cohort (DMC 25-27).
2 remaining
hemistrigae
(DMC
could take up to 80 equites singulares
for quingenary
Latera dextra: 6 hemistrigae
infantry
cohort (DMC 28);
infirmary
(DMC 4).
Plot 11: 200 x 250 ft, 12 hemistrigae
per strigas.
Milliary legionary first cohort (DMC 3) occupying
2
(DMC 4).
remaining
Plot 12: 150 x 200 ft,
Legionary
cohort.

6 hemistrigae

10 hemistrigae;

fabrica

side.
from
7).
2 for

the

per scamnum.

34Camp dimensions are given in Imperial measurements to facilitate

application
DMC
feet
in
Roman
(0.97
the
all
the
measurements
where
are
given
of
rules
of
foot)
English
of an
.

97

Plot 13 & 14: Quaestorium.

350 x 200 ft.

Quaestorium
200 ft long per
90 ft wide (DMC 18), leaving 8 hemistrigae
stricra .
This is room for 1328 auxiliary
(DMC 25). If the Quaestorium
infantry
was
slightly
narrower,
or the auxiliaries
were squashed in a bit, there would be
space for 1360 auxiliary
infantry,
and cavalry of a milliary part
or the infantry
mounted cohort (DMC 26).
Plot 15: 150 x 150 ft,
1 legionary
cohort.
Total forceS35:
1 legion with co 1st coh
1 ala. co
1 coh eq.
1 coh eq.
2 coh quing.

6 hemistrigae.

Infantry
5120

720
240
120

800
480
960

200

scouts
Total:
Density

Cavalry

7560
of troops

Durno
Dimensions:
Intervallum:

1080

8640

per acre = c. 460.

c. 930 x 650m = c. 56 ha (143 acres).

60 ft.

Plot 1 (praetentura.
left side): 840 x 900ft.
6 legionary
cohorts arranged ft16
around the perimeter
Remaining space of 720 x 720
occupied by:
(140ft wide including
scamnum of legates & tribunes
4 quingenary
infantry
cohorts (120 ft wide)
I quingenary
ala (90 ft wide)
1 milliary ala (150 ft wide)
Road (20 ft wide)
180 ft width remaining
contains:
1 legionary
lst cohort
2 quingenary
infantry
cohorts
1 quingenary
cohors equitata.
200 scouts.

(DMC 2).
road)

900
900ft.
Plot 2 (praetentura
right side):
x
2).
(DMC
6 legionary

the
perimeter
around
arranged
cohorts
Remaining space of 780 x 720 ft, (24 hemistrigae)
occupied by:
ft
(140
including
&
legates
tribunes
road)
wide
scamnum of
3 quingenary
infantry
cohorts (90 ft wide)
3 quingenary
alae (270 ft wide)

35Calculations
strength
of units
are done on the basis of the theoretical
512;
720;
3:
5120;
Ala
Legion
in
quingenary
ala
milliary
chapter
accepted
oo
800
240
480;
infantry
800;
+
milliary
cohors
equitata
cohort
quingenary
cohort
480
120
infantry
+
equitat
cavalry.
cohors
quingenary
cavalry;
36This

allows

30ft
34-6).
(DMC
each
wide

24
hemistrigae,
for
space

98

Road (20 ft wide)

180 ft width remaining
contains:
1 legionary
1st cohort
1 quingenary
infantry
cohort
I quingenary
cohors equitat
600 marines
hospital,
vet, fabrica.
Praetorium

220 ft wide (DMC 9)

Plot 3 (left side of praetorium):

600 x 1000 ft.
4 legionary
(DMC 2).
cohorts along the perimeter
Remaining space of 480 ft x 1000 ft occupied by:
Praetorium
(80 ft wide)
Guard post (20 ft, DMC 9)
Comites (60 ft, DMC 10)
Road (25 ft)
300 Equites Singulares
(30 ft)
1 quingenary
ala (60 ft)
Road (25 ft)
180 ft width remaining contains:
1 legionary
Ist cohort
4 quingenary
cohortes equitatae.
Plot 4 (right side of praetorium):
1200 x 1000 ft.
4 legionary
(DMC 2).
cohorts along the perimeter
Remaining space of 1080 x 1000 ft occupied by:
Praetorium
(80 ft wide)
Guard post (20 ft, DMC 9)
Comites (60 ft, DMC 10)
Road (20 ft)
300 Equites Singulares
(30 ft)
Pedites Singulares
(30 ft)
2 quingenary
infantry
cohorts +1 milliary infantry
cohort (60 ft)
1 quingenary
ala (90 ft)
Road (20 ft)
3 quingenary
infantry
alae +3 quingenary
cohorts (270 ft)
Road (20 ft)
2 quingenary
infantry
alae +2 quingenary
cohorts (180 ft)
Road (20 ft)
180 ft width remaining
contains:
1st cohort
1 legionary
4 quingenary
cohortes equitatae.
600 x 800 ft.
Plot 5 (left side of retentura):
5 legionary
cohorts arranged
around the perimeter
(80 ft wide)
Quaestorium
Remaining 400 ft occupied by:
2 roads (40 ft)
1 milliary cohors equitat
3 quingenary
cohortes equitatae
1 milliary infantry
cohort
infantry
1 quingenary
cohort.
900 x 800 ft.
Plot 6 (right
side of retentura):
(DMC 2).
6 cohorts arranged
around the perimeter

99

(DMC 2).

Quaestorium
(80 ft wide)
Remaining 700 ft occupied by:
3 roads (60 ft)
4 quingenary
cohortes equitatae
3 milliary infantry
cohorts
6 quingenary
infantry
cohorts
Totalforces:
Infantry
2 legions with oD 1st coh
10240
15 cohort vexillation
<-D
2
1st cohorts
7840
with
1 ala co
11 quingenary
alae
1 cohors ecruitat
800
cD
17 quingenary
cohortes equitatae 8160
5 ndlliary infantry
4000
cohorts
25 quing. infantry
12000
cohorts
600
marines
200
scouts
160
guards
equites singulares
300
pedites sinqulares
44300

Total
Density

of troops

370.
per acre = c.

100

Cavalry

720
5632
240
2040

600

9232

=53532

Figure

L.

iji:

LEGCOH

UD
LAJ
--j

LEGCOH

MOORISH
CAVALRY

=3=
C=>
S

de
the
munitionibus
of

Reconstruction

::
LEG

camp

castrorum

LEGCOX

MARINES

CAVALRY
PANNONIAN

VEX

cr

c3z

C--)

PANNONIAN
CAVALRY

C>
C-3

ALAm

CM

ALA

cD

(-J.
CD

SCAMNUM
OFTRIBUWES

SCAMNUM
OFTRIBUNES

SCAMNUM
OFLEGATES

SCAMNUM
OFLEGATES

=IE
cm

C! i

c2,

0-

CY

CZY

CY

--Z

--c

C-1.7

Ci"i
"
o-

c
c=
92.

ME
c=:
C-i

-cc,

cm-

C>
3'
CD
LAJ

L&J

C-)

Ui

QUAESTORIUM

Z->
C->

-J

CZ2Y

C-)

-J

IIII
-PALMYRENES1
cc=,
l

ABRI

LEGCOH

100

LEGCOH

500

ft

LEGCOH

LEGCOH

JL

LLEG
LEGCOH

COH
--j, -

SCOUTSLEGCOH
6

LEGCOH

ALA
II
CON
QUING LEGCON

----]
10

EGCOH

PRAETORIUM

COH

11

COH
QUING

c, LEGCOH

13
LEGCOH

COHEO

14

,j

COHEO

15
LEGCOH

-E

I.

III

200 ft

iv: Hypothetical
Figure
reconstruction
the de munitionibus
castrorum

of Rey Cross

102

according

to the rules

of

PLIEure v: Hypothetical
.de
munitionibus
ca

of Durno

reconstruction

to the. rules

accordinq

of the

strorum

FT-`LEG

C-,

Ts

COH
QUING

COH
QUIhG

COHEQ

C-,

LEGCOH

LEGCOH

LEGCOH

OUING

LEGCOH

9nfl
C,

COHEQ

C-,
C,

OILING
ALA

ALA
nfl

ALAQUING

C-,

ALAQUING

zr

ALAQUING

4 COH
QUING

rfl

r--

13

COH
QUING

SCAMNUM
OFTRIBUNES

SCAMNUM
OFTRIBUNES

SCAMNUM
OFLEGATES

SCAMNUM
OFLEGATES

C,
C-,

C-,

C,
C-,

C-,

OC>
GI

C,
C.,

C-,
C,

C-,

=
=

C,
C>

C-,

A=

C
C>

C=

C-,

C-)

rc>

oC
ra

C-,
C
0

C,
C-,

C-,
C-,

C-.

'

C-,

n,

UG

LEGCOH

100

500

103

loooft

C)

Chai)ter

5: The Order

of March

Introduction
An army in marching
and the dangers

march during

was in a potentially
in the treatises

are outlined

Polybius

provide.

formation

a fairly

includes

general

than that of Vegetius

provide

information

detailed

description
advice,

and less detailed

on the organization

situation

vulnerable

in the advice

and reflected

Onasander's

the mid Republic.

very

they

of the Roman line of

is much more

as usual,

too, but between

of the marching

do

them they
during

column

the

Empire.

Descriptions

impressiveness

a detailed

about

descriptions

39ff ) are quite

Vitellius'

his dramatic

to exercise

opportunity

Josephus'

descriptions

Josephus,

Tacitus

and so comparison

This chapter
of marching

formations

marching

columns

the relationship

between

of

all provide

used in different

between

and Titus

(BJ III

integral

to attack.

with particular

104

Rome by

Caesar,
formations

is possible.

with descriptions
the

the length
Finally,

reference

115ff,

of History

Sallust,

and consider

circumstances,

march.

of historical

part

of the treatises

line of march and line of battle,

the
to
from
other
one
of an army

into

(On the writing

in the treatises

sources

vulnerability

on the

details of Roman marching

given

historical

an army

of accuracy.

these and the advice

in the

and their

but

with the

can be a certain

of the march

To Lucian

a minor

the advice

will compare

marching

there

account

the importance

and Arrian

columns

though

description

II 89).

are

and he stresses

narrative,

the historian

abilities,

as is Tacitus'

in AD 69 (Hist.

such

provide

of the armies of Vespasian

striking,

troops

29 & 37)

line of march rarely

of an army's

types

and width

of
of

I will consider

and the deployment

to Arrian's

ektaxis.

Sources
Onasander

and Vegetius

and the latter

order,

than in the battle

could

throw

easily

that

to carry

falling

of Augustus

and

Vegetius

with

one reason

both infantry

required

Tacitus

regularly.

and
on

notes a prohibition

may have been a military

formation,

not

regulation

emergency;

thin

column

and if such a column

lack depth
suggests

into

a battle

between

ad morem

its

safer

A flank

may panic.

battle

column should
line suggests

line of sufficient

the order

reduxit,

depth,

is
the

recommendations
states that

more of a rectangular
(vi-vii)

easier
attack

to

Such

an

in

an

manage
easily

would

line to face the enemy,

battle

into

to guide

Onasander

width
and

but Onasander

advice

Vegetius'

as possible,

be too weak to resist.

how wide the marching

wide to provide

more general

than

much

wheeled

and therefore

on the line wheeling

relationship

is

Veg. 1115),

different

of the

position

for alterations.

latitude

longer

much

the

whereas

be as compact

must

very

a long

VI 40-41;

his own decisions,

he suggests,

arrangement,

about

he provides

and allow little

line

marching

(Polybius

As usual,

in making

are much firmer

details

provide

on the line of march

commander

lyeterem
iniret.

and Hadrian

which

be familiar

should

(Onas. vi) and this is no doubt

,

out route-marches

much less specific.

it,

Soldiers

of ambushes

XI 18)'.

Polybius
troops

disorder.

out on the line of march and this

(Annals

on the line of march

because of the possibility

on the alert

the Constitutiones

cavalry

the

(1115),

the line into

in formation

marching

are more dangers

there

suggests

itself

of an army in marching

out the vulnerability

point

it would

None of the treatise

be, but Onasander's

pierce

writers
comment

that it would have to be fairly

and that there

had to be some

of march and line of battle.

ne quis

agmine

105

decederet

nec puqnam

nisi

iussus

Although

Vegetius

provide

any detailed

stresses
advice

obtaining

detailed

Onasander

and Vegetius,
for

prepared
additionally
difficult
high

if the

to prevent

of march

(111 5) for dispositions

Cavalry
advance.

or

confined

be sent ahead to occupy

passes and

of Onasander

(vi-vii)

on the line of march are as foUows:

Vegetius

T
to scout

Compact
formation.
Baggage
equipment
column.

Infantry
(Their baggage)
Legion I
(Their baggage)
Legion II
(Their baggage)
(Baggageof
following:
)
Left wing of Socii Infantry
Cavalry

on
threat.

through

passes

Onasander

troops
front

must be

(111 5) and Onasander

(VI 40- 1) and the recommendations

description

T
Right wing of Socii Cavalry

greatest

that the soldiers

simultaneously

line

(111 5).

advance

ambushes.

Polybius

Picked
Socii
at
depending

both emphasise

and fighting

in

than

other

of an attack,

scouts

sending

part of the force should

country,

and Vegetius

and

however,

that

advises

ground

Polybius'

intelligence

marching

the threat

on minimizing

he does not

of the line of march,

the vulnerability

in

Scouts

Cavalry
Legions
Baggage train,
by infantry
Light infantry
Light cavalry

rectangular
&
medical
in centre of

Bravest
soldiers
frontorrear
depending
on area
threat.
greatest

Picked cavalry
inf antry
on
under greatest

at
of

flanked

& light
f lank
threat.

from
or rear
of
area

In times of extreme
(if sufficient
danger
the infantry
space,
in
parallel
marches
hastati,
of
columns
principes and triaru.
The formation
Polybius
marching

of the

to the
column,

date

marching

column

of Vegetius'

cavalry

situated

differs

source.
at both

106

very

Scouts
van

from

little
were

and

sent

rear,

the time of
ahead

of the

as were

light

infantry,

the socii or auxiliaries

The baggage

in the Centre of the line or in a well protected

with a flank

The legions

guard.

and infantry

cavalry

the greatest

formed

danger,

potential

times of extreme
to manoeuvre

danger,
directly

and Vegetius'

standard

battle

line with legions

the wings

Varro,

121),
and

(cf:

also

two

mentions

the

agmen

pilatum

(see above p. 106).

a number

of variants

and topographical

Although

munitionibus

of the

wheel

6 on Pitched

formation

of marching

animals within
) which

in a historical

circumstances

main column

castrorum

provides

Picked

or flanks

rear

columns

Onasander's
directly

(ap. Servius

into

a
on

Aen. XII

formation

the marching
in a very

or unfavourable

of the treatises

able

Battles).

advances

context

In

and cavalry

only

compact

ground.

The

Varro

does

once.

for use in secure territory

does suggest

to the basic line of march for use under

none of these authors

in advance

could

the basic type of formation,

The evidence

of the column.

and auxiliaries

for use in dangerous

is recorded

be supplied

was no doubt

line

in Chapter

f-,,rvej

to mention

not appear

types

baggage

This

in the centre

with the baggage

pilatum

without

line.

recommended

dispositions

the quadratum

formation
term

battle

and could

army could march in parallel

battle

also,

were placed

it was the van,

whether

intention

or trains,

for the part of the column facing

protection

Polybius'
into

position,

in the centre

marched

extra

train,

that there were

different

tactical

mentiozrthe
to clear

role of engineers
obstacles

some information

from
on this

the

and surveyors
route,

matter,

the

de

and their

'Servius
from the autobiography
is again the source for this reference,
of
in agrum
hostium
duxi
Scaurus,
M. Aemilius
pilatum
exercitum
veni
The context indicates that the acrmen Pilatum was
X11121).
(ap. ServiusAen.
the
the
conditions
as
aqmen quadratum.
same
used under
107

importance

is well illustrated

munitionibus
Ravenna

( 30).

roads

( 24),

at Misenum and

because they

These all camped in the praetentura

army out of the camp and constructed

The army of the de

from the fleets

1300 marines

included

castrorum

111 141 )3

(Bi

by Josephus

presumably

lead the

also clearing

etC4.

obstacles

Field Practices
,
Historians

often
Arrian

column.
the terrain

through

shows little

variation

in AD 135.

them (ektaxis

which

1),

of scouts

but there

the army was to march

Analysis

of the descriptions

in the 'standard'

vi below illustrated

Fig.

at the front

seems little

would always

of the

doubt

that

be carefully

by the historians

provided

line of march between the campaigns

proposed

descriptions

campaign

against

the Alans

formations

of marching

of

from

to Arrian.

It was usually
with

the presence

in 109 BC Quq. 46) and Arrian's

Metellus

Sallust

mentions

in advance.

scouted

to mention

neglect

the

normally

including
imperial

allies

the case that

or auxiliaries

positioned

bodyguard
family

the legions
at the

marched

front

and

was on campaign,

3The difficult
mountain
broad highway suitable
days.

cohorts

rear.

Cavalry

The general

as the van and rearguards5.

and Praetorian

in the centre

if the emperor

were positioned

of the column
again

were

and his retinue,

or a member of the

in the centre

of the line,

from
Gabora
transformed
to
Jotapata
was
route
for heavy infantry
and the Roman siege train

into a
in four

( 24),
4The army included
200 scouts also encamped in the praetentura
because they would lead the army out of the camp. The construction
of roads
territory
in unconquered
and perhaps the clearing of
seems a bit unrealistic
function.
their
primary
obstacles was
the correlation
implications
'This has important
concerning
be
below.
battle
line
considered
will
which
of
of march and

108

between

the line

before

or between

also usually
could be split

placed

in the centre

up.

Thus in Josephus'

siege equipment

train

legions

experienced
flank

towards

guards,

use of flank

guards

formation

of his

8).

below

)7
,

to line of battle

when there

that

the second

being

employed

in times of extreme

probability

of an attack.

or right

turn

would convert

of cavalry

under

made to

between

these

the marching

to deploy

of the

from normal
be sufficient

would normally

(see below p. 11 5ff ).

march formations,

danger,

when there
that

circumstances

the battle

force,
11 16.

was the

one would

and line of march and

line;

column immediately

'General
placed before legionary
and retinue
Annals
Arrian ektaxis 4; between the legions,

The

the proximity

with

line of battle

is essentially

threat).

greatest

were two different

It is under

second formation

his

by his less

is occasionally

or with an intention

suggests

Polybius'

followed

placed

by Vegetius

account

indeed,

Caesar often
-

(Jucf. 46), as recommended

Polybius'

to see a close correlation

baggage,

the cavalry

under

expect

or it

of the column,

parts

(Arrian),

may be linked

there

40),

XIII

the officers'

line,

wi-, F-

though

time to manoeuvre

the cover

equipment

Annals

Reference

of cavalry

fashion

line

marching

are only on the flank

in this

enemy (to be considered

marching

of Arrian's

with skirmishers

here they

(eg:

are in separate

(eg: BG 1119; VIII

could be interspersed
(111 5, though

train

consisting

and siege

two descriptions,

trains

the rear

usually

train

of the column

and main baggage

as are the siege and baggage

baggage

The baggage

the legions'.

BJ III

a simple left

into battle

115ff;

line.

V 39ff;

7jt is interesting
to note that the position
of the various
units in marching
by
de
the
is
munitionibus
castrorum,
quite similar to
recommended
as
camps,
their position
and light infantry
are stationed
on the line of march; cavalry
at
his bodyguard
both ends of the camp and the general,
and the baggage
are
best
Such
the
in
in
the
protected
area.
arrangement
an
camp
centre,
again
forming
line
the
facilitate
the
doubt
up
of
march
army set out
when
would no
again -

109

Several
types

of the historians

formation.

of marching

Marius

marched

for battle,

(Juq.

Sextius

the enemy might

(EP. 59.7.3).

formation

was almost a line of battle

Other

march could wheel directly

Caesar's

most likely

legions

dangerous

aqmen

up in this

8),

"ready

marching

or that the line of

151; 1116).

At one

(PG IV 14),

acies formation
described

danger

by Polybius

Livy is the only historian

be when

every

occasion

to use

the army

the enemy or marching

gives

fashion

a particular

preparatory

that

under

of how tightly

some indication

he states

used

from any

to appear

(Tac. Annals

approaching

could

that

and on virtually

8. The historian

quadratum

show formed

military

regularly,

to a simile

in agmen qUadratum

BG VIII

in triplex

with cohorts.

was either

circumstances
the

packed

mention

as if he

"exactly

refers

be expected

for times of extreme

for use by a legion

formation

the

Quq. 46), and again,

Seneca

(Hirtius,

were marching

the term acfmen quadratum

using

authors

into line of battle

the arrangement

and adapted

Finally,

about an army marching

in a place where

column in Africa

(acfmen quadratum)

100).

quarter"

point,

that Metellus'

formation

in a square

by a philosopher

mentions

Sallust

of the enemy"

were in sight

that there

hand"
if
close
at
as
an enemy were

"just

was advancing

also appear

were two different

to indicate

the

soldiers

to forming

at a

the testudo

(39.30).

The literature
types

therefore

of marching

territory

column

did

one for

exist,

likelihood
there
no
was
or when

when the probability

"Livy
35.3;

seems to substantiate

of attack

was high,

2.6;
7.29;
12
times;
term
the
uses
36.10; 39.30; 44.9; Fr 21.97.
110

Polybius'

statement

advancing

of an enemy attack,

21.5;

two

friendly

through

the other for use

or the army was marching

10.14;

that

21.32;

into battle.

21.57;

31.37;

Various

historians

formation,

them

categorize

different

column in the late Republic

first

described

system
in

expeditum)
baggage,
force

employed

by Caesar.

marching

column

dependent

flank

guards,

Germanicus,

Apart

different

orders

which

Belgic

Caesar's
attack.
the

aqmen

scouts

there

quadratum

term actmen qu

formation

two different

types

of

the use of these was

136-7 & fig

was for level,

used by different

from

the Bellum

18).

He

(BG 1119)

(eg:

open terrain

dratum

described
suggests

it is possible

to see

and in different

generals
suggests

the iter

expeditum

Nervii

to the

at least

three

mentioned

type

of marching

(BG

11 17) and

acies

BG VIII

marching
8).

Caesar

by

formation"
which

was his normal march when not expecting

is the tri plex

(Hirtius,

above (p. 108),

Gallicum

his "usual

dt,
Marquar,,
and

own comments
Finally

131-4)

particular

line of march outlined

of march used by Caesar,

and Veith

Kromayer

/dt (1891

whereas the column with

terrain

seem to have included,

the formations

The evidence

campaigns.

without

of the legionary

used by Caesar

guards

or cavalry,

of the 'standard'
columns

most marching

variations

flank

(iter

11 16; Arxian).

Annals

between

that

(1989a

circumstances

of infantry

from the aspects

which

sees only

was for use in confined

either

the

mentioning

the

march

marched

Marquar

qUadratum.

and suggests

column without

'gros'

or

use under
of marching

battle

and with one quarter

however,

the Empire

topographical

(BJ V 39ff)

and Titus

again

Le Bohec,

the narrow

suggests

types,

during

upon

train

and the agmen

distinct

saw three

force

legionary

main

their

(Reisemarsch),

march

Caesarian

the

of marching

types

saw three

the route

Polybius,

by the baggage

as the rearguard,

also

(1928 420ff),
by

the

which

followed

and Veith

types
for

explanations

provide

and

Kromayer

circumstances.

the different

to analyze

have attempted

from
an

formation

(RG IV 14) and

himself

does not use the

in which the two terms are used are so

but the context

ill

that they probably

similar

was expecting

Within

the two types

use in secure
of variants,
the

agmen

particularly

with the second type.

by Tacitus

first

type

Vespasian

directly

triplex

sometimes

by

Polybius

and Titus
flank

with

by

Caesar

is that

and Arrian's

(BG

the former

Quq. 46; Arrian)

guards

type

between this formation

used

(BJ V 39ff),

the

and

11 17),
was more

and could

deploy

into line of battle.

Le Bohec's
different

that the different

suggestion
types

of terrain

that a confined

much narrower.

Obviously

Byzantine

the column should

be decreased

18),

that

major

as Polybius

is,

The repetition

and increased

states,

or formed

and the reasons

the marching

the

the width
through,

how the width

of

areas are negotiated

as confined

between

simply

column to be

between

describes

to its normal width

difference

by the historians

be wheeled

description

the

this

the army was marching

on Strategy

treatise

but the column returned

more likely
formation

of terrain

were for use in

argues

had to be some relation

there

and the Anonymous

formations

He presumably

space would require

of the line of march and the kind

(gitrat.

marching

seems unlikely.

on the grounds

could

and

to include

expeditum,

into battle line,

The major difference

guards.

115ff)

iter

for

to be a number

appear

This would appear

Caesar's

acies,

the first

by Polybius,

there

which could wheel directly

described

(BJ III

compact,

defined

the second for insecure,

column with its flank

the

formation

territory,

or

battle.

in a pitched

immediately

of marching

quadratum

described

refer

to engage

for use when the army

to the same formation,

It seems

afterwards.

two types

of marching

tactical.

the second

that

up directly

type

of marching

into line of battle

for the differences

112

suggests

are accurate.

formation
Polybius'

Analysis

of the

circumstances

of

statements

as

formation

lines

these

march

of

toPo

a literary

simply

into

line of battle,

engage the enemy,

cases

when

prohibits
In

most

form

does indeed

the army

or the commander

(juct-46;

engagement

dismissal

expected

100; BG IV 14; VIII

the

second

to wheel

up a battle

line and

on the column or an

an attack

8; Annals

these

of

ability

comments on the column's

was used and the historian

directly

the

151;

11 16; XIII

164;

40;

Arrian).

Although,

as stated

generals

and campaigns,

actual order

the information

number

in use,

does appear to be a fairly

by the treatises

supplied

of attacks

carried

of the formation'.

vulnerability

weakness;

her

campaigns,

the Gauls frequently

Caesar

above,

march after
marching
were

formations

campaigns

of different
in Gaul with

in the case of the

close agreement

field
the
and

between

practices.

on the line of march

Attacks
The

in the Caesarian

marching

of march there

in the formations

are variations

particularly

different

three

apparently

there

above,

enemies

records

approaching

different

marching

It was not only

also aware
attacked

how the Nervii

intelligence

receiving

formation

were

on marching

out

order

enemy
under

and

during

to attack

the
this

who realized

Caesar's

Gallic

As mentioned

the Roman army on the

spies about the Romans' usual

from Belgic

and,

the Romans

illustrates

him on the march".

planned

(BG 1117) but their

the

of it,

columns

attack failed
as stated

because the Roman forces

above,

Caesar

employed

such circumstances.

9BG 111 20; 111 24; VII 67; E!C 1 64; 1 78-9;
Annals 11 5; BJ 11 540.

B. Afr. 6; 67-9;

75; B. Hisp. 10;

'00ne of the other times of danger for a Roman army was when entrenching,
19;
illustrating
(BG
11128),
11
for
Gauls
to
the
time
favourite
attack
another
(see
Roman
best
to
time
the
a
army
attack
aware of
that they were perfectly
Camps).
4
Marching
on
above, chapter

113

Such

attacks

were usually

light

infantry

together,

were usually

and cavalry

The deployment

column".

and rear

was therefore

important

the marching

infantry

from surprise

cavalry

line,
for

prepare
driven

the cavalry

if they

were defeated.

be taken within

Labienus
with

includes

illustrate

these

attacked

the intention

the

effects

of forcing
was forced

Caesar

before

continuing,

slowly

with

halted

to make a stand.

longer

than

be fatigued

As with deployment

into

for the infantry

the cavalry

to

screen

be

could become an additional

the cavalry

such circumstances,
column for protection

march

of

the

(B. Afr. 69-70),

Caesar's

repeated

at the rear.

might

in the same way

attacks

off Labienus'

of
from

primarily

the

(B. Mr.
men.

was no
attack

he had to march

alternately

marched,

then

camp, but it took him a lot

marching
75).

line.

the rear,

off the initial

by Labienus,

time Labienus

with 300 men from each legion in light

drove

harrying

and drive

The column

The next

heavy kits

on lines of march

army to make camp where there

Caesar made his intended

he had planned.

from carrying

of attacks

concerted

to halt his march

and with

the legions

these legionaries

as well as
for

should

descriptions

several

Caesar's

water.

prepared

the

was (BC 1 79).

The Bellum Africum

and

Under

to defend

some protection

screen

the cavalry

the lines of the marching

the baggage

attacks.

a protective

However,

and

of the column

to provide

by the enemy infantry

an attack

off (eg: BG III 20ff).

burden

that

could provide

cavalry

or with

used initially

on the flanks

of cavalry

at the front

battle

cavalry

with

made primarily

attacked,
order,

Together

Caesar was
who would not

with the cavalry,

Caesar was certainly

aware of the

6;
67;
VII
B.
Afr.
BG
11120;
BC
164;
178;
"Attacks
with cavalry
with cavalry:
67,75;
Mr.
defending
BG
the
Binfantry:
marching
column:
light
cavalry
and
67;
6;
light
infantry,
together
Afr.
67;
B.
20;
VII
cavalry
against a
with
111
78.
Af
B.
r.
similar attack:
114

importance

of keeping

recommended

kept

the dangers

in with

of not keeping

order

the units,

to resist

numbers

to form up properly.

was in

to form

unable

(Dio LVI 20-1).

but because of the confined

it was very

difficult

suffered

danger

that a long narrow

line of

terrain,

and the advice

in the

in hostile

is for the use of a rectangular

formation

column,

this may not have been of particular

the column

was wide enough

as Arrian

is a clear

correlation

depth

his

of

Vespasian's
given.

agmen

intended

line,

battle

line,

to this

this

width

importance

pierced

acies

attack.

of Arrian's
is not

there

under
11).

marching
necessarily

would

the cover

Although

shortly.

115

of

there

column and the

the

case with

example for which the actual column width

matter

for

as long as

by a flank

formation,

into line of battle

the width

Onasander,

any particular

his army to do (ektaxis

intended

(eg:

case the army would probably

or triplex

time to manoeuvre

between

it being

in which

quadratum

the only other

I shc-01 return

do not advise

to prevent

the enemy was close at hand,

the cavalry,

days and

suggest

a marching

usually

on both

casualties

columns

and the historians

particular

be sufficient

and infantry

to safety.

writers

in the

day the

space through

for the cavalry

severe

were

up in sufficient

The following

Since the treatises

be marching

army initially

were

see above p. 106).

Unless

Varus'

the soldiers

of marching

in general

treatises

formation;

and camp followers

The Romans

and width

Both the treatise

in proper

comments clearly

the baggage

organized

to retreat

were unable

march

Vegetius

and

and because

which the army was passing,

Length

as Onasander

alert

and his accompanying

the enemy attacks

was better

march order

disaster

of the Varian

to no regular

mixed

men on the

(see above p. 106)

-

Dio's description
illustrate

his

is

Onasander
the

advises

concern

against

that

apprehension

an extended

a formation

such

for
several
column

(vi 5),

due to uncertainty

likely

was more

including

reasons,

to induce

and he gives

panic

and

of this:

an example

" For sometimes the leaders, after descending f rom mountains into
treeless
those in the rear still
and level regions,
observing
descending,
have thought the enemy were attacking,
so that they
have been on the point of marching
against their own men as
enemies, and some have even come to blows. "
Such a misidentification
68 (Hist.
train

II 68).

could

The dangers

are well illustrated

Cotta's

and Tacitus

and difficult

Although

analysis

with Vespasian's

the absence

would

of flank

have

Gichon

number

vulnerable

admits

camp for their

has used Josephus'

calculations

(BJ

train

111 65-69)

is difficult

that

because

has attempted

to do this

and he suggests

the Roman

If this

to attack,

of attacks

were the

especially

by the Jews in

with a column this long,

overnight

rest before
overnight

in

"the

the last of the

stay"

(1986 307).
despite

and the siege train.

units

of the Roman forces

catalogue
and,

(BG V

was easy to

long for an army with a core of only three legions

of auxiliary

that

mentions

controlled

28-30 km long.

and with the possibility

guards

entered

column

been extremely

territory.

This seems extremely

Gichon

into Judaea (1986 303-8),

a marching

length

Gichon

were able to leave the site of the previous

the large

Caesar

baggage

11 5).

in the histories,

accounts

have formed

head of the troops

troops

literature;

of actual lines of march and their

advance

the mountainous

(Annals

army in AD

with a heavy

that a column with a long baggage

to defend

of the few detailed

the army

of a long line of march

in the historical

remarks

ambush

case,

as with Vitellius'

column was too long for it to be properly

retreating

army would

happen,

actually

like

Josephus,

116

gives

as the basis for his

the full

theoretical

figures

for every

6000
strong,
call

unit

involved

milhary

auxiliary

at 500 infantry

equitatae
are highly
Chapter

3, on The Organization

been quite
formation

or four

but many of the units

of the main column

There

is

that

length,

legions

easily,

VII 67).
been

Had the column

very

triplex
although

topography,

be useful
Agricola

use

of a shorter

of

march

out in advance

have

would

column

behind

these

in the latter

is illustrated

(BG 11 19),

the baggage

train

did in Scotland

marching

might

in mountainous

(Aqric.

25),

were
on the

of the situation

(KIG

the line where it was threatened

army

regions.

this would not have

in agmen

be affected

quadratum

and as possibly

like those of Josephus,

100 men.
117

by

An alternative,

was to advance

of

when

When his column was attacked

formations

circumstances,

been

but 28 km does

by the Nervii

been more than a few miles long,

An

in

marching

would be more compact because of the parallel

particularly

12Gichon's calculations,
contained
each century

have fanned

when entrenching

to protect

to accomplish.

acies, formation
the

guard

seems to have been able to take charge

troops

to have

army is unlikely

the siege equipment,

(BG 11 26).

quickly

moving

easy

of

at the rear of the column

Caesar

to Alesia,

line

with

may have

the units

duties.

Vespasian's

were attacked

on the scene fairly

probably

(see

anyway

so the van is 7.2 km long,

abreast,

out scouting

particularly

and the two legions

fairly

infantry

The importance

seem excessive.

and although

also has the advance

in the van would

carrying

doubt

no

considerable

Caesar's

Gichon

so numerous.
cavalry

of Units),

these

elsewhere,

of the units

strengths

for the war, Vespasian's

up to strength

three

As I have argued

plus 120 cavalry.

are

500, and cohortes

1000 and quingenary

units

the legions

in his calculations

Thus,

to be the theoretical

unlikely

been brought

march

12

in separate
illustrated

or

columns,

the

general

which

would

columns

as

on Trajan's

are based on the theory

that

Column

(scenes

106-9) "-

63-4;

the best weather

of the year

been sufficiently

hard

The only
detail

other

for

of a line

of march

analysis

is Arrian's

ektaxis.

its exact length.

calculating

can be firmly

identified,

to tell whether

as vexillations.

Finally,

of the auxiliary

Arrian's

column

are

of the column

be easily

marching

which

survives

Arrian
here

even

would

have

certain

some of the units

mentions

based

an estimation

16

by the general

that

On the

the

were present

basis

for

of these

4.7km long,

only

marched

in

on the width

of assumptions

who was riding

the

whether

legions

The figures

on a number

by Arrian

or present

any details

and cavalry5.

in

army was in Judaea it

were at full strength

Arrian

a unique

are problems

it is not entirely

units

infantry

therefore

there

of the Cappadocian

although

provides

mentioned

In addition,

other

in sufficient

many of the units

column may have been about

controllable

the ground

5& 6), he does not provide

(ektaxis

numbers

Arrian's

others

Since part

is impossible

length

Although

or milliary.

only as vexillations".

but

column

with

units were quingenary

abreast

that

to

for this to be achieved.

of a Roman marching

picture

four

it seems probable

description

similar

limited
was
season

Since the campaigning

the size of
and

the

calculations,

short

enough

to

up and down the line

13The interpretation
is
highly
Column
times
Trajan's
at
on
scenes
of
have
been
Marching
by
columns
may
no means certain.
and
problematic
(cf:
Annals 151) rather
different
divided
to attack
simultaneously
objectives
(cf: Aqric. 25) or making them less
them being surrounded
than to prevent
to enemy attack.
vulnerable

had cavalry
14Cohors III Ulpia Petraeorum
present but no
sag. -o equitata
Cohors I
but no infantry;
Cohors IV Raetorum equitata,
cavalry
infantry;
Cohors
infantry;
Germanorum
I
but
equitata
no
Ituraeorum
cavalry
equitata,
200
had
I
Lepidorum
Cohors
infantry;
present;
men
but
only
no
co, cavalry
Legion XII was only present as a vexillation.
'5Many of the difficulties
description
of Vespasian's

16For these estimations

here can
listed
line of march.

and details

of Arrian

118

be applied

Is order

equally

to Josephus'

of march see below fig. vii.

(9k--_taxis 10) and for

the line to deploy

approximately

for Arrian's

to appear

correct

of enemy

dictated

attack

considered
recommended

line

the

of

columns

as with

the line

of battle,

cohort

(Kromayer

therefore
because

of the

different

the change

explains

of a tactical

It is always
same

contubernia

of the battle

as

in the

under

Trajan

6 on Pitched

cohortal

de munitionibus

used

line

depth

column

march

of

on the evidence
to propose
column,

of four

of 8, split

abreast
in this

by the legionaries.

period

to 8 under

Arrian

and
is
way

Wheeler
as the

or Hadrian.

during

castrorum

119

Battles)

of column equals

of the marching

that the contubernium

system

of

and width

6
of at Numantia

contubernium

being

weapons

however,
the

between length

Arrian's

from 6 in the Flavian

reform

assumed,
time

line.

no

in numbers

width

Vespasian's

of

the width

equals

that

that the depth of the maniple and

contubernia

as half an Imperial

explained

exact

Wheeler takes this further

of legionary

suggestion

the depth

argued

fact

to be

by any of the treatises

that width

description

1928 429).

the size of contubernium

presumably

the

a rule of thumb

Josephus'

and Veith

of Schulten's

result

6 from

is given
the

also have
The

up.

than the compromise

line and on this basis Veith

was

drawn

and was

the possibility

would

(see above p. 105, and Chapter

Wheeler (1979 312) mentions

of battle

was

topography,

battle

of

marching

by Onasander

mentioned

line

march

was of less importance

soldiers

that

into

for

width

that,

suggests

column could vary considerably

by the size of the army;

deploying

and

when

is

If this

28 km continues

army of c. 15,000 maximum,

of the marching

and width

not necessarily

line.

for an army of less than 60,000.

excessive

The length

battle

into

quickly

the

of 8 was introduced
late

Republic.

are 8 and although

at
The

Wheeler

Birley's

accepts

date of the reign

I have explained

elsewhere

2nd century

or early
Hadrianic

above that the width

than simply
any

the depth

particular

column width
that

width

and depth

the contubernium

and depth

between

that

line.

a numerical

are given

that

of column

and depth

width

I have argued

between

relationship

because it seems unlikely

the column
line.

or

do not recommend

to engage in pitched

of battle

Trajanic

by other factors

the treatises

In addition,

between

whatsoever

the numbers

where

line,

or mention

of battle

of Units).

column could be affected

army was expecting

be no relationship

relationship

of the battle

column

Vespasian's

column

of the marching

date, in the lst

any hypothetical

3 on The Organization

(see Chapter

reform

before

and therefore

AD,

for a much earlier

my preferences

(1979 312),

for this work

of Marcus Aurelius

battle,

there

need

of 6 and the size of

width

It is only in the case of Arrian's

it is possible

to suggest

of the legionaries

a direct
in battle

line.

Line of march and line of battle

The vulnerability

(see above p. 105),

Vegetius
attack

of the line

when

line of battle

forming

of march is mentioned
but an army was equally

up a line

was therefore

was a close correlation

is clearly

visible

adapted
formation

in Polybius'

use

by a cohort

mentioned

17eg: Lucullus'
attack
total
in
the
resulting
Mithr. 84-5; Frontinus

Deploying

from

line

of march

to

so it was important

between the two formations.

of the

and

to surprise

vulnerable

time for an army,

description

Onasander

second

This correlation
type

of marching

above (p. 110), this system could no doubt have been

As suggested
for

of battle".

a dangerous

that there

formation.

by both

by

Caesar.

legion,
This

to form

may actually

on Mithridates'
vast
defeat of Mithridates
Strat. II i 14).
120

the

triplex
have

acies

marching

been an easier

army when it was deploying,

(Plutarch
Lucul. 26-8; Appian

manoeuvre

than that

described

because of the uniform

by Polybius

armament

of the legionaries

Cavalry

which

important

acted

screen could then quickly

was in place.

Such a system could

as Arrian

indicates

described

in the historical

the very

close correlation

column in dangerous
front

and rear,

cavalry

and legions

in the centre
Chapter

flanked

6 on Pitched

The details

sources

battle

than references

and usually

and with

line.

of march

lines illustrates

of battle

A popular
battle

marching
at

was cavalry
between

auxiliaries

the

This could easily be converted

lines of the Republic

by auxiliaries

an

in relative

lines

of the

or when anticipating

and Empire,

the cavalry

with legions
(see

on the wings

Battles).

from line of march to line of battle

to 'wheeling'

into battle

battle
both
and
march
of

line that survives

it is possible

line or making

Arrian's

151; 1116).

to indicate

are not included

absent from the treatises,

and are conspicuously

the line (Jug. 46; Annals

this and although

Analysis

40).

into battle

time to deploy

the two formations.

151; XIII

have

would

to the wings once the infantry

and descriptions

in the centre

of manoeuvring

in any of the histories

11).

between

(eg Annals

into one of the 'standard'

redeploy

(ektaxis

of march

they deployed

whilst

give the infantry

circumstances

legions

to the line

guards

the infantry

role in protecting

This cavalry

safety

as flank

ektaxis

in sufficient
the position

a single

turn

other
to form

is the only description

detail
of various

for analysis

of

units in both

the
in
the
hastati
if
the
'8Polybius
that
and
attack
column
right
were
states
leave
hastati
the
battle
line
form
the
left
to
turn
left,
would
from
the
a
came
lines
the
have
to
then
or pass
other
round
they
wheel
in the rear;
would
have
723)
that
the
triarii
(1957
may
occupied
Walbank
suggests
them
through
from
the
if
the
line,
this
right
came
an
attack
so
marching
the middle column of
front
the
triarii.
in
have
to
of
manoeuvre
would also
principes

121

line of march and line of battle,

should

states,

during

stationed

the

the cavalry

formed

a screen

dangerous

period

of redeployment.

of the

on all sides

particularly

difficult.

deploy

the units

with

marching

It seems likely

that

in the van taking

the centre, of the battle

I Lepidorum

held

line.

the

positions

in the marching

right

Legion

and

The infantry
intended

the left

archers

would

battle

line,

wing

from

withdraw

to form

archers

from one of these auxiliary

The

withdrawn
Arrian's

equites

to the rear of the line,

bodyguard

deployment

particularly

with

but unfortunately
the Armenian

and

artillery

the latter

there
archers

ahead of the legions

since

and
they

of the
8 ranks
of 100

infantry,

deployment.

wing

difficulties

on the

actually

are
hills,

two

column

It is possible

that

marched

Once the infantry

"'Legion XV may have held the right because that was traditionally
16)
legion
(Veg.
the
111
line
battle
and
in
whole
any
of honour
by
XII
a
represented
vexillation.
Legion
only
was
whereas

122

have

to serve as

of the marching

of this.

on the right

likewise

would

militias

at the rear

explanation

their

below)'9.

up in their

sincfulares

provincial

and the cavalry

to facilitate

XV held the

to the rear

The only noticeable

were

is no further

of their

A detachment

along with the picked

and reinforcements.

of the

and Cohors

would then join the left wing on the

units

lecfionis

to

those

wing,

(see fig. viii

the two hills on which the wings were anchored.

ground.

to the right

because

line of march

the legionaries

been

of the column holding

respectively

infantry

were

have

not

of Cohors I Italica

between

rising

cavalry

on the right

in the centre

of the heavy

allowing

would

to protect

and in the same way Legion

column,

XII

this

up position

left

and

Since

the column wheeled

Thus the infantry

right

the infantry

around

column,

in the rear on the left wing and the legions

the

how the units

redeploy.

As Arrian
them

j!
the
ajus does not describe

were

the position
was present

fully

deployed,

wings

behind

battle

line.

It is clear
intended

that

line

have to deploy

into battle

(Annals
first,

battle

therefore,

they

and

line probably

this

line.

led the army

elaborate

had more influence

so they

could

or its Imperial
the position

such

equivalent

of units

on the organization

battle

his

with

important

an

which

might

against

advanced

enter

Under

redeployment.

was expected,

been

his auxiliary

of sending

the main

out

up a line of march

Thus when Germanicus

the intention

thought

have

must

when drawing

when an agmen quadratum

and an engagement

any

mind,

11 16) with

need for

the

without

in

behind

archers

was caref ully

of march

for any general

consideration

into

line

Arrian's

on the

positions

assigned

and the mounted

infantry

the auxiliary

battle

Cherusci

could then move to their

the cavalry

the

infantry

immediately

circumstances,
was being used

in the intended

battle

of the line of march than

factor.

other

The General
Although

the treatises

of march this,
from the other
retinue
column,

do not deal with the position

and his functions

literary

and bodyguard

encouraging

when the army was marching,

As stated

evidence.

was usually

situated

himself

generally

but the commander

his men, as Sallust

of the general

on the line

can be inferred

above (p. 108), the commander's

in the centre

of the marching

rode up and down the column

describes:

"On the march, Metellus moved up and down the column to see
that the men kept close together
that no one left the ranks,
food
his
that
and
their
each
carried
and
soldier
standards,
round
45
Juq.
Sallust
11
arms.
"Marius..
went round
praise and reprimands

section of the army

every
as they were deserved -"

123

distributing
Sallust

Juq. 100

Sulla

(Sallust

actions,

Vespasian

11 5),

soldiers

and

remained

This is very
illustrate

for the same

intended

in formation

much a literary

(ektaxis

of a 'good'

(Plut.

matter,

formulaic

that

nor

manner.

the literary

one of the attributes

treatises

or not,

Chapter

6 on

importance

as riding

Pitched

and,

115 )20

sources

around

Battles).

Arrian

importance,

other

the

and biographers

to

qualities

that

deal with

is a topos

this

the topic

considered

it is mentioned

was in a pitched

was clearly

aware

his soldiers
ensuring

that

does

in an almost

column was obviously

whether

as

such

the hardships

or sharing

The fact

the lines

and reprimanding

of particular

with

20; Hist. 11 5),

along the marching

of encouraging

necessary

along

of a good commander

just

to ensure

column

10).

general,

Mar. 7: Hist.

Riding

the

along

According

at the head of the column

topos and used by historians

the place for camp (Aqric.

the soldiers

to marching

to ride

67).

(BG VII

when necessary

was accustomed

Arrian

the skiUs

choosing

not

in reinforcements

ordering

to Tacitus,

with

20) are also praised

(Agric.

and Caesar seems to have done the same when his column came under

attack,

(Hist.

Jug. 96) and Agricola

in the

battle

(see

this,

the

of

on the march when

they

remained

in

ranks.

Conclusions
Comparison
order

of

of the advice
march

correspondence
column generally

in

contained

histories

and

in the treatises
other

literary

The overaU

between

the two.

reflects

the advice in the treatises,

with

descriptions

works

shows

organization

of the

the

close

of the marching

and the literary

evidence

20The language
Tacitus
choosing
on Agricola
used is also very similar;
20)
(Aqric.
locum
Vespasian
ipse
loca
;
on
castris
caper
castris
campsites Sallust
Sulla
Ogilvie
Richmond
in
As
115).
(Hist.
and
out,
on
point
caper
96);
Quq.
Tacitus
Agricola
in
on
multus
aqm1ne
adesse
multus
agmine ...
(ARn Lq.2 0) .
124

illustrates

or when the possibility

through
likely

hostile

as

provides

far

more

was likely

passing

or the column was

marching

a very

columns

did come under

There is no hint in the treatises

to withstand

enough
between

width

is perhaps

redeployment

into

could

(see above p. 110).

the manoeuvres
the relationship

battle

any other

though

take place,

a constant
there

in turning

area

of times

number

being attached

is with

the column

to face an attack

the

few problems

ease

with

of the

close

which

this

narratives

in attempting

to trace
again

Thus when an army on

battle,

the position

to have had more influence

125

It

of the

line of march to battle line,

indicated.

wide

ektaxis.

theme of the historical

or a pitched

factor.

being

the deployment

may be because
and

to the width

to see a correlation

line only in Arrian's

this

Arrian's

the two is clearly

line is likely

approaches,

of being attacked

the

do not consider

formations

between

was likely

of battle

two

Although

to add the details

different

and it is possible

attack,

line,

the

involved

in the battle

march than

the concern

that the treatises

between

relationship

the march

a flank

their

considering

of any importance

column;

himself

typically,

attack.

of column and depth

surprising

of march

concern

Onasander,

Onasander,

the dangers

particularly

relevant

in men of the marching

Despite

situation.

than

advice

but leaves it to the general

advice

upon the individual

march,

his

of the second type.

they both have the same concerns,

on the

in

rigid

formation,

a single

outline

depending

is

usual

recommending

troops

for

and the column

when an enemy attack

territory

to have to form up a line of battle.

Vegetius

line

low,

was very

of attack

territory

for use in friendly

formations,

the two different

clearly

of the

on the order

of

The usual

order

alteration

unless

line of battle.

of march of an army is therefore

Cherusci
military
contents

in front
(Annals
treatises

although

there

the usual field

military

(Annals

XI 18).

to by Tacitus

is reflected

introduced,
in Germanicus'

11 16; see also be-low Chapter

of established

of troops

a major
in the

from
Republic
the
n-dd
no
such
change
was

the one variation

of the legions,

reflect

to undergo

deployment
in
the
change
was a major

On the whole,

to the mid Empire,

infantry

there

unlikely

126

march against

6 on Pitched

practices,

regulations

the use of auxiliary

covering

though

Battles).

may also reflect

this subject

the
The
the

and referred

Fig

Orders

vi:
-

of march

B. Jug. 46
Light armed auxiliaries
&
picked slingers
archers
Legions?
Cavalry interspersed
with skirmishers
on
flanks.
Battle

from

the literary

sources

B. Juq. 100

BG Il 19

T
Light infantry
Legions
Light infantry

T
6 Legions in light
marching order
Baggage
2 New Legions

Cavalry
archers
Battle

+ slingers,
on flanks.

&
& slingers
Cavalry
+
been
have
may
archers
line
to
protect
positioned
from flank attack.

ensued.

ensued.
Marching
territory.

BG 11 14

In Triplex
formation

BG VIII

T
Acies

Annals

T
3 veteran legions
Baggage train

No battle
Troops
battle.

Intended

almost

in line

of

to join battle

hostile

1 51

Cavalry
Legion I

1 Legion

through

T
+ Aux infantry

Baggage train
Legion XXI
Legion V
Legion XX as rearguard
Socii
Some auxiliaries
The line of march could
into line of
wheel directly
battle.

Annals

Annals

1 64

Same formation

as above.

Annals XIII 40
T

11 16

T
Gallic + German Aux.
Foot archers

4 legions
General +2 Praet.
cohorts + picked cavalry
4 legions
Light armed auxiliaries
Mounted archers
Auxiliary
cohorts
Could wheel directly
line of battle.

127

into

Cavalry
Foot archers
Legion III
Baggage train
Vex. Legion X
Legion VI
? Foot archers
Cavalry
Expecting
battle

ambush

or

Bj III

115ff

BJ V 39ff
T

Aux. infantry
+ archers
Heavy infantry
+ cavalry
10 men from each
century
with
entrenching
gear
Pioneers to level route
Officers'
equipment
with
mounted
escort
General
with foot +
mounted
escort
Legionary
cavalry
Siege train
Officers
with escort

Legions,
abreast
Baggage

marching

train

Arrian

ADied forces
Syrian auxiliaries
Pioneers + surveyors
Officers'
baggage
General's escort
Legionary
cavalry
Officers
Legions,
abreast
Baggage

marching

Scouts

train

train

Mercenaries
Rearguard (also to keep
watch on mercenaries)
Probably
battle.

not anticipating

Auxiliary
cohorts
Rearguard
of light +
heavy infantry
+ cavalry

Probably
battle

Aux. cavalry
flanked
Aux. infantry,
by cavalry
Equites
sinqulares
Legionary
cavalry

Siege train
Officers of Legion
Legion XV
Officers of Legion
Vex. Legion XII
Provincial
militias
Aux. infantry
Baggage train
Aux. cavalry
Battle

not anticipating

128

to follow.

XV

XII

Fig_. vii:

Hypothetical

Reconstruction

of Arrian's

Line

of March

Because of the problems involved in the reconstruction

line of march
of Arrian's
below contain a number of estimations
mentioned above (p. 118), the calculations
and assumptions:
i) AM regular army units are assumed to be at full paper strength
and the
from Legion XII Fulminata 2000 strong.
The strength
vexillation
of the provincial
In
train.
baggage
the
Militia is estimated,
the
train
as are
sizes of
artillery
and
the latter case, because the march appears to be one to the battle site and no
camp is to be constructed
prior to the battle, it is assumed that the bulk of the
army's baggage remains in camp.
ii) All infantry
the cavalry three abreast.
march in columns four abreast,
iii) The distances of 0.75m per infantry
rank and 2.7m for cavalry ranks adopted
by Gichon has also been used here.
UNIT

MAX NUMBER

Scouts

Not included
0

in calculations

Cavalry:
Coh III Ulp. Petr. sag. cceq.
Ala II Ulp. Aurian.
Coh IV Raet.
Ala I Aug. Gernina Colon.
Coh I Itur. eq.
Coh III Aug. Cyr. eq.
Coh I Raet. eq.
Coh I Germ. eq.
Infantry:
Coh I Ital.
Coh III Aug Cyr.
Coh I Bosp.
Coh I Fl. Numid.
oD

SinquIares
Equites
Equites
Leqionis
Artillery
Officers
Legion XV
Legion XV ApoEdnaris
Officers
Legion XII
Legion XII Fulminata

Infantry:
Provincial
militia
Coh I Lepid.
Impedimenta
Cavalry:
Ala I Ulp.

LENGTH

Dac.

129

240
512
120
512
120
120
120
240
1984

216
460
108
460
108
108
108
216
1784

480
480
800
480
2240

90
90
150
90
420

120
180
?
?
4800
?
2000
7100+

108
162
100
50
900
30
375
1725

800?
200
?
1280+

150
38
100
340

512

460

12866

4677
3
c. miles

(metres)

Figure

viii:

Suggested

deployment

of Arrian's

line of maLrch to line of battle -

Scouts
CobIII Dip Petr. sag.w
Ala II Dip Aurian
CobIV Raet. eq.
Ala I AugGeikinaColon.
CobI Itur. sag. eq.
CobIII AugCyr. sag.eq.
CobI Raet. eq.
CobI Geraeq.

F-----'

CobI Ital.
CobIII AugCyr sag. eq.
CobI Bospsag.w
CobI Fl Nuaidsag. eq.
CobI Bospsag.& eq.
CohI Fl Nutid sag. eq.
Equites Sinqulares
Equites Leqionis
Artillery
Officers LegionXV

1. A

LegionXVApollinaris
Officers LegionXII
LegionXII Fulainata

--I

Provincial itilitia
CobI Lepid
Baggage
Ala IV Gallorm
CobI Ital
r--77=
Ala I Dip Dac

130

Chapter

6: Pitched

Battles

Introduction
The importance

the subject

prominence
Vegetius,
course

of the pitched

of an entire

historian

war,

battle

the force
to when

resorted

historians.

for example

to exercise

be so decisive

could

and the advantage,

other

Vegetius

strategies

he suggests

should

be attempted

(111.25).

Even when the commanding

there

both

This

the strengths

or flight

chapter

pursuit,

and

various

on choosing

use of different

earth

timing

in the flank

however

policy

only be

are

to pitched

resorting

armies,

the

the enemy had failed

had to be taken

of both

of attacks

be carried

be assured,

had decided

These included

and weaknesses

would

before

general
that

points

writers.

will consider

by the treatises;
units

many

and the possibility

sides

pursuit

still

to the treatise

according
terrain,

were

or

the

the result

that it should

suggests

a scorched

tactics

could offer

Because

abilities'.

or dissipating

terror

turn

could

as many sieges,

ways of destroying

Ambushes,

particularly

in 197 BC and Pydna in

and could never

(111.9).

battle,

battle

Cynoscephalae

his literary

by the

is indicated

treatises,

military

A pitched

not as dramatic

perhaps

an opportunity

of a pitched

in Roman warfare

is given in the general

and in the ancient

168 BC and, although

great

battle

to offer
into

battle

a pitched

consideration,

and the nature

of the

the use of reserves

and rear,

the

by

as well as how

out.

aspects

of pitched

battles

the time and place for battle,

types

and the role of the general

of troops,
in battle.

and

that

the disposition

developments

The chapter

are covered

of

in these,

will consider

in

'Tacitus'
for example,
is very
account of the second battle of Cremona,
father
between
including
dramatic,
encounter
and son who were fighting
an
horrors
(Hist.
illustrating
the
III 25), and he
of
civil
war
on opposite sides,
(Hist
the
of
and
confusion
of
a
night
action
excitement
puts across
-11122-3).

131

the use of auxiliaries

particular

re-introduction

Greek

the

of

2 comprises

Appendix
Republic

style

summaries

in

phalanx

the

AD.

century

second
fought

battles

of pitched

Empire and which

and early

force and the suggested

as the main striking

the late

during

to in the text -

are referred

Sources
Onasander
battle,

and Vegetius

the methods

Vegetius'

detailed

the subject

of drawing

description

of his third

army in the field.

to all aspects

after

a defeat.

the advice given by Onasander

to his treatise,

been

very

similar

based much of book III

64).
similar

and they

advice

on others.

agree

Accounts

of pitched

in detail,

making

and tactics.
Tacitus

in particular
the section

in content

to that

on Frontinus'

on Many

battles

it difficult

In their

provides

of this

exempla relating

a time and place for

from choosing

of that

given

in ancient

by Onasander

historians

or impossible

suggestion,

they

to analyze

see Chapter

actions

may have

to Schenk

(1930 39-

and Vegetius
do offer

given

for

is very

contradictory

the military

revolt,

may

Vegetius

can be confused

of the Boudiccan

132

according

though

were written

on general

work

in Onasander2

treatise,

matters,

accounts

and if the stratagems

and Dio spend far more time on the speeches

For discussion

of the

with the procedures

The exempla given can be used to illustrate

a lot of the advice

Certainly

in book II introduces

organization

stratagems

battles,

pitched

in battle.

deployment

and their

which is concerned

Book II of Frontinus'

battle to retreating

have

up troops

of legionary

book,

of fighting

as an appendix

for
time
the
advice on
choice of a site and a

both offer

and lacking
dispositions

example,

both

by the two leaders

2 on the Literary

Evidence.

than

the

devices

battle 3.

actual

limitations,

military

large scale pitched

for

his

enormous

battles,

campaign

The advice

operation.

battles

to pitched

to Battle

The treatises

provide

states that

or obliged

should

However,

advice

never

several

these stratagems

with the question

The exempla illustrate

troop

should

when the enemy is hampered

when the enemy is deploying

'Tacitus
Annals
Graupius,
Agric.

XIV 35-6; Dio LXII

30-34, and the battle

unless

battle.

induced
that

by

other
may

the time for battle

since

(Strat.

in his stratagems
with the timing
be offered

Vegetius

Frontinus

II i)

of the battle,

not

or not.

to get the advantage

to the elements

(eg:

scruples

(II i 14).

Strat.

over an
II i 1-

(II i 16-17) and

In many cases the use

3-6; cf : the speeches

itself,
Acfric. 35-7.

133

into

put

relating

but

He also suggests

by religious

his line of battle

is of

be offered

should

at all,

actions

to pitched

deployment

and exposure

been

subjects

battle

a section on choosing

battle

delaying

enemy worn out from hunger

2), attacks

" (111 25).

are all connected

of whether

of his battle

the subject

engage in general

on the subject

exempla

description

each section.

on when a pitched

before resorting

in his treatise

of small. and

on particular

below under

by necessity.

much detail

accounts

seem to have

never

does not mention

be employed

also have included

he provides

little

"good officers

opportunity

plans

by the treatises

given

Onasander

or accepted.

the

In

)EK-uq14;
'Alavwv
The
Ka-c'

Alans.

the

against

will be discussed

Preliminaries

eye witness

with

these

of Roman battles

corDus provide

and there is also Arrian's

though

even

value

usef u.1 in the study

practices,

rhetorical

other

in use, but despite

practices

and the Caesarian

commentaries

on contemporary

tactics

can be very

the histories
Caesar's

addition,

plans

the actual field

which may obscure

may include

of battles

Accounts

before

Mons

would give the Romans a psychological

of such a stratagem
as a tactical
Germans

Caesar

one.

Lucullus,

latter

was still

though
trying

greatly
to deploy

the

number

Neither

outnumbered,

Onasander

Mithridates

attacked

was just

the

(BG 1 50; Strat.

II

when the

the enemy line was in chaos

might also help to

was of importance

which

Frontinus

nor

even though

reasons

his huge army;

of casualties

when the battle

particularly

to fight

army

4. The use of such a stratagem

and fled almost immediately

limit

Ariovistus'

to do so for superstitious

were reluctant

i 16).

forced

as well

advantage

to any

general,

one in a campaign.

gives much

to the

consideration

use of

methods other than pitched

battles

to defeat an enemy or scare him off without

an engagement5 - Delaying

tactics

are mentioned

with the waging

give Rome a breathing

space in 217 BC after

armies

for

could

prepare

the

campaigns

does not appear

to be advocating

engaging

when conditions

were perfect

this

at all.

Vegetius

battles

delaying

to differ

tactics

were to

of Trasimene

so her

Vegetius,

to come.

but rather

tactics,

(or when a battle

appears

and the implications

matter,

the disaster
and

however,

or not engaging

in connection

I iii 3), but Fabius'

war (Strat.

of a defensive

by Frontinus

only

was unavoidable),

with the earlier

writers

on

below.

of this will be considered

Choice of Terrain
Onasander
pitched

and Vegetius

both

battle is to be fought,

the nature
of terrain

of the battlefield
to suit the strengths

4The accounts
Appian
Mithr.

5The latter
Dio (LXIX

as they believe
(Veg. 11114).

victory

are

seems to have been Arrian's

15) he was successful.

very

intention

134

is greatly

The general

and weaknesses

battle
of Lucullus'
84-5; Strat. II i 14.

of the terrain

the importance

stress

(ektaxi

dependent

on

must choose the type

of his troops

similar;

where

and those of the

Plutarch

Lucul.

26-8;

), and according

to

if the strength

enemy;

constricted
advises

high ground

missiles

troops
Such

force,

He suggests
so that

is the

importance
until

other

of the field

for throwing

though

important

for

a general

example

possible

the terrain.
suit

had at his disposal.

if the army

of pitched

and weaknesses

these

Germanicus

could

strengths
at Idistaviso

Obviously

some kind

battles

remark

that

that was suitable

for the

but even

that

then

it was

be of use,

could

or

that the strengths

deal of effect

below).

"open ground

135

it was

of the line of battle

(see

(II ii 1)

of protection.

had a great

weaknesses

(II ii 6)

of a battle,

do not give much indication

the deployment

(II ii 7-8),

the flanks

army

and

this was not always possible,

phenomena

natural

to provide

and

a large

on the march,

was attacked

of the two armies

It is rather

dust and wind

the outcome

affect

II ii 2-4),

(Strat.

to protect

provides

the use of high

particularly

to choose a place to fight

possible

field-works

The accounts

features

recommends

Frontinus

down from

area to embarrass

to make use of any

construct

to

as arranging

such

(XXXI).

to face the sun,

natural

of the terrain

whenever

a hill

climbing

Onasander

that

above,

and charging

using

in a confined

Since the nature

forces

missiles

he also mentions

and deploying

troops

advantages,

of battle

mentioned

so the enemy is forced

deploying

of

weapons and firing

of throwing

place is found

a suitable

exempla, for some of the tactics

ground

natural

the importance

mentions

for

or woody areas

dust and wind are in the face of the enemy (111 14).

the sun,

battle

avoiding

Vegetius

and

rough

but Vegetius

hilly

and cut-up,

and it is difficult

using

(XXXI),

be chosen

because of the advantage

greater

with

engage.

for cavalry

(111 13).

is stronger

to Onasander,

according

should

country

and open ground

if the infantry
holding

near hilly

ground

plains

is in the cavalry,

on the choice of
that is tailored

Indeed,

Tacitus

is not the only battle

to
has

field

available

to a Roman.

(Annals

11 16).
the

concerning

be entirely

would

would take place on flat,

Hispaniens

cavalry

ground
are

that

out

effectiveness

battle

by

the

greater

force,

reports

that Pompey easily overcame

and it was better

B. Alex. 73-76;

ektaxis

on high ground
and,

troops

for the use of artillery

and treatise

perhaps

an engagement

take

II ji 2).

the difficulty

to protect
place,

range that
flanks.

their

in the former

to hold the high ground

of the terrain;

range

during

the civil

136

and

It also

because

Frontinus
because his

The advantage

of

frequently

II U 3; BG VIII.

proposed

formidable
Romans
in
to
the
than
such
engage
more sense

It was only an advantage

the

missiles is mentioned

of the extra

high

down on the enemy with

alike (Veg. 111 14; Strat.

to take advantage

actually

holding

in one encounter

Both Caesar and Arrian

more importantly,

about

increased

(Strat.

and other

writers

19).

(B. Hisp. 29).

for the enemy to engage.

Mithridates

for

suitable

entirely

also for an army on the defensive.

down onto Mithridates'

by bistorians

of the Bellum

The two main advantages

army would be able to charge

meant that an attacking

high ground

height

and made it harder

of artiRery,

army charged

extra

the

the engagement

calm and sunny

for one.

and open

plains

because

were

the

all

that in one battle

more concerned

or in preparation

Vegetius;

that

and the author

at Munda

conditions

seem to have been far

in a pitched

pointed

(BC 171),

was flat and the weather

as the terrain

Roman generals

by cavalry

surrounded

open ground

F- mentions

Caesar mentions

Indeed,

Vegetius

and
because

is odd

cavalry

with Vegetius

agree

sources

are best for cavalry.

infantry

for

of terrain

suitability

Onasander

between

contradiction

and literary

commentaries
ground

The

"

if he acts sensibly.

are good too,

Woods and forests

14;

to site artillery

would

be provided

In neither

case did

the Bellovaci

had

circumstances.

if the enemy attacked

wars in Spain Marcellus

despite
refused

to let his army engage that of Q. Cassius

troops

on high

ground

disadvantaged
difficulties

if

did

they

of engaging

of Mons Graupius

account

about

was concerned

of the lower

in the marshlands

for
their
too
soft
was

suited

in this kind

heavy

treatises

similar

mentions

circumstances

auxiliaries

who could

"Medway"

(Dio LX 20).

Tacitus

a
and

the tribes

states

that

the

to throw

were long limbed,

suitable

"specialist"

troops

use of

for fighting

in Britain,

swim across

Aulus

Plautius

in full

rivers

armour,

These have been identified

troops

to cross

important

roles in the two attacks

29, Aqr-i

Batavians

also fought

18).

(Agri

36),

and it would

137

than

However,

made use of German

at the battle

as Batavians

of the

(Hassall

1970

the Thames

(Dio LX 20),

on Anglesey

(Annals

in a more conventional

perhaps

other

to have had many.

as well as having

Graupius

to fight

and had long spears

the

were also the first

and they

trying

(B. Hisp. 29),

impossible
it
made
and

and the Roman army does not appear

131-6),

troops

1 64).

Caesar

ground.

of terrain.

None of the
cavalry,

to the

it had to negotiate

to the historian,

according

to marsh dwelling,

because

problems

armour

to the

get the enemy to engage.

was in marshy

(Annals

Rhine

the Cherusci,

whereas

naturally

under

had severe

army in Germany

Germanicus'

in Tacitus'

most favourable

and still

Pompeian

the

to engage

The

ground

of using

the position

at Munda

line

his battle

in order

river

missiles,

The trick

did have problems

Where Roman heavy infantry

(B. Alex. 60).

are illustrated

uphill

to the enemy,

troops and most unfavourable

ground

36).

(Aqric.

hold
to
been
have
to
seems

advantage

marshy

by attacking

be seriously

would

hill

the

to storm

attempt

a force

his troops

knew

and Marcellus

up his

had drawn

because the latter

be incorrect

XIV

role

at Mons

to describe

them as

"specialist"

troops.

More likely,

his soldiers

abilities

In addition

possess -

might

to using

of natural

the enemy would

get the sun,

This,

to his advantage,

the terrain

to take advantage

p. 135).

dust

the Romans got the dust blowing

but

Polybius

disadvantage
to tell

whether

troops

or not;

both

that

says

deployed

sides

sun (Polybius

a general

took such factors

deployed

other

factors

by the sources

mentioned

gives no indication
Certainly
accident

at the second battle

that the Vitellians

them to fire

their

and provide

excellent

One of the
obstacles

best

artillery

ways

to prevent

measure was particularly

attacked

on its flanks

at Cynoscephalae

II ii 7),

was put

at a

possible

the Cimbri

his

and Teutones

but there

barbarian

may well have

dispositions

Plutarch,

so

not

for example,

with this intention.

of Cremona it seems to have been completely

themselves

off target,

to take

so

when deploying

his line of battle

arranged

found

targets

neither

account

dust and wind,

and

43; Strat.

It is not always

II ii 8; Plut. Mar. 26).

(Strat.

that Marius

against

so

did at Cannae,

XXII

so that

into

Roman

the

affecting

(Livy

111 114).

his troops

that the Germans had to face the sun,

been

faces

deploying

(111 14; see above

is what Hannibal

in their

was also advised

recommended

and wind in his face

by the rising

Marius

the general

Vegetius

phenomena.

to some sources,

according

would make use of any particular

any general

advantage
of being

important

the rising

and to be Muminated

for the Flavian

any chance

facing

troops

moon, causing

by the moonlight

to caim at (Hist. 111.23

of the terrain
outflanked.

was to use natural

Such a preventative

as an army was at its most vulnerable

or at the rear,

in 197 BC (Polybius

as happened
XVIII

26).

by

to the Macedonian
The manoeuvrability

when
phalanx
of the

6jt seems quite likely

that the line of retreat
would be a more important
(see
171).
below
the
than
rose
sun
p.
where
consideration

138

Roman manipular

as illustrated

movements,
cohort

and cohort

at Cynoscephalae,

and meet an enemy coming from behind

do.

When Caesar's

civil

wars,

troops

fighting

thereby

despite

the flexibility

Onasander

(XXI),

wing

(11120).

Frontinus

31ff),

states

that

forced

thereby
opponent's

rivers

secure

However,

better

to prevent

features

arrangements

to secure

one
this

also advises

(II ii 6) but

his right

infantry

wing with

against

Civffis

Rhine

(Hist. IV 16) fought

respectively

and

a stream

may

to counter

well

battles

have

his

(Annals

at Idistaviso
pitched

so he

Caesar was

on the left wing.

to his own line of battle

(XI

by a river

was secured

left wing (BC 11188-9 )7 Germanicus

.

and

to turn

cohort

used

close to
them

to

one wing.

This strategy
anchor

Weser

other

the

(B. Afr. 12).

natural

at Magnesia

and light

to make alterations

11 16) and Cerialis

the

wing

Pompey secured

his cavalry

strong

to

in the histories.

the Roman left

and at Pharsalus

could concentrate

seven battle

during

cavalry

it was obviously

using

to turn

were unable

gives one example of the use of this stratagem

many more may be found

Appian

advises

and one of Vegetius'

every

on two fronts

battle

of the Roman system,

such a possibility.

by Labienus'

the

with

prevention;

of the line of battle

his line and ordered

the

of outflanking

the phalangists

which

were surrounded

Caesar extended

about,

and their

for the rear cohorts

it was possible

system

aided both the execution

systems

could

be taken

both wings as Arrian

further
intended

and natural

features

could

to do for his engagement

be used to

with the Alani

from
from
legion
his
third
7The alteration
cohort
each
one
ordering
comprised
them on his right wing to oppose the extra forces on
line and positioning
the flexibility
of the cohort
Pompey's left wing (BC 111.89), again illustrating
system.

139

(Ervalic

12)'.

Boudicca,

Suetonius

Paulinus,

and with a wood at his rear

wings,

from the rear

attack

when

in a steep

his line of battle

positioned

faced

to prevent

sided

huge

the

with

army

movements,

outflanking

his

to secure

valley

of

or an

XIV 34).

(Annals

Fieldworks
When

natural

obstacles

were

entrenchments

to protect

the flanks,

of the military
this,

from cavalry

battle,

fortifications
details

to secure

in battle

his battle

and his cavalry

outside.

to restrict

the

that

account

line,

trenches

not

are several

for storming

works

area

mention

(locum

to those
their
whether

(B. Afr. 51),

(B. Afr. 60).

line

beyond

mentioned

operations

his

trenches

the trenches

at Munda,
).

above.

chance of deciding
the

to protect

within

coepi

More

he had decided

which

ground

definire

of

to protect

He dug two straight

Because of unfavourable

similar

examples

used the same

dug by Pharnaces

to the point

by any

the town than fighting

the same He later

-

of his battle

dig

to

was

the town of Uzitta

(B. Alex. 37).

this would hamper

does

there

then drew up the infantry

the operational

digging

complained

the field

Domitius

alternative

Caesar had used fortifications

wing

close together

not to advance

involved

that is not mentioned

was essentially

the right

about

against

4ft deep and fairly

began

a practice

when he was attacking

the purpose

are provided

flanks

an

this was more in preparation

and although
a pitched

available,

Nevertheless,

writers.

from the late Republic.

mainly

his flanks

treatise

not

This

Caesar

may have

Caesar's
the conflict,
were

men
but

completed

(B. Hisp. 30).

"Such a strategy,
however,
involve fighting
a battle
would almost certainly
Arrian
battle
topographical
that
the
circumstances;
mentions
under particular
(ektaxis
11).
fought
be
place
appointed
an
at
will

140

Caesar had previously

used entrenchments

(B G 11.9).

He states

to the front

and rear of his battle

the

end

of

each

(Str

II iii

17).

series of Roman fieldworks

S. E angles
destroyed

by the river

is c. 700m long,
almost

to the

break

emplacements
its outline
redoubts

at Mauchamp,

charge

is irregular;
are fairly

entrenchments

the fieldworks
as the

lines

linked

the

a marching

or hamper

to be complete and

by Caesar,

The dimensions

an infantry

and reaches
of the trench

it.

not explain
but their

to

Of the artillery

attack.

only the northern

could

(20 cm-1m)

appeared

was

have been wide and deep enough

presumably

one survives,
The trenches

main purpose

and
of the

seems to have

artillery'.

were to prevent

at Mauchamp

on a

from the N. W and

running

given

of the Aisne.

Napoleon

shallow

similar

claimed that the end of the S. E trench

at the end of each trench,

been as a base for Caesar's

Caesar's

entrenchments

at

by Archelaus'army

These comprised

Aisne.

more than the figure

a tributary

dug

out investigations

carried

but the N. W trench

Aisne,

but it would

up a cavalry

and Stoffel

Napoleon

slightly

Miette,

are not known,

III

with additional

of the camp.

Sulla

that

mentions

400ft

wing about

were positioned

both his wings from envelopment

Napoleon

camp of 41 hectares

Forts and artillery

Frontinus

trench.

to protect

entrenchments

dug on his right

that he had trenches

line.

the Belgae in 57 BC

in Gaul against

his battle

seem to be adequate

camp with

the

rivers

line being

outflanked

and

for this purpose,

especially

and Miette,

a further

Aisne

57
in
9The identification
battle
BC
Caesar's
fieldworks
the
these
site
of
as
of
by Rice Holmes
(the earlier
has been hotly disputed
arguments
are summarized
include
the
1990? 250).
These arguments
1911 659-68, the later by Goudineau
later
is
than
indicators
the
that
in
the
camp
as
camp
marching
use of claviculae
do
dimensions
the
that
exactly
not correspond
with
Caesar's
and
campaigns
difficult
date
to
However,
Caesar.
by
camps
are
marching
very
those given
fact
The
that
the
into
the
to
clavicula,
came
use.
it
is
impossible
say
when
and
literary
is
the
do
ditch
the
evidence
not
correspond
with
dimensions
not
of
been
have
the
letter.
to
out
Caesar's
carried
not
may
important;
orders

141

to any

obstacle
Suetonius

Paulinus

filling

in ditches

below

(p. 142).

Favourable
Ideally

Belgic

etc.

(Hist. II 25);

a battle
(eg:

the ground

is avoided

is obvious

for

that

battle

by

of Cremona

here see

of the terrain

down towards

the enemy.
a definite

was considered
nor Varus
slopes

at the 1st battle

illustrated

in Caesar's

or delayed

because of the unfavourable

ground

ground"

for cavalry
Engaging

was either

flat,

nature

of

at Gergovia

is

comments,

it

open ground,

(see above p. 136), or ground

an enemy which

disadvantage,

The

From Caesar's

required

and during

the civil

because it would

difficulties

and

On several

commentaries.

and the Roman defeat

(BG VII 53).

was eager to engage

(E! C 11 34) ".

ground

illustrated

him "favourable

which would also be suitable

steep

on the difficulties

BG V 49; BC 11 34),

blamed on the unfavourable

Curio

the first

would wish to engage the enemy on favourable

about this is clearly

occasions

for

time preparing

that

mentions

Ground

any general

concern

manoeuvreslo.

outflanking

spent

Tacitus

sloping
a hill

climbing
wars

neither

have meant climbing

of unfavourable

ground

are

of Cremona:

"the battle line was broken up by the nature of the ground which
and pits, and in avoiding or going around
was full of trenches
these the men were compelled to engage their opponents
at a
disadvantage
and in small groups"
(Plut. Otho 12).
No doubt
marching

before
would

advantageous

a battle
have taken

started

a great

deal of marching

place as the opposing

armies

and counter-

aimed for the most

terrain.

"The

for
in
legions
camp
use as reinforcements
remaining
newly recruited
Caesar's
to
trenches
dealt
have
cross
attempt
enemy
concerted
any
with
could
line.
battle
his
and outflank
"Ostorius
Scapula's
to storm a defensive

in Wales when they

troops faced a similar difficulty
35).
(Annals
hilltop
XII
a
on
position
142

had

As stated

above,

Onasander

is found

(XXXI).

Again

comes; one of Caesar's

because of Caesar's
advantage

" (B G 111 17, in 56 BC

battle

in specific

fight

in a horned

rising

ground.

formation

him when there

of Forces:

and Vegetius

in advance,
the

to
on

stationed

to do if the

Alans

pair of hills that he could

is important

to the effectiveness

of

deployed

against

these

the

Vegetius
enemy

from the enemy,

dispositions

the best
advises
so that

will

whom,

enemy
care

a bad battle

his general
there

the

great

with

soldiers,

the battle

of planning

be

even with

up (Veg. 111 14).

the importance

who is to oppose

should

cavalry

awaiting

mention

deciding

because

obstructions

he intended

his

He intended

especiaUy

Veg. 111 14),

line

to fight

Treatises

and of making

battle

12).

the

presented

held by detachments

was not a convenient

line on, but the terrain

he enjoyed

proposed

(ektaxis

circumstances

with both wings

(Onas. XVI),

broken

with Viridovix

Both Onasander

example,

strategy

13

his dispositions

dispositions

of this

opportunity

in addition,

Arrian,

does not say what

Arrian

his battle

Disposition

)12

topographical

anchor

favourable

or some particularly

itself.

to fight

an example

place

a suitable

battle
to
avoid
wished

Sabinus,

legates,

than

Caesar

until

absence and the size of the enemy "unless

of position

decided

avoiding

recommends

it is from

battle

to deploy

for

cavalry

(Onas. XXX;
line will

be

his troops

in

be no interference

and it will give the Roman troops

of

a psychological

12This also reflects

the advice given by Vegetius that a general
by
by
induced
"unless
necessity"
or
obliged
opportunity
engage

should not
(111 25).

"Rome's enemies also made use of terrain

they knew would be unsuitable
or
area
for Roman troops, eg: the Iceni made their stand in a restricted
difficult
31),
(Annals
XII
their
and
see
of
cavalry
Romans
make
use
the
not
could
where
163.
below
p.
also

143

advantage

(111 11 & 17)"

sometimes

it is an advantage

Onasander,

(XXXIX).

for

to wait

can make his dispositions

general

perhaps

or planned

Both Onasander
formation

the terrain

and Vegetius
depending

state that

the line

and attack
(Onas.

XXI;

the

Veg. 111 15)

line (11 15; 11114),

simply

that

troops

the cavalry

should

the enemy to battle,

heavy

infantry.

(Onas. XIX).

light

The

This sounds very

by both Polybius

and Livy,

(XV).

types

has, their

the general
As far

should

15

Vegetius

should

face the enemy

intervals

troops

should

cavalry

left within
also

carry

much like the descriptions

descriptions

but Vegetius'two

be made
through
is easily

is much less specific;

(XVI)

of the main body of infantry

through

and

two arrangements

suggests

Onasander

whereas

the line

that

of

arms ,

as the width

a compromise

and so compact

be posted in front
then retire

better

cannot be reduced

so that the enemy can easily burst

rear,

for the battle

states

dispositions

were many different

is concerned,

being too long and narrow

outflanked

there

of the enemy

of the main body of troops

from

so the

are sometimes

because some things

on the type of soldiers

and the strength

first

(XXXII).

beforehand

between

light

the enemy's

He adds that plans made at the time of battle

to rules

depth

to deploy

enemy

into account

taking

than those made before the engagement

battle

the

that

states

more shrewdly,

and that

to provoke

the ranks
out

he

the

of the
pursuit

of the Roman legion

are also on the same

lines.

14Perhaps this is related

the late Empire.
"The
same consideration
Chapter 5).

to the use of inexperienced

was necessary
144

for

or weak Roman forces

the line

of march

in

(see above

His first

two lines
battle

A third
Light

reserve.
fled.

16
each)
.

(5 cohorts

line.

If

the light

troops

If the enemy fled,

troops.

The second

of light
and,

troops

with

artillery

and slingers,

reserve

bodies

that

Vegetius

then

in the

3ft,

arrangements

strengths

and weaknesses

(testud

) to

discharged

protect

a.U their

16For discussion

detail,

explaining

such

and Livy

The

suggest

as Cato for this

for

the

the intervals

6ft

(111 15),

force

described

and each rank,

in the absence

in the rear.

section

(11 3; see below note 19,20).

goes into greater

line,

source

Other

and triarii.

and those of Polybius

may have used a Republican

different

that

description

then two ranks

these was a line of

Behind
of scutati

ranks

the enemy to battle

were to be kept

and infantry

this

as he does elsewhere

Vegetius

force

and light

the front

with

and cavalry,

out the pursuit.

a reserve

by the cavalry

to provoke

as above,

and the legions

ranks

similar,

and hastati)

were,

to carry

of cavalry

between

was fairly

as a

them if they

and pursued

the

of the

at the rear

remain

be pursued

would

(principes

the cavalry,

similarities

they

whose duties

through

retired

arrangement

of legionaries

(triarii)

infantry

side

on either

are stationed

in

and hastati

of principes

the enemy to battle

provoked

fought.

composed

Cavalry

line of heavy

troops

not,

force

has the main infantry

arrangement

between

and later
above,

describes
depending

of the enemy (11120)'7 . Finally,

of light

themselves

missiles

the front

troops

from

fire

on the

Onasander

should

form

unt: U the

seven

states

a tortoise

enemy

have

(XXI).

of these arrangements,

17The last of these has a flank

XXI and above p. 139.

enemy

ranks

each man

protected

145

see below p. 152.

by a natural

obstacle,

cf : Onasander

Unlike

Vegetius,

Onasander
out that

gives

by stationing

more force

directly

and have to fire

(XVII).

flanks,

especially

Light

forces

holding

Reserves

of the line,

in front

archers

These

troops

troops
high

ground

be kept

should

line requiring
the left

carrying

mentioned
legates,

of war,

or after

on circumstances.

to attack

the enemy's
than the
(XIX

and to dislodge

country,

for carrying

(Onas. XXII;

enemy

on the enemy's

Veg. III

one near the right

out manoeuvres

to

in the

and one on

wedges and pincers,

the wing from being surrounded.

Onasander

and are particularly

for

useful

rear.

Practices

importance

the

Caesar frequently
centurions

of the

The deployment

of a battle

146

s p----

The question

as Onasander

points

planning

of war with his

(BG IV 13, VI 5, VII

dispositions.

the enemy varies,

advance

held councils

BG VI 5, VII 60) and Arrian

of march and battle

order

before

and senior

will not be as

and become confused

of reserves,

such as forn-ting

confirms

by the treatises.

councils

proposed

Field

evidence

tribunes

holding

attack

of Forces:

literary

groups

are for emergencies

the reserves

out a sudden

Disposition

together

one in the centre

of the wing to prevent

that

states

ndssiles

are more vulnerable

of the main force

at the rear

more troops,

with

(Onas. XVIII).

line had three

the enemy flank,

attack

their

as the flanks

be used in broken

should

are able to fire

they

also be used

should

missiles,

with

He points

troops.

if they are behind the heavy infantry

at the enemy whereas

The Vegetian

troops

prominence

and the enemy line will be forced

XX).

The

to the role of light

over the heads of the infantry,

forceful

front

particular

on the legions,

books II and III concentrates

who throughout

45; Labienus
describes

his

of deploying
out (XXXIII),

line could take some time,

and

this was a particularly

of Mithridates
were fully

by Onasander
Pharsalus.
all

his

(XXXII),

of deploying

light

troops

cavalry

his own right

wing,

on his
Caesar

they

mentioned

is well illustrated

at

Caesar saw that he had posted

left

Since

wing.

giving

this

from

took one cohort

them all to his right,

before

the advantage

the enemy,

after

Pompey's dispositions,

and

line and posted

However,

defeat

Lucullus'

forces

on the Pontic

due to his attack

(see above p. 134)'8.

On studying

endangered
third

vulnerable

was primarily

deployed

in;
be
for
to
an army
state

seriously

each legion's
(BC III

him an advantage

89).

Concern

about the width

illustrated

by Agricola's

Tacitus,

Agricola
There

ranks.

served

digging

35).

the

operational

trenches,

against

area"

as suggested
line within

attacks,

of battle

line

the

flank

mentioned

at

Munda

above,

certain

According

of this

as a result
during

the actual

above (p. 140) may not

but on some occasions

Caesar's

as well.
(B. Hisp.

to

so he opened out the

that the line was too thin

of the fieldworks

to protect

to restrict

to keep the battle

attacks'

(Agri

about being outflanked

was concerned

The construction

"restrict

hne at Mons Graupius

were suggestions

have been simply

have

line (see above p. 144) is best

but this does not seem to have been a weakness

manoeuvre,
battle.

and depth of the battle

30)

may

may

attempts

have

to

involved

and if so they may have been intended

limits

as well as to protect

against

flank

9-

by
18cf: Caesar's difficulties
his
taken
Nervii
the
army
was
when
against
had
be
to
this,
there
20.
To
11
BG
a relationship
against
guard
surprise
between the order of march and line of battle;
see above Chapter 5 on The
Order of March.
"On the one occasion Caesar formed up a single line (simplex acies), he was
forced to order his men not to advance more than 4ft from the standards,
because the line had become too disorganized.
147

Although

both

deployment

Livy

and tactics

describe

a number

dispositions
"standard"
Caesar,

the

of
line

Arrian

historians

of battle

army

for

and early

between

actual

and

including

information

dispositions

possible

during

the

available

first

however,

description

battle line of the Republic

on the

indicate

to

Republic.

Using

from Tacitus

and other

dispositions

in the late

and thus a comparison

and those advised

Vegetius'

and his information

is

the

they do not indicate

some comment

some idea of military

period,

between

it

socii,

Empire may be obtained,

battle

and the "standard"

battles,

describe

Since both historians,

a Roman army

and the limited

Republic

145),

Roman

of the Imperial

The similarities

piece

19-25)

legion in battle,

the socii fought

of set

(VI

Polybius

and

of the Republican

in the line of battle

where

3-18)

(VIII

is possible

by the treatise
of the battle

writers.

line

(11 15)

have been noted above (pp. 144-

may well have

come from

one of the

Republican

line of the Republic,

according

to Polybius

and Livy,

treatises".

The "standard"

battle

was as follows:
1. A screen

retire
cavalry

through

infantry

the ranks

in pursuing

The heavy
p

of light

infantry

ncipes and triarii.

(velites)

of heavy infantry.

a fleeing

of velites,

to battle,

then

would also assist the

in the three

acted as a reserve

manoeuvres
between

hastati,

enemy

enemy.

The latter

3. The socii were stationed

the

The velites

would take up the fight

also be used for outflanking

same system

to provoke

(eg:

the legions

principes

force in the rear and could

Cynoscephalae
and cavalry

and triarii

lines of hastati,

197 BC).
and employed

as the legions

(Livy

the
VIII

8).

20Webster
Vegetius
from
this information
(1985 231) suggests
obtained
Frontinus,
but Vegetius also mentions Cato as a source (11 3), and perhaps
description
this is a more likely source for Vegetius'
of the Republican legion.
148

The

cavalry

outflanking

manoeuvres

The line of battle

to flee,

Trebbia,

is used

Cannae,

(Polybius
regular

deployment

course,

exceptions,
gives

The adoption

the

Romans

of the

for

examples

of a tactical

the line of battle,

II iii 4,16,17

system

based on the cohort

the line

with

The major difference

on the wings.
line.

of the

In

first,

infantry

engaged

combat

(BG 1 52).

usually

placed

at

Republic

Such light

Thapsus

"specialist"
B. Afr.

it

between

7922)

dispositions

such as slingers
or

front

with

the

infantry

cavalry

of heavy

in hand to hand
Period

were

and cavalry,

and

and archers
cavalry

of

in the front

ranks

were used in this

the heavy

from Caesar

and the auxiliary

the

of

held the centre

pila and then engaging

that

which

of the maniple

The evidence

side,

was usually

infantry

troops

instead

is the absence of the velites

their

throwing

on the wings,

were frequently
line

late

the

of

were,
for

reason,

the legions

usually

on either

There

on the general

of the velites.

infantry

the auxiliary

8).

deal of affect

shows that

corpus"

it as the

)21

(Stra

with the exception

and the "Caesarian

XIV

the

Cynoscephalae

describes

tactical

a particular

does not seem to have had a great

Gisgo,

and Polybius
(111 72;

including

occasions

Hasdrubal

23-7),

Roman army

usually

on many

against

8; XVIII

XIV

(see below p- 170)

-

be caused

the Great Plains

111 72,113;

Frontinus

by

the enemy line and cause the enemy

to break
would

prevented

cavalry,

enemy

out the pursuit

and carried

was intended

the

opposed

wings

when most casualties

formation

This

the

on

to

(eg: Caesar's
improve

their

21Strat.
to confuse
II iii 4; Scipio changed his usual battle line suddenly
the
troops
his
out a
on
wings and carrying
Hasdrubal,
strongest
stationing
flank attack.
22Caesar also on occasion stationed
at the front of his own battle
auxiliaries
infantry,
than
12,
but
these
auxiliary
rather
cf
archers
are
line, eg: B. Afr 154.
below
XVII
p.
Onasander
and
149

(BG 1123; BC 1134; B. Afr. 69,72;

effectiveness

the

enemy

cavalry,

to oppose
a fleeing

and pursue

manoeuvres

outflanking

prevent

The role of the

14).

and early Empire;

the Republic

remains the same throughout

cavalry

B. Hisp

enemy.

In the early
first

The

the

was simply

legions

holding

cavalry

on the wings.

on this,

are also a variant

In the second arrangement

legions

and cavalry

This,

however,

light

troops

reserve

posted

the

(Acfri

35).

much discussion

and this

(eg:

XIV 34; two battles

the

against

force

Republic

then

and

of the

Hist. V 16; Agric.

(eg:

35).

with

the

the

withdrawing;

in
held
were

and the legions

the use of this variant

will be considered

in front

was deployed

of the middle

battle

striking

The reason behind

is little

there

see below (p. 165).

on the wings

enemy

the

with

then auxiliary

dispositions

proposed

infantry

to

use.

of the main line of infantry

to the system

acted as the principal

auxiliaries

Arrian's
though

is not a return

provoking

in front

the auxiliary

were

infantry,

there was no actual battle;

Hist. I 24; 11121-22).

at Cremona,
Alani

infantry

system

in the late Republic,

As with dispositions

38, although

1152; XIII

Annals

of the line and auxiliary

the centre

in regular

Republican

of the old

continuation

of the use of light

evidence

to be two types of disposition

Empire there appear

has generated

below (p. 153).

Legions
Further

details

battle.

His usual

occasions

the

depth

flexibility

are available

a simplex

in

from Caesar on the deployment

was the

formation

or cruadruplex

cohorts

of the

for the general

duplex

acies

battle

or triplex

was used.

line,

the

to compron-dse between

150

acies

These

system

of his legions
though

formations

providing

in

on rare
refer

to

sufficient

a line that was too short

or

too thin

(see above

standard

for the late Republic,

(Rice

p. 144).

Holmes 1911587-99).

described
has
been
acies

The triplex

with the cohorts

sound,

especially

mentioned

above.

The middle line of three

mentioned

by Vegetius

outflanking
attacking
of cohorts

which

corpus

indicates

manoeuvres

that

regularly

used during

As stated

above,
for

acies (B. Afr.

outflanked
through
Caesar
his first

probably
outflank

this

states

that

tactical

with

these elephants

concern

the greater

normal

acies

Caesar

reason.

line was made up of cavalry

a triplex

an enemy

a 5-5 formation

and the

line to

Caesarian

are the most

on them,

acies were rarely

interspersed

of legionaries

at Uzitta,

used,

once

used

and this
a simplex

that his small force might

25

or rear attack

was the quadruplex

with

behind

be

of the enemy bursting

of a flank

danger

of battle

line

only

prevention

sacrificing

cavalry,

Scipio's

of Caesar

out

carry

but a longer

and reserves

and quadruplex

line to avoid

his thin

to face

around

and variations

13), and this was through

by Labienus'

line could

period.

the simplex
a specific

compromise

would act as the reserves

turn

study

these two acies,

length/width

acies was presumably

24
.A

to be

this would appear

the rear

whilst

necessary

The duplex

the

cohorts

gives fewer reinforcements

outflanking

was usually

if

and

from the rear 23

.

prevent

with

and Onasander

manoeuvres

to

regard

in a 4-3-3 formation

arranged

In normal circumstances,

tactically

as the

elephants

this.

Caesar sent reinforcements

acies,
(B. Afr.

To oppose

.
but

41),

and

to each wing

2'Vegetius 111 18 and Onasander XXII discuss reserves at the rear of the line,
Caesar
Pharsalus,
160.
ordered
one
At
above,
stated
below
as
p.
see
and
(BC
his
III
to
line
third
legion's
right
wing
reinforce
from
reserve
each
cohort
from
face
the
BG
to
turning
rear,
see
line
attack
89). For the third
of cohorts
124.
24cf:

Vegetius'
p. 152.

description

of legionary

deployment

11 15, but see also below

of the cohort system allowed him

25When this did in fact happen, the flexibility
line
this
to
in
the
new attack.
repulse
to turn round every other cohort
151

to create

a fourth

at Pharsalus

No details

Empire

first

before

descriptions

but

Silhanek

There

to this

formation

and Principe

triplex

the

late

here are legionaries,

triarii

of the legion,

almost exclusively
he is using
systems

a late

of legionary

Polybius,

Livy

unaware

of the

and

Republican

probably

change

from

source

(11 15,11114)

deployment

Cato
the

152

there

in

and cohort

Vegetius

and this suggests

for

is no

this.

However,

deals
that
his

owe more to the mid Republic,

(see above

manipular

that

and if the

of both the manipular

and cohorts,

or Imperial

of

that Vegetius,

of the legion is concerned,

of centuries

lines

acies.

elements

in terms

two

but Caesar specifies

his confusion,
systems.

(see below).

with

It seems much more likely

As far as the organization

the triarii

acies (1972 167-8) but

source for the force of reserves.

has here combined

His

it is at this point that Caesar

all ten cohorts

represent

infantry,

of five

two lines

with

Republic

and indeed

of the triplex

not be

confused.

comes from

in the rear (eg: BC 183),

doubt that Vegetius'

seems httle

line of heavy

the reserves,

was in use in

in the battle

it would

however,

acies

Caesar's

line,

it is not triplex,

acies,

the 4-3-3

hastati

is also the reserve

and auxiliaries

it is a duplex
explains

the advantages

cohorts

though

are,

to be the duplex

where the third

similar

legionaries

to that

to those of the late Republic

deployment

that this represents

suggests

to indicate

A line

that they were similar

appears

there

of legionary

de Re Militari,

Vegetius'

of legionary

(11 15) initially

cohorts,

fails

for the deployment

to suppose

unreasonable
Vegetius'

is similar

The manoeuvre

system.

are available

line of the

81).

illustrates
(BC
11189),
again
and
above

mentioned

of the cohort

(B Af
-

line of cohorts

p. 145).

to cohort

Vegetius
system,

appears

or is using

sources

relating

line is therefore

and his battle

to both types,

of

a synthesis

both.

Auxiliaries

As stated
Onasander
indicate

emphasises
that

the cavalry.
before
civil

their

through

retiring

(p. 146),

above

main interest

Vegetius'

the

of light

role

principal

role

troops.

was to incite

the lines of heavy infantry,

This was, indeed,

Onasander

their

wars of the late Republic,

Both
the

main role during

however,
before

out the pursuit

with

but well

the Republic,

were rarely

whilst

to battle

role had declined

auxiliaries

legions

writers,

enemy

and to carry

the former

was writing,

is in the

and during

posted

the

at the front

of

the line.

The general
fighting

impression

abilities

from

the

of many auxiliaries

at Pharsalus

auxiliaries

gained

writers

of this

show than

Crassus'

reasoning

between

the legions

Calvinus

placed the 'legions'

supplied

by Deiotarus

a small frontage,

because

he also lacked

line,

with

(B. Alex. 38-40).

if

supported

behind

posting

was lack

and encouraged

suggests
by

near

the legionaries

to guard

his camp during

entrenching
battle

that

the

states

Domitius

of his battle

in the centre
trust

and

of the line

(BG 111 24).

in their

strength

would fight

the legionaries

camp (BC 173).

the

use (BC II 75ff)

that the auxiliaries

being

is that

in the centre

in them

Caesar may have had this in mind when he positioned

between

for

of his auxiliaries

of confidence

Rice-Holmes

Appian

were suspect.

were more for

period

better

(1914 124

his auxiliary

)26

infantry

in

He also used auxiliaries

(BG 124; 150, the former

occasion

along with

26This is no doubt true, but in Crassus' case the auxiliaries

may have been
Caesar
details),
(unfortunately
the
gives
no
and
placing
slingers
or
archers
battle
line
have
been
his
tactically
(cf
in
the
these
would
of
sound
centre
of
BC 1 81-3).
153

legions

recently

recruited

auxiliary

infantry,

carry

there

force

infantry

was already

in the late

to fire

line,

directly

attacks.

Analysis

suggests

that

Pharsalus

Scipio's

these

Pompey

positioned

Unfortunately

the

lack

on his left

line,

this

suggests
of detail

are illustrated

Archers

analysis.

Uzitta

at

wings

and on the wings

of Caesar's

for

troops,
to fire

a position
with

which

such force.

and foot archers

Empire

cohorts;
milliary,

However,

criticizes

(ektaxis

(Holder

1980 appendix

two cohortes
indicating

their

equitatae
continued

in the field.

3),

6 cohortes

4 alae,

and two cohorts

importance

other auxiliary
are unable
an accurate

Arrian's

mounted

at the rear of his battle

32 units of archers

12-13).

similar

Column (scenes 177-9;

may not provide

with the artillery

on

as weJl.

prohibits

because the archers

the Column

are also positioned

line and on the flanks

the

Onasander

purpose

here

from behind

shooting

At

of archers

intention

dispositions

Empire

forces.

the specific

and the emphasis

in action on Trajan's

of the use of these auxiliaries

representation

for

of the

out flank

and early

uses of these

was the

minor,

in front

to carry

Republic

wing

Imperial

310) and in both cases they are depicted

the role

and cavalry.

and archers;

the principal

archers

flank

and archers

in the late

indeed,

were,

the right

of attacking

dispositions

Although

to

when

seems to have been fairly

for slingers,

at the enemy line,

of their

(BG II 8ff).

engaged

Republic

two positions

suggests

or deal with a new threat

Uzitta)

role for slingers

was a much greater

Onasander

(cf:

The

force,

used as a reserve

was occasionally

manoeuvres

the main legionary

of auxiliary

whose abilities

however,

out outflanking

he seems also to have doubted).

are attested
equitatae

are known

during
and 22

to have

been

27
.

1907
50;
Cohors
AE
27Milldary cohorts
I
Cohors
I
Ituraeorum,
of archers:
81;
1924
AE
Cohors
III
Ulpia
Petraeorum
Hemesenorum;
cohortes equitatae:
Artillery
ILS 1998,2585.
could take the place of
Cohors I Damascenorum
Onasander
Cremona
line,
II.
front
the
the
of
eg:
at
positioned
archers
(continued...
)
154

Slingers

are illustrated

310) and in the historical

together,
iaculatores".

The differences
that

though,

no units

address

may have

slings
auxiliary

units

(Saddington

slingers

been a general

certainly

fire

does not

mention

Pompey's

exposed.

These

by

that

(CIL

by their

archers
Caesar's

were

archers

the Empire,
battles

in pitched

practice

in the use of

VIII

2532) and although

weapons

in the late Republic

Cohorts

to exist during
archers

made up

this period

but

and artillery

in

power.

Pharsalus.

off

suggests

to play a role along with

by enemy infantry

driven

had a role

still

may not have continued

surrounded

were

during

11 20;

but it is

Unlike

staff.

as

slingers,

are not known,

epigraphically

requirement

identified

continued

the army's

What Onasander

they

of

42 65; Annals

(Livy

a sling

fight

such

types

this is not so common in the Empire.

of slingers

supplying

that

to the army in Africa

1982 140),

exclusively

are attested

proves

were often

used

auxiliaries
two

the two types

may have

of slingers

the evidence

Hadrian's

between

the libratores

possible

though

and libratores

the more common type,

39).

indicate

both

Tacitus

and

throwing

missile

Column scene

frequently

very

and archers

slingers

other

with

Livy

funditores,
XIII

literature

sometimes

(Trajan's

along with the archers

fighting

is the

or cavalry,
were protected
the

cavalry

massacred

by

vulnerability
but this

of these

is clearly

by his cavalry,
archers

Caesar's

and

illustrated

if
at

but when these

slingers

advancing

troops

were

infantry.

left
At

27

(
continued)
...
here so they can fire at the enemy with
recommends
placing the archers
The difficulties
of the Flavian troops at the second
greater force (XVII).
how serious an obstacle artillery
battle of Cremona indicates
could be when
sited here.
"Slingers
fighting
together
from
the Punic wars,
attested
are
archers
and
Sallust Jug. 46,49,94,100,
Ldvy 37 41; 42 58 (also fighting
with iaculatores);
105; L. Cornelius Sisenna Frag - 19 1 (stationed behind the battle line); Caesar
RC passim;
BG 11 7 (Balearic
with Cretan and Numidian archers),
slingers
B. Mr.
passim .
155

Idistaviso,

the auxiliary
by the Cherusci

attacked

had to go to the help of the archers

infantry

who were

11 16).

(Annals

Cavalry

At this

point

pitched

battles.

cavalry

on the wings,

to discuss

in virtually

prevent

or execute

infantry

and Vegetius

part,

cavalry

in battle

line,

most

to break

such

formations,

with

cavalry.

The

superiority

illustrated

by Caesar's

had little

During
by

to attack

commander

Caesar's

in forcing

by infantry,

especially

unable

by Arrian

both Crassus

is

cavalry

over

The Roman forces

(BG 1120).

they

attacked

picked infantry
cavalry

were

at Pharsalus
29

to flee

of the infantry
archers,

and

Parthian

the

against

infantry

Pompey's

off , it left the flanks

are usually

formation

counter

For
with

proposed

success

the Nervii

Veg. 11 15).

confrontations

cavalry

'barbarian'

even

infantry.

difficulty

Once

unprotected

as Caesar's

fourth

illustrates.

the late Republic

light

of

and when his cavalry

had been driven

at Pharsalus

degrees

against

by the Nervian

and vulnerable
line

of

battle

by surprise,

seem to have

the cavalry

varying

direct

of infantry

and the square infantry

employed

twice repulsed

the line

hence

out the

and to carry

(Onas. XVI,

reasons;

to

relevance

with

face
the enemy
to
was

attacks,

avoided

for sound tactical

Antony

were taken

flank

only

battle

every

recommend

seem to have

the Alan cavalry,

against

the role of cavalry

function

Their

as Onasander

pursuit,
the

I intend

infantry,
doubted

used

cavalry
to

units

'stiffen

the strength

been a German method of fighting,

frequently
' cavalry

of his cavalry.

went into battle

in

supported

circumstances

when

This seems originally

and Caesar expresses

his admiration

the

to have
for the

faces
lunge
the
his
infantry
to
to
29Frontinus
Caesar's
at
of
orders
considers
it
is
impossible
to
tell
this
though
whether
the cavalrymen
a stratagem,
32).
(Strat.
infantry
IV
Caesar's
vii
of
the effectiveness
increased

156

fighters'
fought

(BG 1 48),

abilities
together

and German,
with infantry,
However,

either

auxiliaries

fighting

that

for the cohors

together

infantry

and the cavalry

The proportion
(Keppie

1984 182).

the

equitata,

gives very

fighters

cavalry

would

he indicates

type

of the Empire

are arranged

with

the remainder

of these units

ever

the rest

situation

for the Imperial

infantry

was one infantryman

cohors equitata

on the wingS31.

was to support
in a cohors
Caesar

Unfortunately

to cavalry,

about equal since in his description

that there

for the

of the auxiliary

to 480 infantry

outnumbered.

of light

not,

that this was not the case

in this

120 cavalry

be vastly

it is

of the cavalry

also suggests

but with

Because

however,

indicate

orders

was the

1984 182).

the Empire,

and infantry
battle

Arrian's

to cavalry

(Keppie

during

the cavalry

on the proportions

were probably

The proportions
for this

the cavalry

as 'used to

and infantry

of cavalry

of battles

equitatae

with

mixture

The role of the infantry

few details

the numbers

equitata

of infantry

and strengthen

this

in this fashion.

of his cohortes

and

whether

infantry

by African

130

accounts

to determine

his cavalry

are described

troops

Gallic

(see below p. 158).

or antesicinani

light

The African

also.

of the lack of detailed

fought

cavalry

actua. Uy

was primarily

seems to have been used more widely,

It has been suggested

impossible

and cavalry

that he also interspersed

armed auxiliaries

the
cavcalry
calongside

inspiration

Since Caesar's

not surprising

light

the tactic

Spanish

although

is not explained

it is perhaps

how the infantry

of the German

to each rider

therefore

though

(BG 148).

appear to be wrong

of fighting.

"Cavalry
24;
light
infantry
together:
BG
11
VII 65; VIII 17 &
operating
and
in B. Afr.,
19; BC 1 43; 11 34; 11175; 11184; very frequently
where it seems
to support the cavalry;
B. Hisp. 14,
to have been the norm for light infantry
21,23,30.
3'Cavalry and infantry
of cohortes equitatae were separated
(ektaxi
Arrian
1).
115-26)
(BJ
111
Vespasian
and
157

when on the march

The

use

dismounted

of

treatises

and is usually

tactically

unsound

166),

but

there

XII 3 1; Strat.
fighting

of cavalry

is questionable
fighting

22 49; B. Hisp. 15; Davies

unit

Speidel

training

II W 23) and neither

on foot,

indeed

all cavalrymen

(1970) 143).

legionaries

under

(1965)

be more suitably

cavalry

any disadvantage
in both cases.

a disadvantage

on foot before

It

when

transferring

of Ti. Claudius

would have at least some

even though

their

for this.

equipped

to

unsuited

781; the example

on foot,

such circumstances

under

suffered

would not be designed

would

as infantrymen

successful

and fought

as

(1990)

mentions

Thus most cavalrymen

at fighting

such circumstances
they

author

the

and modern

ancient

ground

they are very

(Veg. I 18; Gilliam

and experience

out though,

on

by

mentioned

(1971) 756; Hyland

operating

circumstances,

on foot as some at least trained

Maximus,

under

them

of

examples

as to whether

to a cavalry

both

by writers

condemned

topographical

particular
(Annals

cavalrymen

(Livy
are

is not

as infantry

equipment

As Davies
the heavily

than

points
armed

(1971 756).

Antesignani
These

have

troops

been mentioned

already

to fight

Caesar used as weU as auxiliaries

literally

fighting
the
men
means

fighters

first
who were

17),

often

"Caesar

had begun

to operate
(1990 191).
and

the bravest

does

with

into

Caesar only mentions

not

indicate

and defended

if

this

outside
numbers

was the

the cavalry.

However,

(Stra

II iii

usual

number

but

explains,

body of troops

the normal legionary

on one occasion

The term
rank

as Carter

as a special

legionaries

the front

the standards

or some of them,

or otherwise

armed

of the standards,

32
legion
in
the
men
.

to use them,

cavalry

alongside

in front

battle

as the light

formation"

(300, BC 111 84)

elsewhere

it

bravery as an antesignanus
"Cicero grudgingly
at Pharsalus
admits Antony's
bravest
these
in
the
the legion,
that
Vegetius
men
are
(Phil. II 71).
states
to
others.
an example
providing

158

is

(B. Afr. 78).

to assist

Caesar's

a role taken

cavalry,

to all the front

rank fighters,
for special

reported

as using

antesignani

Although

Vegetius

mentions

information

on their

defended

with

no references

Imperial

period.

It is possible

References

Unfortunately

of light

the accounts

the

above

could

battles

of pitched

on this

they

helmets

with

given

in this

forces

suggests

the Empire

(Cagnat

1913 495 and AE 1978 471) and although

different

tasks,

this

an Empire-wide

was

antesignani.

Speidel

Empire,
in
the
early
Arrian's

'phalanx'

there were troops

is slight

situation

and there

is nothing

that

legions

and

all

sPecialization

example

159

during

Speidel. is willing

were armed and trained

even in the lst century

as his principal

are too sketchy

still called antesignani

legion

argues for increased

perhaps

auxiliaries.

matter.

of the Imperial

the evidence

the

period

evidence

abilities

as a small body

to

Epigraphic

some ranks

the

of the auxiliary

any evidence

that

in

rare

to the

to provide

to argue

covered

and referring

antesignani,

be

now

he does say that

whose fighting

armed troops

role of Caesar's

troops,

little

are extremely

that with the expansion

the principal

armed

than

other

Empire and existence

light

their

to antesignani

very

he gives

though

and wore less armour,

literature

elite

(11 2,7,16),

and role in battle,

(11 16).

of

war general

and his use of them may have been unique.

bearskins

were not suspect,

Caesar could use as many or

Caesar is the only civil

antesignani

duties

the standards

in the early

Since the term antesignani

presumably

duties.

by the antesignani

occasions

may weU be these troops.

and they

as few as he needed

on other

order

but they are sent

At this point the men are not caUed antesicina

(BC 111 75),

refers

kept 300 men from each legion in light

that Caesar customarily

mentioned

of this.

to indicate
had

within

a group

for
that
of

the legion from

AD (1992 14-15) and uses

Parker,

however,

goes

even further
century

and suggests

to a phalangic

and a return

change

a radical

(1928 258),

system

in the 2nd

deployment

in troop

discussed
be
will
which

below.

Artillery
Onasander

does not

Vegetius

only mentions

slingers,

or on a hill

artillery

battle

in

use of artillery

them as being positioned

to increase

above and like

line,

the

their

For the most part

,

as the slingers

and archers

at the front

or rear of the

be stationed

them could

and

the battle line with the

(111 14).

battle

battles,

pitched

behind

range

the same role in a pitched

plays

mentioned

mention

or on the wings".

Reserves
The system

of the triplex

of the battle

acies. provided

attack

legions

could be kept as reserves

force

legionary

which

he used

Britons

and therefore

suggest

this

of reserves

mentioned

118),

160

recruited

and in the Empire the

(Hist. V 16; Mons

35) and Agricola

.

(Aqri

to prevent
a further

a flank

two cohorts

attack

kept
(cf :

in reserve,

may have been because they were

by Vegetius

33At the front of the battle line, 2nd battle

infantry
behind
the
both
118,
BG
and
wings
19.

out

a good example of the use

provides

(1967 274).

not trustworthy

at the rear

point of the line

or newly

in reserve

were held in the rear

and Richmond

Ogilvie

150;

held

He may also have kept

though

groups

(BG 124;

of Mons Graupius

emergencies

XXII).

a vulnerable

the auxiliaries

was on occasion

the legions

alae for

Onasander

three

Alternatively

The account
-

of reserves;
four

(Pharsalus).

cohorts

from the rear (RG 124) or carry

deal with an attack

a flank

Graupius)

of reserve

line that could be used to reinforce

(BG 150; Pharsalus),

entire

groups

There

is no hint

of the

(111 18).

of Cremona (Hist. III 23); on the

and on the wings, Arrian ektaxis

in the disposition

'Chanqes

Very few changes

to Vegetius.
Republic
battle

in field dispositions

The writers

the auxiliary

with

Light

enemy.
the

intervals

left between

late Republic

enemy

the legions

fighting.

However,

deal of interest;

two changes

and the possible

the former

behind

reasons

still

have attracted

of the Hellenistic

of the
a great

force instead

of the

phalanx.

The

style

for the latter.

as is the evidence

are disputed,

stationed

the brunt

carried

as the main striking

reintroduction

to

through

retire

were usually

in the dispositions

the use of auxiliaries

of the legions

would

infantry

but the legions

and cavalry,

the

This was not the case in the

of the legions.

the cohorts

in front

they

then

and

and early Empire where the light

between

legions

attacking,

of the

and to pursue

the wings

be stationed

would

of the

would form the centre

holding

cavalry

infantry
into

provoke

agree with the historians

of the legions

infantry

from Polybius

in the period

are recorded
treatises

of military

the heavy

that

line,

fleeing

of forces

Auxiliaries

is no doubt

There
took

the

reserve.
the battle

role

The principal

examples

the Frisii

against

to the legionaries

given

usually

Suetonius'

over

exclusively

dispositions

from

35-7).

the other

as the main striking

force

the different

35).

are Idistaviso,

161

were held
(Annals

in

11 16),

defeat of the Batavians

Cerialis'

This method of disposition

system

mentioned

does
above;

against Tiridates

are

claims the reason for Agricola's

was to gain a victory

Some modern historians

disposition:

the auxiliaries

and the latter

Imperial

Tacitus

view to explain

of the Empire

against Boudicca and Corbulo's

loss of any Roman blood (Agric.

this

(Agri

IV 73),

At Mons Graupius,

both of this type.

use of auxiliaries

of this tactic

(Annals

(Hist. V 17) and Mons Graupius

not take

battles

in some pitched

that

without

the

have also taken

"It reflects the view that, at a time when there was still a clear
division
legionaries
between
the citizen
and the non-citizen
it was desirable to preserve the lives of Roman citizens
auxilia,
(Campbell 1987 29).
if possible. 11
Hyland

(1990 166) claims that

as cannon

fodder

in cavalry

prior

part,

to the infantry

as stated

infantry

troops

of some of these troops

levied

from

simply

swamping

locals,

definitely

was most

fighting

deployed

Germanicus,
Agricola's

up a defensive

hint

of

or Cerialis,

and Parker

and Cheesman

position

above

on ground
the lighter

of a favourable

the

as "doubtless

(pp. 134-142),

the

Agricola
they

were

confidence

outcome.

dispositions

of

the reason

an invention

of the

(1914 104) state that if the enemy took

were driven

tactical

been

would not have

Agricola

(1928 258) dismisses

armed auxiliaries

is therefore

importance
great
was of

fashion;

where the heavy armed legionaries

if the auxiliaries

abilities

circumstances,

had sufficient

influencing

was
down

to wear

such

in this

had he not been certain

motive

that Labienus

seems a valid tactic.

and the general

Both Parker

of disposition

fighting

using

under

auxiliaries

at Mons Graupius

only engaging

and

his

this

and only attacked

a lot of them had recently

in this fashion

tactics

successfully,

As stated

slaves,

for the most

19), but the fighting

thus

Apronius

historian".

type

no

gives

(B. Mr.

suspect;

and

forces

does not

fodder",

not to send in the legions.

abilities

his troops

Tacitus

operate

not

however,

of the period;

as "cannon

troops

by the British

outnumbered
in their

was probably

Caesar's

sending

There is a suggestion

numbers

freedmen

frequently

the enemy cavalry

in Africa

by their

simply

This,

battles

fought

manoeuvres.

to use his auxiliaries

Caesar's

legions

tactics.

as shock

the cavalry

above,

in outflanking

wilhng

for

Caesar had the same attitude,

and that

to have been the case in pitched

appear

at Mons Graupius

used the auxiliaries

Agricola

would

be sent in with the

back.

The reason for this

and due to the nature

occupation

to any general

162

could not

of the terrain.

of favourable
and it is a frequently

ground

for

repeated

theme

in

the

accounts

topographical

The

Cherusci,

of

Germans

drawn

were

the stiffest

who presented

hills.

Furneaux

(1896 306) suggests

whole

position,

enabling

It was therefore

L. Apronius:

The Frish

had to approach

The first

the Batavians

the battle
cavalry

the

to the Romans occupied

the

"formed

initially

the key of the

Romans as they

of the

first.

the Cherusci

on coastal

legionaries

land adjacent

and the Romans

marshes

sent in German auxiliaries

"laden

had particular

describes

and Tacitus
land"

and states

with arms and frightened

had also dammed

the terrain

of swimming"

Cerialis

as "a

the legionaries

that

with this type

day on the same terrain,

fighting

difficulty

Civilis

to the Rhine.

waste of flooded

of the following

whereas

of fighting.

For

engaged

his

with

first.

and auxiliaries

Mons Graupius:

whereas

to deal with

knew the land and were familiar

the Germans

the

interesting

proves

of woods

on the flank

stand

the land further

were at a disadvantage

front

Apronius

day Cerialis'

treacherous

slippery,

up in

of

auxiliaries.

on marshy

to flood

the Rhine

a ford.

across

then other

and cavalry,
Cerialis:

made their

involved

that the Cherusci

important

Analysis

wars.

battles

resistance

them to fall

advanced".

Civil

and

of the four

circumstances

Idistaviso:

Gallic

the

The British

a defensive

army was occupying

position

on rising

ground.

The

four

battles

ground,

unfavourable
under

involved

because a pitched

particularly

1976 41 & 45).

one with

no cities

At Mons Graupius

had to engage the retreating

Britons

this

on what

was

for

but they were willing

marshes or hills,

these circumstances

the enemy,

are

fought

all

battle
or towns

was the first

in a pitched

163

the

Romans

to accept battle

was the only way to defeat

to be captured
opportunity

battle

and Agricola

(Luttwak
the Romans
could not

Cheesman

was for tactical

troops

armed

in their

were correct

Graupius

of the

Germanicus'

would

were some light

cohortes)

possibly

to cohortes

equitatae.

to swim rivers

in full

detailed

The only
after

account

Mons Graupius

tactical

reason,

The legion

employed

particularly
suggestion

battle

of a pitched
fought

to the Batavians,

though

for
famous
their
were

between

their

is

armour

The heavy

during

the civil

wars of

of the legions

armed troops

at the rear,

Thus

of the Imperial

period

appears

once
firing
as the

the use of auxiliaries

topographical

certain

forces

infantry

ranks.

under

infantry

mainly

on level ground

lines with the light

'A; Lavwv

Icaf

on campaign

Republic.

37

(Agric.

to be for a specific

conditions.

as phalanx?
ficwEIC

Arrian's

army

force in battles

(cf :

does state

Tacitus

at Mons Graupius

in

used

heavy.

of the front

the heads

the light

infantry

armed

164).

and

at Mons

being

are

(Hist. IV 12; ILS 2558),

(Dio LXXV).

again form the main battle

main strike

Annals

auxiliaries

armour

is Issus,

the late 2nd century

n-dssiles over

Rhine,

heavily

Since these auxiliaries

to have been particularly

unlikely

for

difficult

and he may weU be referring

expeditas

ability

battles

and in these

armed

Parker

were traditionally

The auxiliaries

in the lower

campaigns

there

be

that

that the use of auxiliaries

assumption

reasons.

doubt

seems little

There

Roman army

that

circumstances

that

30).

not to take it (Agric.

afford

since

change

(1928 258) and states

detailed

of

Caesar

description

and

in preparation

the legion

in the tactical
that

deployed

employment

"the legions

164

of a Roman

for an Alan

late

attack

are

including

as a phalanx.

of Roman troops

were no longer

the

in

others

and have given rise to much discussion,

that in the 2nd century

sees a "definite

most

accounts

dispositions

The author's
interesting

the

is the

drawn

the

Parker
in battle"

up in lines

of

but

cohorts,
Wheeler,
lst

was had

recourse

to the

who deals with the subject

AD and indeed

century

away from the phalanx

Arrian's

legionaries

feet between
The front

that

of the Servian

deployed

each file,

four

at length,

suggests

ranks

weapons

for thrusting

whilst

enemy.

Archers

heads of the legionaries;

more archers
provided

Despite

and

artillery

more fire

power.

the initial
that

suggests

the standard
power

behind

of the auxiliaries

by some treatises

and visible

is the deployment

of the legions,

that

appear

and cavalry

of the late Republic

the heavy infantry

and on rising

in various
their

pitched

packed

battle

plans,

on the wings

and early
ground
battles

to fix

used

over the
and

his line

closer analysis

have suggested.
is close enough

Empire,

to

and the fire

is both recommended
(see above p. 135).

weapons and Arrian's

proposed

It

tactics

new -

Wheeler cites many examples in his attempt

of Arrian's

Arrian

Xoy yat at the

held the wings,

as some historians

were not as radical

deployment

which

at these unorthodox

surprise

they

The positioning

on the hills

aimed

also used their

and fired

infantry

and auxiliary

rank

whose xov-cot

their

at the rear

were stationed

cavalry

ranks,

hurled

ranks

of 1

(Veg. 111 15).

as in a phalanx,

rank

the rear four

and artiRery

1979 304).

the icov-cor. and the front

the front

in the

deep with intervals

The next three

got completely

to the usual 3ft of the legion

these at the belhes of the enemy horses.

beyond

(Wheeler

8 ranks

phalanx"

of the phalanx

the Romans never

constitution

were armed with

would have extended

of the

sees hints

in a formation

in contrast

formation

older

disposition

defensive

and equates

formation

to show the Republican

the phalangic

system

(1979 307) such as the testudo.

165

with

forerunners
any tightly

The testudo

is

described

in detail

uses was to protect

simply

a body of soldiers

lacked

light

armed troops

to be a defensive

formation

and does not indicate

I see no indication
AD

either,

although

Paulinus'

(Parker

the

battle

Graupius
protect

to suggest
the legions

veil

the

legions

Arrian

and

he sees this

suggesting

numbered

are being

's proposed

deployed

"the Romans modified

At

as a phalanx.

force

of

Mons

of the legions

is a procedure

to
well

corresponds

some of

immediate

with

precursor

of Arrian's

really

above and again,

However,

be described

"the

the auxiliaries

as a "veil".

form the main battle

there is no suggestion

The

line for
that the

as a phalanx.

dispositions
their

in the accounts

Wheeler

while the auxiliaries

reasons mentioned

does indeed

that the next step would be removing

8000 and cannot

at

111 117; BG 1 50; 11 8).

account

as the

Suetonius

but this was a standard

The positioning

seen at Mons Graupius".

infantry

are held in reserve

the tactical

deployed

the reserve

of Tacitus'

for

Paulinus

is nothing

and there
had

with missiles

1928 258) and Agricola's

as does Arrian,

(Polybius

histories

(1979 310-13),

at this battle

formation

this

(Parker

were held in reserve.

vocabulary

commands

of auxiliary

legions

legions

the

in military

that

Arrian's

phalanx

attack,

the camp as weU as provide

documented
argues

a flank

to prevent

procedure

space,

appears

the lst century

during

1928 258; Wheeler 1979 310-11).

draw up his army in a confined

therefore

of the Roman legions.

suggested

Boudicca

against

The testudo

in operation

phalanx

have

some

dispositions

Mons Graupius

tendency

a battle

to protect

an enemy well equipped

against

a phalangic

of a legionary

(XXI).

two

Onasander

by archers.

surrounded

for the same purpose,

the use of this formation

recommends
line which

30) who states that one of the formation's

by Dio (XLIX

for
tactical
are also

formations

and tactics

166

reasons.
according

As Wheeler notes,
to circumstances,

11(1979 304).

and terrain.

opponents

of the terrain;

Arrian

Thus Agricola

his formation

proposed

It is based on the theory

cavalry.
bristling

with

was a defensive

whole campaign

According

possible.

one and he planned

to Dio, he succeeded

a battle

will not charge

a defensive

It is essentially

spears.

the Alan heavy

for use against

that cavalry

in this,

because

used auxiliaries

formation,

line

but Arrian's
if

to avoid an engagement

(LXIX

off the Alans

scaring

15).

Although

Parker

accommodate
epigraphic

suggests

the phalanx

eight

detail,

a single

the rov-roa

(1977)

and the other

to identify

but only from comparative

evidence

for this in the 2nd century,

particularly

within

p. 159).

There

in the design

variety
which

specialist

was experimentation

particularly

with

of spear

types,

types

units

spears

in

the

(Plut. Marius

Marchant

by
Arrian's
used
were

167

with half the

half with

the

has been
in less

the two different

evidence;
Speidel

evidence.

there

for increased
is

the legion

of weapons

very

little

(see above

in the Roman

25; Suet. Dom. 10; on the wide

1990) and it is difficult

troops.

Wheeler

though

is some evidence

there

and although

Empire,

army,

well

literary

or epigraphic

late

and

structure

formation

and more recently,

of the archaeological

to use the latter

specialization

The

(1977 270; 1979 312-13).

Wheeler attempted

Is legions,

spears used by Arrian

attempted

this.

of Units).

were armed in the phalanx

in detail

(1992 15).

is no analysis

of the cohort

existence

file of the phalanx

of how the legions

by Speidel

to disprove

3 on The Organization

armed with

by Wheeler

considered

of evidence

to

organization

system could be based on the contubernium,

man contubernium

The question

is plenty

(see chapter

that Arrian's

LoyXIQ to produce

there

there

to legionary

alteration

shows the continued

evidence

into the 3rd century

argues

a radical

What is certain

to tell

precisely

is that they

were

the Macedonian

not using

type

standard

The

adopted

use of the

m1snomer.
historians
n. 3).

Historians

Various

Legion

this

historians

frequently

of six legions

against

frequently
more

heavy

in the late

placed

and Ammianus
on

deployments
against
Empire.

the

there

differences

of earlier

between

sounds

Nero 19),

been any

was used

more

of the Romans using

is frequently

this

account
that

this

Arrian

different
in
a
an enemy armed
Wheeler

has never

the

in the late

used
Republic,

as a
or

of enemy Rome had to deal

Empire.

is the danger

periods.

This

(Suet.

formation

the type

Because the Ey.-ra EIc is the only detailed

Caesar

Augusta

as a phalanx.

and Antony

cavalry,

1928 258

out that

troops.

of Alexander"

but

as it was by Crassus

formation

as a deployment

formation,

for the use of the

the SHA points

"phalangic"

the

Parker

as the Historia

Empire and Wheeler cites examples

or testudo

avvacynicypoC

defensive

out that

I believe,

30,000 men recruited

and there

campaign,

was armed and deployed

in the later

(eg:

evidence

context

50 5) but

is,

may have led some

and this

armed like the other

Parthian

point

formation

Severus'

the "Phalanx

I Italica,

a possible

that

suggestion

with

(Sev. Alex.

were a

to find later
Alexander

the spears

that

use of the phalanx

war havt been used in this

Nero's

for

recruited

this

have also attempted

was formed
like

rather

to describe

more extensive

to it as a phalanx

phalanx

purpose

or adapted

Wheeler 1979 314ff).

(eg:

refers

for this

legion
term
to
the
mean
uses

Arrian

for his Parthian

the

sarissa,

"phalanx"

term

to suggest

phalanx

and it seems likely

of field

dispositions

too much emphasis

battle

line

was planning

and

the

a defensive

between
might

be

standard
campaign

way to Rome's usual enemies in the early

(1979 304) cites Marsden

168

as suggesting

that this is one of the

Stock

battle

to the positioning

referring
tactics

plans

of artillery

of the legion.

The dispositions

but

they

by

deployment

at

Mons

dispositions

are for tactical

elsewhere,

and the enemy.

were

Graupius

auxiliaries

and cavalry

behind

the battle

line).

change

century,

Arrian's

of the campaign

fire

(legions

Empire

ground

power on rising

(Strat.

with the

correspond

and early

II iii 15) rather

in
and

it as a

have described

probably

would

Agricola's

of the nature

Republic

Is use of the testudo

like Antony

in legionary

Frontinus

lst

the

dispositions

on the wings;

Like

type.

only
in

others

Arrian's

of the

practices

the

because

reasons,

centre,

stratagem

and

not to the

and wings,

been
have
used
also
may
used

Arrian

no means

For the most part,

and field

treatises

on the flanks

is

Marsden

(1969 190) but

3rd
2nd
the
centuries
and
of

than a major

deployment.

Pursuit

The importance

of the pursuit

(p. 144), both Onasander

stress

(Onas. XXVII,
solely

reduce

Vegetius
surrounded

states

suggests

should

or,

retreats

in the

in the latter

but

repulse

that

casualties

defeated

Retreats

to

allowed

the use of light

troops

Veg. II 15,111 14).

the

Vegetius

states

if

and pursuits

former

case and

the

should
to inflict

line

to flee so they

enemy
would

to carry

formation

that the line of battle

the

greater

should
not turn

not

injury

be

and fight

is

(111 17).

enemy

be made in formation,

care not to demoralize

169

above

Both also

in

again in case the enemy turn,

defeated

be made with great

battle

break

possible,

(and to be ready
that

As stated

of keeping

Veg. 111 14).

XXXII;

designed

Onasander

importance

particular

suggest

by the

is indicated

writers.

enemy (Onas. XIX;

of a fleeing

out the pursuit

the

and Vegetius

battle

a pitched

by the treatise

is given

the subject

prominence

following

to

on the
XXVII).

completely
(111 21).

the army and not to

fall into ambushes,

force with ambushes

but to delay the pursuing

(III

oneself

22).

Pursuit
light

is invariably

infantry

always

(eg: Arrian).

The heaviest

to a fleeing

occur

because he lacked

literary

sources

cavalry

(Plut.

Graupius).

frequently

out by the cavalry

Onasander

this
battle

figures

battles

do not

mentioned
the figures

and advance

This advice

the fleeing

are probably

fairly

Mons

50; Munda,
Graupius,

34The casualty
figures
more disproportionate;
losses 200 to Antiochus'

behind

(ektaxis

29),

above;

his "phalanx",

in case the

which is exactly

what

with that of Vegetius

is that

the assumption

once

will finish

by the cavalry

the

army.

casualty

for political

unreliable,
of the often

figures,
or literary

the proportions
very

unequal

30,000 to c. 1000; Boudicca,

10,000

Mons

be carried

should

the pursuers

also corresponds

cited

the

mention

two sides give some indication

Romans;

The

caused by pursuing

infantry,

to back up this general

they may be exaggerated

5000 to Caesar's

a fact

(BG IV 26,35).

of the Alani

of the defeated

would appear
always

slowly

the attack

the killing

off and destroy

Casualty

almost

of defeating

advantage

for the pursuit

but the heavy

of the line of battle

line is broken

battle

has been broken,

to take full

his pursuit

infantry,

and renew

recommends.

on the purpose

that

proposed
and light

turn

line

to the heavy casualties

refer

was to remain in formation

enemy should

the cavalry

in a pitched

casualties

by the

28; BG 1 50; 11 20; VI 8; BC 11 40; Idistaviso;

Lucul.

Arrian

sometimes accompanied

whose battle

enemy

by Caesar who was unable

acknowledged
the British

out by the cavalry,

carried

Britons

to

strategy;
and

accounts

when

reasons.

they

are

Although

of casualties
losses,

of

on the

eg: Thapsus,

80,000 Britons

to 400

36034.

for the Roman campaign against Antiochus

are even
Appian gives the figures for two battles; XI 20, Roman
36,
Magnesia
XI
Roman
10,000
including
prisoners;
c.
170

Roman retreats
formation,

formation
defeat

Don-dtius'

Cremona,

troops

refuge

is shown in Caesar's

before

he offered

battle

was avoided

battlefield.

would

the high

But the principal

reason

for the construction

(eg:

Cannae,

Livy

XXII

of marching

commentaries;

he invariably

position

to

49; 2nd battle

of

a camp

constructed

and on one occasion

(BC 1 82).

sides

camps less than two miles apart

because "the proximity

to avoid battle

side to retreat

and find

on the

of the camp

quickly",

refuge

of

camps as a place of

camps of both

of the marching

after

ground

a defensible

site was to provide

had constructed

Caesar wished

and a result

not be forthcoming.

One of the

more interesting

Arrian's

plans for the pursuit

no intention

topic

on the

Stratagems

to

surrounded

he was more likely

casualties

Trasimene

to the eventual

and Caesar against

to escape to inflict

losses of 24 cavalry

greater

grounds

to fight
victor.

devotes

Frontinus

the enemy.

if

that

to the

the

death;

Frontinus

casualties

300
infantry
and

during

this

includes

the Germans as examples

the flight

had
of his

was totally

would
Hannibal

result

in

at Lake

of callowing the enemy

(Strat.

to c. 50,000 including
171

a section

enemy

the

(111 21).

seem to have the same idea and he certainly

of surrounding
this

and fight

would not turn

to flee so they

enemy be allowed

makes is that

Vegetius

recommendations

defeated

greater

and the

The importance

because

would allow the beaten

in Parthia

and Antony

(BG 1 43; 11 8; BC 111 94-5),

battle

Caesar and Afranius

made in

to gain

could retreat

26ff).

Hist. III

Empire are usually

deployed

troops

by Pharnaces.

defeated

and early

Crassus
by
used

camp near the battle

a marching
which

the late Republic

such as the testudo

circular
their

during

II vi 4-5).

prisoners.

The General

Although

Onasander

tends

general,

both he and Vegetius

the rear

(Onas. XXXIII;

the right

to give

in Onasander

reserves;

with

he should

to stay alive and keep command of the troops.

his men by his presence

encourage

a battle

from

be at the rear,

he is kept

He is expected

and move troops

of the

position

should fight

state that the general

Veg. 111 18); in Vegetius

of the infantry

to the

more prominence

around

to

at the rear
by and

to ride
the field

when

necessary.

Emphasis is placed on the general

demoralized
killed,

by learning

and even if he was just wounded

wounded

learning

In a battle

Frontinus

that

misinformation
general

their

includes
general

wore

(Strat.

they

helmet to assure

caught

of encouraging
cloak
sight

his soldiers

Antony

which

(Strat.

the rumour

and fled

II vii

11),

was

(Appian
after

and of how

amongst enemy ranks that

Caesar

his troops

in this respect;

have

must

on the

confidence

II iv 9-10)".

of it (BG VII
that

had been

and Pansa the latter

of this they turned

had been injured

had been killed

red

general

an example of an army losing

spreading

a distinctive

whenever

between

could be used,

aware of the importance

that their

the news could have an affect

and as soon as his army heard

BC 11169).

An army could be thoroughly

alive.

in the middle of a battle

outcome of the battle.

their

staying

given

the

was particularly
at Alesia he

soldiers

heart

88) and at Munda he took off his

he was still

alive

(Appian

BC 11 104).

have
35Another
the
the
may
occurred
at
of
misinformation
of
use
example
hints
Antonius
Primus
that
have
Tacitus
Cremona;
battle
may
at
second
had
(Hist.
troops
Mucianus'
that
Ijj
the
arrived
deliberately
rumour
spread
25).

172

Despite

to the contrary

advice

to the field

his troops;

with

into renewing

the fight

from the treatises,

II viii 12-13) "'.

.

(Stra

on foot with the auxiliaries

it very

hard for him to see the overa. U situation

at Mons Graupius

responsibility
Cerialis

the battle

to Tacitus

Agricola

but this would have made

and decide when to send in the

(Hist.

emergencies

rear

V 16)

on the other

hand,

although

his presence

Crassus,

the cavalry

to support

the

at

the line of battle

battle

was to encourage
spoke to their

the legionaries,

left.

not noticed

these speeches

for

men

Ariovistus

and

it meant that

line of the triplex

officers

were

the battle

in

occupied

of the Roman
might

not have

for the Romans.

to exhibit

their

duties

principal

Onasander

before a battle

for their

Civilis,

recommended.

the difficulties

elsewhere,

his men, which

or composed

in the third

The other

one of the other

troops

Vegetius

what

had to order

victory

an opportunity

picked

encouraged

greatly

exactly

with the cavalry

the historians

of

wing against

pressed

alive,

force

a reserve

against

with the right

been such an overwhelming

from staying

battle

fought

and had Crassus

Apart

his

is

commander,

or been engaged

generals

with

as a foot soldier

that it left to someone else the

In

reserves.

fighting

which

there

the hard

of the general

from the rear,

in the

of sending

remained

Caesar,

disadvantage

another

than directing

rather

left,

According

men

cavalry.

This illustrates

acies

took

both Caesar and Sulla did so to shame their

fought

reserve

frequently

the general

mentions.

to encourage
rhetorical

histories.

of the general

Indeed,

in

Traditionally

them and this gave

skills

as they rewrote

these speeches

are

36It was not just generals who made use of this tactic to encourage their men
to fight eg: the famous standard bearer of the Xth at Caesar's opposed landing
Strat. II viii 1-6, variations
(BG IV 25) and Frontinus
in Britain
on the same
tactic.
173

as important

often

Obviously

up and down the lines

although

of course

actually

fighting

of troops

he would be a great

(BG 1120).

The tactical
groups

weakest

of the line on foot.

part

making

did

he was

Onasander

when entrenching

and so Caesar rode round

serious

to encourage

speeches

suggests,

do what

by the Nervii

offguard

was fairly

situation

the different

Caesar

not ride

to the soldiers

encouragement

On one occasion

with.

he could

them as Onasander

encouraging

when his army was caught

suggests,

as a foot soldier

was fighting

if the general

(see above p- 133 note

battle

as the actual

to the historian

He then joined

them.

the

Conclusions
The

accounts

favourably

correspond
by the

treatises.

reserves

etc.

Choice

very

reflect

often reflect

Onasander
earlier

depending
both
on

Onasander
suggests

concerning

supplies

variants
troops

is content

avoiding

battle

of forces,

points

of

and concerns
There are
does not

suggest

some things

out,

part

positioning

and being outflanked.

when what the treatises

most

put forward

and suggestions

terrain

cannot

be

beforehand.

military

about

The

later

'standard'

All advise
until

battle

circumstances
writer

is

also

Vegetius,
line,

174

on the other

plus

a number

and the nature

far

more cautious

place is found,

of

of the
than

and Onasander

care when engaging,

a suitable

The

to make many of the decisions,

of dispositions.

the details

than Vegetius.

procedures

to leave the general

on topographical

and Frontinus.

the

of the treatises,

recommended

sides.

for

period

disposition

but as Onasander

or planned

his

Roman

the contents

regarding

is much less rigid

writer

particularly
hand,

practices,

to rules

reduced

the

of terrain,

and occasions

variants

actual

in

with the recommendations

are the same, particularly

inevitable

battles

pitched

of

but

only

Vegetius

recommends

and

completely

to engage an army would mean keeping

in line with the low risk

the more risky
surprising

defence

the Roman defeat

at Adrianople.

warfare,

Vegetius

is more concerned

campaign

against

the Alans is essentia)ly

the

engage

enemy

Vegetius

if

to

the

deployments,

actual

the latter

that

suggests

and

1976 192-3)

than

It is perhaps

period.

not

As in his book on siege

defensive,

campaign,

and this is more

(Luttwak

defence

with

necessary

In a defensive

circumstances.
importance

only

(111 25).

Empire

of the earlier

absolutely

when

an army intact

strategies

offensive

after

of the later

fighting

only

or when the outcome was in no doubt

necessary

Failure

battle

avoiding

than

intending

the author

are of equal

such considerations
especially

since

had not changed

to

topographical

specific

under

Arrian's

attack.

the

a great

evidence

of

deal since

the

Republic.

Although

the treatises

battles,

of pitched

subject
influence

Caesar indicates

contents

have

been

avoid

aware

although

(BG 11 22),

(XXXII)

to tell whether

very

Roman battle

that there

were established

Caesar

of them.

perhaps

something

implies

certainly

had any

tactics
military

were very
practices

writers

would

was aware

of the

that they had some relevance

there is a slight

which

well on the

the treatises

procedures.

indeed
books
the
text
and
of

actual practices,
too rigid

correspond

in the Roman army (BG VI 34), and the treatise

and dispositions
of course

practices

it is impossible

at all on battlefield

conservative;

field

and actual

Onasander

criticism

to

of them for being

seems to have attempted

to

37
.

37Caesar states that his dispositions

against the Nervii were dictated more by
demands
hill,
immediate
the
the
the
the
and
of
the
of
slope
the features of
site,
(BG
22).
book
11
theories
military
rule
by
the
of any
than
situation
175

Siege

warfare

Introduction
Siege

warfare

The capture

conflicts.

one of the principal

could have great
plunder

strategic

the dramatic

episodes

deal

and it could

be the only

primarily,

than methods of attack

concerned

with the practicalities

been considered

will only be considered

their

concerning

This

chapter

evidence

will

available

practicalities

Roman siege

an opponent

in detail

the

and defence,

but also because of

however,

construction

tend

of

siege

and since this thesis is

and not military

(Marsden

by

to give sieges

The treatises,
with

of warfare

when sufficient

engineering

which

1969 & 1971),

such machinery

is available

in the treatises

information

use.

therefore
in historical

of siege warfare

the more technical

the

it is given

tended

importance,

involved.

exclusively,

rather

through

way to attack

by the prominence

because of their

often

and strongholds

could be obtained

Roman historians

sources.

machinery

has already

is indicated

they frequently
and

towns

was often

battle'.

a pitched

no doubt

partly

force;

internal

and

external

in enemy territory

wealth

and other

prominence,

Rome's

of an invading

of siege warfare

both the treatises

in

importance;

cities,

to accept

The importance

part

of towns and strongholds

objectives

of captured

who declined

to

an important

played

treatises.

methods

consider

the

advice

of the

and archaeological
and the employment
It will

and discuss

also survey

any changes

'The Jews seem to have realized they could

battle so decided to defend selected strong

176

treatises

sources

concerning

of the engines
briefly
that

took

and

described

the precursors
place

during

the
the
in
of
the

not defeat the Romans in pitched

points during the Jewish revolt.

Republic

and Empire.

contained
brackets

The

3; references

in Appendix
indicates

to siege

in the appendix.

an entry

Treatises

A number

of the surviving

treatises

touch

on the subject

Some of these are concerned

almost exclusively

be fairly

artillery

other

technical,

covering
treatises

more general

usually

The writers

of both

Greek and HeUenistic

workS2.

subject.

Philo

of Byzantium.

concerned

That

Sources),

covers

both

fortify,

As stated

agreed
sides

that

machinery

to the 4th century

though

there

as stated

was probably

work is disputed,

instructions

above,

the treatises
advice

giving

and how to besiege

of the Roman period

and

BC and is

a companion

detailed

a city,

on the

2,

above (Chapter

4.
period

and defend

whereas

detail

of varying

it dates to the Hellenistic

provision

and the specific

dates

of defence,

of siege warfare,

and tend to

are by Aeneas 'Tacticus'

The exact date of Philo's

on how to besiege a city'.

it is generally

sections

on this subject

originally

military

seem to have made some use of earlier

of Aeneas

only with methods

on the Literary

include

of siege warfare

with the subject

and other

types

Greek treatises

The two surviving

types,

by a date in

followed

sites

is

in the chapter

discussed

of Roman sieges

A precis

treatise

though

The treatise
on how to

one.

may be divided

given by these will be discussed

into

two

in the relevant

2jt is because of the influence

of earlier Greek and Hellenistic
works on the
that this chapter
Roman treatises
will include a discussion
of earlier siege
techniques .
3Lydus
Aeneas
cites
(TEo,Xjo, 2,CE-ct.Kq) rather

as an authority
than on defending

on the art
of besieging
one (de Maq. I 47).

he
69-71)
the
(1979
arguments;
suggests
summarizes
Lawrence
date is also proposed.
240s BC but a later 3rd century
177

city

a date in the

sections

below.

practical

side

involved

such as the treatment

below,

8 on Morality

for siege

which

in Warfare).
but believed

warfare

Vegetius

he considers

devotes

useful

a large section

Onasander

towns

of captured

and so does not include

.),

writers,

in the

and their

Frontinus

touches

rarely

and is more interested

warfare

of the Strateqemata,

and engines

ruses

of siege

Chapter

Book III

Pref

Of the more general

moral issues

defenders

had long since

reached

them in his work.

Instead

for the capture

(Strat.

though

on siege warfare
(IV 30)5
subjects,

with a pronounced

to siege warfare,

treating

The book may be divided

.
and it is possible

Vegetius'

section

based partly

on earlier

sources

up into a number

to see how indebted

of sections

he was to earlier

on different
works:

for convenient
5"1 believe I have arranged
public use the information
have
handed
down,
that
defending
ancient
authors
cities
besieging
and
11
through
discovered
been
necessity.
more
recently
has
that
178

and

on defence.

emphasis

was, by his own admission,

on

of cities.

it in the same way that Philo does, from the point of view of both attacker
defender,

III

he concentrates

and defence

of his de Re Militari

in

of machines

limit

their

(see

the subject

covers

the development

that

on the

on
and

Veg. IV 1-6

How cities
may be
defended naturally
fortifications.

Philo I
Vit.
de Arch Iv
On fortifications
of
Vegetius may
cities.
have followed
Vitruvius
to some
(Johnson 1983
extent
31) but would appear
to be more indebted to
6
Philo
.
Philo II

and by

Veg. IV 7-11

The supplies
a city
should gather in case of
siege.

Veg. IV 13-25

Combination of Philo's
individual
sections
on
withstanding
a siege and
besieging
a city.

Philo III,
on
withstanding
a siege.
Philo IV, on besieging
a city.

Veg. IV 18-19

On heightening
walls and
firing
incendiary
devices
to counter advance of
siege towers.

Philo

111 12-13.

Veg. IV 23

Semicircular
concave wall
to cover breach in outer
wall

Philo

111 18.

Veg. IV 28

Brief mention
circumvallation

Philo

111 5-6.

eg:

Vegetius

makes no mention

Roman.

However,

those

of the

would

have

earlier
perhaps

works.

Greek

used

and

of Philo in his list

Hellenistic

Hellenistic

periods,

treatises

their

are all

derived

were closely

it seems likely

or based

(1 8); they

that

own very

the

from

Romans

heavily

on

might be using a Greek source such as Philo or,

a Roman treatise

and Helienistic

of sources

Roman siege techniques

Thus Vegetius

more likely,

the Greek

since

of

which

was itself

a direct

descendant

of

tradition.

'Vegetius
is often not as detailed as Philo; for example, although he points out
2)
(IV
does
he
to
towers
not prescribe
rams
are vulnerable
that right angled
2-6).
does
(11
Philo
for
towers
as
shape
particular
any
179

Vitruvius
military

touches

on certain

he takes into consideration

gates are designed
detailed

wheels

(X

along

water

nature

were

'Mechanicus'

Athenaeus

the whole,

Apollodorus'

in his opening

note

because

Greeks,

and

in

work is less technical

to the

they

Emperor

he claims

date.
out
of
were

work on the subject.

the enemy do not

(de Arch.

X xvi 2)'.

in

that are more technical

by Heron

further
technical

the

authors

of Alexandria

make

treatises

than the artillery

to have

of
have

(see Chapter

of the Emperor

is that

Hadrian.

2 on
by
On

manuals and

made no use of ancient

The treatise

a stronghold

it

The nEpt pnXqvjjjiq-c(A)v

treatises

at the request

written

mill

feels

however,

some cases

of the Greek

fairly

(X ii),

devices

"because

a city"

predecessors.

The latest

needed in assaulting

than Vitruvius'

besiege

of the Roman period

Hellenistic

of Damascus,

Apollodorus

of cities

and

such as rams and

machines

Vitruvius,

vi) -

towers

Book X includes

such as lifting

the defence

and artillery

Sources).

The Literary

assault

above and will not be considered

been discussed

equipment

by

written
use of their

considerable

authors

treatises

surviving

(X

when they

make use of our manuals

The three

machinery

screws

to say much about

unnecessary

and other

with other

and

v)

(de Arch. I v).

as a

fortifications,

of a town's

of a siege and his walls,

the possibility

of artillery

in his capacity

warfare

the construction

this in mind

with

descriptions

siege towers,

aspects

When describing

architect.

of siege

describes

and is generally

Whereas the latter

simply

a variety

of

more practical
describes

the

that manuals on siege warfare were

7A very interesting
comment suggesting
The
have
day
author
application.
Vitruvius'
a
practical
in
could
and
available
had
happened
Romans
besieging
Romans
as
the
of
does not consider
possibility
Caesar
Vitruvius,
Perhaps
of
and
supporter
a
in the recent civil wars.
himself
latter
had
in
the
this
secured
now
felt
that
unlikely
was
Octavian,
power.

180

different

pieces of equipment,

how they

should

Pre-Roman

be used and can be adapted

evolution

onwards,

and the evidence

extremely

good.

from

Nimrud

and other

sides used archery

are depicted
device,

besieged

into surrender".

Persian

siege

destroying

techniques

in the Ionian
a sanctuary

found

around

8eg: Apollodorus
includes
Vitruvius
does not think
Arch. X xiv 1).

revolt
outside

the

devices.

ramp

city

probably

and upending

for

mines

it.

Both

also blockaded
the

walls and starving

Palaepaphos;

at

using

missiles from city walls and

the city

and the Persians

the

besiegers

and possibly

The Assyrians

illustrated

in literary

BC palace reliefs

show

rams,

it with chains

camp outside

are

ladders,

or throwing

catching

and incendiary

reliefs

period

the most part

are described

sieges

The

scaling

firing

is for

periods

in the 9th century

in Assyria9.

up a fortified

setting

early

illustrated

elsewhere

an anti-ram

participated

purposes'.

may be seen from the Assyrian

most of these

mobile siege towers,

defenders

employing

Missiles

for

Assyrian

and

siege ramps,

cities,

in siege techniques

and are graphically

whereas

for different

on

Siege Warfare

A gradual

records

gives at least some information

Apollodorus

besieged

materials

represent

for

Paphos

had

it in c. 497 BC,
a siege

attempts

ramp.

to halt

its

a section on the different

uses of ladders whereas
it necessary
to give any information
on them (de

'Saggs
(1944) 260-261 quotes from a description
by the Assyrian
king
Esarhaddon
of a siege he carried out; sieges are also mentioned in the Old
28
52;
2-6
Joshua
Deuteronomy
Testament
on the capture
eg:
of Jericho
including
the sending
out of spies and massacre of the population
and
destruction
of the city.
"cf: Oppenheim (1955) who quotes documents mentioning children being sold
Another
document mentions a woman in
for money in order to buy food.
Babylon who sold herself into slavery to receive food from her master and so
besieged.
the
famine
city
was
while
a
survive

181

and the besieged

construction,
part

of it to collapse.

violent

assault

heightened

and two brick

towers

including
their

work

walls which

artillery,

BC (Diodorus

Siculus

providing

covering

built.

XIV 42 1),

Salamis
properly,

was burnt
so their

with a ditch

to provide

fire for Alexander's

helepolis,

troops

it may

suggests

of the assault

4th century

I in the early

in sieges for
device;

at Halicarnassus
(Arrian

its

both

use in

seems to have

Anab. 1 20-23).

In

large
have
become
to
scale
a
very
seems
The best

and huge mobile siege towers.

built

for

Demetrius

Diodorus

had little

success

and he was unable

effectiveness

to such an

reference

its sophistication

and Rhodes and which

Demetrius

for the garrison;

shelter

as an anti-personnel

particularly

with the use of massive artillery

Unfortunately

a line of circumvallation

came to be used widely

BC siege warfare

Salamis in Cyprus

the

assault;

When direct

for Dionysius

invented

the late 4th century

example

a ramp and direct

a number

line of blockade.

physical

was the

The

the ramp.

XI 8ff ), though

in the success

of this

in siege warfare.

This is the earliest

been a major factor

affair

following

army which tried

undermined

were roofed

supposedly

and defence,

offence

and

intervals.

(T hucydides

not have been the first

Torsion

walls

the Peloponnesians

were set at regular

investing

building

it, causing

the city

but this is not certain

in c. 427 BC by the Peloponnesian

techniques,

failed,

assault

may have entered

The Persians

a good example of a major development

city was besieged

Plataeans

also undermined

on one of the gates,

Plataea provides

of different

the ramp and fired

cannot

182

to bring
be judged.

Poliorcetes'

describes

in detail

with his towers;

that

sieges

at Rhodes

at

(XX 48;

the one at
into

action

The essential

techniques

through

period

to the Middle Ages and, as stated

to benefit

from the developments

the Greek

and Hellenistic

Roman

Sieqe

As stated

to

and Frontinus).

sometimes

cities

and strongholds.

assault

These
could

tactics

about

surrender

Pindenissum

method,
blockade

however,

(49 BC);

Jotapata

(eg:

Numantia

was to attempt
whilst

(eg: Syracuse

(AD

an initial

preparations
(214-12 BC);

(AD 67)).

183

assault

or by

a violent
(210

New Carthage

(AD 58)),

whereas

if the

could be blockaded

to induce

(133 BC);

(52 BC);

the stronghold

Masada

some advice,

or together;
(eg:

them

against

and defending

by direct

72/73)).
assault

Alesia

could

were made for an assault

BC);

(51/50

the stronghold

siege machinery

the stronghold

Alternatively,

preparations

whilst

Volandum

to

do, or on particular

of attacking

position;

out a

tend

they

to obtain

possible

the objective

(54 BC);

starvation

(51 BC)).

Uxellodunum
blockaded

and from

how to carry

defences

and

most aspects

to capture

in Britain

through

a city,

be used individually

did not wish to risk this,

general

them,

Instead

and Apollodorus

a fortified

could

be sufficient

two oppida

Vegetius.

It is, however,

brief,

very

actua. Uy describes

even

capture

were two ways of attacking

blockade.

place before

were available.

as Vitruvius

be used

can

albeit

BC);

not

on machinery,

(Onasander

BC);

finish,

to

start

that

There

that

none of the textbooks

above,

concentrate
ruses

textbooks

the Romans were able

above,

that had taken

the Assyrian

Techniques

from

siege

warfare

of siege

from

little

changed

(eg:
The

and,

be immediately
Ambracia

most common

if this

failed,

were made for an assault

Carthage

(189

(147-6 BC);

to
with

Marseilles

Initial

Assaults

Onasander's

advice

with blockades;
give

is concerned

he suggests

the defenders

more with

that the general

by continuous

he also advocates

the use of feint

(xlji).

illustrates

Frontinus

initial

is frequently

assault

Corbulo's

attack

excellent

example

Having

quarter

effective

Corbulo

attempted

fire

covering

and Corbulo

Scipio's

attack

between

the two forces

surprise

attack -

Although

Onasander

all recommend
citadels
provides

or

(x1ji),

or warn

very

well

(210 BC),

the

defenders

because of its

(AD

58) provides

half provided

whilst

the

of a testudo

formation,

was initially

attacking

by surprise

III ix 3) and Vegetius

the

use of stealth

rarely

happened.

war (Stra

III

from

and caught

the effectiveness

illustrating

half

with no casualties.

with one group

this

other

by the violence

at New Carthage

taken

an

by Onasander.

recommended

in a few hours

from the Jugurthine

184

III i),

for defenders

were overcome

about

points,

(Strat.

and slings,

(Strat.

Frontinus

defended

only one example,

again

and

warns that this

the protection

were

to

and Vegetius

artillery

immediately,

The defenders

at low tide.

his army

the defenders

attacks

his force;

divided

simultaneously

but he made another

unsuccessful,
a lagoon

two divisions

with

assault

took the city

to

(IV 12).

The defenders

and to scale them with ladders.

of the assault,

from

the walls under

to undermine

ix),

assault

of the walls,

and confuse

of Volandum

city

of the type of violent

made a reconnaissance,

a highly

(III

of the attackers

on the Armenian

parts

of surprise

the most dangerous

and the determination

violence

to divide

attacks

dividing

xxxix),

than

of cities

assault

make a sudden

at different

attacks

the advantage

from an unexpected

and attacks

should

(Onas.

less time to react

weaken the besieged

the violent

of a

(IV 26)

to capture
Frontinus
ix 3; Sallust

Jug

93-4) ".

way to encourage

Another

been to sack the captured

part

the

(this

citadel

surrendered

be discussed

will

Advice

on countering
building

suggested
siege,

these

and

mentions

that

this

up supplies

pila

with

Cicero's

out in
below,

detail

greater

muralia,

soldiers

a sortie

by the defenders

muralia

may also have been represented

Roman soldiers
attackers,

would probably
Pila muralia
or thrust

with some kind

not have been strong

would have required

down on attackers

a spear

Mustrated

because

he

were also defended

by

These

were

used

on Trajan's

enough

Column

and thrusting
The shafts

to withstand

by

(54 BC; BG V 40)

attack

(AD 26; Annals

of spear.

during

iv 51).

(scenes

Pila

77-79);

at the Dacian
of ordinary

pila

such treatment

and

heavy shafts so they could be dropped

thick,

with

greater

on the Praeneste

of the thickness

time for the defenders,

the Roman circumvallation

a stone fort

are shown defending

presumably

he

assault.

of spear.

hillfort

of a Thracian

for a

Although

camp came under

were defending

troops

Vegetius

29) in preparation

an assault

type

a particular

limited.

do.

might

such

under

is very

(IV 8&

dangerous

on what they

when his winter

and when Sabinus'

murale

in

an initial

against

was a particularly

coming

type

of missiles

be used

could

to give any advice

soldiers

of this

an assault

Roman fortifications

that

holding

any defenders

until

8).

Chapter

fails

of the city

seems to have

to surrender

a citadel

force 12
.
ship

relief

Connolly

has suggested

in the Vatican

is a pilum

of the shaft.

390
in
BC,
Capitol
the
the
"Although
Gauls
with
the
same
attempted
47).
(Livy
Manlius
v
geese and
failed because of some vigilant
12These were not the palisade stakes,
found
been
have
of which
examples
Camps).
Marching
4
Chapter
on

they

called pila muralia,

mistakenly
forts
(see
Roman
the
sites
of
above,
at
Tt*)Cvkd
A

185

Assault

Machines

If the initial

assault

(see below p. 183,199

these devices,
to counter

certain

(xhi);

as the opportunity
defenders

statement

and the

skill

of the

helps to explain

perhaps

why the treatises

how

that it is

stating

piece of equipment

under

types of siege engines

engineers

out a siege in the way they do with other

some of

explains

will be based on luck,

military

often

a blockade

both describe

will use the different

and his decision

arises,

general

attack,

and enforce

altogether,

to use a particular

a general

for

only the latter

whilst

the subject

avoids

to tell the general

his troops

and Vegetius

in more detail,

Onasander

conditions

of the

Apollodorus

the former

them.

not his duty

carry

as well to protect
ff ).

and shelters

machines

various

a circumvallation

the besieging

or one was not attempted,

to prepare

was expected
building

failed,

the strength

13
present
.T

how to

do not prescribe

aspects

his

(see below

of warfare

205).

Shelters
(vineae,

Shelters

attackers

to approach
types

Vegetius

(IV 13-16).

stout

protection
uncured
devices

with

against
hides

the

are described

different

timbers

crates

pluteii,

walls

planks
n-dssiles.

for

and

provided

or mining

assaults

by ApoHodorus

The shelters

or some other

(Apollodorus

and testudines)

(140.9-144.2;

were generally
hurdles

wicker

The whole structure

fireproof

material

protection

purposes,

for

the

and the

153.8-155.7)

and

made from a framework

on the

sides

and

roof

would then be covered

to protect

of
as
with

it from incendiary

142; Veg. IV 15).

(de Arch. X xvi 1) also makes this last point, a fact apparently
Legion
X
Jerusalem
the
that
of
at
artillery
Josephus'
by
statement
confirmed
269).
legion
Perhaps
this
(BJ
had
V
legion
that
to
other
of any
was superior
than the others.
better engineers
"Vitruvius

186

Shelters

of all these types

BC, Avaricum

were regularly

types

(the

of shelter
etc. ),

archers

the

Caesar,

of all types.

Vegetius

equally

for example,

ram,

vineae

sources

do

does not suggest

at this

or ineffective

the attackers

Such

Caesar's

any specific

them to approach

the walls.

to the walls

for

These

attempted

for

pluteff

these

make

behind

(IV 23) and presumably

devices,

At Marseilles,

in Marseilles

from brick

that

eventually

and timber

to allow
troops

the attacking

the use of a battering

assaults,

of

and even these were

were to allow

shelters

be

would

vineae made of four layers

artillery,

a gallery

these

against

types of shelter.

other

of the artillery

to build

defences

and incendiary

point,

were working

were forced

troops

sappers,
seem to

not

the ram testudo

against

was the strength

for

seems to use the term vineae for shelters

because of the power of the defenders'

pierced.

access

for example,

he recommends

effective

hurdles

literary

he does later against

though

the missiles

the

uses for the different

different

suggests

for

testudo
other

distinctions;

shelters,

Vegetius

57

Noviodunum

49 BC, Vetera, AD 69,

51/50 BC, Marseilles

52 BC, Pindenissum

Amida AD 359) but although

(eg:

used in sieges

ram,

or

operations.

undermining

Cie%

towers
Sie-ge
of siege towers

The construction
(164.5-178),
V 291 ff)
towers

and Ammianus
had

incendiary
bridges
whilst

and by Vegetius

be well

to

devices
along

with

the tower

(xix

is covered

more briefly

protected

by

and were generally

artillery

was brought

(IV 17), whilst

2) describe

7; xxiv

uncured
supposed

and archers

in some detail

by Apollodorus

both Josephus

such towers
hides

in use

against

to include

14

adssiles

(BJ
Siege
and

rams and boarding

to keep the defenders

off the walls

into action.

' 4Ammianus (xxiii 4 10-13) also describes a siege tower as part of his excursus
the
this
However,
construction
only
considers
of
since
machinery.
on siege
here.
included
it
be
its
not
will
use,
the tower and not
187

Descriptions
than

of siege towers

the treatises,

use of towers
during

the Jewish

illustrated

This tower,

described

as being

the treatises,

Ammianus

whilst

(AD 361) having

incendiary

devices

Vegetius

fired

suggests
sorties

heightened
where
walls,

and when a tower

would

warns

of success;

off

on a higher

the stone wall of the

(AD 359) are

by hides as advised

and they

against

the advance

of the wall could

dominating

the walls,
subside

was moved up, the defenders

long iron-bound

the besieging

are reported

against

missiles

so it would

approach

it away from the walls using

Onasander

defences

siege towers

the tower

a ram, though

of protection,

be made, sections

to prevent

to keep the defenders

by

on wooden rafts
were burnt

by

by the defenders.

several

could

the tower

on the top levels

makes no mention of the towers

any kind

One is also

iv)'5;

(AD 67) and Amida

from incendiary

protected

AD 363).

and troops

missiles

like those at Jotapata

at Aquileia

degrees

levels

hurl

whi-Ist others

52 BC; the sieges

in Rome (Panel

comments on its effectiveness

fortress.

they

of Severus

Arch

a ram on one of the lower

and Josephus

18-20);

AD 359; Pirisabora

sources

for the practical

evidence

Avaricum

The siege tower at Masada also contained

the walls.
level,

on the

to storm the city

waiting

that

116 BC;

Cirta

(eg:
Amida

revolt;

in action

here contained

are often

and it is in these sources

found
be
can

in the historical

more detailed

during

general

a large

at Athens

siege engines,

and at Marseilles

15The contents
(1967).

of the friezes

be strengthened

or

mines could

be dug

it reached

could attempt

the

to drive

beams.

of sieges,

(87 BC) the defenders

(49 BC) the defenders

Severus
Arch
the
of
on

188

(IV

before

about the dangers

number

of siege engines

of sorties

meeting

with

(xl)

varying

were able to burn

sortied

during

are discussed

and

the

a truce

by BriDiant

to

burn

the

defenders

Caesarian

works.

siege

during

got into difficulties

the gates of the city were blocked

additional

There is plenty

walls in preparation
At Dura

practice.

for

added

Archaeological
before

point

evidence

278) were also strengthened

These were preparations
before
67),

to the attackers'

(171

BC)

type of warfare

common

by the defenders

approach

possibly

of

inside

presumably
towers

siege

than

rebuilt

of a siege in mind or

wall

(AD

of the wa.U were heightened

siege operations,
for them,

in preparation

the

siege -

(52 BC) and Jotapata

(AD 359) sections

of a

(AD 69) and Cremna (AD

with the possibility

At Avaricum

at some

because of the prospect

Placentia

from the attackers'

rather

with

and at Haliartus

as the

rubble

in reaction

attackers

been
have
to
a common practice
seems
of siege ramps
(eg:
Palaepaphos,
times
early
since

done to prevent

and Avaricum

ramps,

the

of

it.

The undermining

frequently

begun.

threat

defenders

the

demolished

256),

made either

actions

was a fairly

from rams and outside

(214-212 BC),

(AD 256) and Amida

when they came under

and heightening

at some point soon before they came under

a siege had actually

Dura

than to provide

a siege,

were built

attack

(396 BC),

and those of Syracuse

siege,

rather

the walls of Veii were strengthened

suggests

the siege there

and eventually

the strengthening

hinder

to

and

the

sorties

sorties

or during

an attack,

them against

protection

however,

city.

(AD 256) long mounds

the walls to strengthen

for

over-optimistic

to suggest

of evidence

359),

(AD

Amida

up to prevent

for the besieged

security

At

the approach

52 BC, both without

successfully).
and the example

Vegetius,

however,

Jerusalem
never

he gives of undermining

189

see above p. 181), and was

of siege towers

success;

in this

(eg: Sotiates

56 BC

(AD 70) and Dura (AD

mentions

the use of siege

a siege tower is from Rhodes

in the 4th century

treatise
that

It

BC, perhaps

for this section

was itself

of his work or, as suggested

on a Greek

based heavily

to drive

was possible

another

away

and the Romans did this at Vetera

suggests,

of a two storey

bujit

siege tower

a Roman treatise

above,

work.

towers

siege

a Greek

that he was using

indicator

long

with

beams as Vegetius

(AD 69) to counter

by the Batavians.

The tower

the advance

was demolished

by blows from the poles.

Battexing
The

Rams

ram is one of the

discussed

from

would

usually

for protection
and the

14).

Apollodorus

of view

be suspended

got their

names from

described

ram is

(153.8-164.4),

briefly

out that a ram in several

and solidity

of a ram were fairly

angles

of towers,

Rams could

vary

hundred

in strength,

f
made up rom several

by Vitruvius

(XXIII

(testudo)

or tortoise

both the ram

to the two animals

(IV

(de Arch

and

X xv)

Apollodorus

hanging

points

the principles

to keep its

behind

its use against

in the walls

points

the use
gates,

(157).

and two of the more powerful

seem to have been

by the Jews at Jerusalem

(BJ V 299) and the

Victor

ram used at Bezabde

pieces,

with

The ram

practice.

4 8-9).

recommends

weak points

and

(IV 14), and in the histories

by Vegetius

Apollodorus

defence

to Vegetius

similarities

and although

and any other

year old Persian

their

be properly

can

and
field

and according

pieces must have several

basic,

the Roman ram nicknamed

offence

and actual

and Ammianus

(161.6-8),

which

in a mobile shelter

detail

in

equipment

of both

of the treatises

of Josephus. (BJ 111214-221)

strength

of siege

and ease of movement,

shelter

The

items

point

to the advice

reference
(aries)

the

few

presumably

190

(AD 360).

This latter

for easy transportation,

ram was
and this

does not seem to have affected

reconnaissance

be made to discover

would

the ram would

which

At Singara

mortar

in the joints

and falling

few

(eg:

Roman sculpture

pieces

with

(154.1-5)

by Apollodorus

the animal

they

this

be in the shape

should

from

are named
been

Olympia

either

side (Winich

Vegetius
missiles

is this

makes
could

padded

such defences

frames

in

sources,

were

and the steeply

pitched

roofs

though

down would roll off.

are actua. Uy in the shape

to tell

states

(4-Kpwv;

panels ii

of Severus,

so missiles thrown

Apollodorus

of an anvil

suggestions
down

be thrown

mats (centones)

These

frequently

161.4),

the

that

they

whether

and the

it does have a decorative

head

would

of the

Greek

of

ram

ram head

ram's

head on

1972 101).

stone,

are fairly

were

in the literary

but it is difficult

shape;

several

could

point,

of the walls which

illustrated

equipment

in illustrations

after,

shape,

onto the shelters

the defenders

the parts

described

wooden

of a1l the rams depicted

have

at this

of

damp

the still

an entry

Column scene 79; Arch

The heads

actually

used the ram against

attacked

and those

in testudines

recommended

in a couple

specified

walls and forced

of siege

Trajan's

Most of these,

suspended

is only

down.

Rams are one of the

and iv).

built

of a newly

(AD 360) they

at Bezabde

unstable

this

have more effect,

that

of the walls against

weak sectors

(AD 360) the Persians

cases.

whilst

Whilst it seems most likely

its strength.

countering

the

walls,

and rams in an attempt

could

catch

obvious

from

for

be lowered

rams

even

pieces

to break

to cushion

(IV

23);

heavy

of column

and

off the ram heads;

the blows of the ram, or

the ram head in a noose and haul it up the wall.

suggestions

to make,

had been in use since Assyrian

191

and other

sources

show that

times (see above p. 181).

Missiles

thrown

millstones

purpose

the

walls

of Jotopata

cut them down using

defenders
de Arch.

caught
X xii)

The treatise

and the Persians

of Apollodorus

equipment,

Each of the devices

those

that

wheels,

with

on the 'axle'

describes

might

look very
objects

shaped
mentioned

shown

armed

At Marseilles

ram

one

(Vitruvius

of three

which

is

indicating

The shape

texts

or iron

157.1-6).

that

usef ul

particularly

(jj()oj3okoC

catapult

they

may

against

the

of this

of the treatise.

192

similar

to

This

and the barrel-

may be the iron

is fairly

1988 165-167 for a synopsis

is compared

povayKwv).

on the Column,

shown

of later

wooden

to have two attachments

itself
the
the
ram
of
arm
and

throwing

of siege

pieces

actions.

at the end of the arms

& Lepper

also have

should

similar

by Apollodorus.

the

(AD 360).

all movable

may be pegs,

for offensive

stone

that

to the representation

in illustrations

16See Frere

the Romans

while they were in use (140.12;

which

on the walls (188.2-9),

of a single

until

to long poles.

on the Column appears

depicted

have been mobile engines

defenders

with chaff.

a clue to the identification

states

pegs to secure them into the ground

Apollodorus

the walls

Column (scene 308) which have been the object

Apollodorus

particularly

near the ground

was able to protect

did the same at Bezabde

may provide

on Trajan's

discussion"

of much

(189 BC)

a ram in a noose and wound it up with a windlass

illustrated

devices

sacks filled

hooks attached

reaping

at Ambracia

the rams whilst

Josephus

(AD 67) for a while using

and the

(171 BC) the defenders

At Haliartus

shot.

were used to drop the weights.

cranes

AD 378),

(AD 278) may have been used for this

to destroy

used stones and lead weights

of masonry,

chunks

AD 360; Adrianople

(Bezabde

than as an artillery

included

often

stone from Cremna

rounded

rather

from

drums

or column

large

very

down

ram heads

to the ram heads

Unfortunately,

of the different

as with

theories.

most of the equipment

type

particular

though

work,
suitable

hand

the arm of the right

for

position

However,

difficult
it
is
and

of ram is used,

it is possible

type of ram described

that the three

how it would

to see exactly

may be drawn

machine
the

against

swinging

how this

does not explain

Apollodorus

he describes,

wall

or

the

back

defenders

to a

on it.

on the Column may show the

machines

in the treatise.

Mines
is given in the treatises

Much advice
both

attackers

Both

Apollodorus

destruction
then

and defenders,

of defensive

firing

them,

enter

a city

deep

ditch

and some on how they

walls,

secretly

filled

with

no other

As stated

above (p. 181), mines,

the Assyrian
both

the purposes

Maozamalcha

through

mentioned

a cuniculus

Marseilles

how tunnels

any

mining

by Vegetius.
taken

channel.

them,

be used to

should

have

a wide

attempts

(IV

5) but

like rams and siege towers,

were in use from

of mines in Roman sieges dug for

Veii

through

case the Romans are supposed

or drainage

cities

could

in the

them.

and there are examples

(AD 363) were both

in the former

though

BC),

period,

on countering

be countered.

the use of mines

that

suggests

to prevent

water

could

the walls and underpinning

also mentions

Vegetius

provides

advice

describe

undermining

and the latter

17

24)

(IV

Vegetius

and

of n-dnes by

the construction

concerning

(396 BC) supposedly,

and

mines dug into

the towns,

to have entered

the citadel

At Ambracia

(49 BC) and Dura (AD 256) attempts

(189 BC),

Athens

(87

were made to undermine

17Interestingly,
Vegetius
good at
were particularly
notes that the Bessians
24).
(IV
Caesar
their
mining
mineral
notes
with
because
experience
of
mining
Avaricum
Gauls
the
skilled
were particularly
Sotiates
at
at
the
and
that
iron
they
because
and
rniners.
copper
experienced
were
digging
mines

193

the walls

with

defenders
Caesar's
action

varying

at Marseilles
sappers

opened

basin inside
were flooded

of a deep moat,

suggestion

than a precaution

rather

operations

raining

mines they

their

how the

describes

Vitruvius

of SUCCeSS".
a water-fiUed

created

to Vegetius'

similar

Caesarian

degrees

their

walls so when

(de Arch
but

X xi),

to the

a reaction

made before

an

the siege.

Wall breaches
Should
then

the walls
line

another

fire

from

defence

of

(Veg. IV 23),

the flanks

was done at Athens

under

such

heavy

forced

to retreat.

and succeeded
anticipated
Jerusalem

this
(AD

fire

and

built

70) when

the

inside

if they

it,

tried

his attack

he found
others

several
Romans

tried

effort

like

to attack

to assault

72/73)
(AD
Masada
at

the stone wall of the fortress

it.

and this

built

of a

construction

to attack

open to

the inner

soldiers
built

wall.

were coming
wall,

on this section

the defenders

that

above,

wall that was about

the newly

to assault

renewed

and the Romans made no concerted

dangers 19 The Sicarii
.

the

and because Sulla's

he tried

When he later
in breaching

by

provided

described

and this would also leave the attackers

(87 BC),
when

of attack

that part of the original

as the front

as well

This

be

could

wall to cover

concave semicircular
to be breached

to any of the methods

succumb

he was

of the wall

had already

The same happened

the fortress

at

of Antonia,

the new wall because of the

a wall of earth

absorbed

and timber

the blows of the ram

fumes
by
their
driven
poisonous
is At Ambracia
mine
out of
the Romans were
but
defenders
the
the
Athens
collapsed
defenders,
walls
at
pumped in by the
flooded
the
Marseilles
mines
were
attackers'
inner
built an
had already
wall, at
firing
by
the
defences
the
mines
collapsed
were
two
Dura
of
sections
and at
to
been
have
result.
a
entry
as
gain
to
unable
but the attackers
appear
"'The fortress
was eventually
fortress
the
Romans entered
this
force
at
Roman
attacked
captured.
already

taken by a 'stratagem'
when a small group of
the
trumpets;
their
main
sounded
and
secretly
fortress
fled,
believing
the
Jews
the
but
point

194

which

had breached

and had bastions

the outer

wall.

went a step further

fortifications

with inner

designed

specifically

could be easily defended

Later

(eg:

wall was breached

if the outer

that

walls and retrenchments

16th-17th

Lucca,

century).

Artillery

and missiles

Vegetius

(IV 6) states

the walls

whilst

for

an attack

positions,

he describes

two types

use against

information

siege

of their

The effectiveness

to provide

to protect

provided

protection

of the wall.
a particular
yards

Josephus
ballista

(BJ 111 257).

knock
to
were able
defenders

could

takes

provide

writers

22).

little

very

to very

attacks

with

building

great

delight

Marcellus

detailed

effective

near

rams whilst

at Bezabde

at Jotopata

a ramp against

as Vegetius

195

that

II

(AD

(AD 67) it

a vulnerable

in describing

and corners

the

to take the town by storm.

the walls;

he states

(214-212 BC)

(AD 359) drove

at Amida

attempt

off the

placed artillery

at Syracuse

section

the effectiveness

flung
head
and
man's
a
off

At the same point,

off battlements

the defenders

to keep

an attack

working

which knocked

be equally

(IV

were intended

which

and limit themselves

an abortive

for soldiers

in

missiles

Other

siege towers

troops

covered

the role of artillery

men and machines

fire for his troops

in the Persian

360) Roman artillery

both

above (p. 183,184,186).

covering

off

during

off the walls during

It was also used

18).

to keep the defenders

stresses

of incendiary

construction

of artillery

and the artillery

defenders

against

use of artillery

walls has been mentioned

on his ships

and later

(IV

engines

on the actual

descriptions

used artillery

was made,

of fortified

the defence
Elsewhere

that attackers

of

it more than 600

the Roman machines

off towers.
suggests

Artillery

used by

(IV 22); at Amida

the Roman onaqrj'L were used with

and destroyed

However

them

effect

both

attackers

device.

Various

in the literary

sources,

eg: Archimedes'

at Marseilles

the artillery

two missiles

Finds

of Legion

(Marsden

have produced

position
fired

(Richmond

personnel

officers,

spiked

are reported
(214-212

BC),

wooden beams 12

which seem to have fired

balls are common at siege sites such

balls.

(Marsden

1969 82), both of which

67 catapult

bolts were found in the

have led Richmond

to postulate

tower f rom which at least two catapults

lead or clay slingshot

fire

covering

have

found

from

the

were

Many of these

could also be used as an antiCorbulo's

two types

a hill.

As with

at a number

Cremna (AD 278),

which was besieged

commanders,

purposes.

from

qlandes

been

(AD 135),

EE VI 1885).

catapults

as an

(AD 70, and see above note

(AD 199/200)

locations

of an artillery

who fired

Beththera
Asculum

of ballista

device and for incendiary

glandes

against

1968 32-33).

(AD 58) included

clay

artillery

at Syracuse
fire

could

1969 78) and Numantia

to artillery,

funditores)

artillery

bolts and ballista

quantities

and height

In addition

powerful

X at Jerusalem

at Hatra

at Hod Hill and their

excavations

used

simultaneously.

of both catapult

as Carthage

exceptionally

(49 BC) which

13), and some of the catapults

defenders

and

anti-personnel

feet long,

siege towers

it seems to have been used most often

and siege engines,

the catapults

the Persian

against

although
,

fortifications

great

assault on Volandum
(libratores

of slingers
artillery

of sites

and particularly

missiles,

including

Perugia

were inscribed

and derogatory

comments

196

with

lead and

Burnswark,

(41 BC) and

by Pompeius Strabo in 90-88 BC (Appian

glandes

and

BC 147;

the names of legions

and illustrations

as part

of

an airborne

propaganda

informed

the

of

inscribed

with

received

in this

Incendiary

situation
messages

and archers

or they could

states that tar,

the enemy's

sulphur,

(see above

burning

barrels
poured

to break

it up,
)20

boiling
and

Vegetius

c1lande

Romans.

As a result

traitors

and capture

of information
train.

a supply

the

describes
or artillery,

states

formation

missile

falarica,

that it was fired

however,

which

is not

by catapult

could

(IV 18).

be shot slowly

that it should

(Bezabde

defenders

the description

with

(AD

Romans

I, AD

may have

from artillery".

the maUeolus and the falarica.

corresponds

at the

naphtha

case the Persian

of incendiary

down

(AD 67)

at Jotapata

AD 256) and pitch

baskets

used in siege

onto the Roman siege engines;

burning

(Dura,

filled

two types

4 14) who states

alight.

materials

fired

for burning

be prepared

(51 BC) the Gauls rolled

At Uxellodunum

Hatrenes

(IV 8)

Vegetius

were frequently

devices

and in the latter

and this

The

oil should

devices

incendiary

on attackers.

oil onto a Roman testudo

and bitumen

pitch

an arrow,

the fire

firing

and liquid

pitch

The use of sulphur

their

(XXIII

by

be dropped

with incendiary

360) is also attested,

like

(87 BC)

also be used to fire

could

simply

p. 181).

filled

Josephus

archers

the

and incendiary

engines,

warfare

Vegetius

was kept

Sulla was able to ambush

way,

slingers

and missiles,

fired

Athens

towards

Sulla

devices

Artillery,

199/200

campaign.
in

to Appian,

According

be fired

The malleolus
given

by
was

by Ammianus

from a loose bow to keep

mentioned

by Ammianus,

and could pierce

but

solid iron or the

"The same happened to Lucullus in Parthia in 69 BC (Dio xxxvi 1). Dio, states
impossible
to
bitumen
extinguish.
full
almost
was
and
of
that naphtha was
2'Both
others'

full
fired
31
BC
charcoal
in
of
pots
Actium
sides at
34
2).
ji
(Dio
ships by means of artillery

197

and pitch

at each

layers

protective

the burning

allowing

of a siege engine,

to reach the

material

wooden structure.

Incendiary
Epirote
with

relieving

torches,

army

tow,

pitch

have been found

(James 1983 142-3),

do

they

so they

(both AD
The

equipment.

Wall

and Bar Hill on the Antonine

at Wroxeter

need not be associated

been

assault

(AD

at Singara

and Maozamalcha

to destroy

winter

) as we]l as red hot

are also mentioned

trying

have

to

seem

Cicero's

attacking

(AD 360), Aquileia.

(189 BC)

at Ambracia

Qacula fervefacta.

Malleoli

by the defenders

heads of maUeoli

though

darts

the camp.

360), the two sieges at Bezabde

363), particularly

the Nervii

and maReoli;

the

used in siege warfare;

the Roman besiegers

incendiary

to burn

glande

were frequently

by archers
attacked

(54 BC) fired

quarters
clay

fired

arrows

commonly

most

with

exclusively

sieges,
these

under

used

circumstances -

Historians

do not generally

falaricae,

but

nj)p(opoj

of the Greeks,
C22.

One

century

Romans

was in

long

catapults

Illyrian

they

earliest

According
with

flax,

wars 11).

defending

(AD 58) included

Vetera

shot

from

fired

by catapults
These

artillery.

uses

to Appian,
pitch

of these

are the

he fired

and sulphur

from catapults;

the

town

two

shafts

the town

of

using

(49 BC) a siege ramp was

Corbulo's

shot from catapults,

the Batavians'

the

wooden
into

by

missiles

was besieging

At Marseilles

shelters

missile barrage
and the Romans
with

Anab. II 21 2); Salamis, 307 BC (Diodorus

22Tyre, 307 BC (Arrian
88
2).
XX
Siculus
304
(Diodorus
BC
48 6); Rhodes,

198

as

Salamis and Rhodes in the late 4th

Figulus

firebrands

(AD 69) destroyed

missiles

recorded

Marcius

fired
bars
hot
iron
fire
by
red
set on
at Volandum

are

used at Tyre,

156 BC when

and covered

(Appian

y that

of the

in Dalmatia.

Delminium
cubits

do specif

to incendiary

refer

fire

Siculus

bolts

XX

shot from catapults

of an incendiary
side was firing

(ardentes

the falarica

the bolt is most likely

them,

it is not certain

which

by Vegetius

mentioned

to as being fired

which is only ever referred

the head

has identified

bolt from Dura and although

catapult

and not the malleolus

Blockade

James (1983)

hastae).

by archers

and circumvallation

As stated

(p. 183,199),

above

attacking

did not wish

general

Scipio

at Numantia

attempt

to induce

(133 BC),

or obtaining

assault

to attempt

supplies,

for

an assault

barrier

like

the place and

this took the form

Usually

from

the defenders

preventing

army from sorties

the besieging

and protecting

or the

some reason,

was to blockade

starvation.

a physical

failed,

on a stronghold

the alternative
through

surrender

of a line of circumvallation,
escaping

if

by the defenders.

The military

details

Vegetius
11).

the supplies

Circumvallations

dig a V-shaped
should

a city

(140.1-3).
at least

be used to build

Vegetius

stones.
beyond

ditch

five

should

feet

palisade

of the type
observation

(IV 28).

he has mentioned
which

literary

evidence;

sieges

at Beththera

appears

deep

(AD 135),

(1.52

and consist

Vegetius

m);

longer
no
was

possibly

Hatra

199

should

from the

be buttressed

or loricula

of a ditch

should

used by besieging
by the archaeological

be
with

barrier

that a physical

(AD 199/200)

with

and rampart

Lines of circumvaRation

recorded

force

the debris

should

seems to imply

to be corroborated

the latest

that the besieging

and this

(IV 7-

the former

and Vegetius,

the circumvallation

besieged
the
range
of
weapon
and turrets

obtain

He states

though

of strongholds,

in case of blockade

by Apollodorus

a rampart,
that

mentions

the blockade

about

are mentioned

some details

providing

ditch

say little

treatises

forces,

an

and other

date

to the

and Cremna

(AD

278),

although

Because circumval-lations

historians

Roman

undertaken,
frequently

gave details

In addition

to this information,

usually

about the various

one of the few physical

Although

Apollodorus

construct

the rampart,

particularly

dig,

rocky

area,

wa.U inight

a stone

their

components

which formed

varied

or where

from

was of stone because that

Although

Vegetius

suggests

rampart,

he gives
suggest

and observation
at a number

these included
(Carthage,

for signalling

146 BC).

of sites (eg: Carthage,

The materials

the circumva-Uation

was the only material

possible

used

in a

use, though

Alesia

wall at

to the

the literary

(Numantia,

(52 BC),

to

available.

defence of turrets

and artillery

to

or impossible

Towers along the rampart

Numantia,

be used

to what was available;

the additional

as to their

no indications

should

was unnecessary

Masada (AD 72/3)

sources

the case.

instead;

be constructed

attaching

the ditch

according

a ditch

the work.

23

of a siege to survive

the spoil

and

construction

remains of a circumvallation

was not necessarily

of ramparts

were being

operations

mentioned

features

that

stated
this

large-scale

the archaeological

are often

in the construction

indicated

usually

being

circumvallation

of the site.

because of the topography

unnecessary

a full

of blockade,

was a line

this

133 BC)

are recorded
Machaerus

and

Masada (AD 72/3)).

"The

traces of a circumvallation
135),
(AD
Beththera
and
such as
literary
in
the
siege mentioned
(AD 135) for example,
Beththera
Cremna
at
and
a circumvallation,
were
have shown that operations
literary
sources.

of a siege site,
can lead to the identification
knowledge
increase
of a particular
can vastly
72/3)
(AD
Machaerus
and
at
evidence;
literary
in
the
is
sources of
made
no mention
discoveries
(AD 278) recent archaeological
on a much larger scale than suggested in the

200

The towers

of the wall.

circuit
south

that

sectors

the

of

the effective
the

range

siting

Apollodorus
rampart,

cover

recommends
which

is

(6 ft,

suggested

(AD 72/3).

Most ditches

two ditches

at Alesia

of ditches

m.;

Perugia

(41 BC)

unlikely)

No ditch

was found

one, and as with

and

at Numantia

marching

camps,

the literary

the defences

201

As

and Masada

the outer of the

states.

deeper

than

The
the

(eg: Alesia (52 B C) 2.4-2.6

to Appian,

although

ditches

especia. Uy

by a ditch,

though

of the

1 24).

(7 ft,

usually

were

by Apollodorus

8.8 m. according

as any

camp

as Caesar

to be flat-bottomed

minimum 5 feet (1.52 m. ) specified

for

as long

as at Machaerus

difficult,

considerably,

apart,

topographical

marching

and Vegetius

seem to have been V-shaped,

found
was

varied

of

were accompanied

of the soil made this

the nature

depth

BJ 111 84)

not all ramparts

above,

If

towers.

depth

the

with

towers.

at least 5 feet deep in front

ditch

a V-shaped

m. at

1969 chap. iv)

,

by

of intervals,

regularity

the area between

comparable

to Josephus

according

for

a desire

more

affected

varied

50-75

individual

probably

was

towers

m. at Machaerus,

towers

in them could

artillery

between

was up to c. 300 m. (Marsden

of

These

vulnerable

they could be some distance

of artillery,

on the

side.

potentially

and also between

the

and it is possible

of a catapult

than

considerations

where

m. at Masada),

distances

(25-35

sites

for

defence

The

different

were for the siting

towers

by the besiegers

an extra

circumvallation.

and 80-100

Cremna

and

considered

between

considerably

only to have been built

appear

are more open to attack

were

all the way round

those at Masada are along the eastern

whilst

however,

towers

they

At Machaerus

west sector

sectors,

did
Masada
not extend
and

at Machaerus

though

this

sources

seems rather

state there

of circumvallations

was

may have

been in accordance
relieving

with

Caesar's

army.

threat

the potential

to protect

a circumvallation

to blockade

or the arrival

the Gauls in the hillfort

of a

(52 BC) included

at Alesia

from the Gallic relieving

his troops

a contravallation

defences

elaborate

very

of a sortie

army as well as

and protect

his soldiers

from sorties.

The distance

between

was important,

(52 BC) 660-1800

72/3)

275-650 m.;

investing

At

circumvallation
between

Machaerus

on blockade

were the most vulnerable

have

to cover,

the effective

places out of the artillery

against

of a catapult

well within

by the besieged.

artillery

range

m.;

Masada (AD

n-tissiles.

distance

that those sections

distance
force

250-1000

between

the

when the ground

for the same reason as the

of the siege lines

that a sortying
would

have

party

would
and in

to react

Alesia,

300
to
c.
m. (Marsden
was up
Machaerus

was probably

intended

The blockading

any artillery
primarily

on these

as a defence

278)
(AD
Cremna
was
wall at

of the town and this short

202

1969

and Masada were in many

besiegers,
Roman
the
of
range

of the circumvallation
sorties

the

probably

besieging

varied

from

on the enemy -

the walls of Numantia,

chap. iv),

sections

the

missiles

range

lines;

the loricula

In most of these cases the

town was increased

and the greater

the longer

to train

particular

Since

Masada

and

wall and the besieged

of towers

330-570 m.;

of the defenders'

them was open and more easy,

positioning

(133 BC)

(AD 72/3)

Machaerus

be out of range

Alesia,

(Numantia

sites

siege

under

that

This distance

(AD 278) 125-180 m. ).

Cremna

line would

Numantia,

m.;

who states

of the besieged.

weapon range

site to site as well as at individual

Alesia

wall and the stronghold

(IV 28),

to Vegetius

according

be beyond

should

the circumvallation

distance

would tend

to

back up Mitchell's
held artillery,
defensive

and that this was for use as an offensive

one,

as

the

probably

was

first

on the besiegers'

towers
the
that
of
some
claims

role

than a

weapon rather

of

most

wall

artillery

on

24

circumvcaUations

Onasander

Although
blockade,

that the besieging

by sending

AU prisoners

new arrivals

the Mandubji
the

similar

town

incident

had expelled
Romans

through

the town.

of generals

the use of circumvallation

starving

general

aggravate

the scarcity

in action

but would

Gauls precisely
at Cremna

occurred

because
(AD 278);

is supposed

Onasander's

concerning

in Warfare),
after

rather

to have hurled

ruthless

but that

the capture

Lydius

were sent back by the

the ravines

surrounding

(see below,

exclusively

of cities.

any method of inducing

to allow

would appear to contradict

of generals

could afford

they had been expelled

when the townspeople

them into

almost

or surrender

once the war was over the general

as the war continued,

deals

23

)25

of the lack of supplies.

suggestion

the conduct

even

the supplies

consume

from the town because of food shortages

Lydius

of food in the town

when he refused

(52 BC) after

his lines at Alesia

and

age into the town (xlji

men of military

be useless

during

besieged,

of the

out

may have had this intention

by the

a lot of his advice

on Morality

the

except

would

Caesar

more quickly.

from

does not mention

he does advocate

suggests

These

with

the behaviour

The implication

to be magnanimous,
defeat

Chapter

or surrender

is clear;

but as long
was open

to him.

24Since the loricula mentioned by Vegetius was for the defence of the besieging
defence
the
to
against
of
artillery
additional
it
provide
sense
make
would
army,
188).
(see
dangerous
be
above
p.
very
sorties which could
lists a few stratagems
25Frontinus
supplies
on preventing
(III
blockade
in
time
xiv-xv).
of
supplies
and obtaining

203

arriving

(III

iv),

Conclusions
The

treatises

discussed

subjects
be taken

the practicalities

of besieging

different.

Frontinus

they had already

been developed

were involved

The techniques

of siege

the late

the equipment

Roman;

of countering

it.

Thus

rams in nooses which

(IV 23).
artillery

in the

4th

developed

Vegetius

This

lack

of development

of interest
in torsion

in the subject,
artillery,

such details
part

there

treatises

would

since

appear

strong

and actual

field

The two

are

be believed

and Onasander

.),

to use when so

from

the Assyrian

the

though

to

period

as were the methods

catching

over a thousand

to have been the introduction

use of circumvallations,

the heads

of

later

years

of torsion
neither

of

does seem to have

the circumvallation

in the Roman period.

in siege

techniques

and although

his Strategemata

relationship

may account

for

is fairly

It also explains

between

practices.

204

general,

lack

Frontinus'

there were improvements

have been out of place.

is a very

because

the same,

also recommends

BC and

popular

little

show defenders

reliefs

which was a Roman development,

become particularly

advice on

justifications

what equipment

was essentially

Assyrian

century

of

of siege warfare

their

III Pref

that can

(xlff).

warfare

The major changes

siege.

(Strat.

because it was not his place to tell the general

many variables

one under

machines

other

pieces

little

though

siege

to the limit

various

the subject

and Frontinus,

did not deal with

the

there is very

or defending

for not covering

reasons

way to the

can list the precautions

and defence,

a city

are Onasander

comprehensively

different

can describe

and writers

for both attack

who give their

Vegetius

Although

above.

available

in a rather

warfare

in case of siege,

equipment

authors

siege

cover

and changes

the inclusion

of

why for the most

the methods described

in the

Analysis

techniques

of siege

defenders

had more time to react and devise

were more likely

actions

67) were in reaction

ramp;

lowering

hooks

to this);

pouring

boiled

fenugreek

be prepared,

when

he

opportunity

Technical

and the skill

treatises

more general
on other

a little

such

but the general

example,
number

gives

of reasons:

instructions

were

relevant

are no longer

extant

towers

available

treatises

by writers

of artillery,

of

battering

and

for information

and Vegetius

Vegetius

rams.

and defences

the details

with

as they

against

This

so little

were

Vegetius,

that

well known

or similar

The
for

may be for a

such as Aeneas Tacticus

the subject;

205

as the

to know when to use them.

and may have been available,

may have covered

is correct

(and actions)

descriptions

had changed

unnecessary

and

and supphes

equipment

or line of battle.

techniques

was a

formation;

the strength

and

compared

scanty

down

(xlii).

for detailed

of march

considered

Greek and Hellenistic

were still

the

on luck,

seems to be expected

siege

the Roman siege

but Onasander

on the use of these devices

on the order

well

Equipment

(IV 7-11),
use

as siege

for use' are very

'instructions

boards.

of the engineers

information

some were very

to cut the sacks

such as those by Apollodorus

works

equipment

provides

will

were available

(AD

of the ram head (and the Romans'

poles

advises

of attack,

at Jotopata

of the wa.U opposite

on the gangway

a general

devised

although

and

on what the enemy

oil on the Roman testudo

and this depends

arises,

the defenders,

boiling

as Vegetius

that

says

to long

attached

pouring

could

the height

sacks in front

chaff-filled

reaction

Josephus

attackers

and methods

depending

to the Roman techniques,

by that time: increasing

use of reaping

defences

Thus the defences

known

both

although

to be counter-reactions,

or doing.

was preparing

them,

that

suggests

detailed
anyway;

and Philo

Roman works

and as suggested

that

above,

many of the actions

taken

in siege

warfare

were in reaction

to the enemy's

operations.

above (p. 178) the emphasis in Vegetius'

As stated
defence,

the latter.

particularly

for the defence

(de Arch. I v),

Like Vitruvius

of a city

(IV 1-8) are made bearing

a siege.

Onasander,

fortified

positions

century

AD would have been concerned

a time

however,

at this

techniques

probably
defence

and because

time,

by both

Empire

writing

may be stressing

barbarians

(eg:

as sophisticated

wars between

hand,

on the other

Vegetius'

suggestions

in mind the possibility

does not touch

was

after
because

still

primarily

essentially

expansioniSt2

of the insecurity

now more than

Adrianople,

ever

6.

at Adrianople
of some parts

Roman towns

AD 378) and other

of the 1st

Vegetius,

in AD 378,
of the Empire

facing
were

attack

enemies with

during
(eg:
the
the
Romans
those
sieges
of
as

Rome and Persia,

of

the enemy at

with attacking

the Roman defeat

of

upon the defence

at all, and this may be because his model general

the

when

with both defence and offence,

works were concerned

whereas earlier

is on

book on siege warfare

siege
the

AD 359-363).

for
the
just
a
general
only
way
about
"Successful
also
were
actions
offensive
Corbulo's
(cf:
time
this
complaints
as
well
at
glory
and
to gain recognition
20).
Annals
Claudius,
by
Germany
xi
from
when recalled

206

Mo-rality in Warfare

Introduction
Most ancient
but

touched

also

Onasander,

the

upon

for example,

behaviour

Cicero

than

only the two situations

of morality

discussed

by Westington.

will not be discussed

for native

Roman revenge

example

mentioned

After

be

he should
traditions

and the treatises

of open engagements

generally

the behaviour

relevant

and

the subject

will consider

above and will

In addition,

is

date there

this

in war,

this chapter

it is directly

unless

and

(1938) has dealt comprehensively

in the field

with morality

general -

with the character

and tactics

and behaviour

atrocities

of the

qualities

up to 133 BC.

Because of these factors

siege warfare.

examples

for

of warfare

some of the established

Westington

in warfare

deal primarily

themselves

moral

what strategies

mentions

of war.

with the issue of morality

much less evidence

with

in addition

the conduct

concerning

and

personal

seems almost more concerned

of the general

employing.

dealt not only with the practicalities

treatises

military

avoid

of non-Romans

to that of the Romans,

for

atrocities.

The Treatises
Cicero

states

declaration

established
advice
obvious

war

given
hints

humane

36),
(de
Offic.
I
of war

(mores

traditions

code included

Fetial

the

and conduct
of

customs

that

belli,

rather

by Polybius
or established

Verr.
than

iv

the actual

and Onasander
military

116),

laws

concerning

and elsewhere
though

these

laws of the Fetial

mentions
are

conventions

rather

the

probably

1.
code

may also be considered

the

The

as fairly

than laws.

for
Senate
Emperor
in
the
Rome
or
declaration
matter
the
of war was a
just
the
of
and
unjust
wars
will
not
subject
the
campaign,
on
general
not
and
here.
be considered
'Since

207

Cicero

gives

(134-36),

advice

some general

Leg Man. 13);

(presumably

to those who surrender;

duty

general's

with

barbarous

in the conduct

the importance
punishment

this

should

is a statement

not

enemy by generosity

Onasander
Cicero's
they

comments;

would

generosity

the besieged

not face slaughter,

made the war more difficult

Thus

encouraged

had been informed

plundering
usually
could,
general

should
be killed

be strictly
the

should

prevent

should

and

also emphasized

(V 115),

and urged

that

to conquer

the

controlled

(vi)

war was still

who destroyed

nothing

echo

if they

to surrender

knew

and massacred
(xxxviii).

to surrender

to lose should

not be ravaged

and prisoners

in progress

interest).

because if they

208

some of which

until

not be

the enemy

to allow them time to surrender;

intentions,

a massacre especially

hold out or seize the citadel

Polybius

were less likely

country

if it was in the general's

(de Offic. 1 82).

it was better

were more likely

and generals

of the general's

the rest

on the subject,

points

as cities

the enemy's

while

because

nothing

who have not been cruel

be spared.

from an enemy with

acts of desperation
(vi);

those

of cities

(V 12 2).

by force

several

must be granted

and it was the

to the defeated

be excessive

than

(Pro

cruelty,

excess

and spare

that

of war should

forward

puts

the guilty

only

of showing

general

not let them

strictly,

and plundering

good cause or with

to punish

Connected

his troops

from Roman soldiers)

in the destruction

be done without

for the perfect

necessary

and to show mercy to those who surrender

gain,

protection

in the de Officiis

and morality

control

should

a general

for his personal

plunder

should

the qualities

and when describing

(Pro Leg Man. 10-16);

on behaviour

of war should

(though

In the same way,

if the defenders
expected

not

enemy allies
in sieges,

seemed likely

to be killed

the
to

they would

fight
but

more fiercely
fairly

and desperately

While Cicero's
purely

moralizing
above

some rather

killed

off , even

cold-blooded

comments

that

suggesting

resistance

of a

He is not

prisoners

in order

if it was in the general's

these

containing

application.

which

spared

and

and sometimes

though

about

prisoners

be executed,

abstract

for their

suggestions

of cities

to continued

Onasander,

of

also include

could later

to be rather

tend

are all useful

the surrender

was preferable

those

nature,

overtones,

surrender

this

that

admonishments

moralistic

These suggestions
.

the idea was to encourage

obvious;

by demonstrating

armies

(Xlii)2

be

could

to encourage

interest

to do so

(xlii).

Other,
under

perhaps

siege are mentioned

illustrated
city

more formalized,

in the historical

and the distinction

those taken by assault.

only

briefly

the treatment

by some of the sources

These relate

sources.
shown

involving

conventions

between

towns

These conventions

of cities

but are well

to the method of sacking

which

have surrendered

will be discussed

in greater

and
detail

below.

The general
prisoners
general

impression

and cities
hoped

one gets from the treatises

should

to gain from

encourage

the surrender

preferable

to defeating

be varied
it;

according

both leniency

of the enemy,

is that

the treatment

to the situation
and severity

which the military

and what the

could
writers

of

be used to
suggest

was

an enemy by force.

2cf : Vegetius' advice concerning

a fleeing enemy following a pitched battle (III
because an enemy that is surrounded
21); flight
with
should be facilitated
6,
fight
ferociously
(see
Chapter
lose
to
more
above
on Pitched
will
nothing
Battles)
-

209

Mercy

and Brutality

Cicero

implies

that the general

Onasander

as stated

above,

brutality

when necessary.
by the demolition

created
xiv 23),

"for

be praised

harshness

to those who resisted,

Caesar

had

BG vii

reflects

Onasander's

merciful

towards

(BG vii

40),

executed
war,

1 75).

According

statements

this

soldiers

that

of this

to Caesar,

several

as an ally,

for mercy encouraged

such as native

cavalry

the defeat of Cato (B. Mr.

Bituriges
the
in
for
Caesar
the
of
case
claim

210

in Africa
88).

been

Aulus

he was

of Vercigetorix

and when Petreius

in the civil

unharmed

deserted

officers

mercy.

Thus

men were sent back

of Petreius'

the

his use of clementia

a period of fraternization

during

of

year

seem to have

to join the revolt

the tribe

aU his enemy's

his reputation

and cities

city of Utica following

the governor's

but

also

encouraged

those of Cicero.

than

rather

and

Agricola

his second

does

which

his

varied

by fire.

during

to experience

if he

who surrendered

supposedly

which

clemency

was to retain

made sure

enemy forces

mercy

the Aedui who were planning

but this

As a result

for

to those

40; BC 1 75; Vell. Pat. II 87),

some of Caesar's

Caesar

with

20),

apparently

out fugitives

who preferred

reputation

a wide

(eg:

justified

tactics
(AcIri

Britain

of many tribes

surrender

flushing

(Annal

terror;

the enemy's

with

the panic

used

Tigranocerta

to capture

Corbulo

lenience

showing

use of terror
in

campaigning

enemy,

be used along

should

he would increase

though,

occasion

how Corbulo

as merciful".

of the

the

in order

of Artaxata
it,

mercy

describes

Tacitus

treatment

combined

that

suggests

if he destroyed

it he would

spared

show mercy on every

should

(BC

to Caesar.

the surrender

of

(B. Afr. 92) and the

Hirtius

who had revolted

also makes
but then

surrendered
to act very
above,

3 )3

(BG viii

stances

such as revolts

Having

a reputation

encouraging

and by other

is frequently

quoted

magnanimity

(Livy

during

similar

stratagem

the revolt

of Civilis

of armed

town of Terponus

in

Book

IV

it in the hope that

(Appian

Wars 18).

of Falerii

tribe

Roman

also by military

but

behaviour

of Frontinus'

Stratagems;

feared

unharmed

cause and handed

Similarly,

would

land

their

and lost none

a large

over

when Octavian

of the Iapydes

the tribe

have

might

had gone over to the rebels

remained

Civilis'

IV iii 14).

the Myrian

and various

and well illustrated

with an army the citizens

abandoned

men (Strat.
which

such

a city of the Lingones

did not destroy

Illyrian

behaviour

as an example of traditional

When the inhabitants

they

below.

The tale of the schoolmaster

the effect

is given

was advancing

would be plundered.

number

to illustrate

circum-

exceptional

by Frontinus

are suggested

not only by historians

as stratagems,

property

Magnanimous

historians.

vi and

one was not the only method of

v 27; Val. Max. vi 5; Plut. Cam. 10),

and as the author

of their

warfare

ready

Onasander

and these will be discussed

war,

the enemy to surrender.

by the author

Another

and civil

involve

usually

for mercy or cultivating

forms of psychological

writers

these examples

However,

Caesar was quite

to do so (cf:

if it was in his interests

harshly,

p. 209).

In spite of his reputation,

.

took the

had abandoned,

surrender,

which

he

it did

3Caesar seems to have achieved similar results in Gaul at least by his success,
for
his
Gauls
to
the
capture
ability
building
among
reputation
a
such
up
had
built
52
he
in
BC
as
a
as
soon
Vellaunodunum
hillforts
that
surrendered
11).
(BG
vii
circumvallation
4When Camillus was besieging Falerii he refused to accept the young hostages
back
instead
them
him
to
and
sent
with
presented
the traitorous
schoolmaster
that
impressed
their
Faliscans
enemy's
action
The
with
so
were
their parents.
they immediately
surrendered.

211

Cicero and Onasander

Frontinus
2-5).

does, and gives several

Sulla

Praeneste

Corbulo

encouraged

the Armenian
he executed

of it

sight

However,

Tacitus

38),

illustrating

Surrendered
The sources
rather

than

the dangers

suggest
to

to encourage

to

uncertainties

resort

surrendered,
importance

of this

to surrender

requesting

before

to concentrate
in

subject

had to come from

too far.

the

the enemy to surrender

of military

include

on the former.

Despite

treatises,

the enemy,

none

(cf :

action

advice on encouraging
and field

his forces.

(eg:

ix

even more strongly

of both cities

might offer

engaging

to surrender

the

treatment

that a commander

suggestion

initiative

but tend

to

Thus the treatises

and the subsequent

II

)5

to wipe out the

intention

severity

that it was better

have

meeting and at

(Strat.

them to resist

of taking

in a more

noble and shot his head

surrendered
Scapula's

who had

and forces

cities

Veg. 1119 and above p. 209).

surrender

Ostorius

at

II ix 3), and

to surrender

Armenian

only encouraged

and captured

(Strat.

them to the defenders

immediately

that

reports

of the Silures

whole tribe
(XII

besieged

the

generals

It fell in the middle of a council

out of a ballista, into the town.

the

of the besieged

the resistance

a captured

II ix

(Strat.

effectiveness

city of Tigranocerta

but

in warfare

tactics

the heads of Praenestine

and displaying

fashion;

broken

on spears

in battle

dramatic

of their

examples

to have

is supposed

by fastening

been killed

the use of terror

do not advocate

of the

writers

forces

which

the obvious
make

the

a city or a field army the opportunity

The implication
usually

BG 11 13; VII

seems to be that the

in the form of ambassadors

11).

in battle
5Displaying
them into besieged
the heads of those killed
or firing
of psychological
warfare
also
towns
was an aspect
or artillery
with shngs
during
Christians
the
later
in
crusades:
and particularly
periods
employed
killed in battle into the town of Nicea to terrorize
hurled
the heads of Turks
Corbulo,
(Gesta Francorum
viii).
et aliorum Hierosalimitanorum
the garrison
f
by
have
to
actually
executing
a captive
step
urther
however,
gone one
seems
decapitating
corpses.
than
simply
rather

212

The historical
besieging

sources,

though

waste of time and supplies,

field forces.
besieging

Thus when Julian

thereby

surrender,
fortress

was destroyed

several

attempts

scale

massacre

eventually

to resort

have

taken

Similarly,

place

Severus

had breached

The
made

making

to take the strongest

to circumv&Uation

it is doubtful

as happened

offered

Titus

well.

to

1 8).

to surrender,

when he had failed

and was about

his troops

after

at Jerusalem

lives

defenders

the

were treated

Had the Jews surrendered,

would

stormed.

to surrender

effort

by storm

(BJ V 36ff).

defenders

large

time and losing

(Amn-danus xxiv

siege

the defenders

impassioned

of the city

blockade

the

to persuade

one particularly
parts

but

loss of life and

not the case with

he persuaded

a dangerous

avoiding

to prevent

to avoid spending

of Anatha,

to surrender,

were attacking

this is generaHy

wished

fortress

Persian

the

they

a long or hard siege,

or during

before

was by no means the case;

this

suggest

the cities

did request

generals

particularly

however,

when

the Hatrenes

and

that a large
the

city

was

the opportunity

the outer of Hatra's

two walls (AD

198).

Invitations

to surrender

failure
the
often
made
after
were

as in the case of Jerusalem

winter

camp (54 BC),

barbarian

besiegers

objectives

by storm.

It is possible

and Hatra

Vetera

above,

that by the 4th century

may have

become more formalized;

surrender

at the beginning
Ammianus

(AD 378),

in their

defenders

of a siege and sometimes

xx 6).

This

Singara,

between

Rome and Persia (AD 359-363) which involved

213

the

to surrender

were

usually

invited

given

several

days to do

is particularly

so (eg:

where

to take their

attempts

AD the matter of invitations

the

assault,

and in the cases of Q. Cicero's

(AD 69) and Adrianople

had also been frustrated

of the initial

evident
a number

to

in the wars
of sieges,

but

it was not just

Constantius

the case in external

and

Constantius.

Julian's

requests

to surrender

formality

as a realistic

expectation;

they

Whether

discussed

below,

hands of their

cities

captors

According

surrender,

and

which

to
these

However,

though

Sapor
of his

at the sight
the

at

least

very

surrendered

fared

usually

than those taken by storm.

for

matter

a few exceptions

with

any

will

which

much better

had

been

surrendered
for

mercy,

above,

taken
cities,
that

some cities

the capture

rather

to have

is likely

surrendered

When Caesar

at the very

realized

cities

was besieging

that the city

the siege the defenders

that he would be merciful

the Gallic tribe

to surrender.
though

of the Atuatuci
of surrender

enquired
provided

that they surrendered

of

might have
As seen
many more

as

like Numantia.

starvation

terms

than if

to be taken,

was certain

about

214

general

of a siege,

start

do
through
faced
to
so
or when

just

treatment

on the

a particular

encouraged

be

of the

The colony surrendered

convention

than any reputation

did so when the defenders

at Marseilles,

It is this

by storm".

city

at the

"was
horrible
fate
less
but
its
it
to
Romans
the
no
storm
as
were about
it

to

This seems to be some kind

when describing

by Livy

by Ammianus

to Ammianus,

important

of Pometia in 502 BC (1117 2).

rebel Latin colony

an opportunity

xix 13).

was an extremely

and is mentioned

of rule of warfare

did so.

rarely

whole,

of

the cities mentioned

although

to do so (Ammianus

On the

siege.

supporters

xxi 12).

at Amida would be so terrified

to surrender

or not

by

of a siege seem to have been as much a

immediately

would

when invited

surrender

under

they

held

defenders

the

war between

the civil

was

(Ammianus

the assault

that the defenders

that

army

Aquileia
gave

at the start

were asked to surrender

believed

361,

AD

supporters

beginning

before

surrender

in

Julian

during

warfare;

in 57 BC, during
-

Caesar

stated

before the battering

ram touched

1132

)6

their

(12riusquam

the wall of the oppidum

Josephus mentions the despair of the Jews when the Romans brought

(BJ V 277),

rams to bear on the walls at Jerusalem

had taken

skirmishes

before

place

moment when the siege proper

been

some kind

of formal

by Cicero's

confirmed

"even

surrendered
(quamvis

murum

been entitled

to treat

In practice,

to be merciful

and so encourage

civil

harsher

wars

This

surrendered
first

Appian;

massacred

instance

the Roman soldiers

the wishes

siege had been a hard

following

28, though

the capture

in the latter

an excuse

of Scipio,

of a city

case there

were other

did
'Interestingly,
Atuatuci
the
surrender,
when
(cf:
for
their
protection
own
oppidum overnight
215

to be

which

B. Jug. 91).
according

to

the surrender

slaughter

because the

to explain

B. Juq. 91; Avaricum,

reasons

and

of sieges

of a city

15; Capsa,

made elsewhere
(Capsa

than those

was likely

following
the
to
recall
obey
ref used

one,

all cities

In the catalogue

Punica

interest

had revolted

of the inhabitants

Appian

was against

far better

enemies

indiscriminate
began
the
an
and
scaled
walls

of Locha,

violence

this

or not it surren-

virtually

that

cities

(see below pp. 218 & 221).

(Locha,

walls"

may have

in the general's

fared

of defeated

are only two examples

at their

the general

whether

stage of a siege,

when the treatment

3), there
being

he wanted

is the case even with

and more violent

(Appendix

In the

at whatever

by assault.

begun,

places to surrender,

other

is

this

and

matter,

I 35).

because it was usually

though,

which surrendered,

during

however

the city

may have

is that there

ram has hammered

de Offic.

percusserit,

the

be shown to those who have

that mercy should

the battering

various

seems to represent

this

concerning

once the siege had formally

then,

dered.

this

point,

and although

The implication

convention

though

aries

this

started.

statement

Theoretically

taken

BG

murum aries attigisset,

excessive
BG VII

for the behaviour

of

Caesar shut them up in their

Cicero de Offic 82).

Caesar's

at the end of the revolt

Capsa also surrendered

.

of Tacfarinas)

was fired

anyway,

the men massacred

slavery.

Sallust

(B. Jug. 91) describes

(contra

ius beW).

Cicero's

that

statement,

dered

"even

though

mercy

the battering

by the 2nd to lst

those

of the rules

be shown

who have surren-

to those

ram has hammered

and a generally

those who surrendered

who insisted

on severe

further

Rome's

Verrine

oration

military

be done

"in

passions

of war-time,

conqueror

Cities

might
that,

suggests
lenient

these

days

when

military

even though

were taken

the

licence,

occasionaIly

this was confined

victorious
1the

following
soldiers

was to
would

Cicero's
that

outrages

however

fourth
would

not

much

the

the custom of war and the right

116).

The

of captured

cities

Verr.

the treatment

iv

by storm

primarily

in

(capta),

was taken

city

this

that

that lenience

noted

of committing

by the indiscriminate

in the confusion

is

(capta

by storm almost invariably

was usually

discriminati,

at least

or at least to condemn

He suggests

tendency

Verres

those taken

followed

However,

does,

walls"

BC there was an increasing

and due to the belief

them. " (in

provoke

than in the past,

which

of war

rule of war,

more leniently,

This

aims.
he accuses

where

at their

accepted

punishment.

Rome's long term interests

protect

sold into

BC.

century

to treat

but the town

this as a violation

Paul (1984 226-7) notes that from the 2nd century

tendency

of troops

and the rest of the population

should

seem to be realistic

therefore,

iv 25, for actions

Annals
220,
below
also
and
p.
see

troops,

slaughter

would

216

might
still

badly;

be more
suffer.

though

age (eg: Volandum)

of a city,

have been

also

the assault

of the population,

to men of military

the storming

statement

), would

fared

of the

it is debatable

Towns

would

how

also be

plundered

and occasionally

Jerusalem,

Maozamalcha

might be sold into slavery

groups
city

razed

)7

were released,

artisans

taken

by storm.

city

of a town

At Syracuse,

but ordered

Marcellus

Archimedes

seems to be the only reported

Westington

doubts

describes
points

the plunder
that

out

clemency.

general's

not

were

before

and their

even

though

be spared,

the a city

might

still

suffer

tion " of Roman warfare.

been carrying

overrun.

the majority

out an indiscriminate

25).

xxv

However,
and

obeyed

(1938 93ff).

general's

the

Healso

order

but this

about

might

be

of the loot by

suicide.

The case

of the inhabitants

might

badly.

surrendered
Until

strictly

subsequent

Here the Carthaginian

and only

(Livy

the destruction

evidence

provides

the

it was

to plunder

(Plut. Mar. 19).

(B. Jug. 76),

in describing

its capture

of New Carthage

from

at Thala

that

been completely

his soldiers

casualty

exempt

are reported

is more interested

the citadel

allowed

X 16).

(Polybius

even though

were spared

thorough

illustrates

defend

of the

of the city as particularly

of Syracuse

The capture

for the duration

was very

slaves

Roman deserters

of the

order

No casualties

because Sallust

the

citizens

any of the free inhabitants

them not to kill

that

to slavery

slaughter

of the different

The treatment

were sent to the fleet

and slaves

the defenders

the

by Scipio is interesting;

were reduced

war and male non-citizens

occasionally

dismissed.

or simply

Numantia,

to survive

who managed

at New Carthage

of prisoners

Very

Those

(eg:

to the ground

this final

for another
general

when he realized
surrender

possible

"conven-

Mago attempted

to

that the city

had

the Roman soldiers

had

massacre of the population

on the orders

7Razing a town seems to have been a very severe punishment,

and in the cases
Jerusalem,
the
Numantia
Carthage,
cities represented
particularly
and
of
destruction
to
their
total
Rome;
to
probably
was
set an
resistance
strong
example.
217

of Scipio,

according
the order

sounded

When the

citadel

town by storm

the indiscriminate

through

(X 15).

those in the citadel

contradict

Onasander's

advice

defenders

seemed likely

to hold out in the citadel

in Polybius

would stop and this

The mass graves

351-2).

of the skulls

"war

after

cemetery",

mutilation,

either

in particular,
evidence
doubt

with

of other

represent

blows

of a young

clear

surviving

itself,

as the use

as effective

(Wheeler

25 skulls
blows.

1943

"must have

some of which

the victim

of

was dead".

23 adult

are associated

with the

showing

evidence

of

Wheeler cites one example

man with at least nine sword cuts as well as

(1943 63).

the battle

the massacre

settlement

injuries,

that

from sword cuts or other

the skull

is a

example of the violence

of a fortified

show multiple

14 of the

to

if the

there

However,

surrendered,

old, and 11 female skeletons

20-35 years

male, mostly

(xIii).

to

would appear

mercy to the population

a vivid

provide

the assault

it was quite

and

of defenders.

at Maiden Castle

Several

This treatment

showing

the surrender

following

been inflicted

to surrender.

that once the citadel

such a massacre

of a

of both inhabitants

method may have been considered

of mercy in inducing

claims

it was also no doubt intended

encourage

clear implication

Polybius
on the taking

terror

slaughter

In the case of New Carthage

about

Scipio

surrendered,

to plunder.

and turn

to stop the slaughter

was the Roman custom and was to inspire

that this

animals

to Polybius

Whilst the blows on some of the skulls

this one, Wheeler claims,

no

is clear evidence

of the massacre.

la

Revenge
and
r-.
=belUorlS
.
The treatment
those

of those

conquered

of those
newly

who had rebelled

conquered

by the

enemy would not normally

against

Romans.

be treated

218

Rome tended
In the

too harshly,

to differ
latter

from

case the

but rebels

were

dealt

usually

the enemy
war,

was forced
into

was sold

Scipio's

triumph,

treatment

slavery

the town,

perhaps

out from the revolt

for

and defeated

who

embarrassing

the defenders

This

defeats

further

outbreaks

so he cut off the hands of all who had carried

Again,

and

particularly

Tacitus

because

severe

difficulties

they

makes an interesting
several

c. AD 47/48 fought

massacre

had revolted,

of

though

not expect
particularly

mercy.
bloody,

great

with

of their

during

the

of rebellion
weapons.

population

also because

was
of the

though

in the

Annals

as with Numantia

(Annals

Boudiccan

they

"had rebellion

this was partly

Roman soldiers
iv 25).
revolt

219

as

on their

xii 31), and so knew they could

in the defeat of Tacfarinas'

resulting

one and the

to the historian

because

rebels could expect

he claims that the Iceni in

treatment;

bravery

rebellionis,

The battle

had been a difficult

Britons

comment on the treatment

examples

(conscientia

consciences"

according

the

ten

of the sieges.

well as giving

of the

Jerusalem,

harsh

Caesar wanted

in Gaul (BG viii 44),

Jotapata

at

were the last to hold

At Uxellodunum,

to prevent

to appear

the Romans had taken

of reasons;

in 153 BC.

were

the entire

to the ground.

was razed

most significantly,

of Viriathus

to surrender

few

the

had suffered

they

to make an example of the defenders

at

of a

or not -

were rebels

surrendered

starvation

except

for a number

was probably

that time and,

through

and the town itself

to capture

between

the course

was not so great.

Thus when Numantia

population

they

whether

the distinction

these circumstances

towns and forces

years

more harshly

if

In addition,

Romans during

towards

atrocities

be treated

might

pour

severely

very

had committed

they

Under

with

les autres.

encouraqer

was exacerbated

was

because the war

had suffered

The slaughter

rebels

following

hardships,
the defeat

by the atrocities

on the inhabitants

by the Britons

committed
Verulamium

(Annals

whole tribe

of the Ordovices

(Aqric.

The

following

sources

clearly

even though

The

following

The Veneti,
though

detention

they

his arrival

conquered

envoys

leaders

at

(BG vii

3)

(BG vii 17 & 28),

and the massacre

Caesar was 'forced'

to harsh

by his

punishments.

by Caesar in 56 BC, were harshly

16),

(BG iii 8).

them so the Gauls would respect

be exacted

and not the Bituriges.

the Gallic revolt

he was opposed

(BG iii

harsh

and

at Cenabum

of Avaricum

(BG viii 38),

captured

surrendered

of Caesar's

could

out by the Carnutes

him even though

however,

for atrocities

the storming

for inciting

responsible

to execute

rebellion

of Roman merchants

murder

at Cenabum was eventually

but

this

was because

treated
of their

Caesar wished to make an example of

the rights

of envoys,

and executed

the tribal

and sold the rest into slavery.

One occasion

where this

the treatment
executed

(Punica

there

Hasdrubal

for revenge

seems to have had little

was at Carthage

in full

Even though

f ul-I scale massacre

atrocities

desire

of the defeated

Roman soldiers

of surrender.

pardon

before

rebellion

and

almost the

exterminated

between

connection

that had been carried

When the individual

soldiers

the

make

the bloodshed

encouraged

these

brief

their

but it is also clear that revenge

same time.

even

supposedly

London

18)'.

treatment,
the

35),
and Agricola
xiv

of Camulodunum,

view of their

the city

might

colleagues

was taken

have been.

118), and the implication

is clear;

unit

220

by assault

Appian

there

states that

atrocities

stationed

tortured

to destroy

the Carthaginians

was depriving

"Since they had attacked

a Roman
Ordovices
can be classed as rebels.

where Hasdrubal

affect

on
and

any hopes
was not the

by committing
of all hope of a

on Roman soldiers

in their

territory

the

treatment
to
lead
savage
would

and civilians

the enemy surrendered

whether

or not.

Civil War
Towns and field
Tacitus

rebelled.
civil

forces

during

times

(Hist.

as badly

wars could suffer

that troops

states

war as at other

civil

could not be controlled

11 29; 111 7),

of a town

attacks

could

of fellow

be particularly

7),

bloody9.

by Otho's troops

on civilians

13; Agric.

Romans following

and by those

a civil

battle

to control

or the capture
led to the

troops

on the coast of Gaul and N. Italy

of Vitellius

after

war

(Hist. 1144; Plut. Otho

a pitched

Failure

during

as tightly

and since during

money could not be made from the ransom of prisoners

14), the slaughter

as those which

their

successes

(Hist. II

at Cremona

(Hist. 11 56).

Despite
troops

the suggestions
strictly

(Cicero

in the treatises

Pro Leg. Man. 13),

Syracuse

(see above p. 217).

Thapsus,

his soldiers

After

the case,

as at

forces

defeat of the Scipionic

at

opponents

to his men to spare them (B. Afr. 85).

However,

does not seem to have punished

that he was not particularly

his

control

all their

Caesar

entreaties

should

was not always

went on the rampage and massacred

Caesar's

angry

his soldiers

at their

failure

to control

9Plutarch
(Otho 14) mentions
battle of Bedriacum.

the huge

of complete

this

Caesar's

despite

examples

that the commander

in any way,

One of the most famous

actions".

troops

occurred

pile of dead

suggesting

following

by a temple

the Flavian

after

the first

following
disobedience
10Examples of strict
troops
of orders
of
punishment
Scipio
defeated
three
the
treatment
the
are
executed
rare;
of
concerning
215);
(see
Locha
their
troops
failed
to
above
at
p.
control
who
officers
following
ill
the
treatment
entire
cohort
Sertorius
an
of
executed
supposedly
(Appian
109),
Roman
BC
town
Lauro
the
1
the
during
of
of
capture
a woman
following
death
the
threatened
Cassius
any
soldier
plundered
who
with
and
73).
(BC
IV
Rhodes
of
surrender
221

at Cremona in AD 69.

victory
had

Vitellius

supported

little

of Tacitus'

The treatment

difficulty

civil

ndght have suffered

and its inhabitants

because

was an important

Marseilles
Caesar's

interests

badly

However,

and

of Perugia

Gomphi in Thessaly

interests

and well-supplied

over

and would

captives
81).

Caesar intended

the other

"Since
prisoners,

towns

the

his treatment

in Thessaly,

troops
plunder

both

not have been in

its citizens,

he did

though

also influenced

interests

Octavian's

Lucius

Antonius,

and so the blame for the city's

opposition

in the ill-treatment

possibly

be a useful

under

supply

of towns;
his setback

The town

coercion.

base for either

Caesar took the town by storm and allowed his men to plunder
the walls of another

and

However,

and reputation.

sided with Caesar but following

to Pompey,

also be

but could

because of the length

and it would

could also result

had originally

went

before

he would

war perhaps

in 41 BC; he released

whom he executed

officials

a general's

at DyrAchium
A

town

n-dlitary

of his ally Mark Antony,

fell on the city

in the light

Caesar claims he spared

of its antiquity

strategic

Political

of the defenders

the brother

though

war varied

to sack the place or ill-treat

a garrison.

treatment

rich

during

towns

of captured

of the siege but when it surrendered

the city

civil

had

it

although

seems to have made

the town,

during

which

to do so anyway".

Marseilles

severe.

leave

of troops

days,

commander

from sacking

comment on the control

have been unable

very

The Flavian

his troops

to prevent

effort

and

the city

stormed

four

for

it

sacked

111 33-34).

(Hist.

surrendered

troops

The victorious

was

side.

it, then paraded

town that had acted similarly

(BC 11180-

of Gomphi to act as an example and terrify

have
to
it
worked
seems
and

because

they

from
taking
to
the
been
have
profit
unable
would
from
the
the
money
campaign.
of
source
only
was

222

all

of

These towns seem to have been in a no-win

surrendered.

the different

support

the inhabitants
interests,

therefore,

could

civil

during

have a significant

civil wars,

Political

influence

and military

on the treatment

of

in the case of open engagements,

though

made the outcome as bloody

war often

to

Caesar could perceive

them accordingly.

and treat

as rebels

towns in particular

In the case of Gomphi,

factions.

forced

situation,

as in rebellions.

Conclusions
The advice contained
in warfare
the

in the treatises

is for the most part

few exceptions

usually

and Cicero about behaviour

reflected

"accepted"

in

in the other

behaviour

shown to those who surrendered,

or severe
control.

and,

again

with

and the conduct

there

of war,

generals

Thus if a town surrendered,

at whatever

ram had touched

If,

mercifully.
destruction,

on the other

the walls,
hand,

and the survivors

most evidence
contrast

in the

suggests

that there

of towns,

though

resistance

continued

treatment

of field

may only

in the citadel

accepted

under
warfare

conventions

sources.

towns,

might

there

forces.

the

be treated

would usually

a town was stormed,

it faced plunder

face slavery.

and

Although

seems to have been a similar

The example
convention

have

been

after

the capture

223

were kept
concerning

was
cruel

stage of the siege and even after

the defenders

was a more formalized

this

troops

of literary

of a massacre

to besieged

relates

mercy

were not excessively

was a series of generally

from the range

With

sources.

above,

the legal formalities

which can be reconstructed

battering

discussed

a few more exceptions,

It is also clear that whatever

literary

and morality

of New Carthage

concerning

applicable

the sacking

to towns

of the town.

in

which

The

exceptions

periods

of civil

In civil

rebellion

war,

and prisoners
under

to be treated

expect

committed

Tacitus

circumstances.
(Annals

mercifully

atrocities

borne out by the evidence

certainly

(Punica.

not either

could

states

conditions

that

would not

which

not

could

rebels

those who

that

These

are

statements

and so can be considered

times

as at other

and Appian

118).

during

part

abnormal

controlled

31),

XII

most

be committed

might

atrocities

the

so under

could not be as tightly

were worthless,
other

for

occurred

and for revenge,

because troops

war,

happen

'conventions'

to these

'conventions'

in

themselves.

The

'conventions'

various

influence

on the commander's

but the interests

As Paul points

lenient

to newly

might

or forces

be severely

and this is particularly

By advocating

the widespread
being

appear

conquest.
an example

to all who contemplated

210).
p.
above

hand,

On the other
as an example

(eg:

revolt

that

and leniency

(BG VIII

likewise

224

applied

and

as a tool of
to serve

as

44), and his treatment

of

of Uxellodunum

p. 222) was also to serve

and Agricola

brutality

is far more pragmatic,

interest

the defenders

Cicero

grounds,

his interests.

his
known
he
to
this
advantage
and
used
was well

Corbulo

to be

circumstances

in Onasander

to have used brutality

Caesar punished

however,

these

with to serve

The suggestion

(see above

had more

probably

use of mercy on humanitarian

Thus

the town of Gomphi

under

to surrender.

dealt

could be used when it was in the general's

clementia,

himself,

enemy,

so with revolts.

unrealistic.

Roman commanders

or defeated

some

it was in Rome's interests

Leniency

peoples.

towns

other

those who resisted

is probably

out (see above p. 216),

had

have

might

of his surrendered

treatment

conquered

encourage

BG 111 16),

above

of Rome and, or, the commander

affect.

might

listed

on conduct

a mixture

His
too (see

of ruthlessness

and mercy
examples

to encourage
of how both

used to bring
morality

surrender

terror

about surrender,

in Roman warfare

and serve

(Strat

II ix)

Frontinus

225

as examples -

and mercy
perhaps

(Strat.

By providing
II xi)

best illustrates

could

be

the role of

Conclusions

With most of the topics

correlation

between

practices.

This

discussed

the

of the

advice

is especially

evident

advice has been shown to be realistic

been possible

the claim of most of the treatises

literary

topos as Campbell
'Greek

the

justified;

do give realistic

they

A concluding
above,

section

I do not intend

and

the strong

particular

are clear:

presented

in the treatises

nature

and organization
limited

organization
contemporary

Thus

is not just

advice

does seem to be

this

claim

was

advice.

between

topics considered
Two factors

here.

the analyses

Roman military

in

theory

as

and the very

conservative

do raise problems;

the strength

practices,

above however,

discussed

and siege warfare.

of units,

in

information

units,

evidence

which

depending
sizes
unit
in peacetime

the

treatises

In the first
implies

of the Roman army that is not corroborated

on the

distinction
be
to
the
would seem
various

it would have

of Roman warfare.

Two of the subjects

fairly

and field

of

Much of the

from the treatises.

of the individual

correlation

field

on the siting

in many cases the

and practical

clear

actual

column.

practical

treatises;

to repeat

and

given

(1987 19), though

the discussion

and very

practicable;

knowledge

to be giving

phalanx'

follows

treatises

and therefore

suggested

the case with

military

in the advice

a basic military

to acquire

is a definite

of the marching

camps and the arrangement

marching

there

above

subject

between the theoretical

the textbooks
on circumstances

and increased

-A

reasonable

report,

case, the admittedly

in

a regularity

the

by any of the other

explanation

for

paper strengths

and the fluctuations

this
of the

to the actual

since they might be left understrength

to or above theoretical

226

strength

in reaction

to an

for

or in preparation

emergency
indicates

that

that

suggests

this

why this should

during

the Empire.

guidance

fact

and the

shown to be right

of siege warfare
that

and the power

seems no

and auxiliary

units

as opposed to descriptions

and it has been proposed

changed

very

when he states that the general

little.

of

that this

is

pieces

upon the luck

of the military

and the skill

and

Onasander

"will use the various

this depends

arises and ...

of the combatants,

There

which was more a case of action

techniques

as the opportunity

(II

and Vegetius

too.

both legions

on siege warfare,
above,

and Livy

of Polybius

in this way,

the Empire

not be the case for

has to do with the nature

of equipment

during

has been discussed

siege equipment,

reaction,

were flexible

was possible

reason

The lack of practical

war.

legions

Republican

The evidence

engineers"

(xliii).

for the actual

Evidence

is a problematic

use of treatises

'chicken

and egg' question;

strongly

because they are simply describing

or did

follow

commanders

should,

and so the field

Certainly

there

used under

their

fortunately

(BG 1122; VI 34) states

institutions

of military
criticism

22
for
their
Il
in
BG
these
of

deployments

"dictated
were

that

practices,

and standard

rigidity

so

or past procedures,
seem to imply

they

of the treatises?

did not use;

one could follow

would

be

de Arch.

the textbooks
hints

at a little

when he says that

his troop

and perhaps

more by the topography

227

practices

states that there were textbooks

Rome's enemies

xvi 2)).

field

could and indeed

treatises

Vitruvius

on siege warfare
Caesar

the advice

that implies

(which

actual

contemporary

reflect

circumstances;

reflect

as the writers

advice,

practices

is evidence

certain

do the treatises

the

area and raises

of the site,

the slope of

the hill and the demands of the immediate

than by the theories

situation

of any

textbook"'.

military

dangers
the
be
to
of
aware
seems

Onasander
Vegetius

provides

He is prepared

fairly

inflexible

number

depending

in play.

of variables

immediate

more influence

on dispositions

and the general

"things...

must resolve

because of the

situation,

and the nature

the situation

is not.

writer

but leaves it to the general

Onasander

himself

have

of the enemy would

(xxxii).

the

that

was aware

(xv),

he might say in his treatise

than anything

He does admit that

to rules or planned

beforehand"

alone is not sufficient;

experience

cannot be reduced

is aware that his textbook

Caesar,

Whereas

a textbook.

of the earlier

on the individual

Like

the topography

situation,

that

advice,

the basic instructions

to provide

to add the details

himself

of too rigid

(xxxii),

and so

and insight

are

also necessary.

generalship;
there
officers

8) claimed

(XI

Polybius

might

through

that

exempla,

be a place

for

there

were

treatises

this is why Onasander

takes his reader

to learn

the

art

in the education

of potential

imply,

and one

these alone were not enough,

to a certain

of

Whilst

experience.

and Onasander

Caesar

from
basics
the treatises,
the
could pick up

ways

and practical

treatises

military

as Polybius,

and generals,

three

and

point and then leaves it up

to the individual.

A lot of the advice

a large

part

given

of ancient

in the treatises
warfare

is fairly

was a matter

obvious

common sense,

of common sense.

but

Since the

Royal Navy were similar.

'The "Fighting
Instructions"
of the 18th century
Britannica,
they
Enclyclopaedia
to the
provided
valuable
According
but limited the opportunities
for
based on sound principles,
instructions
272).
16
1962,
Britannica
(Enclyclopaedia
vol.
tactical skill

228

treatise

writers

the obvious,

hinder

but potentially

very

important,

so they

line on a natural

These are fairly

manoeuvres.

outflanking

they did point out

near water and not overlooked

a wing of a battle

or anchoring

or prevent

ground

on raised

such as camping

or near gullies,

to be comprehensive,

treatises

wished their

obvious

had to be included

to

obstacle

schemes

in a textbook

on

warfare.

The textbook

general
briefly

Let us consider

an ideal commander

Empire,
diScussed

Having
At night

the actions

intelligence,

the general

he will persona. Uy decide where to pitch camp, on rising

and forests,

and not overlooked

face in the direction

strength

of the camp defences

the area is secure

he will order

of tomorrow's

manuals

and a ditch

three

him that it is better

feet

day the general

to reconnoitre,
of his campaign,
fairly
is
column

long,

though

It will

the enemy.

The

of the enemy.

Since

he prefers

If

or a ditch.

feet wide,

wide.

away

topped

If
by a

his textbook

the latter.

The

to the size of his army.

sets off after

and these are followed

inteUigence

and eight

to be safe than sorry,

size of the camp is proportionate

The following

towards

march,

deep and five

ground

easy reach of a river.

may decide on a simple palisade

six feet high

will set out.

The camp will

ground.

will depend on the proximity

the general
a rampart

by higher

but will be within

ground

probably

advises

from the pages of the various

created

his army and received

gathered

not enclose any marshy

palisade,

of the early

general'

above.

from gullies

not,

'textbook

of the

reports

his enemy.

He sends scouts ahead

by the mass of his army.

no sign

he does ensure

229

At the start

of the enemy so his marching

there are cavalry

at both van and

rear,

occasionally
in order,

the
down
marching
and
up

rides

those who fall out without

When his scouts

the

quadratum,
baggage
of battle,
these

his army

a more compact

formation

the general

two formations

delay.

his equites

has ensured

himself

singulares,

Once the

enemy

first

he orders

and the topography

he will

engage,

exempla,

deploys

those of the enemy,

wings.

flanking

the

legions,

his potential

one to the other

of the column,

with

line

between
minimal

by

surrounded

on the flanks.

the

general

and studies

make various

will

of a marching
carefully

If the latter

of the battlefield.

derived

a stratagem

employ

acies,

anchoring

to his strengths

camp ,

the enemy's
is unsuitable,

from

his

book

are situated
flanked

to prevent
in the centre

by the auxiliary

Since one wing is anchored

and weaknesses

one wing of his battle

that his line is deep enough

and long enough

The legions

or triplex

in an aqmen

march

the construction

his army according

possibly

He ensures

by the enemy,
wing.

or will

from

of an

of

or made up himself.

The general

a river.

and punishing

is danger

considered

cavalry

battle

a pitched

dispositions
not

auxiliary

the site for it himself,

chosen

is

everything

is a close correlation

there

in the centre

rides

before engaging:

preparations

already

that

the

cavalry

with

can deploy

and with

accepts

to continue

Having

so the army

The general

having

infantry.

and auxiliary

ensuring

or there

are nearby,

enemy

orders

general

column

The general

permission.

the

report

with himself.

his men when necessary

and admonishing

encouraging

ambush,

are in the centre

and baggage

and the legions

a flank

attack

of the line,
infantry,

by a natural

230

to prevent

and

line on a hill or
it being

pierced

on his unsecured

formed up in a duplex

and the cavalry

obstacle,

on the

he may strengthen

the other

After

wing
forces

reserve

the enemy.

in the hope of outflanking

He will

in the rear
-

he will tell them to get on with it.

his troops

addressing

further
him
no
give
will

guidance

on fighting

His textbooks

battles.

pitched

The general

himself will command his army from the rear to avoid being killed
but will ride around
if necessary.

fleeing

When the enemy is defeated

Empire

what devices

find

himself

(for a textbook

general

result),

the cavalry

still in battle

in a fashion

formation,

the

in case

general

the

to teach them,

advice

campaign,
that

of his

provided,

the military

himself.

If the enemy had rebelled,

enemy,

he may

a lesson -

and others,

textbooks,

the

among other

things,

expected.

231

to learn

to do so, and the enemy has not

interests

theorists

of the

might counter

will show mercy to his defeated

Romans.

against

generals

and how the besieged

may be used,

and machines

them harshly

successful

of the early

he can use his manuals

besieged),

are not themselves

any atrocities

following

when and

will pursue

his enemy (textbook

besieging

as long as it is in Rome's (or his)

By

in reserves

may advance,

For the most part the textbook

treat

and sending

but he will have to decide how to use these machines

committed

or wounded,

and renew the fight.

Should the general

them,

the only possible

enemy while the infantry

the enemy turn

early

his troops

encouraging

this is virtually

Empire,

some

retain

general

ntight

conduct

that his enemy behaved

Use of treatLses
Campbell

(1987 24) was concerned

of treatises;
using

military

theory

even if true

tactic

a particular
or previous

or stratagem

that it is impossible

Unless

Onasander,

Frontinus

are simply

and Arrian

(and past practices

practices

Roman warfare

therefore

was a very

in field

notable

changes

striking

force in pitched

style

phalanx,

battles

are precisely

the variables

Despite
they

the limitations

provide

practices.
the

advice

Onasander
textbooks

A mediocre
his

implies,
and trust

to be strategies

Onasander

deal

general

officers;

field

practices

very little.

The most

as the

information

and these

cannot

concerning

as Caesar

would know when to move beyond

to his own experience

232

principal

of the Greek

of the enemy,

treatises

admits

general,

and

used because of particular

might get by with this essential

a great

Since

and Arrian).

cover.

in only going so far with their

of valuable

field

current

reintroduction

or because of the nature

that

new techniques;

the use of auxiliaries

of the treatises

a great

of

would have changed

de

the

practices

current

anyway,

we

point.

like

theory,

and explaining

and the supposed

have been shown

circumstances

or

to introduce

enterprise

practices,

topographical

use of treatises;

in the cases of Frontinus

the advice in the treatises

by

it does not matter

going to reflect

describing

conservative

whether

be used to a certain

could

are not trying

textbooks

writing

I believe

technique

a new

it is undoubtedly

castrorum,

munitionibus

they

is advocating

a manual

they

that

use

had read or was influenced

for the actual

to argue

know from Caesar and Vitruvius

to say for certain

However,

exempla.

to the practical

relating

be impossible

it would

he argued

general

about evidence

advice,

basic

knowledge

and

was aware

and

the recommendations

and inspiration.

field

of

Avvendix

1: Translation

1. We will

now explain

their
for

and it

pitching,

soldiers,

so there

Because

the width

twice this is 48 feet.

feet;

(striga)

provide

sufficient
duty

guard

at any one time,

do not

they

area as those tents would have been.

to allocate

they

are the most trustworthy

to the vallum,

camp next

a human

wall the

army

the allocation

as is also shown
feet.

Now,

on the diagram.

to camp

alter

the

end,

and we will

site thus:

have attached

cohorts

which

should

be avoided,
one

more

is assigned

the method

the centuries

corner

the

as indicated

'This
is based
translation
BudO, text of Lenoir.

below

area
on the

on the

of

round

the

ramparts,
will

Sometimes
although

cannot

pitch

cohort's

as it will
we will

be at the far

in hemistrigae.

tents

but

the

by the same

reinforcements,

to the standards

to a cohort,

was 120 x

of 30 x 720

a space

is lessened

and fewer
tightly

the area

or 60 x 360 feet,

below,

the length

below.

because

is retained,

occupies

of pitching

of the arrangement

150 x 150 feet

an area

and

that

a plan

in

the

not change

assign

uncovered,

more legions

But if we receive

be necessary

For one cohort

are

to increase

the area which

to the diagram

is doubled,

the width

there

when

when it is necessary

the following:

according

to hold inside

number

of the hemistriga

alter

the legions

units,

However

tribes.

troops),

and we will

whenever

proportion.

order

it would have been necessary

it and by their

foreign

the width

be 90 x 240 feet

will

from

raised

to the cohort,

unchanged,

180 feet

per

his tent on the same

of the provincial

to guard

(non-legionary

more reinforcements

remains

tents

eight

more space.

2. Because
should

Otherwise

are on

each century

has a place to pitch

centurion

will

which

This space is calculated

more then

pitch

each other,

12 feet

remains

16 men from

Since

century.

In this way their

century.

there

to the

This makes 24

camp opposite

space for those coming and going.

legionary

a complete

be made;

long.

10 feet are assigned

So when two centuries

will

has 80

120 feet

in a line

run

is 30 feet,

by two feet

century

and 9 feet to the pack animals.

60
feet
of

a strip

will

pitch

above

is increased

A complete

men.

which

of the hemistriqa

described

this length

eight

be ten tents

will

Castrorum'

the cohorts

ten feet;

shelters

5 feet to the weapons

tents,

for

the way in which

One tent occupies

tents.
the

De
Munitionibus
the
of

it is customary

to

can be done,

this
their

We

tents

allocation

it

in the usual
will

be

left

diagram.

1977 Teuber

233

text

of Grillone

and

the

1979

3. The first

the via sagularis,

inside
camps

cohort

because

of the standards

double
it
it
is
strength,
will have a double assignment
of
and eagles and, as
feet
for
360
lines,
feet
120
the
for the camping space,
for
of space;
example,
240
feet
for
180
feet
lines
for
the
and
camping;
or
will

same for

be the

sagularis,

and the

sagularis,

on the

left

hand

if there

of the

in a line

praetorium

also on the

praetentura,

as one is entering

side

opposite

of the plan
is an uneven

two of the first

case three,

camps on the right,

one cohort

praetoria;

in this

in the

third

Therefore

cohorts.

camp on the sides

pitch

should

other

to be camped,

of legions

number

the

the arrangement

cohorts

to the via

next

of the

sides

the

through

via

porta

it so that the army can be

led out in its usual order.

4. However,

or six legions,

then

(or a second

vexillations
infantry

quingenary

the space is even more restricted,

but

this

be calculated

should

hospital

the veterinary

hospital

a distance

the hospital

in the

from

hospital.

5. Legionary
cohort,

so that

area

should

above,

first
the
above

allege that

should

be assigned

primipilares

namely

be placed

at

convalescing
is usually

departments

cohorts

there

should

a double

and re-enlisted

they

would

ought

baggage.

the legion

They
as stated

not to camp near to

be of equal

not

by the enemy,

to be overrun

of their

or on the sides of the praetor-ium

legate

their

the vexillations

6. The Praetorian

to the

the same space as a legionary

because

If possible,

cohorts.

because

happened

of these

cohort,

cohort),

should

and if

assigned

may be peace for those

be assigned

at 600 men,

is calculated

camp above the praetentura

rampart

first

ideally

which

to each

assigned

should

the rampart,

there

(the

are

it,

200 men.

for

vexillations

which

camp above

and the workshops,

The

as that

calculated

which

for

calls

to a legionary

120 feet

camp

the hospital

above

of the vexillations,

be assigned

so that

exactly,

departments

and other

instead

it should

should

cohorts

If the situation

cohort).

may be placed

cohort

two first

and two in the praetentura

side of the praetorium

on either
tents,

are five

there

when

rank

and if the

and its legate

will

are responsible.
camp on the sides

space
veterans

because
should

same area.

234

they

of the praetorium
use larger

also be assigned

tents.

and
The

a place in the

7. The Praetorian
emperor's

equites

cavalry

left.
the
on

600 equites

example
that

decurions

is an equal

there

and other

100 cavalry

there

is less and there

headquarters

staff

8. If there
cavalry

be an uneven

are camped

in place

of the cohorts

arrangement
be the same.

number

of the praetorium.

total

width

way.

above.

guard

post but if necessary

10. In

the

companions
Praetorian
road
should

be

assigned

side of the praetorium;

for them.

cohorts

and the other

of the praetorium

unit

lines in a

complete

140 to 220 feet may be assigned

must be assigned

to

to the

to the length,

should

be given

as

to the

ten feet is enough.

from

50 to 70 feet

can be assigned

and in this area a space should

of our emperor,

immediately

has been inserted,

should

800 or 900 they should

will be assigned

720 feet

same way an area

Prefect

and

not more than 720 feet is assigned

that

20 feet of the length

stated

the number

since

lines on either

For although

the

to

Praetorian

cohorts,

number

Thus the Praetorian

of the praetorium,

area

side.

of Praetorian

should

which camps on the side of the praetorium

satisfactory

on the left

500 one line will be sufficient

careful

the

assigning

and left sides of the praetorium

and in complete

about

very

in

for

room in the hemistriclae

of one of the cohorts,

singulares

9. We must be particularly
the length

number

on the right

If the equites

camp in equal numbers

is enough

there

who are nearest

should

be

It should

on each side and the

stationed

be no hesitation

should

150 of the

of the Praetorians.

number

of the

number

who have two horses each, will have more room

principales

If the number

to camp.

is a greater

and 300 Praetorians,

singulares

the

side of the praetorium,

If there

camp in the lines

should

singulares

so arranged

if they

should

equites, singulares

for

latter,

camp on the right

adjacent

the

space

be assigned

to the via Principalis.

Praetorian
proportionately

cohorts

and the

as we have

rest

to the
to the

Then when a
of the

indicated

units
in

our

assign

the

pamphlet.
11. The altars
auguratorium

are set up at the end of the praetorium;

to the right

so that the general

side of the praetorium

can observe

having
left
that
the
side,
so
up on
the tribunal

and address

next

to the via Principalis,

the omens there correctly;

observed

the tribunal

the omens, the general

the army on the favourable

235

we will

auspices.

is set

can ascend

12. At

the

to the

entrance

Principalis

and in the

praetorium

is the spot named groma,

so that by sighting

is put over the same place,

For the reason

a star.
are known

technique

quickly

for

describe

the

can advance

14.1

will

now

should

stated

above,

Likewise

this

so that the

of the

and left gates,

the right

be 60 feet wide,

The

praetentura.
and which

the same width

and because of the orientation

should

gets its

and for this reason it is known

the praetorium)

named after

via

as the work
as

(the via

the road which leads to the porta praetoria

above this in the praetentura

be 60 feet wide,

should

as

the lines situated

of the tents,

to it, since the standards

not run parallel

look down the via praetoria.

should

15. And so below the via Principalis

is termed

which

common lines

because the number

In the

always

The tribunes

present.

same way

tribunes,

an area

below

should

16. As I have come to a suitable

of

sesquiplicarii,
the duplicarii

additional

in

and sesquiplicarii
calculated

ala. has 16 turmae,

horses

of the

to the number

camp in this area.

usually

Separated

of legions

to the legionary

from these by a road

we have shown below

the other;

camp.
I will now describe

point,

there

which

one of each in every

is the number

quingenary

alae one after

space,

but a space of 50 to

be assigned

should

termed scamnum.

or quingenary

24 turmae,

this

cohorts

their

measurements

is variable;

according

of the Praetorian

on the plan how each unit

consists

of legions

be kept for it,

which is similarly

are the milliary

the legates

we will assign

scamnum and does not have the fixed

80 feet wide should

which

groma

who practise

to the via Sagularis

parallel

the vallum from the legions

is no doubt

praetoria

those

above,

arrangement

name from the principia,

the intervallum.

the iron-footed

a sortie.

between

which separates

assembles

from this point the gates of the

written

running

which runs

Principalis,

via

as gromatici.

13. Access roads are provided

army

to the

next

because the troop

are being fixed

here or because when the measurements

camp form

this

called

middle

2.

turma.
Thus

when

are

the extra

decurions

decurions,

The decurions
there

horses

and other

It

ala.

duplicarii

and

each have 3 horses,

are 96 horses

over the 1000,

are discounted.

NCOs and so there

For this reason 3 feet are calculated

-

236

the milliary

for each trooper;

A
are 64
their

at 1000 so that the prefect

is established

number

area in the space and their

the rest,

each trooper

17. This,

however,

through
legions,

the portae

the retentura:

of which,

quintanae

because of the forces.

18.

quaestorium

The

their

assigned

is so called

places there;
than

immediately

the

behind

and hostages

because

the

the

camp there,

and if any booty

as the

sometimes

in a line with the gate

lines

In particular,

were

The quaestorium

camp there.

so that

5 or more

and it is known

this is above the praetorium

praetorium

ie:

quaestors

the praetorium.

should

way;

should be made 40 feet wide;

placed,

called decumana because the 10th cohorts

be narrower

is larger,

be 50 feet wide,

it should

quintana

for

the road above the praetorium,

the army

when

are usually

if the gates are placed there

an

2h feet.

is assigned

the extension

can camp in a more spacious

principales

concerns

of the ala can be assigned

of the

guard

the enemy's

should
be

will

ambassadors
it is

has been captured,

placed in the quaestorium.

19. The centurions

of the guard

close to the via quintana

they are right
they

infantry

or part-mounted

use the same tents

size of the line.

looking

cohort

Infantry
towards

20.30

feet will be wide enough

it ought

the orders
legates

are given

opposite

21. As far
blowing
2400 feet

to the legion,

camp in the other

allied

and other

tribes

above.

The offices
should

if there are five legions,

of the first

be placed

cohort,

where

in the scamnum of the

the eagle.

as possible,

breeze can refresh

long

because of the

in such a way that the allied

for the via sagularis;

to be 40 feet wide.

should

the allies

be arranged

as stated

A quingenary

cohorts.

cohorts

and

space to them

be placed above these,

should

it should

are held in all sides,

however,

as the Praetorian

the via quintana;

tribes

a double

we will assign

or part-mounted

camp above these;

should

is protected

the rear of the praetorium

to the praetorium;

next

because

lines,

so that

camp on the sides of the quaestorium

should

by

the camp should

the army.

1600 feet

wide.

be 3x2

in proportion

I said above a3x2

If it is longer

237

ration,

the trumpet

so that

for example,
call

can be

the horn

but in a disturbance

sounded,

if it is wider,

22.1 think

we have dealt carefully

and if explanations
their

23. Meanwhile,

to be placed in the plan.

the units

The Praetorian

camp.

and the milliary

if the space
infantry

cohorts
then

or quingenary

camp in the praetentura.

the first

horsemen;

have explained

camp next to the cohorts.

or quingenary

part-mounted

is assigned

one foot

plus a fifth

of the total

cavalryman

however

2, feet

in

to calculate

order

transform,

as it were,

can assign

the space to the cavalry

26. So a milliary
into infantry,

be multiplied

way;

this

cavalry,

fifth.

the

area

makes

by five.
120,

to the horse.

by 5,

units

Then,

this

infantry

we

which I shall transform

gets and

half the number,

taking

is 600.

we

so that

the 1 foot the infantryman

to the remaining

238

retentura,

more easily.

We will deal with the number

multiplied

760 feet is assigned

cohorts

each

we have

Now when
of the

) soldier

(auxiliary?

into infantry

has 240 cavalry

and to which I shall assign

the 23feet which is assigned

should

cohort

vexillations.

of the hernistriga;

length

with their

light

camp in the retentura;

units

units

are safer

In the same way the scouts

and the

the part-mounted

part-mounted

they

and Pannonian

Each provincial

receives

horsemen

as well because they are

just like the legionary

cohort

organization

units,

light

and so that

roads,

below.

the

singulares

or quingenary

and Pannonian

camp there

their

received

cohorts

by the Moorish cavalry

they are protected

25. The milliary

equites

should

camp on the sides of the praetorium

to construct

camp in the line of the first

should

on where they

cohorts.

All the marines

they should

and we shall review

the emperor's

alae, Moorish cavalry

to go out in order

working,

at the end.

and second

vexillations

of

and the art of avoiding

We will also advise

alae should

above the first

over the fortifications

of measuring

and cavalry,

or quingenary

permits;

units

24. Milliary

whilst

the beginning

I will explain

that is necessary,

I will deal with them in

of measurements

I will deal with them briefly

sites,

unfavourable

at the porta

a square.

become necessary,

the fixing

heard

with everything

lest I seem to be passing

the choice of site,

camps,

enough

on some matters

In addition,

place.

is too near being

the outline

decumana;

be easily

cannot

of cavalry

Therefore

in this

minus

of the milliary

it

the

part-

mounted

added

cohort;

space for a milliary

27. A quingenary
the numbers

of a milliary

cohort

camp in 136 tents

they

the rest of a milliary

28. A milliary

We will

Britons,
the

drivers.
praetentura

next

30. And

and camps in 100 tents,

In the same way a quingenary

Cantabrians,

tribes,
of guards
assign

feet

five

to the marines,

Getuh,

cohort

Dacians,

Palmyrenes,

forces,

among the allied

the enemy they

the numbers

so we may calculate

3 legions,

Moorish

cavalry,

4 Praetorian

1600 vexillarii,
equites

should

are there

to carry

of the units

which

in

their

with

camp in the
booty,

they

800 Pannonian

light

Palmyrenes,

200 scouts,

3 milliary

4 quingenary;

900 Getuli,

horsemen,

infantry

700 Dacians,

500 Britons,

31. After

receiving

retentura.

so that we know how many hemistrigae

retentura.

Now,
is halved,

the numbers
the number
so that

Now we shall organize

we should

that

500 marines

cohorts

of guards.

always

and

part-mounted

239

at

cohorts

3 quingenary;

500

700 Cantabrians

and two

do the calculations

for the

to put up in each half of the

is 13640.

camps on each side,

the sides of the praetorium

600

from the fleet

will camp in the retentura

an equal number

cavalry,

alae and 5 quingenary;

2 milliary

centuries

I have listed

400 Praetorian

cohorts,

4 milliary

singulares,

Misenum and 800 from Ravenna;

number

infantry

to each of the camels

but if they

of which

is as above
-

and any others

are to be used against

450 of the emperor's

and

and half

camp in the quaestorium.

should

above:

the

We will

If they

has 6 centuries,

cohort

unit has ten centuries

the centuries

retentura.

and decurions

the centurions

and the rest of its organisation

place

part-mounted

(? ) turmae and ?6 decurions;

number,

part-mounted

use one each.

has six centuries

So a milliary

cohort.

240 cavalry,

and from this

but half

unit.

infantry

the centurions

the

when calculating

the same organization

contains

part-mounted

A quingenary

use one each.

cohort

of infantry,

has ten centuries

be assigned

So let us

is 1360.

total

cohort.

part-mounted

part-mounted

the

number,

that a space for 1360 men should

remember

29.

to the above

and calculate

that

likewise

The

is 6820.
for the

just as we did for the retentura

praetentura

space for the tents

assign

32. So we should

of the legionary

and standards

when 3 legions

that

notice

so that we know where we should

with their

cohorts.

720
feet
is
the
the
half
camp
camp,
part of
wide and we assign
tents and 240 feet for the standards
having

that,

deducted

600 feet remain.

sagularis,

Now to establish

praetentura.
space,

Thus

90 feet for the

on the sides of the camp to the cohorts

for

the space

are to

reinforcements

the

and the

cohorts

milliary

for

we shall fill one side of the praetorium

of the via

width

camp in an area of the

alae should

the assignments

so

the rest

of the 600 feet

so that we know how many alae

may camp in the praetentura.

33.420
feet

feet on the side of the praetorium

by the Praetorians,

20 by the guard

and 40 feet by the roads;

companions

from alae which

cavalry

150 feet for the standards

a milliary

This

4000; this

is 2000.

of cavalry

A milliary

ala

and 600 feet for the tents.

By

3 feet in

is assigned

I have the number

of

that is 200 so this will be one hemistrig

of this so that

5 times 200 is 1000, the correct

5 heniistriqae;

we must

the

calculate

so that we know similarly

number

workshops,

on

space for

ala.

However,

retentura,

60

by the emperor's
the distribution

A cavalryman

I will take a third

who will camp in the length;

And now we calculate

35.

This is 4000, half of which

are left.

of 600 feet;

a length

of soldiers,

the number

we must compute

150 feet makes 5 hemistrigas.

this method

60 feet

this is approximately

the praetentura

be assigned

should

picket,

by units

that is 600 feet.

this side of the praetorium;

34. Now to organize

is occupied

together
which

with

will be the number

hold 500 men; as we have said,

there is no difference

an infantryman
a fifth

500 which

is the number

force,

as on the

should

be set up.

veterinary

at 600 men, is 8000.

of half the part;

6th
a
part,
away

calculated

the hospital,

together

between adding

and taking

of the

how many hemistrigae

space for

are calculated

remainder

receives

of men held in a hemistriqa.

which

I foot and a fifth.

part to the number

and

Half of this is

it is 600 feet wide,

in this case 600 feet.

240

hospital

will
So

that has been

There

remains

36. But we have a force of 4000; we may see how many times 500 1 have;

it is

8.

and

of hemistriqae

This is the number

the assignment
3 cohorts

their

is subtracted,

6 hemistrigae

in which

making a total of 540.

here which will take up 720 feet from which the

tents

amount the unit occupies

This makes 240 feet,

above was 300 feet,

of the alae calculated

can pitch

to be made.

that is 540 feet;

can be set up.

180 feet

there remains

Like the one above the lst

cohort,

access roads are made in the same way for the units,
60 feet is assigned
tents

each one being 4- 10 feet This leaves 120 feet which we assign to the

for the roads.

of the tribunes

and legates

37. Now if the surveyor

to the place 1000 extra

assigns

we will have the following.

at the rate of 60 feet each.

men in the same area,

is 500, which

Since half of this

is assigned

to a

deduct 10 feet from the scamnum and build a road between the
we
,
There will be 30 feet; this will be
alae, which is given if the space permits.
a hemistriga
which will be assigned to the remaining 500 men.
hen-dstriq

38. Now on the opposite

1000 men whose lines will be in a space of 60 feet.

scamnum
between

or

be a greater

companions,

the

the sides

area

of the

roads between the Praetorian

observe

gather

in their

more widely,

cohorts

it should

and place

roads

If,

and we also look out so that we increase

to the

allocation

and

however,

cohorts

if there

and retentura,

emperor's

so that the proportion

of the

the space is more restricted,

units can be left out because

and cavalry
as I stated

the

the soldiers

above,

will each

own units.
to camp 50 per line closely

the men are accustomed

and since it happens

more tents

although

and if there

should

quingenary

be more units,

often change,

infantry

cohorts

but not enough

they may have

No more should
above the first

to fill a linel

it will

Similarly

in such a way that they camp more spaciously

whenever

in the remaining

241

lines,

or

as stated.

to camp more closely

be organized

that the units

the lines run in the same area.

away from these except

be necessary

praetorium

praetorium

discipline,

military

40. In the retentura

be taken

We will assign 80 feet to the

of the tribunes

for the quaestorium,

and likewise

if they

of the

force,

or smaller

of the camp is retained.

to pitch

to those

force

the alae.

decrease

width

70 feet

of the legates,

39. It is the same for

should

from the total

side in the same way we deduct

the remaining

into

If there

everything

different

way -

42.

be.

spoken

said,

of soldiers.

in the

space can be assigned

of the force

camp in one hemistriga

They should

in a

which

to

is as we have

This is 400, and so this will be the number

of hemistriqae.

the number

we have

than

the rampart

camp round

17
be
and enough
will

And so I take a 17th part

the quaestorium.

have

half -part
of the
there can
I will see how many hemistriga

about

case this

In the present

troops

6820 troops

the

As this is 600 feet wide,

retentura.

in the retentura

reinforcement

and the cohorts

changes

Now we have

of the

may camp in the lines

if the numbers

it is useful

be more or fewer

should

shown,

they

of all the measurements

as in the case of the praetentura.

been calculated,

already

So that

confusion.

in equal numbers,

retentura,

41.

permit

numbers

is not thrown

so that the organisation

part of the length

plus a fifth

so this makes 480 feet f rom which it emerges that two cohorts

which is 80 feet;

camp on the side of the retentura.

43. We should

distribute

the allies

should not be in more than three

can hear the watchword
that the standards

own tongue
the first

are assigned

44. There

will be 16 legionary

and 4 in the retentura,

camp inside

cohorts

45. As far
military

line,

about

everything

brother

I have followed
the

organization

in a logical

from the beginning,

observe

the same as those of the first

the camp.
6 in the praetentura

60 x 360 feet;

the other

four

the via sagularis.

To this day no author

approved

each one being assigned

as I am able,

affairs,

We should

more quickly.

along the sides,

cohorts

they

nor far from each other so that they

groups,

in their

but

in the lines,

tribes

so that the access roads can run through

cohorts,

wrote

and other

system

Lord,
briefly
of

camps,

pamphlet
in written

before

242

and

and whatever
I

have

arranging

instructions

hope
I
that
this
because
of
and

by you.

of my inexperience

all the authors

summer

in this

has explained

on account

of
they

explained
the troops.

all the measuring

our care will

be rightly

the disposition

46. So we have explained

army

to their

mounted
doubt

we have also shown

places;

a sign of an inexperienced

part-mounted

47. It concerns

to carry

a number

the types
sloping
bottom.

place,

are V-shaped

side is inclined

of the units,

in camp organization

relating

have written.
ditch,

the ditch

of camps and other

stakes,

It is called

as in the V-shaped.

and the same width

which I hope will

ditch

of fortification

stockade

V-shaped

and

when the sides,

reach the

narrower,

the other

be at least five feet wide and

be dug 60 feet in front

Because

of

and weapons.

side is laid out vertical;

They should

should

as the gate.

matters

is used for the sake of discipline,

or Punic.

A similar

to

to use it I will be the first

Five types

rampart,

is Punic when the outer

three feet deep.

alae on

has some cavalry.

in from the top at the same angle and becoming

A ditch

are no

and the division

fortifications
the
with

of authors

49. In a more secure

that if there

the usual method of measuring.

examine

summer camps may be noted:

or part-

it is without

reason,

this new method of measuring

magnanimity

48. Now we shall deal briefly

and infantry

place quingenary

So if you should condescend

please you if you first

on which

of the legions

even to those skilled

of legions.

to your

we should

be moved if

should

It is obvious

so that the retentura

the arrangement

it shows the difficulties

units

no particular

surveyor.

at all in the army,

cohorts

the sides of the quaestorium

the number

for

in the praetentura,

cohorts

which

the whole

and assigned

be placed in the retentura

If the alae should

necessary.

of the legions

of its shortness,

of the gateway,
it is known

as a

titulum.

50. In less secure

thrown

up.

Eight

There should
ditches;

because

rampart
cannot

before

of the construction

are trunks

with

of the soil is too friable

cannot

of turf,

stone,

rocks

feet wide and six feet wide will suffice,

also be a rampart

51. The stakes

nature

places a rampart

be built

be dug without

or rubble
and a little

the gates along the titulum

as "sanctum".

branches.

They are resorted

causing

the turfs

because of the looseness

the sides collapsing.

243

to break,

if a thick

of the stones,

be

parapet.

as along the

it is known

their

should

to if the
enough

or if a ditch

52. When there

of stakes and the place is insecure,

is a shortage

they

protect

the camp with four rows of armed men so that in each row guards are stationed
frequently;
by
the
If the camp
turns.
make
a
circuit
of
camp
should
cavalry
is in a peaceful

discipline,

maintaining

one row of arms will suffice

country,

and the guards

53. However,

the same happens

place is rocky

or sandy,

fortification

54.

The

are stationed

with the stockade

because without

for

a camp.

angles

of the

camps

and weaken the work

be rounded

from the angle of the cohorts

the line rejoins

as with the rampart

be rounded

should

the outside

provides

because

if the

sufficient

they

the defences.

protects

which

of

more widely.

doubt a stockade

projections

feet and until

for the sole purpose

make the

They

should

which make the sides of the work 60

line of the rampart,

and this makes

an angle of 90'.
55. In the same way the clavicula
inside

of the rampart

is traced

from a point

wide open to the edge of the gate;

front

of the road following

gate.

Then

another

gets the name clavicula.

in the same place you add the width

of the

arc on the same line so that

above the plain,

always

praetoria

second place is situated

should

on a flat plain,

in whatever

"unavoidable

camp".

57. It should

be particularly

than the sides of the camp.

were called

going

in are

out;

and it

line are kept

for the establishment

the camp.

or spring

those

from this effect.

point

the fifth

you draw an arc in

point

is fixed

the compasses
of the

the porta decumana is set at the highest

a river

of the gate,

from this centre

the choice of terrain

The porta

from a line on the

at the centre

they choose a site which rises gently

mountain,

a circle

and those coming in a straight

unprotected

56. Concerning

in the middle

the same line which

the compasses

and draw

rampart
always

with

round

mothers-in-law

look towards

the third

is on a hill,

the position

by our ancestors,

244

rise and

the enemy.

by
The

the fourth

on a

from which it is called an

noted that a road should

on one side or the other.

on a distinctive

so that the area is dominated

place is necessary,

Whatever

of the camp; first

be built

which is longer

of the camp there

Unfavourable
should

should

positions,

be avoided

be

which

at all times:

by
from
be
a
mountain
which the enemy could
overlooked
not
in
the
forest
there
be
is
camp;
on
should
nearby
no
going
or see what

the camp should

attack

to conceal

a hidden

may secretly
river

which

58. In hostile
access ramps
gates,

might

nor gulleys

the camp;

approach

or valleys

nor should

flood and overwhelm

territory

up to the rampart

should

if this cannot

be fitted

which

artillery

be avoided.

245

storm.

numerous
platforms

and in places on towers.

out with artillery

the enemy

the camp be near a fast-flowing

to construct

and to build

at the corners

through

the camp in a sudden

one must remember

on the projections

the rampart
in-law

enemy,

double width
around

the

In particular

on any side which is a mother-

2:

cataloclue

of Pitched

This catalogue

contains

only precis

Appendix

BatUes

late

of the

Republic

and Earl

Empire.

outside

engagements

6; it does not include

in chapter

Empire discussed

battles

of pitched

battles.

pitched

in the late Republic

skirmishes

The various

used when they make some contribution

or minor cavalry
have only

been

the dispositions

and

sources

to understanding

and

involved.

tactics

58 BC

Caesar vs Helvetii
The Helvetii
troops

BG 1 24

the Roman rearguard

attacked

hill and sent his cavalry

to a nearby

C. drew up his four

veteran

and all the auxiliary

were drawn

were dug to protect

the baggage

The Helvetii

on the march;

drove

legions

to check

in a triplex

formed

ground,

then drew their

and charged.

The Helvetii

line turned

to deal with

the Roman right;

this

where entrenchments

train.

pila from higher

attacked

His two newer legions

acies.

The Romans threw their

The Boji and Tulingi

his

the enemy attack.

up on top of the ridge

back the Roman cavalry,

swords

Caesar withdrew

assault

while

a phalanx

and advanced.

easily breaking

the phalanx,

were driven

back.
of the battle

the rear cohorts

the front

two lines

defeated

the

Helvetii.
The Romans captured

the Helvetii's

formed

fled.

58 BC

Caesar vs Ariovistus
Caesar

camp and the Helvetii

his

in a triplex

troops

command of each legion.

BG 1 50
acies

The auxiliaries

a legate

with

were left

or quaestor

in

the small Roman

guarding

camp.
The Germans were formed
right

wing,

There

and C. took station

up in a massed phalanx

on the

to face the weak German left.

was no time for throwing

pila because of the suddenness

of the German

charge.
The German left

was defeated

and put to flight

but

the right

was pressing

hard on the Roman left.

Crassus,
freely
ordered

the

than

cavalry
the

other

the third

The Germans

fled,

commander,
officers

line in support
pursued

noticed

who were

this

and as he could

occupied

of the Roman left.

by the Roman cavalry.

246

in the

line

move more
of battle

he

BG Il 8ff

Caesar vs Belgae 57 BC
Both sides

on a hill

Caesar

had camped,

for drawing

suitable

up his battle

line.
dug from his camp at 90 " to his proposed

C. had trenches

were sited at the ends of these trenches

and artillery

battle

to prevent

line.

Fortlets

his right

wing

being outflanked.
The two novice legions
but C. gives

the camp,
In a cavalry
light

no details

line.

slingers,

archers

with his

C. engaged
to prevent

the Belgae

day attacked

the Belgic

and cavalry

the Remi.

against

The cavalry

about the battle

were drawn up before

the Romans come off better.

engagement,

armed Numidians,

moving

in camp; the six others

remained

pursued

and the following

the survivors

rearguard.

Caesar's
in light

BG 11 20

57 BC

Caesar vs Nervii

the enemy so he had his line led by six legions

army was approaching

marching

then the baggage

order,

train,

then the two novice

legions

as rearguard.
began entrenching

The six legions

The light
retreat,

troops

and cavalry

but their

infantry

camp.
the Nervian

engaged
then

C. 's cavalry

charged

and forced

cavalry

and threw

them to

them into

disorder.
Nervian
by thick

infantry
hedges

joined

and the soldiers

The Roman left and centre

of being surrounded.

These were separated

legionaries.

the entrenching

attacked

the nearest

standards.

but the right

were successful

and light

The Roman cavalry

wing was in danger

infantry

were driven

off

again.
C. went round

his legions

them, then joined the right

encouraging

wing which

was in difficulties.
With the arrival

of the two novice legions

wing the tribes

were driven

the pursuing

suffering

severe

casualties

left

at the hands of

cavalry.

Crassus

vs Aquitani

Crassus

formed

because

off,

from
Xth
the successful
the
and

BG 111 24

56 BC

a duplex

he had no great

acies

with

confidence

the

in their

247

auxiliaries
fighting

massed in the
abilities.

centre

Labienus

the Gauls into a poor position.

enticed

as soon as the lines

The Gauls were routed

Labienus

out by the cavalry

was carried

drove

The Roman right

enemy right

where

The victorious

the Parisian

chieftain

attacked

but there

many.

on the

was resistance

was stationed.

the Parisian

them

rear and slaughtered

51 BC

Caesar vs; Bellovaci

positioned

and captured

line.

back the enemy left

Roman right

Caesar formed

who killed

BG VII 62

of the Roman battle

No details

met.

52 BC

vs Parisii

and to

were posted on the wings,

train.

the baggage

The pursuit

but the cavalry

line,

of his battle

No details
protect

BG VI 8

53
BC
Gauls
vs

Labienus,

14

BG VIII
in front

up his legions

of the hill on which the Bellovaci

were

and set up artillery.

did not attack,

The Bellovaci

so C. ordered
C. lined

When the camp was complete,

20 cohorts

up his troops

to entrench

camp.
on the

with the cavalry

wings.
The Bellovaci

withdrew
51

Caesar vs Afranius
Caesar wished

behind

further

for the moment but Afranius

drew up his battle

on C. 's fieldworks.

work

drew up a duplex

Afranius

BC 1 81-3

BC

to avoid battle

line to prevent

a smoke screen.

acies with two lines of five legions;

was composed of auxiliaries

4-3-3
formation,
in
Caesar used a triplex
acies
flanks.
the
in
the
cavalry
on
posted
centre and

his third

line,

of reserves,

There
routed

was no engagement;
easily

enemy could

because of the confined

attain

would

Curio

vs Publius

Attius

Each waited

The cavalry

and slingers

area of the battlefield,

of his camp and therefore

a
any

for the other

in a more favourable
and light

BC 11 34

49 BC

Both sides were eager for battle

join battle

archers

be indecisive.

battle

them.

the safety

with

infantry

and drew up their

to attempt

lines with a valley

to cross the valley

between

so they could

position.
from Attius'

248

left wing began to approach.

Curio
Attius'

fled,

cavalry

of Marrucini

and two cohorts

sent his cavalry

the

leaving

to meet them.

infantry

exposed

to be surrounded

and

massacred.
Taking
attack.

Attius'

Curio

vs Saburra

Saburra

low morale,

of the enemy's

advantage

Curio

his troops

ordered

fled.

troops

49 BC

BC 11 40-2

his troops

ordered

to

to feign

retreat,

Curio

enticing

down onto level

ground.
are no details

There
Saburra

first

attacked

lines.

with his cavalry

which began to outflank

Curio's

beyond

which advanced

cut off by the much faster

The whole force

of Curio

the battle

light

line were quickly

surrounded

down by cavalry

was pinned

and massacred BC 111 88-99

BC 11 75 ff

Appian

wing

line:

with

Triplex

acies,

according

two legions;

Scipio

in the

The right

wing

cavalry,

archers

Pompey's

auxiliaries

or camp.

Total

of 45,000

Caesar's

After
line

were

with

his

Appian

acies;

Xth,

them

wing

to face the

Xth

of 22,000

left.

Appian

on the

right.

so he placed
that

suggests

the line of battle

IX and VIII

all his

many

of

Caesar's

to attack

that

though

Pompey

Antony.

with

Domitius.

C. took

wing

The remainder

up position

opposite

to Appian.
C. took

a fourth

orders

with

on the right

most reliable)

on the left

with

according

into

(his

legion

line

He also placed

to Appian,

states

Xth

in the centre

P. 's cavalry.
right

banks

steep

was on the left

troops

strongest

with

outside

P. 's dispositions,

formed

and

(According

Total

the

observing

opposite
on

Triplex

the depleted

of his troops
Pompey,

were stationed

Pompey

+ 2000 veterans.

line:

Sulla,

with

centre;

on his

slingers

and

to Appian.

by a stream

was protected

flank

and

armed Nunddians.

48 BC

Pharsalus

Pompey's

troops

them from the rear.

and attack
Cohorts

of battle

to
this

transferred

from each legion's

one cohort
(quadruplex

3000 of his bravest

lunge

might

at

the

actually

faces
refer

acies)

of

men.

249

the

right

in ambush
cavalrymen

to the fourth

some of his best cavalry

legion.

his

on

infantry

third

acies).

to his left

wing

Pompey ordered
this

noticed

to catch

and stopped

Both sides threw

P. 's cavalry

P. 's cavalry

C. sent in his fourth

slingers

exposed.

Pompey's

left

pressed

C. then sent in his third

fled,

though

P. 's camp.

Later

C.

supplies

troops

Domitius

Calvinus

line

line which

of Nicopolis

was fresh.

leaving

the archers

before

to

flank.

wing's

and

surrounding

The Pompeians

it as an ordered

P. Is retreating

turned

and

retreat.

defended
troops

C. ordered

panic,

his men

but taken.
off from

them

and cut

water

surrendered.

to the point

the flanks,
Domitius

outside

4 ft deep and not far apart from the town

trenches

Deiotarus

within

for

as the limit

he had determined

the trenches

deploying

his

and the cavalry

on

and the two provided

by

them.
his Roman legions

stationed

B. Alex. 38-40

48 BC

vs Pharnaces

He drew up his line of battle

troops.

in the centre

with a very

on the wings

narrow

front.

The remaining

cohorts

were

as reserves.
drove off the cavalry

The Roman right

his infantry

to cross

Deiotarus'

left and began attacking

in the centre

right

but was pinned

down

only very

vs Pharnaces)

were defeated.

forced
was

Roman right

suffering

Zela (Caesar

Pharnaces'

to surround

the trench.

legions

The victorious
ground,

on Pharnaces'

in the rear.

The Roman left attempted

light

advance

were caught

to high

B. Alex. 74-6

Pharnaces

His troops

and withdraw

47 BC
on opposite

made a surprise

to form a circle

casualties.

Both sides held positions

Caesar.

the right

these

massacred

high morale and the enemy's

dug two straight

Pharnaces

trying

to attack

C. 's cavalry

with an earthwork.

Pompey's

posted

forcing

out,

P. 's cavalry,

This was fiercely

intercepted

the charge.

renewing

it in the rear.

describes

Appian

Because of his troops'

to storm

more closely

fourth

wing and taking

before

rushed

line which repelled

The

The latter

charged.

drew swords.

and his archers

charged

withdraw.

breath

their

pila then

their

fast while Caesar's

to stand

his troops

sides of a valley.

up the steep slope against

entrenching

in a sudden.

250

an unsuspecting

and had to form up line of battle

Pharnaces

attacked

bearing

scythe

with

throwing

chariots,

the disordered

Romans into confusion.

The

chariots

were

driven

by

off

but

n-dssiles

Pharnaces'

infantry

then

attacked.
helped
The Romans were greatly
facing troops climbing uphill).
The right

wing began forcing

and centre

followed.

Pharnaces'

troops

their

success,

Ruspina
Labienus'
light

Caesar,

Pharnaces'

camp.
B. Af r. 13-18

and closely

and dismounted

by

exhilarated

46 BC

long

were

back down the hill and the left

down the WE and Caesar's,

vs Labienus)

believing

troops

(they

of the ground

nature

up the slope and captured

line was very

infantry

Pharnaces'

were thrown

charged

(Caesar

by the

packed

interspersed

cavalry

with

archers.

the line to be infantry,

deployed

in a simplex

acies as best

he could in view of his small numbers.

He posted his archers at the front of
the line and cavalry on the wings to ensure he was not outflanked.
Labienus' cavalry on his wings threatened
to outflank
Caesar.
When the two lines engaged, the cavalry in the centre of line fled but the light
infantry

remained

until

Caesar's

infantry

broke

by the light
four

infantry.

the cavalry

should

charge

again.

to engage the cavalry,

ranks

C. therefore

ordered

only to be surrounded

his men not to advance

more than

feet ahead of the standards.

C. 's troops

were driven

C. ordered

the line to be extended

to turn

about

C- split

on his defences

plain.

of Labienus'

the high ground.

U2itta
Scipio:

cordon

and causing

Eventually,

to their

retired

and forced

to fight

as far as possible,

in a confined
and alternate

and his infantry

heavy

casualties

to Labienus'

reinforcements

cavalry

Caesar urged

forced

his men to drive

Once this objective

the fight,

renewed

behind.
auxiliaries

cohorts

falling

back

troops.

Caesar back onto the

back the enemy and seize

had been achieved,

the Caesarian

troops

own defences.

46 BC
Centre

space.

to face the enemy.

the enemy's

The arrival

into a circle

B. Afr. 59-61
held by his own & Juba's

On the

wings

were

behind

them.

The cavalry

elephants

legions
with

light

was stationed

251

of Numidians

with a reserve
infantry

and

on the right

Numidian

wing as the

left

by the town

was protected

cavalry
right.
Caesar:

His right

was a duplex

stretching

on Scipio's

right.

confidence

in them,

as far as his centre,

he interspersed
Detachments

Vth legion in support.

of the line,

of archers

line here

with a 4uplex

on his left

light

force

the large cavalry

as he lacked

on his left wing and,

them with

it.

and surround

so his battle

to counter

his cavalry

He stationed

on his extreme

force

smaller

his reserves

He concentrated

acies here,

infantry

by fortifications

wing was protected

acies.

and light

Caesar's

was to outflank

His intention

was no room to deploy

and there

of Numidians

force

Large

there.

of Uzitta

and sent up the

infantry

were stationed

parts

at various

on the wings.

and especially

was no battle.

There

Scipio:

B. Mr.

46 BC

Thapsus

up in front

were drawn

legions

of his rampart

80-6

on both

with elephants

wings.
Caesar:

acies with five cohorts

drew up a triplex

acies facing

form
to
a quadruplex
wing
cavalry

The elephants
Scipio's

on the right

Archers,

the elephants.

infantry

back by volleys

of missiles

wing gone, C. 's infantry

forces

plain

suitable

were routed.
B. Hisp. 29-31

between

the

for cavalry

Pompeians:

and

the enemy's rampart.

easily captured

Munda 45 BC
The

and

on the wings.

were posted

forced
wing were

slingers

fled with them.

cavalry

With the right

Scipio's

with light

interspersed

from the Vth legion on each

two camps of Pompeians

and

Caesarians

was very

operations.

13 legions;

cavalry

with light

infantry

and further

auxiliaries

on

the wings.
Caesar:

Legions

and cavalry

in the centre

that,

the operational
uphill.

charged

to prevent

wing as usual),

auxiliaries

The Xth was initially

against

so successful
a legion

cavalry

were driven

pushed

hard

against

back and escaped

252

the left

this.

on the right

despatched
was

right.

Caesar's

The Pompeians

area but his men argued

the Pompeian left being surrounded,

from the Pompeian

Immediately

held the right

on the wings.

C. began to restrict
C. 's troops

(Xth

wing.

into the town of Munda.

Idistaviso

AD 16

Germans

of battle

Few details

line,

but the Roman troops

from line of march to battle

to deploy

ready

no details

and Cherusci:

Germanicus:

H 16

Annals

The Germans were massed in front

were alert

and

line.

of a forest

the Cherusci

whilst

on top of a

ridge.
The Cherusci
flank

Germanicus

charged;

and the remainder

The Roman infantry

The Cherusci

sent

of his cavalry

part

to attack

their

to take them in the rear.

attacked

and put to flight

Germanicus'

attacked

archers

both Germans

and Cherusci.

but were held off by auxiliary

infantry.
The Germans

fled and were massacred.

M. Furius

Canifflus

Romans:

Camillus'

vs Tacfarinas
one legion

AD 17

11 52

Annals

held the centre

of the line,

with auxiliaries

and

an ala on each wing.

No details
There

of Tacfarinas'

dispositions.

was no battle.

L. Apronius

AD 29

vs Frisji

The Romans were crossing

IV 73

Annals

a ford into territory

defended

by the Frisii

in line

of battle.
Apronius

sent in the Ala Canninefatum

rear but these were repulsed,

enemy's

and auxiliary

infantry

as were the legioniary

to attack

the

he sent

cavalry

in next.
3 light

armed

thrown

in.

cohorts,

then

These troops

two more,

sent in earlier.

The remainder

of the auxiliary

was sent in and drove

defeated

lst

revolt

of Iceni

an earthwork

therefore

defeated

the Iceni

back the enemy in a sharp

Scapula

Iceni

Ostorius

up in the

off in a state of exhaustion.

ordered

had with him were auxiliary

an approach

with

his cavalry

to dismount

253

The

engagement.

Annals

Ostorius

were

the command of a legionary

under

were brought

cavalry

and were caught

AD 47

The only troops

defended

infantry,

and cavalry

auxiliaries

all the auxiliary

were sent in at intervals

panic of troops
legate,

then

XII 31
and the

cavalry

too narrow

for

and fight

on foot.

cavalry.
They

Corbulo

vs Tiridates

Corbulo,

drew

presumably

AD 58
in the centre

legionaries
his
up

with

though

on the wings,

his cavalry

and auxiliaries
Tacitus

38

XIII

Annals

them,

outside

does not mention

this.
There

was no battle.

Suetonius

Paulinus

Suetonius

drew

up his line in a valley

or outflanking

ambushes

AD 60/1

vs Boudicca

infantry

line with auxiliary

them and cavalry

outside

of Britons

2nd Battle

of Cremona

to battle

because the morale of his troops

agreed

for the Flavians.

force

main Flavian
Cerialis

under

vs Batavians

The front
legions

night

action,

in the faces

rose and shone

targets

with auxiliaries

The legions

of both

but Tacitus'

on the wings,

and cavalry

and indecisive

was confused

of the Vitellian

The Vitellian

troops,

troops

making

them excellent

fled when it was rumoured

AD 71

up behind.

the moon

until

V 16

Histories
of cavalry

Cerialis

the

had arrived.

Mucianus

Roman line consisted

drawn

was so high.

here.

detail

a rare

111 21-5

the absence of the main force under

despite

Mucianus

The battle,

of the

on the wings.

Histories

Primus

lacks

held the centre

AD 69

Antonius

account

him to prevent

fled and was massacred.

The horde

sides held the centres

a wood behind

with

His legionaries

manoeuvres.

XIV 34

Annals

remained

and auxiliary

infantry,

with

at the rear with a picked

the

force for

use in emergencies.
Mons Graupius
The Britons

were drawn

ground

between

Agricola

drew

Agric.

AD 73/4
up in ranks

the charioteers

filled

the

the hill and the Romans.

in the front

up his auxiliaries

wings.

2 alae were held in reserve

reserve

in front

The main force

cohorts

on a hillside;

35-7

line,

with

the cavalry

on each wing and the legions

on the

were held in

of the camp.
of cavalry

drove

off the charioteers

and Agricola

sent

in 6

of auxiliaries.

The reserve

cavalry

The Britons

fled,

alae drove

pursued

off an attempted

by the cavalry.

254

flank

attack

by the Britons.

T4=cz

Dio LXXV

us AD 194

.
The

battle

descending
Both

fought
was
drew

etc.

in the rear

An ullinus

sent his cavalry

When the

battle

The battle
numerically

heavy

up their

both sides were protected,

approach

with

to fire

was indecisive

over the front

no cavalry

point

on one side

in the centre

cliffs

and

to attack

Niger's

of

Instead,

on the wings.

the Severans

quarters,

artillery,

with

Since the flanks

rankers.

were stationed

over the hills

came to close

the enemy under

infantry

rear.

formed

a testudo

to

fire.
for

a long

time but finally

Niger's

troops

proved

superior.

A storm blew up in the faces of Niger's

this

mountains

to the sea on the other.

generals

archers,

on a plain

the Severan

cavalry

troops

attacked

casualties.

255

and they were forced

and Niger's

troops

back.

fled with

At

heavy

This

catalogue

is highly

The various

literary

to be an exhaustive

themselves

sources

and archaeological

when they add to the understanding

have only been included

thus the references

6 and 7

and is not intended

selective

of all Roman sieges.

catalogue

of the account;

are also selective.

406-396 BC
Veii
Livy IV 40 -v 21
Dionysius of Halicarnassus
XII 10
Camfllus v
Plutarch
beside the N. W gate at Veii 1957-58"
Ward -Perkins "Excavations
PBSR 1959
topography
Ward Perkins "Veii, the historical
of the ancient city"
PBSR 1961

Date:
Place:
Refs:

A: Veii lies on a large plateau

be taken

not easily
to have

lasted

operations

ten

after

action

threats

strenuous

of the siege

the start

from

army

of a relieving

supposed
but

at Troy,

that

with

a line of circumvallation

Romans constructed
against

and was compared

and

it could

As a result,

The siege was traditionally

assault.

may not have been particularly

recorded

by steep sided valleys

fortifications.

the city's

by direct
years

surrounded

virtually

the Veint Pas had strengthened

first

in Chapters

3: Cataloc lue of Sieq es discussed

_

Appendix

siege

for the whole time.

The

403
in
BC when
was

the

round

Veii,

a contravallation

and kept

Etruria,

troops

there

force
Roman
the
suffered a severe
year
by
the
a relieving
simultaneously
attacked
camps was
setback when one of
The Romans,
force of Capenates and Faliscans, and the besieged Veientas
.
however, soon recovered their losses and were able to hold off the Veientas
399
in
BC.
the
to
siege
they
their
raise
made a second attempt
allies when
and
throughout

the winter.

The following

This time they

were attacked

in the rear by Roman forces

siege camps.

The relieving

force

into

Veii.

Finally

in

was routed

396 BC Camillus

command of the siege.

He strengthened

dug up to the citadel.

While Camillus

of Veii,
sacked

B:

Roman forces

and the populations

Despite

siegeworks
phy.

entered

extensive

have been found,

However,

and the besieged

of the

driven

back

and

given

dictator

was appointed

the Roman siege works and had a mine

made diversionary
through

the citadel

slaughtered

fieldwork

from another

this mine.

and no traces

256

on the walls
The town was

or sold into slavery.

in the area around

fortifications
the
most of

attacks

Veii,

are visible

of Ved appear

no traces

from aerial

of any

photogra-

to date to the period

immediately
Livy's

the destruction

preceding

which

had strengthened

that the Veientines

statement

of the city

corresponds

with
before

defences

their

the siege.
214-212 BC
Syracuse
Livy XXIV 34; XXV 23-31
Polybius VIII 3-7
Plutarch Marcellus
Lawrence 1979

Date:
Place:
Refs:

A: Syracuse
high

along

ground,

Archimedes.

by the

and

The

ladders

However,

the fire

came under

a direct

were

equipped

the troops

whilst

of Archimedes'

arrows

and

by grappling

attacked
their

shelters

slingers

no better;

In addition

or lead shot
Romans

realized

Archimedes'

Despite

engines

the

continued

presence
ladders

Archimedes

not

by machines

killed
was

by

the

attack

to plunder

outer

assault

in Sicily,

the loop-

of the

The

them.
because

and the other

surrendered.

and although

there

of

ineffective.

Marcellus
attack

night
city.

taken when the Romans captured

by a Roman soldier.
257

defences

range

heavy stones

which was rather

reinforcements

were finally

a diversionary

over to the soldiers

firing

the

sambucae

through

shooting

Syracuse

off

of long and short

and in 212 BC he made a surprise

captured

and

filled

defenders

the

the bows and sinking

take

of Carthaginian

and

the fire

to blockade,

and resorted

areas of Syracuse

by storm following
was given

could

were

walls,

in pairs to support

on by artillery

grappling

the Roman blockade

scaling

remaining

they

from

of 60 quinquiremes

drive

grouped

the ships were destroyed

and by machines

the

fire

men up and then drop them,

men to

came under

while the men were fired

in

casualties.

heavy

came under

it consisted

javelin

and

The galleys

engines).

artillery,

with

fared

heavy

they

and wooden beams.

and 8 more quinquiremes

battlements,

holes.

by stones

at a distance,

loop-holes

narrow

hooks which could lift

assault

archers,

(scaling

through

were crushed

The sea-borne
with

fired

artillery

gate on the eastern

were still

they

and

screens

wicker

with

by

prepared

from land and sea

assault

and suffered

artillery

When the Romans did get close to the wall,

for the most part

engines

part of the wall by the Hexapyla

to attack

side of the walls.

and other

attempted

forces

land

by a wall extending

artillery

The Romans initially

simultaneously.
scaling

defended

strongly

was very

The
one

The city

was no massacre,

B:

No archaeological

defences

were

evidence

strengthened

for

the siege

and

redesigned

in the period

Date:
Place:
Ref s:

210 BC
(Cartagena)
New Carthage
Livy XXVI 42-47
Polybius X 8-16
Appian Spanish Wars vi 20
of land in a lagoon,

on a spur

only 250 yards

by a ridge

mainland

preceding

was situated

correspond

town
very

besieged,

led

by

the

made a simultaneous
immediately

that

realized
had been

the city

Citizens

of New Carthage

sent to the fleet.

Amongst

artillery

and a great

Date:
Place:
Refs:

203 BC
Locha, Spain
Appian Punica

Locha was a large

difficulties.
Lochaeans

offered

ladders

causeway

Mago,

drew

up

on the

by the Romans who then

The fleet

to retreat

as

But Scipio

were too short.

the two forces

between

but

the citadel
overrun.

Until

and turned

whilst

of equipment

and the city

when he

surrendered
this

the Romans

point,

(according

slaughter,

the Roman plunder

to Polybius

on

to plunder.

non-citizens
were several

and slaves
hundred

were

pieces of

and missiles.

15

town which

As the

the

to take the city by storm.

were released

quantity

left

the Romans were forced

to defend

but then stopped

orders),

deliberately

whose accounts

from both the land side and from the lagoon

was completely

Scipio's

important

states that Scipio

and Livy,

into the city

were caught

in indiscriminate

engaged

Appian

general

and many of their

Mago attempted

to the

the harbour.

occupied

However,

The defenders

captured.

Scipio

that

made a second assault

at low tide.

Polybius

and attempted

attack.

the walls were defended

but

to retreat

ladders

up scaling

of

use

connected

was particularly

as possible.

Carthaginian

but were forced

causeway,
brought

state

well,

The Roman fleet

unfortified.
The

trenches,

with

the

the

coming in to Spain by sea from Carthage,

so Scipio was eager to take it as quickly

the

The city

wide.

as it was the main base for supplies

enclosed

for

particularly

but

the siege.

artillery

A: New Carthage

has been discovered,

was besieged

Romans were about

to leave the city

under

258

by Scipio and Masinissa

with great
ladders

to attack

with

a truce.

Scipio sounded

scaling

the

the recall

but the soldiers

Scipio

dismissed
three

executed

the siege and

to safety,

the survivors
of the officers,

deprived

by lot,

chosen

slaughter.

the army of its loot and

who had disobeyed

orders.

189 BC
Ambracia,
Epirus
Polybius XXI 27-29
4-9
Livy XXXVIII

Date:
Place:
Refs:

had strong

Ambracia
the consul
castellum

Marcus

the citadel,

breaking

the siege.

Having

also

rams

used

battlements.

Against

rams,

the wall-hooks

caught

Romans kept

as the besieged
As a last
Romans

defended

resort,
took

care

their

and hung

up brass

to discover

the Romans had reached

met an underground

then

men.

armed

The situation

device to blow noxious

fight

broke

little

of the

out,

first

between
the

until

plunder.

The

from this
walls.

what

the
was

inside

the wall

tunnel

by the

By this time

a large part of it.

When the

the sappers,

besieged

used a

the Romans to retreat.

that the garrison

259

realized

the

on the

Although

the Roman mine.

the mine forcing

on condition

to have been very

down

sorties.

the city.

position

was a stalemate

fumes through

The town later surrendered

appears

the

the wall and underpinned

two tunnels

and the

up replacement

dug a trench

They

to intercept

then dug a countermine

to bring

besieged

the

actions,

when the saw the spoil heap.

vibrations,

built

and

began a large-

of the wall but could not profit

happening

plates

out

did achieve this

and made frequent

had a mine dug towards

to hide

The

used cranes to drop weights

the gaps and quickly

Fulvius

breaking

Fulvius

wall-hooks

grapples

down sections

besieged

the wall simultaneously,

attacked

these the defenders

breaking

and ditch.

works,

sickle-shaped

with

by a rampart

of reinforcements

these

constructed

and

two camps and a

the

prevent

in, but two groups

Five siege engines

scale assault.
Romans

to

was to build

action

all connected

by

wall, and was besieged

and a strong

His first

was intended

reinforcements
during

defences

natural
Fulvius.

opposite

circumvallation

there

during

sufferings

They scaled the walls and began an indiscriminate

to obey.

refused

because of their

were angry

be allowed free,

and

Date:
Place:
Refs:

171 BC
Haliartus,
Livy XLII

Lucretius,

Boeotia
63

and rams but the besieged

engines

and lead weights

with stones
the besieged

built

hastily

too long,

Lucretius

sides.

He made a diversionary

fled to the citadel

and the city

The only narrative

The siege was a complex

the city

the following

was looted

suburb

of Megara,

general

tortured

and executed

Scipio then dug a trench

his army.

The ditches

side looking
12 ft (3.5

defences.

Scipio's

and the armed men

of different
first

Hasdrubal

and as a result
Roman prisoners

were

capture

was the

the Carthaginian
impossible.

to make surrender
looking

and another

areas of

in which

towards

the

he stationed

The
with sharp stakes and were palisaded.
by a wall 25 stades (4.5 km) long,
was fortified

were filled

and 6 ft (1.7

m) high

points

was based on Polybius'.

which

the capture

across the isthmus

Carthage

towards

other

The inhabitants

the two lines to form a quadrangle

and joined

mainland

up on all

and razed to the ground.

involving

operation

by storm,

day.

was

200

had independent

which

to be brought

the town at several

against

is that of Appian,

account

the rams

and old men were massacred

147-146 BC
Carthage
Livy LI (Ep)
Appian Punica 117-133
Plutarch Apophtheqemata

Date:
Place:
Refs:

destroying

Because the assault

ladders

scaling

of siege

of the wall were destroyed

replacement.

attack

but surrendered

sold into slavery

m) wide,

parapets

with

and towers,

one of

was used for observation.

Supplies

at ensuring
The

mole.

indecisive
capture

naval

rebuilding
constructed

Carthaginians,

which

then
the

the blockade

quay

engines
recaptured

drove
but

so he blocked
Attempts

the Romans partially

off

the

were

and mounds

Romans,

forced

the quay and Scipio

260

another

burnt

incendiary

their
again

and

focused

with
engines
after

devices.

had it fortified

with a massive

entrance

were then

demolished

to retreat

to fire

ships were rather

the harbour

dug

however,

foUowed.

engagement

of a quay

Carthaginians

eventually

Scipio's
but
by
this
off
cut
work
were

to Carthage

ineffectual
stone

ordered

up a number

sorties,

and when stretches

The young

simultaneously.

brought

made frequent

up a rubble

taking

which

the operation,

who was commanding

an

on the

a ram.

The

and began
the

Romans

The Romans

and garrisoned.

During

Scipio
BC
147-146
of

the winter

in Africa

so Carthage

offensive

could receive

Carthage

against

harbour,

of the inner

Apollo.

As the Romans advanced

circular

Two battles

were burnt.

inhabitants

defenders

were

deserters

held

Hasdrubal

surrendered

Carthage

itself

massacre

of

Byrsa

spared.
in

out

the

the houses and the

However,

and

despite

population

and along the

then surrendered

Hasdrubal
Aesculapius.

destroyed,

was totally

they were fired

of Byrsa

they fired

to Scipio and the deserters

but

about

Shortly

were burnt

there

Hasdrubal's

the

forum and Temple of

held out for six days,

of

The

of 146 BC with

in the streets

Byrsa

allies

or elsewhere.

spring

the citadel

developed,

Temple

the

from Africa

the neighbouring

towards

Carthage's

against

in early

but when the Romans reached

roof-tops,
the

no supplies

was resumed

capture

on from the roof-tops.

campaigned

900 Roman
afterwards

in the temple

seems to have
treatment

and

been

of the

no

Roman

prisoners.

Date:
Place:
Refs:

143-133 BC
Numantia (Garray, Soria, Spain)
Appian Iberica 76 ff
Florus 1 33
Orosius V7
Schulten Numantia.
Schulten
Historia.
di Numancia.
Cheesman
"Numantia"
JRS 5 (1915)

A:

Numantia

After

was situated

two unsuccessful

in 134 BC.

to reduce

Numantia, through

rebels.

Seven

Florus),

then

Scipio

Orosius

palisade.
which

camps

seems highly

ditch

it and this

He avoided

blockade

built

was elected
battle

a pitched

were

constructed

ordered

the town

round

the

and preferred

(4 according

town

to be surrounded

to take

of the Spanish

because of the eagerness

The works

unlikely.
devised

work was completed,

was also fortified

enclosing

to

a ditch

with

and

Scipio

with a palisade.

built

had another
Immediately

were over

48

not far behind

behind

(3 m), not including

along the whole line of the wall at intervals

261

Numantia

system in case of trouble.

a signalling

was a wall 8 ft wide (2.4 m) and 10 ft high

Towers

Scipio

and ravines.

claims that this was 10 ft (3 m) wide and 20 ft (6 m) deep,

stades long and Scipio

When this

by rivers

surrounded

to take the town,

attempts

of the campaign

charge

on a plateau

this

ditch

the parapets.

of 100 ft (30 m) were

used for signalling

dimensions
the
same
of

embankment

by the river

tower on either

side of the river

spear heads and were kept

able to hold off attacks
were eventually

Schulten

to surrender

efforts

details

in Appian's
by Appian,

camps mentioned
redoubts

by the rivers

evidence

was found

that

would

this

where there

Appian's

estimate

in five stretches.
(2.4 m) given
Appian

to prevent

was based primarily

more than the seven

and palisade,

on the eastern

for the besiegers

was about 9 km long,

Schulten

(9.2 km),
width

that the difference

was because

in front

The original

but the actual

height

of the wall

of the wall mentioned

distance

in the

Post holes from

between

towers

is not

by the excavators.
c. 116 BC
Algeria)
Cirta (Constantine,
Sallust B. Jug. 21-23

Jugurtha.
strong

to

and the stone wall was found

was found at any point in the circumvallation.

Date:
Place:
Refs:

roughly

which corresponds

literary

mentioned

side of the town

than the 8 ft

of the wall at its top.

were found

believed

Schulten

from the rivers.

No trace

the wooden towers

No

of 4 m, much wider

suggested

of the ditch

into the town.

though

is not known.
sources

many of the

record

found

on

he seems to have

As a result

being brought

supplies

It has an average

gave the width

over a number of years

account

Schulten

of about 50 stades

by Appian.

The Numantines

was razed to the ground.

have been necessary

itself

and

The Romans were

in the archaeological

ditch

was no protection

The circumvallation

of knives

but claimed that there were seven camps and two

of the first

only

full

starvation.

by Schulten

account.

of a

were moored so that

current.

it was accurate.

to confirm

made particular
reported

itself

that as Appian's

(Polybius)

that of an eyewitness

an

from Numantia, and the besieged

through

was investigated

believed

by the construction

were stuck

by the river

rotating

and Numantia

B: The site of Numantia

from 1905.

The timbers

on the siege works

compelled

were sold into slavery

were blocked

from which large timbers

the river.

across

reached

marshland,

as the wall was constructed.

Duero

Communications

they

Where the line went through

and artillery.

besieged

natural

in the town of Cirta

his enemy Adherbal

defences.

to take it by storm using

He encircled
mantlets

which

the town with his forces

(vineae),

262

towers

and a variety

had very

and attempted
of machines.

in this

A 4--

Cirta
take
he
to
was unable
As
rampart and ditch, built towers

way,

and pressed
bribery.

Jugurtha
the attack

However,

force and stratagems,

including

Jugurtha

to take the town and eventually

was unable

The town was very

strongly

Metellus

fortifications.

the two most suitable

towers

on which

enormous

abandoned

efforts,

the siege.

prompt

the town with a rampart

places he moved forward

were erected
with their

to provide

(unspecified)

and ditch,

and threw

mantlets

covering

counter

fire.

up a mound

However,

measures.

though

then in

The besieged

the walls with rams and captured

does not seem to have been a massacre,

were

after six

the town.

There

in the town

Roman deserters

suicide.

committed

87 BC
Athens
Appian

Date:
Place:
Refs:

on a steep hill and its

by its position

protected

encircled

weeks the Romans breached

Athens

and day using

night

despite

108 BC
Thala
Sallust B. Juq. 75-76

Date:
Place:
Refs:

equally

it with

surrounded

& the Piraeus

Mithridatic
Wars 30-40

and the Piraeus

who used the Periclean

auxiliaries

and tried

were held by Archelaus

walls for defence.
the Piraeus

to take

and a force

five
legions
with

Sulla arrived
by storm.

of Cappadocians

When he was forced

and
to

had
build
Walls
to
the
Long
also
and
ramp,
a siege
part of
retire
fire
the
built
to
towers
Both
at
sides
constructed.
engines and artillery
the
defenders
During
the
against
the
sorties
number
of
made
a
siege
other.
Sulla
Roman
the
Romans and succeeded in burning
siege
equipment.
some of
he demolished

was kept informed

of events

shots to the Romans.

the supplies

in the town by traitors

As a result

of this information,

firing

inscribed

lead sling

Sulla was able to ambush

sent to Athens -

it
by
Eleusis
a
protected
Sulla
and
at
camp
a
established
came on
but
the
frequent
he
time
the
on
walls
ditch.
At
deep
assaults
made
same
Sulla
type
During
a
used
skirmish,
violent
one particularly
without success.
As winter

of catapult
forcing

which

Archelaus

supposedly
to withdraw

fired

up to 20 heavy

his wooden tower.

263

lead shots

at one volley,

When the

Roman ramp

besieged

had secretly

to intercept

fought

it with

besieged

built

was still

damp,

retreat.

Sulla then abandoned

attention

to Athens

hearing

After

be no timber
forbade

readily

then

the acropolis

several

others

Despite

this

the Piraeus
no ships

the

for an assault,

The

to collapse.

while the mortar

to

and turned

his

starving

and

it inside

was strongly

he was unable

massacre of the inhabitthe Odeum so there

would
Sulla

it,

to plunder

then

rams and artillery

with

of the newly

the other.

fled

and Archelaus

to part

by the sea.

Archelaus

shortly

built

had

and

one after

and surrounded
it but

part
this

anticipated

the Romans came upon

to attack

The

and rams.

in demolishing

had

fortified

to prevent

the slaughter.

on the assault

pushed

ladders

his soldiers

succeeded

so that

with a ditch

on the Piraeus

Archelaus

were

but it was soon captured.

but allowed

They
but

Romans

which

burning

after

the assault

walls.
wall,

like

defenders

up scaling

who had survived

renewed

semicircular

the

an indiscriminate

of the city

the

and undermined

that

brought

then

the Athenians

The Romans

built

Athens

available

the burning

pardoned

The Romans

rams.

began a blockade

Sulla had the city encircled

escaping,

A few occupied

ants.

Sulla

Meanwhile

on from all sides and were forced

the assault,

fled and Sulla ordered

defenders

had

from

reports

the defenders

When the

itself.

to cannibalism,

resorting

battle.

which Sulla attacked

but his men were fired

engines.

mine.

the walls

causing

wall inside

a semicircular

their

it with wooden beams and then

underpinned

hemp and pitch,

sulphur,

the

away the earth.

defenders'

of the walls with

part

part of the wall,

also n-dned under

the

but

up engines

to withdraw

an underground

the ramps and demolished

repaired
fired

dug

diggers

met the

tunnels

the Romans were forced

had a tunnel

then

brought

the mound and carried

undermined

When the mound subsided

Sulla

Sulla

was completed,

of

As Sulla

withdrew

to

garrison

he

Thessaly.

Date:
Place:
Refs:

57 BC
(? Pommiers,
Noviodunum
Caesar BG 11 12

When Caesar was informed

immediately
height

tried

France)

that the oppidum

did not have a proper

to storm it but was defeated

of the walls.

and made preparations

He therefore
for a siege.

built

by the width

a camp, brought

Before

264

of the ditch

up mantlets

he had finished

and

(vineae)

the defeated

army

fled into the oppidum.

of the Suessones
up to the wall,

the earth

siege

and

ramp),

surrender

piled up (either

towers,

siege

the

57 BC
Oppidum of the Atuatuci
Caesar BG 11 29-33

The oppidum

had great

at one point

where there

(60 m) wide.

followed.

the Romans built

back

was besieging

immediately

prepared

for an assault.

up mantlets

(vineae)

and towers.

in copper

could

mining

not achieve

rampart

but when they

Caesar

and a number

of

12 ft wide (3.5

m)

intervals.

Then

some way off saw it moving towards

The

them up in their

shut

them but they

losses.

the defeated

in the direction

200 ft

made a night

following

day the

sortie
Romans

population

into slavery.

army of the Sotiates

in an oppidum

(? Sos, France)

P. Crassus

they

requested

approximately

at frequent

and Caesar sold the entire

56 BC
Oppidum of the Sotiates
Caesar BG 111 21

that

and

a siege ramp and a tower

heavy

with

Date:
Place:
Refs:

gained

or building

by steep slopes except

approach

had an earth

his men from harming

the oppidum

skills

surrounded

and surrendered.

stormed

tunnelled

alarmed

rushed

Belgium)

sloping

the tower

ridiculed

to prevent

then

the ditch

of the Romans the Gauls sortied

(vineae),

mantlets

driven

strength

was a gently

were alarmed

and were

were

of (? ) 5 miles and redoubts

The Gauls at first

oppidum

filling

Gauls

(? Namur,

Caesar then

with a circuit

them they

natural

On the arrival

skirmishes

saw the mantlets

Caesar granted.

which

Date:
Place:
Refs:

built

being

When they

Because the garrison

The besieged

first

of the siege ramp and mantlets

a sortie
using

The Romans' vigilance

and quarrying.
anything

he moved

resisted

attempted

these

through

and

mines so they

and
their
meant

surren-

dered.

Date:
Place:
Refs:

54 BC
British
Caesar

The Britons
defences

were

using

in small groups

oppidum
BG V9
holding

felled

a position

with

very

good natural

trees to block all the entrances

to stop the Romans penetrating

265

to it.

the defences

and artificial

The Britons

tried

but they piled up

the fortifications

earth against
the oppidum,

the Britons

driving

the protection

under

of a testudo

and captured

out.

54 BC
Cassivellaunus'
oppidum
Caesar BI V 21

Date:
Place:
Refs:

was fortified

The oppidum

by a rampart

Caesar

forests

and marshes.

putting

up a brief

Date:
Place:
Refs:

54 BC
Q- Cicero's winter camp
Caesar BG V 38-49

to Caesar.

fled.

in his winter

He strengthened

after

and killed.

Many were captured

unable to get a message through

quarters

the defences

by

and was well protected

on two sides and the Britons,

attacked

resistance,

Q. Cicero was besieged

and trench

timer to build

of the camp using

up

to 120 towers

overnight.

assaulted

the camp filling

in the ditches

but for days the Romans were able to hold out.

They prepared

fire

stakes

hardened

on the towers

with

from watching

learnt

a3

testudines

under

fired

moulded bullets

wind.

When these

testudines

caught

and scaling

odds and Cicero

finally

three

and built

ladders.

hours,

the proper

then
using

assaulted

tools they

worked

on towers

grappling

hooks

After

several

darts

at the camp buildings,

(fusili

to
and

days the
argill,

aided by a strong

the camp with

The Romans held on despite

got a message through

they had

(4.5 m), a technique

of Roman prisoners.

the Nervii

storeys

the camp with a

surrounded

of red hot clay and incendiary

fire

extra

by battlements.

not having

and made assaults

ferrefacta)
iacula
et

glandis

Despite

in just

the instruction

f undis

topped

and the Nervii

the Romans.

Roman rampart

the

(pila, muralia)

and a 15 ft wide ditch

mile circumvallation

overtop
Nervii

breastworks

to surrender

(3 m) rampart

10 ft high

built

and siege spears

wicker

The Romans refused

day the Nervii

The next

towers,

overwhelming

to Caesar who came to relieve

the siege.
Date:
Place:
Refs:

52 BC
Vellaunodunum
Caesar BG VII

When advancing
the oppidum

11

to deal with the revolt

at Vellaunodunum

of Vercingetorix

Caesar wished to take

so that no enemy in his rear could interrupt

266

his

In two days he built

lines.

supply
garrison

surrendered

Date:
Place:
Refs:

52 BC
(Bourges)
Avaricum
Caesar BG VII 14-28
Dio XL 34
was a hillfort

Avaricum

by a river

rounded

constructing

a siege

but despite
m) which

which linked

two towers.

The besieged

in turn

of defensive

nooses and pulling

towers

hides

increased
as iron

in height,
miners,

hardened

sortie,

piling

were able to respond

the

extinguished,

quickly

tunnels

of inflammable

and after

siege towers

(23

using

a hard

withdrawn

they

which

their

pulling
building

windlasses,

skill

to block

also

acquired
them

As the Roman siege works

it from their

and all kinds

pith

were

including

wall

Roman tunnels

the

and boulders.

the Gauls fired

the walls,

of the

the siege ramp,

undermining

pitch

operations

and bad weather

techniques,

them up with
length

the

along

and countermining

stakes,

siege

This took 25 days.

the wall.

used a variety

with

The

began

330
80
ft
ft
(97
high
m)
a ramp
and
wide

away siege hooks with

covered

his

Romans

the

by Vercingetorix

attacks

this the Romans built

almost reached

mantlets

The

wall.

with the surrounding

(vineae)

ramp

defences,

gallicu

to Caesar pitched

the hillfort

of

with

murus

sur-

completely

almost

impossible

protection

by the strong

hindered

position,
a strong

and with

causeway

the

under

strong

made a circumvallation

camp by the narrow

and

in a very

and marsh

of the terrain

nature
land

day the

and on the third

a circumvallation

with

approached

and at the same time made a

material
fought

and the

on it.
action

The Romans
the fires

Gauls forced

were

back into

Avaricum.

The following
works

day the Roman towers were moved forwards

were positioned.

were not heavily

Gauls.

They

manned,
abandoned

During

a heavy

Caesar launched
the

walls

and

rainstorm
his attack,
reformed

and their

other siege

when the Gallic

causing
in the

defences

panic among the

town

centre

but

had
Romans
the
that
the
they
occupied
whole circuit of the
saw
scattered when
Avaricum
defenders
in
The
of
and
were
massacred
revenge
population
wall.
for the slaughter
had taken
barely

of Romans at Cenabum and because of the efforts

the Romans

Caesar states that from the population

of c. 40,000

over the siege.

800 escaped

to Vercingetorix.

267

Date:
Place:
Ref s:

52 BC
France)
Alesia, (Aiise-Ste-Reine,
Caesar BG VII 63-90
Dio XL 39-41
Napoleon III Histoire de Jules Cdsar
Rice-Holmes Caesar's conquest of Gaul

A: Alesia's

situation

on a steep sided

by blockade.

except

was a plain

There
three

about

on two sides and in front

were rivers

miles long.

meant that it was impregnable

plateau
Gallic

eastern

slope of the hill below the town's

a ditch

and wall 6 ft high

troops

the whole of the

occupied

walls and fortified

of the town

their

position

with

(2 m).

Caesar's

siege works were very elaborate: camps were constructed

at strategic
Then a trench 20 ft wide (6 m) with vertical sides was
points and 23 redoubts.

dug to protect

the Romans while they

400 paces behind

inner

one was filled

was a rampart

and large forked

defences

branches

Towers

(cipp

diverted

12 ft high

each 15 ft wide (4.5 m).

from the river.

Behind

(3.5 m), a breastwork

the trenches

with battlements

at the point where the breastwork

projecting

at intervals

were erected

The

of c. 80 ft (23.5

joined

m) and extra

lilia and stimuli)

because of the small size of the
added
were
,
This line was 11 miles long (16.2 km) and the Romans con-

Roman force.
structed

with water

and palisade

the rampart.

were 2 trenches,

this trench

About

on the circumvallation.

worked

line of fortifications

identical

another

miles long (20.7 km) to protect

facing

this one 14

outwards,

from the Gallic relieving

themselves

army which

had been sent to Alesia.

The Gauls then forced
their

wives

and children

allow them through

the inhabitants

the Mandubii,
because

the Roman lines,

of lack of supplies

filled

ditch with wattles

by the besieged

and relieving

Roman defences.
attacks

The next

and earth

army was made,

few days

to leave with

Caesar

refused

forces

in front

but a simultaneous

but they

were occupied

to

between Alesia and the

then drew up their

The besieged

the first

but

so they remained

Roman lines and starved.

the town,

of Alesia,

could

with

by the Gauls on both sides of the Roman defences,

of

attack

not break

preparations

the
and

but these defences

held.

The relieving
Alesia

and

undermanned.

army then
Roman

attacked

reinforcements

The besieged

a badly
had

then turned

268

sited
to

Roman camp to the north

be sent,

their

attention

leaving

the

of

defences

to the Roman wattles

and tearing

and breastworks

down the rampart

cohorts

broke

up they

coming

by the cavalry.

pursued

Caesar and Alesia

The next

out extensive

Caesar's

of tracing
and traced

successful

around

and their

defences

Like the other

conjectural

were traced

Napoleon

and was found

of investing

works

a little

less.

one is usually
2.7
deep.
m
-

a little

bottomed

less.

from the river.

ditch

over

to

sections

of the investing

to make maximum use

in mind when

not found

he plotted

less than 6m wide.

ditch

ditch

one is

but only 2.4

show that it held water

The outer line of works was only protected

ditch

line

the V shaped

though

is 4.5 m deep as Caesar says,

ditch

along most

The inner

and V shaped

are about 4.5 m wide,

and a V-shaped

the

in the excavations.

works and Alesia was traced

in the flat-bottomed

mentioned

works
defences

and some of the extra

had this

to be slightly

on the plain,

of the

were found.

probably

Neither

to have been fairly

camps and five

eight

the camps were positioned

Both ditches

Silt deposits

at other

points;

by a flatno traces

by Caesar survive.

51 BC
(Puy d'Issolu,
France)
Uxellodunum
Caesar BG VIII 32-44
Napoleon III Histoire de Jules CO-sar
Rice-Holmes Caesar's conquest of Gaul

A: Uxellodunum
and impossible
Gauls.

and sectioned

has the flat-bottomed

of the wooden towers

Date:
Place:
Refs:

Large

between the investing

of its length

diverted

whilst

in 1862-65 at Alesia with the

of Caesar's

of the 18 redoubts

positions

The Roman ditch

casualties

was handed

He appears

siege works.

the positions

siege works,

of the terrain.

of

to the rear and fresh

serious

excavations

by Caesar such as stimuli

mentioned

suffering

by the colour

The Gallic relieving

day Vercingetorix

the circumvallation.

redoubts

usually

and fled,

reinforce-

surrendered.

B: Napoleon III carried

intention

the attack.

and repulsed

and when the Gauls saw cavalry

army was also repulsed

Again

Caesar was recognized

ments were sent but it was not until

his cloak that the Romans rallied

with hooks.

was situated

to take by storm despite

The legate Caninius

detachments

on a plateau

and built

three

arrived

protected

on all sides by steep rock

the fact that it was held by about 200?

with two legions,

camps on very

269

high

divided
ground.

them into three

From these

he

gradually
allowed

him.

Hoping

to avoid

Gallic

foragers,

the starvation

went foraging

leaders

of Gallic forces

between

a number

building

siege works

which

the besieged

leaving

Uxellodunum,

of guardposts

Caesar regarded

obstinacy

called

for

severe

divided

arrived

his troops

soon after

as insignificant

that

he thought

to discourage

25

with

still held out

But the besieged

punishment

was

of fortifications,

his ring

Gaius Fabius

the numbers

the

and as there

Caninius

and completed

everywhere.

the

had faced at Alesia,

The siege was continued

outside

manpower

The Romans surprised

a garrison.

and took over part of the siege works.

and although
their

the town as far as his limited

and cut them to pieces.

no danger

cohorts

round

a rampart

constructed

the Gauls from

revolt.
By the time Caesar arrived
by siege works

making

at Uxellodunum

escape from the blockade

had a very

large

The rivers

could not be diverted

archers,,

grain

slingers

the town was completely

impossible.

Caesar set about cutting

supply

enclosed

As the besieged

off the water supply.

so Caesar cut off access to them by posting

This left one spring

and artillery.

from which water

could

be obtained.
a ramp despite

The Romans built

between

skirmishes

towards

a tunnel

with a ten storey

the source

them down

on the

barrels

with incendiary

surrender
reached

getting

were

control

even though
the spring

of the

fort.

it.

further

outbreaks

who had carried

weapons

The

of revolt
should

be cut off.

270

The Gauls

Finally

troops

still

an

to climb

as it looked

besieged

There

Caesar ordered

(17 m)

them and rolling

as if the

refused

to

the Roman tunnels

When the Gauls saw the spring

fail they took it as an omen and surrendered.

deter

but Caesar ordered

some had died of thirst.

and diverted

dug

same time launching

the Gauls were recalled

up to the walls of Uxellodunum;

Romans

firing

materials,

and at the

works,
were burnt

The Roman siege works

attack.

to dominate the spring.

artillery

Roman siege

and continual

The ramp was 60 ft high

of the spring.

tower containing

of the terrain

At the same time the Romans secretly

the two sides.

by filling

responded

the difficulty

suddenly

was no massacre,

but to

that the hands of all those

B: The site of Uxellodunum,

by Napoleon

was investigated
two of which
ditches

The third

at which

point

One particularly
Uxellodunum

which

the spring.

arched

roof.

Department

of Lot,

camps were found,

possibly

because they were in very

fortified

by a double line of parallel

to form part

of the circumvallation,

is had been found.

discovery

was a tunnel

The tunnel

as the tunnel

along its length

wooden props,

west

the Romans supported

some of which

of

side

dug by the Romans to

1.5 m wide and 1.8 m high

was about

points

on the

with an
the roof

survived.

51-50 BC
Pindenissum,
Cilicia
Cicero Ad Fam. II 10; XV 4; Ad Att. V 20

Date:
Place:
Refs:

Pindenissum
Cilicians

tower and plenty

many

destroyed

hillfort

a large

with

in S. E. Cilicia
Cicero

to be pro-Parthian.

the town with one very

the assault

pressed

(vineae),

a siege

penthouses

a 57 day operation
no fatalities.

forced

and the population

and

Then he

siege ramp,

but

Roman casualties

drew a rampart

large camp and six smaller ones.

After

of artillery.

held by well armed

the hillfort

The town

was taken

was completely

to surrender.

49 BC
Massalia (Marseilles)
Caesar BC 1 34-36; 56-58; 11 1-22
Lucan Pharsalia 111308-762
de Architectura
X xvi 11-12
Vitruvius

Date:
Place:
Refs:

The siege
between

of Marseilles

first
the
of
one
was

on three

with

stores,

and fleet.

set up arms factories

Marseilles
to

Ahenobarbus

by the sea.

sides

surrender.

actions

major

The town was situated

Caesar and Pompey.

surrounded

Caesar

fortified

was a strongly

who were believed

ditch round

legions

fortified,

has been identified

At certain

and walls with

city

Traces of three

was strongly

interesting

divert

with

III in 1865.

to have continued

appears

which

the only

in the French

were not properly

positions.

strong

Puy d'Issolu

had sided
The

on a rocky

The inhabitants

with Pompey and could

there
been
had
sent
who

of

the

town

by Pompey.

and began the siege.

271

up the

fortifications

not be persuaded
was

led

war

promontory,

had stocked

the town's

and repaired

defence

in the civil

by

Caesar brought

by

Domitius
up three

Caesar

himself

facing
hill
a
on
camp

that he pitched
battlements

from

built

this

Towers

supplies.

at Arles

a line of circumvallation

does not mention

to the

camp

to engage the fleet

his legate

On the land two timber

a huge arsenal

with extremely

12 ft (3.5 m) spiked
strong

siege ramps and towers

the ramps reaching

of mantlets,

hindered

were

the artillery,

particular

by the

though

However

the Caesarian
Caesar

which

were

Caesar went off

The siege was

machines that fired

forces

had to built

in detail.

of Marseilles'

they easily repulsed

had

the defenders

describes

strength

of Domitius'.
the protection

under

including

artillery

As a result

and a testudo

mantlets

Caesarians

beams.

and warships

the better

were built

80 ft high (23 m).

powerful

water

the siege.

fleet getting

with

off

cutting

At this point

to conduct

on by land and sea with Caesar's

carried

sides,

were prepared

at Marseilles.

Trebonius

reports

and drew a large rampart

sea on both

(vineae)

and mantlets

to Spain leaving

the citadel

but Lucan

very

But

defences

the

and in

aimed at burning

sorties

the siege works.

The Caesarians
retire

then built

to during

a brick

and to fight

sorties

walls 5 ft (1.5 m) thick.

built

a very

m) and rolled

into

place to link

besiegers

strong

Vitruvius,

who was probably

gallery

the brick

artillery

boulders

the tower,

tower

and destroy
After

the

particularly
and fired
to Vitruvius

a water filled

six

60 ft long

devices

(17.7
on the

while the

part of the wall to collapse.

one of the Caesarian

moat deeper and created

with

tower

with a tower

and incendiary

causing

to

fire from this tower

(musculus)

at Marseilles,

engineers

states that more than 30 mines were being dug towards

dug their

strongly

very

Under covering

covered

withstood

began undermining

It was built

it was a 30 ft (9 m) square

for artillery.

the besiegers

The gallery

on the west side of the operations

from.

When finished

storeys, high with loop-holes

town wall.

tower

the city so the besieged

the walls to flood

basin inside

the mines.

collapse

of the tower

keen for the city

a truce

to surrender.

all the Roman siege engines

But the besieged

including

the siege ramp was set on fire

bolts.

272

because

was arranged
the brick

by ballistae

Caesar

was

broke the truce

tower.

shooting

According
red hot iron

Trebonius
building

the seige and because of a shortage

resumed

to allow troops
equipment

to advance

were short
they

catapults,

Since a great
Caesar

surrendered.

and fame,

41 BC
Perugia
Appian BC V 32ff
Velleius Paterculus

Date:
Place:
Refs:

legions

and he was awaiting

army he immediately

entire
long

(10.7

km)

Lucius

of the hill of Perugia

Octavian

quickly

drew a palisade
these

then built

facing

1500 wooden
fortified

both inwards
the

the construction

completed

Perugia

began to starve.

Lucius

attempted

folding

ladders

fired

arrows

fairly
was

resistance
ladders

and engines.

surrendered;
Octavian

Velleius

punished

suggests

the city

at the foot

of the

(17.7

other entrenchments

to besiege

those
There

army.

As there

m).
with

and for

within

frequent

were

but when they

were

was no sign of the relieving

filled

assault,

but

Lucius'

supplies

the height

He increased

army

gear for filling

ditches

and

ditch

scaled

the

up the

the circumvallation

The mass attack

limited

the town 56 stades

the depth and width

of the siege works

undermining

and lead shot.

his

fire.

covering

Some began

palisades.

with

along it at 60 ft intervals

relieving

expected

made a violent

arrived

to cut off

doubling

to break out with his forces using

under

raised

the defences.

and outwards

during

army of 6

line of countervallation

camps and various

skirmishes

round

to the Tiber

works

towers

against

besieged

and ditch

his investment,

protection

The

with a newly
When Octavian

a similar

to strengthen

There were also strongly

the lines

Lucius

reinforcements.

strengthened

and built

inhabitants

of two legions.

a garrison

to 30 ft (8.8 m) deep and wide.

of the ditches
rampart

brother

and extended

coming by river.

and its

74 3

was held by Antony's

Perugia

for their

was now too short

the city

spared

but left

wall was in ruins,

of the city

part

and the range

of supplies

because of its antiquity

sides - Gates were left in the walls

and the besiegers brought up all their

cover

under

its cover.

under

the besieged

new ramp with brick

strong

a very

by

of wood improvised

then

army was forced

that Octavian

officials

rather

273

walls whilst

meant that

his army

rallied

than Lucius

at first

others

Octavian's

and threw

back into

succeeded

and

down the

the town and then

in taking

it by storm.

and intended

to turn

the

city

to his

over

Appian,

when one citizen

Date:
Place:
Refs:

AD 26
Hillfort
Tacitus

The Thracian

were

repulsed;

constructing

Sabinus
redoubts

had revolted

Sabinus
Thracian
his

moved

from which

to throw

The Thracians

rocks,

suffered

one party

committed

to

according

ladders.

a serious

camp

whilst

the rest were forced

AD 43
Southern
Suetonius
Richmond

a ditch

the

and built

a mound

at the Thracians.
and disagreement

to break

them back

a few Thracians

and

tightened

arose over

and of the men who remained,

attempted

back into the hillfort

began

and

with

and fodder,

but

sortied

hillfort

He gradually

and firebrands

The Romans forced

the

he linked

which

water shortage

others

pila) and missiles and although

The Thracians

nearer

from water

to Sabinus

strongly

a camp and then seized a narrow

(5.9 km).

spears

surrendered

suicide

Date:
Place:
Refs:

fire,

and were occupying

hillfort.

the fortress

round

to cut off the defenders

tactics;

built

4 miles in circumference

breastwork

scaling

fortresses.

led to the nearest

which

it caught

his own house.

tribesmen

mountain

ridge

blockade

fired

but

in Thrace
Annals IV 46-51

hilltop

defended

to plunder

soldiers

with

out

with

hurdles

siege spears

broke through

some
and

(muralia

the Roman lines

and surrendered.

Britain
Vesp. 4
Hod Hill vol II

A: Vespasian's

achievements

of two powerful

tribes,

during

the capture

of Britain

the conquest

were the defeat

of more than 20 oppida and the capture

of

the Isle of Wight.

by Vespasian.

B: Hod Hill may have been one of the oppida taken

defences

were undergoing

these were left

from

the

fire,

catapult
distribution
a tower
chieftain's

inside

evidence

at the time of the Roman invasions

alterations
Richmond

unfinished.
the

has attempted

hillfort.

Here,

shown by the distribution

suggests

at least
hut

a catapult

50 ft high.
and

274

came under

but

events
heavy

bolts on the ground.

at the east corner,

The concentration
intended

to reconstruct

one hut

of catapult

was situated

was presumably

The hillfort

of fire
to induce

possibly

was probably
surrender.

The
on
on a
This

hillfort

inside,

or destruction

is no evidence

the defences

although

on the

of an assault

were slighted.

AD 51
Hill in N. Wales
Tacitus Annals XII 33-35

Date:
Place:
Ref s:

When he was about to fight

be favourable

the Romans Caratacus

the slope was gentler

the front

of the hill facing

On his arrival

Ostorius

off worse but under

formation

cover of a testudo
fight

to avoid a drawn out an unprofitable

planned

and javelins

torches

crossing.
the

crossed

the Romans came

of missiles

they tore down the makeshift

the Britons,

unprotected

He then

the wall under

Corbulo
his force

a testudo

by artillery

their

attacked

and put the

forts.

Two

Volandum,

the
and

made a reconnaissance
into

four

formation

detachments

The two other

fired

to destroy

while Corbulo

divided

in Armenia

campaign

prepared

On arrival

in the region.

ladders.

with scaling

Corbulo
by officers

and stormed

began to undermine

a difficult

39

on the defensive,

an assault.

At

back and cut to pieces.

In order

fort

and

stone ramparts.

with

at close quarters

AD 58
Volandum,
Armenia
Tacitus Annals XIII

were attacked

crude

In an exchange

Date:
Place:
Refs:

strongest

a site which would

of the defences,

made a reconnaissance

were driven

Armenians

build

the Romans was a river

In the subsequent

by armour,

the Britons

the rampart.

and attacked

rampart.

selected

to him and impede the Romans; on one side were steep hills

wherever

river

as there

to have been successful

appears

detachments;

and two types

attacked

and another

provided

covering

of slingers

one
fire

firing

of

lead

shot at long range.

The Armenians
fierce

that

barricades
fatalities

the

were very

hard pressed

defenders

forced

were

flattened
the
gates were
at
and only

non-combatants

minor

casualties.

sold into slavery

at every
from

the

point
walls

and the attack

in a few hours,

and fortifications
Every

adult

taken

the

with no Roman

male was slaughtered,

and the town thoroughly

275

was so

plundered.

the

Date:
Place:
Refs:

AD 67
Jotapata
Josephus

Jotapata

was the first

Bj 111 135-408
of the three

The siege was described

of the Jewish revolt.

commanded
high

the Jewish

forces

accessible

only

plateau

in the town.

in great detail
The town itself

from the north

Vespasian

in the best position

out the siege and the first

failed

under

therefore

the covering

began a ramp to attack

watch kept

of the town

Roman actions

decided

then

on the town.

to starve

and burnt

the town into

The Jews continued

that Vespasian

such problems

the vulnerable

were

reverted

of the wall

section

But the Jews increased

fire of artillery.

walls as the ramp grew and then sortied

Vespasian

on a

had incorporated

camp to the north

pitched

who

to take the town by storm.

attempts

Vespasian

by Josephus
was situated

and Josephus

this slope into the defences.

to carry

down

great sieges which formed the putting

the height

of the

the Roman siege works.

and had a close

submission

and cause the Romans

to sortie

to his original

plan to take the town by

storm.
As the ramps
fire.

Josephus

sacks in front
hooks attached
works
wall.

neared

the walls a ram was brought

protected

the walls

for

by artillery

up protected

a time by manoeuvring

chaff-filled

of the ram head but the Romans cut down the sacks with reaping
The Jews then sortied

to long poles.

and destroyed

the siege

but the Romans set up the ram again and soon forced a breach in the
but the Jews
The Romans tried to enter using a testudo formation
boiling

poured

Romans could

boards

so the

not get any grip.

The Romans raised

the height

of the platforms

high encased in iron for protection,

ramps

overtopped

before

dawn.

slaughter

on the gangway

oil on them and boiled fenugreek

the walls

The Romans captured

followed.

Josephus

three

towers

artillery.

After

47 days the

and holding

and on advice

from

an informer

the town without

surrendered

276

50 ft

and erected

to Vespasian

attacked

resistance

just

and mass

to save his life.

Date:
Place:
Ref s:

AD 69
Placentia (Piacenza)
11 19-22
Tacitus Histories

The town of Placentia

added

walls,

besiegers

was held by supporters

heightened

parapets,

were Vitellians
was a violent

protective

equipment

known

The following
cratesque

torches

attacked

the gates with

The

supplies.

at the Vitellians,

forcing

AD 69
Vetera (Xanten,
Tacitus Histories

Germany)
IV 21-24

with

not have

serious

build

The defenders
and hurled

them to retire.

One

missiles.
(plut

and mantlets

the walls,

objects

the proper
but it is not

the walls,

with screens

days

casualties.

and incendiary

crowbars.

lead and bronze

stones,

did

outside

and began to undermine

et vineae)

with stakes,

to retire

the amphitheatre

day the besiegers

ramp and attack

missiles

and were forced

as both were hurling

which,

and gathered

The besiegers

assault.

in burning

side succeeded

the towers

the

the command of Caecina and for the first

under

the action

of Otho who had reinforced

siege

an earth

armed themselves
down millstones

Caecina

and
the

abandoned

siege.
Date:
Place:
Refs:

fortress

The legionary

5000 soldiers

only

but Tacitus

fire

so the

the defences

strengthened

first

return

fire

others

climbed

retreat

under

and demolished

but the range

on a testudo

civilian

were not designed

by storm;

was too great

Romans

settlement

to withstand

the Batavians

opened

the Romans could

although

then used scaling

formed

comrades

by their

The

manned.

Some Batavians

and captives

ladders

whilst

but they were forced

then showed the Batavians

siege tower to keep the defenders

undermine

the wall.

stones shot from ballistae.

by the Batavians
briefly

sparsely

but was held by

to

a hail of Roman missiles.

Roman deserters

could

for two legions

the neighbouring

the defences

artillery.

with

were

to take the fortress

tried

at some distance

was designed

ramparts

out that

points

Civilis

siege.

at Vetera

abandoned

the badly

Screens

and mantlets

by firebolts

assault,

knowing

supplies.
277

whilst

built

However

were burnt
the

off the rampart

how to build
others

engine

(crates

the

at a lower level

was destroyed

et vineae)

shot from catapults.

that

a timber

Romans

prepared

Civilis
were

by

short

then
of

who had served

While the Batavians

the Germans

most level.
fortress.

the Porta Praetoria

When it was near enough

to lift

crane

towards

and pushed

siege machinery

A two storey

and tried

was

out poles and used a

them into

at a time and drop

again gave up the assault

siege

where the ground

the Romans thrust

of the besiegers

up several

Civilis

on the rampart.

attacks

made uncoordinated

was built

tower

in the Roman army built

to persuade

the

the Romans

to surrender.
The Romans held out and when a relieving
battle

ensuing

Civilis

army arrived

dead or injured

was reported

In the

made a sortie.
and the Batavians

and

Germans fled.

AD 70
Jerusalem
Josephus BJ V 1-VI 442
Tacitus Histories V 11-13;
Dio LXV 4

Date:
Place:
Refs:

Jerusalem

over

of a number

was composed

fortifications,

of allies

be fought.

the city

with

three

disagreements

four

legions

The Jews sortied

on one side of
the single

against

the ground

and a

3 miles from

legions

as far as the city

on the west side of the city then moved in closer

forces
that
Jewish
the
it
then
only
and
was

begin the assault

its own

each with

camp was about

and the Romans levelled

legions

The three

walls.

arrived

in closer,

on the other.

legion but were repulsed

areas,

who had violent

His first

and auxiliaries.

and the fourth

of different
Titus

then he moved the legions

Jerusalem,

1-3

of factions

and held a number

how the war should

number

frags

to

made any attempt

to unite.
first

Titus'

target

was to capture

the New City and he constructed

guarded.
artillery,

An artillery
but without

The Roman artillery,

Romans brought
so Titus
Jews.
wall,

battle
causing
particularly

up a ram.

had three

75 ft high

the northern
platforms
broke

out,

suburb

the Jews using

that of the Xth,

captured

of their

was very

the Jews were still

(20 m) towers

effective

hindering

set up on platforms

278

Roman

inexperience.
and the

the assault

to bombard

forced
Jews
fell
down
the
to
tower
were
withdraw
one
the ram pierced it and after 15 days of the siege Titus captured
Although

as

where the walls were not strongly

much damage because

However

known

of Jerusalem

the

from the
the New

City.

Titus

Four days later

a tower

took the Middle

Town after

in the wall.

A five day lull in hostilities

then followed

to get the Jews to surrender.

the fortress

against

fire

heavy

and the Upper

tried

and Jewish

wall behind

another

for

struggle
legionar-ies

on taking

Temple,

the Romans'

brought

up and the Romans took

Again

Titus

Lower

and Upper

burnt

offered

capture

also taken.

Many others

city

from three

apart

by a massacre,

of Machaerus

surrounded
good supplies

A short

built
violent
of

when a small party

Titus

attacked
built

road

and

to the

were built,

rams were

by storm.

The Inner

to surrender
the latter.

then

took

the

I
The last area of

although

of the famine.
section

and a short

had very

strong

by deep ravines.
of weapons

many prisoners

suicide or died of starvation;

the effects

towers

because

Palace which was also taken using platforms.

had committed

some relish

rams

in a firebrand.

AD 72/73
Jordan)
Machaerus (Mukawar,
Josephus BJ VII 176Strobel " Das r6mische Belagerungswerk

A: The fortress
a plateau

Temple

ramps to reach

using

was followed

with

threw

brought

had already

by the ram.

ramps

the Jews an opportunity

Cities,

describes

Date:
Place:
Refs:

when a soldier

to hold out was Herod's

The final

Outer

the

time and in

The wall collapsed

and a wide

Several

objective.

next

and these

(6.6 km) with

ramps,

trumpets.

was destroyed

again

to become severe.

two days

their

and sounded

secretly

for a short

but the defenders

after

was ended

The fortress

Temple was then

them.

it which could not be reached

entered

Jews to surrender,

built

Antonia,

ramps

The Romans came under

the assault

in Jerusalem

counterrnines

the fortress

the Jews fled.

Jerusalem

the

and built

the ramps by Antonia

to bear on the walls and began undermining

of the assault

unsuccessfully

4
mile long circumvallation
a

constructed

The Romans then concentrated

tried

his legions

City.

to persuade

the food shortages

causing

Titus

then divided

seems to have abandoned

three days his legions

13 forts,

in which

The Jews then undermined

Titus

collapsed.

Titus

of Antonia

Josephus

and

unsuccessfully.

ensured

the ram against

using

Herod

and engines

279

Titus

were

Josephus

razed the entire

of the wall.

90
"Z
DPV
(1974)
Machc'irus
um
natural

defences,

had fortified
for

defence.

situated

on

the place and

Bassus,

the

of Judaea

governor
immediately

and

began to built

made frequent

of Legion

when one of their

the Roman siegeworks

but a certain

result

the Roman siege ramp,

Traces of 11 camps of various

survives

have been about

all c. 2x4m,

The earth
Josephus
fortress
top.

suggests

Its width

and

been

because

to be certain

and the whole

wall varies

m between

varies

between

from

of towers,
Roman feet).

(80-100

side,

would

1.8 m to 2.3

foundations

are the stone

25-35

circumvallation

in width

The

sections.

short

several

was on the west

a siege tower

to be unfinished

not the eastern

leading

as

up to the

15 m at the base to 30 m at the

15-20 m, high from the width

and its completion

of the ramp.

may have been rendered

by the surrender.

AD 72/73
Masada
Josephus BJ VII
Hawkes 1929
Schulten 1933
Richmond 1962
Yadin 1966

A: Masada was the last

Sicarii

more.

to have

appear

and was c. 85 m long and ran along a ridge

The ramp appears

Date:
Place:
Refs:

of

siege ramp

(cf : Masada).

unnecessary

long

The stone

an interval

with

and stone

Strobel

in four

and on the S. W sector

and

says,

as a

out,

three

and possibly

it is impossible

though

1 km longer.

its length

m along

have

at Machaerus

of camps and long stretches

and most would

are 2.5 km long

lengths

surviving

inside the town.

state of the circumvallation.

circumvallation

total

the fortress

surround

of the fragmentary
The

of

makes no mention

has been carried

sizes have been found,

to the circumvallation,

connected

a number

by the

have been traces.

of a circumvallation

camps

Josephus

amount of fieldwork

The Jews

was captured

nor the Jewish fortress

been excavated

These

The Jews

casualties.

but states that the Jews were trapped

a line of circumvallation

of which

heavy

favourites

him.

and

made a reconnaissance

sides suffered

Romans and Bassus made as if to crucify

B: Neither

X,

a siege ramp to the east of the fortress.

and both

sorties

surrendered

eventually

legate

275-406

fortress

from AD 66 to its capture

to hold out in Judaea and was held by the

in AD 72 or 73.

280

The fortress

was situated

on

a plateau
the easier

on the western

of these,

limestone
Sicarii

by deep ravines

surrounded

wall 18 ft high

The Xth legion

of Judaea,
posted

Silva,

the siege

been present

the legate of the legion

and governor

forts

at strategic

points

his HQ at the most convenient

on the western

works,

Masada stood were linked

having

a circumvallation,

He then established

sentries.

960
the
and

all the way around

in siege warfare,

experienced
built

Masada had a

by a fort.

guarded

food and water.

and Jerusalem.

immediately

directing

with

was very

at both Jotapata

side,

(5.5 m) with towers

were well supplied

in only two places,

and was accessible

to the higher

the rocks

side where

land around.

and

site for
on which

From here the Romans

began work

on a siege ramp along a limestone projection

which ended 450 ft
(135 m) below the level of Masada. A platform of earth 300 ft high (100 m) was
heaped up along the projection
and as this was not strong enough to take the
the Romans built

engines,
height

(30 M) covered

kept the defenders

artillery
the Sicarii

had already

and timber
soldiers

that the Romans kept

morning

to find

Josephus

archaeological

does
it

is

was built

for

great
fill

in

some

of

itself,

and not possible

because

ordered

Josephus
the fortress

much
the

his

states
in the

suicide.
the

of

details

4.5 km long,

Because

the line takes advantage

side where the ground

fire.

about

the
But

the wall.

Silva

ram.

7 had committed

details

and is 1.5 - 1.8 m wide.

For the most part

Roman

from

the

was built

of the rough

of

terrain

of the hardness

of the

of the steep slopes;

on

was more open a series of ten stone towers

There are eight

of the wall about 80 - 100 m apart.
two large and six small, which are situated
the fortress,

along the length

camps surrounding
at strategic

up the ramp,

and this was of earth

and entered

except

The circumvallation

was not necessary,

the eastern

overnight

to

possible

of the

at it and it caught

torches

go into

not

evidence.

the local limestone

ground.

to the blows

a close vigil

the first

wall inside

another

that all the defenders

but

siegeworks

ditch

built

burning

out with artillery

off the walls while the ram breached

and so impervious

to throw

with iron plates and fitted

and when this had been hauled

and a ram was constructed

point

(21 m) wide and the same

on top of it.

A 90 ft high tower

B:

pier 75 ft wide

a stone

points
directing

as Josephus
operations

stated.

Silva's

HQ at the most convenient

may well be camp Fl,

281

very

near to the ramp.

The

itself

ramp

limestone
engineers'
itself,

of
earth
,
Nearby

spur.

most

has been found

evidence
Date:
Place:
Refs:

been

specific

by famine and thirst.

by storm.

2 years

lasted

operations

were during

rebels a long time before

it is not known

though

this

the

whether

to the

Talmud

how intensive

and when it was taken

period,

nor Dio (who

Eusebius

explains

According

1924

AASOR

Neither

Beththera)

to

reference

operations

certain

held by Jewish

near to Jerusalem

citadel

or was taken

surrendered

little

concentrated,

by the Romans and the siege lasted

the Jews were destroyed

no

In the fortress

of the siege.

was a strong

The place was besieged

the

possibly

area,

AD 135
(Bettir)
Beththera,
Dio Ep. LXIX 13
Eusebius Ecclesiastical
Hist. iv 6
Carroll "Bettir
and its archaeological
remains"
Schulten 1933
Abel Histoire de la Palestine vol 11 1952

A: Beththera

makes

levelled

of the siege engines.

have

investigations

of a

an extension

was essentially

was an artificially

for the construction

yard

where

timber,

and

place

the

siege

the Roman

the inhabitants

were massacred.
B:

Bettir

is not mentioned

circumvallation

which

circumvallation

consisted

with earth
north

as the site of Eusebius'

was recognized

western

contravaHation,
on the vulnerable

sections

Schulten

though

is

there

a second

have been destroyed.

on a plateau

additional

points

evidence

along the

may

form

of this second

defences.

to the N. E of Bettir,

The archaeological

filled

probably

which

a long stretch

suggests

N. W side may be to provide

camp has been identified,

3m apart,

wall

The

accounts.

It was 4 km long and at several

and small stones.

and

in any of the literary

of two stone walls about

by the Roman

Beththera

wall

One Roman

but any others

gives no clue as to how the

place was taken.

Date:
Place:
Refs:
B:

The

investing
visible,

?
Woden Law
Richmond & St Joseph "Excavations
Frere & St Joseph 1983
Iron-age
works

hillfort

at Woden Law is partly

of Roman design.

the innermost

at Woden Law 1950" PSAS 1982

being

about

Three

different

enclosed
stages

21 m from the defences

282

by a series

of

of siege-lines

are

of the hillfort,

and

all three
ditches

lines

being

of a number

composed

The ramparts

platform.

they

have

could

This also explains

are no signs
defences

lines and evidence

the successive

undergoing

in the camps

1.6 km to the

at Pennymuir,

are such
been

exercises.

that the sections

of each

Woden Law was

up.

could have been quartered

training
north

by the literary

are suggested

from training

linked

and not properly

units

of any

It has therefore

assault.

next to a main road and troops

works

there

siege works

are practice

by different

line were built

by direct

been taken

the works

that

suggested

are incomplete,

Masada etc. and the hillfort's

siege camps as at Burnswark,

practice

3-3.3

between

All the lines in the circumvallation

that

The

and ramparts

0.9 - 1.2 m and in width between

m.
be
is
4.2
6.3
In
there
may
mound
which
addition
a
are
m
wide.
-

in depth

vary

an artillery

of ditches

sources

Such

of the site.

west

(Appian

86;

Iberica

Veg. 1 25; Seneca Ep. 18 6).

Date:
Place:
Refs:

?
Burnswark
Frere & St Joseph 1983

B: There

are two siege camps at Burnswark,

The larger

fort,

has three

to the south,

defended

probably

hillfort's

water

by an artillery

platform.

but is incomplete.

supply

were found

used as a training

area,

as at Woden Law.

more likely

by the presence

been held by rebels.

The northern

the hillfort,
camp dominated

Alternatively,

pottery

It if was, the siege appears

the
Lead

The site may have been

the presence

siege may have been carried

2nd
of
century

each

of two

This is made

out.

on the site and it may have

to have been resolved

before

finished.
camp was

the northern

c. AD 199-200
Hatra
Dio LXXVI 10Herodian 111 93

Date:
Place:
Refs:

Hatra as being surrounded

Dio describes
other

facing

on the hillside.

shots

that an actual

gateways

side of the hillfort

There is no circumvallation.

and clay catapult

camps suggests

one on either

supplies

besiegers.

available

locally,

He blames this

to take the city.

partly

Only Dio mentions

thus

mostly
creating

for the failure

that Severus

283

by desert

with little

considerable

water or

difficulties

of both Trajan

for

and Severus

made two attempts

to capture

Hatra.

On the first

The following

attempt

The Romans succeeded

despite

stones

the breaching

besieged

rebuilt

As a result

Reports

or shortly

and the archaeological

sources

according
another

to Dio,

assault

the

his army

at Dura

by the Persians

under

is by no means full

This
Shapur

in the literary

is not mentioned

The siege
evidence

had watched

150 miles east of Palmyra.

about

town was captured

AD 256.

after,

seem to

the siege.

of Excavations

on the Euphrates

Roman garrison

ordered

down

to surrender

an opportunity

However,

wall.

he abandoned

of this

c. AD 256
Dura Europos
Ed. Rostovtzeff,

important

Severus

but some events

of the siege are clear.

The Romans made preparations

in case of a siege,

including

the city walls by building

earth embankments

against
later

strengthening

the walls on both the inside

It seems probably

but would

by assault
including

have been impeded

of the

adjacent

of the walls.
to prevent

fired

their

The Persians
mine using

wall and tower

enter

and blocked

the city

pitch,

collapsed

possibly

both

the undermining
was a skirmish

completely

obstructed

sulphur,

but the Persians

here.

284

to take Dura
fire,

were made to

near the Palmyrene

undermined

up the countermine,

then

attempts

at a tower

The Persians

wall and when the two mines met there

companions.

was

walls and artillery

Several

wall and underpinned

curtain

Romans dug a countermine

Romans retreated

embankment

have attempted

by the high

One mine was directed

the walls.

gate on the S. E section

part

would first

missiles from the towers.

incendiary

undermine

the Persians

that

The inner

and outside.

it further.

to reinforce

widened

sloping

with

the tower

and

timber.

The

and destruction

of the

underground.

The

trapping

some of their

the countermine

and straw.

circuit

who hurled

some of which

artillery,

the wall and when Severus

B: Dura is situated
in,

of the outer

of the outer

stretch

and gave the Hatrenes

are specified

engines

two missiles simultaneously.

from a tribunal

in an

of siege machinery

inhabitants

the

powerful

and used very

following

Date:
Place:
Refs:

by

losses

heavy

suffering

no particular

down a short

in breaking

have been capable of firing

mutinied.

though

counter-attacks

vicious

and naphtha

the assault

after

withdrew

year the Romans used a wide variety

to take the city by storm,

attempt

wall

Severus

A section

and
of the

do not seem to have been able to

The Persians

also carried

against

out operations

the S. W wall of the city.

S-W
from
to
the
dug
the
40
long
edge
of
ravine
a
very narrow mine over
was
m
The mine was widened out near the foundations
of the tower
corner tower.
and these foundations
A short

was almost

destroyed.

completely

destroyed

so that

the Persians

was built

increased

the height

ing the great

efforts

the Persians

took.

fortified

were sent to capture

Romans sent them back Lydius

Cremna

When the famine

just

Lydius

fortifications.

B:

During

which

to

ballista

after

him.

belong

to

as he looked

the place.

been badly

Lydius

and when the

of supplies

which surrounded
from beyond

killed

Lydius

expelled

the

in the

everyone

his

punished

man went over

through

most

accurate

to the Romans and

a loophole

in Cremnals,

death the rest surrendered.

Lydius'

the

the command

Cremna was strongly

in supplies

Lydius
This

of Cremna

in the town

to the south

and

captured

it.

when

in the mid 3rd century

to have

emplacements
large

excavations

appear

strengthened
appear

Shortly

became worse

his target.

a catapult

with

dug to bring

taken

for missing

ramp

long consider-

under

them into the ravines

to defend

enough

was eventually

artilleryman
shot

hurled

He also had a tunnel

leaving

town,

Romans
the

undermined

of brigands

and old from the town because of shortage

Roman camp.

the south

1987 & 1988

Studies

and the Romans seem to have blockaded

the town.

the

have not shown how it was taken.

and Roman troops

the young

was

along
the

and

was finally

The city

A: The town of Cremna was held by a group

of Lydius

tombs,

that the siege was fairly

AD 278
Cremna, Anatolia
Zosimus 1 69-70
Mitchell & Waelkens Anatolian

Date:
Place:
Refs:

from

tower

tower

this

that

ramp against

seem to have

and

It seems likely

but the excavations

The Persian

debris

and

walls

this

on the siege ramp further

working

earth

of the

it to collapse.

causing

sacked

brick,

of

believed

Rostovtzeff

to missile fire.

wall would not be exposed

wall

and when the mine was fired

was built

tunnel

ventilation

and underpinned.

undermined

were almost completely

siege.

The

and several

damaged

several
town's

features

fortifications

of the towers

in the assault.

were

noted
were

on the west wall

A series

of artillery

of the site may also date to the siege and several

bc-Ols have been found

both inside

285

and outside

the defences.

Two rough
town,

had stone towers

have

encampments
tentatively
dating

identified

to this

and

immediately

site

inscription

This

the Roman road.

have attempted

to counter

opposite

the

artillery

platforms.

operations

Roman mound.

situated

march.

For two consecutive

on the upper
to do.
so they

was by direct

attempt
but they

were driven

surrounded
towers

soldiers

made reckless

Persian

archers

possession
were fired

on from

and opened

including

field

the

line

was in Sapor's

(vineae

the

this tower

missiles.

were protected

from the walls.

through

so they

serious

underground

forces
brought

first

Roman artillery
Amida was then

by iron plates

up.

and

and had

Some of the

so the gates were blocked

city

on the Persians

and siege ramps

et pluteii)

of

which

The Persians'

the city.

and other

When the Persian

causing

as

mounds

that

suggests

the use of captured

the defenders
sorties

entered

of a tower.
fire,

to destroy

resolved

The towers

on top to drive

evidence

the town wall

their

used

the Romans opened fire

However

and mantlets

artillery

may have

to

appear

days the Romans were asked to surrender

assault,

were constructed.

a mound inside

of the Tigris

reaches

back by artillery

by sheds

The defenders

Turkey)

Amida,

were expected

a Roman

than Zosimus implies.

were more extensive

who approached,

sides

The archaeological

AD 359
Amida (Diyarbakir,
Ammianus XIX 1

Date:
Place:
Refs:

they

Both

Terentius

(IGR 3 434,358).

23 m high.

by constructing

this

Probus

line of blockading

of what is probably

On the west side of the town are also the remains

been

HQ has

also mentions

the operations

siege mound c. 140 m long and at least

of Roman

to the Emperor

of the second

to the rear

the

facing

wall,

Roman

of the

of an inscription

who may have commanded

Marcianus

the

by the discovery

year

walls and beside

found

been

western

Some traces

to it and sallyports.

attached

the city's

the front

lines;

may be part of the Roman blockading

defences

facing

of the ridges

stone walls along the crest

Roman

At one point

tunnels

and

took

attacked

the Roman defenders

artillery

to bear on the tower

casualties.

Romans
inside constructed
the
to
ramp
grew
earthworks
siege
Gallic troops made a night
increase the height of the walls - In one incident
the
Romans
have
difficulties
to
fired
into
but
and
seem
catapults
got
sortie
As the Persian

with

no ammunition

so the Persians

would

286

be frightened

by the noise
-

The

Persians

finally

towers

drove

which

Both sides continued

the artillery

mounds but eventually

earth

a passage

from the wall to the earth

advanced

and took the city,

Persians

gradually

the outer

wall of Amida.

According

up their

The Romans brought

thein and dislodging

destroying

to raise their

creating

and brought

off the walls.

the defenders

to bear on the towers,

subsided,

to take Andda by storm

decided

onagri
-

the Roman one

bank over which

presumably

to Ammianus

siege

breaching

after

the Persians

the

the

slaughtered

Romans but he escaped.

AD 360
Singara (Beled Sinjar,
Ammianus XX 6

Date:
Place:
Refs:

The town,

in Mesopotamia,

situated

and was besieged

the Persians

by Sapor during

in which

an advance

along the walls.

to surrender,
ladders

using scaling

was held by two legions

the inhabitants

approached

themselves

posted

Iraq)

began to undermine

the walls under

(vineae

The Romans fired

The fighting

continued

Finally

sides.
attacked

tower

a round

siege.

and both

Persian

the protection

for several

on all parts

and mantlets

at the miners.

of missiles

days with heavy losses on both

up an exceptionally

powerful

The

to burn

ram with

Romans tried

kept

effective

up fierce

fire

in the joints

with

town.

A very small number

was killed

were transported

the

The Persian

indiscriminately

to remote parts

ram and

being breached
incendiary

bows and slings

of the newly

damp and the tower collapsed.

of the town

the main body of his force

of penthouses

a variety

days

several

after

was still

built

but

the

wall where

the

troops

and the rest,

entered

the

including

of Persia.

AD 360
Bezabde I
Ammianus XX 7

Date:
Place:
Refs:
Bezabde

was a very

side facing

Sapor

and

been rebuilt

mortar

the

nxissiles and artillery

which had recently

sides

ram was very

the soldiers,

brought

the Persians

in a previous
missiles

indecisively

assault

Meanwhile

and siege engines.

& pluteii).

As

Sapor gave the inhabitants

made a direct

then

units

Roman territory.

through

prepared

and other

gave

the

the river
town

fortress

strong

on the upper

the low ground

a day

to surrender,

287

reaches

was protected
then

his

of the Tigris.
by a double

troops

advanced

On
wall.
with

the fighting.
narrow

heavy losses in

and for the next two days both sides suffered

ladders

scaling

paths

the Persians

a one day truce

After

and were opposed

which also fired

blazing

Persian engines

came to a halt under

baskets

wicker

heavy

by very

fire

smeared

rams up the

to bring

tried

from

bows and artillery

The

and bitumen.

with pitch

the fire and were burnt

by the incendiary

devices.

Despite

heavy

losses

the Persians

during

the struggle

Persian

rams was covered

the exposed

themselves

of the wall.

After

fighting

followed,

When this collapsed

The Persian

formation

to be

less likely

the Persians

into the town.

rushed

A massacre and looting

were also taken.

many prisoners

garrison

was given
ladders

and scaling

destroyed

by missiles

Antioch.

heavy

under

Roman earthworks
when these

to take the town by storm

but were driven

millstones

up a massive

This was protected

by a very

back.

strong

mantlet

but could

were built
into

to enable

the Persians

action

ram was about to destroy

in a noose and then poured

The Persians
siege ramps

then

overtopped

down boiling
and burnt

sallied

the walls,

walls while the Romans attacked

the towers.
the Persians

Again
sortied

rushes

ten

had used at
not make an

the rams to be used effectively

fired

at them but in vain as the beams were elaborately

When the great

were

After

of column.

the Persians

was

a testudo

using

Roman penthouses

and chunks

ram which

but this

fire.

artillery

were brought

to surrender

an opportunity

including

days the Romans brought

of wood,

One of the

danger.

a weak tower and a weak

the Romans scattered.

The Romans attempted

rejected.

missiles

and

quickly

AD 360
Bezabde II
Ammianus XX 11

Date:
Place:
Refs:

impact

to extreme

It was used against

at close quarters

though

the town

with soaked hide and was therefore

damaged by the Roman missiles.

stretch

were keen to take

a tower
pitch,

nearly
artillery

in three

and burnt

incendiary

protected

the Persians

forcing

fire

kept

f rom fire.
its head

caught

the Romans to retreat.

all the siege engines.

divisions,

the Romans were repulsed

various

and

When the

the defenders

using

and despite

a ram against

off the
one of

being hard pressed

one of the Roman siege mounds which was made

and cane.

288

Constantius

decided

the approach

to blockade

to resort

of winter

Date:
Place:
Refs:

AD 361
Aquileia
Amrrdanus

Aquileia

was seized by supporters

it although

they

and

protection

of penthouses
textas)

siege.

The town's

position

besiegers

light

to breach

armed troops
devices

day direct

but were forced

assault

or with

and diverting
Constantius

hurdles

advanced

engines

they

the river

the

(pluteii

et cratesque

the walls but an assault

was repulsed.

towers

placed

efforts

so the

of three

ships

on platforms

they

approached

the defenders

kept

at a lower level crossed

and the towers

their

transferred

use of rams or mines

on top of the tower

on gangways

off the
and tried

were showered

fell into the river.

and the besiegers

tried

with

The following

tobreak

down a gate,,

and n-dssiles.
by direct

the siege with less energy.

began to prosecute
Aquileia

to

under

were unable to find a weak spot to take the city

force
to
made
were

Attempts

woven

in the face of fire

to retire

When the besiegers

forces

out the

was again tried

assault

Julian's

being

ever

an opportunity

given

were

ruled

As the towers

the wall.

of incendiary

variety

by cutting

to surrender

but the town did not surrender

the aqueducts

until

it heard

that

was dead.

AD 363
Pirisabora
Ammianus XXIV 2
Zosimus 3 17-19
Libanius Or. xviii 227-228

Date:
Place:
Refs:

This

wooden
Soldiers

together.

walls whilst

sent a force to take

sieges without

the besiegers

assault

by a river

constructed

fastened

to undermine

of the frontal

to a regular

refused

and closely

and tried

With the failure

suffering

so Julian

several

defenders

The

or surrendered.
when

of Constantius

to have survived

surrender
densius

losses

severe

XXI 12

it was known

destroyed

the siege after

he abandoned

out but with

the Persians

to starve

was a town

describes

in detail.

side it was further

eastern

side there

on the

lower

reaches

by water

ditch,
deep
a
was

the

Euphrates

by two circular

It was enclosed
protected

of

diverted

a palisade

289

which

Zosimus

walls and on the north

from the river

and towers.

whilst

on the

The citadel

had

its own walls of bitumen

but

surrender
trenches

didn't,

then

formation

but

the

approached

the Persians

that

were given

Maozamalcha
fortified

stood

which

which

up to the town.

siege

tower.

of a
to

attempted

When this

were taken and Zosimus

Julian

was forced

missile

attacks.

fight

a ram and a fierce

they

ground

AD 378
Adrianople
Ammianus

just

The
did

not

formation

followed.

down
The next

overran
to take

f rom, the

of the wall

day a replacement
another

town,

prisoners,

team

while

slaughtered
plundered

or a

During

gate.

on the walls

assault
the

and were

forces

a section

as the ram breached

want

but came under

his

to protect

broke

Romans

and began a mine

fire bombs and artillery

made a diversionary

the town.

because

it to the

work

the Romans

entered

population

his officers

Meanwhile

their

flares,

on devices

to concentrate

completed

sappers

stones,

rampart.

to surrender,

refused

set up artillery

in testudo

a deep

moved his camp to a

it with a doubt

garrison,

built ramps,

and was

on all sides with

Julian

water.

was held by a picked

archers,

to withdraw.

attack,

with

The Romans also attacked

forced

of miners

surrounded

the siege and fortified

in the ditches,

fire from slingers,

gate with

was filled

to conduct

position

the Romans filled

Date:
Place:
Refs:

next

50 miles west of Ctesiphon

less than

on a hill

at one point

When the town,

razed

artillery

the Roman lines.

through

safe conduct

two walls and 16 towers,

with

suitable

a night

Julian

2500 prisoners

surrendered.

then

the protection

the gate under

a helepoLis

built

then

and

defenders

The

The Romans fired

to retreat.

in the

filled

and

AD 363
Maozamalcha
Ammianus XXIV 4
Zosimus 3 20-22
Libanius Or. xviii 235-41

Date:
Place:
Refs:

ditch

gate

they

engines

a ram.

with

attacked

forced

were

undermine

states

up siege

walls and fled to the citadel.

then

made as if to

When the Persians

tower

a corner

and set up siege engines,

testudo

brought

Julian

breached

the outer

abandoned

brick

and baked

the
the

it and

XXXI

15

after the battle

The Goths were eager to take Adrianople
They surrounded
had heard there was treasure there.

290

nearby
the city

because they
and made a

direct

assault

surrender
gates,

When this

on all sides.

but the Romans refused.

strengthening

places and storing

The Goths tried

Roman traitors

and when this failed

were re-using

Roman missiles,

barbs

shafts

to arrow

During
their

the assault
attempts

using

stones and masonry,

the Goths came under

scaling

ladders

including

easier

direct

column drums.

291

fastening

the

not be reused.
Roman fire

by the Romans throwing

and
down

Because of their lack of success

in the siege and eventually

loot.

the help of

As the Goths

again.

heavy and accurate

were foiled

with

the cords
could

blocking
in suitable

up artillery

assault

so they

severed

included

to take the city

the Romans ordered

to be partly

the Goths became less interested

go after

tried

setting

to

the city

ordered

of defence

Measures

of the wall,

weak parts
water.

the Goths

failed

abandoned

it to

Bibliography
i. Texts

and Commentaries

Poliorketiker',
)
"Griechische
R.
ApoUodorus
Schneider
Damascus
(ed.
of
der Wissenschaften
GescheUschaft
zu
Abhandlungen
der Kninqlichen
Gttingen
X, 1908.
Arrian

(ed.

Roos A. G. ) Scripta

Caesar

(ed.

Holmes T. Rice)

C. Iuli

Caesar

(ed.

Seel 0. ) Bellum

Gallicum,

Caesar

(ed.

Klotz A. ) Bellum

c,n4*--,O-r

tee4-

Caesar

1961, Leipzig

(ed.

Tacitus

(ed.

Furneaux

Tacitus

(ed.

Koestermann

(ed. Ogilvie
1967, Oxford.

Vegetius

(ed.

(ed.
Vitruvius
1934.

Secondary

H. ) The Annals

of Tacitus,

Club)

Lang C. ) Epitoma
Granger

Rei Militaris,

1977, Leipzig.
Tacticus,

Aeneas

1891 & 1896, Oxford.

E. ) Vols 1-11.2,1960,1961,1962,
I. A. ) Cornelii

of

de metatione

Liber

Castrorum,

Greek
Illinois
Loeb, 1923.

R. M. & Richmond

& trans.

and The Aqueducts

Gromatici

de Metatione

Bellum

Africum,

Bellum

The Strataqems

A. ) Hygini

A. ) Hyqinus'

Grillone

L.--4=lr

C-E

(ed.
Von Domaszewski
1887, Leipzig.
castrorum,

1914, Oxford.

1969, Leipzig.

CO-X'L-.Q-r)

Onasander
(ed.
& trans.
The
Onasander,
Asclepiodotus,

ii.

Commentarii,

(ed.
Klotz
A. ) Bellum
Alexandrum,
1966, Stuttgart.
fragmenta,
Hispaniense,

Hyginus

Tacitus

Caesaris

Civile,

(ed. & trans.

Frontinus
Bennett
Rome, Loeb, 1950.
Hyginus

1928, Leipzig.

Minora,

Tacit

Leipzig.
De Vita Agricolae,

1885, Leipzig.

H. ) The Ten Books on Architecture,

Loeb,

Sources
The Roman Art

of War under

the Republic,

Cambridge,

Adcock

F. E. (1940)
Mass.

Agache

R. 1966 Recherches
'
Paris.
Picardie,

Agache

Protohistoriques,
A4rienne de vestiges
R. 1970 Ddtection
Romains et MOdidvaux dans le bassin de la Somme et ses abords,
du Nord No. 7, Heilly.
de la Soc. de Prehistorique

a6riennes

292

de I'habitat

rural

ciaUo-romaine

en

GalloBull.

der R6mischen

Alf6ldbG.
1968 Die Hilfstruppen
Band 6, Dusseldorf.
Alter

R. 1973 "The Masada Complex"

Astin

A. E. 1978 Cato the Censor

Austin

N. J. E. 1979 "Ammianus

Proving

56,19-24.

Commentary

Oxford.

on Warfare"

Coll.

Barnes

T. D. 1979 "The date of Vegetius"

Phoenix

Becatti

G. 1957 Colonna

Milano.

di Marco Aurelio,

Bell M. J. V. 1965 "Tactical

xiv, 404-22.

Reform

American

33,254-7.

in the Roman Republican

J. 1982 "The Great Chesters

Bennett
Bennett

165.

Latomus

A. C. 1983 On Powers or The Magistracies of the Roman State,

Philological
Society Memoirs vol. 149, Philadelphia
-

Bandy

ES

Inferior,

Germania

'Pilum Murale"'

Historia

Army"

AA series

5 x, 200-205.

J. 1986 "Fort sizes as a Guide to Garrison

Study
Type: A preliminary
Forts in the European
in Unz C- (ed. ) Studien
Provinces"
of Selected
Roms III,
Stuttgart.
zu den Militdrgrenzen

Bingham J. 1631 The Art of embattling

Tactics.
Birley

E. 1951 "Centurial

stones

or the second part of Aelian's

an army,

from Hadrian's

Wall",

TCWAAS series

ii

Birley

E. 1953 "The Epigraphy

of the Roman Army" in Actes du Deuxi6me
Conqr6s International
d'Epigraphie
Grecque et latine, 226-38.

Birley

E. 1966 "Alae and cohortes

54-67.
Swobodae dedicata,

Birley

E. 1969 "Septimius

Severus

Birley

E. 1981 "A Note on Hyginus

in

milliariae"

Corollae

and the Roman Army"

ES 8,63-82.

and the First

Britannia

Cohort"

Erich

memoriae

xi,

Birley

E. 1982 "The Dating and Character

of the text de munitionibus
in Wirth G. (ed. ) Romanitas-Christianitas
Untersuchunqen
castrorum"
der
Kaiserzeit.
Johannes
Geschichte
Literatur
rmischen
und
zur
Straub zum 70.277-281.

Birley

E. 1982 "The
Historia-Auqusta

Dating of Vegetius
and the Historia
57-67.
Colloquium,
(1975),

Boon G. 1977 Review of von Petrikovits

115
1977 "Arrian

and the Alani"

Bosworth

A. B.

Bouchier

E. S. 1915 Review of Santacruz

293

Antiquaries

Augusta"

Journal

HSCP, zi-4 - 2-56

(1914),

JRS v, 256-257.

Bonner

Ivii,

113-

Breeze

D. 1969 "The Organization

of the Legion:
Equites Legionis"
JRS lix, 50-55.

Breeze

D. 1980 "Agricola
24.

BriUiant

R. 1967 "The Arch

Broshi

M. 1982 "The

Scottish

the Builder",

of Severus

and the

Forum 12,14-

Archaeoloqical

MAAR xxix.

in the Roman Forum",

379-84.

JJS xxxiii,

of Josephus"

Credibility

Cohort

the First

225 BC - AD 14, Oxford.

Brunt

P. A. 1971 Italian

Cagnat

R. 1913 l'Arme romaine d'Afrique

Paris.
sous les Empereurs,

Manpower,

et lloccupation

de l'Afrique

militaire

Campbell D. B. 1986 "What happened at Hatra? The Problems of the Severan

Siege Operations.
", Freeman P. & Kennedy D. (eds. ) 51-58.
Campbell
Chantraine

B. 1987 "Teach

how to be a general"

yourself

H. (ed. ) 1984 Das rnsche

Neuss

Cheesman

G. L. 1911 "Numantia"

JRS i, 180-6.

Cheesman

G. L. 1914 The Auxilia

of the Roman Imperial

Clarke

C. 1896 Die Reliefs

der Traianssdule,

Collingwood
R. G. & Richmond
London.
ConnoUy

Berlin.

I. A. 1969 The Archaeology

of Roman Britain,

P. 1981 Greece and Rome at War.

Century
Origins
P. K. 1968 The Third
of the
D. Phil. thesis.
Oxford
University
unpublished

Crawford

O. G. S. 1949 The Topography

Crump G. A. 1975 " Ammianus

27.
Curle

Oxford.

Army,

J. 1767 "The military institutions

in PhiDips
of the Romans", reprinted
T. R. (ed. ) (1944) The Roots of Strategy,
Harrisbury
Military Service
Publications
Co.

Cichorius

Cooper

13-29.

JRS lxxvii,

Marcellinus

of Roman Scotland,
as a military

Post and its

J. 1911 A Roman Frontier
Glasgow.
the Parish of Melrose,

Dain A. 1967 Les Stratkiistes

'New'

People:

Roman

Cambridge.

historian"

the

Army,

Fort

Historia,

Heft

of Newstead

in

Byzantines.

Davies

R. W. 1968a "Roman Wales and Roman Military

Cambr. 117,103-20.

Davies

R. W. 1968b " Fronto,

95.

Hadrian

Practice-Camps",

and the Roman Army"

294

Latomus

Arch.

xxvii

75-

Davies

R. W. 1971 "Cohortes

Historia

Equitataell

751-63.

xx,

Davies R. W. 1974 " The Daily Life of the Roman Soldier

ANRW IIA,
299-338.
Davison D. P. 1989 The Barracks
of the Roman Army
Centuries
AD BAR Int. Series 472.
Delbrtick
H. 1975 History of the Art
History,
English translation.
Dennis

G. T.

(ed. ) 1984 Maurice's

Dennis

G. T.

(ed. ) 1985 Three

Dillon

1814 The Art of Embattlinq

Tactica,
London.

Military

Surveyors:

an Army,

CFHB 25.

Treatises,
An

B. 1967 Die Ranqordnunq

Durry

Pr6-toriennes,

des r6mischen

S. S. 1980 "Hyginus

e Paccampamento

romano"

Frere

S. S. & St Joseph

Frere

S. S. & Lepper

Fuhrmann

Cohort",

and the First

J. K 1983 Roman Britain

Column,

F. 1988 Traian's

Lehrbuch,

M. 1960 Das Systematische

Gabba E. 1983 "Tecnologic

militare anticall,
Atti del Convegno di Como, 219-234.
Garlan
Gichon

Y- 1972 La cluerre

Heeres,

Paris.
Monographs

154-161.

Athenaeum,

Freeman P. & Kennedy

D. (eds. ) 1986 The Defence of the
Byzantine
East, British Institute
at Ankara
of Archaeology
No. 8; BAR Int. Series 297, Oxford.
Frere

the

part of Aelian's

R. 0.1971
Roman Military
Records on Papyru
Philological
,
Philological
Association
No. 26, London.
of the American

P. 1934 "Polibio

to

Introduction

beinq the second

Von Domaszewski A. /Dobson

2nd Ed, K61n.

Fraccaro

to Third

of Political

the Framework

of War within

Byzantine

0. A. 1971 The Roman Land

Agrimensores,
Newton Abbott.

Fink

from the First

Strateqicon.

Dilke

M. 1938 Les Cohortes

the Principate

under

Britannia

xi,

from the Air,

Roman and
Monograph

51-60.
Cambridge.

Gloucester.
Gttingen.

Tecnologia,

economia e societa,

dans Pantiquit-.

to the Bellum
M. 1986 "Aspects
of a Roman Army in War According
in Freeman P. & Kennedy D. (eds. ) 287-310.
Judaicum of Josephus",

Gilliam J. F. 1965 " Dura, Rosters

74-92.
Goffart W. 1977 "The
65-100.
xxxiii

and the Constitutio

Date and Purpose

295

of Vegetius'

Antoninianall

Historia

De Re Militari"

14,

Traditio

Goffart

London.

W. 1989 Rome's Fall and After,

in Evans
C. D. 1974 "Vegetius and his proposed reforms of the Army",
J. A. S. (ed. ) Polis et Imperium,
Studies in Honour of E-T. Salmon.

Gordon

Goudineau 1990? Caesar et la Gaule, Paris

Grenier

A. 1931 Manuel d'arch(ologie

volA,

qaUo-romaine,

Paris.

Hanson W. S. 1978 "Roman campaigns north of the Forth-Clyde

evidence of the temporary
camps", PSAS 109,140-50.
Hanson
Hassall

W. S. 1987 Agricola

and the Conquest

M. W. C. 1970 "Batavians
Britannia
1,131-6.

of the North,

the

and

Roman

C. 1929 "The

Hawkes

C. 1929 Review

Roman Siege of Masada" Antiquity

Hawkes C. & Richmond

72-75.

of Schulten,

11
The pre-Roman
115-8.

1.1934

Hazell P. J. 1981 "The Pedite

Review of Schulten,
Gladius"

Antiquaries

Forts",
in
Provinces,

111,195-213.

1904-12,

Numantia,

Britain",

of

M. W. C. 1983 "The Internal

Planning of Roman Auxiliary
Hartley
B. & Wacher J. (eds. ) Rome and her Northern
Gloucester,
96-131.

Hawkes

the

London.

Conquest

Hassall M. W-C- 1977 Review of Groenman & van Waateringe,

Antiquaries
Journal lvii,
garrisons
of Valkenburg",
Hassall

isthmus:

JRS xix,

99-102.

Masada 1933, JRS xxiv,

Journal

Ixi,

73-82.

Hobley

B. 1971 "An Experimental

Reconstruction
Turf
of a Roman Military
in Applebaum
Rampart",
S. (ed. ) Roman Frontier
Studies 1967, Tel
Aviv, 21-33.

Holder

P. A. 1980 The Auxilia

Oxford.

Holmes T. Rice 1911 Caesar's

from Augustus

Conquest

to Trajan

"On the probable

Hopkins
age structure
Studies 20: 2,245-264.
Population
A. 1990 Ecluus:

of the

Roman

The Horse in the Roman World,

London.

James S. 1983 "Archaeological

40,142-43.
Jobey G. 1978 "Burnswark

Evidence

Hill,

for Roman Incendiary

Dumfriesshire",

Johnson A. 1983 Roman Forts of the First

London.
the German Provinces,
Johnson

Series

70,

of Gaul.

I
K.

Hyland

BAR Int.

S. 1983 Late Roman Fortifications,

296

TDGNHAS

and 2nd Centuries

London.

population",

Projectiles",

Si

53,57-104.
AD in Britain

and

Jones G. D. B.
camps",
Jones,

G. D. B. 1970 "The

M. and Wetters

London

D. 1986 "'European
Kennedy
Freeman P. & Kennedy

limes in Osterreich,

Keppie

L. 1984 The Making

of the Roman Arm

Kiechle

F. 1964 "Die Taktik

des Flavius

London.
BRGK 45,88-129.

zu, antiken

der

Lenoir
Lenoir

Luttwak

M. 1977 "Lager

M. 1979 Pseudo-Hygin,
Paris.
Budd,
E. N.

1976 The

August

Grand

des

Fortifications

Strateqy

of the

on Armour
MacMullen R. 1960 "Inscriptions
AJA 64,23-40.
Roman Empire",

militare

297

die

Paris.

697-722.
du Camp,

Roman

Empire,

and the Supply

Association

G.

Baltimore.

of Arms

in
Great Britain:
"Roman
1990
D.
a case
weapons
Marchant
dating
1,1-6.
in
typology",
JRMES
and
Spearheads,
problems

Marquardt J. 1891 De llorclanisation

tome
xi.
romaines,
antiquitO-s

und

Paris.

MEFR lxxxix,

mit Claviculae",

und

Oxford.

Romains sous le Haut Empi

Lqion

Kaiserzeit

BAR 206, Oxford

A. W. 1979 Greek aims in fortification,

Le Bohec Y. 1989 La Troisiime

der Griechen

de Damas 'I REG 111 230-280.

d'ApoUodore

J. 1984 Roman Stone Fortifications,

Le Bohec Y. 1989 L'ArmOe

Kriegsgeschichte,

und Krieqfhrunq

Lammert F. 1931 l' Die rmische Taktik

zu Beginn
Geschichts-Schreibungl',
Philolocius 23,2.

Lawrence

of Hatra",

London.

G. 1922 Schlachten-Atlas

Kromayer J. & Veith G. 1928 Heerwesen

Rmer, Mnchen.

Siege

Severan

Arrianus"

King A. C. 1990 Roman Gaul and Germany,

Lander

Vienna.

Soldiers'
and the
D. (eds. ) 397-409.

Lacoste E. 1890 "Les poliorcO-tiques

im

Soldat

Der r6mische

des Augustus.
Mainz.

H. 1986 Der r6mische

Keay S. 1988 Roman Spain,

Kromayer J. & Veith

Leipzig.

BBCS 23,100-3.

Roman Camps at Y Pigwn",

Junkelmann
M. 1986 Die Legionen
Experiment,
archdologischen
Kandler

Two Roman marching

Gareg:

and Arosfa

1965 IlYdstradfellte
BBCS 21,174-8.

in the

study:

chez les romain s, Manuel des

Marsden
E. W.
Oxford.

1969 Greek

and

Marsden

E. W. 1971 Greek and Roman Artillery:

Maxfield

V. 1981 The Military

Maxfield V. 1986 "Pre-Flavian

72.
Maxwell G. S.
camps",

and their

Forts

Oxford

Treatises,

Technical

of the Roman Arm

Decorations

Development,

Historical

Artillery:

Roman

Garrisons",

London.

Britannia

1980 "Agricola's
Campaigns:
the evidence
Scottish Archaeological
Forum 12,25-54.

17,59-

of the temporary

Mazzarino, S. 1971 "La Traeizione

I'Impero
Ie
sulla, Guerre tra Shabuhr
Romano: 'Prospettivel
e 'Deformazione Storica"' Acta Antiqu
xix 59-82.
Mller G. 1984 " Die militrischen
in Chantranine
(ed. ).
Napolon

111 1865-6 Histoire

Nash-Williams
M. G.,
Oppenheim

Anlagen

de Jules Csar,

V. E. 1969 The Roman Frontier

Cardiff.
A. L. 1955 "Siege-documents

II,

des Gaules,

Guerre

Parker

H. M. D. 1932 "The antiqua

London.

Oxford.

legio of Vegetius",

Paul G. M. 1984 A Historical

Commentary on Sallust's
Classical
ARCA
& Medieval
Texts,
Papers
Liverpool.

CQ 26,137-49.
Bellum Jugurthinum,
13,
and Monographs

Legionslager
H. 1975 Die Innenbauten
rmischer
von Petrikovits
der rheinische-westflischen
Prinzipatszeit,
Abhandlungen
56, Opladen.
der Wissenschaften
Pitts

L. F. & St Joseph J. K. 1985 Inchtuthil:

Series 6.
Monograph
Britannia

Platnauer
Rainbird

M. 1918 Septindus
J. S. 1969 "Tactics

Rawson E. 1971 "The literary

13-31.
xxxix,

Severus,

The Roman

der
whrend
Akademie

Legionary

Fortress,

Review

19,11-12.

London.

at Mons Graupius",
sources

Jarrett

17,69-89.

Iraq

Owens E. J. 1991 The City in the Greek and Roman World,

H. M. D. 1928 The Roman Leqion

Paris.

in Wales 2nd ed. revised

from Nippur",

Parker

von Novaesium ",

und die Siedlungen

Classical

for the pre-Marian

"The
1934
J.
McIntyre
&
I.
A.
Richmond
TCWAAS 34,50-61.
Crackenthorpe",
"The
1937
S.
G.
&
Keeney
Richmond I. A.
AA 4,14,129-50.
Coquetdalehead",

298

Roman Army",

PBSR

Roman Camps at Rey Cross

Roman Works

at Chew

and

Green,

Northumberland

County

Richmond I. A. 1955 "Roman Britain and Roman Military Antiquities",

Proceedings
Reckitt Archaeological
Lecture),
of the British
x1i, 297-315.

(Albert
Academy

Richmond
I. A. 1940 The
History
15.

Richmond

Romans

I. A. 1962 "The Roman Siege-Works

Richmond I. A. 1968 Hod Hill Volume

1951 and 1958, London.
Rivet

Redesdale,

in

Two:

JRS lii 142-55.

at Masada",
Excavations

out between

carried

A. L. F. 1971 "Hillforts
in Action",
in Hill D. & Jesson M. The Iron ACI
Wheeler,
Hillforts,
to Sir
Mortimer
and its
papers
presented
Southampton,
109-202.

Robinson

H. RusseU 1975 The Armour

Rossi L. 1971 Trajan's

of Imperial

Rome, London.

Column and the Dacian Wars, London.

Royal

Commission
on
Roxburghshire.

Rger

C. B. 1984 "Eine Kleine

Chantraine.

Ancient

St Joseph J. K. 1936 "The

107-112.

& Historic

Monuments

Garnisongeschichte

des rmischen

Roman Camps at Pennymuir",

1956

Scotland

for

4 vii,

PSAS Series

JRS x1i, 52-65.

St Joseph J. K. 1951 "Air

Reconnaissance

of north

St Joseph J. K. 1958 "Air

101.

Reconnaissance

in Britain,

1955-7 ", JRS x1viii,

St Joseph J. K. 1969 "Air

28.

Reconnaissance

in Britain,

1965-68",

Britain",

Stracathro
Camps at Ardoch,
i, 163-78.
Britannia

St Joseph J. K. 1970 "The

Recent Excavations",
St Joseph J. K. 1973 "Air
1xiii, 214-46.

Reconnaissance

St Joseph J. K. 1977 "Air

1xvii, 125-61.

Reconnaissance

in Roman Britain,

S. S. 1983b Roman Britain

Saddington
Harare.

1982 The

Development

299

of the

86-

104-

Wells:

1969-72",

JRS

1973-6",

JRS

in Roman Britain,

and the site of

from the Air,

Auxiliary
the
Roman
development
"The
1975
of
D.
B.
Saddington
ANRW 11.3,176-201.
to Trajan",
Augustus
D. B.

JRS lix,

and Ythan

St Joseph J. K. 1983a "The camp at Durno, Aberdeenshire,

ix, 271-87.
Britannia
Mons Graupius",
St Joseph J. K and Frere

in

Neuss",

Cambridge.
Forces from

Roman Auxiliary

Forces,

Saggs H. W. F. 1944 The Might

Sander

E. 1940 " Die antiqua

Santacruz
Schenk

that

ordinatio

Assyri
was

London

legionis

des Vegetius

Ausg

Schulten

A. 1927 Numantia

III.

Die Lager

des Scipi

Schulten

A. 1929 Numantia

IV.

Die Laqer

bei Renieblas,

Schulten

A. 1931 Numantia

I. Die Stadt

Schulten

A. 1933 Geschichte

Settis

Die Burg

des Herodes

Traiana,

0. L. 1933 "The Ancient

Syrian
M. 1984 "'Europeans'
Hatra",
Roman Army Studies I.

Speidel

M. 1992 The Framework

Cardiff.
Caerleon
Lecture,

Die

-en

Munich.
Munich.

und die rmischen

Books 1&2:
unpublished

Lager,

A Translation
PhD thesis.

Troops

Elite

and

CJ 28,657-669.

Writers"

of an Imperial

at Dura-Europos

Leqion.

The

Fifth

and
Annual

of Nicomedia.

Stadter

P. A. 1978 "The Ars Tactica

1xxiii 117-128.

Stolle

F. 1912 Das Laqer

Suolahti

J. 1955 The Junior

Helsinki.
Period,

Syme R. 1958 Tacitus,

I.

Torino.

Military

Speidel

P. A. 1980 Arrian

Rei

Munich.

Numantia,

Silhanek
D. K. 1971 Vecretius'
Epitoma
Commentary,
New York University

Stadter

Epitoma

von Numantia.

S. (ed. ) 1988 La Colonna

SPaulding

der

die Quellen

Renatus.

Schulten
der
A. 1914 Numantia:
die Erc lebnisse
Keitiberer
und ihre Kriege mit Rom, Munich.

Schulten A. 1933 Masada:

Leipzig.

", Klio 32,382-91.

Madrid.

S. G. 1914 El Solar Numanting,

D. 1930 " Flavius Vegetius

Militaris",
Klio Beheift 22.

Tradition

of Arrian:

der
R6mer,
Heer
und
Officers

of the

and Originality",

CP

Strasburg.

Roman

in the

Army

Republican

Oxford.

Thompson E. H. 1977 Review of von Petrikovits

eA 1/04jv
G. 1985 'Ein
Ulbert
spatrepublikanisches
A
Madrider BeitrAge II.
Extremadura",
Walbank F. W. 1957,1967,1979,
Oxford.

A Historical

300

1975, Britannia
Legionslager

Commentary

461-463.

viii,
in

Spanisch-

on Polybius,

3 vols,

Warry

J. 1980 Warfare

in the Classical

World.

Watson G. R. 1983 The Roman Soldier,

Webster

G. 1988 The Roman Imperial

Wellesley

K. 1975 The Long Year,

London.

AD 69, London.

Wescher
C.
(ed. ) 1867 Poliorc6tique
Apollodorus
of Damascus).
Westington
Wheeler

M. M. 1938 Atrocities

des

E. L. 1977 Flavius Arrianus:

A Political
University
PhD thesis.
unpublished

Wheeler E. L. 1979 "The Legion

E. L. 1988 Stratagem
Mnemosyne
Supp.
108.

Wheeler M. 1943 Maiden Castle,

Wheeler M. 1964 Roman Art
Wightman

as Phalanx",
and

the

and Military

Biograph

GRBS xix,

Tactica",
Chiron

Tacticus,

to 133 BC.
,

Duke

351-365.

303-318.

ix,

Vocabulary

of

Military

Trickery,

Oxford.

and Architecture,

E. 1985 Gallia Belgica,

Wilkes J. J. & Frere

of Arrian's

(Aeneas

Grecs,

in Roman Warfare

Wheeler E. L. 1978 "The Occasion

Wheeler

3rd Ed, London.

Army.

London.

London.

S. S. 1989 Stracleath,

Britannia

Monograph

No. 9.

Wilson D. R. 1974 "Roman Camps in Britain",

in Pippidi D. M. (ed. ) Actes du
d'2tudes
IX Conqres International
Romaines 341sur les FrontiOres
350..
Wiseman P. & Wiseman A. 1980 Julius
London.
Yadin

Y. 1966 Masada,

Caesar:

London.

301

The Battle

for Gaul, translation,