1

Alawi v. Alauya

Sophia Alawi is a sales representative of EB

Villarosa & Partners, Co. Ltd. Of Davao City,
while Ashari Alauya is an incumbent
executive clerk of court of 4th Judicial
Sharia District in Marawi City.
Alawi and Alauya were classmates and
friends.
Through Alawis agency, a
contract was executed for the purchase on
instalments by Alauya of one of the
housing
units
belonging
to
the
abovementioned firm.
Thereafter, a
housing loan was granted to Alauya by the
National
Home
Mortgage
Finance
Corporation (NHMFC). On December 15,
1995, Alauya addressed a letter to the
President of Villarosa and Co. advising the
termination of contract with the company,
on the ground that Alauyas consent was
vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit,
fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence
by sales agent which makes the contract
void ab initio.
Alauya also wrote to Vice President of
Credit and Collection Group of National
Home Mortgage Finance Corp. (NHMFC)
repudiating as fraudulent and void his
contract with Villarosa & Co. and asking for
a cancellation of his housing loan.
Alauya also wrote to Ms. Corazon Ordonez,
Head of Fiscal Management and Budget
Office, and to the Chief, Finance Division of
Supreme Court to stop deductions from his
salary.
Alawi filed on SC a verified complaint dated
January 25, 1996, to which she appended a
copy of the letter and accused Alauya of:
o Imputation of libellous charges with
no solid grounds through manifest
ignorance and evident bad faith.
o Causing undue injury.
o Unauthorized enjoyment of free
postage.
o Usurpation of the title attorney
which only regular members of the
Philippine Bar may use.
Alauya thereafter claims that Alawi was
only envious of him for being an Executive
Clerk of Court but also a scion of a Royal

Family. He also claimed that Alawi falsified

his signature.
As with the use of the title attorney, he
justified it by assertion that it is
synonymous with Counsellors-at-Law. He
preferred
to
use
attorney
because
counsellor
is
often
mistaken
for
councillor.

Issue:

Whether or not Alauya is guilty of libellous

charges without solid grounds through bad
faith.

Whether or not Alauya is entitled to use

the appellation attorney.
Ruling:
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees (R.A. 6713)
enunciates the State policy of promoting a high
standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in
the public service.
Public officials and
employees must at all times respect the rights
of others and refrain from doing acts contrary
to law, good morals, good customs, public
policy, public order, public safety and public
interest.
The conduct of behaviour of every official and
employee
of
an
agency
involved
in
administration of justice from presiding judge
to the most junior clerk, should be
circumscribed
with
heavy
burden
of
responsibility.
He must act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good faith.
As to Alauyas usurpation of the title
attorney, the Court has declared that persons
who passed the Sharia Bar are not full-fledge
members of the Philippine bar.
His
disinclination to use the title counsellor does
not warrant his use of the title attorney.

In In re Meling, the Court said that the title

attorney is reserved only to those, who,
having obtained the necessary degree in
the study of law and successfully taken
the Bar Examinations, have been admitted
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and remain members thereof in good
standing, and it is they who are authorized
to practice law in this jurisdiction.
OFFICE
OF
THE
COURT
ADMINISTRATOR vs. ATTY. MISAEL M.
LADAGA
A.M. No. P-99-1287 January 26, 2001
Facts:
Atty. Misael Ladaga, Branch Clerk of Court of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati, appeared as
counsel for and in behalf of his cousin, Narcisa
Naldoza Ladaga, an accused in Criminal Case
No. 84-885 for Falsification of Public
Documents before the METC of Quezon City. It
is also denied that the appearance of said
respondent in said case was without the
previous permission of the Court.
During the occasions that the respondent
appeared as such counsel before the METC of
Quezon City, he was on official leave of
absence. Moreover, his Presiding Judge, Judge
Napoleon Inoturan was aware of the case he
was handling. Respondent appeared as pro
bono counsel for his cousin-client Narcisa
Ladaga. Respondent did not receive a single
centavo from her. Helpless as she was and
respondent being the only lawyer in the family,
he agreed to represent her out of his
compassion and high regard for her.
This is the first time that respondent ever
handled a case for a member of his family who
is like a big sister to him. He appeared for free
and for the purpose of settling the case
amicably. Furthermore, his Presiding Judge was
aware of his appearance as counsel for his
cousin. On top of this, during all the years that
he has been in government service, he has
maintained his integrity and independence.

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DECISION: Reprimanded.
He failed to obtain a prior permission from the
head of the Department. The presiding judge of
the court to which respondent is assigned is
not the head of the Department contemplated
by law.
Issue:
WON Atty. Ladaga, upon such
appearances, was engages into
practice? NO

several
private

Held:
Respondent is charged under Sec. 7(b)(2) of
the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees which prohibits
civil servants from engaging in the private
practice of their profession. A similar
prohibition is found under Sec. 35, Rule 138 of
the Revised Rules of Court which disallows
certain attorneys from engaging in the private
practice of their profession.
THERE WAS NO PRIVATE PRACTICE:
In People vs. Villanueva:
Practice is more than an isolated appearance,
for it consists in frequent or customary action,
a succession of acts of the same kind. In other
words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs.
Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, N.S.
768). Practice of law to fall within the
prohibition of statute has been interpreted as
customarily or habitually holding ones self out
to the public, as a lawyer and demanding
payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4
S. E. 522, 98 N. C. 644, 647). The appearance
as counsel on one occasion, is not conclusive
as determinative of engagement in the private
practice of law.
Based on the foregoing, it is evident that the
isolated instances when respondent appeared
as pro bono counsel of his cousin in Criminal
Case No. 84885 does not constitute the
private practice of the law profession
contemplated by law.

Cayetano v. Monsod
FACTS: Monsod was nominated by President
Aquino as Chairman of the Comelec. The
Commission on Appointments confirmed the
appointment despite Cayetano's objection,
based on Monsod's alleged lack of the required
qualification of 10 year law practice. Cayetano
filed this certiorari and prohibition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Monsod has been
engaged in the practice of law for 10 years
RULING: YES. The practice of law is not limited
to the conduct of cases or litigation in court. It
embraces the preparation of pleadings and
other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, the management of such actions
and proceedings on behalf of clients, and other
works where the work done involves the
determination of the trained legal mind of the
legal effect of facts and conditions (PLA vs.
Agrava.)
The records of the 1986 constitutional
commission show that the interpretation of the
term practice of law was liberal as to consider
lawyers employed in the Commission of Audit
as engaged in the practice of law provided that
they use their legal knowledge or talent in their
respective work. The court also cited an article
in the January 11, 1989 issue of the Business
Star, that lawyers nowadays have their own
specialized fields such as tax lawyers,
prosecutors, etc., that because of the demands
of their specialization, lawyers engage in other
works or functions to meet them. These days,
for example, most corporation lawyers are
involved in management policy formulation.
Therefore, Monsod, who passed the bar in
1960, worked with the World Bank Group from
1963-1970, then worked for an investment
bank till 1986, became member of the
CONCOM in 1986, and also became a member
of the Davide Commission in 1990, can be
considered to have been engaged in the
practice of law as lawyer-economist, lawyermanager, lawyer-entrepreneur, etc.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Commission on

Appointments committed grave abuse of
discretion in confirming Monsods appointment
RULING: NO. The power of the COA to give
consent to the nomination of the Comelec
Chairman by the president is mandated by the
constitution. The power of appointment is
essentially within the discretion of whom it is
so vested subject to the only condition that the
appointee should possess the qualification
required by law. From the evidence, there is no
occasion for the SC to exercise its corrective
power since there is no such grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the CA. Adapted

Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, 223 SCRA 378

(1993)
FACTS: The petitioner contends that the
advertisements reproduced by the respondents
are champertous, unethical, demeaning of the
law profession, and destructive of the
confidence of the community in the integrity of
the members of the bar and that, to which as a
member of the legal profession, he is ashamed
and offended by the following advertisements:
Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE Please call:521-0767,
LEGAL 5217232,5222041
CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am-6:00 pm
7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on
Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic
beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage.
Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Nonquota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration
of Absence Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees.

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Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Force Visa
for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave.,
LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy
CLINIC, INC. Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251;
522-2041; 521-0767
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits
the fact of publication of said advertisements
at its instance, but claims that it is not engaged
in the practice of law but in the rendering of
"legal support services" through paralegals
with the use of modern computers and
electronic
machines.
Respondent
further
argues that assuming that the services
advertised are legal services, the act of
advertising these services should be allowed
supposedly in the light of the case of John R.
Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona,
reportedly decided by the United States
Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.
ISSUE: Whether
offered by the
practice of law
violation
of
responsibility

or not, the advertised services

Legal Clinic, Inc., constitutes
and whether the same are in
the
Code
of
Professional

RULING: The advertisement of the respondent

is covered in the term practice of law as
defined in the case of Cayetano vs. Monsod.
There is a restricted concept and limited
acceptance of paralegal services in the
Philippines. It is allowed that some persons not
duly licensed to practice law are or have been
permitted with a limited representation in
behalf of another or to render legal services,
but such allowable services are limited in scope
and extent by the law, rules or regulations
granting permission therefore. Canon 3 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility provides
that a lawyer in making known his legal
services shall use only true, honest, fair,
dignified
and
objective
information
or
statement of facts. Canon 3.01 adds that he is
not supposed to use or permit the use of any
false,
fraudulent,
misleading,
deceptive,
undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement
or claim regarding his qualifications or legal
services. Nor shall he pay or give something of

value to representatives of the mass media in

anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to
attract legal business (Canon 3.04). The
Canons of Professional Ethics, before the
adoption of the CPR, had also warned that
lawyers
should
not
resort
to
indirect
advertisements for professional employment,
such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper
comments, or procuring his photograph to be
published in connection with causes in which
the lawyer have been engaged of concerning
the manner of the conduct, the magnitude of
the interest involved, the importance the
lawyer's position, and all other like selflaudation. There are existing exceptions under
the law on the rule prohibiting the
advertisement of a lawyers services. However,
taking into consideration the nature and
contents of the advertisements for which
respondent is being taken to task, which even
includes a quotation of the fees charged by
said Respondent Corporation for services
rendered, the court found and held that the
same definitely do not and conclusively cannot
fall under any of the exceptions. The
respondents defense with the case of Bates vs.
State Bar applies only when there is an
exception
to
the
prohibition
against
advertisements by lawyers, to publish a
statement of legal fees for an initial
consultation or the availability upon request of
a written schedule of fees or an estimate of the
fee to be charged for the specific services. No
such exception is provided for, expressly or
impliedly whether in our former Canons of
Professional Ethics or the present Code of
Professional Responsibility. Besides, even the
disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a
proviso that the exceptions stand therein are
"not applicable in any state unless and until it
is implemented by such authority in that
state. The Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and
ENJOIN The Legal Clinic, Inc., from issuing or
causing the publication or dissemination of any
advertisement in any form which is of the same
or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A"
and "B" of this petition, and from conducting,
directly or indirectly, any activity, operation or
transaction proscribed by law or the Code of
Professional Ethics as indicated herein.

In Re INTEGRATION OF THE BAR OF

THE PHILIPPINES [49 SCRA 22,
January 9, 1973]
FACTS:
[T]he
Commission
on
Bar
Integration
submitted its Report with the earnest
recommendation on the basis of the said
Report
and
the
proceedings
had
in
Administrative Case No. 526 of the Court, and
consistently with the views and counsel
received from its [the Commission's] Board of
Consultants, as well as the overwhelming
nationwide sentiment of the Philippine Bench
and Bar that (the) Honorable (Supreme)
Court ordain the integration of the Philippine
Bar as soon as possible through the adoption
and promulgation of an appropriate Court
Rule. The petition in Adm. Case No. 526
formally prays the Court to order the
integration of the Philippine Bar, after due
hearing, giving recognition as far as possible
and practicable to existing provincial and other
local Bar associations.
ISSUES:
(1) Does the Court have the power to integrate
the Philippine Bar?
(2) Would the integration of the Bar be
constitutional?
(3) Should the Court ordain the integration of
the Bar at this time?
HELD:
YES. On all issues.
RATIO:
[T]he Court is of the view that it may integrate
the Philippine Bar in the exercise of its power,

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under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution,
to promulgate rules concerning x x x the
admission to the practice of law.

Issue: Whether or Not

constitutional and valid.

RA

No.

972

is

Held:
The Court is fully convinced, after a
thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the
arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and
the authoritative materials and the mass of
factual data contained in the exhaustive Report
of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the
integration of the Philippine Bar is perfectly
constitutional and legally unobjectionable,
within the context of contemporary conditions
in the Philippines, has become an imperative
means to raise the standards of the legal
profession, improve the administration of
justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its
public responsibility fully and effectively.
[T]he Court, by virtue of the power vested in it
by Section 13 of Article VIII of the Constitution,
ordained the integration of the Bar of the
Philippines effective January 16, 1973.

IN RE CUNANAN [94
Resolution; 18 Mar 1954]

Phil

534;

Facts:
Congress passed Republic Act Number 972,
commonly known as the Bar Flunkers Act of
1953. In accordance with the said law, the
Supreme Court then passed and admitted to
the bar those candidates who had obtained an
average of 72 per cent by raising it to 75
percent.
After its approval, many of the unsuccessful
postwar candidates filed petitions for admission
to the bar invoking its provisions, while other
motions for the revision of their examination
papers were still pending also invoked the
aforesaid law as an additional ground for
admission. There are also others who have
sought simply the reconsideration of their
grades without, however, invoking the law in
question. To avoid injustice to individual
petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions
for reconsideration, irrespective of whether or
not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972.

RA No. 972 has for its object, according to its

author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates
who suffered from insufficiency of reading
materials and inadequate preparation.
In the judicial system from which ours has
been evolved, the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at
law in the practice of the profession and their
supervision have been indisputably a judicial
function and responsibility. We have said that in
the judicial system from which ours has been
derived, the admission, suspension, disbarment
or reinstatement of attorneys at law in the
practice of the profession is concededly
judicial.
On this matter, there is certainly a clear
distinction between the functions of the judicial
and legislative departments of the government.
It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate
power to grant license for the practice of law
belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law
passed by Congress on the matter is of
permissive character, or as other authorities
may say, merely to fix the minimum conditions
for the license.
Republic Act Number 972 is held to be
unconstitutional.

their (Atty. Eala and Ms. Moje) living together in

a house which was a few blocks aways from
the church where Ms. Moje had exchange
marital vows with the complainant. Also
alleged and proven was the fact that the
respondent was the father of the complainant's
daughter. The complainant further went on
saying that Atty. Eala and his wife have been
openly flaunting their adulterous relationship.
For Mr. Guevarra, respondent's grossly immoral
conduct runs afoul of the Constitution and the
laws he, as a lawyer, has been sworn to uphold.
In pursuing obsessively his illicit love for the
complainant's wife, Atty. Eala was charged to
have mocked the institution of marriage,
betrayed his own family, broke up the
complainant's marriage, commits adultery with
his wife, and degrades the legal profession.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines Committee on Bar Discipline found the charge
against sufficiently proven and recommended
that Atty. Eala be disbarred for violating Rule
1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The IBP Board of Governors,
however, annulled and set aside the
Recommendation
of
the
Investigating
Commissioner and accordingly dismissed the
case for lack of merit. The complainant then
went to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:

Guevarra vs. Eala, A.C. No. 7136.

August 1, 2007
FACTS:
Joselano Guevarra filed a Complaint for
Disbarment before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Committe on Bar Discipline
(CBD) against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala
a.k.a Noli Eala for "grossly immoral conduct
and unmitigated violation of the lawyer's oath."
In his complaint, Mr. Guevarra alleged that his
wife Irene Moje have been maintaining an illicit
affair with Atty. Eala during their marriage, and
presented certain facts proving such allegation.
These includes a social card, the preparation of
which was admitted by the respondent and

Where or not Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala be

disbarred for "grossly immoral conduct and
unmitigated violation of the lawyer's oath"?
RULING:
That the marriage between complainant and
Irene was subsequently declared void ab initio
is immaterial. The acts complained of took
place before the marriage was declared null
and void. As a lawyer, respondent should be
aware that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife are presumed,
unless proven otherwise, to have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage. In carrying on an
extra-marital affair with Irene prior to the
judicial declaration that her marriage with

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complainant was null and void, and despite
respondent himself being married, he showed
disrespect for an institution held sacred by the
law. And he betrayed his unfitness to be a
lawyer.
Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is
DISBARRED for grossly immoral conduct,
violation of his oath of office, and violation of
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Arrieta vs. Llosa [A.C.

November 28, 1997]

No.

4369.

Ponente: ROBERTO, J.
FACTS:
Complainant Pike P. Arrieta prays for the
disbarment of Atty. Joel A. Llosa for certifying
under oath a Deed of Absolute Sale with parties
and signatories already dead prior to the
execution of the said Deed. Respondent
admitted having notarized the Deed of
Absolute Sale. But before affixing his notarial
seal, he first ascertained the authenticity of the
signatures, verified the identities of the
signatories, and determined the voluntariness
of its execution. The designated Investigating
Commissioner of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines recommended the dismissal of the
instant case. The Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted the
above recommendation and resolved to
dismiss the instant case after finding no
compelling reason to continue with the
disbarment proceedings.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Atty. Llosa should
be disbarred.
HELD:
NO. Respondent was only suspended from
practice of law for six (6) months.
RATIO:

Respondents act of certifying under oath a

Deed of Absolute Sale knowing that some of
the vendors were already dead, they being his
former clients, constituted misconduct. An
attorney may be disbarred or suspended for
any violation of his oath or of his duties as an
attorney and counselor, which include statutory
grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court, all of these being broad
enough to cover practically any misconduct of
a lawyer in his professional or private capacity.
As the Canon of Professional Responsibility
provides:
CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND
AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL
PROCESSES.
But this being his first administrative offense,
such should not warrant the supreme penalty
of disbarment.

DOMINADOR P. BURBE VS. ATTY.

ALBERTO C. MAGULTA AC NO. 99-634.
JUNE 10, 2002
Facts: Petitioner engaged the services of the
respondent to help him recover a claim of
money against a creditor. Respondent prepared
demand letters for the petitioner, which were
not successful and so the former intimated that
a case should already be filed. As a result,
petitioner paid the lawyer his fees and included
also amounts for the filing of the case.
A couple of months passed but the petitioner
has not yet received any feedback as to the
status of his case. Petitioner made several
follow-ups in the lawyers office but to no avail.
The lawyer, to prove that the case has already
been filed even invited petitioner to come with
him to the Justice Hall to verify the status of
the case. Petitioner was made to wait for hours
in the prosecutors office while the lawyer
allegedly went to the Clerk of Court to inquire
about the case. The lawyer went back to the
petitioner with the news that the Clerk of Court
was absent that day.

Suspicious of the acts of the lawyer, petitioner

personally went to the office of the clerk of
court to see for himself the status of his case.
Petitioner found out that no such case has been
filed.
Petitioner confronted Atty. Magulta where he
continued to lie to with the excuse that the
delay was being caused by the court personnel,
and only when shown the certification did he
admit that he has not at all filed the complaint
because he had spent the money for the filing
fee for his own purpose; and to appease
petitioners feelings, he offered to reimburse
him by issuing two (2) checks, postdated June 1
and June 5, 1999, in the amounts of P12,000.00
and P8,000.00, respectively.
Issue: Whether or not the lawyer should be
disbarred.
Held: Yes. The Supreme Court upheld the
decision of the Commission on Bar Discipline of
the IBP as follows: It is evident that the
P25,000 deposited by complainant with the
Respicio Law Office was for the filing fees of the
Regwill complaint. With complainants deposit
of the filing fees for the Regwill complaint, a
corresponding obligation on the part of
respondent was created and that was to file the
Regwill complaint within the time frame
contemplated by his client. The failure of
respondent to fulfill this obligation due to his
misuse of the filing fees deposited by
complainant, and his attempts to cover up this
misuse of funds of the client, which caused
complainant additional damage and prejudice,
constitutes highly dishonest conduct on his
part, unbecoming a member of the law
profession. The subsequent reimbursement by
the respondent of part of the money deposited
by complainant for filing fees, does not
exculpate
the
respondent
for
his
misappropriation of said funds.

6
Montecillo vs Gica
60 SCRA 234 Legal EthicsLawyers Duty to
the Courts Contemptuous Language
Jorge Montecillo was accused by Francisco Gica
of slander. Atty. Quirico del Mar represented
Montecillo and he successfully defended
Monteceillo in the lowercourt. DelMar was even
able to win their counterclaim thus the lower
court ordered Gica to pay Montecillo the
adjudged moral damages. Gica appealed the
award of damages to the Court of Appeals
where the latter court reversed the same. Atty.
Del Mar then filed a motion for reconsideration
where he made a veiled threat against the
Court of Appeals judges intimating that he
thinks the CA justices knowingly rendered an
unjust decision and judgment has been
rendered through negligence and that the CA
allowed itself to be deceived.
The CA denied the MFR and it admonished
Atty. Del Mar from using such tone with the
court. Del Mar then filed a second MFR where
he again made threats. The CA then ordered
del Mar to show cause as to why he should not
be punished for contempt. Thereafter, del Mar
sent the three CA justices a copy of a letter
which he sent to the President of the
Philippines asking the said justices to consider
the CA judgment. But the CA did not reverse its
judgment. Del Mar then filed a civil case
against the three justices of the CA before a
Cebu lower court but the civil case was
eventually
dismissed
by
reason
of
a
compromise agreement where del Mar agreed
to pay damages to the justices. Eventually, the
CA suspended Atty.Del Mar from practice.
The issue reached the Supreme Court. Del Mar
asked the SC to reverse his suspension as well
as the CA decision as to the Montecillo case.
The SC denied both and this earned the ire of
del Mar as he demanded from the Clerk of the
Supreme Court as to who were the judges who
voted against him. The Supreme Court then
directed del Mar to submit an explanation as to
why he should not be disciplined. Del Marin his
explanation instead tried to justify his actions
even stating that had he not been convinced
that human efforts in [pursuing the case] will

be fruitless he would have continued with the

civil case against the CA justices. In his
explanation, del Mar also intimated that even
the Supreme Court is part among the corrupt,
the grafters and those allegedly committing
injustice.
Del Mar even filed a civil case against some
Supreme Court justices but the judge who
handled the case dismissed the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Del Mar should be
suspended.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent violated

Canons 15and 21 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

HELD:
Yes. Atty. Del Mar, by his contemptuous acts is
in violation of his duties to the courts. As an
officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral
duty to help build and not destroy
unnecessarily the high esteem and regard
towards the court so essential to the proper
administration of justice.
It is manifest that del Mar has scant respect
for the two highest Courts of the land when on
the flimsy ground of alleged error in deciding a
case, he proceeded to challenge the integrity
of both Courts by claiming that they knowingly
rendered unjust judgment. In short, his
allegation is that they acted with intent and
malice, if not with gross ignorance of the law,
in disposing of the case of his client. Del Mar
was then suspended indefinitely.
Clarita J.
Valencia

hearings, the parties filed their respective

memoranda and the case was deemed
submitted for resolution. The Commissioner
found respondent guilty of violating Canons 15
and 21 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and recommended the penalty of
suspension for six months. The IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved the report
and recommendation of Commissioner Reyes
but increased the penalty of suspension from
six months to one year.

Samala

vs.

Atty.

LucianoD.

A.C. No. 5439; January 22, 2007

Austria-Martinez, J.
Facts: Clarita J. Samala (complainant) filed a
complaint against Atty. Luciano D. Valencia
(respondent) for Disbarment on the following
grounds:(a) serving on two separate occasions
as counsel for contending parties;(b) knowingly
misleading the court by submitting false
documentary evidence;(c) initiating numerous
cases in exchange for non-payment of rental
fees; and (d) having a reputation of being
immoral by siring illegitimate children.
After respondent filed his Comment, the Court
referred the case to the IBP for investigation,
report, and recommendation. After a series of

Held: This Court adopts the report of the IBP

Board of Governors except as to the issue on
immorality and as to the recommended
penalty.(a) On serving as counsel for
contending parties. Respondent, while being
the counsel for defendant Valdez, also acted as
counsel for the tenants Lagmay, Valencia,
Bustamante and Bayuga by filing an
Explanation and Compliance before the RTC.
The Presiding Judge warned respondent to
refrain from repeating the act of being counsel
of record of both parties in Civil Case No. 95105-MK.Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that a
lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests
except by written consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure of the facts. A
lawyer may not, without being guilty of
professional misconduct, act as counsel for a
person whose interest conflicts with that of his
present or former client. He may not also
undertake to discharge conflicting duties any
more than he may represent antagonistic
interests. This stern rule is founded on the
principles of public policy and good taste. It
springs from the relation of attorney and client
which is one of trust and confidence. Lawyers
are expected not only to keep inviolate the
client's confidence, but also to avoid the
appearance of treachery and double-dealing for
only then can litigants be encouraged to
entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is
of paramount importance in the administration
of justice. One of the tests of inconsistency of
interests is whether the acceptance of a new

7
relation would prevent the full discharge of the
lawyer's duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty
to
the
client
or
invite
suspicion
of
unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the
performance of that duty. (b) On knowingly
misleading the court by submitting false
documentary evidence. Complainant alleges
that in Civil Case No. 00-7137 filed before MTC,
Branch 75 for ejectment, respondent submitted
TCT No. 273020 as evidence of Valdez's
ownership despite the fact that a new TCT No.
275500 was already issued in the name of Alba
on February 2, 1995.
During the hearing before Commissioner Raval,
respondent avers that when the Answer was
filed in the said case, that was the time that he
came to know that the title was already in the
name of Alba; so that when the court dismissed
the complaint, he did not do anything anymore.
Respondent further avers that Valdez did not
tell him the truth and things were revealed to
him only when the case for rescission was filed
in 2002. Respondent failed to comply with
Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides that a lawyer
shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or
allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
It matters not that the trial court was not
misled by respondent's submission of TCT No.
273020 in the name of Valdez, as shown by its
decision dated January 8, 2002 dismissing the
complaint for ejectment. What is decisive in
this case is respondent's intent in trying to
mislead the court by presenting TCT No.
273020 despite the fact that said title was
already cancelled and a new one, TCT No.
275500, was already issued in the name of
Alba.
A lawyer is the servant of the law and belongs
to a profession to which society has entrusted
the administration of law and the dispensation
of justice. 40 As such, he should make himself
more an exemplar for others to emulate.
On initiating numerous cases in exchange for
nonpayment of rental fees.

Complainant alleges that respondent filed the

following cases: (a) Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK
at the RTC, Branch 272; (b) Civil Case No. 007137 at the MTC, Branch 75; and (c) I.S. Nos.
00-4439 and 01-036162 both entitled "Valencia
v. Samala" for estafa and grave coercion,
respectively,
before
the
Marikina
City
Prosecutor. Complainant claims that the two
criminal cases were filed in retaliation for the
cases she filed against Lagmay docketed as I.S.
No. 00-4306 for estafa and I.S. No. 00-4318
against Alvin Valencia (son of respondent) for
trespass to dwelling.
As culled from the records, Valdez entered into
a retainer agreement with respondent. As
payment for his services, he was allowed to
occupy the property for free and utilize the
same as his office pursuant to their retainer
agreement. 42
Respondent filed I.S. Nos. 00-4439 43 and 01036162 44 both entitled "Valencia v. Samala"
for estafa and grave coercion, respectively, to
protect his client's rights against complainant
who filed I.S. No. 00-4306 45 for estafa against
Lagmay, and I.S. No. 00-4318 46 against Alvin
Valencia 47 for trespass to dwelling.
The Court finds the charge to be without
sufficient basis. The act of respondent of filing
the aforecited cases to protect the interest of
his client, on one hand, and his own interest,
on the other, cannot be made the basis of an
administrative charge unless it can be clearly
shown that the same was being done to abuse
judicial processes to commit injustice.
The filing of an administrative case against
respondent for protecting the interest of his
client and his own right would be putting a
burden on a practicing lawyer who is obligated
to defend and prosecute the right of his client.
On having a reputation for being immoral by
siring illegitimate children.
The court finds respondent liable for being
immoral by siring illegitimate children.

During the hearing, respondent admitted that

he sired three children by Teresita Lagmay who
are all over 20 years of age, while his first wife
was still alive. He also admitted that he has
eight children by his first wife, the youngest of
whom is over 20 years of age, and after his
wife died in 1997, he married Lagmay in 1998.
Respondent further admitted that Lagmay was
staying in one of the apartments being claimed
by complainant. However, he does not consider
his affair with Lagmay as a relationship and
does not consider the latter as his second
family. He reasoned that he was not staying
with Lagmay because he has two houses, one
in Muntinlupa and another in Marikina.
In this case, the admissions made by
respondent are more than enough to hold him
liable on the charge of immorality. During the
hearing, respondent did not show any remorse.
He even justified his transgression by saying
that he does not have any relationship with
Lagmay and despite the fact that he sired three
children by the latter, he does not consider
them as his second family. It is noted that
during the hearing, respondent boasts in telling
the commissioner that he has two houses - in
Muntinlupa, where his first wife lived, and in
Marikina, where Lagmay lives. It is of no
moment that respondent eventually married
Lagmay after the death of his first wife. The
fact still remains that respondent did not live
up to the exacting standard of morality and
decorum required of the legal profession.
Under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. It may be difficult to specify
the degree of moral delinquency that may
qualify an act as immoral, yet, for purposes of
disciplining a lawyer, immoral conduct has
been defined as that "conduct which is willful,
flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a
moral indifference to the opinion of respectable
members of the community.Thus, in several
cases, the Court did not hesitate to discipline a
lawyer for keeping a mistress in defiance of the
mores and sense of morality of the community.
That respondent subsequently married Lagmay

8
in 1998 after the death of his wife and that this
is his first infraction as regards immorality
serve to mitigate his liability.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds respondent Atty.
Luciano D. Valencia GUILTY of misconduct and
violation of Canons 21, 10 and 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for three (3) years,
effective immediately upon receipt of herein
Resolution.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all
courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines as well as the Office of the Bar
Confidant for their information and guidance,
and let it be entered in respondent's personal
records.
SO ORDERED.
Lee vs Tambago, 544 SCRA 393, February
12, 2008
Facts: Complainant, Manuel L. Lee, charged
respondent, Atty. Regino B. Tambago, with
violation of Notarial Law and the Ethics of the
legal profession for notarizing a will that is
alleged to be spurious in nature in containing
forged signatures of his father, the decedent,
Vicente Lee Sr. and two other witnesses, which
were also questioned for the unnotated
Residence Certificates that are known to be a
copy of their respective voter's affidavit. In
addition to such, the contested will was
executed and acknowledged before respondent
on June 30, 1965 but bears a Residence
Certificate by the Testator dated January 5,
1962, which was never submitted for filing to
the
Archives
Division
of
the
Records
Management and Archives Office of the
National Commission for Culture and Arts
(NCAA). Respondent, on the other hand,
claimed that all allegations are falsely given
because he allegedly exercised his duties as
Notary Public with due care and with due
regards to the provision of existing law and had
complied with elementary formalities in the
performance of his duties and that the

complaint was filed simply to harass him based

on the result of a criminal case against him in
the Ombudsman that did not prosper. However,
he did not deny the contention of non-filing a
copy to the Archives Division of NCAA. In
resolution, the court referred the case to the
IBP and the decision of which was affirmed with
modification against the respondent and in
favor of the complainant.
Issue: Did Atty. Regino B. Tambago committed a
violation in Notarial Law and the Ethics of Legal
Profession for notarizing a spurious last will and
testament?
Held: Yes. As per Supreme Court, Atty. Regino
B. Tambago is guilty of professional misconduct
as he violated the Lawyer's Oath, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court, Canon 1 and Rule 1.01nof
the Code of Professional Responsibility, Article
806 of the Civil Code and provision of the
Notarial Law. Thus, Atty. Tambago is suspended
from the practice of law for one year and his
Notarial commission revoked. In addition,
because he has not lived up to the
trustworthiness expected of him as a notary
public and as an officer of the court, he is
perpetually disqualified from reappointments
as a Notary Public.
A.M. No. L-363

July 31, 1962

IN RE: DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST

ATTY. DIOSDADO Q. GUTIERREZ, respondent.
Victoriano A. Savellano for complaint.
Nestor M. Andrada for respondent.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
Respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez is a member
of the Philippine Bar, admitted to it on October
5, 1945. In criminal case No. R-793 of the Court
of First Instance of Oriental Mindoro he was
convicted of the murder of Filemon Samaco,
former municipal mayor of Calapan, and
together
with
his
co-conspirators
was
sentenced to the penalty of death. Upon review
by this Court the judgment of conviction was
affirmed on June 30, 1956 (G.R. No. L-17101),

but the penalty was changed to reclusion

perpetua. After serving a portion of the
sentence respondent was granted a conditional
pardon by the President on August 19, 1958.
The unexecuted portion of the prison term was
remitted on condition that he shall not again
violate any of the penal laws of the
Philippines.
On October 9, 1958 the widow of the deceased
Filemon Samaco, victim in the murder case,
filed a verified complaint before this Court
praying that respondent be removed from the
roll of lawyers pursuant to Rule 127, section 5.
Respondent presented his answer in due time,
admitting the facts alleged by complainant
regarding pardon in defense, on the authority
of the decision of this Court in the case of In re
Lontok, 43 Phil. 293.
Under section 5 of Rule 127, a member of the
bar may be removed suspended from his office
as attorney by the Supreme Court by reason of
his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude. Murder is, without doubt, such a
crime. The term moral turpitude includes
everything which is done contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty or good morals. In re Carlos
S. Basa, 41 Phil. 275. As used in disbarment
statutes, it means an act of baseness, vileness,
or depravity in the private and social duties
which a man owes to his fellowmen or to
society in general, contrary to the accepted
rule of right and duty between man and man.
State ex rel. Conklin v. Buckingham, 84 P. 2nd
49; 5 Am. Jur. Sec. 279. pp. 428-429.
The only question to be resolved is whether or
not the conditional pardon extended to
respondent places him beyond the scope of the
rule on disbarment aforecited. Reliance is
placed by him squarely on the Lontok case. The
respondent therein was convicted of bigamy
and thereafter pardoned by the GovernorGeneral. In a subsequent decision, this Court
decided in his favor and held: When
proceedings to strike an attorneys name from
the rolls the fact of a conviction for a felony
ground for disbarment, it has been held that a
pardon operates to wipe out the conviction and
is a bar to any proceeding for the disbarment of

9
the attorney
granted.

after

the

pardon

has

been

It is our view that the ruling does not govern

the question now before us. In making it the
Court proceeded on the assumption that the
pardon granted to respondent Lontok was
absolute. This is implicit in the ratio decidendi
of the case, particularly in the citations to
support it, namely. In Re Emmons, 29 Cal. App.
121; Scott vs. State, 6 Tex. Civ. App. 343; and
Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 380. Thus in Scott vs.
State the court said:
We are of opinion that after received an
unconditional pardon the record of the felony
conviction could no longer be used as a basis
for the proceeding provided for in article 226.
The record, when offered in evidence, was met
with an unconditional pardon, and could not,
therefore, properly be said to afford proof of a
conviction of any felony. Having been thus
cancelled, all its force as a felony conviction
was taken away. A pardon falling short of this
would not be a pardon, according to the judicial
construction which that act of executive grace
was received. Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 344;
Knote v. U.S., 95 U.S. 149, and cases there
cited; Young v. Young, 61 Tex. 191.
And the portion of the decision in Ex parte
Garland quoted with approval in the Lontok
case is as follows:
A pardon reaches both the punishment
prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the
offender; and when the pardon is full, it
releases the punishment and blots out the
existence of guilt, so that in the eye of the law
the offender is as innocent as if he had never
committed the offense. It granted before
conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and
disabilities, consequent upon conviction, from
attaching; if granted after conviction, it
removes the penalties and disabilities, and
restores him to all his civil rights it makes him,
as it were, a new man, and gives him a new
credit and capacity.
The pardon granted to respondent here is not
absolute but conditional, and merely remitted

the unexecuted portion of his term. It does not

reach the offense itself, unlike that in Ex parte
Garland, which was a full pardon and amnesty
for all offense by him committed in connection
with rebellion (civil war) against government of
the United States.
The foregoing considerations rendered In re
Lontok are inapplicable here. Respondent
Gutierrez must be judged upon the fact of his
conviction for murder without regard to the
pardon he invokes in defense. The crime was
qualified by treachery and aggravated by its
having been committed in hand, by taking
advantage of his official position (respondent
being municipal mayor at the time) and with
the use of motor vehicle. People vs. Diosdado
Gutierrez, supra. The degree of moral turpitude
involved is such as to justify his being purged
from the profession.
The practice of law is a privilege accorded only
to those who measure up to certain rigid
standards of mental and moral fitness. For the
admission of a candidate to the bar the Rules
of Court not only prescribe a test of academic
preparation
but
require
satisfactory
testimonials of good moral character. These
standards are neither dispensed with nor
lowered after admission: the lawyer must
continue to adhere to them or else incur the
risk of suspension or removal. As stated in Ex
parte Wall, 107 U.S. 263, 27 Law ed., 552, 556:
Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is
most sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is
their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in
the world, to repudiate and override the laws,
to trample them under foot and to ignore the
very bonds of society, argues recreancy to his
position and office and sets a pernicious
example to the insubordinate and dangerous
elements of the body politic.
WHEREFORE, pursuant to Rule 127, Section 5,
and considering the nature of the crime for
which respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez has
been convicted, he is ordered disbarred and his
name stricken from the roll of lawyers.
G.R. No. L-29543

November 29, 1969

Oronce v. CA
Gross Misconduct

10
clients especially considering that the parties
involved are father and son. This case may
have never reached the courts had there been
an earnest effort by the lawyers to have both
parties find an off court settlement but records
show that no such effort was made. The useful
function of a lawyer is not only to conduct
litigation but to avoid it whenever possible by
advising settlement or withholding suit. He is
often called upon less for dramatic forensic
exploits than for wise counsel in every phase of
life. He should be a mediator for concord and a
conciliator for compromise, rather than a
virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of
litigation.
De Ysasi v. NLRC 1994
Jon De Ysasi and Jon De Ysasi III are father and
sons respectively. The elder Ysasi owns a
hacienda in Negros Occidental. De Ysasi III is
employed in the hacienda as the farm
administrator. In November 1982, De Ysasi III
underwent surgery and so he missed work. He
was confined and while hes nursing from his
infections he was terminated, without due
process, by his father. De Ysasi III filed against
his father for illegal dismissal before the
National Labor Relations Commission. His
father invoked that his son actually abandoned
his work.
ISSUE: Whether or not De Ysasi III abandoned
his work.
HELD: No. His absence from work does not
constitute
abandonment.
To
constitute
abandonment, there must be a.) failure to
report for work or absence without valid or
justifiable reason, and b.) a clear intention to
sever the employer-employee relationship, with
the second element as the more determinative
factor and being manifested by some overt
acts. No such intent was proven in this case.
The Supreme Court, in making its decision,
noted that the lawyers for both camps failed to
exert all reasonable efforts to smooth over
legal conflicts, preferably out of court and
especially in consideration of the direct and
immediate consanguineous ties between their

Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility explicitly provides that (a)
lawyer shall encourage his client to avoid, end
or settle the controversy if it will admit of a fair
settlement. Both counsel fell short of what
was expected of them, despite their avowed
duties as officers of the court. In the same
manner, the labor arbiter who handled this
regrettable case has been less than faithful to
the letter and spirit of the Labor Code
mandating that a labor arbiter shall exert all
efforts towards the amicable settlement of a
labor dispute within his jurisdiction. If he ever
did so, or at least entertained the thought, the
copious records of the proceedings in this
controversy are barren of any reflection of the
same.
GLORIA PAJARES, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
JUDGE
ESTRELLA
ABAD
SANTOS,
MUNICIPAL
COURT
OF
MANILA
and
UDHARAM
BAZAR
CO.,
respondentsappellees.
Moises C. Nicomedes for petitioner-appellant.
Tomas Lopez Valencia for respondentsappellees.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
We dismiss as frivolous petitioner-appellant's
appeal from the lower Court's Order of
dismissal of her petition for a writ of certiorari
with prayer for preliminary injunction against

respondent judge's order denying her motion

for a bill of particulars as the defendant in a
simple collection case.
The origin of the case is narrated in the Court
of Appeals' Resolution dated August 16, 1968
certifying the appeal to this Court as involving
purely questions of law:
This is an appeal interposed by petitioner
Gloria Pajares from the order dated July 21,
1962 issued by the Court of First Instance of
Manila, dismissing her petition for certiorari
with preliminary injunction against respondent
Judge Estrella Abad Santos of the Municipal
Court of Manila and respondent Udharam Bazar
& Co.
There is no dispute that on April 25, 1962, the
Udharam Bazar & Co. sued Gloria Pajares
before the Municipal Court of Manila for
recovery of a certain sum of money. The
lawsuit was docketed in the inferior court as
Civil Case No. 97309 and was eventually
assigned to the sala of the respondent Judge
Abad Santos.
In its complaint the Udharam Bazar & Co.
averred, among others, as follows:
"2. That defendant in 1961, ordered from the
plaintiff quantities of ready made goods and
delivered to her in good condition and same
were already sold, but did not make the full
payment up to the present time;
"3. That defendant is still indebted to the
plaintiff in the sum of P354.85, representing
the balance of her account as the value of the
said goods, which is already overdue and
payable."
Instead of answering the complaint against her,
Gloria Pajares, however, moved for a bill of
particulars praying the inferior court to require
the Udharam Bazar & Co. to itemize the kinds
of goods which she supposedly purchased from
the said company, the respective dates they
were taken and by whom they were received as
well as their purchase prices, alleging that

11
without this bill she would not be able to meet
the issues raised in the complaint.

that no genuine factual questions are at all

involved in this appeal.

After due hearing, the inferior court denied the

motion of Gloria Pajares for a bill of particulars.
Her motion for reconsideration having been
denied too by the said court, she then brought
the incident on certiorari to the Court of First
Instance of Manila, alleging in support of her
petition that in denying her motion for a bill of
particulars, the respondent judge acted in
grave abuse of discretion.

It is plain and clear that no error of law, much

less any grave abuse of discretion, was
committed by respondent judge in denying
appellant's motion for a bill of particulars in the
collection case instituted in the Municipal Court
of Manila by private respondent-appellee for
the recovery of her indebtedness of P354.85
representing the overdue balance of her
account for ready-made goods ordered by and
delivered to her in 1961. Appellee's complaint
precisely and concisely informed appellant of
the ultimate or essential facts constituting the
cause of action against her, in accordance with
the requirements of the Rules of Court.1

But on July 19, 1962, herein respondent

Udharam Bazar & Co. filed a motion to dismiss
the petition for a writ of certiorari, as well as
the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction,
for the reasons: (1) that the allegations of the
complaint filed by the said company in the
inferior court, particularly paragraphs 2 and 3
thereof, are clear, specific and sufficiently
appraise the defendant, now herein petitioner
Gloria Pajares, of the nature of the cause of
action against her so as to enable her to
prepare for her defenses; and (2) that things
asked for in the motion for a bill of particulars
are evidentiary matters, which are beyond the
pale of such bill. Convinced that the said
motion of the company is well founded, the
lower court accordingly dismissed the petition
on April 21, 1962.
Her subsequent motion for reconsideration
having been similarly denied by the court
below, Gloria Pajares undertook the present
appeal to this Court, contending under her lone
assignment of error to maintain her such
appeal that the lower court erred in dismissing
her petition for certiorari with preliminary
injunction, in its order dated July 21, 1962, as
amended by its order dated August 18, 1962.
The only genuine issues involved in the case at
bar are: (1) whether the allegations of the
complaint sufficiently appraise Gloria Pajares of
the nature of the cause of action against her;
and (2) whether the items asked for by the said
Gloria Pajares in her motion for a bill of
particulars constitute evidentiary matters. To
our mind these are purely legal questions. A
perusal of the brief of the parties has shown

It was therefore improper for appellant, through

her counsel, to insist on her motion that
appellee as plaintiff "submit a bill of particulars,
specifying therein in detail the goods
represented by the alleged amount of P354.85,
giving the dates and invoice numbers on which
they were delivered to the defendant, the
amount due on each such invoice and by whom
they were received." These particulars sought
all concerned evidentiary matters and do not
come within the scope of Rule 12, section 1 of
the Rules of Court which permits a party "to
move for a definite statement or for a bill of
particulars of any matter which is not averred
with sufficient definiteness or particularly to
enable him to prepare his responsive pleading
or to prepare for trial."
Since appellant admittedly was engaged in the
business of buying and selling merchandise at
her stall at the Sta. Mesa Market, Quezon City,
and appellee was one of her creditors from
whom she used to buy on credit ready made
goods for resale, appellant had no need of the
evidentiary particulars sought by her to enable
her to prepare her answer to the complaint or
to prepare for trial. These particulars were just
as much within her knowledge as appellee's.
She could not logically pretend ignorance as to
the same, for all she had to do was to check
and verify her own records of her outstanding
account with appellee and state in her answer
whether from her records the outstanding

balance of her indebtedness was in the sum of

P354.85, as claimed by appellee, or in a lesser
amount.
The record shows, furthermore, that a month
before appellee filed its collection case, it had
written appellant a demand-letter for the
payment of her outstanding account in the said
sum of P354.85 within one week. Appellant,
through her counsel, wrote appellee under date
of March 23, 1962, acknowledging her said
indebtedness but stating that "Due to losses
she has sustained in the operation of her stall,
she would not be able to meet your request for
payment of the full amount of P354.85 at once.
I would therefore request you to be kind
enough to allow her to continue paying you
P10.00 every 15th and end of the month as
heretofore."
No error was therefore committed by the lower
court in summarily dismissing appellant's
petition for certiorari against respondent
judge's order denying her motion for a bill of
particulars, as pretended by appellant in her
lone assignment of error. Well may we apply to
this appeal, the words of Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes
in an analogous case,2 that "the circumstances
surrounding this litigation definitely prove that
appeal is frivolous and a plain trick to delay
payment and prolong litigation unnecessarily.
Such attitude deserves condemnation, wasting
as it does, the time that the courts could well
devote to meritorious cases."
Here, this simple collection case has needlessly
clogged the court dockets for over seven years.
Had appellant been but prudently advised by
her counsel to confess judgment and ask from
her creditor the reasonable time she needed to
discharge her lawful indebtedness, the
expenses of litigation that she has incurred by
way of filing fees in the Court of First Instance,
premiums for her appeal bond, appellate court
docket fees, printing of her appellant's brief,
and attorney's fees would have been much
more than sufficient to pay off her just debt to
appellee. Yet, here she still remains saddled
with the same debt, burdened by accumulated
interests, after having spent uselessly much

12
more than the amount in litigation in this
worthless cause.
As we recently said in another case,3 the
cooperation of litigants and their attorneys is
needed so that needless clogging of the court
dockets with unmeritorious cases may be
avoided. There must be more faithful
adherence to Rule 7, section 5 of the Rules of
Court which provides that "the signature of an
attorney constitutes a certificate by him that
he has read the pleading and that to the best
of his knowledge, information and belief, there
is good ground to support it; and that it is not
interposed
for
delay"
and
expressly
admonishes that "for a willful violation of this
rule an attorney may be subjected to
disciplinary action."
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is
affirmed, and petitioner-appellant's counsel
shall pay treble costs in all instances. This
decision shall be noted in the personal record
of the attorney for petitioner-appellant in this
Court for future reference. So ordered.
A.C. No. 8391
November 23, 2010
[Formerly CBD Case No. 06-1631]
MANUEL C. YUHICO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. FRED L. GUTIERREZ, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before us is a Complaint1 dated January 10,
2006 for disciplinary action against respondent
Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez (Gutierrez) filed by
Manuel C. Yuhico (Yuhico) for violation of Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
Complainant Yuhico alleged that he met
Gutierrez at the Office of the City Prosecutor in
Pasig City on May 4, 2005. Yuhico was there to
testify at the preliminary investigation of a
Complaint for Estafa against one Jose S.

Chicharro, who was then being represented by

Gutierrez. He claimed that they eventually
became acquainted as they frequently saw
each other during the hearings of the case.
On June 24, 2005, Yuhico averred that Gutierrez
phoned him and asked for a cash loan of
P30,000.00. Gutierrez then claimed that he
needed money to pay for the medical expenses
of his mother who was seriously ill. Yuhico
immediately handed the money. In turn,
Gutierrez promised to pay the loan very soon,
since he was expecting to collect his attorney's
fees from a Japanese client.
On June 28, 2005, Gutierrez again asked Yuhico
for a loan, this time in the amount of
P60,000.00, allegedly to pay the medical
expenses of his wife who was also hospitalized.
Again, Yuhico readily issued to Atty. Gutierrez
an Equitable PCI Bank check amounting to
P60,000.00.2 Again, Gutierrez promised to pay
his two loans totalling to P90,000.00 "within a
short time."
On July 12, 2005, Yuhico asked Gutierrez to pay
his loans. Atty. Gutierrez failed to pay. In a text
message on July 12, 2005 at 2:47 p.m., Atty.
Gutierrez stated:
I really don't know how to say this as I don't
want to think that I may be taking advantage of
our friendship. You see i've long expected as
substantial attorney's fees since last week from
my client Ogami from japan. It's more or less
more than 5m and its release is delayed due to
tax and the law on money laundering. From my
estimate it wud be collected by me on or b4
august 5. N the meantime I am quite in a
financial difficulty as everyone is.
Later, Yuhico alleged that Gutierrez attempted
to borrow money from him again. He said
Gutierrez claimed that his daughter needed
P70,000.00 to pay the fees required to take the
licensure examination in the U.S. Medical
Board. Gutierrez assured him that he will pay
all his debts on or before August 10, 2005. In
his text message on July 12, 2005 at 3:05 p.m.,
Atty. Gutierrez said:

As you are aware of these past few days were

really great trials 4 me. My mother died, my
wife got sick and now my bro in law died.
These events led me to struggling finances. To
get me going I tried to sel my car but my buyer
backed out. Now my immediate problem is the
amt of 70thousand which my daughter needs
for her payment sa US medical board. I dnt
want her to miss this opportunity. Can u help
me again? I will pay all my debts on or b4
Aug.10 pls. Thanks.
However, this time, Yuhico refused to lend
Gutierrez any amount of money. Instead, he
demanded from Gutierrez the payment of his
debts. Gutierrez then sent another text
message to Yuhico on July 12, 2005 and
requested him to give him another week to pay
his debts. Gutierrez failed to make the
payment.
Yuhico repeatedly requested the payment of
loans from Gutierrez from August to December
2005. Gutierrez, on the other hand, for
numerous times promised to pay, but always
failed to do so. At one point, Gutierrez even
asked Yuhico's account number and promised
to deposit his payment there, but he never
deposited the payment.
On December 5, 2005, Yuhico's counsel sent a
demand letter3 to Gutierrez to pay his debts,
but to no avail.
Thus, Yuhico filed the instant complaint against
Gutierrez before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBPCBD).
On January 12, 2006, the IBP-CBD directed
Gutierrez to submit his Answer on the
complaint against him.4
In his Answer,5 Gutierrez claimed that Yuhico
was the one who offered to lend him money in
gratitude for the assistance he extended to the
latter when he was under threat by his clients.
He, however, admitted that he accepted the
loan due to compelling circumstances.
Gutierrez added that he has no intention of
evading his obligation to pay his debts, but he

13
is currently in financial distress, thus, he cannot
pay his debts yet. He claimed he will pay his
debts when his financial condition improves.
On March 24, 2006, both parties were directed
to appear at the mandatory conference before
the IBP-CBD. Gutierrez failed to attend on two
occasions.
On June 9, 2006, the IBP-CBD directed both
parties to submit their respective position
papers.
Likewise, during the clarificatory hearing before
the IBP-CBD, only the complainant's counsel
attended. There was no appearance on the part
of Gutierrez.
In his Position Paper, Yuhico manifested that
the Supreme Court, in Huyssen v. Atty.
Gutierrez,6 had already disbarred Gutierrez
from the practice of law for gross misconduct,
in view of his failure to pay his debts and his
issuance of worthless checks.
Subsequently, in a Resolution dated December
11, 2008, the, IBP-CBD found Gutierrez guilty of
non-payment of just debts and ordered him to
return the amount of Ninety Thousand Pesos
(P90,000.00) to Yuhico, with interest until full
payment.
In view of the previous disbarment of Gutierrez,
the IBP-CBD recommended to the Court that,
instead of rendering the instant case moot,
Gutierrez should be disbarred anew effective
upon the expiration of the sanction pursuant to
the March 26, 2004 Supreme Court Decision.
The IBP-CBD explained that while we do not
have jurisprudence on the issue of double or
multiple
disbarment,
the
American
jurisprudence, however, recognizes double or
multiple disbarments as well as the minimum
requirement of five (5) years for readmission to
the Bar.
On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of
Governors, in Resolution No. XVIII-2008-649,
resolved
to
adopt
the
report
and
recommendation of the IBP-CBD and approve it
with modification as to the payment of the

amount
of
Ninety
Thousand
Pesos
(P90,000.00), this time, without interest.
We sustain the findings of the IBP, but with
modification as to its recommendations.
We have held that deliberate failure to pay just
debts constitute gross misconduct, for which a
lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension
from the practice of law. Lawyers are
instruments for the administration of justice
and vanguards of our legal system. They are
expected to maintain not only legal proficiency,
but also a high standard of morality, honesty,
integrity and fair dealing so that the peoples
faith and confidence in the judicial system is
ensured. They must, at all times, faithfully
perform their duties to society, to the bar, the
courts and to their clients, which include
prompt payment of financial obligations. They
must conduct themselves in a manner that
reflects the values and norms of the legal
profession as embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility.7
In the instant case, there is no question as to
Gutierrez's guilt. His admission of the loan he
contracted and his failure to pay the same
leaves no room for interpretation. Neither can
he justify his act of non-payment of debt by his
dire financial condition. Gutierrez should not
have contracted loans which are beyond his
financial capacity to pay.1avvphi1
Likewise, we cannot overlook Gutierrez's
propensity
of
employing
deceit
and
misrepresentations for the purpose of obtaining
debts without the intention of paying them.
Records show Gutierrez's pattern of habitually
making promises of paying his debts, yet
repeatedly failing to deliver. The series of text
messages he sent to Yuhico promising to pay
his loans, while simultaneously giving excuses
without actually making good of his promises,
is clearly reprehensible. Undoubtedly, his acts
demonstrate lack of moral character to satisfy
the responsibilities and duties imposed on
lawyers as professionals and as officers of the
court.

We also note that in Huyssen v. Atty.

Gutierrez,8 the Court had already disbarred
Gutierrez from the practice of law for gross
misconduct due to non-payment of just debts
and issuance of bouncing checks.
In view of the foregoing, while we agree with
the findings of the IBP, we cannot, however,
adopt its recommendation to disbar Gutierrez
for the second time, considering that Gutierrez
had already been previously disbarred. Indeed,
as the IBP pointed out, we do not have double
or multiple disbarment in our laws or
jurisprudence. Neither do we have a law
mandating a minimum 5-year requirement for
readmission, as cited by the IBP. Thus, while
Gutierrez's infraction calls for the penalty of
disbarment, we cannot disbar him anew.
WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XVIII-2008-649
dated December 11, 2008, of the IBP, which
found FRED L. GUTIERREZ guilty of GROSS
MISCONDUCT, is AFFIRMED. He is ORDERED to
PAY the amount of Ninety Thousand Pesos
(P90,000.00) to the complainant immediately
from receipt of this decision with interest.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished and
properly recorded in the Office of the Bar
Confidant, to be appended to the personal
record of Gutierrez; the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines; and the Office of the Court
Administrator, for circulation to all courts in the
country for their information and guidance.
This Decision shall be immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
ADM. CASE NO. No. 5195
2009

April 16,

NELIA PASUMBAL DE CHAVEZ-BLANCO,

REPRESENTED BY HER ATTORNEY-IN-FACT,
ATTY. EUGENIA J. MUOZ, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JAIME B. LUMASAG, JR., Respondent.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:

14
This is an administrative complaint for
disbarment filed by complainant Nelia P. de
Chavez-Blanco against respondent Atty. Jaime
Lumasag, Jr., for deceit, dishonesty and gross
misconduct.
In a Report and Recommendation dated 11
December 2001,1 the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Commissioner Milagros San
Juan found respondent guilty of the charges
and recommended the penalty of disbarment.
Subsequently, the IBP Board of Governors
reduced the penalty to a five (5)-year
suspension in its Resolution XV-2002-229 dated
29 June 2001. In a Resolution dated 9
December
2002,
the
Court,
however,
remanded the case to the IBP in view of its
findings that no formal hearing/investigation
was conducted.
Upon remand to the IBP, the case was reassigned to IBP Commissioner Dennis A.B. Funa
and hearings were accordingly held thereafter.
Through her attorney-in-fact, Atty. Eugenia J.
Muoz, complainant alleged in her Complaint2
that she was a resident of the United States of
America together with her husband, Mario
Blanco. She also stated that she owned two (2)
adjacent parcels of land in Quezon City, each
with an area of 400 square meters, covered by
Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 22162
and 22163 registered in her name. In a
document dated 20 November 1989, she
authorized
respondent,
who
were
her
husbands first cousin, to sell said lots.3
In a letter dated 20 March 1990, respondent
reported that he had sold only one lot for the
price of P320,000.00 and therefrom he
deducted
P38,130.00
for
taxes
and
commissions. And, allegedly, per complainants
instructions, he remitted the remaining balance
of P281,900.00 to a certain Belen Johnnes.4
In 1995, complainant was informed by
respondent that the other lot remained unsold
due to the presence of squatters on the
property.

In December 1998, Mario Blanco discovered

that in truth, the two (2) lots had been sold on
11 March 1990 to the spouses Celso and
Consolacion Martinez for the price of
P1,120,000.00, and that new titles had been
issued to the transferees. Mario Blanco
confronted respondent with these facts in a
letter, but the latter disregarded the same.
Thus, in May 1999, complainant, through Atty.
Muoz sent a demand letter to respondent
directing him to remit and turn over to her the
entire proceeds of the sale of the properties.
Soon thereafter, respondent admitted the sale
of the properties and his receipt of its
proceeds, but he never tendered or offered to
tender the same to complainant. Despite
repeated and continued demands, respondent
has since not remitted the amount equivalent
to P838,100.00 (P278,000.00 for the first parcel
of land and P560,000.00 for the second).5
Complainant also averred that the Special
Power of Attorney dated 16 January 1989,
which respondent had used to sell the lots is a
forgery and a falsified document, as the
signature therein were not the real signatures
of complainant and her spouse. In addition,
they could not have acknowledged the
document before a notary, as they were not in
the Philippines at the time.6
For his part, respondent vehemently denied all
the accusations of deceit, dishonesty and gross
misconduct.7
Respondent countered that Mario Blanco was
the true owner of the properties, which had to
be titled in complainants name, as Mario
Blanco was a U.S. citizen. Mario Blanco had
requested him to look for a buyer of the
properties and, in the course of selling them,
respondent claimed that he had only
transacted with the former and never with
complainant. Respondent averred that he had
been authorized in November 1989 to sell the
property, through a Special Power of Attorney,
for a price of not less than P250,000.00 net for
the owner.8

Respondent also alleged that the deed of

absolute sale if the two (2) lots had been
executed on 19 March 1990 but, only one lot
was initially paid in the amount of P281,980.00,
which he immediately remitted to Mario
Blanco. The payment for the other lot was
withheld, pending the relocation of the
squatters who had been occupying the
premises. And when respondent had finally
collected the proceeds of the second lot more
than three (3) years after, he asked Mario
Blanco if the former could use the amount for a
real estate venture whose profit, if successful,
he would share with the latter. Mario Blanco
allegedly did not think twice and consented to
the proposal. The venture, however, did not
push through.9
Respondent strongly maintained that the two
(2) lots had been sold for only P563,960.00.10
Finally, respondent denied the charge of
falsification. He claimed that complainant and
her spouse, Mario Blanco, had in fact signed
the Special Power of Attorney, but it was only
notarized later.11
In his Report and Recommendation dated 4
December 2006, Atty. Dennis A.B. Funa arrived
at the following findings:
It appears from the records that the two lots
were sold by Respondent for P560,000.00, not
P1,120,000.00 as alleged by Complainant. The
basis is the Deed of Absolute Sale dated March
11, 1990 which shows that the two lots
composing 800 sq. meters being sold for
P560,000.00. There appears to be no
documentary basis for the claimed amount of
P1,120,000.00 of Complainant. However,
Respondent in his Comment stated that the
two lots were sold by him for P563,960.00. In
any case, we shall uphold and apply the
amount stated in the Deed of Absolute Sale.
In Respondents letter dated March 20, 1990,
he acknowledged that he already received
P320,000.00 as the "total value of one lot".
Moreover, the computation shows that the
P320,000.00 was only for 400 sq.m. as the
computation
stated:
"400
sq.m.
x

15
800p/sqm=P320,000.00." Therefore, if the first
lot was sold for P320,000.00, then the second
lot must have been sold for P240,000 x x x
x x x there was clear deception on the part of
Respondent when he wrote the letter dated
March 20, 1990 "informing" the Blanco spouses
that he had sold only one of the two parcels of
land for P320,000.00. This is belied by the fact
that on March 11, 1990, or 9 days before he
wrote the letter, a Deed of Absolute Sale was
executed by him selling the two lots for
P560,000.00. This Deed of Absolute Sale was
notarized on March 19, 1990. During the
hearing, Respondent admitted that the Deed of
Sale covered two lots. Clearly, Respondent was
not
forthcoming
towards
the
Blanco
spouses.1awphi1
xxx
x x x Instead of representing that two lots had
been sold for P560,000.00. Respondent only
represented that he sold only one lot for
P320,000.00 and pocketing the balance of
P240,000.00.
xxx
During the course of hearing, Respondent
claims that the Deed of Sale referred to above
is a fake, and that there is a Deed of Sale
showing a selling price of P320,000.00 which is
the real Deed of Sale. However, no such Deed
of Sale has been presented by Respondent and
no such Deed of Sale appears in the records.
Later in the hearing, Respondent retracted his
statement claiming he was merely confused.
As for the alleged falsification of a Special
Power of Attorney dated January 16, 1989,
wherein the signatures of the Blanco spouses
appear in the SPA when they were not in the
Philippines on January 16, 1989 but were
allegedly in the United States, their absence in
the country has not been satisfactorily
established since mere xerox copies of their
passports, although noted by a notary public,
cannot duly establish their absence in the
country on that date. Other acceptable
documents such as a certification from the

Bureau of Immigration would have been

appropriate but which, however, had not been
presented. In any case, Respondent denies the
charge of falsification.12 (Citations omitted)
[Emphasis supplied]
Accordingly,
the
IBP
Commissioner
recommended that, in view of the fact that
respondent was already 72 years old, he be
meted out the penalty of suspension of one (1)year suspension, not disbarment as had been
prayed for and not 5 year-suspension as had
been earlier resolved by the IBP Board of
Governors. Moreover, the IBP Commissioner
recommended that respondent be ordered to
deliver to Complainant the amount of
P240,000.00 plus the legal interest rate of 6%
per annum computed from March 1990.
On 31 May 2007, the IBP Board of Governors
passed Resolution No. XVII-2007-222 adopting
and
approving
the
Report
and
Recommendation of the IBP Commissioner.13
The Court agrees with the findings and
conclusion of the IBP, but a reduction of the
recommended penalty is called for, following
the dictum that the appropriate penalty for an
errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound
judicial discretion based on the surrounding
facts.14
A lawyer may be disciplined for any conduct, in
his professional or private capacity, that
renders him unfit to continue to be an officer of
the court. Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility commands all lawyers to uphold
at all times the dignity and integrity of the legal
profession. Specifically, Rule 1.01 thereof
provides:
Rule 1.01A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful
conduct.
There is no need to stretch ones imagination
to arrive at an inevitable conclusion that
respondent committed dishonesty and abused
the confidence reposed in him by the
complainant and her spouse.

Records show that two lots had been sold by

respondent as evidenced by the Deed of
Absolute Sale of 11 March 1990. Respondent,
however, taking advantage of the absence of
complainant and her spouse from the
Philippines and their complete trust in him,
deceitfully informed them in a letter dated 20
March 1990 that he had sold only one. It can be
reasonably deduced from the exchanges
between the parties that the proceeds of the
first lot had been transmitted to complainant
and her spouse. Respondents contention,
though, that he had been authorized to retain
the proceeds of the second is specious, as
complainant and her spouse could not have
given the same, having been left in the dark as
regards its sale. And despite repeated
demands, to date, there is no showing that the
outstanding amount has been paid. Thus,
respondents
deceitful
conduct
warrants
disciplinary sanction and a directive for the
remittance of the remaining proceeds is in
order.
As to the charge of falsification, the Court
agrees with the IBP that the same appears to
be unsubstantiated. Settled is the rule that, in
administrative proceedings, the burden of proof
that the respondent committed the acts
complained of rests on the complainant. In fact,
if the complainant, upon whom rests the
burden of proving his cause of action, fails to
show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon
which he bases his claim, the respondent is
under no obligation to prove his exception or
defense.15 Mere allegation is not evidence and
is not equivalent to proof.16
Respondents
actions
erode
the
public
perception of the legal profession. They
constitute gross misconduct for which he may
be suspended, following Section 27, Rule 138
of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys
by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A
member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or
other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction

16
of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to
take before the admission to practice, or for a
willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a
party to a case without authority to so do.
Complainant
asks
that
respondent
be
disbarred. The Court finds, however, that
suspension from the practice of law is sufficient
to discipline respondent. The supreme penalty
of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases
of misconduct that seriously affect the standing
and character of the lawyer as an officer of the
court and member of the bar. While the Court
will not hesitate to remove an erring attorney
from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers,

where the evidence calls for it, the Court will

also not disbar him where a lesser penalty will
suffice to accomplish the desired end. In this
case, the Court finds the recommended penalty
of suspension of two (2) years for respondent
to be too severe, considering his advanced
age. The Court believes that a suspension of
six (6) months is sufficient. Suspension, by the
way, is not primarily intended as punishment,
but as a means to protect the public and the
legal profession.171avvphi1
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,
respondent Atty. Jaime Lumasag, Jr. is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period
of
SIX
(6)
MONTHS,
effective

immediately, with a warning that a repetition of

the same or a similar act will be dealt with
more severely. Further, respondent is ordered
to deliver to complainant the amount of
P240,000.00 plus legal interest rate of 6% per
annum computed from March 1990.
Let notice of this Resolution be spread in
respondents record as an attorney in this
Court, and notice thereof be served on the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the
Office of the Court Administrator for circulation
to all the courts concerned.
SO ORDERED.