Pretty ok aff

Contention 1: Protecting human rights prevents

future wars
Human rights solve war and WMD prolif
William W. Burke-White, Lecturer in Public and International Affairs and Senior Special Assistant to the
Dean, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University; Spring 04
17 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 249, pp. 249-50

This Article presents a strategic--as opposed to ideological or normative--argument that the promotion of
human rights should be given a more prominent place in U.S. foreign policy. It does so by suggesting a
correlation between the domestic human rights practices of states and their propensity to engage in
aggressive international conduct. Among the chief threats to U.S. national security are acts of aggression
by other states. Aggressive acts of war may directly endanger the United States, as did the Japanese
bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941, or they may require U.S. military action overseas, as in Kuwait fifty
years later. Evidence from the post-Cold War period indicates that states that systematically abuse their
own citizens' human rights are also those most likely to engage in aggression. To the degree that
improvements in various states' human rights records decrease the likelihood of aggressive war, a
foreign policy informed by human rights can significantly enhance U.S. and global security. Since
1990, a state's domestic human rights policy appears to be a telling indicator of that state's propensity to
engage in international aggression. A central element of U.S. foreign policy has long been the
preservation of peace and the prevention of such acts of aggression. If the correlation discussed herein is
accurate, it provides U.S. policymakers with a powerful new tool to enhance national security through the
promotion of human rights. A strategic linkage between national security and human rights would
result in a number of important policy modifications. First, it changes the prioritization of those countries
U.S. policymakers have identified as presenting the greatest concern. Second, it alters some of the policy
prescriptions for such states. Third, it offers states a means of signaling benign international intent
through the improvement of their domestic human rights records. Fourth, it provides a way for a current
government to prevent future governments from aggressive international behavior through the
institutionalization of human rights protections. Fifth, it addresses the particular threat of human rights
abusing states obtaining weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Finally, it offers a mechanism for U.S.U.N. cooperation on human rights issues.

Human rights solve war

William W. Burke-White, Lecturer in Public and International Affairs and Senior Special Assistant to the
Dean, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, Spring 2004
17 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 249
This Article presents a strategic--as opposed to ideological or normative--argument that the promotion of human rights should be given a more prominent place in U.S. foreign policy. It does so by suggesting a correlation between the
domestic human rights practices of states and their propensity to engage in aggressive international conduct. Among the chief threats to U.S. national security are acts of aggression by other states. Aggressive acts of war may directly
endanger the United States, as did the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941, or they may require U.S. military action overseas, as in Kuwait fifty years later. Evidence from the post-Cold War period [*250] indicates that states

in aggression. To the degree that improvements in various

states' human rights records decrease the likelihood of aggressive war, a foreign policy informed by
human rights can significantly enhance U.S. and global security.
Since 1990, a state's domestic human rights policy appears to be a telling indicator of that state's
propensity to engage in international aggression. A central element of U.S. foreign policy has long been
that systematically abuse their own citizens' human rights are also those most likely to engage

the preservation of peace and the prevention of such acts of aggression. If the correlation discussed
herein is accurate, it provides U.S. policymakers with a powerful new tool to enhance national security
through the promotion of human rights. A strategic linkage between national security and human rights
would result in a number of important policy modifications. First, it changes the prioritization of those countries U.S. policymakers have identified as presenting the greatest concern. Second, it alters some of the policy
prescriptions for such states. Third, it offers states a means of signaling benign international intent through the improvement of their domestic human rights records. Fourth, it provides a way for a current government to prevent future
governments from aggressive international behavior through the institutionalization of human rights protections. Fifth, it addresses the particular threat of human rights abusing states obtaining weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
Finally, it offers a mechanism for U.S.-U.N. cooperation on human rights issues.

Human rights are key to national security and preventing war

William W. Burke-White, Lecturer in Public and International Affairs and Senior Special Assistant to the
Dean, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, Spring 2004
17 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 249, p. 265-6
One causal pathway rooted in liberal international relations theory that may explain the observed
correlation between systematic human rights violations and interstate aggression is the institutional
constraint that accompanies human rights protections. Institutionalization of human rights norms has at
least two powerful effects on state behavior. First, human rights protections govern how broad a spectrum
of the community has at least some voice in the political decisions of the state. Even if the state is not a
democratic polyarchy, if it provides basic protections for the human rights of all or most citizens, then a
very broad spectrum of the polity is represented in political affairs. Freedom of thought and freedom from
extrajudicial bodily harm, for example, allow citizens to develop their own views on political issues and,
often, to express those views through public channels. A wider spectrum of voices, in turn, increases the
level of political competition--one of the key structural explanations for the democratic peace--even
without the establishment of a democratic form of government. Of course, in a non-democratic, but
human rights respecting state, the views of individual interests may not have a direct effect on state
policy, but, arguably, they can still increase the level of political competition by facilitating debate and the
exchange of ideas. The second effect of institutionalized protections of human rights is to set a minimum
floor of treatment for all citizens within the domestic polity. Even in a non-democracy, minimum human
rights protections ensure that rights are accorded to individuals not directly represented by the
government. By ensuring a minimum treatment of the unrepresented, human rights protections prevent
the government from externalizing the costs of aggressive behavior on the unrepresented. In human rights
respecting states, for example, unrepresented individuals cannot be forced at gunpoint to fight or be
bound into slavery to generate low-cost economic resources for war, and thus restrain the state from
engaging in aggressive action. On the other hand, in a state where power is narrowly concentrated in the
hands of a political elite that systematically represses its own people, the state will be more able to bear
the domestic costs of war. By violating the human rights of its own citizens, a state can force individuals
to fight or support the military apparatus in its war-making activities. Similarly, by denying basic human
rights, a state may be better able to bear the political costs of war. Even if such a state had fair elections,
denial of freedom of thought and expression might well insulate the government from the electoral costs
of an aggressive foreign policy.

Human rights solve war

William W. Burke-White, Lecturer in Public and International Affairs and Senior Special Assistant to the
Dean, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, Spring 2004

17 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 249, p. 266-7

The social beliefs explanation begins from the proposition that individuals within human rights protecting
states share a preference for a minimum set of protections of human rights. This assumption is appropriate
for two reasons. First, according to liberal political science theory, state policy represents the preferences
of some subset of the domestic polity. If the observed state policy is to protect human rights, then at least
some subset of the domestic polity must share that preference. Second, even if individuals within a
domestic polity seek a variety of differentiated ends, basic respect for human rights allows individuals to
pursue--to some degree at least--those ends as they define them. Liberal theory thus suggests that
individuals within a human rights respecting state tend to support basic human rights provisions. The next
step in the social beliefs argument is to recognize that respect for human rights has an inherently
universalist tendency. Unlike cultural or national rights, human rights are just that--human. They apply as
to those individuals within a domestic polity as to those outside the polity. Such cosmopolitan liberalism
indicates that "the more people are free, the better off all are." The net result is that individuals within a
human rights respecting state tend, on the average, to support the human rights of individuals in other
states as well. Given a set of universalist human rights values in states that respect human rights, the
policy articulated by the government may be one which respects human rights at home and demands their
protection abroad. This belief in a thin set of universal human rights may cause the leadership of the state
to frame its security policy around that belief structure and to refrain from aggressive acts that would
violate the human rights of citizens at home or abroad. As Peter Katzenstein argues, "security interests are
defined by actors who respond to cultural factors." Acts of international aggression tend to impinge on the
human rights of individuals in the target state and, at least temporarily, limit their freedom. After all,
bombs, bullets, death and destruction are not consistent with respect for basic human rights. Framed in the
liberal international relations theory terms of policy interdependence, international aggression by State A imposes costs on State B, whose citizens' human rights will be infringed upon by the act of aggression. This infringement in turn
imposes costs on citizens in State A, whose citizens have a preference for the protection of the human rights of citizens in both states. This shared value of respect for human rights thus may restrain State A from pursuing international

By contrast, a state which commits gross human rights violations against its own people will not
be subject to this restraint. Such violations often occur when the government has been "captured" by a
select minority that chooses to violate human rights. If the citizens themselves are not in favor of human
rights at home, they are unlikely to be committed to the enforcement of human rights abroad. Where
capture occurs, the government is not responsive to the preferences of the domestic polity. In such cases,
even if there is a strong preference among citizens to protect human rights at home and abroad, the
government is unlikely to respond to those interests and its policies will not be constrained by them.
aggression. n105

***Impact***

Contention 2: Human Rights Stop Terrorism

HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION THWARTS OPPORTUNITIES FOR
TERRORISM
Rosemary Foot, Professor of International Relations, St. Anthonys College, Oxford, 2003, Survival,
Volume 45, No. 2, Summer, p. 173
It is a linkage that has lived on the neo-Reaganite George W. Bush administration and appeals because the
human security idea allows for connections to be made between neo-conservative and liberal rhetoric.
The idea contributed to the decision in Bushs January 2002, State of the Union Address to describe Iraq,
Iran and North Korea as an axis of evil and to the argument in the September 2002 National Security
Strategy that terrorists would thrive where there was an absence of the rule of law and a failure to protect
human dignity. Thus, for the Bush administration, human-rights concerns enter into policymaking first as
a result of political, bureaucratic and legislative commitments made in the past. And secondly, because of
its acceptance latterly of the idea that gross violations of human rights generally tend to be the mark of a
state that might, wittingly or not, provide the base from which terrorist cells can operate, or be hospitable
to the establishment of links with transnational terrorism, or through it actions foment violent unrest that
spills over its borders.

Human rights key to national security prevents terrorist recruitment

MICHAEL J. O'DONNELL, Editor in Chief, Boston College Third World Law Journal, Winter 2004
24 B.C. Third World L.J. 223
The resentment and anger engendered by U.S. hypocrisy on human rights policy and corporate
responsibility are antithetical to long-term U.S. interests, and represent an immediate security threat in an
age of global terrorism. As the U.S. has become entrenched in the Middle East, an area of the world
currently saturated by virulent anti-Americanism, its perception abroad has increasingly become a
matter of national security policy. As one prominent human rights leader has noted, "Human rights
are the foundation of national security, both domestically and around the world." Flagrant
inconsistency between U.S. rhetoric and practice abroad provides anti-American extremists and terrorists
with an invaluable propaganda tool for adding angry recruits to their ranks. Because such antagonism is
eminently preventable, U.S. double standards on human rights and corporate accountability represent a
clear foreign policy failure.

US human rights leadership is key to national security and stopping terrorism

Lorne W. Craner, Asst. Sec. Of State For Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, October 31, 2001
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/rm/2001/6378.htm
The world has changed dramatically for all of us since September 11, and some people have expressed the concern that, as a result of the attacks on America, the Bush Administration will abandon human rights and democracy work.

maintaining the focus on human rights and democracy worldwide is an

integral part of our response to the attack and is even more essential today than before September 11th.
They remain in our national interest in promoting a stable and democratic world. As Dr. [Condoleezza]
Rice said only a week after the horrific attack, "Civil liberties matter to this President very much, and
our values matter to us abroad. We are not going to stop talking about the things that matter to us, human rights, religious freedom and so forth and so on. We're going to continue to press
To those people I say boldly that this is not the case. In fact,

those things; we would not be American if we did not." In practical terms, we continue to raise human rights issues at the highest levels of governments worldwide and have made it clear that these issues remain important to us. We do

there is often a direct link between the absence of human rights and democracy and seeds of
terrorism. Promoting human rights and democracy addresses the fear, frustration, hatred, and violence that
is the breeding ground for the next generation of terrorists. We cannot win a war against terrorism by
halting our work promoting the universal observance of human rights. To do so would be merely to set
so because

the stage for a resurgence of terrorism in another generation. As Thomas Jefferson said: that government is the strongest of which everyone may feel a part. At
the very least, the brutality of the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon and the fact that it was completely unprovoked suggest that models based on what we used to call the "rational actor" are far from fully
comprehensive -- unless, of course, you are willing to take Clausewitz one step further and suggest that not only is war politics by another means, but so, too, is terrorism. But that would be to give it a legitimacy that it clearly does not

This is not an attack on

armies, but on symbols. Obviously, we need to learn how to fight the perceptions and misperceptions that lie behind all that better than we do. The question that we all are asking ourselves since that
merit. Even so, what drives individuals -- not states, but men, individual, independent actors -- to assume the cloak of moral or religious rectitude and declare holy war on a country?

terrible day last month is this: how do we, who have the responsibility for promoting and protecting the values that underpin civil society at home and throughout the world, pick our way through all the causes and effects of that and
make sure that it does not happen again? Obviously, there is much we can do: in intelligence-gathering and information sharing, in civil defense and homeland security, in diplomacy and economic leveraging, in international
cooperation and coalition-building, in pressure and in force. All this the Administration is doing, and much, much more. My point is not to venture into the realm of military strategy. That is not my responsibility in this administration.
Fortunately for all of us, the President has assembled a very experienced and capable team for that. This country is not the cause of all the problems of this world -- quite the contrary. We spend a great deal of time and effort trying to

. We cannot solve every regional dispute and ethnic conflict. And yet, we are the
sole superpower. Our reach is global and unprecedented. People look to us. Our power and our potential
are immense. We have interests and we have obligations to our friends and allies. As the head of the
bureau charged with advising the President and Secretary of State on human rights, I have to worry about
the causes and consequences of conflicts wherever they take place, for all of them involve human rights
in one way or another -- whether in Sudan or Sierra Leone, Indonesia, Macedonia, or the Middle East. I
solve them. But still, we cannot be everywhere at once

suspect most of you are looking to hear something about this administration's priorities within the field of human rights, especially after the September 11th attacks. Let me begin by outlining the general principles that I think will
guide us. First, over the past 20 years, both political parties -- Republicans and Democrats -- have firmly embraced the belief that

America has an obligation to advance

fundamental freedoms around the world. Thus human rights have the deep and strong backing of both parties, all branches of government, and, most importantly, the American people.
This will not change. In a multilateral sense, the United States has been the unquestioned leader of the movement to expand human rights since the Second World War. We pushed it in the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and into the conventions and treaty bodies that have ensued. And when I say "we," I do not just mean the U.S. government. For it was our people, Americans from every walk of life, who gave the international nongovernmental organization (NGO) movement so much of its intellectual force, its financial muscle, and its firm commitment to civil society. This, too, will not change. We in this administration are conscious of our history and

are

proud to bear the mantle of leadership in international human rights into this new century.

HUMAN RIGHTS PROMOTION IS KEY TO FIGHTING INTERNATIONAL

TERRORISM
Paula J. Dobriansky, Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs, HERITAGE FOUNDATION REPORTS,
December 21, 2001, p. 1.

The advancement of human rights and democracy is important in its own right. At the same time, these
efforts are the bedrock of our war on terrorism. The violation of human rights by repressive regimes
provides fertile ground for popular discontent. In turn, this discontent is cynically exploited by terrorist
organizations and their supporters. By contrast, a stable government that responds to the legitimate desires
of its people and respects their rights, shares power, respects diversity, and seeks to unleash the creative
potential of all elements of society is a powerful antidote to extremism. I am pleased to tell you that this
Administration's commitment to human rights, democracy, and religious freedom is unshakeable. The
President and other senior officials have emphasized these core principles repeatedly in the aftermath of
September 11. The President's National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice, at a recent Forum on the
Africa Growth and Opportunity Act, reiterated our commitment to promoting democracy, noting
"democratization and stability are the underpinning for a world free of terrorism."

***Impacts***
Future terrorist attacks will cause extinction
Alexander 03, Director of Inter-University for Terrorism Studies
[Yonah, Washington Times, August 28, LN] bg

the international community

failed, thus far at least, to understand the magnitude and implications of the terrorist
threats to the very survival of civilization itself. Even the United States and Israel have for decades tended to regard terrorism as a
Last week's brutal suicide bombings in Baghdad and Jerusalem have once again illustrated dramatically that

mere tactical nuisance or irritant rather than a critical strategic challenge to their national security concerns. It is not surprising, therefore, that on September 11, 2001,
Americans were stunned by the unprecedented tragedy of 19 al Qaeda terrorists striking a devastating blow at the center of the nation's commercial and military
powers. Likewise, Israel and its citizens, despite the collapse of the Oslo Agreements of 1993 and numerous acts of terrorism triggered by the second intifada that
began almost three years ago, are still "shocked" by each suicide attack at a time of intensive diplomatic efforts to revive the moribund peace process through the now
revoked cease-fire arrangements [hudna]. Why are the United States and Israel, as well as scores of other countries affected by the universal nightmare of modern
terrorism surprised by new terrorist "surprises"? There are many reasons, including misunderstanding of the manifold specific factors that contribute to terrorism's
expansion, such as lack of a universal definition of terrorism, the religionization of politics, double standards of morality, weak punishment of terrorists, and the

Unlike their historical counterparts,

contemporary terrorists have introduced a new scale of violence in terms of conventional
and unconventional threats and impact. The internationalization and brutalization of
current and future terrorism make it clear we have entered an Age of Super Terrorism [e.g.
biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear and cyber] with its serious implications
concerning national, regional and global security concerns. Two myths in particular must be debunked immediately if
exploitation of the media by terrorist propaganda and psychological warfare.

an effective counterterrorism "best practices" strategy can be developed [e.g., strengthening international cooperation]. The first illusion is that terrorism can be greatly
reduced, if not eliminated completely, provided the root causes of conflicts - political, social and economic - are addressed. The conventional illusion is that terrorism
must be justified by oppressed people seeking to achieve their goals and consequently the argument advanced "freedom fighters" anywhere, "give me liberty and I will
give you death," should be tolerated if not glorified. This traditional rationalization of "sacred" violence often conceals that the real purpose of terrorist groups is to
gain political power through the barrel of the gun, in violation of fundamental human rights of the noncombatant segment of societies. For instance, Palestinians
religious movements [e.g., Hamas, Islamic Jihad] and secular entities [such as Fatah's Tanzim and Aqsa Martyr Brigades]] wish not only to resolve national grievances
[such as Jewish settlements, right of return, Jerusalem] but primarily to destroy the Jewish state. Similarly, Osama bin Laden's international network not only opposes
the presence of American military in the Arabian Peninsula and Iraq, but its stated objective is to "unite all Muslims and establish a government that follows the rule of

The second myth is that strong action against terrorist infrastructure [leaders, recruitment, funding,
will only increase terrorism. The argument here is that
law-enforcement efforts and military retaliation inevitably will fuel more brutal acts of
violent revenge. Clearly, if this perception continues to prevail, particularly in democratic
societies, there is the danger it will paralyze governments and thereby encourage further
terrorist attacks. In sum, past experience provides useful lessons for a realistic future strategy. The prudent application of
force has been demonstrated to be an effective tool for short- and long-term deterrence of
terrorism. For example, Israel's targeted killing of Mohammed Sider, the Hebron commander of the Islamic Jihad, defused a "ticking bomb." The
the Caliphs."

propaganda, training, weapons, operational command and control]

assassination of Ismail Abu Shanab - a top Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip who was directly responsible for several suicide bombings including the latest bus attack in
Jerusalem - disrupted potential terrorist operations. Similarly, the U.S. military operation in Iraq eliminated Saddam Hussein's regime as a state sponsor of terror.

it behooves those countries victimized by terrorism to understand a cardinal message

communicated by Winston Churchill to the House of Commons on May 13,
1940: "Victory at all costs, victory in spite of terror, victory however long and hard the road
may be: For without victory, there is no survival."
Thus,

Nuclear technology is easily accessible to terrorist groups, enabling them to inflict

maximum damage.
O'Neill 97 from the Institute for Science and International Security
[Kevn, Editor at the Institute for Science and International Security, The Nuclear Terrorist Threat
http://www.isisonline.org/publications/terrorism/threat.pdf]

The proliferation of nuclear weapons or radiological dispersal devices to terrorist groups is

perhaps one of the most frightening threats to U.S. security. Nuclear materials, technologies
and know-how are more widely available today than ever before. Small quantities of both
fissile materials and highly radioactive materials, sufficient to manufacture a radiological
dispersal device, are actively traded on the black market. A nuclear detonation by a
terrorist group would likely result in an unprecedented number of casualties. In contrast, a

radiological dispersal attack would probably be less violent, but could significantly
contaminate an urban center, causing economic and social disruption. Both types of attacks
would have significant psychological impacts on the entire population.

Nuclear terrorism will trigger a global nuclear war

Beres 87, Professor of Political Science and International Law at Purdue University
[Louis Ren, Terrorism and Global Security: The Nuclear Threat, p. 42-43]

Nuclear terrorism could even spark full-scale war between states. Such war could involve the
entire spectrum of nuclear-conflict possibilities, ranging from a nuclear attack upon a non-nuclear
state to systemwide nuclear war. How might such far-reaching consequences of nuclear terrorism come about? Perhaps the most likely way
would involve a terrorist nuclear assault against a state by terrorists hosted in another state. For example, consider the following scenario: Early in the 1990s, Israel
and its Arab-state neighbors finally stand ready to conclude a comprehensive, multilateral peace settlement. With a bilateral treaty between Israel and Egypt already
many years old, only the interests of the Palestiniansas defined by the PLOseem to have been left out. On the eve of the proposed signing of the peace agreement,
half a dozen crude nuclear explosives in the one-kiloton range detonate in as many Israeli cities. Public grief in Israel over the many thousands dead ands maimed is
matched only by the outcry for revenge. In response to the public mood, the government of Israel initiates selected strikes against terrorist strongholds in Lebanon,
whereupon Lebanese Shiite forces and Syria retaliate against Israel. Before long, the entire region is ablaze, conflict has escalated to nuclear forms, and all countries in
the area have suffered unprecedented destruction. Of course, such a scenario is fraught with the makings of even wider destruction. How would the United States react

a chain reaction of interstate

nuclear conflict could ensure, one that would ultimately involve the superpowers or even
every nuclear-weapons state on the planet. What, exactly, would this mean? Whether the terms of assessment be statistical or
human, the consequences of nuclear war require an entirely new paradigm of death . Only such a
paradigm would allow us a proper framework for absorbing the vision of near-total obliteration and the outer limits of human
destructiveness. Any nuclear war would have effectively permanent and irreversible consequences. Whatever the actual extent of injuries and fatalities, such a
war would entomb the spirit of the entire species in a planetary casket strewn with shorn
bodies and imbecile imaginations.
to the situation in the Middle East? What would be the Soviet response? It is certainly conceivable that

Nuclear terrorism will prompt US nuclear retaliation killing hundreds of millions

instantly
Easterbrook 01, Senior Editor of New Republic
[Greg, Americas New War: Nuclear Threats, Greenfield at Large, November 1, LN] bg

when the United States and Russia had thousands of nuclear weapons
pointed at each other, what held each side back was the fact that fundamentally they were
rational. They knew that if they struck, they would be struck in turn. Terrorists may not be held by this, especially
suicidal terrorists, of the kind that al Qaeda is attempting to cultivate. But I think, if I could leave you with
Well, what held through the Cold War,

one message, it would be this: that the search for terrorist atomic weapons would be of great benefit to the Muslim peoples of the world in addition to members, to

if an atomic warhead goes off in Washington, say, in the

current environment or anything like it, in the 24 hours that followed, a hundred million
Muslims would die as U.S. nuclear bombs rained down on every conceivable military target
in a dozen Muslim countries.
people of the United States and Western Europe, because

Contention 3: No state sovereignty without

Human Rights
Sovereignty is based on an emotional attachment of the people to the government
Michael Ignatieff is a former leader of the Liberal Party of Canada and a fellow of Massey College at the University of Toronto,
New Republic, February 16, 2012, p. 25

Sovereignty draws on much deeper identifications. The sovereign protects us with its
monopoly of the means of violence. It can also ask citizens to sacrifice their life for their country. This is
nobodys idea of a rational contract, but it is everybodys idea of the patriotic ideal.
Sovereignty draws on this deep layer of emotional identification of the people with the
sovereign as the juridical embodiment of the nation. If this deeper layer did not exist,
contract alone would not keep political order intact. Sovereign obedience, on such a view,
reposes on a primal emotional bond between citizen and nation, a nexus of individual and
collective identity, mediated through a government elected by the people.

Sovereign legitimacy is grounded in the ability of sovereigns to arouse patriotic

passion
Michael Ignatieff is a former leader of the Liberal Party of Canada and a fellow of Massey College at the
University of Toronto, New Republic, February 16, 2012, p. 25

These emotional underpinnings of sovereignty make liberals uneasy. The liberal attempt to secularize obedience has
always been an attempt to make politics rational, to replace awe with consent. By vesting sovereignty in the

people, and by locating legitimacy in consent, liberals from Locke onward sought to
expunge from sovereigntys claim upon us those irrational, overbearing demands that
could lead both to slaughter and to tyranny. Yet the sacramental, sacrificial, all-consuming
emotions that popular refuse to be thought away. Contractual sovereignty has never made
peace with patriotic passion and never can, any more than philosophies of limited
government can make their peace with the passion of the people to feel and act as one.
Sovereigns are legitimate to us to the extent that they convince our reason and rouse our
patriotic passions.

Contention 4: Denying Human Rights

Dehumanizes
Human rights are fundamental to deny them is to challenge ones very humanity
Natsu Taylor Saito, Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law, Yale Law & Policy
Review, 2002, 20 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 427, p. 427-8

There is a nexus between the abolition or the diminution of [the precepts of American
slavery jurisprudence] as advocated by the slavemasters in power in the American colonial
and antebellum periods and the efforts in this decade to advocate universal human rights
for all. The more we appreciate the extraordinary injustice of the original precepts, the more persistent we will be in eradicating the vestiges
of those precepts in the United States and the equivalent denigration throughout the world. Nelson Mandela reminded a joint session of the

Human rights law is

a subset of international law designed to protect certain fundamental rights of individuals
and of ethnic, religious, racial, and national minorities within states. It also encompasses
the rights of peoples to self-determination. Since World War II the major world powers have acknowledged that these
United States Congress in 1990 that "to deny any person their human rights is to challenge their very humanity."

universal principles of human rights must be accepted as binding on all states, because the domestic laws that protect the rights of "insiders" often
fail to protect those regarded as "Other" within the polity. n4 The colonial legacy of the arbitrary imposition of state boundaries upon indigenous
nations in almost every part of the world makes international human rights law particularly important.

***Impact***
Dehumanization destroys the value to wife and outweighs all calculable impacts
Berube 97 Professor of Communication Studies and Associate Director of NanoScience and
Technology Studies at
University of South Carolina
[David M., NANOTECHNOLOGICAL PROLONGEVITY: The Down Side, http://www.cas.sc.edu/engl/faculty/berube/prolong.htm]

Montagu and Matson's treatise on the dehumanization of humanity. They

warn[s]: "its destructive toll is already greater than that of any war, plague, famine, or
natural calamity on record -- and its potential danger to the quality of life and the fabric of civilized
society is beyond calculation. For that reason this sickness of the soul might well be called the Fifth
Horseman of the Apocalypse.... Behind the genocide of the holocaust lay a dehumanized
thought; beneath the menticide of deviants and dissidents... in the cuckoo's next of America, lies a dehumanized image of man... (Montagu & Matson, 1983, p.
This means-ends dispute is at the core of

xi-xii). While it may never be possible to quantify the impact dehumanizing ethics may have had on humanity, it is safe to conclude the foundations of humanness

When we calculate the actual losses and the virtual benefits, we approach
a nearly inestimable value greater than any tools which we can currently use to measure it.
Dehumanization is nuclear war, environmental apocalypse, and international genocide. When
people become things, they become dispensable. When people are dispensable, any and
every atrocity can be justified. Once justified, they seem to be inevitable for every epoch has evil and
offer great opportunities which would be foregone.

dehumanization is evil's most powerful weapon.

Contention 5: Human rights key to democracy

Human rights key to democratization
Thomas Carothers, director, Democracy and Rule of Law Project, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY,
Summer 1994, p. 106.

In most of the countries that have undergone democratic transitions in recent years, during
the generative period of the transitions (generally the late 1970s and early to mid-1980s), the emphasis of external
actors was on human rights advocacy rather than democracy promotion per se. Therefore,
just as human rights advocates should not overlook the fact that democratization has
advanced the cause of human rights in many countries, democracy promotion proponents
should not ignore the contribution of human rights advocacy to democratization.

Promoting human rights in China is a precondition for the development of

democracy and resolving regional conflicts
Samuel S. Kim, Adjunct Prof of PoliSci and Senior Research Associate at the East Asian Institute at
Columbia University, 2000
In What if China Doesnt Democratize?, ed. Edward Friedman and Barrett L. McCormick. p. 155-156

To borrow from the familiar Chinese refrain"no state sovereignty, no human rights"we
can say, "no human rights, no or little chance of democratization." Viewing democratization
as an ongoing and multi- stage process rather than a natural outcome of certain social,
cultural, and economic preconditions, human rights can be defined as what David Held calls
"empowering rights"73 that are integral to strategic interactions among state, society, and
international factors necessary to bring about a transition to democracy. Democracy in a
minimalist procedural senseuniversal and equal suffrage and free electoral competition
cannot come about without the citizens enjoying civil and political rights as guaranteed in the
UDHR (Article 21) and the ICCPR (Article 25) Human rights are empowering democratization in
normative and substantive terms as well. There is no way or means of "seeking truth from
facts" without an opposition. International legitimation no longer rests solely on the claims
of state sovereignty by the powers that be. Increasingly, it rests on the condition of human
rights, on how the government treats its own sovereign people.74 Contrary to Deng's chaos
theory, respect for human rights is not only a more reliable guide to a peaceful transition to
democracy but also for domestic stability in the multina tional Chinese state, especially for
peaceful resolution of the simmering conflicts in Democratic Taiwan, Buddhist Tibet, and
Muslim Xinjiang. There is also the normative/behavioral requirement of great power status: a great power abroad is and becomes what a great power does at home and abroad.75 In
short, a China that respects human rights would be a more democratic country, just as a more
democratic China would become part of the world order solution in the Asia-Pacific region
and beyond.

***Impacts***

Democracy = Best Form of Government

Democracy is the best form of government multiple reasons
-

holds rulers accountable to the people

institutions prevent abusive rule and corruption

guarantees human rights

stimulates political competition that generates higher quality officials

McFaul 10 (Michael McFaul, Hoover Senior Fellow, professor of polisci and director
of the Center on Democracy, Development, and Rule of Law at Stanford and
nonresident associate at Carnegie, Advancing Democracy Abroad, p. 35-37)

democracy provides the best institutional arrangement for holding

rulers accountable to the people. If leaders must compete for popular support to
stay in power, they will respond to their citizens preferences. Rulers who do not need
First and foremost,

popular support to gain or maintain power will likely be more responsive to whatever group the family, the
military, the mullahs, or the communist party controls their fate. The larger the number of people needed to elect

the more inclined that leader will be to pursue public policies that benefit the
majority. Not surprisingly, therefore, democracies have consistently generated superior
levels of social welfare compared to autocracies at similar income levels. Second, the
institutions of democracy prevent abusive rule, constrain bad government, and
provide a mechanism for getting rid of corrupt or ineffective leaders. Truly
oppressive leaders cannot remain in power for long if they must seek the electoral
mandate of those being oppressed. Autocrats face no such constraints. Mass terror
and genocide occur in autocracies, not democracies. Democracies do not prevent all abusive
behavior, but over the centuries, democratic leaders have unquestionably inflicted less
pain and suffering on their people than have autocratic leaders. Joseph Stalin and the
Soviet regime sent 28.7 million to forced labor camps , 2.7 million of whom died while
a leader,

incarcerated. Stalin consciously starved millions in Ukraine in the 1932-33 holodomor, and ordered the political

Hitler not only unleashed carnage through war, he

murdered six million Jews and millions more poles, gypsies, and others in his
concentration camps. In China, Mao may have killed more than seventy million people
execution of millions more during his bloody reign. Adolf

during his reign, including the roughly thirty-eight million people who died during a horrific famine generated by
government policies. In only four years, Pol

Pot exterminated roughly a quarter of Cambodias

population. Idi Amin in Uganda, Saddam Hussein in Iraq, and Slobodan Miloevi in Yugoslavia
also systematically slaughtered their own citizens. The carnage within democracies during the
same century is tragic, but its breadth is not on the same scale. In the twenty-first century, autocratic
regimes in Sudan, Zimbabwe, North Korea, and Burma inflict pain on their citizens in
a manner with no parallel in democratic countries. Famine is also a phenomenon of
dictatorships, not democracies. Amartya Sen notes in his work the remarkable fact that, in the
terrible history of modern famines in the world, no substantial famine has ever
occurred in any independent and democratic country with a relatively free press.
Ironically, skeptics in the democracy promotion debate in the U.S., often argue that bread and butter issues should
come first, or it is hard to care about our vote when you are starving. What these critics fail to recognize is that

people often starve because they do not have the power to vote. More generally,
democracies are better at guaranteeing human rights and individual freedoms than

are autocracies, because they do not rely on the goodwill of leaders. The correlation
between Freedom House scores on political liberties and civil liberties is robust. For every liberal autocrat like
Singapores Lee Kuan Yew or the King of Jordan, there are several more Hitlers, Stalins, and Mugabes. Finally,

democracy stimulates political competition that helps to generate higher quality

officials in government. Just as market competition leads to better products, political
competition produces better leaders, ideas, and organizations. At a minimum,
democracy provides a mechanism for getting rid of bad or incompetent rulers in a
way that autocracy does not. The absence of political competition in autocracies
produces complacency, corruption, and no mechanism for generating new talent.

Democracy Good Laundry List/Econ

Democracy is the best system of governance solves war,
terrorism, and economic growth
Mitchell and Phillips 8 (Lincoln A. Mitchell, Assistant Professor in the Practice of
International Politics at Columbias School of International and Political Affairs, and
David L. Phillips, project director of the National Committee on American Foreign
Policy, Enhancing Democracy Assistance, January 2008,
http://www.acus.org/files/publication_pdfs/65/Enhancing%20Democracy
%20Assistance.pdf)

Democracy is both a reflection of American values and in Americas strategic

interests. Democracies do not fight wars against each other, nor do they engage in
terrorism or produce refugees. They also make more reliable allies and better
trading partners. Democracy has proven to be the best system of governance to
realize universal human aspirations for freedom and to support human
development. Democracy is also the basis for steadier and more reliable economic
development. It is grounded in the rule of law, which stimulates competition,
innovation, and progress while providing the necessary legal framework for free
markets. Democracy also fosters an ethos of self-reliance and entrepreneurship that
is far better suited to economic growth than that of authoritarianism, which breeds
apathy and stagnation. Democratic governance creates conditions for individuals to
fulfill their potential and live better lives.

Peace
Democracy key to peace maintains internal stability,
accountability, transparency, and pluralism and decreases
extremism
Craner and Wollack 8 (Lorne W. Craner, President of the International Republican
Institute, and Kenneth Wollack, President of the National Democratic Institute, New
Directions for Democracy Promotion,
http://www.ndi.org/files/2344_newdirections_engpdf_07242008.pdf)

the majority of people in

every region of the world now believe that democracy is the best form of
government. While democratic systems may be the standard that nations seek, achieving that standard and
In recent decades, scores of countries have chosen to become democratic and

sustaining support for democratic governance can be a difficult process. A critical challenge for new democracies is
to deliver better lives to their populations. To be successful and maintain popular support, a democracy cannot be
just a set of concepts or processes; it must be connected to economic prosperity and produce visible improvements,

Democracies
also provide the best alternatives for fostering peace across borders by maintaining
internal stability and achieving economic and social development. The September 11
which are key factors in preventing alternatives, such as autocratic regimes, from gaining ground.

attacks increased the focus on failed states and those in conflict as potential breeding grounds for extremists.

Democracies, with their focus on accountability, transparency, and pluralism, can

help reduce extremism by allowing avenues for dissent, alternation of power, and
protections for the rights of minorities.

Nuke War
Continued democratization is essential to avert nuclear war
Muravchik 01 Resident Scholar at American Enterprise Institute
[Joshua, Democracy and nuclear peace, Jul 11, http://www.npec-web.org/syllabi/muravchik.htm]

The greatest impetus for world peace -- and perforce of nuclear peace -- is the spread of democracy. In a
famous article, and subsequent book, Francis Fukuyama argued that democracy's extension was leading to "the end
of history." By this he meant the conclusion of man's quest for the right social order, but he also meant the "diminution of the likelihood
of large-scale conflict between states." (1) Fukuyama's phrase was intentionally provocative, even tongue-in-cheek, but he was pointing
to two down-to-earth historical observations: that democracies are more peaceful than other kinds of government and that the world is growing more democratic.
Neither point has gone unchallenged. Only a few decades ago, as distinguished an observer of international relations as George Kennan made a claim quite contrary to
the first of these assertions. Democracies, he said, were slow to anger, but once aroused "a democracy . . . . fights in anger . . . . to the bitter end." (2) Kennan's view
was strongly influenced by the policy of "unconditional surrender" pursued in World War II. But subsequent experience, such as the negotiated settlements America
sought in Korea and Vietnam proved him wrong. Democracies are not only slow to anger but also quick to compromise. And to forgive. Notwithstanding the
insistence on unconditional surrender, America treated Japan and that part of Germany that it occupied with extraordinary generosity. In recent years a burgeoning

the proposition that democracies do not go to war with

one another has been described by one political scientist as being "as close as anything we
have to an empirical law in international relations." (3) Some of those who find enthusiasm for democracy off-putting have challenged this proposition,
literature has discussed the peacefulness of democracies. Indeed

but their challenges have only served as empirical tests that have confirmed its robustness. For example, the academic Paul Gottfried and the columnist-turned-politician Patrick J. Buchanan have both instanced democratic England's
declaration of war against democratic Finland during World War II. (4) In fact, after much procrastination, England did accede to the pressure of its Soviet ally to declare war against Finland which was allied with Germany. But the
declaration was purely formal: no fighting ensued between England and Finland. Surely this is an exception that proves the rule. The strongest exception I can think of is the war between the nascent state of Israel and the Arabs in
1948. Israel was an embryonic democracy and Lebanon, one of the Arab belligerents, was also democratic within the confines of its peculiar confessional division of power. Lebanon, however, was a reluctant party to the fight. Within
the councils of the Arab League, it opposed the war but went along with its larger confreres when they opted to attack. Even so, Lebanon did little fighting and soon sued for peace. Thus, in the case of Lebanon against Israel, as in the
case of England against Finland, democracies nominally went to war against democracies when they were dragged into conflicts by authoritarian allies. The political scientist Bruce Russett offers a different challenge to the notion that
democracies are more peaceful. "That democracies are in general, in dealing with all kinds of states, more peaceful than are authoritarian or other nondemocratically constituted states . . . .is a much more controversial proposition than
'merely' that democracies are peaceful in their dealings with each other, and one for which there is little systematic evidence," he says. (5) Russett cites his own and other statistical explorations which show that while democracies
rarely fight one another they often fight against others. The trouble with such studies, however, is that they rarely examine the question of who started or caused a war. To reduce the data to a form that is quantitatively measurable, it is
easier to determine whether a conflict has occurred between two states than whose fault it was. But the latter question is all important. Democracies may often go to war against dictatorships because the dictators see them as prey or
underestimate their resolve. Indeed, such examples abound. Germany might have behaved more cautiously in the summer of 1914 had it realized that England would fight to vindicate Belgian neutrality and to support France. Later,
Hitler was emboldened by his notorious contempt for the flabbiness of the democracies. North Korea almost surely discounted the likelihood of an American military response to its invasion of the South after Secretary of State Dean
Acheson publicly defined America's defense perimeter to exclude the Korean peninsula (a declaration which merely confirmed existing U.S. policy). In 1990, Saddam Hussein's decision to swallow Kuwait was probably encouraged
by the inference he must have taken from the statements and actions of American officials that Washington would offer no forceful resistance. Russett says that those who claim democracies are in general more peaceful "would have
us believe that the United States was regularly on the defensive, rarely on the offensive, during the Cold War." But that is not quite right: the word "regularly" distorts the issue. A victim can sometimes turn the tables on an aggressor,
but that does not make the victim equally bellicose. None would dispute that Napoleon was responsible for the Napoleonic wars or Hitler for World War II in Europe, but after a time their victims seized the offensive. So in the Cold
War, the United States may have initiated some skirmishes (although in fact it rarely did), but the struggle as a whole was driven one-sidedly. The Soviet policy was "class warfare"; the American policy was "containment." The socalled revisionist historians argued that America bore an equal or larger share of responsibility for the conflict. But Mikhail Gorbachev made nonsense of their theories when, in the name of glasnost and perestroika, he turned the
Soviet Union away from its historic course. The Cold War ended almost instantly--as he no doubt knew it would. "We would have been able to avoid many . . . difficulties if the democratic process had developed normally in our
country," he wrote. (7) To render judgment about the relative peacefulness of states or systems, we must ask not only who started a war but why. In particular we should consider what in Catholic Just War doctrine is called "right
intention," which means roughly: what did they hope to get out of it? In the few cases in recent times in which wars were initiated by democracies, there were often motives other than aggrandizement, for example, when America
invaded Grenada. To be sure, Washington was impelled by self-interest more than altruism, primarily its concern for the well-being of American nationals and its desire to remove a chip, however tiny, from the Soviet game board. But
America had no designs upon Grenada, and the invaders were greeted with joy by the Grenadan citizenry. After organizing an election, America pulled out. In other cases, democracies have turned to war in the face of provocation,
such as Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982 to root out an enemy sworn to its destruction or Turkey's invasion of Cyprus to rebuff a power-grab by Greek nationalists. In contrast, the wars launched by dictators, such as Iraq's invasion
of Kuwait, North Korea's of South Korea, the Soviet Unions of Hungary and Afghanistan, often have aimed at conquest or subjugation. The big exception to this rule is colonialism. The European powers conquered most of Africa and
Asia, and continued to hold their prizes as Europe democratized. No doubt many of the instances of democracies at war that enter into the statistical calculations of researchers like Russett stem from the colonial era. But colonialism
was a legacy of Europe's pre-democratic times, and it was abandoned after World War II. Since then, I know of no case where a democracy has initiated warfare without significant provocation or for reasons of sheer aggrandizement,
but there are several cases where dictators have done so. One interesting piece of Russett's research should help to point him away from his doubts that democracies are more peaceful in general. He aimed to explain why democracies
are more peaceful toward each other. Immanuel Kant was the first to observe, or rather to forecast, the pacific inclination of democracies. He reasoned that "citizens . . . will have a great hesitation in . . . . calling down on themselves
all the miseries of war." (8) But this valid insight is incomplete. There is a deeper explanation. Democracy is not just a mechanism; it entails a spirit of compromise and self-restraint. At bottom, democracy is the willingness to resolve
civil disputes without recourse to violence. Nations that embrace this ethos in the conduct of their domestic affairs are naturally more predisposed to embrace it in their dealings with other nations. Russett aimed to explain why
democracies are more peaceful toward one another. To do this, he constructed two models. One hypothesized that the cause lay in the mechanics of democratic decision-making (the "structural/institutional model"), the other that it lay
in the democratic ethos (the "cultural/normative model"). His statistical assessments led him to conclude that: "almost always the cultural/normative model shows a consistent effect on conflict occurrence and war. The
structural/institutional model sometimes provides a significant relationship but often does not." (9) If it is the ethos that makes democratic states more peaceful toward each other, would not that ethos also make them more peaceful in
general? Russett implies that the answer is no, because to his mind a critical element in the peaceful behavior of democracies toward other democracies is their anticipation of a conciliatory attitude by their counterpart. But this is too
pat. The attitude of live-and-let-live cannot be turned on and off like a spigot. The citizens and officials of democracies recognize that other states, however governed, have legitimate interests, and they are disposed to try to
accommodate those interests except when the other party's behavior seems threatening or outrageous. A different kind of challenge to the thesis that democracies are more peaceful has been posed by the political scientists Edward G.
Mansfield and Jack Snyder. They claim statistical support for the proposition that while fully fledged democracies may be pacific, Ain th[e] transitional phase of democratization, countries become more aggressive and war-prone, not
less." (10) However, like others, they measure a state's likelihood of becoming involved in a war but do not report attempting to determine the cause or fault. Moreover, they acknowledge that their research revealed not only an
increased likelihood for a state to become involved in a war when it was growing more democratic, but an almost equal increase for states growing less democratic. This raises the possibility that the effects they were observing were
caused simply by political change per se, rather than by democratization. Finally, they implicitly acknowledge that the relationship of democratization and peacefulness may change over historical periods. There is no reason to
suppose that any such relationship is governed by an immutable law. Since their empirical base reaches back to 1811, any effect they report, even if accurately interpreted, may not hold in the contemporary world. They note that "in
[some] recent cases, in contrast to some of our historical results, the rule seems to be: go fully democratic, or don't go at all." But according to Freedom House, some 62.5 percent of extant governments were chosen in legitimate
elections. (12) (This is a much larger proportion than are adjudged by Freedom House to be "free states," a more demanding criterion, and it includes many weakly democratic states.) Of the remaining 37.5 percent, a large number are
experiencing some degree of democratization or heavy pressure in that direction. So the choice "don't go at all" (11) is rarely realistic in the contemporary world. These statistics also contain the answer to those who doubt the second
proposition behind Fukuyama's forecast, namely, that the world is growing more democratic. Skeptics have drawn upon Samuel Huntington's fine book, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Huntington
says that the democratization trend that began in the mid-1970s in Portugal, Greece and Spain is the third such episode. The first "wave" of democratization began with the American Revolution and lasted through the aftermath of
World War I, coming to an end in the interwar years when much of Europe regressed back to fascist or military dictatorship. The second wave, in this telling, followed World War II when wholesale decolonization gave rise to a raft of
new democracies. Most of these, notably in Africa, collapsed into dictatorship by the 1960s, bringing the second wave to its end. Those who follow Huntington's argument may take the failure of democracy in several of the former
Soviet republics and some other instances of backsliding since 1989 to signal the end of the third wave. Such an impression, however, would be misleading. One unsatisfying thing about Huntington's "waves" is their unevenness. The
first lasted about 150 years, the second about 20. How long should we expect the third to endure? If it is like the second, it will ebb any day now, but if it is like the first, it will run until the around the year 2125. And by then--who
knows?--perhaps mankind will have incinerated itself, moved to another planet, or even devised a better political system. Further, Huntington's metaphor implies a lack of overall progress or direction. Waves rise and fall. But each of
the reverses that followed Huntington's two waves was brief, and each new wave raised the number of democracies higher than before. Huntington does, however, present a statistic that seems to weigh heavily against any
unidirectional interpretation of democratic progress. The proportion of states that were democratic in 1990 (45%), he says, was identical to the proportion in 1922. (13) But there are two answers to this. In 1922 there were only 64
states; in 1990 there were 165. But the number of peoples had not grown appreciably. The difference was that in 1922 most peoples lived in colonies, and they were not counted as states. The 64 states of that time were mostly the
advanced countries. Of those, two thirds had become democratic by 1990, which was a significant gain. The additional 101 states counted in 1990 were mostly former colonies. Only a minority, albeit a substantial one, were
democratic in 1990, but since virtually none of those were democratic in 1922, that was also a significant gain. In short, there was progress all around, but this was obscured by asking what percentage of states were democratic.
Asking the question this way means that a people who were subjected to a domestic dictator counted as a non-democracy, but a people who were subjected to a foreign dictator did not count at all. Moreover, while the criteria for
judging a state democratic vary, the statistic that 45 percent of states were democratic in 1990 corresponds with Freedom House's count of "democratic" polities (as opposed to its smaller count of "free" countries, a more demanding

That Freedom House

could count 120 freely elected governments by early 2001 (out of a total of 192 independent states) bespeaks a
vast transformation in human governance within the span of 225 years. In 1775, the number of democracies was zero. In 1776, the
criterion). But by this same count, Freedom House now says that the proportion of democracies has grown to 62.5 percent. In other words, the "third wave" has not abated.

birth of the United States of America brought the total up to one. Since then, democracy has spread at an accelerating pace, most of the growth having occurred within

That this momentum has slackened somewhat since its

pinnacle in 1989, destined to be remembered as one of the most revolutionary years in all
history, was inevitable. So many peoples were swept up in the democratic tide that there
the twentieth century, with greatest momentum since 1974.

was certain to be some backsliding. Most countries' democratic evolution has included some fits and starts rather than a smooth
progression. So it must be for the world as a whole. Nonetheless, the overall trend remains powerful and clear. Despite
the backsliding, the number and proportion of democracies stands higher today than ever before. This progress offers a source of hope
for enduring nuclear peace. The danger of nuclear war was radically reduced almost
overnight when Russia abandoned Communism and turned to democracy. For other
ominous corners of the world, we may be in a kind of race between the emergence or
growth of nuclear arsenals and the advent of democratization. If this is so, the greatest cause for
worry may rest with the Moslem Middle East where nuclear arsenals do not yet exist but
where the prospects for democracy may be still more remote.
Empirically, democracy saves lives the alternative is autocracy which
breeds conflict and extremism
Craner and Wollack 8 (Lorne W. Craner, President of the International Republican
Institute, and Kenneth Wollack, President of the National Democratic Institute, New
Directions for Democracy Promotion,
http://www.ndi.org/files/2344_newdirections_engpdf_07242008.pdf)

Every major peace agreement negotiated in the last two decades has included, as a
principal goal, elections and the possibility of democratic governance. Developing
democratic processes in the course of building sustainable peace is central to
achieving stability and securityboth domestically in those countries and internationally. The return
on this investment is astronomical. The value of lives saved in places as diverse as
East Timor, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Nepal, El Salvador, and Kosovo , to
list only a few, goes far beyond the expenditures that help to build inclusive political processes that cause

The value in
realized and potential economic development and the economic implications
derived from international peace and stability also have to be considered in the
equation. Democracies provide the best alternatives for fostering peace across
borders by maintaining internal stability and achieving economic and social
development. Conversely, autocracy, corruption, and lack of accountability exacerbate
powerlessness, poverty, and intolerance and breed instability, increasing the
potential for conflict and extremism, while hindering efforts to address famine, disease, and other
belligerents to put down arms and engage in peaceful competition for governmental power.

matters essential for human development.

Solves War
Democracy prevents war
-

democratic states fight in self-defense only no risk of aggressive

wars against other democracies

separation of powers

toleration and respect among citizens

Rieffer-Flanagan 10 (Barbara Ann J. Rieffer-Flanagan, assistant professor of

political science at Central Washington University, Democratic peace in theory and
practice, edited by Steven W. Hook, p. 264)

aspects of liberal democracies that encourage restraint with regard to

war. According to John Rawls (1999), citizens in democratic states fight in self-defense, not
for economic or territorial gain. Thus, aggressive wars against other liberal
democratic societies are improbable. It has also been argued that the separation of
powers found in many democratic political systems can slow down and limit the
drive to war (Russett 1993, 40). Furthemore, most citizens in liberal democratic societies hold
norms of toleration and respect for their fellow citizens. While they may disagree on particular
issues, they respect the rights of other citizens to participate and voice their views. If
we extend these notions of respect and toleration to liberal democratic peoples in
foreign countries, the likelihood of war decreases. Ultimately, the cultural and
normative framework that democratic citizens develop results in peaceful values
and expectations and relations between states (Schafer & Walker 2006).
There are other

Backstop Against Turns

Democracy acts as a backstop against all of their impacts no
democratically elected leader will allow policy disasters
McGinnis and Somin 7
John and Ilya, Professor of Law @ NU and Georgetown Respectively, Should
International Law Be Part of Our Law?, Stanford Law Review, Questia

Finally, democratic accountability also plays a crucial role in preventing major public
policy disasters, since elected leaders know that a highly visible catastrophic failure
is likely to lead to punishment at the polls. For example, it is striking that no
democratic nation, no matter how poor, has ever had a mass famine within its
borders, (96) whereas such events are common in authoritarian and totalitarian
states. (97) More generally, democracy serves as a check on self-dealing by
political elites and helps ensure, at least to some extent, that leaders enact policies
that serve the interests of their people.

Democracy Good Empirics

Democracy solves all disadvantages empirical studies prove
democratic governments resolve conflicts peacefully
Ndulo, Professor of Law @ Cornell, 3
Muno Ndulo, Advocate of the Supreme Court of Zambia; Professor, Cornell Law School; Director, Institute for African
Development, Cornell University, 2003, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, Lexis

A 1993 study of 233 internal conflicts around the world, concluded that democracies had
a far better record of peacefully managing such conflicts than alternative
systems. 54 The empirical fact that democracies are far less likely to go to war with each other than other
regimes further substantiates the relationship between poverty and conflict, and their impact on the

Authoritarian or totalitarian systems simply do not have the

institutions by which conflicts in society can be peacefully expressed and resolved.
Dictatorships generally try to deal with conflicts by ignoring or denying them, or by
suppressing them using state coercive apparatus. While such methods may indeed control
conflicts (albeit usually at a severe cost), they [End Page 323] generally cannot resolve
them. 56 The implication of fundamental issues such as identity and cultural integrity in
democratization process.

such conflicts means that almost nothing short of mass expulsions or genocide will make the conflicts disappear.
It is generally believed that the ethnic conflict that erupted in the former Yugoslavia in 1990, for example, had
been suppressed for almost fifty years during the years of communism, but was always present and unresolved.
57 An

authoritarian system can present an illusion of short-term stability through

its use of coercive state power to suppress dissent, but is unlikely to sustain
that stability over the long term. In contrast, it is argued that under a democracy,
disputes that arise are likely to be processed, debated, and reacted to , rather than
resolved definitively and permanently. 58 In short, democracy operates as a conflict
management system. As Harris and Reilly have observed, it is this ability to handle conflicts without
having to suppress them or be engulfed by them that distinguishes democratic governance from authoritarian
rule. 59 This does not by any means suggest that democracy is perfect, or that the mere establishment of
democratic governance will itself lead to the settlement or prevention of conflicts. There are a number of cases
in which democratic institutions are hastily "transplanted" to post-conflict societies without taking root or with a
subsequent resumption of hostilitiesas in the cases of Burundi, Cambodia and Liberia. 60 But it is equally true
that these cases offer many lessons as to how deals are struck and which choices are of crucial importance to
building a sustainable outcome. 61 Democracy is often messy and difficult, but it is also the best hope for
building sustainable solutions to most conflicts in the world. However, democratic institutions have to be strong
enough to function effectively and fairly. They can only be strong where the economic conditions are such that
they can be sustained.

The most comprehensive empirical models prove the viability of

democratic peace theory
Ward et al, Professor of Political Science, 98
Michael D. Ward, Professor of Political Science, University of Washington, and Kristian S. Gleditsch, graduate
research trainee in the Globalization and Democratization Program, et al, at University of Colorado, Boulder, March
1998, The American Political Science Review

democratization-whether in mild or strong degrees-is accompanied

by reduction, not increase, in the risk of war . Though we do not present graphs of the converse,
As Figure 1 details,

reversals of democratization are accompanied by

increased risks of war involvement. These risks are proportionally greater than
the decline or benefits of further democratization . Thus, there is strong evidence that
changes toward autocracy and

democratization has a monadic effect: It reduces the probability that a country will be involved in a war.
Although the probability of war involvement does not decrease linearly, it does decrease monotonically, so that

there is a reduction of about 50%.

During the democratic transition, at every point along the way as well as at the end points,
there is an attendant reduction in the probability of a polity being at war . We also
over the entire range of democracy minus autocracy values,

find that reversals toward greater levels of autocracy (not shown) not only increase the probability of war
involvement. Apparently, it is more dangerous to be at a given level of democracy if that represents an increase
in the level of authoritarianism than it is to be at the same level of democracy if that represents a decrease in
the authoritarian character of the regime. Stated differently, reversals are riskier than progress .ll It
has been argued that institutional constraints are theoretically important in translating the effect of democracy
into foreign policy (Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson, and Woller 1992; Siverson 1995). If the idea of democracy is
separated into its major components, then the degree of executive constraints empirically dominates the
democracy and autocracy scales (Gleditsch and Ward 1997). Accordingly, we demonstrate that moving toward
stronger executive constraints also yields a visible reduction in the risk of war.

It continues
Our results show that the process of democratization is accompanied
by a decrease in the probability of a country being involved in a war , either as a target
or as an initiator. These results were obtained with a more current (and corrected)
database than was used in earlier work , and our analyses also focus more clearly on the process
of transition. In comparison to studies that look only at the existence of change in
authority characteristics, we examine the direction, magnitude, and smoothness
of the transition process.
CONCLUSION

Solves Econ Collapse

Democracy solves economic decline autocracies are twice as
likely to experience economic collapse
McFaul 10 (Michael McFaul, Hoover Senior Fellow, professor of polisci and director
of the Center on Democracy, Development, and Rule of Law at Stanford and
nonresident associate at Carnegie, Advancing Democracy Abroad, p. 46-47)

democracy also protects a

society from the worst forms of economic disasters. Autocracies do not. No
democracy has ever experienced the level of economic and social dislocation of
Stalinism, Maoism, or Pol Potism. To be sure, democratic countries all suffered during the Great
Depression, and economic downturns continue to occur in the democratic world. However, the frequency and
the scale of these economic swings are much more moderate in the democratic world
compared to the autocratic world. According to Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Hilton Root, [T]he
variance in economic growth rates for autocracies is about twice what it is for
democracies. Or put another way, Mort Halperin, Joseph Siegle, and Michael Weinstein calculate that, Over
the past 40 years, autocracies have been twice as likely to experience economic
collapse [that is, a shrinkage in annual GDP per capita of 10 percent or more] as democracies. Really bad
policies that can bring economic ruin occur less frequently in democracies. In the long
Just as democracy immunizes a society from the worst forms of governments,

run, democratic regimes produce policies that favor sustained growth and prosperity just as well as authoritarian

democratic regimes also have higher levels of trade liberalization,

which in turn generates higher growth rates. Democratic regimes also foster the
accumulation of human capital, which has a positive effect on economic
development. Rulers in democracies also must be more responsive to the basic needs of their population,
regimes do. On average,

which does not always produce positive economic results in the short run, but does compel political leaders to

authoritarian regimes are

accountable to a powerful rich minority, and thus are more likely to prey on parts of
society. These regimes also have incentives to extract the maximum possible
surplus to use for their own purposes, not for the welfare of the population as a
whole. Contemporary comparisons of regime type and growth usually focus on the developing world, but leaving
out the developed economies skews the sample. When all countries are included in the analysis, the oldest
democracies in the world are also the richest countries in the world : only two of the
pursue policies beneficial to majorities over the long run. In contrast,

twenty-five highest ranking countries on the Human Development Index Hong Kong (if it is still counted as an
independent political entity) and Singapore are not democracies.

Terrorism
Lack of democracy causes terrorism
Pillar 10 (Paul R. Pillar, professor and director of graduate studies at the Center for
Peace and Security Studies at Georgetown, Democratic peace in theory and
practice, edited by Steven W. Hook, p. 246-7)

a relationship
between a lack of democracy and the roots of terrorism concerns two of the most
conspicuous attributes of the Middle East. One is that the Middle East, more than any
other region, has been the birthplace of the terrorist groups and individual terrorists
most worrisome to the West today. The other is that the Middle East is by most measures
the least democratic region of the world. Admittedly, there are other important characteristics of the
Although perhaps not reducible to convincing statistics, one empirical pattern that suggests

Middle East that are pertinent to the role terrorism has played in that region, such as the long-running conflict

the correlation between terrorism and the paucity of

democracy is no accident. The connection can be understood by reflecting on the most basic principles of
between Israelis and Arabs. But

political systems and the articulation of political interests. Terrorism is a difficult, dangerous, illegal, and, for most
people, immoral business. Few would venture into it if easier and less nasty ways of pursuing the same objectives

As a political act, terrorism is used to pursue various interests and

express various grievances that more often are pursued and expressed peacefully,
when permitted by the political system. Political systems that offer peaceful
channels democracies are less likely to drive people into terrorism than systems
that do not (Pillar 2007). That is a simple statement of the basic principle involved. In practice, of course,
were available.

counterexamples abound. Terrorism has many contributing causes, at the level of nations and societies as well as at
the level of individuals and their personal situations and psychologies. Any explanation based on one cause, be it a
lack of democracy or any other, always will fall short. Yet that does not deny the relevance of the cause or the
prospect that addressing that cause could change the magnitude and nature of the terrorist problem. The principle

Democracies
are good because they are more likely than other political systems to ensure that
the interests of the ruled will guide the actions of the rulers. That is because the
ruled have more of a role in selecting and removing their rulers. Many causes that
terrorist groups pursue involve a population (often defined in terms of religion, ethnicity, or class)
that to some degree sees itself as being ruled in a manner contrary to its interests
and as not having peaceful means to rectify the situation. Democratic theory offers
other insights pertinent to how more democracy might mean less of a proclivity
toward terrorism. Democracy is good not only because it provides a mechanism for
the ruled to choose and cashier their rulers but also because of the effects that
broad participation in government has on the temperament and habits of the ruled
themselves. As one political theorist puts it, a justification for democracy is as a means to producing certain
just offered is consistent with one of the most basic elements of traditional democratic theory.

states or attitudes of mind in the citizens, independence of mind, respect and tolerance for others, interest in public
affairs, willingness to think about them and discuss them, and a sense of responsibility for the whole community
(Field 1963). Several of these qualities are the antithesis of the way most terrorists think and operate. Certainly,

intolerance and a lack of respect for opposing opinions are central characteristics of
the terrorist mindset. Disdain for free discussion a preference for blowing up
negotiating tables rather than sitting at them is another. Within most terrorist groups there
typically is not only a lack of independent thinking but also assiduous efforts by group leaders to quash any hint of
it. A sense of belonging to and responsibility for the community also are important.
That means not merely a mythical or longed-for community, such as the umma, or community of believers in Islam,

that Islamists often invoke as one of their reference points. It means the political system, nation-state, province,

Alienation from ones community is an element in the

sources of extremism in much of the Middle East and, to a lesser degree, in other
parts of the Muslim world. People see themselves as having little or no stake in the
states and political systems in which they live. They are subjects of a political order
but do not feel a part of it. Consequently, they may have little compunction about
turning violently against that order. To the extent that democracy by directly,
peacefully, and meaningfully involving citizens in the political process imparts a
sense of belonging to the political system, it becomes a disincentive against such
violent rejection.
and town in which an individual lives.

Human Rights
Democracy key to human rights
Shale Horowitz, Ass. Prof. Of Polisci at University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, and Albrecht
Schnabel, Senior Research Fellow at Swiss Peace Foundation, Bern, 2004
In Human Rights and Societies in Transition, ed. Horowitz and Schnabel, p. 7.
However, the situation for other human rights is likely to be worse if political rights and
freedoms are weak or non-existent. Authoritarian regimes and leaders typically use their
discretionary power to attack and weaken their political opponents and to prevent new
opposition from arising. This strategy usually goes beyond action against political freedoms
proper: authoritarian regimes are more likely to try to monopolize control of the mass media
and other "informational" institutions, particularly the educational system and religious
institutions. This control will be used to shut out opposition voices, including human rights
advocates. At the same time, the regime will argue that local traditions and histori cal
experiences justify its own practices and that they are threatened by the supposedly "alien"
demands of the opposition. Authoritarian re gimes are also more likely to politicize economic
subsidies and regulations in an effort to build bases of support through patronage networks.
This results in more widespread discrimination and greater neglect in providing public goods.
Last, authoritarian regimes may initiate or perpetuate civil and international conflicts, in
order to divert public attention away from political and economic difficulties that undermine
their legitimacy.6 These likely interactions are shown in figure 1.1

The protection of human rights is necessary for the survival of

the species
Copelon 99(Profesor of Law at NY School of Law, 3 N.Y. City L. Rev.)
The indivisible human rights framework survived the Cold War despite U.S.
machinations to truncate it in the international arena. The framework is there to shatter the
myth of the superiority [*72] of the U.S. version of rights, to rebuild popular expectations,
and to help develop a culture and jurisprudence of indivisible human rights. Indeed,
in the face of systemic inequality and crushing poverty, violence by official and
private actors, globalization of the market economy, and military and environmental
depredation, the human rights framework is gaining new force and new dimensions.
It is being broadened today by the movements of people in different parts of the world,
particularly in the Southern Hemisphere and significantly of women, who understand the
protection of human rights as a matter of individual and collective human survival
and betterment. Also emerging is a notion of third-generation rights, encompassing
collective rights that cannot be solved on a state-by-state basis and that call for new
mechanisms of accountability, particularly affecting Northern countries. The emerging rights
include human-centered sustainable development, environmental protection, peace, and
security. 38 Given the poverty and inequality in the United States as well as our role in

the world, it is imperative that we bring the human rights framework to bear on
both domestic and foreign policy .

A2: Democratization Bad

Democratization now, US intervention critical to success
The Nation (Pakistan), April 16, 2011
Obama's dilemma!, http://mespectator.blogspot.com/2011/04/obamas-middle-eastdilemma.html DA 5/1/11

When US President Barack Obama used the Cairo University as a platform to lecture the
Arab world on the merits of democracy a couple of years ago, he did not imagine that his
words and speeches would be tested before the end of his presidency. In fact, the Arab
revolutions have put Obama and his political advisers off guard, and have presented
them with a dilemma that needs to be dealt with at some point.
In Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, and even in Libya, Washington seemed to have been
quite content with the status quo. It was forced to adjust its policy only when it became
absolutely clear that change in these countries was inevitable. Several excuses have been
given to justify the lack of interest by the Obama administration in democracy promotion in
the Middle East (ME). Absorbed with his internal problems and preoccupied with reestablishing America's leadership abroad, Obama's utmost priorities are to resuscitate the
US economy and end two unnecessary wars, i.e. Iraq and Afghanistan, it has been argued.
Given the golden opportunity presented by the uprisings in the Arab world to
advance the cause of democracy, however, these excuses are hardly convincing.
Unlike the costly intervention in Iraq, for example, the US could contribute to
establishing democracies in the Arab world at a cheap price. Over the past two
years, since he became President, Obama has not been really interested in the kind of
rhetoric which featured prominently under his predecessor and focused on democratic
change in the ME. Words such as democracy promotion' have almost disappeared from
Obama's public speeches. This trend brought to the fore the eternal question in US policy
circles about the ability of America to live with democratic governments in the ME. The
thesis that America must support dictators or else accept to live with the very people it
regards as dangerous for its interests and core values has become the compass that directs
US policy in the ME under Obama.

A2: Democratization Bad

Democratization inevitable, US needs to provide assistance to
consolidate it
Congressional Documents and Publications, April 13, 2011, House Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on Middle East and South Asia Hearing;
"Shifting Sands: Political Transitions in the Middle East, Part 1.";
Testimony by Scott Carpenter, Keston Family Fellow, The Washington Institute for Near East
Policy, http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/Car041311.pdf DOA: 5/2/11

For the Saudis, however, there is an absolute paranoia surrounding the Shia, who they
believe are being supported wholly by the revolutionaries in Tehran. They hear Iranian
propaganda about the Egyptian revolution being a continuation of Iran's revolution as truth.
It is for this reason that the Saudis have pressured the King of Bahrain and bankrolled the
hard-liners within the Khalifa family to guarantee that Bahraini Shia demands are in no way
met.
The Saudis risk creating a self-fulfilling prophecy which will be wholly negative for U.S.
interests in the region. By urging the King of Bahrain to crush the uprising there, the
government of Saudi Arabia has handed Iran, Hezbollah, and other Shia reactionaries, such
as Iraq's Muqtada al-Sadr, a new rallying cry. The Saudis are increasing public pressure on
the government of Iraq, for example, which provides Hezbollah with a welcome distraction at
a time when its patron in Damascus is under pressure. Clearly, the vehement anti-Shia
rhetoric and violence used against Bahrian's Shia in recent weeks is contributing to the
radicalization of Shia across the region who, until Saudi troops rolled across the causeway,
were content to be Iraqi, Kuwati,Yemeni, Saudi or Bahraini. Ultimately, in my view, the
forest fire that has been burning will continue to spread and no fire break of
money alone will stop it. For this reason, it is critical that the United States
convince Riyadh in some way that the focus should be on managing change rather
than trying to stop or roll it back. Constitutional monarchies in Jordan, Bahrain and
elsewhere can be tolerated and should even be considered enviable end states. Going
forward, American interests in the region will remain rather consistent with the past, but the
environment in which we try to advance them will be radically different, for both good and
ill. As my remarks hopefully make clear, the key to successfully managing the
political transitions across the region lies in Egypt and, to a lesser extent (but no
less critical), Tunisia. In my view, it is of utmost importance that the United States
do everything it can to help Egypt and Tunisia consolidate their democratic
transitions since their relatively successful transitions are necessary to create a
strong foundation for a new relationship with the region. Doing so will require
creativity, resources, and intestinal fortitude to weather the ups and downs of these
countries' domestic politics over the next two or so years. The Muslim Brotherhood--in some
political guise--will play a role in the respective elections that are quickly approaching. How
big a role the MB will play remains unclear, but the United States will have to strike a wise
balance between, on the one hand, being alive to the dangers that the Brotherhood and its
allies pose to critical U.S. interests and, on the other hand, providing the Brotherhood with a
political gift through lightning-rod statements or actions that could motivate voters
otherwise indifferent to the Brotherhood's message to support the movement. Privately, the

Administration should engage with the Supreme Military Council in Egypt concerning
elements of the political transition that might inadvertently abet the Islamist current's
political prospects. Publicly, it is important for the Administration to send a clear
message to the political elite and voting publics in Egypt and Tunisia that we
support transitions producing governments that show, through action, their
commitment to the universal freedoms of speech, assembly, thought, and
religion, and to a free press; that encourage religious liberty and practice and
enforce religious tolerance for all minorities; that support the rights of people to
communicate freely, including through the internet, without interference; and
that combat extremism in all its forms, including those based on religion. In the
case of Egypt, we must clearly state that we also support a government that fulfills its
international obligations. It is also important for the Administration to act now to
create incentives encouraging Egyptians and Tunisians to choose the sort of
leadership with whom we can build new and lasting relationships. In the case of
Egypt, such incentives might include opening negotiations for a free trade
agreement and the expansion of the QIZ program. For both governments, an early
loan collateralized by seized assets of the ancien regime could be a compelling
incentive. In addition, the United States should dramatically expand financial
support to traditional democracy promotion NGOs such as the National
Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute through either the
Middle East Partnership Initiative or USAID. The United States should also look to
help consolidate democracy through new media tools that could, for instance,
safe guard the electoral process or assist in capturing and remembering the
legacy of the revolutions. At the same time, if the United States is to fundamentally
leverage the changes taking place in the region in order to secure its interests, the Obama
Administration must find a way to reinvigorate the Green Movement in Iran. In
April 2009, the Obama Administration missed a golden opportunity to support a
similar revolution to the one that swept Hosni Mubarak from power in 2011
because it was convinced doing so would risk its efforts to broker a nuclear deal
with Iran. This was a historic, strategic mistake, but it has a second chance. As I
elaborated earlier, I strongly believe that the Arab revolutions of 2011 pose an
insurmountable challenge to Iran's regime, but accelerating the impact will require a
comprehensive strategy. Forging such a strategy and pursuing it aggressively, however, will
do little to calm Saudi Arabia, whose greatest nightmare is a democratic Iran that becomes a
strong ally of the United States.

Some Blocks

A2: Imperialism

Imperialism Good
American imperialism is awesome
Miller 11 (Harrison, head writer and research for The Miller Monitor, Justifying Imperialism
December 21, 2011, https://sites.google.com/a/ncps-k12.org/amhnews-h-miller2011/intellectual/justifying-imperialism)

United States imperialism began in the late 1800s and since its inception Americans have been debating the moral validity behind the idea.
Through the tenacious leadership of American presidents, the United States has been influencing other countries in political, economic, and
cultural ways. The

effects of United States imperialism have been positive and justify the concept
because the ideals of democracy have been spread to the nations of Panama and the Philippines,
and Puerto Rico continue to be positively influenced by American politics, economy, and culture.
Since interaction began between America and Panama in the early twentieth century we have been
able to see how both parties benefit from the United States intervention. America originally went into Panama
because they wanted to build the Panama Canal. The Panama Canal would benefit the United States in trade because it was a good passageway
between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans - it could save Americans time and money. However, Columbia owned Panama at the time, and would
not let the United States build and use a canal in Panama; Panama, displeased with Columbias rule in their country, turned to the United States
for help. Once

independent, Panama granted America the canal and both nations walked away from
the situation very pleased. America stayed in Panama to build and use the canal until 1977, when
the Panamanians wanted to be fully independent. In 1989, however, the United States helped
Panama overthrow the dictator Noriega and restored democracy to the Central American nation.
The United States has stayed in Panama ever since, and the Panamanians are happy with their
involvement because America has helped them maintain both liberty and democracy. Panama is just one
example; America has also maintained freedom and democracy in Puerto Rico. The United States originally became involved in Puerto Rico as a
result of the Spanish American War. They

gained Puerto Rico from the war, and helped Puerto Rico by guiding
them and controlling the island's politics and economics for the first few years of independence.
Times have changed, and, Puerto Rico has become a commonwealth; they have their own their own
government, we support them economically. Politically, Puerto Ricos government is democratic
due to the exposure the island received in prior years from the United States. The democratic government
ensures that all Puerto Ricans are free and equal and entitled to suffrage. Without Americas involvement, Puerto Rico might not have become the
democracy that it is today; America spread democracy to them, and perhaps there is one less dictatorship because of that. Although America is
no longer taking over other countries as much as they used to in the twentieth century, but a different kind of imperialism still exists cultural

While
some say that cultural imperialism does not affect other countries positively, it is clear that there
many benefits linked to cultural imperialism. Those who don't support imperialism believe that America needs to listen to
imperialism. Cultural imperialism is the promotion of American beliefs in morals through the growth of our industry in other nations.

Gandhi, who said that I want the culture of all lands to be blown about my house as freely as possible. But I refuse to be blown off my feet by
any. While the quote has its truths, this is indeed and opinion that can easily be argued. Gandhi is saying that he is open to learning about other
cultures, but doesnt want to be forced to take part in one. However, America

is not forcing anyone to take part in

their culture and has not in the past; countries like France and China have limited American
cultural programming through satellites and the Internet. With six billion people in the world, one
culture taking over would be impossible. And even if it were possible, what constitutes American
culture? It is my belief that our culture is just a homogenized cluster of all the cultures in the world,
so in part, nations are scared to accepted a "tainted" version of their original culture? Cultural
imperialism is spreading though American culture to those who want it, just as the most successful imperialism in the twentieth century resulted
when countries were happy overall with American influence. The

majorities of both Panama and Puerto Rico (based

on a vote) are happy with the current involvement of the United States. The United States helped
them economically and politically. They are both democratic, and cultural imperialism is just
spreading other American beliefs through American movies goods, and brand names, to those who

want them. After analyzing historical growth of the American empire, it is safe to say that there
has been an overall positive affect of United States imperialism. Panama has been helped economically with the
building of the canal, and the ideal of democracy made their government democratic. Puerto Rico also has a democratic government, and the
United States economically supports them. Americans spread the ideal of democracy, and as a result these two countries are democratic.
American cultural imperialism exists today for those countries who want to learn about American culture. Thus, the United States has positively
affected other countries with the ideal of democracy, and continues to spread their culture to other countries today, justifying the validity of
imperialism.

Colonialism is key for democracy in underdeveloped nations

Ishiyama 11
[John T. Ishiyama, 6. Democratization and the Global Environment, Comparative Politics: Principles of Democracy and Democratization, April
20 2011, Wiley interscience]
An oft- cited additional international factor affecting democratic development, particularly in the developing world, is the legacy of
colonialism. On the one hand, there is the extremely Eurocentric view that the

spread of democracy is the political outcome

of the spread of European values and traditions via colonialism (for a discussion, see Huntington, 1984 ). This is because,
theoretically, the colonial power may have transmitted some of its culture and language to the colony,
which in turn may have led to the emergence of a cooperative political culture, or may have left institutions
that were conducive to democracy in place when the colonizing powers exited (Weiner, 1989 ). However, some scholars (Barro, 1999 ; Quainoo,
2000 ) have found no relationship between colonial heritage and democracy, while others (Lipset et al ., 1993; Clague et al. , 2001 ) fi nd that
being a former British colony increases the probability that a country becomes democratic. In particular, several scholars have argued that the
type of colonizer was important in explaining whether a country was able to develop into a democracy after the end of colonial rule. Myron
Weiner (1989) , for instance, noted that by 1983 every country in the Third World that emerged from colonial rule since World War II with a
population of at least one million (and almost all the smaller countries as well) with a continuous democratic experience was a former British
colony. This would suggest that there was something about British colonial rule that made it different from the colonial administration of other
European states, such as France and Belgium. Khapoya (1998) , for instance, distinguishes between two main types of colonial rule in Africa:
indirect rule and direct rule. The British generally used a system of indirect

rule, where the emphasis was not on the assimilation of

Africans to become black Britishers, but rather to share skills, values, and culture, to empower the Africans with the ability to
run their own communities. Thus, instead of assimilating the Africans as British citizens, society was segregated between the natives
and the whites living in the colony. The British also employed an indirect system of administrative rule. Generally this meant that the colonial
authorities would co - opt the local power structure (the kings, chiefs, or headman) and via invitations, coercion, or bribery, incorporate them into
the colonial administrative structure. In return, these local elites were expected to enforce laws, collect taxes, and serve as the buffer between
the natives and colonial authorities. A positive

consequence of this system of indirect rule (a system used elsewhere in the

that it provided native elites with important experiences in self rule. Further, many British colonies adopted practices that mimicked British practices such as experience
with electoral, legislative, and judicial institutions (Clague et al. , 2001 ). Given this level of preparedness, then following
British Empire, such as in India and Malaya) was

World War II, Britain was much more willing than other colonial powers to grant independence, which in turn made the newly independent states
more willing to retain the institutions the British had put into place. Thus, from this perspective, Britain seems to have left its colonies in a better
situation to develop democracy later than non - British colonies.

Imperialism Ethical
Imperialism breeds democratic self rule
Kurtz 03 (Stanley, Senior Fellow at the Ethics and Public Policy Center, A just empire? Democratic
Imperialism: A Blueprint, April 1, 2003, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6426)

Our commitment to political autonomy sets up a moral paradox. Even

the mildest imperialism will be experienced by

many as a humiliation. Yet imperialism as the midwife of democratic self-rule is an undeniable
good. Liberal imperialism is thus a moral and logical scandal, a simultaneous denial and
affirmation of self-rule that is impossible either to fully accept or repudiate. The counterfactual offers a way
out. If democracy did not depend on colonialism, we could confidently forswear empire. But in contrast to early modern
colonial history, we do know the answer to the counterfactual in the case of Iraq. After many
decades of independence, there is still no democracy in Iraq. Those who attribute this fact to
American policy are not persuasive, since autocracy is pervasive in the Arab world, and since
America has encouraged and accepted democracies in many other regions. So the reality of Iraqi dictatorship
tilts an admittedly precarious moral balance in favor of liberal imperialism.

American imperialism K2 world peace

Elshtain 03 (Jean Bethke, Laura Spelman Rockefeller Professor of Social and Political Ethics at the
University of Chicago Divinity School, Just War Against Terrorism pg. 169)

The heavy burden being imposed on the United States does not require that the United States
remain on hair-trigger alert at every moment. But it does oblige the United States to evaluate all
claims and to make a determination as to whether it can intervene effectively and in a way that does
more good than harmwith the primary objective of interdiction so that democratic civil society
can be built or rebuilt. This approach is better by far than those strategies of evasion and denial of the sort visible in Rwanda, in
Bosnia, or in the sort of "advice" given to Americans by some of our European critics. At this point in time the possibility of
international peace and stability premised on equal regard for all rests largely, though not
exclusively, on American power. Many persons and powers do not like this fact, but it is inescapable. As Michael Ignatieff puts it,
the "most carefree and confident empire in history now grimly confronts the question of whether it can escape Rome's ultimate fate."9
Furthermore, America's

fate is tied inextricably to the fates of states and societies around the world. If
large pockets of the globe start to go badhere, there, everywhere (the infamous "failed state"
syndrome)the drain on American power and treasure will reach a point where it can no longer be
borne.

Intervention protects basic human rights

Nardin and Pritcharal 90 (Terry- professor and head of the Political Science Department at the
National University of Singapore, Kathleen D- director of community impact product development for

the United Way of America, ETHICS AND INTERVENTION: THE UNITED STATES IN GRENADA,
1983 1990, pg 9)

A second major argument in favor of intervention is based on a concern for human rights. This
argument rests on the idea that a country that values democracy and individual rights should be
pre-pared to act when those values are threatened, not only at home but abroad. According to this
view, it is simply intolerable for a free nation to stand on the sidelines while foreign tyrants like Idi Amin
and Pal Pat enslave and massacre their own unfortunate subjects. At least in extreme cases like these.
unilateral intervention should be permitted if other means fall. A nation that is not in a position to
intervene Itself should support those governments (like Tanzania in the case of Idi Amin) that are
able to act.

Imperialism Inevitable
Imperialism cant be blamed solely on the imperialist
Said 94 (Edward W., was a professor of English and Comparative Literature at Columbia University, a
literary theorist, and a public intellectual, Culture and Imperialism May 31, 1994, pg. 19)
Domination and inequities of power and wealth are perennial facts of human society. But in today's global setting they are also interpretable as

The nations of contemporary Asia, Latin America,

and Africa are politically independent but in many ways are as dominated and dependent as they
were 'when ruled directly by European powers. On the one hand, this is the consequence of selfinflicted wounds, critics like V. S. Naipaul are wont to say: they (everyone knows that "they" means
coloreds, wogs, niggers) are to blame for what "they" are, and it's no use droning on about the
legacy of imperialism. On the other hand, blaming the Europeans sweepingly for the misfortunes of
the present is not much of an alternative. What we need to do is to look at these Matters as a
network of interdependent histories that it would be inaccurate and senseless to repress, useful and
interesting to understand. The point here is not complicated. If while sitting in Oxford, Paris, or New York you tell Arabs or Africans
that they belong to a basically sick or unregenerate culture, you are unlikely to convince them. Even if you prevail over them,
they are not going to concede to you your essential superiority or your right to rule them despite
your evident wealth and power. The history of this standoff is manifest throughout colonies where
white masters were once unchallenged but finally driven out . Conversely, the triumphant natives soon enough found
having something to do with imperialism, its history, its new forms.

that they needed the West and that the idea of fatal independence was a nationalist fiction designed mainly for what Fanon calls the "nationalist
bourgeoisie," who in turn often ran the new countries with a callous, exploitative tyranny reminiscent of the departed masters.

A2: Imperialism Is Bad

We do not support imperial conquest or occupation
Michael Ignatieff is a former leader of the Liberal Party of Canada and a fellow of Massey College at the
University of Toronto, New Republic, February 16, 2012, p. 27

The real challenge for a doctrine of sovereign responsibility is not to prove that there are some limits to a
sovereigns right to be wrong about justice. The greater challenge is to ground the responsibilities of intervening
states in some set of principles that makes their actions consistent. Libya but not Syria, Sudan but not Zimbabwe:
intervention so discretionary can seem unprincipled. The principles of the Commission on Sovereignty and
Intervention sought to balance basic respect for sovereignty with a clear thresholdethnic cleansing; massacre,
actual or apprehended that should trigger intervention in every case. And some further restraining principles flow
from sovereignty itself. If protecting a people from their own sovereign is a principled rationale for intervention,
respecting that sovereignty in turn precludes taking it away from the people you have intervened to protect. Imperial
conquest or occupation must be excluded.

Intervention is justified when people are trying to overthrow a tyrannical sovereign

Michael Ignatieff is a former leader of the Liberal Party of Canada and a fellow of Massey College at the
University of Toronto, New Republic, February 16, 2012, p . 27

But legitimacy, as the Commission argued, is a matter not only of principle, but also of prudence. Interventions that
cannot succeed should not be tried, no matter how pressing the principle. (The question of how to measure the
probabilities of success is of course a difficult one.) It matters, too, to be clear about what the principle at stake
actually is. Libya and Syria may look like civil wars, but they are in fact revolutions. As Arthur Applbaum has
argued, overthrowing sovereigns and replacing them with othersthe revolutionary moveis an act that other
democratic peoples have good reason to support. Peoples, even just some of them, can decide to rise against their
sovereigns. When they decide to risk their lives, as the Libyans of Benghazi did last winter, and as the Syrians in
town after town did this summer and fall, they must earn their freedom with their own handsbut they are also
entitled to assistance when the only other choice is a return to tyranny.

In periods of revolution people have already withdrawn support from the sovereign
and intervention is justified
Michael Ignatieff is a former leader of the Liberal Party of Canada and a fellow of Massey College at the
University of Toronto, New Republic, February 16, 2012, p. 27

As long as we define these struggles as civil wars, we are inclined to stay out. Once we define them as revolutions,
the principle at stake looks different. (The difference is an empirical one, of course: each struggle must be carefully
studied, because too often they are described according to the prior ideological inclinations of the observer.) In
revolutionary situations, such large numbers of people have withdrawn consent from their sovereign that the

principle is not whether to protect them, but whether to help them make a revolution. Indeed, we can only protect
them by regime change, by transferring sovereignty into their hands. Prudence and principle must be intertwined at
this point. If we intervene in every civil war that purports to be a revolution, we sacrifice an important value: the
stability of an imperfect but necessary order of states. But if we turn a blind eye to revolution, we miss a chance to
align sovereignty more closely with justice.

A2: Sovereignty Stuff

A2: Sovereignty is Unconditional

Sovereign authority is derived from following the law When governments violate it
they no longer have the right to claim they are sovereign
Michael Ignatieff is a former leader of the Liberal Party of Canada and a fellow of Massey College at the
University of Toronto, New Republic, February 16, 2012, p. 25

This brings us to the vexed relation between law and sovereignty. On a commonsense account, sovereignty is the
origin and source of law. The exercise of sovereignty by governments, by courts, and by the police ought to be in
conformity with law.

Sovereigns have a special responsibility to their own citizens

Michael Ignatieff is a former leader of the Liberal Party of Canada and a fellow of Massey College at the
University of Toronto, New Republic, February 16, 2012, p. 26

Calling the Europeans small-minded is to miss the point. Sovereignty is a system of power that correlates authority
with territory, legitimacy with national identity. It is the only system of power that, as a result, can create the
consensus for common action and sacrifice. Since sovereignty expresses national identity, it is bound to be morally
partial: Germans will help Germans, Greeks will help Greeks. Attacking sovereignty because it defends moral
partiality misunderstands its very nature: sovereigntys legitimacy reposes on the premise that a sovereign accords
special protection to its own citizens.

If sovereignty is treated as an absolute the sovereign loses authority

Michael Ignatieff is a former leader of the Liberal Party of Canada and a fellow of Massey College at the
University of Toronto, New Republic, February 16, 2012, p. 27

But we should not be nave about where a defense of moral pluralism may lead us. The burqa in Afghanistan, the
expropriation of white farmers in Zimbabwe, the death penalty in Texas all secure moral coverand every other
violation of human rights likewiseunder the sovereign right of states to be wrong about justice. States do have a
right to be wrong about justice: that is clearly what the U.N. Charter means when it places sovereignty above all
other rights. Yet there must be some limits to this right, as there are to all rights, or else sovereignty loses any moral
standing or justification.

A2: Sovereignty is Unconditional

If the sovereign does not protect individual rights, it has no authority
Michael Ignatieff is a former leader of the Liberal Party of Canada and a fellow of Massey College at the
University of Toronto, New Republic, February 16, 2012, p. 27

These processes are absent in many of the states of the world. And where sovereignty is unconstrained, we could
argue that human rights invigilation by third party outsiders becomes justified, to exercise the scrutiny and control of
sovereignty that insiders would exercise if their sovereigns allowed them to. On this account, the moral authority of
human rights NGOs together with U.N. bodies is a residual right to protect the subjects of a sovereign when they
lack the institutional means to protect themselves. But why, Roth might reply, do they have the right to assume
functions of invigilation that belong to the sovereign people alone? The answer, I think, is that the legitimacy of
collective self-determination the right of states to be sovereignderives in turn from individual selfdetermination, the right of individuals to be free. If this individual right is crushed, an individual retains the right to
appeal for help outside, and those outside have a duty to assist. The duty to assist is not indeterminate. It is
correlated to the individual rights that have been abused and stays there, in peaceful advocacy of change from
within, unless the sovereign goes further and pushes abuse to the level of wholesale murder or massacre, ethnic
cleansing or genocide. At this point, an individualized duty to assist and support rights claimants would evolve into a
responsibility to protect whole populations whose existence is threatened. This is the doctrine of sovereign
responsibility articulated in the report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. It appeared
in 2001, was ratified by the U.N. General Assembly in 2005, and saw its first application in the Libyan intervention of
2011.

Sovereignty is based on individual responsibility and the protection of the right to

self-determination
Michael Ignatieff is a former leader of the Liberal Party of Canada and a fellow of Massey College at the
University of Toronto, New Republic, February 16, 2012, p. 27

Roth is skeptical that sovereign inviolability will remain able to protect weak states from the humanitarian whims of
the strong, once international law gives houseroom to the responsibility to protect. Yet he concedes that sovereignty
does entail responsibility. The sovereign right of collective self-determination presupposes the self-determination
rights of individuals. It follows that sovereignty entails a minimum responsibility that may not extend as far as full
democratic rights, but must extend as far as rights to life and basic security. Sovereigns have the right to be wrong,
but not about this.

Globalization means that nation states are not containers of sovereignty

Michael Goodhart, University of Pittsburgh, International Studies Quarterly, 2011 (55), p. 1056

The problem with the new sovereigntists move from identifying the tension between democratic popular
sovereignty and global governance to the condemnation of the latter is that it gets this relationship backward.
Rabkins comments notwithstanding, the new sovereigntists argue that global governance should be rejected as
undemocratic because it conflicts with popular sovereignty. The normative ideal of popular sovereignty justifies
their opposition to recent empirical developments. From the point of view we are presenting, these developments
instead provide evidence that the empirical presumptions on which the normative ideal of popular sovereignty rests
are increasingly shaky. Although globalization is notoriously hard to define, at a minimum it connotes increasing
global interdependence, a growing density and significance of various types of transnational and international
transaction and interaction. These trends stimulate (among other things) increasing demand for governance of these
transactions and interactions, whether in the form of law, regulation, bureaucratization, or politicization (the creation
of political entities to decide transnational policy questions). Increasing interdependence leads to an increasing
demand for global governance; like other states, the United States faces pressure to embrace this trend toward global
governance and the internationalist outlook animating it. This trend is both an instance of and a response to
globalization, one that undermines independence, autonomy, and control and renders the notion of states as
containers of politics implausible. Moreover, globalization has penetrated the public consciousness through
academic and political debate and through the popular media, such that there exists today a widespread and growing
perception that interdependence and interconnectedness are transforming politics profoundly. Both reality and
perceptions of it are changing in ways that directly challenge the empirical presumptions of popular sovereignty as a
normative ideal. Extensive empirical evidence supports these claims.15 There is no point reviewing it here, however,
because the new sovereigntists themselves acknowledge that globalization is profoundly transforming governance. It
is precisely this transformation that they deem so threatening to popular sovereignty and constitutional government.
The ICC seeks to impose binding rules to limit the conduct of states; the WTO, through its appellate body, creates
mechanisms that allow for binding trade rules to be imposed without the consent of all members (Rabkin 2005:
chapter 8); the citation of foreign court decisions and CIL transforms the domestic systems of constitutional
government, allowing a way for international norms to find their way into domestic law and policy; 16 European-style
regulatory regimes dealing with labor, the environment, and human rights subordinate democratic legislative
processes to supranational judges and bureaucrats and empower non-governmental organizations and so-called
global civil society to influence international regulators directly, circumventing domestic political processes and
altering the constitutional dynamics of sovereign government.

A2: Sovereignty is Unconditional

Its in states own interests to participate in global governance structures
Michael Goodhart, University of Pittsburgh, International Studies Quarterly, 2011 (55), p. 1056

Each of the new sovereigntists own examples of dangerous developments in global governance can be understood
as an effort by states to regain or retain control or influence in areas where heightened interdependence undercuts
them. To the extent that globalization compromises states capacity to protect and promote their citizens rights,
welfare, and interests effectively, these efforts could be seen as democratically required. As Drezner (2001) and
others have shown, the US government itself uses global governance to promote American aims and interestsjust
as Bolton recommends. To abandon global governance would necessarily (further) reduce American control and
influence vis-a`-vis other actors (and in the case of unilateral withdrawal, vis-a`-vis other states). This too has
democratic costs that the new sovereigntists simply overlookperhaps because American power blinds them to
what observers in other countries can see more clearly. The Irish, for example, no more want to leave the EU than
they want to cede influence within it.17 If democracy obliges states to protect and promote their citizens rights and
interests, the fact of growing interdependence strongly implies that states should seek to assert whatever control and
influence they can. It is of course true that doing so through global governance regimes undermines domestic
authority in the traditional sense, as the new sovereigntists assert. But it is equally true that with respect to the
requirements of popular sovereignty, this simply means that states are damned if they do and damned if they dont.
Paradoxically, popular sovereignty requires and also rules out global governance.

Popular sovereignty is not workable under modern conditions

Michael Goodhart, University of Pittsburgh, International Studies Quarterly, 2011 (55), p. 1056-7

This is what we mean by saying that popular sovereignty as a normative doctrine becomes incoherent once its
empirical presumptions are fundamentally altered. It is in this sense that the reassertion of democratic sovereignty in
an age of globalization is increasingly less plausible. Popular sovereigntys territorial conception of political
authority, on the one hand, and the protection and promotion of citizens freedom and equality, on the other,
sometimes pull in opposite directions in conditions of increasing interdependence. The point is not that the new
sovereigntists are wrong about what popular sovereignty ideally requires; it is rather that the complex normative
demands of popular sovereignty can only be simultaneously satisfied under particular, historically contingent,
conditions. As those conditions change, popular sovereignty becomes unworkable. Popular sovereignty is not wrong
or flawed; it is inadequate and increasingly ineffective in securing freedom and equality.

Globalization puts human rights at-risk

Michael Goodhart, University of Pittsburgh, International Studies Quarterly, 2011 (55), p. 1061-2

Reinterpreting these constraints in terms of human rights provides democratic criteria much more amenable to
global governance arrangements. Citizenship rights are limited to a particular polity in ways that reflect and help to
reproduce the framework of popular sovereignty. Human rights, appropriately for an era of growing
interdependence, point to the global extension of these guarantees. Among the chief threats globalization poses to
freedom and equality is the exercise of power that is not subject to traditional democratic constraints through the
state. This power might be exercised by IGOs like the IMF or the World Bank or by TNCs. State-based mechanisms
are insufficientthey lack the authority and the reach to address these threats. Robust guarantees of human rights
would constrain the power of such entities. Similarly, the ideal of citizens holding elected officials to account relies
on a statist conception of politics, but there are numerous alternatives to electoral accountability of this kind,
including holding power wielders to specified normative standards (see also Grant and Keohane 2005). Human
rights provide clear standards to which power wielders can be held, standards that flow directly from the democratic
principles of freedom and equality and thus do not depend on variable or controversial definitions of who the
appropriate accountability holders are.23 This is not to say that human rights are a substitute for electoral
accountability; our point is simply that, where electoral accountability is unavailable or incoherent, human rights
help to define the parameters of what counts as decisions consistent with democracy, the range of decisions that can
plausibly be understood as democratic.

The Responsibility to Protect is grounded in sovereignty and when states do not

protect their own citizens others are obligated to intervene
Michael Goodhart, University of Pittsburgh, International Studies Quarterly, 2011 (55), p. 5-6

The assertion is reinforced in multiple arenas. Practically, the United Nations grapples with reconciling sovereignty
as permissiveness and sovereignty as responsibility, since virtually much of its work (in development, human
rights, peacekeeping, and nation building, infringe on traditional notions of sovereign prerogative. A December 2001
United Nations sponsored, and International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) produced, a
report entitled, The Responsibility to Protect, concluded that sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their
own citizens from avoidable catastrophefrom mass murder and rape, from starvationbut that when they are
unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states (2001: viii).
Such responsibility, the Commission contends, lies in obligations inherent in the conception of sovereignty; the
responsibility of the Security Council, under Article 24.

Globalization already diminishes sovereignty

Michael Goodhart, University of Pittsburgh, International Studies Quarterly, 2011 (55), p. 1065

Finally, we think the new sovereigntists deny the implications of their own argument. After all, for them sovereignty
is necessarily a conditional good, one valued because it enables constitutional democratic government. When we
consider how globalization diminishes the effectiveness of popular sovereignty as well as the democratic costs of
sovereigntysuch as its defense of undemocratic regimes and human rights violators (costs the new sovereigntists
acknowledge)the strong traditionalist case for popular sovereignty becomes much less persuasive. If sovereignty
no longer enables democracy or represents an obstacle to the realization of freedom and equality, its normative
justification collapses.

Claims of total sovereignty silence minorities within nations

Human Rights Review, January-March 2007, p. 6

On the other hand, popular sovereignty maintains that authority resides in or emanates from the will and consent of
(territorially and nationally defined) people. This construction triply and subversively divorces sovereignty from
human rights. First, by wedding sovereignty to the nation, popular sovereignty imposes a superincumbent thing (the
unitary nation) upon the diversity of human experience and identity. Any resulting homogenization silences minority
nations (Palestinians, Chechens, Basques) within the state. Second, popular sovereignty potentially de-links
individual rights and liberties from conceptions of the common good by tying public policy to majority decision. To
illustrate by way of parody, women in the United States may invoke their numerical majority to disenfranchise men,
or ethnic minorities might decide to disenfranchise whites. Realistically, heterosexuals may deny homosexuals
employment and housing protections, and even civil rights of marriage and adoption. More starkly, governments
may, under guise of majority decision, deprive minorities (for example, black Africans in Darfur) of essential rights
of political participation and religious worship.

Strong conceptions of sovereignty kill global cooperation necessary to solve

international problems
Human Rights Review, January-March 2007, p. 6

Third, binding sovereignty territorially and nationally separates peoples across borders such that a transnational
populist concern with, say, preventing pollution conceivably confronts (and is defeated by) state (so-called
national) interests in stimulating and perpetuating economic growth despite environmental degradation.

The purpose of sovereignty is to promote the good of citizens

Human Rights Review, January-March 2007, p. 13

This article thus challenges the opposition between human rights and sovereignty, and takes its cue from The
Responsibility to Protect: from whence does the notion of sovereignty as responsibility arise? Here, I contend that
democratic, isocratic, humanistic elements (what may be thought of as human rights precursors) are actually
embedded in early notions of sovereignty, including what I call Bodins hierarchical, Althusiuss confederative,
Hobbes singular, and Hegels progressive sovereignty.6 I focus on these four because each offers a unique, early
conception of sovereignty tied to a particular governmental structure: Bodin to monarchy ediated by subassociations, Althusius to confederation, Hobbes to unmediated monarchy and Hegel to constitutional regimes.
Despite differences in government structure, however, each (radically) disassociates sovereignty from its agents and
aligns it to its end (the good of citizens). While their sovereignties may seem remote from contemporary debate,
and even, as with Bodin and Hobbes, antithetical to the argument, they serve to illustrate the theoretical abyss
between todays IR-dominated conceptions of sovereignty and earlier, more human rights friendly ones. From each
theorist I derive eight foundational theses to ground what I call a democratic sovereignty. In the language of The
Responsibility to Protect (2001), obligation towards and responsibility for a states citizens is arguably the sine qua
non of sovereigntyand thus forms its theoretical foundation.

SOVEREIGNTY IS NOT ABSOLUTE BECAUSE ALL GOVERNMENTS ARE

NOT ELECTED
George Soros, Global Financier and International Development Expert, THE BUBBLE OF AMERICAN
SUPREMACY, 2004, p. 102)

The principle of sovereignty needs to be reconsidered. Sovereignty belongs to the people; the people are
supposed to delegate it to the government through the electoral process. But not all governments are
democratically elected and even democratic governments may abuse the authority thus entrusted to them.
If the abuses of power are severe enough and the people are deprived of opportunities to correct them,
outside interference is justified. International intervention is often the only lifeline available to the
oppressed.

WHEN RULES OF STATES DO NOT PROTECT CITIZENS, THE

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAS A RESPONSIBILITY TO INTERVENE
George Soros, Global Financier and International Development Expert, THE BUBBLE OF AMERICAN
SUPREMACY, 2004, p. 103)

The rulers of a sovereign state have a responsibility to protect the citizens. When they fail to do so, the
responsibility should be transferred to the international community. That principle ought to guide the
international community in its policies. One of my main objections to the American intervention in Iraq is
that it has compromised this principle by substituting American might for international legitimacy.

A2: Some Common Stuff

A2: Cultural Relevatism

Cultural relevatism destroys human rights protection
Ayton-Shenker

, March

1995

[Diana, LL.M., in intl. human rights law, Law School of the U of Essex, England. Human Rights Program at Hunter College of CUNY, The Challenge of Human Rights and Cultural Diversity,

http://www.un.org/rights/dpi1627e.htm]

How can universal human rights exist in a culturally diverse world? As the international
community becomes increasingly integrated, how can cultural diversity and integrity be respected?
How could a global culture emerge based on and guided by human dignity and tolerance?
Cultural relativism is the assertion that human values
vary a great deal
according to different cultural perspectives. Some would apply this relativism to the promotion, protection,
interpretation and application of human rights which could be interpreted differently within different cultural, ethnic
and religious traditions
this relativism pose a dangerous threat to
the effectiveness of
the international system of human rights
If cultural tradition
alone governs State compliance
then widespread disregard, abuse
of human rights would be given
legitimacy
the promotion and protection of human rights perceived as culturally relative would only be subject
to State discretion
By rejecting or disregarding their legal obligation to promote and protect
universal human rights, States advocating cultural relativism could raise their own cultural norm
above
international law and standards.
This situation sharpens a long-standing dilemma:

Is a global culture inevitable? If so, is the

world ready for it?

These are some of the issues, concerns and

questions underlying the debate over universal human rights and cultural relativism.

, far from being universal,

. In other words, according to this view, human rights are culturally relative rather than universal. Taken to its extreme,

international law and

would

that has been painstakingly contructed over the decades.

with international standards,

and violation

. Accordingly,

, rather than international legal imperative.

s and particularities

A2: International Regimes Solves

International regimes have no enforcement and norms do not trigger compliance
Goodman and Jinks, 2004

[Ryan and Derek, Assistant Professor of Foreign, International, and Comparative Law, Harvard Law School and Professor of Law, Arizona State University College of Law, Duke Law Journal, December, 54 Duke L.J.

621, Lexis]

Before we proceed with our analysis, it is important to note the special characteristics of human rights regimes that bracket our discussion and that make the investigation of socialization processes especially productive in this arena. Most international regimes seek to facilitate
cooperation or coordination among states. 11 The global promotion of human rights, however, is importantly different from both types of regimes. 12 For several reasons, the prevalence of human rights violations is not reducible to a simple collective action problem. First, states have

many states have

little clear interest in promoting and protecting human rights abroad
and
domestically. Some states
are simply willing to violate human rights when it is convenient to do so, and they have no interest in accepting
structural commitments that may alter their current decision processes
The task of designing
effective human rights regimes is further complicated by several structural characteristics of international society
First, international human rights norms are not self-enforcing. 13 This point issues
from the fact that human rights regimes do not address coordination problems and that states have no clear, direct
interest in securing human rights protection in other states. Second, good faith participants in such regimes are
generally unwilling or unable to shoulder the enforcement costs necessary to coerce recalcitrant states to comply
with human rights norms. This "enforcement deficit" - exacerbated by high enforcement costs and negligible direct
returns - is a political reality of the current international order.
substantial capacity to promote and protect human rights within their territory without coordinating their efforts with [*629] other states. Without question, states retain some substantial measure of effective autonomy in this area. Second,

. Although "bad actors" impose externalities on other states in extreme cases (for example, when poor human rights

conditions trigger massive refugee flows), these externalities arise only sporadically

typically affect only a few (bordering) states. Third, many states have no interest in promoting and protecting human rights

. Indeed, one of the central regime design problems in human rights law is how best to influence "bad actors" to

make fundamental changes. The question whether international law can promote human rights norms may be recast, in an important sense, as how human rights regimes can best harness the mechanisms of social influence.

that

undercut the potential effectiveness of some strategies. Consider two.

Treaties prove the multilateral human rights commitments fail

Tsutsui, March 2005

[Kiyoteru, Professor of political sociology at Stanford University, The American Journal of Sociology, Human Rights in a Globalizing World: the paradox of empty promises, www.stanford.edu/~emiliehb/Papers/hr_practices.pdf]

mainstream international relations

perspectives often regard the growing legalization of human rights principles as epiphenomenal (Mearsheimer
1994/1995); or, they assume that states only comply with the principles of international law when it is in their
national interest and when international institutions are designed to enforce observance of law (Downs, Rocke, and
Barsoom 1996). In short, the rationalist tradition has led scholars to expect that the human rights regime has little
impact on actual human rights practices. Treaties are simply not designed to make ratifying governments
accountable for their commitments.
Scholars of international relations, particularly within the realist and neoliberal traditions, expect this compliance gap between states commitment to international law and states practices. Theses

Treaty signers more likely to violate human rights

Tsutsui 05, March 2005 [Kiyoteru, Professor of political sociology at Stanford University, The American Journal
of Sociology, Human Rights in a Globalizing World: the paradox of empty promises,
www.stanford.edu/~emiliehb/Papers/hr_practices.pdf]

Table 3 below displays our major findings. Two outcomes re striking. First, state commitment to the international
human rights legal regime does not automatically translate into government respect for human rights. States that
ratify a greater number of human rights treaties are not more likely to protect human rights than states that ratify a
small number of treaties. To the contrary, model 1 suggests that ratification is frequently coupled with non
compliance behavior and that state commitment to the international human rights legal regime at times leads to
radical decoupling, exacerbating human rights abuse. (21) This finding is remarkably consistent when we
disaggregate overall commitment to the human rights regime and examine ratification of specific UN treaties
(models 2-7). In no instance does state ratification of any of the six core UN human rights treaties predict the
likelihood of government respect for human rights. Rather, state ratification of all six treaties has a negative effect
on signatories behavior: treaty members are more likely to repress their citizens than non-ratifiers. (22) Together,
these findings draw a troubling picture: international human rights treaties do little to encourage better practices and
cannot stop many governments from a spiral of increasing repressive behavior, and may even exacerbate poor
practices.

Treaties enable governments to deflect responsibility

Tsutsui, March 2005

[Kiyoteru, Professor of political sociology at Stanford University, The American Journal of Sociology, Human Rights in a Globalizing World: the paradox of empty promises, www.stanford.edu/~emiliehb/Papers/hr_practices.pdf]

These have created fertile grounds for what we call radical

decoupling, wherein treaties have an effect opposite to what are intended. We argue that international human rights
treaties lack the mechanisms of enforcement that provide governments with the incentives not to defect from their
policy commitments (Hathaway 2002; Downs et al. 1996, Tsutsui and Wotipka 2001). This dual nature of the regime
state legitimation without enforcementmay at times lead governments to use global laws as a shield for
increasingly violent domestic behaviors.
First, we extend the concept of decoupling to the institutional processes and historical contingents around global human rights politics.

Treaties dont stop the human rights abuses of modern warfare

Gentry, 1999 [John, researcher and writer on defense/security issues, traveled with the US Army in Bosnia, Human Rights, Ethnicity, and National Identity, Vol. 22, No. 4:Pg 95, Lexis]

there are fundamental reasons why major parts of the international human-rights agenda make
little sense. Warfare in recent decades has changed dramatically toward total warfare of a sort that prominently
involves civilians as both targets and participants, which often is in alleged defense of group rights
Bureaucratic concerns and national ambitions aside,

. The 1992-1995 Bosnian war is a classic

example. In this conflict, simply put, grievances among three ethnic factions -- Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats, and Bosnian Muslims -- led to combat whose strategic as well as tactical objectives focused on increasing the size and security of pockets of land held nearly completely by
one's own ethnic group. This required expansion of key chunks of ethnically homogeneous land and capture of some strategic locations, which simplified the demographic mosaic of prewar Bosnia. Pejoratively called ethnic cleansing, the strategy that all three sides employed had at
its heart the advancement of the rights of their own group over those of others and the targeting of members of other groups who stubbornly resisted achievement of those goals by refusing to leave their homes. When bombast did not work, the groups used murder and other
"atrocities" to move people to other places, either horizontally as corpses or vertically as living beings. This type of warfare both tramples the human rights of victims and fosters alleged rights to personal and group security and self-actualization. Western descriptions, such as victim

This kind of conflict is incompatible with current international rules of warfare that
define acceptable actions between groups of fighters called soldiers who are government employees
the 1949
Geneva Conventions and other conventions that regulate by voluntary state compliance the conduct of the armies
fighting conventional wars are woefully inadequate to describe, let alone regulate, intrasocietal and intersocietal
wars. In a conflict such as Bosnia's
all significant participants were war criminals by
conventional standards because
or war criminal, depend largely on who won and who lost, not on behavior.

. That is,

in which movement of civilians was a major strategic goal,

A2: Intervention Stuff

A2: Intervention Always Fails

Intervention has failed in the past because the US has not backed the democratic
protestors
Shadi Hamid, Director of Research, Brookings Doha Center , Brookings Institute, States News Service, April 26,
2011 THE STRUGGLE FOR MIDDLE EAST DEMOCRACY,
www.brookings.edu/articles/2011/0426_middle_east_hamid.aspx DOA: 5/5/11
To be sure, the United States has a checkered, tragic history in the region. For decades, the United States has been
on the wrong side of history, supporting and funding Arab autocrats and undermining nascent democratic
movements when they threatened American interests. So critics of Western 'meddling' have a point: whenever
the United States and Europe interfere in the region, they seem to get it wrong. That is precisely why it's so
important that, this time, they get it right. But getting it right requires that the United States fundamentally
reassess its Middle East policy and align itself with Arab populations and their democratic aspirations. This
has not happened.
Egypt and Tunisia, despite all their problems, remain the most promising cases. Elsewhere, the situation is
considerably more grave, with U.S.-backed autocrats in Yemen and Bahrain having used unprecedented force
against their own citizens. Saudi Arabia's military intervention in Bahrain has fanned the flames of regional
sectarianism and made an already explosive situation even worse.
Thus far, the Obama administration has been behind the curve in nearly every country, reacting to rather than
shaping events. President Obama adopted a slow and deliberate approach, and refused to take a stronger stand with
America's Yemeni and Gulf allies. Even enemies such as the Syrian regime have so far escaped any real pressure. If
anything is clear, it is that Arabs have shown that something more than caution and gradualism is called for
in historic moments of change. This time, they-not the international community-are leading the way. But they
and their countries need the international community to follow. Otherwise, their revolutions may still fail.

A2: West Irrelevant

Western leverage a critical variable to the spread of democracy
Ivan Krastev is chairman of the board of the Centre for Liberal Strategies in Sofia, Bulgaria, and a fellow at the
Institute of Human Sciences in Vienna. He is also editor-in-chief of the Bulgarian edition of Foreign Policy and
associate editor of Europe's World. , Journal of Democracy, Volume 22, Number 2, April 2011 Paradoxes of the New
Authoritarianism, p. 10

Levitsky and Way have concluded, based on a study of numerous cases of competitive authoritarianism, that
authoritarian regimes have the best chance of surviving in countries where Western leverage is limited and where
linkages with the West are low. The existence of a functional state with a capacity for repression and the presence of
an efficient ruling party are other critical factors that boost the survival chances of authoritarian regimes. Such
regimes are harder to dislodge in big, nuclear-armed countries that have never been Western colonies, that are
governed by a consolidated ruling party, and that are ready to shoot when students come to protest on the main
square. Authoritarians are less likely to stay in power in states that are small and weak, that are located near the
European Union or United States, that need IMF loans, that are economically and culturally connected with the
West, that lack a strong ruling party, and that cannot or will not shoot protesters.

A2: Utilitarianism Good

Util Bad
Utilitarianism allows totalitarianism and war
Kateb, 1992 (George, Prof of Politics, Princeton Univ., The Inner Ocean: individualism and Democratic
Culture; Cornell University Press, p.11)

I do not mean to take seriously the idea that utilitarianism is a satisfactory replacement for the theory of
rights. The well-being (or mere preferences) of the majority cannot override the rightful claims of
individuals. In a time when the theory of rights is global it is noteworthy that some moral philosophers
disparage the theory of rights. The political experience of this century should be enough to make them
hesitate: it is not clear that, say, some version of utilitarianism could not justify totalitarian evil. It also
could be fairly easy for some utilitarians to justify any war and any dictatorship, and very easy to justify
any kind of ruthlessness even in societies that pay some attention to rights. There is no end to the immoral
permissions that one or another type of utilitarianism grants. Everything is permitted, if the calculation is
right.

Utilitarianism justifies the tyranny of the majority

Maximiano, Associate Professor of business ethics DLSU School of Business, 03 (Jose Mario
Maximiano, Nov 6, Business World, The View from Taft,)

According to the utilitarian principle, the correct action, decision or judgment is the one that will produce
the greatest net benefits at the lowest net costs for the greatest number of people. Sad to say, this principle
has no eyes to see and no brains to know who are those who have less in life, and those who are
disadvantaged and less gifted. Like a horse with blinders, utilitarianism automatically focuses on the
majority, regardless of socio-economic status. In the application of the utilitarian principle, therefore, it is
possible that those who have more in life would benefit more, while those with less would benefit less.
The utilitarian principle seems inadequate when applied to situations that involve the basic rights of
others. Was the government ethically correct in demolishing some shanties to pave the way for the
beautification project specifically for a visiting leader? Similarly, was the government ethically correct to
drive away some indigenous tribes to give way for the construction of a dam? While some would see
beautification, greening, cleaning and the construction of the dam as benefits, others may see the same as
unjust and unfair, and hence as costs, because those projects may at times violate the basic rights of
others.

Utilitarianism justifies doing evil in the name of preventing evil, causing war and
violence
Richard Norman, Professor of Moral Philosophy, University of Kentucky, ETHICS, KILLING, AND
WAR, 1995, p. 207

Since the waging of war almost invariably involves the deliberate taking of life on a massive scale, it will
be immensely difficult to justify. I have argued that utilitarian justifications are not good enough. We
cannot justify the taking of life simply by saying that the refusal to take life is likely to lead to worse
consequences. An adequate notion of moral responsibility implies that other people's responsibility for
evil does not necessarily justify us is doing evil ourselves in order to prevent them. We cannot sacrifice
some of our people for the others and claim that we are justified by a utilitarian calculus of lives.

A2: Callahan Rights Specific

Rights must come first or they will always be violated in the name of security
Kateb, Professor of Politic Princeton University, 92 (George, The Inner Ocean: Individualism and
Democratic Culture; Cornell University Press, p. 5)
All I wish to say now is that unless rights come first they are not rights. They will tend to be sacrificed to
some purpose deemed higher than the equal dignity of every individual. There will be little if any concept
of the integrity or inviolability of each individual. The group or the majority or the good or the sacred or
the vague fixture will be preferred. The beneficiaries will be victimized along with the victims because no
one is being treated as a person who is irreplaceable and beyond value. To make rights anything but
primary, even though in the name of human dignity, is to injure human dignity.

Protection of rights over all else creates a quality to life which promotes community development
sustaining human survival; making survival the ultimate goal promotes and unsustainable
authoritarian society

Schroeder, Professor of Law, Duke University, 86 (Christopher H. Schroeder, RIGHTS AGAINST

RISKS, APRIL, The Columbia Law Review, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 495, p. 519-20)

Actually, expanding the idea of preservation to include bodily integrity on the basis of quality of life
considerations has already pointed the way to a more realistic statement of those individual characteristics
worth protecting. The same considerations of quality of life counsel recognizing some freedom of action
and initiative within the definition of the morally relevant aspects of the individual. Doing so is consistent
with a long political and philosophical heritage. Deeply ingrained in practically all theories of the rights
tradition is the vision of a person as capable of forming and entitled to pursue some individual life plan.
91 Given this vision, placing survival or bodily integrity absolutely above all other ends would be
tantamount to saying that the life plan that one ought to adopt is that of prolonging life at all costs. That
idea is unacceptably authoritarian and regimented. It would be extremely anomalous for a theory
supposedly centered on the autonomy of the individual to result in a conception of justice that constrained
all individuals to a monolithic result. Individual human beings want more from their lives than simple
bodily integrity, and the conception of an individual, of what defines and constitutes a person, as so
limited is peculiarly impoverished. Individuals are capable of formulating and pursuing life plans, of
forming bonds of love, commitment, and friendship on which they subsequently act, of conceiving
images of self- and community-improvement. Some of these may directly advance interests in human
survival, as when dedicated doctors and scientists pursue solutions to cancer or develop chemical
pesticides with a view to assisting agricultural self-sufficiency in developing countries. Some may
dramatically advance the "quality of life," rather than survival itself, as when Guttenberg's press made
literature more widely available or when Henry Ford pioneered the mass production of the automobile.
However, even individual initiatives of much less demonstrable impact on the lives of others constitute a
vital element that makes human life distinctively human. A just society ought to understand and value this

element both in the concrete results it sometimes produces and in the freedom and integrity that are
acknowledged when individual liberty to conceive and act upon initiative is respected.

A2: Callahan -- General

Survival is not a value in itself- people take risks all the time we must uphold rights otherwise there
would be policy paralysis

Henry Shue, Professor of Ethics and Public Life, Princeton University, 1989 (Nuclear Deterrence and
Moral Restraint, pg. 45-6)

When we pursue several values simultaneously, we face the fact that they often conflict and that we face
difficult tradeoffs. If we make one value absolute in priority, we are likely to get that value and little else.
Survival is a necessary condition for the enjoyment of other values, but that does not make it sufficient.
Logical priority does not make it an absolute value. Few people act as though survival were an absolute
value in their personal lives, or they would never enter an automobile. We can give survival of the species
a very high priority without giving it the paralyzing status of an absolute value. Some degree of risk is
unavoidable if individuals or societies are to avoid paralysis and enhance the quality of life beyond mere
survival. The degree of that risk is a justifiable topic of both prudential and moral reasoning.

Utilitarian justifications for embryonic stem cell research endorse commodification

of humans
Robert D. Orr, MD, Director of Ethics, Fletcher Allen Health Care at the University of Vermont College
of Medicine, Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law and Ethics, Fall, 2001, 2 Yale J. Health Pol'y L. & Ethics
189, p. 195

Moreover, the Nuremberg tribunal, guided by the overarching principle that human beings are never to be
treated as a means to an end, but must always be ends in themselves, soundly rejected the above
arguments. It is sad and ironic that as the generation that bequeathed to us the Nuremberg Code is
passing, we are discarding the wisdom it gained at such a high price. Using identical utilitarian and
pragmatic reasoning, contemporary politicians, scientists, and the public at large are endorsing the
commodification and destruction of members of our human family.

Utilitarian justifications for embryonic stem cell research endorse commodification

of humans
Robert D. Orr, MD, Director of Ethics, Fletcher Allen Health Care at the University of Vermont College
of Medicine, Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law and Ethics, Fall, 2001, 2 Yale J. Health Pol'y L. & Ethics
189, p. 195
(PDOCSS218)

Moreover, the Nuremberg tribunal, guided by the overarching principle that human beings are never to be
treated as a means to an end, but must always be ends in themselves, soundly rejected the above
arguments. It is sad and ironic that as the generation that bequeathed to us the Nuremberg Code is
passing, we are discarding the wisdom it gained at such a high price. Using identical utilitarian and
pragmatic reasoning, contemporary politicians, scientists, and the public at large are endorsing the
commodification and destruction of members of our human family.