Robert Grosseteste and the Origins of Experimental Science 1100-1700 by A. C.

Crombie
Review by: Marshall Clagett
Isis, Vol. 46, No. 1 (Mar., 1955), pp. 66-69
Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of The History of Science Society
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66

BOOK REVIEWS

The original title of the Almagestis stated

(p. 43) to be hi mathematikesyntaxis,meaning the mathematicalsynthesis. Heiberg,
however, has shown that syntaxiswas not in
the title. It merely means treatise or work,
and the Almagest was referred to as the
mathimatikeor megali syntaxis to distinguish it from the apotelesmatikior tetrabiblos syntaxis. The actual title was simply
Mathematika,meaning Mathematics.
Professor Sarton defends Ptolemy's lapse
into pseudo-science in the Tetrabiblosby attacking our newspapers for their columns on
astrology. He thinks (p. 62) they "should
be punished just as one punishes the purveyors of adulterated food." This is an interesting proposition, but highly debatable.
Indiana University

AUBREYDILLER

A. C. CROMBIE: Robert Grosseteste and

the Originsof ExperimentalScience IIoo1700. Xii + 369 pp. Oxford, at the Clarendon Press, I953.
The principalpurpose of this volume on
Grossetesteis to arguewith supportingevidence the position that the origins of the
experimentalmethod employed by modem
scienceare foundin the medievalperiod. As
Crombiehimself puts it: "The thesis of this
book is that the modem systematicunderstandingof at least the qualitativeaspects
of this method was createdby the philosophers of the West in the thirteenthcentury.
It was they who transformedthe Greek
geometrical method into the experimental
scienceof the modem world (p. i)." In the
course of developing this thesis Crombie
entersinto a summarydescriptionof science
in the twelfth centuryand an examinationof
Grosseteste'swritingson the theory of science, includinghis principalconclusionsregardinginduction,verificationand falsification in naturalscience. Crombieshowshow
these conclusionsrelate to the opinions of
Aristotleand Galenand how they influenced
the discussionsof succeedingLatin schoolmen, suchas RogerBacon,AlbertusMagnus,
WilliamOckham,and others. As a particular
scienceillustrating,in Crombie'sopinion,the
new grasp of the experimentalscience, he
presents a most valuablehistory of certain
aspects of medievaloptics from Grosseteste

to Newton. In this history he pays particular

and detailed attention to the theory of the
rainbow as developed in the thirteenth century, a theory culminating in the De iride etc.
of Theodoric of Freiberg. This treatment of
optics as a detailed example of medieval
science is supplemented by brief remarks on
medieval mechanics as developed in the fourteenth century.
As I have stated in a review of Crombie's
Augustine to Galileo (Isis, 44: 399), I do not
believe that Crombie has fully demonstrated
his thesis, although I fully agree with him as
to the importance of the continuous development of the substance of medieval science,
and particularly of medieval optics, for the
subsequent achievements of modem science.
I fail to see, for example, how Grosseteste or
even Theodoric presents any fundamental
advance in method beyond the experimental
and mathematical procedure of Ptolemy in
his optics. Between the medieval writers and
their Greek predecessors, there may be a
difference of degree but not one of kind in
their respective procedures. Furthermore, I
am not convinced, as Crombie seems to be,
that the discussions of methods that arose in
medieval commentaries on the Posterior
Analytics of Aristotle from the time of
Grosseteste had any paramount or causative
influence on the "actual" development of
medieval scientific procedure, although, to
be sure, these discussions are most interesting and are worthy of study, being reflective
of the increased interest in scientific methods. For example, it would be difficult, if not
impossible, on the basis of present evidence
to relate the brilliant achievements in medieval statics associated with the name of
Jordanus and his successors to medieval discussions of methodology. Rather it seems to
me that the development of statics was the
outcome of close attention to and the study
of Greek mathematical statics considered in
the light of Aristotelian physical ideas. Almost certainly Jordanus antedated the intensive discussion of the Posterior Analytics. It
may be that the discussions of the theory of
science played a more important role in the
fruitful investigations of kinematics and
dynamics at Oxford and Paris in the fourteenth century. But even here it does not
appear to me that logicians like Swineshead
and Heytesbury in their logical-mathematical
works were in fact following Grosseteste's

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BOOK REVIEWS

67

Alhazen's De speculis comburentibus. Thabit

ibn Qurra, the author of the Liber karastonis,
so far as I know is not known in Arabic as
Ibn Thebit, the form which Crombie uses
(p. 36).
With the discussion of twelfth-century empiricism and rationalism completed, Crombie
feels he has set the stage for Grosseteste,
who, Crombie claims, unites "the two twelfthcentury traditions of technology and logic."
A brief outline of Grosseteste's life is followed by a discussion of his scientific writings, and an attempt to order them by date.
As an additional note to this discussion I
would like to call attention to a brief fragment from Simplicius' Commentary on the
Physics, which Grosseteste probably translated.2 Then follows a discussion of Grosseteste's views on the nature of science, as
developed in his commentaries on the Posterior Analytics and the Physics of Aristotle.
"The conception of science which Grosseteste
. . .learnt from Aristotle was one in which
there was a double movement, from theory
to experience and from experience to theory
(p. 52)." For Grosseteste as for Aristotle,
scientific knowledge was the "demonstrative
knowledge of things through their causes,
and its instrument was the demonstrated
syllogism, which established the connexion
between premises and conclusions, or causes
and their effects, through the middle term
Grosseteste makes what was
(pp. 52-53)."
to become the conventional distinction between knowledge of the fact (quia) and
knowledge of the cause of the fact (propter
quid), and Grosseteste certainly held that
for investigation into physical things we
must begin with effects, that is, with the
knowledge of facts. Crombie here points to
what I assume he would believe is an unAristotelian opinion of Grosseteste. "Grosseteste said physics was uncertain because there
could be only probable knowledge of changeable natural things (p. 59)." It would seem
to me that here Crombie is introducing the
word "probable," not existing in the passages quoted, that he is making Grosseteste
out to be an early probabilist. It is true that
Grosseteste does say: "Similiter in naturalibus est minor certitudo propter mutabili1J. H. Randall,"The Developmentof Scien- tatem rerum naturalium." But "minor certific Method in the School of Padua," Journal
Cf.
2I am publishingthis fragment in a forthof the History of Ideas, I940, z: I77-206.
coming volume to be presented to Professor
D. P. Lockwood, Ugo Benzi (Chicago, I95),
A. P. Evans of ColumbiaUniversity.
pp. 222-227.

prescriptions as to method. I do not mean

to deny of course that there is a continuous
history of methodological discussions, a history which demonstrates the increasing maturity of these discussions from the time of
Grosseteste to that of Galileo, and Crombie
does a superb job of tracing the thirteenthand fourteenth-century backgrounds to the
discussions of methodology undertaken by
the Italian natural philosophers already examined by Randall.' One can have nothing
but praise for Crombie's account of the successive examination of the discussions of the
various schoolmen on the question of the
theory of science, even if one does not accept
the causative role of these discussions, and
even if one raises certain doubts as to
Crombie's interpretation and evaluation of
the scholastic ideas.
While space forbids a discussion of the
many details of medieval science presented
in this volume, I would like to present and
criticize Crombie's discussion of medieval
scientific methodology. In his second chapter, "Empiricism and Rationalism in TwelfthCentury Science," Crombie traces the concern of medieval education with practical
and technical matters. At the same time he
attempts to show how the Aristotelian distinction between "experimental facts and
rational or theoretical knowledge of the cause
of the fact" came into the Latin West with
the New Logic of Aristotle and Galen's medicine. With it came the Greek distinction between analysis and synthesis, between the
procedure going from the composite to the
particular and that going from the particular
distinction in short
to the composite -a
between resolutio and compositio. As a necessary part of the treatment of twelfth-century science the author treats briefly of the
translations made from Greek and Arabic.
Here we notice a few unimportant slips. For
example, there is no evidence at all that
Adelard of Bath translated Euclid's Elements
in I1 26, as Crombie asserts (p. 3I). Further
there is no extant copy of a translation of
the Conics of Apollonius as listed by Crombie (p. 36), for there is only a fragment of
that work existing as an introduction to

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68

BOOK REVIEWS

titudo" is not necessarily equivalent to "only

probable knowledge," for in the first place
it is doubtful whether Grosseteste means to
imply by "minor certitude" that all physics
is subject only to probable knowledge, as
Plato would hold, and in the second it is
even more doubtful that he implies the principal conclusion of the fourteenth century
probabilists, that knowledge of nature is only
probable because there is no demonstration
of the principle of causation in natural
events.
While the knowledge of physics may be
less certain than other kinds of knowledge,
according to Grosseteste, certain procedures
were to be followed for ascertaining that
knowledge. Crombie has pointed out that
such a procedure was twofold: (i) the discovery of causal definitions by the combined
use of resolution and composition, and (2)
the certification of the causal definitions by
verification and falsification. "By relating
these logical methods to scientific practice
Grosseteste made the first moves toward the
creation of modem science (p. 6i)." The
causes or causal definitions that Grosseteste
was seeking were the four Aristotelian
causes: formal, material, efficient, and final.
In maintaining the Aristotelian causes as his
scientific objective, Grosseteste could hardly
be called heralding modem scientific procedures, and in my opinion Crombie does not
sufficiently discuss the distinctions between
the causal objectives of medieval and early
modem science.
But let us take as an example given by
Crombie of Grosseteste's scientific search
for causes, his discovery of the causes for
homed animals having homs. The formal
cause is found to be "not having teeth in the
upper jaw," which cause he arrived at by
examining the common nature of homed
animals. The material and efficient causes
are for Grosseteste that the earthy matter
which ordinarily would go to form teeth
forms homs instead. The final or purposeful
cause is to provide a means for the animal
to protect himself.
In asserting causal connections in universal
form, Grosseteste held that the mind by an
intuitive induction jumped from the single
instances to the general statement. Now not
much of this whole first procedure of finding
causes and causal connections was original
with Grosseteste, as Crombie shows. The

originality Crombie claims for Grosseteste is

in the latter's exposition of the further tests
needed to establish causal connections. Crombie suggests that the reason why Grosseteste
held that there need be further tests is that
there may be a plurality of causes that could
produce a given effect. In support of assigning a doctrine of plurality of causes to
Grosseteste, Crombie cites the following passage: "If one determinate cause cannot be
reached from the effect, since there is no
effect which has not some cause, it follows
that an effect, when it has one cause, may
have another, and so that there may be several causes of it (p. 8i)."
This remark demands some comment.
While I do not have Grosseteste's commentary on the Posterior Analytics at hand so
that I may check the context of this passage,
I wonder if Grosseteste really believed in a
plurality of specific causes, or whether, like
Aristotle, he was not merely raising the
point as a dialectical question. I ask this
question because in his De calore solis
Grosseteste says that there is a univocal
cause for every univocal effect (omnis enim
passionis univoce est causa univoca). It is
true that sometime we might confuse the
cause of an effect as specific which is really
generic, and thus it appears there is a plurality of specific causes when in fact there is
only one generic cause. The Aristotelian
example is that there might be several different herbs producing the same cure. The
conclusion we would draw from this is not
that there is a plurality of causes, but rather
that there is a single generic cause producing
that effect, i.e., all the herbs producing the
cure must belong to the same genus, and it is
the generic property of such herbs to produce such a cure.
Whether or not there are in Grosseteste's
view of the physical world unique and truly
ascertainable causes, or merely the most
likely of several possible causes, each of
which could cause a given effect under different conditions, Grosseteste's achievement,
according to Crombie, was to develop "the
method of verification into a systematic
method of experimental procedure." Grosseteste's technique of deciding between possible
causes was to show either that a given theory
had consequences which contradicted the facts
of experience and thus must be discarded, or
that it had consequences in accord with other

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BOOK REVIEWS

69

phenomenaand thus would be certified. I Books of the Western World, vol. i6.)
mustconfessthatthe examplesof howGrosse- Chicago: Encyclopedia Brittanica, Inc.,
teste actually used his methods as reported 1952.
by Crombieappearto me to be much more
The followingis a sample of misleading
inept science than the best of Greek and errrors:
medieval science. The actual so-called exp. 745, 1. 20: 62023' for 68023'
perimentingfor the most part turnsout to be
p. 748, 1. 27 and 3I: 227037' for 277037'
largely passive observations.
p. 756, 1. io: May for March
Grosseteste's views on the relation of
p. 756, last L: 44012' for 440II
of
considerable
are
physics
and
mathematics
p. 757, .-8: 5045' for 5?55'
interest. He was basically Aristotelian in
p. 759, L-26: KEO for KED
holding mathematicsto be an instrument p. 76o, 1. 22: GER for GES
p. 768, ch. I5, 1. 6: 84020' for 74020'
which can be used to describeevents in the
physical world. He was assured,moreover, p. 770, 1. i6: 47050' for 670501
p. 77I, h. I6, 1. I0: 183020' for 133020'
that the causeshe soughtin physicalscience
p. 77I, ch. I6,1. i6: 80?I8' for 700I8'
are not themselvesmathematical,but rather
p. 772,1.13: DE for DF
are physical. Crombiepresents, still under
p. 778, L 20: Januaryfor June
the head of mathematicalphysics, Grosse: 45047j' for 450571'
P. 780,1.
p. 78I, ch. 23, 1.4: "the eight (sic) month"
teste's "light metaphysics."While it is true
not in text and wrong
that Grosseteste'slight metaphysicsturned
his study to mathematicaloptics, much of
Incorrectfigures (sample):
which is experimentallyverifiable,I would
hesitate to say with Crombiethat Grossep. 742: H omitted
p. 749: line DC wrong; the idea of the proof
teste's light metaphysicswas thereby made
requires that EDC be on a straight
verifiable(p. io6). Suchveriexperimentally
line
opfication that experimental-mathematical
p. 780: F and line GD omitted
tics broughtlight metaphysicswas solely in
p. 78I: lines ED and FG omitted
terms of gross analogiesbetweenthe experip. 787: point C incorrectlyplaced
mentallyverifiablelaws of light propagation p. 788: point D incorrectlyplaced; line CH
wrong (should be FH)
and Grosseteste'scurious ideas of the role
p. 790: line EF omitted
The
form.
corporeal
as
a
of
lux
in nature
details of his metaphysicalsystem were, I
The translationis supposedlybased "on
believe, in no way "verifiable"by experi- the first edition" (p. 493), which would be
mental optics. Be that as it may, this whole Nuremberg 1543. I found, however, many
discussionleads Crombieto a most fertilein- instances where the translation follows the
vestigationof opticsin the middleages.
text which is exclusively given (correctly as
While I have tendedin this reviewto em- well as incorrectly) in the Thorn edition
phasizepoints of disagreementwith the au- (i873). The translation is also not trustthor let me assurethe readerthat this is one worthy in other details. Examples: p. 794,
of the most stimulatingand carefully pre- we read "the simple mean position of the
pared studies in medieval science that has sun was at 149048' from the spring equinox
come forth in some time. Nowhereelse do but in 26047' of Virgo, wherein the position
we have so muchmaterialassembledfor the of Mercury was approximately I3Y20." Mr.
study of medieval scientific methodology. Wallis obviously did not understand the
Finalnote shouldbe madeof the richbibliog- method of counting longitudes employed by
raphy appendedto this volume, which de- Copernicus. The text really says "the mean
serves commendationfor its completeness. position of the sun was at I49048' but,
MARSHALLCLAGETT (counted) from the spring equinoX, 26047'

Universityof Wisconsin

NICOLAUSCOPERNICUS:On the Revolu-

tions of the Heavenly Spheres. Trans-

lated by Charles Glenn Walls. (Great

of Virgo, and thus Mercury had an elongaThe translator modified

tion of 13/4O."
(without comment) the text and the final
number to make them fit his incorrect interpretation.
In general Mr. Wallis' translation is often
not much more than a simple replacement

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