Treating minorities with fatwas: a study of

the Ahmadiyya community in Indonesia

Ahmad Najib Burhani

Contemporary Islam
Dynamics of Muslim Life
ISSN 1872-0218
Cont Islam
DOI 10.1007/s11562-013-0278-3

1 23

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Author's personal copy

Cont Islam
DOI 10.1007/s11562-013-0278-3

Treating minorities with fatwas: a study

of the Ahmadiyya community in Indonesia
Ahmad Najib Burhani

# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Abstract The term minority religious community in the Muslim country of Indonesia
refers not only to those embracing religions other than Islam, but also to minority groups
like the Ahmadiyya. Recently, the treatment of Ahmadis has been worse than the
treatment of non-Muslims. This article, therefore, intends to study the status of deviant
groups under Islamic law and the treatment of them in Muslim society. Specifically, this
article addresses the following questions: How did ulama in the past define and treat
minority groups? How do contemporary Sunni ulama define and treat the Ahmadiyya?
What is the status of this group under Islamic law? Are they apostates, heretics, or
unbelievers? And what are the legal consequences of these charges? To answer these
questions, this article employs two methods. First, for theoretical treatment of minority
groups in the past, this article focuses its analysis on al-Ghazlis Faysal al-tafriqa and
Faih al-batiniyya. Second, following a discussion of classical Islam,the article moves

time by analyzing fatwas against the Ahmadiyya from five institutions:

to contemporary
the Rbita al-lam al-Islm, Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI), Muhammadiyah,
Council of the Islamic Fiqh Academy of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation
(OIC), and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). This article argues that, first, fatwas against the
Ahmadiyya issued by these institutions were intended as a device to sustain orthodoxy of
umma and, second, orthopraxy or devoutness in observing religious rituals, as practiced
by the Ahmadis, does not exempt them from the charge of apostasy because theologically
they are believed to deviate from orthodox beliefs.
Keywords Ahmadiyya . Orthodoxy-orthopraxy . Apostasy . Religious minority . Fatwa
. Ideological persuasion

A. N. Burhani
Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), Jakarta, Indonesia
Present Address:
A. N. Burhani (*)
Widya Graha Lt. 9, Jl. Gatot Subroto No. 10, Jakarta 12710, Indonesia
e-mail: najib27@yahoo.com

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Introduction
The first and most important problem in dealing with the Ahmadiyya 1 from the
perspective of Islamic law is to determine whether the Ahmadis should be included in
classical fiqh categories of apostates (murtadd, pl. murtaddn), masked-apostates
(zindq, pl. zandiqa), heretics (mulhid, pl. mulhidn), 2 innovators (mubtadi, pl.

someone within these categories

3
mubtadin), or unbelievers (kfir, pl. kuffr).
Ruling
has legal ramifications. To deal with the religious status of the Ahmadis, this article
employs the perspective of the Sunni Muslim since the Ahmadiyya themselves would
not consider themselves within the above categories, instead they see themselves as
reformers (mujaddid, pl. mujaddidn) of Islam. From an Islamic legal perspective, it is
also almost impossible to judge this theological issue from a neutral perspective since
it puts the observer in the position of John Locke when he says, for everyone is
orthodox to himself: these things, and all others of this nature, are much rather marks
of mens striving for power and empire over one another, than of the church of Christ
(Locke 2003: 215).4 By taking John Lockes pluralist position there would be no Islamic
law that can be applied to the Ahmadiyya. Lockes view is the stance that should be
taken by secular government, not by a muft (person who gives fatwa).
This article intends to understand the legal status of religious dissident groups
deemed heretic in Islamic law and the treatment of them by a number of Muslim
institutions. Specifically, this article addresses the following questions: How did
Muslims in the past define and treat deviant minority groups? How do contemporary
Muslims define and treat the Ahmadiyya? What is the status of this group under Islamic
law? Are they apostates, masked-apostates, heretics, innovators, unbelievers, or reformers? And what are the legal consequences of these charges? In analyzing the
Ahmadiyya from the perspective of Islamic law, this article employs two methods.
First, in a theoretical discussion of the place of the Ahmadiyya in Islam, this article will
use the criteria proposed by al-Ghazl in his two books: Faysal al-tafriqa bayn al-Islm
wa al-zandaqa (the criterion of distinction between Islam and zandaqa) and Faih al
btiniyya (the infamies of the Btiniyya).5 Second, following the discussion on classical

Islam, this article moves to contemporary time, with insights from the past, by
analyzing six fatwas against Ahmadiyya from five Muslim institutions: the
Muhammadiyah, the Rbita al-lam al-Islm (Muslim World League)henceforth

the Rbita, the Majelis Ulama

Indonesia (MUICouncil of Indonesian Ulama), the

Council of the Islamic Fiqh Academy of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation

(OIC), and the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU).

The Ahmadiyya referred to in this article are specifically the Qadiani Ahmadiyya, not the Lahore
Ahmadiyya, except where otherwise stated.
2
The term mulhid in contemporary Arabic usage is usually used as translation of atheist. Cf. Kudsi-Zadeh

(1972: 25).
3
Sociological discussion on this issue commonly uses different terms such as orthodoxy, heterodoxy,
heresy, orthopraxy, and apostasy. The discussion usually deals with the issue of whether the Ahmadiyya is
an orthodox or heretical movement.
4
John Lockes A letter concerning toleration is originally published in 1689.
5
The term Btiniyya refers to several groups including the Khurramites, the Qarmatians, and the Ismals, but
mostly to the last two (Jackson 2002: 137).
this term refers

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Classical discourse on the boundaries of Islam

Since its establishment in 1889, the Ahmadiyya has posed quite a difficult problem for
Sunni Muslim jurists and theologians in determining whether they are still within the
boundaries of Islam or if they can no longer be considered within the pale of Islam. The
issue of Ahmadiyya is different from that of the Bahai Faith, which ulama almost
unanimously agree cannot be regarded as Muslims because they have different religious
practices and beliefs. Almost all religious rituals in the Ahmadiyya are the same as the
practices in Sunni Islam and they officially follow the Hanafi school of Islamic law.
Their holy book is the Quran. They have the same declaration of faith (shahda), they
go to Mecca and Medina for pilgrimage (hajj), they observe five daily prayers, and they
fast during the month of Raman. Some scholars even agree to the statement that the
Ahmadis are among the most devout Muslims in term of religious practices (Gualtieri
1989: 59).
Of course this movement has some distinctive beliefs that they acknowledge publicly.
Mahmud Ahmad, famously called the Promised Son6 within this movement, even asked
Ahmadiyya missionaries to show the distinctiveness of the Ahmadiyya to people who
become their targeted mission (Mahmud Ahmad 2007a: 277290, b: 932). Among these
distinctive beliefs are the belief in the prophethood of Ghulam Ahmad, the belief in Ghulam
Ahmads claim to be the Messiah, its opposition to warfare jihad, the system of caliphate,
the doctrine of intra-community or intra-religious marriage, the prohibition to pray behind
non-Ahmadi imm, and the concept of chanda or candah (monetary donation). The most
important difference between this group and other Muslims, which often results in the
Ahmadiyya being harshly opposed by other Muslim groups, is in the belief that the founder
of this movement, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, is a prophet and the Promised Messiah.
To understand the place of the Ahmadiyya in Islam, particularly in Indonesian Sunni
orthodoxy, it is useful to take insights from al-Ghazls Faysal al-tafriqa and Faih al
his way of dealing with
btiniyya. Al-Ghazl becomes the main figure here because

heretics has some similarities with the way contemporary Indonesian ulama deal with the
same issue. Moreover, al-Ghazl has a special place in Indonesian Islam, particularly
with traditionalist Muslims, as his religious stance has been a reference for the NUs
conception of Aswajaan Indonesian version of ahl al-sunna wa al-jama or Sunni
Islam (Burhani 2012).
In these two books, particularly the former, al-Ghazl makes a criteria of distinction between those who can be called Muslims and those who cannot. Because the
main concern of al-Ghazl in these two books is with the internal problem within
Islam or with dissident religious groups, his criteria could give a useful perspective on
how we should understand and place of the Ahmadiyya within Islam. Al-Ghazls
discussion on this issue revolves around three different categorical terms: apostate
(murtadd), masked-apostate (zindq), and unbeliever (kfir). The term murtadd is
used for those with a history of being Muslims either by conversion or by birth, but
then abandon Islam. Unbeliever is the term for those who have no history of being
Muslims or never believed in Islam.7 Therefore, every person who commits apostasy
will inevitably become an infidel, but not all infidels are apostates. Masked-apostate
6
7

Elaboration on this can be found in Zafrullah Khan (1978: 3839).

Al-Ghazl defines unbelief as those who reject anything brought by the Prophet as lies (1993: 25)

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denotes those who show outwardly that they are Muslims, while in their hearts they
do not believe in Islam.
As reflected in the title of the book, al-Ghazls main concern in writing Faysal al
tafriqa is to define a decisive criterion for differentiating between Islam and zandaqa;
those who can be called Muslims and those who have transgressed the boundaries of
Islam and can no longer be called Muslims. The theological litmus test employed by alGhazl to determine the religious status of his subject is to ascertain their belief in three
fundamental principles of faith (usl al-aqid or usl al-mn), namely: (1) the
prophethood of the
Prophet Muhammad; and (3)
existence and oneness of God; (2) the
the reality of the Last Day (Jackson 2002: 47 and 112; al-Ghazl 1993: 6162).8 Other
than these three principles, al-Ghazl considers secondary principles (fur) in which
disagreement would not qualify someone to the charge of unbeliever. Some philosophers,
in al-Ghazls eyes, outwardly profess Islam, but their writings show that they doubt one
or more of these three fundamental beliefs. That is why he includes them in the category
of zandaqa. 9 Al-Ghazl also considers the Btiniyya apostates since their beliefs are

incompatible with Islamic creeds and their beliefs do not rely on the authority of any
prophet recognized by Islam (Ahmad 2007: 156).10
Belief in the prophethood of the Prophet Muhammad requires someone to accept as
true anything brought by him and transmitted through diffusively congruent channels
(tawtur). Rejecting this would qualify the charge of unbelief. However, since there is
requirement of tawtur in the transmission of prophetic traditions, people who disagree
with the isolated reports (akhbr al-hd), for al-Ghazl, cannot be classified as unbe
lievers. Disagreeing with the ijm(Muslim
consensus) also does not qualify someone to
be included in the category of unbeliever (Jackson 2002: 114; al-Ghazl 1993: 63). It is in
the context of accepting anything coming from the Prophet to be true that al-Ghazl
attacks philosophers, who in his view breach Islamic creeds such as denying the resurrection of the body, the punishment of the Hereafter, and the belief that God knows the
detail of individual things and events (Jackson 2002: 109110; al-Ghazl 1993: 56).
Analyzing how al-Ghazl treats philosophers, he appears far away from the criteria that
he defines on the outer limits of Islam. This can be seen from the fact that, besides his
emphasis that disagreement on the secondary issues on religion would not disqualify
someone from his status as Muslim, al-Ghazl in fact extends the charge of unbeliever for
disagreement on issues other than the above three fundamental principles. For the existence
of anything informed by the Prophet and for the interpretation of the scriptural texts, for
instance, he offers five criteria of acceptable interpretation; those who give interpretation
beyond these criteria would qualify for the charge of unbelief. These five criteria are: (1)
ontological (dht); (2) sensory (hiss); (3) conceptual (khayl); (4) noetic (aql); or (5)

The MUI makes quite similar criteria for those who can be called Muslim. Al-Ghazl proposes three
criteria, while the MUI proposes ten. The more criteria applied, the stricter Islam would be or, using
Jacksons statement, a narrower criterion would make it easier to increase the number of doctrines branded
as heresy (Jackson 2002: 4; MUI 2009: 8).
9
Al-Ghazl considers philosophers to be unbelievers if they believe in one of the following three views:
(1) the eternity of the world, (2) Gods ignorance of the particulars of the world, or (3) that bodies are not
resurrected in the afterlife (Ahmad 2009: 160; cf. al-Ghazl 1993: 56).
10
Al-Ghazl considers what the Btiniyya do as new heresies (bidamustahdatha) created by the groups
apostates (al-zandiqa) (al-Ghazl 1964:
159). The fatwa from the
of heretics (al-mulhida) and masked
MUI and the Rbita seem to adopt al-Ghazls policy since they consider the Ahmadiyya apostates, not

heretics.

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analogous (shabah) (Jackson 2002: 94; al-Ghazl 1993: 28). Interpretation of any
existence or any text beyond these five limits should not be tolerated and those who do
that would be deemed unbelievers. This is why al-Ghazl considers the interpretation of
the Btiniyya unacceptable since, for him, their interpretation is too speculative. An

example of this is the interpretation of some of the Btiniyya of the calf of the

Samaritan (Q 20.85-7) in which they believe that it must be metaphorically interpreted

(tawl) because it is a figure of speech (al-Ghazl 1993: 55; Jackson 2002: 109).
Actually, as emphasized by Sherman Jackson (2002), there are two motives behind
the writing of Faysal al-tafriqa. The first is to stop the intolerance of the Muslim
Traditionalist and Rationalist Muslims, who easily brand those
extremists, from both
who disagree with them as unbelievers.11 The second is to stop the very broad criteria of
Muslim employed by philosophers and the zandiqa. 12 Al-Ghazl employs two
different methods in dealing with them. For the first group, he offers a minimalist
criterion for extremists who could be considered Muslims, so that he can include
Mutazila and Shia in the Muslim band. For al-Ghazl, any Muslim who disagrees
with the ijmashould not be called apostate. For the second group, he gives maximalist
criterion for the zandiqa, thus he excludes the Ismaili and some philosophers from the
pale of Islam. Ahmad (2009: 167) calls al-Ghazls first method an attempt to differentiate apostasy from heresy, while the second is to equate the concept of zandaqa with
apostasy. Regarding the legal status of zandaqa in Islamic law, al-Ghazl also applies
the same legal status of zandaqa as the apostates, but the former is even worse than the
latter. Al-Ghazl still applies the procedure of istitba (giving the opportunity for an
apostate to recant) for the apostate before being subjected to any punishment (Ahmad
2009: 158). If they repent then their status and rights will be fully reestablished as before
their apostasy. This procedure of istitba is not applied for zandaqa because they
conceal their infidelity with their outward appearance as Muslims.13
Reading the Ahmadiyya using al-Ghazls perspective as written in Faysal al-tafriqa,
it seems that they could not be categorized as either apostates or originalunbelievers.
They never leave Islam, which at a glance disqualifies them from being called apostates.
They certainly cannot be called original unbeliever since they have no other religion next
to Islam, nor do they publicly claim of profess any other religion than Islam. The category
close enough to describe the Ahmadiyya is masked-infidelity (zandiqa). However,
application of the category of zandiqa to the Ahmadiyyais quite problematic since they
do not embrace Islam merely as lip service as a way to avoid paying jizya (tax), as past
zandiqa did, while still preserving and practicing their original beliefs. The most
appropriate category for the Ahmadiyya from among al-Ghazls categories is Muslims
who deviate from what he considered the acceptable interpretation of Islam. In several
cases, the way the Ahmadiyya interpret the Quran is quite similar to the Btiniyya,

11
isrfuh f takfri baah baan (their excessiveness in charging and counter-charging of each other
as unbelief) (al-Ghazl 1993: 27).
12
In an Indonesian context, the first group could be represented by the Front Pembela Islam (FPIFront
for the Defense of Islam) and the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMICouncil of Indonesian Holy
Warriors), while the second group could be represented by the Jaringan Islam Liberal (JILLiberal
Islam Network).
13
In this context, al-Shfi disagrees with al-Ghazl. He equates the status of zandaqa with munfiqn.
The legal status of munfiqn is ruled based on what they say, while what is in their hearts is given to God.
The Prophet also does not punish munfiqn during his time until they clearly breach the law (Griffel 2001:
346347).

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namely using metaphorical interpretations. Examples of this are their interpretation of the
Night Journey (Isr wa Mirj) (Q. 17.2) and the miracles of Moses (Q. 2.60), which will
be discussed in the next part of this article. When interpreting the prophethood of
Muhammad, they also believe that the term khtam al-nabiyyn (Q. 33.40) should not
be interpreted as the last or final prophet, but the seal of the prophets or the best
prophet.14 This interpretation opens the possibility for the coming of another prophet, that
is Mirza Ghulam Ahmad.
Looking at the way they give hermeneutical interpretation (tawl) to the above verses,
it could be seen that they go beyond the five accepted levels of interpretation proposed by
al-Ghazl. Even the way some Sufis interpret Islamic teachings, for al-Ghazl, is not
acceptable, let alone the interpretation of the Ahmadiyya. For al-Ghazl, the harm
created by some Sufis to religion is greater than the harm brought by apostates since
they open doors to libertinism that can never be closed and, therefore, executing one
of these people is better than killing a hundred (open) Unbelievers (Jackson 2002: 115;
al-Ghazl 1993: 65). Al-Ghazls opposition to the Btiniyya and the philosophers is

clearly greater than his opposition to apostates and unbelievers since, for him, unbeliever
would not attract people to join them, while people like excessive Sufis, they destroy the
religious law through religious law itself (yahdamu al-shar min al-shar) (Jackson
2002: 115; al-Ghazl 1993: 65).15

Fatwas against the Ahmadiyya in Indonesia

There are numerous fatwas against the Ahmadiyya issued by various Muslim institutions and individual ulama, 16 but this article studies only six fatwas connected
directly with contemporary issues of the Ahmadiyya in Indonesia. These fatwas were
issued by the following institutions: the Muhammadiyah, the Rbita, the MUI, the

Council of the Islamic Fiqh Academy of the OIC, and the NU.
From the above five institutions, in term of chronology, the Muhammadiyah is the first
institution that issued a fatwa against the Ahmadiyya. This movement was established in
Yogyakarta in 1912 and is the second largest Islamic movement in Indonesia. It claims to
have 30 million members, mostly in urban areas. The fatwa on the Ahmadiyya from the
Majlis Tarjih (the Council of Law-Making) of the Muhammadiyah was issued during the
18th Muktamar (Congress) in Solo in 1929. This short fatwa is entitled Hukum orang
jang mengimankan pada Nabi sesudah Nabi Muhammad s.a.w. (the law regarding those
who have faith in the existence of a prophet after the Prophet Muhammad). It begins with
14

Discussion on the concept of khtam al-nabiyyn can be found Yohanan Friedmann (1989), particularly
the chapter on the finality of prophethood (pp. 4952).
15
Sometimes, the terminological category used by al-Ghazl to designate this group is unacceptable
heretics (mulhidn), or those who create new unacceptable innovations. This term is different from the
by Shi`a and Mu`tazila that, for al-Ghazl still acceptable, although they are located just
deviation made
inside the border of the outer limits of Islam. This term is also different from unsanctioned innovation
(bida) because bida would not qualify as belonging to the category of unbelievers. However, in several
places, al-Ghazl equates the term zandaqa with mulhidn.

16
Among them are fatwa from Hasanayn Muhammad
Makhlf in 1953 that can be found in his
compilation of fatwas, Fatw Shariyya wa buhth Islmiyya (1965), pp. 8696, the fatwa from the
Syaikh of al-Azhar, Gadul Haq Ali Gadul Haq, in 1983, and the fatwa from Maulana Ahmad Riza Khan
Barelwi of India (18561921) (Sanyal 2005).

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quotation from a verse of the Quran (al-Ahzb 33:40) and two prophetic traditions stating
that the prophet Muhammad is khtam al-nabiyyn (the seal of prophets) and consequently no prophet after him. After these quotations the fatwa declares that those who do not
accept this doctrine are kafir (unbeliever) (PP Muhammadijah 1964: 910).
The above fatwa does not explicitly mention the Ahmadiyya as the object of fatwa, but
this fatwa was obviously issued in response to this movement since it was decided during
the climax of the rupture between the Muhammadiyah and the Ahmadiyya. The missionary of the Ahmadiyya first made contact with the Indonesian people in 1920 when
Khwaja Kamal-ud-Din, one of the Lahore Ahmadiyya leaders and one of the most
successful missionaries of this group, came to Surabaya and stayed there until 1921.
However, the real missionary works of this movement did not begin until 1924, when two
Lahore missionaries from India, Mirza Wali Ahmad Baig and Maulana Ahmad, came to
Yogyakarta. The Muhammadiyah welcomed these missionaries with a warm reception
and treated the Ahmadiyya as older brothers. The cordial relationship between these two
movements even created a rumor that the Muhammadiyah and the Ahmadiyya were
going to merge into one (Beck 2005: 221222). The quarrel between them began when a
religious teacher from India, Abdul Ali Siddiq al-Qadiri, during his tour to Java in
October-November 1927, showed the distinctiveness or incompatibilities of Ahmadiyya
beliefs with Sunni orthodoxy (Zulkarnain 2005: 190; Beck 2005: 236). Since then, the
Muhammadiyah tried to disassociate itself from the Ahmadiyya, and to oppose the
activities of the Ahmadiyya, including the project of translating Muhammad Alis The
Holy Quran into Malay (Ichwan 2001). The climax of this rupture was the issuance of the
above fatwa.
After Indonesian Independence from the Dutch colonial government in 1945, the first
fatwa on the Ahmadiyya that had nationwide repercussions was issued not by an
Indonesian Islamic institution, but by the Rbita. This organization is an international

non-governmental Islamic organization. It was established in 1962 and has its base in
Mecca. During its annual conference in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, on Rabiul Awwal 1418,
1,394 H (April 1974), this organization issued a fatw and a resolution against the
Ahmadiyya. The fatwa begins with the elaboration on the controversial beliefs of the
Ahmadiyya, such as Ghulam Ahmads claim as a prophet and the promised Messiah,
revelations received by Ghulam Ahmad, and Qadian as Ahmadiyyas place of pilgrimage.
After that elaboration, this fatwa then refers to the decision of Pakistan that declares the
Ahmadiyya as a non-Muslim minority. Finally, the fatwa declares that the Ahmadiyya is
obviously outside the pale of Islam (khrija an al-Islm khurjan kmilan) and its
followers are infidels and apostates (kuffr murtaddn an al-Islm).
The resolution does not quote any verse from the Quran or prophetic traditions.
Instead, it begins with an accusation that the Ahmadiyya was established by the British
Raj in India with the purpose to deceive people from the true teachings of Islam and to
destroy this religion from the inside. These resolutions (qarrt) then declare that the
Ahmadis or the Qadiyanis, as stated in this resolution, are infidels (kuffr) and out of the
pale of Islam. This resolution then commands all Muslims to take the following actions:
Keep away from dealing with the Qadiyanis or the Ahmadis as they sometimes
call themselves; boycott them economically, socially and culturally, and refrain
from intermarriage with them or burying their dead in Muslim cemeteries, and
consider them as infidels. Islamic governments are asked to ban all the activities

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of the followers of the impostor Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, i.e., the Qadiyanis, and
to regard them as a non-Muslim minority who should not be allowed to assume
sensitive positions in the state. Publish Photostat copies of the Qadiyani distortions of the Holy Quran, take inventory of the Qadiyani translations of the
meaning of the Holy Quran, highlight the distortions and ban the circulation of
such translations.17
The context of the issuance of these fatwa and resolution seems to have a strong
connection with two factors: first, the movement in Pakistan that culminated with the
1974 Constitutional Amendment, in which the government, under Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto,
declares the Qadianis a separate community or non-Muslim minority, and second, the
rise of Saudi Arabia as a petro-dollar country and their intention the spread the Wahhabi
ideology around the Muslim world.18 After the issuance of this fatwa, the Rbita actively

disseminated it to Muslim countries, including Indonesia. In fact, one of the signatories

of the fatwa is Mohamad Rasjidi (19152001), former Minister of Religion of Indonesia
and a leader of the Muhammadiyah and the Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII,
Indonesian Council for Islamic Propagation). Mohammad Natsir (19081993), the fifth
Prime Minister of Indonesia and the founder and leader of the DDII, was also one of the
leaders of the Rbita at that time.19 This is why the campaign against the Ahmadiyya in
out mainly by activists of the DDII, which was founded and led by
Indonesia was carried
Mohammad Natsir. A number of books and articles attacking the Ahmadiyya were
published in this institution and its magazine, Serial Media Dakwah (Ropi 2010: 298). It
was amidst the influence of this propaganda that the MUI issued a fatwa against
Ahmadiyya in 1980.
The fatwa from the MUI on the Ahmadiyya entitles Ahmadiyah Qadiyan, which
means that it is directed specifically to the Qadiani faction of the Ahmadiyya, while
the Lahore faction is excluded from it. This fatwa was issued during the second
Musyawarah Nasional (National Congress) of this institution in Jakarta on 26 May1
June 1980 and consists of two points: first, the Ahmadiyya is a community outside
the pale of Islam; it is a deviant and misleading community (jamaah di luar Islam,
sesat dan menyesatkan). Second, in dealing with Ahmadiyya the MUI is expected to
always discuss with the government (Sekretariat MUI 2010: 4142). This fatwa does
not quote any reference, quotation from Quranic verses, or prophetic traditions. It
does mention that this fatwa was issued based on the study of nine books of the
Ahmadiyya, but it does not clarify the titles of the books used as the basis of the
issuance of this fatwa. The signatories of this fatwa are Hamka (Haji Abdul Malik
Karim Amrullah) as the chairman of the MUI and Kafrawi as the secretary.
In connection with the second point of the fatwa, however, the New Order government
of Indonesia did not give any support for executing the fatwa in concrete and
implementable policy. This is actually quite understandable since the government under
17

This fatwa is available at http://www.anti-ahmadiyya.org/en/modules.php?name=News&file=

article&sid=180. The Arabic version of this fatwa is available at http://alhafeez.org/rashid/rabita.jpg
(accessed 25 December 2011).
18
The context of the issuance of this fatwa still needs to be studied. Discussion on the 1974 Constitutional
Amendment can be found in Saeed (2007).
19
Mohammad Natsir assumed his role as the Secretary General of the Rbita in 1969. It is still not clear for
the present author how long he was in that office. However, what is clear is that he was an active member of
that organization until his death in 1993 (Mamur 1995: 35; von der Mehden 1993: 61)

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Suharto was not interested in interfering in religious issues. This regime places emphasis
on national development and stability. They were not bothered with religious issues as
long as national stability remained intact. To appeal for the governments involvement in
this issue, during the Rapat Kerja Nasional (National Meeting) on 47 March 1984, the
MUI requested the government to review the legal status of the Ahmadiyya in Indonesia
as stated in the Decree from the Minister of Justice number J.A/5/23/13 on 13 March
1953, and the announcement in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia number
26 on 31 March 1953. The reason for this appeal was because they consider the
Ahmadiyya: (1) create unrest and disharmony in society since its teachings contradict
with the teachings of Islam; (2) create divisions among Muslims, such as in rituals,
prayers, marriage, and so on; c) it also creates danger to public order and state security
(Sekretariat MUI 2010: 41). Besides the appeal to government, the MUI also gives
recommendation to three elements of Indonesian Muslims; the ulama, the followers of
the Ahmadiyya, and Muslim people in general. The MUI recommends that members of
the MUI at all levels (nation, province, and district), non-MUI ulama, and Muslim
preachers to explain to the Muslim community that the Qadiani Ahmadiyya is a deviant
group and outside Islam. To the followers of the Qadiani Ahmadiyya, the MUI asks them
to return to the true teachings of Islam. And to all other Muslims, the MUI recommends
them to be cautious and guard themselves in religious issues so that they are not
influenced by this deviant Ahmadiyya.20
The fourth influential fatwa on the Ahmadiyya in Indonesia is the fatwa from the
Majmaal-Fiqh al-Islm (Council of Islamic Fiqh Academy) of the Organization of
Islamic Cooperation (OIC). 21 This fatwa was issued during the Second Meeting in
Jeddah on 2228 December 1985 as a response to a fatwa request (istift) submitted by
the Islamic Legal Council, Cape Town, South Africa, concerning the religious status of
the Qadiani and the Lahore Ahmadiyya. After looking into the teachings of both factions
of the Ahmadiyya, particularly the claim of prophethood of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad and
the abolishment of jihd, the Council declares the Qadiani Ahmadis have committed
apostasy, they are murtaddn khrijn an al-Islm (apostates, exiting out of Islam)
(Islamic Fiqh Academy 2000: 67). Despite their belief that Ghulam Ahmad is only a
zilli (shadow) and burz (manifestation) of the Prophet Muhammad, the same charge
applies to the Lahore.22 The difference between this fatwa and the fatwa from the Rbita

is that this fatwa is indiscriminate in perceiving the two factions of the Ahmadiyya,

20

Seeing the reluctance of the secular government of Indonesia to ban the Ahmadiyya, according to Ismatu
Ropi, some ulama then sent a petition to the Saudi government asking them to pressurize the Indonesian
government into helping the MUI implement the fatwa. As a sequel to this petition, in 1981 the Indonesian
Ministry of Religion received a formal letter from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia requesting them to issue a
legal prohibition of the Ahmadiyya in Indonesia. On 20 September 1984, the Ministry of Religion finally
issued a circular to its offices to keep their eyes open to the activities of the Ahmadiyya, that this movement
could preach only their beliefs within their own community (Djamaluddin 2011: 137145; Ropi 2010: 300
301; Zaenal Abidin 2007: 183184).
21
Before 28 June 2011, the OIC stood for Organization of Islamic Conference. The OIC was established in
1969 as a response to the attack to Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerussalem. General information regarding this
organization can be found at http://www.oic-oci.org (Accessed 25 December 2011). Among academic
discussion on the role of the OIC in Islamic world can be found in Eickelman and Piscatori (1996),
particularly Chap. 6, Muslim politics: a changing political geography.
22
The Arabic version of this fatwa is available at http://www.fiqhacademy.org.sa/qrarat/2-4.htm (Accessed
25 December 2011).

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despite the fact that the Lahore Ahmadiyya have moved closer to ordinary Muslims and
forgetting their distinction from orthodox Islam.
Interestingly enough, the fatwa from the OIC was used as one of the considerations of
the issuance of the new fatwa of the MUI on the Ahmadiyya, which was issued during the
Musyawarah Nasional (National Congress) on 2629 July 2005. 23 This fatwa also
adopted the way in which the OIC generalized the charge of apostasy for both the
Qadiani and Lahore Ahmadiyya. This fatwa reflects the shift in treatment of the
Ahmadiyya in Indonesia after the fall of Suharto in 1998. Previously, the Ahmadiyya
community had a relatively peaceful life. Unlike in previous decades, however, opposition to this community from other groups has become more intense in recent years.
Followers of the Ahmadiyya have become victims of constant physical attacks since the
downfall of the Suharto regime in 1998a period known as the Era Reformasi. They
have been stigmatized and attacked by radical Muslims while the government has largely
overlooked and ignored these hostilities. The MUI fatwa in 2005 played a significant role
in the current opposition to the Ahmadiyya by providing ideological justification.
Th MUI fatwa in 2005 is entitled Aliran Ahmadiyah (Ahmadiyya stream) and
signed by Maruf Amin as the head of Fatw Commission and Hasanuddin as the
secretary. The core of the fatwa is not only a reaffirmation and restatement of the MUI
fatwa that was issued in 1980, but also a radicalization of the previous fatwa.24 First,
it cited a fatwa from a foreign country: the Organization of Islamic Cooperation
(OIC)s 1985 fatwa against the Ahmadiyya. Second, the MUI fatwa in 2005 did not
differentiate between the Qadiani Ahmadiyya and the Lahore Ahmadiyya (something
the OIC fatwa did not do either), whereas the MUI fatwa in 1980 addressed only the
Qadiani Ahmadiyya. Third, the fatwa placed the government in a hierarchically lower
position than the MUI by insisting that it enforce the fatwa. Fourth, the MUI fatwa
did not only declare the Ahmadiyya beyond the pale of Islam, but also insisted that
the government halt the spread of the Ahmadiyya movement, freeze its organization,
and seal off all of its buildings (as did the 1974 Rbita resolution).

The fatwa consists of four parts: reflection, reminder,

consideration, and
decision. In the reflection part, the fatwa states that (1) although the MUI have
issued a fatwa condemning the Ahmadiyya in 1980 and that this movement has been
forbidden,25 the Ahmadiyya still exists and spreads its teachings in Indonesia; (2) the
existence and the activities of the Ahmadiyya have created unrest or disharmony in
society; (3) some people in society have requested the MUI to reaffirm the previous
fatwa on the status of the Ahmadiyya because of the controversies and social actions
23

Actually, there was a debate in the forum on how Indonesian Muslims should respond to the OIC fatwa.
However, at the end, the leaders of the MUI preferred to follow that fatwa since Indonesia is a member of
the OIC (Karni and Alfian 2005).
24
The transformation of the MUI from being a servant of the state (khdim al-hukma) into a servant of
the umma (khdim al-umma) can be found in Moch. Ichwan (2005). As elaborated in this article, one of
the factors that contributed to the shift of MUIs religious stance was the involvement of conservative
Muslims, such as from the MMI, in its officials.
25
The meaning of forbidden (telah dilarang keberadaannya) here is based on the MUI fatwa and has no
legal basis since there is no decree from the Indonesian government that forbids the Ahmadiyya. A fatwa
from the MUI does not have the status of law. There are a number of prohibitions to the Ahmadiyya issued
by some offices of District Attorneys such as Kejari of Sidenreng South Sulawesi, Kerinci Jambi, and
Meulaboh in West Aceh, but these prohibitions are valid only for these districts (Susanti 2008; Crouch
2009).

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Cont Islam

related to this movement; (4) to answer the demand from society and to protect the
purity of Islam, the MUI concludes that it is needed to reissue the previous fatwa.
In the reminder part, the MUI mentions several verses from the Quran (Q 33.40;
6.153; 5.105) and prophetic traditions stating that Muhammad is the seal of the prophets
(khtam al-nabiyyn) and therefore there is no prophet after him.26 This reminder implies
that whoever believes in the existence of a prophet after Muhammad, he lies, certainly
not following the right path, and can no longer be considered Muslim. Consequently,
since the Ahmadiyya believe that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad is a prophet, then the MUI see
their deviation as intolerable and, therefore, consider them leaving Islam. In the consideration part, the MUI use the fatwa issued by the Majmaal-Fiqh al-Islm of the
OIC in 1985 that declares the Ahmadiyya commit apostasy and leave Islam, the fatwa of
the MUI in 1980, and the opinion during the meeting of the C Commissionfatwa
divisionin the 7th National Conference of the MUI in 2005 as references in issuing a
fatwa. There are three points of this fatwa: (1) the MUI reaffirms the fatwa of the MUI
issued during the Second National Conference in 1980, declaring that the Ahmadiyya is
outside Islam, sesat dan menyesatkan (misguided and misleading), and any Muslim who
follows the Ahmadiyya is murtad (apostate) or leaving Islam; (2) those who already
follow the Ahmadiyya are required to return immediately to the true teachings of Islam,
which is an Islam that is in line with the Quran and the Hadith; (3) the government must
prohibit the spread of the Ahmadiyya in Indonesia, freeze the organization, and seal off
all places of their activities.27
The last fatwa to become an object of analysis of this article is the fatwa on
Ahmadiyya from the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)the largest Muslim organization in
Indonesia. The fatwa used in this article is the one entitled Taushiyah: Sikap PBNU
tentang Ahmadiyah (Taushiyah: The stance of the Central Board of the NU on the
Ahmadiyya).28 This fatwa was issued during a Plenary Meeting of the Central Board of
the NU in Bogor on 911 September 2005 led by four chairmen of the NU: Maruf
Amin, Said Agil Siradj, Masdar F Masudi, and Rozy Munir. It consists of four points:
(1) Ahmadiyya is a deviant sect (aliran sesat) and exiting out of Islam (keluar dari
Islam) since they do not accept the Prophet Muhammad as the last prophet as obviously
stated in the Quran, al-Sunna, and the consensus (Ijm) of the ulama. However,
regarding the activities of the Ahmadiyya community, it is forbidden for people to take
the law into their own hands. The ban of the beliefs and activities of the Ahmadiyya is
fully given over to government discretion, and is obviously not the right of any people or
group. (2) In expressing their objection to the activities of the Ahmadiyya in their
neighborhood, it is recommended for any people to express it in peaceful and polite
ways. (3) To the Muslim community, it is expected to study Islam comprehensively in
order to avoid mistakes and errors in their religious interpretations. (4) The government
26

A discussion on this issue can be found in the works of Yohanan Friedmann (1989, 1998, 2011), where
he elaborates Islamic discourse on khatm al-nabiyyin from early Islam until contemporary time.
27
These three points of the fatwa reflect three steps of implementation of law in classical fiqh: declaration,
request for istitba, execution or punishment. However, in modern times this last step could be implemented mostly only in civil law, not penal law.
28
Taushiyah or tawsiya is usually translated as non-legal recommendation. Taushiyah is usually issued of
ift institution afterconsidering that issuing of such kind of fatwa is necessary, regardless of the existence
or non-existence of istift (request for fatwa) from umma. Discussion about various terms used in the fatwa
or fatwa-like decisions in Indonesia can be found in Moch. Nur Ichwan (2005).

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Cont Islam

is expected to have a firm and consistent policy in dealing with the existence of the
Ahmadiyya sect in Indonesia.29 As shall be elaborated in the next part, this fatwa reflects
the view of al-Shfi, the most influential school of law in the NU, in dealing with
religious identity.

From al-Ghazl to the MUI: declaring deviant believers apostates

Analyzing the Ahmadiyya through the lens of the three litmus tests put forward by alGhazl, it is clear that, from their outward public announcement, the Ahmadis do not
deviate or break-away from any of those litmus tests. They believe in the oneness of
God, the prophethood of Muhammad, and the existence of the Last Day. Their profession of Islam could not be categorized as merely lip service or, like zandiqa, they hide
their true beliefs behind their outward pronouncement. 30 Their difference from mainstream Muslims, particularly Sunni orthodoxy, and the reason why the ulama in the
above mentioned five institutions to rule the Ahmadis apostates is not based on their
public beliefs on the above principles of faith, but on their distinctive beliefs and
practices, particularly on the following four issues: (1) they believe in the prophethood
of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, the founder of the Ahmadiyya, and justifying this belief with
a new interpretation of the concept of khtam al-nabiyyn; (2) they employ metaphorical
interpretation of the Quran, particularly for the Lahore Ahmadiyya; (3) they allegedly
abrogate the duty of warfare jihd and change it with the jihad of the pen; and (4) their
prohibition for intermarriage with other Muslims and prohibition to pray behind nonAhmadi imm in congregational prayer.
From al-Ghazls perspective, particularly as he puts forward in his Faysal al-tafriqa,
the way the Ahmadiyya interpret the Quran and the concept of prophethood deviates from
the five levels of acceptable interpretation proposed by him, namely: dht, hiss, khayl,
(Q 33.40)
aql, and shabah. The concept of khatm al-nubuwwa or khtam al-nabiyyn
commonly interpreted by Muslim commentators (mufassirn) as the last prophet or the
seal of prophets is interpreted differently in the Ahmadiyya, namely, the best prophet,
but not necessarily the last one.31 The Ahmadis believe that the legislative (tashr) prophet
will not appear after the Prophet Muhammad, but the non-legislative prophet (ghayr
tashr) and shadowy (zill) or manifestational (burz) prophet will come after

Muhammad and that Ghulam

Ahmad is that prophet (Mahmud Ahmad 1980: 437;
Dard 2008: 82943; Friedmann 1989: 132).
The Ahmadis also hold different interpretations to several verses of the Quran,
such as on the miracle of Moses and the Night Journey (Isr wa Mirj). For the
Lahore Ahmadiyya, the miracle given by God to Moses as mentioned in the Quran
29

This fatwa is available in Karni et al. (2010: 16) and at http://nu.or.id/page/id/dinamic_detil/6/12315/

Taushiyah/Sikap_PBNU_tentang_Ahmadiyah.html (accessed 26 December 2011)
30
Bashir-ud-Din Mahmud Ahmad, a son of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad and the second caliph of the
Ahmadiyya, states, So, while we of the Ahmadiyya Jamaat declare ourselves Muslims, nobody has the
right to say that our Islam is a pretence; that at heart we deny Islam or deny the Holy Prophet (on whom be
peace); that we subscribe to a new Kalima or turn to a new Qibla in our prayers (Mahmud Ahmad 1980:
56).
31
The concept of the seal of the prophets is also interpreted that there is not true claim of prophethood
without confirmation of Muhammad (Mahmud Ahmad 1980: 437).

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(2.60) must be interpreted metaphorically. Since they do not believe in miracles, the
supernatural incident that occurred to Moses and his people must be hermeneutically
interpreted. Muhammad Ali translates irib biaska-l-hajara as March on the rock

with thy staff, while in other translation that phrase

istranslated as strike the rock
with thy staff (Ali 2002: 30; Yusuf Ali 2008: 31). In the story of the Night Journey,
as mentioned in the Quran (17.2), the Ahmadiyya has different understanding of the
concept al-masjid al-aqs (the Distant Mosque). Traditionally, it is understood as the
for the Ahmadiyya this could be interpreted as the Masjid
mosque in Jerusalem, but
al-Aqs in Qadian, [It] may signify the Prophet Solomons Temple at Jerusalem, the

Holy Prophets Mosque at Medina or the Promised Messiahs Mosque at Qadian

(Ghulm Fard 2002, 1404; Sher Al 2004: 9). 32 The most important difference
between mainstream Muslims and Ahmadiyya is their interpretation of the passage of
the Quran on the concept of khtam al-nabiyyn (Q. 33.40). The way the Ahmadiyya
interpret the Quran is quite similar to the Btiniyya in al-Ghazls time, in which for

him it was going too far from the acceptable interpretations.

However, it is not merely their allegedly deviant interpretation that deems them
apostates by the ulama in the above institutions, but because they use that distinctive
interpretation to justify their system of beliefs, which are clearly irreconcilable with
orthodox Sunni Islam. In al-Ghazl criteria, the Ahmadiyya interpretation could not
be categorized as intellectual dissent. It is theological and political dissent.33 It is in
accordance with this logic that the two above fatwas, i.e., the MUI fatwa in 2005 and
the OIC fatwa in 1985, also charge the Lahore Ahmadiyya with the crime of apostasy.
Discerning the charge ascribed to the Ahmadiyya, it is quite interesting to see the term
used by the five fatwas in charging this group of people. The fatwas from the
Muhammadiyah, the Rbita, and the MUI (1980) used the term kfir or outside the
fatwas, i.e., the OIC and the NU, declare that the Ahmadis
pale of Islam. The two other
have committed apostasy (irtidd). The fatwa from the MUI in 2005 uses both of the
two terms; kfir for those who become Ahmadi by birth and murtadd for any Muslim
who converts to the Ahmadiyya. For some ulama, these two terms have different legal
consequences. The charge of apostasy would make someone liable for the capital
punishment. The ascription of the status of unbelievers have different consequences
between ahl al-kitb and non-ahl al-kitbthe former were protected but must pay tax,
while the latter became a subject of war.
Applying this traditional category to the context of this discussion, the term apostate
indicates that the Ahmadis are not original unbelievers. However, if the term apostasy is
used to imply that the Ahmadis once in their lives they have been proven to accept Islam
as their religion and then publicly renounce it, then this is not quite the case of the
Ahmadis. Most of the Ahmadis are born as Ahmadi-Muslims and they never publicly
announce their breaking-away from Islam. That is why the term apostasy is a quite
ambiguous term to apply to the Ahmadiyya. The more sensible way to read the term
apostasy in this context is by understanding apostasy not to indicate the public
announcement of the turning away from Islam (al-ruj an din al-Islm), but as a term
32

There is a different numbering system between the Ahmadiyya version of the Quran and the Sunni
version. The Ahmadiyya counts bismillh in the beginning of sra as the first verse. In the Sunni Quran,
the quoted verse is Q. 17.1.
33
This is also the view of Muhammad Iqbal (1974).

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Cont Islam

used by a certain group of Muslims to charge other groups because they deviate from the
acceptable standard beliefs of the orthodox. This is quite similar to charging heterodoxy or
heresy with apostasy.
From Sunni orthodoxy, there are a number of beliefs or deeds that could make
someone liable to the charge of apostasy without necessarily this person making a
declaration of apostasy outwardly, although they are always disputed. As stated by alGhazl, not believing in the resurrection of the body and the punishment of the
Hereafter would entail philosophers with the charge of apostasy, even though they never
declare leaving Islam (al-Ghazl 1993: 56). Believing in the createdness of the Quran
or believing that the Quran is a cultural product could also be ascribed with apostasy as
in the case of Nashr Hamid Abu Zayd (Hirschkind 1995; Saeed 2011: 356). 34 The
apostasy of the Ahmadiyya in the views of ulama in the above five ift institutions
could be included in this category of deviating from the standard Sunni orthodoxy,
instead of the outright renouncement from Islam. This way of charging someone with
the status of apostasy is obviously different from that of al-Shfi who gives a
minimalist criteria of Muslim, namely pronouncing the declaration of faith (shahda),
and would not charge of apostasy for anyone who says it (Ahmad 2009: 159160;
Griffel 2001: 345).35 For al-Shfi`, the law of apostasy cannot be applied to the case of
heterodoxy. Furthermore, the basis of the legal judgment for the belief of some people in
this world, in his view, should rely on what they state or profess publicly, not what is in
their hearts (Griffel 2001: 346347).
It seems the above five ift institutions analyzed in this study do not differentiate
clearly between kufr and ridda or they just equate the two terms. This is similar to alShfi`, who does not distinguish between murtadd and kfir (Griffel 2001: 348). Only the
fatwa of the MUI in 2005 differentiates these two terms clearly. This fatwa declares that,
in general, the Ahmadiyya is outside the pale of Islam and any Muslim who converts to
this belief system is murtad (keluar dari Islam), murtadd (exiting out of Islam).
One of the important concepts in the discussion of apostasy is istitba. From the above
six fatwas, three fatwas, namely the MUI fatwas and the fatwa from the Rbita, explicitly
in other
mention the procedure of istitba. The absence of explicit statement on istitba
fatwas, however, does not imply that ulama in these three institutions do not accept this
procedure. It seems the reason for this absence is simply because of the shortness of the
fatwas and also because the objective of the issuance of fatwas is only to give answer
regarding the religious status of the Ahmadiyya and not answering the question about the
punishment of this crime. This is different from the MUI fatwas that have another objective
besides informing the religious status of the Ahmadis. The MUI fatwas intend to apply
punishment to the apostasy of the Ahmadiyya, although this is limited to civil and not
criminal law. It is related to this objective that they explicitly mention the procedure of
Quoting Majma al-anhur written by the Hanafi scholar Abd al-Rahman ibn Muhammad, often called

Shaikh-Zdeh, Rudolph Peters and Gert J.J. De Vries (19761977) mention

a list of sayings or acts that
could bring someone to the charge of apostasy, including ridiculing scholars and celebrating Nawrz. If
someone follows this, everything could make someone apostate. Anybody can make their own distinctive
criteria of Muslim and non-Muslim. Abdullah Saeed mentions that there are a large number of apostasy
list. Even a rejection to a letter of the Quran could qualify someone with apostasy (Saeed 2011: 33).
35
Both Ahmad and Griffel quote al-Shfis al-Umm, but they use different editions. Ahmad uses the one
edited by Muhammad Zuhri al-Najjar (Cairo: Maktabat al-Kulliyyat al-Azhariyya 1961), 6: 1567. Griffel
uses the edition published by al-Matbaa al-Kubra al-Amiriyya, 190308. I have not had a chance to
consult with these books.
34

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Cont Islam

istitba. Actually, there is something quite contradictory in the MUI fatwa in 2005. On the
one hand, it considered that some of the Ahmadis are original non-Muslims. However, on
the other hand, it gave the procedure of istitba indiscriminately to all of them, not only for
those who converted from Sunni Islam to the Ahmadiyya. Actually, this contradiction
would disappear if the terms apostasy and unbeliever in the MUI fatwas are understood as
the same thing and used interchangeably. But it seems the MUI differentiates between
them.
Still related to the procedure of istitba, it is very likely that there is another reason why
the fatwas from the Muhammadiyah, the MUI in 1980, the OIC, and the NU describe only
the religious status of the Ahmadiyya without talking any punishment. This is related to
the way these institutions perceive themselves. The Muhammadiyah and the NU seem to
perceive themselves as simply the holder of religious authority, not political authority, and
give the authority to execute the decision regarding the Ahmadiyya to the government or
judicial discretion. This can be seen, for instance, for the fatwa issued by the NU, in which
the ulama in this organization completely leave the authority to deal with the apostasy of
the Ahmadiyya to government discretion and forbid people to appoint themselves as the
persecutors of deviant believers. This is different from the MUI fatwa in 2005 in which the
ulama in this institution seem to feel that they have authority to punish the Ahmadiyya or
at least could insist that the government execute their decisions, particularly in civil law.
Perhaps it is this point that motivates radical Muslims such as the Front Pembela Islam
(FPIFront for the Defense of Islam) to appoint themselves as the executors of the fatwa
since the government does not respond quickly to the recommendations of the MUI.
Traditionally, the punishment of apostasy is upheld or emphasized because apostates
have created social and political disorder in society. And in the case of group apostasy, as
allegedly committed by the Ahmadiyya, it was often considered as bughh (rebel) against
the Islamic society or state.36 However, the studied six fatwas do not emphasize this issue.
Instead, all of them indicate that the reason why they charge the Ahmadiyya with apostasy
is their belief in the prophethood of Ghulam Ahmad. Actually, the fatwa from the MUI in
1980 mentions that the Ahmadiyya has created unrest and disharmony in society, divisions
among Muslims, and a danger to public order and state security. However, these are not the
reasons why they issued a fatwa against the Ahmadiyya. These reasons were used to
appeal to the government to revoke its decree that endorses the Ahmadiyya as a legal
organization in Indonesia. The fatwa from the MUI in 2005 refers to the previous fatwa
from the same institution, and also mentions that the Ahmadiyya has created unrest in
society, but this is only their minor or secondary reason and only mentioned in passing. The
main reason for charging apostasy to the Ahmadiyya in this fatwa and all other five fatwas
is the heretical beliefs of the Ahmadiyya. It is from here this article argues that the issuance
of fatwas against the Ahmadiyya is intended mostly to sustain Sunni orthodoxy, i.e., that
the Prophet Muhammad is the last prophet and no prophet after him.

Conclusion
Although there is no indication that the fatwas from the above five institutions were
influenced by the works of al-Ghazl, there are some similarities between them in
36

A discussion on collective apostasy can be read in Ahmad (2009: 151153).

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Cont Islam

their treatment of dissident groups. First, the fatwas ascribe the status of apostasy for
the crime of heresy or heterodoxy. This charge is not based on their rejection of Islam
after accepting it, but because they hold certain beliefs irreconcilable to the accepted
doctrines in the Sunni orthodoxy on the concept of khtam al-nabiyyn. Second, the
charge of apostasy has been ascribed to the Ahmadiyya by three fatwas from those
five institutions in order for them to be able to punish the Ahmadis since the charge of
unbelievers (kuffr) or original unbelievers does not have any legal consequence in
modern time. The charge of unbeliever would put the Ahmadiyya outside Islam. And
since the old concept of dr al-Islm and dr al-harb is no longer applicable, the
charge of unbeliever certainly has no effect. The terms kufr and murtadd seem to be
used interchangeably in some fatwas. Fourth, like during al-Ghazls time, the
charge of apostasy is used by ulama to protect Islam from any deviation or to sustain
orthodoxy. The difference between these two periods is the subject only of fatwas. AlGhazl dealt with the growth of the Btiniyya, while the contemporary ulama have to

face the growth of the Ahmadiyya.

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