1

Why was the Legion of the United States so successful in defeating the
Ohio Valley and Great Lakes Indians?
In 1794 the Legion of the United States, led by Major General Wayne,
launched an offensive campaign against a confederation of the Ohio
Valley and Great Lakes Indian tribes which resulted in the Legions victory
at the Battle of Fallen Timbers on 20th August.1 The battle itself was
considered a skirmish at the time and casualties on both sides were light
the military action of the Legion that day alone did not prevent the Indian
tribes from continuing resistance to the US.2 However, after the battle the
morale of the confederation appeared to have been crushed, as there was
no further Indian military action against the Legion and over the next year
Wayne convinced Indian representatives to sign the Treaty of Greeneville
with relative ease.3 This essay will explore why the Legion was able to
defeat the Indians and why the Indian confederation suffered such a
drastic defeat, looking at military as well as other, less overt factors that
conspired to wholly defeat the Indians. Firstly the tactical and strategic
strengths of the Legion will be studied to see how the American military
had developed to combat the Indian method of warfare, followed by an
examination of the tactical disadvantages that hindered the Indian tribes
in 1794. Finally the essay will consider long-term issues that hampered
the Indians against the Legion and worsened their defeat, forcing the
tribes to make peace in the Treaty of Greeneville.

1 W. Sword, President Washingtons Indian War: The struggle for the Old
Northwest, 1790-1795 (University of Oklahoma Press, 1985), p. 306
2 B. Blair, The Battle of Fallen Timbers and the Treaty of Fort Greenville: Why Did
Anthony Wayne Win Both and Could He Have Lost?, Masters Thesis, University of Toledo
(2005), p. 67Sword, President Washingtons Indian War, p. 306
3D. Swader, A Common Dish: The Ohio Indian Confederacy and the Struggle for the
Upper Ohio Valley, 1783-1795 , Masters Dissertation, Youngstown State University
(1999), p. 99Sword, President Washingtons Indian War, p. 330

The Legion of the United States that Wayne led from 1792 was intended to
be fully capable of overcoming Indian tactics and of far-exceeding the
dismal achievements of St. Clair before it.4 In this it undoubtedly
succeeded, due to the training measures implemented by Wayne as well
as to tactics and stratagems designed to counter Indian warfare.
Wayne wanted to be able to rely on his troops in battle; St. Clairs reliance
on large numbers of militiamen contributed to his defeat, so Wayne relied
instead on a core force of trained regulars.5 The training regime of the
Legion was thus very strict: discipline was harsh to eliminate
undesirables, men were drilled vigorously in offensive and defensive
manoeuvres within realistic mock battles, and moving in open formation
was practised alongside improving skill with the musket.6 Its training
meant that the Legion fought as a cohesive force against the Indians at
the Battle of Fallen Timbers and ably performed a combined-arms
offensive with bayonets to drive their enemy out of cover and into
retreat.7 The disciplined bayonet offensive was recognised as an effective
4 R. Horsman, The British Indian Department and the Resistance to General Anthony
Wayne, 1793-1795, The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, volume 49, issue 02
(Organisation of American Historians, 1962), pp. 269-290, p. 269A. Birtle, The Origins of
the Legion of the United States, The Journal of Military History, volume 67, issue 04
(Society for Military History, 2003), pp. 1249-1262, p. 1249
5 J. Currie, The First Congressional Investigation: St. Clairs Military Disaster of 1791
(1990), p. 101Sword, President Washingtons Indian War, p. 232
6 Ibid., pp. 232-234Birtle, The Origins of the Legion of the United States, The Journal of
Military History, p. 1258

7 J. Mahon, Anglo-American Methods of Indian Warfare, 1676-1794, The

Mississippi Valley Historical Review, volume 45, issue 02 (Organisation of

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anti-Indian tactic, as it took the fight to an army that was less cohesive
and preferred to avoid casualties forcing the Indians to retreat or suffer
unacceptable losses.8 St. Clairs army did not attempt such a manoeuvre
to drive away its Indian enemy and probably lacked the cohesiveness of
Waynes regulars to succeed using the bayonet instead St. Clair and his
men stood their ground and were whittled away by the surrounding
Indians who used cover and picked off artillery crew with impunity.9

Wayne also took measures to avoid Indian ambushes and to ensure that
the Legion made it to a direct battle unscathed. He refused to divide his
army to pursue Indian war parties Harmars men had suffered terribly
when they chased bands of Indians only to be ambushed by a much
greater force.10 The Legion marched with screens of light infantry and
cavalry to prevent the regular body of troops from surprise attacks, and
fortified their camps at night to protect against Indian raids.11 Again, great
discipline was required to keep this formation throughout the march and
to advance quickly enough so that time could be spent fortifying the camp
at night without slowing the Legions progress.12 Waynes use of
intelligence, gathered by Legionary scouts and by allied Chickasaw and
Choctaw Indians, also made it hard for the Indian confederacy to ambush
him: these factors combined to thwart the preferred Indian tactic the
ambush and forced the Indians to fight a pitched battle.13
American Historians, 1958), pp. 254-275, pp. 269-271, 274
8 Ibid., p. 256-257
9Currie, The First Congressional Investigation: St. Clairs Military Disaster
of 1791, p. 97
10 Sword, President Washingtons Indian War, pp. 112-113, 282
11 Blair, The Battle of Fallen Timbers and the Treaty of Fort Greenville:
Why Did Anthony Wayne Win Both and Could He Have Lost?, pp. 27-28
12 Ibid., pp. 27-28

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Waynes grand strategy for his campaign certainly helped the Legion to
triumph over the Indian tribes at least as much as his tactics and training
regime did. The Legion set out in August 1794 with a clear objective in
sight: the collection of Indian villages and farms along the Auglaize and
Maumee rivers, the Grand Glaize.14 By capturing these settlements in the
summer along with their crops the Legion would threaten the Indian
supply base and force the confederation to fight or to starve.15 This
strategy combined with the anti-ambush methods simultaneously
employed by the Legion to force the Indians into a pitched battle in which
they were at an immediate disadvantage.16 From these measures it is
obvious that Wayne and the Legion understood the Indian way of warfare
and fought specifically to negate its strengths and exploit its weaknesses.

The combined Indian armies at the Battle of Fallen Timbers suffered from
a number of disadvantages. As previously discussed, the Indian way of
warfare was not suited to fighting European-style battles.17 The key
element of Indian warfare was the ambush; if surprise wasnt possible
then the tribes relied on surrounding the enemy, fighting in a dispersed
formation with ample cover, and on retreating before overwhelming force
only to advance when the pressure relaxed.18 At the Battle of Fallen
Timbers the Indian force spread itself thinly to prevent Waynes Kentucky
mounted volunteers from flanking them and to attempt to flank the
13 Ibid., pp. 30-31
14 Sword, President Washingtons Indian War, p. 279
15 Ibid., p. 279
16Mahon, Anglo-American Methods of Indian Warfare, 1676-1794, p. 264
17 Blair, The Battle of Fallen Timbers and the Treaty of Fort Greenville:
Why Did Anthony Wayne Win Both and Could He Have Lost?, p. 72
18 Mahon, Anglo-American Methods of Indian Warfare, 1676-1794, p. 260

5
Legion, but this dispersal weakened the Indian lines offensive power
greatly.19 The trees for which the battle was named afforded the Indians
plenty of cover but the offensive manoeuvre by the Legions infantry and
the mounted volunteers drove the Indians out from their cover; the
potential loss of life if the tribes had remained in position was too great
and the Indian warriors thus retreated from the considerable pressure
directed against them.20
Not only were the Indians fighting in a direct battle which didnt suit them
they were also considerably outnumbered. The training and tactics of the
Legion were certainly important but they also had a distinct numerical
advantage over their Indian opponents; Wayne commanded around 2,000
regulars and 1,500 Kentucky cavalry against 1,400 Indians.21 The Indian
forces were already outnumbered a long-term cause of this will be
discussed later when a number of them split off from the main body to
end their three-day fast which had begun on the 18th when conflict was
expected to begin, thus reducing the Indian numbers by roughly 500.22
Their significant disadvantage in terms of numbers present for the battle
meant that the Indians had to spread themselves too thinly and that the
Legion could afford to keep troops in reserve for flanking or in case of
retreat.23
The factors discussed thus far explain why the Legion was able to triumph
over the combined Indian tribes in the Battle of Fallen Timbers, but it is
important to also consider why the Indian defeat was so damaging.

19 Blair, The Battle of Fallen Timbers and the Treaty of Fort Greenville:
Why Did Anthony Wayne Win Both and Could He Have Lost?, p. 51
20 Ibid., pp. 51-53
21 Ibid., pp. 29, 46
22 Ibid., p. 50
23Ibid., p. 46

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Firstly, the Indian tribes lacked a long-term strategy. They had no grand
strategy or plan to defeat the Legion or any of its predecessors; the Indian
confederacy instead fought battles on an individual basis, attempting to
defeat the US army one battle at a time. 24 Had the Indians capitalised on
the defeats of Harmar and St. Clair with counteroffensives they may have
forced the Americans to sign a peace treaty favourable to the tribes, and
had they focused on severing Waynes vulnerable supply lines the Legion
may have been forced to retreat.25 Once the US army had learnt how to
defeat the Indians in battle, defeat was almost inevitable.
The lack of strategic goals may have been linked to the nature of the
Indian confederacy. The tribes only came together when their lands were
threatened by the greater American enemy and remained rivals to each
other, making it hard to keep an Indian army together when there was no
immediate threat of battle and thus difficult to organise a coordinated
offensive after the threat had passed.26 This disunity can be seen in June
1794; the Lakes Indian tribes insisted on attacking Fort Recovery rather
than striking at the Legions supply lines and then largely left the
confederacy, accusing their rivals of having fired upon them during the
attack.27 The Indians had amassed 1800 warriors prior to the Fort
Recovery disaster but could only wield 1400 against Wayne due to the
fractured nature of the confederacy. The battle against the Legion and the
destruction of their settlements and supplies crippled the confederacys
morale and shattered it entirely, reducing it once more to individual tribes
looking after their own interests.

24 Blair, The Battle of Fallen Timbers and the Treaty of Fort Greenville:
Why Did Anthony Wayne Win Both and Could He Have Lost?, p. 37
25 Ibid., pp. 34, 37
26 Ibid., pp. 43-44
27 Swader, A Common Dish: The Ohio Indian Confederacy and the
Struggle for the Upper Ohio Valley, 1783-1795, pp. 91, 93-94

Finally, the Indian confederacy based much of its activity on the

encouragement of the British, who had convinced them that they would
risk war with America to aid them in their struggle.28 The British however
had no intention of getting directly involved with another American war,
as the Indians realised when British Fort Miamis closed its gates to the
retreating Indians after Fallen Timbers as a result the Indians lost hope of
ever defeating the United States and became willing to negotiate peace
with General Wayne.29

The Legion of the United States triumphed over the Indian confederacy
militarily because its training, tactics and strategy were all designed to
combat the Indian way of warfare. The Indians were defeated so
comprehensively because they lacked an overarching strategy to deal
with the American government; because their sorely-needed British ally
showed themselves to be untrustworthy; and because the confederacy
was terribly demoralised following the destruction of their homes and
crops and so became divided, leading to its disintegration and
negotiations with the US, with individual tribes petitioning for peace deals
that would deliberately disadvantage their rivals and give themselves the
greatest benefit.30

Essay length:
-

2,100 words including footnotes

1,641 words without including footnotes

28 Horsman, The British Indian Department and the Resistance to General Anthony
Wayne, 1793-1795, pp. 272-273

29 Swader, A Common Dish: The Ohio Indian Confederacy and the

Struggle for the Upper Ohio Valley, 1783-1795, p. 98
30 Ibid., pp. 99, 102

Bibliography
-

Birtle, A., The Origins of the Legion of the United States, The
Journal of Military History, volume 67, issue 04 (Society for Military

History, 2003), pp. 1249-1262

Blair, B. D., The Battle of Fallen Timbers and the Treaty of Fort
Greenville: Why Did Anthony Wayne Win Both and Could He Have

Lost?, Masters thesis, (University of Toledo, 2005)

Currie, J., The First Congressional Investigation: St. Clairs Military
Disaster of 1791, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?

AD=ADA517709&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf> (1990),
retrieved November 2010
Horsman, R., The British Indian Department and the Resistance to
General Anthony Wayne, 1793-1795, The Mississippi Valley
Historical Review, volume 49, issue 02 (Organisation of American

Historians, 1962), pp. 269-290

Mahon, J., Anglo-American Methods of Indian Warfare, 1676-1794,
The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, volume 45, issue 02

(Organisation of American Historians, 1958), pp. 254-275

Swader, D., A Common Dish: The Ohio Indian Confederacy and the
Struggle for the Upper Ohio Valley, 1783-1795, Masters

Dissertation, (Youngstown State University, 1999)

Sword, W., President Washingtons Indian War: The struggle for the
Old Northwest, 1790-1795 (University of Oklahoma Press, 1985)