VICENTE B. CHUIDIAN, petitioner, vs.

SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division)

and the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The instant petition arises from transactions that were entered into by the government in the
penultimate days of the Marcos administration. Petitioner Vicente B. Chuidian was alleged to be
a dummy or nominee of Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos in several companies said to have been
illegally acquired by the Marcos spouses. As a favored business associate of the Marcoses,
Chuidian allegedly used false pretenses to induce the officers of the Philippine Export and
Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation (PHILGUARANTEE), the Board of Investments (BOI)
and the Central Bank, to facilitate the procurement and issuance of a loan guarantee in favor of
the Asian Reliability Company, Incorporated (ARCI) sometime in September 1980. ARCI, 98%
of which was allegedly owned by Chuidian, was granted a loan guarantee of Twenty-Five
Million U.S. Dollars (US$25,000,000.00).
While ARCI represented to Philguarantee that the loan proceeds would be used to establish
five inter-related projects in the Philippines, Chuidian reneged on the approved business plan and
instead invested the proceeds of the loan in corporations operating in the United States, more
particularly Dynetics, Incorporated and Interlek, Incorporated. Although ARCI had received the
proceeds of the loan guaranteed by Philguarantee, the former defaulted in the payments thereof,
compelling Philguarantee to undertake payments for the same. Consequently, in June 1985,
Philguarantee sued Chuidian before the Santa Clara County Superior Court,[1] charging that in
violation of the terms of the loan, Chuidian not only defaulted in payment, but also misused the
funds by investing them in Silicon Valley corporations and using them for his personal benefit.
For his part, Chuidian claimed that he himself was a victim of the systematic plunder
perpetrated by the Marcoses as he was the true owner of these companies, and that he had in fact
instituted an action before the Federal Courts of the United States to recover the companies
which the Marcoses had illegally wrested from him.[2]
On November 27, 1985, or three (3) months before the successful peoples revolt that
toppled the Marcos dictatorship, Philguarantee entered into a compromise agreement with
Chuidian whereby petitioner Chuidian shall assign and surrender title to all his companies in
favor of the Philippine government. In return, Philguarantee shall absolve Chuidian from all
civil and criminal liability, and in so doing, desist from pursuing any suit against Chuidian
concerning the payments Philguarantee had made on Chuidians defaulted loans.

It was further stipulated that instead of Chuidian reimbursing the payments made by
Philguarantee arising from Chuidians default, the Philippine government shall pay Chuidian the
amount of Five Million Three Hundred Thousand Dollars (US$5,300,000.00). Initial payment of
Five Hundred Thousand Dollars (US$500,000.00) was actually received by Chuidian, as well as
succeeding payment of Two Hundred Thousand Dollars (US$200,000.00). The remaining
balance of Four Million Six Hundred Thousand Dollars (US$4,600,000.00) was to be paid
through an irrevocable Letter of Credit (L/C) from which Chuidian would draw One Hundred
Thousand Dollars (US$100,000.00) monthly.[3] Accordingly, on December 12, 1985, L/C No.
SSD-005-85 was issued for the said amount by the Philippine National Bank
(PNB). Subsequently, Chuidian was able to make two (2) monthly drawings from said L/C at the
Los Angeles branch of the PNB.[4]
With the advent of the Aquino administration, the newly-established Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) exerted earnest efforts to search and recover money,
gold, properties, stocks and other assets suspected as having been illegally acquired by the
Marcoses, their relatives and cronies.
Petitioner Chuidian was among those whose assets were sequestered by the PCGG. On May
30, 1986, the PCGG issued a Sequestration Order [5] directing the PNB to place under its custody,
for and in behalf of the PCGG, the irrevocable L/C (No. SSD-005-85). Although Chuidian was
then residing in the United States, his name was placed in the Department of Foreign Affairs
Hold Order list.[6]
In the meantime, Philguarantee filed a motion before the Superior Court of Santa Clara
County of California in Civil Case Nos. 575867 and 577697 seeking to vacate the stipulated
judgment containing the settlement between Philguarantee and Chuidian on the grounds that: (a)
Philguarantee was compelled by the Marcos administration to agree to the terms of the
settlement which was highly unfavorable to Philguarantee and grossly disadvantageous to the
government; (b) Chuidian blackmailed Marcos into pursuing and concluding the settlement
agreement by threatening to expose the fact that the Marcoses made investments in Chuidians
American enterprises; and (c) the Aquino administration had ordered Philguarantee not to make
further payments on the L/C to Chuidian. After considering the factual matters before it, the said
court concluded that Philguarantee had not carried its burden of showing that the settlement
between the parties should be set aside.[7] On appeal, the Sixth Appellate District of the Court of
Appeal of the State of California affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court of Sta. Clara
County denying Philguarantees motion to vacate the stipulated judgment based on the settlement
agreement.[8]
After payment on the L/C was frozen by the PCGG, Chuidian filed before the United States
District Court, Central District of California, an action against PNB seeking, among others, to
compel PNB to pay the proceeds of the L/C. PNB countered that it cannot be held liable for a

breach of contract under principles of illegality, international comity and act of state, and thus it
is excused from payment of the L/C. Philguarantee intervened in said action, raising the same
issues and arguments it had earlier raised in the action before the Santa Clara Superior Court,
alleging that PNB was excused from making payments on the L/C since the settlement was void
due to illegality, duress and fraud.[9]
The Federal Court rendered judgment ruling: (1) in favor of PNB excusing the said bank
from making payment on the L/C; and (2) in Chuidians favor by denying intervenor
Philguarantees action to set aside the settlement agreement.[10]
Meanwhile, on February 27, 1987, a Deed of Transfer[11] was executed between then
Secretary of Finance Jaime V. Ongpin and then PNB President Edgardo B. Espiritu, to facilitate
the rehabilitation of PNB, among others, as part of the governments economic recovery
program. The said Deed of Transfer provided for the transfer to the government of certain assets
of PNB in exchange for which the government would assume certain liabilities of PNB.
[12]
Among those liabilities which the government assumed were unused commercial L/Cs and
Deferred L/Cs, including SSD-005-85 listed under Dynetics, Incorporated in favor of Chuidian
in the amount of Four Million Four Hundred Thousand Dollars (US$4,400,000.00).[13]
On July 30, 1987, the government filed before the Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0027
against the Marcos spouses, several government officials who served under the Marcos
administration, and a number of individuals known to be cronies of the Marcoses, including
Chuidian. The complaint sought the reconveyance, reversion, accounting and restitution of all
forms of wealth allegedly procured illegally and stashed away by the defendants.
In particular, the complaint charged that Chuidian, by himself and/or in conspiracy with the
Marcos spouses, engaged in devices, schemes and stratagems by: (1) forming corporations for
the purpose of hiding and avoiding discovery of illegally obtained assets; (2) pillaging the coffers
of government financial institutions such as the Philguarantee; and (3) executing the court
settlement between Philguarantee and Chuidian which was grossly disadvantageous to the
government and the Filipino people.
In fine, the PCGG averred that the above-stated acts of Chuidian committed in unlawful
concert with the other defendants constituted gross abuse of official position of authority,
flagrant breach of public trust and fiduciary obligations, brazen abuse of right and power, unjust
enrichment, violation of the Constitution and laws of the land.[14]
While the case was pending, on March 17, 1993, the Republic of the Philippines filed a
motion for issuance of a writ of attachment [15] over the L/C, citing as grounds therefor the
following:

(1) Chuidian embezzled or fraudulently misapplied the funds of ARCI acting in a fiduciary
capacity, justifying issuance of the writ under Section 1(b), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court;
(2) The writ is justified under Section 1(d) of the same rule as Chuidian is guilty of fraud in
contracting the debt or incurring the obligation upon which the action was brought, or that he
concealed or disposed of the property that is the subject of the action;
(3) Chuidian has removed or disposed of his property with the intent of defrauding the plaintiff
as justified under Section 1(c) of Rule 57; and
(4) Chuidian is residing out of the country or one on whom summons may be served by
publication, which justifies the writ of attachment prayed for under Section 1(e) of the same
rule.

The Republic also averred that should the action brought by Chuidian before the U.S.
District Court of California to compel payment of the L/C prosper, inspite of the sequestration of
the said L/C, Chuidian can ask the said foreign court to compel the PNB Los Angeles branch to
pay the proceeds of the L/C. Eventually, Philguarantee will be made to shoulder the expense
resulting in further damage to the government. Thus, there was an urgent need for the writ of
attachment to place the L/C under the custody of the Sandiganbayan so the same may be
preserved as security for the satisfaction of judgment in the case before said court.
Chuidian opposed the motion for issuance of the writ of attachment, contending that:
(1) The plaintiffs affidavit appended to the motion was in form and substance fatally defective;
(2) Section 1(b) of Rule 57 does not apply since there was no fiduciary relationship between the
plaintiff and Chuidian;
(3) While Chuidian does not admit fraud on his part, if ever there was breach of contract, such
fraud must be present at the time the contract is entered into;
(4) Chuidian has not removed or disposed of his property in the absence of any intent to defraud
plaintiff;
(5) Chuidians absence from the country does not necessarily make him a non-resident; and
(6) Service of summons by publication cannot be used to justify the issuance of the writ since
Chuidian had already submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court by way of a motion to lift the
freeze order filed through his counsel.

On July 14, 1993, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution ordering the issuance of a writ of
attachment against L/C No. SSD-005-85 as security for the satisfaction of judgment. [16] The
Sandiganbayans ruling was based on its disquisition of the five points of contention raised by

the parties. On the first issue, the Sandiganbayan found that although no separate affidavit was
attached to the motion, the motion itself contained all the requisites of an affidavit, and the
verification thereof is deemed a substantial compliance of Rule 57, Section 3 of the Rules of
Court.
Anent the second contention, the Sandiganbayan ruled that there was no fiduciary
relationship existing between Chuidian and the Republic, but only between Chuidian and
ARCI. Since the Republic is not privy to the fiduciary relationship between Chuidian and ARCI,
it cannot invoke Section 1(b) of Rule 57.
On the third issue of fraud on the part of Chuidian in contracting the loan, or in concealing
or disposing of the subject property, the Sandiganbayan held that there was a prima facie case of
fraud committed by Chuidian, justifying the issuance of the writ of attachment. The
Sandiganbayan also adopted the Republics position that since it was compelled to pay, through
Philguarantee, the bank loans taken out by Chuidian, the proceeds of which were fraudulently
diverted, it is entitled to the issuance of the writ of attachment to protect its rights as creditor.
Assuming that there is truth to the governments allegation that Chuidian has removed or
disposed of his property with the intent to defraud, the Sandiganbayan held that the writ of
attachment is warranted, applying Section 1(e) of Rule 57. Besides, the Rules provide for
sufficient security should the owner of the property attached suffer damage or prejudice caused
by the attachment.[17]
Chuidians absence from the country was considered by the Sandiganbayan to be the most
potent insofar as the relief being sought is concerned. [18] Taking judicial notice of the admitted
fact that Chuidian was residing outside of the country, the Sandiganbayan observed that:

x x x no explanation whatsoever was given by him as to his absence from the

country, or as to his homecoming plans in the future. It may be added, moreover, that
he has no definite or clearcut plan to return to the country at this juncture given the
manner by which he has submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. [19]
Thus, the Sandiganbayan ruled that even if Chuidian is one who ordinarily resides in the
Philippines, but is temporarily living outside, he is still subject to the provisional remedy of
attachment.
Accordingly, an order of attachment[20] was issued by the Sandiganbayan on July 19, 1993,
ordering the Sandiganbayan Sheriff to attach PNB L/C No. SSD-005-85 for safekeeping
pursuant to the Rules of Court as security for the satisfaction of judgment in Sandiganbayan
Civil Case No. 0027.

On August 11, 1997, or almost four (4) years after the issuance of the order of attachment,
Chuidian filed a motion to lift the attachment based on the following grounds: First, he had
returned to the Philippines; hence, the Sandiganbayans most potent ground for the issuance of
the writ of preliminary attachment no longer existed. Since his absence in the past was the very
foundation of the Sandiganbayans writ of preliminary attachment, his presence in the country
warrants the immediate lifting thereof. Second, there was no evidence at all of initial fraud or
subsequent concealment except for the affidavit submitted by the PCGG Chairman citing mere
belief and information and not on knowledge of the facts. Moreover, this statement is
hearsay since the PCGG Chairman was not a witness to the litigated incidents, was never
presented as a witness by the Republic and thus was not subject to cross-examination.
Third, Chuidian denies that he ever disposed of his assets to defraud the Republic, and there
is nothing in the records that support the Sandiganbayans erroneous conclusion on the
matter. Fourth, Chuidian belied the allegation that he was also a defendant in other related
criminal action, for in fact, he had never been a defendant in any prosecution of any sort in the
Philippines.[21] Moreover, he could not have personally appeared in any other action because he
had been deprived of his right to a travel document by the government.
Fifth, the preliminary attachment was, in the first place, unwarranted because he was not
guilty of fraud in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation. In fact, the L/C was not a
product of fraudulent transactions, but was the result of a US Court-approved
settlement. Although he was accused of employing blackmail tactics to procure the settlement,
the California Supreme Court ruled otherwise. And in relation thereto, he cites as a sixth ground
the fact that all these allegations of fraud and wrongdoing had already been dealt with in actions
before the State and Federal Courts of California. While it cannot technically be considered as
forum shopping, it is nevertheless a form of suit multiplicity over the same issues, parties and
subject matter.[22] These foreign judgments constitute res judicata which warrant the dismissal of
the case itself.
Chuidian further contends that should the attachment be allowed to continue, he will be
deprived of his property without due process. The L/C was payment to Chuidian in exchange for
the assets he turned over to the Republic pursuant to the terms of the settlement in Case No.
575867. Said assets, however, had already been sold by the Republic and cannot be returned to
Chuidian should the government succeed in depriving him of the proceeds of the L/C. Since said
assets were disposed of without his or the Sandiganbayans consent, it is the Republic who is
fraudulently disposing of assets.
Finally, Chuidian stressed that throughout the four (4) years that the preliminary attachment
had been in effect, the government had not set the case for hearing. Under Rule 17, Section 3,
the case itself should be dismissed for laches owing to the Republics failure to prosecute its
action for an unreasonable length of time. Accordingly, the preliminary attachment, being only a

temporary or ancillary remedy, must be lifted and the PNB ordered to immediately pay the
proceeds of the L/C to Chuidian.
Subsequently, on August 20, 1997, Chuidian filed a motion to require the Republic to
deposit the L/C in an interest bearing account.[23] He pointed out to the Sandiganbayan that the
face amount of the L/C had, since its attachment, become fully demandable and
payable. However, since the amount is just lying dormant in the PNB, without earning any
interest, he proposed that it would be to the benefit of all if the Sandiganbayan requires PNB to
deposit the full amount to a Sandiganbayan trust account at any bank in order to earn interest
while awaiting judgment of the action.
The Republic opposed Chuidians motion to lift attachment, alleging that Chuidians
absence was not the only ground for the attachment and, therefore, his belated appearance before
the Sandiganbayan is not a sufficient reason to lift the attachment. Moreover, allowing the
foreign judgment as a basis for the lifting of the attachment would essentially amount to an
abdication of the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to hear and decide the ill gotten wealth cases
lodged before it in deference to the judgment of foreign courts.
In a Resolution promulgated on November 13, 1998, the Sandiganbayan denied Chuidians
motion to lift attachment.[24]
On the same day, the Sandiganbayan issued another Resolution denying Chuidians motion
to require deposit of the attached L/C in an interest bearing account.[25]
In a motion seeking a reconsideration of the first resolution, Chuidian assailed the
Sandiganbayans finding that the issues raised in his motion to lift attachment had already been
dealt with in the earlier resolution dated July 14, 1993 granting the application for the writ of
preliminary attachment based on the following grounds: First, Chuidian was out of the country
in 1993, but is now presently residing in the country. Second, the Sandiganbayan could not have
known then that his absence was due to the non-renewal of his passport at the instance of the
PCGG. Neither was it revealed that the Republic had already disposed of Chuidians assets
ceded to the Republic in exchange for the L/C. The foreign judgment was not an issue then
because at that time, said judgment had not yet been issued and much less final. Furthermore,
the authority of the PCGG Commissioner to subscribe as a knowledgeable witness relative to the
issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment was raised for the first time in the motion to lift
the attachment. Finally, the issue of laches could not have been raised then because it was the
Republics subsequent neglect or failure to prosecute despite the passing of the years that gave
rise to laches.[26]
Chuidian also moved for a reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan resolution denying the
motion to require deposit of the L/C into an interest bearing account. He argued that contrary to

the Sandiganbayans pronouncement, allowing the deposit would not amount to a virtual
recognition of his right over the L/C, for he is not asking for payment but simply requesting that
it be deposited in an account under the control of the Sandiganbayan. He further stressed that the
Sandiganbayan abdicated its bounden duty to rule on an issue when it found that his motion will
render nugatory the purpose of sequestration and freeze orders over the L/C. Considering that
his assets had already been sold by the Republic, he claimed that the Sandiganbayans refusal to
exercise its fiduciary duty over attached assets will cause him irreparable injury. Lastly, the
Sandiganbayans position that Chuidian was not the owner but a mere payee-beneficiary of the
L/C issued in his favor negates overwhelming jurisprudence on the Negotiable Instruments Law,
while at the same time obliterating his rights of ownership under the Civil Code.[27]
On July 13, 1999, the Sandiganbayan gave due course to Chuidians plea for the attached
L/C to be deposited in an interest-bearing account, on the ground that it will redound to the
benefit of both parties.
The Sandiganbayan declared the national government as the principal obligor of the L/C
even though the liability remained in the books of the PNB for accounting and monitoring
purposes.
The Sandiganbayan, however, denied Chuidians motion for reconsideration of the denial of
his motion to lift attachment, agreeing in full with the governments apriorisms that:

x x x (1) it is a matter of record that the Court granted the application for writ of
attachment upon grounds other than defendants absence in the Philippine territory. In
its Resolution dated July 14, 1993, the Court found a prima facie case of fraud
committed by defendant Chuidian, and that defendant has recovered or disposed of his
property with the intent of defrauding plaintiff; (2) Chuidians belated presence in the
Philippines cannot be invoked to secure the lifting of attachment. The rule is specific
that it applies to a party who is about to depart from the Philippines with intent to
defraud his creditors. Chuidians stay in the country is uncertain and he may leave at
will because he holds a foreign passport; and (3) Chuidians other ground, sufficiency
of former PCGG Chairman Gunigundos verification of the complaint, has been met
fairly and squarely in the Resolution of July 14, 1993. [28]
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari contending that the respondent Sandiganbayan
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it ruled
that:

1) Most of the issues raised in the motion to lift attachment had been substantially addressed in
the previous resolutions dated July 14, 1993 and August 26, 1998, while the rest were of no
imperative relevance as to affect the Sandiganbayans disposition; and
2) PNB was relieved of the obligation to pay on its own L/C by virtue of Presidential
Proclamation No. 50.

The Rules of Court specifically provide for the remedies of a defendant whose property or
asset has been attached. As has been consistently ruled by this Court, the determination of the
existence of grounds to discharge a writ of attachment rests in the sound discretion of the lower
courts.[29]
The question in this case is: What can the herein petitioner do to quash the attachment of
the L/C? There are two courses of action available to the petitioner:
First. To file a counterbond in accordance with Rule 57, Section 12, which provides:

SEC. 12. Discharge of attachment upon giving counterbond. At anytime after an

order of attachment has been granted, the party whose property has been attached, or
the person appearing on his behalf, may, upon reasonable notice to the applicant,
apply to the judge who granted the order, or to the judge of the court in which the
action is pending, for an order discharging the attachment wholly or in part on the
security given. The judge shall, after hearing, order the discharge of the attachment if
a cash deposit is made, or a counterbond executed to the attaching creditor is filed, on
behalf of the adverse party, with the clerk or judge of the court where the application
is made, in an amount equal to the value of the property attached as determined by the
judge, to secure the payment of any judgment that the attaching creditor may recover
in the action. Upon the filing of such counter-bond, copy thereof shall forthwith be
served on the attaching creditor or his lawyer. Upon the discharge of an attachment in
accordance with the provisions of this section the property attached, or the proceeds of
any sale thereof, shall be delivered to the party making the deposit or giving the
counter-bond, or the person appearing on his behalf, the deposit or counter-bond
aforesaid standing in place of the property so released. Should such counterbond for
any reason be found to be, or become, insufficient, and the party furnishing the same
fail to file an additional counter-bond, the attaching creditor may apply for a new
order of attachment.
or

Second. To quash the attachment on the ground that it was irregularly or improvidently
issued, as provided for in Section 13 of the same Rule:

SEC. 13. Discharge of attachment for improper or irregular issuance. - The party
whose property has been attached may also, at any time either before or after the
release of the attached property, or before any attachment shall have been actually
levied, upon reasonable notice to the attaching creditor, apply to the judge who
granted the order, or to the judge of the court in which the action is pending, for an
order to discharge the attachment on the ground that the same was improperly or
irregularly issued. If the motion be made on affidavits on the part of the party whose
property has been attached, but not otherwise, the attaching creditor may oppose the
same by counter-affidavits or other evidence in addition to that on which the
attachment was made. After hearing, the judge shall order the discharge of the
attachment if it appears that it was improperly or irregularly issued and the defect is
not cured forthwith.
It would appear that petitioner chose the latter because the grounds he raised assail the
propriety of the issuance of the writ of attachment. By his own admission, however, he
repeatedly acknowledged that his justifications to warrant the lifting of the attachment are facts
or events that came to light or took place after the writ of attachment had already been
implemented.
More particularly, petitioner emphasized that four (4) years after the writ was issued, he had
returned to the Philippines. Yet while he noted that he would have returned earlier but for the
cancellation of his passport by the PCGG, he was not barred from returning to the Philippines.
Then he informed the Sandiganbayan that while the case against him was pending, but after the
attachment had already been executed, the government lost two (2) cases for fraud lodged
against him before the U.S. Courts, thus invoking res judicata. Next, he also pointed out that the
government is estopped from pursuing the case against him for failing to prosecute for the
number of years that it had been pending litigation.
It is clear that these grounds have nothing to do with the issuance of the writ of
attachment. Much less do they attack the issuance of the writ at that time as improper or
irregular. And yet, the rule contemplates that the defect must be in the very issuance of the
attachment writ. For instance, the attachment may be discharged under Section 13 of Rule 57
when it is proven that the allegations of the complaint were deceptively framed, [30] or when the
complaint fails to state a cause of action. [31] Supervening events which may or may not justify the
discharge of the writ are not within the purview of this particular rule.

In the instant case, there is no showing that the issuance of the writ of attachment was
attended by impropriety or irregularity. Apart from seeking a reconsideration of the resolution
granting the application for the writ, petitioner no longer questioned the writ itself. For four (4)
long years he kept silent and did not exercise any of the remedies available to a defendant whose
property or asset has been attached. It is rather too late in the day for petitioner to question the
propriety of the issuance of the writ.
Petitioner also makes capital of the two foreign judgments which he claims warrant the
application of the principle of res judicata. The first judgment, in Civil Case Nos. 575867 and
577697 brought by Philguarantee before the Santa Clara Country Superior Court, denied
Philguarantees prayer to set aside the stipulated judgment wherein Philguarantee and Chuidian
agreed on the subject attached L/C. On March 14, 1990, the Court of Appeal of the State of
California affirmed the Superior Courts judgment. The said judgment became the subject of a
petition for review by the California Supreme Court. There is no showing, however, of any final
judgment by the California Supreme Court. The records, including petitioners pleadings, are
bereft of any evidence to show that there is a final foreign judgment which the Philippine courts
must defer to. Hence, res judicata finds no application in this instance because it is a requisite
that the former judgment or order must be final.[32]
Second, petitioner cites the judgment of the United States District Court in Civil Case 862255 RSWL brought by petitioner Chuidian against PNB to compel the latter to pay the
L/C. The said Courts judgment, while it ruled in favor of petitioner on the matter of
Philguarantees action-in-intervention to set aside the settlement agreement, also ruled in favor of
PNB, to wit:

Under Executive Order No. 1, the PCGG is vested by the Philippine President with
the power to enforce its directives and orders by contempt proceedings. Under
Executive Order No. 2, the PCGG is empowered to freeze any, and all assets, funds
and property illegally acquired by former President Marcos or his close friends and
business associates.
On March 11, 1986, PNB/Manila received an order from the PCGG ordering PNB to
freeze any further drawings on the L/C. The freeze order has remained in effect and
was followed by a sequestration order issued by the PCGG. Subsequently, Chuidians
Philippine counsel filed a series of challenges to the freeze and sequestration orders,
which challenges were unsuccessful as the orders were found valid by the Philippine
Supreme Court. The freeze and sequestration orders are presently in effect. Thus,
under the PCGG order and Executive Orders Nos. 1 and 2, performance by PNB
would be illegal under Philippine Law. Therefore PNB is excused from performance

of the L/C agreement as long as the freeze and sequestration orders remain in
effect. (Underscoring ours)
xxx

xxx

xxx

Chuidian argues that the fact that the L/C was issued pursuant to a settlement in
California, that the negotiations for which occurred in California, and that two of the
payments were made at PNB/LA, compels the conclusion that the act of prohibiting
payment of the L/C occurred in Los Angeles. However, the majority of the evidence
and Tchacosh and Sabbatino compel the opposite conclusion. The L/C was issued in
Manila, such was done at the request of a Philippine government instrumentality for
the benefit of a Philippine citizen, the L/C was to be performed in the Philippines, all
significant events relating to the issuance and implementation of the L/C occurred in
the Philippines, the L/C agreement provided that the L/C was to be construed
according to laws of the Philippines, and the Philippine government certainly has an
interest in preventing the L/C from being remitted in that it would be the release of
funds that are potentially illgotten gains. Accordingly, the Court finds that the PCGG
orders are acts of state that must be respected by this Court, and thus PNB is excused
from making payment on the L/C as long as the freeze and sequestration orders
remain in effect.[33] (Underscoring ours)
Petitioners own evidence strengthens the governments position that the L/C is under the
jurisdiction of the Philippine government and that the U.S. Courts recognize the authority of the
Republic to sequester and freeze said L/C. Hence, the foreign judgments relied upon by
petitioner do not constitute a bar to the Republics action to recover whatever alleged ill-gotten
wealth petitioner may have acquired.
Petitioner may argue, albeit belatedly, that he also raised the issue that there was no evidence
of fraud on record other than the affidavit of PCGG Chairman Gunigundo. This issue of fraud,
however, touches on the very merits of the main case which accuses petitioner of committing
fraudulent acts in his dealings with the government. Moreover, this alleged fraud was one of the
grounds for the application of the writ, and the Sandiganbayan granted said application after it
found a prima facie case of fraud committed by petitioner.
In fine, fraud was not only one of the grounds for the issuance of the preliminary
attachment, it was at the same time the governments cause of action in the main case.
We have uniformly held that:

x x x when the preliminary attachment is issued upon a ground which is at the same
time the applicants cause of action; e.g., an action for money or property embezzled
or fraudulently misapplied or converted to his own use by a public officer, or an
officer of a corporation, or an attorney, factor, broker, agent, or clerk, in the course of
his employment as such, or by any other person in a fiduciary capacity, or for a willful
violation of duty, or an action against a party who has been guilty of fraud in
contracting the debt or incurring the obligation upon which the action is brought, the
defendant is not allowed to file a motion to dissolve the attachment under Section 13
of Rule 57 by offering to show the falsity of the factual averments in the plaintiffs
application and affidavits on which the writ was based and consequently that the
writ based thereon had been improperly or irregularly issued the reason being that
the hearing on such a motion for dissolution of the writ would be tantamount to a trial
of the merits of the action. In other words, the merits of the action would be
ventilated at a mere hearing of a motion, instead of at the regular trial.[34] (Underscoring
ours)
Thus, this Court has time and again ruled that the merits of the action in which a writ of
preliminary attachment has been issued are not triable on a motion for dissolution of the
attachment, otherwise an applicant for the lifting of the writ could force a trial of the merits of
the case on a mere motion.[35]
It is not the Republics fault that the litigation has been protracted. There is as yet no
evidence of fraud on the part of petitioner. Petitioner is only one of the twenty-three (23)
defendants in the main action. As such, the litigation would take longer than most
cases. Petitioner cannot invoke this delay in the proceedings as an excuse for not seeking the
proper recourse in having the writ of attachment lifted in due time. If ever laches set in, it was
petitioner, not the government, who failed to take action within a reasonable time
period. Challenging the issuance of the writ of attachment four (4) years after its implementation
showed petitioners apparent indifference towards the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan.
In sum, petitioner has failed to convince this Court that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused
its discretion in a whimsical, capricious and arbitrary manner. There are no compelling reasons
to warrant the immediate lifting of the attachment even as the main case is still pending. On the
other hand, allowing the discharge of the attachment at this stage of the proceedings would put in
jeopardy the right of the attaching party to realize upon the relief sought and expected to be
granted in the main or principal action. It would have the effect of prejudging the main case.
The attachment is a mere provisional remedy to ensure the safety and preservation of the
thing attached until the plaintiff can, by appropriate proceedings, obtain a judgment and have

such property applied to its satisfaction.[36] To discharge the attachment at this stage of the
proceedings would render inutile any favorable judgment should the government prevail in the
principal action against petitioner. Thus, the Sandiganbayan, in issuing the questioned
resolutions, which are interlocutory in nature, committed no grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. As long as the Sandiganbayan acted within its jurisdiction, any
alleged errors committed in the exercise of its jurisdiction will amount to nothing more than
errors of judgment which are reviewable by timely appeal and not by special civil action
of certiorari.[37]
Moreover, we have held that when the writ of attachment is issued upon a ground which is at
the same time the applicants cause of action, the only other way the writ can be lifted or
dissolved is by a counterbond, in accordance with Section 12 of the same rule. [38] This recourse,
however, was not availed of by petitioner, as noted by the Solicitor General in his comment.[39]
To reiterate, there are only two ways of quashing a writ of attachment: (a) by filing a
counterbond immediately; or (b) by moving to quash on the ground of improper and irregular
issuance.[40]These grounds for the dissolution of an attachment are fixed in Rule 57 of the Rules
of Court and the power of the Court to dissolve an attachment is circumscribed by the grounds
specified therein.[41] Petitioners motion to lift attachment failed to demonstrate any infirmity or
defect in the issuance of the writ of attachment; neither did he file a counterbond.
Finally, we come to the matter of depositing the Letter of Credit in an interest-bearing
account. We agree with the Sandiganbayan that any interest that the proceeds of the L/C may
earn while the case is being litigated would redound to the benefit of whichever party will
prevail, the Philippine government included. Thus, we affirm the Sandiganbayans ruling that
the proceeds of the L/C should be deposited in an interest bearing account with the Land Bank of
the Philippines for the account of the Sandiganbayan in escrow until ordered released by the said
Court.
We find no legal reason, however, to release the PNB from any liability thereunder. The
Deed of Transfer, whereby certain liabilities of PNB were transferred to the national government,
cannot affect the said L/C since there was no valid substitution of debtor. Article 1293 of the
New Civil Code provides:

Novation which consists in substituting a new debtor in the place of the original one,
may be made without the knowledge or against the will of the latter, but not without
the consent of the creditor. Payment by the new debtor gives him the rights mentioned
in Articles 1236 and 1237.
Accordingly, any substitution of debtor must be with the consent of the creditor, whose
consent thereto cannot just be presumed. Even though Presidential Proclamation No. 50 can be

considered an insuperable cause, it does not necessarily make the contracts and obligations
affected thereby exceptions to the above-quoted law, such that the substitution of debtor can be
validly made even without the consent of the creditor. Presidential Proclamation No. 50 was not
intended to set aside laws that govern the very lifeblood of the nations commerce and
economy. In fact, the Deed of Transfer that was executed between PNB and the government
pursuant to the said Presidential Proclamation specifically stated that it shall be deemed effective
only upon compliance with several conditions, one of which requires that:

(b)
the BANK shall have secured such governmental and creditors approvals
as may be necessary to establish the consummation, legality and enforceability of the
transactions contemplated hereby.
The validity of this Deed of Transfer is not disputed. Thus, PNB is estopped from denying
its liability thereunder considering that neither the PNB nor the government bothered to secure
petitioners consent to the substitution of debtors. We are not unmindful that any effort to secure
petitioners consent at that time would, in effect, be deemed an admission that the L/C is valid
and binding. Even the Sandiganbayan found that:

x x x Movant has basis in pointing out that inasmuch as the L/C was issued in his
favor, he is presumed to be the lawful payee-beneficiary of the L/C until such time
that the plaintiff successfully proves that said L/C is ill-gotten and he has no right over
the same.[42]
In Republic v. Sandiganbayan,[43] we held that the provisional remedies, such as freeze orders
and sequestration, were not meant to deprive the owner or possessor of his title or any right to
the property sequestered, frozen or taken over and vest it in the sequestering agency, the
Government or other person.
Thus, until such time that the government is able to successfully prove that petitioner has no
right to claim the proceeds of the L/C, he is deemed to be the lawful payee-beneficiary of said
L/C, for which any substitution of debtor requires his consent. The Sandiganbayan thus erred in
relieving PNB of its liability as the original debtor.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED. The Resolutions
of the Sandiganbayan dated November 6, 1998 and July 2, 1999 are AFFIRMED. The PNB is
DIRECTED to remit to the Sandiganbayan the proceeds of Letter of Credit No. SFD-005-85 in
the amount of U.S. $4.4 million within fifteen (15) days from notice hereof, the same to be
placed under special time deposit with the Land Bank of the Philippines, for the account of
Sandiganbayan in escrow for the person or persons, natural or juridical, who shall eventually be
adjudged lawfully entitled thereto, the same to earn interest at the current legal bank rates. The

principal and its interest shall remain in said account until ordered released by the Court in
accordance with law.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
LIBAN VS GORDON
FACTS
Petitioners Liban, et al., who were officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red
Cross Chapter, filed with the Supreme Court what they styled as Petition to Declare Richard J.
Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate against respondent Gordon, who was elected
Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors during his incumbency
as Senator.
Petitioners alleged that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors,
respondent Gordon ceased to be a member of the Senate pursuant to Sec. 13, Article VI of the
Constitution, which provides that [n]o Senator . . . may hold any other office or employment in the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Petitioners
cited the case of Camporedondo vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 129049, decided August 6, 1999, which
held that the PNRC is a GOCC, in supporting their argument that respondent Gordon automatically
forfeited his seat in the Senate when he accepted and held the position of Chairman of the PNRC
Board of Governors.
Formerly, in its Decision dated July 15, 2009, the Court, voting 7-5, [1] held thatthe office of
the PNRC Chairman is NOT a government office or an office in a GOCC for purposes of the
prohibition in Sec. 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The PNRC Chairman is elected by the
PNRC Board of Governors; he is not appointed by the President or by any subordinate government
official. Moreover, the PNRC is NOT a GOCC because it is a privately-owned, privately-funded, and
privately-run charitable organization and because it is controlled by a Board of Governors four-fifths
of which are private sector individuals. Therefore, respondent Gordon did not forfeit his legislative
seat when he was elected as PNRC Chairman during his incumbency as Senator.
The Court however held further that the PNRC Charter, R.A. 95, as amended by PD 1264
and 1643, is void insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation since Section 7, Article XIV
of the 1935 Constitution states that [t]he Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the
formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations, unless such corporations are owned or
controlled by the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof. The Court thus directed
the PNRC to incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with the Securities and Exchange
Commission if it wants to be a private corporation. The fallo of the Decision read:

WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross is
not a government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the
prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. We also declare that Sections 1, 2, 3, 4(a), 5,
6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of the Charter of the Philippine National Red Cross, or Republic Act No. 95,
as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 1264 and 1643, are VOID because they create the PNRC as a
private corporation or grant it corporate powers.

Respondent Gordon filed a Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration of

the Decision. The PNRC likewise moved to intervene and filed its own Motion for Partial
Reconsideration. They basically questioned the second part of the Decision with regard to the
pronouncement on the nature of the PNRC and the constitutionality of some provisions of the
PNRC Charter.

II.

THE ISSUE

Was it correct for the Court to have passed upon and decided on the issue of the
constitutionality of the PNRC charter? Corollarily: What is the nature of the PNRC?

III.

THE RULING

[The Court GRANTED reconsideration and MODIFIED the dispositive portion of the Decision
by deleting the second sentence thereof.]
NO, it was not correct for the Court to have decided on the constitutional issue
because it was not the very lis mota of the case. The PNRC is sui generis in nature; it is
neither strictly a GOCC nor a private corporation.
The issue of constitutionality of R.A. No. 95 was not raised by the parties, and was not
among the issues defined in the body of the Decision; thus, it was not the very lis mota of the
case. We have reiterated the rule as to when the Court will consider the issue of constitutionality
in Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, Inc., thus:
This Court will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless it is the very lis mota. It is a wellestablished rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be
unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if the
record also presents some other ground upon which the court may [rest] its judgment, that course will be
adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until such question will be
unavoidable.

[T]his Court should not have declared void certain sections of . . . the PNRC
Charter. Instead, the Court should have exercised judicial restraint on this matter, especially since
there was some other ground upon which the Court could have based its judgment. Furthermore,
the PNRC, the entity most adversely affected by this declaration of unconstitutionality, which was not
even originally a party to this case, was being compelled, as a consequence of the Decision, to
suddenly reorganize and incorporate under the Corporation Code, after more than sixty (60) years
of existence in this country.
Since its enactment, the PNRC Charter was amended several times, particularly on June 11,
1953, August 16, 1971, December 15, 1977, and October 1, 1979, by virtue of R.A. No. 855, R.A.
No. 6373, P.D. No. 1264, and P.D. No. 1643, respectively. The passage of several laws relating to
the PNRCs corporate existence notwithstanding the effectivity of the constitutional proscription on
the creation of private corporations by law is a recognition that the PNRC is not strictly in the nature
of a private corporation contemplated by the aforesaid constitutional ban.
A closer look at the nature of the PNRC would show that there is none like it[,] not just in
terms of structure, but also in terms of history, public service and official status accorded to it by the
State and the international community. There is merit in PNRCs contention that its structure is sui
generis. It is in recognition of this sui generis character of the PNRC that R.A. No. 95 has remained
valid and effective from the time of its enactment in March 22, 1947 under the 1935 Constitution and
during the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and the 1987 Constitution. The PNRC Charter and its
amendatory laws have not been questioned or challenged on constitutional grounds, not even in this
case before the Court now.
[T]his Court [must] recognize the countrys adherence to the Geneva Convention and respect
the unique status of the PNRC in consonance with its treaty obligations. The Geneva Convention
has the force and effect of law. Under the Constitution, the Philippines adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land. This constitutional provision must be
reconciled and harmonized with Article XII, Section 16 of the Constitution, instead of using the latter
to negate the former. By requiring the PNRC to organize under the Corporation Code just like any
other private corporation, the Decision of July 15, 2009 lost sight of the PNRCs special status under
international humanitarian law and as an auxiliary of the State, designated to assist it in discharging
its obligations under the Geneva Conventions.
The PNRC, as a National Society of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement, can neither be classified as an instrumentality of the State, so as not to lose its
character of neutrality as well as its independence, nor strictly as a private corporation since it is
regulated by international humanitarian law and is treated as an auxiliary of the State.
Although [the PNRC] is neither a subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the government,
nor a GOCC or a subsidiary thereof . . . so much so that respondent, under the Decision, was
correctly allowed to hold his position as Chairman thereof concurrently while he served as a
Senator, such a conclusion does not ipso facto imply that the PNRC is a private corporation within

the contemplation of the provision of the Constitution, that must be organized under the Corporation
Code. [T]he sui generis character of PNRC requires us to approach controversies involving the
PNRC on a case-to-case basis.
In sum, the PNRC enjoys a special status as an important ally and auxiliary of the
government in the humanitarian field in accordance with its commitments under international
law. This Court cannot all of a sudden refuse to recognize its existence, especially since the issue of
the constitutionality of the PNRC Charter was never raised by the parties. It bears emphasizing that
the PNRC has responded to almost all national disasters since 1947, and is widely known to provide
a substantial portion of the countrys blood requirements. Its humanitarian work is unparalleled. The
Court should not shake its existence to the core in an untimely and drastic manner that would not
only have negative consequences to those who depend on it in times of disaster and armed
hostilities but also have adverse effects on the image of the Philippines in the international
community. The sections of the PNRC Charter that were declared void must therefore stay.
[Thus, R.A. No. 95 remains valid and constitutional in its entirety. The Court MODIFIED the
dispositive portion of the Decision by deleting the second sentence, to now read as follows:
WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross is
not a government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the
prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution .]

NERI VS. SENATE COMMITTEE

MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ

ROMULO L. NERI vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON

ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND
INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND
COMMERCE, AND SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL
DEFENSE AND SECURITY
G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008
FACTS: On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and
Communication (DOTC) entered into a contract with Zhong Xing
Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment
and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in
the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos).
The Project was to be financed by the Peoples Republic of China.

The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In

the September 18, 2007 hearing Jose de Venecia III testified that
several high executive officials and power brokers were using their
influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate
Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing wherein he was
interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos of
COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval
of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed President
Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to
accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed about the
NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking executive
privilege. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a
letter to the senate averring that the communications between GMA
and Neri are privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in
Senate vs Ermita be applied. He was cited in contempt of
respondent committees and an order for his arrest and detention
until such time that he would appear and give his testimony.
ISSUE:
Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions
covered by executive privilege?
HELD:
The communications are covered by executive privilege

The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials and employees

to follow and abide by the Constitution, existing laws and
jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate v. Ermita
when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.),
does not in any way diminish the concept of executive privilege. This
is because this concept has Constitutional underpinnings.
The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where
the subject of inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the
Constitution to the President, such as the area of military and
foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the
repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and
diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of
powers, the information relating to these powers may enjoy greater
confidentiality than others.
Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential
communications privilege:
1) The protected communication must relate to a quintessential
and non-delegable presidential power.
2) The communication must be authored or solicited and received
by a close advisor of the President or the President himself. The
judicial test is that an advisor must be in operational proximity
with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified
privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need,
such that the information sought likely contains important
evidence and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by
an appropriate investigating authority.

In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of

executive privilege on the ground that the communications elicited
by the three (3) questions fall under conversation and
correspondence between the President and public officials
necessary in her executive and policy decision-making process
and, that the information sought to be disclosed might impair our
diplomatic as well as economic relations with the Peoples Republic
of China. Simply put, the bases are presidential communications
privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or
foreign relations.
Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the
communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by
the presidential communications privilege. First, the communications
relate to a quintessential and non-delegable power of the
President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with
other countries. This authority of the President to enter into
executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature
has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.
Second, the communications are received by a close advisor of the
President. Under the operational proximity test, petitioner can be
considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyos
cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling
need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the
unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.
Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of
petitioners claim of executive privilege violates the constitutional
provisions on the right of the people to information on matters of
public concern.50 We might have agreed with such contention if

petitioner did not appear before them at all. But petitioner made
himself available to them during the September 26 hearing, where
he was questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he expressly
manifested his willingness to answer more questions from the
Senators, with the exception only of those covered by his claim of
executive privilege.
The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to
limitation. Section 7 of Article III provides:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern
shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents,
and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as
well as to government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.
MAGALLONA v. ERMITA, G.R. 187167, August 16, 2011
Facts:
In 1961, Congress passed R.A. 3046 demarcating the maritime baselines of the
Philippines as an Archepelagic State pursuant to UNCLOS I of 9158, codifying the
sovereignty of State parties over their territorial sea. Then in 1968, it was amended by
R.A. 5446, correcting some errors in R.A. 3046 reserving the drawing of baselines
around Sabah.
In 2009, it was again amended by R.A. 9522, to be compliant with the UNCLOS III of
1984. The requirements complied with are: to shorten one baseline, to optimize the
location of some basepoints and classify KIG and Scarborough Shoal as regime of
islands.
Petitioner now assails the constitutionality of the law for three main reasons:
1. it reduces the Philippine maritime territory under Article 1;

2. it opens the countrys waters to innocent and sea lanes passages hence undermining
our sovereignty and security; and
3. treating KIG and Scarborough as regime of islands would weaken our claim over
those territories.
Issue: Whether R.A. 9522 is constitutional?
Ruling:
1. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with acquisition or loss of territory. it is just a codified
norm that regulates conduct of States. On the other hand, RA 9522 is a baseline law to
mark out basepoints along coasts, serving as geographic starting points to measure. it
merely notices the international community of the scope of our maritime space.
2. If passages is the issue, domestically, the legislature can enact legislation
designating routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes
passages. but in the absence of such, international law norms operate.
the fact that for archipelagic states, their waters are subject to both passages does not
place them in lesser footing vis a vis continental coastal states. Moreover, RIOP is a
customary international law, no modern state can invoke its sovereignty to forbid such
passage.
3. On the KIG issue, RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA 3046 and
in fact, it increased the Phils. total maritime space. Moreover, the itself commits the
Phils. continues claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over KIG.
If not, it would be a breach to 2 provisions of the UNCLOS III:
Art. 47 (3): drawing of basepoints shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the
general configuration of the archipelago.
Art 47 (2): the length of baselines shall not exceed 100 mm.
KIG and SS are far from our baselines, if we draw to include them, well breach the
rules: that it should follow the natural configuration of the archipelago.

G.R. NO. 183871

Rubrico vs. Arroyo
February 18, 2010

FACTS:
Rubrico, in her petition, said she was abducted on April 3, 2007 by armed men
belonging to the 301st Air Intelligence and Security Squadron, based at the Philippine
Air Force Field Station at Fernando Air Base in Lipa City, Batangas. During her detention,
the petitioner added, her daughters Mary Joy Rubrico Carbonel and Jean Rubrico
Apruebo were harassed by Senior Insp. Arsenio Gomez and that there were also armed
men following them. The petitioners prayed that a writ of amparo be issued, ordering
the individual respondents to desist from performing any threatening act against the
security of the petitioners and for the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) to immediately
file an information for kidnapping qualified with the aggravating circumstance of gender
of the offended party. It also prayed for damages and for respondents to produce
documents submitted to any of them on the case of Lourdes.
The respondents then filed a joint return on the writ specifically denying the material
inculpatory averments against them. Respondents interposed the defense that the
President may not be sued during her incumbency.
Petitioners pleaded back to be allowed to present evidence ex parte against the
President, et al.
By a separate resolution, the CA dropped the President as respondent in the case .

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT the [CA] committed reversible error in dismissing [their] Petition and dropping
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as party respondent.
HELD:
The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved under our system of
government, albeit not expressly reserved in the present constitution. Addressing a
concern of his co-members in the 1986 Constitutional Commission on the absence of an
express provision on the matter, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J. observed that it was already
understood in jurisprudence that the President may not be sued during his or her
tenure.

Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual
incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to
provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of
the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving
as such.
The Court also affirmed the dismissal of the amparo case against other respondents for
failure of the petition to allege ultimate facts as to make out a case against that body
for the enforced disappearance of Lourdes and the threats and harassment that
followed.