Consti Law Part 2

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (Atty.
Niceforo Solis) 91
1ST EXAM COVERAGE CASE COMPILATION
ANGARA v. ELECTORAL COMMISSION
63 Phil. 139 (1936)
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-45081
July 15, 1936
JOSE A. ANGARA, petitioner,

vs.
THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO YNSUA,
MIGUEL CASTILLO, and DIONISIO C.
MAYOR,respondents.
Godofredo Reyes for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Hilado for respondent
Electoral Commission.
Pedro Ynsua in his own behalf.
No appearance for other respondents.
LAUREL, J.:
This is an original action instituted in this court by the
petitioner, Jose A. Angara, for the issuance of a writ of
prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission,
one of the respondents, from taking further cognizance of the
protest filed by Pedro Ynsua, another respondent, against
the election of said petitioner as member of the National
Assembly for the first assembly district of the Province of
Tayabas.
The facts of this case as they appear in the petition and as
admitted by the respondents are as follows:
(1) That in the elections of September 17, 1935, the
petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and the respondents,
Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor,
were candidates voted for the position of member of
the National Assembly for the first district of the
Province of Tayabas;
(2) That on October 7, 1935, the provincial board of
canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as memberelect of the National Assembly for the said district,
for having received the most number of votes;
(3) That on November 15, 1935, the petitioner took
his oath of office;
(4) That on December 3, 1935, the National
Assembly in session assembled, passed the
following resolution:
[No. 8]
RESOLUCION
CONFIRMANDO
LAS
ACTAS DE AQUELLOS DIPUTADOS
CONTRA QUIENES
NO
SE
HA
PRESENTADO PROTESTA.
Se resuelve: Que las actas de eleccion de
los Diputados contra quienes no se
hubiere presentado debidamente una
protesta antes de la adopcion de la
presente resolucion sean, como por la
presente, son aprobadas y confirmadas.
Adoptada, 3 de diciembre, 1935.
(5) That on December 8, 1935, the herein
respondent Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral
Commission a "Motion of Protest" against the
election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara,
being the only protest filed after the passage of
Resolutions No. 8 aforequoted, and praying, among
other-things, that said respondent be declared
elected member of the National Assembly for the
first district of Tayabas, or that the election of said
position be nullified;
(6) That on December 9, 1935, the Electoral
Commission adopted a resolution, paragraph 6 of
which provides:
6. La Comision no considerara ninguna
protesta que no se haya presentado en o
antes de este dia.
petitioner, Jose A. Angara, one of the respondents
in the aforesaid protest, filed before the Electoral
Commission a "Motion to Dismiss the Protest",
alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8 of Dismiss the
Protest", alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8 of the
National Assembly was adopted in the legitimate
exercise of its constitutional prerogative to prescribe
the period during which protests against the
election of its members should be presented; (b)
that the aforesaid resolution has for its object, and
is the accepted formula for, the limitation of said
period; and (c) that the protest in question was filed
out of the prescribed period;
respondent, Pedro Ynsua, filed an "Answer to the
Motion of Dismissal" alleging that there is no legal
or constitutional provision barring the presentation
of a protest against the election of a member of the
National Assembly after confirmation;
petitioner, Jose A. Angara, filed a "Reply" to the
aforesaid "Answer to the Motion of Dismissal";
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (Atty. Niceforo Solis) 91

(10) That the case being submitted for decision, the
Electoral Commission promulgated a resolution on
January 23, 1936, denying herein petitioner's
"Motion to Dismiss the Protest."
The application of the petitioner sets forth the following
grounds for the issuance of the writ prayed for:
(a) That the Constitution confers exclusive
jurisdiction upon the electoral Commission solely as
regards the merits of contested elections to the
National Assembly;
(b) That the Constitution excludes from said
jurisdiction the power to regulate the proceedings of
said election contests, which power has been
reserved to the Legislative Department of the
Government or the National Assembly;
(c) That like the Supreme Court and other courts
created in pursuance of the Constitution, whose
exclusive jurisdiction relates solely to deciding the
merits of controversies submitted to them for
decision and to matters involving their internal
organization, the Electoral Commission can
regulate its proceedings only if the National
Assembly has not availed of its primary power to so
regulate such proceedings;
(d) That Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly
is, therefore, valid and should be respected and
obeyed;
(e) That under paragraph 13 of section 1 of the
ordinance appended to the Constitution and
paragraph 6 of article 7 of the Tydings-McDuffie
Law (No. 127 of the 73rd Congress of the United
States) as well as under section 1 and 3 (should be
sections 1 and 2) of article VIII of the Constitution,
this Supreme Court has jurisdiction to pass upon
the fundamental question herein raised because it
involves an interpretation of the Constitution of the
Philippines.
On February 25, 1936, the Solicitor-General appeared and
filed an answer in behalf of the respondent Electoral
Commission interposing the following special defenses:
(a) That the Electoral Commission has been
created by the Constitution as an instrumentality of
the Legislative Department invested with the
jurisdiction to decide "all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the members
of the National Assembly"; that in adopting its
resolution of December 9, 1935, fixing this date as
the last day for the presentation of protests against
the election of any member of the National
Assembly, it acted within its jurisdiction and in the
legitimate exercise of the implied powers granted it
by the Constitution to adopt the rules and
regulations essential to carry out the power and

functions conferred upon the same by the
fundamental law; that in adopting its resolution of
January 23, 1936, overruling the motion of the
petitioner to dismiss the election protest in question,
and declaring itself with jurisdiction to take
cognizance of said protest, it acted in the legitimate
exercise of its quasi-judicial functions a an
instrumentality of the Legislative Department of the
Commonwealth Government, and hence said act is
beyond the judicial cognizance or control of the
Supreme Court;
(b) That the resolution of the National Assembly of
December 3, 1935, confirming the election of the
members of the National Assembly against whom
no protest had thus far been filed, could not and did
not deprive the electoral Commission of its
jurisdiction to take cognizance of election protests
filed within the time that might be set by its own
rules:
(c) That the Electoral Commission is a body
invested with quasi-judicial functions, created by the
Constitution as an instrumentality of the Legislative
Department, and is not an "inferior tribunal, or
corporation, or board, or person" within the purview
of section 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, against which prohibition would lie.
The respondent Pedro Ynsua, in his turn, appeared and filed
an answer in his own behalf on March 2, 1936, setting forth
the following as his special defense:
(a) That at the time of the approval of the rules of
the Electoral Commission on December 9, 1935,
there was no existing law fixing the period within
which protests against the election of members of
the National Assembly should be filed; that in fixing
December 9, 1935, as the last day for the filing of
protests against the election of members of the
National Assembly, the Electoral Commission was
exercising a power impliedly conferred upon it by
the Constitution, by reason of its quasi-judicial
attributes;
(b) That said respondent presented his motion of
protest before the Electoral Commission on
December 9, 1935, the last day fixed by paragraph
6 of the rules of the said Electoral Commission;
(c) That therefore the Electoral Commission
acquired jurisdiction over the protest filed by said
respondent and over the parties thereto, and the
resolution of the Electoral Commission of January
23, 1936, denying petitioner's motion to dismiss
said protest was an act within the jurisdiction of the
said commission, and is not reviewable by means
of a writ of prohibition;

(d) That neither the law nor the Constitution
requires confirmation by the National Assembly of
the election of its members, and that such
confirmation does not operate to limit the period
within which protests should be filed as to deprive
the Electoral Commission of jurisdiction over protest
filed subsequent thereto;
(e) That the Electoral Commission is an
independent entity created by the Constitution,
endowed with quasi-judicial functions, whose
decision are final and unappealable;
( f ) That the electoral Commission, as a
constitutional creation, is not an inferior tribunal,
corporation, board or person, within the terms of
sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil
Procedure; and that neither under the provisions of
sections 1 and 2 of article II (should be article VIII)
of the Constitution and paragraph 13 of section 1 of
the Ordinance appended thereto could it be subject
in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions to a writ
of prohibition from the Supreme Court;
(g) That paragraph 6 of article 7 of the TydingsMcDuffie Law (No. 127 of the 73rd Congress of the
united States) has no application to the case at bar.
The case was argued before us on March 13, 1936. Before it
was submitted for decision, the petitioner prayed for the
issuance of a preliminary writ of injunction against the
respondent Electoral Commission which petition was denied
"without passing upon the merits of the case" by resolution of
this court of March 21, 1936.
There was no appearance for the other respondents.
The issues to be decided in the case at bar may be reduced
to the following two principal propositions:
question of jurisdiction
consideration.
squarely
presented
to
our
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our

system of government. It obtains not through express
provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each
department of the government has exclusive cognizance of
matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own
sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three
powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the
Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and
independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for
an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various departments of
the government. For example, the Chief Executive under our
Constitution is so far made a check on the legislative power
that this assent is required in the enactment of laws. This,
however, is subject to the further check that a bill may
become a law notwithstanding the refusal of the President to
approve it, by a vote of two-thirds or three-fourths, as the
case may be, of the National Assembly. The President has
also the right to convene the Assembly in special session
whenever he chooses. On the other hand, the National
Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the sense
that its consent through its Commission on Appointments is
necessary in the appointments of certain officers; and the
concurrence of a majority of all its members is essential to
the conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its power to
determine what courts other than the Supreme Court shall
be established, to define their jurisdiction and to appropriate
funds for their support, the National Assembly controls the
judicial department to a certain extent. The Assembly also
exercises the judicial power of trying impeachments. And the
judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter,
effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its
power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive
and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.
2. Has the said Electoral Commission acted without

or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to the
cognizance of the protest filed the election of the
herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous
confirmation of such election by resolution of the
National Assembly?
But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft
strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive,
the legislative and the judicial departments of the
government. The overlapping and interlacing of functions
and duties between the several departments, however,
sometimes makes it hard to say just where the one leaves off
and the other begins. In times of social disquietude or
political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution
are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In
cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only
constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine
the proper allocation of powers between the several
departments and among the integral or constituent units
thereof.
We could perhaps dispose of this case by passing directly

upon the merits of the controversy. However, the question of
jurisdiction having been presented, we do not feel justified in
evading the issue. Being a case prim impressionis, it would
hardly be consistent with our sense of duty to overlook the
broader aspect of the question and leave it undecided.
Neither would we be doing justice to the industry and
vehemence of counsel were we not to pass upon the
As any human production, our Constitution is of course

lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was
within the power of our people, acting through their
delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the
expression of their sovereignty however limited, has
established a republican government intended to operate
and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of
checks and balances, and subject to specific limitations and
1. Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the

Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the
controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in
the affirmative,

restrictions provided in the said instrument. The Constitution
sets forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and
limitations upon governmental powers and agencies. If these
restrictions and limitations are transcended it would be
inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a
mechanism by which to direct the course of government
along constitutional channels, for then the distribution of
powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere
expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good
government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the
limitation and restrictions embodied in our Constitution are
real as they should be in any living constitution. In the United
States where no express constitutional grant is found in their
constitution, the possession of this moderating power of the
courts, not to speak of its historical origin and development
there, has been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a
period of more than one and a half centuries. In our case,
this moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear
implication from section 2 of article VIII of our constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government.
Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent of such
powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the
instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when
the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it
does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it
does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the
legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred
obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine
conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to
establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights
which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This
is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial
supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review
under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial
review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be
exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties,
and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the
very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could
only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to
sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its
function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon
questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation.
More than that, courts accord the presumption of
constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because
the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but
also because the judiciary in the determination of actual
cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice
of the people as expressed through their representatives in
the executive and legislative departments of the
governments of the government.
But much as we might postulate on the internal checks of
power provided in our Constitution, it ought not the less to be
remembered that, in the language of James Madison, the
system itself is not "the chief palladium of constitutional
liberty . . . the people who are authors of this blessing must
also be its guardians . . . their eyes must be ever ready to
mark, their voice to pronounce . . . aggression on the
authority of their constitution." In the Last and ultimate
analysis, then, must the success of our government in the
unfolding years to come be tested in the crucible of Filipino

minds and hearts than in consultation rooms and court
chambers.
In the case at bar, the national Assembly has by resolution
(No. 8) of December 3, 1935, confirmed the election of the
herein petitioner to the said body. On the other hand, the
Electoral Commission has by resolution adopted on
December 9, 1935, fixed said date as the last day for the
filing of protests against the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly,
notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the
National Assembly as aforesaid. If, as contended by the
petitioner, the resolution of the National Assembly has the
effect of cutting off the power of the Electoral Commission to
entertain protests against the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly,
submitted after December 3, 1935, then the resolution of the
Electoral Commission of December 9, 1935, is mere
surplusage and had no effect. But, if, as contended by the
respondents, the Electoral Commission has the sole power
of regulating its proceedings to the exclusion of the National
Assembly, then the resolution of December 9, 1935, by
which the Electoral Commission fixed said date as the last
day for filing protests against the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, should
be upheld.
Here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it
does a conflict of a grave constitutional nature between the
National Assembly on the one hand, and the Electoral
Commission on the other. From the very nature of the
republican government established in our country in the light
of American experience and of our own, upon the judicial
department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation
of interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional
boundaries. The Electoral Commission, as we shall have
occasion to refer hereafter, is a constitutional organ, created
for a specific purpose, namely to determine all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly. Although the Electoral
Commission may not be interfered with, when and while
acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it
is beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted
by the people and that it is not subject to constitutional
restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a separate
department of the government, and even if it were,
conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law
between department powers and agencies of the
government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in
justifiable and appropriate cases. Discarding the English type
and other European types of constitutional government, the
framers of our constitution adopted the American type where
the written constitution is interpreted and given effect by the
judicial department. In some countries which have declined
to follow the American example, provisions have been
inserted in their constitutions prohibiting the courts from
exercising the power to interpret the fundamental law. This is
taken as a recognition of what otherwise would be the rule
that in the absence of direct prohibition courts are bound to
assume what is logically their function. For instance, the

Constitution of Poland of 1921, expressly provides that
courts shall have no power to examine the validity of statutes
(art. 81, chap. IV). The former Austrian Constitution
contained a similar declaration. In countries whose
constitutions are silent in this respect, courts have assumed
this power. This is true in Norway, Greece, Australia and
South Africa. Whereas, in Czechoslovakia (arts. 2 and 3,
Preliminary Law to constitutional Charter of the
Czechoslovak Republic, February 29, 1920) and Spain (arts.
121-123, Title IX, Constitutional of the Republic of 1931)
especial constitutional courts are established to pass upon
the validity of ordinary laws. In our case, the nature of the
present controversy shows the necessity of a final
constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of authority
between two agencies created by the Constitution. Were we
to decline to take cognizance of the controversy, who will
determine the conflict? And if the conflict were left undecided
and undetermined, would not a void be thus created in our
constitutional system which may be in the long run prove
destructive of the entire framework? To ask these questions
is to answer them. Natura vacuum abhorret, so must we
avoid exhaustion in our constitutional system. Upon
principle, reason and authority, we are clearly of the opinion
that upon the admitted facts of the present case, this court
has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the
subject mater of the present controversy for the purpose of
determining the character, scope and extent of the
constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly."
Having disposed of the question of jurisdiction, we shall now
proceed to pass upon the second proposition and determine
whether the Electoral Commission has acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction in adopting its resolution of
December 9, 1935, and in assuming to take cognizance of
the protest filed against the election of the herein petitioner
notwithstanding the previous confirmation thereof by the
National Assembly on December 3, 1935. As able counsel
for the petitioner has pointed out, the issue hinges on the
interpretation of section 4 of Article VI of the Constitution
which provides:
"SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed
of three Justice of the Supreme Court designated by the
Chief Justice, and of six Members chosen by the National
Assembly, three of whom shall be nominated by the party
having the largest number of votes, and three by the party
having the second largest number of votes therein. The
senior Justice in the Commission shall be its Chairman. The
Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly." It is imperative,
therefore, that we delve into the origin and history of this
constitutional provision and inquire into the intention of its
framers and the people who adopted it so that we may
properly appreciate its full meaning, import and significance.
The original provision regarding this subject in the Act of
Congress of July 1, 1902 (sec. 7, par. 5) laying down the rule
that "the assembly shall be the judge of the elections,
returns, and qualifications of its members", was taken from

clause 1 of section 5, Article I of the Constitution of the
United States providing that "Each House shall be the Judge
of the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its own
Members, . . . ." The Act of Congress of August 29, 1916
(sec. 18, par. 1) modified this provision by the insertion of the
word "sole" as follows: "That the Senate and House of
Representatives, respectively, shall be the sole judges of the
elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective
members . . ." apparently in order to emphasize the
exclusive the Legislative over the particular case s therein
specified. This court has had occasion to characterize this
grant of power to the Philippine Senate and House of
Representatives, respectively, as "full, clear and complete"
(Veloso vs. Boards of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar
[1919], 39 Phil., 886, 888.)
The first step towards the creation of an independent tribunal
for the purpose of deciding contested elections to the
legislature was taken by the sub-committee of five appointed
by the Committee on Constitutional Guarantees of the
Constitutional Convention, which sub-committee submitted a
report on August 30, 1934, recommending the creation of a
Tribunal of Constitutional Security empowered to hear
legislature but also against the election of executive officers
for whose election the vote of the whole nation is required,
as well as to initiate impeachment proceedings against
specified executive and judicial officer. For the purpose of
hearing legislative protests, the tribunal was to be composed
of three justices designated by the Supreme Court and six
members of the house of the legislature to which the contest
corresponds, three members to be designed by the majority
party and three by the minority, to be presided over by the
Senior Justice unless the Chief Justice is also a member in
which case the latter shall preside. The foregoing proposal
was submitted by the Committee on Constitutional
Guarantees to the Convention on September 15, 1934, with
slight modifications consisting in the reduction of the
legislative representation to four members, that is, two
senators to be designated one each from the two major
parties in the Senate and two representatives to be
designated one each from the two major parties in the House
of Representatives, and in awarding representation to the
executive department in the persons of two representatives
to be designated by the President.
Meanwhile, the Committee on Legislative Power was also
preparing its report. As submitted to the Convention on
September 24, 1934 subsection 5, section 5, of the proposed
Article on the Legislative Department, reads as follows:
The elections, returns and qualifications of the
members of either house and all cases contesting
the election of any of their members shall be judged
by an Electoral Commission, constituted, as to each
House, by three members elected by the members
of the party having the largest number of votes
therein, three elected by the members of the party
having the second largest number of votes, and as
to its Chairman, one Justice of the Supreme Court
designated by the Chief Justice.

The idea of creating a Tribunal of Constitutional Security with
comprehensive jurisdiction as proposed by the Committee
on Constitutional Guarantees which was probably inspired
by the Spanish plan (art. 121, Constitution of the Spanish
Republic of 1931), was soon abandoned in favor of the
proposition of the Committee on Legislative Power to create
a similar body with reduced powers and with specific and
limited jurisdiction, to be designated as a Electoral
Commission. The Sponsorship Committee modified the
proposal of the Committee on Legislative Power with respect
to the composition of the Electoral Commission and made
further changes in phraseology to suit the project of adopting
a unicameral instead of a bicameral legislature. The draft as
finally submitted to the Convention on October 26, 1934,
reads as follows:
(6) The elections, returns and qualifications of the
Members of the National Assembly and all cases
contesting the election of any of its Members shall
be judged by an Electoral Commission, composed
of three members elected by the party having the
largest number of votes in the National Assembly,
three elected by the members of the party having
the second largest number of votes, and three
justices of the Supreme Court designated by the
Chief Justice, the Commission to be presided over
by one of said justices.
During the discussion of the amendment introduced by
Delegates Labrador, Abordo, and others, proposing to strike
out the whole subsection of the foregoing draft and inserting
in lieu thereof the following: "The National Assembly shall be
the soled and exclusive judge of the elections, returns, and
qualifications of the Members", the following illuminating
remarks were made on the floor of the Convention in its
session of December 4, 1934, as to the scope of the said
draft:
xxx
xxx
xxx
Mr. VENTURA. Mr. President, we have a doubt here

as to the scope of the meaning of the first four lines,
paragraph 6, page 11 of the draft, reading: "The
elections, returns and qualifications of the Members
of the National Assembly and all cases contesting
the election of any of its Members shall be judged
by an Electoral Commission, . . ." I should like to
ask from the gentleman from Capiz whether the
election and qualification of the member whose
elections is not contested shall also be judged by
the Electoral Commission.
Mr. ROXAS. If there is no question about the
election of the members, there is nothing to be
judged; that is why the word "judge" is used to
indicate a controversy. If there is no question about
the election of a member, there is nothing to be
submitted to the Electoral Commission and there is
nothing to be determined.
Mr. VENTURA. But does that carry the idea also

that the Electoral Commission shall confirm also the
election of those whose election is not contested?
Mr. ROXAS. There is no need of confirmation. As
the gentleman knows, the action of the House of
Representatives confirming the election of its
members is just a matter of the rules of the
assembly. It is not constitutional. It is not necessary.
After a man files his credentials that he has been
elected, that is sufficient, unless his election is
contested.
Mr. VENTURA. But I do not believe that that is
sufficient, as we have observed that for purposes of
the auditor, in the matter of election of a member to
a legislative body, because he will not authorize his
pay.
Mr. ROXAS. Well, what is the case with regards to
the municipal president who is elected? What
happens with regards to the councilors of a
municipality? Does anybody confirm their election?
The municipal council does this: it makes a canvass
and proclaims in this case the municipal council
proclaims who has been elected, and it ends there,
unless there is a contest. It is the same case; there
is no need on the part of the Electoral Commission
unless there is a contest. The first clause refers to
the case referred to by the gentleman from Cavite
where one person tries to be elected in place of
another who was declared elected. From example,
in a case when the residence of the man who has
been elected is in question, or in case the
citizenship of the man who has been elected is in
question.
However, if the assembly desires to annul the
power of the commission, it may do so by certain
maneuvers upon its first meeting when the returns
are submitted to the assembly. The purpose is to
give to the Electoral Commission all the powers
exercised by the assembly referring to the
elections, returns and qualifications of the
members. When there is no contest, there is
nothing to be judged.
Mr. VENTURA. Then it should be eliminated.
Mr. ROXAS. But that is a different matter, I think Mr.
Delegate.
Mr. CINCO. Mr. President, I have a similar question
as that propounded by the gentleman from Ilocos
Norte when I arose a while ago. However I want to
ask more questions from the delegate from Capiz.
This paragraph 6 on page 11 of the draft cites cases
contesting the election as separate from the first
part of the sections which refers to elections,
returns and qualifications.

Mr. ROXAS. That is merely for the sake of clarity. In
fact the cases of contested elections are already
included in the phrase "the elections, returns and
qualifications." This phrase "and contested
elections" was inserted merely for the sake of
clarity.
Mr. CINCO. Under this paragraph, may not the
Electoral Commission, at its own instance, refuse to
confirm the elections of the members."
Mr. ROXAS. I do not think so, unless there is a
protest.
Mr. LABRADOR. Mr. President, will the gentleman
yield?
THE PRESIDENT. The gentleman may yield, if he
so desires.
Mr. ROXAS. Willingly.
Mr. LABRADOR. Does not the gentleman from
Capiz believe that unless this power is granted to
the assembly, the assembly on its own motion does
not have the right to contest the election and
qualification of its members?
Mr. ROXAS. I have no doubt but that the gentleman
is right. If this draft is retained as it is, even if twothirds of the assembly believe that a member has
not the qualifications provided by law, they cannot
remove him for that reason.
Mr. LABRADOR. So that the right to remove shall
only be retained by the Electoral Commission.
Mr. PELAYO. Mr. President, I would like to be

informed if the Electoral Commission has power
and authority to pass upon the qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly even though
that question has not been raised.
Mr. ROXAS. I have just said that they have no
power, because they can only judge.
In the same session, the first clause of the aforesaid draft
reading "The election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly and" was eliminated by
the Sponsorship Committee in response to an amendment
introduced by Delegates Francisco, Ventura, Vinzons,
Rafols, Lim, Mumar and others. In explaining the difference
between the original draft and the draft as amended,
Delegate Roxas speaking for the Sponsorship Committee
said:
xxx
xxx
xxx
Sr. ROXAS. La diferencia, seor Presidente,

consiste solamente en obviar la objecion apuntada
por varios Delegados al efecto de que la primera
clausula del draft que dice: "The elections, returns
and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly" parece que da a la Comision Electoral la
facultad de determinar tambien la eleccion de los
miembros que no ha sido protestados y para obviar
esa dificultad, creemos que la enmienda tien razon
en ese sentido, si enmendamos el draft, de tal
modo que se lea como sigue: "All cases contesting
the election", de modo que los jueces de la
Comision Electoral se limitaran solamente a los
casos en que haya habido protesta contra las
actas." Before the amendment of Delegate
Labrador was voted upon the following
interpellation also took place:
Mr. ROXAS. By the assembly for misconduct.

Mr. LABRADOR. I mean with respect to the
qualifications of the members.
El Sr. CONEJERO. Antes de votarse la enmienda,

quisiera
El Sr. PRESIDENTE. Que dice el Comite?
Mr. ROXAS. Yes, by the Electoral Commission.

El Sr. ROXAS. Con mucho gusto.
Mr. LABRADOR. So that under this draft, no
member of the assembly has the right to question
the eligibility of its members?
Mr. ROXAS. Before a member can question the
eligibility, he must go to the Electoral Commission
and make the question before the Electoral
Commission.
Mr. LABRADOR. So that the Electoral Commission
shall decide whether the election is contested or not
contested.
Mr. ROXAS. Yes, sir: that is the purpose.
El Sr. CONEJERO. Tal como esta el draft, dando

tres miembros a la mayoria, y otros tres a la minoria
y tres a la Corte Suprema, no cree Su Seoria
que esto equivale practicamente a dejar el asunto a
los miembros del Tribunal Supremo?
El Sr. ROXAS. Si y no. Creemos que si el tribunal o
la Commission esta constituido en esa forma, tanto
los miembros de la mayoria como los de la minoria
asi como los miembros de la Corte Suprema
consideraran la cuestion sobre la base de sus
meritos, sabiendo que el partidismo no es suficiente
para dar el triunfo.

El Sr. CONEJERO. Cree Su Seoria que en un
caso como ese, podriamos hacer que tanto los de
la mayoria como los de la minoria prescindieran del
partidismo?
El Sr. ROXAS. Creo que si, porque el partidismo no
les daria el triunfo.
xxx
xxx
the phrase "judge of" and the words "the elections", which
was accordingly accepted by the Convention.
The transfer of the power of determining the election, returns
and qualifications of the members of the legislature long
lodged in the legislative body, to an independent, impartial
and non-partisan tribunal, is by no means a mere experiment
in the science of government.
xxx
The amendment introduced by Delegates Labrador, Abordo

and others seeking to restore the power to decide contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members
of the National Assembly to the National Assembly itself, was
defeated by a vote of ninety-eight (98) against fifty-six (56).
In the same session of December 4, 1934, Delegate Cruz
(C.) sought to amend the draft by reducing the
representation of the minority party and the Supreme Court
in the Electoral Commission to two members each, so as to
accord more representation to the majority party. The
Convention rejected this amendment by a vote of seventy-six
(76) against forty-six (46), thus maintaining the non-partisan
character of the commission.
As approved on January 31, 1935, the draft was made to
read as follows:
(6) All cases contesting the elections, returns and
qualifications of the Members of the National
Assembly shall be judged by an Electoral
Commission, composed of three members elected
by the party having the largest number of votes in
the National Assembly, three elected by the
members of the party having the second largest
number of votes, and three justices of the Supreme
Court designated by the Chief Justice, the
Commission to be presided over by one of said
justices.
The Style Committee to which the draft was submitted
revised it as follows:
SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission
composed of three Justices of the Supreme Court
designated by the Chief Justice, and of six
Members chosen by the National Assembly, three of
whom shall be nominated by the party having the
largest number of votes, and three by the party
having the second largest number of votes therein.
The senior Justice in the Commission shall be its
chairman. The Electoral Commission shall be the
sole judge of the election, returns, and qualifications
of the Members of the National Assembly.
When the foregoing draft was submitted for approval on
February 8, 1935, the Style Committee, through President
Recto, to effectuate the original intention of the Convention,
agreed to insert the phrase "All contests relating to" between
Cushing, in his Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies

(ninth edition, chapter VI, pages 57, 58), gives a vivid
account of the "scandalously notorious" canvassing of votes
by political parties in the disposition of contests by the House
of Commons in the following passages which are partly
quoted by the petitioner in his printed memorandum of March
14, 1936:
153. From the time when the commons established
their right to be the exclusive judges of the
elections, returns, and qualifications of their
members, until the year 1770, two modes of
proceeding prevailed, in the determination of
controverted elections, and rights of membership.
One of the standing committees appointed at the
commencement of each session, was denominated
the committee of privileges and elections, whose
functions was to hear and investigate all questions
of this description which might be referred to them,
and to report their proceedings, with their opinion
thereupon, to the house, from time to time. When
an election petition was referred to this committee
they heard the parties and their witnesses and other
evidence, and made a report of all the evidence,
together with their opinion thereupon, in the form of
resolutions, which were considered and agreed or
disagreed to by the house. The other mode of
proceeding was by a hearing at the bar of the
house itself. When this court was adopted, the case
was heard and decided by the house, in
substantially the same manner as by a committee.
The committee of privileges and elections although
a select committee. The committee of privileges and
elections although a select committee was usually
what is called an open one; that is to say, in order to
constitute the committee, a quorum of the members
named was required to be present, but all the
members of the house were at liberty to attend the
committee and vote if they pleased.
154. With the growth of political parties in
parliament questions relating to the right of
membership gradually assumed a political
character; so that for many years previous to the
year 1770, controverted elections had been tried
and determined by the house of commons, as mere
party questions, upon which the strength of
contending factions might be tested. Thus, for
Example, in 1741, Sir Robert Walpole, after
repeated attacks upon his government, resigned his
office in consequence of an adverse vote upon the

Chippenham election. Mr. Hatsell remarks, of the
trial of election cases, as conducted under this
system, that "Every principle of decency and justice
were notoriously and openly prostituted, from
whence the younger part of the house were
insensibly, but too successfully, induced to adopt
the same licentious conduct in more serious
matters, and in questions of higher importance to
the public welfare." Mr. George Grenville, a
distinguished member of the house of commons,
undertook to propose a remedy for the evil, and, on
the 7th of March, 1770, obtained the unanimous
leave of the house to bring in a bill, "to regulate the
trial of controverted elections, or returns of
members to serve in parliament." In his speech to
explain his plan, on the motion for leave, Mr.
Grenville alluded to the existing practice in the
following terms: "Instead of trusting to the merits of
their respective causes, the principal dependence
of both parties is their private interest among us;
and it is scandalously notorious that we are as
earnestly canvassed to attend in favor of the
opposite sides, as if we were wholly self-elective,
and not bound to act by the principles of justice, but
by the discretionary impulse of our own inclinations;
nay, it is well known, that in every contested
election, many members of this house, who are
ultimately to judge in a kind of judicial capacity
between the competitors, enlist themselves as
parties in the contention, and take upon themselves
the partial management of the very business, upon
which they should determine with the strictest
impartiality."
155. It was to put an end to the practices thus
described, that Mr. Grenville brought in a bill which
met with the approbation of both houses, and
received the royal assent on the 12th of April, 1770.
This was the celebrated law since known by the
name of the Grenville Act; of which Mr. Hatsell
declares, that it "was one of the nobles works, for
the honor of the house of commons, and the
security of the constitution, that was ever devised
by any minister or statesman." It is probable, that
the magnitude of the evil, or the apparent success
of the remedy, may have led many of the
contemporaries of the measure to the information of
a judgement, which was not acquiesced in by some
of the leading statesmen of the day, and has not
been entirely confirmed by subsequent experience.
The bill was objected to by Lord North, Mr. De Grey,
afterwards chief justice of the common pleas, Mr.
Ellis, Mr. Dyson, who had been clerk of the house,
and Mr. Charles James Fox, chiefly on the ground,
that the introduction of the new system was an
essential alteration of the constitution of parliament,
and a total abrogation of one of the most important
rights and jurisdictions of the house of commons.
As early as 1868, the House of Commons in England solved
the problem of insuring the non-partisan settlement of the
controverted elections of its members by abdicating its

prerogative to two judges of the King's Bench of the High
Court of Justice selected from a rota in accordance with
rules of court made for the purpose. Having proved
successful, the practice has become imbedded in English
jurisprudence (Parliamentary Elections Act, 1868 [31 & 32
Vict. c. 125] as amended by Parliamentary Elections and
Corrupt Practices Act. 1879 [42 & 43 Vict. c. 75], s. 2;
Corrupt and Illegal Practices Preventions Act, 1883 [46 & 47
Vict. c. 51;, s. 70; Expiring Laws Continuance Act, 1911 [1 &
2 Geo. 5, c. 22]; Laws of England, vol. XII, p. 408, vol. XXI,
p. 787). In the Dominion of Canada, election contests which
were originally heard by the Committee of the House of
Commons, are since 1922 tried in the courts. Likewise, in the
Commonwealth of Australia, election contests which were
originally determined by each house, are since 1922 tried in
the High Court. In Hungary, the organic law provides that all
protests against the election of members of the Upper House
of the Diet are to be resolved by the Supreme Administrative
Court (Law 22 of 1916, chap. 2, art. 37, par. 6). The
Constitution of Poland of March 17, 1921 (art. 19) and the
Constitution of the Free City of Danzig of May 13, 1922 (art.
10) vest the authority to decide contested elections to the
Diet or National Assembly in the Supreme Court. For the
purpose of deciding legislative contests, the Constitution of
the German Reich of July 1, 1919 (art. 31), the Constitution
of the Czechoslovak Republic of February 29, 1920 (art. 19)
and the Constitution of the Grecian Republic of June 2, 1927
(art. 43), all provide for an Electoral Commission.
The creation of an Electoral Commission whose membership
is recruited both from the legislature and the judiciary is by
no means unknown in the United States. In the presidential
elections of 1876 there was a dispute as to the number of
electoral votes received by each of the two opposing
candidates. As the Constitution made no adequate provision
for such a contingency, Congress passed a law on January
29, 1877 (United States Statutes at Large, vol. 19, chap. 37,
pp. 227-229), creating a special Electoral Commission
composed of five members elected by the Senate, five
members elected by the House of Representatives, and five
justices of the Supreme Court, the fifth justice to be selected
by the four designated in the Act. The decision of the
commission was to be binding unless rejected by the two
houses voting separately. Although there is not much of a
moral lesson to be derived from the experience of America in
this regard, judging from the observations of Justice Field,
who was a member of that body on the part of the Supreme
Court (Countryman, the Supreme Court of the United States
and its Appellate Power under the Constitution [Albany,
1913] Relentless Partisanship of Electoral Commission, p.
25 et seq.), the experiment has at least abiding historical
interest.
The members of the Constitutional Convention who framed
our fundamental law were in their majority men mature in
years and experience. To be sure, many of them were
familiar with the history and political development of other
countries of the world. When , therefore, they deemed it wise
to create an Electoral Commission as a constitutional organ
and invested it with the exclusive function of passing upon

and determining the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly, they must have done so
not only in the light of their own experience but also having in
view the experience of other enlightened peoples of the
world. The creation of the Electoral Commission was
designed to remedy certain evils of which the framers of our
Constitution were cognizant. Notwithstanding the vigorous
opposition of some members of the Convention to its
creation, the plan, as hereinabove stated, was approved by
that body by a vote of 98 against 58. All that can be said now
is that, upon the approval of the constitutional the creation of
the Electoral Commission is the expression of the wisdom
and "ultimate justice of the people". (Abraham Lincoln, First
Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861.)
From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is
evident that the purpose was to transfer in its totality all the
powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters
pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an
independent and impartial tribunal. It was not so much the
knowledge and appreciation of contemporary constitutional
precedents, however, as the long-felt need of determining
legislative contests devoid of partisan considerations which
prompted the people, acting through their delegates to the
Convention, to provide for this body known as the Electoral
Commission. With this end in view, a composite body in
which both the majority and minority parties are equally
represented to off-set partisan influence in its deliberations
was created, and further endowed with judicial temper by
including in its membership three justices of the Supreme
Court.
The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation,
invested with the necessary authority in the performance and
execution of the limited and specific function assigned to it
by the Constitution. Although it is not a power in our tripartite
scheme of government, it is, to all intents and purposes,
when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent
organ. It is, to be sure, closer to the legislative department
than to any other. The location of the provision (section 4)
creating the Electoral Commission under Article VI entitled
"Legislative Department" of our Constitution is very
indicative. Its compositions is also significant in that it is
constituted by a majority of members of the legislature. But it
is a body separate from and independent of the legislature.
The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as
complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in
the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the
Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of
that power by the National Assembly. And this is as effective
a restriction upon the legislative power as an express
prohibition in the Constitution (Ex parte Lewis, 45 Tex. Crim.
Rep., 1; State vs.Whisman, 36 S.D., 260; L.R.A., 1917B, 1).
If we concede the power claimed in behalf of the National
Assembly that said body may regulate the proceedings of
the Electoral Commission and cut off the power of the
commission to lay down the period within which protests
should be filed, the grant of power to the commission would
be ineffective. The Electoral Commission in such case would

be invested with the power to determine contested cases
involving the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly but subject at all times to
the regulative power of the National Assembly. Not only
would the purpose of the framers of our Constitution of totally
transferring this authority from the legislative body be
frustrated, but a dual authority would be created with the
resultant inevitable clash of powers from time to time. A sad
spectacle would then be presented of the Electoral
Commission retaining the bare authority of taking
cognizance of cases referred to, but in reality without the
necessary means to render that authority effective whenever
and whenever the National Assembly has chosen to act, a
situation worse than that intended to be remedied by the
framers of our Constitution. The power to regulate on the
part of the National Assembly in procedural matters will
inevitably lead to the ultimate control by the Assembly of the
entire proceedings of the Electoral Commission, and, by
indirection, to the entire abrogation of the constitutional
grant. It is obvious that this result should not be permitted.
We are not insensible to the impassioned argument or the
learned counsel for the petitioner regarding the importance
and necessity of respecting the dignity and independence of
the national Assembly as a coordinate department of the
government and of according validity to its acts, to avoid
what he characterized would be practically an unlimited
power of the commission in the admission of protests against
members of the National Assembly. But as we have pointed
out hereinabove, the creation of the Electoral Commission
carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative in
character to limit the time with which protests intrusted to its
cognizance should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction
that where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined,
every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one
or the performance of the other is also conferred (Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, eight ed., vol. I, pp. 138, 139). In
the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to
the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the
Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to
promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of
its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary
implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral
Commission.
It is, indeed, possible that, as suggested by counsel for the
petitioner, the Electoral Commission may abuse its regulative
authority by admitting protests beyond any reasonable time,
to the disturbance of the tranquillity and peace of mind of the
members of the National Assembly. But the possibility of
abuse is not argument against the concession of the power
as there is no power that is not susceptible of abuse. In the
second place, if any mistake has been committed in the
creation of an Electoral Commission and in investing it with
exclusive jurisdiction in all cases relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, the remedy is political, not judicial, and must be
sought through the ordinary processes of democracy. All the

possible abuses of the government are not intended to be
corrected by the judiciary. We believe, however, that the
people in creating the Electoral Commission reposed as
much confidence in this body in the exclusive determination
of the specified cases assigned to it, as they have given to
the Supreme Court in the proper cases entrusted to it for
decision. All the agencies of the government were designed
by the Constitution to achieve specific purposes, and each
constitutional organ working within its own particular sphere
of discretionary action must be deemed to be animated with
the same zeal and honesty in accomplishing the great ends
for which they were created by the sovereign will. That the
actuations of these constitutional agencies might leave much
to be desired in given instances, is inherent in the perfection
of human institutions. In the third place, from the fact that the
Electoral Commission may not be interfered with in the
exercise of its legitimate power, it does not follow that its
acts, however illegal or unconstitutional, may not be
challenge in appropriate cases over which the courts may
exercise jurisdiction.
But independently of the legal and constitutional aspects of
the present case, there are considerations of equitable
character that should not be overlooked in the appreciation
of the intrinsic merits of the controversy. The Commonwealth
Government was inaugurated on November 15, 1935, on
which date the Constitution, except as to the provisions
mentioned in section 6 of Article XV thereof, went into effect.
The new National Assembly convened on November 25th of
that year, and the resolution confirming the election of the
petitioner, Jose A. Angara was approved by that body on
December 3, 1935. The protest by the herein respondent
Pedro Ynsua against the election of the petitioner was filed
on December 9 of the same year. The pleadings do not show
when the Electoral Commission was formally organized but it
does appear that on December 9, 1935, the Electoral
Commission met for the first time and approved a resolution
fixing said date as the last day for the filing of election
protest. When, therefore, the National Assembly passed its
resolution of December 3, 1935, confirming the election of
the petitioner to the National Assembly, the Electoral
Commission had not yet met; neither does it appear that said
body had actually been organized. As a mater of fact,
according to certified copies of official records on file in the
archives division of the National Assembly attached to the
record of this case upon the petition of the petitioner, the
three justices of the Supreme Court the six members of the
National Assembly constituting the Electoral Commission
were respectively designated only on December 4 and 6,
1935. If Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly
confirming non-protested elections of members of the
National Assembly had the effect of limiting or tolling the time
for the presentation of protests, the result would be that the
National Assembly on the hypothesis that it still retained
the incidental power of regulation in such cases had
already barred the presentation of protests before the
Electoral Commission had had time to organize itself and
deliberate on the mode and method to be followed in a
matter entrusted to its exclusive jurisdiction by the
Constitution. This result was not and could not have been
contemplated, and should be avoided.
From another angle, Resolution No. 8 of the National

Assembly confirming the election of members against whom
no protests had been filed at the time of its passage on
December 3, 1935, can not be construed as a limitation upon
the time for the initiation of election contests. While there
might have been good reason for the legislative practice of
confirmation of the election of members of the legislature at
the time when the power to decide election contests was still
lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by the
legislature cannot be construed as depriving the Electoral
Commission of the authority incidental to its constitutional
power to be "the sole judge of all contest relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the
National Assembly", to fix the time for the filing of said
election protests. Confirmation by the National Assembly of
the returns of its members against whose election no
protests have been filed is, to all legal purposes,
unnecessary. As contended by the Electoral Commission in
its resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the motion of
the herein petitioner to dismiss the protest filed by the
respondent Pedro Ynsua, confirmation of the election of any
member is not required by the Constitution before he can
discharge his duties as such member. As a matter of fact,
certification by the proper provincial board of canvassers is
sufficient to entitle a member-elect to a seat in the national
Assembly and to render him eligible to any office in said
body (No. 1, par. 1, Rules of the National Assembly, adopted
December 6, 1935).
Under the practice prevailing both in the English House of
Commons and in the Congress of the United States,
confirmation is neither necessary in order to entitle a
member-elect to take his seat. The return of the proper
election officers is sufficient, and the member-elect
presenting such return begins to enjoy the privileges of a
member from the time that he takes his oath of office (Laws
of England, vol. 12, pp. 331. 332; vol. 21, pp. 694, 695; U. S.
C. A., Title 2, secs. 21, 25, 26). Confirmation is in order only
in cases of contested elections where the decision is
adverse to the claims of the protestant. In England, the
judges' decision or report in controverted elections is certified
to the Speaker of the House of Commons, and the House,
upon being informed of such certificate or report by the
Speaker, is required to enter the same upon the Journals,
and to give such directions for confirming or altering the
return, or for the issue of a writ for a new election, or for
carrying into execution the determination as circumstances
may require (31 & 32 Vict., c. 125, sec. 13). In the United
States, it is believed, the order or decision of the particular
house itself is generally regarded as sufficient, without any
actual alternation or amendment of the return (Cushing, Law
and Practice of Legislative Assemblies, 9th ed., sec. 166).
Under the practice prevailing when the Jones Law was still in
force, each house of the Philippine Legislature fixed the time
when protests against the election of any of its members
should be filed. This was expressly authorized by section 18
of the Jones Law making each house the sole judge of the
election, return and qualifications of its members, as well as
by a law (sec. 478, Act No. 3387) empowering each house to
respectively prescribe by resolution the time and manner of

filing contest in the election of member of said bodies. As a
matter of formality, after the time fixed by its rules for the
filing of protests had already expired, each house passed a
resolution confirming or approving the returns of such
members against whose election no protests had been filed
within the prescribed time. This was interpreted as cutting off
the filing of further protests against the election of those
members not theretofore contested (Amistad vs. Claravall
[Isabela], Second Philippine Legislature, Record First
Period, p. 89; Urguello vs. Rama [Third District, Cebu], Sixth
Philippine Legislature; Fetalvero vs. Festin [Romblon], Sixth
Philippine Legislature, Record First Period, pp. 637-640;
Kintanar vs. Aldanese [Fourth District, Cebu], Sixth
Philippine Legislature, Record First Period, pp. 1121,
1122; Aguilar vs. Corpus [Masbate], Eighth Philippine
Legislature, Record First Period, vol. III, No. 56, pp. 892,
893). The Constitution has repealed section 18 of the Jones
Law. Act No. 3387, section 478, must be deemed to have
been impliedly abrogated also, for the reason that with the
power to determine all contest relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, is inseparably linked the authority to prescribe
regulations for the exercise of that power. There was thus no
law nor constitutional provisions which authorized the
National Assembly to fix, as it is alleged to have fixed on
December 3, 1935, the time for the filing of contests against
the election of its members. And what the National Assembly
could not do directly, it could not do by indirection through
the medium of confirmation.
Summarizing, we conclude:
(a) That the government established by the
Constitution follows fundamentally the theory of
separation of power into the legislative, the
executive and the judicial.
(b) That the system of checks and balances and the
overlapping of functions and duties often makes
difficult the delimitation of the powers granted.
(c) That in cases of conflict between the several
departments and among the agencies thereof, the
judiciary, with the Supreme Court as the final
arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism
devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate
constitutional boundaries.
than to any of the other two departments of the

governments.
(f ) That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly.
(g) That under the organic law prevailing before the
present Constitution went into effect, each house of
the legislature was respectively the sole judge of
the elections, returns, and qualifications of their
elective members.
(h) That the present Constitution has transferred all
the powers previously exercised by the legislature
with respect to contests relating to the elections,
returns and qualifications of its members, to the
Electoral Commission.
(i) That such transfer of power from the legislature
to the Electoral Commission was full, clear and
complete, and carried with it ex necesitate rei the
implied power inter alia to prescribe the rules and
regulations as to the time and manner of filing
protests.
( j) That the avowed purpose in creating the
Electoral Commission was to have an independent
constitutional organ pass upon all contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, devoid of
partisan influence or consideration, which object
would be frustrated if the National Assembly were to
retain the power to prescribe rules and regulations
regarding the manner of conducting said contests.
(k) That section 4 of article VI of the Constitution
repealed not only section 18 of the Jones Law
making each house of the Philippine Legislature
respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns
and qualifications of its elective members, but also
section 478 of Act No. 3387 empowering each
house to prescribe by resolution the time and
manner of filing contests against the election of its
members, the time and manner of notifying the
adverse party, and bond or bonds, to be required, if
any, and to fix the costs and expenses of contest.
(d) That judicial supremacy is but the power of

judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and
controversies, and is the power and duty to see that
no one branch or agency of the government
transcends the Constitution, which is the source of
all authority.
(l) That confirmation by the National Assembly of

the election is contested or not, is not essential
before such member-elect may discharge the duties
and enjoy the privileges of a member of the
National Assembly.
(e) That the Electoral Commission is an

independent constitutional creation with specific
powers and functions to execute and perform,
closer for purposes of classification to the legislative
(m) That confirmation by the National Assembly of

the election of any member against whom no
protest had been filed prior to said confirmation,
does not and cannot deprive the Electoral
Commission of its incidental power to prescribe the
time within which protests against the election of

any member of the National Assembly should be
filed.
We hold, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting
within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative
in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the
respondent Pedro Ynsua against the election of the herein
petitioner Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of the
National Assembly of December 3, 1935 can not in any
manner toll the time for filing protests against the elections,
returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time
as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.
In view of the conclusion reached by us relative to the
character of the Electoral Commission as a constitutional
creation and as to the scope and extent of its authority under
the facts of the present controversy, we deem it unnecessary
to determine whether the Electoral Commission is an inferior
tribunal, corporation, board or person within the purview of
sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The petition for a writ of prohibition against the Electoral
Commission is hereby denied, with costs against the
petitioner. So ordered.
PHILIPPINE COCONUT v. REPUBLIC
600 S 102 (2009)

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION,
INC. (COCOFED), MANUEL V. DEL ROSARIO,
DOMINGO P. ESPINA, SALVADOR P. BALLARES,
JOSELITO A. MORALEDA, PAZ M. YASON, VICENTE
A. CADIZ, CESARIA DE LUNA TITULAR, and
RAYMUNDO C. DE VILLA,
Petitioners,
- versus REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
JOVITO R. SALONGA, WIGBERTO E. TAADA,
OSCAR F. SANTOS, ANA THERESIA HONTIVEROS,
and TEOFISTO L. GUINGONA III,
Oppositors-Intervenors.
x---------------------------------------------x
DANILO B. URUSA,
Petitioner,
- versusREPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
x---------------------------------------------x
EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR.,
Petitioner,
- versusREPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
For consideration is the Urgent Motion to Approve
the Conversion of the SMC Common Shares into SMC
Series 1 Preferred Shares dated July 24, 2009 (Motion)
interposed by petitioners Philippine Coconut Producers
Federation, Inc., et al. (collectively, COCOFED). COCOFED
seeks the Courts approval of the conversion of 753,848,312
Class A and Class B common shares of San Miguel
Corporation (SMC) registered in the names of Coconut
Industry Investment Fund and the so-called 14 Holding
Companies (collectively known as CIIF companies) into
753,848,312 SMC Series 1 Preferred Shares (hereinafter,
the Conversion).
SMCs conversion or stock exchange offer is
embodied in its Information Statement[1] and yields the
following relevant features:
Instrument
Peso
denominated,
perpetual,
cumulative, non-voting
preferred shares with a
par value of Php 5.00
per share and Issue
Price of Php 75 per
share.
Dividend Rate - The SMC Board of
Directors shall have the
sole discretion to declare
dividends on the Series
1 Preferred Shares as
redeemed
by SMC,
the dividend rate shall
be at a fixed rate of 8%
per
annum, payable
quarterly and calculated
by reference to the
issue price.
Dividend Rate Step Up - Unless the Series
1 Preferred Shares are
redeemed
by SMC,
the Dividend Rate shall
be adjusted at the end
of the fifth year to the
higher
of
(a)
the
Dividend Rate or (b) the

prevailing
10-year
PDSTF rate plus a
spread of 300 bps.
collectively referred to as the SMC

Common Shares).
xxxx
Optional Redemption and Purchase - SMC

has the option, but not
the obligation, to redeem
all or part of the Series 1
Preferred Shares on the
third anniversary from
the Issue Date or on any
Dividend Date thereafter
at a redemption price
equal to the Issue price
of the Preferred Shares
plus all cumulated and
unpaid cash dividends.
Preference in the event of the liquidation of
SMC - The Series 1
Preferred Shares shall
have preference over
the common shares.
Selling costs - All selling costs pertaining to
the Common Shares
shall be borne by the
common shareholders. x
x x (Emphasis added.)
COCOFED proposes to constitute a trust fund to be

known as the Coconut Industry Trust Fund (CITF) for the
Benefit of the Coconut Farmers, with respondent Republic,
acting through the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA), as
trustee. As proposed, the constitution of the CITF shall be
subject to terms and conditions which, for the most part,
reiterate the features of SMCs conversion offer, albeit
specific reference is made to the shares of the 14 CIIF
companies. Among the terms and conditions are the
following:
Standard 1. There must be a
prior approval by this Honorable Court in
this instant case G.R. No. 177857-58
entitled COCOFED, et. al. vs. Republic of
the Philippines, of the conversion of the
sequestered SMC Common Shares, Both
Class A and Class B, registered in the
respective names of the 14 CIIF Holding
Companies, into SMC Series 1 Preferred
Shares.
Standard 2. The SMC shares to
be exchanged are all the shares of stock of
SMC that are presently sequestered and
registered in the respective names of the
14 CIIF Holding Companies in the total
number of 753,848,312, both Class A
and Class B shares x x x (hereinafter,
Standard 4. The SMC Common

Shares shall be converted at an exchange
ratio of one (1) SMC Series 1 Preferred
Share (hereinafter, SMC Series 1
Preferred Share) for every one (1) SMC
Common Share tendered. Each SMC
Series 1 Preferred Share shall have a par
value of (P5.00) per share and an Issue
Price of Seventy Five Pesos per share
(P75.00). Dividends on the SMC Series 1
Preferred Share shall be cumulative and
with dividend rate of 8% per annum
computed on the Issue Price of Seventy
Five Pesos (P75.00) per share.
xxxx
Standard 6. If and when SMC
exercises its right, but not an obligation, to
redeem after a period of three (3) years
the SMC Series 1 Preferred Shares, the
redemption shall in no case be less than
the Issue Price of Seventy Five Pesos
(P75.00) per share plus unpaid cumulative
dividends.
xxxx
Standard
8. Upon
written
appointment to the Board of Governors of
the [PCA] of the three (3) nominees
submitted to the President of the
Philippines by the [COCOFED], as
required by PD 1468, a trust fund is
thereby automatically created to be
identified and known as the Coconut
Industry Trust Fund (CITF) For the Benefit
of the Coconut Farmers and the trustee of
the Coconut Industry Trust fund shall be:
The Republic of the Philippines Acting
Through the Philippine Coconut Authority
for the Benefit of the Coconut Farmers.
Standard 9. The initial capital of
the [CITF] shall be the SMC Series 1
Preferred Shares that will be issued by
SMC as herein described.
Standard 10. Within ten (10)
days from and after the date of the final
approval by this Honorable Court of the
Conversion,
the
Republic
of
the Philippines,
acting
through
the
Presidential
Commission
on
Good
Government through its duly authorized

Chairman, shall deliver to SMC these
documents.
xxxx
Standard 11. As the issuer, SMC
shall within a reasonable period from a
trade, or exchange, of the SMC Common
Shares into 753,848,312 SMC Series 1
Preferred Shares through the facilities of
the Philippine Stock Exchange, deliver
duly-signed and issued SMC Series 1
Preferred Stock Certificate(s) in the name
of The Republic of the Philippines acting
though the Philippine Coconut Authority as
Trustee of the Coconut Industry Trust Fund
(CITF) For the Benefit of the Coconut
Farmers.
Standard 12. Upon compliance
by the SMC with its reciprocal obligations
according to the terms and intent of the
approval by this Honorable Court, then it
shall acquire absolute ownership of the
SMC Common Shares free from all liens,
writs, demands, or claims x x x.
Standard 13. The trustee of the
[CITF] shall have no authority to sell,
dispose, assign, encumber or otherwise
impair the value of the SMC Series 1
Preferred Shares, unless the same are
redeemed by SMC in accordance with its
Articles of Incorporation, as amended.
Standard 14. For purposes of
ascertaining x x x the identities and
addresses of coconut farmers, the
beneficiaries of the developmental projects
herein authorized to be financed, a ground
survey of coconut farmers as presently
defined, or hereafter defined, by the [PCA],
shall be conducted by the [PCA] x x x.
Standard 15. Thirty (30) days
after the receipt of any dividend paid on
the SMC Series 1 preferred Shares, the
net proceeds x x x shall be disbursed by
the Trustee in favor of these entities in
these proportions:
a.
Forty
percent
(40%) Coconut Industry Trust
Fund
constituted
under
Paragraph 11, Standard 8 and
Standard 9 hereof which the
Trustee should invest and reinvest only in the permissible
investments authorized under
Paragraph 11, Standard 16.
b. Twenty percent (20%)

To the (PCA) in trust and for
the benefit of the coconut
farmers, being the governmental
agency designated by law to
implement projects for the
coconut industry.
c. Twenty percent (20%)
To the [COCOFED], in its
capacity as the duly recognized
organization of the coconut
farmers
with
the
highest
membership.
d. Twenty
percent
(20%) To the PCA Accredited
Other
Coconut
Farmers
organizations The trustee shall
disburse this allocation to each
and all of those PCA Accredited
Other
Coconut
Farmers Organizations.
Standard 16. In the event of
redemption of the SMC Series 1 Preferred
Shares, whether in full or in part, the
proceeds of such redemption shall form
part of the capital of the [CITF] which the
Trustee shall invest, within a period of forty
eight (48) hours from receipt of the
proceeds of such redemption, and reinvest
in these permissible investments x x x.[2]
To the basic motion, respondent Republic filed its

Comment questioning COCOFEDs personality to seek the
Courts
approval
of
the
desired
conversion. RespondentRepublic also disputes COCOFEDs
right to impose and prescribe terms and conditions on the
proposed conversion, maintaining that the CIIF SMC
common shares are sequestered assets and are in custodia
legis under Presidential Commission on Good Governments
(PCGGs) administration. It postulates that, owing to the
sequestrated status of the said common shares, only PCGG
has the authority to approve the proposed conversion and
seek the necessary Court approval. In this connection,
respondent
Republic
cites Republic
v.
Sandiganbayan[3] where the coconut levy funds were
declared as prima facie public funds, thus reinforcing its
position that only PCGG, a government agency, can ask for
approval of the conversion.
On September 4, 2009, Jovito R. Salonga and four
others sought leave to intervene. Attached to the motion was
their Comment/Opposition-in-Intervention, asserting that the
government bears the burden of showing that the conversion
is indubitably advantageous to the public interest or will
result in clear and material benefit. Failure of the
government to carry the burden means that the current
status of the sequestered stocks should be maintained

pending final disposition of G.R. Nos. 177857-58. They
further postulate that even assuming that the proposal to
convert the SMC shares is beneficial to the government, it
cannot pursue the exchange offer because it is without
power to exercise acts of strict dominion over the
sequestered shares. Lastly, they argue that the proposed
conversion x x x is not only not advantageous to the public
interest but is in fact positively disadvantageous.
On September 4, 2009, respondent Republic filed a
Supplemental Comment in which it cited the Partial
Summary Judgment rendered by the Sandiganbayan on May
27, 2004 in Civil Case No. 33-F, declaring the Republic as
owner, in trust for the coconut farmers, of the subject CIIF
SMC shares (27%). The same comment also referred to
Resolution No. 365-2009 passed on August 28, 2009 by the
United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) Board of Directors
expressing the sense that the proposed conversion of the
CIIF SMC common shares to SMC Series I preferred shares
is financially beneficial.[4] Reference was also made to
PCGG Resolution 2009-037-756 dated September 2, 2009,
requesting the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to seek
approval of this Court for the proposed conversion.[5] By way
of relief, respondent Republic prayed that the PCGG be
allowed to proceed and effect the conversion.
On the preliminary issue as to the proper party to seek
the imprimatur on the conversion, the Court rules that it is
the PCGG, not COCOFED, that is authorized to seek the
approval of the Court of the Series 1 preferred shares
conversion.
As records show, PCGG sequestered the 753,848,312
SMC common shares registered in the name of CIIF
companies on April 7, 1986.[6] From that time on, these
sequestered shares became subject to the management,
supervision, and control of PCGG, pursuant to Executive
Order No. (EO) 1, Series of 1986, creating that commission
and vesting it with the following powers:
Sec. 3. The Commission shall
have the power and authority:
xxxx
(b) To sequester or place or
cause to be placed under its control or
possession any building or office wherein
any ill-gotten wealth or properties may be
found, and any records pertaining thereto,
in order to prevent their destruction,
concealment or disappearance which
would frustrate or hamper the investigation
or otherwise prevent the Commission from
accomplishing its task.
(c) To provisionally take over in
the public interest or to prevent its disposal
or dissipation, business enterprises and
properties taken over by the government
of the Marcos Administration or by entities
or persons close to former President

Marcos, until the transactions leading to
such acquisition by the latter can be
disposed of by the appropriate authorities.
Eventually, the coconut levy funds that were used to

acquire the sequestered CIIF SMC common shares in
question were peremptorily determined to be prima
facie public funds. The Court, in Republic v. COCOFED,
[7]
elucidated on the nature of the coconut levy funds:
Coconut Levy Funds Are Prima Facie
Public Funds
To avoid misunderstanding and
confusion, this Court will even be more
categorical and positive than its earlier
pronouncements: the coconut levy funds
are not only affected with public interest;
they are, in fact, prima facie public funds.
Public funds are those moneys
belonging to the State or to any political
subdivision of the State; more specifically,
taxes, customs duties and moneys raised
by operation of law for the support of the
government or for the discharge of its
obligations. Undeniably, coconut levy
funds satisfy this general definition of
public funds, because of the following
reasons:
1. Coconut levy funds are raised
with the use of the police and taxing
powers of the State.
2. They are levies imposed by the
State for the benefit of the coconut
industry and its farmers.
3. Respondents have judicially
admitted that the sequestered shares were
purchased with public funds.
xxxx
6. The very laws governing
coconut levies recognize their public
character.[8]
xxxx
2. Coconut Funds Are Levied for the
Benefit of the Coconut Industry and
Its Farmers.
xxxx

And explaining the PCGGs authority to vote the
sequestered shares acquired from the coconut levy, the
Court further wrote:
Having Been Acquired With Public Funds,
UCPB Shares Belong, Prima Facie, to the
Government
Having shown that the coconut
levy funds are not only affected with public
interest, but are in fact prima facie public
funds, this Court believes that the
government should be allowed to vote the
questioned shares, because they belong
to it as the prima facie beneficial and true
owner.
As stated at the beginning, voting
is an act of dominion that should be
exercised by the share owner. One of the
recognized rights of an owner is the right
to vote at meetings of the corporation. The
right to vote is classified as the right to
control. Voting rights may be for the
purpose of, among others, electing or
removing directors, amending a charter, or
making or amending by laws. Because the
subject UCPB shares were acquired with
government funds, the government
becomes their prima facie beneficial and
true owner.
Ownership includes the right to
enjoy, dispose of, exclude and recover a
thing without limitations other than those
established by law or by the owner. x x x
And the right to vote shares is a mere
incident of ownership. In the present case,
the government has been shown to be
the prima facie owner of the funds used to
purchase the shares. Hence, it should be
allowed the rights and privileges flowing
from such fact.[9]
Time and again, the Court has likened sequestration to
preliminary attachment and receivership under Rules 57 and
59 of the Rules of Court and has accordingly applied the said
rules to sequestration cases. So it was that in Republic v.
Sandiganbayan[10] the Court noted that the powers and
duties of the PCGG as conservator and protector of
sequestered assets are virtually the same as those
possessed by a receiver under Rule 59, Section 6:
SEC. 6. General powers of
receiver.Subject to the control of the
court in which the action or proceeding is
pending, a receiver shall have the power
to bring and defend, in such capacity,
actions in his own name; to take and keep
possession of the property in controversy;
to receive rents; to collect debts due to
himself as receiver or to the fund, property,

estate, person, or corporation of which he
is the receiver; to compound for and
compromise the same; to make transfers;
to pay outstanding debts; to divide the
money and other property that shall
remain among the persons legally entitled
to receive the same; and generally to do
such acts respecting the property as
the court may authorize. However, funds
in the hands of a receiver may be invested
only by order of the court upon the written
consent of all the parties to the action.
No action may be filed by or
against a receiver without leave of the
court which appointed him. (Emphasis
supplied.)
And in Republic v. Sandiganbayan,[11] the Court

observed that the PCGGs power to sequester alleged illgotten properties is likened to the provisional remedies of
preliminary attachment or receivership which are always
subject to the control of the court.
The PCGG, therefore, as the receiver of
sequestered assets and in consonance with its duty under
EO 1, Series of 1986, to protect and preserve them, has the
power to exercise acts of dominion provided that those acts
are approved by the proper court.
From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that it is
the PCGGnot COCOFED or the CIIF companiesthat has
the right and/or authority during sequestration to seek this
Courts approval for the proposed conversion. Consequently,
the terms and conditions sought by COCOFED for the
conversion are not material to the proposed conversion. At
most, COCOFEDs prayer for approval of the conversion
reflects its conformity to said transfiguration.
After a circumspect evaluation of the incident at bar,
we resolve to approve the conversion, taking into account
certain circumstances and hard economic realities as
discussed below:
Contrary to the assertion of intervenors Salonga, et
al., respondent Republic has satisfactorily demonstrated that
the conversion will redound to the clear advantage and
material benefit of the eventual owner of the CIIF SMC
shares in question.
Positive action must be taken in order to preserve the
value of the sequestered CIIF SMC common shares. The
worldwide economic crisis that started last year affected
thePhilippines and adversely impacted on several banks and
financial institutions, resulting in billions of loses. The
Philippine Stock Exchange Index retreated by a record
12.3% on October 27, 2008, the biggest single day fall since
July 24, 1987. This year, 2009, the recorded index of 2,859
has not regained the pre-October 27, 2008 level of 3,837.89.

Moreover, the CIIF SMC shares traded in the local
bourse have substantially dropped in value in the last two (2)
years. The SMC Class A shares, which commanded the
unit price of PhP 48 per share as of November 6, 2008, were
trading at PhP 57.50 in 2007 and PhP 65 in 2006. SMC
Class B shares, on the other hand, which fetched a price of
PhP 49 per share on November 6, 2008, were priced at PhP
61 in 2007 and PhP 74.50 in 2006. As of June 1, 2009,
Class A and Class B common shares of CIIF SMC closed
at PhP 53.50 and PhP 54 per unit, respectively. CIIF SMC
share prices may decline over the years.
No doubt shares of stock are not the safest of
investments, moored as they are on the ever changing
worldwide and local financial conditions. The proposed
conversion would provide better protection either to the
government or to the eventually declared real stock owners,
depending on the final ruling on the ownership issue. In the
event SMC suffers serious financial reverses in the short or
long term and seeks insolvency protection, the owners of the
preferred shares, being considered creditors, shall have, vis-vis common stock shareholders, preference in the
corporate assets of the insolvent or dissolved corporation. In
the case of the SMC Series 1 Preferred Shares, these
preferential features are made available to buyers of said
shares and are amply protected in the investment.[12]
More importantly, the conversion will ensure a higher
cumulative and fixed dividend rate of 8% per annum
computed at an issue price of PhP 75 per share, a yield not
currently available to common shareholders. The OSG
succinctly explained the undeniable advantages to be gained
from the conversion, thus:
Assuming that the data contained in
the SMC Information Sheet is accurate
and true, the closing prices of SMC
Common Class A and B Shares, as of
June 1, 2009, are Fifty-three pesos and
50/100 (P53.50) and Fifty-four Pesos
(P54.00), respectively. The proposed
conversion into Series 1 Preferred Shares
would give said share an issue price of
seventy-five pesos (P75.00) per share.
Corollarily, while the current SMC
Common shares have no fixed dividend
rate, the Series 1 Preferred Shares have a
determined dividend rate of eight percent
(8%) per annum. On these points
alone, the benefits to the shareholders
are clearly quantifiable.
Further still, the SMC Series 1
Preferred Shares are deemed cumulative.
As a cumulative share with preference in
the payment of dividends, it is entitled to
cumulate the dividends in those years
where no dividend is declared. Thus, if a
cumulative share is entitled to 10% of par
value as cumulative dividend yearly, where
no dividends are declared in 1989, 1990

and 1991 because there are no profits,
and dividends are declared in 1992
because of surplus or unrestricted
earnings, the holder of the preferred
cumulative shares is entitled to receive
40% of par value as his cumulative
dividends for the years 1989 to 1991.
The declaration of dividends is still

generally subject to the discretion of the
board but once dividends are declared, the
cumulative preferred shareholders are
entitled to receive the dividends for the
years when no declaration was made.
When dividends are declared, cumulative
dividends must be paid regardless of the
year in which they are earned. Therefore,
holders of the converted preferred shares
are assured of accumulated annual
dividends.[13] (Emphasis added.)
As it were, the issue price of PhP 75 per share

represents a 40% premium, more or less, over the prevailing
market price, i.e., about PhP 54 per share, of the CIIF SMC
common shares as of June 1, 2009. The 40% premium
amply covers the block and control features of the CIIF
SMC common shares. These shares below 33.33% are, to
many, not even considered vested with control premium. It
can be safely assumed that the issue price of PhP 75 per
share was based on an independent valuation of the CIIF
SMC shares, a requisite usually prescribed as a prelude to
Board approval.
The redemption value of the preferred shares
depends upon and is actually tied up with the issue price
plus all the cumulated and unpaid dividends. This
redemption feature is envisaged to effectively eliminate the
market volatility risks on the side of the share
owners. Undoubtedly, these are clear advantages and
benefits that inure to the share owners who, on one hand,
prefer a stable dividend yield on their investments and, on
the other hand, want security from the uncertainty of market
forces over which they do not have control.
Recent developments saw SMC venturing and
diversifying into several huge projects (i.e., oil, power,
telecommunications), business moves which understandably
have caused some critics to raise the concern over a
possible prejudice to the CIIF SMC common shares
presently under sequestration should such investments turn
sour. A number of people claim these new acquisitions are
likely to dissipate the assets of SMC. Some sectors
ratiocinate that the huge capital investments poured into
these projects may substantially erode SMCs profitability in
the next few years, resulting in diminished dividends
declaration. The proposed conversion will address the
concerns and allay the fears of well meaning sectors, and

insulate and protect the sequestered CIIF SMC shares from
potential damage or loss.
Moreover, the conversion may be viewed as a sound
business strategy to preserve and conserve the value of the
governments interests in CIIF SMC shares. Preservation is
attained by fixing the value today at a significant premium
over the market price and ensuring that such value is not
going
to
decline
despite
negative
market
conditions. Conservation is realized thru an improvement in
the earnings value via the 8% per annum dividends versus
the uncertain and most likely lower dividends on common
shares.
A fixed dividend rate of 8% per annum translates to
PhP 6 per preferred share or a guaranteed yearly dividend of
PhP 4,523,308,987.20 for the entire sequestered CIIF SMC
shares. The figures jibe with the estimate made by
intervenors Salonga, et al.[14] Compare this amount to the
dividends declared for common shares for the recent past
years which are in the vicinity of PhP 1.40 per unit share or a
total amount of PhP 1,055,387,636.80 per annum. The
whopping difference is around PhP 3.5 billion annually or
PhP 10.5 billion in three (3) years. On a year-to-year basis,
the difference reflects an estimated increase of 77% in
dividend earnings. With the bold investments of SMC in
various lines of business, there is no assurance of
substantial earnings in the coming years. There may even
be no earnings. The modest dividends that accrue to the
common shares in the recent years may be a thing of the
past and may even be obliterated by poor or unstable
performance in the initial years of operation of newlyacquired ventures.
In the light of the above findings, the Court holds that
respondent Republic has satisfactorily hurdled the onus of
showing that the conversion is advantageous to the public
interest or will result in clear and material benefit to the
eventually declared stock owners, be they the coconut
farmers or the government itself.
In their Comment/Opposition in Intervention,
intervenors Salonga, et al., however, assert that the
proposed conversion is positively disadvantageous to
respondent. They label the conversion as a devious
compromise favorable only to COCOFED and Cojuangco,
Jr. This allegation is simply conjectural. No evidence of the
alleged compromise was presented, as it was only
COCOFED that initiated the proposal for conversion.
The claim that the Cojuangco, Jr. group will be able
to oust the government nominees from the SMC Board, buy
the sequestered shares without encumbrances, and do so
with SMC funds is inaccurate and even speculative.
Intervenors completely miss the point. The genuine issue is
whether or not the desired conversion will be beneficial and
advantageous to the government or the eventual owners of
the shares. The perceived full control by Cojuangco, Jr. over
SMC after the common shares are released from
sequestration is hardly relevant to the propriety of the
conversion. Intervenors have not been able to demonstrate
how the domination of SMC by Cojuangco, Jr., if that should

come to pass, will prejudice or impair the interests of
respondent Republic in the preferred shares. The more
important consideration in the exercise at hand is the
preservation and conservation of the preferred shares and
the innumerable benefits and substantial financial gains that
will redound to the owner of these shares.
The conversion, so intervenors claim, will result in
the loss of voting rights of PCGG in SMC and enable
Cojuangco, Jr. to acquire the sequestered shares, without
encumbrances, using SMC funds. This is incorrect. The
common shares after conversion and release from
sequestration become treasury stocks or shares. Treasury
shares under Sec. 9 of the Corporation Code (Batas
Pambansa Blg. 68) are shares of stock which have been
issued and fully paid for, but subsequently reacquired by the
issuing corporation by purchase, redemption, donation or
through some other lawful means. Such shares may again
be disposed of for a reasonable price fixed by the board of
directors.
A treasury share or stock, which may be common or
preferred, may be used for a variety of corporate purposes,
such as for a stock bonus plan for management and
employees or for acquiring another company. It may be held
indefinitely, resold or retired. While held in the companys
treasury, the stock earns no dividends and has no vote in
company affairs.[15] Thus, the CIIF common shares that
would become treasury shares are not entitled to voting
rights. And should conversion push through, SMC, not
Cojuangco, Jr., becomes the owner of the reacquired
sequestered CIIF SMC common shares. Should SMC opt,
however, to sell said shares in the future, prospective
buyers, including possibly Cojuangco, Jr., have to put up
their own money to acquire said common shares. Thus, it is
erroneous for intervenors to say that Cojuangco, Jr., with the
use of SMC funds, will be acquiring the CIIF SMC common
shares.
It bears to stress that it was SMC which amended
its articles of incorporation, reclassifying the existing
composition of the authorized capital stock from PhP 4.5
billion common shares to PhP 3.39 billion common shares
and PhP 1.11 billion Series 1 Preferred Shares. The
conversion in question is a legitimate exercise of corporate
powers under the Corporation Code. The shares in question
will not be acquired with SMC funds but by reason of the
reconfiguration of said shares to preferred shares.
The Court can perhaps take judicial notice of the
governments enunciated policy to reduce, if not eliminate, its
exposure to business. The PCGG has held on to the
sequestered shares for more than 20 years and this may be
the opportune time to do away with its participation in SMC,
especially considering the claim that the sequestration of the
CIIF SMC common shares has frightened away investors
and stunted growth of the company.
The only interest of PCGG in SMC is to protect the
CIIF SMC common shares from dissipation. PCGG is neither
tasked to bar Cojuangco, Jr., or any individual for that matter,

from securing domination of the SMC Board, nor avert
Cojuangco, Jr.s acquisition of the CIIF SMC common shares
once released from sequestration. Even if the conversion is
approved, nothing can prevent the government from
prosecuting the people whom intervenors tag as responsible
for greasing the government and the coconut farmers of
billions of pesos.
On the other hand, COCOFED does not stand to
benefit from the conversion, because portions of the
dividends or proceeds from the redemption cannot be
allocated directly to proposed beneficiaries, as this will be
contrary to Sec. 2 of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 961, [16] as
amended by PD 1468. In addition, the preferred shares
which will be placed in the names of the CIIF companies, or
the dividends derived from said shares, shall remain as
sequestered assets until final resolution of the ownership
issue.
Intervenors suggest a deferment of any action on
the conversion until the CIIF SMC shares ownership issue is
settled. The General Offer of conversion, originally expiring
on August 24, 2009, was extended up to September 21,
2009. Availment of the conversion calls for immediate action.
Almost all of the parties-in-interestCOCOFED, UCPB as
administrator of the CIIF, and respondent Republic through
PCGGhave in one way or another signified their assent to
the conversion.
It has not successfully been demonstrated,
however, how the alleged eventual ownership by Cojuangco,
Jr. of the sequestered shares will prejudice the interests of
respondent Republic in the preferred shares. It cannot
likewise be figured out what distinct benefits the government
will obtain if the common shares are converted to preferred
shares or used in another manner after final resolution of the
ownership issue.
The indicated advantages of conversion, if
accomplished now, will surely make up for the
apprehensions arising from the possible domination by
Cojuangco, Jr. of the SMC in the future. The primordial
consideration is that the shares be shielded from dissipation
and potential risks that may arise from uncertainty of market
and business conditions. The conversion will ensure stable
share value and enhanced earnings of the shares.
Lest it be overlooked, the decision on whether to
proceed with the conversion or defer action thereon until final
adjudication of the issue of ownership over the sequestered
shares properly pertains to the executive branch,
represented by the PCGG. Just as it cannot look into the
wisdom behind the enactment of a law, the Court cannot
question the wisdom and reasons behind the decision of the
executive branch to ask for the conversion of the common
shares to preferred shares. Else, the Court would be
trenching on the well-settled doctrine of separation of
powers. The cardinal postulate explains that the three
branches must discharge their respective functions within the
limits of authority conferred by the Constitution. Under the
principle of separation of powers, neither Congress, the
President, nor the Judiciary may encroach on fields allocated

to the other branches of government. The legislature is
generally limited to the enactment of laws, the executive to
the enforcement of laws, and the judiciary to their
interpretation and application to cases and controversies.[17]
Jurisprudence is well-established that the courts
cannot intervene or interfere with executive or legislative
discretion exercised within constitutional limits. In JG
Summit Holdings, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[18] the Court
explained:
The discretion to accept or reject a
bid and award contracts is vested in the
Government agencies entrusted with that
function. The discretion given to the
authorities on this matter is of such wide
latitude that the Courts will not interfere
therewith, unless it is apparent that it is
used as a shield to a fraudulent award
(Jalandoni v. NARRA, 108 Phil. 486
[1960]). x x x The exercise of this
discretion is a policy decision that
necessitates prior inquiry, investigation,
comparison,
evaluation,
and
deliberation. This task can best be
discharged by the Government agencies x
x x. The role of the Courts is to ascertain
whether a branch or instrumentality of the
Government
has
transgressed
its
constitutional boundaries. But the Courts
will not interfere with executive or
legislative discretion exercised within those
boundaries. Otherwise, it strays into the
realm of policy decision-making.
It is only upon a clear showing of
grave abuse of discretion that the Courts
will set aside the award of a contract made
by a government entity. Grave abuse of
discretion implies a capricious, arbitrary
and whimsical exercise of power (Filinvest
Credit Corp. v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, No. 65935, 30 September 1988,
166 SCRA 155). The abuse of discretion
must be so patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law,
as to act at all in contemplation of law,
where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason
of passion or hostility (Litton Mills, Inc. v.
Galleon Trader, Inc., et al., L-40867, 26
July 1988, 163 SCRA 489). (Emphasis
supplied.)
In Ledesma v. Court of Appeals,[19] the Court added:

x x x [A] court is without power to
directly decide matters over which full

discretionary authority has been delegated
to the legislative or executive branch of the
government. It is not empowered to
substitute its judgment for that of Congress
or of the President. It may, however, look
into the question of whether such exercise
has been made in grave abuse of
discretion.
In Francisco,
Jr.
v.
UEM-MARA
Philippines
Corporation,[20] the Court elucidated the co-equal status of
the three branches of government:
Considering the co-equal status of
the three branches of government, courts
may not tread into matters requiring
the exercise
of
discretion of
a
functionary or office in the executive and
legislative branches, unless it is clearly
shown that the government official or office
concerned abused his or its discretion. x x
x
Furthermore,
x x x courts, as a rule,
refuse
to
interfere
with
proceedings
undertaken
by
administrative bodies or officials
in the exercise of administrative
functions. This is so because
such bodies are generally better
equipped technically to decide
administrative questions and that
non-legal factors, such as
government policy on the matter,
are usually involved in the
decisions. (Emphasis supplied.)
Corollary to the principle of separation of powers is the

doctrine of primary jurisdiction that the courts will DEFER to
the decisions of the administrative offices and agencies by
reason of their expertise and experience in the matters
assigned to them. Administrative decisions on matters within
the jurisdiction of administrative bodies are to be respected
and can only be set aside on proof of grave abuse of
discretion, fraud, or error of law.[21]
beneficial to convert the CIIF SMC shares as offered by the

SMC.
(2) Resolution No. 365-2009 of the UCPB Board of
Directors issued on August 28, 2009 reiterating its position
that the proposed conversion is financially beneficial, thus:
WHEREAS, in its regular meeting on
June 26, 2009, the UCPB Board of
Directors instructed the UCPB-TBG to
undertake a study on the financial and
economic viability of the proposed SMC
share conversion;
WHEREAS, the UCPB Board of
Directors in a special meeting on July 16,
2009 noted and referred to the PCGG and
CIIF
14
Holding
Companies
for
appropriate action UCPB-TBGs study on
the financial and economic viability of the
proposed SMC share conversion, which
states that, x x x it would be more
advantageous to convert the CIIFs SMC
common shares to the proposed SMC
Series 1 Preferred Shares.;
WHEREAS, during a special
meeting on July 20, 2009 among the
UCPB committee, PCGG and CIIF 14
Holding Companies, UCPB-TBGs study
on the financial and economic viability
of the proposed SMC share conversion
was affirmed and endorsed to the
PCGG and CIIF 14 Holding Companies
for appropriate action;
WHEREAS, apart from the legal
issues surrounding the CIIF SMC shares
and considering the immediate concern
to preserve the value of the said
shares, taking into account the current
global financial crisis and its effects on
the Philippine financial situation, and as
recommended by the UCPB-TBG, the
proposed SMC share conversion is
financially
and
economically
advantageous;
The only instance when the Courts ought to interfere is

when a department or an agency has acted with grave
abuse of discretion or violated a law. A circumspect review
of the pleadings and evidence extant on record shows that
the PCGG approved the conversion only after it conducted
an in-depth inquiry, thorough study, and judicious evaluation
of the pros and cons of the proposed conversion. PCGG
took into consideration the following:
WHEREAS, in addition, given the

dynamic market environment, when the
shares are converted, the shareholders
will no longer gain from any profits or
suffer from any losses resulting from
the change in business strategy of
SMC, or from any change in the
economic
situation
or
market
developments;
(1) Resolution of the UCPB Board of Directors

approved during its July 20, 2009 special meeting, where it
categorically decided and concluded that it is financially
BE IT RESOLVED, That, based on

the facts and circumstances prevailing
as of even date and the results of the

study conducted by the UCPB-TBG,
UCPB, as the administrator of the CIIF
and in compliance with its mandate
under PD 1468, concluded that it is
financially beneficial to convert the CIIF
SMC shares as offered by the San
Miguel Corporation. (Emphasis supplied.)
(3) The Department of Finance, through Secretary

Margarito B. Teves, upon the recommendation of the
Development Bank of the Philippines, confirmed that the
CIIF SMC shares conversion is financially and economically
advantageous and that it shall work for the best interest of
the farmers who are the ultimate and beneficial owners of
said shares.
(4) The letter of the OSG dated July 30,
2009 opined that the proposed conversion is legally
allowable as long as PCGG approval is obtained, thus:
Parenthetically, x x x our Office
received a copy of COCOFED, et al.s
Urgent Motion To Approve the Conversion
of the SMC Common Share Into SMC
Series 1 Preferred Shares dated July 24,
2009. Attached therewith is the SMC
Notice of Regular Meeting and Information
Statement dated July 23, 2009 which
discusses and compares the common
shares and Series 1 preferred shares. As
can be gleaned from the x x x Information
Statement dated July 23, 2009, the
advantages of conversion of the common
shares to Series 1 preferred shares are as
follows:
1.
The Series 1 preferred
shares shall be entitled to receive cash
dividends upon declaration made at the
sole option of the Board of Directors, fixed
at 8% per annum as determined by
Management. On the other hand, there is
no fixed dividend rate for common
shares. Further, no dividend shall be
declared and paid to holders of common
shares unless cash dividends shall have
been declared and paid to all holders of
the Series 1 preferred shares. Moreover,
the Series 1 preferred shares are
cumulative, which means that should
dividend payments get delayed, it would
eventually be paid in the future. This
feature is not available for common
shareholders.
2.
shares are redeemable in whole or in part,
at the sole option of the Company (SMC),
at the end of three (3) years from the Issue
Date or on any Dividend Payment Date

thereafter, at the price equal to the Issue
Price plus any accumulated unpaid cash
dividends. Series 1 preferred shares are
also perpetual or have no stated maturity.
3.
Should SMC decide not to
redeem the Series 1 preferred shares at
the end of the fifth year from Issue Date,
the Dividend Rate will be adjusted to the
higher of 8% per annum, and the
prevailing 10-year Philippine Dealing
System Treasury Fixing (PDST-F) Rate
plus a spread of up to 300 basis
points. This is an advantage because
there is the opportunity for the Series 1
Preferred Shareholders to enjoy a higher
dividend rate.
4.
shares have preference over common
shares upon liquidation.
5.
shares shall be listed with the Philippine
Stock Exchange within one year from
issue date which should provide liquidity to
the issue.
On
the
other
hand,
the
disadvantages to the conversion are as
follows:
1.
Holders
of
Series
1
preferred shares will have no voting rights
except as provided by law. Thus, the
PCGGs representatives in the SMC Board
will have been effectively removed from
participating in the management of the
SMC.
2.
Series 1 preferred shares
have no maturing date as these are
perpetual shares. There is no definite
assurance that the SMC will exercise its
option of redemption.
3.
Holders of the Series 1
preferred shares shall not be entitled to
any participation or share in the retained
earnings remaining after dividend payment
shall have been made on Series 1
preferred shares.
4.
There is no expiry date on
the SMCs option to redeem the Series 1
Preferred Shares. Should market interest
rates fall below the Dividend Rate, on or
after the 3rd anniversary from Issue Date,
the SMC may exercise the option to
redeem the Series 1 Preferred Shares.

It is also our considered view that
the conversion of the CIIF SMC common
shares to SMC Series 1 preferred shares
does not take them away from the
jurisdiction of the courts. In conversion,
the SMC common shares are merely
reclassified into SMC Series 1 preferred
shares without changing the proportional
interest of the stockholder in San Miguel
Corporation. Verily, the conversion of the
SMC common shares to SMC Series 1
preferred shares does not involve a
change in the condition of said shares.
The conversion of the SMC
common shares to SMC Series 1 preferred
shares and its eventual redemption is
legally allowable as long as the approval of
the PCGG is obtained for the amendment
of the Articles of Incorporation of SMC, to
allow the creation of the proposed
preferred
share
with
its
various
features. As long as the PCGG approval
is obtained, the exercise of the redemption
feature of the SMC in accordance with the
Amended Articles of Incorporation would
not constitute a sale of the sequestered
asset that is prohibited.
Hence, on September 2, 2009, the PCGG issued
Resolution No. 2009-037-756 approving the proposed
conversion:
WHEREAS, guided by the
foregoing, the Commission interposes no
objection to the conversion of the CIIF
shares in SMC, as well as the PCGG ITFCARP shares, including the qualifying
shares issued to PCGG/government
nominee-directors, to Series 1 Preferred
shares.
NOW,
THEREFORE,
be
it
RESOLVED, as it is hereby RESOLVED,
that the Commission hereby APPROVES,
as it is hereby APPROVED, the conversion
of the CIIF owned common shares, as well
as the PCGG ITF-CARP common shares,
including the qualifying shares issued to
PCGG/government nominee-directors in
San Miguel Corporation (SMC), to Series
1 Preferred Shares,PURSUANT to the
confirmation of the Department of
Finance (DOF) and legal opinion of the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
and SUBJECT to the conditions set
forth in the said OSG opinion and
requests of the OSG to seek the
approval of the Honorable Supreme
Court for the said proposed conversion.

(Emphasis supplied.)
The approval by the PCGG, for respondent
Republic, of the conversion is a policy decision which cannot
be interfered with in the absence of a showing or proof, as
here, that PCGG committed grave abuse of discretion.
In the similar Palm Avenue Realty Development
Corporation v. PCGG,[22] the Court ruled that the approval by
PCGG of the sale of the sequestered shares of petitioner
corporations allegedly owned and controlled by Kokoy
Romualdez was legal and could not be the subject of a writ
of certiorari or prohibition, absent proof that PCGG
committed a grave abuse of discretion. The price of PhP 29
per share approved by the PCGG was even below the
prevailing price of PhP 43 per share.
The Court ratiocinated in that case, thus:
It was no doubt in the light of these
undeniable actualities, and in an attempt to
discharge its responsibility to preserve the
sequestered stock and put an end to its
continuing and inexorable depreciation,
that the PCGG performed the acts now
subject of attack in the case at bar. Upon
these facts and considerations, it
cannot be said that the PCGG acted
beyond the scope of the power
conferred upon it by law. Indeed, it
would appear that its acts were
motivated and guided by the law
creating it and prescribing its powers,
functions,
duties
and
responsibilities. Neither can it be said
that it acted with grave abuse of
discretion. It evidently considered and
assessed the facts, the conflicting
positions of the parties concerned, and
the options open to it, before taking the
course of action that it did. The
possibility that it has erred cannot, to
be sure, be completely eliminated. As
above stated, it is entirely possible that
a better bargain might have been struck
with someone else. What cannot be
denied is that the arrangement actually
adopted and implemented has resulted
in the satisfactory reconciliation of the
conflicting facts in the case and the
preservation of the stock for the benefit
of the party that may finally be
adjudged by competent court to be the
owner thereof, and to a certain extent,
to the advantage of numerous
employees.
The petitioners have failed to
demonstrate that respondent PCGG has
acted without or in excess of the authority
granted to it by law, or with grave abuse of

discretion, or that it had exercised judicial
or quasi-judicial functions in this case,
correctible by certiorari. The Court thus
finds itself bereft of any justification to
issue the prerogative writ of certiorari or
prohibition
that
petitioners
seek.
By relinquishing its voting rights in the SMC Board

through the conversion, the government, it is argued, would
be surrendering its final arsenal in combating the
maneuverings to frustrate the recovery of ill-gotten wealth. It
may, as feared, be rendered helpless in preventing an
impending peril of a lurking dissipation.
This contention has no merit.
Salonga, et al. question the position of respondent

Republic that the benefits derived from the conversion are
clearly quantifiable. As they claim, the price differential of
PhP 21 per share is only profit on paper and at the price of
losing membership in the SMC Board. Moreover, they point
out that the dividends to be distributed to the common
shares may even be higher than the guaranteed 8%
dividends.
These contentions are specious. While it is conceded
that the price differential of PhP 21 is an unrealized gain, the
clear financial advantage derived from the transaction is not
the price differential but the guaranteed 8% dividend per
annum based on the issue price of PhP 75 per share as
compared to a much lower dividend rate that common
shares may earn. Worse, there may even be no dividends
for the common shares after distribution of the dividends to
the holders of the preferred shares in the event of poor or
weak business performance. In addition, unless the Series 1
Preferred Shares are redeemed at the end of the fifth year
from issue date, the dividend rate of 8% shall be increased
based on the following formula:
[T]he dividend rate shall be adjusted

to the higher of (i) the Dividend Rate, and
(ii) the prevailing 10-year PDST-F Rate (or
such successor benchmark rate) as
displayed under the heading Bid Yield as
published on the PDEx Page (or such
successor page) of Bloomberg (or such
successor electronic service provider) at
approximately 11:30 a.m. Manila time on
the date corresponding to the end of the
fifth year from the Issue Date (or if not
available, the PDST-F Rate on the banking
day prior to such date, or if still not
available, the nearest preceding date on
which the PDST-F Rate is available, but if
such nearest preceding date is more than
five days prior to the date corresponding to
the end of the fifth year from the Issue
Date, the Board of Directors at its
reasonable discretion shall determine the
appropriate substitute rate), plus a spread
of up to 300 basis points, in either case
calculated in respect of each share by
reference to the Issue Price.[23]
Undoubtedly, the holders of preferred shares will

have distinct advantages over common shareholders.
The mere presence of four (4) PCGG nominated

directors in the SMC Board does not mean it can prevent
board actions that are viewed to fritter away the company
assets. Even under the status quo, PCGG has no controlling
sway in the SMC Board, let alone a veto power at 24% of the
stockholdings. In relinquishing the voting rights, the
government, through PCGG, is not in reality ceding control.
Moreover, PCGG has ample powers to address
alleged strategies to thwart recovery of ill-gotten wealth.
Thus, the loss of voting rights has no significant effect on
PCGGs function to recover ill-gotten wealth or prevent
dissipation of sequestered assets.
It is also not correct to say that the holders of the
preferred shares lose all their voting rights. Sec. 6 of the
Corporation Code provides for the situations where nonvoting shares like preferred shares are granted voting rights,
viz:
Section 6. Classification of shares.
The shares of stock in corporations may
be divided into classes or series of shares,
or both, any of which classes or series of
shares may have such rights, privileges or
restrictions as may be stated in the articles
of incorporation: Provided, That no
share may be deprived of voting rights
except those classified and issues as
preferred or redeemable shares,
unless otherwise provided in this
Code: Provided, further, That there shall
always be a class or series of shares
which have complete voting rights.
xxxx
Where the articles of incorporation
provide for non-voting shares in the cases
allowed by this Code, the holders of such
shares shall nevertheless be entitled to
vote on the following matters:
1.
Amendment of the articles
of incorporation;
2.
Adoption and amendment
of by-laws;
3.
Sale, lease, exchange,
mortgage,
pledge
or
other
disposition
of
all
or

substantially all of the corporation
property;
4.
Incurring,
creating
or
increasing bonded indebtedness;
5.
Increase or decrease of
capital stock;
6.
Merger or consolidation of
the corporation with
another corporation or
other corporations;
7.
Investment of corporate
funds
in
another
corporation or business
in accordance with this
Code; and
8.
Dissolution
of
the
corporation.
Except as provided in the
immediately preceding paragraph, the vote
necessary to approve a particular
corporate act as provided in this Code
shall be deemed to refer only to stocks
with voting rights.
In addition, the holders of the preferred shares retain
the right to dissent and demand payment of the fair value of
their shares, to wit:
Sec. 81. Instances of appraisal right.
Any stockholder of a corporation shall
have the right to dissent and demand
payment of the fair value of his shares in
the following instances:
1.
In case any amendment to
the articles of incorporation has the effect
of changing or restricting the rights of any
stockholders or class of shares, or of
authorizing preferences in any respect
superior to those of outstanding shares of
any class, or of extending or shortening
the term of corporate existence;
2.
In case of sale, lease,
exchange, transfer, mortgage, pledge or
other disposition of all or substantially all of
the corporate property and assets as
provided in this Code, and
3.
In
consolidation.
case
of
merger
or
Lastly, the preferred shares will be placed under

sequestration and management of PCGG. It has powers to
protect and preserve the sequestered preferred shares even
if there are no government-nominated directors in the SMC
Board.
Thus, the loss of four (4) board seats would not in
reality prejudice the rights and interests of the holders of the
preferred shares. And such loss is compensated by the

tremendous financial gains and benefits and enormous
protection from loss or deterioration of the value of the CIIF
SMC shares. The advantages accorded to the preferred
shares are undeniable, namely: the significant premium in
the price being offered; the preference enjoyed in the
dividends as well as in the liquidation of assets; and the
voting rights still retained by preferred shares in major
corporate actions. All things considered, conversion to
preferred shares would best serve the interests and rights of
the government or the eventual owner of the CIIF SMC
shares.
It is likewise postulated that the dividends distributed
to the common shares may end up higher than 8%
guaranteed to preferred shares. This assumption is
speculative. With the huge investments SMC poured into
several big ticket projects, it is unlikely that there will be
much earnings left to be distributed to common
shareholders. And to reiterate, the decision to convert is
best left to the sound business discretion of the government
agencies concerned.
Salonga, et al. also argue that the proposed
redemption is a right to buy the preferred shares at less than
the market value. That the market value of the preferred
shares may be higher than the issue price of PhP 75 per
share at the time of redemption is possible. But then the
opposite scenario is also possible. Again, the Court need
not delve into policy decisions of government agencies
because of their expertise and special knowledge of these
matters. Suffice it to say that all indications show that SMC
will redeem said preferred shares in the third year and not
later because the dividend rate of 8% it has to pay on said
shares is higher than the interest it will pay to the banks in
case it simply obtains a loan. When market prices of shares
are low, it is possible that interest rate on loans will likewise
be low. On the other hand, if SMC has available cash, it
would be prudent for it to use such cash to redeem the
shares than place it in a regular bank deposit which will earn
lower interests. It is plainly expensive and costly for SMC to
keep on paying the 8% dividend rate annually in the hope
that the market value of the shares will go up before it
redeems the shares. Likewise, the conclusion that
respondent Republic will suffer a loss corresponding to the
difference between a high market value and the issue price
does not take into account the dividends to be earned by the
preferred shares for the three years prior to redemption. The
guaranteed PhP 6 per share dividend multiplied by three
years will amount to PhP 18. If one adds PhP 18 to the
issue price of PhP 75, then the holders of the preferred
shares will have actually attained a price of PhP 93 which
hews closely to the speculative PhP 100 per share price
indicated by movants-intervenors. In effect, there will not be
much prejudice to respondent on the assumption that the
speculative PhP 100 per share will be attained.
On the issue of the net dividends accruing
COCOFED, the Court rules that the dividends shall
placed in escrow either at the Land Bank
the Philippines or
at
the
Development
Bank
to
be
of
of

the Philippines in the name of respondent Republic and not
COCOFED.
Salonga, et al. also contend that PCGG cannot pursue
the exchange offer of SMC for want of power to exercise acts
of strict dominion over the sequestered shares.
and
receivershipare
provisional,
temporary,
designed
for
particular
exigencies, attended by no character of
permanency or finality, and always
subject to the control of the issuing
court or agency. (Emphasis supplied.)
This is incorrect.
The Court, to be sure, has not barred the conversion
of any sequestered common shares of a corporation into
preferred shares. It may be argued that the conversion
scheme under consideration may later on be treated as an
indirect sale of the common shares from the registered
owner to another person if and when SMC decides to
redeem the Series 1 preferred shares on the third
anniversary from the issue date of the preferred shares. Still,
given the circumstances of the pending incident, the Court
can validly allow the proposed conversion in accordance with
Rule 57, Sec. 11, in relation to Rule 59, Sec. 6 of the Rules
of Court. Sec. 11 reads:
SEC. 11. When attached property
may be sold after levy on attachment and
before entry of judgment.Whenever it
shall be made to appear to the court in
which the action is pending, upon hearing
with notice to both parties, that the
property attached is perishable, or that the
interests of all the parties to the action
will be subserved by the sale thereof,
the court may order such property to be
sold at public auction in such manner
as it may direct, and the proceeds of
such sale to be deposited in court to
abide the judgment in the action.
Republic
v.
sequestration is akin
receivership, thus:
Sandiganbayan[24] teaches
that
to preliminary attachment or
As thus described, sequestration,

freezing and provisional takeover are akin
to the provisional remedy of preliminary
attachment, or receivership. x x x By
attachment, a sheriff seizes property of a
defendant in a civil suit so that it may
stand as security for the satisfaction of any
judgment that may be obtained, and not
disposed of, or dissipated, or lost
intentionally or otherwise, pending the
action. x x x By receivership, property, real
or personal, which is subject of litigation, is
placed in the possession and control of a
receiver appointed by the Court, who shall
conserve it pending final determination of
the title or right of possession over it. x x x
All
these
remediessequestration,
freezing, provisional, takeover, attachment
Even if the conversion-cum-redemption partakes of an

indirect sale, PCGG can be allowed to approve the
conversion in line with our ruling in Palm Avenue Realty
Development Corporation,[25] subject to the approval of the
Court.
Evidently, as long as the interests of all the parties will
be subserved by the sale of the sequestered properties, the
Court may allow the properties to be sold. More so, the
Rules would allow the mere conversion of the shares of
stock given the evident benefit that all the parties would
receive from such conversion that far outweighs any
perceived disadvantage. Thus, the Court is clearly
empowered to allow the conversion herein pressed by the
PCGG.
While the PCGG, as sequestrator, does not exercise
acts of ownership over sequestered assets, the proper court,
where the case involving the sequestered asset is pending,
may, nevertheless, issue a positive and definite order
authorizing the sale of said assets. As we held in Republic
v. Sandiganbayan:
Our temporary restraining order
lifting the Sandiganbayan restraining order
did not, by any stretch of the imagination,
authorize PCGG to sell the Falcon
aircraft. A definite and positive order of a
court is needed before the jet plane may
be sold. The proper procedure after the
lifting of the restraining order was for
PCGG to go to Sandiganbayan and ask
for formal authority to sell the aircraft.[26] x x
x
The ruling in Republic v. Sandiganbayan voiding the

sale by PCGG of a sequestered jet does not apply squarely
to the incident at bar, because PCGG did not, in that case,
seek court approval before the sale. Moreover, PCGG was
not able to provide any justification for the seizure of the jet
from the lessee. In the pending incident before the Court, it
has long been settled that the CIIF SMC common shares
were bought by what have been declared as prima
facie public funds. Thus, the sequestration is justified. More
importantly, respondent Republic, as contained in the
Supplemental Comment filed by the OSG dated September
4, 2009, has adopted Resolution No. 2009-037-756
approving the conversion of the shares, and has prayed for
the approval by the Court of such conversion.
In sum, the conversion of the CIIF SMC Common
Shares to Series 1 Preferred Shares should be approved in

the best interests of everyone concerned including the
government and the Filipino people.
Once the subject conversion is accomplished, the
preferred shares shall remain in custodia legis and their
ownership shall be subject to final ownership determination
by the Court. In addition, the preferred shares shall be
registered in the name of the CIIF companies until the final
adjudication of the issue as to the true and legal owners of
said shares. Unless and until the ownership issue shall have
been resolved with finality, said preferred shares shall remain
under sequestration and PCGG management.[27]
WHEREFORE,
the
Court APPROVES the
conversion of the 753,848,312 SMC Common Shares
registered in the name of CIIF companies to SMC SERIES 1
PREFERRED SHARES of 753,848,312, the converted
shares to be registered in the names of CIIF companies in
accordance with the terms and conditions specified in the
conversion offer set forth in SMCs Information Statement
and appended as Annex A of COCOFEDs Urgent Motion
to Approve the Conversion of the CIIF SMC Common Shares
into SMC Series 1 Preferred Shares. The preferred shares
shall remain in custodia legis and their ownership shall be
subject to the final ownership determination of the
Court. Until the ownership issue has been resolved, the
preferred shares in the name of the CIIF companies shall be
placed under sequestration and PCGG management.
The net dividend earnings and/or redemption
proceeds from the Series 1 Preferred Shares shall be
deposited in an escrow account with the Land Bank of
the Philippines or the Development Bank of the Philippines.
Respondent Republic, thru the PCGG, is hereby
directed to cause the CIIF companies, including their
respective directors, officers, employees, agents, and all
other persons acting in their behalf, to perform such acts and
execute such documents as required to effectuate the
conversion of the common shares into SMC Series 1
Preferred Shares, within ten (10) days from receipt of this
Resolution.
Once the conversion is accomplished, the SMC
Common Shares previously registered in the names of the
CIIF companies shall be released from sequestration.
SO ORDERED.
TAWAY MPC v. LA TRINIDAD

646 S 21 (2011)
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 166471
March 22, 2011
TAWANG MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE Petitioner,

vs.
LA TRINIDAD WATER DISTRICT, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. The petition1 challenges the 1 October 2004
Judgment2 and 6 November 2004 Order3 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Judicial Region 1, Branch 62, La Trinidad,
Benguet, in Civil Case No. 03-CV-1878.
The Facts
Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative (TMPC) is a cooperative,
registered with the Cooperative Development Authority, and
organized to provide domestic water services in Barangay
Tawang, La Trinidad, Benguet.
La Trinidad Water District (LTWD) is a local water utility
created under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 198, as
amended. It is authorized to supply water for domestic,
industrial and commercial purposes within the municipality of
La Trinidad, Benguet.
On 9 October 2000, TMPC filed with the National Water
Resources Board (NWRB) an application for a certificate of
public convenience (CPC) to operate and maintain a
waterworks system in Barangay Tawang. LTWD opposed
TMPCs application. LTWD claimed that, under Section 47 of
PD No. 198, as amended, its franchise is exclusive. Section
47 states that:
Sec. 47. Exclusive Franchise. No franchise shall be granted
to any other person or agency for domestic, industrial or
commercial water service within the district or any portion
thereof unless and except to the extent that the board of
directors of said district consents thereto by resolution duly
adopted, such resolution, however, shall be subject to review
by the Administration.
In its Resolution No. 04-0702 dated 23 July 2002, the NWRB
approved TMPCs application for a CPC. In its 15 August
2002 Decision,4 the NWRB held that LTWDs franchise
cannot be exclusive since exclusive franchises are
unconstitutional and found that TMPC is legally and
financially qualified to operate and maintain a waterworks
system. NWRB stated that:
With respect to LTWDs opposition, this Board observes that:
1. It is a substantial reproduction of its opposition to the
application for water permits previously filed by this same
CPC applicant, under WUC No. 98-17 and 98-62 which was
decided upon by this Board on April 27, 2000. The issues

being raised by Oppositor had been already resolved when
this Board said in pertinent portions of its decision:
"The authority granted to LTWD by virtue of P.D. 198 is not
Exclusive. While Barangay Tawang is within their territorial
jurisdiction, this does not mean that all others are excluded
in engaging in such service, especially, if the district is not
capable of supplying water within the area. This Board has
time and again ruled that the "Exclusive Franchise" provision
under P.D. 198 has misled most water districts to believe that
it likewise extends to be [sic] the waters within their territorial
boundaries. Such ideological adherence collides head on
with the constitutional provision that "ALL WATERS AND
NATURAL RESOURCES BELONG TO THE STATE". (Sec.
2, Art. XII) and that "No franchise, certificate or authorization
for the operation of public [sic] shall be exclusive in
character".
xxxx
All the foregoing premises all considered, and finding that
Applicant is legally and financially qualified to operate and
maintain a waterworks system; that the said operation shall
redound to the benefit of the homeowners/residents of the
subdivision, thereby, promoting public service in a proper
and suitable manner, the instant application for a Certificate
of Public Convenience is, hereby, GRANTED.5
LTWD filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 18 November
2002 Resolution,6 the NWRB denied the motion.
LTWD appealed to the RTC.
The RTCs Ruling
In its 1 October 2004 Judgment, the RTC set aside the
NWRBs 23 July 2002 Resolution and 15 August 2002
Decision and cancelled TMPCs CPC. The RTC held that
Section 47 is valid. The RTC stated that:
The Constitution uses the term "exclusive in character". To
give effect to this provision, a reasonable, practical and
logical interpretation should be adopted without disregard to
the ultimate purpose of the Constitution. What is this ultimate
purpose? It is for the state, through its authorized agencies
or instrumentalities, to be able to keep and maintain ultimate
control and supervision over the operation of public utilities.
Essential part of this control and supervision is the authority
to grant a franchise for the operation of a public utility to any
person or entity, and to amend or repeal an existing
franchise to serve the requirements of public interest. Thus,
what is repugnant to the Constitution is a grant of franchise
"exclusive in character" so as to preclude the State itself
from granting a franchise to any other person or entity than
the present grantee when public interest so requires. In other
words, no franchise of whatever nature can preclude the
State, through its duly authorized agencies or
instrumentalities, from granting franchise to any person or
entity, or to repeal or amend a franchise already granted.
Consequently, the Constitution does not necessarily prohibit
a franchise that is exclusive on its face, meaning, that the

grantee shall be allowed to exercise this present right or
privilege to the exclusion of all others. Nonetheless, the
grantee cannot set up its exclusive franchise against the
ultimate authority of the State.7
TMPC filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 6 November
2004 Order, the RTC denied the motion. Hence, the present
petition.
Issue
TMPC raises as issue that the RTC erred in holding that
Section 47 of PD No. 198, as amended, is valid.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
What cannot be legally done directly cannot be done
indirectly. This rule is basic and, to a reasonable mind, does
not need explanation. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally
done directly can be done indirectly, then all laws would be
illusory.
In Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, Inc.,8 the Court held that,
"What one cannot do directly, he cannot do
indirectly."9In Akbayan
Citizens
Action
Party
v.
Aquino,10 quoting Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air
Terminals Co., Inc.,11 the Court held that, "This Court has
long and consistently adhered to the legal maxim that those
that cannot be done directly cannot be done
indirectly."12 In Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v.
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas,13 the Court held that, "No one is
allowed to do indirectly what he is prohibited to do directly."14
The President, Congress and the Court cannot create
directly franchises for the operation of a public utility that are
exclusive in character. The 1935, 1973 and 1987
Constitutions expressly and clearly prohibit the creation of
franchises that are exclusive in character. Section 8, Article
XIII of the 1935 Constitution states that:
No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization
for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to
citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or other entities
organized under the laws of the Philippines, sixty per centum
of the capital of which is owned by citizens of the
Philippines, nor shall such franchise, certificate or
authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer
period than fifty years. (Empahsis supplied)
Section 5, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution states that:
citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations
organized under the laws of the Philippines at least sixty per
centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, nor

shall such franchise, certificate or authorization be
exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty
years. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states that:
citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations
organized under the laws of the Philippines, at least sixty per
centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, nor shall
such franchise, certificate or authorization be exclusive in
character or for a longer period than fifty years. (Emphasis
supplied)
Plain words do not require explanation. The 1935, 1973 and
1987 Constitutions are clear franchises for the operation
of a public utility cannot be exclusive in character. The 1935,
1973 and 1987 Constitutions expressly and clearly state
that, "nor shall such franchise x x x be exclusive in
character." There is no exception.
When the law is clear, there is nothing for the courts to do
but to apply it. The duty of the Court is to apply the law the
way it is worded. In Security Bank and Trust Company v.
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 61,15 the Court held
that:
Basic is the rule of statutory construction that when the law
is clear and unambiguous, the court is left with no
alternative but to apply the same according to its clear
language. As we have held in the case ofQuijano v.
Development Bank of the Philippines:
"x x x We cannot see any room for interpretation or
construction in the clear and unambiguous language of the
above-quoted provision of law. This Court had steadfastly
adhered to the doctrine that its first and fundamental
duty is the application of the law according to its
express terms, interpretation being called for only when
such literal application is impossible. No process of
interpretation or construction need be resorted to where a
provision of law peremptorily calls for application. Where a
requirement or condition is made in explicit and
unambiguous terms, no discretion is left to the judiciary.
It must see to it that its mandate is obeyed."16 (Emphasis
supplied)
In Republic
of
the
Philippines
v.
Express
Telecommunications Co., Inc.,17 the Court held that, "The
Constitution is quite emphatic that the operation of a public
utility shall not be exclusive."18 In Pilipino Telephone
Corporation
v.
National
Telecommunications
Commission,19 the Court held that, "Neither Congress nor the
NTC can grant an exclusive franchise, certificate, or any
other form of authorization to operate a public
utility."20 In National Power Corp. v. Court of Appeals,21 the
Court held that, "Exclusivity of any public franchise has not
been favored by this Court such that in most, if not all, grants
by the government to private corporations, the interpretation
of rights, privileges or franchises is taken against the

grantee."22 In Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc.
v. National Telecommunications Commission,23 the Court
held that, "The Constitution mandates that a franchise
cannot be exclusive in nature."24
Indeed, the President, Congress and the Court cannot create
directly franchises that are exclusive in character. What the
President, Congress and the Court cannot legally do directly
they cannot do indirectly. Thus, the President, Congress and
the Court cannot create indirectly franchises that are
exclusive in character by allowing the Board of Directors
(BOD) of a water district and the Local Water Utilities
Administration (LWUA) to create franchises that are
exclusive in character.
In PD No. 198, as amended, former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos (President Marcos) created indirectly franchises that
are exclusive in character by allowing the BOD of LTWD and
the LWUA to create directly franchises that are exclusive in
character. Section 47 of PD No. 198, as amended, allows the
BOD and the LWUA to create directly franchises that are
exclusive in character. Section 47 states:
Sec. 47. Exclusive Franchise. No franchise shall be
granted to any other person or agency for domestic,
industrial or commercial water service within the district or
any portion thereof unless and except to the extent that
the board of directors of said district consents thereto
by resolution duly adopted, such resolution, however,
shall be subject to review by the Administration.
(Emphasis supplied)
In case of conflict between the Constitution and a statute, the
Constitution always prevails because the Constitution is the
basic law to which all other laws must conform to. The duty
of the Court is to uphold the Constitution and to declare void
all laws that do not conform to it.
In Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board,25 the
Court held that, "It is basic that if a law or an administrative
rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is
null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic
law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it
conflicts with the Constitution."26 In Sabio v. Gordon,27 the
Court held that, "the Constitution is the highest law of the
land. It is the basic and paramount law to which all other
laws must conform."28 In Atty. Macalintal v. Commission on
Elections,29 the Court held that, "The Constitution is the
fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all
other laws must conform and in accordance with which all
private rights must be determined and all public authority
administered. Laws that do not conform to the Constitution
shall be stricken down for being unconstitutional."30 InManila
Prince Hotel v. Government Service Insurance System,31 the
Court held that:
Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or
contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or
contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the

executive branch or entered into by private persons for
private purposes is null and void and without any force
and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the
fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation,
it
is
deemed
written
in
every
statute and
contract."32 (Emphasis supplied)
shall be limited to their proportionate share in the capital

thereof."
To reiterate, the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions

expressly prohibit the creation of franchises that are
exclusive in character. They uniformly command that "nor
shall such franchise x x x be exclusive in character." This
constitutional prohibition is absolute and accepts no
exception. On the other hand, PD No. 198, as amended,
allows the BOD of LTWD and LWUA to create franchises that
are exclusive in character. Section 47 states that, "No
franchise shall be granted to any other person or agency x x
x unless and except to the extent that the board of
directors consents thereto x x x subject to review by the
Administration." Section 47 creates a glaring exception to
the absolute prohibition in the Constitution. Clearly, it is
patently unconstitutional.
xxxx
Section 47 gives the BOD and the LWUA the authority to

make an exception to the absolute prohibition in the
Constitution. In short, the BOD and the LWUA are given the
discretion to create franchises that are exclusive in
character. The BOD and the LWUA are not even legislative
bodies. The BOD is not a regulatory body but simply a
management board of a water district. Indeed, neither the
BOD nor the LWUA can be granted the power to create any
exception to the absolute prohibition in the Constitution, a
power that Congress itself cannot exercise.
In Metropolitan Cebu Water District v. Adala,33 the Court
categorically declared Section 47 void. The Court held that:
Nonetheless, while the prohibition in Section 47 of P.D.
198 applies to the issuance of CPCs for the reasons
discussed above, the same provision must be deemed
void ab initio for being irreconcilable with Article XIV,
Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution which was ratified on
January 17, 1973 the constitution in force when P.D. 198
was issued on May 25, 1973. Thus, Section 5 of Art. XIV of
the 1973 Constitution reads:
"SECTION 5. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of
authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be
granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to
corporations or associations organized under the laws of the
Philippines at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is
owned by such citizens, nor shall such franchise,
certificate, or authorization be exclusive in character or for
a longer period than fifty years. Neither shall any such
franchise or right be granted except under the condition that
it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the
Batasang Pambansa when the public interest so requires.
The State shall encourage equity participation in public
utiltities by the general public. The participation of foreign
investors in the governing body of any public utility enterprise
This provision has been substantially reproduced in Article

XII Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution, including the
prohibition against exclusive franchises.
Since Section 47 of P.D. 198, which vests an "exclusive

franchise" upon public utilities, is clearly repugnant to
Article XIV, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution, it is
unconstitutional and may not, therefore, be relied upon by
petitioner in support of its opposition against respondents
application for CPC and the subsequent grant thereof by the
NWRB.
WHEREFORE, Section
47
of
P.D.
unconstitutional.34 (Emphasis supplied)
198
is
The dissenting opinion declares Section 47 valid and

constitutional. In effect, the dissenting opinion holds that (1)
President Marcos can create indirectly franchises that are
exclusive in character; (2) the BOD can create directly
franchises that are exclusive in character; (3) the LWUA can
create directly franchises that are exclusive in character; and
(4) the Court should allow the creation of franchises that are
exclusive in character.
Stated differently, the dissenting opinion holds that (1)
President Marcos can violate indirectly the Constitution; (2)
the BOD can violate directly the Constitution; (3) the LWUA
can violate directly the Constitution; and (4) the Court should
allow the violation of the Constitution.
The dissenting opinion states that the BOD and the LWUA
can create franchises that are exclusive in character "based
on reasonable and legitimate grounds," and such creation
"should not be construed as a violation of the constitutional
mandate on the non-exclusivity of a franchise" because it
"merely refers to regulation" which is part of "the
governments inherent right to exercise police power in
regulating public utilities" and that their violation of the
Constitution "would carry with it the legal presumption that
public officers regularly perform their official functions." The
dissenting opinion states that:
To begin with, a government agencys refusal to grant a
franchise to another entity, based on reasonable and
legitimate grounds, should not be construed as a violation of
the constitutional mandate on the non-exclusivity of a
franchise; this merely refers to regulation, which the
Constitution does not prohibit. To say that a legal provision is
unconstitutional simply because it enables a government
instrumentality to determine the propriety of granting a
franchise is contrary to the governments inherent right to
exercise police power in regulating public utilities for the
protection of the public and the utilities themselves. The
refusal of the local water district or the LWUA to consent to
the grant of other franchises would carry with it the legal

presumption that public officers regularly perform their official
functions.
The dissenting opinion states two "reasonable and legitimate
grounds" for the creation of exclusive franchise: (1)
protection of "the governments investment," 35 and (2)
avoidance of "a situation where ruinous competition could
compromise the supply of public utilities in poor and remote
areas."36
There is no "reasonable and legitimate" ground to violate the
Constitution. The Constitution should never be violated by
anyone. Right or wrong, the President, Congress, the Court,
the BOD and the LWUA have no choice but to follow the
Constitution. Any act, however noble its intentions, is void if it
violates the Constitution. This rule is basic.
In Social Justice Society,37 the Court held that, "In the
discharge of their defined functions, the three departments
of government have no choice but to yield obedience to
the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it
imposes must be observed."38 In Sabio,39 the Court held
that, "the Constitution is the highest law of the land. It is the
basic and paramount law to which x x x all persons,
including the highest officials of the land, must defer. No
act shall be valid, however noble its intentions, if it
conflicts with the Constitution."40 In Bengzon v.
Drilon,41 the Court held that, "the three branches of
government must discharge their respective functions within
the
limits
of
authority
conferred
by
the
Constitution."42 In Mutuc v. Commission on Elections,43 the
Court held that, "The three departments of government in
the discharge of the functions with which it
is [sic] entrusted have no choice but to yield obedience
to [the Constitutions] commands. Whatever limits it
imposes must be observed."44
Police power does not include the power to violate the
Constitution. Police power is the plenary power vested in
Congress to make laws not repugnant to the Constitution.
This rule is basic.
In Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Viron
Transportation Co., Inc.,45 the Court held that, "Police power
is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make,
ordain, and establish wholesome and reasonable laws,
statutes
and
ordinances, not
repugnant
to
the
Constitution."46 In Carlos Superdrug Corp. v. Department of
Social Welfare and Development,47 the Court held that,
police power "is the power vested in the legislature by the
constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of
wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances x
x x not repugnant to the constitution."48 In Metropolitan
Manila Development Authority v. Garin,49 the Court held that,
"police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty, is the
power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make,
ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and
reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances x x x not
repugnant to the Constitution."50
There is no question that the effect of Section 47 is the

creation of franchises that are exclusive in character. Section
47 expressly allows the BOD and the LWUA to create
franchises that are exclusive in character.
The dissenting opinion explains why the BOD and the LWUA
should be allowed to create franchises that are exclusive in
character to protect "the governments investment" and to
avoid "a situation where ruinous competition could
compromise the supply of public utilities in poor and remote
areas." The dissenting opinion declares that these are
"reasonable and legitimate grounds." The dissenting opinion
also states that, "The refusal of the local water district or the
LWUA to consent to the grant of other franchises would carry
with it the legal presumption that public officers regularly
perform their official functions."
When the effect of a law is unconstitutional, it is void.
In Sabio,51 the Court held that, "A statute may be declared
unconstitutional because it is not within the legislative
power to enact; or it creates or establishes methods or forms
that infringe constitutional principles; or its purpose or effect
violates the Constitution or its basic principles."52 The
effect of Section 47 violates the Constitution, thus, it is void.
In Strategic Alliance Development Corporation v. Radstock
Securities Limited,53 the Court held that, "This Court must
perform
its
duty
to
defend
and
uphold
the
Constitution."54 In Bengzon,55 the Court held that, "The
Constitution expressly confers on the judiciary the power to
maintain inviolate what it decrees."56 In Mutuc,57 the Court
held that:
The concept of the Constitution as the fundamental law,
setting forth the criterion for the validity of any public act
whether proceeding from the highest official or the lowest
functionary, is a postulate of our system of government. That
is to manifest fealty to the rule of law, with priority accorded
to that which occupies the topmost rung in the legal
hierarchy. The three departments of government in the
discharge of the functions with which it is [sic] entrusted have
no choice but to yield obedience to its commands. Whatever
limits it imposes must be observed. Congress in the
enactment of statutes must ever be on guard lest the
restrictions on its authority, whether substantive or formal, be
transcended. The Presidency in the execution of the laws
cannot ignore or disregard what it ordains. In its task of
applying the law to the facts as found in deciding cases, the
judiciary is called upon to maintain inviolate what is decreed
by the fundamental law. Even its power of judicial review to
pass upon the validity of the acts of the coordinate branches
in the course of adjudication is a logical corollary of this basic
principle that the Constitution is paramount. It overrides any
governmental measure that fails to live up to its mandates.
Thereby there is a recognition of its being the supreme law.58
Sustaining the RTCs ruling would make a dangerous
precedent. It will allow Congress to do indirectly what it
cannot do directly. In order to circumvent the constitutional
prohibition on franchises that are exclusive in character, all

Congress has to do is to create a law allowing the BOD and
the LWUA to create franchises that are exclusive in
character, as in the present case.
WHEREFORE,
we GRANT the
petition.
We DECLARE Section 47 of Presidential Decree No.
198UNCONSTITUTIONAL. We SET ASIDE the 1 October
2004 Judgment and 6 November 2004 Order of the Regional
Trial Court, Judicial Region 1, Branch 62, La Trinidad,
Benguet, in Civil Case No. 03-CV-1878 andREINSTATE the
23 July 2002 Resolution and 15 August 2002 Decision of the
National Water Resources Board.
SO ORDERED.
METROBANK v. TOBIAS
664 S 165 (2012)
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
This appeal assails the adverse decision of the Court of
Appeals
(CA)1 that
dismissed
the
petition
for certiorari brought by the petitioner to nullify and set aside
the resolutions issued by the Secretary of Justice on July 20,
20042 and November 18, 20053 directing the City Prosecutor
of Malabon City to withdraw the information in Criminal Case
No. 27020 entitledPeople v. Antonino O. Tobias III.

We affirm the CA in keeping with the principle of noninterference with the prerogative of the Secretary of Justice
to review the resolutions of the public prosecutor in the
latters determination of the existence of probable cause,
absent any showing that the Secretary of Justice thereby
commits grave abuse of his discretion.
Supreme Court
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
Antecedents
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO.
(METROBANK), represented by ROSELLA A.
SANTIAGO,
Petitioner,
-versus-
ANTONINO O. TOBIAS III,

Respondent.
G.R. No. 177780
In 1997, Rosella A. Santiago, then the OIC-Branch Head of

Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company (METROBANK) in
Valero Street, Makati City, was introduced to respondent
Antonino O. Tobias III (Tobias) by one Jose Eduardo
Present:
Gonzales, a valued client of METROBANK. Subsequently,
Tobias opened a savings/current account for and in the
name of Adam Merchandising, his frozen meat business. Six
months later, Tobias applied for a loan from METROBANK,
which in due course conducted trade and credit verification
CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,
of Tobias that resulted in negative findings. METROBANK
next proceeded to appraise the property Tobias offered as
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
collateral by asking him for a photocopy of the title and other
related documents.4 The property consisted of four parcels of
BERSAMIN,
land located in Malabon City, Metro Manila with a total area
of 6,080 square meters and covered by Transfer Certificate
VILLARAMA, JR.,ofand
Title (TCT) No. M-16751.5 Based on the financial
statements submitted by Tobias, METROBANK approved a
*
credit line for P40,000,000.00. On August 15, 1997, Joselito
PERLAS-BERNABE,
Bermeo Moreno, Lead Internal Affairs Investigator of
METROBANK, proceeded to the Registry of Deeds of
Malabon to cause the annotation of the deed of real estate
mortgage on TCT No. M-16751. The annotation was Entry
Promulgated:
No. 26897.6
January 25, 2012

Thereafter, Tobias initially availed himself of P20,000,000,
but took out the balance within six months.7 He paid the
interest on the loan for about a year before defaulting. His
loan was restructured to 5-years upon his request. Yet, after
two months, he again defaulted. Thus, the mortgage was
foreclosed, and the property was sold to METROBANK as
the lone bidder.8On June 11, 1999, the certificate of sale was
issued in favor of METROBANK.9
When the certificate of sale was presented for registration to

the Registry of Deeds of Malabon, no corresponding original
copy of TCT No. M-16751 was found in the registry vault.
Atty. Sarah Principe-Bido, Deputy Register of Deeds of
Malabon, went on to verify TCT No. M-16751 and learned
that Serial No. 4348590 appearing therein had been issued
for TCT No. M-15363 in the name of one Alberto Cruz; while
TCT No. 16751 (now TCT No. 390146) appeared to have
been issued in the name of Eugenio S. Cruz and Co. for a
parcel of land located in Navotas.10
Given such findings, METROBANK requested the

Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) to
investigate.11 In its report dated May 29, 2000, 12 PAOCTF
concluded that TCT No. M-16751 and the tax declarations
submitted by Tobias were fictitious. PAOCTF recommended
the filing against Tobias of a criminal complaint for estafa
through falsification of public documents under paragraph 2
(a) of Article 315, in relation to Articles 172(1) and 171(7) of
the Revised Penal Code.13
The Office of the City Prosecutor of Malabon ultimately

charged Tobias with estafa through falsification of public
documents through the following information,14 viz:
xxx
That on or about the 15th day of August, 1997 in the
Municipality of Malabon, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, by means of deceit, false
pretense, fraudulent acts and misrepresentation
executed prior to or simultaneous with the
commission of fraud, represented to METROBANK,
as represented by MS. ROSELLA S. SANTIAGO,
that he is the registered owner of a parcel of land
covered by TCT No. M-16751 which he represented
to be true and genuine when he knew the
Certificate of Title No. M-16751 is fake and spurious
and executed a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of
Metrobank and offered the same as collateral for a
loan and Rosella S. Santiago relying on said
misrepresentation gave to accused, the amount
of P20,000,000.00 and once in possession of the

amount, with intent to defraud, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously failed to deliver the land covered by
spurious title and misappropriate, misapply and
converted the said amount ofP20,000,000.00 to his
own personal use and benefit and despite repeated
demands accused failed and refused and still fails
and refuses to return the amount to complainant
METROBANK, and/or delivered the land covered in
the spurious title in the aforementioned amount
of P20,000,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.15
Tobias filed a motion for re-investigation,16 which was

granted.
In his counter-affidavit submitted during the reinvestigation,17 Tobias averred that he had bought the
property from one Leonardo Fajardo through real estate
brokers Augusto Munsuyac and Carmelito Pilapil; that
Natalio Bartolome, his financial consultant from Carwin
International, had convinced him to purchase the property
due to its being an ideal site for his meat processing plant
and cold storage business; that the actual inspection of the
property as well as the verification made in the Registry of
Deeds of Malabon City had ascertained the veracity of TCT
No. 106083 under the name of Leonardo Fajardo; that he
had applied for the loan from METROBANK to pay the
purchase price by offering the property as collateral; that in
order for the final application to be processed and the loan
proceeds to be released, METROBANK had advised him to
have the title first transferred to his name; that he had
executed a deed of absolute sale with Fajardo covering the
property, and that said instrument had been properly
registered in the Registry of Deeds; that the transfer of the
title, being under the account of the seller, had been
processed by seller Fajardo and his brokers Munsuyac and
Pilapil; that his title and the property had been inspected and
verified by METROBANKs personnel; and that he did not
have any intention to defraud METROBANK.
Nonetheless, on December 27, 2002, the City Prosecutor of

Malabon still found probable cause against Tobias, and
recommended his being charged with estafa through
falsification of public document.18
Tobias appealed to the Department of Justice

(DOJ).

On July 20, 2004, then Acting Secretary of Justice

Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez issued a resolution directing the
withdrawal of the information filed against Tobias,19 to wit:
WHEREFORE,
the
assailed
resolution is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The City Prosecutor of Malabon
City is directed to cause the withdrawal of
the Information in Crim. Case No. 27020
against respondent Antonino O. Tobias III,
and report the action taken thereon within
ten (10) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.
Acting Secretary of Justice Gutierrez opined that Tobias had

sufficiently established his good faith in purchasing the
property; that he had even used part of the proceeds of the
loan to pay the seller; that it was METROBANK that had
caused the annotation of the mortgage on the TCT, thereby
creating an impression that the title had been existing in the
Registry of Deeds at that time; that, accordingly, the
presumption that the possessor of a falsified document was
the author of the falsification did not apply because it was
always subject to the qualification or reference as to the
approximate time of the commission of the falsification.
METROBANK moved to reconsider,20 arguing that Tobias

had employed deceit or false pretense in offering the
property as collateral by using a fake title; and that the
presumption that the possessor of the document was the
author of the falsification applied because no other person
could have falsified the TCT and would have benefitted
therefrom except Tobias himself.
On November 18, 2005, Secretary of Justice Raul

M.
Gonzalez
denied
METROBANKs motion for
reconsideration.21
Ruling of the CA
METROBANK challenged the adverse resolutions

through certiorari.
On December 29, 2006, the CA promulgated its

decision,22 dismissing
METROBANKs
petition
for certiorari by holding that the presumption of authorship
might be disputed through a satisfactory explanation, viz:
We are not unaware of the established presumption

and rule that when it is proved that a person has in
his possession a falsified document and makes use
of the same, the presumption or inference is that
such person is the forger (Serrano vs. Court of
Appeals, 404 SCRA 639, 651 [2003]), citing Koh
Tieck Heng vs. People, 192 SCRA 533, 546-547
[1990]). Yet, the Supreme Court declared that in the
absence of satisfactory explanation, one who is
found in possession of a forged document and who
used it is presumed to be the forger (citing People
vs. Sendaydiego, 81 SCRA 120, 141 [1978]). Very
clearly then, a satisfactory explanation could render
ineffective the presumption which, after all, is
merely a disputable one.
It is in this score that We affirm the resolution of the

Department of Justice finding no probable cause
against private respondent Tobias for estafa thru
falsification of public document. The record speaks
well of Tobias good faith and lack of criminal
intention and liability. Consider:
(a) Tobias has in his favor a similar

presumption that good faith is always
presumed. Therefore, he who claims bad faith
must prove it (Prinsipio vs. The Honorable
Oscar Barrientos, G.R. 167025, December 19,
2005). No such evidence of bad faith of Tobias
appears on record;
(b) Tobias actuation in securing the loan belies

any criminal intent on his part to deceive
petitioner Bank. He was not in a hurry to obtain
the loan. He had to undergo the usual process
of the investigative arm or machine of the Bank
not only on the location and the physical
appearance of the property but likewise the
veracity
of
its
title.
Out
of
the
approved P40,000,000.00 loan he only availed
of P20,000,000.00, for his frozen meat
business which upon investigation of the Bank
failed to give negative results;

(c) Tobias paid the necessary interests for one

(1) year on the loan and two (2) installments on
the restructured loan; and
(d) More importantly, the loan was not released

to him until after the mortgage was duly
registered with the Registry of Deeds of
Malabon City and even paid the amount
of P90,000.00 for the registration fees therefor.
These actuations, for sure, can only foretell that

Tobias has the least intention to deceive the Bank in
obtaining the loan. It may not be surprising to find
that Tobias could even be a victim himself by
another person in purchasing the properties he
offered as security for the loan.23
The CA stressed that the determination of probable

cause was an executive function within the discretion of the
public prosecutor and, ultimately, of the Secretary of Justice,
and the courts of law could not interfere with such
determination;24 that the private complainant in a criminal
action was only concerned with its civil aspect; that should
the State choose not to file the criminal action, the private
complainant might initiate a civil action based on Article 35 of
the Civil Code, to wit:
In the eventuality that the Secretary of Justice

refuses to file the criminal complaint, the
complainant, whose only interest is the civil aspect
of the case and not the criminal aspect thereof, is
not left without a remedy. In Vda. De Jacob vs.
Puno, 131 SCRA 144, 149 [1984], the Supreme
Court has this for an answer:
The remedy of complainant in a case where

the Minister of Justice would not allow the filing
of a criminal complaint against an accused
because it is his opinion that the evidence is
not sufficient to sustain an information for the
complaint with which the respondents are
charged of, is to file a civil action as indicated
in Article 35 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 35. When a person, claiming to be

injured by a criminal offense, charges
another with the same, for which no
independent civil action is granted in this
Code or any special law, but the justice of
the peace finds no reasonable grounds to
believe that a crime has been committed,
or the prosecuting attorney refuses or fails
to institute criminal proceedings, the
complainant may bring a civil action for
damages against the alleged offender.
Such civil action may be supported by a
preponderance of evidence. Upon the
defendants motion, the court may require
the plaintiff to file a bond to indemnify the
defendant in case the complainant should
be found to be malicious.
If during the pendency of the civil action,

an information should be presented by the
prosecuting attorney, the civil action shall
be suspended until the termination of the
criminal proceedings.25
METROBANK sought reconsideration, but the CA denied its

motion for that purpose, emphasizing that the presumption
that METROBANK firmly relied upon was overcome by
Tobias sufficiently establishing his good faith and lack of
criminal intent. The CA relevantly held:
Petitioner should be minded that the subject

presumption that the possessor and user of a
forged or falsified document is presumed to be the
falsifier or forger is a mere disputable presumption
and not a conclusive one. Under the law on
evidence, presumptions are divided into two (2)
classes: conclusive and rebuttable. Conclusive or
absolute presumptions are rules determining the
quantity of evidence requisite for the support of any
particular averment which is not permitted to be
overcome by any proof that the fact is otherwise, if
the basis facts are established (1 Greenleaf, Ev 44;
29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence 164; 1 Jones on Evidence
6 ed, page 132). Upon the other hand, a disputable
presumption has been defined as species of
evidence that may be accepted and acted on when
there is no other evidence to uphold the contention
for which it stands, or one which may be overcome
by other evidence (31A C.J.S., p. 197; People v. de
Guzman, G.R. No. 106025, Feb. 9, 1994; Herrera,
Remedial Law, Vol. VI, 1999 Edition, pp. 40-41). In
fact, Section 3 of Rule 131 provides that the
disputable presumptions therein enumerated are
satisfactory if uncontradicted but may be

contradicted and overcome by other evidence.
Thus, as declared in Our decision in this case,
private respondent had shown evidence of good
faith and lack of criminal intention and liability that
can overthrow the controversial disputable
presumption.26
was correct in finding that there was lack of evidence to

prove that the purported fake title was the very cause that
had induced the petitioner to grant the loan; and that the
Secretary likewise appropriately found that Tobias dealt with
the petitioner in good faith because of lack of proof that he
had employed fraud and deceit in securing the loan.
Issue
In this appeal, METROBANK raises the lone issue of
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT

OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF
SUBSTANCE PROBABLY NOT IN ACCORD WITH
LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF
THIS HONORABLE COURT AND THUS,
COMMITTED PATENT ERROR IN RENDERING
THE
ASSAILED
DECISION
DATED
29
DECEMBER 2006, DISMISSING METROBANKS
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND AFFIRMING
THE RESOLUTIONS DATED 20 JULY 2004 AND
18 NOVEMBER 2005 OF THE HON. SECRETARY
OF JUDTICE AND IN DENYING METROBANKS
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.
METROBANK submits that the presumption of authorship

was sufficient to establish probable cause to hold Tobias for
trial; that the presumption applies when a person is found in
possession of the forged instrument, makes use of it, and
benefits from it; that contrary to the ruling of the CA, there is
no requirement that the legal presumption shall only apply in
the absence of a valid explanation from the person found to
have possessed, used and benefited from the forged
document; that the CA erred in declaring that Tobias was in
good faith, because good faith was merely evidentiary and
best raised in the trial on the merits; and that Tobias was
heavily involved in a modus operandi of using fake titles
because he was also being tried for a similar crime in the
RTC, Branch 133, in Makati City.
METROBANK maintains that what the Secretary of Justice
did was to determine the innocence of the accused, which
should not be done during the preliminary investigation; and
that the CA disregarded such lapse.
On the other hand, Tobias posits that the core function of the
Department of Justice is to prosecute the guilty in criminal
cases, not to persecute; that although the prosecutors are
given latitude to determine the existence of probable cause,
the review power of the Secretary of Justice prevents
overzealous prosecutors from persecuting the innocent; that
in reversing the resolution of Malabon City Assistant
Prosecutor Ojer Pacis, the Secretary of Justice only acted
within his authority; that, indeed, the Secretary of Justice
Lastly, Tobias argues that the presumption of forgery could

not be applied in his case because it was METROBANK,
through a representative, who had annotated the real estate
mortgage with the Registry of Deeds; and that he had no
access to and contact with the Registry of Deeds, and
whatever went wrong after the annotation was beyond his
control.
Ruling
The appeal has no merit.

Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the courts have
no right to directly decide matters over which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the Executive
Branch of the Government,27 or to substitute their own
judgments for that of the Executive Branch,28 represented in
this case by the Department of Justice. The settled policy is
that the courts will not interfere with the executive
determination of probable cause for the purpose of filing an
information, in the absence of grave abuse of
discretion.29 That abuse of discretion must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at
all in contemplation of law, such as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion or hostility.30 For instance, in Balanganan v. Court of
Appeals, Special Nineteenth Division, Cebu City,31 the Court
ruled that the Secretary of Justice exceeded his jurisdiction
when he required hard facts and solid evidence in order to
hold the defendant liable for criminal prosecution when such
requirement should have been left to the court after the
conduct of a trial.
In this regard, we stress that a preliminary investigation for

the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause
is not part of a trial.32 At a preliminary investigation, the
investigating prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice only
determines whether the act or omission complained of
constitutes the offense charged.33 Probable cause refers to
facts and circumstances that engender a well-founded belief
that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is
probably guilty thereof.34 There is no definitive standard by
which probable cause is determined except to consider the
attendant conditions; the existence of probable cause

depends upon the finding of the public prosecutor conducting
the examination, who is called upon not to disregard the
facts presented, and to ensure that his finding should not run
counter to the clear dictates of reason.35
Tobias was charged with estafa through falsification of public

document the elements of which are: (a) the accused uses a
fictitious name, or falsely pretends to possess power,
influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or
imaginary transactions, or employs other similar deceits; (b)
such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must
be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud; (c) the offended party must have
relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent
means, that is, he was induced to part with his money or
property because of the false pretense, fraudulent act or
fraudulent means; and (d) as a result thereof, the offended
party suffered damage.36It is required that the false
statement or fraudulent representation constitutes the very
cause or the only motive that induced the complainant to part
with the thing.37
METROBANK urges the application of the presumption of

authorship against Tobias based on his having offered the
duplicate copy of the spurious title to secure the loan; and
posits that there is no requirement that the presumption shall
apply only when there is absence of a valid explanation from
the person found to have possessed, used and benefited
from the forged document.
We cannot sustain METROBANKs urging.
Firstly, a presumption affects the burden of proof that is

normally lodged in the State.38 The effect is to create the
need of presenting evidence to overcome the prima
facie case that shall prevail in the absence of proof to the
contrary.39 As such, a presumption of law is material during
the actual trial of the criminal case where in the
establishment thereof the party against whom the inference
is made should adduce evidence to rebut the presumption
and demolish the prima facie case.40 This is not so in a
preliminary investigation, where the investigating prosecutor
only determines the existence of a prima facie case that
warrants the prosecution of a criminal case in court.41
Secondly, the presumption of authorship, being disputable,

may be accepted and acted upon where no evidence
upholds the contention for which it stands.42 It is not correct
to say, consequently, that the investigating prosecutor will try
to determine the existence of the presumption during

preliminary investigation, and then to disregard the evidence
offered by the respondent. The fact that the finding of
probable cause during a preliminary investigation is an
executive function does not excuse the investigating
prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice from discharging the
duty to weigh the evidence submitted by the parties. Towards
that end, the investigating prosecutor, and, ultimately, the
Secretary of Justice have ample discretion to determine the
existence of probable cause,43 a discretion that must be used
to file only a criminal charge that the evidence and
inferences can properly warrant.
The presumption that whoever possesses or uses a spurious

document is its forger applies only in the absence of a
satisfactory explanation.44 Accordingly, we cannot hold that
the Secretary of Justice erred in dismissing the information in
the face of the controverting explanation by Tobias showing
how he came to possess the spurious document. Much less
can we consider the dismissal as done with abuse of
discretion, least of all grave. We concur with the erudite
exposition of the CA on the matter, to wit:
It would seem that under the above proposition of

the petitioner, the moment a person has in his
possession a falsified document and has made use
of it, probable cause or prima facie is already
established and that no amount of satisfactory
explanation will prevent the filing of the case in
court by the investigating officer, for any such good
explanation or defense can only be threshed out in
the trial on the merit. We are not to be persuaded.
To give meaning to such argumentation will surely
defeat the very purpose for which preliminary
investigation is required in this jurisdiction.
A preliminary investigation is designed to secure the

respondent involved against hasty, malicious and
oppressive prosecution. A preliminary investigation
is an inquiry to determine whether (a) a crime has
been committed, and (b) whether there is probable
cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof
(De Ocampo vs. Secretary of Justice, 480 SCRA 71
[2006]). It is a means of discovering the person or
persons who may be reasonably charged with a
crime (Preferred Home Specialties, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals,
478
SCRA 387,
410
[2005]).
Prescindingly, under Section 3 of Rule 112 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure, the respondent must
be informed of the accusation against him and shall
have the right to examine the evidence against him
and submit his counter-affidavit to disprove criminal
liability. By far, respondent in a criminal preliminary

investigation is legally entitled to explain his side of
the accusation.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Complainant,

vs.
MERLE RAMONEDA-PITA, Clerk III, Municipal Trial Court
in Cities, Danao City. Respondent.
We are not unaware of the established presumption

and rule that when it is proved that a person has in
his possession a falsified document and makes use
of the same the presumption or inference is that
such person is the forger (Serrano vs. Court of
Appeals, 404 SCRA 639, 651 [2003]), citing Koh
Tieck Heng vs. People, 192 SCRA 533, 546-547
[1990]). Yet, the Supreme Court declared that in the
absence of satisfactory explanation, one who is
found in possession of a forged document and who
used it is presumed to be the forger (citing People
vs. Sendaydiego, 81 SCRA 120, 141 [1978]). Very
clearly then, a satisfactory explanation could render
ineffective the presumption which, after all, is
merely a disputable one.45
DECISION
We do not lose sight of the fact that METROBANK, a

commercial bank dealing in real property, had the duty to
observe due diligence to ascertain the existence and
condition of the realty as well as the validity and integrity of
the documents bearing on the realty.46 Its duty included the
responsibility of dispatching its competent and experience
representatives to the realty to assess its actual location and
condition, and of investigating who was its real owner.47 Yet,
it is evident that METROBANK did not diligently perform a
thorough check on Tobias and the circumstances
surrounding the realty he had offered as collateral. As such,
it had no one to blame but itself. Verily, banks are expected
to exercise greater care and prudence than others in their
dealings because their business is impressed with public
interest.48 Their failure to do so constitutes negligence on its
part.49
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review

on certiorari, and AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of
Appeals promulgated on December 29, 2006. The petitioner
shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
CSC v. RAMONEDA-PITA
696 S 155 (2013)
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
EN BANC
A.M. No. P-08-2531
April 11, 2013
(Formerly A.M. No. 08-7-220-MTCC)
PER CURIAM:
This administrative case arose from a letter 1dated June 23,
2006 by Director David E. Cabanag, Jr. of the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) Regional Office No. VII calling the
attention of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) to the
continued employment of Merle Ramoneda-Pita (RamonedaPita) as Clerk III of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Danao City. It informed the OCA that in CSC
Resolution No. 0102632 dated January 26, 2001,
Ramoneda-Pita was found guilty of dishonesty and
dismissed from the service. As accessory penalties, she was
perpetually barred from joining government service and her
civil service eligibility was revoked. However, Ramoneda-Pita
did not declare her ineligibility when she stated in her
Personnel Data Sheet (PDS)3 dated June 14, 2005 that she
had never been involved in any administrative case and that
she was civil service eligible.
The antecedent facts follow.
On March 23, 1998, an anonymous letter 4 informed the CSC
of an alleged irregularity in the civil service eligibility of
Ramoneda-Pita. The letter stated that the irregularity
concerned Ramoneda-Pitas taking of the Career Service
Sub-Professional Examination held in Cebu City on July 26,
1987.
The CSC retrieved the records for the July 26, 1987
examinations and compared the pictures and signatures of
Ramoneda-Pita as they appeared in the Picture Seat Plan
(PSP) for the exam and her PDS dated October 17, 1990. As
the pictures and signatures did not match, the CSC required
Ramoneda-Pita to explain why it seemed that another
person took the civil service examination on her behalf.
Ramoneda-Pita denied that someone else took the civil
service examinations in her stead. She averred that she took
the civil service examinations on July 30, 1986 and not July
26, 1987. She explained that there were dissimilarities in the
pictures in the PSP and the PDS because these were not
taken on the same year and might have deteriorated in
quality over the years. On the other hand, she accounted for
the difference in her signatures to her low educational
attainment leading to her non-development and nonmaintenance of a usual signature.5
In its Investigation Report6 dated May 3, 1999, the CSC
made the following observations and recommendation:
The person who actually took the Career Service
Subprofessional Examination on July 26, 1987 in Cebu City,
was the "Merle C. Ramoneda" whose picture and signature

were affixed in the Admission Slip/Notice of Admission and in
the Picture Seat Plan, is NOT the "Merle C. Ramoneda"
whose picture and signature appear in the Personal Data
Sheet dated October 17, 1990 of the real Merle C.
Ramoneda.
In view of the foregoing, considering that the evidence
presented is substantial, it is recommended that respondent
Merle C. Ramoneda be adjudged guilty of the charges and
meted the penalty of dismissal with all its accessories.7
Thus, the CSC issued Resolution No. 010263 dated January
26, 2001 finding Ramoneda-Pita guilty of dishonesty, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby finds Merle C.
Ramoneda guilty of the offense of Dishonesty. Accordingly,
the penalty of dismissal from the service with all its
accessory penalties is imposed.
Since the respondent is not in the government service, the
penalty of dismissal is deemed implemented. She is also
perpetually barred from entering the government service and
from taking any civil service examination in the future. Her
Civil Service Sub-Professional Eligibility is likewise revoked.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the
Ombudsman-Visayas for whatever legal action it may take
under the premises.8
Ramoneda-Pita moved for reconsideration but the CSC
denied it in Resolution No. 0108809 dated May 3, 2001.
Ramoneda-Pita appealed CSC Resolution Nos. 010263 and
010880 to the Court of Appeals and, subsequently, to this
Court. In both instances, her appeal was denied.10
On January 14, 2005, Ramoneda-Pita wrote to then
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appealing for clemency
stating that she accepted her fate and turned a new leaf with
a solemn commitment to do good for the rest of her life. The
Office of the President referred the matter to Director David
Cabanag, Jr. of the CSC Regional Office No. VII for
validation, verification and investigation.11
While the appeal for clemency was pending and in the
course of the CSCs investigation, the CSC discovered that,
again, Ramoneda-Pita had been declaring in her PDS,
particularly the PDS dated June 14, 2005 submitted to the
Supreme Court, that she had not been found guilty in any
administrative case and that she was civil service eligible.12
Thus, on May 11, 2006, the CSC, in its Investigation
Report13 pursuant to the Office of the Presidents referral,
found that Ramoneda-Pita had not sufficiently established
moral reformation which is crucial in the grant of executive
clemency. It recommended that the plea for executive
clemency be denied.
On June 23, 2006, Director Cabanag, Jr. wrote a letter to the

OCA informing it of the continued employment of RamonedaPita as Clerk III of the MTCC, Danao City despite the finality
of CSC Resolution No. 010263.
On August 18, 2006, the OCA required Ramoneda-Pita to
submit her comment within fifteen (15) days.
In her Comment dated September 7, 2006, Ramoneda-Pita
asserted that she never concealed that she had been
previously found guilty of dishonesty. She claimed that her
immediate supervisor, Judge Manuel D. Patalinghug, was
furnished a copy of CSC Resolution No. 010263. She
admitted having filed request for executive clemency with the
Office of the President. In connection to this, she said that
the CSC directed her to submit some documents needed for
its processing. She explained that she made the entries in
her June 14, 2005 PDS because she wanted to be
consistent in her statements in her previous PDS and,
considering her low education, she just copied the data
entries contained in her earlier PDS. She said that it was
never her intention to falsify the PDS and she did not
understand the legal implications. She prayed for the Courts
understanding and cited her good record during her years of
service.
In its Report14 dated July 4, 2008, the OCA recommended,
among others, that the case be docketed as a regular
administrative matter and that this Court conduct its own
investigation on the matter.
This Court noted and adopted the recommendation of the
OCA in a Resolution15 dated August 6, 2008 where it directed
the OCA to conduct its own investigation on the matter and
submit a report and recommendation thereon.
Thus, this administrative case.
In its Memorandum16 dated February 19, 2009, the OCA
recommended Ramoneda-Pitas dismissal from the service.
It found that Ramoneda-Pita fully participated in the
proceedings before the CSC never once questioning its
jurisdiction. It stated:
In the instant case, respondent Ramoneda-Pita, who never
even questioned the jurisdiction of the CSC, fully participated
in the proceedings before the CSC. Although she was not yet
a Supreme Court employee when the CSC instituted the
case against her, she had already become a member of the
judiciary when Resolution No. 01-0263 dated January 26,
2001 finding her guilty and meting her the penalty of
dismissal was issued - having been appointed by the Court
to her present position on July 24, 2000. Her motion for
reconsideration of the CSC Resolution was denied. The
respondent then filed a petition for review before the Court of
Appeals which affirmed the same Resolution. A petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 was filed with the
Supreme Court which in its Resolution dated August 24,
2004 found no reversible error in the challenged decision of
the Court of Appeals to warrant the exercise by the Court of

its discretionary appellate jurisdiction in the case. Taking into
consideration the pronouncement in the Ampong case, we
believe that with all the more reason the doctrine of estoppel
should thus be considered applicable in the instant case as
the respondent went all the way to the Supreme Court to
question the CSC Resolution. In addition, the Court itself has
even ruled on the case, effectively upholding CSC
Resolution No. 01-0263 when it explicitly stated that in any
event, the petition would still be denied for failure thereof to
sufficiently show that the public respondent committed any
reversible error in the challenged decision as to warrant the
exercise by this Court of its discretionary appellate
jurisdiction in this case.
xxxx
There lies the question as to how should respondent then be
proceeded against with respect to her employment in the
Judiciary. We deem that we cannot just implement CSC
Resolution No. 01-0263 and dismiss the respondent outright.
The Court still maintains its administrative jurisdiction over
the respondent and should therefore have the final
determination of her administrative liability.
Considering, however, that the CSC had already conducted
both fact-finding and formal investigations, we find no reason
why the Court should replicate what the CSC had done more
ably.17
In support of its conclusion, the OCA cited Ampong v. Civil
Service Commission, CSC-Regional Office No. 1118among
others. Said the OCA:
The standard procedure is for the CSC to bring its complaint
against a judicial employee before the Supreme Court
through the OCA as shown in several cases. The Court,
however, has made exceptions in certain cases. In the very
recent case of Ampong, the Court, although it declared that it
had administrative jurisdiction over the petitioner,
nevertheless upheld the ruling of the CSC based on the
principle of estoppel. In the said case, petitioner Ampong, a
court interpreter at the time the CSC instituted administrative
proceedings against her, questioned the jurisdiction of the
CSC after it found her guilty of dishonesty in surreptitiously
taking the CSC-supervised Professional Board Examination
for Teachers (PBET) in 1991 in place of another person and
dismissed her from the service. The Court denied the petition
on the ground that the previous actions of petitioner
estopped her from attacking the jurisdiction of the CSC
which had accorded her due process.19 (Citations omitted.)
The OCA then proceeded to discuss the merits of
Ramoneda-Pitas contention. It noted Ramoneda-Pitas claim
that her physical appearance changed over the intervening
years since she took the Civil Service Sub-Professional
Examinations. She also posed the possibility that the picture
quality had deteriorated over time. In addition, she also
claims that the examiner must have interchanged her picture
with someone else as he was the one who pasted the
pictures to the seat plan.
However, the OCA seriously doubted the validity of

Ramoneda-Pitas claim saying:
We do not think that a mere three-year gap would bring
about drastic changes in a persons appearance. Besides,
the respondent failed to substantiate her claims. She could
have easily submitted additional evidence, such as pictures
to show the gradual change in her appearance through the
three-year period.20
On the confusion with respect to the pictures, the OCA said
that it was not "likely due to the strict procedure followed
during civil service examinations x x x." 21 Moreover, the OCA
stated:
The presentation of various explanations and conjectures
show the inconsistent stands taken by the respondent. She
insists that the picture in the seat plan was her and that her
physical appearance has changed over the years, yet in the
same breath argues that the examiner must have
interchanged her picture with the pictures of other
examinees.
The same inconsistency is manifest in all her records. Upon
the Courts resolution of her petition for review on certiorari,
the respondent states in her letter dated January 14, 2005
addressed to President Arroyo that she fought hard to prove
her innocence but had accepted her fate and mistake, with
the solemn commitment that she would never commit the
same or similar mistake for the rest of her life. x x x.
xxxx
The respondent has a string of dishonest acts which started
when she had somebody impersonate her in taking the Civil
Service Subprofessional examination. Upon the discovery of
her deception, she embarked on a series of prevarications to
cover it up, the most notable of which is the Personal Data
Sheet dated April 5, 2000 she submitted to the Court as one
of the supporting documents for her appointment to the
judiciary. In the Personal Data Sheet, item no. 25 asks "Do
you have any pending administrative case?" while item no.
27 queries "Have you ever been convicted of any
administrative offense?" The respondent answered "no" to
both questions. It must be remembered that at the time she
filled out the Personal Data Sheet, she already had a
pending administrative case, the CSC having already filed its
formal charge on September 7, 1998. Her fraudulent
answers had been instrumental in the unquestioned approval
of her appointment because had she answered truthfully the
Court would have been alerted to her pending administrative
case with the CSC and would have surely withheld, if not
denied, her appointment.
Taking judicial notice of the fact-finding and formal
investigations conducted by the CSC relative to the
impersonation case of the respondent and given the
observations on her subsequent actuations which were
predisposed to deceive, we find that the respondent, is
indeed, guilty of dishonesty and falsification of document.22

The OCA thus recommended:
In view of the foregoing, we respectfully submit for the
consideration of the Honorable Court the recommendation
that respondent Merle Ramoneda-Pita, Clerk III, Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, Danao City, be found GUILTY of
Dishonesty and Falsification of Official Document and be
DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all her
retirement benefits, except the value of her accrued leaves, if
any, and with prejudice to re-employment in the government
or any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities or agencies
including government-owned or controlled corporations.23
This notwithstanding, we reiterate that we will not and cannot

tolerate dishonesty for the judiciary expects the highest
standard of integrity from all its employees. The conduct and
behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with
the dispensation of justice is circumscribed with a heavy
burden or responsibility. The Court will not hesitate to rid its
ranks of undesirables. (Citations omitted; emphases ours.)
In any event, the OCA had asked Ramoneda-Pita to
comment on the matter. She was therefore given due notice
and fair hearing. It is noteworthy that she only rehashed the
arguments that she raised before the CSC proceedings.
We note and adopt the recommendation of the OCA.
We now proceed to the substantive aspect of the case.
As a preliminary matter, we address the matter of propriety

of the proceedings against Ramoneda-Pita in the CSC.
This Court has defined dishonesty in

Commission v. Perocho, Jr.26 as:
We have always maintained that it is only the Supreme Court

that can oversee the judges and court personnels
administrative compliance with all laws, rules and
regulations. No other branch of government may intrude into
this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation
of powers.24 However, as aptly pointed out by the OCA,
Ramoneda-Pita was afforded the full protection of the law,
that is, afforded due process. She was able to file several
affidavits and pleadings before the CSC with counsel. It may
also be noted that the case had been elevated to the Court
of Appeals and this Court, where the Resolution of the CSC
was upheld in both instances.
Intentionally making a false statement in any material fact, or

practicing or attempting to practice any deception or fraud in
securing his examination, registration, appointment or
promotion. Thus, dishonesty, like bad faith, is not simply bad
judgment or negligence. Dishonesty is a question of
intention. In ascertaining the intention of a person accused of
dishonesty, consideration must be taken not only of the facts
and circumstances which gave rise to the act committed by
the respondent, but also of his state of mind at the time the
offense was committed, the time he might have had at his
disposal for the purpose of meditating on the consequences
of his act, and the degree of reasoning he could have had at
that moment. (Citations omitted.)
The OCAs reliance in Ampong v. Civil Service Commission

is well taken. As we have stated in Civil Service Commission
v. Andal25:
In Ampong, petitioner in that case admitted her guilt. She
voluntarily went to the CSC regional office, admitted to the
charges leveled against her and waived her right to the
assistance of counsel. She was given ample opportunity to
present her side and adduce evidence in her defense before
the CSC. She filed her answer to the charges against her
and even moved for a reconsideration of the adverse ruling
of the CSC. In short, Ampong did not question the authority
of the CSC and, in fact, actively participated in the
proceedings before it.
In the present case, while respondent may have filed his
Answer to the formal charge of dishonesty after having been
directed to do so, he denied having taken the civil service
examination and did not even appear at the formal
investigation conducted by the CSC-NCR. He appealed to
the CSC after the adverse decision of the CSC-NCR was
rendered but raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction over his
person. He argued that as an employee in the Judiciary, "the
jurisdiction to hear disciplinary action against him vests with
the Sandiganbayan or the Supreme Court." It cannot
therefore be said that he was estopped from assailing the
jurisdiction of the CSC.
Civil
Service
We have previously dealt with cases with a marked

resemblance to the present case.
In Civil Service Commission v. Sta. Ana, 27 we found sufficient
basis to dismiss a court stenographer for misrepresenting
herself to have passed the Career Service Professional
Examination Computer Assisted Test (CAT) when she had
somebody else take the exam for her. The CSC undertook to
compare the respondents PDS with the CAT application and
the Picture Seat Plan of the examinations and found them to
be different.
In Civil Service Commission v. Dasco,28 we found Ms.
Caridad S. Dasco guilty of dishonesty and consequently
dismissed her from the service for having someone else take
the requisite Civil Service Examinations in her stead. It was
found that her picture in the CSCs PSP had a marked
difference from her PDS.
In Office of the Court Administrator v. Bermejo,29 we
dismissed Ms. Lourdes Bermejo for having another person
impersonate her at the Civil Service Examinations.
A careful review of the documents submitted before the CSC
and a perusal of its investigation reports in the present case,
convince us that Ramoneda-Pita was not the one who took
the Civil Service Sub-Professional Examinations conducted
on July 26, 1987. Specimen signatures in the various PDS

she had submitted over the years to the Court do not
resemble the signature which appeared in the seat plan of
the CSC. Moreover, no substantive evidence was presented
by Ramoneda-Pita to bolster her defense that she was not
able to develop a settled signature. Nor did she substantiate
her claim that the difference between the pictures in the PSP
and the PDS is due to the aging process.
This Court cannot stress enough that its employees should
hold the highest standard of integrity for they are a reflection
of this esteemed institution which they serve. It certainly
cannot countenance any form of dishonesty perpetrated by
its employees. As we have stated in the Code of Conduct for
Court Personnel30:
WHEREAS, court personnel, from the lowliest employee to
the clerk of court or any position lower than that of a judge or
justice, are involved in the dispensation of justice, and
parties seeking redress from the courts for grievances look
upon court personnel as part of the Judiciary.
WHEREAS, in performing their duties and responsibilities,
court personnel serve as sentinels of justice and any act of
impropriety on their part immeasurably affects the honor and
dignity of the Judiciary and the peoples confidence in it.
(Emphases supplied.)
In this case, Ramoneda-Pitas length of service in the
judiciary is inconsequential. The CSCs discovery of the
perfidy in her acquisition of her civil service eligibility and her
insistence in stating that she is civil service eligible in her
PDS when she had been already found guilty of an
administrative charge even after the finality of the CSC
Resolution and even after her seeking clemency tell this
Court that Ramoneda-Pita has not and does not live up to
the high standards demanded of a court employee. As the
Court has previously stated it will not hesitate to rid the ranks
of undesirables.31
WHEREFORE, Merle C. Ramoneda-Pita is hereby found
GUILTY of dishonesty. She is DISMISSED from the service
with forfeiture of all her retirement benefits, except the value
of her accrued leave credits, if any, and with prejudice to reemployment in the government or any of its subdivisions,
instrumentalities or agencies including government-owned
and controlled corporations. Let a copy of this Decision be
attached to her records with this Court.
SO ORDERED.
COURT-BRANCH 41, BACOLOD CITY, AND ROSALIE

JAYPE-GARCIA, FOR HERSELF IN BEHALF OF MINOR
CHILDREN, NAMELY: JO-ANN, JOSEPH AND EDUARD,
JESSE ANTHONE, ALL SURNAMED
GARCIA, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Hailed as the bastion of Christianity in Asia, the Philippines
boasts of 86.8 million Filipinos -or 93 percent of a total
population of 93.3 million - adhering to the teachings of
Jesus Christ.1 Yet, the admonition for husbands to love their
wives as their own bodies just as Christ loved the church
and gave himself up for her2 failed to prevent, or even to
curb, the pervasiveness of violence against Filipino women.
The National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women
(NCRFW) reported that, for the years 2000-2003, "female
violence comprised more than 90% of all forms of abuse and
violence and more than 90% of these reported cases were
committed by the women's intimate partners such as their
husbands
and
live-in
partners.3
Thus, on March 8, 2004, after nine (9) years of spirited
advocacy by women's groups, Congress enacted Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9262, entitled An Act Defining Violence
Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective
Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for
Other Purposes. It took effect on March 27, 2004.4
R.A. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and
criminalizes acts of violence against women and their
children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate
partners, i.e, husband; former husband; or any person who
has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom the
woman has a common child.5 The law provides for protection
orders from the barangay and the courts to prevent the
commission of further acts of VAWC; and outlines the duties
and responsibilities of barangay officials, law enforcers,
prosecutors and court personnel, social workers, health care
providers, and other local government officials in responding
to complaints of VAWC or requests for assistance.
A husband is now before the Court assailing the
constitutionality of R.A. 9262 as being violative of the equal
protection and due process clauses, and an undue
delegation of judicial power to barangay officials.
The Factual Antecedents
GARCIA v. DRILON
699 S 352 (2013)
EN BANC
G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013
JESUS C. GARCIA, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE RAY
ALAN T. DRILON, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL
On March 23, 2006, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private

respondent) filed, for herself and in behalf of her minor
children, a verified petition6 (Civil Case No. 06-797) before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City for the
issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her
husband, Jesus C. Garcia (petitioner), pursuant to R.A.
9262. She claimed to be a victim of physical abuse;
emotional, psychological, and economic violence as a result
of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner, with threats of
deprivation of custody of her children and of financial

support.7
Private
respondent's
claims
Private respondent married petitioner in 2002 when she was

34 years old and the former was eleven years her senior.
They have three (3) children, namely: Jo-Ann J. Garcia, 17
years old, who is the natural child of petitioner but whom
private respondent adopted; Jessie Anthone J. Garcia, 6
years old; and Joseph Eduard J. Garcia, 3 years old.8
Private respondent described herself as a dutiful and faithful
wife, whose life revolved around her husband. On the other
hand, petitioner, who is of Filipino-Chinese descent, is
dominant, controlling, and demands absolute obedience
from his wife and children. He forbade private respondent to
pray, and deliberately isolated her from her friends. When
she took up law, and even when she was already working
part time at a law office, petitioner trivialized her ambitions
and prevailed upon her to just stay at home. He was often
jealous of the fact that his attractive wife still catches the eye
of some men, at one point threatening that he would have
any
man
eyeing
her
killed.9
Things turned for the worse when petitioner took up an affair
with a bank manager of Robinson's Bank, Bacolod City, who
is the godmother of one of their sons. Petitioner admitted to
the affair when private respondent confronted him about it in
2004. He even boasted to the household help about his
sexual relations with said bank manager. Petitioner told
private respondent, though, that he was just using the
woman because of their accounts with the bank. 10
Petitioner's infidelity spawned a series of fights that left
private respondent physically and emotionally wounded. In
one of their quarrels, petitioner grabbed private respondent
on both arms and shook her with such force that caused
bruises and hematoma. At another time, petitioner hit private
respondent forcefully on the lips that caused some bleeding.
Petitioner sometimes turned his ire on their daughter, JoAnn, who had seen the text messages he sent to his
paramour and whom he blamed for squealing on him. He
beat Jo-Ann on the chest and slapped her many times.
When private respondent decided to leave petitioner, Jo-Ann
begged her mother to stay for fear that if the latter leaves,
petitioner would beat her up. Even the small boys are aware
of private respondent's sufferings. Their 6- year-old son said
that when he grows up, he would beat up his father because
of
his
cruelty
to
private
respondent. 11
All the emotional and psychological turmoil drove private
respondent to the brink of despair. On December 17, 2005,
while at home, she attempted suicide by cutting her wrist.
She was found by her son bleeding on the floor. Petitioner
simply fled the house instead of taking her to the hospital.
Private respondent was hospitalized for about seven (7)
days in which time petitioner never bothered to visit, nor
apologized or showed pity on her. Since then, private
respondent has been undergoing therapy almost every week
and
is
taking
anti-depressant
medications.12
When private respondent informed the management of

Robinson's Bank that she intends to file charges against the
bank manager, petitioner got angry with her for jeopardizing
the manager's job. He then packed his things and told
private respondent that he was leaving her for good. He
even told private respondent's mother, who lives with them in
the family home, that private respondent should just accept
his extramarital affair since he is not cohabiting with his
paramour and has not sired a child with her.13
Private respondent is determined to separate from petitioner
but she is afraid that he would take her children from her and
deprive her of financial support. Petitioner had previously
warned her that if she goes on a legal battle with him, she
would
not
get
a
single
centavo.14
Petitioner controls the family businesses involving mostly the
construction of deep wells. He is the President of three
corporations 326 Realty Holdings, Inc., Negros Rotadrill
Corporation, and J-Bros Trading Corporation of which he
and private respondent are both stockholders. In contrast to
the absolute control of petitioner over said corporations,
private respondent merely draws a monthly salary of
P20,000.00 from one corporation only, the Negros Rotadrill
Corporation. Household expenses amounting to not less
than P200,000.00 a month are paid for by private respondent
through the use of credit cards, which, in turn, are paid by
the same corporation together with the bills for utilities. 15
On the other hand, petitioner receives a monthly salary of
P60,000.00 from Negros Rotadrill Corporation, and enjoys
unlimited cash advances and other benefits in hundreds of
thousands of pesos from the corporations.16 After private
respondent confronted him about the affair, petitioner
forbade her to hold office at JBTC Building, Mandalagan,
where all the businesses of the corporations are conducted,
thereby depriving her of access to full information about said
businesses. Until the filing of the petition a quo, petitioner
has not given private respondent an accounting of the
businesses the value of which she had helped raise to
millions
of
pesos.17
Action
of
the
RTC
of
Bacolod
City
Finding reasonable ground to believe that an imminent

danger of violence against the private respondent and her
children exists or is about to recur, the RTC issued a
TPO18 on March 24, 2006 effective for thirty (30) days, which
is
quoted
hereunder:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is
hereby:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
a) Ordered to remove all his personal belongings from the
conjugal dwelling or family home within 24 hours from receipt
of the Temporary Restraining Order and if he refuses,
ordering that he be removed by police officers from the
conjugal dwelling; this order is enforceable notwithstanding
that the house is under the name of 236 Realty Holdings Inc.
(Republic Act No. 9262 states regardless of ownership),
this is to allow the Petitioner (private respondent herein) to

enter the conjugal dwelling without any danger from the
Respondent.
After the Respondent leaves or is removed from the conjugal
dwelling, or anytime the Petitioner decides to return to the
conjugal dwelling to remove things, the Petitioner shall be
assisted by police officers when re-entering the family home.
The Chief of Police shall also give the Petitioner police
assistance on Sunday, 26 March 2006 because of the
danger that the Respondent will attempt to take her children
from her when he arrives from Manila and finds out about
this
suit.
b) To stay away from the petitioner and her children, mother
and all her household help and driver from a distance of
1,000 meters, and shall not enter the gate of the subdivision
where the Petitioner may be temporarily residing.
c) Not to harass, annoy, telephone, contact or otherwise
communicate with the Petitioner, directly or indirectly, or
through other persons, or contact directly or indirectly her
children, mother and household help, nor send gifts, cards,
flowers, letters and the like. Visitation rights to the children
may be subject of a modified TPO in the future.
d) To surrender all his firearms including a .9MM caliber
firearm and a Walther PPK and ordering the Philippine
National Police Firearms and Explosives Unit and the
Provincial Director of the PNP to cancel all the Respondent's
firearm licenses. He should also be ordered to surrender any
unlicensed firearms in his possession or control.
e) To pay full financial support for the Petitioner and the
children, including rental of a house for them, and
educational
and
medical
expenses.
f)
Not
to
dissipate
the
conjugal
business.
g) To render an accounting of all advances, benefits,

bonuses and other cash he received from all the
corporations from 1 January 2006 up to 31 March 2006,
which himself and as President of the corporations and his
Comptroller, must submit to the Court not later than 2 April
2006. Thereafter, an accounting of all these funds shall be
reported to the court by the Comptroller, copy furnished to
the Petitioner, every 15 days of the month, under pain of
Indirect
Contempt
of
Court.
h) To ensure compliance especially with the order granting
support pendente lite, and considering the financial
resources of the Respondent and his threat that if the
Petitioner sues she will not get a single centavo, the
Respondent is ordered to put up a BOND TO KEEP THE
PEACE in the amount of FIVE MILLION PESOS, in two
sufficient sureties.
On April 24, 2006, upon motion 19 of private respondent, the
trial court issued an amended TPO, 20 effective for thirty (30)
days,
which
included
the
following
additional
provisions:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
i) The petitioners (private respondents herein) are given the

continued use of the Nissan Patrol and the Starex Van which
they
are
using
in
Negros
Occidental.
j) The petitioners are given the continued use and occupation
of the house in Paraaque, the continued use of the Starex
van in Metro Manila, whenever they go to Manila.
k) Respondent is ordered to immediately post a bond to keep
the
peace,
in
two
sufficient
sureties.
l) To give monthly support to the petitioner provisionally fixed
in the sum of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php
150,000.00) per month plus rental expenses of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (Php 50,000.00) per month until the matter
of support could be finally resolved.
Two days later, or on April 26, 2006, petitioner filed an
Opposition to the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Renewal of the
TPO21 seeking the denial of the renewal of the TPO on the
grounds that it did not (1) comply with the three-day notice
rule, and (2) contain a notice of hearing. He further asked
that the TPO be modified by (1) removing one vehicle used
by private respondent and returning the same to its rightful
owner, the J-Bros Trading Corporation, and (2) cancelling or
reducing the amount of the bond from P5,000,000.00 to a
more
manageable
level
at
P100,000.00.
Subsequently, on May 23, 2006, petitioner moved22 for the
modification of the TPO to allow him visitation rights to his
children.
On May 24, 2006, the TPO was renewed and extended yet
again, but subject only to the following modifications prayed
for by private respondent:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
a) That respondent (petitioner herein) return the clothes and
other personal belongings of Rosalie and her children to
Judge Jesus Ramos, co-counsel for Petitioner, within 24
hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his
counsel, otherwise be declared in Indirect Contempt of
Court;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
b) Respondent shall make an accounting or list of furniture
and equipment in the conjugal house in Pitimini St.,
Capitolville Subdivision, Bacolod City within 24 hours from
receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his
counsel;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
c) Ordering the Chief of the Women's Desk of the Bacolod
City Police Headquarters to remove Respondent from the
conjugal dwelling within eight (8) hours from receipt of the
Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, and that he
cannot return until 48 hours after the petitioners have left, so
that the petitioner Rosalie and her representatives can
remove things from the conjugal home and make an
inventory of the household furniture, equipment and other
things in the conjugal home, which shall be submitted to the
Court.
d) Deliver full financial support of Php200,000.00 and

Php50,000.00 for rental and Php25,000.00 for clothes of the
three petitioners (sic) children within 24 hours from receipt of
the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, otherwise be
declared
in
indirect
contempt
of
e) That respondent surrender his two firearms and all
unlicensed firearms to the Clerk of Court within 24 hours
from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his
counsel;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
f) That respondent shall pay petitioner educational expenses
of the children upon presentation of proof of payment of such
expenses.23
Claiming that petitioner continued to deprive them of
financial support; failed to faithfully comply with the TPO; and
committed new acts of harassment against her and their
children, private respondent filed another application24 for the
issuance of a TPO ex parte. She alleged inter alia that
petitioner contrived a replevin suit against himself by J-Bros
Trading, Inc., of which the latter was purportedly no longer
president, with the end in view of recovering the Nissan
Patrol and Starex Van used by private respondent and the
children. A writ of replevin was served upon private
respondent by a group of six or seven policemen with long
firearms that scared the two small boys, Jessie Anthone and
Joseph
Eduard.25
While Joseph Eduard, then three years old, was driven to
school, two men allegedly attempted to kidnap him, which
incident traumatized the boy resulting in his refusal to go
back to school. On another occasion, petitioner allegedly
grabbed their daughter, Jo-Ann, by the arm and threatened
her.26 The incident was reported to the police, and Jo-Ann
subsequently filed a criminal complaint against her father for
violation of R.A. 7610, also known as the Special Protection
of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination
Act.
Aside from the replevin suit, petitioner's lawyers initiated the
filing by the housemaids working at the conjugal home of a
complaint for kidnapping and illegal detention against private
respondent. This came about after private respondent,
armed with a TPO, went to said home to get her and her
children's belongings. Finding some of her things inside a
housemaid's (Sheryl Jamola) bag in the maids' room, private
respondent filed a case for qualified theft against Jamola.27
On August 23, 2006, the RTC issued a TPO,28 effective for
thirty
(30)
days,
which
reads
as
follows:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is
hereby:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
1) Prohibited from threatening to commit or committing,
personally or through another, acts of violence against the
offended
party;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
2)
Prohibited
from
harassing,
annoying,
telephoning,
contacting or otherwise communicating in any form with the

offended
party,
either
directly
or
indirectly;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
3) Required to stay away, personally or through his friends,
relatives, employees or agents, from all the Petitioners
Rosalie J. Garcia and her children, Rosalie J. Garcia's three
brothers, her mother Primitiva Jaype, cook Novelita Caranzo,
driver Romeo Hontiveros, laundrywoman Mercedita
Bornales, security guard Darwin Gayona and the petitioner's
other household helpers from a distance of 1,000 meters,
and shall not enter the gate of the subdivision where the
Petitioners are temporarily residing, as well as from the
schools of the three children; Furthermore, that respondent
shall not contact the schools of the children directly or
indirectly in any manner including, ostensibly to pay for their
tuition or other fees directly, otherwise he will have access to
the children through the schools and the TPO will be
rendered
nugatory;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
4) Directed to surrender all his firearms including .9MM
caliber
firearm
and
a
Walther
PPK
to
the
5) Directed to deliver in full financial support of
Php200,000.00 a month and Php50,000.00 for rental for the
period from August 6 to September 6, 2006; and support in
arrears from March 2006 to August 2006 the total amount of
Php1,312,000.00;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
6) Directed to deliver educational expenses for 2006-2007
the
amount
of
Php75,000.00
and
Php25,000.00;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
7) Directed to allow the continued use of a Nissan Patrol with
Plate No. FEW 508 and a Starex van with Plate No. FFD 991
and should the respondent fail to deliver said vehicles,
respondent is ordered to provide the petitioner another
vehicle which is the one taken by J Bros
Tading;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
8) Ordered not to dissipate, encumber, alienate, sell, lease or
otherwise dispose of the conjugal assets, or those real
properties in the name of Jesus Chua Garcia only and those
in which the conjugal partnership of gains of the Petitioner
Rosalie J. Garcia and respondent have an interest in,
especially the conjugal home located in No. 14, Pitimini St.,
Capitolville Subdivision, Bacolod City, and other properties
which are conjugal assets or those in which the conjugal
partnership of gains of Petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia and the
respondent have an interest in and listed in Annexes I, I1, and I-2, including properties covered by TCT Nos. T186325
and
T-168814;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
9) Ordered that the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City and
E.B. Magalona shall be served a copy of this TEMPORARY
PROTECTION ORDER and are ordered not to allow the
transfer, sale, encumbrance or disposition of these abovecited properties to any person, entity or corporation without
the personal presence of petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia, who
shall affix her signature in the presence of the Register of

Deeds, due to the fear of petitioner Rosalie that her
signature will be forged in order to effect the encumbrance or
sale of these properties to defraud her or the conjugal
partnership of gains.
In its Order29 dated September 26, 2006, the trial court
extended the aforequoted TPO for another ten (10) days,
and gave petitioner a period of five (5) days within which to
show cause why the TPO should not be renewed, extended,
or modified. Upon petitioner's manifestation,30 however, that
he has not received a copy of private respondent's motion to
modify/renew the TPO, the trial court directed in its
Order31 dated October 6, 2006 that petitioner be furnished a
copy of said motion. Nonetheless, an Order32 dated a day
earlier, October 5, had already been issued renewing the
TPO dated August 23, 2006. The pertinent portion is quoted
x
x x x it appearing further that the hearing could not yet be

finally terminated, the Temporary Protection Order issued on
August 23, 2006 is hereby renewed and extended for thirty
(30) days and continuously extended and renewed for thirty
(30) days, after each expiration, until further orders, and
subject to such modifications as may be ordered by the
court.
After having received a copy of the foregoing Order,
petitioner no longer submitted the required comment to
private respondent's motion for renewal of the TPO arguing
that it would only be an exercise in futility. 33
Proceedings
before
the
CA
During the pendency of Civil Case No. 06-797, petitioner

filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition 34 for
prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB- SP. No. 01698), with prayer for
injunction and temporary restraining order, challenging (1)
the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 for being violative of the
due process and the equal protection clauses, and (2) the
validity of the modified TPO issued in the civil case for being
an
unwanted
product
of
an
invalid
law.
On May 26, 2006, the appellate court issued a 60-day
Temporary
Restraining
Order35 (TRO)
against
the
enforcement of the TPO, the amended TPOs and other
orders
pursuant
thereto.
Subsequently, however, on January 24, 2007, the appellate
court dismissed36 the petition for failure of petitioner to raise
the constitutional issue in his pleadings before the trial court
in the civil case, which is clothed with jurisdiction to resolve
the same. Secondly, the challenge to the validity of R.A.
9262 through a petition for prohibition seeking to annul the
protection orders issued by the trial court constituted a
collateral
attack
on
said
law.
His motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Decision
having been denied in the Resolution37 dated August 14,
2007, petitioner is now before us alleging that
The Issues
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
PETITION ON THE THEORY THAT THE ISSUE OF
CONSTITUTIONALITY WAS NOT RAISED AT THE
EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY AND THAT, THE PETITION
CONSTITUTES A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE
VALIDITY OF THE LAW.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS
ERROR IN FAILING TO CONCLUDE THAT R.A. 9262 IS
DISCRIMINATORY, UNJUST, AND VIOLATIVE OF THE
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE MISTAKE
IN NOT FINDING THAT R.A. 9262 RUNS COUNTER TO
THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION.
IV.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT
THE LAW DOES VIOLENCE TO THE POLICY OF THE
STATE TO PROTECT THE FAMILY AS A BASIC SOCIAL
INSTITUTION.
V.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT
DECLARING R.A. No. 9262 AS INVALID AND
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT ALLOWS AN UNDUE
DELEGATION OF JUDICIAL POWER TO THE BARANGAY
OFFICIALS.38nadcralavvonlinelawlibrary
The Ruling of the Court
Before delving into the arguments propounded by petitioner
against the constitutionality of R.A. 9262, we shall first tackle
the propriety of the dismissal by the appellate court of the
petition for prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698) filed by
petitioner.
As a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity so that if not raised in the
pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised in the trial, and if
not raised in the trial court, it will not be considered on
appeal.39 Courts will not anticipate a question of
constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.40
In defending his failure to attack the constitutionality of R.A.
9262 before the RTC of Bacolod City, petitioner argues that
the Family Court has limited authority and jurisdiction that is
inadequate to tackle the complex issue of constitutionality. 41
We
disagree.

Family Courts have authority and
to consider the constitutionality of
jurisdiction
a statute.
At the outset, it must be stressed that Family Courts are

special courts, of the same level as Regional Trial Courts.
Under R.A. 8369, otherwise known as the Family Courts Act
of 1997, family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to
hear and decide cases of domestic violence against women
and children.42 In accordance with said law, the Supreme
Court designated from among the branches of the Regional
Trial Courts at least one Family Court in each of several key
cities identified.43 To achieve harmony with the first
mentioned law, Section 7 of R.A. 9262 now provides that
Regional Trial Courts designated as Family Courts shall
have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of VAWC
defined under the latter law, viz:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
SEC. 7. Venue. The Regional Trial Court designated as
a Family Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction
over cases of violence against women and their children
under this law. In the absence of such court in the place
where the offense was committed, the case shall be filed in
the Regional Trial Court where the crime or any of its
elements was committed at the option of the complainant.
(Emphasis supplied)
Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of
Bacolod City remains possessed of authority as a court of
general original jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of cases
whether civil, criminal, special proceedings, land registration,
guardianship, naturalization, admiralty or insolvency.44 It is
settled that RTCs have jurisdiction to resolve the
constitutionality of a statute,45 this authority being embraced
in the general definition of the judicial power to determine
what are the valid and binding laws by the criterion of their
conformity to the fundamental law.46 The Constitution vests
the power of judicial review or the power to declare the
constitutionality or validity of a law, treaty, international or
executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in all
RTCs.47 We said in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. CA48 that,
[p]lainly the Constitution contemplates that the inferior
courts should have jurisdiction in cases involving
constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it speaks of appellate
review of final judgments of inferior courts in cases where
such constitutionality happens to be in issue. Section 5,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads in part as
SEC. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following
powers:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or

regulation
is
in
question.
xxxx
Thus, contrary to the posturing of petitioner, the issue of
constitutionality of R.A. 9262 could have been raised at the
earliest opportunity in his Opposition to the petition for
protection order before the RTC of Bacolod City, which had
jurisdiction to determine the same, subject to the review of
this
Court.
Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Violence
Against Women and Their Children, lays down a new kind of
procedure requiring the respondent to file an opposition to
the
petition
and
not
an
answer.49
Thus:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
SEC. 20. Opposition to petition. (a) The respondent may
file an opposition to the petition which he himself shall verify.
It must be accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and
shall show cause why a temporary or permanent protection
order
should
not
be
issued.
(b) Respondent shall not include in the opposition any
counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint, but
any cause of action which could be the subject thereof may
be litigated in a separate civil action. (Emphasis supplied)
We cannot subscribe to the theory espoused by petitioner
that, since a counterclaim, cross-claim and third-party
complaint are to be excluded from the opposition, the issue
of constitutionality cannot likewise be raised therein.
A counterclaim is defined as any claim for money or other
relief which a defending party may have against an opposing
party.50 A cross- claim, on the other hand, is any claim by
one party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter either of the original
action or of a counterclaim therein.51 Finally, a third-party
complaint is a claim that a defending party may, with leave
of court, file against a person not a party to the action for
contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in
respect of his opponent's claim.52 As pointed out by Justice
Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, the unconstitutionality of a
statute is not a cause of action that could be the subject of a
counterclaim, cross-claim or a third-party complaint.
Therefore, it is not prohibited from being raised in the
opposition in view of the familiar maxim expressio unius est
exclusio
alterius.
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or

certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final
judgments
and
orders
of
lower
courts
in:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
Moreover, it cannot be denied that this issue affects the

resolution of the case a quo because the right of private
respondent to a protection order is founded solely on the
very statute the validity of which is being attacked 53 by
petitioner who has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as
a result of its enforcement. The alleged unconstitutionality of
R.A. 9262 is, for all intents and purposes, a valid cause for
the
non-issuance
of
a
protection
order.
a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any

treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential
That the proceedings in Civil Case No. 06-797 are summary

in nature should not have deterred petitioner from raising the

same in his Opposition. The question relative to the
constitutionality of a statute is one of law which does not
need to be supported by evidence.54 Be that as it may,
Section 25 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC nonetheless allows the
conduct of a hearing to determine legal issues, among
others,viz:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
enjoined.
SEC. 25. Order for further hearing. - In case the court

determines the need for further hearing, it may issue an
order
containing
the
following:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
Federal injunctions against state criminal statutes, either in

their entirety or with respect to their separate and distinct
prohibitions, are not to be granted as a matter of course,
even if such statutes are unconstitutional. No citizen or
member of the community is immune from prosecution, in
good faith, for his alleged criminal acts. The imminence of
such a prosecution even though alleged to be unauthorized
and, hence, unlawful is not alone ground for relief in equity
which exerts its extraordinary powers only to prevent
irreparable injury to the plaintiff who seeks its aid. (Citations
omitted)
(a) Facts undisputed and admitted;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

(b)
Factual
and legal
resolved;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
issues to
be
(c) Evidence, including objects and documents that have

been
marked
and
will
be
presented;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(d) Names of witnesses who will be ordered to present their
direct testimonies in the form of affidavits; and
(e) Schedule of the presentation of evidence by both parties
which shall be done in one day, to the extent possible, within
the 30-day period of the effectivity of the temporary
protection order issued. (Emphasis supplied)
To obviate potential dangers that may arise concomitant to
the conduct of a hearing when necessary, Section 26 (b) of
A.M. No. 04-10-11- SC provides that if a temporary
protection order issued is due to expire, the trial court may
extend or renew the said order for a period of thirty (30) days
each time until final judgment is rendered. It may likewise
modify the extended or renewed temporary protection order
as may be necessary to meet the needs of the parties. With
the private respondent given ample protection, petitioner
could proceed to litigate the constitutional issues, without
necessarily running afoul of the very purpose for the
adoption of the rules on summary procedure.
In view of all the foregoing, the appellate court correctly
dismissed the petition for prohibition with prayer for
injunction and temporary restraining order (CA-G.R. CEB SP. No. 01698). Petitioner may have proceeded upon an
honest belief that if he finds succor in a superior court, he
could be granted an injunctive relief. However, Section 22(j)
of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC expressly disallows the filing of a
petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any
interlocutory order issued by the trial court. Hence, the 60day TRO issued by the appellate court in this case against
the enforcement of the TPO, the amended TPOs and other
orders pursuant thereto was improper, and it effectively
hindered the case from taking its normal course in an
expeditious
and
summary
manner.
As the rules stand, a review of the case by appeal
or certiorari before judgment is prohibited. Moreover, if the
appeal of a judgment granting permanent protection shall not
stay its enforcement,55 with more reason that a TPO, which is
valid only for thirty (30) days at a time, 56 should not be
The mere fact that a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional

or invalid, does not of itself entitle a litigant to have the same
enjoined.57 In Younger v. Harris, Jr.,58 the Supreme Court of
the United States declared, thus:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
The sole objective of injunctions is to preserve the status

quo until the trial court hears fully the merits of the case. It
bears stressing, however, that protection orders are
granted ex parte so as to protect women and their children
from acts of violence. To issue an injunction against such
orders will defeat the very purpose of the law against VAWC.
Notwithstanding all these procedural flaws, we shall not shirk
from our obligation to determine novel issues, or issues of
first impression, with far-reaching implications. We have,
time and again, discharged our solemn duty as final arbiter
of constitutional issues, and with more reason now, in view of
private respondent's plea in her Comment59 to the instant
Petition that we should put the challenge to the
constitutionality of R.A. 9262 to rest. And so we shall.
Intent
of
Congress
in
enacting
R.A.
9262.
Petitioner claims that since R.A. 9262 is intended to prevent

and criminalize spousal and child abuse, which could very
well be committed by either the husband or the wife, gender
alone is not enough basis to deprive the husband/father of
the
remedies
under
the
law.60
A perusal of the deliberations of Congress on Senate Bill No.
2723,61 which became R.A. 9262, reveals that while the
sponsor, Senator Luisa Pimentel-Ejercito (better known as
Senator Loi Estrada), had originally proposed what she
called a synthesized measure 62 an amalgamation of two
measures, namely, the Anti-Domestic Violence Act and the
Anti- Abuse of Women in Intimate Relationships Act 63
providing protection to all family members, leaving no one in
isolation but at the same time giving special attention to
women as the usual victims of violence and
abuse,64 nonetheless, it was eventually agreed that men be
denied protection under the same measure. We quote
pertinent portions of the deliberations:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
Wednesday,
December
10,
2003
Senator Pangilinan. I just wanted to place this on record, Mr.

President. Some women's groups have expressed concerns

and relayed these concerns to me that if we are to include
domestic violence apart from against women as well as other
members of the household, including children or the
husband, they fear that this would weaken the efforts to
address domestic violence of which the main victims or the
bulk of the victims really are the wives, the spouses or the
female partners in a relationship. We would like to place that
on record. How does the good Senator respond to this kind
of
observation?
Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President, there is this group of
women who call themselves WIIR Women in Intimate
Relationship. They do not want to include men in this
domestic violence. But plenty of men are also being abused
by women. I am playing safe so I placed here members of
the family, prescribing penalties therefor and providing
protective measures for victims. This includes the men,
children, live-in, common-law wives, and those related with
the
family.65
x
Wednesday,
January
x
The
x
14,
x
President
x
2004
x
Pro
Tempore.
x
x
Also, may the Chair remind the group that there was the
discussion whether to limit this to women and not to families
which was the issue of the AWIR group. The understanding
that I have is that we would be having a broader scope
rather than just women, if I remember correctly, Madam
sponsor.
Senator
Estrada.
Yes,
Mr.
President.
As a matter of fact, that was brought up by Senator

Pangilinan
during
the
interpellation
period.
I think Senator Sotto has something to say to that.
Senator Legarda. Mr. President, the reason I am in support
of the measure. Do not get me wrong. However, I believe
that there is a need to protect women's rights especially in
the
domestic
environment.
opportunities especially in the domestic environment where

the macho Filipino man would always feel that he is stronger,
more
superior
to
the
Filipino
woman.
x
I think that the sponsor, based on our earlier conversations,

concurs with this position. I am sure that the men in this
Chamber who love their women in their lives so dearly will
agree with this representation. Whether we like it or not, it is
an unequal world. Whether we like it or not, no matter how
empowered the women are, we are not given equal
The President Pro Tempore. What does the sponsor say?

Senator Estrada. Mr. President, before accepting this, the
committee came up with this bill because the family
members have been included in this proposed measure
since the other members of the family other than women are
also possible victims of violence. While women are most
likely the intended victims, one reason incidentally why the
measure focuses on women, the fact remains that in some
relatively few cases, men also stand to be victimized and
that children are almost always the helpless victims of
violence. I am worried that there may not be enough
protection extended to other family members particularly
children who are excluded. Although Republic Act No. 7610,
for instance, more or less, addresses the special needs of
abused children. The same law is inadequate. Protection
orders for one are not available in said law.
I am aware that some groups are apprehensive about
granting the same protection to men, fearing that they may
use this law to justify their abusive behavior against women.
However, we should also recognize that there are
established procedures and standards in our courts which
give credence to evidentiary support and cannot just
arbitrarily and whimsically entertain baseless complaints.
Mr. President, this measure is intended to harmonize family
relations and to protect the family as the basic social
institution. Though I recognize the unequal power relations
between men and women in our society, I believe we have
an obligation to uphold inherent rights and dignity of both
husband and wife and their immediate family members,
particularly
children.
While I prefer to focus mainly on women, I was compelled to
include other family members as a critical input arrived at
after a series of consultations/meetings with various NGOs,
experts, sports groups and other affected sectors, Mr.
President.
Senator
As I said earlier, there are nameless, countless, voiceless

women who have not had the opportunity to file a case
against their spouses, their live-in partners after years, if not
decade, of battery and abuse. If we broaden the scope to
include even the men, assuming they can at all be abused
by the women or their spouses, then it would not equalize
the already difficult situation for women, Mr. President.
Sotto.
Mr.
President.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, with the permission of the

other
senators.
Senator Sotto. Yes, with the permission of the two ladies on
the Floor. The President Pro Tempore. Yes, Sen. Vicente C.
Sotto III is recognized. Senator Sotto. I presume that the
effect
of
the
proposed
amendment
of
Senator Legarda would be removing the men and children
in this particular bill and focus specifically on women alone.
That will be the net effect of that proposed amendment.
Hearing the rationale mentioned by the distinguished
sponsor, Sen. Luisa Loi Ejercito Estrada, I am not sure now

whether she is inclined to accept the proposed amendment
of
Senator
Legarda.
There being none, the amendment, as amended, is

approved.66
I am willing to wait whether she is accepting this or not

because if she is going to accept this, I will propose an
amendment to the amendment rather than object to the
amendment,
Mr.
President.
It is settled that courts are not concerned with the wisdom,

justice, policy, or expediency of a statute.67 Hence, we dare
not venture into the real motivations and wisdom of the
members of Congress in limiting the protection against
violence and abuse under R.A. 9262 to women and children
only. No proper challenge on said grounds may be
entertained in this proceeding. Congress has made its
choice and it is not our prerogative to supplant this judgment.
The choice may be perceived as erroneous but even then,
the remedy against it is to seek its amendment or repeal by
the legislative. By the principle of separation of powers, it is
the legislative that determines the necessity, adequacy,
wisdom
and
expediency
of
any
law.68
Senator Estrada. The amendment is accepted, Mr.

President. The President Pro Tempore. Is there any
objection?
x
Senator Sotto. x x x May I propose an amendment to the

amendment. The President Pro Tempore. Before we act on
the amendment? Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
The
President
Pro
Tempore.
Yes,
please
proceed.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President, I am inclined to believe the

rationale used by the distinguished proponent of the
amendment. As a matter of fact, I tend to agree. Kung may
maaabuso, mas malamang iyong babae kaysa sa lalake. At
saka iyong mga lalake, puwede na talagang magulpi iyan.
Okey lang iyan. But I cannot agree that we remove the
children
from
this
particular
measure.
So,
The
if
may
President
Pro
propose
an
Tempore.
To
amendment
the
amendment.
Senator Sotto. more than the women, the children are very
much abused. As a matter of fact, it is not limited to minors.
The abuse is not limited to seven, six, 5-year-old children. I
have seen 14, 15-year-old children being abused by their
fathers, even by their mothers. And it breaks my heart to find
out
about
these
things.
Because of the inadequate existing law on abuse of children,
this particular measure will update that. It will enhance and
hopefully prevent the abuse of children and not only women.
We only step in when there is a violation of the Constitution.

However, none was sufficiently shown in this case.
R.A.
9262
guaranty
of
does
of
the
not
equal
violate
the
protection
laws.
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things

similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. The oft-repeated
disquisition in the early case ofVictoriano v. Elizalde Rope
Workers' Union69 is instructive:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a
guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all
citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in
order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality,
that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by
a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean
indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on
persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It
guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution
does not require that things which are different in fact be
treated in law as though they were the same. The equal
protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things
that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is
limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the
territory
within
which
it
is
to
operate.
SOTTO-LEGARDA AMENDMENTS
Therefore, may I propose an amendment that, yes, we
remove the aspect of the men in the bill but not the children.
Senator Legarda. I agree, Mr. President, with the Minority
Leader.
The President Pro Tempore. Effectively then, it will be
women
AND
CHILDREN.
Senator
Senator
Sotto.
Estrada.
Yes,
It
is
Mr.
accepted,
President.
Mr.
President.
The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection? [Silence]
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution

allows classification. Classification in law, as in the other
departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of
things in speculation or practice because they agree with
one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid
because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification
is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the
mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of
constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is
that it be reasonable, which means that the classification
should be based on substantial distinctions which make for
real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of
the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions
only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the
class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the

classification or distinction is based on a reasonable
foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.
(Emphasis supplied)
Measured against the foregoing jurisprudential yardstick, we
find that R.A. 9262 is based on a valid classification as shall
hereinafter be discussed and, as such, did not violate the
equal protection clause by favoring women over men as
victims of violence and abuse to whom the State extends its
protection.
I.
R.A.
9262
rests
on
substantial
distinctions.
The unequal power relationship between women and men;

the fact that women are more likely than men to be victims of
violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice
against women all make for real differences justifying the
classification under the law. As Justice McIntyre succinctly
states, the accommodation of differences ... is the essence
of
true
equality.70
A. Unequal power relationship between men and
women
According to the Philippine Commission on Women (the
National Machinery for Gender Equality and Women's
Empowerment), violence against women (VAW) is deemed
to be closely linked with theunequal power relationship
between women and men otherwise known as genderbased violence. Societal norms and traditions dictate people
to think men are the leaders, pursuers, providers, and take
on dominant roles in society while women are nurturers,
men's companions and supporters, and take on subordinate
roles in society. This perception leads to men gaining more
power over women. With power comes the need to control to
retain that power. And VAW is a form of men's expression of
controlling
women
to
retain
power.71
The United Nations, which has long recognized VAW as a
human rights issue, passed its Resolution 48/104 on the
Declaration on Elimination of Violence Against Women on
December 20, 1993 stating that violence against women is
a manifestation of historically unequal power relations
between men and women, which have led to domination
over and discrimination against women by men and to the
prevention of the full advancement of women, and that
violence against women is one of the crucial social
mechanisms by which women are forced into subordinate
positions,
compared
with
men.72
Then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno traced the historical and
social context of gender-based violence and developments
in advocacies to eradicate VAW, in his remarks delivered
during the Joint Launching of R.A. 9262 and its
Implementing Rules last October 27, 2004, the pertinent
portions
of
which
are
quoted
History reveals that most societies sanctioned the use of
violence against women. The patriarch of a family was
accorded the right to use force on members of the family
under
his
control.
I
studies:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
quote
the
early
Traditions subordinating women have a long history rooted in

patriarchy the institutional rule of men. Women were seen
in virtually all societies to be naturally inferior both physically
and intellectually. In ancient Western societies, women
whether slave, concubine or wife, were under the authority of
men. In law, they were treated as property.
The Roman concept of patria potestas allowed the husband
to beat, or even kill, his wife if she endangered his property
right over her. Judaism, Christianity and other religions
oriented towards the patriarchal family strengthened the
male
dominated
structure
of
society.
English feudal law reinforced the tradition of male control
over women. Even the eminent Blackstone has been quoted
in his commentaries as saying husband and wife were one
and that one was the husband. However, in the late 1500s
and through the entire 1600s, English common law began to
limit the right of husbands to chastise their wives. Thus,
common law developed the rule of thumb, which allowed
husbands to beat their wives with a rod or stick no thicker
than
their
thumb.
In the later part of the 19th century, legal recognition of these
rights to chastise wives or inflict corporeal punishment
ceased. Even then, the preservation of the family was given
more importance than preventing violence to women.
The metamorphosis of the law on violence in the United
States followed that of the English common law. In 1871, the
Supreme Court of Alabama became the first appellate court
to strike down the common law right of a husband to beat his
wife:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
The privilege, ancient though it may be, to beat one's wife
with a stick, to pull her hair, choke her, spit in her face or kick
her about the floor, or to inflict upon her like indignities, is not
now acknowledged by our law... In person, the wife is
entitled to the same protection of the law that the husband
can invoke for himself.
As time marched on, the women's advocacy movement
became more organized. The temperance leagues initiated
it. These leagues had a simple focus. They considered the
evils of alcoholism as the root cause of wife abuse. Hence,
they demonstrated and picketed saloons, bars and their
husbands' other watering holes. Soon, however, their
crusade was joined by suffragette movements, expanding
the liberation movement's agenda. They fought for women's
right to vote, to own property, and more. Since then, the
feminist
movement
was
on
the
roll.
The feminist movement exposed the private invisibility of the
domestic violence to the public gaze. They succeeded in
transforming the issue into an important public concern. No
less than the United States Supreme Court, in 1992
case Planned
Parenthood
v.
Casey,
noted:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

In an average 12-month period in this country, approximately
two million women are the victims of severe assaults by their
male partners. In a 1985 survey, women reported that nearly
one of every eight husbands had assaulted their wives
during the past year. The [American Medical Association]
views these figures as marked underestimates, because
the nature of these incidents discourages women from
reporting them, and because surveys typically exclude the
very poor, those who do not speak English well, and women
who are homeless or in institutions or hospitals when the
survey is conducted. According to the AMA, researchers on
family violence agree that the true incidence of partner
violence is probably double the above estimates; or four
million
severely
assaulted
women
per
year.
Studies on prevalence suggest that from one-fifth to onethird of all women will be physically assaulted by a partner or
ex-partner during their lifetime... Thus on an average day in
the United States, nearly 11,000 women are severely
assaulted by their male partners. Many of these incidents
involve sexual assault... In families where wife beating takes
place, moreover, child abuse is often present as well.
Other studies fill in the rest of this troubling picture. Physical
violence is only the most visible form of abuse. Psychological
abuse, particularly forced social and economic isolation of
women,
is
also
common.
Many victims of domestic violence remain with their abusers,
perhaps
because
they
perceive
no
superior
alternative...Many abused women who find temporary refuge
in shelters return to their husbands, in large part because
they have no other source of income... Returning to one's
abuser can be dangerous. Recent Federal Bureau of
Investigation statistics disclose that 8.8 percent of all
homicide victims in the United States are killed by their
spouses...Thirty percent of female homicide victims are killed
by their male partners.
Finally in 1994, the United States Congress enacted the
Violence
Against
Women
Act.
In the International front, the women's struggle for equality
was no less successful. The United States Charter and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirmed the equality
of all human beings. In 1979, the UN General Assembly
adopted the landmark Convention on the Elimination of all
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). In 1993,
the UN General Assembly also adopted the Declaration on
the Elimination of Violence Against Women. World
conferences on the role and rights of women have been
regularly held in Mexico City, Copenhagen, Nairobi and
Beijing. The UN itself established a Commission on the
Status
of
Women.
The Philippines has been in cadence with the half and full
steps of all these women's movements. No less than
Section 14, Article II of our 1987 Constitution mandates the
State to recognize the role of women in nation building and
to ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women
and men. Our Senate has ratified the CEDAW as well as the
Convention on the Rights of the Child and its two protocols.

To cap it all, Congress, on March 8, 2004, enacted Rep. Act
No. 9262, entitled An Act Defining Violence Against Women
and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for
Victims, Prescribing Penalties therefor and for other
Purposes. (Citations omitted)
B. Women
victims
are
the
usual
of
and
most likely
violence.
At the time of the presentation of Senate Bill No. 2723,

official statistics on violence against women and children
show that
x x x physical injuries had the highest number of cases at
5,058 in 2002 representing 55.63% of total cases reported
(9,903). And for the first semester of 2003, there were 2,381
reported cases out of 4,354 cases which represent 54.31%.
xxx (T)he total number of women in especially difficult
circumstances served by the Department of Social Welfare
and Development (DSWD) for the year 2002, there are 1,417
physically abused/maltreated cases out of the total of 5,608
cases. xxx (T)here are 1,091 DSWD cases out of a total
number of 3,471 cases for the first semester of 2003.
Female violence comprised more than 90% of all forms of
abuse and violence and more than 90% of these reported
cases were committed by the women's intimate partners
such as their husbands and live-in partners.73
Recently, the Philippine Commission on Women presented
comparative statistics on violence against women across an
eight-year period from 2004 to August of 2011 with violations
under R.A. 9262 ranking first among the different VAW
categories
since
its
implementation
in
2004,74 thus:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
Table 1. Annual Comparative Statistics on Violence Against
Women, 2004 - 2011*
Reported
Cases
Rape
Incestuous
Rape
Attempted
Rape
Acts
of
Lasciviousne
ss
Physical
Injuries
Sexual
Harassment
RA 9262
200
4
997
38
200
5
927
46
200
6
659
26
200
7
837
22
200
8
811
28
200 2010 2011

9
770 1,042 832
27 19
23
194 148 185 147 204 167 268
201
580 536 382 358 445 485 745
625
3,55 2,33 1,89 1,50 1,30 1,49 2,018 1,588

3
5
2
5
7
8
53 37 38 46 18 54 83
63
218 924 1,26

9
Threats
319 223 199
Seduction
62 19 29
Concubinag 121 102 93
e
2,38
7
182
30
109
3,59
9
220
19
109
5,28
5
208
19
99
9,974 9,021
374
25
158
213
15
128

RA 9208
Abduction
/Kidnapping
Unjust
Vexation
Total
17
29
11
16
16
34
24
23
34
28
152 190
18 25
62
22
90
50
59
59
83
703 183
155
6,27 5,37 4,88 5,72 6,90 9,48 15,10 12,94

1
4
1
9
5
5
4
8
*2011 report covers only from January to August

Source: Philippine National Police Women and Children
Protection Center (WCPC)
On the other hand, no reliable estimates may be obtained on
domestic abuse and violence against men in the Philippines
because incidents thereof are relatively low and, perhaps,
because many men will not even attempt to report the
situation. In the United Kingdom, 32% of women who had
ever experienced domestic violence did so four or five (or
more) times, compared with 11% of the smaller number of
men who had ever experienced domestic violence; and
women constituted 89% of all those who had experienced 4
or more incidents of domestic violence.75 Statistics in Canada
show that spousal violence by a woman against a man is
less likely to cause injury than the other way around (18
percent versus 44 percent). Men, who experience violence
from their spouses are much less likely to live in fear of
violence at the hands of their spouses, and much less likely
to experience sexual assault. In fact, many cases of physical
violence by a woman against a spouse are in self-defense or
the result of many years of physical or emotional abuse. 76
While there are, indeed, relatively few cases of violence and
abuse perpetrated against men in the Philippines, the same
cannot
render
R.A.
9262
invalid.
In a 1960 case involving the violation of a city ordinance
requiring drivers of animal-drawn vehicles to pick up, gather
and deposit in receptacles the manure emitted or discharged
by their vehicle-drawing animals in any public highways,
streets, plazas, parks or alleys, said ordinance was
challenged as violative of the guaranty of equal protection of
laws as its application is limited to owners and drivers of
vehicle-drawing animals and not to those animals, although
not utilized, but similarly pass through the same streets.
The ordinance was upheld as a valid classification for the
reason that, while there may be non-vehicle-drawing animals
that also traverse the city roads, but their number must be
negligible and their appearance therein merely
occasional, compared to the rig-drawing ones, as not to
constitute a menace to the health of the community. 77 The
mere fact that the legislative classification may result in
actual inequality is not violative of the right to equal
protection, for every classification of persons or things for
regulation by law produces inequality in some degree, but
the
law
is
not
thereby
rendered
invalid.78
C.
Gender
bias
and
and sentencing, crimes against women are often treated

differently and less seriously than other crimes. This was
argued by then United States Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
now Vice President, chief sponsor of the Violence Against
Women Act (VAWA), in defending the civil rights remedy as a
valid exercise of the U.S. Congress' authority under the
Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses. He stressed that
the widespread gender bias in the U.S. has institutionalized
historic prejudices against victims of rape or domestic
violence, subjecting them to double victimization first at
the hands of the offender and then of the legal system. 79
Our own Senator Loi Estrada lamented in her Sponsorship
Speech for Senate Bill No. 2723 that (w)henever violence
occurs in the family, the police treat it as a private matter and
advise the parties to settle the conflict themselves. Once the
complainant brings the case to the prosecutor, the latter is
hesitant to file the complaint for fear that it might later be
withdrawn. This lack of response or reluctance to be involved
by the police and prosecution reinforces the escalating,
recurring and often serious nature of domestic violence. 80
Sadly, our own courts, as well, have exhibited prejudices and
biases
against
our
women.
In a recent case resolved on March 9, 2011, we fined RTC
Judge Venancio J. Amila for Conduct Unbecoming of a
Judge. He used derogatory and irreverent language in
reference to the complainant in a petition for TPO and PPO
under R.A. 9262, calling her as only a live-in partner and
presenting her as an opportunist and a mistress in an
illegitimate relationship. Judge Amila even called her a
prostitute, and accused her of being motivated by
insatiable greed and of absconding with the contested
property.81 Such remarks betrayed Judge Amila's prejudices
and
lack
of
gender
sensitivity.
The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the
discrimination brought about by biases and prejudices
against women. As emphasized by the CEDAW Committee
on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women,
addressing or correcting discrimination through specific
measures focused on women does not discriminate against
men.82 Petitioner's contention,83 therefore, that R.A. 9262 is
discriminatory and that it is an anti-male, husbandbashing, and hate-men law deserves scant consideration.
As a State Party to the CEDAW, the Philippines bound itself
to take all appropriate measures to modify the social and
cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view
to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and
all other practices which are based on the idea of the
inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on
stereotyped roles for men and women.84 Justice Puno
correctly pointed out that (t)he paradigm shift changing the
character of domestic violence from a private affair to a
public offense will require the development of a distinct
mindset on the part of the police, the prosecution and the
judges.85
prejudices
From the initial report to the police through prosecution, trial,
II. The classification is germane to the purpose of the

law.

The distinction between men and women is germane to the
purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to address violence
committed against women and children, spelled out in
its Declaration of Policy, as follows:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared that the
State values the dignity of women and children and
guarantees full respect for human rights. The State also
recognizes the need to protect the family and its members
particularly women and children, from violence and threats to
their
personal
safety
and
security.
Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address
violence committed against women and children in keeping
with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the
Constitution and the provisions of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Convention on the
Rights of the Child and other international human rights
instruments of which the Philippines is a party.
In 1979, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the CEDAW,
which the Philippines ratified on August 5, 1981.
Subsequently, the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW was also
ratified by the Philippines on October 6, 2003. 86 This
Convention mandates that State parties shall accord to
women equality with men before the law87 and shall take all
appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against
women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations
on the basis of equality of men and women. 88 The
Philippines likewise ratified the Convention on the Rights of
the Child and its two protocols. 89 It is, thus, bound by said
Conventions
and
their
respective
protocols.
III. The classification is not limited to existing
conditions only, and apply equally to all members
Moreover, the application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the
existing conditions when it was promulgated, but to future
conditions as well, for as long as the safety and security of
women and their children are threatened by violence and
abuse.
R.A. 9262 applies equally to all women and children who
suffer violence and abuse. Section 3 thereof defines VAWC
as:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
x x x any act or a series of acts committed by any person
against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a
woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or
against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or
without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result
in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or
economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery,
assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of
liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following
acts:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or

physical
harm;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in
nature, committed against a woman or her child. It includes,
but is not limited to:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating
a woman or her child as a sex object, making demeaning
and sexually suggestive remarks, physically attacking the
sexual parts of the victim's body, forcing her/him to watch
obscene publications and indecent shows or forcing the
woman or her child to do indecent acts and/or make films
thereof, forcing the wife and mistress/lover to live in the
conjugal home or sleep together in the same room with the
abuser;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage
in any sexual activity by force, threat of force, physical or
other harm or threat of physical or other harm or
coercion;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
c) Prostituting the woman or child.
C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions
causing or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering of
the victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment,
stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation,
repeated verbal abuse and mental infidelity. It includes
causing or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual
or psychological abuse of a member of the family to which
the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or
to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted
deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of
common
children.
D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to
make a woman financially dependent which includes, but is
not limited to the following:
1. withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim

from engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation,
business or activity, except in cases wherein the other
spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and moral grounds
as
defined
in
Article
73
of
the
Family
Code;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources
and the right to the use and enjoyment of the conjugal,
community
or
property
owned
in
common;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
3. destroying household property;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
4. controlling the victims' own money or properties or solely
controlling the conjugal money or properties.
It should be stressed that the acts enumerated in the

aforequoted provision are attributable to research that has

exposed
the
dimensions
and
dynamics of battery. The acts described here are also found

in the U.N. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against
Women.90 Hence, the argument advanced by petitioner that
the definition of what constitutes abuse removes the
difference between violent action and simple marital tiffs is
tenuous.
There is nothing in the definition of VAWC that is vague and
ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in his defense. The
acts enumerated above are easily understood and provide
adequate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited
acts. They are worded with sufficient definiteness that
persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what
conduct is prohibited, and need not guess at its meaning nor
differ in its application.91 Yet, petitioner insists92 that phrases
like depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her
child of a legal right, solely controlling the conjugal or
common money or properties, marital infidelity, and
causing mental or emotional anguish are so vague that
they make every quarrel a case of spousal abuse. However,
we have stressed that the vagueness doctrine merely
requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to
be upheld not absolute precision or mathematical
exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather
than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the
metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An
act will not be held invalid merely because it might have
been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its
provisions.93
There is likewise no merit to the contention that R.A. 9262
singles out the husband or father as the culprit. As defined
above, VAWC may likewise be committed against a woman
with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship. Clearly, the use of the gender-neutral word
person who has or had a sexual or dating relationship with
the woman encompasses even lesbian relationships.
Moreover, while the law provides that the offender be related
or connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a
sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the
application of theprinciple of conspiracy under the Revised
Penal Code (RPC). Thus, in the case of Go-Tan v. Spouses
Tan,94 the parents-in-law of Sharica Mari L. Go- Tan, the
victim, were held to be proper respondents in the case filed
by the latter upon the allegation that they and their son (GoTan's husband) had community of design and purpose in
tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial support;
harassing and pressuring her to be ejected from the family
home; and in repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally,
mentally
and
physically.
R.A.
9262
is
not
violative
process
clause
of
the
of
the
due
Constitution.
Petitioner bewails the disregard of R.A. 9262, specifically in

the issuance of POs, of all protections afforded by the due
process clause of the Constitution. Says he: On the basis of
unsubstantiated allegations, and practically no opportunity to
respond, the husband is stripped of family, property, guns,
money, children, job, future employment and reputation, all in

a matter of seconds, without an inkling of what happened. 95
A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts
of violence against women and their children, their family or
household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs. Its
purpose is to safeguard the offended parties from further
harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life and facilitate
the opportunity and ability to regain control of their life.96
The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to
ensure that the victim or offended party is afforded all the
remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the
victim. This serves to safeguard the victim from greater risk
of violence; to accord the victim and any designated family or
household member safety in the family residence, and to
prevent the perpetrator from committing acts that jeopardize
the employment and support of the victim. It also enables the
court to award temporary custody of minor children to protect
the children from violence, to prevent their abduction by the
perpetrator and to ensure their financial support.97
The rules require that petitions for protection order be in
writing, signed and verified by the petitioner98 thereby
undertaking full responsibility, criminal or civil, for every
allegation therein. Since time is of the essence in cases of
VAWC if further violence is to be prevented, 99 the court is
authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before
notice and hearing when the life, limb or property of the
victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to
believe that the order is necessary to protect the victim from
the immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or to prevent
such
violence,
which
is
about
to
recur.100
There need not be any fear that the judge may have no
rational basis to issue an ex parte order. The victim is
required not only to verify the allegations in the petition, but
also to attach her witnesses' affidavits to the petition.101
The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged
as violative of the right to due process. Just like a writ of
preliminary attachment which is issued without notice and
hearing because the time in which the hearing will take could
be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of
his property,102 in the same way, the victim of VAWC may
already have suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of
her tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice and hearing
were required before such acts could be prevented. It is a
constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements
of procedural due process must yield to the necessities of
protecting vital public interests,103 among which is protection
of women and children from violence and threats to their
personal
safety
and
security.
It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex
parte, the court shall likewise order that notice be
immediately given to the respondent directing him to file an
opposition within five (5) days from service. Moreover, the
court shall order that notice, copies of the petition and TPO
be served immediately on the respondent by the court
sheriffs. The TPOs are initially effective for thirty (30) days

from
service
on
respondent.104
the
Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless

order the immediate issuance and service of the notice upon
the respondent requiring him to file an opposition to the
petition within five (5) days from service. The date of the
preliminary conference and hearing on the merits shall
likewise
be
indicated
on
the
notice.105
The opposition to the petition which the respondent himself
shall verify, must be accompanied by the affidavits of
witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or
permanent protection order should not be issued.106
It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a
petition for protection order should be apprised of the
charges imputed to him and afforded an opportunity to
present his side. Thus, the fear of petitioner of being
stripped of family, property, guns, money, children, job,
future employment and reputation, all in a matter of seconds,
without an inkling of what happened is a mere product of an
overactive imagination. The essence of due process is to be
found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit
any evidence one may have in support of one's defense. "To
be heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in court;
one may be heard also through pleadings. Where
opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or
pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due
process.107
It should be recalled that petitioner filed on April 26, 2006 an
Opposition to the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Renewal of the
TPO that was granted only two days earlier on April 24,
2006. Likewise, on May 23, 2006, petitioner filed a motion for
the modification of the TPO to allow him visitation rights to
his children. Still, the trial court in its Order dated September
26, 2006, gave him five days (5) within which to show cause
why the TPO should not be renewed or extended. Yet, he
chose not to file the required comment arguing that it would
just be an exercise in futility, conveniently forgetting that the
renewal of the questioned TPO was only for a limited period
(30 days) each time, and that he could prevent the continued
renewal of said order if he can show sufficient cause
therefor. Having failed to do so, petitioner may not now be
heard to complain that he was denied due process of law.
Petitioner next laments that the removal and exclusion of the
respondent in the VAWC case from the residence of the
victim, regardless of ownership of the residence, is virtually a
blank check issued to the wife to claim any property as her
conjugal
home.108
The wording of the pertinent rule, however, does not by any
stretch of the imagination suggest that this is so. It
states:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
SEC. 11. Reliefs available to the offended party. -- The
protection order shall include any, some or all of the following
reliefs:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
x
(c) Removing and excluding the respondent from the

residence of the offended party, regardless of ownership of
the residence, either temporarily for the purpose of
protecting the offended party, or permanently where no
property rights are violated. If the respondent must remove
personal effects from the residence, the court shall direct a
law enforcement agent to accompany the respondent to the
residence, remain there until the respondent has gathered
his
things
and
escort
him
from
the
residence;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
xxxx
Indubitably, petitioner may be removed and excluded from
private
respondent's
residence,
regardless
of
ownership, only temporarily for the purpose of protecting the
latter. Such removal and exclusion may be permanent
only where no property rights are violated. How then can the
private respondent just claim any property and appropriate it
for
herself,
as
petitioner
seems
to
suggest?
The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is
justified.
Petitioner argues that by criminalizing run-of-the-mill
arguments, instead of encouraging mediation and
counseling, the law has done violence to the avowed policy
of the State to protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous
social
institution.109
Under Section 23(c) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the court shall
not refer the case or any issue thereof to a mediator. The
reason behind this provision is well-explained by the
Commentary on Section 311 of the Model Code on Domestic
and Family Violence as follows:110
This section prohibits a court from ordering or referring
parties to mediation in a proceeding for an order for
protection. Mediation is a process by which parties in
equivalent bargaining positions voluntarily reach consensual
agreement about the issue at hand. Violence, however, is
not a subject for compromise. A process which involves
parties mediating the issue of violence implies that the victim
is somehow at fault. In addition, mediation of issues in a
proceeding for an order of protection is problematic because
the petitioner is frequently unable to participate equally with
the person against whom the protection order has been
sought. (Emphasis supplied)
There
power
is
no
undue
delegation
to
barangay
of
judicial
officials.
Petitioner contends that protection orders involve the

exercise of judicial power which, under the Constitution, is
placed upon the Supreme Court and such other lower
courts as may be established by law and, thus, protests the
delegation of power to barangay officials to issue protection
orders.111 The
pertinent
provision
reads,
as

SEC. 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May
Issue
and
How.
Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs) refer to the protection
order issued by the Punong Barangay ordering the
perpetrator to desist from committing acts under Section 5
(a) and (b) of this Act. A Punong Barangay who receives
applications for a BPO shall issue the protection order to the
applicant on the date of filing after ex parte determination of
the basis of the application. If the Punong Barangay is
unavailable to act on the application for a BPO, the
application shall be acted upon by any available Barangay
Kagawad. If the BPO is issued by a Barangay Kagawad, the
order must be accompanied by an attestation by
the Barangay Kagawad that the Punong Barangay was
unavailable at the time of the issuance of the BPO. BPOs
shall be effective for fifteen (15) days. Immediately after the
issuance
of
an ex
parte BPO,
the Punong
Barangay or Barangay Kagawad shall personally serve a
copy of the same on the respondent, or direct any barangay
official
to
effect
its
personal
service.
reasonable ground to believe that an offense has been

committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof,
the Punong Barangay must determine reasonable ground to
believe that an imminent danger of violence against the
woman and her children exists or is about to recur that would
necessitate the issuance of a BPO. The preliminary
investigation conducted by the prosecutor is, concededly, an
executive, not a judicial, function. The same holds true with
the
issuance
of
a
BPO.
The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate

in any proceeding before the Punong Barangay.
Before a statute or its provisions duly challenged are voided,

an unequivocal breach otor a clear conflict with the
Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one,
must be demonstrated in such a manner as to leave no
doubt in the mind of the Court. In other words, the grounds
for nullity must be beyond reasonable doubt. 116 In the instant
case, however, no concrete evidence and convincing
arguments were presented by petitioner to warrant a
declaration of the unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262, which is
an act of Congress and signed into law by the highest officer
of the co-equal executive department. As we said in Estrada
v. Sandiganbayan,117 courts must assume that the legislature
is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary
powers, and passed laws with full knowledge of the facts and
for the purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the
welfare
of
the
majority.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to

settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.112 On the other hand,
executive power "is generally defined as the power to
enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying
the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due
observance."113
As clearly delimited by the aforequoted provision, the BPO
issued by the Punong Barangay or, in his unavailability, by
any available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the
perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical harm to the
woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman
or her child physical harm. Such function of the Punong
Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature, in pursuance
of his duty under the Local Government Code to enforce all
laws and ordinances, and to maintain public order in the
barangay.114
We have held that (t)he mere fact that an officer is required
by law to inquire into the existence of certain facts and to
apply the law thereto in order to determine what his official
conduct shall be and the fact that these acts may affect
private rights do not constitute an exercise of judicial
powers.115
In the same manner as the public prosecutor ascertains
through a preliminary inquiry or proceeding whether there is
We need not even belabor the issue raised by petitioner that

since barangay officials and other law enforcement agencies
are required to extend assistance to victims of violence and
abuse, it would be very unlikely that they would remain
objective and impartial, and that the chances of acquittal are
nil. As already stated, assistance by barangay officials and
other law enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty
to enforce the law and to maintain peace and order.
Conclusion
We reiterate here Justice Puno's observation that "the history

of the women's movement against domestic violence shows
that one of its most difficult struggles was the fight against
the violence oflaw itself. If we keep that in mind, law will not
again be a hindrance to the struggle of women for equality
but will be its fulfillment."118 Accordingly, the constitutionality
of R.A. 9262 is, as it should be, sustained.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is
hereby DENIED for
lack
of
merit.
SO ORDERED.

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (Atty.

July 15, 1936

JOSE A. ANGARA, petitioner,

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (Atty. Niceforo Solis) 91

regulations essential to carry out the power and

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (Atty. Niceforo Solis) 91

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our

2. Has the said Electoral Commission acted without

We could perhaps dispose of this case by passing directly

As any human production, our Constitution is of course

1. Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (Atty. Niceforo Solis) 91

unfolding years to come be tested in the crucible of Filipino

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (Atty. Niceforo Solis) 91

returns, and qualifications of its members", was taken from

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (Atty. Niceforo Solis) 91

Mr. VENTURA. Mr. President, we have a doubt here

Mr. VENTURA. But does that carry the idea also

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (Atty. Niceforo Solis) 91

Mr. PELAYO. Mr. President, I would like to be

Sr. ROXAS. La diferencia, seor Presidente,

Mr. ROXAS. By the assembly for misconduct.

El Sr. CONEJERO. Antes de votarse la enmienda,

Mr. ROXAS. Yes, by the Electoral Commission.

El Sr. CONEJERO. Tal como esta el draft, dando

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (Atty. Niceforo Solis) 91

The amendment introduced by Delegates Labrador, Abordo

Cushing, in his Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (Atty. Niceforo Solis) 91

controverted elections of its members by abdicating its

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (Atty. Niceforo Solis) 91

be ineffective. The Electoral Commission in such case would

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (Atty. Niceforo Solis) 91

From another angle, Resolution No. 8 of the National

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (Atty. Niceforo Solis) 91

than to any of the other two departments of the

(d) That judicial supremacy is but the power of

(l) That confirmation by the National Assembly of

(e) That the Electoral Commission is an

(m) That confirmation by the National Assembly of

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (Atty. Niceforo Solis) 91

Republic of the Philippines

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (Atty. Niceforo Solis) 91

collectively referred to as the SMC

Optional Redemption and Purchase - SMC

COCOFED proposes to constitute a trust fund to be

Standard 4. The SMC Common

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (Atty. Niceforo Solis) 91

b. Twenty percent (20%)

To the basic motion, respondent Republic filed its

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (Atty. Niceforo Solis) 91

or persons close to former President

Eventually, the coconut levy funds that were used to

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (Atty. Niceforo Solis) 91

himself as receiver or to the fund, property,

And in Republic v. Sandiganbayan,[11] the Court

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (Atty. Niceforo Solis) 91

no dividends are declared in 1989, 1990

The declaration of dividends is still

As it were, the issue price of PhP 75 per share

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (Atty. Niceforo Solis) 91

how the domination of SMC by Cojuangco, Jr., if that should

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (Atty. Niceforo Solis) 91

President, nor the Judiciary may encroach on fields allocated