Mind Association

Sophist 263B Revisited

Author(s): Kenneth M. Sayre
Source: Mind, New Series, Vol. 85, No. 340 (Oct., 1976), pp. 581-586
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association
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Sophistz63B Revisited
KENNETH

M.

SAYRE

Plato's account of falsejudgmentat Sophist263B is terseand elliptical.

Of the two statements'Theaetetus sits' and 'Theaetetus flies', the
Strangersays, one is true and the otherfalse:
And the trueone says ofthings-that-are
thattheyare withreference
to you (AE'yEc3s av-rC3vo ytEvdArq0rS ra o'vTa cag Ecaztv 7E,epcaof).
The false [says of] otherthan things-that-are
[thattheyare] [with
referenceto you] (o 3s 0&Ev)3)S
02
,EEpa -rCv o'vrcv). So it states
things-that-are-not
as things-that-are
(ra /tr)o'vT' apa coSg
o'v-a AE'yE).
But at any rate [it states]things-that-are,
different
fromthings-thatare in your case (vTcov 8E' yE o'vra e-Epa 7TEpCaofi).For we said that
thereare manythings-that-are
in each case, and also many thingsthat-are-not(7ToAAaytEv yap EOaqlev o'vPTa 7TEpC Waa-rov Etvac 7TvO,
3
7ToAAa'

OVK

o'vTa).

This passage has posed problemsforsympatheticcommentators.One is

the problemof mere intelligibility.'
A more basic problemhas been that
of reconstructing
fromthe passage a credibleaccount of true and false
judgment. In Plato's Analytic Method (Chicago, I969) I offeredan
interpretation
which,althoughI believeaccuratelydirected,is potentially
flawedin an importantrespect.2The difficulty
with this interpretation
stems from a mistakenassumption,which most commentatorsshare,
about the nature of not-Beingin the Sophist account. Correctingthis
mistakeyields an interpretation
which is more fullyPlatonic both in
contentand elegance,and which is considerablymorefaithful
to thetext
of the dialogue.
In examiningthis amended interpretation
it will be helpfulfirstto
considerwhy Plato chooses not to rely upon a more directaccount of
true and false judgment already available in the middle dialogues. In
conjunctionwith his discussionof the method of Ao'yos in the Phaedo,

A sensitive discussion of syntacticalambiguities in these sentences may

be found in David Keyt's 'Plato on Falsity: Sophist 263B,' in E. N. Lee,
A. P. D. Mourelatos, and R. M. Rorty (eds.), Exegesis and Argument:
Studies in Greek Philosophy Presented to Gregory Vlastos (Humanities
Press, New York: I973), to which I am indebted in the translationabove.
RobertVacca also is to be thankedforadvice on Plato's use of us eEanv.
I say 'potentiallyflawed' because, although the interpretationin the book
is literallycompatible with what I now believe to be the correctaccount,
its furtherelucidation in my 'Falsehood, Forms and Participationin the
Sophist,'Nous, iv (I970),
8I-9I,
broughtthe flawto the surface.I am
indebted to Alvin Plantinga for drawing the problem to my attention.
This interpretationwas developed originallyin response to difficulties
with other accounts of false judgment in the Sophist,which need not be
reviewed forpresentpurposes.
58I

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582

KENNETH

M. SAYRE:

Plato develops (99C-Io2B) a theoryof causation according to which

individualthingstake on particularfeaturesby participationin relevant
Forms. Accordingto this theory,the reason Theaetetus is sittingis his
participationin Sitting,and the reason he is not Flyingis his failureto
participatein Flying. A simple and thoroughlyPlatonic explanationof
truthand falsehoodappears on the face of this observation.Why is it
not the case for Plato simplythat 'Theaetetus sits' is true if and onlyif
Theaetetus participatesin Sitting,and false otherwise;and in general
that 'X is a' is true if and onlyif X participatesin A, and falseif it fails
so to participate?There is no reasonto thinkthatPlato rejectsthistheory
of causation in the later dialogues. Why, then, does he not adopt this
simple answer?
It is possible,of course,thatPlato bypassesthisanswermerelybecause
he has not been talkingin this contextabout participationof individuals
in Forms, and because the answer does not lend itselfparticularlywell
to a discussionof the topics towardthe end of the Sophist.But in fact
there are much strongerreasons, having to do with the treatmentof
negativestatements.If 'Theaetetus flies'is false,then 'Theaetetus is not
flying'is true,and presumablyforthesame reasons.But ifso, thenfailure
to participatein Flyingis the source of the truthof the latter;and thisis
fromthe case of 'Theaetetus sits', which is true because
quite different
accountwould not make
Theaetetusparticipatesin Sitting.A satisfactory
and
participationthe cause of truthin one statementtype (affirmative),
failureto participatethe cause of truthin another(negative).A related
is how to treat statementslike 'Theaetetus is dissatisfied';
difficulty
should theirtruthbe conceivedas caused by participation(in Dissatisfaction)or by failureto participate(in Satisfaction)?Parallel difficulties
arise forthe analysisof falsehood.
A means of establishingparityof truthconditionsbetweenaffirmative
and negativestatementsis to introducethe notion of 'negativeForms',
accordingto whichnot-Ais theFormconsistingofall FormsotherthanA.
Since not-Flyingconsistsof all Forms save Flying,we may thenunderstand the truth of 'Theaetetus is not flying'(elliptically,'Theaetetus
not-flies')as caused by Theaetetus' participationin not-Flying,parallel
to participationin Sittingas the source of the truthof 'Theaetetus sits'.
Similarly,'Theaetetus is not sitting'would be false by reason of failure
to participatein not-Sitting,parallel to the falsehood of 'Theaetetus
flies'by failureto participatein Flying. It appears thatPlato is moving
of'thatwhichis not' (ro p71o'v: 258C).
in thisdirectionwithhis definition
'What is not' in thissense consistsof 'partsofthe Different':thenot-Tall,
and all similarForms set in contrast(avrerEOv: 257E)
the not-Beautiful,
withotherForms thatexist.
Even with 'not-Being' thus construedin his conceptual repertoire,
however,Plato must avoid this way of establishingparity,for it leads
to consequencesthat are whollyintolerable.Accordingto this amended
account,'X is not a' is falseif and onlyifX does not participatein not-A.
in anyFormotherthanA itself.
ButX participatesinnot-Abyparticipating
Hence, if thereis even one Form otherthan A in which X participates,
which for any X almost surelywill be the case, then X participatesin

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SOPHIST

263B

REVISITED

583

not-A: consequently'X is not a' would never be false. Moreover,if X

participatesboth in A and in one otherForm, X participatesin both A
and not-A, and both 'X is a' and 'X is not a' are true simultaneously.
These resultsdiscouragethe attemptto account fortruthand falsehood
in termsof participationalone.
The interpretationdeveloped in Plato's Analytic Method takes its
lead fromthe remarkat 295E thatAo'yosis generatedthroughthe combination of the Forms (-r6v ElI3WV caVPirTAoK)v).
According to this ina statementabout Theaetetusis true if nothinghe is doing
terpretation,
keeps it frombeing true,and false if nothinghe is doing keeps it from
in the language of participationand of
being false. Put less truistically,
combiningForms, 'Theaetetus sits' is true if and only if all Forms in
which Theaetetus participatescombine with' Sitting (as Running and
Jumping,forexample,do not), and 'Theaetetus flies'is false if and only
ifall Formsin whichhe participatescombinewithnot-Flying.'Theaetetus
is not sitting',by the same token,is false if and only if all Forms in
which he participates combine with Sitting (not-not-Sitting),and
'Theaetetus is not flying'is true if and only if all Forms in which he
participatescombine with not-Flying.A feature recommendingthis
is thatthe same accounts of truthand falsehoodapply to
interpretation
both affirmative
and negativestatements,and that the same conditions
rendera statementfalse as renderits negationtrue. In general 'X is a'
is trueand 'X is nota' falseifand onlyifall Formsin whichX participates
combinewithA, and 'X is a' is false and 'X is not a' trueif and onlyif
all Forms in whichX participatescombinewithnot-A.
There is a difficulty
with this interpretation,
however,which by now
should be familiar.We have been assuming, with the commentators
generally,thatnot-Aconsistsof all Forms otherthanA.' As the Stranger
insistsat 257B, when we speak of 'thatwhichis not' we mean not something contrary(4'avrtov) to what exists but only somethingdifferent
(Erepov). But if not-A consists of all Forms different
fromA, then X
participatesin not-Aifand onlyifit participatesin some Form otherthan
A. Thus X could participatein A and in not-A simultaneously,a consequence of which seems to be that A and not-A are compatible.This
betweenA and not-Ais the sourceof our problem.
apparentcompatibility
in question, 'Theaetetus flies'is false
Accordingto the interpretation
if and only if all Forms in which Theaetetus participatescombinewith
(are compatiblewith) not-Flying,and 'Theaetetus flies' is true if and
onlyif all such Forms combinewithFlying.But assume thatTheaetetus
in factis flying.If so, then all Forms in which he participatesare compatible with Flying,and 'Theaetetus flies'is true. Yet if so, it mightbe
the case thatall Forms in whichhe participatescombinewithnot-Flying
I

The force of 'combines with' is 'is compatible with'. The application of

the concept of compatibilityto the Forms is discussed in Plato's Analytic
Method,p. I95, fn. 68, but more remainsto be said.
The sense of 'negative Forms' that causes the problem is not specifically
adopted in Plato's AnalyticMethod,althoughnothingis said to rule it out.
It is explicitlyadopted, however,in 'Falsehood, Forms and Participation
in the Sophist', p. 82.

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584

KENNETH

M. SAYRE:

also, since Flyingitselfis compatiblewith not-Flying.Thus, according

to this interpretation,
'Theaetetus flies' mightbe true and false simultaneously,an infirmity
as severeas those examinedabove.
The way out of this difficulty,
as is the case so oftenin problemsof
Platonicinterpretation,
is more carefulreadingof the text.'What is not',
the Stranger emphasizes, is not what is bvavtLos-but what is E1rEpOS
(257B, and again at 258B). We understandthat by excludingthe Evavitos
Plato meantto exclude the opposite,in favourof the E'TEpos in the sense
of what is only different.
But thereare severalsenses in which Forms or
propertiesof thingsmightbe opposed, and no reason to thinkthat all
are being excluded indiscriminately.
Propertiesmightbe opposed in the
fashionof greaterand smaller,such that nothingcan possess the two
but somethingnonethelessmightpossess a thirdproperty
simultaneously,
(equality)instead.Propertiesopposed in thissense are mutuallyexclusive,
but togetherare not exclusive of other alternatives.Let us call this
'oppositionin thenonexhaustivesense'. Propertiesmiglht
also be opposed,
on the otherhand, in the exhaustivesense of gaseous, liquid and solid,
such thatif somethingof the appropriatesort(physicalsubstancein the
aggregate)is one it cannot be another,but must be one of the several
alternatives.
Now it is almostcertainthatPlato used EvavtLos-to conveyopposition
in the nonexhaustivesense, and not in the other.Althoughthereis no
illustrationin the immediatecontextof what he intendedby the term,
Evavir-os-is used in this sense throughoutthe dialogues.' Moreover, at
thatadmitsofan Evavtlos there
Protagoras332C we readthatofeverything
is one such opposite and no more. One memberof such a pair excludes
the other (for example, larger/smaller);but as we have seen the pair
itselfneed not exclude a thirdalternative(equality); hence a pair of such
oppositescannotbe assumedto exhaustall alternatives.More specifically,
we are told in the Philebusthat pleasure and pain are Evavtlos-(4iD),
but thatthereare some thingsthat are neitherone nor the other(43D).
Clearly,by the exclusionof Evavtlos-at Sophist257B and 258B, opposition
in the exhaustivesense in not being eliminated.
Equally importantis the factthatthingsmightbe E'FTEpoSin morethan
one sense also, and that in these passages Plato may be insistingupon
in one sense butnotin another.The customaryinterpretation
the different
of E'Epos is that simplyof the otheror the different.
Accordingto this
the Form not-A consists of all Forms different
fromA
interpretation,
But &'ErpoS can also mean 'other'in the sense of'the one
indiscriminately.
or the other'(or 'this,thator the other'),wherethe alternatives(possibly
several) are intended as exclusive and collectivelyexhaustive.This is
preciselythe second sense of opposition mentionedabove in the discussion of 6vaviLos. There are two strongindicationsin the text that
of 'that
Plato intendedthis lattersense of E%rEPoS-in his characterization
I

Among many examples of properties that are designated Evavt0os in this

sharp/blunt),
sense are those at Lysis 2I5E (dry/wet,cold/hot,bitter/sweet,
at Phaedo Io2D, E (short/tall)and Io3C (hot/cold); at ParmenidesI49E
(greater/smaller)
and I55A (older/younger);and at Laws 889B (hot/cold,
right/wrong).
dry/moist)and 896D (good/evil,fair/foul,

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SOPHIST

263B

REVISITED

585

which is not'. One is the repeated use of a form of dvvr-i0a-W/

in
describingthe relationshipof 'that which is not' to what exists. This
termcarriesthe generalsense of being set against,or opposed. At 257D,
and twice again at 257E, the not-beautifulis said to be opposed to the
beautiful.At 258B, and again at 258E, the nature of the differentis
opposed at least in partto the natureof the existent.Moreover,at 258B
the natures of the different
and of the existentare said furtherto be
av1tKEqC[EVwv, a form Aristotle uses to convey the sense of contradiction.'

The otherindicationis even morespecific.The onlyexamplethe Stranger

gives of things that are not bvavrtlos-but only J1rEpoS is that of the
exclusive and exhaustivepropertiestall, equal and short (257B). Thus
there is abundant evidence in the textthatthe E'TEpoS which marksthe
nature of the differentis not merelywhat is other than the Form in
question,but whatis opposed to itwithina setofexclusiveand exhaustive
alternatives.

The unavoidable consequence, as I see it, is that the commentators

have been wrong in construing'that which is not' as consistingof
froma given
'negativeForms' each of whichincludesall Forms different
existent.2The 'negative Form' not-A includes not all Forms simply
fromA, but ratherall Forms relatedto A such that together
different
they constitutean exclusive and exhaustiveset. The Form not-Sitting,
for example, thus consists of Walking, Running, Jumping,Standing,
Lying, and so forth,one (but only one) of which must apply to any
individualthat is not in fact sitting,but none of which can apply to a
sittingindividual.
This sense of 'that which is not' rescuesthe account of falsejudgment
The difficulty
in Plato's AnalyticMethodfromits logical difficulty.
arose
in the courseofthe followingconsiderations.To participatein not-Ais to
participatein a Form included in not-A,namely(I assumed previously)
any Form otherthan A itself.But since an individualaccordinglycould
in A and
participatein bothA and not-Asimultaneously
by participating
a Form other than A, A and not-A must be capable of combining.
Hence it is possible forall Forms in whichTheaetetusparticipateswhile
flyingto combine with not-Flyingas well as with Flying (since Flying
itselfwould combine with not-Flying),and for both 'Theaetetus flies'
and 'Theaetetusis notflying'to be trueat once. But ifnot-Flyingincludes
onlyForms participationin whichis excludedby participationin Flying,
then Flyingand not-Flyingare expresslyincapable of combination,and
to participatein Flying is incompatiblewith participatingin Forms all
of which combine with not-Flying.Hence the danger of contradiction
Significantly,for our problematic in connection with Sophist 257B and

I7B3-22, AristotlecontrastsEvav-isr1 and

258B, in On Interpretation

as contrarietyand contradiction.
avT-naTLKa5SZ
Most, but not all commentatorshave interpretedDifferencein such a way
that not-A includes all Forms differentfrom A. An interpretationmore
in line with the above is hinted at very generallyin D. W. Hamlyn, 'The
Communion of Forms and the Development of Plato's Logic', The
PhilosophicalQuarterly,v (I955), 289-302. See also Keyt, ibid., where a
is suggestedfornegativepredication.
similarinterpretation

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586

KENNETH

M. SAYRE:

SOPHIST

263B

REVISITED

disappears. The interpretationdefended in Plato's Analytic Method

remainsviable. A statementof the form'X is a' (or 'X is not a') is true
if and only if all Forms in which X participatescombine with A (or
not-A),and falseifand onlyifall such Forms combinewithnot-A(or A).
In the contextof the Sophist,Plato is able to maintainan accountof true
and false judgment formulatedin terms of combining Forms and
participation.

By the same token,however,he would also be able to maintainan

account in terms of participationalone. The discouragementin this
approach examinedabove stemmedfromthe assumptionthat participation in not-A is tantamountto participationin any Form otherthan A,
fromwhich followsnot only that 'X is not a' would never be false but
moreoverthat it could be true simultaneouslywith 'X is a'. With the
sense of not-A by which that 'negativeForm' consists of all but only
Forms relatedto A as exclusiveand mutuallyexhaustive,however,these
problemsdisappear. The simple account is thus available: that 'X is a'
(or 'X is not a') is true if and only if X participatesin A (or not-A),and
falseotherwise.
Why did Plato not opt for this simpleraccount in the Sophist?The
question is counterfactualand the answer speculative. This simpler
account is an extensionof the theoryof causation associated explicitly
with the Phaedo, in which the Forms are depicted as incompositeand
independent(78C). In the contextof the Sophist,however,not only is
the possibilityof false judgment dependentupon the minglingof discourse with not-Being(26oB), which itselfis a combinationof Forms,
but moreoverdiscourseitself,and withit philosophy,depends upon the
blendingof the Forms (259E). The simpleaccountin termsof participation alone thus appears unsuitablefora pair of relatedreasons. It carries
misleadingassociationsfromthe Phaedo of Forms that do not mingle,
and it would not serve in a discussion of not-Beingas it blends with
discourse.
By contrast,the somewhat longer account, with the clarification
developedabove, enjoysthe distinctadvantagesnot onlyof showinghow
discoursehas its source in the combiningForms, but also of clarifying
the sense in whichthe true stateswhat is and the falsewhat is different.
That is, 'Theaetetus sits' is true because it says of Sittingthatit is with
referenceto Theaetetus,while 'Theaetetus flies' is false because it says
this of Flying, which in not-Sittingis differentfrom Sitting. Thus
'Theaetetusflies'falselystatespartofnot-Sittingas Sitting-a partwhich
nonethelessis, but whichis different
fromwhat is in the case of Theaetetus. Or as the Strangerputs it, speakingto Theactetus:
the true one says of things-that-are
that theyare with referenceto
you,the falseotherthanthings-that-are.
So it statesthings-that-arenot as things-that-are.
But at anyratethings-that-are,
different
from
in yourcase (263B).
things-that-are
UNIVERSITY

OF NOTRE

DAME

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