Persons Part 10

PERSONS and FAMILY RELATIONS (Atty.
Vincent Juan) 1
4TH EXAM COVERAGE CASE COMPILATION
PATERNITY and FILIATION
further exchanged reply and rejoinder to buttress their legal

postures.
BADUA v. CA
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 105625 January 24, 1994
MARISSA BENITEZ-BADUA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, VICTORIA BENITEZ LIRIO AND
FEODOR BENITEZ AGUILAR, respondents.
Reynaldo M. Alcantara for petitioner.
Augustus Cesar E. Azura for private respondents.
PUNO, J.:
This is a petition for review of the Decision of the 12th
Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CV No.
30862 dated May 29, 1992. 1
The facts show that the spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel
Chipongian owned various properties especially in Laguna.
Isabel died on April 25, 1982. Vicente followed her in the
grave on November 13, 1989. He died intestate.
The fight for administration of Vicente's estate ensued. On
September 24, 1990, private respondents Victoria BenitezLirio and Feodor Benitez Aguilar (Vicente's sister and
nephew, respectively) instituted Sp. Proc. No. 797 (90)
before the RTC of San Pablo City, 4th Judicial Region, Br.
30. They prayed for the issuance of letters of administration
of Vicente's estate in favor of private respondent Aguilar.
They alleged, inter alia, viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
4. The decedent is survived by no other heirs or relatives be
they ascendants or descendants, whether legitimate,
illegitimate or legally adopted; despite claims or
representation to the contrary, petitioners can well and truly
establish, given the chance to do so, that said decedent and
his spouse Isabel Chipongian who pre-deceased him, and
whose estate had earlier been settled extra-judicial, were
without issue and/or without descendants whatsoever, and
that one Marissa Benitez-Badua who was raised and cared
by them since childhood is, in fact, not related to them by
blood, nor legally adopted, and is therefore not a legal
heir; . . .
The trial court then received evidence on the issue of

petitioner's heirship to the estate of the deceased. Petitioner
tried to prove that she is the only legitimate child of the
spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. She
submitted documentary evidence, among others: (1) her
Certificate of Live Birth (Exh. 3); (2) Baptismal Certificate
(Exh. 4); (3) Income Tax Returns and Information Sheet for
Membership with the GSIS of the late Vicente naming her as
his daughter (Exhs. 10 to 21); and (4) School Records (Exhs.
5 & 6). She also testified that the said spouses reared an
continuously treated her as their legitimate daughter. On the
other hand, private respondents tried to prove, mostly thru
testimonial evidence, that the said spouses failed to beget a
child during their marriage; that the late Isabel, then thirty six
(36) years of age, was even referred to Dr. Constantino
Manahan, a noted obstetrician-gynecologist, for treatment.
Their primary witness, Victoria Benitez-Lirio, elder sister of
the late Vicente, then 77 years of age, 2 categorically
declared that petitioner was not the biological child of the
said spouses who were unable to physically procreate.
On December 17, 1990, the trial court decided in favor of the
petitioner. It dismissed the private respondents petition for
letters and administration and declared petitioner as the
legitimate daughter and sole heir of the spouses Vicente O.
Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. The trial court relied on
Articles 166 and 170 of the Family Code.
On appeal, however, the Decision of the trial court was
reversed on May 29, 1992 by the 17th Division of the Court
of Appeals. The dispositive portion of the Decision of the
appellate court states:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from herein is
REVERSED and another one entered declaring that
appellee Marissa Benitez is not the biological daughter or
child by nature of the spouse Vicente O. Benitez and Isabel
Chipongian and, therefore, not a legal heir of the deceased
Vicente O. Benitez. Her opposition to the petition for the
appointment of an administrator of the intestate of the
deceased Vicente O. Benitez is, consequently, DENIED; said
petition and the proceedings already conducted therein
reinstated; and the lower court is directed to proceed with the
hearing of Special proceeding No. SP-797 (90) in
accordance with law and the Rules.
Costs against appellee.
SO ORDERED.
In juxtaposition, the appellate court held that the trial court
erred in applying Articles 166 and 170 of the Family Code.
In this petition for review, petitioner contends:
On November 2, 1990, petitioner opposed the petition. She

alleged that she is the sole heir of the deceased Vicente
Benitez and capable of administering his estate. The parties
1. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed error of law

and misapprehension of facts when it failed to apply the
PERSONS and FAMILY RELATIONS (Atty. Vincent Juan) 2

provisions, more particularly, Arts. 164, 166, 170 and 171 of
the Family Code in this case and in adopting and upholding
private respondent's theory that the instant case does not
involve an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child;
3) That in case of children conceived through artificial

insemination, the written authorization or ratification of either
parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence,
intimidation, or undue influence.
2. Assuming arguendo that private respondents can question

or impugn directly or indirectly, the legitimacy of Marissa's
birth, still the respondent appellate Court committed grave
abuse of discretion when it gave more weight to the
testimonial evidence of witnesses of private respondents
whose credibility and demeanor have not convinced the trial
court of the truth and sincerity thereof, than the documentary
and testimonial evidence of the now petitioner Marissa
Benitez-Badua;
Art. 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child

shall be brought within one year from the knowledge of the
birth or its recording in the civil register, if the husband or, in
a proper case, any of his heirs, should reside in the city or
municipality where the birth took place or was recorded.
3. The Honorable Court of Appeals has decided the case in a

way not in accord with law or with applicable decisions of the
supreme Court, more particularly, on prescription or laches.
If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside
at the place of birth as defined in the first paragraph or where
it was recorded, the period shall be two years if they should
reside in the Philippines; and three years if abroad. If the
birth of the child has been concealed from or was unknown
to the husband or his heirs, the period shall be counted from
the discovery or knowledge of the birth of the child or of the
fact of registration of said birth, which ever is earlier.
We find no merit to the petition.

Petitioner's insistence on the applicability of Articles 164,
166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code to the case at bench
cannot be sustained. These articles provide:
Art. 164. Children conceived or born during the marriage of
the parents are legitimate.
Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the
wife with sperm of the husband or that of a donor or both are
likewise legitimate children of the husband and his wife,
provided, that both of them authorized or ratified such
insemination in a written instrument executed and signed by
them before the birth of the child. The instrument shall be
recorded in the civil registry together with the birth certificate
of the child.
Art. 166. Legitimacy of child may be impugned only on the
following grounds:
1) That it was physically impossible for the husband to have
sexual intercourse with his wife within the first 120 days of
the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the
child because of:
a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual
intercourse with his wife;
b) the fact that the husband and wife were living separately
in such a way that sexual intercourse was not possible; or
c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevented
sexual intercourse.
2) That it is proved that for biological or other scientific
reasons, the child could not have been that of the husband
except in the instance provided in the second paragraph of
Article 164; or
Art. 171. The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of
the child within the period prescribed in the preceding Article
only in the following case:
1) If the husband should die before the expiration of the
period fixed for bringing his action;
2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint, without
having desisted therefrom; or
3) If the child was born after the death of the husband.
A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do
not contemplate a situation, like in the instant case, where a
child is alleged not to be the child of nature or biological child
of a certain couple. Rather, these articles govern a situation
where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child of
his wife. Thus, under Article 166, it is the husband who can
impugn the legitimacy of said child by proving: (1) it was
physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with
his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which
immediately preceded the birth of the child; (2) that for
biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have
been his child; (3) that in case of children conceived through
artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification
by either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud,
violence, intimidation or undue influence. Articles 170 and
171 reinforce this reading as they speak of the prescriptive
period within which the husband or any of his heirs should
file the action impugning the legitimacy of said child.
Doubtless then, the appellate court did not err when it
refused to apply these articles to the case at bench. For the
case at bench is not one where the heirs of the late Vicente
are contending that petitioner is not his child by Isabel.
Rather, their clear submission is that petitioner was not born
to Vicente and Isabel. Our ruling in Cabatbat-Lim
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 166 SCRA 451, 457 cited
in the impugned decision is apropos, viz.:

Petitioners' recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code
[now Article 170 of the Family Code] is not well-taken. This
legal provision refers to an action to impugn legitimacy. It is
inapplicable to this case because this is not an action to
impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an action of the private
respondents to claim their inheritance as legal heirs of their
childless deceased aunt. They do not claim that petitioner
Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child of the deceased,
but that she is not the decedent's child at all. Being neither
legally adopted child, nor an acknowledged natural child, nor
a child by legal fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not
a legal heir of the deceased.
We now come to the factual finding of the appellate court
that petitioner was not the biological child or child of nature
of the spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. The
appellate court exhaustively dissected the evidence of the
parties as follows:
. . . And on this issue, we are constrained to say that
appellee's evidence is utterly insufficient to establish her
biological and blood kinship with the aforesaid spouses,
while the evidence on record is strong and convincing that
she is not, but that said couple being childless and desirous
as they were of having a child, the late Vicente O. Benitez
took Marissa from somewhere while still a baby, and without
he and his wife's legally adopting her treated, cared for,
reared, considered, and loved her as their own true child,
giving her the status as not so, such that she herself had
believed that she was really their daughter and entitled to
inherit from them as such.
The strong and convincing evidence referred to us are the
following:
First, the evidence is very cogent and clear that Isabel
Chipongian never became pregnant and, therefore, never
delivered a child. Isabel's own only brother and sibling, Dr.
Lino Chipongian, admitted that his sister had already been
married for ten years and was already about 36 years old
and still she has not begotten or still could not bear a child,
so that he even had to refer her to the late Dr. Constantino
Manahan, a well-known and eminent obstetriciangynecologist and the OB of his mother and wife, who treated
his sister for a number of years. There is likewise the
testimony of the elder sister of the deceased Vicente O.
Benitez, Victoria Benitez Lirio, who then, being a teacher,
helped him (he being the only boy and the youngest of the
children of their widowed mother) through law school, and
whom Vicente and his wife highly respected and consulted
on family matters, that her brother Vicente and his wife
Isabel being childless, they wanted to adopt her youngest
daughter and when she refused, they looked for a baby to
adopt elsewhere, that Vicente found two baby boys but
Isabel wanted a baby girl as she feared a boy might grow up
unruly and uncontrollable, and that Vicente finally brought
home a baby girl and told his elder sister Victoria he would
register the baby as his and his wife's child. Victoria Benitez
Lirio was already 77 years old and too weak to travel and
come to court in San Pablo City, so that the taking of her
testimony by the presiding judge of the lower court had to be

held at her residence in Paraaque, MM. Considering, her
advanced age and weak physical condition at the time she
testified in this case, Victoria Benitez Lirio's testimony is
highly trustworthy and credible, for as one who may be
called by her Creator at any time, she would hardly be
interested in material things anymore and can be expected
not to lie, especially under her oath as a witness. There were
also several disinterested neighbors of the couple Vicente O.
Benitez and Isabel Chipongian in Nagcarlan, Laguna (Sergio
Fule, Cecilia Coronado, and Benjamin C. Asendido) who
testified in this case and declared that they used to see
Isabel almost everyday especially as she had drugstore in
the ground floor of her house, but they never saw her to
have been pregnant, in 1954 (the year appellee Marissa
Benitez was allegedly born, according to her birth certificate
Exh. "3") or at any time at all, and that it is also true with the
rest of their townmates. Ressureccion A. Tuico, Isabel
Chipongian's personal beautician who used to set her hair
once a week at her (Isabel's) residence, likewise declared
that she did not see Isabel ever become pregnant, that she
knows that Isabel never delivered a baby, and that when she
saw the baby Marissa in her crib one day she went to
Isabel's house to set the latter's hair, she was surprised and
asked the latter where the baby came from, and "she told me
that the child was brought by Atty. Benitez and told me not to
tell about it" (p. 10, tsn, Nov. 29, 1990).
The facts of a woman's becoming pregnant and growing big
with child, as well as her delivering a baby, are matters that
cannot be hidden from the public eye, and so is the fact that
a woman never became pregnant and could not have,
therefore, delivered a baby at all. Hence, if she is suddenly
seen mothering and caring for a baby as if it were her own,
especially at the rather late age of 36 (the age of Isabel
Chipongian when appellee Marissa Benitez was allegedly
born), we can be sure that she is not the true mother of that
baby.
Second, appellee's birth certificate Exh. "3" with the late
Vicente O. Benitez appearing as the informant, is highly
questionable and suspicious. For if Vicente's wife Isabel,
who wads already 36 years old at the time of the child's
supposed birth, was truly the mother of that child, as
reported by Vicente in her birth certificate, should the child
not have been born in a hospital under the experienced,
skillful and caring hands of Isabel's obstetrician-gynecologist
Dr. Constantino Manahan, since delivery of a child at that
late age by Isabel would have been difficult and quite risky to
her health and even life? How come, then, that as appearing
in appellee's birth certificate, Marissa was supposedly born
at the Benitez home in Avenida Rizal, Nagcarlan, Laguna,
with no physician or even a midwife attending?
At this juncture, it might be meet to mention that it has
become a practice in recent times for people who want to
avoid the expense and trouble of a judicial adoption to simply
register the child as their supposed child in the civil registry.
Perhaps Atty. Benitez, though a lawyer himself, thought that
he could avoid the trouble if not the expense of adopting the
child Marissa through court proceedings by merely putting

himself and his wife as the parents of the child in her birth
certificate. Or perhaps he had intended to legally adopt the
child when she grew a little older but did not come around
doing so either because he was too busy or for some other
reason. But definitely, the mere registration of a child in his or
her birth certificate as the child of the supposed parents is
not a valid adoption, does not confer upon the child the
status of an adopted child and the legal rights of such child,
and even amounts of simulation of the child's birth or
falsification of his or her birth certificate, which is a public
document.
Third, if appellee Marissa Benitez is truly the real, biological
daughter of the late Vicente O. Benitez and his wife Isabel
Chipongian, why did he and Isabel's only brother and sibling
Dr. Nilo Chipongian, after Isabel's death on April 25, 1982,
state
in
the
extrajudicial
settlement
Exh. "E" that they executed her estate, "that we are the sole
heirs of the deceased ISABEL CHIPONGIAN because she
died without descendants or ascendants?" Dr. Chipongian,
placed on a witness stand by appellants, testified that it was
his brother-in-law Atty. Vicente O. Benitez who prepared said
document and that he signed the same only because the
latter told him to do so (p. 24, tsn, Nov. 22, 1990). But why
would Atty. Benitez make such a statement in said
document, unless appellee Marissa Benitez is not really his
and his wife's daughter and descendant and, therefore, not
his deceased wife's legal heir? As for Dr. Chipongian, he
lamely explained that he signed said document without
understanding completely the meaning of the words
"descendant and ascendant" (p. 21, tsn, Nov. 22, 1990). This
we cannot believe, Dr. Chipongian being a practicing
pediatrician who has even gone to the United States (p. 52,
tsn,
Dec.
13,
1990).
Obviously,
Dr. Chipongian was just trying to protect the interests of
appellee, the foster-daughter of his deceased sister and
brother-in-law, as against those of the latter's collateral blood
relatives.
Fourth, it is likewise odd and strange, if appellee Marissa
Benitez is really the daughter and only legal heir of the
spouses Vicente O. Benitez and Isabel Chipongian, that the
latter, before her death, would write a note to her husband
and Marissa stating that:
even without any legal papers, I wish that my husband and
my child or only daughter will inherit what is legally my own
property, in case I die without a will,
and in the same handwritten note, she even implored her
husband
that any inheritance due him from my property when he
die to make our own daughter his sole heir. This do [sic]
not mean what he legally owns or his inherited property. I
leave him to decide for himself regarding those.
(Exhs. "F-1", "F-1-A" and "F-1-B")
We say odd and strange, for if Marissa Benitez is really the

daughter of the spouses Vicente O. Benitez and Isabel
Chipongian, it would not have been necessary for Isabel to
write and plead for the foregoing requests to her husband,
since Marissa would be their legal heir by operation of law.
Obviously, Isabel Chipongian had to implore and supplicate
her husband to give appellee although without any legal
papers her properties when she dies, and likewise for her
husband to give Marissa the properties that he would inherit
from her (Isabel), since she well knew that Marissa is not
truly their daughter and could not be their legal heir unless
her (Isabel's) husband makes her so.
Finally, the deceased Vicente O. Benitez' elder sister Victoria
Benitez Lirio even testified that her brother Vicente gave the
date
December 8 as Marissa's birthday in her birth certificate
because that date is the birthday of their (Victoria and
Vicente's) mother. It is indeed too much of a coincidence for
the child Marissa and the mother of Vicente and Victoria to
have the same birthday unless it is true, as Victoria testified,
that Marissa was only registered by Vicente as his and his
wife's child and that they gave her the birth date of Vicente's
mother.
We sustain these findings as they are not unsupported by
the evidence on record. The weight of these findings was not
negated by documentary evidence presented by the
petitioner, the most notable of which is her Certificate of Live
Birth (Exh. "3") purportedly showing that her parents were
the
late
Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. This Certificate
registered on December 28, 1954 appears to have been
signed by the deceased Vicente Benitez. Under Article 410
of the New Civil Code, however, "the books making up the
Civil Registry and all documents relating thereto shall be
considered public documents and shall be prima
facieevidence of the facts therein stated." As related above,
the totality of contrary evidence, presented by the private
respondents sufficiently rebutted the truth of the content of
petitioner's Certificate of Live Birth. of said rebutting
evidence, the most telling was the Deed of Extra-Judicial
Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Isabel Chipongian
(Exh. "E") executed on July 20, 1982 by Vicente Benitez, and
Dr. Nilo Chipongian, a brother of Isabel. In their notarized
document, they stated that "(they) are the sole heirs of the
deceased Isabel Chipongian because she died without
descendants or ascendants". In executing this Deed, Vicente
Benitez effectively repudiated the Certificate of Live Birth of
petitioner where it appeared that he was petitioner's father.
The repudiation was made twenty-eight years after he
signed petitioner's Certificate of Live Birth.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition for review is dismissed for
lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
BABIERA v. CATOTAL

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 138493. June 15, 2000]
TEOFISTA BABIERA, petitioner, vs. PRESENTACION B.
CATOTAL, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A birth certificate may be ordered cancelled upon adequate
proof that it is fictitious. Thus, void is a certificate which
shows that the mother was already fifty-four years old at the
time of the child's birth and which was signed neither by the
civil registrar nor by the supposed mother. Because her
inheritance rights are adversely affected, the legitimate child
of such mother is a proper party in the proceedings for the
cancellation of the said certificate.
Statement of the Case
Submitted for this Courts consideration is a Petition for
Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking reversal of the March 18, 1999 Decision[2] of the
Court of Appeals[3] (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 56031. Affirming
the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte in Special
Proceedings No. 3046, the CA ruled as follows:
"IN VIEW HEREOF, the appealed decision is hereby
AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the instant appeal is DISMISSED
for lack of merit. Costs against the defendant-appellant,
TEOFISTA BABIERA, a.k.a. Teofista Guinto."[4]
The dispositive portion of the affirmed RTC Decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing findings and
pronouncements of the Court, judgment is hereby rendered,
to wit[:]
1) Declaring the Certificate of Birth of respondent Teofista
Guinto as null and void 'ab initio';
2) Ordering the respondent Local Civil Registrar of Iligan to
cancel from the registry of live birth of Iligan City BIRTH
CERTIFICATE recorded as Registry No. 16035;
Furnish copies of this decision to the Local Civil Registrar of
Iligan City, the City Prosecutor, counsel for private
respondent Atty. Tomas Cabili and to counsel for petitioner.
SO ORDERED."
"Presentacion B. Catotal (hereafter referred to as

PRESENTACION) filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Lanao del Norte, Branch II, Iligan City, a petition for the
cancellation of the entry of birth of Teofista Babiera (herafter
referred to as TEOFISTA) in the Civil Registry of Iligan City.
The case was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 3046.
"From the petition filed, PRESENTACION asserted 'that she
is the only surviving child of the late spouses Eugenio
Babiera and Hermogena Cariosa, who died on May 26,
1996 and July 6, 1990 respectively; that on September 20,
1996 a baby girl was delivered by 'hilot' in the house of
spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera and without the
knowledge of said spouses, Flora Guinto, the mother of the
child and a housemaid of spouses Eugenio and Hermogena
Babiera, caused the registration/recording of the facts of
birth of her child, by simulating that she was the child of the
spouses Eugenio, then 65 years old and Hermogena, then
54 years old, and made Hermogena Babiera appear as the
mother by forging her signature x x x; that petitioner, then 15
years old, saw with her own eyes and personally witnessed
Flora Guinto give birth to Teofista Guinto, in their house,
assisted by 'hilot'; that the birth certificate x x x of Teofista
Guinto is void ab initio, as it was totally a simulated birth,
signature of informant forged, and it contained false entries,
to wit: a) The child is made to appear as the legitimate child
of the late spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena
Cariosa, when she is not; b) The signature of Hermogena
Cariosa, the mother, is falsified/forged. She was not the
informant; c) The family name BABIERA is false and unlawful
and her correct family name is GUINTO, her mother being
single; d) Her real mother was Flora Guinto and her status,
an illegitimate child; The natural father, the carpenter, did not
sign it; that the respondent Teofista Barbiera's birth certificate
is void ab initio, and it is patently a simulation of birth, since it
is clinically and medically impossible for the supposed
parents to bear a child in 1956 because: a) Hermogena
Cariosa Babiera, was already 54 years old; b) Hermogena's
last child birth was in the year 1941, the year petitioner was
born; c) Eugenio was already 65 years old, that the void and
simulated birth certificate of Teofista Guinto would affect the
hereditary rights of petitioner who inherited the estate of
cancelled and declared void and theretofore she prays that
after publication, notice and hearing, judgment [be]
render[ed] declaring x x x the certificate of birth of
respondent Teofista Guinto as declared void, invalid and
ineffective and ordering the respondent local civil registrar of
Iligan to cancel from the registry of live birth of Iligan City
BIRTH CERTIFICATE recorded as Registry No. 16035.
"Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance,
the trial court issued an order directing the publication of the
petition and the date of hearing thereof 'in a newspaper, the
Local Civil Registrar of Iligan City, the office of the City
Prosecutor of Iligan City and TEOFISTA.
The Facts
The undisputed facts are summarized by the Court of
Appeals in this wise:
"TEOFISTA filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that 'the

petition states no cause of action, it being an attack on the
legitimacy of the respondent as the child of the spouses
Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariosa Babiera; that
plaintiff has no legal capacity to file the instant petition

pursuant to Article 171 of the Family Code; and finally that
the instant petition is barred by prescription in accordance
with Article 170 of the Family Code.' The trial court denied
the motion to dismiss.
"1) Respondent (plaintiff in the lower court a quo) does not

have the legal capacity to file the special proceeding of
appeal under CA GR No. CV-56031 subject matter of this
review on certiorari;
"Subsequently, 'Attys. Padilla, Ulindang and Padilla

appeared and filed an answer/opposition in behalf of private
respondent Teofista Babiera, [who] was later on substituted
by Atty. Cabili as counsel for private respondent.'
2) The special proceeding on appeal under CA GR No. CV56031 is improper and is barred by [the] statute of limitation
(prescription); [and]
"In the answer filed, TEOFISTA averred 'that she was always
known as Teofista Babiera and not Teofista Guinto; that
plaintiff is not the only surviving child of the late spouses
Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena C. Babiera, for the truth of
the matter [is that] plantiff Presentacion B. V. Catotal and
[defendant] Teofista Babiera are sisters of the full-blood. Her
Certificate of Birth, signed by her mother Hermogena
Babiera, x x x Certificate of Baptism, x x x Student's Report
Card x x x all incorporated in her answer, are eloquent
testimonies of her filiation. By way of special and affirmative
defenses, defendant/respondent contended that the petition
states no cause of action, it being an attack on the legitimacy
of the respondent as the child of the spouses Eugenio
Babiera and Hermogena Carioza Babiera; that plaintiff has
no legal capacity to file the instant petition pursuant to Article
171 of the Family Code; and finally that the instant petition is
barred by prescription in accordance with Article 170 of the
Family Code." [5]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals held that the evidence adduced during
trial proved that petitioner was not the biological child of
Hermogena Babiera. It also ruled that no evidence was
presented to show that Hermogena became pregnant in
1959. It further observed that she was already 54 years old
at the time, and that her last pregnancy had occurred way
back in 1941. The CA noted that the supposed birth took
place at home, notwithstanding the advanced age of
Hermogena and its concomitant medical complications.
Moreover, petitioner's Birth Certificate was not signed by the
local civil registrar, and the signature therein, which was
purported to be that of Hermogena, was different from her
other signatures.
The CA also deemed inapplicable Articles 170 and 171 of the
Family Code, which stated that only the father could impugn
the child's legitimacy, and that the same was not subject to a
collateral attack. It held that said provisions contemplated a
situation wherein the husband or his heirs asserted that the
child of the wife was not his. In this case, the action involved
the cancellation of the childs Birth Certificate for being
void ab initio on the ground that the child did not belong to
either the father or the mother.
3) The Honorable Court of Appeals, the fifteenth division

utterly failed to hold, that the ancient public record of
petitioner's birth is superior to the self-serving oral testimony
of respondent."[7]
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is not meritorious.
First Issue: Subject of the Present Action
Petitioner contends that respondent has no standing to sue,
because Article 171[8] of the Family Code states that the
child's filiation can be impugned only by the father or, in
special circumstances, his heirs. She adds that the
legitimacy of a child is not subject to a collateral attack.
This argument is incorrect. Respondent has the requisite
standing to initiate the present action. Section 2, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court, provides that a real party in interest is
one "who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment
in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit." [9] The
interest of respondent in the civil status of petitioner stems
from an action for partition which the latter filed against the
former.[10] The case concerned the properties inherited by
respondent from her parents.
Moreover, Article 171 of the Family Code is not applicable to
the present case. A close reading of this provision shows that
it applies to instances in which the father impugns the
legitimacy of his wifes child. The provision, however,
presupposes that the child was the undisputed offspring of
the mother. The present case alleges and shows that
Hermogena did not give birth to petitioner. In other words,
the prayer herein is not to declare that petitioner is an
illegitimate child of Hermogena, but to establish that the
former is not the latter's child at all. Verily, the present action
does not impugn petitioners filiation to Spouses Eugenio
and Hermogena Babiera, because there is no blood relation
to impugn in the first place.
In Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals,[11] the Court ruled thus:
Hence, this appeal.[6]
"Petitioners insistence on the applicability of Articles 164,

166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code to the case at bench
cannot be sustained. These articles provide:
Issues
x x x.....x x x.....x x x
Petitioner presents the following assignment of errors:

"A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do
not contemplate a situation, like in the instant case, where a
child is alleged not to be the child of nature or biological child
of a certain couple. Rather, these articles govern a situation
where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child of
his wife. Thus, under Article 166, it is the husband who can
impugn the legitimacy of said child by proving: (1) it was
physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with
his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which
case at bench is not one where the heirs of the late Vicente
are contending that petitioner is not his child by Isabel.
Rather, their clear submission is that petitioner was not born
to Vicente and Isabel. Our ruling in Cabatbat-Lim vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 166 SCRA 451, 457 cited in
the impugned decision is apropos, viz:
Petitioners recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code
[now Art. 170 of the Family Code] is not well-taken. This legal
provision refers to an action to impugn legitimacy. It is
but that she is not the decedents child at all. Being neither
[a] legally adopted child, nor an acknowledged natural child,
nor a child by legal fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is
not a legal heir of the deceased."[12] (Emphasis supplied.)
Second Issue: Prescription
Petitioner next contends that the action to contest her status
as a child of the late Hermogena Babiera has already
prescribed. She cites Article 170 of the Family Code which
provides the prescriptive period for such action:
"Art. 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child
shall be brought within one year from the knowledge of the
birth or its recording in the civil register, if the husband or, in
a proper case, any of his heirs, should reside in the city or
municipality where the birth took place or was recorded.
"If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside
at the place of birth as defined in the first paragraph or where
it was recorded, the period shall be two years if they should
reside in the Philippines; and three years if abroad. If the
birth of the child has been concealed from or was unknown
to the husband or his heirs, the period shall be counted from
the discovery or knowledge of the birth of the child or of the

fact of registration of said birth, whichever is earlier."
This argument is bereft of merit. The present action involves
the cancellation of petitioners Birth Certificate; it does not
impugn her legitimacy. Thus, the prescriptive period set forth
in Article 170 of the Family Code does not apply. Verily, the
action to nullify the Birth Certificate does not prescribe,
because it was allegedly void ab initio.[13]
Third Issue: Presumption
Certificate
in
Favor
of
the
Birth
Lastly, petitioner argues that the evidence presented,

especially Hermogenas testimony that petitioner was not her
real child, cannot overcome the presumption of regularity in
the issuance of the Birth Certificate.
While it is true that an official document such as petitioners
Birth Certificate enjoys the presumption of regularity, the
specific facts attendant in the case at bar, as well as the
totality of the evidence presented during trial, sufficiently
negate such presumption. First, there were already
irregularities regarding the Birth Certificate itself. It was not
signed by the local civil registrar.[14] More important, the Court
of Appeals observed that the mothers signature therein was
different from her signatures in other documents presented
during the trial.
Second, the circumstances surrounding the birth of petitioner
show that Hermogena is not the former's real mother. For
one, there is no evidence of Hermogenas pregnancy, such
as medical records and doctors prescriptions, other than the
Birth Certificate itself. In fact, no witness was presented to
attest to the pregnancy of Hermogena during that time.
Moreover, at the time of her supposed birth, Hermogena was
already 54 years old. Even if it were possible for her to have
given birth at such a late age, it was highly suspicious that
she did so in her own home, when her advanced age
necessitated proper medical care normally available only in a
hospital.
The most significant piece of evidence, however, is the
deposition of Hermogena Babiera which states that she did
not give birth to petitioner, and that the latter was not hers
nor her husband Eugenios. The deposition reads in part:
"q.....Who are your children?
a.....Presentation and Florentino Babiera.
q.....Now, this Teofista Babiera claims that she is your
legitimate child with your husband Eugenio Babiera, what
can you say about that?
a.....She is not our child.
x x x.....x x x.....x x x

q.....Do you recall where she was born?
a.....In our house because her mother was our house helper.
q.....Could you recall for how long if ever this Teofista
Babiera lived with you in your residence?
a.....Maybe in 1978 but she [would] always go ou[t] from time
to time.
q.....Now, during this time, do you recall if you ever assert[ed]
her as your daughter with your husband?
a.....No, sir."[15]
Relying merely on the assumption of validity of the Birth
Certificate, petitioner has presented no other evidence other
than the said document to show that she is really
Hermogenas child. Neither has she provided any reason
why her supposed mother would make a deposition stating
that the former was not the latter's child at all.
All in all, we find no reason to reverse or modify the factual
finding of the trial and the appellate courts that petitioner was
not the child of respondents parents.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the
assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
DE JESUS v. DIZON
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 142877. October 2, 2001]
JINKIE CHRISTIE A. DE JESUS and JACQUELINE A. DE

JESUS, minors, represented by their mother,
CAROLINA A. DE JESUS, petitioners, vs. THE
ESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN GAMBOA DIZON,
ANGELINA V. DIZON, CARLOS DIZON, FELIPE
DIZON, JUAN DIZON, JR. and MARYLIN DIZON
and asproper parties: FORMS MEDIA CORP.,
QUAD MANAGEMENT CORP., FILIPINAS PAPER
SALES CO., INC. and AMITY CONSTRUCTION &
INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES, INC., respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
The petition involves the case of two illegitimate
children who, having been born in lawful wedlock, claim to
be the illegitimate scions of the decedent in order to enforce
their respective shares in the latters estate under the rules

on succession.
Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got
married on 23 August 1964. It was during this marriage that
Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus,
herein petitioners, were born, the former on 01 March 1979
and the latter on 06 July 1982.
In a notarized document, dated 07 June 1991, Juan G.
Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as
being his own illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de
Jesus. Juan G. Dizon died intestate on 12 March 1992,
leaving behind considerable assets consisting of shares of
stock in various corporations and some real property. It was
on the strength of his notarized acknowledgment that
petitioners filed a complaint on 01 July 1993 for Partition
with Inventory and Accounting of the Dizon estate with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, of Quezon City.
Respondents, the surviving spouse and legitimate
children of the decedent Juan G. Dizon, including the
corporations of which the deceased was a stockholder,
sought the dismissal of the case, arguing that the complaint,
even while denominated as being one for partition, would
nevertheless call for altering the status of petitioners from
being the legitimate children of the spouses Danilo de Jesus
and Carolina de Jesus to instead be the illegitimate children
of Carolina de Jesus and deceased Juan Dizon. The trial
court denied, due to lack of merit, the motion to dismiss and
the subsequent motion for reconsideration on, respectively,
13 September 1993 and 15 February 1994. Respondents
assailed the denial of said motions before the Court of
Appeals.
On 20 May 1994, the appellate court upheld the
decision of the lower court and ordered the case to be
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. It ruled
that the veracity of the conflicting assertions should be
threshed out at the trial considering that the birth certificates
presented by respondents appeared to have effectively
contradicted petitioners allegation of illegitimacy.
On 03 January 2000, long after submitting their answer,
pre-trial brief and several other motions, respondents filed an
omnibus motion, again praying for the dismissal of the
complaint on the ground that the action instituted was, in
fact, made to compel the recognition of petitioners as being
the illegitimate children of decedent Juan G. Dizon and that
the partition sought was merely an ulterior relief once
petitioners would have been able to establish their status as
such heirs. It was contended, in fine, that an action for
partition was not an appropriate forum to likewise ascertain
the question of paternity and filiation, an issue that could only
be taken up in an independent suit or proceeding.
Finding credence in the argument of respondents, the
trial court, ultimately, dismissed the complaint of petitioners
for lack of cause of action and for being improper.[1] It
decreed that the declaration of heirship could only be made
in a special proceeding inasmuch as petitioners were
seeking the establishment of a status or right.

Petitioners assail the foregoing order of the trial court in
the instant petition for review on certiorari. Basically,
petitioners maintain that their recognition as being
illegitimate children of the decedent, embodied in an
authentic writing, is in itself sufficient to establish their status
as such and does not require a separate action for judicial
approval following the doctrine enunciated in Divinagracia
vs. Bellosillo.[2]
In their comment, respondents submit that the rule
in Divinagracia being relied by petitioners is inapplicable to
the case because there has been no attempt to impugn
legitimate filiation in Divinagracia. In praying for the
affirmance of dismissal of the complaint, respondents count
on the case of Sayson vs. Court of Appeals,[3] which has
ruled that the issue of legitimacy cannot be questioned in a
complaint for partition and accounting but must be
seasonably brought up in a direct action frontally addressing
the issue.
The controversy between the parties has been pending
for much too long, and it is time that this matter draws to a
close.
The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate
children, is established by (1) the record of birth appearing
in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of
legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall be
proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed
by the Rules of Court and special laws.[4] The due
recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a
will, a statement before a court of record, or in any
authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of
acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action
is required.[5] In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just
a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary
recognition that does not require a separate action for
judicial approval.[6] Where, instead, a claim for recognition
is predicated on other evidence merely tending to prove
paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record or an authentic
writing, judicial action within the applicable statute of
limitations is essential in order to establish the childs
acknowledgment.[7]
A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners
were born during the marriage of their parents. The
certificates of live birth would also identify Danilo de Jesus
as being their father.
There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly
established and founded on sounder morality and more
convincing reason than the presumption that children born in
wedlock
are
legitimate.[8]This
presumption
indeed
becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is
physical impossibility of access between the spouses during
the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately
precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the physical
incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his
wife; (b) the fact that the husband and wife are living
separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is not

possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which
absolutely prevents sexual intercourse.[9] Quite remarkably,
upon the expiration of the periods set forth in Article 170,
[10]
and in proper cases Article 171,[11] of the Family Code
(which took effect on 03 August 1988), the action to impugn
the legitimacy of a child would no longer be legally feasible
and the status conferred by the presumption becomes fixed
and unassailable.[12]
Succinctly, in an attempt to establish their illegitimate
filiation to the late Juan G. Dizon, petitioners, in effect, would
impugn their legitimate status as being children of Danilo de
Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus. This step cannot be
aptly done because the law itself establishes the legitimacy
of children conceived or born during the marriage of the
parents. The presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil
status for the child born in wedlock, and only the father,
[13]
or in exceptional instances the latters heirs, [14] can
contest in an appropriate action the legitimacy of a child
born to his wife. Thus, it is only when the legitimacy of a
child has been successfully impugned that the paternity
of the husband can be rejected.
Respondents correctly argued that petitioners hardly
could find succor in Divinagracia. In said case, the Supreme
Court remanded to the trial court for further proceedings the
action for partition filed by an illegitimate child who had
claimed to be an acknowledged spurious child by virtue of a
private document, signed by the acknowledging parent,
evidencing such recognition. It was not a case of legitimate
children asserting to be somebody elses illegitimate
children. Petitioners totally ignored the fact that it was not for
them, given the attendant circumstances particularly, to
declare that they could not have been the legitimate children,
clearly opposed to the entries in their respective birth
certificates, of Danilo and Carolina de Jesus.
The rule that the written acknowledgment made by the
deceased Juan G. Dizon establishes petitioners alleged
illegitimate filiation to the decedent cannot be validly invoked
to be of any relevance in this instance. This issue, i.e.,
whether petitioners are indeed the acknowledged illegitimate
offsprings of the decedent, cannot be aptly adjudicated
without an action having been first been instituted to impugn
their legitimacy as being the children of Danilo B. de Jesus
and Carolina Aves de Jesus born in lawful
wedlock. Jurisprudence is strongly settled that the
paramount declaration of legitimacy by law cannot be
attacked collaterally,[15] one that can only be repudiated or
contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that
purpose.[16] Indeed, a child so born in such wedlock shall be
considered legitimate although the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced
as having been an adulteress.[17]
WHEREFORE, the foregoing disquisitions considered,
the instant petition is DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

The facts as alleged by petitioner are as follows:
Corazon G. Garcia is legally married to but living
separately from Ramon M. Yulo for more than ten (10) years
at the time of the institution of the said civil case. Corazon
cohabited with the late William Liyao from 1965 up to the
time of Williams untimely demise on December 2, 1975.
They lived together in the company of Corazons two (2)
children from her subsisting marriage, namely:
Enrique and Bernadette, both surnamed Yulo, in a
succession of rented houses in Quezon City and Manila.
This was with the knowledge of William Liyaos legitimate
children, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda Christina Liyao-Ortiga,
from his subsisting marriage with Juanita Tanhoti Liyao. Tita
Rose and Christina were both employed at the Far East
Realty Investment, Inc. of which Corazon and William were
then vice president and president, respectively.
LIYAO v. TANHOTI-LIYAO
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 138961. March 7, 2002]
WILLIAM LIYAO, JR., represented by his mother Corazon

Garcia, petitioner, vs. JUANITA TANHOTI-LIYAO,
PEARL MARGARET L. TAN, TITA ROSE L. TAN
AND LINDA CHRISTINA LIYAO, respondents.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing
the decision dated June 4, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. C.V. No. 45394[1] which reversed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch
167 in declaring William Liyao, Jr. as the illegitimate
(spurious) son of the deceased William Liyao and ordering
Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl Margaret L. Tan, Tita Rose L.
Tan and Linda Christina Liyao to recognize and acknowledge
William Liyao, Jr. as a compulsory heir of the deceased
William Liyao and entitled to all successional rights as such
and to pay the costs of the suit.
On November 29,1976, William Liyao, Jr., represented
by his mother Corazon G. Garcia, filed Civil Case No. 24943
before the RTC of Pasig, Branch 167 which is an action for
compulsory recognition as the illegitimate (spurious) child of
the late William Liyao against herein respondents, Juanita
Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl Margaret L. Tan, Tita Rose L. Tan and
Linda Christina Liyao.[2] The complaint was later amended to
include the allegation that petitioner was in continuous
possession and enjoyment of the status of the child of said
William Liyao, petitioner having been recognized and
acknowledged as such child by the decedent during his
lifetime."[3]
Sometime in 1974, Corazon bought a lot from Ortigas

and Co. which required the signature of her husband,
Ramon Yulo, to show his consent to the aforesaid sale. She
failed to secure his signature and, had never been in touch
with him despite the necessity to meet him. Upon the advice
of William Liyao, the sale of the parcel of land located at the
Valle Verde Subdivision was registered under the name of
Far East Realty Investment, Inc.
On June 9, 1975, Corazon gave birth to William Liyao,
Jr. at the Cardinal Santos Memorial Hospital. During her
three (3) day stay at the hospital, William Liyao visited and
stayed with her and the new born baby, William, Jr. (Billy). All
the medical and hospital expenses, food and clothing were
paid under the account of William Liyao. William Liyao even
asked his confidential secretary, Mrs. Virginia Rodriguez, to
secure a copy of Billys birth certificate. He likewise
instructed Corazon to open a bank account for Billy with the
Consolidated Bank and Trust Company[4] and gave weekly
amounts to be deposited therein.[5] William Liyao would bring
Billy to the office, introduce him as his good looking son and
had their pictures taken together.[6]
During the lifetime of William Liyao, several pictures
were taken showing, among others, William Liyao and
Corazon together with Billys godfather, Fr. Julian Ruiz,
William Liyaos legal staff and their wives while on vacation
in Baguio.[7] Corazon also presented pictures in court to
prove that that she usually accompanied William Liyao while
attending various social gatherings and other important
meetings.[8] During the occasion of William Liyaos last
birthday on November 22, 1975 held at the Republic
Supermarket, William Liyao expressly acknowledged Billy as
his son in the presence of Fr. Ruiz, Maurita Pasion and other
friends and said, Hey, look I am still young, I can still make
a good looking son."[9] Since birth, Billy had been in
continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of a
recognized and/or acknowledged child of William Liyao by
the latters direct and overt acts. William Liyao supported
Billy and paid for his food, clothing and other material needs.
However, after William Liyaos death, it was Corazon who
provided sole support to Billy and took care of his tuition fees
at La Salle, Greenhills. William Liyao left his personal
belongings, collections, clothing, old newspaper clippings

and laminations at the house in White Plains where he
shared his last moments with Corazon.
Testifying for the petitioner, Maurita Pasion declared
that she knew both Corazon G. Garcia and William Liyao
who were godparents to her children. She used to visit
Corazon and William Liyao from 1965-1975. The two
children of Corazon from her marriage to Ramon Yulo,
namely, Bernadette and Enrique (Ike), together with some
housemaids lived with Corazon and William Liyao as one
family. On some occasions like birthdays or some other
celebrations, Maurita would sleep in the couples residence
and cook for the family. During these occasions, she would
usually see William Liyao in sleeping clothes. When
Corazon, during the latter part of 1974, was pregnant with
her child Billy, Maurita often visited her three (3) to four (4)
times a week in Greenhills and later on in White Plains
where she would often see William Liyao. Being a close
friend of Corazon, she was at the Cardinal Santos Memorial
Hospital during the birth of Billy. She continuously visited
them at White Plains and knew that William Liyao, while
living with her friend Corazon, gave support by way of
grocery supplies, money for household expenses and
matriculation fees for the two (2) older children, Bernadette
and Enrique. During William Liyaos birthday on November
22, 1975 held at the Republic Supermarket Office, he was
carrying Billy and told everybody present, including his two
(2) daughters from his legal marriage, Look, this is my son,
very guapo and healthy.[10] He then talked about his plan for
the baptism of Billy before Christmas. He intended to make it
engrande and make the bells of San Sebastian Church
ring.[11] Unfortunately, this did not happen since William
Liyao passed away on December 2, 1975. Maurita attended
Mr. Liyaos funeral and helped Corazon pack his clothes.
She even recognized a short sleeved shirt of blue and
gray[12] which Mr. Liyao wore in a photograph[13] as well as
another shirt of lime green[14] as belonging to the deceased. A
note was also presented with the following inscriptions: To
Cora, Love From William.[15] Maurita remembered having
invited the couple during her mothers birthday where the
couple had their pictures taken while exhibiting affectionate
poses with one another. Maurita knew that Corazon is still
married to Ramon Yulo since her marriage has not been
annulled nor is Corazon legally separated from her said
husband. However, during the entire cohabitation of William
Liyao with Corazon Garcia, Maurita had not seen Ramon
Yulo or any other man in the house when she usually visited
Corazon.
Gloria Panopio testified that she is the owner of a
beauty parlor and that she knew that Billy is the son of her
neighbors, William Liyao and Corazon Garcia, the latter
being one of her customers. Gloria met Mr. Liyao at
Corazons house in Scout Delgado, Quezon City in the
Christmas of 1965. Gloria had numerous occasions to see
Mr. Liyao from 1966 to 1974 and even more so when the
couple transferred to White Plains, Quezon City from 19741975. At the time Corazon was conceiving, Mr. Liyao was
worried that Corazon might have another miscarriage so he
insisted that she just stay in the house, play mahjong and not
be bored. Gloria taught Corazon how to play mahjong and
together with Atty. Brillantes wife and sister-in-law, had
mahjong sessions among themselves. Gloria knew that Mr.

Liyao provided Corazon with a rented house, paid the salary
of the maids and food for Billy. He also gave Corazon
financial support. Gloria knew that Corazon is married but is
separated from Ramon Yulo although Gloria never had any
occasion to see Mr. Yulo with Corazon in the house where
Mr. Liyao and Corazon lived.
Enrique Garcia Yulo testified that he had not heard
from his father, Ramon Yulo, from the time that the latter
abandoned and separated from his family. Enrique was
about six (6) years old when William Liyao started to live with
them up to the time of the latters death on December 2,
1975. Mr. Liyao was very supportive and fond of Enriques
half brother, Billy. He identified several pictures showing Mr.
Liyao carrying Billy at the house as well as in the office.
Enriques testimony was corroborated by his sister,
Bernadette Yulo, who testified that the various pictures
showing Mr. Liyao carrying Billy could not have been
superimposed and that the negatives were in the possession
of her mother, Corazon Garcia.
Respondents, on the other hand, painted a different
picture of the story.
Linda Christina Liyao-Ortiga stated that her parents,
William Liyao and Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, were legally
married.[16] Linda grew up and lived with her parents at San
Lorenzo Village, Makati, Metro Manila until she got married;
that her parents were not separated legally or in fact and that
there was no reason why any of her parents would institute
legal separation proceedings in court. Her father lived at their
house in San Lorenzo Village and came home regularly.
Even during out of town business trips or for conferences
with the lawyers at the office, her father would change his
clothes at home because of his personal hygiene and habits.
Her father reportedly had trouble sleeping in other peoples
homes. Linda described him as very conservative and a
strict disciplinarian. He believed that no amount of success
would compensate for failure of a home. As a businessman,
he was very tough, strong, fought for what he believed in and
did not give up easily. He suffered two strokes before the
fatal attack which led to his death on December 2, 1975. He
suffered a stroke at the office sometime in April-May 1974
and was attended by Dr. Santiago Co. He then stayed in the
house for two (2) to three (3) months for his therapy and
acupuncture treatment. He could not talk, move, walk, write
or sign his name. In the meantime, Linda and her sister, Tita
Rose Liyao-Tan, ran the office. She handled the collection of
rents while her sister referred legal matters to their lawyers.
William Liyao was bedridden and had personally changed.
He was not active in business and had dietary restrictions.
Mr. Liyao also suffered a milder stroke during the latter part
of September to October 1974. He stayed home for two (2)
to three (3) days and went back to work. He felt depressed,
however, and was easily bored. He did not put in long hours
in the office unlike before and tried to spend more time with
his family.
Linda testified that she knew Corazon Garcia is still
married to Ramon Yulo. Corazon was not legally separated
from her husband and the records from the Local Civil
Registrar do not indicate that the couple obtained any

annulment[17] of their marriage. Once in 1973, Linda chanced
upon Ramon Yulo picking up Corazon Garcia at the
company garage. Immediately after the death of Lindas
father, Corazon went to Lindas office for the return of the
formers alleged investments with the Far East Realty
Investment, Inc. including a parcel of land sold by Ortigas
and Company. Linda added that Corazon, while still a VicePresident of the company, was able to take out documents,
clothes and several laminated pictures of William Liyao from
the office. There was one instance when she was told by the
guards, Mrs. Yulo is leaving and taking out things
again.[18] Linda then instructed the guards to bring Mrs. Yulo
to the office upstairs but her sister, Tita Rose, decided to let
Corazon Garcia go. Linda did not recognize any article of
clothing which belonged to her father after having been
shown three (3) large suit cases full of mens clothes,
underwear, sweaters, shorts and pajamas.
Tita Rose Liyao-Tan testified that her parents were
legally married and had never been separated. They resided
at No. 21 Hernandez Street, San Lorenzo Village, Makati up
to the time of her fathers death on December 2, 1975. [19] Her
father suffered two (2) minor cardio-vascular arrests (CVA)
prior to his death. During the first heart attack sometime
between April and May 1974, his speech and hands were
affected and he had to stay home for two (2) to three (3)
months under strict medication, taking aldomet, serpadil and
cifromet which were prescribed by Dr. Bonifacio Yap, for high
blood pressure and cholesterol level control.[20] Tita Rose
testified that after the death of Mr. Liyao, Corazon Garcia
was paid the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00) representing her investment in the Far East
Realty Investment Inc. Tita Rose also stated that her family
never received any formal demand that they recognize a
certain William Liyao, Jr. as an illegitimate son of her father,
William Liyao. After assuming the position of President of the
company, Tita Rose did not come across any check signed
by her late father representing payment to lessors as rentals
for the house occupied by Corazon Garcia. Tita Rose added
that the laminated photographs presented by Corazon
Garcia are the personal collection of the deceased which
were displayed at the latters office.
The last witness who testified for the respondents was
Ramon Pineda, driver and bodyguard of William Liyao from
1962 to 1974, who said that he usually reported for work at
San Lorenzo Village, Makati to pick up his boss at 8:00
oclock in the morning. At past 7:00 oclock in the evening,
either Carlos Palamigan or Serafin Villacillo took over as
night shift driver. Sometime between April and May 1974, Mr.
Liyao got sick. It was only after a month that he was able to
report to the office. Thereafter, Mr. Liyao was not able to
report to the office regularly. Sometime in September 1974,
Mr. Liyao suffered from another heart attack. Mr. Pineda
added that as a driver and bodyguard of Mr. Liyao, he ran
errands for the latter among which was buying medicine for
him like capasid and aldomet. On December 2, 1975, Mr.
Pineda was called inside the office of Mr. Liyao. Mr. Pineda
saw his employer leaning on the table. He tried to massage
Mr. Liyaos breast and decided later to carry and bring him to
the hospital but Mr. Liyao died upon arrival thereat. Mrs.
Liyao and her daughter, Linda Liyao-Ortiga were the first to

arrive at the hospital.
Mr. Pineda also declared that he knew Corazon Garcia
to be one of the employees of the Republic Supermarket.
People in the office knew that she was married. Her
husband, Ramon Yulo, would sometimes go to the office.
One time, in 1974, Mr. Pineda saw Ramon Yulo at the office
garage as if to fetch Corazon Garcia. Mr. Yulo who was also
asking about cars for sale, represented himself as car dealer.
Witness Pineda declared that he did not know anything
about the claim of Corazon. He freely relayed the information
that he saw Mr. Yulo in the garage of Republic Supermarket
once in 1973 and then in 1974 to Atty. Quisumbing when he
went to the latters law office. Being the driver of Mr. Liyao for
a number of years, Pineda said that he remembered having
driven the group of Mr. Liyao, Atty. Astraquillo, Atty.
Brillantes, Atty. Magno and Atty. Laguio to Baguio for a
vacation together with the lawyers wives. During his
employment, as driver of Mr. Liyao, he does not remember
driving for Corazon Garcia on a trip to Baguio or for activities
like shopping.
On August 31, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision,
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendants as follows:
(a) Confirming the appointment of Corazon G. Garcia as the
guardian ad litem of the minor William Liyao, Jr.;
(b) Declaring the minor William Liyao, Jr. as the illegitimate
(spurious) son of the deceased William Liyao;
(c) Ordering the defendants Juanita Tanhoti Liyao, Pearl
Margaret L. Tan, Tita Rose L. Tan and Christian Liyao, to
recognize, and acknowledge the minor William Liyao, Jr. as
a compulsory heir of the deceased William Liyao, entitled to
all succesional rights as such; and
(d) Costs of suit.[21]
In ruling for herein petitioner, the trial court said it was
convinced by preponderance of evidence that the deceased
William Liyao sired William Liyao, Jr. since the latter was
conceived at the time when Corazon Garcia cohabited with
the deceased. The trial court observed that herein petitioner
had been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the
status of a child of the deceased by direct and overt acts of
the latter such as securing the birth certificate of petitioner
through his confidential secretary, Mrs. Virginia Rodriguez;
openly and publicly acknowledging petitioner as his son;
providing sustenance and even introducing herein petitioner
to his legitimate children.
The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the ruling of
the trial court saying that the law favors the legitimacy rather
than the illegitimacy of the child and the presumption of
legitimacy is thwarted only on ethnic ground and by proof
that marital intimacy between husband and wife was

physically impossible at the period cited in Article 257 in
relation to Article 255 of the Civil Code. The appellate court
gave weight to the testimonies of some witnesses for the
respondents that Corazon Garcia and Ramon Yulo who were
still legally married and have not secured legal separation,
were seen in each others company during the supposed
time that Corazon cohabited with the deceased William
Liyao. The appellate court further noted that the birth
certificate and the baptismal certificate of William Liyao, Jr.
which were presented by petitioner are not sufficient to
establish proof of paternity in the absence of any evidence
that the deceased, William Liyao, had a hand in the
preparation of said certificates and considering that his
signature does not appear thereon. The Court of Appeals
stated that neither do family pictures constitute competent
proof of filiation. With regard to the passbook which was
presented as evidence for petitioner, the appellate court
observed that there was nothing in it to prove that the same
was opened by William Liyao for either petitioner or Corazon
Garcia since William Liyaos signature and name do not
appear thereon.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied,
petitioner filed the present petition.
It must be stated at the outset that both petitioner and
respondents have raised a number of issues which relate
solely to the sufficiency of evidence presented by petitioner
to establish his claim of filiation with the late William Liyao.
Unfortunately, both parties have consistently overlooked the
real crux of this litigation: May petitioner impugn his own
legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate of his
supposed father, William Liyao?
We deny the present petition.
Under the New Civil Code, a child born and conceived
during a valid marriage is presumed to be legitimate. [22] The
presumption of legitimacy of children does not only flow out
from a declaration contained in the statute but is based on
the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed
virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded in a policy
to protect innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.[23]
The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is
not conclusive and consequently, may be overthrown by
evidence to the contrary. Hence, Article 255 of the New Civil
Code[24]provides:
Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days
following the celebration of the marriage, and before three
hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of
the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.
Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted
other than that of the physical impossibility of the husband
having access to his wife within the first one hundred and
twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of
the child.
1) By the impotence of the husband;

2) By the fact that husband and wife were living separately in
such a way that access was not possible;
3) By the serious illness of the husband.
Petitioner insists that his mother, Corazon Garcia, had
been living separately for ten (10) years from her husband,
Ramon Yulo, at the time that she cohabited with the late
William Liyao and it was physically impossible for her to have
sexual relations with Ramon Yulo when petitioner was
conceived and born. To bolster his claim, petitioner
presented
a
document
entitled,
Contract
of
Separation,[25] executed and signed by Ramon Yulo
indicating a waiver of rights to any and all claims on any
property that Corazon Garcia might acquire in the future.[26]
The fact that Corazon Garcia had been living
separately from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time
petitioner was conceived and born is of no moment. While
physical impossibility for the husband to have sexual
intercourse with his wife is one of the grounds for impugning
the legitimacy of the child, it bears emphasis that the
grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child mentioned
in Article 255 of the Civil Code may only be invoked by the
husband, or in proper cases, his heirs under the conditions
set forth under Article 262 of the Civil Code. [27]Impugning the
legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the
husband, or in exceptional cases, his heirs for the simple
reason that he is the one directly confronted with the scandal
and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces and he
should be the one to decide whether to conceal that infidelity
or expose it in view of the moral and economic interest
involved.[28]It is only in exceptional cases that his heirs are
allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of these cases,
none - even his heirs - can impugn legitimacy; that would
amount o an insult to his memory.[29]
It is therefor clear that the present petition initiated by
Corazon G. Garcia as guardian ad litem of the then minor,
herein petitioner, to compel recognition by respondents of
petitioner William Liyao, Jr, as the illegitimate son of the late
William Liyao cannot prosper. It is settled that a child born
within a valid marriage is presumed legitimate even though
the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may
have been sentenced as an adulteress.[30] We cannot allow
petitioner to maintain his present petition and subvert the
clear mandate of the law that only the husband, or in
exceptional circumstances, his heirs, could impugn the
legitimacy of a child born in a valid and subsisting marriage.
The child himself cannot choose his own filiation. If the
husband, presumed to be the father does not impugn the
legitimacy of the child, then the status of the child is fixed,
and the latter cannot choose to be the child of his mothers
alleged paramour. On the other hand, if the presumption of
legitimacy is overthrown, the child cannot elect the paternity
of the husband who successfully defeated the presumption.
[31]
This physical impossibility may be caused:
Do the acts of Enrique and Bernadette Yulo, the

undisputed children of Corazon Garcia with Ramon Yulo, in

testifying for herein petitioner amount to impugnation of the
legitimacy of the latter?
We think not. As earlier stated, it is only in exceptional
cases that the heirs of the husband are allowed to contest
the legitimacy of the child. There is nothing on the records to
indicate that Ramon Yulo has already passed away at the
time of the birth of the petitioner nor at the time of the
initiation of this proceedings. Notably, the case at bar was
initiated by petitioner himself through his mother, Corazon
Garcia, and not through Enrique and Bernadette Yulo. It
is settled that the legitimacy of the child can be impugned
only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper
parties and within the period limited by law.
Considering the foregoing, we find no reason to discuss
the sufficiency of the evidence presented by both parties on
the petitioners claim of alleged filiation with the late William
Liyao. In any event, there is no clear, competent and positive
evidence presented by the petitioner that his alleged father
had admitted or recognized his paternity.
on the ground of bigamy.[5] He alleged that nine years before

he married Ma. Theresa on December 10, 1980, she had
married one Mario Gopiao, which marriage was never
annulled.[6] Gerardo also found out that Mario was still alive
and was residing in Loyola Heights, Quezon City.[7]
Ma. Theresa did not deny marrying Mario when she
was twenty years old. She, however, averred that the
marriage was a sham and that she never lived with Mario at
all.[8]
The trial court ruled that Ma. Theresas marriage to
Mario was valid and subsisting when she married Gerardo
and annulled her marriage to the latter for being bigamous. It
declared Jose Gerardo to be an illegitimate child as a result.
The custody of the child was awarded to Ma. Theresa while
Gerardo was granted visitation rights.[9]
[G.R. No. 123450. August 31, 2005]
Ma. Theresa felt betrayed and humiliated when

Gerardo had their marriage annulled. She held him
responsible for the bastardization of Gerardo. She moved
for the reconsideration of the above decision INSOFAR
ONLY as that portion of the decision which grant(ed) to
the petitioner so-called visitation rights between the hours
of 8 in the morning to 12:00 p.m. of any Sunday.[10] She
argued that there was nothing in the law granting visitation
rights in favor of the putative father of an illegitimate
child.[11] She further maintained that Jose Gerardos
surname should be changed from Concepcion to Almonte,
her maiden name, following the rule that an illegitimate child
shall use the mothers surname.
GERARDO B. CONCEPCION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS
and
MA.
THERESA
ALMONTE, respondents.
Gerardo opposed the motion. He insisted on his

visitation rights and the retention of Concepcion as Jose
Gerardos surname.
DECISION
Applying the best interest of the child principle, the

trial court denied Ma. Theresas motion and made the
following observations:
The child, by reason of his mental and physical

immaturity, needs special safeguard and care, including
appropriate legal protection before as well as after birth.[1] In
case of assault on his rights by those who take advantage of
his innocence and vulnerability, the law will rise in his
defense with the single-minded purpose of upholding only
his best interests.
It is a pity that the parties herein seem to be using their son

to get at or to hurt the other, something they should never do
if they want to assure the normal development and wellbeing of the boy.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The

assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
45394 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
CONCEPCION v. CA
THIRD DIVISION
CORONA, J.:
This is the story of petitioner Gerardo B. Concepcion

and private respondent Ma. Theresa Almonte, and a child
named Jose Gerardo. Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were
married on December 29, 1989.[2] After their marriage, they
lived with Ma. Theresas parents in Fairview, Quezon City.
[3]
Almost a year later, on December 8, 1990, Ma. Theresa
gave birth to Jose Gerardo.[4]
Gerardo and Ma. Theresas relationship turned out to
be short-lived, however. On December 19, 1991, Gerardo
filed a petition to have his marriage to Ma. Theresa annulled
The Court allowed visitorial rights to the father knowing that

the minor needs a father, especially as he is a boy, who must
have a father figure to recognize something that the
mother alone cannot give. Moreover, the Court believes that
the emotional and psychological well-being of the boy would
be better served if he were allowed to maintain relationships
with his father.
There being no law which compels the Court to act one way
or the other on this matter, the Court invokes the provision of
Art. 8, PD 603 as amended, otherwise known as the Child
and Youth Welfare Code, to wit:

In all questions regarding the care, custody, education and
property of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount
consideration.
WHEREFORE, the respondents Motion for Reconsideration
has to be, as it is hereby DENIED.[12]
Ma. Theresa elevated the case to the Court of Appeals,
assigning as error the ruling of the trial court granting
visitation rights to Gerardo. She likewise opposed the
continued use of Gerardos surname (Concepcion) despite
the fact that Jose Gerardo had already been declared
illegitimate and should therefore use her surname
(Almonte). The appellate court denied the petition and
affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.[13]
On the issue raised by Ma. Theresa that there was
nothing in the law that granted a putative father visitation
rights over his illegitimate child, the appellate court affirmed
the best interest of the child policy invoked by the court a
quo. It ruled that [a]t bottom, it (was) the childs welfare and
not the convenience of the parents which (was) the primary
consideration in granting visitation rights a few hours once a
week.[14]
The appellate court likewise held that an illegitimate
child cannot use the mothers surname motu proprio. The
child, represented by the mother, should file a separate
proceeding for a change of name under Rule 103 of the
Rules of Court to effect the correction in the civil registry.[15]
Undaunted, Ma. Theresa moved for the reconsideration
of the adverse decision of the appellate court. She also filed
a motion to set the case for oral arguments so that she could
better ventilate the issues involved in the controversy.
After hearing the oral arguments of the respective
counsels of the parties, the appellate court resolved the
motion for reconsideration. It reversed its earlier ruling and
held that Jose Gerardo was not the son of Ma. Theresa by
Gerardo but by Mario during her first marriage:
It is, therefore, undeniable established by the evidence in
this case that the appellant [Ma. Theresa] was married to
Mario Gopiao, and that she had never entered into a lawful
marriage with the appellee [Gerardo] since the so-called
marriage with the latter was void ab initio. It was [Gerardo]
himself who had established these facts. In other words,
[Ma. Theresa] was legitimately married to Mario Gopiao
when the child Jose Gerardo was born on December 8,
1990. Therefore, the child Jose Gerardo under the law is
the legitimate child of the legal and subsisting marriage
between [Ma. Theresa] and Mario Gopiao; he cannot be
deemed to be the illegitimate child of the void and nonexistent marriage between [Ma. Theresa] and [Gerardo], but
is said by the law to be the child of the legitimate and
existing marriage between [Ma. Theresa] and Mario Gopiao
(Art. 164, Family Code). Consequently, [she] is right in firmly
saying that [Gerardo] can claim neither custody nor visitorial
rights over the child Jose Gerardo. Further, [Gerardo] cannot
impose his name upon the child. Not only is it without legal
basis (even supposing the child to be his illegitimate child
[Art. 146, The Family Code]); it would tend to destroy the
existing marriage between [Ma. Theresa] and Gopiao, would
prevent any possible rapproachment between the married
couple, and would mean a judicial seal upon an illegitimate
relationship.[16]
The appellate court brushed aside the common
admission of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa that Jose Gerardo
was their son. It gave little weight to Jose Gerardos birth
certificate showing that he was born a little less than a year
after Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were married:
We are not unaware of the movants argument that various
evidence exist that appellee and the appellant have judicially
admitted that the minor is their natural child. But, in the
same vein, We cannot overlook the fact that Article 167 of
the Family Code mandates:
The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother
may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been
sentenced as an adulteress. (underscoring ours)
Thus, implicit from the above provision is the fact that a
minor cannot be deprived of his/her legitimate status on the
bare declaration of the mother and/or even much less, the
supposed father. In fine, the law and only the law
determines who are the legitimate or illegitimate children
for ones legitimacy or illegitimacy cannot ever be
compromised. Not even the birth certificate of the minor
can change his status for the information contained therein
are merely supplied by the mother and/or the supposed
father. It should be what the law says and not what a
parent says it is.[17] (Emphasis supplied)
Shocked and stunned, Gerardo moved for a
reconsideration of the above decision but the same was
denied.[18] Hence, this appeal.
The status and filiation of a child cannot be
compromised.[19] Article 164 of the Family Code is clear. A
child who is conceived or born during the marriage of his
parents is legitimate.[20]
As a guaranty in favor of the child [21] and to protect his
status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family Code provides:
Article 167. The child shall be considered legitimate
although the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
The law requires that every reasonable presumption be
made in favor of legitimacy.[22] We explained the rationale of
this rule in the recent case of Cabatania v. Court of
Appeals[23]:
The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a
declaration in the statute but is based on the broad principles

of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. It is
grounded on the policy to protect the innocent offspring from
the odium of illegitimacy.
Gerardo invokes Article 166 (1)(b)[24] of the Family
Code. He cannot. He has no standing in law to dispute the
status of Jose Gerardo. Only Ma. Theresas husband Mario
or, in a proper case,[25] his heirs, who can contest the
legitimacy of the child Jose Gerardo born to his wife.
[26]
Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal
right of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs.
[27]
Since the marriage of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void
from the very beginning, he never became her husband and
thus never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of her
child.
The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from the
sexual union in marriage, particularly during the period of
conception.[28] To overthrow this presumption on the basis of
Article 166 (1)(b) of the Family Code, it must be shown
beyond reasonable doubt that there was no access that
could have enabled the husband to father the child.[29] Sexual
intercourse is to be presumed where personal access is not
disproved, unless such presumption is rebutted by evidence
to the contrary.[30]
The presumption is quasi-conclusive and may be
refuted only by the evidence of physical impossibility of
coitus between husband and wife within the first 120 days of
the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the
child.[31]
To rebut the presumption, the separation between the
spouses must be such as to make marital intimacy
impossible.[32] This may take place, for instance, when they
reside in different countries or provinces and they were never
together during the period of conception. [33] Or, the husband
was in prison during the period of conception, unless it
appears that sexual union took place through the violation of
prison regulations.[34]
Here, during the period that Gerardo and Ma. Theresa
were living together in Fairview, Quezon City, Mario was
living in Loyola Heights which is also in Quezon City.
Fairview and Loyola Heights are only a scant four kilometers
apart.
Not only did both Ma. Theresa and Mario reside in the
same city but also that no evidence at all was presented to
disprove personal access between them. Considering these
circumstances, the separation between Ma. Theresa and her
lawful husband, Mario, was certainly not such as to make it
physically impossible for them to engage in the marital act.
Sexual union between spouses is assumed. Evidence
sufficient to defeat the assumption should be presented by
him who asserts the contrary. There is no such evidence
here. Thus, the presumption of legitimacy in favor of Jose
Gerardo, as the issue of the marriage between Ma. Theresa
and Mario, stands.
Gerardo relies on Ma. Theresas statement in her

answer[35] to the petition for annulment of marriage [36] that she
never lived with Mario. He claims this was an admission that
there was never any sexual relation between her and Mario,
an admission that was binding on her.
Gerardos argument is without merit.
First, the import of Ma. Theresas statement is that Jose
Gerardo is not her legitimate son with Mario but her
illegitimate son with Gerardo. This declaration an avowal
by the mother that her child is illegitimate is the very
declaration that is proscribed by Article 167 of the Family
Code.
The language of the law is unmistakable. An assertion
by the mother against the legitimacy of her child cannot
affect the legitimacy of a child born or conceived within a
valid marriage.
Second, even assuming the truth of her statement, it
does not mean that there was never an instance where Ma.
Theresa could have been together with Mario or that there
occurred absolutely no intercourse between them. All she
said was that she never lived with Mario. She never claimed
that nothing ever happened between them.
Telling is the fact that both of them were living in
Quezon City during the time material to Jose Gerardos
conception and birth. Far from foreclosing the possibility of
marital intimacy, their proximity to each other only serves to
reinforce such possibility. Thus, the impossibility of physical
access was never established beyond reasonable doubt.
Third, to give credence to Ma. Theresas statement is to
allow her to arrogate unto herself a right exclusively lodged
in the husband, or in a proper case, his heirs. [37] A mother
has no right to disavow a child because maternity is never
uncertain.[38] Hence, Ma. Theresa is not permitted by law to
question Jose Gerardos legitimacy.
Finally, for reasons of public decency and morality, a
married woman cannot say that she had no intercourse with
her husband and that her offspring is illegitimate. [39] The
proscription is in consonance with the presumption in favor
of family solidarity. It also promotes the intention of the law
to lean toward the legitimacy of children.[40]
Gerardos insistence that the filiation of Jose Gerardo
was never an issue both in the trial court and in the appellate
court does not hold water. The fact that both Ma. Theresa
and Gerardo admitted and agreed that Jose Gerardo was
born to them was immaterial. That was, in effect, an
agreement that the child was illegitimate. If the Court were
to validate that stipulation, then it would be tantamount to
allowing the mother to make a declaration against the
legitimacy of her child and consenting to the denial of filiation
of the child by persons other than her husband. These are
the very acts from which the law seeks to shield the child.

Public policy demands that there be no compromise on
the status and filiation of a child.[41] Otherwise, the child will
be at the mercy of those who may be so minded to exploit
his defenselessness.
The reliance of Gerardo on Jose Gerardos birth
certificate is misplaced. It has no evidentiary value in this
case because it was not offered in evidence before the trial
court. The rule is that the court shall not consider any
evidence which has not been formally offered.[42]
Moreover, the law itself establishes the status of a child
from the moment of his birth. [43] Although a record of birth or
birth certificate may be used as primary evidence of the
filiation of a child,[44] as the status of a child is determined by
the law itself, proof of filiation is necessary only when the
legitimacy of the child is being questioned, or when the
status of a child born after 300 days following the termination
of marriage is sought to be established.[45]
Here, the status of Jose Gerardo as a legitimate child
was not under attack as it could not be contested collaterally
and, even then, only by the husband or, in extraordinary
cases, his heirs. Hence, the presentation of proof of
legitimacy in this case was improper and uncalled for.
In addition, a record of birth is merely prima
facie evidence of the facts contained therein.[46] As prima
facie evidence, the statements in the record of birth may be
rebutted by more preponderant evidence. It is not conclusive
evidence with respect to the truthfulness of the statements
made therein by the interested parties.[47] Between the
certificate of birth which isprima facie evidence of Jose
Gerardos illegitimacy and the quasi-conclusive presumption
of law (rebuttable only by proof beyond reasonable doubt) of
his legitimacy, the latter shall prevail. Not only does it bear
more weight, it is also more conducive to the best interests
of the child and in consonance with the purpose of the law.
It perplexes us why both Gerardo and Ma. Theresa
would doggedly press for Jose Gerardos illegitimacy while
claiming that they both had the childs interests at heart. The
law, reason and common sense dictate that a legitimate
status is more favorable to the child. In the eyes of the law,
the legitimate child enjoys a preferred and superior status.
He is entitled to bear the surnames of both his father and
mother, full support and full inheritance.[48] On the other hand,
an illegitimate child is bound to use the surname and be
under the parental authority only of his mother. He can claim
support only from a more limited group and his legitime is
only half of that of his legitimate counterpart. [49] Moreover
(without unwittingly exacerbating the discrimination against
him), in the eyes of society, a bastard is usually regarded as
bearing a stigma or mark of dishonor. Needless to state, the
legitimacy presumptively vested by law upon Jose Gerardo
favors his interest.
It is unfortunate that Jose Gerardo was used as a pawn
in the bitter squabble between the very persons who were
passionately declaring their concern for him. The paradox
was that he was made to suffer supposedly for his own sake.
This madness should end.
This case has been pending for a very long time
already. What is specially tragic is that an innocent child is
involved. Jose Gerardo was barely a year old when these
proceedings began. He is now almost fifteen and all this time
he has been a victim of incessant bickering. The law now
comes to his aid to write finis to the controversy which has
unfairly hounded him since his infancy.
Having only his best interests in mind, we uphold the
presumption of his legitimacy.
As a legitimate child, Jose Gerardo shall have the right
to bear the surnames of his father Mario and mother Ma.
Theresa, in conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code
on surnames.[50] A persons surname or family name
identifies the family to which he belongs and is passed on
from parent to child.[51] Hence, Gerardo cannot impose his
surname on Jose Gerardo who is, in the eyes of the law, not
related to him in any way.
The matter of changing Jose Gerardos name and
effecting the corrections of the entries in the civil register
regarding his paternity and filiation should be threshed out in
a separate proceeding.
In case of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity
of marriage, Article 49 of the Family Code grants visitation
rights to a parent who is deprived of custody of his children.
Such visitation rights flow from the natural right of both
parent and child to each others company. There being no
such parent-child relationship between them, Gerardo has
no legally demandable right to visit Jose Gerardo.
Our laws seek to promote the welfare of the child.
Article 8 of PD 603, otherwise known as the Child and Youth
Welfare Code, is clear and unequivocal:
Article 8. Childs Welfare Paramount. In all questions
regarding the care, custody, education and property of the
child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration.
Article 3 (1) of the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of a Child of which the Philippines is a signatory is
similarly emphatic:
Article 3
1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by
public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law,
administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best
interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.
The State as parens patriae affords special protection
to children from abuse, exploitation and other conditions
prejudicial to their development. It is mandated to provide
protection to those of tender years. [52] Through its laws, the

State safeguards them from every one, even their own
parents, to the end that their eventual development as
responsible citizens and members of society shall not be
impeded, distracted or impaired by family acrimony. This is
especially significant where, as in this case, the issue
concerns their filiation as it strikes at their very identity and
lineage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The
September 14, 1995 and January 10, 1996 resolutions of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 40651 are hereby
AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
2006 denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in CAG.R. CV No. 70125.

A Complaint3 for compulsory recognition with prayer for
support pending litigation was filed by minor Joanne Rodjin
Diaz (Joanne), represented by her mother and guardian,
Jinky C. Diaz (Jinky), against Rogelio G. Ong (Rogelio)
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac City. In her
Complaint, Jinky prayed that judgment be rendered:
(a) Ordering defendant to recognize plaintiff Joanne Rodjin
Diaz as his daughter.
(b) Ordering defendant to give plaintiff monthly support
of P20,000.00 pendente lite and thereafter to fix monthly
support.
(c) Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff attorneys fees in
the sum of P100,000.00.
(d) Granting plaintiff such other measure of relief as maybe
just and equitable in the premises.4
As alleged by Jinky in her Complaint in November 1993 in
Tarlac City, she and Rogelio got acquainted. This developed
into friendship and later blossomed into love. At this time,
Jinky was already married to a Japanese national,
Hasegawa Katsuo, in a civil wedding solemnized on 19
February 1993 by Municipal Trial Court Judge Panfilo V.
Valdez.5
From January 1994 to September 1998, Jinky and Rogelio
cohabited and lived together at Fairlane Subdivision, and
later at Capitol Garden, Tarlac City.
ONG v. DIAZ
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 171713
From this live-in relationship, minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz was

conceived and on 25 February 1998 was born at the Central
Luzon Doctors Hospital, Tarlac City.
Rogelio brought Jinky to the hospital and took minor Joanne
and Jinky home after delivery. Rogelio paid all the hospital
bills and the baptismal expenses and provided for all of
minor Joannes needs recognizing the child as his.
December 17, 2007
ESTATE OF ROGELIO G. ONG, petitioner,

vs.
Minor JOANNE RODJIN DIAZ, Represented by Her
Mother and Guardian, Jinky C. Diaz, respondent.
DECISION
In September 1998, Rogelio abandoned minor Joanne and

Jinky, and stopped supporting minor Joanne, falsely alleging
that he is not the father of the child.
Rogelio, despite Jinkys remonstrance, failed and refused
and continued failing and refusing to give support for the
child and to acknowledge her as his daughter, thus leading
to the filing of the heretofore adverted complaint.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure assailing (1) the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 23 November 2005
and (2) the Resolution2 of the same court dated 1 March
After summons had been duly served upon Rogelio, the

latter failed to file any responsive pleading despite repeated
motions for extension, prompting the trial court to declare
him in default in its Order dated 7 April 1999. Rogelios
Answer with Counterclaim and Special and Affirmative
Defenses was received by the trial court only on 15 April

1999. Jinky was allowed to present her evidence ex parte on
the basis of which the trial court on 23 April 1999 rendered a
decision granting the reliefs prayed for in the complaint.
In its Decision6 dated 23 April 1999, the RTC held:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Ordering defendant to recognize plaintiff as his natural
child;
2. Ordering defendant to provide plaintiff with a monthly
support of P10,000.00 and further
3. Ordering defendant to pay reasonable attorneys fees in
the amount of P5,000.00 and the cost of the suit.
On 28 April 1999, Rogelio filed a motion to lift the order of
default and a motion for reconsideration seeking the courts
understanding, as he was then in a quandary on what to do
to find a solution to a very difficult problem of his life.7
On 29 April 1999, Rogelio filed a motion for new trial with
prayer that the decision of the trial court dated 23 April 1999
be vacated and the case be considered for trial de novo
pursuant to the provisions of Section 6, Rule 37 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.8
On 16 June 1999, the RTC issued an Order granting
Rogelios Motion for New Trial:
WHEREFORE, finding defendants motion for new trial to be
impressed with merit, the same is hereby granted.
The Order of this court declaring defendant in default and the
decision is this court dated April 23, 1999 are hereby set
aside but the evidence adduced shall remain in record,
subject to cross-examination by defendant at the appropriate
stage of the proceedings.
In the meantime defendants answer is hereby admitted,
subject to the right of plaintiff to file a reply and/or answer to
defendants counterclaim within the period fixed by the Rules
of Court.
Acting on plaintiffs application for support pendente lite
which this court finds to be warranted, defendant is hereby
ordered to pay to plaintiff immediately the sum of P2,000.00
a month from January 15, 1999 to May 1999 as support
pendente lite in arrears and the amount of P4,000.00 every
month thereafter as regular support pendente lite during the
pendency of this case.9
Since it was duly established that plaintiffs mother Jinky

Diaz was married at the time of the birth of Joanne Rodjin
Diaz, the law presumes that Joanne is a legitimate child of
the spouses Hasegawa Katsuo and Jinky Diaz (Article 164,
Family Code). The child is still presumed legitimate even if
the mother may have declared against her legitimacy (Article
167, Ibid).
The legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the
following grounds provided for in Article 166 of the same
Code. Paragraph 1 of the said Article provides that there
must be physical impossibility for the husband to have
sexual intercourse with the wife within the first 120 days of
the 300 days following the birth of the child because of
a) physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual
intercourse with his wife;
b) husband and wife were living separately in such a way
that sexual intercourse was not possible;
c) serious illness of the husband which prevented sexual
intercourse.
It was established by evidence that the husband is a
Japanese national and that he was living outside of the
country (TSN, Aug. 27, 1999, page 5) and he comes home
only once a year. Both evidence of the parties proved that
the husband was outside the country and no evidence was
shown that he ever arrived in the country in the year 1997
preceding the birth of plaintiff Joanne Rodjin Diaz.
While it may also be argued that plaintiff Jinky had a
relationship with another man before she met the defendant,
there is no evidence that she also had sexual relations with
other men on or about the conception of Joanne Rodjin.
Joanne Rodjin was her second child (see Exh. "A"), so her
first child, a certain Nicole (according to defendant) must
have a different father or may be the son of Hasegawa
K[u]tsuo.
The defendant admitted having been the one who
shouldered the hospital bills representing the expenses in
connection with the birth of plaintiff. It is an evidence of
admission that he is the real father of plaintiff. Defendant
also admitted that even when he stopped going out with
Jinky, he and Jinky used to go to motels even after 1996.
Defendant also admitted that on some instances, he still
used to see Jinky after the birth of Joanne Rodjin. Defendant
was even the one who fetched Jinky after she gave birth to
Joanne.
The RTC finally held:
On the strength of this evidence, the Court finds that Joanne

Rodjin is the child of Jinky and defendant Rogelio Ong and it
is but just that the latter should support plaintiff.10
The only issue to be resolved is whether or not the

defendant is the father of the plaintiff Joanne Rodjin Diaz.
On 15 December 2000, the RTC rendered a decision and

disposed:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring
Joanne Rodjin Diaz to be the illegitimate child of defendant
Rogelio Ong with plaintiff Jinky Diaz. The Order of this Court
awarding support pendente lite dated June 15, 1999, is
hereby affirmed and that the support should continue until
Joanne Rodjin Diaz shall have reached majority age.11
in consultation with out laboratories and experts on the field

of DNA analysis, can possibly avail of such procedure with
whatever remaining DNA samples from the deceased
defendant alleged to be the putative father of plaintiff minor
whose illegitimate filiations is the subject of this action for
support.17
Rogelio filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied

for lack of merit in an Order of the trial court dated 19
January 2001.12 From the denial of his Motion for
Reconsideration, Rogelio appealed to the Court of Appeals.
After all the responsive pleadings had been filed, the case
was submitted for decision and ordered re-raffled to another
Justice for study and report as early as 12 July 2002.13
Hence, this petition which raises the following issues for

resolution:
During the pendency of the case with the Court of Appeals,

Rogelios counsel filed a manifestation informing the Court
that Rogelio died on 21 February 2005; hence, a Notice of
Substitution was filed by said counsel praying that Rogelio
be substituted in the case by the Estate of Rogelio
Ong,14 which motion was accordingly granted by the Court of
Appeals.15
In a Decision dated 23 November 2005, the Court of Appeals
held:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is
hereby GRANTED. The appealed Decision dated December
15, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac, Tarlac, Branch
63 in Civil Case No. 8799 is hereby SET ASIDE. The case is
hereby REMANDED to the court a quo for the issuance of an
order directing the parties to make arrangements for DNA
analysis for the purpose of determining the paternity of
plaintiff minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz, upon consultation and in
coordination with laboratories and experts on the field of
DNA analysis.
No pronouncement as to costs.16
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was
denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated 1
March 2006.
In disposing as it did, the Court of Appeals justified its
Decision as follows:
In this case, records showed that the late defendantappellant Rogelio G. Ong, in the early stage of the
proceedings volunteered and suggested that he and
plaintiffs mother submit themselves to a DNA or blood
testing to settle the issue of paternity, as a sign of good faith.
However, the trial court did not consider resorting to this
modern scientific procedure notwithstanding the repeated
denials of defendant that he is the biological father of the
plaintiff even as he admitted having actual sexual relations
with plaintiffs mother. We believe that DNA paternity testing,
as current jurisprudence affirms, would be the most reliable
and effective method of settling the present paternity dispute.
Considering, however, the untimely demise of defendantappellant during the pendency of this appeal, the trial court,
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
WHEN IT DID NOT DISMISS RESPONDENTS
COMPLAINT
FOR
COMPULSORY
RECOGNITION
DESPITE ITS
FINDING THAT THE EVIDENCE
PRESENTED FAILED TO PROVE THAT ROGELIO G. ONG
WAS HER FATHER.
II
WHEN IT DID NOT DECLARE RESPONDENT AS THE
LEGITIMATE CHILD OF JINKY C. DIAZ AND HER
JAPANESE
HUSBAND,
CONSIDERING
THAT
RESPONDENT FAILED TO REBUT THE PRESUMPTION
OF HER LEGITIMACY.
III
WHEN IT REMANDED THE CASE TO THE COURT A QUO
FOR DNA ANALYSIS DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT IS NO
LONGER FEASIBLE DUE TO THE DEATH OF ROGELIO G.
ONG.18
Petitioner prays that the present petition be given due course
and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated November
23, 2005 be modified, by setting aside the judgment
remanding the case to the trial court for DNA testing
analysis, by dismissing the complaint of minor Joanne for
compulsory recognition, and by declaring the minor as the
legitimate child of Jinky and Hasegawa Katsuo.19
From among the issues presented for our disposition, this
Court finds it prudent to concentrate its attention on the third
one, the propriety of the appellate courts decision remanding
the case to the trial court for the conduct of DNA testing.
Considering that a definitive result of the DNA testing will
decisively lay to rest the issue of the filiation of minor
Joanne, we see no reason to resolve the first two issues
raised by the petitioner as they will be rendered moot by the
result of the DNA testing.
As a whole, the present petition calls for the determination of
filiation of minor Joanne for purposes of support in favor of
the said minor.

Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate
paternity but also to secure a legal right associated with
paternity, such as citizenship, support (as in the present
case), or inheritance. The burden of proving paternity is on
the person who alleges that the putative father is the
biological father of the child. There are four significant
procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action which
parties have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative
defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical
resemblance between the putative father and child.20
A child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is
presumed legitimate.21 As a guaranty in favor of the child and
to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family
Code provides:
Article 167. The children shall be considered legitimate
although the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
The law requires that every reasonable presumption be
made in favor of legitimacy. We explained the rationale of
this rule in the recent case of Cabatania v. Court of
Appeals22:
The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a
declaration in the statute but is based on the broad principles
of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The
presumption is grounded on the policy to protect the
innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.
The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not
conclusive and consequently, may be overthrown by
evidence to the contrary. Hence, Article 255 of the New Civil
Code23 provides:
Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days
following the celebration of the marriage, and before three
hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of
the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.
Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other
than that of the physical impossibility of the husbands having
access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty
days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the
child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:
1) By the impotence of the husband;
2) By the fact that husband and wife were living separately in
such a way that access was not possible;
3) By the serious illness of the husband.24
The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as
follows:
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by

any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document
or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate
filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws.
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate
filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as
legitimate children.
There had been divergent and incongruent statements and
assertions bandied about by the parties to the present
petition. But with the advancement in the field of genetics,
and the availability of new technology, it can now be
determined with reasonable certainty whether Rogelio is the
biological father of the minor, through DNA testing.
DNA is the fundamental building block of a persons entire
genetic make-up. DNA is found in all human cells and is the
same in every cell of the same person. Genetic identity is
unique. Hence, a persons DNA profile can determine his
identity.25
DNA analysis is a procedure in which DNA extracted from a
biological sample obtained from an individual is examined.
The DNA is processed to generate a pattern, or a DNA
profile, for the individual from whom the sample is taken.
This DNA profile is unique for each person, except for
identical twins.
Everyone is born with a distinct genetic blueprint called DNA
(deoxyribonucleic acid). It is exclusive to an individual
(except in the rare occurrence of identical twins that share a
single, fertilized egg), and DNA is unchanging throughout
life. Being a component of every cell in the human body, the
DNA of an individuals blood is the very DNA in his or her
skin cells, hair follicles, muscles, semen, samples from
buccal swabs, saliva, or other body parts.
The chemical structure of DNA has four bases. They are
known as A (Adenine), G (guanine), C (cystosine) and T
(thymine). The order in which the four bases appear in an
individuals DNA determines his or her physical make up.
And since DNA is a double stranded molecule, it is
composed of two specific paired bases, A-T or T-A and G-C
or C-G. These are called "genes."

Every gene has a certain number of the above base pairs
distributed in a particular sequence. This gives a person his
or her genetic code. Somewhere in the DNA framework,
nonetheless, are sections that differ. They are known as
"polymorphic loci," which are the areas analyzed in DNA
typing (profiling, tests, fingerprinting). In other words, DNA
typing simply means determining the "polymorphic loci."
How is DNA typing performed? From a DNA sample
obtained or extracted, a molecular biologist may proceed to
analyze it in several ways. There are five (5) techniques to
conduct DNA typing. They are: the RFLP (restriction
fragment length polymorphism); "reverse dot blot" or HLA
DQ a/Pm loci which was used in 287 cases that were
admitted as evidence by 37 courts in the U.S. as of
November 1994; DNA process; VNTR (variable number
tandem repeats); and the most recent which is known as the
PCR-([polymerase] chain reaction) based STR (short
tandem repeats) method which, as of 1996, was availed of
by most forensic laboratories in the world. PCR is the
process of replicating or copying DNA in an evidence sample
a million times through repeated cycling of a reaction
involving the so-called DNA polymerize enzyme. STR, on the
other hand, takes measurements in 13 separate places and
can match two (2) samples with a reported theoretical error
rate of less than one (1) in a trillion.
Just like in fingerprint analysis, in DNA typing, "matches" are
determined. To illustrate, when DNA or fingerprint tests are
done to identify a suspect in a criminal case, the evidence
collected from the crime scene is compared with the "known"
print. If a substantial amount of the identifying features are
the same, the DNA or fingerprint is deemed to be a match.
But then, even if only one feature of the DNA or fingerprint is
different, it is deemed not to have come from the suspect.
As earlier stated, certain regions of human DNA show
variations between people. In each of these regions, a
person possesses two genetic types called "allele," one
inherited from each parent. In [a] paternity test, the forensic
scientist looks at a number of these variable regions in an
individual to produce a DNA profile. Comparing next the DNA
profiles of the mother and child, it is possible to determine
which half of the childs DNA was inherited from the mother.
The other half must have been inherited from the biological
father. The alleged fathers profile is then examined to
ascertain whether he has the DNA types in his profile, which
match the paternal types in the child. If the mans DNA types
do not match that of the child, the man is excluded as the
father. If the DNA types match, then he is not excluded as
the father.26
In the newly promulgated rules on DNA evidence it is
provided:
SEC. 3 Definition of Terms. For purposes of this Rule, the
following terms shall be defined as follows:
xxxx
(c) "DNA evidence" constitutes the totality of the DNA

profiles, results and other genetic information directly
generated from DNA testing of biological samples;
(d) "DNA profile" means genetic information derived from
DNA testing of a biological sample obtained from a person,
which biological sample is clearly identifiable as originating
from that person;
(e) "DNA testing" means verified and credible scientific
methods which include the extraction of DNA from biological
samples, the generation of DNA profiles and the comparison
of the information obtained from the DNA testing of biological
samples for the purpose of determining, with reasonable
certainty, whether or not the DNA obtained from two or more
distinct biological samples originates from the same person
(direct identification) or if the biological samples originate
from related persons (kinship analysis); and
(f) "Probability of Parentage" means the numerical
estimate for the likelihood of parentage of a putative
parent compared with the probability of a random
match of two unrelated individuals in a given
population.
Amidst the protestation of petitioner against the DNA
analysis, the resolution thereof may provide the definitive key
to the resolution of the issue of support for minor Joanne.
Our articulation in Agustin v. Court of Appeals27 is particularly
relevant, thus:
Our faith in DNA testing, however, was not quite so steadfast
in the previous decade. In Pe Lim v. Court of Appeals (336
Phil. 741, 270 SCRA 1), promulgated in 1997, we cautioned
against the use of DNA because "DNA, being a relatively
new science, (had) not as yet been accorded official
recognition by our courts. Paternity (would) still have to be
resolved by such conventional evidence as the relevant
incriminating acts,verbal and written, by the putative father."
In 2001, however, we opened the possibility of admitting
DNA as evidence of parentage, as enunciated inTijing v.
Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 125901, 8 March 2001, 354
SCRA 17]:
x x x Parentage will still be resolved using conventional
methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways
available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise
in using DNA test for identification and parentage testing.
The University of the Philippines Natural Science Research
Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the
capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat
(STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the
DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from the
mother and the other from the father. The DNA from the
mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed to establish
parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the
use of DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge.
Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not
hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it

was said, that courts should apply the results of science
when competently obtained in aid of situations presented,
since to reject said results is to deny progress.
issue after due hearing and notice to the parties upon a

showing of the following:
(a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;
The first real breakthrough of DNA as admissible and

authoritative evidence in Philippine jurisprudence came in
2002 with out en banc decision in People v. Vallejo [G.R. No.
144656, 9 May 2002, 382 SCRA 192] where the rape and
murder victims DNA samples from the bloodstained clothes
of the accused were admitted in evidence. We reasoned that
"the purpose of DNA testing (was) to ascertain whether an
association exist(ed) between the evidence sample and the
reference sample. The samples collected (were) subjected to
various chemical processes to establish their profile.
A year later, in People v. Janson [G.R. No. 125938, 4 April
2003, 400 SCRA 584], we acquitted the accused charged
with rape for lack of evidence because "doubts persist(ed) in
our mind as to who (were) the real malefactors. Yes, a
complex offense (had) been perpetrated but who (were) the
perpetrators? How we wish we had DNA or other scientific
evidence to still our doubts."
In 2004, in Tecson, et al. v. COMELEC [G.R. Nos. 161434,
161634 and 161824, 3 March 2004, 424 SCRA 277], where
the Court en banc was faced with the issue of filiation of then
presidential candidate Fernando Poe, Jr., we stated:
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to
satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA
testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body
cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the
long dead parent could be resorted to. A positive match
would clear up filiation or paternity. In Tijing v. Court of
Appeals, this Court has acknowledged the strong weight of
DNA testing...
Moreover, in our en banc decision in People v. Yatar [G.R.
No. 150224, 19 May 2004, 428 SCRA 504], we affirmed the
conviction of the accused for rape with homicide, the
principal evidence for which included DNA test results. x x x.
Coming now to the issue of remand of the case to the trial
court, petitioner questions the appropriateness of the order
by the Court of Appeals directing the remand of the case to
the RTC for DNA testing given that petitioner has already
died. Petitioner argues that a remand of the case to the RTC
for DNA analysis is no longer feasible due to the death of
Rogelio. To our mind, the alleged impossibility of complying
with the order of remand for purposes of DNA testing is more
ostensible than real. Petitioners argument is without basis
especially as the New Rules on DNA Evidence28 allows the
conduct of DNA testing, either motu proprio or upon
application of any person who has a legal interest in the
matter in litigation, thus:
SEC. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order. The
appropriate court may, at any time, either motu proprio or on
application of any person who has a legal interest in the
matter in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall
(b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to

the type of DNA testing now requested; or (ii) was previously
subjected to DNA testing, but the results may require
confirmation for good reasons;
(c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique;
(d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce
new information that is relevant to the proper resolution of
the case; and
(e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may
consider as potentially affecting the accuracy or integrity of
the DNA testing.
From the foregoing, it can be said that the death of the
petitioner does not ipso facto negate the application of DNA
testing for as long as there exist appropriate biological
samples of his DNA.
As defined above, the term "biological sample" means any
organic material originating from a persons body, even if
found in inanimate objects, that is susceptible to DNA
testing. This includes blood, saliva, and other body fluids,
tissues, hairs and bones.29
Thus, even if Rogelio already died, any of the biological
samples as enumerated above as may be available, may be
used for DNA testing. In this case, petitioner has not shown
the impossibility of obtaining an appropriate biological
sample that can be utilized for the conduct of DNA testing.
And even the death of Rogelio cannot bar the conduct of
DNA testing. In People v. Umanito,30 citing Tecson v.
Commission on Elections,31 this Court held:
The 2004 case of Tecson v. Commission on Elections [G.R.
No. 161434, 3 March 2004, 424 SCRA 277] likewise
reiterated the acceptance of DNA testing in our jurisdiction in
this wise: "[i]n case proof of filiation or paternity would be
unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to
obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained
from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical
residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to."
It is obvious to the Court that the determination of whether
appellant is the father of AAAs child, which may be
accomplished through DNA testing, is material to the fair and
correct adjudication of the instant appeal. Under Section 4 of
the Rules, the courts are authorized, after due hearing and
notice, motu proprio to order a DNA testing. However, while
this Court retains jurisdiction over the case at bar,
capacitated as it is to receive and act on the matter in
controversy, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and

does not, in the course of daily routine, conduct hearings.
Hence, it would be more appropriate that the case be
remanded to the RTC for reception of evidence in
appropriate hearings, with due notice to the parties.
(Emphasis supplied.)
As we have declared in the said case of Agustin v. Court of
Appeals32:
x x x [F]or too long, illegitimate children have been
marginalized by fathers who choose to deny their existence.
The growing sophistication of DNA testing technology finally
provides a much needed equalizer for such ostracized and
abandoned progeny. We have long believed in the merits of
DNA testing and have repeatedly expressed as much in the
past. This case comes at a perfect time when DNA testing
has finally evolved into a dependable and authoritative form
of evidence gathering. We therefore take this opportunity to
forcefully reiterate our stand that DNA testing is a valid
means of determining paternity.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of
merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23
November 2005 and its Resolution dated 1 March 2006
are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
PROOFS OF FILIATION
FERNANDEZ v. CA
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 108366 February 16, 1994

JOHN PAUL E. FERNANDEZ, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and CARLITO S.
FERNANDEZ, respondents.
Erlinda B. Espejo for petitioners.
C.B. Carbon & Associates for private respondent.
PUNO, J.:
The legal dispute between the parties began when the
petitioners filed Civil Case No. Q-45567 for support against
the private respondent before the RTC of Quezon City. The
complaint was dismissed on December 9, 1986 by Judge

Antonio P. Solano, 1 who found that "(t)here is nothing in the
material allegations in the complaint that seeks to compel
(private respondent) to recognize or acknowledge
(petitioners) as his illegitimate children," and that there was
no sufficient and competent evidence to prove the petitioners
filiation. 2
Petitioners plodded on. On February 19, 1987, they file the
case at bench, another action for recognition and support
against the private respondent before another branch of the
RTC of Quezon City, Branch 87. The case was docketed as
Civil Case No. Q-50111.
The evidence shows that VIOLETA P. ESGUERRA, single, is
the mother and guardian ad litem of the two petitioners,
CLARO ANTONIO FERNANDEZ and JOHN PAUL
FERNANDEZ, met sometime in 1983, at the Meralco
Compound tennis courts. A Meralco employee and a tennis
enthusiast, Carlito used to spend his week-ends regularly at
said courts, where Violeta's father served as tennis
instructor.
Violeta pointed to Carlito as the father of her two sons. She
claimed that they started their illicit sexual relationship six (6)
months after their first meeting. The tryst resulted in the birth
of petitioner Claro Antonio on March 1, 1984, and of
petitioner John Paul on not know that Carlito was married
until the birth of her two children. She averred they were
married in civil rites in October, 1983. In March, 1985,
however, she discovered that the marriage license which
they used was spurious.
To bolster their case, petitioners presented the following
documentary evidence: their certificates of live birth,
identifying respondent Carlito as their father; the baptismal
certificate of petitioner Claro which also states that his father
is respondent Carlito; photographs of Carlito taken during the
baptism of petitioner Claro; and pictures of respondent
Carlito and Claro taken at the home of Violeta Esguerra.
Petitioners likewise presented as witnesses, Rosario
Cantoria, 3 Dr. Milagros Villanueva, 4 Ruby Chua Cu, 5 and Fr.
Liberato Fernandez. 6 The first three witnesses told the trial
court
that
Violeta
Esguerra
had,
at
different
times, 7 introduced the private respondent to them as her
"husband". Fr. Fernandez, on the other hand, testified that
Carlito was the one who presented himself as the father of
petitioner Claro during the latter's baptism.
In defense, respondent Carlito denied Violeta's allegations
that he sired the two petitioners. He averred he only served
as one of the sponsors in the baptism of petitioner Claro.
This claim was corroborated by the testimony of Rodante
Pagtakhan, an officemate of respondent Carlito who also
stood as a sponsor of petitioner Claro during his baptism.
The Private respondent also presented as witness, Fidel
Arcagua, a waiter of the Lighthouse Restaurant. He disputed
Violeta's allegation that she and respondent Carlito
frequented the said restaurant during their affair. Arcagua

stated he never saw Violeta Esguerra and respondent Carlito
together at the said restaurant. Private respondent also
declared he only learned he was named in the birth
certificates of both petitioners as their father after he was
sued
for
support
in
Civil
Case
No.
Q-45567.
Based on the evidence adduced by the parties, the trial court
ruled in favor of petitioners, viz.:
In view of the above, the Court concludes and so holds that
the plaintiffs minors (petitioners herein) are entitled to the
relief's prayed for in the complaint. The defendant (herein
private respondent) is hereby ordered to recognize Claro
Antonio Carlito Fernandez, now aged 6, and John Paul
Fernandez, now aged 41/2 as his sons. As the defendant
has admitted that he has a supervisory job at the Meralco,
he shall give the plaintiffs support in the amount of P2,000
each a month, payment to be delivered to Violeta Esguerra,
the children's mother and natural guardian, with arrears
reckoned as of the filing of the complaint on February 19,
1987.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the decision was set aside and petitioners
complaint dismissed by the respondent Court of Appeals 8 in
its impugned decision, dated October 20, 1992. It found that
the "proof relied upon by the (trial) court (is) inadequate to
prove the (private respondent's) paternity and filiation of
(petitioners)." It further held that the doctrine of res
judicata applied because of the dismissal of the petitioners
complaint in Civil Case No. Q-45567. Petitioners' motion for
reconsideration was denied on December 22, 1992.
Petitioners now contend that the respondent appellate court
erred in: (1) not giving full faith and credit to the testimony in
of Violeta Esguerra; (2) not giving weight and value to the
testimony of Father Liberato Fernandez; (3) not giving
probative value to the numerous pictures of respondent
Carlito Fernandez taken during the baptismal ceremony and
inside the bedroom of Violeta Esguerra; (4) not giving
probative value to the birth certificates of petitioners; (5)
giving so much credence to the self-serving and incredible
testimony of respondent Carlito Fernandez; and (6) holding
that the principle of res judicata is applicable in the case at
bar.
We find no merit in the petition.
The rule is well-settled that findings of facts of the Court of
Appeals may be reviewed by this court only under
exceptional circumstances. One such situation is when the
findings of the appellate court clash with those of the trial
court as in the case at bench. It behooves us therefore to
exercise our extraordinary power, and settle the issue of
whether the ruling of the appellate court that private
respondent is not the father of the petitioners is
substantiated by the evidence on record.
We shall first examine the documentary evidence offered by

the petitioners which the respondent court rejected as
insufficient to prove their filiation. Firstly, we hold that
petitioners cannot rely on the photographs showing the
presence of the private respondent in the baptism of
petitioner Claro (Exh. "B-8", Exh. "B-12", Exh. "H" and Exh.
"I"). These photographs are far from proofs that private
respondent is the father of petitioner Claro. As explained by
the private respondent, he was in the baptism as one of the
sponsors of petitioner Claro. His testimony was corroborated
by Rodante Pagtakhan.
Secondly, the pictures taken in the house of Violeta showing
private respondent showering affection to Claro fall short of
the evidence required to prove paternity (Exhibits "B", "B-1",
"B-2", "B-7", "B-14" and "B-15"). As we held inTan vs.
Trocio, 192 SCRA 764, viz:
. . . The testimonies of complainant and witness Marilou
Pangandaman, another maid, to show unusual closeness
between Respondent and Jewel, like playing with him and
giving him paternity. The same must be said of . . . (the)
pictures of Jewels and Respondent showing allegedly their
physical likeness to each other. Said evidence is
inconclusive to prove paternity and much less would prove
violation of complaint's person and honor. (Emphasis
supplied)
Thirdly, the baptismal certificates (Exh. "D") of petitioner
Claro naming private respondent as his father has scant
evidentiary value. There is no showing that private
respondent participated in its preparation. On this score, we
held in Berciles vs. Systems, et al. 128 SCRA 53 (1984):
As to the baptismal certificates, Exh. "7-A", the rule is that
although the baptismal record of a natural child describes
her as a child of the record the decedent had no intervening,
the baptismal record cannot be held to be a voluntary
recognition of parentage. . . . The reason for this rule that
canonical records do not constitute the authentic document
prescribed by Arts. 115 and 117 to prove the legitimate
filiation of a child is that such canonical record is simply proof
of the only act to which the priest may certify by reason of his
personal knowledge, an act done by himself or in his
presence, like the administration of the sacrament upon a
day stated; it is no proof of the declarations in the record with
respect to the parentage of the child baptized, or of prior and
distinct facts which require separate and concrete evidence.
In Macandang vs. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 73 (1980),
we also ruled that while baptismal certificates may be
considered public documents, they can only serve as
evidence of the administration of the sacraments on the
dates so specified. They are not necessarily competent
evidence of the veracity of entries therein with respect to the
child's paternity.
Fourth, the certificates of live birth (Exh. "A"; Exh. "B") of the
petitioners identifying private respondent as their father are
not also competent evidence on the issue of their paternity.

Again, the records do no show that private respondent had a
hand in the preparation of said certificates. In rejecting these
certificates, the ruling of the respondent court is in accord
with our pronouncement in Roces vs. Local Civil
Registrar, 102 Phil. 1050 (1958), viz:
. . . Section 5 of Act No. 3793 and Article 280 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines explicity prohibited, not only the
naming of the father or the child born outside wedlock, when
the birth certificates, or the recognition, is not filed or made
by him, but, also, the statement of any information or
circumstances by which he could be identified. Accordingly,
the Local Civil Registrar had no authority to make or record
the paternity of an illegitimate child upon the information of a
third person and the certificate of birth of an illegitimate child,
when signed only by the mother of the latter, is incompetent
evidence of fathership of said child. (Emphasis supplied)
A I am sure.
(TSN, May 23, 1986, pp. 14-16)
However, on cross examination, Father Fernandez admitted
that he has to be shown a picture of the private respondent
by Violeta Esguerra to recognize the private respondent, viz:
Q When was the, approximately, when you were first shown
this picture by Violeta Esguerra?
A I cannot recall.
Q At least the month and the year?
A It must be in 1986.
We reiterated this rule in Berciles, op. cit., when we held that

"a birth certificate no signed by the alleged father therein
indicated is not competent evidence of paternity."
Q What month in 1986.
We have also reviewed the relevant testimonies of the

witnesses for the petitioners and we are satisfied that the
respondent appellate court properly calibrated their weight.
Petitioners capitalize on the testimony of Father Liberato
Fernandez who solemnized the baptismal ceremony of
petitioner Claro. He declared on the witness stand:
Q When was the first time you know you are going to testify
here?
Q Do you recall Father, whether on that occasion when you

called for the father and the mother of the child, that both
father and mother were present?
A It is difficult. . .
A Let us see, you came there two times and first one was
you want to get a baptismal certificate and then the second
time was I asked you for what is this? And you said it is for
the court.
Q On the second time that Ms. Violeta Esguerra went to your
place, you were already informed that you will testify here
before this Honorable Court?
A Yes.
A Yes.
Q Would you able to recognized the father and the mother
who were present at that time?
Q And you were informed by this Ms. Violeta Esguerra that

this man wearing the blue T-shirt is the father?
A Yes.
A Yes, sir.
Q Please point to the court?
Q So, it was Violeta Esguerra who. . .
A There (witness pointing to the defendant, Carlito
Fernandez).
Q For instance, just give us more specifically what question
do you remember having asked him?
A Yes, like for example, do you renounce Satan and his
works?
Q What was the answer of Fernandez?
A Yes, I do.
Q I just want to be sure, Father, will you please look at the
defendant again. I want to be sure if he is the person who
appeared before you on that occasion?
A Yes.
(TSN, May 23, 1986, pp. 18 to 22)
Indeed, there is no proof that Father Fernandez is a close
friend of Violeta Esguerra and the private respondent which
should render unquestionable his identification of the private
respondent during petitioner Claro's baptism. In the absence
of this proof, we are not prepared to concede that Father
Fernandez who officiates numerous baptismal ceremonies
day in and day out can remember the parents of the children
he has baptized.
We cannot also disturb the findings of the respondent court
on the credibility of Violeta Esguerra. Her testimony is highly

suspect as it is self-serving and by itself, is insufficient to
prove the paternity of the petitioners.
We shall not pass upon the correctness of the ruling of the
respondent appellate court applying the doctrine of res
judicata as additional reason in dismissing petitioners action
for recognition and support. It is unnecessary considering
our findings that petitioners evidence failed to substantiate
their cause of action.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DISMISSED and the
Decision of the respondent court in CA-G.R. CV No. 29182
is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
FERNANDEZ v. FERNANDEZ
THIRD DIVISION
[G. R. No. 143256. August 28, 2001]
RODOLFO FERNANDEZ and MERCEDES CARANTO

FERNANDEZ, HUSBAND and WIFE, EDDIE C.
FERNANDEZ
and
LUZ
FERNANDEZ,
SPOUSES,petitioners, vs. ROMEO FERNANDEZ,
POTENCIANO
FERNANDEZ,
FRANCISCO
FERNANDEZ, JULITA FERNANDEZ, WILLIAM
FERNANDEZ, MARY FERNANDEZ, ALEJANDRO
FERNANDEZ,
GERARDO
FERNANDEZ,
RODOLFO
FERNANDEZ
and
GREGORIO
FERNANDEZ, respondents.
DECISION
being childless by the death of their son, purchased from a

certain Miliang for P20.00 a one (1) month baby boy. The
boy being referred to was later on identified as Rodolfo
Fernandez, the herein appellant. Appellant was taken care
of by the couple and was sent to school and became a
dental technician. He lived with the couple until they became
old and disabled.
On July 20, 1982, Jose K. Fernandez died thereby leaving
his wife Generosa A. de Venecia and Rodolfo Fernandez
and an estate consisting of the following:
(a) A parcel of land (Lot 9132, before Lot No. 444-C, of the
Cadastral Survey of Dagupan, Cadastral Case No. 41,
G.L.R.O. Cadastral Record No. 925), situated in the Barrio of
Pantal, City of Dagupan. Bounded on the NE. by Lot No.
447; on the SE. by Lot No. 9134; on the SW. by the Arellano
Street; and on the NW. by Lot No. 9131. Containing an area
of One Hundred Ninety Four (194) square meters, more or
less. Covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 525 (T9267) Pangasinan Registry of Deeds.
(b) A two (2) storey residential building made of concrete
and wood, G.I. roofing with a floor area of 154 square meters
and 126 square meters of the first and second floor,
respectively. Declared under Tax Decl. No. 22-592-1 and
assessed therein at P26,000.00.
On August 31, 1989, appellant and Generosa de Venecia
executed a Deed of Extra-judicial Partition dividing and
allocating to themselves the following:
To: Generosa de Venecia Vda. De Fernandez
(a)
119.5 sq. m. located on the southwestern portion of
the land;
(b)
Whole residential house above-mentioned;
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
To: Rodolfo V. Fernandez
Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing

the decision[1] of the respondent Court of Appeals dated
December 22, 1999 affirming the decision [2] of the Regional
Trial Court Branch 40, Dagupan City in an action for nullity of
contracts, partition, recovery of possession and damages in
favor of plaintiffs-appellees, herein respondents.
74.5 square meters to be taken on the northeastern portion

of the land.
The facts as found by the respondent Court of Appeals,

are as follows:[3]
The late Spouses Dr. Jose K. Fernandez, and Generosa A.
de Venecia were the registered owners of a parcel of land
located at Dagupan City covered by TCT No. T-9267 (525)
consisting of 194 sq. meters, and the two-storey building
constructed thereon covered by Tax Declaration 22-592-1. It
is undisputed that Generosa gave birth to a baby boy named
Rogelio who died when he was only twelve (12) years old as
paralytic. In the testimony of Romeo Fernandez (TSN, Aug.
31, 1994, pp. 9-14) it was revealed that the late Spouses
On the same day, Generosa de Venecia executed a Deed of

Absolute Sale in favor of Eddie Fernandez, appellants son
over the following:
A portion of One Hundred Nineteen and One-Half (119.5)
Square meters including the building and/or all existing
thereon to be taken from the southwestern portion of the
parcel of land described as follows, to wit:
A parcel of land (Lot No. 9132, before Lot No. 444-C, of the
Cadastral Survey of Dagupan, Cadastral Case No. 41,
G.L.R.O. Cadastral Record No. 925), situated in the Barrio
of Pantal, City of Dagupan. Bounded on the NE. by Lot No.
447; on the SE by Lot No. 9134; on the SW. by the Arellano
Street; and on the NW. by Lot No. 9131. Containing an area
of One Hundred and Ninety-Four (194), Square Meters,

more or less, covered by TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF
TITLE NO. 525 (T-9267) Pangasinan Registry of Deeds
(Exh. 8, Exhibits for the Defendants)
After learning the transaction, Romeo, Potenciano,
Francisco, Julita, William, Mary, Alejandro, Gerardo, Rodolfo
and Gregorio, all surnamed Fernandez, being nephews and
nieces of the deceased Jose K. Fernandez, their father
Genaro being a brother of Jose, filed on September 21,
1994, an action to declare the Extra-Judicial Partition of
Estate and Deed of Sale void ab initio (docketed as Civil
Case No. 94-00016-D).
The complaint alleged that defendants (herein appellants),
motivated by unmitigated greed, deliberate and malicious
acts of depriving the plaintiff and other heirs (herein
appellees) of the deceased spouses, without basis of
heirship or any iota of rights to succession or inheritance,
taking advantage of the total physical and mental incapacity
of the deceased Generosa de Venecia aggravated by
unlawful scheme confederated, colluded and conspired with
each other in causing the fake, simulated grossly inauthentic
contracts purporting to be executed on August 31, 1989 and
jointly on the same date, caused the execution of the deed of
absolute sale purportedly signed by Generosa de Venecia
covering the same property described in the deed of extrajudicial partition and by virtue of the said acts, appellants
were able to secure new land titles in their favor (Records,
pp. 3-4, Complaint). Appellees thus prayed that the Deed of
Extra-judicial Partition, Deed of Absolute Sale and Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 54641 be declared void from the
beginning.
Significantly, in their answer, defendants alleged:
16. That the deceased Sps. Jose K. Fernandez and
Generosa were husband and wife blessed with one child the
herein defendant Rodolfo V. Fernandez whom they
acknowledged during their lifetime. (underscoring supplied)
18. That the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Deed of
Absolute Sale executed by the late Generosa de Venecia
and defendant Rodolfo V. Fernandez which are now in
question were all made with the full knowledge, consent and
approval of the parties thereto and for value. (Records, pp.
20-21, Answer).
On May 10, 1996, the Regional Trial Court rendered a
decision in favor of the plaintiffs, the dispositive portion
reads:[4]
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
plaintiffs and against the defendants;
1. Declaring the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition
dated August 31, 1989 (Exh. 3), the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated August 31, 1989 (Exh.
8), the TCT No. 54641, and the TCT No.
54693 null and void;
2. Ordering the defendants to reconvey to, and to

peacefully surrender to the plaintiffs the
possession of the house and lot in question;
3. Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally
to pay to plaintiffs the following:
(a) P50,000.00 as compensatory damages;
(b) P100,000.00 as moral damages;
(c) P20,000.00 as attorneys fees; and
(d) P2,000.00 as litigation costs.
SO ORDERED.
In so ruling, the trial court found that defendant Rodolfo
Fernandez was not a legitimate nor a legally adopted child of
spouses Dr. Jose Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia
Fernandez, hence Rodolfo could not inherit from the
spouses. Rodolfos claim as a son of the deceased spouses
Fernandez was negated by the fact that (1) he only reached
high school and was told to stop studying so that he could
help in the clinic of Dr. Fernandez, (2) he failed to present
any birth certificate, (3) the book entitled Fercolla clan which
was compiled and edited by respected people such as
Ambassador Armando Fernandez, Justice Jorge Coquia and
Teresita Coquia-Sison, showed the geneology of the family
of Dr. Jose and Generosa Fernandez without a child; a
pedigree may be admitted in evidence to prove the facts of
genealogy and that entries in a family bible or other family
books or charts, engravings or rings, family portraits and the
like, may be received as evidence of pedigree, [5] (4) the
certification issued by the Records Management and
Archives Office that there was no available information about
the birth of petitioner Rodolfo to the spouses Fernandez, (5)
the application of Dr. Jose Fernandez for backpay certificate
naming petitioner Rodolfo as his son was doubtful
considering that there were blemishes or alteration in the
original copy; (6) that Rodolfos baptismal certificate was
spurious and falsified since there were no available records
of baptism with the parish from June 7, 1930 to August 8,
1936, while Rodolfos baptismal certificate which was issued
in 1989 showed that he was baptized on November 24,
1934. The court found that the extra-judicial partition and the
deed of absolute sale were prepared and executed under
abnormal, unusual and irregular circumstances which
rendered the documents null and void.
Defendants Rodolfo Fernandez et. al appealed to the
respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial courts
judgment in its assailed decision dated December 22, 1999.
In resolving the appeal, the respondent court delved
into the legitimacy of defendant-appellant Rodolfo
Fernandez filiation with the deceased spouses. It found that
appellants evidence which consisted of a certificate of
baptism stating that he was a child of the spouses
Fernandez and the application for recognition of rights to
back pay under RA 897 filed by Dr. Jose Fernandez, wherein
the latter referred to Rodolfo as his son, did not acquire
evidentiary weight to prove his filiation. The appellate court
concluded that while baptismal certificates may be

considered public documents, they were evidence only to
prove the administration of the sacraments on the dates
therein specified, but not the veracity of the statements or
declarations made therein with respect to his kinsfolk; that
while the application for back pay was a public document, it
was not executed to admit the filiation of Jose K. Fernandez
with Rodolfo V. Fernandez, the herein appellant; that the
public document contemplated in Article 172 of the Family
Code referred to the written admission of filiation embodied
in a public document purposely executed as an admission of
filiation and not as obtaining in this case wherein the public
document was executed as an application for the recognition
of rights to back pay under Republic Act No. 897. Appellants
Rodolfo Fernandez et al filed their motion for reconsideration
which was denied in a resolution dated May 17, 2000.[6]
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE

TRIAL COURTS FINDING THAT THE PETITIONER
RODOLFO FERNANDEZ WAS NOT THE CHILD OF
SPOUSES DR. JOSE K. FERNANDEZ AND GENEROSA
DE VENECIA BECAUSE
(a) THE
FILIATION
OF
PETITIONER
RODOLFO
FERNANDEZ
COULD
NOT
BE
COLLATERALLY
ATTACKED IN AN ACTION FOR DECLARATION OF
NULLITY OF DOCUMENTS, PARTITION, RECOVERY OF
POSSESSION AND DAMAGES, AND;
Rodolfo Fernandez et al filed the instant petition for

review with the following issues:
(b) THE DECISION AS AFFIRMED BY THE COURT OF

APPEALS DID NOT DECLARE IN THE DISPOSITIVE
PORTION THEREOF THAT PETITIONER RODOLFO
FERNANDEZ IS NOT THE CHILD OF SPOUSES DR. JOSE
FERNANDEZ AND GENEROSA FERNANDEZ.
IV

JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT ORDERING THE
DEFENDANTS, PETITIONERS HEREIN, TO RECONVEY
TO, AND PEACEFULLY SURRENDER TO THE
PLAINTIFFS,
RESPONDENTS
HEREIN,
THE
POSSESSION OF THE HOUSE AND LOT IN QUESTION
BECAUSE THE SAID ORDER IS PALPABLY CONTRARY
TO
THE
ADMITTED
FACTS
THE
LAW
AND
JURISPRUDENCE, FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

AWARD OF DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS FEES TO THE
RESPONDENTS, THERE BEING NO FACTUAL BASIS IN
THE AFFIRMED DECISION TO JUSTIFY SUCH AWARD.
(a) THE HOUSE AND LOT IN QUESTION ARE ADMITTED

BY THE PARTIES TO BE CONJUGAL PROPERTIES OF
THE SPOUSES DR. JOSE K. FERNANDEZ AND
GENEROSA DE VENECIA, AND
(b) RESPONDENTS, WHO ARE NOT RELATED TO
GENEROSA DE VENECIA BY CONSANGUINITY, ARE NOT
HER INTESTATE HEIRS AND CANNOT SUCCEED AB
INTESTATO TO HER INTESTATE ESTATE.
II
The principal issue for resolution in this case concerns

the rights of the parties to the conjugal property of the
deceased spouses Fernandez.
Petitioners allege that the respondent court found the
extra-judicial partition executed by petitioner Rodolfo
Fernandez and Generosa Fernandez, widow of Dr. Jose
Fernandez, null and void because the former allegedly failed
to prove legitimate filiation to his putative father, the late Dr.
Jose Fernandez. Petitioners, contend, however, that the
burden of proof lies with the respondents because they were
the ones contesting the filiation of Rodolfo Fernandez. They
insist that both lower courts had no power to pass upon the
matter of filiation because it could not be collaterally
attacked in the present action but in a separate and
independent action directly impugning such filiation.
We are not persuaded.

JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT DECLARING (1) THE
DEED OF EXTRA-JUDICIAL PARTITION DATED AUGUST
31, 1989 (EXH. 3), THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE ALSO
DATED AUGUST 31, 1989 (EXH. 8), TCT NO. 54641, AND
TCT NO. 54693 NULL AND VOID FOR THE FOLLOWING
REASONS:
(a) IT HAS NO FACTUAL BASIS DULY ESTABLISHED BY
THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD, AND
(b) RESPONDENTS, NOT BEING PARTIES TO THE
QUESTIONED DEEDS, HAVE NO PERSONALITY TO
CONTEST THE VALIDITY OF SAID DOCUMENTS.
III
It must be noted that the respondents principal action

was for the declaration of absolute nullity of two documents,
namely: deed of extra-judicial partition and deed of absolute
sale, and not an action to impugn ones legitimacy. The
respondent court ruled on the filiation of petitioner Rodolfo
Fernandez in order to determine Rodolfos right to the deed
of extra-judicial partition as the alleged legitimate heir of the
spouses Fernandez. While we are aware that ones
legitimacy can be questioned only in a direct action
seasonably filed by the proper party, this doctrine has no
application in the instant case considering that respondents
claim was that petitioner Rodolfo was not born to the
deceased spouses Jose and Generosa Fernandez; we do
not have a situation wherein they (respondents) deny that
Rodolfo was a child of their uncles wife. The case of
Benitez-Badua vs. Court of Appeals,[7] which has a similar
factual backdrop is instructive:

A careful reading of the above articles[8] will show that they
do not contemplate a situation, like in the instant case, where
a child is alleged not to be the child of nature or biological
child of a certain couple. Rather, these articles govern a
situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a
child of his wife. Thus, under Article 166, it is the husband
who can impugn the legitimacy of said child by proving: (1) it
was physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse,
with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which
case at bench is not where the heirs of the late Vicente are
contending that petitioner is not his child by Isabel. Rather,
their clear submission is that petitioner was not born to
Vicente
and
Isabel.
Our
ruling
in
CabatbatLim vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 166 SCRA 451, 457
cited in the impugned decision is apropos, viz:
Petitioners recourse to Art. 263 of the New Civil Code (now
Art. 170 of the Family Code) is not well taken. This legal
provision refers to an action to impugn legitimacy. It is
but that she is not the decedents child at all. Being neither
legally adopted child, nor an acknowledged natural child, nor
a child by legal fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not
a legal heir of the deceased.
Thus, it is necessary to pass upon the relationship of
petitioner Rodolfo Fernandez to the deceased spouses
Fernandez for the purpose of determining what legal right
Rodolfo has in the property subject of the extra-judicial
partition. In fact, the issue of whether or not Rodolfo
Fernandez was the son of the deceased spouses Jose
Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia was squarely raised
by petitioners in their pre-trial brief [9] filed before the trial
court, hence they are now estopped from assailing the trial
courts ruling on Rodolfos status.
We agree with the respondent court when it found that
petitioner Rodolfo failed to prove his filiation with the
deceased spouses Fernandez. Such is a factual issue which
has been thoroughly passed upon and settled both by the
trial court and the appellate court. Factual findings of the
Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and not
reviewable by this Court and they carry even more
weight[10] when the Court of Appeals affirms the factual
findings of the trial court. [11] We accordingly find no cogent
reason to disagree with the respondent courts evaluation of

the evidence presented, thus:[12]
The Records Management and Archives Office is bereft of
any records of the birth of appellant Rodolfo Fernandez. On
October 11, 1995, it issued a certification worded as follows:
This is to certify that the Register of Births for the
Municipality of Dagupan, Pangasinan in the year 1984 is
not on file with the National Archives, hence, there is no
available information about the birth of Rodolfo V. Fernandez
alleged to have been born on November 24, 1934 to the
spouses Jose K. Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia in
Dagupan, Pangasinan (Records, p. 146)
Appellant nonetheless, contends that the Application for
Recognition of Back Pay Rights Under Act No. 897 is a
public document and a conclusive proof of the legitimate
filiation between him and the deceased spouses (Rollo, p.
41, Appellants Brief). We do not agree.
It may be conceded that the Application for Recognition of
Back Pay Rights Under Act No. 897 is a public document
nevertheless, it was not executed to admit the filiation of
Jose K. Fernandez with Rodolfo V. Fernandez, the herein
appellant. The public document contemplated in Article 172
of the Family Code refer to the written admission of filiation
embodied in a public document purposely executed as an
admission of filiation and not as obtaining in this case
wherein the public document was executed as an application
for the recognition of rights to back pay under Republic Act
No. 897. Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence provides:
Sec. 32. Public documents as evidence Documents
consisting of entries in public records made in the
performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie
evidence of the facts therein stated. All other public
documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the
fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the
latter.
The rule is not absolute in the sense that the contents of a
public document are conclusive evidence against the
contracting parties as to the truthfulness of the statements
made therein. They constitute only prima facie evidence of
the facts which give rise to their execution and of the date of
the latter. Thus, a baptismal certificate issued by a
Spanish priest under the Spanish regime constitutes prima
facie evidence of the facts certified to by the parish priest
from his own knowledge such as the administration of the
sacrament on the day and in the place and manner set forth
in the certificate; but it does not constitute proof of the
statements made therein concerning the parentage of the
person baptized (Francisco, Evidence, 1994 ed., p. 516,
citing Garcia vs. Gajul, 53 Phil. 642; Adriano vs. de Jesus, 23
Phil. 350; Buan vs. Arquiza, 5 Phil. 193; Siguion vs. Siguion,
8 Phil. 7). Public documents are perfect evidence of the fact
which give rise to their execution and of the date of the latter
if the act which the officer witnessed and certified to or the

date written by him are not shown to be false; but they are
not conclusive evidence with respect to the truthfulness of
the statements made therein by the interested parties
(Martin, Rules of Court in the Philippines with Note and
Comments, vol. 4, p. 577).
Corollarily, the Application for Recognition of Back Pay
Rights Under Act No. 897 is only a proof that Jose K.
Fernandez filed said application on June 5, 1954 in Dagupan
City but it does not prove the veracity of the declaration and
statement contained in the said application that concern the
relationship of the applicant with herein appellant. In like
manner, it is not a conclusive proof of the filiation of appellant
with his alleged father, Jose K. Fernandez the contents
being, only prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
Additionally, appellant claims that he enjoyed and possessed
the status of being a legitimate child of the spouses
openly and continuously until they died (Rollo, p. 42;
Appellants Brief). Open and continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child is meant the enjoyment by the
child of the position and privileges usually attached to the
status of a legitimate child such as bearing the paternal
surname, treatment by the parents and family of the child as
legitimate, constant attendance to the childs support and
education, and giving the child the reputation of being a child
of his parents (Sempio-Diy, The Family Code of the
Philippines, pp. 245-246). However, it must be noted that, as
was held in Quismundo vs. WCC, 132 SCRA 590,
possession of status of a child does not in itself constitute
an acknowledgment; it is only a ground for a child to compel
recognition by his assumed parent.
Lastly, to substantiate his claim of being a legitimate child
appellant presented a baptismal certificate issued by Fr.
Rene Mendoza of the St. John Metropolitan Cathedral of
Dagupan City on August 10, 1989 stating therein that
appellant is a child of the late spouses having been born on
November 15, 1934 and baptized on November 24, 1934
(Exh. "1 Exhibits for the Defendants). As stated, while
baptismal certificates may be considered public documents,
they are evidence only to prove the administration of the
sacraments on the dates therein specified, but not the
veracity of the statements or declarations made therein with
respect to his kinsfolk (Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 135
SCRA 439). It may be argued that a baptismal certificate is
one of the other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws of proving filiation but in this case, the
authenticity of the baptismal certificate was doubtful when Fr.
Raymundo Q. de Guzman of St. John the Evangelist Parish
of Lingayen-Dagupan, Dagupan City issued a certification on
October 16, 1995 attesting that the records of baptism on
June 7, 1930 to August 8, 1936 were all damaged (Records,
p. 148, Exh. G). Neither the family portrait offered in
evidence establishes a sufficient proof of filiation Pictures do
not constitute proof of filiation (Reyes vs. Court of Appeals)
(supra). In fine, the evidence presented by appellant did not
acquire
evidentiary
weight
to
prove
his
filiation. Consequently the Extra-Judicial Partition dated
August 31, 1989 executed by appellant Rodolfo Fernandez
and Generosa de Venecia is null and void.
Considering the foregoing findings, petitioner Rodolfo

is not a child by nature of the spouses Fernandez and not a
legal heir of Dr. Jose Fernandez , thus the subject deed of
extra-judicial settlement of the estate of Dr. Jose
Fernandez between Generosa vda. de Fernandez and
Rodolfo is null and void insofar as Rodolfo is
concerned[13] pursuant to Art.1105 of the New Civil Code
which states:
A partition which includes a person believed to be an heir,
but who is not, shall be void only with respect to such
person.
Petitioners next contend that respondents admitted that
the property in question was the conjugal property of the late
spouses Dr. Jose Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia, thus
when Dr. Jose Fernandez died intestate in 1982, his estate
consisted solely of pro indiviso of the conjugal property
and the other half belonged to his wife Generosa de
Venecia; that granting Dr. Jose Fernandez was only
survived by his wife, the respondents nephews and nieces of
Dr. Jose are entitled to inherit the share of the decedents
estate while the share of the conjugal property will still
belong to Generosa as the widow of Dr. Jose Fernandez,
hence the trial courts order reconveying the possession of
the subject lot and building to respondents was contrary to
the admitted facts and law since respondents are not related
by consanguinity to Generosa vda de Fernandez.
We agree.
Article 1001 of the Civil Code provides:
Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the
widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one half of
the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children
to the other half.
Generosa was the widow of Dr. Jose Fernandez and as
provided in the above-quoted Article 1001, she is entitled to
the of the inheritance and the respondents to the other .
In effect, pro indiviso is the share of Generosa as the
surviving spouse, i.e., as her share of the conjugal
property estate and of the remaining as share as heir
from her husbands estate. Thus, we find well taken the
petitioners assertion that the annulment of the extra-judicial
partition between Generosa and petitioner Rodolfo does not
necessarily result in respondents having exclusive right to
the conjugal property, as erroneously found by the
respondent court. Generosa, during her lifetime, had the
right to enjoy and dispose of her property without other
limitations than those established by law,[14] which right she
exercised by executing a deed of sale in favor of petitioner
Eddie Fernandez.
Petitioners assails respondents right, not being heirs of
Generosa, to question the validity of the deed of sale since
the action for the annulment of contracts may only be
instituted by all who are thereby obliged principally or
subsidiarily.[15]
We disagree.

As a rule, a contract cannot be assailed by one who is
not a party obliged principally or subsidiarily under a
contract. However, when a contract prejudices the rights of a
third person, he may exercise an action for nullity of the
contract if he is prejudiced in his rights with respect to one of
the contracting parties, and can show detriment which would
positively result to him from the contract in which he had no
intervention.[16] As we have discussed above, respondents
are entitled to the of the entire conjugal property, ie., lot
and building; however considering that widow Generosa,
during her lifetime , sold the entire building to petitioner
Eddie Fernandez, respondents had been deprived of their
share therein, thus the deed of sale was prejudicial to the
interest of respondents as regards their share in the
building. Respondents therefore, have a cause of action to
seek the annulment of said deed of sale.
Petitioners further allege that the respondent court
erred in declaring null and void the deed of sale executed
between Generosa and petitioner Eddie Fernandez
concluding that the same was simulated or false and in
affirming the trial courts findings that the deed was prepared
and executed under abnormal, unusual and irregular
circumstances without however, particularly stating the
circumstances.
We agree.
Respondents allege that the deed of sale was fictitious
and simulated because there was no consideration for the
sale. However, this assertion was controverted by vendee
petitioner Eddie Fernandez declaration, that the money he
paid for the sale came from his savings as overseas contract
worker in Saudi Arabia from 1982-1989 which respondents
failed to controvert by presenting evidence to the contrary.
The presumption that a contract has sufficient consideration
cannot be overthrown by a mere assertion that it has no
consideration.[17] Under Art. 1354 of the Civil Code,
consideration is presumed unless the contrary is proven.
Respondents also claim that the signature appearing in
the deed of sale was not that of Generosa because she was
already bedridden with both legs amputated before she
died. Forgery cannot be presumed; it must be proved by
clear, positive and convincing evidence[18] and whoever
alleges it has the burden of proving the same; [19] a burden
respondents failed to discharge. The respondents had not
presented any convincing proof to override the evidentiary
value of the duly notarized deed of sale. A notarial document
is evidence of the facts in the clear unequivocal manner
therein expressed. It has in its favor the presumption of
regularity. To contradict all these, there must be evidence
that is clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant.
co-owner of the share of the building together with the

respondents who owned the share therein.[21]
Finally, anent the issue of actual and moral damages
and attorneys fees awarded by the trial court, we find them
to be bereft of factual basis. A party is entitled to an
adequate compensation for such pecuniary loss actually
suffered by him as he has duly proven.[22] Such damages, to
be recoverable, must not only be capable of proof, but must
actually be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty.
[23]
Courts cannot simply rely on speculation, conjecture or
guesswork in determining the fact and amount of damages.
[24]
The testimony of respondent Romeo Fernandez that he
suffered around P100,000 actual damages was not
supported by any documentary or other admissible evidence.
We also agree with the petitioners that the respondent court
should not have awarded moral damages in the amount of
P100,000 since they also failed to show proof of moral
suffering, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings and social humiliation.
Attorneys fees should likewise be deleted for lack of factual
basis and legal justification. Both the lower courts did not cite
specific factual basis to justify the award of attorneys fees,
which is in violation of the proscription against the imposition
of a penalty on the right to litigate.[25]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed
judgment is hereby Affirmed with Modification, as follows:
1. Respondents as legitimate heirs of Dr. Jose Fernandez
are entitled to the share of the conjugal lot and building of
the deceased spouses Jose and Generosa Fernandez who
died childless and intestate;
2. The deed of extra-judicial partition is nullified insofar as
the share of petitioner Rodolfo in the conjugal lot
is concerned and the title issued pursuant thereto in the
name of Rodolfo Fernandez;
3. Considering that the deed of sale is valid insofar as the
share of Generosa sold to petitioner Eddie Fernandez, TCT
No. 54693 is cancelled and a new title should be issued in
the names of petitioner Eddie Fernandez and respondents
as co-owners of the and shares respectively in the
conjugal building.
4. The awards of actual and moral damages and attorneys
fees are deleted.
SO ORDERED.
[20]
We note however, that Generosa sold the entire 2

storey building to petitioner Eddie Fernandez, i.e. she did
not only sell her undivided share in the building but also
the share of the respondents. We rule, that such a sale of
the entire building without the consent of the respondents is
not null and void as only the rights of the co-owner seller are
transferred, thereby making the buyer, petitioner Eddie , a
LABAGALA v. SANTIAGO

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 132305. December 4, 2001]
IDA
C.
LABAGALA, petitioner, vs. NICOLASA T.

SANTIAGO, AMANDA T. SANTIAGO and HON.
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul the
decision dated March 4, 1997,[1] of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 32817, which reversed and set aside the
judgment dated October 17, 1990,[2] of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 54, in Civil Case No. 87-41515,
finding herein petitioner to be the owner of 1/3 pro
indiviso share in a parcel of land.
The pertinent facts of the case, as borne by the
records, are as follows:
Jose T. Santiago owned a parcel of land covered by
TCT No. 64729, located in Rizal Avenue Extension, Sta.
Cruz, Manila. Alleging that Jose had fraudulently registered
it in his name alone, his sisters Nicolasa and Amanda (now
respondents herein), sued Jose for recovery of 2/3 share of
the property.[3] On April 20, 1981, the trial court in that case
decided in favor of the sisters, recognizing their right of
ownership over portions of the property covered by TCT No.
64729. The Register of Deeds of Manila was required to
include the names of Nicolasa and Amanda in the certificate
of title to said property.[4]
Jose died intestate on February 6, 1984. On August 5,
1987, respondents filed a complaint for recovery of title,
ownership, and possession against herein petitioner, Ida C.
Labagala, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, to
recover from her the 1/3 portion of said property pertaining to
Jose but which came into petitioners sole possession upon
Joses death.
Respondents alleged that Joses share in the property
belongs to them by operation of law, because they are the
only legal heirs of their brother, who died intestate and
without issue. They claimed that the purported sale of the
property made by their brother to petitioner sometime in
March
1979[5] was
executed
through
petitioners
machinations and with malicious intent, to enable her to
secure the corresponding transfer certificate of title (TCT No.
172334[6]) in petitioners name alone.[7]
Respondents insisted that the deed of sale was a
forgery. The deed showed that Jose affixed his thumbmark
thereon but respondents averred that, having been able to
graduate from college, Jose never put his thumbmark on
documents he executed but always signed his name in
full. They claimed that Jose could not have sold the property
belonging to his poor and unschooled sisters who

sacrificed
for
his
studies
and
personal
welfare.[8] Respondents also pointed out that it is highly
improbable for petitioner to have paid the supposed
consideration of P150,000 for the sale of the subject property
because petitioner was unemployed and without any visible
means of livelihood at the time of the alleged sale. They
also stressed that it was quite unusual and questionable that
petitioner registered the deed of sale only on January 26,
1987, or almost eight years after the execution of the sale.[9]
On the other hand, petitioner claimed that her true
name is not Ida C. Labagala as claimed by respondent but
Ida C. Santiago. She claimed not to know any person by the
name of Ida C. Labagala. She claimed to be the daughter of
Jose and thus entitled to his share in the subject
property. She maintained that she had always stayed on the
property, ever since she was a child. She argued that the
purported sale of the property was in fact a donation to her,
and that nothing could have precluded Jose from putting his
thumbmark on the deed of sale instead of his signature. She
pointed out that during his lifetime, Jose never
acknowledged respondents claim over the property such
that respondents had to sue to claim portions thereof. She
lamented that respondents had to disclaim her in their desire
to obtain ownership of the whole property.
Petitioner revealed that respondents had in 1985 filed
two ejectment cases against her and other occupants of the
property. The first was decided in her and the other
defendants favor, while the second was dismissed. Yet
respondents persisted and resorted to the present action.
Petitioner recognized respondents ownership of 2/3 of
the property as decreed by the RTC. But she averred that
she caused the issuance of a title in her name alone,
allegedly after respondents refused to take steps that would
prevent the property from being sold by public auction for
their failure to pay realty taxes thereon. She added that with
a title issued in her name she could avail of a realty tax
amnesty.
On October 17, 1990, the trial court ruled in favor of
petitioner, decreeing thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered recognizing the
plaintiffs [herein respondents] as being entitled to the
ownership and possession each of one-third (1/3) pro
indiviso share of the property originally covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 64729, in the name of Jose T.
Santiago and presently covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 172334, in the name of herein defendant [herein
petitioner] and which is located at No. 3075-A Rizal Avenue
Extension, Sta. Cruz, Manila, as per complaint, and the
adjudication to plaintiffs per decision in Civil Case No. 56226
of this Court, Branch VI, and the remaining one-third
(1/3) pro indiviso share adjudicated in said decision to
defendant Jose T. Santiago in said case, is hereby adjudged
and adjudicated to herein defendant as owner and entitled to
possession of said share. The Court does not see fit to
adjudge damages, attorneys fees and costs. Upon finality of
this judgment, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 172334 is
ordered cancelled and a new title issued in the names of the

two (2) plaintiffs and the defendant as owners in equal
shares, and the Register of Deeds of Manila is so directed to
effect the same upon payment of the proper fees by the
parties herein.
SO ORDERED.[10]
According to the trial court, while there was indeed no
consideration for the deed of sale executed by Jose in favor
of petitioner, said deed constitutes a valid donation. Even if
it were not, petitioner would still be entitled to Joses 1/3
portion of the property as Joses daughter. The trial court
ruled that the following evidence shows petitioner to be the
daughter of Jose: (1) the decisions in the two ejectment
cases filed by respondents which stated that petitioner is
Joses daughter, and (2) Joses income tax return which
listed petitioner as his daughter. It further said that
respondents knew of petitioners existence and her being the
daughter of Jose, per records of the earlier ejectment cases
they filed against petitioner. According to the court,
respondents were not candid with the court in refusing to
recognize petitioner as Ida C. Santiago and insisting that she
was Ida C. Labagala, thus affecting their credibility.
Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
reversed the decision of the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and
one is entered declaring the appellants Nicolasa and
Amanda Santiago the co-owners in equal shares of the onethird (1/3) pro indiviso share of the late Jose Santiago in the
land and building covered by TCT No. 172334. Accordingly,
the Register of Deeds of Manila is directed to cancel said
title and issue in its place a new one reflecting this decision.
SO ORDERED.
Apart from respondents testimonies, the appellate
court noted that the birth certificate of Ida Labagala
presented by respondents showed that Ida was born of
different parents, not Jose and his wife. It also took into
account the statement made by Jose in Civil Case No.
56226 that he did not have any child.
Hence, the present petition wherein the following
issues are raised for consideration:
1. Whether or not petitioner has adduced preponderant
evidence to prove that she is the daughter of the late Jose T.
Santiago, and
2. Whether or not respondents could still impugn the
filiation of the petitioner as the daughter of the late Jose T.
Santiago.
Petitioner contends that the trial court was correct in
ruling that she had adduced sufficient evidence to prove her
filiation by Jose Santiago, making her his sole heir and thus
entitled to inherit his 1/3 portion. She points out that
respondents had, before the filing of the instant case,
previously considered[11] her as the daughter of Jose who,
during his lifetime, openly regarded her as his legitimate
daughter. She asserts that her identification as Joses

daughter in his ITR outweighs the strange answers he gave
when he testified in Civil Case No. 56226.
Petitioner asserts further that respondents cannot
impugn her filiation collaterally, citing the case of Sayson v.
Court of Appeals[12] in which we held that (t)he legitimacy of
(a) child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for
that purpose, by the proper parties and within the period
limited by law.[13] Petitioner also cites Article 263 of the Civil
Code in support of this contention.[14]
For their part, respondents contend that petitioner is not
the daughter of Jose, per her birth certificate that indicate her
parents as Leo Labagala and Cornelia Cabrigas, instead of
Jose Santiago and Esperanza Cabrigas.[15] They argue that
the provisions of Article 263 of the Civil Code do not apply to
the present case since this is not an action impugning a
childs legitimacy but one for recovery of title, ownership, and
possession of property.
The issues for resolution in this case, to our mind, are
(1) whether or not respondents may impugn petitioners
filiation in this action for recovery of title and possession; and
(2) whether or not petitioner is entitled to Joses 1/3 portion
of the property he co-owned with respondents, through
succession, sale, or donation.
On the first issue, we find petitioners reliance on Article
263 of the Civil Code to be misplaced. Said article provides:
Art. 263. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child
shall be brought within one year from the recording of the
birth in the Civil Register, if the husband should be in the
same place, or in a proper case, any of his heirs.
If he or his heirs are absent, the period shall be eighteen
months if they should reside in the Philippines; and two
years if abroad. If the birth of the child has been concealed,
the term shall be counted from the discovery of the fraud.
This article should be read in conjunction with the other
articles in the same chapter on paternity and filiation in the
Civil Code. A careful reading of said chapter would reveal
that it contemplates situations where a doubt exists that a
child is indeed a mans child by his wife, and the husband
(or, in proper cases, his heirs) denies the childs filiation. It
does not refer to situations where a child is alleged not to be
the child at all of a particular couple.[16]
Article 263 refers to an action to impugn
the legitimacy of a child, to assert and prove that a person is
not a mans child by his wife. However, the present case is
not one impugning petitioners legitimacy. Respondents are
asserting not merely that petitioner is not a legitimate child of
Jose, but that she is not a child of Jose at all. [17] Moreover,
the present action is one for recovery of title and possession,
and thus outside the scope of Article 263 on prescriptive
periods.
Petitioners
reliance
on Sayson is
likewise
improper. The factual milieu present in Sayson does not
obtain in the instant case. What was being challenged by

petitioners in Sayson was (1) the validity of the adoption of
Delia and Edmundo by the deceased Teodoro and Isabel
Sayson, and (2) the legitimate status of Doribel
Sayson. While asserting that Delia and Edmundo could not
have been validly adopted since Doribel had already been
born to the Sayson couple at the time, petitioners at the
same time made the conflicting claim that Doribel was not
the child of the couple. The Court ruled in that case that it
was too late to question the decree of adoption that became
final years before. Besides, such a challenge to the validity
of the adoption cannot be made collaterally but in a direct
proceeding.[18]
In this case, respondents are not assailing petitioners
legitimate status but are, instead, asserting that she is not at
all their brothers child. The birth certificate presented by
respondents support this allegation.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that::
The Certificate of Record of Birth (Exhibit H) [19] plainly states
that Ida was the child of the spouses Leon Labagala and
[Cornelia] Cabrigas. This document states that it was Leon
Labagala who made the report to the Local Civil Registrar
and therefore the supplier of the entries in said
Certificate. Therefore, this certificate is proof of the filiation
of Ida. Appellee however denies that Exhibit H is her Birth
Certificate. She insists that she is not Ida Labagala but Ida
Santiago. If Exhibit H is not her birth certificate, then where
is hers? She did not present any though it would have been
the easiest thing to do considering that according to her
baptismal certificate she was born in Manila in 1969. This
court rejects such denials and holds that Exhibit H is the
certificate of the record of birth of appellee Ida
Against such evidence, the appellee Ida could only present
her testimony and a baptismal certificate (Exhibit 12) stating
that appellees parents were Jose Santiago and Esperanza
Cabrigas. But then, a decisional rule in evidence states that
a baptismal certificate is not a proof of the parentage of the
baptized person. This document can only prove the identity
of the baptized, the date and place of her baptism, the
identities of the baptismal sponsors and the priest who
administered the sacrament -- nothing more.[20] (Citations
omitted.)
At the pre-trial conducted on August 11, 1988,
petitioners counsel admitted that petitioner did not have a
birth certificate indicating that she is Ida Santiago, though
she had been using this name all her life.[21]
Petitioner opted not to present her birth certificate to
prove her relationship with Jose and instead offered in
evidence her baptismal certificate.[22] However, as we held
in Heirs of Pedro Cabais v. Court of Appeals:
a baptismal certificate is evidence only to prove the
administration of the sacrament on the dates therein
specified, but not the veracity of the declarations therein
stated with respect to [a persons] kinsfolk. The same is
conclusive only of the baptism administered, according to the
rites of the Catholic Church, by the priest who baptized
subject child, but it does not prove the veracity of the

declarations and statements contained in the certificate
concerning the relationship of the person baptized.[23]
A baptismal certificate, a private document, is not
conclusive proof of filiation.[24] More so are the entries made
in an income tax return, which only shows that income tax
has been paid and the amount thereof.[25]
We note that the trial court had asked petitioner to
secure a copy of her birth certificate but petitioner, without
advancing any reason therefor, failed to do so. Neither did
petitioner obtain a certification that no record of her birth
could be found in the civil registry, if such were the case. We
find petitioners silence concerning the absence of her birth
certificate telling. It raises doubt as to the existence of a
birth certificate that would show petitioner to be the daughter
of Jose Santiago and Esperanza Cabrigas. Her failure to
show her birth certificate would raise the presumption that if
such evidence were presented, it would be adverse to her
claim. Petitioners counsel argued that petitioner had been
using Santiago all her life. However, use of a family name
certainly does not establish pedigree.
Further, we note that petitioner, who claims to be Ida
Santiago, has the same birthdate as Ida Labagala.[26] The
similarity is too uncanny to be a mere coincidence.
During her testimony before the trial court, petitioner
denied knowing Cornelia Cabrigas, who was listed as the
mother in the birth certificate of Ida Labagala. In her petition
before this Court, however, she stated that Cornelia is the
sister of her mother, Esperanza. It appears that petitioner
made conflicting statements that affect her credibility and
could cast a long shadow of doubt on her claims of filiation.
Thus, we are constrained to agree with the factual
finding of the Court of Appeals that petitioner is in reality the
child of Leon Labagala and Cornelia Cabrigas, and contrary
to her averment, not of Jose Santiago and Esperanza
Cabrigas. Not being a child of Jose, it follows that petitioner
can not inherit from him through intestate succession. It now
remains to be seen whether the property in dispute was
validly transferred to petitioner through sale or donation.
On the validity of the purported deed of sale, however,
we agree with the Court of Appeals that:
This deed is shot through and through with so many
intrinsic defects that a reasonable mind is inevitably led to
the conclusion that it is fake. The intrinsic defects are
extractable from the following questions: a) If Jose Santiago
intended to donate the properties in question to Ida, what
was the big idea of hiding the nature of the contract in the
faade of the sale? b) If the deed is a genuine document,
how could it have happened that Jose Santiago who was of
course fully aware that he owned only 1/3 pro indiviso of the
properties covered by his title sold or donated the whole
properties to Ida? c) Why in heavens name did Jose
Santiago, a college graduate, who always signed his name
in documents requiring his signature (citation omitted) [affix]
his thumbmark on this deed of sale? d) If Ida was [the] child
of Jose Santiago, what was the sense of the latter donating

his properties to her when she would inherit them anyway
upon his death? e) Why did Jose Santiago affix his
thumbmark to a deed which falsely stated that: he was
single (for he was earlier married to Esperanza Cabrigas);
Ida was of legal age (for [s]he was then just 15 years old);
and the subject properties were free from liens and
encumbrances (for Entry No. 27261, Notice of Adverse
Claim and Entry No. 6388, Notice of Lis Pendens were
already annotated in the title of said properties). If the deed
was executed in 1979, how come it surfaced only in 1984
after the death of Jose Santiago and of all people, the one in
possession was the baptismal sponsor of Ida?[27]
Clearly, there is no valid sale in this case. Jose did not
have the right to transfer ownership of the entire property to
petitioner since 2/3 thereof belonged to his sisters.
[28]
Petitioner could not have given her consent to the
contract, being a minor at the time.[29] Consent of the
contracting parties is among the essential requisites of a
contract,[30] including one of sale, absent which there can be
no valid contract. Moreover, petitioner admittedly did not pay
any centavo for the property,[31] which makes the sale
void. Article 1471 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1471. If the price is simulated, the sale is void, but the
act may be shown to have been in reality a donation, or
some other act or contract.
Neither may the purported deed of sale be a valid deed
of donation. Again, as explained by the Court of Appeals:
Even assuming that the deed is genuine, it cannot be a
valid donation. It lacks the acceptance of the donee required
by Art. 725 of the Civil Code. Being a minor in 1979, the
acceptance of the donation should have been made by her
father, Leon Labagala or [her] mother Cornelia Cabrigas or
her legal representative pursuant to Art. 741 of the same
Code. No one of those mentioned in the law - in fact no one
at all - accepted the donation for Ida.[32]
In sum, we find no reversible error attributable to the
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals, hence it must be
upheld.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 32817 is
AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 146737. December 10, 2001]
In the matter of the intestate estate of the late JUAN

"JHONNY" LOCSIN, SR., LUCY A. SOLINAP
(Daughter of the late Maria Locsin Araneta), the
successors of the late LOURDES C. LOCSIN,
MANUEL
C.
LOCSIN,
ESTER
LOCSIN
JARANTILLA and the intestate estate of the late
JOSE C. LOCSIN, JR., petitioners, vs. JUAN C.
LOCSIN, JR., respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
A Certificate of Live Birth duly recorded in the Local
Civil Registry, a copy of which is transmitted to the Civil
Registry General pursuant to the Civil Registry Law, is prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated. However, if there
are material discrepancies between them, the one entered in
the Civil Registry General prevails.
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking
the reversal of the September 13, 2000 Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 57708 which affirmed in
toto the September 13, 1996 order of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 30, of Iloilo City in Special Proceeding No.
4742. The September 13 order of the trial court appointed
Juan E. Locsin, Jr., respondent, as the sole administrator of
the Intestate Estate of the late Juan "Jhonny" Locsin, Sr.
Records show that on November 11, 1991, or eleven
(11) months after Juan "Jhonny" Locsin, Sr.[1] died intestate
on December 11, 1990, respondent Juan E. Locsin, Jr. filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 30, a
"Petition for Letters of Administration" (docketed as Special
Proceeding No. 4742) praying that he be appointed
Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the deceased. He
alleged, among others, (a) that he is an acknowledged
natural child of the late Juan C. Locsin; (b) that during his
lifetime, the deceased owned personal properties which
include undetermined savings, current and time deposits
with various banks, and 1/6 portion of the undivided mass of
real properties owned by him and his siblings, namely: Jose
Locsin, Jr., Manuel Locsin, Maria Locsin Yulo, Lourdes
Locsin and Ester Locsin; and (c) that he is the only surviving
legal heir of the decedent.
On November 13, 1991, the trial court issued an order
setting the petition for hearing on January 13, 1992, which
order was duly published,[2] thereby giving notice to all
persons who may have opposition to the said petition.
LOCSIN v. LOCSIN, JR.

THIRD DIVISION
Before the scheduled hearing, or on January 10, 1992,

the heirs of Jose Locsin, Jr., the heirs of Maria Locsin,
Manuel Locsin and Ester Jarantilla, claiming to be the lawful
heirs of the deceased, filed an opposition to respondents
petition for letters of administration. They averred that
respondent is not a child or an acknowledged natural child of

the late Juan C. Locsin, who during his lifetime, never affixed
"Sr." in his name .
On January 5, 1993, another opposition to the petition
was filed by Lucy Salinop (sole heir of the late Maria Locsin
Vda. De Araneta, sister of the deceased), Manuel Locsin and
the successors of the late Lourdes C. Locsin alleging that
respondent's claim as a natural child is barred by
prescription or the statute of limitations.
The Intestate Estate of the late Jose Locsin, Jr. (brother
of the deceased) also entered its appearance in the estate
proceedings, joining the earlier oppositors. This was
followed by an appearance and opposition dated January 26,
1993 of Ester Locsin Jarantilla (another sister of Juan C.
Locsin), likewise stating that there is no filial relationship
between herein respondent and the deceased.
Thereupon, the trial court conducted hearings.
To support his claim that he is an acknowledged natural
child of the deceased and, therefore, entitled to be appointed
administrator of the intestate estate, respondent submitted a
machine copy (marked as Exhibit "D") [3] of his Certificate of
Live Birth No. 477 found in the bound volume of birth records
in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City. Exhibit
"D" contains the information that respondent's father is Juan
C. Locsin, Sr. and that he was the informant of the facts
stated therein, as evidenced by his signatures (Exhibit "D-2"
and "D-3"). To prove the existence and authenticity of
Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 from which Exhibit "D" was
machine copied, respondent presented Rosita J. Vencer, the
Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City. She produced and
identified in court the bound volume of 1957 records of birth
where the alleged original of Certificate of Live Birth No. 477
is included.
Respondent also offered in evidence a photograph
(Exhibit "C")[4] showing him and his mother, Amparo
Escamilla, in front of a coffin bearing Juan C. Locsin's dead
body. The photograph, respondent claims, shows that he
and his mother have been recognized as family members of
the deceased.
In their oppositions, petitioners claimed that Certificate
of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") is spurious. They
submitted a certified true copy of Certificate of Live Birth No.
477 found in the Civil Registrar General, Metro Manila,
marked as Exhibit "8",[5] indicating that the birth of
respondent was reported by his mother, Amparo Escamilla,
and that the same does not contain the signature of the late
Juan C. Locsin. They observed as anomalous the fact that
while respondent was born on October 22, 1956 and his birth
was recorded on January 30, 1957, however, his Certificate
of Live Birth No. 447 (Exhibit "D") was recorded on
a December 1, 1958 revised form. Upon the other hand,
Exhibit "8" appears on a July, 1956 form, already used
before respondent's birth. This scenario clearly suggests
that Exhibit "D" was falsified. Petitioners presented as
witness, Col. Pedro L. Elvas, a handwriting expert. He
testified that the signatures of Juan C. Locsin and Emilio G.
Tomesa (then Civil Registrar of Iloilo City) appearing in
Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") are
forgeries. He thus concluded that the said Certificate is a

spurious document surreptitiously inserted into the bound
volume of birth records of the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo
City.
After hearing, th trial court, finding that Certificate of
Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") and the photograph (Exhibit
"C") are sufficient proofs of respondent's illegitimate filiation
with the deceased, issued on September 13, 1996 an order,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this PETITION is
hereby GRANTED and the petitioner Juan E. Locsin, Jr. is
hereby appointed Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the
late Juan Johnny Locsin, Sr.
"Let Letters of Administration be issued in his favor, upon his
filing of a bond in the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P50,000.00) to be approved by this Court.
"SO ORDERED.[6]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered the
challenged Decision affirming in toto the order of the trial
court dated September 13, 1996. Petitioners moved for a
reconsideration, while respondent filed a motion for
execution pending appeal. Both motions were, however,
denied by the Appellate Court in its Resolution dated
January 10, 2001.
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari by
petitioners.
The focal issue for our resolution is which of the two
documents - Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D")
and Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "8") is genuine.
The rule that factual findings of the trial court, adopted
and confirmed by the Court of Appeals, are final and
conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal [7] does not
apply when there appears in the record of the case some
facts or circumstances of weight and influence which have
been overlooked, or the significance of which have been
misinterpreted, that if considered, would affect the result of
the case.[8] Here, the trial court failed to appreciate facts and
circumstances that would have altered its conclusion.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays
down the persons preferred who are entitled to the issuance
of letters of administration, thus:
Section 6.
When and to whom letters of
administration granted. If no executor is named in the
will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the
trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate,
administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be,
or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to
such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of
kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to
serve;

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or
next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent
or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin,
neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of a person to
apply for administration or to request that administration be
granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or
more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to
serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve,
it may be granted to such other person as the court may
select. (Emphasis ours)
Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides
that a petition for letters of administration must be filed by an
interested person, thus:
Sec.2 Contents of petition for letters of administration.
A petition for letters of administration must be filed by
an interested person and must show, so far as known to
the petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts; x x x" (Emphasis ours)
An "interested party", in estate proceedings, is one who
would be benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or one who
has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor.[9] Also, in
estate proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to those
whose relationship with the decedent is such that they are
entitled to share in the estate as distributees.[10] In Gabriel v.
Court of Appeals,[11] this Court held that in the appointment of
the administrator of the estate of a deceased person, the
principal consideration reckoned with is the interest in said
estate of the one to be appointed administrator.
Here, undisputed is the fact that the deceased, Juan C.
Locsin, was not survived by a spouse. In his petition for
issuance of letters of administration, respondent alleged that
he is an acknowledged natural son of the deceased,
implying that he is an interested person in the estate and is
considered as next of kin. But has respondent established
that he is an acknowledged natural son of the deceased? On
this point, this Court, through Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, held:
"The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate
children, is established by (1) the record of birth appearing
in the civil register or a final judgement; or (2) an admission
of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall be
proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed
by the Rules of Court and special laws. The due recognition
of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement
before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in
itself, a consummated act of acknowledgement of the child,
and no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic
writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory
recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not
require a separate action for judicial approval. Where,
instead, a claim for recognition is predicated on other

evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a
record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or
an authentic writing, judicial action within the applicable
statute of limitations is essential in order to establish the
child's acknowledgment."[12] (Emphasis ours)
Here, respondent, in order to establish his filiation with
the deceased, presented to the trial court his Certificate of
Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") and a photograph (Exhibit
"C") taken during the burial of the deceased.
Regarding the genuineness and probative value of
Exhibit "D", the trial court made the following findings,
affirmed by the Appellate Court:
"It was duly established in Court that the Certificate of Live
Birth No. 477 in the name of Juan E. Locsin, Jr., the original
having been testified to by Rosita Vencer, exists in the files
of the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo. Petitioner since birth
enjoyed the open and continuous status of an acknowledged
natural child of Juan C. Locsin, Sr., he together with his
mother was summoned to attend to the burial as evidenced
by a picture of relatives facing the coffin of the deceased with
petitioner and his mother in the picture. x x x. It was duly
proven at the trial that the standard signatures presented by
oppositors were not in public document and may also be
called questioned document whereas in the certificate of live
birth No. 477, the signature of Juan C. Locsin, Sr. was the
original or primary evidence. The anomalous and suspicious
characteristic of the bound volume where the certificate of
live birth as alleged by oppositors was found was testified to
and explained by Rosita Vencer of the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar that they run out of forms in 1957 and
requisitioned forms. However, the forms sent to them was
the 1958 revised form and that she said their office usually
paste the pages of the bound volume if destroyed. All the
doubts regarding the authenticity and genuineness of the
signatures of Juan C. Locsin, Sr. and Emilio Tomesa, and the
suspicious circumstances of the bound volume were erased
due to the explanation of Rosita Vencer."
This Court cannot subscribe to the above findings.
Pursuant to Section 12 of Act 3753 (An Act to Establish
a Civil Register), the records of births from all cities and
municipalities in the Philippines are officially and regularly
forwarded to the Civil Registrar General in Metro Manila by
the Local Civil Registrars. Since the records of births cover
several decades and come from all parts of the country, to
merely access them in the Civil Registry General requires
expertise. To locate one single birth record from the mass, a
regular employee, if not more, has to be engaged. It is
highly unlikely that any of these employees in Metro Manila
would have reason to falsify a particular 1957 birth record
originating from the Local Civil Registry of Iloilo City.
With respect to Local Civil Registries, access thereto by
interested parties is obviously easier. Thus, in proving the
authenticity of Exhibit "D," more convincing evidence than
those considered by the trial court should have been
presented by respondent.

The trial court held that the doubts respecting the
genuine nature of Exhibit "D" are dispelled by the testimony
of Rosita Vencer, Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City.
The event about which she testified on March 7, 1994
was the record of respondent's birth which took place on
October 22, 1956, on 37 or 38 years ago. The Local Civil
Registrar of Iloilo City at that time was Emilio G.
Tomesa. Necessarily, Vencer's knowledge of respondent's
birth record allegedly made and entered in the Local Civil
Registry in January, 1957 was based merely on her general
impressions of the existing records in that Office.
When entries in the Certificate of Live Birth recorded in
the Local Civil Registry vary from those appearing in the
copy transmitted to the Civil Registry General, pursuant to
the Civil Registry Law, the variance has to be clarified in
more persuasive and rational manner. In this regard, we
find Vencer's explanation not convincing.
Respondent's Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit
"D") was recorded in a December 1, 1958 revised
form. Asked how a 1958 form could be used in 1957 when
respondent's birth was recorded, Vencer answered that "xxx
during that time, maybe the forms in 1956 were already
exhausted so the former Civil Registrar had requested for a
new form and they sent us the 1958 Revised Form."[13]
The answer is a "maybe", a mere supposition of an
event. It does not satisfactorily explain how a Revised Form
dated December 1, 1958 could have been used on
January 30, 1957 or almost (2) years earlier.
Upon the other hand, Exhibit "8" of the petitioners
found in the Civil Registrar General in Metro Manila is on
Municipal Form No. 102, revised in July, 1956. We find no
irregularity here. Indeed, it is logical to assume that the
1956 forms would continue to be used several years
thereafter. But for a 1958 form to be used in 1957 is
unlikely.
There are other indications of irregularity relative to
Exhibit "D." The back cover of the 1957 bound volume in the
Local Civil Registry of Iloilo is torn. Exhibit "D" is merely
pasted with the bound volume, not sewn like the other
entries.
The documents bound into one volume are original
copies. Exhibit "D" is a carbon copy of the alleged original
and sticks out like a sore thumb because the entries therein
are typewritten, while the records of all other certificates are
handwritten. Unlike the contents of those other certificates,
Exhibit "D" does not indicate important particulars, such as
the alleged father's religion, race, occupation, address and
business. The space which calls for an entry of the
legitimacy of the child is blank. On the back page of Exhibit
"D", there is a purported signature of the alleged father, but
the blanks calling for the date and other details of his
Residence Certificate were not filled up.
When asked to explain the torn back cover of the
bound volume, Vencer had no answer except to state, "I am
not aware of this because I am not a bookbinder." As to why
Exhibit "D" was not sewn or bound into the volume, she
explained as follows:
"COURT:
I will butt in. Are these instances where your employees
would only paste a document like this Certificate of Live
Birth?
WITNESS:
Yes, Your Honor, we are pasting some of the leaves just to
replace the record. Sometimes we just have it pasted in the
record when the leaves were taken.
ATTY. TIROL:
You mean to say you allow the leaves of the bound volume
to be taken out?
A: No sir. It is because sometimes the leaves are
detached so we have to paste them."[14] (Emphasis ours)
There is no explanation why out of so many certificates,
this vital document, Exhibit "D", was merely pasted with the
volume.
Vencer's testimony suffers from infirmities. Far from
explaining the anomalous circumstances surrounding Exhibit
"D", she actually highlighted the suspicious circumstances
surrounding its existence.
The records of the instant case adequately support a
finding that Exhibit "8" for the petitioners, not respondent's
Exhibit "D", should have been given more faith and credence
by the courts below.
The Civil Registry Law requires, inter alia, the Local
Civil Registrar to send copies of registrable certificates and
documents presented to them for entry to the Civil Registrar
General, thus:
Duties of Local Civil Registrar. Local civil registrars
shall (a) file registrable certificates and documents
presented to them for entry; (b) compile the same monthly
and prepare and send any information required of them by
the Civil-Registrar; (c) issue certified transcripts or copies of
any document registered upon payment of proper fees; (d)
order the binding, properly classified, of all certificates or
documents registered during the year; (e) send to the Civil
Registrar-General, during the first ten days of each
month, a copy of the entries made during the preceding
month, for filing; (f) index the same to facilitate search and
identification in case any information is required; and (g)
administer oaths, free of charge, for civil register
purposes"[15] (Emphasis ours)
In light of the above provisions, a copy of the document
sent by the Local Civil Registrar to the Civil Registrar
General should be identical in form and in substance with the
copy being kept by the latter. In the instant case, Exhibit "8",

as transmitted to the Civil Registrar General is not identical
with Exhibit "D" as appearing in the records of the Local Civil
Registrar of Iloilo City. Such circumstance should have
aroused the suspicion of both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals and should have impelled them to declare Exhibit
"D" a spurious document.
Exhibit "8" shows that respondent's record of birth was
made by his mother. In the same Exhibit "8", the signature
and name of Juan C. Locsin listed as respondent's father
and the entry that he and Amparo Escamilla were married in
Oton, Iloilo on November 28, 1954 do not appear.
In this connection, we echo this Court's pronouncement
in Roces vs. Local Civil Registrar[16] that:
Section 5 of Act No. 3753 and Article 280 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines x x x explicitly prohibit, not only the naming
of the father of the child born out of wedlock, when the birth
certificate, or the recognition, is not filed or made by
him, but also, the statement of any information or
circumstances by which he could be identified. Accordingly,
the Local Civil Registrar had no authority to make or record
the paternity of an illegitimate child upon the information of a
third person and the certificate of birth of an illegitimate
child, when signed only by the mother of the latter, is
incompetent evidence of fathership of said child.
(Emphasis ours)
The Roces ruling regarding illegitimate filiation is further
elucidated in Fernandez vs. Court of Appeals [17] where this
Court said that "a birth certificate not signed by the alleged
father (who had no hand in its preparation) is not competent
evidence of paternity."
A birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence
prescribed by both the Civil Code and Article 172 of the
Family Code
for purposes
of
recognition
and
filiation. However, birth certificate offers onlyprima
facie evidence of filiation and may be refuted by contrary
evidence.[18] Its evidentiary worth cannot be sustained where
there exists strong, complete and conclusive proof of its
falsity or nullity. In this case, respondent's Certificate of Live
Birth No. 477 entered in the records of the Local Civil
Registry (from which Exhibit "D" was machine copied) has all
the badges of nullity. Without doubt, the authentic copy on
file in that office was removed and substituted with a falsified
Certificate of Live Birth.
At this point, it bears stressing the provision of Section
23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court that
"(d)ocuments consisting of entries in public records made in
the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated." In this case, the
glaring discrepancies between the two Certificates of Live
Birth (Exhibits "D" and "8") have overturned the genuineness
of Exhibit "D" entered in the Local Civil Registry. What is
authentic is Exhibit "8" recorded in the Civil Registry General.
Incidentally, respondent's photograph with his mother
near the coffin of the late Juan C. Locsin cannot and will not
constitute proof of filiation,[19] lest we recklessly set a very
dangerous precedent that would encourage and sanction
fraudulent claims. Anybody can have a picture taken while

standing before a coffin with others and thereafter utilize it in
claiming the estate of the deceased.
Respondent Juan E. Locsin, Jr. failed to prove his
filiation with the late Juan C. Locsin, Sr.. His Certificate of
Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") is spurious. Indeed,
respondent is not an interested person within the meaning
of Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court entitled
to the issuance of letters of administration.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The
challenged Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. No. 57708 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Respondent's petition for issuance of letters of
administration is ORDERED DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
BERNABE v. ALEJO
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 140500. January 21, 2002]
ERNESTINA BERNABE, petitioner, vs. CAROLINA ALEJO
as guardian ad litem for the minor ADRIAN
BERNABE, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The right to seek recognition granted by the Civil Code
to illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the
Family Code took effect cannot be impaired or taken away.
The minors have up to four years from attaining majority age
within which to file an action for recognition.
Statement of the Case
Before us is a Petition[1] for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying for (1) the nullification
of the July 7, 1999 Court of Appeals[2] (CA) Decision[3] in CAGR CV No. 51919 and the October 14, 1999 CA
Resolution[4] denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration,
as well as (2) the reinstatement of the two Orders issued by
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City (Branch 109)
concerning the same case. The dispositive portion of the
assailed Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the order of the lower
court dismissing Civil Case No. 94-0562 is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Let the records of this case be remanded to the
lower court for trial on the merits.[5]
The Facts
The undisputed facts are summarized by the Court of
Appeals in this wise:

The late Fiscal Ernesto A. Bernabe allegedly fathered a son
with his secretary of twenty-three (23) years, herein plaintiffappellant Carolina Alejo. The son was born on September
18,
1981 and
was
named
Adrian Bernabe.
Fiscal Bernabe died on August 13, 1993, while his wife
Rosalina died on December 3 of the same year, leaving
Ernestina as the sole surviving heir.
On May 16, 1994, Carolina, in behalf of Adrian, filed the
aforesaid complaint praying that Adrian be declared an
acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe and as such
he (Adrian) be given his share in Fiscal Bernabes estate,
which is now being held by Ernestina as the sole surviving
heir.
On July 16, 1995, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the
complaint, ruling that under the provisions of the Family
Code as well as the case of Uyguangco vs. Court of
Appeals, the complaint is now barred xx x.[6]
Orders of the Trial Court
In an Order dated July 26, 1995, the trial court granted
Ernestina Bernabes Motion for Reconsideration of the trial
courts Decision and ordered the dismissal of the Complaint
for recognition. Citing Article 175 of the Family Code, the
RTC held that the death of the putative father had barred the
action.
In its Order dated October 6, 1995, the trial court added
that since the putative father had not acknowledged or
recognized Adrian Bernabe in writing, the action for
recognition should have been filed during the lifetime of the
alleged father to give him the opportunity to either affirm or
deny the childs filiation.
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals ruled that in
the interest of justice, Adrian should be allowed to prove that
he was the illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe. Because the
boy was born in 1981, his rights are governed by Article 285
of the Civil Code, which allows an action for recognition to be
filed within four years after the child has attained the age of
majority. The subsequent enactment of the Family Code did
not take away that right.
after the putative fathers death in the absence of any written

acknowledgment of paternity by the latter.
II
Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in
ruling that respondents had four years from the attainment of
minority to file an action for recognition as provided in Art.
285 of the Civil Code, in complete disregard of its repeal by
the [express] provisions of the Family Code and the
applicable jurisprudence as held by the Honorable Court of
Appeals.
III
Whether or not the petition for certiorari filed by the
petition[er] is fatally defective for failure to implead the Court
of Appeals as one of the respondents.[9]
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
First and Second Issues: Period to File Action for
Recognition
Because the first and the second
interrelated, we shall discuss them jointly.
issues
are
Petitioner contends that respondent is barred from filing

an action for recognition, because Article 285 of the Civil
Code has been supplanted by the provisions of the Family
Code. She argues that the latter Code should be given
retroactive effect, since no vested right would be impaired.
We do not agree.
Article 285 of the Civil Code provides the period for
filing an action for recognition as follows:
ART. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children
may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed
parents, except in the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the
child, in which case the latter may file the action before the
expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority;
Hence, this appeal.[7]

Issues
In her Memorandum,[8] petitioner raises the following
issues for our consideration:
I
Whether or not respondent has a cause of action to file a
case against petitioner, the legitimate daughter of the
putative father, for recognition and partition with accounting
(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a

document should appear of which nothing had been heard
and in which either or both parents recognize the child.
In this case, the action must be commenced within four
years from the finding of the document.
The two exceptions provided under the foregoing
provision, have however been omitted by Articles 172, 173
and 175 of the Family Code, which we quote:

ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established
by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a
final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by
the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing
legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
evidence,
the

special laws.
ART. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by
the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to
the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of
insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five
years within which to institute the action.
The action already commenced by the child shall survive
notwithstanding the death of either or both of the parties.
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their
illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same,
evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified
in Article 173, except when the action is based on the
second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action
may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
Under the new law, an action for the recognition of an
illegitimate child must be brought within the lifetime of the
alleged parent. The Family Code makes no distinction on
whether the former was still a minor when the latter died.
Thus, the putative parent is given by the new Code a chance
to dispute the claim, considering that illegitimate children
are usually begotten and raised in secrecy and without the
legitimate family being aware of their existence. x x x The
putative parent should thus be given the opportunity to affirm
or deny the childs filiation, and this, he or she cannot do if he
or she is already dead.[10]
Nonetheless, the Family Code provides the caveat that
rights that have already vested prior to its enactment should
not be prejudiced or impaired as follows:
ART. 255. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as
it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
The crucial issue to be resolved therefore is
whether Adrians right to an action for recognition, which was
granted by Article 285 of the Civil Code, had already vested

prior to the enactment of the Family Code. Our answer is
affirmative.
A vested right is defined as one which is absolute,
complete and unconditional, to the exercise of which no
obstacle exists, and which is immediate and perfect in itself
and not dependent upon a contingency x x x.[11] Respondent
however contends that the filing of an action for recognition
is procedural in nature and that as a general rule, no vested
right may attach to [or] arise from procedural laws.[12]
Bustos v. Lucero[13] distinguished
procedural law in these words:
substantive
from
x x x. Substantive law creates substantive rights and the two

terms in this respect may be said to be synonymous.
Substantive rights is a term which includes those rights
which one enjoys under the legal system prior to the
disturbance of normal relations. Substantive law is that part
of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or
which regulates the rights and duties which give rise to a
cause of action; that part of the law which courts are
established to administer; as opposed to adjective or
remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing
rights or obtains redress for their invasion. [14](Citations
omitted)
Recently, in Fabian v. Desierto,[15] the Court laid down
the test for determining whether a rule is procedural or
substantive:
[I]n determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme
Court, for the practice and procedure of the lower courts,
abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test
is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is,
the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties
recognized by substantive law and for justly administering
remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If
the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the
rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be
classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a
means of implementing an existing right then the rule deals
merely with procedure.[16]
Applying the foregoing jurisprudence, we hold that
Article 285 of the Civil Code is a substantive law, as it
gives Adrian the right to file his petition for recognition within
four years from attaining majority age. Therefore, the Family
Code cannot impair or take Adrians right to file an action for
recognition, because that right had already vested prior to its
enactment.
Uyguangco v. Court of Appeals[17] is not applicable to
the case at bar, because the plaintiff therein sought
recognition as an illegitimate child when he was no longer a
minor. On the other hand, in Aruego Jr. v. Court of
Appeals[18] the Court ruled that an action for recognition filed
while the Civil Code was in effect should not be affected by

the subsequent enactment of the Family Code, because the
right had already vested.
Not Limited to Natural Children
Spurious children should not be in a better position than

natural children. The rules on proof of filiation of natural
children or the rules on voluntary and compulsory
acknowledgment for natural children may be applied to
spurious children.
To be sure, Article 285 of the Civil Code refers to the

action for recognition of natural children. Thus, petitioner
contends that the provision cannot be availed of by
respondent, because at the time of his conception, his
parents were impeded from marrying each other. In other
words, he is not a natural child.
That does not mean that spurious children should be

acknowledged, as that term is used with respect to natural
children. What is simply meant is that the grounds or
instances for the acknowledgment of natural children are
utilized to establish the filiation of spurious children.
A natural child is one whose parents, at the time of

conception, were not disqualified by any legal impediment
from marrying each other. Thus, in De Santos v. Angeles,
[19]
the Court explained:
A spurious child may prove his filiation by means of a record

of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any
authentic writing. These are the modes of voluntary
recognition of natural children.
A childs parents should not have been disqualified to marry

each other at the time of conception for him to qualify as a
natural child.[20]
In case there is no evidence on the voluntary recognition of

the spurious child, then his filiation may be established by
means of the circumstances or grounds for compulsory
recognition prescribed in the aforementioned articles 283
and 284.
A strict and literal interpretation of Article 285 has

already been frowned upon by this Court in the aforesaid
case of Aruego, which allowed minors to file a case for
recognition even if their parents were disqualified from
marrying each other. There, the Complaint averred that the
late
Jose Aruego Sr.,
a
married
man,
had
an
extramarital liason with Luz Fabian. Out of this relationship
were born two illegitimate children who in 1983 filed an
action for recognition. The two children were born in 1962
and 1963, while the alleged putative father died in 1982. In
short, at the time of their conception, the two childrens
parents were legally disqualified from marrying each other.
The Court allowed the Complaint to prosper, even though it
had been filed almost a year after the death of the presumed
father. At the time of his death, both children were still
minors.
Moreover, in the earlier case Divinagracia v. Rovira,
the Court said that the rules on voluntary and compulsory
acknowledgment of natural children, as well as the
prescriptive period for filing such action, may likewise be
applied to spurious children. Pertinent portions of the case
are quoted hereunder:
[21]
The so-called spurious children, or illegitimate children other

than natural children, commonly known as bastards, include
those adulterous children or those born out of wedlock to a
married woman cohabiting with a man other than her
husband or to a married man cohabiting with a woman other
than
his
wife.
They
are
entitled
to
support
and successional rights. But their filiation must be duly
proven.
How should their filiation be proven? Article 289 of the Civil
Code allows the investigation of the paternity or maternity or
spurious children under the circumstances specified in
articles 283 and 284 of the Civil Code. The implication is that
the rules on compulsory recognition of natural children are
applicable to spurious children.
The prescriptive period for filing the action for compulsory

recognition in the case of natural children, as provided for in
article 285 of the Civil Code, applies to spurious
children.[22] (Citations omitted, italics supplied)
Thus, under the Civil Code, natural children have
superior successional rights
over
spurious
ones.
[23]
However, Rovira treats them as equals with respect to
other rights, including the right to recognition granted by
Article 285.
To emphasize, illegitimate children who were still
minors at the time the Family Code took effect and whose
putative parent died during their minority are thus given the
right to seek recognition (under Article 285 of the Civil Code)
for a period of up to four years from attaining majority age.
This vested right was not impaired or taken away by the
passage of the Family Code.
Indeed, our overriding consideration is to protect the
vested rights of minors who could not have filed suit, on their
own, during the lifetime of their putative parents. As
respondent aptly points out in his Memorandum,[24] the State
as parens patriae should protect a minors right. Born in
1981, Adrian was only seven years old when the Family
Code took effect and only twelve when his alleged father
died in 1993. The minor must be given his day in court.
Third Issue: Failure to Implead the CA
Under Section 4(a) of Rule 45 of the current Rules of
Court, it is no longer required to implead the lower courts or
judges x x x either as petitioners or respondents. Under
Section 3, however, the lower tribunal should still be
furnished a copy of the petition. Hence, the failure of
petitioner to implead the Court of Appeals as a party is not a
reversible error; it is in fact the correct procedure.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the
assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
DE LA ROSA v. VDA. DE DAMIAN
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 103028. October 10, 1997]
CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DELA ROSA, petitioner,

vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF MACIANA
RUSTIA VDA. DE DAMIAN, namely: GUILLERMO
R. DAMIAN & JOSE R. DAMIAN; HEIRS OF
HORTENCIA RUSTIA CRUZ, namely: TERESITA
CRUZ-SISON. HORACIO R. CRUZ, JOSEFINA
CRUZ-RODIL, AMELIA CRUZ-ENRIQUEZ and
FIDEL R. CRUZ, JR.; HEIRS OF ROMAN RUSTIA,
namely:
JOSEFINA
RUSTIA-ALABANO,
VIRGINIA RUSTIA-PARAISO, ROMAN RUSTIA,
JR., SERGIO RUSTIA, FRANCISCO RUSTIA,
LETICIA RUSTIA-MIRANDA; GUILLERMINA R.
RUSTIA
and
GUILLERMA
RUSTIAALARAS, respondents.
DECISION
TORRES, JR., J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the
Resolution of Court of Appeals Seventh Division in CA-G.R.
SP No. 23415 promulgated on November 27, 1991, granting
the
private
respondents
upon
petition
for certiorari and mandamus. The appellate court had ruled
for the approval of the private respondents record on appeal,
thus paving the way for the continuance of their appeal from
the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila Branch 55
in SP Case No. 97668.
On May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgado, Vda. De Danao filed a
Petition for Letters of Administration of the intestate estate of
the deceased spouses Josefa Delgado, who died on
September 8, 1972, and Dr. Guillermo Rustia who died on
February 28, 1974. The case was docketed as SP Case No.
97668. The petition was filed by Luisa Delgado on behalf of
the surviving sisters, brothers, nephews, nieces and grandnephews and grand-nieces of Josefa Delgado. In due
course, the petition was opposed by Marciana Rustia Vda.
De Damian, Hortencia Rustia-Cruz, (sisters of the deceased
Dr. Guillermo Rustia); Josefina Albano, Virginia RustiaParaiso, Roman Rustia, Jr., Sergio Rustia Francisco Rustia,
Leticia Rustia Miranda, (children of the late Roman Rustia,
brother of the deceased Dr. Guillermo Rustia); and
Guillermina Rustia Rustia (de facto adopted daugther of
Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia).
With the permission of the trial court, Guillerma S.

Rustia-(Alaras) was allowed to intervene in the proceedings
upon her assertion of the status of an acknowledged natural
child, and thus, the only surviving child and sole heir, of Dr.
Guillermo J. Rustia.
On January 14, 1976, oppositor Hortencia Rustia-Cruz
died and was substituted in the estate proceedings by her
husband Fidel Cruz and their five children Teresita, Horacio,
Josefina, Amelia and Fidel, Jr. In time, oppositor Marciana
Rustia Vda. De Damian also died and was substituted by her
children Guillermo and Jose.
On April 3, 1978, Luisa Delgado filed an Amended
Petition for Latters of Administration, this time alleging that
the deceased Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia had
been living continuously as husband and wife, but without
the benefit of marriage.
In the ensuing proceedings, the parties presented their
respective evidence upon the following issues, as
enumerated by the estate court:
1. Whether or not the deceased Josefa Delgado was legally
married to Dr. Guillermo Rustia;
2. In the negative, whether or not the petitioner and the other
claimants to the estate of the late Josefa Delgado are
entitled to her estate, if any;
3. Whether or not the intervenor was acknowledged as a
natural or illegitimate child by the deceased Dr. Guillerma
Rustia in his lifetime;
4. Whether or not the oppositor Guillerma Rustia has any
right or interest in the estate in controversy;
5. Whether or not the estate of Josefa Delgado was legally
settled; and
6. Who is entitled to the estates administration?[1]
On March 14, 1988, herein petitioner Carlota Delgado
Vda. De Dela Rosa was substituted for her sister, the
petitioner Luisa Vda. de Danao, who had died on May 18,
1987.
On May 11, 1990, the Regional Trial Court of Manila
Branch 55, in the proceedings for joint administration of
estate of the late Josefa Delgado and Dr. Guillermo Rustia,
rendered its decision[2] appointing herein petitioner Carlota
Vda. De Dela Rosa as administrator of the estates of the two
mentioned deceased. The dispositive portion of the trial
courts decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing,
petitioner (Carlota Delgado Vda. De Dela Rosa)
and her co-claimants to the estate of the late
Josefa Delgado listed in the petition, and
enumerated elsewhere in this Decision, are hereby
declared as the only legal heirs of the said Josefa
Delgado who died intestate in the City of Manila on

September 8, 1972, and entitled to partition the
same among themselves in accordance with the
proportions referred to in this Decision.
Similarly, the intervenor Guillerma S. Rustia is
hereby declared as the sole and only surviving heir
of the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia, and thus, entitled
to the entire estate of the said decedent, to the
exclusion of the oppositors and the other parties
thereto.
The Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of the estate of
Josefa Delgado executed by the late Guillermo J.
Rustia on June 15, 1973 is hereby SET ASIDE,
and declared of no force and effect.
As the estates of both decedents have not as yet
been settled, and their settlement are considered
consolidated in this proceeding in accordance with
law, a single administrator therefore is both proper
and necessary, and, as the petitioner Carlota
Delgado Vda. de Dela Rosa has established her
right to the appointment as administratrix of the
estates, the Court hereby APPOINTS her as the
ADMINISTRATRIX of the intestate estate of the
deceased JOSEFA DELGADO in relation to the
estate of DR. GUILLERMO J. RUSTIA.
"Accordingly, let the corresponding LETTERS OF
ADMINISTRATION issue to the petitioner
CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DELA ROSA upon
her filing of the requisite bond in the sum of FIVE
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00).
Finally,
oppositor
GUILLERMINA RUSTIA
RUSTIA is hereby ordered to cease and desist
from her acts of administration of the subject
estates, and is likewise ordered to turn over to the
appointed Administratrix all her collections of the
rentals and income due on the assets of the
estates in question, including all documents,
papers, records and titles pertaining to such
estates to the petitioner and appointed
Administratrix CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE
DELA ROSA, immediately upon receipt of this
Decision. The same oppositor is hereby required
to render an accounting of her actual
administration of the estates in controversy within
a period of sixty (60) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.
In due time, the private respondents (oppositors below)
filed a notice of appeal on May 20, 1990, thereby notifying
the court of their intention to appeal the decision. The
Record on Appeal was filed with the trial court on June 21,
1990, thirty-one (31) days from the time counsel for private
respondents counsel received the courts decision. On
September 25, 1990, the Regional Trial Court of Manila
Branch 55, the Hon. Hermogenes R. Liwag, denied due
course to, and dismissed the appeal on the ground that the
Record on Appeal was filed a day late, pursuant to Batas
Pambansa 129 and the Interim Rules.
Private respondents assailed the ruling in a petition

for certiorari and mandamus, filed with the Supreme Court
on October 20, 1990. However, in a Resolution dated
November 5, 1990, this Court referred the petition to the
Court of Appeals, the latter then having concurrent
jurisdiction with the Court over the petition. The petition was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 23415. On March 20, 1991, the
respondent appellate court ruled that the appeal was not
perfected in time, and the trial courts decision had thus
become final and executory. The court observed that the
perfection of an appeal within the time prescribed by the
rules is a jurisdictional requirement, and failure to do the
same removes from the appellate court any jurisdiction over
the action.
However, on motion for reconsideration by the private
respondents filed on April 11, 1991, and after hearing the
parties respective oral arguments, the appellate court
reversed itself, and ruled that in the light of special
circumstances attending the proceedings leading to the
issuance of the letters of administration, and in the interest of
substantial justice, the private respondents appeal should be
given due course.[3]
In its Resolution dated November 27, 1991, the Court
of Appeals held that the trial court should have proceeded
with caution in considering the allowance of private
respondents appeal, as every party-litigant should be
afforded ample opportunity for the proper and just
determination of his cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities. The court cited Supreme Court rulings
furthering exceptional instances where delay in filing a
record on appeal, in order to perfect an appeal, was ignored,
when, on its face, the appeal appears to be impressed with
merit.
WHEREFORE, the decision dated March 21, 1991 is
hereby RECONSIDERED the petition for certiorari and
mandamus is GRANTED, the Order of respondent Court
dated September 25, 1990 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE
and another one is rendered APPROVING the Record on
Appeal and GIVING DUE COURSE to the appeal interposed
by oppositors-appellants-petitioners from the decision of
respondent court rendered on May 11, 1990 in SP-97668.
SO OREDERD.
Petitioner Carlota Delgado Vda. de Dela Rosa is now
before us, insisting on the final and executory nature of the
trial courts May 11, 1990 decision naming her as
administrator of the subject estates. She argues that the
Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the trial courts
decision dismissing the private respondents appeal, as the
taking of an appeal and the filing of the record on appeal
within the reglementary period is mandatory and
jurisdictional in nature, and the private respondents failure to
comply with such requirement renders their appeal nugatory.
A. It is clear and patent error for the Court of Appeals to
have granted the petition for certiorari and mandamus
of respondents Guillerma R. Rustia and the heirs of
Marciana Vda. de Damian, although Hermogenes R.

Liwag acted within his jurisdiction and in accordance
with the law when he dismissed the appeal of
Guillerma R. Rustia et. al. since they filed their record
on appeal beyond the reglementary period of thirty (30)
days.
B. The Court of appeals committed grave abuse of
discretion in setting aside the order of September 25,
1990 of Judge Hermogenes R. Liwag, which dismissed
the appeal of respondents Guillerma R. Rustia et. al.
contrary to law and settled jurisprudence that the
taking of an appeal including the filing of the record on
appeal within the reglementary period is mandatory
and jurisdictional.
C. The Court of Appeals acted without jurisdiction and with
grave abuse of discretion in approving the record on
appeal of Guillerma R. Rustia et. al. although it was
filed beyond the thirty (30) day reglementary period.
D. The Court of Appeals acted without jurisdiction and
committed grave abuse and reversible error in giving
due course to the appeal of Guillermina R. Rustia et.
al. although their record on appeal was filed out of
time.
1. Judge Hermogenes R. Liwag did not commit grave abuse
of discretion nor acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in
issuing the order of September 25, 1990 which, denied due
course to the appeal of respondents heirs of Marciana Vda.
de Damian and accordingly dismissed the appeal.
2. Mandamus cannot and should not be granted to set aside
the order of September 25, 1990 to compel Judge
Hermogenes R. Liwag to give due course to the appeal of
respondent heirs of Marciana Vda. de Damian.
The general rule still holds, that the right to appeal is
not a natural right, but statutory. The appellate jurisdiction of
the courts is conferred by law, and must be exercised in the
manner and in accordance with the provisions thereof and
such jurisdiction is acquired by the appellate court over the
subject matter and parties by the perfection of the appeal.
[4]
However, dismissal of appeals based on purely technical
grounds is frowned upon by the courts as it is their policy to
encourage hearings of appeals on the merits.[5]
As a rule, periods prescribed to do certain acts must be
followed. However, under exceptional circumstances, a
delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused on grounds
of substantial justice.[6]
Even assuming that the private respondents record on
appeal was filed a day late, strong consideration of
substantial significance are manifest, as attested to by the
appellate courts findings, which urge this Court to relax the
stringent application of technical rules in the exercise of our
equity jurisdiction, in spite of the apparent negligence of
counsel. The appellate courts discussion is hereby
reproduced:
A look at oppositors Record on Appeal which was also
forwarded with the case records, shows that it consists of
361 pages. It was dated Quezon City, for Manila,

Philippines, 20 June 1990. On its page 360, counsel for
oppositors-appellants submitted that the Record on Appeal
together with the evidence be certified to this
Court. Counsel also submitted that the Record on Appeal
and the Notice of Appeal be heard and approved on Friday,
June 29, 1991. Page 361 of the Record on Appeal shows
that a copy thereof was sent by registered mail to counsel for
private respondents. The record on Appeal, therefore, can
speak for itself, that it was already prepared, completed,
finished and signed by counsel for oppositors on June 20,
1990, or within the 30-day reglementary period from
counsels receipt of the decision sought to be
appealed. Though the Record on Appeal should have been
presented on or before June 20, 1990, but was submitted on
the following day, June 21, the intent of counsel for
oppositors to comply strictly with rules governing the manner
and period for perfecting the appeal as well as to avoid
needless delays so necessary to the orderly and speedy
discharge of judicial business is manifest. Also counsel
have filed a motion for extension for more time to submit the
Record on Appeal, which is allowable under the rules, she
did not to do so but deemed it best to file the Record on
Appeal. This is also a clear manifestation of her not to delay
the proceedings.
A look at the case records also show that in between June
21- when the Record on Appeal was filed, - up to September
25 when the Record on Appeal was disapproved and the
appeal was dismissed there were numerous pleadings
submitted before respondent court as well as certain
proceedings had and taken in connection therewith which
must have contributed to the delay in the resolution of the
Record on Appeal. Intervenor Guillerma Rustia filed a
motion for reconsideration of the decision and an
amplificatory arguments (sic) in support of her motion. The
respondent court heard her motion for reconsideration as
well as granted counsels time within which to submit their
comment/opposition/reply
and
Guillerma
filed
her
rejoinder. Private respondent Carlota Vda. de Dela Rosa
then filed an urgent ex-parte motion for implementation of
the decision naming and appointing her as administratrix and
a reply to oppositors opposition to her urgent ex-parte
motion. The respondent court issued an order considering
the urgent ex-parte motion submitted for resolution. Private
respondent Carlota again filed an urgent ex-parte motion for
implementation of the portion of the decision appointing her
as administratrix. Intervenor Guillerma Rustia also filed a
motion praying that she be appointed as special
administratrix and a motion to dismiss the appeal. Private
respondent Carlota also filed her comment on the Record on
Appeal, submitting that xxx the record on appeal submitted
by oppositors xxx be admitted, however asking that it
includes the documents passed upon by the trial
court. Intervenor Guillerma Rustia then filed an omnibus
motion. Private respondent filed an ex-parte motion praying
for the dismissal of the appeal in conjunction with the plea of
intervenor Guillerma Rustia. Oppositors filed an opposition
to the omnibus motion. The court had two hearings
concerning the omnibus motion. Intervenor Guillerma then
filed a rejoinder to the opposition filed by oppositors. On

September 25, 1991, or after all these pleadings were filed
and the proceedings were held that respondent court issued
the order denying due course to the record on appeal and
dismissed the appeal. It is observed, therefore, that during
that intervening period, the respondent court afforded
considerable time and opportunity and patience to the
private respondents recourses which lasted for more than
three (3) months, yet it resolved to disapprove the Record on
Appeal as well as to dismiss oppositors appeal because the
record on appeal was filed 1-day late, thereby showing that
respondent court was too stringent in applying the rules on
oppositors, when even in the initial comment by counsel for
respondent Carlota to the Record on Appeal, he submitted
that the record on appeal be admitted despite the fact that
the counsel was furnished a copy of the record on appeal
and must have found out that it was submitted on June 21,
1990.
The respondent court likewise pointed out the trial
courts pronouncements as to certain matters of substance,
relating to the determination of the heirs of the decedents
and the party entitled to administration of their estate, which
were to be raised in the appeal, but were barred absolutely
by the denial of the Record on Appeal upon the too technical
ground of late filing. The court particularly referred to the
importance, from the legal standpoint, of the question of the
veracity of the decedents status as husband and
wife. Likewise, the status of intervenor Guillerma S. Rustia,
who claims to be a natural child of Dr. Guillermo Rustia with
one Amparo Sagarbarria, and that of oppositor Guillermina
R. Rustia, who on the other hand claims to have been
acknowledged by Guillermo Rustia as his daughter, concern
legitimacy of children, and the resolution of their status
demands closer consideration. Summing up, the appellate
court declared:
In the light of the peculiar facts embodied in the pleadings
and documents and records of the main case, the
arguments/issues raised and argued during the hearing, as
well as the numerous authorities in point, most importantly,
on the substantial implication/effect of the dismissal of the
appeal just because the record on appeal was presented 1day late, and the merits of the oppositors cause, We find it
justifiable to reconsider Our decision and reverse and set
aside the order of respondent court dated September 25,
1990.
We are restating the instances wherein we allowed the
continuance of an appeal in some cases were a narrow and
stringent application of the rules would have denied it, when
to do so would serve the demands of substantial justice and
in the exercise of equity jurisdiction.
In Castro vs. Court of Appeals,[7] reiterated in
Velasco vs. Gayapa, Jr., [8] We stressed the importance and
real purpose of appeal and ruled:
An appeal is an essential part of our judicial system. We
have advised the courts to proceed with caution so as not to
deprive a party of the right to appeal (National Waterworks
and Sewerage Authority vs. Municipality of Libmanan, 97
SCRA 138) and instructed that every party litigant should be
afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just
disposition of his cause, freed from the constraints of

technicalities (A-One Feeds, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 100
SCRA 590).
The rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid
and technical sense. The rules of procedure are used only
to help secure, not override substantial justice. (Gregorio vs.
Court of Appeals, 72 SCRA 120). Therefore, we ruled in
Republic vs. Court of Appeals (83 SCRA 453) that a six-day
delay in the perfection of the appeal does not warrant its
dismissal. And again in Ramos vs. Bagasao, 96 SCRA 395),
this Court held that the delay of four (4) days in filing a notice
of appeal and a motion for extension of time to file a record
on appeal can be excused on the basis of equity.
The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to
afford every party-litigant the amplest opportunity for the
proper and just determination of his cause, free from the
constraints of technicalities.[9]
In Cawit vs. Court of Appeals,[10] the Court observed
that in the early case of Berkenkotter vs. Court of Appeals,
promulgated on September 28, 1973, 53 SCRA 228, we
departed from the rigid interpretation of Section 6, Rule 41 of
the Rules of Court to the effect that failure to state and/or
show in the Record on Appeal that the appeal was perfected
on time is a sufficient cause for the dismissal of the appeal.
In this instance, private respondents intention to raise
valid issues in the appeal is apparent and should not have
been construed as an attempted to delay or prolong the
administration proceedings. Surely, the natural and legal
course for them would have been to file a motion for
extension of time within which to submit their Record on
Appeal, and under usual practice such request would have
been granted. However, counsel for private respondents
instead continued with the filing of the Record on Appeal with
the trial court for approval, albeit belatedly, in the belief that
this measure was a more efficient recourse as the Record on
Appeal, which consisted of 361 pages, would be submitted
for approval earlier than if the time for the submission of the
same was extended. Unfortunately, petitioner and the
intervenor pounded on this technical lapse to further their
own interests, which from a reading of the pleadings and
evidence on record, does not appear indubitably valid.
In the inception of this action for issuance of letters of
administration, petitioners predecessor alleged that Josefa
Delgado and Dr. Guillermo Rustia were legally married, only
to withdraw such submission later by a belated amended
petition, advancing that the two were never actually married,
but were only living together as husband and wife. Such
change of stance was accepted by the trial court, upon the
justification that no record of marriage of Josefa Delgado and
Dr. Guillermo Rustia could be found, and that it was highly
irregular that the two could celebrate important occasions in
grand fashion, when no whiff was made of their own
marriage. In corroboration, the testimonies of certain close
friends of Josefa Delgado disclose that the marriage
between Josefa and Guillermo, allegedly, never occurred.
It bears mentioning that the records likewise disclose
testimonies pointing out the existence of marriage between

the decedents. Needless to state, it s presumed in our
jurisdiction that a man and a woman deporting themselves
as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage. This is the common order of society, and can only
be rebutted by sufficient contrary evidence.
In another vein, the propriety of the appointment of
Carlota Vda de Damian as sole administrator of the estates
of the decedents is put to question, especially in light of the
trial courts finding that Josefa Delgado and Dr. Guillermo
Rustia were not married to each other. It has been observed
that the estates of deceased spouses may be settled in a
single proceeding,[11]but in all other instances, even if the
deceased persons are related as ascendants and
decendants, their separate estates must be settled in
different proceedings.[12] The reason for this is the avoidance
of opportunity of encroachment into the estate left by one
decedent by the heirs of another, especially in instances,
such as this petition, were different heirs are determined for
different decedents.
As for the status of Guillerma Rustia-Alaras as an
acknowledged child of Dr. Guillermo Rustia, Article 175, in
conjunction with Article 173 and 172 of the Family Code
provides for the means for proving filiation:
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate
filiation in the same way and on the same, evidence as
The action already commenced by the child shall survive

notwithstanding the death of either or both of the parties.
(286a)
The cases relied upon in the trial courts decision,
pointing to a childs action for establishing filiation even
beyond the putative parents death are modified by the
enactment of the above-cited provisions of the Family Code,
which cite definite periods within which such actions must be
interposed. The acknowledgment of Guillerma Alaras as an
acknowledged (illegitimate) child of Dr. Guillermo Rustia,
represents a crucial bar in the claim of the private
respondents, as under Articles 988[13]and 1003[14] of the Civil
Code.
A review of the trial courts decision is needed, in view
of the above-demonstrated divergence of the evidence and
arguments presented.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations,
the Court hereby AFFIRMS the Resolution dated November
27, 1991 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23415,
for the APPROVAL of the private respondents Record on
Appeal and the CONTINUANCE of the appeal from the
Manila, Branch LV Regional Trial Courts May 11, 1990
decision.
SO ORDERED.

second paragraph of 172, in which case the action may be
brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. (289a)
(Underscoring Ours)
x xx
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by
(1) The record of birth appearing, in the civil register or a
final judgment; or
VERCELES v. POSADA
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation is a public document

concerned.

SUPREME COURT
Manila

special laws. (265a, 266a, 267a)
xxx
Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by
the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to
the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of
insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five
years within which to institute the action.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 159785
April 27, 2007
TEOFISTO I. VERCELES, Petitioner,

vs.
MARIA CLARISSA POSADA, in her own behalf, and as
mother of minor VERNA AIZA POSADA, CONSTANTINO
POSADA and FRANCISCA POSADA, Respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for review seeks the reversal of the
Decision1 dated May 30, 2003 and the Resolution2 dated
August 27, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
50557. The appellate court had affirmed with modification the
Judgment3 dated January 4, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Virac, Catanduanes, Branch 42, in Civil Case No.
1401. The RTC held petitioner liable to pay monthly support
to Verna Aiza Posada since her birth on September 23, 1987
as well as moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees
and costs of suit.
The facts in this case as found by the lower courts are as
follows:
Respondent Maria Clarissa Posada (Clarissa), a young lass
from the barrio of Pandan, Catanduanes, sometime in 1986
met a close family friend, petitioner Teofisto I. Verceles,
mayor of Pandan. He then called on the Posadas and at the
end of the visit, offered Clarissa a job.
Clarissa accepted petitioners offer and worked as a casual
employee in the mayors office starting on September 1,
1986. From November 10 to 15 in 1986, with companions
Aster de Quiros, Pat del Valle, Jaime and Jocelyn Vargas,
she accompanied petitioner to Legaspi City to attend a
seminar on town planning. They stayed at the Mayon Hotel.
On November 11, 1986, at around 11:00 a.m., petitioner
fetched Clarissa from "My Brothers Place" where the
seminar was being held. Clarissa avers that he told her that
they would have lunch at Mayon Hotel with their companions
who had gone ahead. When they reached the place her
companions were nowhere. After petitioner ordered food, he
started making amorous advances on her. She panicked, ran
and closeted herself inside a comfort room where she stayed
until someone knocked. She said she hurriedly exited and
left the hotel. Afraid of the mayor, she kept the incident to
herself. She went on as casual employee. One of her tasks
was following-up barangay road and maintenance projects.
On December 22, 1986, on orders of petitioner, she went to
Virac, Catanduanes, to follow up funds for barangayprojects.
At around 11:00 a.m. the same day, she went to
Catanduanes Hotel on instructions of petitioner who asked to
be briefed on the progress of her mission. They met at the
lobby and he led her upstairs because he said he wanted the
briefing done at the restaurant at the upper floor.
Instead, however, petitioner opened a hotel room door, led
her in, and suddenly embraced her, as he told her that he
was unhappy with his wife and would "divorce" her anytime.
He also claimed he could appoint her as a municipal
development coordinator. She succumbed to his advances.
But again she kept the incident to herself.
Sometime in January 1987, when she missed her
menstruation, she said she wrote petitioner that she feared
she was pregnant. In another letter in February 1987, she
told him she was pregnant. In a handwritten letter dated
February 4, 1987, he replied:
My darling Chris,
Should you become pregnant even unexpectedly, I should
have no regret, because I love you and you love me.
Let us rejoice a common responsibility you and I shall take
care of it and let him/her see the light of this beautiful world.
We know what to do to protect our honor and integrity.
Just relax and be happy, if true.
With all my love,
Ninoy
2/4/874
Clarissa explained petitioner used an alias "Ninoy" and
addressed her as "Chris," probably because of their twentyfive (25)-year age gap. In court, she identified petitioners
penmanship which she claims she was familiar with as an
employee in his office.
Clarissa presented three other handwritten letters 5 sent to
her by petitioner, two of which were in his letterhead as
mayor of Pandan. She also presented the pictures6 petitioner
gave her of his youth and as a public servant, all bearing his
handwritten notations at the back.
Clarissa avers that on March 3, 1987, petitioner, aware of
her pregnancy, handed her a letter and P2,000 pocket
money to go to Manila and to tell her parents that she would
enroll in a CPA review course or look for a job. In June 1987,
petitioner went to see her in Manila and gave her
another P2,000 for her delivery. When her parents learned of
her pregnancy, sometime in July, her father fetched her and
brought her back to Pandan. On September 23, 1987, 7 she
gave birth to a baby girl, Verna Aiza Posada.
Clarissas mother, Francisca, corroborated Clarissas story.
She said they learned of their daughters pregnancy through
her husbands cousin. She added that she felt betrayed by
petitioner and shamed by her daughters pregnancy.
The Posadas filed a Complaint for Damages coupled with
Support Pendente Lite before the RTC, Virac, Catanduanes
against petitioner on October 23, 1987.8
On January 4, 1995, the trial court issued a judgment in their
favor, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the [respondents] and against the
[petitioner] and ordering the latter:
1. to pay a monthly support of P2,000.00 to Verna Aiza
Posada since her birth on September 23, 1987 as he was

proved to be the natural father of the above-named minor as
shown by the exhibits and testimonies of the [respondents];
PATERNITY OF THE CHILD, WHICH IS MADE

COLLATERAL TO THIS ACTION FOR DAMAGES?11
2. to pay the amount of P30,000.00 as moral damages;
In sum, the pertinent issues in this case are: (1) whether or

not paternity and filiation can be resolved in an action for
damages with support pendente lite; (2) whether or not the
filiation of Verna Aiza Posada as the illegitimate child of
petitioner was proven; and (3) whether or not respondents
are entitled to damages.
3. to pay the amount of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages;

4. to pay the sum of P10,000.00 as attorneys fees; and
5. to pay the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.9
Verceles appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
judgment with modification, specifying the party to whom the
damages was awarded. The dispositive portion of the Court
of Appeals decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED with
modification by ordering [petitioner] Teofisto I. Verceles:
1. To pay a monthly support of P2,000.00 to Verna Aiza
Posada from her birth on September 23, 1987.
2. To pay [respondent] Maria Clarissa Posada the sum
of P15,000.00 as moral damages and [P]15,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
3. To pay [respondents] spouses Constantino and Francisca
Posada the sum of P15,000.00 as moral damages
and P15,000.00 as exemplary damages.
4. To pay each of the said three [respondents] P10,000.00 as
attorneys fees; and
5. To pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.10
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner now presents the following issues for resolution:
In his Memorandum, petitioner asserts that the fact of

paternity and filiation of Verna Aiza Posada has not been
duly established or proved in the proceedings; that the award
for damages and attorneys fees has no basis; and that the
issue of filiation should be resolved in a direct and not a
collateral action.
Petitioner argues he never signed the birth certificate of
Verna Aiza Posada as father and that it was respondent
Clarissa who placed his name on the birth certificate as
father without his consent. He further contends the alleged
love letters he sent to Clarissa are not admissions of
paternity but mere expressions of concern and advice. 12 As
to the award for damages, petitioner argues Clarissa could
not have suffered moral damages because she was in pari
delicto, being a willing participant in the "consensual carnal
act" between them.13 In support of his argument that the
issue on filiation should have been resolved in a separate
action, petitioner cited the case of Rosales v. Castillo
Rosales14 where we held that the legitimacy of a child which
is controversial can only be resolved in a direct action.15
On the other hand, respondents in their Memorandum
maintain that the Court of Appeals committed no error in its
decision. They reiterate that Clarissas clear narration of the
circumstances on "how she was deflowered" by petitioner,
the love letters and pictures given by petitioner to Clarissa,
the corroborating testimony of Clarissas mother, the fact that
petitioner proffered no countervailing evidence, are
preponderant evidence of paternity. They cited the case
of De Jesus v. Syquia16 where we held that a conceived child
can be acknowledged because this is an act favorable to the
child.17 They also argue that damages should be awarded
because petitioner inveigled Clarissa to succumb to his
sexual advances.18
I.
WAS THERE ANY EVIDENCE ON RECORD TO PROVE
THAT APPELLANT VERCELES WAS THE FATHER OF THE
CHILD?
II.
WOULD THIS ACTION FOR DAMAGES PROSPER?
III.
WOULD
THE
RTC
COURT
HAVE
ACQUIRED
JURISDICTION OVER THIS ISSUE OF APPELLANTS
Could paternity and filiation be resolved in an action for

damages? On this score, we find petitioners stance
unmeritorious. The caption is not determinative of the nature
of a pleading. In a string of cases we made the following
rulings. It is not the caption but the facts alleged which give
meaning to a pleading. Courts are called upon to pierce the
form and go into the substance thereof.19 In determining the
nature of an action, it is not the caption, but the averments in
the petition and the character of the relief sought, that are
controlling.20
A perusal of the Complaint before the RTC shows that
although its caption states "Damages coupled with
SupportPendente Lite," Clarissas averments therein, her

meeting with petitioner, his offer of a job, his amorous
advances, her seduction, their trysts, her pregnancy, birth of
her child, his letters, her demand for support for her child, all
clearly establish a case for recognition of paternity. We have
held that the due recognition of an illegitimate child in a
record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or
in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of
acknowledgement of the child, and no further court action is
required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a
ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary
recognition that does not require a separate action for
judicial approval.21
The letters of petitioner marked as Exhibits "A" to "D" are
declarations that lead nowhere but to the conclusion that he
sired Verna Aiza. Although petitioner used an alias in these
letters, the similarity of the penmanship in these
letters vis the annotation at the back of petitioners fading
photograph as a youth is unmistakable. Even an
inexperienced eye will come to the conclusion that they were
all written by one and the same person, petitioner, as found
by the courts a quo.
We also note that in his Memorandum, petitioner admitted
his affair with Clarissa, the exchange of love letters between
them, and his giving her money during her pregnancy. 22
Articles 172 and 175 of the Family Code are the rules for
establishing filiation. They are as follows:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by
judgment; or
concerned.
The letters, one of which is quoted above, are private

handwritten instruments of petitioner which establish Verna
Aizas filiation under Article 172 (2) of the Family Code. In
addition, the array of evidence presented by respondents,
the dates, letters, pictures and testimonies, to us, are
convincing, and irrefutable evidence that Verna Aiza is,
indeed, petitioners illegitimate child.
Petitioner not only failed to rebut the evidence presented, he
himself presented no evidence of his own. His bare denials
are telling. Well-settled is the rule that denials, if
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are
negative and self-serving which merit no weight in law and
cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony
of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.23
We, however, cannot rule that respondents are entitled to
damages. Article 221924of the Civil Code which states moral
damages may be recovered in cases of seduction is
inapplicable in this case because Clarissa was already an
adult at the time she had an affair with petitioner.
Neither can her parents be entitled to damages. Besides,
there is nothing in law or jurisprudence that entitles the
parents of a consenting adult who begets a love child to
damages. Respondents Constantino and Francisca Posada
have not cited any law or jurisprudence to justify awarding
damages to them.
We, however, affirm the grant of attorneys fees in
consonance with Article 2208 (2)25 and (11)26 of the New Civil
Code.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated May 30, 2003
and the Resolution dated August 27, 2003 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 50557 are AFFIRMED, with the
MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages and
exemplary damages be DELETED.
SO ORDERED.

special laws.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate
filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as
DE LA CRUZ v. GRACIA
SECOND DIVISION
JENIE SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ and minor

CHRISTIAN DELA CRUZ
AQUINO,
represented by JENIE SAN JUAN DELA
CRUZ,
Petitioners,
versus
G.R. No. 17772

Present:
QUISUMBING
CARPIO MOR
CHICO-NAZA
LEONARDO-D
PERALTA,* JJ
RONALD PAUL S. GRACIA, in his capacity

as City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City,
Respondent.
Promulgated:

LOVE WITH EACH OTHER, THEN WE
BECAME GOOD COUPLES. AND AS OF
NOW SHE IS PREGNANT AND FOR
THAT WE LIVE TOGETHER IN OUR
HOUSE NOW. THATS ALL.[6] (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
July 31, 2009

x-----------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
For several months in 2005, then 21-year old
petitioner Jenie San Juan Dela Cruz (Jenie) and then 19year old Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino
(Dominique) lived together as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage. They resided in the house of
Dominiques parents Domingo B. Aquino and Raquel Sto.
Tomas Aquino at Pulang-lupa, Dulumbayan, Teresa, Rizal.
By letter dated November 11, 2005,[7] the City Civil

Registrar of Antipolo City, Ronald Paul S. Gracia
(respondent), denied Jenies application for registration of
the childs name in this wise:
7.
On September 4, 2005, Dominique died.[1] After

almost two months, or on November 2, 2005, Jenie, who
continued to live with Dominiques parents, gave birth to her
herein co-petitioner minor child Christian Dela Cruz Aquino
at the Antipolo Doctors Hospital, Antipolo City.
Jenie applied for registration of the childs birth,
using Dominiques surname Aquino, with the Office of the
City Civil Registrar, Antipolo City, in support of which she
submitted the childs Certificate of Live Birth,[2] Affidavit to
Use the Surname of the Father[3] (AUSF) which she had
executed
and
signed,
and Affidavit
of
Acknowledgmentexecuted by Dominiques father Domingo
Butch Aquino.[4] Both affidavits attested, inter alia, that
during the lifetime of Dominique, he had continuously
acknowledged his yet unborn child, and that his paternity
had never been questioned. Jenie attached to the AUSF a
document entitled AUTOBIOGRAPHY which Dominique,
during his lifetime, wrote in his own handwriting, the pertinent
portions of which read:
Rule 7 of Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 2004

(Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act
No. 9255 [An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children to Use
the Surname of their Father, Amending for the Purpose,
Article 176 of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise
Known as the Family Code of the Philippines])
provides that:
Rule 7. Requirements for the Child to Use the Surname
of the Father
7.1 For Births Not Yet Registered
7.1.1 The illegitimate child shall use the surname of the

father if a public document is executed by the father, either
at the back of the Certificate of Live Birth or in a separate
document.
7.1.2 If admission of paternity is made through a private
handwritten instrument, the child shall use the surname of
the father, provided the registration is supported by the
following documents:
a. AUSF[8]
AQUINO, CHRISTIAN DOMINIQUE S.T.
AUTOBIOGRAPHY
IM CHRISTIAN DOMINIQUE
STO. TOMAS AQUINO, 19 YEARS OF
AGE TURNING 20 THIS COMING
OCTOBER 31, 2005.[5] I RESIDE AT
PULANG-LUPA
STREET
BRGY.
DULUMBAYAN, TERESA, RIZAL. I AM
THE YOUNGEST IN OUR FAMILY. I HAVE
ONE BROTHER NAMED JOSEPH
BUTCH STO. TOMAS AQUINO. MY
FATHERS NAME IS DOMINGO BUTCH
AQUINO AND MY MOTHERS NAME IS
RAQUEL STO. TOMAS AQUINO. x x x.
xxxx
AS OF NOW I HAVE MY WIFE
NAMED JENIE DELA CRUZ. WE MET
EACH OTHER IN OUR HOMETOWN,
TEREZA RIZAL. AT FIRST WE BECAME
GOOD FRIENDS, THEN WE FELL IN
b. Consent of the child, if 18 years old and over at

the time of the filing of the document.
c. Any two of the following documents showing
clearly the paternity between the father and the
child:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Employment records
SSS/GSIS records
Insurance
Certification of membership in any organization
Statement of Assets and Liability
Income Tax Return (ITR)
In summary, the child cannot use the surname of his father

because he was born out of wedlock and the father
unfortunately died prior to his birth and has no more capacity
to acknowledge his paternity to the child (either through the
back of Municipal Form No. 102 Affidavit of
Acknowledgment/Admission of Paternity or the Authority to
Use the Surname of the Father). (Underscoring supplied)

Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint[9] for
injunction/registration of name against respondent before
the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, docketed as SCA
Case No. 06-539, which was raffled to Branch 73 thereof.
The complaint alleged that, inter alia, the denial of
registration of the childs name is a violation of his right to
use the surname of his deceased father under Article 176 of
the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9255,[10] which provides:
Article 176. Illegitimate children shall use the
surname and shall be under the parental authority of their
mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with
this Code. However,illegitimate children may use the
surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly
recognized by the father through the record of birth
appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in
a public document or private handwritten instrument is
made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to
institute an action before the regular courts to prove nonfiliation during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate
child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate
child. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Hence, this direct resort to the Court via Petition for

Review on Certiorari raising this purely legal issue of:
WHETHER
OR
NOT
THE
UNSIGNED
HANDWRITTEN STATEMENT OF THE DECEASED
FATHER OF MINOR CHRISTIAN DELA CRUZ CAN BE
CONSIDERED AS A RECOGNITION OF PATERNITY IN A
PRIVATE HANDWRITTEN INSTRUMENT WITHIN THE
CONTEMPLATION OF ARTICLE 176 OF THE FAMILY
CODE, AS AMENDED BY R.A. 9255, WHICH ENTITLES
THE SAID MINOR TO USE HIS FATHERS SURNAME.
[15]
(Underscoring supplied)
Petitioners contend that Article 176 of the Family
Code, as amended, does not expressly require that the
private handwritten instrument containing the putative
fathers admission of paternity must be signed by him. They
add that the deceaseds handwritten Autobiography, though
unsigned by him, is sufficient, for the requirement in the
above-quoted paragraph 2.2 of the Administrative Order that
the admission/recognition must be duly signed by the father
is void as it unduly expanded the earlier-quoted provision of
Article 176 of the Family Code.[16]
They maintained that the Autobiography executed by

Dominique constitutes an admission of paternity in a private
handwritten instrument within the contemplation of the
above-quoted provision of law.
Petitioners further contend that the trial court erred

in
not
finding
that Dominiques handwritten
Autobiography contains a clear and unmistakable
recognition of the childs paternity.[17]
For failure to file a responsive pleading or answer

despite service of summons, respondent was declared in
default.
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General

(OSG) submits that respondents position, as affirmed by the
trial court, is in consonance with the law and thus prays for
the dismissal of the petition. It further submits that
Dominiques Autobiography merely acknowledged Jenies
pregnancy but not [his] paternity of the child she was
carrying in her womb.[18]
Jenie thereupon presented evidence ex-parte. She

testified on the circumstances of her common-law
relationship with Dominique and affirmed her declarations in
her AUSF that during his lifetime, he had acknowledged his
yet unborn child.[11] She offered Dominiques handwritten
Autobiography (Exhibit A) as her documentary evidence-inchief.[12] Dominiques lone brother, Joseph Butch S.T. Aquino,
also testified, corroborating Jenies declarations.[13]
By Decision[14] of April 25, 2007, the trial court
dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action as the
Autobiography was unsigned, citing paragraph 2.2, Rule 2
(Definition of Terms) of Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 1,
Series of 2004 (the Rules and Regulations Governing the
Implementation of R.A. 9255) which defines private
handwritten document through which a father may
acknowledge an illegitimate child as follows:
2.2 Private handwritten instrument an instrument
executed in the handwriting of the father and duly signed by
him where he expressly recognizes paternity to the child.
The trial court held that even if Dominique was the author of
the handwritten Autobiography, the same does not contain
any express recognition of paternity.
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by R.A.

9255, permits an illegitimate child to use the surname of
his/her father if the latter had expressly recognized him/her
as his offspring through the record of birth appearing in the
civil register, or through an admission made in a public
or private handwritten instrument. The recognition made in
any of these documents is, in itself, a consummated act of
acknowledgment of the childs paternity; hence, no separate
action for judicial approval is necessary.[19]
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does
not, indeed, explicitly state that the private handwritten
instrument acknowledging the childs paternity must be
signed by the putative father. This provision must, however,
be read in conjunction with related provisions of the Family
Code which require that recognition by the father must bear
his signature, thus:
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their
illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
xxxx

Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is
established by any of the following:

final judgment; or
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register

or a final judgment; or


x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
That a father who acknowledges paternity of a child

through a written instrument must affix his signature thereon
is clearly implied in Article 176 of the Family
Code. Paragraph 2.2, Rule 2 of A.O. No. 1, Series of
2004, merely articulated such requirement; it did not unduly
expand the import of Article 176 as claimed by petitioners.
In
the
present
case, however,
special
circumstances exist to hold that Dominiques Autobiography,
though unsigned by him, substantially satisfies the
requirement of the law.
First, Dominique died about two months prior to the
childs birth. Second, the relevant matters in the
Autobiography, unquestionably handwritten by Dominique,
correspond to the facts culled from the testimonial evidence
Jenie
proffered.[20] Third,
Jenies
testimony
is corroborated by the Affidavit of Acknowledgment of
Dominiques father Domingo Aquino and testimony of his
brother Joseph Butch Aquino whose hereditary rights could
be affected by the registration of the questioned recognition
of the child.These circumstances indicating Dominiques
paternity of the child give life to his statements in his
Autobiography that JENIE DELA CRUZ is MY WIFE as
WE FELL IN LOVE WITH EACH OTHER and NOW SHE
IS PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE LIVE TOGETHER.
In Herrera v. Alba,[21] the Court summarized the
laws, rules, and jurisprudence on establishing filiation,
discoursing in relevant part:
Laws, Rules, and Jurisprudence

Establishing Filiation
The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide
as follows:
ART. 175.
Illegitimate children may establish
their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
xxxx
ART. 172.
The filiation of legitimate children is
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the

legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status
of a legitimate child; or
special laws.
The Rules on Evidence include provisions on pedigree.
The relevant sections of Rule 130 provide:
SEC. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree. The
act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify,
in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him
by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it
occurred before the controversy, and the relationship
between the two persons is shown by evidence other than
such act or declaration. The word "pedigree" includes
relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the
dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and
the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family
history intimately connected with pedigree.
SEC. 40.
Family reputation or tradition
regarding pedigree. The reputation or tradition existing in
a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the
pedigree of any one of its members, may be received in
evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member
of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity. Entries in
family bibles or other family books or charts, engraving on
rings, family portraits and the like, may be received as
evidence of pedigree.
This Court's rulings further specify what
incriminating acts are acceptable as evidence to establish
filiation. In Pe Lim v. CA, a case petitioner often cites, we
stated that the issue of paternity still has to be resolved by
such conventional evidence as the relevant incriminating
verbal and written acts by the putative father. Under
Article 278 of the New Civil Code, voluntary recognition by a
parent shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record, or in any authentic
writing. To be effective, the claim of filiation must be
made by the putative father himself and the writing must
be the writing of the putative father. A notarial agreement
to support a child whose filiation is admitted by the putative
father was considered acceptable evidence. Letters to the
mother vowing to be a good father to the child and pictures
of the putative father cuddling the child on various
occasions, together with the certificate of live birth, proved
filiation. However, a student permanent record, a written
consent to a father's operation, or a marriage contract where
the putative father gave consent, cannot be taken as

authentic writing. Standing alone, neither a certificate of
baptism nor family pictures are sufficient to establish filiation.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the earlier

quoted statements in Dominiques Autobiography have been
made and written by him. Taken together with the other
relevant facts extant herein that Dominique, during his
lifetime, and Jenie were living together as common-law
spouses for several months in 2005 at his parents house in
Pulang-lupa, Dulumbayan, Teresa, Rizal; she was pregnant
when Dominique died on September 4, 2005; and about two
months after his death, Jenie gave birth to the child they
sufficiently establish that the child of Jenie is Dominiques.
In the eyes of society, a child with an unknown

father bears the stigma of dishonor. It is to petitioner minor
childs best interests to allow him to bear the surname of the
now deceased Dominique and enter it in his birth certificate.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The City
Civil Registrar of Antipolo City is DIRECTED to
immediately enter the surname of the late Christian
Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino as the surname of petitioner
minor Christian dela Cruz in his Certificate of Live Birth,
and record the same in the Register of Births.
SO ORDERED.
In view of the pronouncements herein made, the

Court sees it fit to adopt the following rules respecting the
requirement of affixing the signature of the acknowledging
parent in any private handwritten instrument wherein an
admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is
made:
1)
Where the private handwritten instrument is
the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove filiation, there
should be strict compliance with the requirement that the
same must be signed by the acknowledging parent; and
2)
Where the private handwritten instrument
is accompanied by other relevant and competent evidence, it
suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have
been made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as
it is merely corroborative of such other evidence.
Our laws instruct that the welfare of the child shall
be the paramount consideration in resolving questions
affecting him.[22] Article 3(1) of the United Nations Convention
on the Rights of a Child of which the Philippines is
a signatory is similarly emphatic:
Article 3
1. In all actions concerning
children, whether undertaken by public or
private social welfare institutions, courts of
law, administrative authorities or legislative
bodies, the best interests of the child shall
be
a
primary
consideration.
[23]
NEPOMUCENO v. LOPEZ
FIRST DIVISION
BEN-HUR NEPOMUCENO,
Petitioner,
Present:
- versus It is thus (t)he policy of the Family Code

to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the paternity and
filiation of children, especially of illegitimate children x x
x.[24] Too,
(t)he
State
as parens
patriae affords special protection to children from abuse,
exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their
development.[25]
G.R. No. 181258
ARHBENCEL ANN LOPEZ,

represented by her mother
ARACELI LOPEZ,
Respondent.
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

CARPIO MORALES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
Promulgated:
March 18, 2010
x------------------------------------------------ x

DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Respondent Arhbencel Ann Lopez (Arhbencel),
represented by her mother Araceli Lopez (Araceli), filed a
Complaint[1] with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan
City for recognition and support against Ben-Hur
Nepomuceno (petitioner).
Born on June 8, 1999, Arhbencel claimed to have
been begotten out of an extramarital affair of petitioner with
Araceli; that petitioner refused to affix his signature on her
Certificate of Birth; and that, by a handwritten note dated
August 7, 1999, petitioner nevertheless obligated himself to
give her financial support in the amount of P1,500 on the
15th and 30th days of each month beginning August 15,
1999.
of P4,000 every 15th and 30th days of the month, or a total

of P8,000 a month.
The appellate court found that from petitioners
payment of Aracelis hospital bills when she gave birth to
Arhbencel and his subsequent commitment to provide
monthly financial support, the only logical conclusion to be
drawn was that he was Arhbencels father; that petitioner
merely acted in bad faith in omitting a statement of paternity
in his handwritten undertaking to provide financial support;
and that the amount of P8,000 a month was reasonable for
Arhbencels subsistence and not burdensome for petitioner
in view of his income.
His Motion for Reconsideration having been denied
by Resolution dated January 3, 2008,[6] petitioner comes
before this Court through the present Petition for Review on
Certiorari.[7]
Arguing that her filiation to petitioner was

established by the handwritten note, Arhbencel prayed that
petitioner be ordered to: (1) recognize her as his child, (2)
give her support pendente lite in the increased amount
of P8,000 a month, and (3) give her adequate monthly
financial support until she reaches the age of majority.
Petitioner contends that nowhere in the

documentary evidence presented by Araceli is an explicit
statement made by him that he is the father of Arhbencel;
that absent recognition or acknowledgment, illegitimate
children are not entitled to support from the putative parent;
that the supposed payment made by him of Aracelis hospital
bills was neither alleged in the complaint nor proven during
the trial; and that Arhbencels claim of paternity and filiation
was not established by clear and convincing evidence.
Petitioner countered that Araceli had not proven that

he was the father of Arhbencel; and that he was only forced
to execute the handwritten note on account of threats
coming from the National Peoples Army.[2]
Arhbencel avers in her Comment that petitioner

raises questions of fact which the appellate court had
already addressed, along with the issues raised in the
present petition.[8]
By Order of July 4, 2001,[3] Branch 130 of the

Caloocan RTC, on the basis of petitioners handwritten note
which it treated as contractual support since the issue of
Arhbencels filiation had yet to be determined during the
hearing on the merits, granted Arhbencels prayer for
support pendente lite in the amount of P3,000 a month.
After Arhbencel rested her case, petitioner filed a
demurrer to evidence which the trial court granted by Order
dated June 7, 2006,[4] whereupon the case was dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence.
The trial court held that, among other things,
Arhbencels Certificate of Birth was not prima facie evidence
of her filiation to petitioner as it did not bear petitioners
signature; that petitioners handwritten undertaking to
provide
support
did
not
contain
a
categorical
acknowledgment that Arhbencel is his child; and that there
was no showing that petitioner performed any overt act of
acknowledgment of Arhbencel as his illegitimate child after
the execution of the note.
On appeal by Arhbencel, the Court of Appeals, by
Decision of July 20, 2007,[5] reversed the trial courts
decision, declared Arhbencel to be petitioners illegitimate
daughter and accordingly ordered petitioner to give
Arhbencel financial support in the increased amount
The petition is impressed with merit.

The relevant provisions of the Family Code[9] that
treat of the right to support are Articles 194 to 196, thus:
Article
194. Support
compromises
everything
indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical
attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with
the financial capacity of the family.
The education of the person entitled to be supported
referred to in the preceding paragraph shall include his
schooling or training for some profession, trade or vocation,
even beyond the age of majority. Transportation shall include
expenses in going to and from school, or to and from place
of work.
Article 195. Subject to the provisions of the succeeding
articles, the following are obliged to support each other to
the whole extent set forth in the preceding article:
1. The spouses;
2. Legitimate ascendants and descendants;
3. Parents and their legitimate children and the
legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter;
4. Parents and their illegitimate children and the
legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter; and

5. Legitimate brothers and sisters, whether of the full or
half-blood.
the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family

history intimately connected with pedigree.
Article 196. Brothers and sisters not legitimately related,

whether of the full or half-blood, are likewise bound to
support each other to the full extent set forth in Article 194,
except only when the need for support of the brother or
sister, being of age, is due to a cause imputable to the
claimant's fault or negligence. (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
SEC. 40.
Family reputation or tradition
regarding pedigree. The reputation or tradition existing in
a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the
pedigree of any one of its members, may be received in
evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member
of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity. Entries in
family bibles or other family books or charts, engraving on
rings, family portraits and the like, may be received as
evidence of pedigree.
Arhbencels demand for support, being based on her

claim of filiation to petitioner as his illegitimate daughter, falls
under Article 195(4). As such, her entitlement to support
from petitioner is dependent on the determination of her
filiation.
Herrera v. Alba[10] summarizes the laws, rules, and
jurisprudence on establishing filiation, discoursing in relevant
part as follows:
Laws, Rules, and Jurisprudence

Establishing Filiation
The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as
follows:
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their
xxxx
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate
children
is

final judgment; or
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed
by the parent concerned.
This Court's rulings further specify what incriminating

acts are acceptable as evidence to establish filiation. In Pe
Lim v. CA, a case petitioner often cites, we stated that the
issue of paternity still has to be resolved by
such conventional evidence as the relevant incriminating
verbal and written acts by the putative father. Under
Article 278 of the New Civil Code, voluntary recognition by a
parent shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record, or in any authentic
writing. To be effective, the claim of filiation must be made
by the putative father himself and the writing must be the
writing of the putative father. A notarial agreement to
support a child whose filiation is admitted by the
putative
father
was
considered
acceptable
evidence. Letters to the mother vowing to be a good father
to the child and pictures of the putative father cuddling the
child on various occasions, together with the certificate of
live birth, proved filiation. However, a student permanent
record, a written consent to a father's operation, or a
marriage contract where the putative father gave consent,
cannot be taken as authentic writing. Standing alone,
neither a certificate of baptism nor family pictures are
sufficient to establish filiation. (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
In the present case, Arhbencel relies, in the main, on
the handwritten note executed by petitioner which reads:
Manila, Aug. 7, 1999

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of
a legitimate child; or
special laws.
The Rules on Evidence include provisions on
pedigree. The relevant sections of Rule 130 provide:
SEC. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree. The act
or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in
respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by
birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it
occurred before the controversy, and the relationship
between the two persons is shown by evidence other than
such act or declaration. The word "pedigree" includes
relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the
dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and
I, Ben-Hur C. Nepomuceno, hereby

undertake to give and provide financial
support in the amount of P1,500.00 every
fifteen and thirtieth day of each month for a
total of P3,000.00 a month starting Aug.
15, 1999, to Ahrbencel Ann Lopez,
presently in the custody of her mother
Araceli Lopez without the necessity of
demand, subject to adjustment later
depending on the needs of the child and
my income.
The abovequoted note does not contain any

statement whatsoever about Arhbencels filiation to
petitioner. It is, therefore, not within the ambit of Article
172(2) vis--visArticle 175 of the Family Code which admits

as competent evidence of illegitimate filiation an admission
of filiation in a private handwritten instrument signed by the
parent concerned.
The note cannot also be accorded the same weight
as the notarial agreement to support the child referred to
in Herrera. For
it
is
not
even
notarized. And Herrera instructs that the notarial agreement
must be accompanied by the putative fathers admission of
filiation to be an acceptable evidence of filiation. Here,
however, not only has petitioner not admitted filiation through
contemporaneous actions. He has consistently denied it.
The only other documentary evidence submitted by
Arhbencel, a copy of her Certificate of Birth,[11] has no
probative value to establish filiation to petitioner, the latter
not having signed the same.
At bottom, all that Arhbencel really has is
petitioners handwritten undertaking to provide financial
support to her which, without more, fails to establish her
claim of filiation. The Court is mindful that the best interests
of the child in cases involving paternity and filiation should be
advanced. It is, however, just as mindful of the disturbance
that unfounded paternity suits cause to the privacy and
peace of the putative fathers legitimate family.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
Court of Appeals Decision of July 20, 2007 is SET
ASIDE. The Order dated June 7, 2006 of Branch 130 of the
Caloocan City RTC dismissing the complaint for insufficiency
of evidence is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
GOTARDO v. BULING
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 165166
August 15, 2012
CHARLES GOTARDO, Petitioner,

vs.
DIVINA BULING, Respondent.
VILLARAMA, JR.,*
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari, 1 filed by
petitioner Charles Gotardo, to challenge the March 5, 2004
decision2 and the July 27, 2004 resolution3 of the Court of

Appeals (CA) in CA GR CV No. 76326. The CA decision
ordered the petitioner to recognize and provide legal support
to his minor son, Gliffze 0. Buling. The CA resolution denied
the petitioner's subsequent motion for reconsideration.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On September 6, 1995, respondent Divina Buling filed a
complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Maasin,
Southern Leyte, Branch 25, for compulsory recognition and
support pendente lite, claiming that the petitioner is the
father of her child Gliffze.4
In his answer, the petitioner denied the imputed paternity of
Gliffze.5 For the parties failure to amicably settle the dispute,
the RTC terminated the pre-trial proceedings.6 Trial on the
merits ensued.
The respondent testified for herself and presented Rodulfo
Lopez as witness. Evidence for the respondent showed that
she met the petitioner on December 1, 1992 at the Philippine
Commercial and Industrial Bank, Maasin, Southern Leyte
branch where she had been hired as a casual employee,
while the petitioner worked as accounting supervisor.7 The
petitioner started courting the respondent in the third week of
December 1992 and they became sweethearts in the last
week of January 1993.8 The petitioner gave the respondent
greeting cards on special occasions, such as on Valentines
Day and her birthday; she reciprocated his love and took
care of him when he was ill.9
Sometime in September 1993, the petitioner started intimate
sexual relations with the respondent in the formers rented
room in the boarding house managed by Rodulfo, the
respondents uncle, on Tomas Oppus St., Agbao, Maasin,
Southern Leyte.10 The petitioner rented the room from March
1, 1993 to August 30, 1994.11 The sexual encounters
occurred twice a month and became more frequent in June
1994; eventually, on August 8, 1994, the respondent found
out that she was pregnant.12 When told of the pregnancy, the
petitioner was happy and made plans to marry the
respondent.13 They in fact applied for a marriage
license.14 The petitioner even inquired about the costs of a
wedding reception and the bridal gown. 15 Subsequently,
however, the petitioner backed out of the wedding plans.16
The respondent responded by filing a complaint with the
Municipal Trial Court of Maasin, Southern Leyte for damages
against the petitioner for breach of promise to marry.17 Later,
however, the petitioner and the respondent amicably settled
the case.18
The respondent gave birth to their son Gliffze on March 9,
1995.19 When the petitioner did not show up and failed to
provide support to Gliffze, the respondent sent him a letter
on July 24, 1995 demanding recognition of and support for
their child.20 When the petitioner did not answer the demand,
the respondent filed her complaint for compulsory
recognition and support pendente lite.21

The petitioner took the witness stand and testified for
himself. He denied the imputed paternity,22 claiming that he
first had sexual contact with the respondent in the first week
of August 1994 and she could not have been pregnant for
twelve (12) weeks (or three (3) months) when he was
informed of the pregnancy on September 15, 1994.23
an incorrect appreciation of the questions asked, and that

the record is replete with evidence proving that the petitioner
was her lover and that they had several intimate sexual
encounters during their relationship, resulting in her
pregnancy and Gliffzes birth on March 9, 1995.
THE ISSUE
During the pendency of the case, the RTC, on the

respondents motion,24 granted a P2,000.00 monthly child
support, retroactive from March 1995.25
THE RTC RULING
In its June 25, 2002 decision, the RTC dismissed the
complaint for insufficiency of evidence proving Gliffzes
filiation. It found the respondents testimony inconsistent on
the question of when she had her first sexual contact with
the petitioner, i.e., "September 1993" in her direct testimony
while "last week of January 1993" during her crosstestimony, and her reason for engaging in sexual contact
even after she had refused the petitioners initial marriage
proposal. It ordered the respondent to return the amount of
support pendente lite erroneously awarded, and to
pay P10,000.00 as attorneys fees.26
The respondent appealed the RTC ruling to the
CA.27
THE CA RULING
In its March 5, 2004 decision, the CA departed from the
RTC's appreciation of the respondents testimony, concluding
that the latter merely made an honest mistake in her
understanding of the questions of the petitioners counsel. It
noted that the petitioner and the respondent had sexual
relationship even before August 1994; that the respondent
had only one boyfriend, the petitioner, from January 1993 to
August 1994; and that the petitioners allegation that the
respondent had previous relationships with other men
remained unsubstantiated. The CA consequently set aside
the RTC decision and ordered the petitioner to recognize his
minor son Gliffze. It also reinstated the RTC order granting
a P 2,000.00 monthly child support.28
When the CA denied29 the petitioners motion for
reconsideration,30 the petitioner filed the present petition for
review on certiorari.
THE PETITION
The petitioner argues that the CA committed a reversible
error in rejecting the RTCs appreciation of the respondents
testimony, and that the evidence on record is insufficient to
prove paternity.
THE CASE FOR THE RESPONDENT
The respondent submits that the CA correctly explained that
the inconsistency in the respondents testimony was due to
The sole issue before us is whether the CA committed a

reversible error when it set aside the RTCs findings and
ordered the petitioner to recognize and provide legal support
to his minor son Gliffze.
OUR RULING
We do not find any reversible error in the CAs
ruling.
We have recognized that "[f]iliation proceedings are usually
filed not just to adjudicate paternity but also to secure a legal
right associated with paternity, such as citizenship, support
(as in this case) or inheritance. [In paternity cases, the
burden of proof] is on the person who alleges that the
putative father is the biological father of the child."31
One can prove filiation, either legitimate or illegitimate,
through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a
final judgment, an admission of filiation in a public document
concerned, or the open and continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate or illegitimate child, or any other means
allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.32 We have
held that such other proof of one's filiation may be a
"baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in
which his name has been entered, common reputation
respecting [his] pedigree, admission by silence, the
[testimonies] of witnesses, and other kinds of proof
admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court."33
In Herrera v. Alba,34 we stressed that there are four
significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action
that parties have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative
defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical
resemblance between the putative father and the child.35 We
explained that a prima facie case exists if a woman declares
supported by corroborative proof that she had sexual
relations with the putative father; at this point, the burden of
evidence shifts to the putative father.36 We explained further
that the two affirmative defenses available to the putative
father are: (1) incapability of sexual relations with the mother
due to either physical absence or impotency, or (2) that the
mother had sexual relations with other men at the time of
conception.37
In this case, the respondent established a prima facie case
that the petitioner is the putative father of Gliffze through
testimony that she had been sexually involved only with one
man, the petitioner, at the time of her conception.38Rodulfo
corroborated her testimony that the petitioner and the
respondent had intimate relationship.39

On the other hand, the petitioner did not deny that he had
sexual encounters with the respondent, only that it occurred
on a much later date than the respondent asserted, such that
it was physically impossible for the respondent to have been
three (3) months pregnant already in September 1994 when
he was informed of the pregnancy.40 However, the petitioner
failed to substantiate his allegations of infidelity and
insinuations of promiscuity. His allegations, therefore, cannot
be given credence for lack of evidentiary support. The
petitioners denial cannot overcome the respondents clear
and categorical assertions.
The petitioner, as the RTC did, made much of the variance
between the respondents direct testimony regarding their
first sexual contact as "sometime in September 1993" and
her cross-testimony when she stated that their first sexual
contact was "last week of January 1993," as follows:
ATTY. GO CINCO:
Since filiation is beyond question, support follows as a matter

of obligation; a parent is obliged to support his child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate.45 Support consists of everything
indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical
attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the
financial capacity of the family.46 Thus, the amount of support
is variable and, for this reason, no final judgment on the
amount of support is made as the amount shall be in
proportion to the resources or means of the giver and the
necessities of the recipient.47 It may be reduced or increased
proportionately according to the reduction or increase of the
necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of
the person obliged to support.48
In this case, we sustain the award of P 2,000.00 monthly
child support, without prejudice to the filing of the proper
motion in the RTC for the determination of any support in
arrears, considering the needs of the child, Gliffze, during the
pendency of this case.
A Third week of December 1992.
WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of

merit. The March 5, 2004 decision and the July 27, 2004
resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA GR CV No. 76326
are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
Q And you accepted him?
SO ORDERED.
When did the defendant, according to you, start courting

you?
A Last week of January 1993.

Q And by October you already had your sexual intercourse?
A Last week of January 1993.
PERLA v. BARING
COURT: What do you mean by accepting?

SUPREME COURT
Manila
A I accepted his offer of love.41

We find that the contradictions are for the most part more
apparent than real, having resulted from the failure of the
respondent to comprehend the question posed, but this
misunderstanding was later corrected and satisfactorily
explained. Indeed, when confronted for her contradictory
statements, the respondent explained that that portion of the
transcript of stenographic notes was incorrect and she had
brought it to the attention of Atty. Josefino Go Cinco (her
former counsel) but the latter took no action on the matter.42
Jurisprudence teaches that in assessing the credibility of a
witness, his testimony must be considered in its entirety
instead of in truncated parts. The technique in deciphering a
testimony is not to consider only its isolated parts and to
anchor a conclusion based on these parts. "In ascertaining
the facts established by a witness, everything stated by him
on direct, cross and redirect examinations must be calibrated
and considered."43 Evidently, the totality of the respondent's
testimony positively and convincingly shows that no real
inconsistency exists. The respondent has consistently
asserted that she started intimate sexual relations with the
petitioner sometime in September 1993.44
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 172471
November 12, 2012
ANTONIO PERLA, Petitioner,

vs.
MIRASOL BARING and RANDY PERLA, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
"An order for x x x support x x x must be issued only if
paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing
evidence."1
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari 2 is the
March 31, 2005 Decision3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 79312 which dismissed petitioner Antonio
Perlas (Antonio) appeal from the February 26, 2003

Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo City,
Branch 71 in Civil Case No. 96-3952, ordering him to give
monthly support to respondent Randy Perla (Randy).
Likewise assailed is the CAs May 5, 2006
Resolution5denying the motion for reconsideration thereto.
Factual Antecedents
Respondent Mirasol Baring (Mirasol) and her then minor
son, Randy (collectively respondents), filed before the RTC a
Complaint6 for support against Antonio.
They alleged in said Complaint that Mirasol and Antonio lived
together as common-law spouses for two years. As a result
of said cohabitation, Randy was born on November 11, 1983.
However, when Antonio landed a job as seaman, he
abandoned them and failed to give any support to his son.
Respondents thus prayed that Antonio be ordered to support
Randy.
7
In his Answer with Counterclaim, Antonio, who is now

married and has a family of his own, denied having fathered
Randy. Although he admitted to having known Mirasol, he
averred that she never became his common-law wife nor
was she treated as such. And since Mirasol had been
intimidating and pestering him as early as 1992 with various
suits by insisting that Randy is his son, Antonio sought moral
and exemplary damages by way of counterclaim from
respondents.
During trial, Mirasol testified that from 1981 to 1983, she
lived in Upper Bicutan, Taguig where Antonio was a
neighbor.8 In the first week of January 1981, Antonio courted
her9 and eventually became her first boyfriend.10Antonio
would then visit her everyday until 1982.11 Upon clarificatory
question by the court whether she and Antonio eventually
lived together as husband and wife, Mirasol answered that
they were just sweethearts.12
When Mirasol became pregnant in 1983, Antonio assured
her that he would support her.13 Eventually, however, Antonio
started to evade her.14 Mirasol last saw Antonio in 1983 but
could not remember the particular month.15
On November 11, 1983, Mirasol gave birth to Randy.16 She
presented Randys Certificate of Live Birth17 and Baptismal
Certificate18 indicating her and Antonio as parents of the
child. Mirasol testified that she and Antonio supplied the
information in the said certificates.19 Antonio supplied his
name and birthplace after Erlinda Balmori (Erlinda), the
"hilot" who assisted in Mirasols delivery of Randy, went to
his house to solicit the said information.20Mirasol also
claimed that it was Erlinda who supplied the date and place
of marriage of the parents so that the latter can file the birth
certificate.21 Mirasol likewise confirmed that she is the same
"Mirasol Perla" who signed as the informant therein.22
Next to take the witness stand was Randy who at that time
was just 15 years old.23 Randy claimed that he knew Antonio
to be the husband of her mother and as his father.24 He
recounted having met him for the first time in 1994 in the
house of his Aunt Lelita, Antonios sister, where he was
vacationing.25 During their encounter, Randy called Antonio
"Papa" and kissed his hand while the latter hugged
him.26 When Randy asked him for support, Antonio promised
that he would support him.27 Randy further testified that
during his one-week stay in his Aunt Lelitas place, the latter
treated him as member of the family.28
For her part, Aurora Ducay testified that she knew both
Mirasol and Antonio as they were neighbors in Upper
Bicutan, Taguig. Presently, Antonio is still her neighbor in the
said place.29 According to her, she knew of Mirasols and
Antonios relationship because aside from seeing Antonio
frequenting the house of Mirasol, she asked Antonio about
it.30 She further narrated that the two have a son named
Randy31 and that Antonios mother even tried to get the child
from Mirasol.32
Testifying as an adverse witness for the respondents,
Antonio admitted having sexual intercourse with Mirasol in
February and August33 of 1981.34 When shown with Randys
Certificate of Live Birth and asked whether he had a hand in
the preparation of the same, Antonio answered in the
negative.35
Testifying for himself, Antonio denied having courted Mirasol
on January 5, 1981 because during that time, he was
studying in Iloilo City. He graduated from the Iloilo Maritime
Academy in March of 198136 as shown by his diploma.37 It
was only in May 1981 or after his graduation that he came to
Manila. Further, he denied having any relationship with
Mirasol.38 He claimed that he had sexual intercourse with
Mirasol only once which happened in the month of
September or October of 1981.39
Antonio came to know that he was being imputed as the
father of Randy only when Mirasol charged him with
abandonment of minor in 1994, which was also the first time
he saw Randy.40 Prior to that, neither Mirasol nor her sister,
Norma, whom he met a few times told him about the child.41
Anent Randys Certificate of Live Birth, Antonio testified as to
several inaccuracies in the entries thereon. According to him,
his middle initial is "E" and not "A" as appearing in the said
certificate of live birth.42 Also, he is not a protestant and a
laborer as indicated in said certificate.43 Antonio likewise
alleged that Mirasol only made up the entries with respect to
their marriage on October 28, 1981.44
Daisy Balmori Rodriguez (Daisy), for her part, testified that
she came to know Mirasol through her mother Erlinda who
was the "hilot" when Mirasol gave birth to Randy.45 She
narrated that her mother asked Mirasol the details to be
entered in the childs Certificate of Live Birth such as the
names of the parents, date and place of marriage, and the
intended name of the child.46 Her mother also told her that
Mirasols son has no acknowledged father.47 Daisy likewise
claimed that Mirasol later left to her care the then infant

Randy until Mirasol took him away without permission when
the child was almost five years old.48
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Issue
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision 49 dated February 26,
2003 ordering Antonio to support Randy.
The pivotal issue to be resolved in this case is whether the

lower courts correctly ordered Antonio to support Randy.
Our Ruling
The RTC ruled that Mirasol and Randy are entitled to the
relief sought since Antonio himself admitted that he had sex
with Mirasol. It also noted that when the 15-year old Randy
testified, he categorically declared Antonio as his father. The
RTC opined that Mirasol would not have gone through the
trouble of exposing herself to humiliation, shame and ridicule
of public trial if her allegations were untrue. Antonios
counterclaim was denied due to the absence of bad faith or
ill-motive on the part of Mirasol and Randy.
The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff Randy Perla and against the defendant Antonio
Perla, ordering the latter to give a reasonable monthly
support of P5,000.00 to Randy Perla for his sustenance and
support to be given to him from the time of the filing of this
Complaint.
Defendants counterclaim is DISMISSED.
There is merit in the petition.

A re-examination of the factual findings
of the RTC and the CA is proper in this
case.
"Generally, factual findings of trial courts, when affirmed by
the CA, are binding on this Court." 57 However, this rule
admits of certain exceptions such as when the finding is
grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures
or when the judgment of the CA is based on
misapprehension of facts.58 As this case falls under these
exceptions, the Court is constrained to re-examine the
factual findings of the lower courts.
Since respondents complaint for support
is anchored on Randys alleged
illegitimate filiation to Antonio, the lower
courts should have first made a
determination of the same.
SO ORDERED.50
Antonio filed a Notice of Appeal51 which was given due
course by the RTC.52
In its Decision53 of March 31, 2005, the CA upheld Randys
illegitimate filiation based on the certified true copies of his
birth certificate and of his baptismal certificate identifying
Antonio as his father. According to the appellate court, while
these documents do not bear the signature of Antonio, they
are proofs that Antonio is the known, imputed and identified
father of Randy. The CA also affirmed the trial courts
findings on the credibility of the witnesses and its
appreciation of facts, as there was nothing to suggest that
the RTC erred in such respects. It highlighted Antonios
vacillation in his testimony regarding the number of times he
had sex with Mirasol and concluded that the same is a clear
badge of his lack of candor - a good reason to disregard his
denials. Thus:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the appealed
Decision is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.54
55
Antonio filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was

denied by the CA in its Resolution56 of May 5, 2006.
Respondents Complaint for support is based on Randys

alleged illegitimate filiation to Antonio. Hence, for Randy to
be entitled for support, his filiation must be established with
sufficient certainty. A review of the Decision of the RTC would
show that it is bereft of any discussion regarding Randys
filiation. Although the appellate court, for its part, cited the
applicable provision on illegitimate filiation, it merely declared
the certified true copies of Randys birth certificate and
baptismal certificate both identifying Antonio as the father as
good proofs of his filiation with Randy and nothing more. This
is despite the fact that the said documents do not bear
Antonios signature. "Time and again, this Court has ruled
that a high standard of proof is required to establish paternity
and filiation. An order for x x x support may create an
unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the family or
the lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if
paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing
evidence."59
Respondents failed to establish Randys
illegitimate filiation to Antonio.
The rules for establishing filiation are found in Articles 172
and 175 of the Family Code which provide as follows:
Article 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established
by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register
or a final judgment; or
document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned.
(1) The open and continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court
and special laws.
xxxx
Article 175. Illegitimate children may establish their
xxxx
Respondents presented the Certificate of Live Birth of Randy
identifying Antonio as the father. However, said certificate
has no probative value to establish Randys filiation to
Antonio since the latter had not signed the same. 60It is
settled that "a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying
the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity
when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand
in the preparation of said certificate."61 We also cannot lend
credence to Mirasols claim that Antonio supplied certain
information through Erlinda. Aside from Antonios denial in
having any participation in the preparation of the document
as well as the absence of his signature thereon, respondents
did not present Erlinda to confirm that Antonio indeed
supplied certain entries in Randys birth certificate. Besides,
the several unexplained discrepancies in Antonios personal
circumstances as reflected in the subject birth certificate are
manifestations of Antonios non-participation in its
preparation. Most important, it was Mirasol who signed as
informant thereon which she confirmed on the witness stand.
Neither does the testimony of Randy establish his illegitimate
filiation. That during their first encounter in 1994 Randy
called Antonio "Papa" and kissed his hand while Antonio
hugged him and promised to support him; or that his Aunt
Lelita treated him as a relative and was good to him during
his one-week stay in her place, cannot be considered as
indications of Randys open and continuous possession of
the status of an illegitimate child under the second paragraph
of Article 172(1). "[T]o prove open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there must
be evidence of the manifestation of the permanent intention
of the supposed father to consider the child as his, by
continuous and clear manifestations of parental affection and
care,
which
cannot
be
attributed
to
pure
charity.1wphi1 Such acts must be of such a nature that they
reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also the
apparent desire to have and treat the child as such in all

relations in society and in life, not accidentally, but
continuously."62 Here, the single instance that Antonio
allegedly hugged Randy and promised to support him cannot
be considered as proof of continuous possession of the
status of a child. To emphasize, "[t]he fathers conduct
towards his son must be spontaneous and uninterrupted for
this ground to exist."63 Here, except for that singular occasion
in which they met, there are no other acts of Antonio treating
Randy as his son.64 Neither can Antonios paternity be
deduced from how his sister Lelita treated Randy. To this
Court, Lelitas actuations could have been done due to
charity or some other reasons.
Anent Randys baptismal certificate, we cannot agree with
the CA that the same is a good proof of Antonios paternity of
Randy. Just like in a birth certificate, the lack of participation
of the supposed father in the preparation of a baptismal
certificate renders this document incompetent to prove
paternity.65 And "while a baptismal certificate may be
considered a public document, it can only serve as evidence
of the administration of the sacrament on the date specified
but not the veracity of the entries with respect to the childs
paternity. Thus, x x x baptismal certificates are per se
inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation and they cannot
be admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove the
same."66
This Court cannot likewise agree with the RTCs conclusion
that Antonio fathered Randy merely on the basis of his
admission that he had sexual encounters with Mirasol.
Neither does it agree with the CA that the inconsistencies in
Antonios testimony with regard to the number of times he
had sexual intercourse with Mirasol are good reasons to
disregard his denials and uphold the respondents claims. It
is well to stress that as plaintiff, Mirasol has the burden of
proving her affirmative allegation that Antonio is the father of
her son Randy.67 She must rely on the strength of her
evidence and not on the weakness of the defense. 68 As
Randy was born on November 11, 1983, it was incumbent
upon Mirasol to prove that she had sexual intercourse with
Antonio prior to the usual period of pregnancy or nine
months before the birth of Randy. This crucial period
therefore is during the early part of the first quarter of 1983.
However, nothing from Mirasols testimony indicates that she
had sexual intercourse with Antonio during that time.
She merely testified that she last met with Antonio in 1983
but could not remember the particular month.69 Plainly, this
hardly means anything not only because it was not
established that the said meeting took place during that
crucial period but also because Mirasol never mentioned that
they had sexual contact during their meeting.
Antonios admission of sexual intercourse with Mirasol does
not likewise by any means strengthen respondents theory
that he fathered Randy. When Antonio testified as an
adverse witness for the respondents, he stated that he had
sexual intercourse with Mirasol in February and August of
1981. Later testifying as witness for his own behalf, he

mentioned that he had a one night affair with Mirasol which
happened in the month of September or October of 1981.
Assuming that he indeed had sexual contact with Mirasol on
the dates mentioned, still, none of these sexual congresses
could have led to the conception of Randy who was born two
years later in 1983.
All told, it is clear that respondents failed to establish
Randys illegitimate filiation to Antonio. Hence, the order for
Antonio to support Randy has no basis.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is
GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated March 31, 2005
and Resolution dated May 5, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 79312 are REVERSED and SER ASIDE
and the Decision dated February 26, 2003 of the Regional
Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 71, in Civil Case No. 963952 is VACATED. A new one is entered DISMISSING the
Complaint for Support filed by Mirasol Baring and Randy
Perla against Antonio Perla.
SO ORDERED.
SALAS v. MATUSALEM
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 180284, September 11, 2013
NARCISO SALAS, Petitioners, v.ANNABELLE
MATUSALEM, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari which

seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision 1dated July 18,
2006 and Resolution2 dated October 19, 2007 of the Court of
Appeals
(CA)
in
CA-G.R.
CV
No.
64379.
The
factual
antecedents:
On May 26, 1995, Annabelle Matusalem (respondent) filed a

complaint for Support/Damages against Narciso Salas
(petitioner) in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ofCabanatuan
City
(Civil
Case
No.
2124-AF).
Respondent claimed that petitioner is. the father of her son
Christian Paulo Salas who was born on December 28, 1994.

Petitioner, already 56 years old at the time, enticed her as
she was then only 24 years old, making her believe that he is
a widower. Petitioner rented an apartment where respondent
stayed and shouldered all expenses in the delivery of their
child, including the cost of caesarian operation and hospital
confinement. However, when respondent refused the offer of
petitioners family to take the child from her, petitioner
abandoned respondent and her child and left them to the
mercy of relatives and friends. Respondent further alleged
that she attempted suicide due to depression but still
petitioner refused to support her and their child.
Respondent thus prayed for support pendente lite and
monthly support in the amount of P20,000.00, as well as
actual, moral and exemplary damages, and attorneys fees.
Petitioner filed his answer4 with special and affirmative
defenses and counterclaims. He described respondent as a
woman of loose morals, having borne her first child also out
of wedlock when she went to work in Italy. Jobless upon her
return to the country, respondent spent time riding on
petitioners jeepney which was then being utilized by a
female real estate agent named Felicisima de Guzman.
Respondent had seduced a senior police officer in San Isidro
and her charge of sexual abuse against said police officer
was later withdrawn in exchange for the quashing of drug
charges against respondents brother-in-law who was then
detained at the municipal jail. It was at that time respondent
introduced herself to petitioner whom she pleaded for charity
as she was pregnant with another child. Petitioner denied
paternity of the child Christian Paulo; he was motivated by
no other reason except genuine altruism when he agreed to
shoulder the expenses for the delivery of said child, unaware
of respondents chicanery and deceit designed to
scandalize him in exchange for financial favor.
At the trial, respondent and her witness Grace Murillo
testified. Petitioner was declared to have waived his right to
present evidence and the case was considered submitted for
decision
based
on
respondents
evidence.
Respondent testified that she first met petitioner at the house
of his kumadre Felicisima de Guzman at Bgy. Malapit, San
Isidro, Nueva Ecija. During their subsequent meeting,
petitioner told her he is already a widower and he has no
more companion in life because his children are all grownup. She also learned that petitioner owns a rice mill, a
construction business and a housing subdivision (petitioner
offered her a job at their family-owned Ma. Cristina Village).
Petitioner at the time already knows that she is a single
mother as she had a child by her former boyfriend in Italy. He
then brought her to a motel, promising that he will take care
of her and marry her. She believed him and yielded to his
advances, with the thought that she and her child will have a
better life. Thereafter, they saw each other weekly and
petitioner gave her money for her child. When she became
pregnant with petitioners child, it was only then she learned
that he is in fact not a widower. She wanted to abort the baby
but petitioner opposed it because he wanted to have another
child.5

On the fourth month of her pregnancy, petitioner rented an
apartment where she stayed with a housemaid; he also
provided for all their expenses. She gave birth to their child
on December 28, 1994 at the Good Samaritan Hospital in
Cabanatuan City. Before delivery, petitioner even walked her
at the hospital room and massaged her stomach, saying he
had not done this to his wife. She filled out the form for the
childs birth certificate and wrote all the information supplied
by petitioner himself. It was also petitioner who paid the
hospital bills and drove her baby home. He was excited and
happy to have a son at his advanced age who is his lookalike, and this was witnessed by other boarders, visitors and
Grace Murillo, the owner of the apartment unit petitioner
rented. However, on the 18th day after the babys birth,
petitioner went to Baguio City for a medical check-up. He
confessed to her daughter and eventually his wife was also
informed about his having sired an illegitimate child. His
family then decided to adopt the baby and just give
respondent money so she can go abroad. When she refused
this offer, petitioner stopped seeing her and sending money
to her. She and her baby survived through the help of
relatives and friends. Depressed, she tried to commit suicide
by drug overdose and was brought to the hospital by Murillo
who paid the bill. Murillo sought the help of the Cabanatuan
City Police Station which set their meeting with petitioner.
However, it was only petitioners wife who showed up and
she was very mad, uttering unsavory words against
respondent.6
Murillo corroborated respondents testimony as to the
payment by petitioner of apartment rental, his weekly visits to
respondent and financial support to her, his presence during
and after delivery of respondents baby, respondents
attempted suicide through sleeping pills overdose and
hospitalization for which she paid the bill, her complaint
before the police authorities and meeting with petitioners
wife
at
the
headquarters.7
On April 5, 1999, the trial court rendered its decision8 in favor
of respondent, the dispositive portion of which
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant as
follows:
1.
Ordering the defendant to give as monthly support

of TWO THOUSAND (P2,000.00) PESOS for the
child Christian Paulo through the mother;
2.
Directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum

of P20,000.00 by way of litigation expenses; and
3.
To pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.9
Petitioner appealed to the CA arguing that: (1) the trial court
decided the case without affording him the right to introduce
evidence on his defense; and (2) the trial court erred in

finding that petitioner is the putative father of Christian Paulo
and
ordering
him
to
give
monthly
support.
By Decision dated July 18, 2006, the CA dismissed
petitioners appeal. The appellate court found no reason to
disturb the trial courts exercise of discretion in denying
petitioners motion for postponement on April 17, 1998, the
scheduled hearing for the initial presentation of defendants
evidence, and the motion for reconsideration of the said
order denying the motion for postponement and submitting
the
case
for
decision.
On the paternity issue, the CA affirmed the trial courts ruling
that respondent satisfactorily established the illegitimate
filiation of her son Christian Paulo, and consequently no
error was committed by the trial court in granting
respondents prayer for support. The appellate court thus
held:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Christian Paulo, in instant case, does not enjoy the benefit of
a record of birth in the civil registry which bears
acknowledgment signed by Narciso Salas. He cannot claim
open and continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate
child.
It had been established by plaintiffs evidence, however, that
during her pregnancy, Annabelle was provided by Narciso
Salas with an apartment at a rental of P1,500.00 which he
paid for (TSN, October 6, 1995, p. 18). Narciso provided her
with a household help with a salary of P1,500.00 a month
(TSN, October 6, 1995, ibid). He also provided her a monthly
food allowance of P1,500.00 (Ibid, p. 18). Narciso was with
Annabelle at the hospital while the latter was in labor,
walking her around and massaging her belly (Ibid, p. 11).
Narciso brought home Christian Paulo to the rented
apartment after Annabelles discharge from the hospital.
People living in the same apartment units were witnesses to
Narcisos delight to father a son at his age which was his
look alike. It was only after the 18th day when Annabelle
refused to give him Christian Paulo that Narciso withdrew his
support
to
him
and
his
mother.
Said testimony of Annabelle aside from having been
corroborated by Grace Murillo, the owner of the apartment
which Narciso rented, was never rebutted on record. Narciso
did not present any evidence, verbal or documentary, to
repudiate
plaintiffs
evidence.
In the cases of Lim vs. CA (270 SCRA 1) and Rodriguez vs.
CA (245 SCRA 150), the Supreme Court made it clear that
Article 172 of the Family Code is an adaptation of Article 283
of the Civil Code. Said legal provision provides that the
father is obliged to recognize the child as his natural child x x
3) when the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that
the
defendant
is
his
father.
In fact, in Ilano vs. CA (230 SCRA 242, 258-259), it was held
that
The last paragraph of Article 283 contains a blanket
provision that practically covers all the other cases in the

preceding paragraphs. Any other evidence or proof that the
defendant is the father is broad enough to render
unnecessary the other paragraphs of this article. When the
evidence submitted in the action for compulsory recognition
is not sufficient to meet [the] requirements of the first three
paragraphs, it may still be enough under the last paragraph.
This paragraph permits hearsay and reputation evidence, as
provided in the Rules of Court, with respect to illegitimate
filiation.
As a necessary consequence of the finding that Christian
Paulo is the son of defendant Narciso Salas, he is entitled to
support
from
the
latter
(Ilano
vs.
CA, supra).
It shall be demandable from the time the person who has
the right to recover the same needs it for maintenance x x.
(Art. 203, Family Code of the Philippines).10
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied
by
the
CA.
Hence,
this
petition
submitting
arguments:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
the
following
1. THE VENUE OF THE CASE WAS IMPROPERLY LAID

BEFORE
THE
REGIONAL
TRIAL
COURT
OF
CABANATUAN CITY CONSIDERING THAT BOTH
PETITIONER
AND
RESPONDENT ARE
ACTUAL
RESIDENTS OF BRGY. MALAPIT, SAN ISIDRO, NUEVA
ECIJA.
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
PRONOUNCING THAT PETITIONER WAS AFFORDED
THE FULL MEASURE OF HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS
OF LAW AND IN UPHOLDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT
DID
NOT
GRAVELY ABUSE
ITS
DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
WHEN IT DECIDED THE INSTANT CASE WITHOUT
AFFORDING PETITIONER THE RIGHT TO INTRODUCE
EVIDENCE
IN
HIS
DEFENSE.
3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE FILIATION OF CHRISTIAN PAULO
WAS DULY ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 175
IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 172 OF THE FAMILY CODE
AND EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE AND THEREFORE
ENTITLED TO SUPPORT FROM THE PETITIONER.11
We
grant
the
petition.
It is a legal truism that the rules on the venue of personal

actions are fixed for the convenience of the plaintiffs and
their witnesses. Equally settled, however, is the principle that
choosing the venue of an action is not left to a plaintiffs
caprice; the matter is regulated by the Rules of Court. 12
In personal actions such as the instant case, the Rules give
the plaintiff the option of choosing where to file his complaint.
He can file it in the place (1) where he himself or any of them
resides, or (2) where the defendant or any of the defendants
resides or may be found.13 The plaintiff or the defendant
must be residents of the place where the action has been
instituted
at
the
time
the
action
is
commenced.14
However, petitioner raised the issue of improper venue for

the first time in the Answer itself and no prior motion to
dismiss based on such ground was filed. Under the Rules of
Court before the 1997 amendments, an objection to an
improper venue must be made before a responsive pleading
is filed. Otherwise, it will be deemed waived. 15 Not having
been timely raised, petitioners objection on venue is
therefore
deemed
waived.
As to the denial of the motion for postponement filed by his
counsel for the resetting of the initial presentation of defense
evidence on April 17, 1998, we find that it was not the first
time petitioners motion for postponement was denied by the
trial
court.
Records disclosed that after the termination of the testimony
of respondents last witness on November 29, 1996, the trial
court as prayed for by the parties, set the continuation of
hearing for the reception of evidence for the defendant
(petitioner) on January 27, February 3, and February 10,
1997. In the Order dated December 17, 1996, petitioner was
advised to be ready with his evidence at those hearing dates
earlier scheduled. At the hearing on January 27, 1997,
petitioners former counsel, Atty. Rolando S. Bala, requested
for the cancellation of the February 3 and 10, 1997 hearings
in order to give him time to prepare for his defense, which
request was granted by the trial court which thus reset the
hearing dates to March 3, 14 and 17, 1997. On March 3,
1997, upon oral manifestation by Atty. Bala and without
objection from respondents counsel, Atty. Feliciano Wycoco,
the trial court again reset the hearing to March 14 and 17,
1997. With the non-appearance of both petitioner and Atty.
Bala on March 14, 1997, the trial court upon oral
manifestation by Atty. Wycoco declared their absence as a
waiver of their right to present evidence and accordingly
deemed
the
case
submitted
for
decision. 16
On July 4, 1997, Atty. Bala withdrew as counsel for petitioner
and Atty. Rafael E. Villarosa filed his appearance as his new
counsel on July 21, 1997. On the same date he filed entry of
appearance, Atty. Villarosa filed a motion for reconsideration
of the March 14, 1997 Order pleading for liberality and
magnanimity of the trial court, without offering any
explanation for Atty. Balas failure to appear for the initial
presentation of their evidence. The trial court thereupon
reconsidered its March 14, 1997 Order, finding it better to
give petitioner a chance to present his evidence. On August
26, 1997, Atty. Villarosa received a notice of hearing for the
presentation of their evidence scheduled on September 22,
1997. On August 29, 1997, the trial court received his motion
requesting that the said hearing be re-set to October 10,
1997 for the reason that he had requested the postponement
of a hearing in another case which was incidentally
scheduled on September 22, 23 and 24, 1997. As prayed for,
the trial court reset the hearing to October 10, 1997. On said
date, however, the hearing was again moved to December
15, 1997. On February 16, 1998, the trial court itself reset
the hearing to April 17, 1998 since it was unclear whether
Atty. Wycoco received a copy of the motion.17

On April 17, 1998, petitioner and his counsel failed to appear
but the trial court received on April 16, 1998 an urgent
motion to cancel hearing filed by Atty. Villarosa. The reason
given by the latter was the scheduled hearing on the
issuance of writ of preliminary injunction in another case
under the April 8, 1998 Order issued by the RTC of Gapan,
Nueva Ecija, Branch 36 in Civil Case No. 1946. But as
clearly stated in the said order, it was the plaintiffs therein
who requested the postponement of the hearing and it
behoved Atty. Villarosa to inform the RTC of Gapan that he
had a previous commitment considering that the April 17,
1998 hearing was scheduled as early as February 16, 1998.
Acting on the motion for postponement, the trial court
denied for the second time petitioners motion for
postponement. Even at the hearing of their motion for
reconsideration of the April 17, 1998 Order on September
21, 1998, Atty. Villarosa failed to appear and instead filed
another motion for postponement. The trial court thus
ordered that the case be submitted for decision stressing
that the case had long been pending and that petitioner and
his counsel have been given opportunities to present their
evidence. It likewise denied a second motion for
reconsideration filed by Atty. Villarosa, who arrived late
during the hearing thereof on December 4, 1998.18
A motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of
right, but a request addressed to the sound discretion of the
court. Parties asking for postponement have absolutely no
right to assume that their motions would be granted. Thus,
they must be prepared on the day of the hearing. 19 Indeed,
an order declaring a party to have waived the right to present
evidence for performing dilatory actions upholds the trial
courts duty to ensure that trial proceeds despite the
deliberate delay and refusal to proceed on the part of one
party.20
Atty. Villarosas plea for liberality was correctly rejected by
the trial court in view of his own negligence in failing to
ensure there will be no conflict in his trial schedules. As we
held
in Tiomico
v.
Court
of
Appeals21:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Motions for postponement are generally frowned upon by
Courts if there is evidence of bad faith, malice or inexcusable
negligence on the part of the movant. The inadvertence of
the defense counsel in failing to take note of the trial dates
and in belatedly informing the trial court of any conflict in his
schedules of trial or court appearances, constitutes
inexcusable negligence. It should be borne in mind that a
client is bound by his counsels conduct, negligence and
mistakes in handling the case.22
With our finding that there was no abuse of discretion in the
trial courts denial of the motion for postponement filed by
petitioners counsel, petitioners contention that he was
deprived of his day in court must likewise fail. The essence
of due process is that a party is given a reasonable
opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may
have in support of ones defense. Where a party was
afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but
failed to do so, he cannot complain of deprivation of due

process. If the opportunity is not availed of, it is deemed
waived or forfeited without violating the constitutional
guarantee.23
We now proceed to the main issue of whether the trial and
appellate courts erred in ruling that respondents evidence
sufficiently proved that her son Christian Paulo is the
illegitimate
child
of
petitioner.
Under Article 175 of the Family Code of the Philippines,
illegitimate filiation may be established in the same way and
on the same evidence
as legitimate
children.
Article
172
of
the Family
Code
Philippines states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
of
the
The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the

following:
judgment;
or
concerned.
filiation
shall
be
proved
by:
legitimate
child;
or
special laws. (Underscoring supplied.)
Respondent presented the Certificate of Live Birth24 (Exhibit
A-1) of Christian Paulo Salas in which the name of
petitioner appears as his father but which is not signed by
him. Admittedly, it was only respondent who filled up the
entries and signed the said document though she claims it
was petitioner who supplied the information she wrote
therein.
We have held that a certificate of live birth purportedly
identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of
paternity when there is no showing that the putative father
had a hand in the preparation of the certificate.25 Thus, if the
father did not sign in the birth certificate, the placing of his
name by the mother, doctor, registrar, or other person is
incompetent evidence of paternity.26 Neither can such birth
certificate be taken as a recognition in a public
instrument27 and it has no probative value to establish
filiation
to
the
alleged
father.28
As to the Baptismal Certificate29 (Exhibit B) of Christian
Paulo Salas also indicating petitioner as the father, we have
ruled that while baptismal certificates may be considered
public documents, they can only serve as evidence of the
administration of the sacraments on the dates so specified.
They are not necessarily competent evidence of the veracity

of entries therein with respect to the childs paternity.30
The rest of respondents documentary evidence consists of
handwritten notes and letters, hospital bill and photographs
taken of petitioner and respondent inside their rented
apartment
unit.
Pictures taken of the mother and her child together with the
alleged father are inconclusive evidence to prove
paternity.31 Exhibits E and F32 showing petitioner and
respondent inside the rented apartment unit thus have scant
evidentiary value. The Statement of Account33 (Exhibit C)
from the Good Samaritan General Hospital where
respondent herself was indicated as the payee is likewise
incompetent to prove that petitioner is the father of her child
notwithstanding petitioners admission in his answer that he
shouldered the expenses in the delivery of respondents child
as
an
act
of
charity.
As to the handwritten notes34 (Exhibits D to D-13) of
petitioner and respondent showing their exchange of
affectionate words and romantic trysts, these, too, are not
sufficient to establish Christian Paulos filiation to petitioner
as they were not signed by petitioner and contained no
statement of admission by petitioner that he is the father of
said child. Thus, even if these notes were authentic, they do
not qualify under Article 172 (2) vis-- vis Article 175 of the
Family Code which admits as competent evidence of
illegitimate filiation an admission of filiation in a private
handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned.35
Petitioners reliance on our ruling in Lim v. Court of
Appeals36 is misplaced. In the said case, the handwritten
letters of petitioner contained a clear admission that he is the
father of private respondents daughter and were signed by
him. The Court therein considered the totality of evidence
which established beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner
was indeed the father of private respondents daughter. On
the other hand, in Ilano v. Court of Appeals,37 the Court
sustained the appellate courts finding that private
respondents evidence to establish her filiation with and
paternity of petitioner was overwhelming, particularly the
latters public acknowledgment of his amorous relationship
with private respondents mother, and private respondent as
his own child through acts and words, her testimonial
evidence to that effect was fully supported by documentary
evidence. The Court thus ruled that respondent had adduced
sufficient proof of continuous possession of status of a
spurious
child.
Here, while the CA held that Christian Paulo Salas could not
claim open and continuous possession of status of an
illegitimate child, it nevertheless considered the testimonial
evidence sufficient proof to establish his filiation to petitioner.
An illegitimate child is now also allowed to establish his
claimed filiation by any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws, like his baptismal certificate, a
judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has been
entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree,
admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and
other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules

of Court.38Reviewing the records, we find the totality of
respondents evidence insufficient to establish that petitioner
is
the
father
of
Christian
Paulo.
The testimonies of respondent and Murillo as to the
circumstances of the birth of Christian Paulo, petitioners
financial support while respondent lived in Murillos
apartment and his regular visits to her at the said apartment,
though replete with details, do not approximate the
overwhelming evidence, documentary and testimonial
presented in Ilano. In that case, we sustained the appellate
courts ruling anchored on the following factual findings by
the appellate court which was quoted at length in
theponencia:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
It was Artemio who made arrangement for the delivery of
Merceditas (sic) at the Manila Sanitarium and Hospital. Prior
to the delivery, Leoncia underwent prenatal examination
accompanied by Artemio (TSN, p. 33, 5/17/74). After
delivery, they went home to their residence at EDSA in a car
owned and driven by Artemio himself (id. p. 36).
Merceditas (sic) bore the surname of Ilano since birth
without any objection on the part of Artemio, the fact that
since Merceditas (sic) had her discernment she had always
known and called Artemio as her Daddy (TSN, pp. 28-29,
10/18/74); the fact that each time Artemio was at home, he
would play with Merceditas (sic), take her for a ride or
restaurants to eat, and sometimes sleeping with Merceditas
(sic) (id. p. 34) and does all what a father should do for his
child bringing home goodies, candies, toys and whatever
he can bring her which a child enjoys which Artemio gives to
Merceditas (sic) (TSN, pp. 38-39, 5/17/74) are positive
evidence that Merceditas (sic) is the child of Artemio and
recognized by Artemio as such. Special attention is called to
Exh. E-7 where Artemio was telling Leoncia the need for a
frog
test
to
know
the
status
of
Leoncia.
Plaintiff pointed out that the support by Artemio for Leoncia
and Merceditas (sic) was sometimes in the form of cash
personally delivered to her by Artemio, thru Melencio, thru
Elynia (Exhs. E-2 and E-3, and D-6), or thru Merceditas
(sic) herself (TSN, p. 40, 5/17/74) and sometimes in the form
of a check as the Manila Banking Corporation Check No.
81532 (Exh. G) and the signature appearing therein which
was identified by Leoncia as that of Artemio because Artemio
often gives her checks and Artemio would write the check at
home and saw Artemio sign the check (TSN, p. 49, 7/18/73).
Both Artemio and Nilda admitted that the check and
signature were those of Artemio (TSN, p. 53, 10/17/77; TSN,
p.
19,
10/9/78).
During the time that Artemio and Leoncia were living as
husband and wife, Artemio has shown concern as the father
of Merceditas (sic). When Merceditas (sic) was in Grade 1 at
the St. Joseph Parochial School, Artemio signed the Report
Card of Merceditas (sic) (Exh. H) for the fourth and fifth
grading period(s) (Exh. H-1 and H-2) as the parent of
Merceditas (sic). Those signatures of Artemio [were] both
identified by Leoncia and Merceditas (sic) because Artemio

signed Exh. H-1 and H-2 at their residence in the
presence of Leoncia, Merceditas (sic) and of Elynia (TSN, p.
57, 7/18/73; TSN, p. 28, 10/1/73). x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
When Artemio run as a candidate in the Provincial Board of
Cavite[,] Artemio gave Leoncia his picture with the following
dedication: To Nene, with best regards, Temiong. (Exh. I).
(pp.
19-20,
Appellants
Brief)
The mere denial by defendant of his signature is not
sufficient to offset the totality of the evidence indubitably
showing that the signature thereon belongs to him. The entry
in the Certificate of Live Birth that Leoncia and Artemio was
falsely stated therein as married does not mean that Leoncia
is not appellees daughter. This particular entry was caused
to be made by Artemio himself in order to avoid
embarrassment.39
In sum, we hold that the testimonies of respondent and
Murillo, by themselves are not competent proof of paternity
and the totality of respondents evidence failed to establish
Christian
Paulos
filiation
to
petitioner.
Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of
proof is required to establish paternity and filiation. An order
for recognition and support may create an unwholesome
situation or may be an irritant to the family or the lives of the
parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is
established by clear and convincing evidence.40
guardian ad
litem for
the
minor
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or

representatives to appear and be substituted within a period
of
thirty
(30)
days
from
notice.
If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the
deceased party, or if the one so named shall fail to appear
within the specified period, the court may order the opposing
party, within a specified time to procure the appointment of
an executor or administrator for the estate of the deceased
and the latter shall immediately appear for and on behalf of
the deceased. The court charges in procuring such
appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be
recovered as costs.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari
is GRANTED. The Decision dated July 18, 2006 and
Resolution dated October 19, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-GR. CV No. 64379 are herebyREVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Civil Case No. 2124-AF of the Regional Trial Court
of
Cabanatuan
City,
Branch
26
is DISMISSED.
No pronouncement as to costs. chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SO ORDERED.
Finally, we note the Manifestation and Motion 41 filed by

petitioners counsel informing this Court that petitioner had
died
on
May
6,
2010.
The action for support having been filed in the trial court
when petitioner was still alive, it is not barred under Article
175 (2)42 of the Family Code. We have also held that the
death of the putative father is not a bar to the action
commenced during his lifetime by one claiming to be his
illegitimate child.43 The rule on substitution of parties
provided in Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, thus applies.
SEC. 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. Whenever a
party to a pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby
extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the
court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact
thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal
representative or representatives. Failure of counsel to
comply with his duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action.
ADOPTION
LANDINGIN v. REPUBLIC
SUPREME COURT
Manila

The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted
for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an
executor or administrator and the court may appoint a
heirs.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 164948
June 27, 2006

DIWATA RAMOS LANDINGIN Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court is the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 77826 which reversed the Decision 2 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac City, Branch 63 in
Civil Case No. 2733 granting the Petition for Adoption of the
petitioner herein.
The Antecedents
On February 4, 2002, Diwata Ramos Landingin, a citizen of
the United States of America (USA), of Filipino parentage
and a resident of Guam, USA, filed a petition 3 for the
adoption of minors Elaine Dizon Ramos who was born on
August 31, 1986;4 Elma Dizon Ramos, who was born on
September 7, 1987;5 and Eugene Dizon Ramos who was
born on August 5, 1989.6 The minors are the natural children
of Manuel Ramos, petitioners brother, and Amelia Ramos.
Landingin, as petitioner, alleged in her petition that when
Manuel died on May 19, 1990,7 the children were left to their
paternal grandmother, Maria Taruc Ramos; their biological
mother, Amelia, went to Italy, re-married there and now has
two children by her second marriage and no longer
communicated with her children by Manuel Ramos nor with
her in-laws from the time she left up to the institution of the
adoption; the minors are being financially supported by the
petitioner and her children, and relatives abroad; as Maria
passed away on November 23, 2000, petitioner desires to
adopt the children; the minors have given their written
consent8 to the adoption; she is qualified to adopt as shown
by the fact that she is a 57-year-old widow, has children of
her own who are already married, gainfully employed and
have their respective families; she lives alone in her own
home in Guam, USA, where she acquired citizenship, and
works as a restaurant server. She came back to the
Philippines to spend time with the minors; her children gave
their written consent9 to the adoption of the minors.
Petitioners brother, Mariano Ramos, who earns substantial
income, signified his willingness and commitment to support
the minors while in petitioners custody.
Petitioner prayed that, after due hearing, judgment be
rendered in her favor, as follows:
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed to this
Honorable Court that after publication and hearing, judgment
be rendered allowing the adoption of the minor children
Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma Dizon Ramos, and Eugene Dizon
Ramos by the petitioner, and ordering that the minor
childrens name follow the family name of petitioner.
Petitioner prays for such other reliefs, just and equitable

under the premises.10
On March 5, 2002, the court ordered the Department of
Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) to conduct a case
study as mandated by Article 34 of Presidential Decree No.
603, as amended, and to submit a report thereon not later
than April 4, 2002, the date set for the initial hearing of the
petition.11 The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered
its appearance12 but deputized the City Prosecutor of Tarlac
to appear in its behalf.13 Since her petition was unopposed,
petitioner was allowed to present her evidence ex parte.14
The petitioner testified in her behalf. She also presented
Elaine Ramos, the eldest of the adoptees, to testify on the
written consent executed by her and her siblings. 15 The
petitioner marked in evidence the Affidavit of Consent
purportedly executed by her children Ann, Errol, Dennis and
Ricfel Branitley, all surnamed Landingin, and notarized by a
notary public in Guam, USA, as proof of said consent.16
On May 24, 2002, Elizabeth Pagbilao, Social Welfare Officer
II of the DSWD, Field Office III, Tarlac, submitted a Child
Study Report, with the following recommendation:
In view of the foregoing, undersigned finds minors Elaine,
Elma & Eugene all surnamed Ramos, eligible for adoption
because of the following reasons:
1. Minors surviving parent, the mother has voluntarily
consented to their adoption by the paternal aunt, Diwata
Landingin this is in view of her inability to provide the
parental care, guidance and support they need. An Affidavit
of Consent was executed by the mother which is hereto
attached.
2. The three minors subject for adoption have also
expressed their willingness to be adopted and joins the
petitioners in Guam, USA in the future. A joint Affidavit of
consent is hereto attached. The minors developed close
attachment to the petitioners and they regarded her as
second parent.
3. The minors are present under the care of a temporary
guardian who has also family to look after. As young
adolescents they really need parental love, care, guidance
and support to ensure their protection and well being.
In view of the foregoing, it is hereby respectfully
recommended that minors Elaine D. Ramos, Elma D. Ramos
and Eugene D. Ramos be adopted by their maternal aunt
Diwata Landingin. Trial custody is hereby further
recommended to be dispensed with considering that they are
close relatives and that close attachments was already
developed between the petitioner and the 3 minors.17
Pagbilao narrated what transpired during her interview, as
follows:

The mother of minors came home together with her son
John Mario, this May 2002 for 3 weeks vacation. This is to
enable her appear for the personal interview concerning the
adoption of her children.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION

FOR ADOPTION DESPITE THE LACK OF CONSENT OF
THE PROPOSED ADOPTEES BIOLOGICAL MOTHER.
II
The plan for the adoption of minors by their paternal aunt

Diwata Landingin was conceived after the death of their
paternal grandmother and guardian. The paternal relatives
including the petitioner who attended the wake of their
mother were very much concerned about the well-being of
the three minors. While preparing for their adoption, they
have asked a cousin who has a family to stay with minors
and act as their temporary guardian.
The mother of minors was consulted about the adoption plan
and after weighing the benefits of adoption to her children,
she voluntarily consented. She realized that her children
need parental love, guidance and support which she could
not provide as she already has a second family & residing in
Italy. Knowing also that the petitioners & her children have
been supporting her children up to the present and truly care
for them, she believes her children will be in good hands.
She also finds petitioners in a better position to provide a
secured and bright future to her children.18
However, petitioner failed to present Pagbilao as witness and
offer in evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos to
the adoption; petitioner, likewise, failed to present any
documentary evidence to prove that Amelia assents to the
adoption.
On November 23, 2002, the court, finding merit in the
petition for adoption, rendered a decision granting said
petition. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that henceforth, minors
Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma Dizon Ramos, Eugene Dizon
Ramos be freed from all legal obligations obedience and
maintenance from their natural parents and that they be
declared for all legal intents and purposes the children of
Diwata Ramos Landingin. Trial custody is dispensed with
considering that parent-children relationship has long been
established between the children and the adoptive parents.
Let the surnames of the children be changed from "DizonRamos" to "Ramos-Landingin."
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil
Registrar of Tarlac, Tarlac for him to effect the corresponding
changes/amendment in the birth certificates of the abovementioned minors.
SO ORDERED.19
The OSG appealed20 the decision to the Court of Appeals on
December 2, 2002. In its brief21 for the oppositor-appellant,
the OSG raised the following arguments:
I

FOR ADOPTION DESPITE THE LACK OF THE WRITTEN
CONSENT OF THE PETITIONERS CHILDREN AS
REQUIRED BY LAW.
III
FOR ADOPTION DESPITE PETITIONERS FAILURE TO
ESTABLISH THAT SHE IS IN A POSITION TO SUPPORT
THE PROPOSED ADOPTEES.
On April 29, 2004, the CA rendered a decision22 reversing the
ruling of the RTC. It held that petitioner failed to adduce in
evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos, the
childrens natural mother. Moreover, the affidavit of consent
of the petitioners children could not also be admitted in
evidence as the same was executed in Guam, USA and was
not authenticated or acknowledged before a Philippine
consular office, and although petitioner has a job, she was
not stable enough to support the children. The dispositive
portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision
dated November 25, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 63, Tarlac City in Spec. Proc. No. 2733 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.23
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration24 on May 21,
2004, which the CA denied in its Resolution dated August 12,
2004.25
Petitioner, thus, filed the instant petition for review on
certiorari26 on September 7, 2004, assigning the following
errors:
1. THAT THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT HAS
OVERLOOKED AND MISAPPLIED SOME FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH ARE OF WEIGHT AND
IMPORTANCE AND WHICH IF CONSIDERED WOULD
HAVE AFFECTED THE RESULT OF THE CASE.
2. THAT THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
CONCLUDING THAT THE PETITIONER-APPELLEE IS
NOT FINANCIALLY CAPABLE TO SUPPORT THE THREE
CHILDREN.27
The issues raised by the parties in their pleadings are the
following: (a) whether the petitioner is entitled to adopt the
minors without the written consent of their biological mother,
Amelia Ramos; (b) whether or not the affidavit of consent

purportedly executed by the petitioner-adopters children
sufficiently complies with the law; and (c) whether or not
petitioner is financially capable of supporting the adoptees.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
It has been the policy of the Court to adhere to the liberal
concept, as stated in Malkinson v. Agrava,28 that adoption
statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interest and
welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration and are
designed to provide homes, parental care and education for
unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the
protection of society and family in the person of the adopter
as well as to allow childless couples or persons to
experience the joys of parenthood and give them legally a
child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of
their natural parental instincts. Every reasonable intendment
should thus be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble
and compassionate objectives of the law.29
However, in Cang v. Court of Appeals, 30 the Court also ruled
that the liberality with which this Court treats matters leading
to adoption insofar as it carries out the beneficent purposes
of the law to ensure the rights and privileges of the adopted
child arising therefrom, ever mindful that the paramount
consideration is the overall benefit and interest of the
adopted child, should be understood in its proper context
and perspective. The Courts position should not be
misconstrued or misinterpreted as to extend to inferences
beyond the contemplation of law and jurisprudence. Thus,
the discretion to approve adoption proceedings is not to be
anchored solely on best interests of the child but likewise,
with due regard to the natural rights of the parents over the
child.31
Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the
Domestic Adoption Act of 1998, provides:
Sec. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. - After
being properly counseled and informed of his/her right to
give or withhold his/her approval of the adoption, the written
consent of the following to the adoption is hereby required:
(a) The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or over;
(b) The biological parent(s) of the child, if known, or the legal
guardian, or the proper government instrumentality which
has legal custody of the child;
(c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10)
years of age or over, of the adopter(s) and adoptee, if any;
(d) The illegitimate sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or
over, of the adopter, if living with said adopter and the latters
souse, if any;
(e) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be

adopted.
The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural
parents is intended to protect the natural parental
relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers,
and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the best interests
of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption.32
Clearly, the written consent of the biological parents is
indispensable for the validity of a decree of adoption. Indeed,
the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his
consent must be obtained before his parental rights and
duties may be terminated and re-established in adoptive
parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the written
consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption.
We note that in her Report, Pagbilao declared that she was
able to interview Amelia Ramos who arrived in the
Philippines with her son, John Mario in May 2002. If said
Amelia Ramos was in the Philippines and Pagbilao was able
to interview her, it is incredible that the latter would not
require Amelia Ramos to execute a Written Consent to the
adoption of her minor children. Neither did the petitioner
bother to present Amelia Ramos as witness in support of the
petition.
Petitioner, nonetheless, argues that the written consent of
the biological mother is no longer necessary because when
Amelias husband died in 1990, she left for Italy and never
came back. The children were then left to the guidance and
care of their paternal grandmother. It is the paternal relatives,
including petitioner, who provided for the childrens financial
needs. Hence, Amelia, the biological mother, had effectively
abandoned the children. Petitioner further contends that it
was by twist of fate that after 12 years, when the petition for
adoption was pending with the RTC that Amelia and her child
by her second marriage were on vacation in the Philippines.
Pagbilao, the DSWD social worker, was able to meet her,
and during the meeting, Amelia intimated to the social worker
that she conformed to the adoption of her three children by
the petitioner.
Petitioners contention must be rejected. When she filed her
petition with the trial court, Rep. Act No. 8552 was already in
effect. Section 9 thereof provides that if the written consent
of the biological parents cannot be obtained, the written
consent of the legal guardian of the minors will suffice. If, as
claimed by petitioner, that the biological mother of the minors
had indeed abandoned them, she should, thus have
adduced the written consent of their legal guardian.
Ordinarily, abandonment by a parent to justify the adoption of
his child without his consent, is a conduct which evinces a
settled purpose to forego all parental duties.33 The term
means neglect and refusal to perform the filial and legal
obligations of love and support. If a parent withholds
presence, love, care, the opportunity to display filial affection,
and neglects to lend support and maintenance, the parent, in
effect, abandons the child.34

Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed
in the care of others is not such an abandonment. 35 To
dispense with the requirement of consent, the abandonment
must be shown to have existed at the time of adoption.36
A No, sir.38
In this case, petitioner relied solely on her testimony and that

of Elaine Ramos to prove her claim that Amelia Ramos had
abandoned her children. Petitioners testimony on that matter
follows:
IV. Background of the Case:
However, the Home Study Report of the DSWD Social

Worker also stated the following:
xxxx
A None, sir.
Since the mother left for Italy, minors siblings had been
under the care and custody of their maternal grandmother.
However, she died in Nov. 2001 and an uncle, cousin of their
deceased father now serves as their guardian. The
petitioner, together with her children and other relatives
abroad have been supporting the minor children financially,
even during the time that they were still living with their
natural parents. Their mother also sends financial support
but very minimal.39
Q How about with her children?
xxxx
A None, sir.
V. Background Information about the Minors Being Sought

for Adoption:
Q Where is the mother of these three children now?

A She left for Italy on November 20, 1990, sir.
Q At the time when Amelia Ramos left for Italy, was there an
instance where she communicated with the family?
Q Do you know what place in Italy did she reside?

A I do not know, sir.
Q Did you receive any news about Amelia Ramos?
A What I know, sir, was that she was already married with
another man.
Q From whom did you learn that?
A From others who came from Italy, sir.
Q Did you come to know whether she has children by her
second marriage?
A Yes, sir, she got two kids.37
Elaine, the eldest of the minors, testified, thus:
Q Where is your mother now?
A In Italy, sir.
Q When did your mother left for Italy?
A After my father died, sir.
Q How old were you when your mother left for Italy in 1990?
A Two years old, sir.
Q At the time when your mother left for Italy, did your mother
communicate with you?
xxxx
As the eldest she tries her best to be a role model to her
younger siblings. She helps them in their lessons, works and
has fun with them. She also encourages openness on their
problems and concerns and provides petty counseling. In
serious problems she already consult (sic) her mother and
petitioner-aunt.40
xxxx
In their 5 years of married life, they begot 3 children, herein
minors, Amelia recalled that they had a happy and
comfortable life. After the death of her husband, her in-laws
which include the petitioner had continued providing support
for them. However being ashamed of just depending on the
support of her husbands relatives, she decided to work
abroad. Her parents are also in need of financial help as they
are undergoing maintenance medication. Her parents
mortgaged their farm land which she used in going to Italy
and worked as domestic helper.
When she left for Italy in November 1990, she entrusted her
3 children to the care & custody of her mother-in-law who
returned home for good, however she died on November
2000.
While working in Italy, she met Jun Tayag, a married man
from Tarlac. They became live-in partners since 1995 and
have a son John Mario who is now 2 years old. The three of
them are considered Italian residents. Amelia claimed that
Mr. Tayag is planning to file an annulment of his marriage
and his wife is amenable to it. He is providing his legitimate
family regular support.

Amelia also sends financial support ranging from P10,000P15,000 a month through her parents who share minimal
amount of P3,000-P5,000 a month to his (sic) children. The
petitioner and other paternal relatives are continuously
providing support for most of the needs & education of
minors up to present.41
Thus, when Amelia left for Italy, she had not intended to
abandon her children, or to permanently sever their motherchild relationship. She was merely impelled to leave the
country by financial constraints. Yet, even while abroad, she
did not surrender or relinquish entirely her motherly
obligations of rearing the children to her now deceased
mother-in-law, for, as claimed by Elaine herself, she
consulted her mother, Amelia, for serious personal problems.
Likewise, Amelia continues to send financial support to the
children, though in minimal amounts as compared to what
her affluent in-laws provide.
Let it be emphasized, nevertheless, that the adoption of the
minors herein will have the effect of severing all legal ties
between the biological mother, Amelia, and the adoptees,
and that the same shall then be vested on the adopter.42 It
would thus be against the spirit of the law if financial
consideration were to be the paramount consideration in
deciding whether to deprive a person of parental authority
over his/her children. More proof has to be adduced that
Amelia has emotionally abandoned the children, and that the
latter will not miss her guidance and counsel if they are given
to an adopting parent.43 Again, it is the best interest of the
child that takes precedence in adoption.
Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that the
Court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is
offered must be specified. The offer of evidence is necessary
because it is the duty of the Court to rest its findings of fact
and its judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered
by the parties. Unless and until admitted by the court in
evidence for the purpose or purposes for which such
document is offered, the same is merely a scrap of paper
barren of probative weight. Mere identification of documents
and the markings thereof as exhibits do not confer any
evidentiary weight on documents unless formally offered.44
Petitioner failed to offer in evidence Pagbilaos Report and of
the Joint Affidavit of Consent purportedly executed by her
children; the authenticity of which she, likewise, failed to
prove. The joint written consent of petitioners children45 was
notarized on January 16, 2002 in Guam, USA; for it to be
treated by the Rules of Court in the same way as a
document notarized in this country it needs to comply with
Section 2 of Act No. 2103,46 which states:
Section 2. An instrument or document acknowledged and
authenticated in a foreign country shall be considered
authentic if the acknowledgment and authentication are
made in accordance with the following requirements:
(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before (1) an

ambassador, minister, secretary of legation, charg d
affaires, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the
Republic of the Philippines, acting within the country or place
to which he is accredited, or (2) a notary public or officer duly
authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgments of
instruments or documents in the place where the act is done.
(b) The person taking the acknowledgment shall certify that
the person acknowledging the instrument or document is
known to him, and that he is the same person who executed
it, and acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed.
The certificate shall be under his official seal, if he is by law
required to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so
state. In case the acknowledgment is made before a notary
public or an officer mentioned in subdivision (2) of the
preceding paragraph, the certificate of the notary public or
the officer taking the acknowledgment shall be authenticated
by an ambassador, minister, secretary of legation, charg de
affaires, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the
Republic of the Philippines, acting within the country or place
to which he is accredited. The officer making the
authentication shall certify under his official seal that the
person who took the acknowledgment was at the time duly
authorized to act as notary public or that he was duly
exercising the functions of the office by virtue of which he
assumed to act, and that as such he had authority under the
law to take acknowledgment of instruments or documents in
the place where the acknowledgment was taken, and that his
signature and seal, if any, are genuine.
As the alleged written consent of petitioners legitimate
children did not comply with the afore-cited law, the same
can at best be treated by the Rules as a private document
whose authenticity must be proved either by anyone who
saw the document executed or written; or by evidence of the
genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the makers.47
Since, in the instant case, no further proof was introduced by
petitioner to authenticate the written consent of her legitimate
children, the same is inadmissible in evidence.
In reversing the ruling of the RTC, the CA ruled that
petitioner was not stable enough to support the children and
is only relying on the financial backing, support and
commitment of her children and her siblings. 48 Petitioner
contradicts this by claiming that she is financially capable as
she has worked in Guam for 14 years, has savings, a house,
and currently earns $5.15 an hour with tips of not less than
$1,000.00 a month. Her children and siblings have likewise
committed themselves to provide financial backing should
the need arise. The OSG, again in its comment, banks on
the statement in the Home Study Report that "petitioner has
limited income." Accordingly, it appears that she will rely on
the financial backing of her children and siblings in order to
support the minor adoptees. The law, however, states that it
is the adopter who should be in a position to provide support
in keeping with the means of the family.

Since the primary consideration in adoption is the best
interest of the child, it follows that the financial capacity of
prospective
parents
should
also
be carefully evaluated and considered. Certainly, the adopter
should be in a position to support the would-be adopted child
or children, in keeping with the means of the family.
IN RE: PETITION FOR

ADOPTION OF MICHAEL JUDE
P. LIM,
Promulgated:
MONINA P. LIM,
Petitioner.
May 21, 2009
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
According to the Adoption Home Study Report49 forwarded

by the Department of Public Health & Social Services of the
Government of Guam to the DSWD, petitioner is no longer
supporting her legitimate children, as the latter are already
adults, have individual lives and families. At the time of the
filing of the petition, petitioner was 57 years old, employed
on a part-time basis as a waitress, earning $5.15 an hour
and tips of around $1,000 a month. Petitioners main
intention in adopting the children is to bring the latter to
Guam, USA. She has a house at Quitugua Subdivision in
Yigo, Guam, but the same is still being amortized. Petitioner
likewise knows that the limited income might be a hindrance
to the adoption proceedings.
CARPIO, J.:
Given these limited facts, it is indeed doubtful whether

petitioner will be able to sufficiently handle the financial
aspect of rearing the three children in the US. She only has a
part-time job, and she is rather of age. While petitioner
claims that she has the financial support and backing of her
children and siblings, the OSG is correct in stating that the
ability to support the adoptees is personal to the adopter, as
adoption only creates a legal relation between the former
and the latter. Moreover, the records do not prove nor
support petitioners allegation that her siblings and her
children are financially able and that they are willing to
support the minors herein. The Court, therefore, again
sustains the ruling of the CA on this issue.
The Facts
While the Court recognizes that petitioner has only the best
of intentions for her nieces and nephew, there are legal
infirmities that militate against reversing the ruling of the CA.
In any case, petitioner is not prevented from filing a new
petition for adoption of the herein minors.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE LIM and
MICHAEL JUDE LIM
FIRST DIVISION
IN RE: PETITION FOR

ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P.
LIM,
MONINA P. LIM,
Petitioner.
x-----------------------x
G.R. Nos. 168992-93
DECISION
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Monina
P. Lim (petitioner) seeking to set aside the Decision[1] dated
15 September 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, General
Santos City, Branch 22 (trial court), in SPL. PROC. Case
Nos. 1258 and 1259, which dismissed without prejudice the
consolidated petitions for adoption of Michelle P. Lim and
Michael Jude P. Lim.
The following facts are undisputed. Petitioner is an

optometrist by profession. On 23 June 1974, she married
Primo Lim (Lim). They were childless. Minor children, whose
parents were unknown, were entrusted to them by a certain
Lucia Ayuban (Ayuban). Being so eager to have a child of
their own, petitioner and Lim registered the children to make
it appear that they were the childrens parents. The
children[2] were named Michelle P. Lim (Michelle) and
Michael Jude P. Lim (Michael). Michelle was barely eleven
days old when brought to the clinic of petitioner. She was
born on 15 March 1977.[3] Michael was 11 days old when
Ayuban brought him to petitioners clinic. His date of birth is
1 August 1983.[4]
The spouses reared and cared for the children as if
they were their own. They sent the children to exclusive
schools. They used the surname Lim in all their school
records and documents. Unfortunately, on 28 November
1998, Lim died. On 27 December 2000, petitioner married
Angel Olario (Olario), an American citizen.
Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by
availing of the amnesty[5] given under Republic Act No.
8552[6] (RA 8552) to those individuals who simulated the birth
of a child. Thus, on 24 April 2002, petitioner filed separate
petitions for the adoption of Michelle and Michael before the
trial court docketed as SPL PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and
1259, respectively. At the time of the filing of the petitions for
adoption, Michelle was 25 years old and already married,
while Michael was 18 years and seven months old.

Michelle and her husband gave their consent to the
adoption as evidenced by their Affidavits of Consent.
[7]
Michael also gave his consent to his adoption as shown in
his Affidavit of Consent.[8] Petitioners husband Olario
likewise executed an Affidavit of Consent[9] for the adoption
of Michelle and Michael.
the time the petitions were filed, Michelle was 25 years old
and already married, while Michael was already 18 years of
age. Parental authority is not anymore necessary since they
have been emancipated having attained the age of majority.
In the Certification issued by the Department of Social

Welfare and Development (DSWD), Michelle was considered
as an abandoned child and the whereabouts of her natural
parents were unknown.[10] The DSWD issued a similar
Certification for Michael.[11]
Joint Adoption by Husband and Wife
The Ruling of the Trial Court

On 15 September 2004, the trial court rendered
judgment dismissing the petitions. The trial court ruled that
since petitioner had remarried, petitioner should have filed
the petition jointly with her new husband. The trial court ruled
that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory
citing Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552 and Article 185 of
the Family Code.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
decision but the motion was denied in the Order dated 16
June 2005. In denying the motion, the trial court ruled that
petitioner did not fall under any of the exceptions under
Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552. Petitioners argument that
mere consent of her husband would suffice was untenable
because, under the law, there are additional requirements,
such as residency and certification of his qualification, which
the husband, who was not even made a party in this case,
must comply.
As to the argument that the adoptees are already
emancipated and joint adoption is merely for the joint
exercise of parental authority, the trial court ruled that joint
adoption is not only for the purpose of exercising parental
authority because an emancipated child acquires certain
rights from his parents and assumes certain obligations and
responsibilities.
Hence, the present petition.
We deny the petition.
It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for

adoption were filed, petitioner had already remarried. She
filed the petitions by herself, without being joined by her
husband Olario. We have no other recourse but to affirm the
trial courts decision denying the petitions for adoption. Dura
lex sed lex. The law is explicit. Section 7, Article III of RA
8552 reads:
SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt:
(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of
full civil capacity and legal rights, of good moral character,
has not been convicted of any crime involving moral
turpitude, emotionally and psychologically capable of caring
for children, at least sixteen (16) years older than the
adoptee, and who is in a position to support and care for
his/her children in keeping with the means of the family. The
requirement of sixteen (16) year difference between the age
of the adopter and adoptee may be waived when the adopter
is the biological parent of the adoptee, or is the spouse of
the adoptees parent;
(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as
above stated for Filipino nationals: Provided, That his/her
country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the
Philippines, that he/she has been living in the Philippines for
at least three (3) continuous years prior to the filing of the
application for adoption and maintains such residence until
the adoption decree is entered, that he/she has been
certified by his/her diplomatic or consular office or any
appropriate government agency that he/she has the legal
capacity to adopt in his/her country, and that his/her
government allows the adoptee to enter his/her country as
his/her adopted son/daughter: Provided, further, That the
requirements on residency and certification of the aliens
qualification to adopt in his/her country may be waived for
the following:
Issue
Petitioner appealed directly to this Court raising the
sole issue of whether or not petitioner, who has remarried,
can singly adopt.
(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a

relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or
affinity; or
(ii) one who seeks to adopt
son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse; or
the
legitimate
The Courts Ruling

Petitioner contends that the rule on joint adoption must
be relaxed because it is the duty of the court and the State to
protect the paramount interest and welfare of the child to be
adopted. Petitioner argues that the legal maxim dura lex
sed lex is not applicable to adoption cases. She argues that
joint parental authority is not necessary in this case since, at
(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks

to adopt jointly with his/her spouse a relative within the fourth
(4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino
spouses; or

(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the
termination of the guardianship and clearance of his/her
financial accountabilities.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the
following cases:
These requirements on residency and certification of

the aliens qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived
pursuant to Section 7. The children or adoptees are not
relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity
of petitioner or of Olario. Neither are the adoptees the
legitimate children of petitioner.
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate

son/daughter of the other; or
Effects of Adoption
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own

illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, however, That the other
spouse has signified his/her consent thereto; or
Petitioner contends that joint parental authority is not

anymore necessary since the children have been
emancipated having reached the age of majority.
This is
untenable.
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each

other.
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one
spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of the other, joint
parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses.
(Emphasis supplied)
The use of the word shall in the above-quoted

provision means that joint adoption by the husband and the
wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of
joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal
situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level
of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to
adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the
spouses.[12]
The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity.
Petitioner, having remarried at the time the petitions for
adoption were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the petitions for
adoption were filed only by petitioner herself, without joining
her husband, Olario, the trial court was correct in denying the
petitions for adoption on this ground.
Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three
exceptions enumerated in Section 7. First, the children to be
adopted are not the legitimate children of petitioner or of her
husband Olario. Second, the children are not the illegitimate
children of petitioner. And third, petitioner and Olario are not
legally separated from each other.
The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as
shown in his Affidavit of Consent does not suffice. There are
certain requirements that Olario must comply being an
American citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in
Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must prove that his
country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the
Philippines; (2) he must have been living in the Philippines
for at least three continuous years prior to the filing of the
application for adoption; (3) he must maintain such residency
until the adoption decree is entered; (4) he has legal capacity
to adopt in his own country; and (5) the adoptee is allowed to
enter the adopters country as the latters adopted child.
None of these qualifications were shown and proved during
the trial.
Parental authority includes caring for and rearing the

children for civic consciousness and efficiency and the
development of their moral, mental and physical character
and well-being.[13] The father and the mother shall jointly
exercise parental authority over the persons of their common
children.[14] Even the remarriage of the surviving parent shall
not affect the parental authority over the children, unless the
court appoints another person to be the guardian of the
person or property of the children.[15]
It is true that when the child reaches the age of
emancipation that is, when he attains the age of majority
or 18 years of age[16] emancipation terminates parental
authority over the person and property of the child, who shall
then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life.
[17]
However, parental authority is merely just one of the
effects of legal adoption. Article V of RA 8552 enumerates
the effects of adoption, thus:
ARTICLE V
EFFECTS OF ADOPTION
SEC. 16. Parental Authority. - Except in cases where
the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter, all legal
ties between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee shall
be severed and the same shall then be vested on the
adopter(s).
SEC. 17. Legitimacy. - The adoptee shall be
considered the legitimate son/daughter of the adopter(s) for
all intents and purposes and as such is entitled to all the
rights and obligations provided by law to legitimate
sons/daughters born to them without discrimination of any
kind. To this end, the adoptee is entitled to love, guidance,
and support in keeping with the means of the family.
SEC. 18. Succession. - In legal and intestate
succession, the adopter(s) and the adoptee shall have
reciprocal rights of succession without distinction from
legitimate filiation. However, if the adoptee and his/her
biological parent(s) had left a will, the law on testamentary
succession shall govern.
Adoption has, thus, the following effects: (1) sever all
legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee,
except when the biological parent is the spouse of the

adopter; (2) deem the adoptee as a legitimate child of the
adopter; and (3) give adopter and adoptee reciprocal rights
and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and
child, including but not limited to: (i) the right of the adopter
to choose the name the child is to be known; and (ii) the right
of the adopter and adoptee to be legal and compulsory heirs
of each other.[18] Therefore, even if emancipation terminates
parental authority, the adoptee is still considered a legitimate
child of the adopter with all the rights[19] of a legitimate child
such as: (1) to bear the surname of the father and the
mother; (2) to receive support from their parents; and (3) to
be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights.
Conversely, the adoptive parents shall, with respect to the
adopted child, enjoy all the benefits to which biological
parents are entitled[20] such as support[21]and successional
rights.[22]
marriage between petitioner and Olario, the marriage still

subsists. That being the case, joint adoption by the husband
and the wife is required. We reiterate our ruling above that
since, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed,
petitioner was married to Olario, joint adoption is mandatory.
We are mindful of the fact that adoption statutes, being

humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare of the
child to be of paramount consideration. They are designed to
provide homes, parental care and education for unfortunate,
needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of
society and family, as well as to allow childless couples or
persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give them
legally a child in the person of the adopted for the
manifestation of their natural parental instincts. Every
reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and
fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.
[23]
But, as we have ruled in Republic v. Vergara:[24]

SUPREME COURT
Manila
We are not unmindful of the main purpose of

adoption statutes, which is the promotion of the welfare of
the children. Accordingly, the law should be construed
liberally, in a manner that will sustain rather than defeat said
purpose. The law must also be applied with compassion,
understanding and less severity in view of the fact that it is
intended to provide homes, love, care and education for less
fortunate children. Regrettably, the Court is not in a position
to affirm the trial courts decision favoring adoption in the
case at bar, for the law is clear and it cannot be modified
without violating the proscription against judicial
legislation. Until such time however, that the law on the
matter is amended, we cannot sustain the respondentspouses petition for adoption. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner, being married at the time the petitions for adoption

were filed, should have jointly filed the petitions with her
husband. We cannot make our own legislation to suit
petitioner.
Petitioner, in her Memorandum, insists that subsequent
events would show that joint adoption could no longer be
possible because Olario has filed a case for dissolution of his
marriage to petitioner in the Los Angeles Superior Court.
We disagree. The filing of a case for dissolution of the
marriage between petitioner and Olario is of no moment. It is
not equivalent to a decree of dissolution of marriage. Until
and unless there is a judicial decree for the dissolution of the
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the

Decision dated 15 September 2004 of the Regional Trial
Court, General Santos City, Branch 22 in SPL. PROC. Case
Nos. 1258 and 1259. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
TAMARGO v. CA
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 85044 June 3, 1992

MACARIO TAMARGO, CELSO TAMARGO and AURELIA
TAMARGO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. ARISTON L.
RUBIO, RTC Judge, Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos Sur;
VICTOR BUNDOC; and CLARA BUNDOC, respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
On 20 October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10
years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing
injuries which resulted in her death. Accordingly, a civil
complaint for damages was filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos Sur, docketed as Civil Case
No. 3457-V, by petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's
adopting parent, and petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia
Tamargo, Jennifer's natural parents against respondent
spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural
parents with whom he was living at the time of the tragic
incident. In addition to this case for damages, a criminal
information or Homicide through Reckless Imprudence was
filed [Criminal Case No. 1722-V] against Adelberto Bundoc.
Adelberto, however, was acquitted and exempted from
criminal liability on the ground that he bad acted without
discernment.
Prior to the incident, or on 10 December 1981, the spouses
Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the
minor Adelberto Bundoc in Special Proceedings No. 0373-T
before the then Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur. This

petition for adoption was grunted on, 18 November 1982,
that is, after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer.
In their Answer, respondent spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's
natural parents, reciting the result of the foregoing petition for
adoption, claimed that not they, but rather the adopting
parents, namely the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura,
were indispensable parties to the action since parental
authority had shifted to the adopting parents from the
moment the successful petition for adoption was filed.
Petitioners in their Reply contended that since Adelberto
Bundoc was then actually living with his natural parents,
parental authority had not ceased nor been relinquished by
the mere filing and granting of a petition for adoption.
The trial court on 3 December 1987 dismissed petitioners'
complaint, ruling that respondent natural parents of
Adelberto indeed were not indispensable parties to the
action.
Petitioners received a copy of the trial court's Decision on 7
December 1987. Within the 15-day reglementary period, or
on 14 December 1987, petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration followed by a supplemental motion for
reconsideration on 15 January 1988. It appearing, however,
that the motions failed to comply with Sections 4 and 5 of
Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court that notice of the
motion shall be given to all parties concerned at least three
(3) days before the hearing of said motion; and that said
notice shall state the time and place of hearing both
motions were denied by the trial court in an Order dated 18
April 1988. On 28 April 1988, petitioners filed a notice of
appeal. In its Order dated 6 June 1988, the trial court
dismissed the notice at appeal, this time ruling that the notice
had been filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period
ending 22 December 1987.
Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on a petition
for mandamus and certiorari questioning the trial court's
Decision dated 3 December 1987 and the Orders dated 18
April 1988 and 6 June 1988, The Court of Appeals dismissed
the petition, ruling that petitioners had lost their right to
appeal.
In the present Petition for Review, petitioners once again
contend that respondent spouses Bundoc are the
indispensable parties to the action for damages caused by
the acts of their minor child, Adelberto Bundoc. Resolution of
this Petition hinges on the following issues: (1) whether or
not petitioners, notwithstanding loss of their right to appeal,
may still file the instant Petition; conversely, whether the
Court may still take cognizance of the case even through
petitioners' appeal had been filed out of time; and (2)
whether or not the effects of adoption, insofar as parental
authority is concerned may be given retroactive effect so as
to make the adopting parents the indispensable parties in a
damage case filed against their adopted child, for acts
committed by the latter, when actual custody was yet lodged
with the biological parents.
1. It will be recalled that, petitioners' motion (and

supplemental motion) for reconsideration filed before the trial
court, not having complied with the requirements of Section
13, Rule 41, and Section 4, Rule 15, of the Revised Rules of
Court, were considered pro forma and hence did not
interrupt and suspend the reglementary period to appeal: the
trial court held that the motions, not having contained a
notice of time and place of hearing, had become useless
pieces of paper which did not interrupt the reglementary
period. 1 As in fact repeatedly held by this Court, what is
mandatory is the service of the motion on the opposing
counsel indicating the time and place of hearing. 2
In view, however, of the nature of the issue raised in the
instant. Petition, and in order that substantial justice may be
served, the Court, invoking its right to suspend the
application of technical rules to prevent manifest injustice,
elects to treat the notice of appeal as having been
seasonably filed before the trial court, and the motion (and
supplemental motion) for reconsideration filed by petitioner in
the trial court as having interrupted the reglementary period
for appeal. As the Court held in Gregorio v. Court of
Appeals: 3
Dismissal of appeal; purely on technical grounds is frowned
upon where the policy of the courts is to encourage hearings
of appeal on their merits. The rules of procedure ought not
be applied in a very rigid technical sense, rules of procedure
are used only to help secure not override, substantial justice.
if d technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is made their
aim would be defeated. 4
2. It is not disputed that Adelberto Bundoc's voluntary act of
shooting Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle gave rise to a
cause of action on quasi-delict against him. As Article 2176
of the Civil Code provides:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no preexisting contractual relation between the parties, is called
a quasi-delict . . .
Upon the other hand, the law imposes civil liability upon the
father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for
any damages that may be caused by a minor child who lives
with them. Article 2180 of the Civil Code reads:
The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not
only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother,
are responsible for the damages caused by the minor
children who live in their company.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when
the person herein mentioned prove that they observed all the

diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
(Emphasis supplied)
This principle of parental liability is a species of what is
frequently designated as vicarious liability, or the doctrine of
"imputed negligence" under Anglo-American tort law, where
a person is not only liable for torts committed by himself, but
also for torts committed by others with whom he has a
certain relationship and for whom he is responsible. Thus,
parental liability is made a natural or logical consequence of
the duties and responsibilities of parents their parental
authority which includes the instructing, controlling and
disciplining of the child. 5 The basis for the doctrine of
vicarious liability was explained by the Court in Cangco v.
Manila Railroad Co. 6 in the following terms:
With respect to extra-contractual obligation arising from
negligence, whether of act or omission, it is competent for
the legislature to elect and our Legislature has so elected
to limit such liability to cases in which the person upon
whom such an obligation is imposed is morally culpable or,
on the contrary, for reasons of public policy. to extend that
liability, without regard to the lack of moral culpability, so as
to include responsibility for the negligence of those persons
whose acts or omissions are imputable, by a legal fiction, to
others who are in a position to exercise an absolute or
limited control over them. The legislature which adopted our
Civil Code has elected to limit extra-contractual liability
with certain well-defined exceptions to cases in which
moral culpability can be directly imputed to the persons to be
charged. This moral responsibility may consist in having
failed to exercise due care in one's own acts, or in having
failed to exercise due care in the selection and control of
one's agent or servants, or in the control of persons who, by
reasons of their status, occupy a position of dependency
with respect to the person made liable for their
conduct. 7 (Emphasis Supplied)
The civil liability imposed upon parents for the torts of their
minor children living with them, may be seen to be based
upon the parental authority vested by the Civil Code upon
such parents. The civil law assumes that when an
unemancipated child living with its parents commits a
tortious acts, the parents were negligent in the performance
of their legal and natural duty closely to supervise the child
who is in their custody and control. Parental liability is, in
other words, anchored upon parental authority coupled with
presumed parental dereliction in the discharge of the duties
accompanying such authority. The parental dereliction is, of
course, only presumed and the presumption can be
overtuned under Article 2180 of the Civil Code by proof that
the parents had exercised all the diligence of a good father
of a family to prevent the damage.
In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with
an air rifle occured when parental authority was still lodged in
respondent Bundoc spouses, the natural parents of the
minor Adelberto. It would thus follow that the natural parents
who had then actual custody of the minor Adelberto, are the
indispensable parties to the suit for damages.
The natural parents of Adelberto, however, stoutly maintain

that because a decree of adoption was issued by the
adoption court in favor of the Rapisura spouses, parental
authority was vested in the latter as adopting parents as of
the time of the filing of the petition for adoption that
is, before Adelberto had shot Jennifer which an air rifle. The
Bundoc spouses contend that they were therefore free of
any parental responsibility for Adelberto's allegedly tortious
conduct.
Respondent Bundoc spouses rely on Article 36 of the Child
and Youth Welfare Code 8 which reads as follows:
Art. 36. Decree of Adoption. If, after considering the report
of the Department of Social Welfare or duly licensed child
placement agency and the evidence submitted before it, the
court is satisfied that the petitioner is qualified to maintain,
care for, and educate the child, that the trial custody period
has been completed, and that the best interests of the child
will be promoted by the adoption, a decree of adoption shall
be entered, which shall be effective he date the original
petition was filed. The decree shall state the name by which
the child is thenceforth to be known. (Emphasis supplied)
The Bundoc spouses further argue that the above Article 36
should be read in relation to Article 39 of the same Code:
Art. 39. Effect of Adoption. The adoption shall:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Dissolve the authority vested in the natural parents,
except where the adopter is the spouse of the surviving
natural parent;
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
and urge that their Parental authority must be deemed to
have been dissolved as of the time the Petition for adoption
was filed.
The Court is not persuaded. As earlier noted, under the Civil
Code, the basis of parental liability for the torts of a minor
child is the relationship existing between the parents and the
minor child living with them and over whom, the law
presumes, the parents exercise supervision and control.
Article 58 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, re-enacted
this rule:
Article 58 Torts Parents and guardians are responsible for
the damage caused by the child under their parental
authority in accordance with the civil Code. (Emphasis
supplied)
Article 221 of the Family Code of the Philippines 9 has
similarly insisted upon the requisite that the child, doer of the

tortious act, shall have beer in the actual custody of the
parents sought to be held liable for the ensuing damage:
Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental
authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages
caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated
children living in their companyand under their parental
authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by
law. (Emphasis supplied)
We do not believe that parental authority is properly
regarded as having been retroactively transferred to and
vested in the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, at the
time the air rifle shooting happened. We do not consider that
retroactive effect may be giver to the decree of adoption so
as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at
a time when adopting parents had no actual or physically
custody over the adopted child. Retroactive affect may
perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for adoption
where such is essential to permit the accrual of some benefit
or advantage in favor of the adopted child. In the instant
case, however, to hold that parental authority had been
retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden
them with liability for a tortious act that they could not have
foreseen and which they could not have prevented (since
they were at the time in the United States and had no
physical custody over the child Adelberto) would be unfair
and unconscionable. Such a result, moreover, would be
inconsistent with the philosophical and policy basis
underlying the doctrine of vicarious liability. Put a little
differently, no presumption of parental dereliction on the part
of the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, could have
arisen since Adelberto was not in fact subject to their control
at the time the tort was committed.
Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code fortifies the
conclusion reached above. Article 35 provides as follows:
Art. 35. Trial Custody. No petition for adoption shall be
finally granted unless and until the adopting parents are
given by the courts a supervised trial custody period of at
least six months to assess their adjustment and emotional
readiness for the legal union. During the period of trial
custody, parental authority shall be vested in the adopting
parents. (Emphasis supplied)
Under the above Article 35, parental authority is provisionally
vested in the adopting parents during the period of trial
custody, i.e., before the issuance of a decree of
adoption, precisely because the adopting parents are given
actual custody of the child during such trial period. In the
instant case, the trial custody period either had not yet begun
or bad already been completed at the time of the air rifle
shooting; in any case, actual custody of Adelberto was then
with his natural parents, not the adopting parents.
Accordingly, we conclude that respondent Bundoc spouses,
Adelberto's natural parents, were indispensable parties to
the suit for damages brought by petitioners, and that the
dismissal by the trial court of petitioners' complaint, the
indispensable parties being already before the court,

constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review
is hereby GRANTED DUE COURSE and the Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 6 September 1988, in C.A.-G.R. No.
SP-15016 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioners' complaint filed before the trial court is hereby
REINSTATED and this case is REMANDED to that court for
further proceedings consistent with this Decision. Costs
against respondent Bundoc spouses. This Decision is
immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
LAHOM v. SIBULO
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 143989. July 14, 2003]
ISABELITA S. LAHOM, petitioner, vs. JOSE MELVIN
SIBULO (previously referred to as DR. MELVIN
S. LAHOM), respondent.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
The bliss of marriage and family would be to most less
than complete without children. The realization could have
likely prodded the spouses Dr. Diosdado Lahom and
Isabelita Lahom to take into their care Isabelitas nephew
Jose Melvin Sibulo and to bring him up as their own. At the
tender age of two, Jose Melvin enjoyed the warmth, love and
support of the couple who treated the child like their
own. Indeed, for years, Dr. and Mrs. Lahom fancied on
legally adopting Jose Melvin. Finally, in 1971, the couple
decided to file a petition for adoption. On 05 May 1972, an
order granting the petition was issued that made all the more
intense than before the feeling of affection of the spouses for
Melvin. In keeping with the court order, the Civil Registrar of
Naga City changed the name Jose Melvin Sibulo to Jose
Melvin Lahom.
A sad turn of events came many years
later. Eventually, in December of 1999, Mrs. Lahom
commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 22, of Naga
City. In her petition, she averred 7. That x x x despite the proddings and pleadings of said
spouses, respondent refused to change his surname from
Sibulo to Lahom, to the frustrations of petitioner particularly
her husband until the latter died, and even before his death
he had made known his desire to revoke respondents
adoption, but was prevented by petitioners supplication,
however with his further request upon petitioner to give to

charity whatever properties or interest may pertain to
respondent in the future.
x x x
xxx
xxx
10. That respondent continued using his surname Sibulo to

the utter disregard of the feelings of herein petitioner, and his
records with the Professional Regulation Commission
showed his name as Jose Melvin M. Sibulo originally issued
in 1978 until the present, and in all his dealings and activities
in connection with his practice of his profession, he is Jose
Melvin M. Sibulo.
x x x
xxx
xxx
13. That herein petitioner being a widow, and living alone

in this city with only her household helps to attend to her, has
yearned for the care and show of concern from a son, but
respondent remained indifferent and would only come to
Naga to see her once a year.
14. That for the last three or four years, the medical checkup of petitioner in Manila became more frequent in view of a
leg ailment, and those were the times when petitioner would
need most the care and support from a love one, but
respondent all the more remained callous and utterly
indifferent towards petitioner which is not expected of a son.
15. That herein respondent has recently been jealous of
petitioners nephews and nieces whenever they would find
time to visit her, respondent alleging that they were only
motivated by their desire for some material benefits from
petitioner.
16. That in view of respondents insensible attitude
resulting in a strained and uncomfortable relationship
between him and petitioner, the latter has suffered wounded
feelings, knowing that after all respondents only motive to
his adoption is his expectancy of his alleged rights over the
properties of herein petitioner and her late husband, clearly
shown by his recent filing of Civil Case No. 99-4463 for
partition against petitioner, thereby totally eroding her love
and affection towards respondent, rendering the decree of
adoption, considering respondent to be the child of petitioner,
for all legal purposes, has been negated for which reason
there is no more basis for its existence, hence this petition
for revocation.[1]
Prior to the institution of the case, specifically on 22
March 1998, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8552, also known as
the Domestic Adoption Act, went into effect. The new statute
deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a decree
of adoption.
Section 19 of Article VI of R.A. No. 8552 now reads:
SEC. 19. Grounds for Rescission of Adoption. Upon
petition of the adoptee, with the assistance of the
Department if a minor or if over eighteen (18) years of age
but is incapacitated, as guardian/counsel, the adoption may

be rescinded on any of the following grounds committed by
the adopter(s): (a) repeated physical and verbal
maltreatment by the adopter(s) despite having undergone
counseling; (b) attempt on the life of the adoptee; (c) sexual
assault or violence; or (d) abandonment and failure to
comply with parental obligations.
Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall
not be subject to rescission by the adopter(s). However,
the adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes
provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code. (emphasis
supplied)
Jose Melvin moved for the dismissal of the petition,
contending principally (a) that the trial court had no
jurisdiction over the case and (b) that the petitioner had no
cause of action in view of the aforequoted provisions of R.A.
No. 8552. Petitioner asseverated, by way of opposition, that
the proscription in R.A. No. 8552 should not retroactively
apply, i.e., to cases where the ground for rescission of the
adoption vested under the regime of then Article 348[2] of the
Civil Code and Article 192[3] of the Family Code.
In an order, dated 28 April 2000, the trial court held
thusly:
On the issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
suit, Section 5(c) of R.A. No. 8369 confers jurisdiction to this
Court, having been designated Family Court in A.M. No. 9911-07 SC.
On the matter of no cause of action, the test on the
sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint, is whether or
not, admitting the facts alleged, the Court could render a
valid judgment in accordance with the prayer of said
complaint (De Jesus, et al. vs. Belarmino, et al., 95 Phil.
365).
Admittedly, Section 19, Article VI of R.A. No. 8552 deleted
the right of an adopter to rescind an adoption earlier granted
under the Family Code. Conformably, on the face of the
petition, indeed there is lack of cause of action.
Petitioner however, insists that her right to rescind long
acquired under the provisions of the Family Code should be
respected. Assuming for the sake of argument, that
petitioner is entitled to rescind the adoption of respondent
granted on May 5, 1972, said right should have been
exercised within the period allowed by the Rules. From the
averments in the petition, it appears clear that the legal
grounds for the petition have been discovered and known to
petitioner for more than five (5) years, prior to the filing of the
instant petition on December 1, 1999, hence, the action if
any, had already prescribed. (Sec. 5, Rule 100 Revised
Rules of Court)
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, the
petition is ordered dismissed.[4]

Via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the 1997 Rules of Court, petitioner raises the following
questions; viz:
1. May the subject adoption, decreed on 05 May
1972, still be revoked or rescinded by an
adopter after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552?
2. In the affirmative, has the adopters action
prescribed?
A brief background on the law and its origins could
provide some insights on the subject. In ancient times, the
Romans undertook adoption to assure male heirs in the
family.[5] The continuity of the adopters family was the
primary purpose of adoption and all matters relating to it
basically focused on the rights of the adopter. There was
hardly any mention about the rights of the adopted.
[6]
Countries, like Greece, France, Spain and England, in an
effort to preserve inheritance within the family, neither
allowed nor recognized adoption.[7] It was only much later
when adoption was given an impetus in law and still later
when the welfare of the child became a paramount concern.
[8]
Spain itself which previously disfavored adoption ultimately
relented and accepted the Roman law concept of adoption
which, subsequently, was to find its way to the
archipelago. The Americans came and introduced their own
ideas on adoption which, unlike most countries in Europe,
made the interests of the child an overriding consideration.
[9]
In the early part of the century just passed, the rights of
children invited universal attention; the Geneva Declaration
of Rights of the Child of 1924 and the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights of 1948,[10] followed by the United Nations
Declarations of the Rights of the Child, [11] were written
instruments that would also protect and safeguard the rights
of adopted children. The Civil Code of the Philippines[12] of
1950 on adoption, later modified by the Child and Youth
Welfare Code[13] and then by the Family Code of the
Philippines,[14] gave immediate statutory acknowledgment to
the rights of the adopted. In 1989, the United Nations
initiated the Convention of the Rights of the Child. The
Philippines, a State Party to the Convention, accepted the
principle that adoption was impressed with social and moral
responsibility, and that its underlying intent was geared to
favor the adopted child. R.A. No. 8552 secured these rights
and privileges for the adopted. Most importantly, it affirmed
the legitimate status of the adopted child, not only in his new
family but also in the society as well. The new law withdrew
the right of an adopter to rescind the adoption decree and
gave to the adopted child the sole right to sever the legal ties
created by adoption.
Petitioner, however, would insist that R.A. No. 8552
should not adversely affect her right to annul the adoption
decree, nor deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction to hear
the case, both being vested under the Civil Code and the
Family Code, the laws then in force.
The concept of vested right is a consequence of the
constitutional guaranty of due process[15] that expresses
a present fixed interest which in right reason and natural

justice is protected against arbitrary state action;[16] it
includes not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of
a demand but also exemptions from new obligations created
after the right has become vested.[17] Rights are considered
vested when the right to enjoyment is a present interest,
[18]
absolute, unconditional, and perfect[19] or fixed and
irrefutable.
In Republic vs. Court of Appeals,[20] a petition to adopt
Jason Condat was filed by Zenaida C. Bobiles on 02
February 1988 when the Child and Youth Welfare Code
(Presidential Decree No. 603) allowed an adoption to be
sought by either spouse or both of them. After the trial
court had rendered its decision and while the case was still
pending on appeal, the Family Code of the Philippines
(Executive Order No. 209), mandating joint adoption by
the husband and wife, took effect. Petitioner Republic
argued that the case should be dismissed for having been
filed by Mrs. Bobiles alone and without being joined by the
husband. The Court concluded that the jurisdiction of the
court is determined by the statute in force at the time of
the commencement of the action. The petition to adopt
Jason, having been filed with the court at the time when
P.D. No. 603 was still in effect, the right of Mrs. Bobiles to
file the petition, without being joined by her husband,
according to the Court had become vested. In Republic vs.
Miller,[21] spouses Claude and Jumrus Miller, both aliens,
sought to adopt Michael Madayag. On 29 July 1988, the
couple filed a petition to formalize Michaels adoption having
theretofore been taken into their care. At the time the action
was commenced, P.D. No. 603 allowed aliens to adopt. After
the decree of adoption and while on appeal before the Court
of Appeals, the Family Code was enacted into law on 08
August 1988 disqualifying aliens from adopting Filipino
children. The Republic then prayed for the withdrawal of the
adoption decree. In discarding the argument posed by the
Republic, the Supreme Court ruled thatthe controversy
should be resolved in the light of the law governing at
the time the petition was filed.
It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that
herein petitioner filed an action to revoke the decree of
adoption granted in 1975. By then, the new law,[22] had
already abrogated and repealed the right of an adopter
under the Civil Code and the Family Code to rescind a
decree of adoption. Consistently with its earlier
pronouncements, the Court should now hold that the action
for rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated
by petitioner after R.A. No. 8552 had come into force, no
longer could be pursued.
Interestingly, even before the passage of the statute, an
action to set aside the adoption is subject to the fiveyear
bar rule under Rule 100[23] of the Rules of Court and that the
adopter would lose the right to revoke the adoption decree
after the lapse of that period. The exercise of the right within
a prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill the
requirements of a vested right entitled to protection. It must
also be acknowledged that a person has no vested right in
statutory privileges.[24] While adoption has often been

referred to in the context of a right, the privilege to adopt is
itself not naturally innate or fundamental but rather a right
merely created by statute.[25] It is a privilege that is governed
by the states determination on what it may deem to be for
the best interest and welfare of the child.[26] Matters relating
to adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of an
adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are subject to
regulation by the State.[27] Concomitantly, a right of
action given by statute may be taken away at anytime
before it has been exercised.[28]
While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from
an adopter a consequential right to rescind the adoption
decree even in cases where the adoption might clearly turn
out to be undesirable, it remains, nevertheless, the bounden
duty of the Court to apply the law. Dura lex sed lex would be
the hackneyed truism that those caught in the law have to
live with. It is still noteworthy, however, that an adopter,
while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can
always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain
benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child. For
instance, upon the grounds recognized by law, an adopter
may deny to an adopted child his legitime and, by a will and
testament, may freely exclude him from having a share in the
disposable portion of his estate.
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the court a
quo is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
MANUEL DE ASIS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,

HON. JAIME T. HAMOY, Branch 130, RTC,
Kalookan City and GLEN CAMIL ANDRES DE
ASIS represented by her mother/guardian
VIRCEL D. ANDRES, respondents.
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
Petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court seeking to nullify the decision of the Court of
Appeals which affirmed the trial courts Orders, dated
November 25, 1993 and February 4, 1994, respectively,
denying petitioners Motion to Dismiss the Complaint in Civil
Case No. C-16107, entitled Glen Camil Andres de Asis, etc.
vs. Manuel de Asis, and the motion for reconsideration.
The pertinent facts leading to the filing of the petition at
bar are, as follows:
On October 14, 1988, Vircel D. Andres, (the herein
private respondent) in her capacity as the legal guardian of
the minor, Glen Camil Andres de Asis, brought an action for
maintenance and support against Manuel de Asis, docketed
as Civil Case No. Q-88-935 before the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, Branch 94, alleging that the defendant
Manuel de Asis (the petitioner here) is the father of subject
minor Glen Camil Andres de Asis, and the former refused
and/or failed to provide for the maintenance of the latter,
despite repeated demands.
In his Answer, petitioner denied his paternity of the said
minor and theorized that he cannot therefore be required to
provide support for him.
On July 4, 1989, private respondent Vircel D. Andres,
through counsel, sent in a manifestation the pertinent portion
of which, reads;
1. That in his proposed Amended Answer, defendant
(herein petitioner) has made a judicial admission/declaration
that
1) defendant denies that the said minor child
(Glen Camil) is his child; 2) he (petitioner) has no obligation
to the plaintiff Glen Camil xxx.
2. That with the aforesaid judicial admissions/declarations by
the defendant, it seems futile and a useless exercise to claim
support from said defendant.
SUPPORT
DE ASIS v. CA
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 127578. February 15, 1999]
3. That under the foregoing circumstances it would be more

practical that plaintiff withdraws the complaint against the
defendant subject to the condition that the defendant should
not pursue his counterclaim in the above-entitled case,
xxx.[1]
By virtue of the said manifestation, both the plaintiff and
the defendant agreed to move for the dismissal of the
case. Acting
thereupon,
the
Regional
Trial
Court a quo issued the following Order of August 8, 1989,
dismissing Civil Case No. Q-88-935 with prejudice, to wit:

Acting on the manifestation of Atty. Romualdo C. delos
Santos, counsel for the defendant, that counsel for the
plaintiff Atty. Ismael J. Andres has no objection that this case
be withdrawn provided that the defendant will withdraw the
counterclaim, as prayed for, let the case be dismissed with
prejudice.
SO ORDERED.[2]
On September 7, 1995, another Complaint for
maintenance and support was brought against Manuel A. de
Asis, this time in the name of Glen Camil Andres de Asis,
represented by her legal guardian/mother, Vircel D.
Andres. Docketed as Civil Case No. C-16107 before Branch
130 of the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan, the said
Complaint prayed, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully
prayed that judgment be rendered ordering defendant:
1. To pay plaintiff the sum of not less than P2,000.00 per
month for every month since June 1, 1987 as support in
arrears which defendant failed to provide plaintiff shortly
after her birth in June 1987 up to the present;
2. To give plaintiff a monthly allowance of P5,000.00 to be
paid in advance on or before the 5th of each and every
month;
denial of the motion to dismiss by the trial court, and holding

that an action for support cannot be barred by res judicata.
To buttress his submission, petitioner invokes the
previous dismissal of the Complaint for maintenance and
support, Civil Case Q-88-935, filed by the mother and
guardian of the minor, Glen Camil Andres de Asis, (the
herein private respondent). In said case, the complainant
manifested that because of the defendants judicial
declaration denying that he is the father of subject minor
child, it was futile and a useless exercise to claim support
from defendant. Because of such manifestation, and
defendants assurance that he would not pursue his
counterclaim anymore, the parties mutually agreed to move
for the dismissal of the complaint. The motion was granted
by the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, which then
dismissed the case with prejudice.
Petitioner contends that the aforecited manifestation, in
effect, admitted the lack of filiation between him and the
minor child, which admission binds the complainant, and
since the obligation to give support is based on the existence
of paternity and filiation between the child and the putative
parent, the lack thereof negates the right to claim for support.
Thus, petitioner maintains that the dismissal of the Complaint
by the lower court on the basis of the said manifestation bars
the present action for support, especially so because the
order of the trial court explicitly stated that the dismissal of
the case was with prejudice.
The petition is not impressed with merit.
3. To give plaintiff by way of support pendente lite, a monthly

allowance of P5,000.00 per month, the first monthly
allowance to start retroactively from the first day of this
month and the subsequent ones to be paid in advance on or
before the 5th of each succeeding month;
The right to receive support can neither be renounced

nor transmitted to a third person. Article 301 of the Civil
Code, the law in point, reads:
4. To pay the costs of suit.
Art. 301. The right to receive support cannot be renounced,

nor can it be transmitted to a third person. Neither can it be
compensated with what the recipient owes the obligor. xxx
Plaintiff prays for such other relief just and equitable under
the premises.[3]
Furthermore, future support cannot be the subject of a

compromise.
On October 8, 1993, petitioner moved to dismiss the

Complaint on the ground of res judicata, alleging that Civil
Case C-16107 is barred by the prior judgment which
dismissed with prejudice Civil Case Q-88-935.
In the Order dated November 25, 1993 denying subject
motion to dismiss, the trial court ruled that res judicata is
inapplicable in an action for support for the reason that
renunciation or waiver of future support is prohibited by law.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the said Order met
the same fate. It was likewise denied.
Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition
for Certiorari. But on June 7, 1996, the Court of Appeals
found the said Petition devoid of merit and dismissed the
same.
Undaunted, petitioner found his way to this court via the
present petition, posing the question whether or not the
public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in upholding the
Article 2035, ibid, provides, that:

No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid:
(1) The civil status of persons;
(2) The validity of a marriage or legal separation;
(3) Any ground for legal separation
(4) Future support;
(5) The jurisdiction of courts;
(6) Future legitime.

The raison d etre behind the proscription against
renunciation, transmission and/or compromise of the right to
support is stated, thus:
The right to support being founded upon the need of the
recipient to maintain his existence, he is not entitled to
renounce or transfer the right for this would mean
sanctioning the voluntary giving up of life itself. The right to
life cannot be renounced; hence, support, which is the
means to attain the former, cannot be renounced.
xxx
To allow renunciation or transmission or compensation of the
family right of a person to support is virtually to allow either
suicide or the conversion of the recipient to a public
burden. This is contrary to public policy.[4]
In the case at bar, respondent minors mother, who was
the plaintiff in the first case, manifested that she was
withdrawing the case as it seemed futile to claim support
from petitioner who denied his paternity over the child. Since
the right to claim for support is predicated on the existence of
filiation between the minor child and the putative parent,
petitioner would like us to believe that such manifestation
admitting the futility of claiming support from him puts the
issue to rest and bars any and all future complaint for
support.
The manifestation sent in by respondents mother in the
first case, which acknowledged that it would be useless to
pursue its complaint for support, amounted to renunciation
as it severed the vinculum that gives the minor, Glen Camil,
the right to claim support from his putative parent, the
petitioner. Furthermore, the agreement entered into between
the petitioner and respondents mother for the dismissal of
the complaint for maintenance and support conditioned upon
the dismissal of the counterclaim is in the nature of a
compromise which cannot be countenanced. It violates the
prohibition against any compromise of the right to support.
Thus, the admission made by counsel for the wife of the
facts alleged in a motion of the husband, in which the latter
prayed that his obligation to support be extinguished cannot
be considered as an assent to the prayer, and much less, as
a waiver of the right to claim for support.[5]
It is true that in order to claim support, filiation and/or
paternity must first be shown between the claimant and the
parent. However, paternity and filiation or the lack of the
same is a relationship that must be judicially established and
it is for the court to declare its existence or absence. It
cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties.
The civil status of a son having been denied, and this civil
status, from which the right to support is derived being in
issue, it is apparent that no effect can be given to such a
claim until an authoritative declaration has been made as to
the existence of the cause.[6]
Although in the case under scrutiny, the admission may

be binding upon the respondent, such an admission is at
most evidentiary and does not conclusively establish the lack
of filiation.
Neither are we persuaded by petitioners theory that the
dismissal with prejudice of Civil Case Q-88-935 has the
effect of res judicata on the subsequent case for support.
The case of Advincula vs. Advincula[7] comes to the fore. In
Advincula, the minor, Manuela Advincula, instituted a case
for acknowledgment and support against her putative father,
Manuel Advincula. On motion of both parties and for the
reason that the plaintiff has lost interest and is no longer
interested in continuing the case against the defendant
and has no further evidence to introduce in support of the
complaint, the case was dismissed. Thereafter, a similar
case was instituted by Manuela, which the defendant moved
to dismiss, theorizing that the dismissal of the first case
precluded the filing of the second case.
In disposing such case, this Court ruled, thus:
The new Civil Code provides that the allowance for support
is provisional because the amount may be increased or
decreased depending upon the means of the giver and the
needs of the recipient (Art. 297); and that the right to receive
support cannot be renounced nor can it be transmitted to a
third person; neither can it be compensated with what the
recipient owes the obligator (Art. 301). Furthermore, the
right to support can not be waived or transferred to third
parties and future support cannot be the subject of
compromise (Art. 2035; Coral v. Gallego, 38 O.G. 3135,
cited in IV Civil Code by Padilla, p. 648, 1956 Ed.). This
being true, it is indisputable that the present action for
support can be brought, notwithstanding the fact the
previous case filed against the same defendant was
dismissed. And it also appearing that the dismissal of Civil
Case No. 3553, was not an adjudication upon the merits, as
heretofore shown, the right of herein plaintiff-appellant to
reiterate her suit for support and acknowledgment is
available, as her needs arise. Once the needs of plaintiff
arise, she has the right to bring an action for support, for it is
only then that her cause of action accrues.xxx
xxx
It appears that the former dismissal was predicated upon a
compromise. Acknowledgment, affecting as it does the civil
status of persons and future support, cannot be the subject
of compromise. (pars. 1 & 4, Art. 2035, Civil Code). Hence,
the first dismissal cannot have force and effect and can
not bar the filing of another action, asking for the same
relief against the same defendant.(emphasis supplied)
Conformably, notwithstanding the dismissal of Civil
Case 88-935 and the lower courts pronouncement that such
dismissal was with prejudice, the second action for support
may still prosper.
WHEREFORE, the petition under consideration is
hereby DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of Appeals
AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
GAN v. REYES
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 145527
May 28, 2002
AUGUSTUS CAEZAR R. GAN, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ANTONIO C. REYES, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge of RTC-Br. 61, Baguio City, ALBERT G.
TOLENTINO, in his capacity as RTC Sheriff of Baguio
City, and FRANCHESKA JOY C. PONDEVIDA, assisted
by BERNADETTE C. PONDEVIDA, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Quite apprehensive that she would not be able to send to
school her three (3)-year old daughter Francheska Joy S.
Pondevida, Bernadette S. Pondevida wrote petitioner
Augustus Caezar R. Gan1 demanding support for their "love
child." Petitioner, in his reply, denied paternity of the child. An
exasperated Bernadette thereafter instituted in behalf of her
daughter a complaint against petitioner for support with
prayer for support pendente lite.2
Petitioner moved to dismiss on the ground that the complaint
failed to state a cause of action. He argued that since
Francheska's certificate of birth indicated her father as
"UNKNOWN," there was no legal or factual basis for the
claim of support.3 His motion, however, was denied by the
trial court.4
Despite denial of his motion, petitioner failed to file his
answer within the reglementary period. Thus, on 19 January
2000 private respondent moved that petitioner be declared in
default, which motion was granted. In its Orderdeclaring
petitioner in default the trial court noted that
petitioner's Motion to Admit Answer was filed more than
ninety (90) days after the expiration of the reglementary
period, and only after private respondent moved that
petitioner be declared in default. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was also denied. Hence, the court received
the evidence of private respondent ex parte.
After finding that the claim of filiation and support was
adequately proved, the trial court rendered its Decision on 12
May 2000 ordering petitioner to recognize private respondent
Francheska Joy S. Pondevida as his illegitimate child and
support her with P20,000.00 every month to be paid on or
before the 15th of each month starting 15 April 2000.
Likewise petitioner was ordered to pay Francheska Joy S.
Pondevida the accumulated arrears of P20,000.00 per
month from the day she was born, P50,000.00 as attorney's
fees
and P25,000.00
for
expenses
of
litigation,
plusP20,000.00 on or before the 15th of every month from

15 May 2000 as alimony pendente lite should he desire to
pursue further remedies against private respondent.5
Forthwith, private respondent moved for execution of the
judgment of support, which the trial court granted by issuing
a writ of execution, citing as reason therefor private
respondent's immediate need for schooling.6 Pursuant to the
writ, the sheriff levied upon a motor vehicle, a Honda City,
with Plate No. UMT 884, registered in the name of "A.B.
Leasing & Fin. Corp., Leased to: G & G Trading," and found
within the premises of petitioner's warehouse in Caloocan
City.7
Meanwhile, petitioner appealed the Judgment to the Court of
Appeals.8
On 9 June 2000 petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with the Court of Appeals imputing grave abuse of
discretion to the trial court for ordering the immediate
execution of the judgment. Petitioner averred that the writ of
execution was issued despite the absence of a good reason
for immediate enforcement. Petitioner insisted that as the
judgment sought to be executed did not yet attain finality
there should be an exceptional reason to warrant its
execution. He further alleged that the writ proceeded from an
order of default and a judgment rendered by the trial court in
complete disregard of his "highly meritorious defense."
Finally, petitioner impugned the validity of the writ as he
argued that it was issued without notice to him. Petitioner
stressed the fact that he received copy of the motion for
immediate execution two (2) weeks after its scheduled
hearing.9
On 31 August 2000 the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition on the ratiocination that under Sec. 4, Rule 39 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure judgments for support are
immediately executory and cannot be stayed by an appeal.
Thus, it did not help petitioner any to argue that there were
no good reasons to support its immediate execution. The
second challenge hurled against the validity of the writ
concerning the lack of notice and hearing was likewise
dismissed with the appeals court favoring substantial justice
over technicalities. Lastly, petitioner's justification for
belatedly filing his answer, i.e., miscommunication with his
lawyer, was disregarded since it fell short of the statutory
requirements of "fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence."10
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner
came to us impugning the dismissal of his petition for
certiorari. Petitioner argues that under the rules a judgment
for support which is subject of an appeal cannot be executed
absent any good reason for its immediate execution.
Petitioner likewise attacks the validity of the writ asserting
that it was issued in violation of his right to notice and
hearing. Petitioner also seeks the setting aside of the default
order and the judgment rendered thereafter for the reason
that should he be allowed to prove his defense of adultery,
the claim of support would be most likely denied.11 Petitioner

claims that in an action by a child against his putative father,
adultery of the child's mother would be a valid defense to
show that the child is a fruit of adulterous relations for, in
such case, it would not be the child of the defendant and
therefore not entitled to support. Parenthetically, how could
he be allowed to prove the defense of adultery when it was
not even hinted that he was married to the mother of
Francheska Joy. Petitioner consents to submit to
Dioxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Testing to resolve the issue of
paternity, which test he claims has a reputation for
accuracy.12
A careful review of the facts and circumstances of this case
fails to persuade this Court to brand the issuance of the writ
of execution by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of
Appeals with the vice of grave abuse of discretion. There is
no evidence indeed to justify the setting aside of the writ on
the ground that it was issued beyond the legitimate bounds
of judicial discretion.
Section 4, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court clearly states that,
unless ordered by the trial court, judgments in actions for
support are immediately executory and cannot be stayed by
an appeal. This is an exception to the general rule which
provides that the taking of an appeal stays the execution of
the judgment and that advance executions will only be
allowed if there are urgent reasons therefor. The aforesaid
provision peremptorily calls for immediate execution of all
judgments for support and makes no distinction between
those which are the subject of an appeal and those which
are not. To consider then petitioner's argument that there
should be good reasons for the advance execution of a
judgment would violate the clear and explicit language of the
rule mandating immediate execution.
Petitioner is reminded that to the plain words of a legal
provision we should make no further explanation. Absoluta
sententia expositore non indiget. Indeed, the interpretation
which petitioner attempts to foist upon us would only lead to
absurdity, its acceptance negating the plain meaning of the
provision subject of the petition.
Petitioner would also have us annul the writ of execution on

the ground that he was not notified of its issuance. We are
unable to accept such a plea for enough has been done by
petitioner to delay the execution of the writ. As the records
show, in partial fulfillment of the writ of execution petitioner
surrendered a sedan which apparently was not his as it was
later ordered released to a third party who laid claim over the
levied vehicle.13 Also, petitioner filed before the Court of
Appeals a Motion for Leave to Deposit in Court Support
Pendente Lite promising to deposit the amount due as
support every 15th of the month, but to date has not
deposited any amount in complete disavowal of his
undertaking.14 He was not even deterred from appealing
before us and needlessly taking up our time and energy by
posing legal questions that can be characterized, at best, as
flimsy and trivial. We are thus not prepared to abrogate the
writ of execution issued in favor of private respondent for
substantial justice would be better served if petitioner be
precluded from interposing another barrier to the immediate
execution of the support judgment.
We are not intimating that in every case the right to notice of
hearing can be disregarded. That is not so. It appears in this
case that there has been too much temporizing in the
execution of the writ which must not be allowed to thwart the
constitutional mandate for speedy disposition of cases. As
has been said, a technicality should be an aid to justice and
not its great hindrance and chief enemy.15 Truly, if the writ of
execution would be voided on this ground alone, then
procedural rules which were primarily drafted to protect
parties in the realm of constitutional guarantees would
acquire a new sanctity at the expense of equity and justice.
Lastly, we note that no useful purpose would be served if we
dwell on petitioner's arguments concerning the validity of the
judgment by default and his insistence that he be subjected,
together with private respondent Bernadette C. Pondevida to
DNA testing to settle the issue of paternity. The futility of his
arguments is very apparent. It is not for us at this instance to
review or revise the Decision rendered by the trial court for to
do so would pre-empt the decision which may be rendered
by the Court of Appeals in the main case for support.
In all cases involving a child, his interest and welfare are
always the paramount concerns. There may be instances
where, in view of the poverty of the child, it would be a
travesty of justice to refuse him support until the decision of
the trial court attains finality while time continues to slip
away. An excerpt from the early case of De Leon v.
Soriano16 is relevant, thus:
The money and property adjudged for support and education
should and must be given presently and without delay
because if it had to wait the final judgment, the children may
in the meantime have suffered because of lack of food or
have missed and lost years in school because of lack of
funds. One cannot delay the payment of such funds for
support and education for the reason that if paid long
afterwards, however much the accumulated amount, its
payment cannot cure the evil and repair the damage caused.

The children with such belated payment for support and
education cannot act as gluttons and eat voraciously and
unwisely, afterwards, to make up for the years of hunger and
starvation. Neither may they enrol in several classes and
schools and take up numerous subjects all at once to make
up for the years they missed in school, due to non-payment
of the funds when needed.
WHEREFORE,
finding
no
reversible
error
in
the Decision sought to be reviewed, the instant petition
is DENIED. The 31 August 2000 Decision of the Court of
Appeals dismissing the Petition for Certiorari instituted by
petitioner Augustus Caezar C. Gan and upholding the validity
of the 2 June 2000 Writ of Execution issued by the Regional
Trial Court Br. 61, Baguio City, in Civil Case No. 4234-R,
is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
MANGONON v. CA
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 125041
June 30, 2006
MA. BELEN B. MANGONON, for and in behalf of her

minor children REBECCA ANGELA DELGADO and
REGINA ISABEL DELGADO. Petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE JOSEFINA
GUEVARA-SALONGA, Presiding Judge, RTC-Makati,
Branch 149, FEDERICO C. DELGADO and FRANCISCO
C. DELGADO, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 20 March 1996,
affirming the Order, dated 12 September 19952 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 149, Makati, granting
support pendente lite to Rebecca Angela (Rica) and Regina
Isabel (Rina), both surnamed Delgado.
The generative facts leading to the filing of the present
petition are as follows:
On 17 March 1994, petitioner Ma. Belen B. Mangonon filed,
in behalf of her then minor children Rica and Rina, a Petition
for Declaration of Legitimacy and Support, with application
for support pendente lite with the RTC Makati.3In said
petition, it was alleged that on 16 February 1975, petitioner
and respondent Federico Delgado were civilly married by
then City Court Judge Eleuterio Agudo in Legaspi City, Albay.
At that time, petitioner was only 21 years old while

respondent Federico was only 19 years old. As the marriage
was solemnized without the required consent per Article 85
of the New Civil Code,4 it was annulled on 11 August 1975 by
the Quezon City Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.5
On 25 March 1976, or within seven months after the
annulment of their marriage, petitioner gave birth to twins
Rica and Rina. According to petitioner, she, with the
assistance of her second husband Danny Mangonon, raised
her twin daughters as private respondents had totally
abandoned them. At the time of the institution of the petition,
Rica and Rina were about to enter college in the United
States of America (USA) where petitioner, together with her
daughters and second husband, had moved to and finally
settled in. Rica was admitted to the University of
Massachusetts (Amherst) while Rina was accepted by the
Long Island University and Western New England College.
Despite their admissions to said universities, Rica and Rina
were, however, financially incapable of pursuing collegiate
education because of the following:
i) The average annual cost for college education in the US is
about US$22,000/year, broken down as follows:
Tuition Fees US$13,000.00
Room & Board 5,000.00
Books 1,000.00
Yearly Transportation &
Meal Allowance 3,000.00
Total US$ 22,000.00
or a total of US$44,000.00, more or less,
for both Rica and Rina
ii) Additionally, Rica and Rina need general maintenance
support each in the amount of US$3,000.00 per year or a
total of US$6,000 per year.
iii) Unfortunately, petitioners monthly income from her 2 jobs
is merely US$1,200 after taxes which she can hardly give
general support to Rica and Rina, much less their required
college educational support.
iv) Neither can petitioners present husband be compelled to
share in the general support and college education of Rica
and Rina since he has his own son with petitioner and own
daughter (also in college) to attend to.
v) Worse, Rica and Rinas petitions for Federal Student Aid
have been rejected by the U.S. Department of Education.6
Petitioner likewise averred that demands7 were made upon
Federico and the latters father, Francisco, 8 for general

support and for the payment of the required college
education of Rica and Rina. The twin sisters even exerted
efforts to work out a settlement concerning these matters
with respondent Federico and respondent Francisco, the
latter being generally known to be financially well-off.9 These
demands, however, remained unheeded. Considering the
impending deadline for admission to college and the opening
of classes, petitioner and her then minor children had no
choice but to file the petition before the trial court.
Petitioner also alleged that Rica and Rina are her legitimate
daughters by respondent Federico since the twin sisters
were born within seven months from the date of the
annulment of her marriage to respondent Federico. However,
as respondent Federico failed to sign the birth certificates of
Rica and Rina, it was imperative that their status as
legitimate children of respondent Federico, and as
granddaughters of respondent Francisco, be judicially
declared pursuant to Article 173 of the Family Code.10
As legitimate children and grandchildren, Rica and Rina are
entitled to general and educational support under Articles
17411 and 195(b)12 in relation to Articles 194(1 and 2) 13 and
199(c)14 of the Family Code. Petitioner alleged that under
these provisions, in case of default on the part of the
parents, the obligation to provide support falls upon the
grandparents of the children; thus, respondent Federico, or
in his default, respondent Francisco should be ordered to
provide general and educational support for Rica and Rina in
the amount of US$50,000.00, more or less, per year.
Petitioner also claimed that she was constrained to seek
support pendente lite from private respondents - who are
millionaires with extensive assets both here and abroad - in
view of the imminent opening of classes, the possibility of a
protracted litigation, and Rica and Rinas lack of financial
means to pursue their college education in the USA.
In his Answer,15 respondent Francisco stated that as the birth
certificates of Rica and Rina do not bear the signature of
respondent Federico, it is essential that their legitimacy be
first established as "there is no basis to claim support until a
final and executory judicial declaration has been made as to
the civil status of the children." 16 Whatever good deeds he
may have done to Rica and Rina, according to respondent
Francisco, was founded on pure acts of Christian charity. He,
likewise, averred that the order of liability for support under
Article 199 of the Family Code is not concurrent such that
the obligation must be borne by those more closely related to
the recipient. In this case, he maintained that responsibility
should rest on the shoulders of petitioner and her second
husband, the latter having voluntarily assumed the duties
and responsibilities of a natural father. Even assuming that
he is responsible for support, respondent Francisco
contends that he could not be made to answer beyond what
petitioner and the father could afford.
On 24 May 1994, petitioner filed a Motion to Declare
Defendant (respondent herein) Federico in Default. 17 This
was favorably acted upon by the trial court in the Order

dated 16 June 1994.18
On 5 August 1994, respondent Federico filed a Motion to Lift
Order of Default alleging that the summons and a copy of the
petition were not served in his correct address.19 Attached
thereto was his Answer20 where he claimed that petitioner
had no cause of action against him. According to him, he left
for abroad and stayed there for a long time "[w]ithin the first
one hundred twenty (120) days of the three hundred days
immediately preceding March 25, 1976" and that he only
came to know about the birth of Rica and Rina when the
twins introduced themselves to him seventeen years later. In
order not to antagonize the two, respondent Federico
claimed he did not tell them that he could not be their father.
Even assuming that Rica and Rina are, indeed, his
daughters, he alleged that he could not give them the
support they were demanding as he was only
making P40,000.00 a month.
Finding sufficient ground in the motion filed by respondent
Federico, the trial court lifted its Order dated 16 June 1994
and admitted his Answer.21
In the meantime, on 25 April 1994, petitioner filed an Urgent
Motion to Set Application for Support Pendente Lite for
Hearing because Rica and Rina both badly needed
immediate financial resources for their education. 22 This
Motion was opposed by respondent Francisco.23 After both
parties submitted supplemental pleadings to bolster their
respective positions, the trial court resolved the motion in an
Order dated 12 September 1995 in this wise:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations,
respondents are hereby directed to provide a monthly
support (pendente lite) of P5,000.00 each or a total
of P10,000.00 for the education of Rebecca Angela and
Regina Isabel Delgado to be delivered within the first five
days of each month without need of demand.24
Unsatisfied with the Order of the trial court, petitioner brought
the case to the Court of Appeals via Petition for Certiorari.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the holding of the trial court
and disposed the petition in the following manner:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby
DISMISSED and the Order of the lower court dated
September 12, 1995 is hereby AFFIRMED.25
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied through
the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 16 May 1996.26
Petitioner is now before this Court claiming that the Decision
of the Court of Appeals was tainted with the following errors:
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
CONCLUDING THAT RESPONDENT JUDGE DID NOT
COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN FIXING THE
AMOUNT OF MONTHLY SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE

GRANTED TO PETITIONERS
MEASLEY P5,000.00 PER CHILD.
CHILDREN
AT
I.
RESPONDENT COURT IGNORED EVIDENCE ON
RECORD OF THE FINANCIAL INCAPACITY OF RICA AND
RINAS PARENTS IN DEFAULT OF WHOM THE
OBLIGATION TO GIVE SUPPORT DEVOLVES ON THE
GRANDFATHER.
II.
IT BEING ESTABLISHED THAT THE PERSON OBLIGED
TO GIVE SUPPORT GRANDFATHER DON PACO IS
UNDOUBTEDLY CAPABLE OF GIVING THE AMOUNT
DEMANDED, RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT
HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN FIXING AN AMOUNT
OF SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE THAT IS OBVIOUSLY
INADEQUATE TO SUPPORT THE EDUCATIONAL
REQUIREMENTS OF THE RECIPIENTS.27
At the time of the filing of the present Petition, it is alleged
that Rica had already entered Rutgers University in New
Jersey with a budget of US$12,500.00 for academic year
1994-1995. She was able to obtain a tuition fee grant of
US$1,190.00 and a Federal Stafford loan from the US
government in the amount of US$2,615.00.28 In order to
defray the remaining balance of Ricas education for said
school year, petitioner claims that she had to secure a loan
under the Federal Direct Student Loan Program.
Meanwhile, Rina entered CW Post, Long Island University,
where she was expected to spend US$20,000.00 for the
school year 1994-1995. She was given a financial grant of
US$6,000.00, federal work study assistance of US$2,000.00,
and a Federal Stafford loan of US$2,625.00.29 Again,
petitioner obtained a loan to cover the remainder of Rinas
school budget for the year.
Petitioner concedes that under the law, the obligation to
furnish support to Rica and Rina should be first imposed
upon their parents. She contends, however, that the records
of this case demonstrate her as well as respondent
Federicos inability to give the support needed for Rica and
Rinas college education. Consequently, the obligation to
provide support devolves upon respondent Francisco being
the grandfather of Rica and Rina.
Petitioner also maintains that as respondent Francisco has
the financial resources to help defray the cost of Rica and
Rinas schooling, the Court of Appeals then erred in
sustaining the trial courts Order directing respondent
Federico to pay Rica and Rina the amount of
award P5,000.00 each as monthly support pendente lite.
On the other hand, respondent Francisco argues that the
trial court correctly declared that petitioner and respondent
Federico should be the ones to provide the support needed
by their twin daughters pursuant to Article 199 of the Family

Code. He also maintains that aside from the financial
package availed of by Rica and Rina in the form of state
tuition aid grant, work study program and federal student
loan program, petitioner herself was eligible for, and had
availed herself of, the federal parent loan program based on
her income and properties in the USA. He, likewise, insists
that assuming he could be held liable for support, he has the
option to fulfill the obligation either by paying the support or
receiving and maintaining in the dwelling here in the
Philippines the person claiming support.30 As an additional
point to be considered by this Court, he posits the argument
that because petitioner and her twin daughters are now US
citizens, they cannot invoke the Family Code provisions on
support as "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to
the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad."31
Respondent Federico, for his part, continues to deny having
sired Rica and Rina by reiterating the grounds he had
previously raised before the trial court. Like his father,
respondent Federico argues that assuming he is indeed the
father of the twin sisters, he has the option under the law as
to how he would provide support. Lastly, he assents with the
declaration of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the
parents of a child should primarily bear the burden of
providing support to their offspring.
The petition is meritorious.
As a preliminary matter, we deem it necessary to briefly
discuss the essence of support pendente lite. The pertinent
portion of the Rules of Court on the matter provides:
Rule
SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE
61
SECTION 1. Application.- At the commencement of the

proper action or proceeding, or at any time prior to the
judgment or final order, a verified application for support
pendente lite may be filed by any party stating the grounds
for the claim and the financial conditions of both parties, and
accompanied by affidavits, depositions or other authentic
documents in support thereof.
xxxx
SEC. 4. Order.- The court shall determine provisionally the
pertinent facts, and shall render such orders as justice and
equity may require, having due regard to the probable
outcome of the case and such other circumstances as may
aid in the proper resolution of the question involved. If the
application is granted, the court shall fix the amount of
money to be provisionally paid or such other forms of
support as should be provided, taking into account the
necessities of the applicant and the resources or means of
the adverse party, and the terms of payment or mode for
providing the support. If the application is denied, the

principal case shall be tried and decided as early as
possible.
Under this provision, a court may temporarily grant support
pendente lite prior to the rendition of judgment or final order.
Because of its provisional nature, a court does not need to
delve fully into the merits of the case before it can settle an
application for this relief. All that a court is tasked to do is
determine the kind and amount of evidence which may
suffice to enable it to justly resolve the application. It is
enough that the facts be established by affidavits or other
documentary evidence appearing in the record.32lavvphi1.net
After the hearings conducted on this matter as well as the
evidence presented, we find that petitioner was able to
establish, by prima facie proof, the filiation of her twin
daughters to private respondents and the twins entitlement
to support pendente lite. In the words of the trial court
By and large, the status of the twins as children of Federico
cannot be denied. They had maintained constant
communication with their grandfather Francisco. As a matter
of fact, respondent Francisco admitted having wrote several
letters to Rica and Rina (Exhs. A, B, C, D, E, F, G, G-1 to G30). In the said letters, particularly at the bottom thereof,
respondent Francisco wrote the names of Rica and
Rina Delgado. He therefore was very well aware that they
bear the surname Delgado. Likewise, he referred to himself
in his letters as either "Lolo Paco" or "Daddy Paco." In his
letter of October 13, 1989 (Exh. G-21), he said "as the
grandfather, am extending a financial help of US$1,000.00."
On top of this, respondent Federico even gave the twins a
treat to Hongkong during their visit to the Philippines. Indeed,
respondents, by their actuations, have shown beyond doubt
that the twins are the children of Federico.33
Having addressed the issue of the propriety of the trial
courts grant of support pendente lite in favor of Rica and
Rina, the next question is who should be made liable for said
award.
The pertinent provision of the Family Code on this subject
states:
ART. 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give
support, the liability shall devolve upon the following persons
in the order herein provided:
(1) The spouse;
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
may be held to shoulder the responsibility should the

claimant prove that those who are called upon to provide
support do not have the means to do so.34
In this case, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
held respondent Federico liable to provide monthly
supportpendente lite in the total amount of P10,000.00 by
taking into consideration his supposed income of P30,000.00
toP40,000.00 per month. We are, however, unconvinced as
to the veracity of this ground relied upon by the trial court
and the Court of Appeals.
It is a basic procedural edict that questions of fact cannot be
the proper subject of a petition for review under Rule 45 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule finds a more
stringent application where the Court of Appeals upholds the
findings of fact of the trial court; in such a situation, this
Court, as the final arbiter, is generally bound to adopt the
facts as determined by the appellate and the lower courts.
This rule, however, is not ironclad as it admits of the
following recognized exceptions: "(1) when the findings are
grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures;
(2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd
or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion;
(4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of
facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when
in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the
issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the
admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when
the findings are contrary to that of the trial court; (8) when
the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set
forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when
the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence
of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and
(11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain
relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion." 35 The case
at bar falls within the seventh and eleventh exceptions.
The trial court gave full credence to respondent Federicos
allegation in his Answer36 and his testimony37 as to the
amount of his income. We have, however, reviewed the
records of this case and found them bereft of evidence to
support his assertions regarding his employment and his
earning. Notably, he was even required by petitioners
counsel to present to the court his income tax return and yet
the records of this case do not bear a copy of said
document.38 This, to our mind, severely undermines the
truthfulness of respondent Federicos assertion with respect
to his financial status and capacity to provide support to Rica
and Rina.
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and

(4) The brothers and sisters.
An eminent author on the subject explains that the obligation
to give support rests principally on those more closely
related to the recipient. However, the more remote relatives
In addition, respondent Francisco himself stated in the

witness stand that as far as he knew, his son, respondent
Federico did not own anything
"Atty. Lopez:

I have here another letter under the letter head of Mr. & Mrs.
Dany Mangonon, dated October 19, 1991 addressed to Mr.
Francisco Delgado signed by "sincerely, Danny Mangonon,
can you remember."
xxxx
WITNESS:
A: I do remember this letter because it really irritated me so
much that I threw it away in a waste basket. It is a very
demanding letter, that is what I do not like at all.
ATTY. LOPEZ:
Q: It is stated in this letter that "I am making this request to
you and not to your son, Rico, for reasons we both are
aware of." Do you know what reason that is?
A: Yes. The reason is that my son do not have fix
employment and do not have fix salary and income and they
want to depend on the lolo.
x x x xlavvphi1.net
Q: Would you have any knowledge if Federico owns a house
and lot?
A: Not that I know. I do not think he has anything.
Q: How about a car?
A: Well, his car is owned by my company.39
Respondent Federico himself admitted in court that he had
no property of his own, thus:
Q: You also mentioned that you are staying at Mayflower
Building and you further earlier testified that this building
belongs to Citadel Corporation. Do you confirm that?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What car are you driving, Mr. Witness?
A: I am driving a lancer, sir.
Q: What car, that registered in the name of the corporation?
A: In the corporation, sir.
Q: What corporation is that?
A: Citadel Commercial, Inc., sir.
Q: What properties, if any, are registered in your name, do
you have any properties, Mr. Witness?
A: None, sir."40 (Emphasis supplied.)

Meanwhile, respondent Francisco asserts that petitioner
possessed the capacity to give support to her twin daughters
as she has gainful employment in the USA. He even went as
far as to state that petitioners income abroad, when
converted to Philippine peso, was much higher than that
received by a trial court judge here in the Philippines. In
addition, he claims that as she qualified for the federal parent
loan program, she could very well support the college
studies of her daughters.
We are unconvinced. Respondent Franciscos assertion that
petitioner had the means to support her daughters education
is belied by the fact that petitioner was even forced by her
financial status in the USA to secure the loan from the
federal government. If petitioner were really making enough
money abroad, she certainly would not have felt the need to
apply for said loan. The fact that petitioner was compelled to
take out a loan is enough indication that she did not have
enough money to enable her to send her daughters to
college by herself. Moreover, even Rica and Rina
themselves were forced by the circumstances they found
themselves in to secure loans under their names so as not to
delay their entrance to college.
There being prima facie evidence showing that petitioner and
respondent Federico are the parents of Rica and Rina,
petitioner and respondent Federico are primarily charged to
support their childrens college education. In view however of
their incapacities, the obligation to furnish said support
should be borne by respondent Francisco. Under Article 199
of the Family Code, respondent Francisco, as the next
immediate relative of Rica and Rina, is tasked to give
support to his granddaughters in default of their parents. It
bears stressing that respondent Francisco is the majority
stockholder and Chairman of the Board of Directors of
Citadel Commercial, Incorporated, which owns and manages
twelve gasoline stations, substantial real estate, and is
engaged in shipping, brokerage and freight forwarding. He is
also the majority stockholder and Chairman of the Board of
Directors of Citadel Shipping which does business with
Hyundai of Korea. Apart from these, he also owns the
Citadel Corporation which, in turn, owns real properties in
different parts of the country. He is likewise the Chairman of
the Board of Directors of Isla Communication Co. and he
owns shares of stocks of Citadel Holdings. In addition, he
owns real properties here and abroad.41 It having been
established that respondent Francisco has the financial
means to support his granddaughters education, he, in lieu
of petitioner and respondent Federico, should be held liable
for supportpendente lite.
Anent respondent Francisco and Federicos claim that they
have the option under the law as to how they could perform
their obligation to support Rica and Rina, respondent
Francisco insists that Rica and Rina should move here to the
Philippines to study in any of the local universities. After all,
the quality of education here, according to him, is at par with

that offered in the USA. The applicable provision of the
Family Code on this subject provides:
Art. 204. The person obliged to give support shall have the
option to fulfill the obligation either by paying the allowance
fixed, or by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling
the person who has a right to receive support. The latter
alternative cannot be availed of in case there is a moral or
legal obstacle thereto.
Under the abovecited provision, the obligor is given the
choice as to how he could dispense his obligation to give
support. Thus, he may give the determined amount of
support to the claimant or he may allow the latter to stay in
the family dwelling. The second option cannot be availed of
in case there are circumstances, legal or moral, which
should be considered.
In this case, this Court believes that respondent Francisco
could not avail himself of the second option. From the
records, we gleaned that prior to the commencement of this
action, the relationship between respondent Francisco, on
one hand, and petitioner and her twin daughters, on the
other, was indeed quite pleasant. The correspondences
exchanged among them expressed profound feelings of
thoughtfulness and concern for one anothers well-being.
The photographs presented by petitioner as part of her
exhibits presented a seemingly typical family celebrating
kinship. All of these, however, are now things of the past.
With the filing of this case, and the allegations hurled at one
another by the parties, the relationships among the parties
had certainly been affected. Particularly difficult for Rica and
Rina must be the fact that those who they had considered
and claimed as family denied having any familial relationship
with them. Given all these, we could not see Rica and Rina
moving back here in the Philippines in the company of those
who have disowned them.
entitled to support pendente lite, the court shall then order

the return of the amounts already paid with legal interest
from the dates of actual payment.44
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Petition is
PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 20 March 1996 and Resolution dated 16 May
1996 affirming the Order dated 12 September 1995 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 149, Makati, fixing the amount
of support pendente lite to P5,000.00 for Rebecca Angela
and Regina Isabel, are hereby MODIFIED in that respondent
Francisco Delgado is hereby held liable for support pendente
lite in the amount to be determined by the trial court pursuant
to this Decision. Let the records of this case be remanded to
the trial court for the determination of the proper amount of
support pendente lite for Rebecca Angela and Regina Isabel
as well as the arrearages due them in accordance with this
Decision within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.
Concomitantly, the trial court is directed to proceed with the
trial of the main case and the immediate resolution of the
same with deliberate dispatch. The RTC Judge, Branch 149,
Makati, is further directed to submit a report of his
compliance with the directive regarding the support pendente
lite within ten (10) days from compliance thereof.
SO ORDERED.
LIM v. LIM
THIRD DIVISION
SPOUSES PRUDENCIO and

FILOMENA LIM,
Petitioners,
G.R. No. 163209
- versus Finally, as to the amount of support pendente lite, we take

our bearings from the provision of the law mandating the
amount of support to be proportionate to the resources or
means of the giver and to the necessities of the
recipient.42 Guided by this principle, we hold respondent
Francisco liable for half of the amount of school expenses
incurred by Rica and Rina as support pendente lite. As
established by petitioner, respondent Francisco has the
financial resources to pay this amount given his various
business endeavors.
MA. CHERYL S. LIM,

for herself and on behalf of
her minor children LESTER
EDWARD S. LIM, CANDICE
GRACE S. LIM, and MARIANO
Promulgated:
S. LIM, III,
Respondents.
October 30, 2009
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
Considering, however, that the twin sisters may have already

been done with their education by the time of the
promulgation of this decision, we deem it proper to award
support pendente lite in arrears43 to be computed from the
time they entered college until they had finished their
respective studies.
CARPIO, J.:
The issue of the applicability of Article 15 of the Civil Code

on petitioner and her twin daughters raised by respondent
Francisco is best left for the resolution of the trial court. After
all, in case it would be resolved that Rica and Rina are not
For review[1] is the Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals,

dated 28 April 2003, ordering petitioners Prudencio and
Filomena Lim (petitioners) to provide legal support to
DECISION
The Case

respondents Cheryl, Lester Edward, Candice Grace and
Mariano III, all surnamed Lim (respondents).
In its Decision dated 28 April 2003, the Court of

Appeals affirmed the trial court. On the issue material to this
appeal, that is, whether there is basis to hold petitioners, as
Edwards parents, liable with him to support respondents, the
Court of Appeals held:
The Facts
In 1979, respondent Cheryl S. Lim (Cheryl) married

Edward Lim (Edward), son of petitioners. Cheryl bore
Edward three children, respondents Lester Edward, Candice
Grace and Mariano III. Cheryl, Edward and their children
resided at the house of petitioners in Forbes Park, Makati
City, together with Edwards ailing grandmother, Chua Giak
and her husband Mariano Lim (Mariano). Edwards family
business, which provided him with a monthly salary
of P6,000, shouldered the family expenses. Cheryl had no
steady source of income.
On 14 October 1990, Cheryl abandoned the
Forbes Park residence, bringing the children with her (then
all minors), after a violent confrontation with Edward whom
she caught with the in-house midwife of Chua Giak in what
the trial court described a very compromising situation.[3]
The law on support under Article 195 of the Family

Code is clear on this matter. Parents and their legitimate
children are obliged to mutually support one another and this
obligation extends down to the legitimate grandchildren and
great grandchildren.
In connection with this provision, Article 200
paragraph (3) of the Family Code clearly provides that
should the person obliged to give support does not have
sufficient means to satisfy all claims, the other persons
enumerated in Article 199 in its order shall provide the
necessary support. This is because the closer the
relationship of the relatives, the stronger the tie that binds
them. Thus, the obligation to support is imposed first upon
the shoulders of the closer relatives and only in their default
is the obligation moved to the next nearer relatives and so
on.[8]
Cheryl, for herself and her children, sued petitioners,

Edward, Chua Giak and Mariano (defendants) in the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 140 (trial court)
for support. The trial court ordered Edward to provide
monthly support of P6,000 pendente lite.[4]
Petitioners sought reconsideration but the Court of

Appeals denied their motion in the Resolution dated 12 April
2004.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
The Issue
On 31 January 1996, the trial court rendered

judgment ordering Edward and petitioners to jointly
provide P40,000 monthly support to respondents, with
Edward shouldering P6,000 and petitioners the balance
of P34,000 subject to Chua Giaks subsidiary liability.[5]
The issue is whether petitioners are concurrently liable

with Edward to provide support to respondents.
The defendants sought reconsideration, questioning

their liability. The trial court, while denying reconsideration,
clarified that petitioners and Chua Giak were held jointly
liable with Edward because of the latters inability x x x to
give sufficient support x x x.[6]
We rule in the affirmative. However, we modify the

appealed judgment by limiting petitioners liability to the
amount of monthly support needed by respondents Lester
Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III only.
Hence, this petition.
The Ruling of the Court
Petitioners Liable to Provide Support

but only to their Grandchildren
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals assailing,
among others, their liability to support respondents.
Petitioners argued that while Edwards income is insufficient,
the law itself sanctions its effects by providing that legal
support should be in keeping with the financial capacity of
the family under Article 194 of the Civil Code, as amended
by Executive Order No. 209 (The Family Code of the
Philippines).[7]
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
By statutory[9] and jurisprudential mandate,[10] the

liability of ascendants to provide legal support to their
descendants is beyond cavil. Petitioners themselves admit
as much they limit their petition to the narrow question
of when their liability is triggered, not if they are liable.
Relying on provisions[11] found in Title IX of the Civil Code, as
amended, on Parental Authority, petitioners theorize that
their liability is activated only upon default of parental
authority, conceivably either by its termination[12] or
suspension[13] during the childrens minority. Because at the
time respondents sued for support, Cheryl and Edward
exercised parental authority over their children,[14]petitioners

submit that the obligation to support the latters offspring
ends with them.
Neither the text of the law nor the teaching of
jurisprudence supports this severe constriction of the scope
of familial obligation to give support. In the first place, the
governing text are the relevant provisions in Title VIII of the
Civil Code, as amended, on Support, not the provisions in
Title IX on Parental Authority. While both areas share a
common ground in that parental authority encompasses the
obligation to provide legal support,[15] they differ in other
concerns including the duration of the obligation and
itsconcurrence among relatives of differing degrees. [16] Thus,
although the obligation to provide support arising from
parental authority ends upon the emancipation of the child,
[17]
the same obligation arising from spousal and general
familial ties ideally lasts during the obligee's lifetime.. Also,
while parental authority under Title IX (and the correlative
parental rights) pertains to parents, passing to ascendants
only upon its termination or suspension, the obligation to
provide legal support passes on to ascendants not only
upon default of the parents but also for the latters inability to
provide sufficient support. As we observed in another case
raising the ancillary issue of an ascendants obligation to give
support in light of the fathers sufficient means:
Professor Pineda is of the view that grandchildren
cannot demand support directly from their grandparents if
they have parents (ascendants of nearest degree) who are
capable of supporting them. This is so because we have
to follow the order of support under Art. 199. We agree with
this view.
xxxx
There is no showing that private respondent
is without means to support his son; neither is there any
evidence to prove that petitioner, as the paternal
grandmother, was willing to voluntarily provide for her
grandson's legal support. x x x[18] (Emphasis supplied;
internal citations omitted)
Here, there is no question that Cheryl is unable to

discharge her obligation to provide sufficient legal support to
her children, then all school-bound. It is also undisputed that
the amount of support Edward is able to give to
respondents, P6,000 a month, is insufficient to meet
respondents basic needs. This inability of Edward and
Cheryl to sufficiently provide for their children shifts a portion
of their obligation to the ascendants in the nearest degree,
both in the paternal (petitioners) and maternal [19] lines,
following the ordering in Article 199. To hold otherwise, and
thus subscribe to petitioners theory, is to sanction the
anomalous scenario of tolerating extreme material
deprivation of children because of parental inability to give
adequate support even if ascendants one degree removed
are more than able to fill the void.
However, petitioners partial concurrent obligation
extends only to their descendants as this word is commonly
understood to refer to relatives, by blood of lower degree. As

petitioners grandchildren by blood, only respondents Lester
Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III belong to this
category. Indeed, Cheryls right to receive support from the
Lim family extends only to her husband Edward, arising from
their marital bond.[20] Unfortunately, Cheryls share from the
amount of monthly support
the trial court awarded
cannot be determined from the records. Thus, we are
constrained to remand the case to the trial court for this
limited purpose.[21]
Petitioners Precluded from Availing
of the Alternative Option Under
Article 204 of the Civil Code, as Amended
As an alternative proposition, petitioners wish to avail
of the option in Article 204 of the Civil Code, as amended,
and pray that they be allowed to fulfill their obligation by
maintaining respondents at petitioners Makati residence.
The option is unavailable to petitioners.
The application of Article 204 which provides that
The person obliged to give support shall have the
option to fulfill the obligation either by paying the allowance
fixed, or by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling
the person who has a right to receive support. The latter
alternative cannot be availed of in case there is
a moral or legal obstacle thereto. (Emphasis supplied)
is subject to its exception clause. Here, the persons entitled
to receive support are petitioners grandchildren and
daughter-in-law. Granting petitioners the option in Article
204 will secure to the grandchildren a well-provided future;
however, it will also force Cheryl to return to the house
which, for her, is the scene of her husbands infidelity. While
not rising to the level of a legal obstacle, as indeed, Cheryls
charge against Edward for concubinage did not prosper for
insufficient evidence, her steadfast insistence on its
occurrence amounts to a moral impediment bringing the
case within the ambit of the exception clause of Article 204,
precluding its application.
WHEREFORE,
we DENY the
petition.
We AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 28
April 2003, and its Resolution dated 12 April 2004 with
theMODIFICATION that petitioners Prudencio and Filomena
Lim are liable to provide support only to respondents Lester
Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III, all surnamed Lim.
We REMAND the case to the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 140, for further proceedings consistent with this
ruling.
SO ORDERED.

Dolina filed a motion for reconsideration but the RTC denied
it in its April 4, 2008 Order,5 with an admonition that she first
file a petition for compulsory recognition of her child as a
prerequisite for support. Unsatisfied, Dolina filed the present
petition for review directly with this Court.
DOLINA v. VALLECERA
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 182367
December 15, 2010
CHERRYL B. DOLINA, Petitioner,

vs.
GLENN D. VALLECERA, Respondent.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about a mothers claim for temporary support of
an unacknowledged child, which she sought in an action for
the issuance of a temporary protection order that she
brought against the supposed father.
The Facts and the Case
In February 2008 petitioner Cherryl B. Dolina filed a petition
with prayer for the issuance of a temporary protection order
against respondent Glenn D. Vallecera before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Tacloban City in P.O. 2008-02-07 1 for
alleged woman and child abuse under Republic Act (R.A.)
9262.2 In filling out the blanks in the pro-formacomplaint,
Dolina added a handwritten prayer for financial support3 from
Vallecera for their supposed child. She based her prayer on
the latters Certificate of Live Birth which listed Vallecera as
the childs father. The petition also asked the RTC to order
Philippine Airlines, Valleceras employer, to withhold from his
pay such amount of support as the RTC may deem
appropriate.
Vallecera opposed the petition. He claimed that Dolinas
petition was essentially one for financial support rather than
for protection against woman and child abuses; that he was
not the childs father; that the signature appearing on the
childs Certificate of Live Birth is not his; that the petition is a
harassment suit intended to force him to acknowledge the
child as his and give it financial support; and that Vallecera
has never lived nor has been living with Dolina, rendering
unnecessary the issuance of a protection order against him.
On March 13, 20084 the RTC dismissed the petition after
hearing since no prior judgment exists establishing the
filiation of Dolinas son and granting him the right to support
as basis for an order to compel the giving of such support.
The Issue Presented

The sole issue presented in this case is whether or not the
RTC correctly dismissed Dolinas action for temporary
protection and denied her application for temporary support
for her child.
The Courts Ruling
Dolina evidently filed the wrong action to obtain support for
her child. The object of R.A. 9262 under which she filed the
case is the protection and safety of women and children who
are victims of abuse or violence. 6 Although the issuance of a
protection order against the respondent in the case can
include the grant of legal support for the wife and the child,
this assumes that both are entitled to a protection order and
to legal support.
Dolina of course alleged that Vallecera had been abusing her
and her child.1avvphil But it became apparent to the RTC
upon hearing that this was not the case since, contrary to her
claim, neither she nor her child ever lived with Vallecera. As it
turned out, the true object of her action was to get financial
support from Vallecera for her child, her claim being that he
is the father. He of course vigorously denied this.
To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in proper
action, first establish the filiation of the child, if the same is
not admitted or acknowledged. Since Dolinas demand for
support for her son is based on her claim that he is
Valleceras illegitimate child, the latter is not entitled to such
support if he had not acknowledged him, until Dolina shall
have proved his relation to him.7 The childs remedy is to file
through her mother a judicial action against Vallecera for
compulsory recognition.8 If filiation is beyond question,
support follows as matter of obligation.9 In short, illegitimate
children are entitled to support and successional rights but
their filiation must be duly proved.10
Dolinas remedy is to file for the benefit of her child an action
against Vallecera for compulsory recognition in order to
establish filiation and then demand support. Alternatively, she
may directly file an action for support, where the issue of
compulsory recognition may be integrated and resolved.11
It must be observed, however, that the RTC should not have
dismissed the entire case based solely on the lack of any
judicial declaration of filiation between Vallecera and Dolinas
child since the main issue remains to be the alleged violence
committed by Vallecera against Dolina and her child and
whether they are entitled to protection. But of course, this
matter is already water under the bridge since Dolina failed
to raise this error on review. This omission lends credence to

the conclusion of the RTC that the real purpose of the
petition is to obtain support from Vallecera.
While the Court is mindful of the best interests of the child in
cases involving paternity and filiation, it is just as aware of
the disturbance that unfounded paternity suits cause to the
privacy and peace of the putative fathers legitimate
family.12 Vallecera disowns Dolinas child and denies having
a hand in the preparation and signing of its certificate of
birth. This issue has to be resolved in an appropriate case.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court DENIES the petition and
AFFIRMS the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban Citys Order
dated March 13, 2008 that dismissed petitioner Cherryl B.
Dolinas action in P.O. 2008-02-07, and Order dated April 4,
2008, denying her motion for reconsideration dated March
28, 2008.
SO ORDERED.
LIM-LUA v. LUA
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 175279-80
June 5, 2013
SUSAN LIM-LUA, Petitioner,

vs.
DANILO Y. LUA, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45,
petitioner seeks to set aside the Decision 1 dated April 20,
2006 and Resolution2 dated October 26, 2006 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) dismissing her petition for contempt (CA-G.R.
SP No. 01154) and granting respondent's petition for
certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 01315).
The factual background is as follows:
On September 3, 2003,3 petitioner Susan Lim-Lua filed an
action for the declaration of nullity of her marriage with
respondent Danilo Y. Lua, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB29346 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City,
Branch 14.
In her prayer for support pendente lite for herself and her two
children, petitioner sought the amount of P500,000.00 as
monthly support, citing respondents huge earnings from
salaries and dividends in several companies and businesses
here and abroad.4
After due hearing, Judge Raphael B. Yrastorza, Sr. issued an

Order5 dated March 31, 2004 granting support pendente lite,
as follows:
From the evidence already adduced by the parties, the
amount of Two Hundred Fifty (P250,000.00) Thousand
Pesos would be sufficient to take care of the needs of the
plaintiff. This amount excludes the One hundred thirty-five
(P135,000.00) Thousand Pesos for medical attendance
expenses needed by plaintiff for the operation of both her
eyes which is demandable upon the conduct of such
operation. The amounts already extended to the two (2)
children, being a commendable act of defendant, should be
continued by him considering the vast financial resources at
his disposal.
According to Art. 203 of the Family Code, support is
demandable from the time plaintiff needed the said support
but is payable only from the date of judicial demand. Since
the instant complaint was filed on 03 September 2003, the
amount of Two Hundred Fifty (P250,000.00) Thousand
should be paid by defendant to plaintiff retroactively to such
date until the hearing of the support pendente
lite. P250,000.00 x 7 corresponding to the seven (7) months
that lapsed from September, 2003 to March 2004 would
tantamount to a total of One Million Seven Hundred Fifty
(P1,750,000.00) Thousand Pesos. Thereafter, starting the
month of April 2004, until otherwise ordered by this Court,
defendant is ordered to pay a monthly support of Two
Hundred Fifty Thousand (P250,000.00) Pesos payable within
the first five (5) days of each corresponding month pursuant
to the third paragraph of Art. 203 of the Family Code of the
Philippines. The monthly support of P250,000.00 is without
prejudice to any increase or decrease thereof that this Court
may grant plaintiff as the circumstances may warrant i.e.
depending on the proof submitted by the parties during the
proceedings for the main action for support.6
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration,7 asserting that
petitioner is not entitled to spousal support considering that
she does not maintain for herself a separate dwelling from
their children and respondent has continued to support the
family for their sustenance and well-being in accordance with
familys social and financial standing. As to the P250,000.00
granted by the trial court as monthly support pendente lite,
as well as theP1,750,000.00 retroactive support, respondent
found it unconscionable and beyond the intendment of the
law for not having considered the needs of the respondent.
In its May 13, 2004 Order, the trial court stated that the
March 31, 2004 Order had become final and executory since
respondents motion for reconsideration is treated as a mere
scrap of paper for violation of the threeday notice period
under Section 4, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, and therefore did not interrupt the
running of the period to appeal. Respondent was given ten
(10) days to show cause why he should not be held in
contempt of the court for disregarding the March 31, 2004
order granting support pendente lite.8

His second motion for reconsideration having been denied,
respondent filed a petition for certiorari in the CA.
On April 12, 2005, the CA rendered its Decision, 9 finding
merit in respondents contention that the trial court gravely
abused its discretion in granting P250,000.00 monthly
support to petitioner without evidence to prove his actual
income. The said court thus decreed:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, this petition
is given due course. The assailed Orders dated March 31,
2004, May 13, 2004, June 4, 2004 and June 18, 2004 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Cebu City issued in Civil
Case No. CEB No. 29346 entitled "Susan Lim Lua versus
Danilo Y. Lua" are hereby nullified and set aside and instead
a new one is entered ordering herein petitioner:
a) to pay private respondent a monthly support pendente lite
of P115,000.00 beginning the month of April 2005 and every
month thereafter within the first five (5) days thereof;
b) to pay the private respondent the amount of P115,000.00
a month multiplied by the number of months starting from
September 2003 until March 2005 less than the amount
supposedly given by petitioner to the private respondent as
her and their two (2) children monthly support; and
c) to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.10
Neither of the parties appealed this decision of the CA. In a
Compliance11 dated June 28, 2005, respondent attached a
copy of a check he issued in the amount of P162,651.90
payable to petitioner. Respondent explained that, as decreed
in the CA decision, he deducted from the amount of support
in arrears (September 3, 2003 to March 2005) ordered by
the CA -- P2,185,000.00 -- plus P460,000.00 (April, May,
June and July 2005), totalingP2,645,000.00, the advances
given by him to his children and petitioner in the sum
of P2,482,348.16
(with
attached
photocopies
of
receipts/billings).
In her Comment to Compliance with Motion for Issuance of a
Writ of Execution,12 petitioner asserted that none of the
expenses deducted by respondent may be chargeable as
part of the monthly support contemplated by the CA in CAG.R. SP No. 84740.
On September 27, 2005, the trial court issued an
Order13 granting petitioners motion for issuance of a writ of
execution as it rejected respondents interpretation of the CA
decision. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and
subsequently also filed a motion for inhibition of Judge
Raphael B. Yrastorza, Sr. On November 25, 2005, Judge
Yrastorza, Sr. issued an Order14 denying both motions.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, both
motions are DENIED. Since a second motion for
reconsideration is prohibited under the Rules, this denial has

attained finality; let, therefore, a writ of execution be issued
in favor of plaintiff as against defendant for the accumulated
support in arrears pendente lite.
Notify both parties of this Order.
SO ORDERED.15
Since respondent still failed and refused to pay the support
in arrears pendente lite, petitioner filed in the CA a Petition
for Contempt of Court with Damages, docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 01154 ("Susan Lim Lua versus Danilo Y. Lua").
Respondent, on the other hand, filed CA-G.R. SP No. 01315,
a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
("Danilo Y. Lua versus Hon. Raphael B. Yrastorza, Sr., in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court of Cebu,
Branch 14, and Susan Lim Lua"). The two cases were
consolidated.
By Decision dated April 20, 2006, the CA set aside the
assailed orders of the trial court, as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
a) DISMISSING, for lack of merit, the case of Petition for
Contempt of Court with Damages filed by Susan Lim Lua
against Danilo Y. Lua with docket no. SP. CA-GR No. 01154;
b) GRANTING Danilo Y. Luas Petition for Certiorari docketed
as SP. CA-GR No. 01315. Consequently, the assailed Orders
dated 27 September 2005 and 25 November 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Cebu City issued in Civil
Case No. CEB-29346 entitled "Susan Lim Lua versus Danilo
Y. Lua, are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE, and instead
a new one is entered:
i. ORDERING the deduction of the amount of
PhP2,482,348.16 plus 946,465.64, or a total of
PhP3,428,813.80 from the current total support in arrears of
Danilo Y. Lua to his wife, Susan Lim Lua and their two (2)
children;
ii. ORDERING Danilo Y. Lua to resume payment of his
monthly support of PhP115,000.00 pesos starting from the
time payment of this amount was deferred by him subject to
the deductions aforementioned.
iii. DIRECTING the issuance of a permanent writ of
preliminary injunction.
SO ORDERED.16
The appellate court said that the trial court should not have
completely disregarded the expenses incurred by
respondent consisting of the purchase and maintenance of
the two cars, payment of tuition fees, travel expenses, and
the credit card purchases involving groceries, dry goods and
books, which certainly inured to the benefit not only of the

two children, but their mother (petitioner) as well. It held that
respondents act of deferring the monthly support adjudged
in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740 was not contumacious as it was
anchored on valid and justifiable reasons. Respondent said
he just wanted the issue of whether to deduct his advances
be settled first in view of the different interpretation by the
trial court of the appellate courts decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
84740. It also noted the lack of contribution from the
petitioner in the joint obligation of spouses to support their
children.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied
by the CA.
Hence, this petition raising the following errors allegedly
committed by the CA:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING
RESPONDENT GUILTY OF INDIRECT CONTEMPT.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE
DEDUCTION OF THE AMOUNT OF PHP2,482,348.16
PLUS 946,465.64, OR A TOTAL OF PHP3,428,813.80
FROM THE CURRENT TOTAL SUPPORT IN ARREARS OF
THE RESPONDENT TO THE PETITIONER AND THEIR
CHILDREN.17
The main issue is whether certain expenses already incurred
by the respondent may be deducted from the total support in
arrears owing to petitioner and her children pursuant to the
Decision dated April 12, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740.
The pertinent provision of the Family Code of the Philippines
provides:
on the basis of the documentary evidence of respondents

alleged income from various businesses and petitioners
testimony that she needed P113,000.00 for the maintenance
of the household and other miscellaneous expenses
excluding the P135,000.00 medical attendance expenses of
petitioner.
Respondent, on the other hand, contends that disallowing
the subject deductions would result in unjust enrichment,
thus making him pay for the same obligation twice. Since
petitioner and the children resided in one residence, the
groceries and dry goods purchased by the children using
respondents credit card, totalling P594,151.58 for the period
September 2003 to June 2005 were not consumed by the
children alone but shared with their mother. As to the
Volkswagen Beetle and BMW 316i respondent bought for his
daughter Angelli Suzanne Lua and Daniel Ryan Lua,
respectively, these, too, are to be considered advances for
support, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.
Respondent stressed that being children of parents
belonging to the upper-class society, Angelli and Daniel Ryan
had never in their entire life commuted from one place to
another, nor do they eat their meals at "carinderias". Hence,
the cars and their maintenance are indispensable to the
childrens day-to-day living, the value of which were properly
deducted from the arrearages in support pendente lite
ordered by the trial and appellate courts.
As a matter of law, the amount of support which those
related by marriage and family relationship is generally
obliged to give each other shall be in proportion to the
resources or means of the giver and to the needs of the
recipient.18 Such support comprises everything indispensable
for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance,
education and transportation, in keeping with the financial
capacity of the family.
The education of the person entitled to be supported referred

to in the preceding paragraph shall include his schooling or
training for some profession, trade or vocation, even beyond
the age of majority. Transportation shall include expenses in
going to and from school, or to and from place of work.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Upon receipt of a verified petition for declaration of absolute

nullity of void marriage or for annulment of voidable
marriage, or for legal separation, and at any time during the
proceeding, the court, motu proprio or upon verified
application of any of the parties, guardian or designated
custodian, may temporarily grant support pendente lite prior
to the rendition of judgment or final order.19 Because of its
provisional nature, a court does not need to delve fully into
the merits of the case before it can settle an application for
this relief. All that a court is tasked to do is determine the
kind and amount of evidence which may suffice to enable it
to justly resolve the application. It is enough that the facts be
established by affidavits or other documentary evidence
appearing in the record.20
Petitioner argues that it was patently erroneous for the CA to

have allowed the deduction of the value of the two cars and
their maintenance costs from the support in arrears, as these
items are not indispensable to the sustenance of the family
or in keeping them alive. She points out that in the Decision
in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740, the CA already considered the
said items which it deemed chargeable to respondent, while
the monthly support pendente lite (P115,000.00) was fixed
In this case, the amount of monthly support pendente lite for

petitioner and her two children was determined after due
hearing and submission of documentary evidence by the
parties. Although the amount fixed by the trial court was
reduced on appeal, it is clear that the monthly support
pendente lite of P115,000.00 ordered by the CA was
intended primarily for the sustenance of petitioner and her
children, e.g., food, clothing, salaries of drivers and house
Article 194. Support comprises everything indispensable for

sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance,
education and transportation, in keeping with the financial
capacity of the family.

helpers, and other household expenses. Petitioners
testimony also mentioned the cost of regular therapy for her
scoliosis and vitamins/medicines.
Q Okay, what other possible expenses that you would like to

include in those two (2) items? You mentioned of a driver, am
I correct?
ATTY. ZOSA:
A Yes, I might need two (2) drivers, Sir for me and my

children.
xxxx
Q How much do you spend for your food and your two (2)
children every month?
A Presently, Sir?
Q Okay. How much would you like possibly to pay for those
two (2) drivers?
A I think P10,000.00 a month for one (1) driver. So I need
two (2) drivers. And I need another househelp.
Yes.
Q You need another househelp. The househelp nowadays

would
charge
you
something
between P3,000.00
toP4,000.00. Thats quite
A For the food alone, I spend not over P40,000.00

to P50,000.00 a month for the food alone.
A Right now, my househelp is receiving P8,000.00. I need

another which I will give a compensation of P5,000.00.
xxxx
Q Other than that, do you still have other expenses?
ATTY. ZOSA:
A My clothing.
Q What other expenses do you incur in living in that place?
COURT:
A The normal household and the normal expenses for a

family to have a decent living, Sir.
How about the schooling for your children?
ATTY. ZOSA:
Q How much other expenses do you incur?

WITNESS:
A For other expenses, is around over a P100,000.00, Sir.
Q Why do you incur that much amount?
A For the clothing for the three (3) of us, for the vitamins and
medicines. And also I am having a special therapy to
straighten my back because I am scoliotic. I am advised by
the Doctor to hire a driver, but I cannot still afford it now.
Because my eyesight is not reliable for driving. And I still
need another househelp to accompany me whenever I go
marketing because for my age, I cannot carry anymore
heavy loads.
WITNESS:
A The schooling is shouldered by my husband, Your Honor.
COURT:
Everything?
A Yes, Your Honor.
xxxx
ATTY. FLORES:
Q Madam witness, let us talk of the present needs. x x x.
What else, what specific need that you would like to add so I
can tell my client, the defendant.
xxxx
WITNESS:
ATTY. FLORES:
xxxx
A I need to have an operation both of my eyes. I also need a

special therapy for my back because I am scoliotic, three (3)
times a week.
Q On the issue of the food for you and the two (2) children,
you mentioned P40,000.00 to P50,000.00?
Q That is very reasonable. [W]ould you care to please repeat

that?
A Yes, for the food alone.

A Therapy for my scoliotic back and then also for the
operation both of my eyes. And I am also taking some
vitamins from excel that will cost P20,000.00 a month.
Q Okay. Lets have piece by piece. Have you asked the
Doctor how much would it cost you for the operation of that
scoliotic?
A Yes before because I was already due last year. Before,
this eye will cost P60,000.00 and the other eyesP75,000.00.
Q So for both eyes, you are talking of P60,000.00
plus P75,000.00 is P135,000.00?
A Yes.
xxxx
arrears less the amount supposedly given by him to

petitioner as her and their two childrens monthly support.
The following is a summary of the subject deductions under
Compliance dated June 28, 2005, duly supported by
receipts22:
Car purchases for Angelli Suzanne -
Php1,350,000.00
and Daniel Ryan -
613,472.86
Car Maintenance fees of Angelli - 51,232.50

Suzanne
Credit card statements of Daniel 348,682.28
Ryan Car Maintenance fees of Daniel 118,960.52
Ryan Php2,482,348.16
Q You talk of therapy?

A Yes.
Q So how much is that?
A Around P5,000.00 a week.21
As to the financial capacity of the respondent, it is beyond
doubt that he can solely provide for the subsistence,
education, transportation, health/medical needs and
recreational activities of his children, as well as those of
petitioner who was then unemployed and a full-time
housewife. Despite this, respondents counsel manifested
during the same hearing that respondent was willing to grant
the amount of only P75,000.00 as monthly support pendente
lite both for the children and petitioner as spousal support.
Though the receipts of expenses submitted in court
unmistakably show how much respondent lavished on his
children, it appears that the matter of spousal support was a
different matter altogether. Rejecting petitioners prayer
for P500,000.00 monthly support and finding the P75,000.00
monthly support offered by respondent as insufficient, the
trial court fixed the monthly support pendente lite
at P250,000.00. However, since the supposed income in
millions of respondent was based merely on the allegations
of petitioner in her complaint and registration documents of
various corporations which respondent insisted are owned
not by him but his parents and siblings, the CA reduced the
amount of support pendente lite toP115,000.00, which ruling
was no longer questioned by both parties.
Controversy between the parties resurfaced when
respondents compliance with the final CA decision indicated
that he deducted from the total amount in arrears
(P2,645,000.00) the sum of P2,482,348.16, representing the
value of the two cars for the children, their cost of
maintenance and advances given to petitioner and his
children. Respondent explained that the deductions were
made consistent with the fallo of the CA Decision in CA-G.R.
SP No. 84740 ordering him to pay support pendente lite in
After the trial court disallowed the foregoing deductions,

respondent filed a motion for reconsideration further
asserting that the following amounts, likewise with supporting
receipts, be considered as additional advances given to
petitioner and the children23:
Medical expenses of Susan Lim-Lua
Php 42,450.71
Dental Expenses of Daniel Ryan
11,500.00
Travel expenses of Susan Lim-Lua
14,611.15
Credit card purchases of Angelli 408,891.08

Suzanne
Salon and travel expenses of Angelli 87,112.70
Suzanne
School expenses of Daniel Ryan Lua
260,900.00
Cash given to Daniel and Angelli
121,000.00
TOTAL -
Php 946,465.64
GRAND TOTAL -
Php 3,428,813.80
The CA, in ruling for the respondent said that all the
foregoing expenses already incurred by the respondent
should, in equity, be considered advances which may be
properly deducted from the support in arrears due to the
petitioner and the two children. Said court also noted the
absence of petitioners contribution to the joint obligation of
support for their children.
We reverse in part the decision of the CA.
Judicial determination of support pendente lite in cases of
legal separation and petitions for declaration of nullity or
annulment of marriage are guided by the following provisions
of the Rule on Provisional Orders24

Sec. 2. Spousal Support.In determining support for the
spouses, the court may be guided by the following rules:
(a) In the absence of adequate provisions in a written
agreement between the spouses, the spouses may be
supported from the properties of the absolute community or
the conjugal partnership.
(b) The court may award support to either spouse in such
amount and for such period of time as the court may deem
just and reasonable based on their standard of living during
the marriage.
(c) The court may likewise consider the following factors: (1)
whether the spouse seeking support is the custodian of a
child whose circumstances make it appropriate for that
spouse not to seek outside employment; (2) the time
necessary to acquire sufficient education and training to
enable the spouse seeking support to find appropriate
employment, and that spouses future earning capacity; (3)
the duration of the marriage; (4) the comparative financial
resources of the spouses, including their comparative
earning abilities in the labor market; (5) the needs and
obligations of each spouse; (6) the contribution of each
spouse to the marriage, including services rendered in
home-making, child care, education, and career building of
the other spouse; (7) the age and health of the spouses; (8)
the physical and emotional conditions of the spouses; (9) the
ability of the supporting spouse to give support, taking into
account that spouses earning capacity, earned and
unearned income, assets, and standard of living; and (10)
any other factor the court may deem just and equitable.
(d) The Family Court may direct the deduction of the
provisional support from the salary of the spouse.
Sec. 3. Child Support.The common children of the spouses
shall be supported from the properties of the absolute
community or the conjugal partnership.
Subject to the sound discretion of the court, either parent or
both may be ordered to give an amount necessary for the
support, maintenance, and education of the child. It shall be
in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to
the necessities of the recipient.
In determining the amount of provisional support, the court
may likewise consider the following factors: (1) the financial
resources of the custodial and non-custodial parent and
those of the child; (2) the physical and emotional health of
the child and his or her special needs and aptitudes; (3) the
standard of living the child has been accustomed to; (4) the
non-monetary contributions that the parents will make toward
the care and well-being of the child.
The Family Court may direct the deduction of the provisional
support from the salary of the parent.
Since the amount of monthly support pendente lite as fixed
by the CA was not appealed by either party, there is no
controversy as to its sufficiency and reasonableness. The

dispute concerns the deductions made by respondent in
settling the support in arrears.
On the issue of crediting of money payments or expenses
against accrued support, we find as relevant the following
rulings by US courts.
In Bradford v. Futrell,25 appellant sought review of the
decision of the Circuit Court which found him in arrears with
his child support payments and entered a decree in favor of
appellee wife. He complained that in determining the
arrearage figure, he should have been allowed full credit for
all money and items of personal property given by him to the
children themselves, even though he referred to them as
gifts. The Court of Appeals of Maryland ruled that in the suit
to determine amount of arrears due the divorced wife under
decree for support of minor children, the husband (appellant)
was not entitled to credit for checks which he had clearly
designated as gifts, nor was he entitled to credit for an
automobile given to the oldest son or a television set given to
the children. Thus, if the children remain in the custody of the
mother, the father is not entitled to credit for money paid
directly to the children if such was paid without any relation
to the decree.
In the absence of some finding of consent by the mother,
most courts refuse to allow a husband to dictate how he will
meet the requirements for support payments when the mode
of payment is fixed by a decree of court. Thus he will not be
credited for payments made when he unnecessarily
interposed himself as a volunteer and made payments direct
to the children of his own accord. Wills v. Baker, 214 S. W.
2d 748 (Mo. 1948); Openshaw v. Openshaw, 42 P. 2d 191
(Utah 1935). In the latter case the court said in part: "The
payments to the children themselves do not appear to have
been made as payments upon alimony, but were rather the
result of his fatherly interest in the welfare of those children.
We do not believe he should be permitted to charge them to
plaintiff. By so doing he would be determining for Mrs.
Openshaw the manner in which she should expend her
allowances. It is a very easy thing for children to say their
mother will not give them money, especially as they may
realize that such a plea is effective in attaining their ends. If
she is not treating them right the courts are open to the
father for redress."26
In Martin, Jr. v. Martin,27 the Supreme Court of Washington
held that a father, who is required by a divorce decree to
make child support payments directly to the mother, cannot
claim credit for payments voluntarily made directly to the
children. However, special considerations of an equitable
nature may justify a court in crediting such payments on his
indebtedness to the mother, when such can be done without
injustice to her.
The general rule is to the effect that when a father is required
by a divorce decree to pay to the mother money for the
support of their dependent children and the unpaid and
accrued installments become judgments in her favor, he

cannot, as a matter of law, claim credit on account of
payments voluntarily made directly to the children. Koon v.
Koon, supra; Briggs v. Briggs, supra. However, special
considerations of an equitable nature may justify a court in
crediting such payments on his indebtedness to the mother,
when that can be done without injustice to her. Briggs v.
Briggs, supra. The courts are justifiably reluctant to lay down
any general rules as to when such credits may be
allowed.28 (Emphasis supplied.)
Here, the CA should not have allowed all the expenses
incurred by respondent to be credited against the accrued
support pendente lite. As earlier mentioned, the monthly
support pendente lite granted by the trial court was intended
primarily for food, household expenses such as salaries of
drivers and house helpers, and also petitioners scoliosis
therapy sessions. Hence, the value of two expensive cars
bought by respondent for his children plus their maintenance
cost, travel expenses of petitioner and Angelli, purchases
through credit card of items other than groceries and dry
goods (clothing) should have been disallowed, as these bear
no relation to the judgment awarding support pendente lite.
While it is true that the dispositive portion of the executory
decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740 ordered herein
respondent to pay the support in arrears "less than the
amount supposedly given by petitioner to the private
respondent as her and their two (2) children monthly
support," the deductions should be limited to those basic
needs and expenses considered by the trial and appellate
courts. The assailed ruling of the CA allowing huge
deductions from the accrued monthly support of petitioner
and her children, while correct insofar as it commends the
generosity of the respondent to his children, is clearly
inconsistent with the executory decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
84740. More important, it completely ignores the unfair
consequences to petitioner whose sustenance and wellbeing, was given due regard by the trial and appellate courts.
This is evident from the March 31, 2004 Order granting
support pendente lite to petitioner and her children, when the
trial court observed:
While there is evidence to the effect that defendant is giving
some forms of financial assistance to his two (2) children via
their credit cards and paying for their school expenses, the
same is, however, devoid of any form of spousal support to
the plaintiff, for, at this point in time, while the action for
nullity of marriage is still to be heard, it is incumbent upon
the defendant, considering the physical and financial
condition of the plaintiff and the overwhelming capacity of
defendant, to extend support unto the latter. x x x29
On appeal, while the Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740
reduced the amount of monthly support fixed by the trial
court, it nevertheless held that considering respondents
financial resources, it is but fair and just that he give a
monthly support for the sustenance and basic necessities of
petitioner and his children. This would imply that any amount
respondent seeks to be credited as monthly support should
only cover those incurred for sustenance and household
expenses.1avvphi1
In the case at bar, records clearly show and in fact has been
admitted by petitioner that aside from paying the expenses of
their two (2) childrens schooling, he gave his two (2) children
two (2) cars and credit cards of which the expenses for
various items namely: clothes, grocery items and repairs of
their cars were chargeable to him which totaled an amount of
more than One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) for each
of them and considering that as testified by the private
respondent that she needs the total amount of P113,000.00
for the maintenance of the household and other
miscellaneous expenses and considering further that
petitioner can afford to buy cars for his two (2) children, and
to pay the expenses incurred by them which are chargeable
to him through the credit cards he provided them in the
amount of P100,000.00 each, it is but fair and just that the
monthly support pendente lite for his wife, herein private
respondent, be fixed as of the present in the amount
of P115,000.00 which would be sufficient enough to take
care of the household and other needs. This monthly support
pendente lite to private respondent in the amount
of P115,000.00 excludes the amount of One Hundred
ThirtyFive (P135,000.00) Thousand Pesos for medical
attendance expenses needed by private respondent for the
operation of both her eyes which is demandable upon the
conduct of such operation. Likewise, this monthly support
of P115,000.00 is without prejudice to any increase or
decrease thereof that the trial court may grant private
respondent as the circumstances may warrant i.e. depending
on the proof submitted by the parties during the proceedings
for the main action for support.
The amounts already extended to the two (2) children, being
a commendable act of petitioner, should be continued by him
considering the vast financial resources at his
disposal.30 (Emphasis supplied.)
Accordingly, only the following expenses of respondent may
be allowed as deductions from the accrued support
pendente lite for petitioner and her children:
1wphi1
Medical expenses of Susan Lim-Lua
Php 42,450.71
Dental Expenses of Daniel Ryan
11,500.00
Credit card purchases of Angelli
365,282.20
(Groceries
and
Dry
Goods) 228,869.38
Credit Card purchases of Daniel Ryan
TOTAL
Php 648,102.29
As to the contempt charge, we sustain the CA in holding that

respondent is not guilty of indirect contempt.
Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court
by acting in opposition to its authority, justice, and dignity. It
signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the
courts order, but such conduct which tends to bring the
authority of the court and the administration of law into
disrepute or, in some manner, to impede the due
administration of justice.31 To constitute contempt, the act

must be done willfully and for an illegitimate or improper
purpose.32 The good faith, or lack of it, of the alleged
contemnor should be considered.33
Respondent admittedly ceased or suspended the giving of
monthly support pendente lite granted by the trial court,
which is immediately executory. However, we agree with the
CA that respondents act was not contumacious considering
that he had not been remiss in actually providing for the
needs of his children. It is a matter of record that respondent
continued shouldering the full cost of their education and
even beyond their basic necessities in keeping with the
familys social status. Moreover, respondent believed in good
faith that the trial and appellate courts, upon equitable
grounds, would allow him to offset the substantial amounts
he had spent or paid directly to his children.
Respondent complains that petitioner is very much
capacitated to generate income on her own because she
presently maintains a boutique at the Ayala Center Mall in
Cebu City and at the same time engages in the business of
lending money. He also claims that the two children have
finished their education and are now employed in the family
business earning their own salaries.
Suffice it to state that the matter of increase or reduction of
support should be submitted to the trial court in which the
action for declaration for nullity of marriage was filed, as this
Court is not a trier of facts. The amount of support may be
reduced or increased proportionately according to the
reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and
the resources or means of the person obliged to
support.34 As we held in Advincula v. Advincula35
Judgment for support does not become final. The right to
support is of such nature that its allowance is essentially
provisional; for during the entire period that a needy party is
entitled to support, his or her alimony may be modified or
altered, in accordance with his increased or decreased
needs, and with the means of the giver. It cannot be
regarded as subject to final determination.36
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The

Decision dated April 20, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP Nos. 01154 and 01315 is hereby MODIFIED to read
as follows:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
a) DISMISSING, for lack of merit, the case of Petition for
Contempt of Court with Damages filed by Susan Lim Lua
against Danilo Y. Lua with docket no. SP. CA-G.R. No.
01154;
b) GRANTING IN PART Danilo Y. Lua's Petition for Certiorari
docketed as SP. CA-G.R. No. 01315. Consequently, the
assailed Orders dated 27 September 2005 and 25
November 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14,
Cebu City issued in Civil Case No. CEB-29346 entitled
"Susan Lim Lua versus Danilo Y. Lua, are hereby
NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE, and instead a new one is
entered:
i. ORDERING the deduction of the amount of Php
648,102.29 from the support pendente lite in arrears of
Danilo Y. Lua to his wife, Susan Lim Lua and their two (2)
children;
ii. ORDERING Danilo Y. Lua to resume payment of his
monthly support of PhP115,000.00 pesos starting from the
time payment of this amount was deferred by him subject to
the deduction aforementioned.
iii. DIRECTING the immediate execution of this judgment.
SO ORDERED."
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Persons Part 10

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PERSONS and FAMILY RELATIONS (Atty.

further exchanged reply and rejoinder to buttress their legal

The trial court then received evidence on the issue of

On November 2, 1990, petitioner opposed the petition. She

1. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed error of law

PERSONS and FAMILY RELATIONS (Atty. Vincent Juan) 2

3) That in case of children conceived through artificial

2. Assuming arguendo that private respondents can question

Art. 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child

3. The Honorable Court of Appeals has decided the case in a

We find no merit to the petition.

PERSONS and FAMILY RELATIONS (Atty. Vincent Juan) 3

testimony by the presiding judge of the lower court had to be

PERSONS and FAMILY RELATIONS (Atty. Vincent Juan) 4

We say odd and strange, for if Marissa Benitez is really the

PERSONS and FAMILY RELATIONS (Atty. Vincent Juan) 5

"Presentacion B. Catotal (hereafter referred to as

"TEOFISTA filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that 'the

PERSONS and FAMILY RELATIONS (Atty. Vincent Juan) 6

"1) Respondent (plaintiff in the lower court a quo) does not

"Subsequently, 'Attys. Padilla, Ulindang and Padilla

3) The Honorable Court of Appeals, the fifteenth division

Hence, this appeal.[6]

"Petitioners insistence on the applicability of Articles 164,

Petitioner presents the following assignment of errors:

PERSONS and FAMILY RELATIONS (Atty. Vincent Juan) 7

the discovery or knowledge of the birth of the child or of the

Lastly, petitioner argues that the evidence presented,

PERSONS and FAMILY RELATIONS (Atty. Vincent Juan) 8

[G.R. No. 142877. October 2, 2001]

JINKIE CHRISTIE A. DE JESUS and JACQUELINE A. DE

their respective shares in the latters estate under the rules

PERSONS and FAMILY RELATIONS (Atty. Vincent Juan) 9

separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is not

PERSONS and FAMILY RELATIONS (Atty. Vincent Juan) 10

[G.R. No. 138961. March 7, 2002]

WILLIAM LIYAO, JR., represented by his mother Corazon

Sometime in 1974, Corazon bought a lot from Ortigas

PERSONS and FAMILY RELATIONS (Atty. Vincent Juan) 11

mahjong sessions among themselves. Gloria knew that Mr.

PERSONS and FAMILY RELATIONS (Atty. Vincent Juan) 12

Liyao and her daughter, Linda Liyao-Ortiga were the first to

PERSONS and FAMILY RELATIONS (Atty. Vincent Juan) 13

1) By the impotence of the husband;

This physical impossibility may be caused:

Do the acts of Enrique and Bernadette Yulo, the

PERSONS and FAMILY RELATIONS (Atty. Vincent Juan) 14

on the ground of bigamy.[5] He alleged that nine years before

[G.R. No. 123450. August 31, 2005]

Ma. Theresa felt betrayed and humiliated when

GERARDO B. CONCEPCION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF

Gerardo opposed the motion. He insisted on his

Applying the best interest of the child principle, the

The child, by reason of his mental and physical

It is a pity that the parties herein seem to be using their son

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The

This is the story of petitioner Gerardo B. Concepcion

The Court allowed visitorial rights to the father knowing that

PERSONS and FAMILY RELATIONS (Atty. Vincent Juan) 15

PERSONS and FAMILY RELATIONS (Atty. Vincent Juan) 16

Gerardo relies on Ma. Theresas statement in her

PERSONS and FAMILY RELATIONS (Atty. Vincent Juan) 17

PERSONS and FAMILY RELATIONS (Atty. Vincent Juan) 18

2006 denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in CAG.R. CV No. 70125.