Peope v.

Manantan
Full
Text: http://www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence1962/jul1962/gr_l14129_1962.php
Facts:
Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation of Section 54, Revised
Election Code. However, Manantan claims that as "justice of peace", the
defendant is not one of the officers enumerated in the said section. The
lower court denied the motion to dismiss holding that a justice of peace is
within
the
purview
of
Section
54.
Under Section 54, "No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer, or assessor of any
province, no officer or employee of the Army, no member of the national,
provincial, city, municipal or rural police force and no classified civil service
officer or employee shall aid any candidate, or exert any influence in any
manner in a election or take part therein, except to vote, if entitled thereto,
or
to
preserve
public
peace,
if
he
is
a
peace
officer.".
Defendant submits that the said election was taken from Section 449 of the
Revised Administration Code wherein, "No judge of the First Instance, justice
of the peace, or treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province and no officer or
employee of the Philippine Constabulary, or any Bureau or employee of the
classified civil service, shall aid any candidate or exert influence in any
manner in any election or take part therein otherwise than exercising the
right to vote.". He claims that the words "justice of peace" was omitted
revealed the intention of Legislature to exclude justices of peace from its
operation.
Issue:
Is justice of peace included in the prohibition of Section 64 of the Revised
Election
Code?
Held:
Yes, it is included in Section 54. Justices of the peace were expressly
included in Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code because the
kinds of judges therein were specified, i.e., judge of the First Instance and
justice of the peace. In Section 54, however, there was no necessity
therefore to include justices of the peace in the enumeration because the
legislature had availed itself of the more generic and broader term, "judge.",
which
includes
all
kinds
of
judges.
A "justice of the peace" is a judge. A "judge" is a public officer, who, by virtue
of his office, is clothed with judicial authority. This term includes all officers
appointed to to decide litigated questions while acting in that capacity,
including justices of the peace, and even jurors, it is said, who are judges of
facts.
From the history of Section 54 of REC, the first omission of the word "justice
of the peace" was effected in Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 357 and
not in the present code as averred by defendant-appellee. Whenever the
word "judge" was qualified by the phrase "of the First Instance', the words
"justice of the peace" were omitted. It follows that when the legislature
omitted the words "justice of the peace" in RA 180, it did not intend to
exempt the said officer from its operation. Rather, it had considered the said
officer as already comprehended in the broader term "judge".
The rule of "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est" is likewise invoked by
the defendant-appellee. Under the said rule, a person, object or thing

omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted

intentionally. However, it is applicable only if the omission has been clearly
established. In the case at bar, the legislature did not exclude or omit
justices of the peace from the enumeration of officers precluded from
engaging in partisan political activities. In Section 54, justices of the peace
were just called "judges". Also, the application of this rule does not proceed
from the mere fact that a case is criminal in nature, but rather from a
reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been
omitted from a legislative enumeration. In the case at bar, there is no
omission
but
only
substitution
of
terms.
The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the only
factor controlling the interpretation of such laws; instead, the rule merely
serves as an additional, single factor to be considered as an aid in
determining
the
meaning
of
penal
laws.
Also, the purpose of the statute s to enlarge the officers within its
purview. Justices of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and various
judges, such as the judges of the Court of Industrial Relations, judges of the
Court of Agrarian Relations, etc., who were not included in the prohibition
under
the
old
statute,
are
now
within
its
encompass.
The rule "expressio unius est exclusion alterius" has been erroneously
applied by CA and lower courts because they were not able to give reasons
for the exclusion of the legislature for the term "justices of peace".

People v. Almuete
G.R. No. L-26551, February 27, 1976
FACTS:
Wenceslao Almuete, Fernando Fronda, Cipriano Fronda and Fausto Durion
were charged with a violation of section 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Law. It
was alleged in the information that the accused being tenants of Margarita
Fernando in her riceland, without notice to her or without her consent, prethreshed a portion of their respective harvests of five cavans of palay each to
her damage.
The lower held that the information is basically deficient because it does not
describe the circumstances under which the cavans of palay were found in
the possession of the accused tenants; it does not specify the date agreed
upon for the threshing of the harvests, and it does not allege that the palay
found in the tenants' possession exceeded ten percent of their net share
based on the last normal harvest.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the tenant's act of pre- reaping and pre-threshing without
notice to the landlord is punishable pursuant to Sec. 39 of the Agricultural
Tenancy Law.
HELD:
No. The prohibition against pre-reaping or pre-threshing found in section 39
of the Agricultural Tenancy Law of 1954 is premised on the existence of the
rice share tenancy system. The evident purpose is to prevent the tenant and
the landholder from defrauding each other in the division of the harvests.
Thus, the legal maxim, cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex (the reason for
the law ceasing, the law itself also ceases). applies to this case.

Section 4 of the Code of Agrarian Reforms declared agricultural share

tenancy throughout the country as contrary to public policy and
automatically converted it to agricultural leasehold. Presidential Decree No. 2
proclaimed the entire country "as a land reform area".
The legislative intent not to punish anymore the tenant's act of pre- reaping
and pre-threshing without notice to the landlord is inferable from the fact
that the Code of Agrarian Reforms did not reenact section 39 of the
Agricultural Tenancy Law and that it abolished share tenancy which is the
basis for penalizing clandestine pre-reaping and pre-threshing.
As held in the Adillo case, the act of pre-reaping and pre-threshing without
notice to the landlord, which is an offense under the Agricultural Tenancy
Law, had ceased to be an offense under the subsequent law, the Code of
Agrarian Reforms. To prosecute it as an offense when the Code of Agrarian
Reforms is already in force would be repugnant or abhorrent to the policy
and spirit of that Code and would subvert the manifest legislative intent not
to punish anymore pre-reaping and pre-threshing without notice to
landholder.

EMETERIA LIWAG, Petitioner vs. HAPPY GLEN LOOP HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION,

INC., Respondent
G. R. No. 189755July 04, 2012Sereno, J.
FACTS
In 1978, F. G. R. Sales, the original developer of Happy Glen Loop, loaned from
Ernesto Marcelo, ownerof T. P. Marcelo Realty Corporation. The former failed to
settle its debts with the latter, so, he assigned all hisrights to Marcelo over several
parcels of land in the Subdivision including the receivables from the lotsalready
sold.As the successor-in-interest, Marcelo represented to lot buyers, the National
Housing Authority (NHA)and the Human Settlement Regulatory Commission (HSRC)
that a water facility is available in thesubdivision. The said water facility has been
the only source of water of the residents for thirty (30) years.In September 1995,
Marcelo sold Lot 11, Block 5 to Hermogenes Liwag. As a result, TransferCertificate of
Title (TCT) No. C-350099 was issued to the latter. In 2003, Hermogenes died.
Petitioner, wife of Hermogenes, subsequently wrote to the respondent Association
demanding the removal of the overheadwater tank over the parcel of land. The
latter refused and filed a case before the Housing and Land UseRegulatory Board
against T. P. Marcelo Realty Corporation, petitioner and the surviving heirs
of Hermogenes.The HLURB ruling was in favor of the respondent Association. One of
the things it affirmed was theexistence of an easement for water system/facility or
open space on Lot 11, Block 5 of TCT No. C-350099wherein the deep well and
overhead tank are situated. However, on appeal before the HLURB Board
of Commissioners, the Board found that Lot 11, Block 5 was not an open space

ISSUE

Whether or not Lot 11, Block 5 of the Happy Glen Loop is considered an open
space as defined in P.
D. 1216.
RULING
Yes, the aforementioned parcel of land is considered an open space.The Court
used the basicstatutory construction principle of ejusdem generis to determine
whether the area falls under
other s imilarfacilities and amenities since P. D. 1216 makes no specific mention of
areas reserved for water facilities.
Ejusdem generis states that where a general word or phrase follows an enumeration
of particular andspecific words of the same class, the general word or phrase is to
be construed to include
or to berestricted to
things akin to or resembling, or of the same kind or class as, those specifically
mentioned.Applying that principle, the Court found out that the enumeration refers
to areas reserved for the commonwelfare of the community. Therefore, the phrase
other similar facilities and amenities should beinterpreted in like manner.It is
without a doubt that the facility was used for the benefit of the community. Water is
a basicnecessity, without which, survival in the community would be impossible.

SARIO MALINIAS,
petitioner,vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, TEOFILO CORPUZ,ANACLETO TANGILAG and
VICTOR DOMINGUEZ,
respondents.
G.R. No. 146943, October 4, 2002
FACTS:On July 31, 1998, Sario Malinias and Roy S. Pilando, who werecandidates for
governor and congress representative positions,respectively, filed a complaint with
the COMELEC's LawDepartment against Victor Dominguez, Anacleto Tangilag
andothers for their violation of the following laws:1. Section 25 of R.A. No. 6646;
and2. Sections 232 and 261 (i) of B.P. Blg. 881.Dominguez was then the incumbent
Congressman of Poblacion,Sabangan, Mountain Province. Corpuz was then the
ProvincialDirector of the Philippine National Police in Mountain Province
whileTangilag was then the Chief of Police of the Municipality of Bontoc,Mountain
Province.The petitioners said that due to said violations, their supporterswere
deprived from participating in the canvassing of electionreturns as they were
blocked by a police checkpoint in the course of their way to the canvassing site at
the Provincial Capitol Building inBontoc, Mountain Province. Among the private
respondents, only Corpuz and Tangilagsubmitted their joint Counter-Affidavit,
wherein they admitted thatthey ordered the establishment of checkpoints all over
the provinceto enforce the COMELEC Gun Ban and its other pertinent rulespursuant
to COMELEC Res. No. 2968 purposive of themaintenance of peace and order around

the vicinity of thecanvassing site. Also, they said that the presence of the policemen
within the saidarea is to prevent some groups who were reportedly had theintention
to disrupt the canvass proceedings. They claimed thatsuch a response was not
unwarranted as this has alreadyhappened in the past, wherein, in fact, the
petitioners were amongthem.
COMELEC
s
Ruling:
After investigating the allegations, COMELEC ruled to dismiss thepetition against
the respondents for insufficiency of evidence toestablish probable cause. Malinias
filed an MR but it was alsodenied for failure of adducing additional evidence
thereon.Not satisfied with the same, Malinias filed to SC a petition for reviewon
certiorari on this case.ISSUE:Did COMELEC abuse its discretion in dismissing the
complaint for lack of probable cause?RATIO DECIDENDI OF SC:No. SC AFFIRMED the
decision of COMELEC and found theconduct of its investigation and ruling on the
case to be in accordwith its jurisdiction and duties under the law. In this
case,COMELEC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion as there isnothing
capricious or despotic in the manner of their resolution of the said complaint, hence,
SC cannot issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari.

On the said violations, the only evidence that was successfullypresented by the
petitioner is the mass-affidavits of his supporters,which were considered self-serving
and cannot be admitted by thecourt thus, the same are not enough to prove his
claims. Also, the allege violation of the respondents of Sec. 25 of R.A. 6646and Sec.
232 of B.P. Blg. No. 881 are not included in the actsdefined as punishable criminal
election offenses under Sec. 27 of R.A. 6646 and Sec. 261 and 262 of B.P. Blg. No.
881, respectively.Here, Sec. 25 merely highlights one of the rights of a political
partyor candidate during elections whereas, the violation of Sec. 232,which
enumerates the persons who are not allowed inside thecanvassing site, can only be
subjected to an administrativedisciplinary action and cannot be punished by
imprisonment asprovided for under Sec. 264 of the same law.Moreover, it is clear in
the defense of the respondents that they didnot violate Sec. 261 (i), a criminal
offense, which prohibits anyofficer or employee of political offices or police force
fromintervening in any election campaign or from engaging in anypartisan activity
except to vote or maintain public order.In the said defense, the respondents said
that setting up thecheckpoints was done to enforce the COMELEC's firearms
ban,pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2968 and not to prejudiceany candidate
from participating in the canvassing. As such, theactions of the respondents are
deemed lawful and not in excess of their authority.
Ruling related to Statutory Construction
Under the rule of statutory construction of expressio unius estexclusio alterius,
there is no ground to order the COMELEC toprosecute private respondents for
alleged violation of Section 232of B.P. Blg. 881 precisely because this is a noncriminal act."It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the express mentionof
one person, thing, or consequence implies the exclusion of allothers. The rule is
expressed in the familiar maxim, expressio uniusest exclusio alterius.The rule of
expressio unius est exclusio alterius is formulated in anumber of ways. One
variation of the rule is the principle that whatis expressed puts an end to that which

is implied. Expressium facitcessare tacitum. Thus, where a statute, by its terms, is

expresslylimited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be
extended to other matters.

Sultan Yahya
Jerry
M. Tomawis v. Hon. Rasad G. Balindong GR No. 182434

FACTS: Private respondents Amna A. Pumbaya, Jalilah A. Mangompia and Ramia A.

Musor,
daughters of the late Acraman Radia, filed with the Sharia District Court an action
for quieting
of title docketed as Civil Case No. 102-97 against Sultan Jerry Tomawis and Mangoda
Radia. The respondents alleged that, being the legal heirs of Acraman Radia, they
were the absolute owners of the lot subject of the complaint; Tomawis assumed
ownership of the said property on the claim that he purchased the same from
Mangoda Radia, who claimed that he inherited it from his late father; in 1996, they
were informed that the small houses built on the said land with their permission
were ordered by Tamawis to be removed; they had been unlawfully deprived of their
right on the land, and Tomawis actions had c
ast doubt on their title.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Sharia District Court can validly take cognizance of Civil
Case No.
102-97

HELD: The allegations as well as the relief sought by the private respondents to
eliminate doubts on the title of ownership on the subject land
are within the jurisdiction of the Sharia District
Court. The said court has, by virtue of PD 1083, original jurisdiction over all personal
and real actions outside the purview of Art. 143 (1)(d) which states that all actions
from customary contracts in which the parties are Muslims, except those for
ejectment. Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is determined from the
allegations of the complaint and the character of

the relief sought. Private respondents petitio

n in Civil Case No. 102-97 alleged the concurrent original of the SDC. On the other
hand, BP 129 was enacted to reorganize only existing civil courts and is a law of
general application to the judiciary. The concurrent jurisdiction of SDCs and the RTCs
over cases involving only Muslims is recognized by the Court. The SDC has exclusive
original jurisdiction over all actions arising from contracts customary to Muslims to
the exclusion of the RTCs, as the exception under PD 1083, while both courts have
concurrent original jurisdiction over all other personal actions. Art. 143 of PD 1083 ,
which states the jurisdictional conferment, is applicable solely when both parties
are Muslims and shall not be construed to operate to the prejudice of a non-Muslim.

PROSPECTIVE AND RETROACTIVE EFFECT OF LAWS PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE

CORPORATION vs. STOCKHOLDERS OF INTERCITY SAVINGS AND LOAN BANK, INC.
G.R. No. 181556 December 14, 2009 Facts:
The Central Bank of the Philippines, now known as BangkoSentralngPilipinas, filed
on June 17, 1987 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati a Petition for
Assistance in the Liquidation of Intercity Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. (Intercity
Bank) alleging that said bank was already insolvent and its continuance in business
would involve probable loss to depositors, creditors and the general public. The trial
court gave it due course.Petitioner Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation was
eventually substituted as the therein petitioner, liquidator of Intercity Bank. In the
meantime, Republic Act No. 9302 which provides that
After the payment of all liabilities and claims against the closed bank, the
Corporation shall pay any surplus dividends at the legal rate of interest, from date
of takeover to date of distribution, to creditors and claimants of the closed bank in
accordance wi
th legal priority before distribution to the shareholders of the closed bank.
Relying on Republic Act No. 9302 PDIC filed on August 8, 2005 a Motion for
Approval of the Final Distribution of Assets and Termination of the Liquidation
Proceedings
Issue:
Whether or not Section 12 of RA 9302 should be applied retroactively in order to
entitle Intercity Bank creditors to surplus dividends.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that Statutes are prospective and not retroactive in their
operation, they being the formulation of rules for the future, not the past. Hence,
the legal maxim lex de futuro, judex de praeterito

the law provides for the future, the judge for the past,
which is articulated in Article 4 of the Civil Code: Laws shall have no retroactiv
e effect, unless the

contrary is provided.
The reason for the rule is the tendency of retroactive legislation to be unjust and
oppressive on account of its liability to unsettle vested rights or disturb the legal
effect of prior transactions. Further, a perusal of RA 9302 shows that nothing indeed
therein authorizes its retroactive application. In fact, its effectivity clause indicates a
clear legislative intent to the contrary, Section 28.
Effectivity Clause. This Act shall
take effect fifteen (15) days following the completion of its publication
in the Official Gazette or in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

VALEROSO vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

2008

GR 164815

February 22,

(focusing on PROSPECTIVITY)
Petitioner: PSINSP JERRY C VALEROSO
Respondent: The People of the Philippines
FACTS:
On July 10, 1996, SPO2 Antonio Disuanco of the Criminal Investigation
Section Division, Central Police District Command received a dispatch order
which directed him and three (3) other personnel to serve a warrant of arrest
against petitioner in a case for kidnapping with ransom. After briefing, team
conducted necessary surveillance on petitioner, checking his hideouts in
Cavite, Caloocan and Bulacan. Then, the team proceeded to the Integrated
National Police Central Station in Culiat, Quezon City, where they saw
petitioner as he was about to board a tricycle. SPO2 Disuanco and his team
approached petitioner. They put him under arrest, informed him of his
constitutional rights, and bodily searched him. Found tucked in his waist was
a Charter Arms, bearing Serial Number 52315 with five (5) live ammunition.

Petitioner was brought to the police station for questioning. A verification of

the subject firearm at the Firearms and Explosives Division at Camp Crame
revealed that it was not issued to the petitioner but to another person.
Petitioner was then charged with illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition under PD No. 1866 as amended.

On May 6, 1998 trial court found petitionerguilty as charged and sentenced

him to suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum plus fine.
Petitioner moved to reconsider but his motion was denied. He appealed to
the CA. On May 4, 2004, the appellate court affirmed the RTC disposition.

SC affirmed CAs decision.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not retroactive application of the law is valid taken into account
that the commission of the offense was on July 10, 1996 wherein the
governing law was PD 1866 which provides the penalty of reclusion temporal
in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.

HELD:
(1)YES. RA 8294 amended PD 1866 on July 6, 1997, during the pendency of the
case with the trial court. The law looks forward, never backward
(prospectivity).Lex prospicit, non respicit. A new law has a prospective, not
retroactive, effect. However, penal laws that favor a guilty person, who is not
a habitual criminal, shall be given retroactive effect.(Exception and exception
to the exception on effectivity of laws).

G.R.
No.
202242
July
17,
2012
FRANCISCO
I.
CHAVEZ,
Petitioner,
vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO
and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR., Respondents.
Facts:
The case is in relation to the process of selecting the nominees for the
vacant seat of Supreme Court Chief Justice following Renato Coronas
departure.
Originally, the members of the Constitutional Commission saw the need to
create a separate, competent and independent body to recommend
nominees to the President. Thus, it conceived of a body representative of all
the stakeholders in the judicial appointment process and called it the Judicial
and Bar Council (JBC).
In particular, Paragraph 1 Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution states that
(1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the
Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the
Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio
Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired
Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector. In
compliance therewith, Congress, from the moment of the creation of the JBC,
designated one representative from the Congress to sit in the JBC to act as
one of the ex officio members.
In 1994 however, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered.
Instead of having only seven (7) members, an eighth (8th) member was
added to the JBC as two (2) representatives from Congress began sitting in
the JBC one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate,
with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. During the existence of the case,
Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr.
(respondents) simultaneously sat in JBC as representatives of the legislature.

It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition.

The respondents claimed that when the JBC was established, the framers
originally envisioned a unicameral legislative body, thereby allocating a
representative of the National Assembly to the JBC. The phrase, however,
was not modified to aptly jive with the change to bicameralism which was
adopted by the Constitutional Commission on July 21, 1986. The respondents
also contend that if the Commissioners were made aware of the
consequence of having a bicameral legislature instead of a unicameral one,
they would have made the corresponding adjustment in the representation
of Congress in the JBC; that if only one house of Congress gets to be a
member of JBC would deprive the other house of representation, defeating
the principle of balance.
The respondents further argue that the allowance of two (2) representatives
of Congress to be members of the JBC does not render JBCs purpose of
providing balance nugatory; that the presence of two (2) members from
Congress will most likely provide balance as against the other six (6)
members who are undeniably presidential appointees
Supreme Court held that it has the power of review the case herein as it is an
object of concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all the
citizens who have the right to seek judicial intervention for rectification of
legal blunders.
Issue:
Whether the practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8)
members, two (2) of whom are members of Congress, defeats the letter and
spirit of the 1987 Constitution.
Held:
No. The current practice of JBC in admitting two members of the Congress to
perform the functions of the JBC is violative of the 1987 Constitution. As
such, it is unconstitutional.
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the
words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given
its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a wellsettled principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in
the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed. As such, it can be clearly and unambiguously
discerned from Paragraph 1, Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
that in the phrase, a representative of Congress, the use of the singular
letter a preceding representative of Congress is unequivocal and leaves
no room for any other construction. It is indicative of what the members of
the Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may designate
only one (1) representative to the JBC. Had it been the intention that more
than one (1) representative from the legislature would sit in the JBC, the
Framers could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided.
Moreover, under the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or
phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings,
its correct construction may be made clear and specific by considering the
company of words in which it is founded or with which it is associated. Every
meaning to be given to each word or phrase must be ascertained from the
context of the body of the statute since a word or phrase in a statute is

always used in association with other words or phrases and its meaning may
be modified or restricted by the latter. Applying the foregoing principle to this
case, it becomes apparent that the word Congress used in Article VIII,
Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular
allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House of
Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular
representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC
Considering that the language of the subject constitutional provision is plain
and unambiguous, there is no need to resort extrinsic aids such as records of
the Constitutional Commission. Nevertheless, even if the Court should
proceed to look into the minds of the members of the Constitutional
Commission, it is undeniable from the records thereof that it was intended
that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only. The underlying reason
leads the Court to conclude that a single vote may not be divided into half
(1/2), between two representatives of Congress, or among any of the sitting
members of the JBC for that matter.
With the respondents contention that each representative should be
admitted from the Congress and House of Representatives, the Supreme
Court, after the perusal of the records of Constitutional Commission, held
that Congress, in the context of JBC representation, should be considered
as one body. While it is true that there are still differences between the two
houses and that an inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the
realization of the legislative powers conferred to them by the Constitution,
the same cannot be applied in the case of JBC representation because no
liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. No
mechanism is required between the Senate and the House of
Representatives in the screening and nomination of judicial officers. Hence,
the term Congress must be taken to mean the entire legislative
department.
The framers of Constitution, in creating JBC, hoped that the private sector
and the three branches of government would have an active role and equal
voice in the selection of the members of the Judiciary. Therefore, to allow the
Legislature to have more quantitative influence in the JBC by having more
than one voice speak, whether with one full vote or one-half (1/2) a vote
each, would negate the principle of equality among the three branches of
government which is enshrined in the Constitution.
It is clear, therefore, that the Constitution mandates that the JBC be
composed of seven (7) members only. Thus, any inclusion of another
member, whether with one whole vote or half (1/2) of it, goes against that
mandate. Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, providing Congress
with an equal voice with other members of the JBC in recommending
appointees to the Judiciary is explicit. Any circumvention of the constitutional
mandate should not be countenanced for the Constitution is the supreme law
of the land. The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all
other laws must conform and to which all persons, including the highest
officials of the land, must defer. Constitutional doctrines must remain
steadfast no matter what may be the tides of time. It cannot be simply made
to sway and accommodate the call of situations and much more tailor itself
to the whims and caprices of the government and the people who run it.
Notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition
of the JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless valid. In the interest of

fair play under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the
declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not
nullified.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical composition of
the Judicial and Bar Council IS declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and
Bar Council is hereby enjoined to reconstitute itself so that only one ( 1)
member of Congress will sit as a representative in its proceedings, in
accordance with Section 8( 1 ), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. This
disposition is immediately executory.

Serana vs. Sandiganbayan

GR No. 162059

Facts:
Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of the University of the
Philippines-Cebu (UP). She was appointed by then President Joseph Estrada
on December 21, 1999 as a student regent of UP, to serve a one-year term
starting January 1, 2000 and ending on December 31, 2000.
Petitioner received 15 million from President Estrada for the renovation of the
Vinzons Hall Annex. However such renovation failed to materialized. Hence,
ombudsman filed a charge of estafa to the sandiganbayan.
Issue:
Can petitioner be charged of estafa in the Sandiganbayan? Can petitioner be
considered as public officer?
Ruling:
Petitioner can be charged of estafa as provided in Section 4(B) of P.D. No.
1606. The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies committed by
public officials in relation to their office. We see no plausible or sensible
reason to exclude estafa as one of the offenses included in Section 4(bB) of
P.D. No. 1606. Plainly, estafa is one of those other felonies. The jurisdiction
is simply subject to the twin requirements that (a) the offense is committed
by public officials and employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No.
1606, as amended, and that (b) the offense is committed in relation to their
office.
As to the issue of whether or not petitioner is a public officer. It was held in
Laurel vs Desierto, that public office is the right, authority, and duty created
and conferred by law, by which for a given period, either fixed by law or
enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with
some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercise by
him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer.
Since BOR performs functions similar to those of a board of trustees of a nonstock corporation. By express mandate of law, petitioner is a public officer as
contemplated by P.D. No. 1606 the statute defining the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. It is well established that compensation is not an essential
element of public office. At most, it is merely incidental to the public office.
Hence, Petitioner is a public officer by express mandate of P.D.No. 1606 and
jurisprudence.

League of Cities v. Comelec

Action:
These are consolidated petitions for prohibition with prayer for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order filed by the
League of Cities of the Philippines, City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P.
Treas assailing the constitutionality of the subject Cityhood Laws and
enjoining the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and respondent
municipalities from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the Cityhood Laws.
Fact:
During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33
municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting
24
other
municipalities
into
cities.
During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009
(RA 9009), which took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450
of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement
for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million.
The rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator
Aquilino Pimentel, the mad rush of municipalities to convert into cities
solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the
fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence.
After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th
Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from the
P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose
cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th
Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.
During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint
Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for
approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution.
Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed,
through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood
bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from
the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009.
On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood
bills. The Senate also approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except
that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills
lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates from March to July 2007
without the Presidents signature.
The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine
whether the voters in each respondent municipality approve of the
conversion of their municipality into a city.
Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws
unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as
well as for violation of the equal protection clause. Petitioners also lament
that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the
share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities
will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under
Section 285 of the Local Government Code.

Issue:
The
petitions
raise
the
following
fundamental
issues:
1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution;
and
2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.
Held:
We
grant
the
petitions.
The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution,
and are thus unconstitutional.
First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the
present case is a prospective, not a retroactive application, because RA 9009
took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became law more than five years
later.
Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria
for the creation of a city in the Local Government Code and not in any other
law, including the Cityhood Laws.
Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution
because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local
government units.
Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code,
as amended by RA 9009, for converting a municipality into a city are clear,
plain and unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory construction.
Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain
municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009 remained an intent and was
never written into Section 450 of the Local Government Code.
Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or
resolutions are not extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th
Congress.
Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section
450 of the Local Government Code, the exemption would still be
unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.

CITY OF MANILA MAYOR ALFREDO LIM v. JUDGE LAGUIO & MTDCFacts:

The petitioners seek to reverse the ruling of the ruling of the RTC regarding the
unconstitutionality of OrdinanceNo. 7783 which is entitled
AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF
BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT,
SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES
FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

Private respondent, Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC), contends that

the City Council has nopower to prohibit the operation of motels and that the
Ordinance does not constitute a proper exercise of police power asthe compulsory
closure of the motel business has no reasonable relation to the legitimate municipal
interests sought to beprotected.The petitioners, on the other hand, argues that the
City Council had the power to "prohibit certain forms of entertainment in order to
protect the social and moral welfare of the community" [Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of
the LocalGovernment Code] and that the Ordinance was enacted by the City Council
of Manila to protect the social and moralwelfare of the community in conjunction
with its police powers [Article III, Section 18(kk) of Republic Act No. 409].Judge
Laguio issued an ex-parte temporary restraining order against the enforcement of
the Ordinance. He alsogranted the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by
MTDC. Hence, the appeal by the petitioners.Issue: Whether or not the Ordinance No.
7783 is constitutionalHeld: NORatio:There is a clear invasion of personal or property
rights, personal in the case of those individuals desirous of owning, operating and
patronizing those motels and property in terms of the investments made and the
salaries to be paidto those therein employed. If the City of Manila so desires to put
an end to prostitution, fornication and other social ills, itcan instead impose
reasonable regulations such as daily inspections of the establishments for any
violation of theconditions of their licenses or permits; it may exercise its authority to
suspend or revoke their licenses for these violations;and it may even impose
increased license fees. In other words, there are other means to reasonably
accomplish thedesired end.Police power legislation of such character deserves the
full endorsement of we reiterate our support for it. Butinspite of its

the judiciary virtuous aims, the enactment of the Ordinance has no statutory or
constitutional authority tostand on. Local legislative bodies, in this case, the City
Council, cannot prohibit the operation of the enumeratedestablishments or order
their transfer or conversion without infringing the constitutional guarantees not
even under theguise

of due process and equal protection of laws of police power.The petition is DENIED
and the decision of the Regional Trial Court declaring the ordinance void is
AFFIRMED.
Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The sangguniang
panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve
resolutionsand appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its
inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the
corporate powers of the cityas provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and
shall:. . . .(4) Regulate activities relative to the use of land, buildings and structures
within the city in order to promote the general welfare and for said purpose shall:
(vii) Regulate the establishment, operation, and maintenance of any entertainment
or amusement facilities, including theatrical performances, circuses, billiard pools,
publicdancing schools, public dance halls, sauna baths, massage parlors, and other
places for entertainment or amusement; regulate such other events or activities for
amusementor entertainment, particularly those which tend to disturb the
community or annoy the inhabitants, or require the suspension or suppression of
the same; or, prohibit certainforms of amusement or entertainment in order to
protect the social and moral welfare of the community.ARTICLE III-THE MUNICIPAL
BOARDSection 18. Legislative powers. The Municipal Board shall have the

following legislative powers:(kk) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and
proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the prosperity, and the
promotion of the morality, peace, goodorder, comfort, convenience, and general
welfare of the city and its inhabitants, and such others as may be necessary to carry
into effect and discharge the powers and dutiesconferred by this chapter; and to fix
penalties for the violation of ordinances which shall not exceed two hundred pesos
fine or six months' imprisonment, or both such fine andimprisonment, for a single
offense

AMORES vs HOUSE of REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

Facts: Petition for certiorari, Milagros E. Amores challenges the Decision of
May 14, 2009 and Resolution No. 09-130 of August 6, 2009 of the
HRETribunal (public respondent), which respectively dismissed petitioners
Petition for Quo Warranto questioning the legality of the assumption of office
of Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva (private respondent) as representative of the
party-list organization Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) in the
House
of
Representatives,
and
denied
petitioners
Motion
for
Reconsideration.
Seeking the ouster of private respondent, petitioner alleged that, among
other things, private respondent assumed office without a formal
proclamation issued by COMELEC; he was disqualified to be a nominee of the
youth sector of CIBAC since, at the time of the filing of his certificates of
nomination and acceptance, he was already 31 years old or beyond the age
limit of 30 pursuant to Section 9 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise
known as the Party-List System Act; and his change of affiliation from
CIBACs youth sector to its overseas Filipino workers and their families sector
was not effected at least six months prior to the May 14, 2007 elections so
as to be qualified to represent the new sector under Section 15 of RA No.
7941.

ISSUES: (1) whether petitioners Petition for Quo Warranto was dismissible
for having been filed unseasonably; and (2) whether Sections 9 and 15 of RA
No. 7941 apply to private respondent.

Ruling: 1) Court finds that public respondent committed grave abuse of

discretion in considering petitioners Petition for Quo Warranto filed out of
time. Its counting of the 10-day reglementary period provided in its Rules
from the issuance of NBC Resolution No. 07-60 on July 9, 2007 is erroneous.
NBC Resolution No. 07-60 partially proclaimed CIBAC as a winner in the May,
2007 elections, along with other party-list organizations, it was by no
measure a proclamation of private respondent himself as required by Section
13 of RA No. 7941.
2) Court finds no textual support for public respondents interpretation that
Section 9 applied only to those nominated during the first three
congressional terms after the ratification of the Constitution or until 1998,

unless a sectoral party is thereafter registered exclusively as representing

the youth sector. As the law states in unequivocal terms that a nominee of
the youth sector must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than
thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election, so it must be that a
candidate who is more than 30 on election day is not qualified to be a youth
sector nominee. Since this mandate is contained in RA No. 7941, the PartyList System Act, it covers ALL youth sector nominees vying for party-list
representative seats.
As petitioner points out, RA No. 7941 was enacted only in March, 1995.
There is thus no reason to apply Section 9 thereof only to youth sector
nominees nominated during the first three congressional terms after the
ratification of the Constitution in 1987. Under this interpretation, the last
elections where Section 9 applied were held in May, 1995 or two months
after the law was enacted. This is certainly not sound legislative intent, and
could not have been the objective of RA No. 7941.
There is likewise no rhyme or reason in public respondents ratiocination that
after the third congressional term from the ratification of the Constitution,
which expired in 1998, Section 9 of RA No. 7941 would apply only to sectoral
parties registered exclusively as representing the youth sector. This
distinction is nowhere found in the law.
Court finds that private respondent was not qualified to be a nominee of
either the youth sector or the overseas Filipino workers and their families
sector in the May, 2007 elections.
The records disclose that private respondent was already more than 30 years
of age in May, 2007, it being stipulated that he was born in August, 1975.
Moreover, he did not change his sectoral affiliation at least six months before
May, 2007, public respondent itself having found that he shifted to CIBACs
overseas Filipino workers and their families sector only on March 17, 2007

Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 14, 2009 and Resolution No.
09-130 dated August 6, 2009 of the HRET are SET ASIDE. Emmanuel Joel J.
Villanueva is declared ineligible to hold office as a member of the House of
Representatives representing the party-list organization CIBAC.