EN BANC

[G.R. No. 122250 & 122258. July 21, 1997]

EDGARDO C. NOLASCO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MUNICIPAL BOARD
OF CANVASSERS, MEYCAUAYAN, BULACAN, and EDUARDO A. ALARILLA, respondents.
FLORENTINO P. BLANCO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EDUARDO A.
ALARILLA, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
First, we rewind the facts. The election for mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan was held on May 8,
1995. The principal protagonists were petitioner Florentino P. Blanco and private respondent
Eduardo A. Alarilla. Blanco received 29,753 votes, while Alarilla got 23,038 votes. [if !supportFootnotes][1][endif]
Edgardo Nolasco was elected Vice-Mayor with 37,240 votes.
On May 9, 1995, Alarilla filed with the COMELEC a petition to disqualify Blanco. He alleged:
xxxxxxxxx
4. Based on intelligence reports that respondent was maintaining his own `private army' at his
aforesaid resident, P/Insp. Ronaldo O. Lee of the Philippine National Police assigned with the
Intelligence Command at Camp Crame, applied for and was granted search warrant no. 95-147 by
Branch 37 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila on 5 May 1995. A copy of the said search warrant
is attached as Annex "A" hereof.
5. In compliance with said search warrant no. 95-147, an elite composite team of the PNP
Intelligence Command, Criminal Investigation Service (CIS), and Bulacan Provincial Command,
backed up by the Philippine National Police Special Action Force, accompanied by mediamen who
witnessed and recorded the search by video and still cameras, raided the house of respondent
Florentino Blanco at his stated address at Bancal, Meycauayan, Bulacan.
6. Enclosed as Annex "A-1" is a video tape taken of the proceedings during the raid.
7. The composite team was able to enter the said premises of respondent Florentino Blanco where
they conducted a search of the subject firearms and ammunition.
8. The search resulted in the arrest of six (6) men who were found carrying various high powered
firearms without any license or authority to use or possess such long arms. These persons
composing respondent's `private army,' and the unlicensed firearms are as follows:
A. Virgilio Luna y Valderama 1. PYTHOM (sic) Cal. 347 SN 26946 with six (6) Rounds of Ammo.
2. INGRAM M10 Cal. 45 MP with Suppressor SN: 45457 with two (2) Mags and 54 Rounds of
Ammo.
B. Raymundo Bahala y Pon 1. HKMP5 Sn. C334644 with two (2) Mags and 47 Rounds of Ammo.
C.Roberto Santos y Sacris 1. Smith and Wesson 357 Magnum Sn: 522218 with six (6) Rounds of Ammo.
D. Melchor Cabanero y Oreil 1. Armscor 12 Gauge with three (3) Rounds of Ammo.
E. Edgardo Orteza y Asuncion 1. Paltik Cal. 38 Rev with six (6) Rounds of Ammo.
F. Francisco Libari y Calimag 1. Paltik Cal. 38 SN: 36869
Copies of the inventory receipts are hereto attached as Annexes "B" to "B-5" hereof.
9. During the search, members of the composite team saw through a large clear glass window,
respondent's Galil assault rifle on a sofa inside a closed room of the subject premises.
10. Not allowed entry thereto by respondent and his wife, the members of the composite policemilitary team applied for the issuance of a second search warrant (Annex "B-6") so that they could
enter the said room to seize the said firearm.
11. While waiting for the issuance of the second search warrant, respondent's wife and
respondent's brother, Mariano Blanco, claiming to be the campaign manager of respondent in the
Nationalist People's Coalition Party, asked permission to enter the locked room so they could
withdraw money in a vault inside the locked room to pay their watchers, and the teachers of
Meycauayan in the 8 May 1995 elections.
12. For reasons not known to petitioner, Mrs. Florentino Blanco and Mariano Blanco, were allowed
to withdraw ten (10) large plastic bags from the vault.
13. When the said PNP composite team examined the ten (10) black plastic bags, they found out
that each bag contained ten (10) shoe boxes. Each shoe box when examined contained 200 pay
envelopes, and each pay envelope when opened contained the amount of P1,000.00. When

questioned, respondent's brother Mariano Blanco and respondent's wife, admitted to the raiding
team that the total amount of money in the ten (10) plastic bags is P10,000,000.00.
14. The labels found in the envelope shows that the money were intended as respondent's bribe
money to the teachers of Meycauayan. Attached as Annex "C" is the cover of one of the shoe
boxes containing the inscription that it is intended to the teachers of Brgy. Lawa, Meycauayan,
Bulacan.
15. On election day 8 May 1995, respondent perpetrated the most massive vote-buying activity
ever in the history of Meycauayan politics. Attached as Annex "D" is the envelope where this
P10,000,000.00 was placed in 100 peso denominations totalling one thousand pesos per envelope
with the inscription `VOTE!!! TINOY.'
This massive vote-buying activity was engineered by the respondent through his organization
called `MTB' or `MOVEMENT FOR TINOY BLANCO VOLUNTEERS.' The chairman of this
movement is respondent's brother, Mariano P. Blanco, who admitted to the police during the raid
that these money were for the teachers and watchers of Meycauayan, Bulacan.
Attached as Annex "E" hereof is an MTB ID issued to one Armando Bulan of Precinct 77-A, Brgy.
Jasmin, Bancal, Meycauayan, Bulacan. You will note that the ID is perforated in the middle. The
purpose is for the voter to tear the office copy and return it to respondent's headquarters to receive
the balance of the P500.00 of the bribe money after voting for respondent during the elections. The
voter will initially be given a down-payment of P500.00.
16. This massive vote-buying was also perpetrated by respondent thru the familiar use of flying
voters. Attached as Annex "F" hereof is a copy of the Police Blotter dated 8 May 1995 showing that
six (6) flying voters were caught in different precincts of Meycauayan, Bulacan, who admitted after
being caught and arrested that they were paid P200.00 to P300.00 by respondent and his
followers, to vote for other voters in the voter's list.
17. Not satisfied, and with his overflowing supply of money, respondent used another scheme as
follows. Respondent's paid voter will identify his target from the list of voter and will impersonate
said voter in the list and falsify his signature.
Attached as Annex "G" hereof is the Minutes of Voting and Counting of Votes in Precinct No. 26,
Brgy. Calvario, Meycauayan, Bulacan. Annex "G-1" is the statement of one Ma. Luisa de los Reyes
Cruz stating that when she went to her precinct to vote, her name was already voted upon by
another person. This entry was noted by Leticia T. Villanco, Poll Chairman; Estelita Artajo, - Poll
Clerk; and Nelson John Nito - Poll Member.
18. Earlier before the election, respondent used his tremendous money to get in the good graces
of the local Comelec Registrar, who was replaced by this Office upon the petition of the people of
Meycauayan. Attached as Annex "H" hereof is an article in the 3 May 1995 issue of Abante entitled
`1 M Suhol sa Comelec Registrar.'
19. The second search warrant on respondent's residence yielded to more firearms and thousands
of rounds of ammunition. These guns were used by respondent to terrorize the population and
make the people afraid to complain against respondent's massive vote buying and cheating in
today's elections. Respondent's bribery of the teachers ensured the implementation of his votebuying ballot box switching, impersonations, and other cheating schemes.
Attached as Annexes `I-1' to I-2' are the pertinent Receipts of the guns and ammunitions seized
from respondent. Attached as Annex "J" is a Certification to the same effect.
20. The above acts committed by respondent are clear grounds for disqualification under Sec. 68
of the Omnibus Election Code for giving money to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public
officials performing election functions; for committing acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy;
and for spending in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by the Election
Code. There are only 97,000 registered voters in Meycauayan versus respondent's expenses of at
least P10,000,000.00 as admitted above. (Emphasis supplied).
On May 15, 1995, Alarilla filed a Very Urgent Ex Parte Motion to Suspend Proclamation. The
COMELEC (First Division) granted the motion after finding that there was a "probable commission
of election offenses which are grounds for disqualification pursuant to the provisions of section 68
of the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), and the evidence in support of disqualification is strong."
It directed the Municipal Board of Canvassers "to complete the canvassing of election returns of
the municipality of Meycauayan, but to suspend proclamation of respondent Florentino P. Blanco
should he obtain the winning number of votes for the position of Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan
until such time when the petitions for disqualification against him shall have been resolved."
On May 25, 1995, Blanco filed a Motion to Lift or Set Aside the Order suspending his proclamation.
On May 29, 1995, he filed his Answer to the petition to disqualify him.
On May 30, 1995, the COMELEC (First Division) heard the petition to disqualify Blanco. The

parties thereafter submitted their position papers. [if !supportFootnotes][2][endif] Blanco even replied to the
position paper of Alarilla on June 9, 1995.
On August 15, 1995, the COMELEC (First Division) disqualified Blanco on the ground of votebuying, viz.:[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif]
xxxxxxxxx
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (First Division) RESOLVES to
DISQUALIFY Respondent Florentino P. Blanco as a candidate for the Office of Mayor of
Meycauayan, Bulacan in the May 8, 1995 elections for having violated Section 261 (a) of the
Omnibus Election Code. The Order suspending the proclamation of herein Respondent is now
made PERMANENT. The Municipal Board of Canvassers of Meycauayan, Bulacan shall
immediately reconvene and, on the basis of the completed canvass of the election returns,
determine the winner out of the remaining qualified candidates who shall be immediately
proclaimed.
SO ORDERED."
Blanco moved for reconsideration on August 19, 1995 in the COMELEC en banc. Nolasco, as vice
mayor, intervened in the proceedings. [if !supportFootnotes][4][endif] He moved for reconsideration of that part
of the resolution directing the Municipal Board of Canvassers to "immediately reconvene and, on
the basis of the completed canvass of the election returns, determine the winner out of the
remaining qualified candidates who shall be immediately proclaimed." He urged that as vice-mayor
he should be declared mayor in the event Blanco was finally disqualified. The motions were heard
on September 7, 1995. The parties were allowed to file their memoranda with right of reply. On
October 23, 1995, the COMELEC en banc denied the motions for reconsideration.
In this petition for certiorari,[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif] Blanco contends:
xxxxxxxxx
18. Respondent COMELEC En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction and acted arbitrarily in affirming en toto and adopting as its own the majority
decision of the First Division in that:
18.1 It upheld the validity of the May 17, 1995 order suspending proclamation of Petitioner Blanco
herein as the winning candidate for Mayor of Meycauayan without the benefit of any notice or
hearing in gross and palpable violation of Blanco's constitutional right to due process of law.
18.2 It violated the provisions of COMELEC Res. No. 2050 as amended, prescribing the procedure
for disposing of disqualification cases arising out of the prohibited acts mentioned in Sec. 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code, which Resolution this Honorable Tribunal explicitly sanctioned in the case
of Lozano vs. Yorac. Moreover, it (COMELEC) violated Blanco's right to equal protection of the
laws by setting him apart from other respondents facing similar disqualification suits whose case
were referred by COMELEC to the Law Department pursuant to Com. Res. No. 2050 and ordering
their proclamation -- an act which evidently discriminated against Petitioner Blanco herein.
18.3 It decided Petitioner Blanco's disqualification case in a SUMMARY PROCEEDING in violation
of law and the precedents which consistently hold that questions of VOTE-BUYING, terrorism and
similar such acts should be resolve in a formal election protest where the issue of vote buying is
subjected to a full-dress hearing instead of disposing of the issue in a summary proceeding;
18.4 It declared Petitioner Blanco as having been involved in a conspiracy to engage in VOTEBUYING without that minimum quantum of proof required to establish a disputable presumption of
vote-buying in gross and palpable violation of the provisions of Section 28, Rep. Act. 6646;
18.5 It ordered the proclamation of a SECOND PLACER as the duly elected Mayor of
Meycauayan, Bulacan, in gross violation and utter disregard of the doctrine laid down by this
Honorable Supreme Court in the case of LABO vs. COMELEC which was reiterated only recently
in the case of Aquino vs. Syjuco.
On the other hand, Nolasco contends in his petition for certiorari [if !supportFootnotes][6][endif] that he should
be declared as Mayor in view of the disqualification of Blanco. He cites section 44 of R.A. No. 7160
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991 and our decision in Labo vs. COMELEC.
[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif]

We shall first resolve the Blanco petition.

Blanco was not denied due process when the COMELEC (First Division) suspended his
proclamation as mayor pending determination of the petition for disqualification against him.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 and sections 4 and 5 of the Rule 25 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure
merely require that evidence of guilt should be strong to justify the COMELEC in suspending a
winning candidate's proclamation. It ought to be emphasized that the suspension order is
provisional in nature and can be lifted when the evidence so warrants. It is akin to a temporary
restraining order which a court can issue ex-parte under exigent circumstances.

In any event, Blanco was given all the opportunity to prove that the evidence on his disqualification
was not strong. On May 25, 1995, he filed a Motion to Lift or Set Aside the Order suspending his
proclamation. On May 29, 1995, he filed his Answer to the petition to disqualify him. The
COMELEC heard the petition. Blanco thereafter submitted his position paper and reply to Alarilla's
position paper. The COMELEC considered the evidence of the parties and their arguments and
thereafter affirmed his disqualification. The hoary rule is that due process does not mean prior
hearing but only an opportunity to be heard. The COMELEC gave Blanco all the opportunity to be
heard. Petitions for disqualification are subject to summary hearings.[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif]
Blanco also faults the COMELEC for departing from the procedure laid down in COMELEC
Resolution 2050 as amended, in disqualification cases. The resolution pertinently provides:
xxxxxxxxx
Where a similar complaint is filed after election but before proclamation of the respondent
candidate the complaint shall, nevertheless, be dismissed as a disqualification case. However, the
complaint shall be referred for preliminary investigation to the Law Department. If, before
proclamation, the Law Department makes a prima facie finding of guilt and the corresponding
information has been filed with the appropriate trial court, the complainant may file a petition for
suspension of the proclamation of the respondent with the court before which the criminal case is
pending and the said court may order the suspension of the proclamation if the evidence of guilt is
strong."
It is alleged that the violation is fatal as it deprived Blanco of equal protection of our laws.
We do not agree. It cannot be denied that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over proclamation and
disqualification cases. Article IX-C, section 2 of the Constitution endows the COMELEC the all
encompassing power to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of
an election x x x." We have long ruled that this broad power includes the power to cancel
proclamations.[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif] Our laws are no less explicit on the matter. Section 68 of B.P. Blg.
881 (Omnibus Election Code) provides:
"Sec. 68. Disqualifications. - Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is
declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a)
given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public
officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy;
(c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited,
received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated
any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be
disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any
person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to
run for an elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent
resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided
for in the elections laws."
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 likewise provides:
"Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment
to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any
reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is
voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission
shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong."
Despite these laws and existing jurisprudence, Blanco contends that COMELEC must follow the
procedure in Resolution No. 2050 as amended. We hold that COMELEC cannot always be
straitjacketed by this procedural rule. The COMELEC has explained that the resolution was
passed to take care of the proliferation of disqualification cases at that time. It deemed it wise to
delegate its authority to its Law Department as partial solution to the problem. The May 8, 1995
elections, however, did not result in a surfeit of disqualification cases which the COMELEC cannot
handle. Hence, its decision to resolve the disqualification case of Blanco directly and without
referring it to its Law Department is within its authority, a sound exercise of its discretion. The
action of the COMELEC is in accord with Section 28 of R.A. No. 6646, viz:
"x x x.
"SEC. 28. Prosecution of Vote-Buying and Vote-selling. - The presentation of a complaint for
violations of paragraph (a) or (b) of Section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 supported by
affidavits of complaining witness attesting to the offer or promise by or of the voter's acceptance of
money or other consideration from the relatives, leaders or sympathizers of a candidate, shall be

sufficient basis for an investigation to be immediately conducted by the Commission, directly or

through its duly authorized legal officers under Section 68 or Section 265 of said Batas Pambansa
Blg. 881. (emphasis supplied)
"x x x."
Indeed, even Commissioner Maambong who dissented from the majority ruling, clings to the view
that "Resolution No. 2050 cannot divest the Commission of its duty to resolve disqualification
cases under the clear provision of section 6 of R.A. No. 6646." [if !supportFootnotes][10][endif] Clearly too,
Blanco's contention that he was denied equal protection of the law is off-line. He was not the
object of any invidious discrimination. COMELEC assumed direct jurisdiction over his
disqualification case not to favor anybody but to discharge its constitutional duty of disposing the
case in a fair and as fast a manner as possible.
Blanco also urges that COMELEC erred in using summary proceedings to resolve his
disqualification case. Again, the COMELEC action is safely anchored on section 4 of its Rules of
Procedure which expressly provides that petitions for disqualification "shall be heard summarily
after due notice." Vote-buying has its criminal and electoral aspects. Its criminal aspect to
determine the guilt or innocence of the accused cannot be the subject of summary hearing.
However, its electoral aspect to ascertain whether the offender should be disqualified from office
can be determined in an administrative proceeding that is summary in character.
The next issue is whether there is substantial evidence to prove the vote buying activities of
Blanco. The factual findings of the COMELEC (First Division) are as follows: [if !supportFootnotes][11][endif]
"x x x
"Respondent argues that the claim of vote-buying has no factual basis because the affidavits and
sworn statements admitted as evidence against him are products of hearsay; inadmissible
because of the illegal searches; they violate the Rule of Res Inter Alios Acta and the offense of
vote-buying requires consummation.
We are not impressed.
A studied reading of the affidavits [Respondent's affidavit is unsigned] attached to the Reply of the
Respondent to the Position Paper of the Petitioner [Annexes 1, 2 and 3] would reveal that they are
in the nature of general denials emanating from individuals closely associated or related to
respondent Blanco.
The same holds true with the affidavits attached to Respondent's Position Paper [Annexes 1, 2, 3
and 4]. Said affidavits were executed by Blanco's political leaders and private secretary.
On the other hand, the affidavit of Romeo Burgos [Exhibit "E-1"] is rich in detail as to how the
alleged vote-buying was conducted.
Moreover, the same is corroborated by object evidence in the nature of MTB [Movement for Tinoy
Blanco] cards which were in the possession of the affiants and allegedly used as a means to
facilitate the vote-buying scheme.
There are also admissions of certain individuals who received money to vote for Respondent
[Annexes "E-2", "E-3", "E-4", "E-5", "E-6", "E-7", "E-8", "E-9" and "E-10"].
On the day of the elections, two individuals were apprehended for attempting to vote for
Respondent when they allegedly are not registered voters of Meycauayan. A criminal complaint for
violation of section 261 [2] of BP 881 was filed by P/Sr. Inspector Alfred S. Corpus on May 9, 1995
with the Municipal Trial Court of Bulacan. The same was docketed as Criminal Case 95-16996
[Exhibit F-2].
Again, similar pay envelopes with money inside them were found in the possession of the
suspected flying voters.
The incident was corroborated by Adriano Llorente in his affidavit narrating the same [Exhibit "F1"]. Llorente, a poll watcher of Petitioner, was the one who accosted the two suspected flying
voters when the latter attempted to vote despite failing to locate their names in the voter's list.
From this rich backdrop of detail, We are disappointed by the general denial offered by
Respondent. In People of the Philippines vs. Navarro, G.R. No. 96251, May 11, 1993, 222 SCRA
684, the Supreme Court noted that "Denial is the weakest defense' [page 692].
In People of the Philippines vs. Rolando Precioso, et al., G.R. No. 95890, May 12, 1993, 221
SCRA 1993, the Supreme Court observed that,
`We have consistently ruled that denials if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence are
negative and self-serving evidence which deserves no weight in law and cannot be given greater
evidentiary weight over the testimony of credible witnesses. Ergo, as between the positive
declarations of the prosecution witness and the negative statements of the accused, the former
deserves more credence." [page 754].'
However, Respondent conveniently resorts to section 33, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court

which states that a declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of
any offense necessarily included herein, may be given in evidence against him [affiants who
executed Exhibits E-1 to E-10] but not against Respondent.
There is no merit in this contention.
The affiants are not the accused. Their participation in the herein case is in the nature of witnesses
who have assumed the risk of being subsequently charged with violating Section 261 [1] of BP
881. In fact, their affidavits were sought by the Petitioner and not by any law enforcement agency.
Even Respondent admits this finding when he filed his Reply to Petitioner's Position Paper and
Motion to Refer for Preliminary Investigation and Filing of Information in Court against the Persons
Who Executed Exhibits E-1 to E-10 for Having Admitted Commission of Election Offense. If they
were the accused, why file the motion? Would not this be redundant if not irrelevant?
xxx
Another telling blow is the unexplained money destined for the teachers. Why such a huge
amount? Why should the Respondent, a mayoralty candidate, and according to his own
admission, be giving money to teachers a day before the elections? What were the peso bills
doing in pay envelopes with the inscription "VOTE!!! TINOY", and kept in shoe boxes with the word
"Teachers" written on the covers thereof?
There is also something wrong with the issuance of the aforementioned MTB cards when one
considers the testimony of Burgos that more or less 50,000 of these cards, which is equivalent to
more or less 52% of the 97,000 registered voters of Meycauayan, Bulacan, were printed by
respondent; that there are only 443 precincts in Meycauayan; that under the law, a candidate is
allowed only one watcher per polling place and canvassing area; and, finally, that there is no
explanation at all by the respondent as to what these "watchers" did in order to get paid P300.00
each.
xxx
Respondent also avers that for an allegation of vote-buying to prosper, the act of giving must be
consummated.
Section 281 [a] of BP 881 states "any person who gives, offers, or promises money x x x." Section
28 of RA 6646 also states that "the giver, offeror, the promisor as well as the solicitor, recipient and
conspirator referred to in paragraphs [a] and [b] of section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 shall
be liable as principals: x x x.
While the giving must be consummated, the mere act of offering or promising something in
consideration for someone's vote constitutes the offense of vote-buying.
In the case at bar, the acts of offering and promising money in consideration for the votes of said
affiants is sufficient for a finding of the commission of the offense of vote-buying."
These factual findings were affirmed by the COMELEC en banc against the lone dissent of
Commissioner Maambong.
There is an attempt to discredit these findings. Immediately obvious in the effort is the resort to our
technical rules of evidence. Again, our ingrained jurisprudence is that technical rules of evidence
should not be rigorously applied in administrative proceedings especially where the law calls for
the proceeding to be summary in character. More importantly, we cannot depart from the settled
norm of reviewing decisions of the COMELEC, i.e., that "this Court cannot review the factual
findings of the COMELEC absent a grave abuse of discretion and a showing of arbitrariness in its
decision, order or resolution."[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif]
We now come to the petition of Nolasco that he should be declared as mayor in the event Blanco
is finally disqualified.[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif] We sustain the plea. Section 44, Chapter 2 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160) is unequivocal, thus:
"x x x
"SEC. 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice Governor, Mayor, and Vice
Mayor.- (a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice governor
or vice mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor. If a permanent vacancy occurs in
the offices of the governor, vice governor, mayor, or vice mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian
member or, in case of his permanent inability, the second highest ranking sanggunian member,
shall become the governor, vice governor, mayor or vice mayor, as the case may be. Subsequent
vacancies in the said office shall be filled automatically by the other sanggunian members
according to their ranking as defined herein.
(b) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the punong barangay, the highest ranking
sanggunian barangay member or, in case of his permanent inability, the second highest ranking
sanggunian member, shall become the punong barangay.
(c) A tie between or among the highest ranking sangguniang members shall be resolved by the

drawing of lots.
(d) The successors as defined herein shall serve only the unexpired terms of their predecessors.
For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official fills a
higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office,
voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his
office.
For purposes of succession as provided in this Chapter, ranking in the sanggunian shall be
determined on the basis of the proportion of votes obtained by each winning candidate to the total
number of registered voters in each distribution the immediately preceding election."
In the same vein, Article 83 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing, the Local Government
Code of 1991 provides:
"x x x.
"ART. 83. Vacancies and Succession of Elective Local Officials.- (a) What constitutes permanent
vacancy - A permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official fills a higher vacant office,
refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is
otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office.
(b) Permanent vacancies in the offices of the governor, vice governor, mayor and vice mayor (1) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice governor or vice
mayor concerned shall ipso facto become the governor or mayor. If a permanent vacancy occurs
in the offices of the governor, vice governor, mayor, or vice mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian
member or, in case of his permanent inability, the second highest ranking sanggunian member,
shall ipso facto become the governor, vice governor, mayor or vice mayor, as the case may be.
Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall be filled automatically by the other sanggunian
members according to their ranking as defined in this Article."
Our case law is now settled that in a mayoralty election, the candidate who obtained the second
highest number of votes, in this case Alarilla, cannot be proclaimed winner in case the winning
candidate is disqualified. Thus, we reiterated the rule in the fairly recent case of Reyes v.
COMELEC,[if !supportFootnotes][14][endif] viz:
"x x x x x x x x x
"We likewise find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC in denying petitioner
Julius O. Garcia's petition to be proclaimed mayor in view of the disqualification of Renato U.
Reyes.
"That the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed
winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified is now settled. The doctrinal instability caused
by see-sawing rulings has since been removed. In the latest ruling on the question, this Court said:
To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes would be to
substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer is just that, a second placer.
He lost the elections. He was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be
considered the first among qualified candidates because in a field which excludes the disqualified
candidate, the conditions would have substantially changed. We are not prepared to extrapolate
the results under the circumstances.
"Garcia's plea that the votes cast for Reyes be invalidated is without merit. The votes cast for
Reyes are presumed to have been cast in the belief that Reyes was qualified and for that reason
can not be treated as stray, void, or meaningless. The subsequent finding that he is disqualified
cannot retroact to the date of the elections so as to invalidate the votes cast for him."
Consequently, respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion insofar as it failed to
follow the above doctrine, a descendant of our ruling in Labo v. COMELEC.[if !supportFootnotes][15][endif]
A final word. The dispute at bar involves more than the mayoralty of the municipality of
Meycauyan, Bulacan. It concerns the right of suffrage which is the bedrock of republicanism.
Suffrage is the means by which our people express their sovereign judgment. Its free exercise
must be protected especially against the purchasing power of the peso. As we succinctly held in
People v. San Juan,[if !supportFootnotes][16][endif] "each time the enfranchised citizen goes to the polls to
assert this sovereign will, that abiding credo of republicanism is translated into living reality. If that
will must remain undefiled at the starting level of its expression and application, every assumption
must be indulged in and every guarantee adopted to assure the unmolested exercise of the
citizen's free choice. For to impede, without authority valid in law, the free and orderly exercise of
the right of suffrage, is to inflict the ultimate indignity on the democratic process."
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the resolution of the respondent COMELEC en banc dated October
23, 1995 is affirmed with the modification that petitioner Edgardo C. Nolasco is adjudged as Mayor
of Meycauyan, Bulacan in view of the disqualification of Florentino P. Blanco. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-46863
November 18, 1939
IRINEO MOYA, petitioner,
vs.
AGRIPINO GA. DEL FIERO, respondent.
Elpidio Quirino for petitioner.Claro M. Recto for respondent.
LAUREL, J.:
This is a petition for review by certiorari of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in the above
entitled case declaring the respondent, Agripino Ga. del Fierro, the candidate-elect for the office of
mayor of the municipality of Paracale, Province of Camarines Norte, with a majority of three votes
over his rival, Irineo Moya. In the general elections held on December 14, 1937, the parties herein
were contending candidates for the aforesaid office. After canvass of the returns the municipal
council of Paracale, acting as board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as the elected mayor
of said municipality with a majority of 102 votes. On December 27, 1937, the respondent field a
motion of protest in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, the Court of Appeals, on July
13, 1939 rendered the judgment hereinbefore mentioned which is sought by the petitioner to be
reviewed and reversed upon the errors alleged to have been committed by the Court of Appeals:
1. In admitting and counting in favor of the respondent, 8 ballots either inadvertently or contrary to
the controlling decisions of this Honorable Court.
2. In admitting and counting in favor of the respondent, 3 ballots marked "R. del Fierro."
3. In admitting and counting in favor of the respondent, 7 ballots marked "Rufino del Firro."
4. In admitting and counting in favor of the respondent, 72 ballots marked "P. del Fierro."
Taking up seriatim the alleged errors, we come to the first assignment involving the eight (8) ballots
now to be mentioned. (1) With reference to ballot Exhibit F-175 in precinct No. 2, alleged to have
been inadvertently admitted in favor of the respondent, such inadvertence raises a question of fact
which could have been corrected by the Court of Appeals and which could we are not in a position
to determine in this proceeding for review by certiorari. Upon the other hand, if the error attributed
to the Court of Appeals consisted in having admitted ballot Exhibit F-175 in precinct No. 2 instead
of the ballot bearing the same number corresponding to precinct No. 1, and this latter ballot clearly
appears admissible for the respondent because the name written on the space for mayor is "Primo
del Fierro" or "Pimo de Fierro", the error is technical and deserves but scanty consideration. (2)
Ballot Exhibit F-26 in precinct No. 3 was erroneously admitted for the respondent by the Court of
Appeals, the name written on the space for mayor being "G.T. Krandes." It is true that on the fourth
line for the councilor "Alcalde Pinong del Fierro": appears; but the intention of the elector is
rendered vague and incapable of ascertaining and the ballot was improperly counted for the
respondent. As to this ballot, the contention of the petitioner is sustained (3) Ballot Exhibit F-77 in
precinct No. 2 should also have been rejected by the Court of Appeals. The ballot bears the
distinguishing mark "O. K." placed after the name "M. Lopis" written on space for vice-mayor. The
contention of the petitioner in this respect is likewise sustained. (4) Ballot Exhibit F-9 in precinct
No. 2 was properly admitted for respondent. On this ballot the elector wrote within the space for
mayor the name of Regino Guinto, a candidate for the provincial board and wrote the respondent's
name immediately below the line for mayor but immediately above the name "M. Lopez" voted by
him for vice-mayor. The intention of the elector to vote for the respondent for the office of the
mayor is clear under the circumstances. (5) Ballot F-131 in precinct No. 1 was also properly
counted for the respondent. On this ballot the elector wrote the respondent's name on the space
for vice-mayor, but, apparently realizing his mistake, he placed an arrow connecting the name of
the respondent to the word "Mayor" (Alcalde) printed on the left side of the ballot. The intention of
the elector to vote for the respondent for the office of mayor is thus evident, in the absence of proof
showing that the ballot had been tampered with. (6) Ballot F-7 in precinct No. 5 is admissible for
the respondent and the Court of Appeals committed no error in so adjudicating. Although the name
of the respondent is written on the first space for member of the provincial board, said name is
followed in the next line by "Bice" Culastico Palma, which latter name is followed in the next line by
word "consehal" and the name of a candidate for this position. The intention of the elector to vote
for the respondent for the office of mayor being manifest, the objection of the petitioner to the
admission of this ballot is overruled. (7) Ballot F-1 in precinct No. 2 is valid for the respondent. On
this ballot the Christian name of the respondent was written on the second space for member of
the provincial board, but his surname was written on the proper space for mayor with no other
accompanying name or names. The intention of the elector being manifest, the same should be
given effect in favor of the respondent. (8) Ballot F-44 in precinct No. 2 wherein "Agripino F.

Garcia" appears written on the proper space, is valid for the respondent. In his certificate of
candidacy the respondent gave his name as "Agripino Ga. del Fierro." The conclusion of the trial
court, upheld by the Court of Appeals, that the letter "F" stands for "Fierro" and "Garcia" for the
contraction "Ga." is not without justification and, by liberal construction, the ballot in question was
properly admitted for the respondent.
The second error assigned by the petitioner refers to three ballots, namely, Exhibit F-119 in
precinct No. 1 Exhibit F-24 in precinct No. 2, and Exhibit F-6 in precinct No. 4. These three ballots
appear to be among the 75 ballots found by the Court of Appeals as acceptable for the respondent
on the ground that the initial letter "P" stands for "Pino" in "Pino del Fierro" which is a name
mentioned in the certificate of candidacy of the respondent. The petitioner contends that the initial
"R" and not "P". Even if we could reverse this finding, we do not feel justified in doing so after
examining the photostatic copies of these ballots attached to the herein petition for certiorari. The
second assignment of error is accordingly overruled.
Upon the third assignment of error, the petitioner questions the correctness of the judgment of the
Court of Appeals in adjudicating to the respondent the seven ballots wherein "Rufino del Fierro"
was voted for the office of mayor. We are of the opinion that the position taken by the Court of
Appeals is correct. There was no other candidate for the office of mayor with the name of "Rufino"
or similar name and, as the respondent was districtly identified by his surname on these ballots,
the intention of the voters in preparing the same was undoubtedly to vote for the respondent of the
office for which he was a candidate.lawphi1.net
The fourth assignment of error deals with the 72 ballots wherein "P. del Fierro" was voted for the
office of mayor, and it is the contention of the petitioner that said ballots should not have been
counted by the Court of Appeals in favor of the respondent. For the identical reason indicated
under the discussion of petitioner's second assignment of error, namely, that "P" stands for "Pino"
in "Pino del Fierro" which is a name mentioned in the certificate of candidacy of the respondent,
we hold that there was no error in the action of the Court of Appeals in awarding the said ballots to
the respondent.
With the exception of ballot marked as Exhibit F-26 in precinct No. 3 and ballot marked as Exhibit
F-77 in precinct No. 2, we are inclined to accept the rest of the disputed ballots for the respondent
not only for the specific reasons already given but also and principally for the more fundamental
reason now to be stated. As long as popular government is an end to be achieved and
safeguarded, suffrage, whatever may be the modality and form devised, must continue to be the
manes by which the great reservoir of power must be emptied into the receptacular agencies
wrought by the people through their Constitution in the interest of good government and the
common weal. Republicanism, in so far as it implies the adoption of a representative type of
government, necessarily points to the enfranchised citizen as a particle of popular sovereignty and
as the ultimate source of the established authority. He has a voice in his Government and
whenever called upon to act in justifiable cases, to give it efficacy and not to stifle it. This,
fundamentally, is the reason for the rule that ballots should be read and appreciated, if not with
utmost, with reasonable, liberality. Counsel for both parties have called our attention to the
different and divergent rules laid down by this Court on the appreciation of ballots. It will serve no
good and useful purpose for us to engage in the task of reconciliation or harmonization of these
rules, although this may perhaps be undertaken, as no two cases will be found to be exactly the
same in factual or legal environment. It is sufficient to observe, however, in this connection that
whatever might have been said in cases heretofore decided, no technical rule or rules should be
permitted to defeat the intention of the voter, if that intention is discoverable from the ballot itself,
not from evidence aliunde. This rule of interpretation goes to the very root of the system.
Rationally, also, this must be the justification for the suggested liberalization of the rules on
appreciation of ballots which are now incorporated in section 144 of the Election Code
(Commonwealth Act No. 357).
It results that, crediting the petitioner with the two ballots herein held to have been erroneously
admitted by the Court of Appeals for the respondent, the latter still wins by one vote. In view
whereof it becomes unnecessary to consider the counter-assignment of errors of the respondent.
With the modification of the decision of the Court of Appeals, the petition for the writ of certiorari is
hereby dismissed, without pronouncement regarding costs.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-33541 January 20, 1972
ABDULGAFAR PUNGUTAN, petitioner,
vs.
BENJAMIN ABUBAKAR, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF
CANVASSERS OF SULU. respondents.
Jose W. Diokno and Manuel M. Gonzales for petitioner.
Salonga, Ordoez, Yap, Sicat and Associates for respondent Benjamin Abubakar.
Teao, Garcia and Apostol for respondent COMELEC, etc.
FERNANDO, J.:p
The resolution of respondent Comelec 1 now assailed in this petition for review, was undoubtedly
motivated by the objective of insuring free, orderly and honest elections in the discharge of its
constitutional function to enforce and administer electoral laws. 2 It excluded from the canvass for
the election of delegates for the lone district of the province of Sulu the returns from 107 precincts
of Siasi, 56 precincts of Tapul, 67 precincts of Parang and 60 precincts of Luuk for being spurious
or manufactured and therefore no returns at all. Unless set aside then, petitioner Abdulgafar
Pungutan, who otherwise would have been entitled to the last remaining seat for delegates to the
Constitutional Convention, there being no question as to the election of the other two delegates, 3
would lose out to respondent Benjamin Abubakar. Petitioner would thus dispute the power of
respondent Commission to exclude such returns as a result of oral testimony as well as the
examination of the fingerprints and signatures of those who allegedly voted as the basis for the
holding that no election in fact did take place. This contention is, however, unavailing, in the light of
our holding last month in Usman v. Comelec. 4 The other principal question raised is whether the
recognition of such prerogative on the part of respondent Commission would contravene the
constitutional provision that it cannot pass on the right to vote. The appropriate answer as will be
made clear is likewise adverse to petitioner. Hence, respondent Commission must be sustained.
The case had its origin from a petition filed on December 16, 1970, by respondent Abubakar and
the other candidates, 5 superseding an earlier one dated December 7, 1970 alleging that in the
towns of Siasi, Tapul, Parang and Luuk, no elections were in effect held in view of massive
violence, terrorism and fraud. 6 The respondents named therein, including now petitioner
Pungutan, answered on December 18, 1970 to the effect that the elections were duly held in the
above-mentioned municipalities and denied the allegation as to the existence of massive fraud,
terrorism and serious irregularities. The case was duly heard, with oral testimony from five
chairmen of certain precincts in Tapul, five teachers from Parang, five teachers from Luuk and
three teachers from Siasi, followed by an examination of the precinct book of voters from said
towns and the fingerprints and signatures of those who voted, as shown at the back of CE Form
No. 1 and CE Form No. 39 for the 1970 elections for the Constitutional Convention.
After reciting the relevant facts, respondent Commission came to this conclusion: "In the light of
the foregoing findings of the Commission with respect to the manner in which the elections were
conducted in Siasi, Tapul, Parang and Luuk, the Commission is of the opinion that the elections in
said municipalities were just as bad if not worse than the elections in Karomatan, Lanao del Norte.
Actually no elections were held in said municipalities as the voting was done by persons other than
the registered voters while armed men went from precinct to precinct, prepared the ballots and
dictated how the election returns were to be prepared. The same reasons which compelled the
Commission to reject the returns from Karomatan and to consider said returns as no returns at all
or spurious or manufactured returns not one notch above returns prepared at gunpoint (again
paraphrasing in the reverse the second Pacis case) compel us with much greater justification to
find that the returns from Siasi, Tapul, Parang and Luuk are spurious returns or manufactured
returns and no returns at all and that the elections in said municipalities are sham." 7 The above
findings of fact found support in the light of the competent and credible evidence sustaining that
the most flagrant irregularities did attend the so-called elections in Siasi, Tapul, Parang and Luuk.
As to Siasi: "In Siasi where there were 21,688 registered voters it was made to appear that 20,970
had voted. However, the result of the examination of the thumbmarks and signatures of those who
voted compared with the fingerprints of the registered voters appearing in their registration record,
CE Form 1 showed that only 460 of the registered voters had been definitely established to have
actually voted, 131 identified through the thumbmarks and 329 by their signatures. The 11,154 of
those who voted were found to be substitute voters: 7,557 were discovered to be voters voting in
substitution of the registered voters through their thumbmarks and 3,597 through their signatures.

No opinion was made with respect to the rest of the votes cast because not all of the 13,282 voters
whose thumbprints could not be analyzed were referred to the NBI for signature examination. Only
4,631 of these blurred thumbprints from 28 precincts were referred to the NBI for signature
examination. Examination of these 4,631 signatures revealed that 3,597 were by persons other
than the registered voters, only 329 were by the register voters and no opinion could be rendered
with respect to 705 for lack of sufficient basis of comparison. In 26 precincts of Siasi there was
100% voting but not necessarily by the registered voters. The overall average for the whole town is
96.6% voting. There were 80 persons who were able to vote without any CE Form 1 or without
voting in the name of the voters registered in the precinct." 8
With respect to Tapul: "In Tapul where there were 12,223 registered voters it appeared that 11,575
votes were cast. 197 persons were able to vote without CE Form No. 1 without using the names of
registered voters in the precinct. When the thumbprints corresponding to the 11,575 votes cast
were examined by the Fingerprint Identification Division of the Commission, only 3 were found to
be identical with the thumbprints of the registered voters in their registration record: one each in
Precincts 8, 29 and 20-A. 5,300 thumbmarks were found to be not identical with the corresponding
thumbmarks of the registered voters in their registration records, CE Form 1. 6,199 thumbmarks,
however, could not be analyzed because they were blurred, smudged or faint. Of these 6,199
blurred thumbprints from 56 precincts, 4,187 from 31 precincts were referred to the NBI
handwriting experts for signature examination. The result of said examination by the NBI of these
4,187 signatures showed that only 13 were found to be identical with the signatures of the
registered voters in their registration record, CE Form 1, while 2,897 were those of persons other
than the registered voters. No opinion could be rendered on 1,277 signatures for lack of sufficient
basis of comparison." 9 Further: "It appeared, therefore, that in the whole town of Tapul out of the
11,575 votes cast only 13 were definitely established as cast by the registered voters. 8,197 were
definitely established as cast by substitute voters. No opinion could be rendered with respect to
1,277 for lack of sufficient basis, 2,012 were not examined anymore since these were in precincts
where the number of substitute voting had been found to constitute a very high percentage. It has
been also established that on Election Day about one hundred men armed with long arms were
seen going around from precinct to precinct in Tapul driving away the voters and instructing the
teachers-inspectors on how to prepare the election returns. Some of the ballot boxes were seen to
have been brought to the Municipal Treasurer's office early in the afternoon of Election Day hours
before the closing of voting. Nineteen (19) precincts of Tapul reported 100% voting while the overall percentage of voting in the whole municipality was 94.5%." 10
Then came the recital as to Parang: "In Parang, where there were 11,761 registered voters in 67
precincts, it was made to appear that 11,083 votes were cast. 66 voters who were not registered in
the precinct were able to vote illegally without even using the names of the registered voters
therein. An examination of the thumbprints of those who voted appearing in CE Form 39 or at the
back of CE Form 1 compared with the corresponding thumbprints of the registered voters
appearing in their registration record in CE Form 1 showed that only 39 thumbprints of the
registered voters in his CE Form 1, while 4,698 were different from those of the registered voters.
6,539 thumbmarks could not be analyzed because they were blurred, smudged or faint. However,
only 2,647 of these 6,539 smudged thumbprints were referred to the NBI for signature examination
since the rest of said blurred thumbmarks were in precincts where a high percentage of nonidentical thumbmarks was already discovered. 1,573 signatures were found to be by persons other
than the registered voters and only 83 were found to be identical with those of the registered
voters. No opinion could be rendered with respect to 991 signatures for lack of sufficient basis. In
20 precincts it was made to appear that all the registered voters had voted. The overall percentage
for the whole town of Parang was 94%. The evidence also showed that in a number of precincts in
Parang armed men had entered the polling places and prepared the ballots. The registered voters
were not able to vote." 11 Lastly, as to Luuk: "In Luuk where there were 13,124 registered voters,
12,263 votes were cast. 281 persons who were not registered voters in this precinct were able to
vote illegally without even using the names of the registered voters. The thumbprints of those who
voted appearing in their voting record either in CE Form 1 or in CE Form 39 compared with the
thumbprints of the registered voters appearing in the voter's registration record in CE Form 1
showed that only 22 of the thumbmarks of those who voted were identical with the thumbmarks of
the registered voters, while 6,021 were found to be different from those of the registered voters.
6,134 thumbmarks could not, however, be analyzed because they were found to be blurred,
smudged or faint. However, the signatures of those who voted in 13 precincts were examined by
the NBI and it was found that the said signatures were written by just a few persons as explained
with greater particularity in the earlier pages of this resolution." 12

In the light of the above and finding no need to determine how the election was in fact conducted
as to Pata, Patikul, Indanan, Panamao, South Ubian, Balimbing, Bongao and Tandubas, it was the
holding of the Commission in the resolution of May 14, 1971: "1. To rule by unanimous vote that
the returns from the 107 precincts of Siasi, 56 precincts of Tapul, 67 precincts of Parang and 60
precincts of Luuk are spurious and/or manufactured returns or no returns at all and as such should
be excluded from the canvass for the election of delegates for the lone congressional district of the
province of Sulu; 2. To hold also by unanimous vote that further hearings on the petition of
[Benjamin Abubakar, et al] for the rejection or exclusion from the canvass of the returns from
Indanan, Panamao, Pata, Tandubas South Ubian, Patikul, Bongao and Balimbing would no longer
be necessary, it appearing that the results of the election would no longer be affected by the
returns from said municipalities after the rejection of the returns from the four towns of Siasi, Tapul,
Parang and Luuk and, therefore, for the purpose of the completion of the canvass, to direct the
Board of Canvassers to include the returns from said municipalities in the canvass; 3. By majority
vote of the members of the Commission to direct the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sulu to
reconvene in Jolo and complete the canvass excluding from said canvass the returns from the
towns of Siasi, Parang, Tapul, and Luuk and to proclaim the 3rd winning candidate at 5:00 P.M. on
May 28, 1971, unless restrained by the Supreme Court." 13 On May 22, 1971, this petition for the
review of the above resolution of May 14, 1971 of respondent Commission was filed. Three days
later, a resolution was adopted by this Court requiring respondents to file an answer not later than
June 4, 1971. Both respondent Commission on Elections and respondent Abubakar duly filed their
answers on said date. Respondent Commission took pains to explain with even more detail why
such a resolution had to be issued considering the "massive voting anomalies ranging from
substitute voting to grabbing of ballots to preparation of election returns and other election
documents at gunpoint" thus justifying its conclusion that the elections in the four towns amounted
to a sham. The case was heard on June 8, 1971 with petitioner Pungutan represented by Attorney
Jose W. Diokno. Respondent Abubakar, represented by Attorney Jovito R. Salonga, sought
permission to submit a memorandum, which was received by this Court on June 28, 1971.
Petitioner was given the opportunity to reply thereto, and he did so in his memorandum filed with
this Court on October 18, 1971. The case was deemed submitted on December 3, 1971. It is the
decision of this Court, as noted at the outset, after a careful study of the pleadings and in the light
of our decision last month in Usman v. Commission on Elections 14 that the challenged resolution
of respondent Commission of May 14, 1971 is in accordance with law. The petition must therefore
fail.
1. There is no merit to the contention that respondent Commission is devoid of power to disregard
and annul the alleged returns from 107 precincts of Siasi, 56 precincts of Tapul, 67 precincts of
Parang and 60 precincts of Luuk for being spurious or manufactured. So we have held on facts
analogous in character in the above Usman decision rendered last month. Nor is it to be wondered
at. Any other view would indict itself for lack of fealty to reason and to the realities of the situation.
It goes without saying that what is contemplated in the law is that the electors in the exercise of
their free will can go to the polls and exercise their right of suffrage, with the boards of inspectors
crediting each candidate with the votes duly obtained after an honest count. It is on that basis that
election returns are to be made. Where no such election was in fact held as was found by
respondent Commission with respect to the four towns, it is not only justified but it is its clear duty
to stigmatize the alleged returns as clearly spurious and manufactured and therefore bereft of any
value. The words of Justice Castro, in the Usman decision, referring to the election returns from
Karomatan, considered as likewise not entitled to credit because of their lack of integrity and
authenticity, are opposite: "These circumstances definitely point, not merely to a few isolated
instances of irregularities affecting the integrity and authenticity of the election returns, but to an
organized, well-directed large-scale operation to make a mockery of the elections in Karomatan.
We find and so hold that the election returns from the 42 precincts in question were prepared
under circumstances conclusively showing that they are false, and are so devoid of value as to be
completely unworthy of inclusion in the canvass. We have no alternative but to affirm the
Comelec's finding that they are spurious and manufactured." 15 Nor is it to be lost sight of that the
power to reject returns of such a character has been exercised most judiciously. Even a cursory
perusal of the mode and manner of inquiry conducted by respondent Commission resulting in the
challenged resolution should suffice to remove any doubt as to the absence of any impropriety or
improvidence in the exercise of such a prerogative. Clearly, there was care and circumspection to
assure that the constitutional objective of insuring that an election be "free, orderly and honest" be
realized. If, under the circumstances disclosed, a different conclusion were arrived at, then
certainly there is a frustration of such an ideal. Moreover, this Court has not displayed any

reluctance in yielding the imprimatur of its approval to the action taken by respondent Commission
in the discharge of its constitutional function of the enforcement of all laws relative to the conduct
of elections. The long line of decisions especially so since Cauton v. Commission on Elections, 16 is
not susceptible of any other interpretation. Only thus may there be an assurance that the
canvassing and proclamation reflect with fidelity and accuracy the true results of an election, in fact
actually held. We do so again. As a matter of fact, such a sympathetic approach to the results
arrived at in the discharge of its functions started with the leading case of Sumulong v.
Commission on Elections. 17 As was so well put by Justice, later Chief Justice, Abad Santos: "The
Commission on Elections is a constitutional body. It is intended to play a distinct and important part
in our scheme of government. In the discharge of its functions, it should not be hampered with
restrictions that would be fully warranted in the case of a less responsible organization. The
Commission may err, so may this Court also. It should be allowed considerable latitude in devising
means and methods that will insure the accomplishment of the great objective for which it was
created -- free, orderly and honest elections. We may not agree fully with its choice of means, but
unless these are clearly illegal or constitute gross abuse of discretion, this court should not
interfere." 18 The same approach is reflected in the opinion of the Chief Justice in Lucman v.
Dimaporo when as he pointed out if "pursuant to our Administrative Law, the findings of fact of
administrative organs created by ordinary legislation will not be disturbed by courts of justice,
except when there is absolutely no evidence or no substantial evidence in support of such
findings ... there is no reason to believe that the framers of our Constitution intended to place the
Commission on Elections created and explicitly made 'independent' by the Constitution itself
on a lower level than said statutory administrative organs; ... ." 19
2. The right to vote has reference to a constitutional guarantee of the utmost significance. It is a
right without which the principle of sovereignty residing in the people becomes nugatory. 20 In the
traditional terminology, it is a political right enabling every citizen to participate in the process of
government to assure that it derives its power from the consent of the governed. What was so
eloquently expressed by Justice Laurel comes to mind: "As long as popular government is an end
to be achieved and safeguarded, suffrage, whatever may be the modality and form devised, must
continue to be the means by which the great reservoir of power must be emptied into the
receptacular agencies wrought by the people through their Constitution in the interest of good
government and the common weal. Republicanism, in so far as it implies the adoption of a
representative type of government, necessarily points to the enfranchised citizen as a particle of
popular sovereignty and as the ultimate source of the established authority." 21
How such a right is to be exercised is regulated by the Election Code. 22 Its enforcement under the
Constitution is, as noted, vested in respondent Commission. Such a power, however, is purely
executive or administrative. So it was characterized by the Chief Justice in Abcede v. Imperial: 23
"Lastly, as the branch of the executive department although independent of the President to
which the Constitution has given the 'exclusive charge' of the 'enforcement and administration of
all laws relative to the conduct of elections,' the power of decision of the Commission is limited to
purely 'administrative questions.' ...."
It becomes obvious then why the right to vote, a denial of which should find redress in the judiciary
as the guardian of constitutional rights, is excluded from the authority vested in respondent
Commission. If the exclusion of the returns from the four towns in Sulu involved a question as to
such a right, then, clearly, what the Commission did was beyond its competence. Such is not the
case however. What is deemed outside such a sphere is the determination of whether or not a
person can exercise or is precluded from exercising the right of suffrage. Thus, the question of
inclusion or exclusion from the list of voters is properly judicial. 24 As to whether or not an election
has been held is a question of a different type. It is properly within the administrative jurisdiction of
respondent Commission. If, as is our decision, no such voting did take place, considering the
massive irregularities that attended it in the four towns, then the exclusion of the alleged returns is
not tainted by infirmity. In that sense, the second issue raised by petitioner that in so acting the
respondent Commission exceeded its constitutional power by encroaching on terrain properly
judicial, the right to vote being involved, is likewise to be resolved against him. At any rate, what
was set forth by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Diaz v. Commission on Elections 25 would likewise dispose
of such a contention adverse to petitioner. Thus: "It is pleaded by respondents that the rejection of
the Sagada returns would result in the disfranchisement of a large number of legitimate voters. But
such disfranchisement would only be provisional, subject to the final determination of the validity of
the votes at the protest that may be filed with the Constitutional Convention." 26
3. As to the plea in the prayer of the petition that in the event that the challenged resolution of May
14, 1971 as to the power of respondent Commission is sustained, a special election be called by it

in all the 290 precincts in the four municipalities of Siasi, Tapul, Parang and Luuk, it suffices to
refer to our ruling in Usman v. Commission on Elections, where a similar point was raised without
success. So it should be in this case. We see no reason to order such a special election. 27
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed and the resolution of the Commission on Elections dated
May 14, 1971 is affirmed. The Commission on Elections is directed to order the board of
canvassers to convene without delay and forthwith proceed with and complete the canvass of the
election returns from all the precincts of Sulu, excluding therefrom all the election returns from 107
precincts of Siasi, 56 precincts of Tapul, 67 precincts of Parang and 60 precincts of Luuk, and
thereafter proclaim the winning candidate for the third Constitutional Convention seat allotted to
the said province. This decision is hereby declared immediately executory. No pronouncement as
to costs.

EN BANC
February 27, 1969
G.R. No. L-29333
MARIANO LL. BADELLES, protestant-appellant,
vs.
CAMILO P. CABILI, protegee-appellee.
G.R. No. L-29334
BONIFACIO P. LEGASPI and CECILIO T. BARAZON protestants-appellants,
vs.
FELIX Z. ACTUB, PROVIDENCIO P. ABRAGAN, MANUEL F. CELDRAN, CASIMERO P.
CABIGON and BENITO ONG, protestees-appellees.
Bonifacio P. Legaspi for and in his own behalf. Camilo P. Cabili. Gerardo B. Padilla and Ignacio
Espaol and Voltaire I. Roviro for protestees-appellees.
FERNANDO, J.:
Two election protests against the duly proclaimed Mayor and Councilors of Iligan City, after the
Nov. 14, 1967 elections, based on the allegations of flagrant violations of certain mandatory
provisions of the Election Code, to be more specifically set forth hereafter, were dismissed in a
single order by the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte, the Honorable Teodulo C. Tandayag
presiding. The cases are now before us on appeal.
In one of them,[[1]] the election of Honorable Camilo P. Cabili to the Office of City Mayor of Iligan
City, was contested by protestant, now appellant, Mariano Badelles. In the other,[[2]] the
protestants are the now appellants, Bonifacio P. Legaspi and Cecilia T. Barazon who along with the
five protestees[[3]] were among those who were registered candidates voted for in such election
for councilors in the City of Iligan, with the protestees being credited with the five highest number
of votes, with protestants Legaspi and Barazon obtaining sixth and seventh places, respectively.
In such order of dismissal, it was admitted that while irregularities as well as misconduct on the
part of election officers were alleged in the election protests filed, there was however an absence
of an allegation that they would change the result of the election in favor of the protestants and
against the protestees, that such irregularities would destroy the secrecy and integrity of the ballots
cast, or that the protestees knew of or participated in the commission thereof. For the lower court
then, the lack of a cause of action was rather evident.
Hence the order of dismissal of March 23, 1968, which was sought to be fortified by the invocation
of the doctrines that voters should not be deprived of their right to vote occasioned by the failure of
the election officials to comply with the formal prerequisites to the exercise of the right of suffrage
and that the rules and regulations for the conduct of elections while mandatory before the voting
should be considered directory thereafter. The validity of such order of dismissal is now to be
inquired into by us in this appeal.
In the petition of protestant Badelles, dated December 8, 1967, and marked as received the next
day by the Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte, 15th Judicial District, it
was stated that both he and protestee Camilo P. Cabili were the duly registered candidates for the
Office of City Mayor of Iligan City, both having filed their respective certificates of candidacy in
accordance with law and as such candidates voted for in the November 14, 1967 election. It was
then alleged that the Board of Canvassers, on November 25, 1967, proclaimed as elected
protestee for having obtained 11,310 votes while protestant was credited with 8,966 votes.
Protestant would impugn the election of Cabili on the ground that there were "flagrant violation of
mandatory provisions of law relating to or governing elections ...." in that more than 200 voters
were registered per precinct contrary to the provision limiting such number of 200 only and that no
publication of the list of voters for each precinct was made up to the election day itself, enabling
persons who under the law could not vote being allowed to do so. As a result of such alleged
"flagrant violations of the laws relation to or governing elections" around 8,300 individuals were
allowed to vote illegally.
It was likewise asserted that not less than 8,000 qualified voters were unable to exercise their right
of suffrage in view of their failure, without any fault on their part, to have the proper identification
cards or the non-listing of their names in the list of voters. It was stated further that even in the
case of those individuals provided with identification cards with their names included in the list of
voters, they could not avail themselves of their right of suffrage as their applications for registration
could not be found. Mention was also made of the fact that the final lists of voters and the
applications for registration were delivered to their respective precincts late on election day itself
thus preventing them from voting. Moreover, confusion, so it was alleged, was caused by the
excessive number of voters being listed and many having been assigned to precincts other than

the correct ones.

What was thus objected to is the fact that illegal votes were cast by those not qualified to do so,
numbering 8,300 or more and that an approximately equal number, who were duly registered with
the Commission on Elections, Iligan City, were unable to vote due to the above circumstances.
The proclamation then could not have reflected the true will of the electorate as to who was the
mayor elected, as the majority of protestee Cabili over the protestant consisted of only 2,344
votes.
The prayer was among others for the proclamation of protestee as well as other candidates for
elective positions in the City of Iligan being set aside and declared null and void, protestant
pleading further that he be granted other such relief as may be warranted in law and equity.
The protest of the candidates for councilor Legaspi and Barazon in the other case against
protestees[[4]] was in substance similarly worded. The prayer was for the setting aside and
declaring null and void the proclamation of protestees with protestants seeking such other relief
which should be theirs according to law and to equity.
In the first case, protestee Cabili moved to dismiss the petition on the following grounds: "1. That
the protest was filed beyond the reglementary period allowed by the Revised Election Code; 2.
That [the lower court] has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the present case, the
Commission on Elections being the proper body to hear the same; 3. That the complaint states no
cause of action."[[5]] This very same grounds were relied upon in a motion to dismiss by
protestees Actub and Cabigon, filed in the other suit.
As above noted, in a single order of March 23, 1968, the two above election protests were
dismissed, the lower court being of the opinion that neither petition alleged a cause of action "to
justify [it] to try the same." The first ground of the motion to dismiss to the effect that the protests in
both cases were filed beyond the reglementary period was rejected. The claim as to lack of
jurisdiction was likewise held to be without merit. The single order of dismissal in both cases as
indicated was based on the lack of a cause of action.
The reasoning followed by the lower court in reaching the above conclusion that there was no
cause of action, proceeded along these lines: "Mere irregularities or misconduct on the part of
election officers which do not tend to affect the result of the elections are not of themselves either
ground for contest or for proper matters of inquiry... There is no allegation in the protest that the
alleged irregularities committed by the election officers would tend to change the result of the
election in favor of the protestants and against the protestees. There is no allegation in the petition
that the 8,000 voters who failed to vote were all voters of protestants and the 8,300 illegal voters
who voted were for the protestees. There is, therefore, no legal and practical justification for the
court to inquire into the irregularities committed by the election officials, as alleged in the petition,
for it would not give any benefit in favor of the protestants to the end that they will be declared the
duly elected mayor and councilors, respectively, of this City."[[6]]
It was further stated in such order of dismissal: "There is no allegation in the petition that the
irregularities committed by the election officials have destroyed the secrecy and integrity of the
ballots cast. There is no allegation in the petition that the non-compliance of the election officials of
the provisions of the election laws regarding the registration of voters were intentional on their part
for the purpose of committing frauds for the benefit of the protestees. There is no allegation in the
petition that because of the alleged irregularities committed by the election officials in not following
the provisions of the election laws regarding the registration of voters and the distribution of the
precincts, that all the votes cast during said elections are illegal, nor is there an allegation in the
protests that the irregularities committed by the election officials would affect the election in favor
of the protestees."[[7]]
A greater regard for the cause of accuracy ought to have admonished the lower court from
asserting in an uncompromising tone the absence of an allegation that the protestants in both
cases failed to allege that if the facts pleaded by them were proved the result would not have been
different. It is true the complaints could have been more explicitly worded, but as they stood, the
absence of such a claim could not be so confidently asserted.
To repeat, both protests were dismissed. We do not discount a certain degree of plausibility
attaching to the line of reasoning thus pursued by the lower court. We are not unaware of the
undeniable fact that both petitions were not distinguished by skill in their drafting or precision in
their terminology. Nonetheless the seriousness and gravity of the imputed failure to have the
elections conducted freely and honestly, with such irregularities alleged, give rise to doubts,
rational and honest, as to who were the duly elected officials. Such allegations, it is to be stressed,
would have to be accepted at their face value for the purpose of determining whether there is a
cause of action, a motion to dismiss amounting to a hypothetical admission of facts thus pleaded.

We cannot in law and in conscience then sustain the order of dismissal.

Without the lower court having so intended, the dismissal would amount to judicial abnegation of a
sworn duty to inquire into and pass upon in an appropriate proceeding allegations of misconduct
and misdeeds of such character. Accordingly, we reverse.
Abes v. Commission on Elections[[8]] points the way, but the lower court was apparently
impervious to its teaching. It may not be controlling, but it furnishes more than a hint. It would
seem, though, that for the court below, its message did not ring out loud and clear.
The opinion in the Abes case, penned by Justice Sanchez, starts thus: "Petitioner's cry for relief,
so their petition avers, is planted upon the constitutional mandate of free, orderly, and honest
elections. Specifically, they list a number of repressible acts." Among those mentioned were that
blank official registration forms were taken from the office of the Quezon City Comelec Register
several weeks before election day, November 14, 1967; that active campaigning within the polling
places by Nacionalista leaders or sympathizers of Nacionalista candidates were allowed; that
voters were permitted to vote on mere mimeographed notices of certain Nacionalista candidates;
that voters were compelled to fill their official ballots on open tables, desks and in many precincts
outside the polling places; that thousands of voters sympathetic to the Nacionalista candidates
were allowed to vote beyond the hours for voting allowed by law; that identification cards were
delivered by partisan leaders of respondents Nacionalista candidates, and those who did not
signify their preference for Nacionalista candidates were not given such cards; that the precinct
books of voters were not sealed within the deadline fixed by law; and that the resulting effect of
irregularities was to prevent full fifty-one per cent of the registered voters from voting.
One of the issues raised on the above facts is whether or not the Commission on Elections could
annul the aforesaid election in Quezon City on the above allegations of fraud, terrorism and other
illegal practices committed before and during the election. The petition did not prosper; it was
dismissed. The remedy, we held, lay not with the Commission on Elections but with the courts of
justice in an election protest.
In the language of Justice Sanchez: "The boundaries of the forbidden area into which Comelec
may not tread are also marked by jurisprudence. That Comelec is not the proper forum to seek
annulment of an election based on terrorism, frauds and other illegal practices, is a principle
emphasized in decisions of this Court." For as announced in Nacionalista Party v. Commission on
Elections,[[9]] assuming that there be a failure to conduct an election in a free, orderly and honest
manner, "the duty to cure or remedy the resulting evil" did not rest with the Commission on
Elections but in "some other agencies of the Government." More specifically, with reference to
provincial and municipal officials, election contests "are entrusted to the courts." Then came this
express affirmation: "The power to decide election contests necessarily includes the power to
determine the validity or nullity of the votes questioned by either of the contestants." .
As so emphatically observed in the Abes opinion, "there has been neither deviation nor retreat
from the foregoing pronouncement." After which came the following: "The ratiocination advanced
that there was failure of election due to rampancy of terrorism, frauds, and other irregularities,
before and during elections, such that allegedly about 51% of the registered voters were not able
to vote, will not carry the day for petitioners. For, in the first place, this is grounded upon bare
assertions. Respondents contest the correctness thereof. And in the answer of respondents
Amoranto, Mathay and others, they aver that out of 162,457 registered voters in Quezon City,
100,382 voters actually cast their votes about 62% of the registered voters. But above all, as
pointed out in City Board of Canvassers vs. Moscoso, [the] nullity of an election for municipal
officials should be determined in a petition contesting the election of municipal officers-elect to be
filed before the Court of First Instance."
Why an election protest is more fitly and appropriately the procedure for determining whether
irregularities or serious violations of the electoral law vitiated the conduct of elections was clearly
and succinctly explained in the Moscoso decision above cited, the opinion coming from Justice
Makalintal. [[10]] Thus: "The question of whether or not there had been terrorism, vote-buying and
other irregularities in the 1959 elections in Tacloban City should be ventilated in a regular election
protest, pursuant to section 174 of the Election Code, and not in a petition to enjoin the city board
of canvassers from canvassing the election returns and proclaiming the winning candidates for
municipal offices."
It would follow then that if the grievance relied upon is the widespread irregularities and the
flagrant violations of the election law, the proper remedy is the one availed of here, the protest.
That such should be the case should occasion no surprise. Time and time again, [[11]] we have
stressed the importance of preserving inviolate the right of suffrage. If that right be disregarded or
frittered away, then popular sovereignty becomes a myth.

As Justice Laurel correctly pointed out: "As long as popular government is an end to be achieved
and safeguarded, suffrage, whatever may be the modality and form devised, must continue to be
the means by which the great reservoir of power must be emptied into the receptacular agencies
wrought by the people through their Constitution in the interest of good government and the
common weal. Republicanism, in so far as it implies the adoption of a representative type of
government, necessarily points to the enfranchised citizen as a particle of popular sovereignty and
as the ultimate source of the established authority." [[12]]
A republic then to be true to its name requires that the government rests on the consent of the
people, consent freely given, intelligently arrived at, honestly recorded, and thereafter counted.
Only thus can they be really looked upon as the ultimate sources of established authority. It is their
undeniable right to have officials of their unfettered choice. The election law has no justification
except as a means for assuring a free, honest and orderly expression of their views. It is of the
essence that corruption and irregularities should not be permitted to taint the electoral process.
It may not always be thus unfortunately. That should be the ideal however. If there be a failure to
observe the mandates of the Election Code, the aggrieved parties should not be left remediless.
Under the law as it stands, it is precisely an election protest that fitly serves that purpose.
It was sought to be thus utilized in these two cases, perhaps in a rather awkward and far from
entirely satisfactory manner. Than itself is no reason for the courts to slam the door against any
opportunity for redress. Yet, that is what would happen if the order of dismissal complained of were
not set aside.
Hence the inevitability of its reversal. The scope of our decision must not be misinterpreted
however. All that it directs is that the protetees in both cases be required to answer. Thereafter, if,
as is not unlikely, there be a denial of the serious imputations made as to the alleged irregularities,
the lower court could properly inquire into what actually transpired. After the facts are thus
ascertained in accordance with the accepted procedural rules, then the appropriate law could be
applied.
It must be clearly emphasized that we do not at this stage intimate any view as to the merit, or lack
of it, of either protest. That would be premature to say the least. All we do is to set aside the order
of dismissal.
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal of March 23, 1968, is reversed and the two cases remanded
to the lower court for proceeding and trial in accordance with this opinion and the law. Without
costs.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 104960 September 14, 1993

PHILIP G. ROMUALDEZ, petitioner,
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 7, TACLOBAN CITY, DONATO ADVINCULA, BOARD OF
ELECTION INSPECTORS, PRECINCT No. 9, MALBOG, TOLOSA, LEYTE, and the MUNICIPAL
REGISTRAR COMELEC, TOLOSA, LEYTE, respondents.
Otilia Dimayuga-Molo for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
VITUG, J.:
An event in this decade, which future generations would likely come to know simply as the "EDSA
People's Power Revolution of 1986," has dramatically changed the course of our nation's history.
So, too, not a few of our countrymen have by it been left alone in their own personal lives. One
such case is that of the petitioner in this special civil action for certiorari.
The petitioner is Philip Romualdez, a natural born citizen of the Philippines, the son of the former
Governor of Leyte, Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez, and nephew of the then First Lady Imelda
Marcos. Sometime in the early part of 1980, the petitioner, in consonance with his decision to
establish his legal residence at Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte, 1 caused the construction of his
residential house therein. He soon thereafter also served as Barangay Captain of the place. In the
1984 Batasan Election and 1986 "snap" Presidential Election, Romualdez acted as the Campaign
Manager of the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) in Leyte where he voted. 2
When the eventful days from the 21st to the 24th of February, 1986, came or were about to come
to a close, some relatives and associates of the deposed President, fearing for their personal
safety, whether founded or not, "fled" the country. Petitioner Romualdez, for one, together with his
immediate family, left the Philippines and sought "asylum" in the United States which the United
States (U.S.) government granted. 3 While abroad, he took special studies on the development of
Leyte-Samar and international business finance. 4
In the early part of 1987, Romualdez attempted to come back to the Philippines to run for a
congressional seat in Leyte. On 23 March 1987, he finally decided to book a flight back to the
Philippines but the flight was somehow aborted. 5
On 25 September 1991, Romualdez received a letter from Mr. Charles Cobb, District Director of
the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, informing him that he should depart from the U.S.
at his expense on or before 23 August 1992, thus:
. . . Failure to depart on or before the specified date may result in the withdrawal of voluntary
departure and action being taken to effect your deportation. In accordance with a decision made to
your case, you are required to depart from the United States at your expense on or before 23
August 1992. 6
Upon receipt of the letter, Romualdez departed from the U.S. for the Philippines, arriving on
December 1991 apparently without any government document. 7
When Romualdez arrived in the Philippines, he did not delay his return to his residence at Malbog,
Tolosa, Leyte. During the registration of voters conducted by the Commission on Election
("COMELEC") on 01 February 1992 for the Synchronized National and Local Election scheduled
for 11 May 1992, petitioner registered himself anew as a voter at Precinct No. 9 of Malbog, Tolosa,
Leyte. The chairman of the Board of Election Inspectors, who had known Romualdez to be a
resident of the place and, in fact, an elected Barangay Chairman of Malbog in 1982, allowed him to
be registered.
Romualdez's registration, however, was not to be unquestioned. On 21 February 1992, herein
private respondent Donato Advincula ("Advincula") filed a petition with the Municipal Trial Court of
Tolosa, Leyte, praying that Romualdez be excluded from the list of voters in Precinct No. 9 of
Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte, under BP 881 and RA 7166. 8 Advincula alleged that Romualdez was a
resident of Massachusetts, U.S.A.; that his profession and occupation was in the U.S.A.; that he
had just recently arrived in the Philippines; and that he did not have the required one-year
residence in the Philippines and the six-month residence in Tolosa to qualify him to register as a
voter in Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. 9
On 25 February 1992, Romualdez filed an answer, contending that he has been a resident of
Tolosa, Leyte, since the early 1980's, and that he has not abandoned his said residence by his
physical absence therefrom during the period from 1986 up to the third week of December 1991. 10
After due hearing, the Municipal Court of Tolosa, Leyte rendered a decision 11 on 28 February
1992, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE PREMISES CONSIDERED, the court finds the respondent to be a resident of Brgy.
Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte and qualified to register as a voter thereat. Hence, the instant petition for
exclusion of Philip G. Romualdez from the list of voter of Precinct No. 9, Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte is
hereby ordered DENIED and petition DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Upon receipt of the adverse decision, Advincula appealed the case to the respondent court.
On 03 April 1992, the respondent court rendered the assailed decision, 12 thus:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds respondent Philip Romualdez disqualified to register as a voter for
the 1992 elections and hereby reverses the decision of the lower court in toto.
The Municipal Registrar of the Commission on Elections of Tolosa, Leyte, is hereby ordered to
delete and cancel the name of respondent Philip G. Romualdez from the list of qualified voters
registered February 1, 1992, at Precinct 9, barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this recourse.
On 7 May 1992, this Court issued a temporary restraining order directing respondent Regional
Trial Court Judge Pedro Espino to cease and desist from enforcing questioned decision. 13
The petitioner has raised several issues which have been well synthesized by the Solicitor General
into
(1) Whether or not the MTC and RTC acquired jurisdiction over, respectively, Case No. 01-S. 1992
and Case No. 92-03-42, the petition having been filed by one who did not allege to be himself a
registered voter of the municipality concerned; and
(2) Whether or not the respondent court erred in finding the petitioner to have voluntarily left the
country and abandoned his residence in Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Anent the first issue, the petitioner assails for the first time the jurisdiction of the respondent Court
and the MTC of Tolosa, Leyte, in taking cognizance of the case, despite an absence of any
allegation in the petition filed with the MTC that Advincula was himself a registered voter in
Precinct No. 9 of Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte conformably with Section 142 of the Omnibus
Election Code. 14
When respondent Advincula filed the petition with the MTC for the exclusion of herein petitioner
Romualdez, the latter countered by filing his answer 15 and praying for the denial of the petition,
without raising the issue of jurisdiction. But what can be telling is that when the MTC decision,
denying the petition for disqualification, went on appeal to the RTC, Romualdez, in his own appealmemorandum, explicitly prayed that the MTC decision be affirmed. This unassailable incident
leads us to reiterate that "while lack of jurisdiction may be assailed at any stage, a party's active
participation in the proceedings before a court without jurisdiction will estop such party from
assailing such lack of jurisdiction." 16 Undoubtedly, the petitioner is now estopped from questioning
the jurisdiction of the respondent not only by his active participation in the proceedings thereat but,
more importantly, in having sought an affirmative relief himself when the appeal was made to the
latter court whose jurisdiction he, in effect, invoked. Furthermore, the question is not really as
much the jurisdiction of the courts below as merely the locus standi of the complainant in the
proceedings, a matter that, at this stage, should be considered foreclosed.
In any case, we consider primordial the second issue of whether or not Romualdez voluntarily left
the country and abandoned his residence in Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. Here, this time, we find for the
petitioner.
The Solicitor General himself sustains the view of petitioner Romualdez. Expressing surprise at
this stance given by the Solicitor General, respondent Advincula posits non sequitur argument 17 in
his comment assailing instead the person of Solicitor Edgar Chua. If it would have any value, at all,
in disabusing the minds of those concerned, it may well be to recall what this Court said in Rubio
vs. Sto. Tomas: 18
It is also incumbent upon the Office of the Solicitor General to present to the Court the position that
will legally uphold the best interest of the government, although it may run counter to a client's
position.
In election cases, the Court treats domicile and residence as synonymous terms, thus: "(t)he term
"residence" as used in the election law is synonymous with "domicile", which imports not only an
intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention." 19 "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when
absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. 20 That residence, in the
case of the petitioner, was established during the early 1980's to be at Barangay Malbog, Tolosa,
Leyte. Residence thus acquired, however, may be lost by adopting another choice of domicile. In

order, in turn, to acquire a new domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily
presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the
old domicile. 21 In other words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non
revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of
time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the
new domicile must be actual. 22
The political situation brought about by the "People's Power Revolution" must have truly caused
great apprehension to the Romualdezes, as well as a serious concern over the safety and welfare
of the members of their families. Their going into self-exile until conditions favorable to them would
have somehow stabilized is understandable. Certainly, their sudden departure from the country
cannot be described as "voluntary," or as "abandonment of residence" at least in the context that
these terms are used in applying the concept of "domicile by choice."
We have closely examined the records, and we find not that much to convince us that the
petitioner had, in fact, abandoned his residence in the Philippines and established his domicile
elsewhere.
It must be emphasized that the right to vote is a most precious political right, as well as a bounden
duty of every citizen, enabling and requiring him to participate in the process of government so as
to ensure that the government can truly be said to derive its power solely from the consent of the
governed. 23 We, therefore, must commend respondent Advincula for spending time and effort
even all the way up to this Court, for as the right of suffrage is not to be abridged, so also must we
safeguard and preserve it but only on behalf of those entitled and bound to exercise it.
WHEREFORE, finding merit on the petition the same is hereby GRANTED DUE COURSE; of the
Decision of the respondent Regional Trial Court dated 03 April 1992 is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE, and the Decision of the Municipal Trial Court dated 28 February 1992 is hereby
REINSTATED and the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court in this case is
correspondingly made PERMANENT. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. 74-MJ July 30, 1976

SALVADOR LACSON, JR., complainant,

vs.
RAMON POSADAS, Municipal Judge, of Talisay, Negros Occidental, respondent.
ANTONIO, J:
Respondent Municipal Judge Ramon Posadas, of Talisay Negros Occidental, is charged in a
verified complaint by Salvador Lacson, Jr. with (a) ignorance of the law, (b) partiality, and (c)
violation of the Election Code of 1971.
The Executive Judge, to whom this case was referred for investigation, report and
recommendation, found the charges of ignorance of the law and partiality to be without factual
basis. He, however, found that respondent Judge has failed to comply with the requirements of
Section 136 of the Election Code of 1971, which provides:
Any person who has been refused registration or whose name has been stricken out from the
permanent list of voters may at any time except sixty (60) days before a regular election or twentyfive (25) days before a special election, apply to the proper court for an order directing the election
registration board or the board of inspectors as the case may be, to include or reinstate his name
in the permanent list of voters, attaching to his application for inclusion the certificate of the
Electron registration board or the board of inspectors regarding his case and proof of service of a
copy of his application and of the notice of hearing thereof upon a member of the said board
(Emphasis supplied.)
In his report of July 17, 1972, the Investigating Judge stated:
Respondent disregarded this requirement and none of the petitions for inclusion based on lack of
forms contains the attached certificate of the Chairman or any member of the Board of Inspectors
of the precinct concerned to the effect that petitioner or petitioners applied for registration on
October 9, 1971 but were refused registration for lack of registration forms. While it may be true
that the various; petitions for inclusion contained the sworn statement of Eduardo Belbes that a
copy of the petition had been served on the members of the Board of Inspectors of the
corresponding precinct, yet this notice applied to the original dates of hearing stated in the Petition
and it is reasonable to assume that on the dates at which the petitions were ordered reset for
hearing by respondent Judge, to wit: On October 18 for the petitions filed on October 14; and on
October 20 for the petitions filed on October 19, the Board of Inspectors were not notified. This is
impliedly admitted by respondent when he expressed the belief that notice to the Election
Registration Board alone was sufficient, and that the certificate of the Board of Inspectors to the
effect that the petitioners applied for registration in the corresponding precinct on October 9, 1971,
but were refused registration for lack of forms was not necessary inasmuch as he relied on the
testimonies of the petitioners themselves on that point. Also, even if respondent was motivated by
a desire to adhere strictly to the requirement of Comelec Resolution No. RR-938 that inclusion
cases be decided within two (2) days from the filing of the petition, it would seem that respondent
acted rather hastily in resetting the inclusion cases filed in the afternoon of October 19, 1971 for
hearing immediately the following morning or on October 20, 1971. This is especially true of
Election Cases Nos. 93 to 172, except Cases Nos. 162 to 172 (Exhs. 8A to 8K inasmuch as Mrs.
Efren admittedly informed respondent of the filing of the cases right the same morning of October
20. Hence it is not likely that the various members of the Board of Inspectors could have been
notified to appear and testify that petitioners in fact appeared before their respective precincts and
were denied registration for lack of forms. caution dictated that this requirement or this procedure
be followed as this was one sure way of Identifying the petitioners and ascertaining whether in fact
they applied for and were refused registration for lack of forms. True, inclusion and exclusion
cases are summary in nature but the procedure adopted by respondent Judge provided no
safeguard whatsoever against indiscriminate inclusion. For he admitted that as long as the
petitioners were present when he called the inclusion cases for hearing and the respondent
Election Registration Board or the members of the Board of Inspectors of the precincts concerned
were not present he considered the latter in default and summarily granted the petition. This could
be the only reason why practically all the inclusion cases resulted in the issuance of orders
directing the inclusion of the petitioners now marked as Exhs 'B', 'B-l' to 'B-54' and, as it turned out,
on appeal most of the petitions were dismissed either for failure of the petitioners to appear or, as
in Cases Nos. 136-153, because the Court found on the basis of the testimony of the Chairman of
Precinct No, 41 of Talisay that he even had a surplus of seventeen (17) application forms. 1
In extenuation the Investigating Judge found also that respondent, in his aforesaid actuations, did
so without improper motive but in good faith.
In our republican system of government, the exercise by the people of their right of suffrage is the

expression of their sovereign will. It is, therefore, absolutely essential that the free and voluntary
use of this right be effectively protected by the law and by governmental authority. As stated in an
earlier case: 2
* * * The people in clothing a citizen with the elective franchise for the purpose of securing a
consistent and perpetual administration of the government they ordain, charge him with the
performance of a duty in the nature of a public trust, and in that respect constitute him a
representative of the whole people. This duty requires that the privilege thus bestowed should be
exercise, not exclusively for the benefit of the citizen or class of citizens professing it, but in good
faith and with an intelligent zeal for the general benefit and welfare of the state. (U.S. vs.
Cruikshank 92 U.S. 588.) In the last analysis, therefore, the inclusion in or exclusion from the
permanent electoral list of any voter concerns not only the latter in his individual capacity but the
public in general.
In the light of the statutory purpose, the seriousness of respondent's failure to comply with the
requirements of Section 136 of the electoral law becomes evident. His good faith or lack of malice
is of no avail, considering that in crimes which are mala prohibita the act alone irrespective of its
motives, constitutes the offense. It appears, however, that on April 8, 1974, the President of the
Philippines promulgated Presidential Decree No. 433, which grants general amnesty under certain
conditions to public school teachers, other government officials and employees, members of the
armed forces of the Philippines and other persons for violation of election laws and other related
statutes in connection with the elections of 1965, 1967, 1969, 1971, and the election of delegates
to the Constitutional Convention.
There is no question that as a consequence of the general amnesty all persons who violated the
election law on the dates and occasions therein mentioned are relieved of their criminal liability. 3
In the case at bar, respondent is relieved of any criminal liability for his aforecited infraction;
however, in the public interest he should be admonished.
WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby admonished that he should exercise greater care in the
observance of the provisions of existing laws in the discharge of his judicial duty, and warned that
any subsequent misconduct shall be dealt with more severely.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-47243
June 17, 1940
CIPRIANO ABAIL, ET AL., petitioners-appellees,
vs.
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE COURT OF BACOLOD, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, ET AL.,
respondents-appellants.
Vicente J. Francisco, Ramon H. Severino, Abundio Z. Arrieta and Res. A.Sobretodo for the
appellants.Emilio R. Severino, Amado B. Parreo, Vicente T Remetio and Carlos Hilado for the
appellees.
In the year 1937 the total number of registered voters in the municipality of Talisay, Negros
Occidental, was 3,658. In 1938 the electoral census of the place, after the registration on
September 24 and October 1, 1938, showed that the number of registered voters had increased to
18,288. A few days before the election for Assemblymen on November 8, 1938, or on October 18,
1938, 17,344 petitions were filed in the justice of the peace court of Bacolod. Negros Occidental,
for the exclusion of the names of an equal number of persons from the permanent list of registered
voters of Talisay, Negros Occidental, on the grounds that they were not residents of Talisay n
accordance with the Election Code, that they could not prepare their ballots themselves, and that
their registration as voters was not done in accordance with law. The hearing of the petitions for
exclusion was held on October 28, 1938. After attorneys Hilado, Parreo, Remitio and Severino
entered their appearance for the challenged voters, the justice of the peace of Bacolod ascertained
who of the challenged voters were present in court and who were absent. Thereafter the said
justice of the peace declared those who were absent in default. Failing to obtain a reconsideration,
the attorneys for the challenged voters moved that, since the presentation of evidence had not yet
commenced, all the petitions be forwarded to the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental
which was then presided over by two Judges. The attorneys for the petitioners in the said 17,344
exclusion cases objected on the ground that the aforesaid attorneys had no authority to represent
those who were absent. Whereupon the justice of the peace of Bacolod ruled that said attorneys
could represent only the 87 challenged voters who were present in the court room and accordingly
remanded their cases to the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. At the same time the

justice of the peace dismissed 253 of the petitions upon motion of the petition upon motion of the
petitioners themselves. Although no evidence was presented by the petitioners in support of their
petition against those who, were declared in default, the justice of the peace of Bacolod ordered
their exclusion from the list of voters on the ground that it was the duty of the challenged voters
appear in court in order to be personally examined in accordance with section 118 (f) of the
Election Code, as one of the grounds for their exclusion from the list of voters was that they could
not prepare their ballots themselves, that is, that they could not read and write. The attorneys for
the challenged voters received notice of the decision of the justice of the peace of Bacolod on
November 2, 1938, when the present petition for certiorari was instituted in the Court First Instance
of Negros Occidental by the petitioners in their own behalf and in behalf of the other challenged
voters for the purpose of having the judgment of the justice of the peace of Bacolod in the
aforesaid exclusion proceedings set aside. After hearing, the Honorable Judge Sotero Rodas of
the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental rendered judgment setting aside the decision of
the respondent justice of the peace of Bacolod and ordering the restoration of the excluded voters
in the permanent electoral census of Talisay, Negros Occidental. From this judgment the instant
appeal was brought, and the respondents-appellants make an elaborate assignment of nine
errors. In view of the result hereinbelow reached, we do not consider it necessary to consider
seriatim these errors.
While the present controversy may seem academic because the 1938 election is over, we have
nevertheless assumed the task of deciding the same on its merits in view of the imperative
necessity and importance of having a correct electoral census in the municipality of Talisay,
Negros Occidental, and for that matter in any municipality or city in the Philippines, for use in future
elections. In the scheme of our present republican government, the people are allowed to have a
voice therein through the instrumentality of suffrage to be availed of by those possessing certain
prescribe qualifications (Article V, Constitution of the Philippines; sections 93 and 94, Election
Code). The people in clothing a citizen with the elective franchise for the purpose of securing a
consistent and perpetual administration of the government they ordain, charge him with the
performance of a duty in the nature of a public trust, and in that respect constitute him a
representative of the whole people. This duty requires that the privilege thus bestowed should be
exercised, not exclusively for the benefit of the citizen or class of citizens professing it, but in good
faith and with an intelligent zeal for the general benefit of the state. (U.S. vs. Cruikshank, 92 U. S.,
588.) In the last analysis, therefore, the inclusion from the permanent electoral list of any voter
concerns not only the latter in his individual capacity but the public in general.
Section 113 of the Election Code provides that if the Judge of the Court of First Instance is in the
province, the proceedings for the inclusion from the list of voters shall, upon petition of any
interested party filed before the presentation of evidence, be remanded to the said Judge who
shall hear and decide the same in the first and last instance. When, therefore, the attorneys for the
challenged voters moved the justice of the peace of Bacolod to remand all the exclusion cases to
the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, then presided over by two Judges, it was
mandatory on said justice of the peace to grant the motion. Without deciding whether the attorneys
who appeared for the challenged voters were in fact authorized by all, it is our opinion that, in view
of the extraordinary circumstance that the challenged voters were more than seventeen thousand
and a representative number thereof were present, and in view of the nature of the proceedings
which affect public interest, it was error for the aforesaid justice of the peace not to have remanded
all the petitions for exclusion to the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. Thereafter, in the
interest of prompt and economical administration of justice the necessary arrangement could have
been made to enable the corresponding judge of First Instance of the province to proceed to
Talisay and hear the cases there.
The judgment appealed from will accordingly be reversed and in the exercise of our discretionary
power (Cason vs. Rickards, 5 Phil., 611; Rementeria vs. Lara, 6 Phil., 532; Agonoy vs. Ruiz, 11
Phil, 204; Muerteguy & Aboitiz vs. Delgado, 22 Phil., 109; Hongkong & Shanghai Banking
Corporation vs. Aldanese, 46 Phil., 713; Tinsay vs. Yusay, 47 Phil., 639; Singh vs. Tan Chay, 51
Phil., 259; Province of Tayabas Perez, 56 Phil., 257), the case remanded to the Court First
Instance of Negros Occidental with instruction to hear and decide the petitions for exclusion of the
merits, in the first and last instance (section 113, Electoral Code), giving the parties every
opportunity to present their respective evidence. so that it may thereafter make such corrections in
the electoral census of Talisay, Negros Occidental, as may be proper (section 90, Electoral Code),
and to refer to the Solicitor-General such violations of the Election Law as might have been
committed. Without pronouncement as to costs.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 139357. May 5, 2000]
ABDULMADID P.B. MARUHOM, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HADJI
JAMIL DIMAPORO, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES_SANTIAGO, J.:
Whether or not a motion to dismiss, filed after an answer has been filed, is a prohibited pleading in
an election protest pending before the Regional Trial Court is the issue posed in this petition for
certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction challenging the Resolution of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) dated July 6, 1999[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif] dismissing Comelec Case SPR No. 5298.
The COMELECs challenged order summarizes the relevant facts of the controversy thus:
1. Petitioner and private respondent were both candidates for Mayor in the Municipality of
Marogong, Lanao del Sur and voted as such in the last May 11, 1998
national and local election (sic). Petitioner is a re-electionist and a
veteran politician;
2. The election in Marogong functioned on May 11, 1998, and after the voting the ballot boxes
were transmitted to the Kalimodan Hall, Provincial Capitol of Lanao del
Sur at Marawi City where the automated counting of votes and canvass
of election returns were centralized;
3. During the counting of votes, serious irregularities, anomalies and electoral frauds were
committed at the instance of petitioner or his followers in that votes
actually casted (sic) for the private respondent were not counted and
credited in his favor thru (sic) the concerted acts, conspiracy and
manipulation of the Board of Election Inspectors, military, Election
Officer and the Machine Operator who happens to be a nephew of the
petitioner;
4. In Precincts Nos. 1A-1A1, 7A1, 8A, 10A-10A1 and 11A about 115 official ballots were refused or
rejected by the counting machine which the private respondents
watchers or representatives have requested and insisted to be re-fed to
the automated machine for the second and third times pursuant to the
provisions of Comelec Resolution No. 3030 but their requests were not
heeded by the Election Officer and the Machine Operator, Solaiman
Rasad, who is a close kin of the Petitioner, and instead considered the
said ballots as finally rejected, while in Precincts Nos. 12A, 23A1 and
6A, around 56 ballots were found therein which were not drawn from
the official ballots and were included in the counting of votes over the
objection of the private respondents watchers or representatives;
5. Before the termination of the counting of votes and the consolidation of the results, the machine
operator and the Election Officer carried away from the Kalimodan Hall
the diskette and brought the same to the down town without the
knowledge of the private respondents watchers or representatives;
6. As a result of the foregoing irregularities, anomalies and electoral frauds, the petitioner was
illegally proclaimed as winner because he appeared to have obtained
2,020 votes while the private respondent garnered 2,000 votes with a
slight margin of only 20 votes;
7. After the counting of votes, the ballot boxes were kept at the Kalimodan Hall, Provincial Capitol,
Marawi City guarded and secured by military and PNP personnel
together with the watchers/representatives of the petitioner and the
private respondent and other candidates or political parties until they
were transported and delivered to the respondent court at Malabang,
Lanao del Sur sometime on August 13, 1998 by 1Lt. Napisa AG
together with the duly authorized representatives of both parties.
xxx xxx xxx
1. On May 22, 1998, private respondent, knowing that he was cheated and the true winner for
Mayor, filed before this Honorable Commission a petition to annul the
proclamation of petitioner Abdulmadid Maruhom as the duly elected
Mayor of Marogong, Lanao del Sur docketed as SPC No. 98-226. [if !
supportFootnotes][2][endif]

2. As precautionary measure to avoid any technicality, private respondent filed on May 25, 1998,
an ordinary "Protest ad Cautelam" against the petitioner before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Malabang, Lanao del Sur entitled
"Hadji Jamil D. Dimaporo vs. Abdulmadid Maruhom" for election protest
(Manual Judicial Recount, revision and reappreciation of ballots)
docketed as Election Case No. 11-127.[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif]
3. On June 1, 1998, petitioner Abdulmadid Maruhom filed an answer with counter-protest in
Election Case No. 11-127 special and affirmative defenses and
counter-protest.[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif] In his answer petitioner prayed to
hold in abeyance further proceedings since the protest is ad cautelam
or subject to the petition filed before this Honorable Commission.
4. On July 2, 1998, before SPC No. 98-228 could be set for hearing by this Honorable
Commission, the private respondent as petitioner therein, filed a motion
to withdraw his petition in said SPC No. 98-228 albeit said case was
among those cases the proceedings of which were ordered to be
continued beyond June 30, 1998, under Comelec Resolution No. 3049
promulgated on June 29, 1998.[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif] xxx
5. On July 17, 1998, an order was issued by this Honorable Commission, (First Division) granting
the private respondents motion to withdraw petition in SPC No. 98-228
and considered the same withdrawn.[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif] xxx.
6. Upon receipt of a copy of said order, dated July 17, 1998, private respondent filed an urgent
motion before the respondent court on July 27, 1998, praying for the
issuance of an order directing the proper officials/officers concerned to
bring and produce before said court the ballot boxes subjects of the
protest and counter-protest and to set the case for hearing as
mandated by law.[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif] xxx
7. After the delivery of the ballot boxes involved in the protest and counter-protest, the public
respondent issued an order, dated August 17, 1998, setting Election
Case No. 11-127 for hearing (a) for the creation of the Committee on
Revision and appointment of the Chairman and Members thereof; (b)
making of the cash deposit and payment of the revisors compensation;
(c) partial determination of the case, etc. on September 1, 1998, at 8:30
oclock in the morning.[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif]
8. When the case was called for hearing on September 2, 1998, a Revision Committee was
created and its membership were duly appointed in open court which
committee was directed by the respondent court to finish the revision of
ballots, if possible, within 20 days from the commencement of the
revision[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif] xxx
9. After the Revision Committee was directed by the respondent to commence the revision of
ballots, the petitioner Abdulmadid Maruhom thru counsel orally moved
for the dismissal of the protest on the grounds that (1) The ballot boxes
containing the ballots in the protested and counter-protested precincts
have been violated; (2) Automated counting of ballots does not
contemplate a manual recount of the ballots; and (3) Protestant is guilty
of forum shopping warranting summary dismissal of the petitioner of the
protest.
10. The private respondent thru (sic) undersigned counsel, vigorously opposed the said oral
motion to dismiss and orally argued that the motion is clearly dilatory
having been made only after the Revision Committee has been ordered
to commence the revision of ballots on September 1, 1998 and
maintained that (1) The motion to dismiss is not allowed in an election
protest; (2) The sanctity and integrity of the ballot boxes subject matter
of the protest and counter-protest have been preserved and never
violated; (3) The automated counting of ballots does not preclude the
filing of the election protest for the judicial recount and revision of
ballots; and (4) The private respondent is not guilty of forum shopping
because his petition of protest is clearly and explicitly a Protest Ad
Cautelam in view of the pendency of his petition before this Honorable
Commission which was withdrawn by the private respondent before it
could be set for hearing or acted upon by this Honorable Commission.

11. After the oral arguments of both parties, the petitioners counsel asked that he be given ample
time to file a written Omnibus Motion to Dismiss and the respondent
court thru then Acting Presiding Judge Rasad Balindong, issued an
order dated September 2, 1998, giving ten (10) days to Atty. Tingcap T.
Mortaba to file an Omnibus Motion in substantiation of all the oral
motions he made, furnishing a copy thereof to the undersigned counsel
for the private respondent who was likewise given an equal period of
time to comment.[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif]
12. On September 11, 1998, petitioner filed his motion to dismiss [if !supportFootnotes][11][endif] and on
September 21, 1998, the private respondent filed a vigorous opposition
to motion to dismiss.[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif]
13. During the hearing on the motion to dismiss and the opposition thereto on September 21,
1998, the petitioners counsel requested for ample time to file a
rejoinder to the vigorous opposition to motion to dismiss submitted by
the private respondent which was granted by the court and on
September 28, 1998, petitioner filed his rejoinder [if !supportFootnotes][13][endif] and
on October 5, 1998 private respondent filed his comment[if !supportFootnotes][14]
[endif]
thereto and thereafter all incidents were submitted for resolution of
the court.
14. On November 10, 1998, the respondent court thru Honorable Presiding Judge Moslemen T.
Macarambon, issued the assailed order denying the petitioners motion
to dismiss for lack of merit and ordering the Revision Committee to
report to the court on November 19, 1998, at 8:30 oclock in the morning
for their oath taking and to receive the instruction of the court in the
revision of the ballots and other allied matters.[if !supportFootnotes][15][endif]
15. On November 18, 1998, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order dated
November 10, 1998,[if !supportFootnotes][16][endif] and on November 23, 1998,
private respondent filed a vigorous opposition [to motion] for
reconsideration.[if !supportFootnotes][17][endif]
16. Finding no compelling reason to disturb its order dated November 10, 1998, the respondent
court issued the assailed order dated December 1, 1998 which denied
the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. In the same order, the
respondent court reiterated its previous order to the members of the
Revision Committee to take their oaths before Atty. Raqueza T. Umbaro
or Atty. Khalil Laguindab and thereafter to convene and start the
revision of ballots on December 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18, 1998, morning
and afternoon.[if !supportFootnotes][18][endif]
17. As a diabolical scheme to cause further delay of the proceedings of the case more specifically
the revision of ballots, the petitioner filed on December 10, 1998, the
instant petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for preliminary
injunction and on December 11, 1998, petitioner filed an urgent motion
before the respondent court praying that further proceedings in Election
Case No. 11-127 be deferred until after protestees petition for certiorari
and prohibition before this Honorable Commission shall have been
finally resolved, copy of which was served upon the undersigned
counsel only on December 12, 1998, at 10:50 A.M. [if !supportFootnotes][19][endif]
xxx
18. That before the undersigned counsel could file his opposition to said urgent motion on
December 14, 1998 and in the absence of a restraining order or writ of
preliminary injunction issued by (the COMELEC), the respondent judge
already issued an order granting the same motion and ordering the
Revision Committee to hold in abeyance the scheduled revision of
ballots on December 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18, 1998, etc. until further
order from the court xxx.[if !supportFootnotes][20][endif]
Petitioner alleges that in dismissing the petition the COMELEC acted in excess of, or with grave
abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
1.] holding that a motion to dismiss an election protest case filed in the Regional Trial Court is a
prohibited pleading;
2.] holding that the motion to dismiss filed after the answer is not allowed;
3.] failing to resolve the issues raised in SPR No. 52-98 which are sufficient legal bases to dismiss

Election Case No. 11-127.

In sum, petitioner insists that in refusing to pass upon the three (3) principal issues raised in
COMELEC Case SPR No. 52-98, to wit:
1. Whether or not public respondent acted in excess of, or with grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in holding that a motion to dismiss an
election protest case in the Regional Trial Court is a prohibited
pleading;
2. Whether or not public respondent acted in excess of, or with grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in holding that a motion to dismiss filed
after the answer to an election protest case in the Regional Trial court
is not allowed; and
3. Whether or not public respondent gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction,
in failing to resolve the relevant material and substantial issues raised
in SPR No. 52-98.
the COMELEC "abdicated its duty under its own rules of procedure and under the Constitution and
the election laws." Such abdication of duty, according to petitioner, amounts to grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
It must be borne in mind that the purpose of governing statutes on the conduct of elections
[i]s to protect the integrity of elections to suppress all evils that may violate its purity and defeat the
will of the voters. The purity of the elections is one of the most
fundamental requisites of popular government. The Commission on
Elections, by constitutional mandate must do everything in its power to
secure a fair and honest canvass of the votes cast in the elections. In
the performance of its duties, the Commission must be given a
considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that will insure
the accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created to
promote free, orderly and honest elections. The choice of means taken
by the Commission on Elections, unless they are clearly illegal or
constitute grave abuse of discretion, should not be interfered with. [if !
supportFootnotes][21][endif]

Section 2 (1) of Article IX of the Constitution gives the COMELEC the broad power to "enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum and recall." There can hardly be any doubt that the text and intent of this constitutional
provision is to give COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the holding
of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.
In accordance with this intent, the Court has been liberal in defining the parameters of the
COMELECs powers in conducting elections. Sumulong v. COMELEC[if !supportFootnotes][22][endif] aptly
points out that
Politics is a practical matter, and political questions must be dealt with realistically not from the
standpoint of pure theory. The Commission on Elections, because of its
fact-finding facilities, its contacts with political strategists, and its
knowledge derived from actual experience in dealing with political
controversies, is in a peculiarly advantageous position to decide
complex political questions xxx. There are no ready made formulas for
solving public problems. Time and experience are necessary to evolve
patterns that will serve the ends of good government. In the matter of
the administration of laws relative to the conduct of election xxx we
must not by any excessive zeal take away from the Commission on
Elections that initiative which by constitutional and legal mandates
properly belongs to it.
Succinctly stated, laws and statutes governing election contests especially the appreciation of
ballots must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the electorate in the choice of public
officials may not be defeated by technical infirmities. [if !supportFootnotes][23][endif] An election protest is
imbued with public interest so much so that the need to dispel uncertainties which becloud the real
choice of the people is imperative,[if !supportFootnotes][24][endif] much more so in this case considering that a
mere twenty (20) votes separates the winner from the loser of the contested election results.
The primordial issue to be resolved herein is whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion in dismissing SPR No. 52-98.
In support of his cause, petitioner insists that there is "nothing irregular or anomalous in the filing of
the motion to dismiss" after the filing of the answer because in effect he is merely insisting on a

preliminary hearing of his special and affirmative defenses. Thus, he claims that the summary
dismissal of his motion to dismiss is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
We disagree.
The filing of the motion to dismiss, in fact, appears to be part of a perfidious plot to prevent the
early termination of the proceedings in Election Case No. 4847 as evidenced by a confluence of
events clearly showing a pattern of delay employed by petitioner to avert the revision ballots.
These events, pointed out by private respondent[if !supportFootnotes][25][endif] and borne by the record, show
that
1. It was only on September 1, 1999 after the creation of the Revision Committee and the
appointment of its Chairman and Members and after the said
committee was ordered by the trial court to commence the revision and
to render its report within 20 days that the petitioner orally moved for
the dismissal of the case on the flimsy grounds that (1) the ballot boxes
subject of the protest and counter protest have been violated; (2) the
automated counting of ballots does not contemplate a manual recount
of ballots; and (3) protestant is guilty of forum-shopping warranting
summary dismissal of the protest;
2. After the oral arguments on the oral motion to dismiss the petitioner requested for ample time
within which to file an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss and over the
vigorous opposition of the private respondent the same was granted by
the court and the petitioner was given a period of ten (10) days to file
the same and the private respondent was likewise given a period of ten
(10) days to file his comment;
3. On September 11, 1998, the motion to dismiss[if !supportFootnotes][26][endif] and during the hearing on the
said motion and the opposition[if !supportFootnotes][27][endif] thereto on September
21, 1998, the petitioner again asked for ample time to file a rejoinder to
the vigorous opposition to motion to dismiss which was again granted
by the court and it was only on September 28, 1998 that said rejoinder
was filed;
4. After a denial of the motion to dismiss on November 10, 1998, [if !supportFootnotes][28][endif] the petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration on November 18, 1998;[if !supportFootnotes][29]
[endif]

5. When the motion for reconsideration was denied on December 1, 1998, [if !supportFootnotes][30][endif]
petitioner filed on December 18, 1998 before the Commission on
Elections a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for
preliminary injunction and asked the trial court to defer the proceedings
of Election Case No. 11-27 until after his petition shall have been finally
resolved which was granted by the trial court. Hence, the scheduled
revision of the ballots on December 14, 15, 16 and 17, 1998 was
cancelled and the proceedings of the case held in abeyance; [if !
supportFootnotes][31][endif]

6. As the Comelec En Banc did not give due course to petitioners prayer for writ of preliminary
injunction, the trial court, upon motion of the private respondent, issued
an order for the revision of ballots on February 8, 1999. [if !supportFootnotes][32]
[endif]
On said day, neither the petitioners counsel nor his designated
revisors appeared, instead the petitioner, assisted by his numerous
armed men, numbering around 30 stated (sic) in strategic places,
prevented the court personnel to enter the court premises. Were it not
for the maximum tolerance exercised by the PNP personnel and the
intervention of the local datus/leaders, there would have been
bloodshed;
7. On February 9, 1999, the petitioners counsel filed a withdrawal of appearance with the attached
letter-request of the petitioner asking for the deferment of the revision
of ballots for at least two (2) weeks to enable him to engage the
services of another counsel. Considering that the incident was
designed to delay the further the early disposition of the case which
would frustrate the ends of justice, the court held in abeyance its ruling
on the withdrawal of appearance of and directed petitioners counsel to
handle the case after the appearance of a new counsel; [if !supportFootnotes][33]

[endif]

8. To further delay the proceedings of the case, the petitioner filed a petition for transfer of venue of
the trial to from RTC, Branch 11, Malabang, Lanao del Sur to Iligan City
or in Metro Manila which the private respondent did not oppose so as
not to delay the early resolution of this Honorable Supreme Court on
the said petition;
9. Again, the proceedings of the case was held in abeyance in view of the pendency of the said
petition for transfer of venue;
10. After the dismissal of the petition in Election Case No. 52-98, the petitioner filed the instant
petition for certiorari before this Honorable Supreme Court with a
prayer for issuance of temporary restraining order;
11. As a diabolical scheme to cause further delay of the proceedings of the case, the petitioner
filed an urgent motion before this Honorable Supreme Court praying for
the immediate issuance of a TRO directing the Presiding Judge, RTC,
Branch III, Iligan City to cease, desist and refrain from conducting any
further proceedings of Election Case No. 4847 until the instant case
shall have been resolved. This Honorable Supreme Court, without
granting the prayer for TRO, directed the RTC, Branch III, Iligan City
not to promulgate any decision in the said election case until further
order[s] from this most Honorable Court.[if !supportFootnotes][34][endif]
It is clear, given the foregoing facts of this case, that the roundabout manner within which petitioner
virtually substituted his answer by belatedly filing a motion to dismiss three (3) months later is a
frivolous resort to procedure calculated to frustrate the will of the electorate. As pointedly observed
by the COMELEC in its challenged Resolution dated July 6, 1999, [if !supportFootnotes][35][endif] petitioner only
filed his motion to dismiss "when the results of the trial appear[ed] to be adverse to him" [if !
supportFootnotes][36][endif]
or right after the creation of the Revision Committee had been ordered by the trial
court. If petitioner truly intended to move for the preliminary hearing of his special and affirmative
defenses as he claims, then he should have simultaneously moved for the preliminary hearing of
his special and affirmative defenses at the time he filed his answer. Otherwise, he should have
filed his motion to dismiss "within the time for but before filing the answer" pursuant to Section 1,
Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Suffice it to state in this regard that such a whimsical change of mind by petitioner can not be
countenanced much more so in election cases where time is of the essence in the resolution
thereof. Indeed, the Omnibus Election Code states in no uncertain terms that
SEC. 258. Preferential disposition of contests in courts. The RTC, in their respective cases, shall
give preference to election contests over all other cases, except
those of habeas corpus, and shall, without delay, hear and within thirty
(30) days from the date of their submission for decision, but in every
case within six (6) months after filing, decide the same. xxx [if !supportFootnotes]
[37][endif]
(emphasis and italics supplied)
Petitioner further argues that his submissions that a.] the integrity of the ballot boxes has been
violated; b.] only rejected ballots or ballots manually counted are the proper subjects of an election
protest; and c.] private respondent is guilty of forum-shopping, are enough grounds to dismiss the
case.
We remain unconvinced.
As aptly observed by the COMELEC in the challenged Resolution, these grounds are "evidentiary
in nature and can be best ventilated during the trial of the case." [if !supportFootnotes][38][endif] It needs be
stressed in this regard that the purpose of an election protest is to ascertain whether the candidate
proclaimed elected by the board of canvassers is really the lawful choice of the electorate.[if !
supportFootnotes][39][endif]
In an election contest where the correctness of the number of votes is involved,
the best and most conclusive evidence are the ballots themselves; where the ballots can not be
produced or are not available, the election returns would be the best evidence. [if !supportFootnotes][40][endif]
In this case, the counted official ballots are available and there is no evidence, other than the bare
allegation of petitioner, that the sanctity of the ballot boxes subject matter of the protest have been
violated or the official ballots contained therein impaired. The best way, therefore, to test the
truthfulness of petitioners claim is to open the ballot boxes in the protested precincts followed by
the examination, revision, recounting and re-appreciation of the official ballots therein contained in
accordance with law and pertinent rules on the matter. Needless to state this can only be done
through a full-blown trial on the merits, not a peremptory resolution of the motion to dismiss on the
basis of the bare and one-sided averments made therein.

Petitioners reliance on COMELEC Resolution No. 2868[if !supportFootnotes][41][endif] to support his restrictive
claim that only rejected ballots or ballots manually counted in case of failure of the automated
counting machines are the proper subjects of an election protest, is just as unpersuasive.
There is admittedly a lacuna leges in R.A. No. 8436 which prescribes the adoption of an
automated election system. However, while conceding as much, this Court ruled in Tupay Loong v.
COMELEC,[if !supportFootnotes][42][endif] that the Commission is nevertheless not precluded from conducting
a manual count when the automated counting system fails, reasoning thus:
In enacting R.A. No. 8436, Congress obviously failed to provide a remedy where the error in
counting is not machine related for human foresight is not all-seeing.
We hold, however, that the vacuum in the law cannot prevent the
COMELEC from levitating above the problem. Section 2(1) of Article
IX (C) of the Constitution gives the COMELEC the broad power "to
enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct
of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall."
Undoubtedly, the text and intent of this provision is to give the
COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the
objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible
elections. Congruent to this intent, this Court has not been niggardly in
defining the parameters of powers of COMELEC in the conduct of our
elections In the case at bar, the COMELEC order for a manual count
was not only reasonable. It was the only way to count the decisive local
votes ... The bottom line is that by means of the manual count, the will
of the voters of Sulu was honestly determined. We cannot kick away
the will of the people by giving a literal interpretation to R.A. 8436.
R.A. 8436 did not prohibit manual counting when machine count
does not work. Counting is part and parcel of the conduct of an
election which is under the control and supervision of the COMELEC
Our elections are not conducted under laboratory conditions. In running for public offices,
candidates do not follow the rules of Emily Post. Too often, COMELEC
has to make snap judgments to meet unforeseen circumstances that
threaten to subvert the will of our voters. In the process, the actions of
COMELEC may not be impeccable, indeed, may even be debatable.
We cannot, however, engage in a swivel chair criticism of these actions
often taken under very difficult circumstances.
Verily, the legal compass from which the COMELEC should take its bearings in acting upon
election controversies is the principle that "clean elections control the appropriateness of the
remedy."[if !supportFootnotes][43][endif]
Be that as it may, the fact is the averments in petitioners counter-protest and private respondents
protest already justified the determination of the issues through a judicial revision and recounting
of the ballots pursuant to Section 255 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides that
Sec. 255. Judicial counting of votes in election contest.- Where allegations in a protest or
counter-protest so warrant or whenever in the opinion of the court
the interests of justice so require, it shall immediately order the book
of voters, ballot boxes and their keys, ballots and other documents
used in the election be brought before it and that the ballots be
examined and votes recounted. (Italics supplied)
So too must fall petitioners procedural objection that private respondent should be faulted for
forum-shopping vis--vis this Courts pronouncement in Samad v. COMELEC[if !supportFootnotes][44][endif]
which states in no uncertain terms that
As a general rule, the filing of an election protest or a petition for quo warranto precludes the
subsequent filing of a pre-proclamation controversy, or amounts to the
abandonment of one earlier filed, thus depriving the COMELEC of the
authority to inquire into and pass upon the title of the protestee or the
validity of his proclamation. The reason is that once the competent
tribunal has acquired jurisdiction of an election protest or a petition for
quo warranto, all questions relative thereto will have to be decided in
the case itself and not in another proceeding. This procedure will
prevent confusion and conflict of authority. Conformably, we have ruled
in a number of cases that after a proclamation has been made, a preproclamation case before the COMELEC is no longer viable.

The rule admits of exceptions, however, as where: (1) the board of canvassers was improperly
constituted; (2) quo warranto was not the proper remedy; (3) what was
filed was not really a petition for quo warranto or an election protest but
a petition to annul a proclamation; (4) the filing of a quo warranto
petition or an election protest was expressly made without
prejudice to the pre-proclamation controversy or was made ad
cautelam; and (5) the proclamation was null and void.
Petitioners argument that the filing of a motion to dismiss in an election contest filed with a regular
court is not a prohibited pleading is well taken. As we pointed out in Melendres, Jr. v. COMELEC: [if
!supportFootnotes][45][endif]

Neither can petitioner seek refuge behind his argument that the motion to dismiss filed by private
respondent is a prohibited pleading under Section 1, Rule 13 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure because the said provision refers to
proceedings filed before the COMELEC. The applicable provisions on
the matter are found in Part VI of the Rules of Procedure titled
"PROVISIONS GOVERNING ELECTION CONTESTS BEFORE TRIAL
COURT" and as this Court pointedly stated in Aruelo v. Court of
Appeals[if !supportFootnotes][46][endif]
It must be noted that nowhere in Part VI of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is it provided that
motions to dismiss and bill of particulars are not allowed
in election protests or quo warranto cases pending before
regular courts.
Constitutionally speaking, the COMELEC cannot adopt a rule prohibiting the filing of a certain
pleading in the regular courts. The power to promulgate
rules concerning pleadings, practice and procedure in all
courts is vested in the Supreme Court.[if !supportFootnotes][47][endif]
The foregoing pronouncement, however, will not extricate petitioner from his predicament because
the denial of petitioners motion to dismiss was based on the fact that the other grounds relied
therein was considered unmeritorious and not because the said motion is a prohibited pleading in
electoral protest cases. While the challenged COMELEC Resolution may not have been entirely
correct in dismissing the petition in this regard, the soundness of its discretion to accord unto the
trial court the competence to resolve the factual issues raised in the controversy cannot be
doubted. Indeed, as reasoned by the COMELEC, the
Commission assumes the competence of the trial court to handle electoral protest and cannot
encroach on its original and exclusive jurisdiction on electoral protest
cases involving the contested mayoralty seat. To our mind, the trial
court should be allowed to resolve the case on the merits to be able to
rule on the factual and legal grounds raised by the petitioner as his
defenses in his Answer. Should the petitioner be dissatisfied with the
outcome of the case in the lower court, he can still appeal, as his relief,
to this Commission within the reglementary period provided by law.
Moreover
At balance, the question really boils down to a choice of philosophy and perception of how to
interpret and apply the laws relating to elections; literal or liberal; the
letter or the spirit; the naked provision or the ultimate purpose; legal
syllogism or substantial justice; in isolation or in the context of social
conditions; harshly against or gently in favor of the voters obvious
choice. In applying elections laws, it would be far better to err in
favor of popular sovereignty than to be right in complex but little
understood legalisms.[if !supportFootnotes][48][endif]
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 123037. March 21, 1997]
TEODORO Q. PEA, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
AND ALFREDO E. ABUEG, JR., respondents.
DECISION
TORRES, JR., J.:

Assailed herein is the October 12, 1995 Resolution [if !supportFootnotes][1][endif] of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) dismissing the Petition Ad Cautelam of the Petitioner
Teodoro Q. Pea in HRET Case No. 95-014. Petitioner questioned the election of the private
respondent Alfredo E. Abueg, Jr. as Member of the House of Representatives representing the
Second District of the province of Palawan.
Petitioner and the private respondent were contenders for the said Congressional Office in the
May 8, 1995 elections. On May 12, 195, upon canvassing the votes cast, the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Palawan proclaimed the private respondent as the winner.
On May 22, 1995, the instant petition was filed with the HRET, wherein the petitioner, as
protestant, averred that:
7. The elections in the precincts of the Second District of Palawan were tainted with massive fraud,
widespread vote-buying, intimidation and terrorism and other serious irregularities committed
before, during and after the voting, and during the counting of votes and the preparation of election
returns and certificates of canvass which affected the results of the election. Among the fraudulent
acts committed were the massive vote-buying and intimidation of voters, disenfranchisement of
petitioners known supporters through systematic deletion of names from the lists of voters,
allowing persons to vote in excess of the number of registered voters, misappreciation, misreading
and non-reading of protestants ballots and other irregularities.
8. According to the Statement of Votes by Precinct/Municipality/City, the protestee allegedly
obtained 52,967 votes, while the protestant allegedly obtained 46,023 votes, or a difference of
6,944 votes. A copy of said document is attached hereto as Annex B.
9. Had the massive fraud, widespread intimidation and terrorism and other serious irregularities not
been committed, the result of the elections for Member of the House of Representatives would
have been different and the protestant would have garnered the highest number of votes for the
Office Member of the House of Representatives in the Second District of Palawan, which was the
true expression of the will of the voters of the Province of Palawan.
10. The proclamation by the members of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Palawan that the
protestee was allegedly the duly elected Member of the House of Representatives for the Second
District of Palawan is contrary to law and to the true expression of the will of the voters of the
Province of Palawan.[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif]
Private respondent-Protestee Abueg filed an Answer With Affirmative Defense, Counterclaim and
Counter-Protest[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif] on June 5, 1995, to which Pea filed a Reply on June 23, 1995.
Subsequent to the filing of his Answer, Abueg filed a Motion to Dismiss [if !supportFootnotes][4][endif] the
Petition on June 22, 1995, averring that the HRET has not acquired jurisdiction over the petition,
the same being insufficient in form and substance. In essence, the motion to dismiss anchors its
challenge on the fact that the petition failed to allege the precincts where the massive fraud and
disenfranchisement of voters occurred, nor did it point out how many votes would be gained by the
protestant as a result of the same.
Petitioner filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss [if !supportFootnotes][5][endif] on July 10, 1995, attaching
thereto a Summary of Contested Precincts, naming 700 precincts where election irregularities
allegedly occurred.
In its Resolution of October 12, 1995, the respondent HRET ruled that although it had jurisdiction
over the petition, as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of the members of the House of Representatives, the said petition, however, fails to state a cause
of action, and is therefore, insufficient in form and substance, meriting its dismissal.
The HRET states pertinently:
There are 743 precincts in the second congressional district of Palawan which is comprised of
Puerto Princesa City and the municipalities of Aborlan, Balabac, Bataraza, Brookes Point, Narra,
Quezon, and Marcos (Ordinance appended to the 1973 Constitution). The Protestant failed to
specify which are the 700 precincts, out of the said 743 precincts, that are included in his protest;
he even failed to allege the municipalities where the protested precincts are located. Worse, the
body of the Petition does not even mention the 700 precincts. Reference to them is made only in
the Prayer. These omissions prevent Protestee from being apprised of the issues which he has to
meet and make it virtually impossible for the Tribunal to determine which ballot boxes have to be
collected.
The Supreme Court, in Fernando vs. Pastor M. Endencia, Judge of First Instance of Bulacan, et.
al. (No. 46099, 66 Phil 148, 150, August 30, 1938) observed that, [w]hile the election law does not
say so directly, it is clearly inferred from its relevant provisions that where the grounds of contest
are that legal votes were rejected and illegal votes received, the motion of protest should state in
what precincts such irregularities occurred. xxx The specification in the motion of protest of the

election precinct or precincts where the alleged irregularities occurred, is required in order to
apprise the contestee of the issues which he has to meet. xxx
In its more recent resolution in Grand Alliance for Democracy (GAD) vs. COMELEC (G.R. No.
78302, May 26, 1987, 150 SCRA 665), the Supreme Court held that the petition therein could have
been dismissed outright as deficient in form and substance, being couched in general terms only,
without precise indication of the time, place and manner of the commission of the alleged
irregularities. xxx
Similarly, this Tribunal, in dismissing an election protest, observed that the protest, in general
language, impugns, contests and protests the illegal, improper and fraudulent electoral practices,
acts and deeds of the protestee and impugns and contests all the election returns in the lone
district of Catanduanes. The tribunal held that this scattershot allegation is not allowed in election
contests and that it is necessary to make a precise indication of the precincts protested and a
specification of the claimed offenses to have been committed by the parties. (Alberto vs. Tapia,
HRET Case No. 37, January 23, 1989)
While Protestant has attached as Annex A to his Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, filed on 10
July 1995, a Summary of contested Precincts, the defects in his Protest were not cured thereby as
the Summary was submitted only after the Motion to Dismiss had been filed. The Opposition and
the attached Summary do not amend the original Petition. There is not even a prayer in the
Opposition suggesting such amendment.
Moreover, in a Resolution promulgated on 17 June 1995, the Commission on Elections en banc
(COMELEC) dismissed herein Petitioners Petition (SPA Case No. 95-258) to declare a failure of
elections in the second district of Palawan. Copy of said Resolution was sent to Petitioner Peas
Petition Ad Cautelam was thus converted into a regular protest (not Ad Cautelam) effective upon
the finality of the official COMELEC resolution, thereby providing him an opportunity to amend it to
cure the defects cited above, Protestant took no positive and affirmative steps for that purpose.
Protestant alleges in his Opposition that Protestee has likewise failed to specify the 47 precincts
he contests in his Counter-Protest. This omission merely renders Protestees Counter-Protest
defective for insufficiency in form and substance and for failure to state a cause of action. It does
not cure the fatal defects in Protestants Petition.
WHEREFORE, for failure of the petition (Protest) to state a cause of action because it is fatally
insufficient in form and substance, the Tribunal Resolved to GRANT Protestees Motion to Dismiss
and to DISMISS, as it hereby DISMISSES, the instant Petition of Protest. As a logical
consequence thereof and also for the same reason, Protestees Counter-Protest is DISMISSED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif]
Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the said resolution was denied by the respondent tribunal
on November 14, 1995.
In this Petition for Certiorari, filed on December 29, 1995, petitioner argues that the respondent
HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to having acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction in dismissing the election protest of petitioner considering that:
I
THE PETITION AD CAUTELAM DATED 22 MAY 1995 STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION AND IS
SUFFICIENT IN FORM AND SUBSTANCE.
II
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE PETITION WAS INITIALLY DEFECTIVE BECAUSE IT
FAILED TO SPECIFY THE CONTESTED PRECINCTS, SAID DEFECT WAS CURED WHEN
PETITIONER SUBMITTED A SUMMARY OF THE CONTESTED PRECINCTS WHICH FORMS
PART OF THE RECORD OF THE RESPONDENT HRET.
It is the Petitioners view that the instant election protest is sufficient in form and substance even
while failing to specify the precincts where irregularities allegedly occurred. Nowhere is it provided
that the specification of the precincts is a jurisdictional requirement that must be complied with in
order that an election protest can be entertained by the HRET. To support his submission,
petitioner cites the cases of Yalung vs. Atienza, 52 Phil 781, Arao vs. COMELEC, 210 SCRA 790
and Gallares vs. Casenas, 48 Phil 362, the latter stating that:
From a reading of the allegations of the protest, it may be seen that frauds, irregularities and
violations of the law are alleged therein, which, if true, would undoubtedly change the result of the
elections.
The fact that in the protest the number of votes which would result in favor of the protestant after
the judicial counting is not specified, does not affect the right of the protestant, for it being known
that said omission is a defect of the protest, the same may be cured by a specification of the votes

mentioned in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of the protest, without thereby adding new grounds for those
already alleged by the protestant.
Applying the same principle to the specification of precincts in the instant case, the defect in the
petition should have been cured by the opposition to the private respondents Motion to Dismiss.
Moreover, the fact that the HRET did not summarily dismiss the Petition Ad Cautelam, and instead,
required the private respondent Abueg to file an Answer, the HRET has thus made a prior
determination that the petition is sufficient in form and substance.
We do not agree.
In the first place, in requiring the private respondent to answer the petition, the HRET was not
ruling on the formal and substantive sufficiency of the petition. The order to require an answer is
but a matter of course, as under the Revised Rules of Procedure of the HRET, it is provided that:
RULE 22. Summons. - Upon the filing of the petition, the Clerk of the Tribunal shall forthwith issue
the corresponding summons to the protestee or respondent together with a copy of the petition,
requiring him within ten (10) days from receipt thereof to file his answer.
As to the adequacy of the protest, we agree with respondent HRET in ruling for the insufficiency of
the same.
A perusal of the petition Ad Cautelam, reveals that Petitioner makes no specific mention of the
precincts where widespread election, fraud and irregularities occured. This is a fatal omission, as it
goes into the very substance of the protest. Under Section 21 of the Revised Rules of Procedure
of HRET, insufficiency in form and substance of the petition constitutes a ground for the immediate
dismissal of the Petition.
The prescription that the petition must be sufficient in form and substance means that the petition
must be more than merely rhetorical. If the allegations contained therein are unsupported by even
the faintest whisper of authority in fact and law, then there is no other course than to dismiss the
petition, otherwise, the assumptions of an elected public official may, and will always be held up by
petitions of this sort by the losing candidate.
Notably, the instant petition ad cautelam poses a more serious inadequacy than a mere failure to
specify the number of votes which would inure to the protestant, as was the case in Gallares vs.
Casenas, or the failure to impugn the validity of some of the ballots cast, as in Yalung vs. Atienza,
supra, both of which cases were decided in the 1920s. The defect in the instant case arises from
the failure to allege the contested precincts. Only a bare allegation of massive fraud, widespread
intimidation and terrorism and other serious irregularities, without specification, and substantiation,
of where and how these occurences took place, appears in the petition. We cannot allow an
election protest based on such flimsy averments to prosper, otherwise, the whole election process
will deteriorate into an endless stream of crabs pulling at each other, racing to disembank from the
water.
On his second point of argument, Petitioner likewise fails to impress. The Court has already ruled
in Joker P. Arroyo vs. HRET,[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif] that substantial amendments to the protest may be
allowed only within the same period for filing the election protest, which, under Rule 16 of the
HRET Rules of Procedure is ten (10) days after proclamation of the winner.
While it is conceded that statutes providing for election contests are to be liberally construed to the
end that the will of the people in the choice of public officers may not be defeated by mere
technical questions, the rule likewise stands, that in an election protest, the protestant must stand
or fall upon the issues he had raised in his original or amended pleading filed prior to the lapse of
the statutory period for filing of the protest.[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif]
Admittedly, the rule is well-established that the power to annul an election should be exercised with
the greatest care as it involves the free and fair expression of the popular will. It is only in extreme
cases of fraud and under circumstances which demonstrate to the fullest degree a fundamental
and wanton disregard of the law that elections are annulled, and then only when it becomes
impossible to take any other step. [if !supportFootnotes][9][endif] xxx This is as it should be, for the democratic
system is good for the many although abhorred by a few.
In sum, this Courts jurisdiction to review decisions and orders of electoral tribunals operates only
upon a showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the tribunal. Only where such a grave
abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the electoral tribunals judgment.
There is such showing in the present petition.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby resolves to DISMISS the present
petition for lack of merit. The resolution of the respondent House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal dated October 12, 1995 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 111624-25 March 9, 1995
ALFONSO C. BINCE, JR., petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF PANGASINAN,
MUNICIPAL BOARDS OF CANVASSERS OF TAYUG AND SAN MANUEL, PANGASINAN AND
EMILIANO MICU, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
Petitioner Alfonso C. Bince, Jr. and private respondent Emiliano S. Micu were among the
candidates in the synchronized elections of May 11, 1992 for a seat in the Sanguniang
Panlalawigan of the Province of Pangasinan allotted to its Sixth Legislative District.
Ten (10) municipalities, including San Quintin, Tayug and San Manuel, comprise the said district.
During the canvassing of the Certificates of Canvass (COC's) for these ten (10) municipalities by
respondent Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBC) on May 20, 1992, private respondent Micu
objected to the inclusion of the COC for San Quintin on the ground that it contained false
statements. Accordingly, the COCs for the remaining nine (9) municipalities were included in the
canvass. On May 21, 1992, the PBC rules against the objection of private respondent. 1 From the
said ruling, private respondent Micu appealed to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), which
docketed the case as SPC No. 92-208.
On June 6, 1992, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a resolution which reads:
Acting on the appeal filed by petitioner-appellant Atty. Emiliano S. Micu to the ruling of the
Provincial Board of Canvassers of Pangasinan, dated May 21, 1992, the Commission en banc
tabulated the votes obtained by candidates Atty. Emiliano S. Micu and Atty. Alfonso C. Bince for
the position of Sangguniang Panlalawigan member of the province of Pangasinan, using as basis
thereof the statement of votes by precinct submitted by the municipality of San Quintin,
Pangasinan, as (sic) a result of said examination, the Commission rules, as follows:
1. That the actual number of votes obtained by candidate Alfonso C. Bince in the municipality of
San Quintin, Pangasinan is 1,055 votes whereas petitioner/appellant Atty. Emiliano S. Micu
obtained 1,535 votes for the same municipality.
Accordingly, the Provincial Board of Canvassers for the province of Pangasinan is directed to
CREDIT in favor of petitioner/appellant Atty. Emiliano S. Micu with 1,535 votes and candidate
Alfonso C. Bince with 1,055 votes in the municipality of San Quintin, Pangasinan. 2
Twenty-one (21) days after the canvass of the COCs for the nine (9) municipalities was completed
on May 20, 1992, private respondent Micu together with the Municipal Boards of Canvassers
(MBCs) of Tayug and San Manuel filed with the PBC petitions for correction of the Statements of
Votes (SOVs) earlier prepared for alledged manifest errors committed in the computation thereof.
In view of the motion of herein petitioner to implement the Resolution of June 6, 1992 which was
alleged to have become final, the PBC, on June 18, 1992, credited in favor of the petitioner and
private respondent the votes for each as indicated in the said resolution and on the basis of the
COCs for San Quintin and the other nine (9) municipalities, petitioner had a total of 27,370 votes
while the private respondent had 27,369 votes. Petitioner who won by a margin of 1 vote was not,
however, proclaimed winner because of the absence of authority from the COMELEC.
Accordingly, petitioner filed a formal motion for such authority.
On June 29, 1992, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a Supplemental Order 3 directing the PBC
"to reconvene, continue with the provincial canvass and proclaim the winning candidates for
Sangguniang Panlalawigan for the Province of Pangasinan, and other candidates for provincial
offices who have not been proclaimed 4 as of that date.
In the meantime, on June 24, 1992, the PBC, acting on the petitions for correction of the SOVs of
Tayug and San Manuel filed by private respondent and the MBCs of the said municipalities, rules
"to allow the Municipal Boards of Canvassers of the municipalities of Tayug and San Manuel,
Pangasinan to correct the Statement of Votes and Certificates of Canvass and on the basis of the
corrected documents, the Board (PBC) will continue the canvass and thereafter proclaim the
winning candidate. 5
On June 25, 1992, petitioner Bince appealed from the above ruling allowing the correction alleging
that the PBC had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition. The appeal was docketed as SPC No. 92384.
On July 8, 1992, private respondent Micu filed before the COMELEC an urgent motion for the
issuance of an order directing the PBC to reconvene and proceed with the canvass. He alleged

that the promulgation of COMELEC Resolution No. 2489 on June 29, 1992 affirmed the ruling of
the PBC dated June 24, 1992. Similarly, petitioner Bince filed an urgent petition to cite Atty.
Felimon Asperin and Supt. Primo. A. Mina, Chairman and Member, respectively, of the PBC, for
Contempt with alternative prayer for proclamation as winner and Injunction with prayer for the
issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO).
On July 9, 1992, the PBC Chairman, Atty. Felimon Asperin, filed a petition with the COMELEC
seeking a "definitive ruling and a clear directive or order as to who of the two (2) contending
parties should be proclaimed" 6 averring that "there were corrections already made in a separate
sheet of paper of the Statements of Votes and Certificates of Canvass of Tayug and San Manuel,
Pangasinan which corrections if to be considered by the Board in its canvass and proclamation,
candidate Emiliano will win by 72 votes. On the other hand, if these corrections will not be
considered, candidate Alfonso Bince, Jr. will win by one (1) vote. 7 On even date, the COMELEC
promulgated its resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads:
(1) To RECONVENE immediately and complete the canvass of the Certificates of Votes, as
corrected, of the municipalities comprising the 6th District of Pangasinan;
(2) To PROCLAIM the winning candidate for Member of the provincial Board, 6th District of
Pangasinan, on the basis of the completed and corrected Certificates of Canvass, aforesaid; in
accordance with the law, the rules and guidelines on canvassing and proclamation. 8
As directed therein, the PBC on July 21, 1992, by a vote of 2-1 with its Chairman Atty. Felimon
Asperin dissenting, proclaimed candidate Bince as the duly elected member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Pangasinan. Assailing the proclamation of Bince, private respondent Micu filed an
Urgent Motion for Contempt and to Annul Proclamation and Amended Urgent Petition for Contempt
and Annul Proclamation on July 22 and 29, 1992, respectively, alleging that the PBC defied the
directive of the COMELEC in its resolution of July 9, 1992. Acting thereon, the COMELEC
promulgated a resolution on July 29, 1992, the decretal portion of which reads:
The Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES:
1. To direct Prosecutor Jose Antonio Guillermo and Supt. Primo Mina, vice-chairman and
secretayr, respectively, of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Pangasinan, to show cause why
they should not be declared in contempt of defying and disobeying the Resolution of this
Commission dated 09 July 1992, directing them to RECOVENE immediately and complete the
canvass of the Certificates of Votes as corrected, of the Municipal Boards of Canvassers of the
Municipalities comprising the 6th District of Pangasinan; and to PROCLAIM the winning candidate
of the Provincial Board, 6th District of Pangasinan, on the basis of the completed and corrected
Certificates of Canvass, aforesaid; instead they excluded the corrected Certificated of Canvass of
the Municipal Boards of Canvassers of Tayug and San Manuel, Pangasinan;
2. To ANNUL the proclamation dated 21 July 1992, by the said Provincial Board of Canvassers
(dissented by Chairman Felimon Asperin), of candidate Alfonso Bince;
3. To DIRECT the Provincial Board of Canvassers to recovene immediately and proclaim the
winning candidate for the second position of the Provincial Board, 6th District of Pangasinan, on
the basis of the completed and corrected Certificates of Canvass submitted by the Municipal
Boards of Canvassers of all the municipalities in the 6th District of Pangasinan, in accordance with
law. 9
Consequently, petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari before this Court seeking to set
aside the foregoing resolution of the COMELEC, contending that the same was promulgated
without prior notice and hearing with respect to SPC No. 92-208 and SPC No. 92-384. The case
was docketed as G.R. No. 106291.
On February 9, 1993, the Court en banc 10 granted the petition ratiocinating that:
Respondent COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in annulling the
petitioner's proclamation without the requisite due notice and hearing, thereby depriving the latter
of due process. Moreover, there was no valid correction of the SOVs and COCs for the
municipalities of Tayug and San Manuel to warrant the annullment of the petitioner's proclamation.
1. Petitioner had been proclaimed, had taken his oath of office and had assumed the position of
the second elected member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Pangasinan for
its Sixth Legislative District. Such proclamation enjoys the presumption of regularly and validity.
The ruling of the majority of the PBC to proclaim the petitioner is based on its interpretation of the
9 July 1992 Resolution of respondent COMELEC which does not expressly single out the
corrected COCs of Tayug and San Manuel; since, as of that time, the only corrected COC which
existed was that for San Quintin, which was made by the PBC on 18 June 1992, the majority of the
PBC cannot be faulted for ruling the way it did. the 9 July 1992 Resolution ( Rollo, p. 51) merely
directed it:

(1) To RECOVENE immediately and complete the canvass of the Certificates of Votes, as
corrected, of the Municipal Boards of Canvassers of the municipalities comprising the 6th District
of Pangasinan;
(2) To PROCLAIM the winning candidate for Member of the Provincial Board, 6th District of
Pangasinan, on the basis of the completed and corrected Certificates of Canvass, aforesaid; in
accordance with the law, the rules and guideline on canvassing and proclamation. (Emphasis
supplied)
The PBC thus had every reason to believe that the phrase "completed and corrected" COCs could
only refer to the nine 99) COCs for the nine municipalities, canvass for which was completed on 21
May 1992, and that of San Quintin, respectively. Verily, the above resolution is vague and
ambiguous.
Petitioner cannot be deprived of his office without due process of law. Although public office is not
property under Section 1 of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution (Article III, 1987 Constitution), and
one cannot acquire a vested right to public office (CRUZ, I.A., Constitutional Law, 1991 ed., 101), it
is, nevertheless, a protected right (BERNAS J., The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines,
vol. I, 1987 ed., 40, citing Segovia vs. Noel, 47 Phil. 543 [1925] and Borja vs. Agoncillo, 46 Phil.
432 [1924]). Due process in proceedings before the respondent COMELEC, exercising its quasijudicial functions, requires due notice and hearing, among others. Thus, although the COMELEC
possesses, in appropriate cases, the power to annul or suspend the proclamation of any candidate
(Section 248, Omnibus Election Code [B.P. Blg. 881]), We had ruled in Farinas vs. Commission on
Elections (G.R. No. 81763, 3 March 1988), Reyes vs. Commission on Elections G.R. No. 81856, 3
March 1988) and Gallardo vs. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 85974, 2 May 1989) that the
COMELEC is without power to partially or totally annul a proclamation or suspend the effects of a
proclamation without notice and hearing.
xxx xxx xxx
Furthermore, the said motion to annul proclamation was treated by the respondent COMELEC as
a Special Case (SPC) because its ruling therein was made in connection with SPC No. 92-208 and
SPC No. 92-384. Special Cases under the COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE involve the preproclamation controversies (Rule 27 in relation to Section 4(h)l Rule 1, and Section 4, Rule 7). We
have categorically declared in Sarmiento vs. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 105628, and
companion cases, 6 August 1992) that pursuant to Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987
Constitution, . . . the commission en banc does not have jurisdiction to hear and decide preproclamation cases at the first instance. Such cases should first be referred to a division
Hence, the COMELEC en banc had no jurisdiction to decide on the aforesaid to annul the
proclamation; consequently, its 29 July 1992 Resolution is motion is null and void. For this reason
too, the COMELEC en banc Resolution of 6 June 1992 in SPC No. 92-2()8 resolving the private
respondent's appeal from the ruling of the PBC with respect to the COC of San Quintin is similarly
void.
2. It is to be noted, as correctly stressed by the petitioner, that there are no valid corrected
Statements of Votes and Certificates of Canvass for Tayug and San Manuel; thus, any reference to
such would be clearly unfounded. While it may be true that on 24 June 1992, the PBC, acting on
simultaneous petitions to correct the SOVs and COCs for Tayug and San Manuel ordered the
MBCs for these two (2) municipalities to make the appropriate corrections in the said SOVs and
their corresponding COCs, none of said Boards convened to the members of actually implement
the order. Such failure could have been due to the appeal seasonably interposed by the petitioner
to the COMELEC or the fact that said members simply chose not to act thereon. As already
adverted to the so-called "corrected" Statements of Votes and Certificates of Canvass consist of
sheets of paper signed by the respective Election Registrars of Tayug (Annex "F-l" of Comment of
private respondent; Annex "A" of Consolidated Reply of petitioner) and San Manuel (Annex "F-2,
Id.; Annex "B", Id.). These are not valid corrections because the Election Registrars, as Chairmen
of the MBCs cannot, by themselves, act for their Section 225 of the respective Board. Section 225
of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) provides that "[A] majority vote of all the members of
the board of canvassers shall be necessary to render a decision." That majority means at least two
(2) of the three (3) members constituting the Board (Section 20(c) of the Electoral Reforms Law of
1987 (R.A. No. 6646) provides that the "municipal board of canvassers shall be composed of the
election registrar or a representative of the Commission, as chairman, the municipal treasurer, as
vice-chairman, and the most senior district school supervisor or in his absence a principal of the
school district or the elementary school, as members"). As to why the Election Registrars, in their
capacities as Chairmen, were 7th only ones who prepared the so-called correction sheets, is
beyond Us. There is no showing that the other members of the Boards were no longer available.

Since they are from the Province of Pangasinan, they could have been easily summoned by the
PBC to appear before it and effect the corrections on the Statements of Votes and Certificates of
Canvass.
Besides, by no stretch of the imagination can these sheets of paper be considered as the
corrected SOVs and COCs. Corrections in a Statement of Vote and a Certificate of Canvass could
only be accomplished either by inserting the authorized corrections into the SOV and COC which
were originally prepared and submitted by the MBC or by preparing a new SOV and COC
incorporating therein the authorized corrections. Thus, the statement in the 29 July 1992
Resolution of the COMELEC referring to "the Certificates of Canvass of the municipal Boards of
Canvassers of Tayug and San Manuel" (Last clause, paragraph 1 of the dispositive portion, Annex
"A" of Petition: Rollo 15), is palpably unfounded. The Commission could have 7 been misled by
Atty. Asperin's ambiguous reference to "corrections already made in separate sheets of paper of
the Statements of Votes and Certificate of Canvass of Tayug and San Manuel, Pangasinan"
(Quoted in the Resolution of 9 July 1992; Id., 50-51), in his petition asking the COMELEC to rule
on who shall be proclaimed. However, if it only took the trouble to carefully examine what was held
out to be as the corrected documents, respondent COMELEC should not have been misled.
Even if We are to assume for the sake of argument that these sheets of paper constitute sufficient
corrections, they are, nevertheless, void and of no effect. At the time the Election Registrars
prepared them on 6 July 1992 respondent COMELEC had not yet acted on the petitioner's
appeal (SPC No. 92-384) from the 24 June 1992 ruling of the PBC authorizing the corrections.
Petitioner maintains that until now, his appeal has not been resolved. The public respondent, on
the other hand, through the Office of the Solicitor General, claims that the same had been:
. . . resolved in the questioned resolution of July 29, 1992, where COMELEC affirmed respondents
(sic) Board's correction that petitioner only received 2,415 votes in Tayug and 2,179 in San Manuel
(see p. 2, Annex "A", Petition) (Rollo, p. 71)
On the same matter, the private respondent asserts that:
This SPC-92-384, is however, deemed terminated and the ruling of the PBC is likewise deemed
affirmed by virtue of the 2nd par., Sec. 16, R.A. No. 7166, supra and Comelec en banc Resolution
No. 2489, supra, dated June 29, 1992 (Id., 36);
If We follow the respondent COMELEC's contention to its logical conclusion, it was only on 29 July
1992 that SPC No. 92-384 was resolved; consequently, the so-called "correction sheets" were still
prematurely prepared. In any event, the COMELEC could not have validly ruled on such appeal in
its 29 July 1992 Resolution because the same was promulgated to resolve the Urgent Motion For
Contempt and to Annul Proclamation filed by the private respondent. Furthermore, before the
resolution of SPC No. 92-384 on the abovementioned date, no hearing was set or conducted to
resolve the pending motion. Therefore, on this ground alone, the 29 July 1992 Resolution, even if it
was meant to resolve the appeal, is a patent nullity for having been issued in gross violation of the
requirement of notice and hearing mandated by Section 246 of the Omnibus Election Code, in
relation to Section 18 of R.A. No. 7166 and Section 6, Rule 27 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, and for having been resolved by the COMELEC en banc at the first instance. The case
should have been referred first to a division pursuant to Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987
constitution and Our ruling in Sarmiento vs. Commission on Elections. Moreover, the COMELEC's
claim that the questioned resolution affirmed the correction made by the Board is totally baseless.
The PBC did not make any corrections. It merely ordered the Municipal Boards of Canvassers of
Tayug and San Manuel to make such corrections. As earlier stated, however, the said MBCs did
not convene to make these corrections. It was the Chairmen alone who signed the sheets of paper
purporting to be corrections.
For being clearly inconsistent with the intention and official stand of respondent COMELEC, private
respondent COMELEC private respondent's theory of termination under the second paragraph of
Section 16 of R.A. No. 7166, and the consequent affirmance of the ruling of the PBC ordering the
correction of the number of votes, must necessarily fail.
The foregoing considered, the proclamation of the private respondent on, 13 August 1992 by the
Provincial Board of Canvassers of Pangasinan is null and void.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenged resolution of the respondent
Commission on Elections of 29 July 1992 and the proclamation of the private respondent on 13
August 1992 as the second Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of
Pangasinan, representing its Sixth Legislative District ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and respondent
Commission on Elections is DIRECTED to resolve the pending incidents conformably with the
foregoing disquisitions and pronouncements.
No costs.

SO ORDERED. 11
On February 23, 1993, private respondent Micu filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion before the
COMELEC praying that the latter hear and resolve the pending incidents referred to by this Court.
Private respondent was obviously referring to SPC No. 92-208 and SPC No. 92-384, both cases
left unresolved by the COMELEC.
Consequently, the First Division of the COMELEC set the cases for hearing on March 8, 1993.
During the hearing, both Micu and Bince orally manifested the withdrawal of their respective
appeals. Also withdrawn were the petitions to disqualify Atty. Asperin and to cite the Board for
contempt. The parties agreed to file their respective memoranda/position papers by March 15,
1993.
Petitioner Bince filed his Position Paper on March 12, 1993 arguing that the withdrawal of SPC No.
92-208 affirmed the ruling of the PBC dated May 21, 1992 and even if it were not withdrawn,
Section 16 of R.A. 7166 would have worked to terminate the appeal. Bince likewise asserts that
his appeal in SPC No. 92-384 became moot and academic in view of this Court's ruling nullifying
the June 24, 1992 order of the PBC granting the petitions for correction of the SOVs and COCs of
Tayug and San Manuel aside from being superseded by the PBC ruling proclaiming him on July
21, 1992.
On the other hand, private respondent Micu, in his Position Paper filed on March 15, 1993
postulated that the petitions filed on June 11, 1992 for the correction of the SOVs and COCs of
Tayug and San Manuel under Section 6 of Rule 27 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, as well as
the ruling of the PBC of June 24, 1992 granting the same were valid so that the withdrawal of
Bince's appeal in SPC No. 92-384 firmly affirmed the PBC ruling of June 24, 1992 allowing the
corrections.
On July 15, 1993, the First Division of the COMELEC promulgated a Resolution, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
Viewed from the foregoing considerations, the Commission (First Division) holds that the petitioner
Alfonso C. Bince Jr. is entitled to sit as member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sixth District of
Pangasinan.
ACCORDINGLY, the Commission (First Division) RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to
AFFIRM the proclamation of petitioner Alfonso C. Bince, Jr. by the Provincial Board of Canvassers
of Pangasinan on 21 July 1992 as the duly elected member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
the Sixth District of the Province of Pangasinan. 12
On July 20, 1993, private respondent Micu filed a Motion for reconsideration of the above-quoted
resolution.
On September 9, 1993, the COMELEC en banc granted the private respondentls motion for
reconsideration in a resolution which dispositively reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Emiliano
S. Micu is granted. The Resolution of the Commission First Division is hereby SET ASIDE. The
proclamation of petitioner Alfonso Bince, Jr. on July 21, 1992 is hereby declared null and void.
Accordingly, the Provincial Board of Canvassers is hereby directed to reconvene, with proper
notices, and to order the Municipal Board of Canvassers of San Manuel and Tayug to make the
necessary corrections in the SOVs and COCs in the said municipalities. Thereafter, the Provincial
Board of Canvassers is directed to include the results in the said municipalities in its canvass.
The PBC is likewise ordered to proclaim the second elected member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of the Sixth Legislative District of Pangasinan.
SO ORDERED. 13
This is the resolution assailed in the instant petition for certiorari.
We do not find merit in this petition and accordingly rule against petitioner.
Respondent COMELEC did not act without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in
annulling the proclamation of petitioner Alfonso Bince, Jr. and in directing the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Pangasinan to order the Municipal Boards of Canvassers of Tayug and San Manuel
to make the necessary corrections in the SOVs and COCs in said municipalities and to proclaim
the winner in the sixth legislative district of Pangasinan.
At the outset, it is worthy to observe that no error was committed by respondent COMELEC when
it resolved the "pending incidents" of the instant case pursuant to the decision of this Court in the
aforesaid case of Bince, Jr. v. COMELEC on February 9, 1993 Petitioner's contention that his
proclamation has long been affirmed and confirmed by this Court in the aforesaid case is baseless.
In Bince, we nullified the proclamation of private respondent because the same was done without
the requisite due notice and hearing, thereby depriving the petitioner of his right to due process. In
so doing, however, we did not affirm nor confirm the proclamation of petitioner, hence, our directive

to respondent COMELEC to resolve the pending incidents of the case so as to ascertain the true
and lawful winner of the said elections. In effect, petitioner's proclamation only enjoyed the
presumption of regularity and validity of an official act. It was not categorically declared valid.
Neither can the COMELEC be faulted for subsequently annulling the proclamation of petitioner
Bince on account of a mathematical error in addition committed by respondent MBCs in the
computation of the votes received by both petitioner and private respondent.
The petitions to correct manifest errors were filed on time, that is, before the petitioner's
proclamation on July 21, 1992. The petition of the MBC of San Manuel was filed on June 4, 1992
while that of still, the MBC of Tayug was filed on June 5, 1992. Still, private respondent's petition
was filed with the MBCs of Tayug and San Manuel on June 10, 1992 and June 11, 1992,
respectively, definitely well within the period required by Section 6 (now Section 7), Rule 27 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Section 6 clearly provides that the petition for correction may be
filed at any time before proclamation of a winner, thus:
Sec. 6. Correction of errors in tabulation or tallying of results by the board of canvassers. (a)
Where it is clearly shown before proclamation that manifest errors were committed in the
tabulation or tallying of election returns, or certificates of canvass, during the canvassing as where
(1) a copy of the election returns of one precinct or two or more copies of a certificate of canvass
was tabulated more than once, (2) two copies of the election returns or certificate of canvass were
tabulated separately, (3) there had been a mistake in the adding or copying of the figures into the
certificate of canvass or into the statement of votes, or (4) so-called election returns from nonexistent precincts were included in the canvass, the board may, motu propio, or upon verified
petition by any candidate, political party, organization or coalition of political parties, after due
notice and hearing, correct the errors committed.
(b) The order for correction must be in writing and must be promulgated.
(c) Any candidate, political party, organization or coalition of political parties aggrieved by said
order may appeal therefrom to the Commission within twenty-four (24) hours from the
promulgation.
(d) Once an appeal is made, the board of canvassers shall not proclaim the winning candidates,
unless their votes are not affected by the appeal.
(e) The appeal must implead as respondents all parties who may be adversely affected thereby.
(f) Upon receipt of the appeal, the Clerk of Court concerned shall forthwith issue summons,
together with a copy of the appeal, to the respondents.
(g) The Clerk of Court concerned shall immediately set the appeal for hearing.
(h) The appeal shall be heard an decided by he Commission en banc (Emphasis ours).
The rule is plain and simple. It needs no other interpretation contrary to petitioner's protestation.
Assuming for the sake of argument that the petition was filed out of time, this incident alone will not
thwart the proper determination and resolution of the instant case on substantial grounds.
Adherence to a technicality that would put a stamp of validity on a palpably void proclamation, with
the inevitable result of frustrating the people's will cannot be countenanced. In Benito v.
COMELEC, 14 categorically declared that:
. . . Adjudication of cases on substantive merits and not on technicalities has been consistently
observed by this Court. In the case of Juliano vs. Court of Appeals (20 SCRA 808) cited in
Duremdes vs. Commission on Elections (178 SCRA 746), this Court had the occasion to declare
that:
Well-settled is the doctrine that election contests involve public interest, and technicalities and
procedural barriers should not be allowed to stand if they constitute an obstacle to the
determination of the true will of the electorate in the choice of their elective officials. And also
settled is the rule that laws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that
the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical
objections (Gardiner v. Romulo, 26 Phil. 521; Galang v. Miranda, 35 Phil. 269; Jalandoni v. Sarcon,
G.R. No.
L-6496, January 27, 1962; Macasunding v. Macalanang, G.R. No.
L-22779, March 31, 1965; Cauton v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. L-25467, April 27, 1967).
In an election case the court has an imperative duty to ascertain all means within its command
who is the real candidate elected by the electorate (Ibasco v. Ilao, G.R. No. L-17512, December
29, 1960). . . . (Juliano vs. Court of Appeals, supra, pp. 818-819). (Emphasis ours)
In the later case of Rodriguez vs. Commission on Elections (119 SCRA 465), this doctrine was
reiterated and the Court went on to state that:
Since the early case of Gardiner v. Romulo (26 Phil. 521), this Court has made it clear that it
frowns upon any interpretation of the law or the rules that would hinder in any way not only the free

and intelligent casting of the votes in an election but also the correct ascertainment of the results,
This bent or disposition continues to the present. (Id., at p. 474).
The same principle still holds true today. Technicalities of the legal rules enunciated in the election
laws should not frustrate the determination of the popular will.
Undoubtedly therefore, the only issue that remains unresolved is the allowance of the correction of
what are purely mathematical and/or mechanical errors in the addition of the votes received by
both candidates. It does not involve the opening of ballot boxes; neither does it involve the
examination and/or appreciation of ballots. The correction sought by private respondent and
respondent MBCs of Tayug and San Manuel is correction of manifest mistakes in mathematical
addition. Certainly, this only calls for a mere clerical act of reflecting the true and correct votes
received by the candidates by the MBCs involved. In this case, the manifest errors sought to be
corrected involve the proper and diligent addition of the votes in the municipalities of Tayug and
San Manuel, Pangasinan.
In Tayug, the total votes received by petitioner Bince was erroneously recorded as 2,486 when it
should only have been 2,415. Petitioner Bince, in effect, was credited by 71 votes more.
In San Manuel, petitioner Bince received 2,179 votes but was credited with 6 votes more, hence,
the SOV reflected the total number of votes as 2,185. On the other hand, the same SOV indicated
that private respondent Micu garnered 2,892 votes but he actually received only 2,888, hence was
credited in excess of 4 votes.
Consequently, by margin of 72 votes, private respondent indisputably won the challenged seat in
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the sixth district of Pangasinan. Petitioner's proclamation and
assumption into public office was therefore flawed from the beginning, the same having been
based on a faulty tabulation. Hence, respondent COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in setting aside the illegal proclamation.
As a parting note, we reiterate' our concern with respect to insignificant disputes plaguing this
Court. Trifles such as the one at issue should not, as much as possible, reach this Court, clog its
docket, demand precious judicial time and waste valuable taxpayers' money, if they can be settled
below without prejudice to any party or to the ends of justice.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 125629. March 25, 1998]
MANUEL C. SUNGA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FERDINAND B.
TRINIDAD, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure seeks to
annul and set aside, for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, the 17 May 1996 Resolution of the COMELEC 2nd Division in Sunga v.
Trinidad, SPA No. 95-213,[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif] dismissing the petition for disqualification against
private respondent Ferdinand B. Trinidad pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2050
promulgated 3 November 1988, as amended by COMELEC Resolution No. 2050-A promulgated 8
August 1990, and 30 July 1996 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc affirming the 17 May 1996
Resolution of the COMELEC 2nd Division.
Petitioner Manuel C. Sunga was one of the candidates for the position of Mayor in the
Municipality of Iguig, Province of Cagayan, in the 8 May 1995 elections. Private respondent
Ferdinand B. Trinidad, then incumbent mayor, was a candidate for re-election in the same
municipality.
On 22 April 1995 Sunga filed with the COMELEC a letter-complaint [if !supportFootnotes][2][endif] for
disqualification against Trinidad, accusing him of using three (3) local government vehicles in his
campaign, in violation of Sec. 261, par. (o), Art. XXII, of BP Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code, as
amended). On 7 May 1995, Sunga filed another letter-complaint [if !supportFootnotes][3][endif] with the
COMELEC charging Trinidad this time with violation of Sec. 261, par. (e) (referring to threats,
intimidation, terrorism or other forms of coercion) of the Omnibus Election Code, in addition to the
earlier violation imputed to him in the first letter-complaint. This was followed by an Amended
Petition[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif] for disqualification consolidating the charges in the two (2) letterscomplaint, including vote buying, and providing more specific details of the violations committed by
Trinidad. The case was docketed as SPA No. 95-213.

In a Minute Resolution dated 25 May 1995, [if !supportFootnotes][5][endif] the COMELEC 2nd Division
referred the complaint to its Law Department for investigation. Hearings were held wherein Sunga
adduced evidence to prove his accusations. Trinidad, on the other hand, opted not to submit any
evidence at all.
Meanwhile, the election results showed that Trinidad garnered the highest number of
votes, while Sunga trailed second.
On 10 May 1995 Sunga moved for the suspension of the proclamation of Trinidad.
However, notwithstanding the motion, Trinidad was proclaimed the elected mayor, prompting
Sunga to file another motion to suspend the effects of the proclamation. Both motions were not
acted upon by the COMELEC 2nd Division.
On 28 June 1995 the COMELEC Law Department submitted its Report [if !supportFootnotes][6][endif] to
the COMELEC En Banc recommending that Trinidad be charged in court for violation of the
following penal provisions of the Omnibus Election Code: (a) Sec. 261, par. (a), on vote buying; (b)
Sec. 261, par. (e), on threats, intimidation, terrorism or other forms of coercion; and, (c) Sec. 261,
par. (o), on use of any equipment, vehicle owned by the government or any of its political
subdivisions. The Law Department likewise recommended to recall and revoke the proclamation of
Ferdinand B. Trinidad as the duly elected Mayor of Iguig, Cagayan; proclaim Manuel C. Sunga as
the duly elected Mayor; and, direct Sunga to take his oath and assume the duties and functions of
the office.
The COMELEC En Banc approved the findings of the Law Department and directed the
filing of the corresponding informations in the Regional Trial Court against Trinidad. Accordingly,
four (4) informations[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif] for various elections offenses were filed in the Regional Trial
Court of Tuguegarao, Cagayan. The disqualification case, on the other hand, was referred to the
COMELEC 2nd Division for hearing.
On 2 May 1996 Sunga filed a Second Urgent Motion to Suspend the Effects and Annul the
Proclamation with Urgent Motion for Early Resolution of the Petition. But in its 17 May 1996
Resolution, the COMELEC 2nd Division dismissed the petition for disqualification, holding in its
Resolution No. 2050 that
1. Any complaint for disqualification of a duly registered candidate based upon any of the grounds
specifically enumerated under Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, filed directly with the
Commission before an election in which respondent is a candidate, shall be inquired into by the
Commission for the purpose of determining whether the acts complained of have in fact been
committed x x x x
In case such complaint was not resolved before the election, the Commission may motu propio, or
on motion of any of the parties, refer the complaint to the Law Department of the Commission as
the instrument of the latter in the exercise of its exclusive power to conduct a preliminary
investigation of all cases involving criminal infractions of the election laws x x x x
2. Any complaint for disqualification based on Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to
Sec. 6 of Republic Act No. 6646 filed after the election against a candidate who has already been
proclaimed as a winner shall be dismissed as a disqualification case. However, the complaint shall
be referred for preliminary investigation to the Law Department of this Commission.
Where a similar complaint is filed after election but before proclamation of the respondent
candidate, the complaint shall, nevertheless, be dismissed as a disqualification case. However, the
complaint shall be referred for preliminary investigation to the Law Department. If, before
proclamation, the Law Department makes a prima facie finding of guilt and the corresponding
information has been filed with the appropriate trial court, the complainant may file a petition for
suspension of the proclamation of the respondent with the court before which the criminal case is
pending and said court may order the suspension of the proclamation if the evidence of guilt is
strong.
As interpreted in the case of Silvestre v. Duavit, SPA 94-003, Resolution No. 2050 provides for the
outright dismissal of the disqualification case in three cases: (1) The disqualification case was filed
before the election but remains unresolved until after the election; (2) The disqualification case
was filed after the election and before the proclamation of winners; and (3) The disqualification
case was filed after election and after proclamation.
If the instant case is deemed to have been filed upon receipt by the COMELEC of the lettercomplaint on April 26 1995, it nevertheless remained pending until after the election. If it is deemed
to have been filed upon filing of the amended petition on 11 May 1995, it was clearly filed after the
election. In either case, Resolution No. 2050 mandates the dismissal of the disqualification case.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the COMELEC En Banc, Sunga
filed the instant petition contending that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in

dismissing the petition for disqualification in that: first, Sec. 6 of RA No. 6646 requires the
COMELEC to resolve the disqualification case even after the election and proclamation, and the
proclamation and assumption of office by Trinidad did not deprive the COMELEC of its jurisdiction;
second, COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 is null and void as it contravenes Sec. 6 of R.A. No.
6646; third, the fact that COMELEC authorized the filing of four (4) informations against private
respondent for violation of the penal provisions of the Omnibus Election Code shows more than
sufficient and substantial evidence to disqualify Trinidad, and he should have been so disqualified;
and fourth, since Trinidad was a disqualified candidate, it is as if petitioner was the only candidate
entitled to be proclaimed as the duly elected mayor.
In his 17-page Comment and Manifestation dated 3 December 1996, the Solicitor General
concurred with petitioners arguments.
Private respondent, on the other hand, postulates inter alia that Sungas letters-complaint
of 22 April 1995 and 7 May 1995 were not petitions for disqualification because no filing fee was
paid by Sunga; the letters-complaint were never docketed by the COMELEC; and, no summons
was ever issued by the COMELEC and private respondent was not required to answer the letterscomplaint. It was only on 13 May 1995 when petitioner filed the so-called Amended Petition,
docketed for the first time as SPA No. 95-213. Thus, the COMELEC correctly dismissed the
disqualification case for having been filed only after the 8 May 1995 elections and the proclamation
of private respondent on 10 May 1995, pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2050.
COMELEC filed its Comment on 21 April 1997 relying heavily on Resolution No. 2050 and
the Silvestre v. Duavit[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif] ruling in support of the dismissal of the disqualification
case. The COMELEC insisted that the outright dismissal of a disqualification case was warranted
under any of the following circumstances: (a) the disqualification case was filed before the election
but was still pending (unresolved) after the election; (b) the disqualification case was filed after the
election but before the proclamation of the winner; and, (c) the disqualification case was filed after
the election and after the proclamation of the winner.
The issue in this case is whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
when it dismissed the disqualification case against private respondent Trinidad.
The petition is partly meritorious.
We find private respondents arguments on the propriety of the letters-complaint puerile.
COMELEC itself impliedly recognized in its Resolution that the petition was filed before the 8 May
1995 election in the form of letters-complaint, thus
This case originally came to the attention of this Commission on 26 April 1995 in a form of letter
from petitioner accusing respondent of utilizing government properties in his campaign and praying
for the latters immediate disqualification. Another letter dated 7 May 1995 and addressed to the
COMELEC Regional Director of Region II reiterated petitioners prayer while alleging that
respondent and his men committed acts of terrorism and violated the gun ban. Finally, on 11 May
1995, an Amended Petition was filed with the Clerk of Court of the Commission containing
substantially the same allegations as the previous letters but supported by affidavits and other
documentary evidence.
That the Amended Petition was filed only on 11 May 1995, or after the elections, is of no
consequence. It was merely a reiteration of the charges filed by petitioner against private
respondent on 26 April 1995 and 7 May 1995 or before the elections. Consequently, the Amended
Petition retroacted to such earlier dates. An amendment which merely supplements and amplifies
facts originally alleged in the complaint relates back to the date of the commencement of the
action and is not barred by the statute of limitations which expired after the service of the original
complaint.[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif]
The fact that no docket fee was paid therefor was not a fatal procedural lapse on the part
of petitioner. Sec. 18, Rule 42, of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides, If the fees above
described are not paid, the Commission may refuse to take action thereon until they are paid and
may dismiss the action or proceeding. The use of the word may indicates that it is permissive only
and operates to confer a discretion on the COMELEC whether to entertain the petition or not in
case of non-payment of legal fees. That the COMELEC acted on and did not dismiss the petition
outright shows that the non-payment of fees was not considered by it as a legal obstacle to
entertaining the same. Be that as it may, the procedural defects have been cured by the
subsequent payment of docket fees, and private respondent was served with summons, albeit
belatedly, and he submitted his answer to the complaint. Hence, private respondent has no cause
to complain that no docket fee was paid, no summons served upon him, or that he was not
required to answer.
Neither do we agree with the conclusions of the COMELEC. We discern nothing in

COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 declaring, ordering or directing the dismissal of a disqualification
case filed before the election but which remained unresolved after the election. What the
Resolution mandates in such a case is for the Commission to refer the complaint to its Law
Department for investigation to determine whether the acts complained of have in fact been
committed by the candidate sought to be disqualified. The findings of the Law Department then
become the basis for disqualifying the erring candidate. This is totally different from the other two
situations contemplated by Resolution No. 2050, i.e., a disqualification case filed after the election
but before the proclamation of winners and that filed after the election and the proclamation of
winners, wherein it was specifically directed by the same Resolution to be dismissed as a
disqualification case.
Moreover, Resolution No. 2050 as interpreted in Silvestre v. Duavit infringes on Sec. 6 of
RA No. 6646,[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif] which provides:
SEC. 6. Effects of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment
to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any
reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is
voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission
shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong (underscoring
supplied).
Clearly, the legislative intent is that the COMELEC should continue the trial and hearing of
the disqualification case to its conclusion, i.e., until judgment is rendered thereon. The word shall
signifies that this requirement of the law is mandatory, operating to impose a positive duty which
must be enforced.[if !supportFootnotes][11][endif] The implication is that the COMELEC is left with no discretion
but to proceed with the disqualification case even after the election. Thus, in providing for the
outright dismissal of the disqualification case which remains unresolved after the election, Silvestre
v. Duavit in effect disallows what RA No. 6646 imperatively requires. This amounts to a quasijudicial legislation by the COMELEC which cannot be countenanced and is invalid for having been
issued beyond the scope of its authority. Interpretative rulings of quasi-judicial bodies or
administrative agencies must always be in perfect harmony with statutes and should be for the
sole purpose of carrying their general provisions into effect. By such interpretative or administrative
rulings, of course, the scope of the law itself cannot be limited. Indeed, a quasi-judicial body or an
administrative agency for that matter cannot amend an act of Congress. Hence, in case of a
discrepancy between the basic law and an interpretative or administrative ruling, the basic law
prevails.
Besides, the deleterious effect of the Silvestre ruling is not difficult to foresee. A candidate
guilty of election offenses would be undeservedly rewarded, instead of punished, by the dismissal
of the disqualification case against him simply because the investigating body was unable, for any
reason caused upon it, to determine before the election if the offenses were indeed committed by
the candidate sought to be disqualified. All that the erring aspirant would need to do is to employ
delaying tactics so that the disqualification case based on the commission of election offenses
would not be decided before the election. This scenario is productive of more fraud which certainly
is not the main intent and purpose of the law.
The fact that Trinidad was already proclaimed and had assumed the position of mayor did
not divest the COMELEC of authority and jurisdiction to continue the hearing and eventually
decide the disqualification case. In Aguam v. COMELEC[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif] this Court held Time and again this Court has given its imprimatur on the principle that COMELEC is with authority
to annul any canvass and proclamation which was illegally made. The fact that a candidate
proclaimed has assumed office, we have said, is no bar to the exercise of such power. It of course
may not be availed of where there has been a valid proclamation. Since private respondents
petition before the COMELEC is precisely directed at the annulment of the canvass and
proclamation, we perceive that inquiry into this issue is within the area allocated by the
Constitution and law to COMELEC x x x x Really, were a victim of a proclamation to be precluded
from challenging the validity thereof after that proclamation and the assumption of office
thereunder, baneful effects may easily supervene.
It must be emphasized that the purpose of a disqualification proceeding is to prevent the
candidate from running or, if elected, from serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the election
laws. Obviously, the fact that a candidate has been proclaimed elected does not signify that his
disqualification is deemed condoned and may no longer be the subject of a separate investigation.
It is worth to note that an election offense has criminal as well as electoral aspects. Its

criminal aspect involves the ascertainment of the guilt or innocence of the accused candidate. Like
in any other criminal case, it usually entails a full-blown hearing and the quantum of proof required
to secure a conviction is beyond reasonable doubt. Its electoral aspect, on the other hand, is a
determination of whether the offender should be disqualified from office. This is done through an
administrative proceeding which is summary in character and requires only a clear preponderance
of evidence. Thus, under Sec. 4 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, petitions for disqualification
"shall be heard summarily after due notice." It is the electoral aspect that we are more concerned
with, under which an erring candidate may be disqualified even without prior criminal conviction. [if !
supportFootnotes][13][endif]

It is quite puzzling that the COMELEC never acted on Sungas motion to suspend the
proclamation of Trinidad. The last sentence of Sec. 6 of RA No. 6646 categorically declares that
the Commission may order the suspension of the proclamation of a candidate sought to be
disqualified whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. And there is not a scintilla of doubt that
the evidence of Trinidads guilt was strong as shown in the Report and Recommendation of the
COMELEC Law Department
Parenthetically, there is merit to petitioners petition against the respondent for disqualification for
the alleged commission of election offenses under Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, such as
use of armed men and act of terrorism, intimidation and coercion of voters, massive vote-buying
and others, duly supported by affidavits of witnesses and other documents. Consequently, the
petitioners evidence supporting the disqualification of respondent remain unrebutted simply
because respondent has expressly waived his right to present evidence in SPA No. 95-213 in his
Manifestation and objection to the presentation of evidence in SPA No. 95-213 dated 16 June
1995, thus the waiver is the intentional relinquishing of a known right of respondent TRINIDAD.
In fact, on the basis of this Report and Recommendation the COMELEC directed the filing
of four (4) criminal informations against Trinidad before the Regional Trial Court, an indication that
there was indeed prima facie evidence of violation of election laws.
However, Sungas contention that he is entitled to be proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor
of the Municipality of Iguig, Province of Cagayan, in the event that Trinidad is disqualified finds no
support in law and jurisprudence. The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of
votes is later disqualified for the office to which he was elected does not entitle the candidate who
obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office. The
votes cast for a disqualified person may not be valid to install the winner into office or maintain him
there. But in the absence of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy
on the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere belief that the candidate was qualified, they
should not be treated as stray, void or meaningless.[if !supportFootnotes][14][endif]
Sunga totally miscontrued the nature of our democratic electoral process as well as the
sociological and psychological elements behind voters preferences. Election is the process of
complete ascertainment of the expression of the popular will. Its ultimate purpose is to give effect
to the will of the electorate by giving them direct participation in choosing the men and women who
will run their government. Thus, it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the
constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or
plurality of votes is proclaimed winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the
majority of whom have positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose him. [if !
supportFootnotes][15][endif]

While Sunga may have garnered the second highest number of votes, the fact remains
that he was not the choice of the people of Iguig, Cagayan. The wreath of victory cannot be
transferred from the disqualified winner to the repudiated loser because the law then as now only
authorizes a declaration of election in favor of the person who has obtained a plurality of votes and
does not entitle a candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. [if !
supportFootnotes][16][endif]
In Aquino v. COMELEC,[if !supportFootnotes][17][endif] this Court made the following
pronouncement:
To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes would be to
substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer is just that, a second placer.
He lost the elections. He was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be
considered the first among qualified candidates because in a field which excludes the disqualified
candidate, the conditions would have substantially changed. We are not prepared to extrapolate
the results under such circumstances.
Also, what Sunga wants us to do is to disregard the express mandate of Sec. 44, RA No.
7160,[if !supportFootnotes][18][endif] which provides in part Sec. 44. Permanent vacancies in the office of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, Vice-Mayor. -

(a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the Governor or Mayor, the Vice-Governor or
Vice-Mayor concerned shall become the Governor or Mayor x x x x
For purposes of this chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official fills a
higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office,
voluntarily resigns or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office
xxxx
This provision is echoed in Art. 83 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local
Government Code of 1991.
The language of the law is clear, explicit and unequivocal, thus admits no room for
interpretation but merely application. This is the basic legal precept. Accordingly, in the event that
Trinidad is adjudged to be disqualified, a permanent vacancy will be created for failure of the
elected mayor to qualify for the said office. In such eventuality, the duly elected vice-mayor shall
succeed as provided by law.[if !supportFootnotes][19][endif]
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The 17 May 1996 and 30 July 1996
Resolutions of the COMELEC are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. COMELEC is ordered to
REINSTATE SPA No. 95-213, "Manuel C. Sunga v. Ferdinand B. Trinidad, for disqualification, and
ACT on the case taking its bearings from the opinion herein expressed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 126669. April 27, 1998]
ERNESTO M. PUNZALAN, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FERDINAND D.
MENESES, respondents.
[G.R. No. 127900. April 27, 1998]
FERDINAND D. MENESES, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ERNESTO M.
PUNZALAN, respondents.
[G.R. No. 128800. April 27, 1998]
ERNESTO M. PUNZALAN, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FERDINAND D.
MENESES, respondents.
[G.R. No. 132435. April 27, 1998]
ERNESTO M. PUNZALAN, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FERDINAND D.
MENESES, respondents.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
Danilo Manalastas, Ferdinand Meneses and Ernesto Punzalan were among the four (4)
candidates for mayor of the municipality of Mexico, Pampanga during the May 8, 1995 elections.
On May 24, 1995, the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) proclaimed Ferdinand
Meneses as the duly elected mayor, having garnered a total of 10,301 votes against Danilo
Manalastas 9,317 votes and Ernesto Punzalans 8,612 votes.
On May 30, 1995, Danilo Manalastas filed an election protest docketed as Election Case
No. E-005-95 before the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, challenging the results
of the elections in the municipalitys forty-seven (47) precincts.[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif] In due time,
Ferdinand Meneses filed his answer with counter protest impugning the results in twenty-one (21)
precincts[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif] of the 47 protested by Manalastas.
On June 2, 1995, Ernesto Punzalan filed his own election protest docketed as Election
Case No. E-006-95, also before the RTC in San Fernando, Pampanga, questioning the results of
the elections in one hundred and fifty seven (157) precincts. [if !supportFootnotes][3][endif] Meneses, on his
part, filed an answer with counter-protest with respect to ninety-six (96) precincts [if !supportFootnotes][4][endif]
of the 157 protested by Punzalan.
Since the two (2) election protests involved the same parties and subject matter, they were
ordered consolidated and were jointly tried by the RTC of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 44.
Succinctly, the election contests sought the nullification of the election of Meneses
allegedly due to massive fraud, irregularities and other illegal electoral practices during the
registration and the voting as well as during the counting of votes such as:
a. the registration of flying voters;
b. the preparation of ballots by persons other than the registered electors concerned;
c. the use of electoral fraudulent practice such as the lansadera;
d. false reading of votes for the petitioner/protestant;
e. the counting of illegal and marked ballots and stray votes as votes for the respondent/protestee;
f. switching of ballots in favor of respondent/protestee;

g. tampering with the ballots for the petitioner/protestant after having been cast, so as to annul the
same or to substitute therefor illegal votes for respondent/protestee;
h. the adding of more votes to those actually counted for the respondent/protestee and the
reducing of the votes actually counted for the petitioner/protestant in the preparation of the
corresponding election return;
i. groups of two or more ballots for the respondent/protestee were written each group, by only one
(1) person;
j. one (1) ballot for the respondent/protestee written by two or more persons. [if !supportFootnotes][5][endif]
By way of counter-protest to the two (2) election protests, Meneses alleged that he, too,
was a victim of massive fraud and illegal electoral practices such as:
a. The preparation of the ballots by persons other than the registered electors concerned;
b. The use of electoral fraudulent practice known as the lansadera;
c. False reading of votes for the protestee;
d. The counting of illegal and marked ballots and stray votes for the protestant;
e. Switching of ballots in favor of of protestant;
f. Tampering with the ballots for the Protestee after having been cast, so as to annul the same or to
substitute therefor illegal votes for the protestant;
g. The adding of more votes to those actually counted for the protestant and the reducing of the
votes actually counted for the protestee in the preparation of the corresponding election returns;
h. Group of two (2) or more ballots for protestant were written, each group, by only one (1) person;
i. One (1) ballot for the protestant written by two (2) or more persons.[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif]
Finding the protests and counter-protests sufficient in form and substance, the trial court
ordered a revision of the ballots. The result of said physical count coincided with the figures
reflected in the election returns, thus: Meneses - 10,301 votes; Manalastas - 9,317 votes; and
Punzalan - 8,612 votes.
After hearing the election protests, the trial court rendered judgment on September 23,
1996 with the following findings, viz: that massive fraud, illegal electoral practices and serious
anomalies marred the May 8, 1995 elections; that ballots, election returns and tally sheets
pertaining to Precinct Nos. 8, 20, 41, 53, 68, 68-A and 70 disappeared under mysterious
circumstances; and that filled-up ballots with undetached lower stubs and groups of ballots with
stubs cut out with scissors were found inside ballot boxes. Because of these irregularities, the trial
court was constrained to examine the contested ballots and the handwritings appearing thereon
and came up with the declaration that Punzalan was the winner in the elections. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. In EPC No. E-005-95 declaring Ferdinand D. Meneses as having garnered 7,719 votes or 33
votes more than the 7,686 votes received by Danilo D. Manalastas and dismissing the instant
protest.
2. In EPC No. E-006-95 declaring Ernesto M. Punzalan as the duly elected Municipal Mayor of
Mexico, Pampanga. Protestee Ferdinand D. Meneses is hereby ordered to vacate his position and
to cease and desist from further discharging the duties and functions officially vested in the Office
of the Municipal Mayor of Mexico, Pampanga which now and henceforth, unless otherwise
disqualified by law, are conferred unto and in favor of Ernesto M. Punzalan, who is hereby ordered
to act, perform and discharge the duties, functions and responsibilities and all incidents
appertaining to and in connection with the Office of the Municipal Mayor of Mexico, Pampanga,
immediately and after he shall have taken his oath of office as such.
3. The counterclaims interposed by Ferdinand D. Meneses in both cases are hereby dismissed.
The authorities concerned are hereby ordered to enforce, implement and assist in the enforcement
and implementation of this Decision immediately after Ernesto M. Punzalan shall have had taken
his oath of office.
As soon as this Decision becomes final, let notice thereof be sent to the Commission on Elections,
Department of Interior and Local Governments and Commission on Audit.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif]
Immediately thereafter, Meneses filed a notice of appeal from the aforesaid decision
declaring Punzalan as the duly elected mayor of Mexico, Pampanga. The case was docketed as
EAC No. 48-96 by the COMELEC. Manalastas did not appeal from the said decision.
On October 1, 1996, Punzalan filed a motion for execution pending appeal with the RTC in
San Fernando, Pampanga. On the same day, the COMELEC issued an order directing the RTC to
elevate the entire records of the case.

On October 10, 1996, the RTC issued an order which granted Punzalans motion for
execution pending appeal. On the same date, Meneses filed before the COMELEC a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or
preliminary injunction, docketed as SPR No. 47-96, seeking the nullification of the RTCs order of
execution pending appeal.
On October 11, 1996, the COMELEC issued a TRO enjoining the RTC from enforcing its
Order dated October 10, 1996.
On October 22, 1996, Meneses filed with the COMELEC a motion for contempt against
Punzalan, alleging that the latter was holding the office of mayor of Mexico, Pampanga in violation
of the TRO issued by the COMELEC.
On October 28, 1996, Punzalan filed before this Court a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and declaratory relief with application for a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining
order, docketed as G.R. No. 126669, to set aside the COMELECs TRO issued on October 11,
1996.
On November 7, 1996, the COMELEC issued two (2) orders, one which submitted for
resolution Meneses application for a writ of preliminary injunction and motion for contempt and
another which granted a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of the RTCs order
of execution dated October 10, 1996.
On November 12, 1996, this Court issued a TRO directing the COMELEC to cease and
desist from enforcing the TRO it issued on October 11, 1996 in SPR No. 47-96.
On November 21, 1996, Punzalan filed before this Court a supplement to the petition
seeking to declare as void the COMELECs preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction and to
declare Meneses in contempt of court.
On January 9, 1997, the COMELEC issued an order which dispositively read as follows:
Considering that the 7 November 1996 preliminary injunction of the Commission was
pursuant to its 11 October 1996 temporary restraining order, which was specifically covered by the
Supreme Courts temporary restraining order, the Commission will respect and abide by the order
of the Supreme Court. Considering, however, that the temporary restraining order of the Supreme
Court relates only to the implementation of the order of execution of judgment pending appeal of
the Regional Trial Court, the Commission finds no legal impediment to proceed with the resolution
of the main action for certiorari pending before it and shall act accordingly.
On January 30, 1997, the COMELEC issued an order stating that: 1) it need not act on
Meneses motion reiterating the prayer to suspend pendente lite the implementation of the Order
dated January 9, 1997, and 2) the Order dated January 9, 1997 shall take effect thirty (30) days
from notice thereof to the parties.
On February 10, 1997, Meneses filed with this Court a petition for certiorari with prayer for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, docketed as
G.R. No. 127900, which sought to set aside the COMELEC Orders dated January 9 and 30, 1997.
On April 24, 1997, the COMELEC issued a resolution granting the petition of Meneses to
set aside the RTCs order of execution pending appeal and allowing Meneses to continue to
discharge the duties and functions of municipal mayor of Mexico, Pampanga, without prejudice to
the resolution of his pending appeal from the RTCs decision.
On April 28, 1997, Punzalan filed with this Court a petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R.
No. 128000, which sought to nullify the COMELECs Resolution dated April 24, 1997.
On December 8, 1997, the COMELEC promulgated a resolution in EAC No. 48-96 setting
aside the trial courts decision and affirming the proclamation of Meneses by the MBC as the duly
elected mayor of Mexico, Pampanga, thusly:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the court a quo in Election Protest Case No.
E-006-95 declaring protestant-appellee Ernesto M. Punzalan as the duly elected Mayor of the
Municipality of Mexico, Pampanga in the May 8, 1995 local elections is hereby ANNULLED and
SET-ASIDE.
ACCORDINGLY, the Commission [First Division] hereby AFFIRMS the proclamation of
protestee-appellant Ferdinand D. Meneses by the Municipal Board of Canvassers as the duly
elected Mayor of Mexico, Pampanga but with the modification that protestee-appellant received
only 9,864 votes, or a deduction of 437 votes from his original 10,301 votes. Further, this
Commission [First Division] hereby COMMANDS protestant-appellee Ernesto M. Punzalan to
RELINQUISH his post in favor of protestee-appellant Ferdinand Meneses immediately upon finality
of this Resolution.[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif]
Punzalan filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid resolution. In its Resolution
dated February 13, 1998, the COMELEC denied said motion for lack of merit.

Hence, this petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction and a prayer for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order, filed on February 16, 1998 and docketed as G.R. No. 132435, to
set aside the COMELECs resolutions of December 8, 1997 and February 13, 1998. Thus,
petitioner alleges:
1. that the decision (resolution) in question is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction;
2. that it was rendered in disregard of law and the evidence;
3. that the decision (resolution) in question is a prejudged decision; and
4. that the decision (resolution) in question is the culmination of a series of acts of the public
respondent favoring the private respondent.[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif]
First. Punzalan maintains that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in
declaring as valid the ballots credited to Meneses which did not bear the signature of the BEI
chairman at the back thereof, invoking the ruling of this Court in Bautista v. Castro[if !supportFootnotes][10]
[endif]
wherein it was held that the absence of the signature of the BEI chairman in the ballot given to
a voter as required by law and the rules as proof of the authenticity of said ballot is fatal.
This contention is not meritorious.
While Section 24[if !supportFootnotes][11][endif] of Republic Act No. 7166, otherwise known as An Act
Providing For Synchronized National and Local Elections and For Electoral Reforms, requires the
BEI chairman to affix his signature at the back of the ballot, the mere failure to do so does not
invalidate the same although it may constitute an election offense imputable to said BEI chairman.
Nowhere in said provision does it state that the votes contained therein shall be nullified. It is a
well-settled rule that the failure of the BEI chairman or any of the members of the board to comply
with their mandated administrative responsibility, i.e., signing, authenticating and thumbmarking of
ballots, should not penalize the voter with disenfranchisement, thereby frustrating the will of the
people.[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif]
In the recent case of Marcelino C. Libanan v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
and Jose T. Ramirez,[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif] this Court affirmed the ruling of the Tribunal in Libanan v.
Ramirez[if !supportFootnotes][14][endif] to the effect that a ballot without BEI chairmans signature at the back is
valid and not spurious, provided that it bears any one of these other authenticating marks, to wit:
(a) the COMELEC watermark; and (b) in those cases where the COMELEC watermarks are
blurred or not readily apparent, the presence of red and blue fibers in the ballots. The Court
explained in this wise:
What should, instead, be given weight is the consistent rule laid down by the HRET that a ballot is
considered valid and genuine for as long as it bears any one of these authenticating marks, to wit:
(a) the COMELEC watermark, or (b) the signature or initials, or thumbprint of the Chairman of the
BEI; and (c) in those cases where the COMELEC watermarks are blurred or not readily apparent
to the naked eye, the presence of red or blue fibers in the ballots. It is only when none of these
marks appears extant that the ballot can be considered spurious and subject to rejection.
Similarly, Section 211 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus
Election Code of the Philippines provides that in the reading and appreciation of ballots, every
ballot shall be presumed to be valid unless there is a clear and good reason to justify its rejection.
Certainly, the inefficiency of an election officer in failing to affix his signature at the back of the
ballot does not constitute as a good and clear reason to justify the rejection of a ballot.
Second. Punzalan contends that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
declaring valid (a) the ballots wherein the signatures of the BEI chairmen were different from their
respective signatures appearing on several COMELEC documents, (b) those group of ballots
allegedly written by one (1) hand and (c) a number of single ballots written by two (2) persons. He
argues that the trial courts findings on the authenticity of said handwritings must prevail over the
findings of the COMELEC because: 1) the finding of the Regional Trial Court was based first on
the findings of the revisors with the assistance of an expert witness in the person of Atty. Desiderio
Pagui; (2) the finding of the Regional Trial Court was arrived at after an adversarial proceeding
where both parties were represented by their lawyers and the expert witness was cross-examined;
and (3) on the other hand, the findings of the public respondent were made unilaterally, without
any hearing. and without the presence of the lawyers of the parties and of the parties themselves.
[if !supportFootnotes][15][endif]

These arguments fail to persuade us.

The appreciation of the contested ballots and election documents involves a question of
fact best left to the determination of the COMELEC, a specialized agency tasked with the
supervision of elections all over the country. It is the constitutional commission vested with the
exclusive original jurisdiction over election contests involving regional, provincial and city officials,

as well as appellate jurisdiction over election protests involving elective municipal and barangay
officials. Consequently, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion or any jurisdictional infirmity or
error of law, the factual findings, conclusions, rulings and decisions rendered by the said
Commission on matters falling within its competence shall not be interfered with by this Court. [if !
supportFootnotes][16][endif]

Anent Punzalans assertion that the trial courts finding which was arrived at after an
adversarial proceeding wherein an expert witness testified and was cross-examined, should not be
interfered with by the COMELEC whose finding was arrived at without the benefit of a hearing or
the aid of an expert, it is axiomatic that the COMELEC need not conduct an adversarial proceeding
or a hearing to determine the authenticity of ballots or the handwriting found thereon. Neither does
it need to solicit the help of handwriting experts in examining or comparing the handwriting. [if !
supportFootnotes][17][endif]
In fact, even evidence aliunde is not necessary to enable the Commission to
determine the authenticity of the ballots and the genuineness of the handwriting on the ballots as
an examination of the ballots themselves is already sufficient.[if !supportFootnotes][18][endif]
In Erni v. COMELEC,[if !supportFootnotes][19][endif] we held that:
x x x. With respect to the contention that a technical examination of the ballots should have been
ordered to determine whether they had been written by two or more persons, or in groups written
by only one hand, we hold that the Commission en banc did not commit an abuse of its discretion
in denying petitioner-protestees request. The rule is settled that the Commission itself can make
the determination without the need of calling handwriting experts.
Nor was evidence aliunde necessary to enable the Commission to determine the genuineness of
the handwriting on the ballots, an examination of the ballots themselves being sufficient. x x. x.. [if !
supportFootnotes][20][endif]

In Bocobo v. COMELEC,[if !supportFootnotes][21][endif] we likewise ruled that:

x x x. Handwriting experts, while probably useful, are not indispensable in examining or comparing
handwriting; this can be done by the COMELEC itself. We have ruled that evidence aliunde is not
allowed to prove that a ballot is marked, an inspection of the ballot itself being sufficient (Penson v.
Parungao, 52 Phil. 718). x x x.[if !supportFootnotes][22][endif]
In the case at bar, the opinion of Atty. Pagui, who was claimed to be a handwriting expert,
was not binding upon the COMELEC especially so where the question involved the mere similarity
or dissimilarity of handwritings which could be determined by a comparison of existing signatures
or handwriting.[if !supportFootnotes][23][endif] Section 22 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence
explicitly authorizes the court, by itself, to make a comparison of the disputed handwriting with
writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or
proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.
In Lorenzo v. Diaz,[if !supportFootnotes][24][endif] this Court enumerated the tools to aid one in the
examination of handwriting, thus:
The authenticity of a questioned signature cannot be determined solely upon its general
characteristics, similarities or dissimilarities with the genuine signature. Dissimilarities as regards
spontaneity, rhythm , presence of the pen, loops in the strokes, signs of stops, shades, etc., that
may be found between the questioned signature and the genuine one are not decisive on the
question of the formers authenticity. The result of examination of questioned handwriting, even
with the benefit of aid of experts and scientific instruments, is, at best, inconclusive. There are
other factors that must be taken into consideration. The position of the writer, the condition of the
surface on which the paper where the questioned signature is written is placed, his state of mind,
feelings and nerves, and the kind of pen and/or paper used, played an important role on the
general appearance of the signature. Unless, therefore, there is, in a given case, absolute
absence, or manifest dearth, or direct or circumstantial competent evidence of the character of a
questioned handwriting, much weight should not be given to characteristic similarities, or
dissimilarities, between the questioned handwriting and an authentic one.[if !supportFootnotes][25][endif]
Indeed, the haste and pressure, the rush and excitement permeating the surroundings of
polling places could certainly affect the handwriting of both the voters and the election officers
manning the said precincts. The volume of work to be done and the numerous documents to be
filled up and signed must likewise be considered. Verily, minor and insignificant variations in
handwriting must be perceived as indicia of genuineness rather than of falsity.
In Go Fay v. Bank of the Philippine Islands,[if !supportFootnotes][26][endif] this Court held that
carelessness, spontaneity, unpremeditation, and speed in signing are evidence of genuineness. In
U.S. v. Kosel,[if !supportFootnotes][27][endif] it was ruled that dissimilarity in certain letters in a handwriting may
be attributed to the mental and physical condition of the signer and his position when he signed.
Grief, anger, vexation, stimulant, pressure and weather have some influence in ones writing.

Because of these, it is an accepted fact that it is very rare that two (2) specimens of a persons
signature are exactly alike.
On the issue of the genuineness of the handwriting on the ballots, it is observed that the
specimens examined by Atty. Desiderio A. Pagui, presented by Punzalan as an expert witness,
were mere certified true copies of the ballots and documents concerned. [if !supportFootnotes][28][endif] This
fact raised a cloud of doubt and made the findings suspect. Consequently, the examination of the
ballots themselves by the COMELEC should not be brushed aside. Section 23, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court explicitly authorizes the court (the COMELEC in this case) to make itself the
comparison of the disputed handwriting with writings admitted as genuine by the party whom the
evidence is offered.
Expert opinions are not ordinarily conclusive in the sense that they must be accepted as
true on the subject of their testimony, but are generally regarded as purely advisory in character;
the courts may place whatever weight they choose upon such testimony and may reject it, if they
find that it is consistent with the facts in the case or otherwise unreasonable.[if !supportFootnotes][29][endif]
In the same manner, whether or not certain ballots were marked had been addressed by
the COMELEC by personally and actually examining the ballots themselves. We find no
compelling reasons to disturb its findings.
In closing, we would like to stress a well-founded rule ensconced in our jurisprudence that
laws and statutes governing election contests especially appreciation of ballots must be liberally
construed to the end that the will of the electorate in the choice of public officials may not be
defeated by technical infirmities.[if !supportFootnotes][30][endif] An election protest is imbued with public
interest so much so that the need to dispel uncertainties which becloud the real choice of the
people is imperative.
Prescinding from the foregoing, we find that respondent COMELEC did not act with grave
abuse of discretion in G.R. No. 132435. The petitions in G.R. Nos. 126669, 127900 and 128800
are rendered moot by the preceding disquisition.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition in G.R. No. 132435 is hereby DISMISSED. The
status quo order issued by this Court on February 24, 1998 is LIFTED. The petitions in G.R. Nos.
126669, 127900 and 128800 are rendered moot and academic by the foregoing disquisition.
Further, this decision is immediately executory in view of the shortness of time between
now and the next elections and to prevent the case from becoming moot and academic.
SO ORDERED.
SERGIO BAUTISTA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JOSE P. CASTRO, In His Capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch IX (Quezon City),
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, and ROBERTO MIGUEL, respondents.
R.C. Domingo, Jr. & Associates for petitioner.
Cenon C. Sorreta for private respondent.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This petition seeks the reversal of the decision of respondent Court of First Instance (now Regional
Trial Court) of Rizal, Branch 9, Quezon City rendered in an appealed election case and which
decision proclaimed herein private respondent Roberto Miguel as the duly elected Barangay
Captain of Barangay Teachers Village East, Quezon City, in the Barangay Elections held on May
17, 1982, with a plurality of twenty-four (24) votes over herein petitioner Sergio Bautista.
Both the petitioner Sergio Bautista and private respondent Roberto Miguel were candidates for the
office above mentioned. After canvass, petitioner Bautista was proclaimed the winner by the
Barangay Board of Canvassers on May 17, 1982 with a plurality of two (2) votes.
On May 25, 1982, Roberto Miguel filed a protest before the City Court of Quezon City, (docketed
as Election Case No. 82-408) on the ground of fraud and illegal acts or practices allegedly
committed by Bautista. The latter filed an answer but filed no counter protest.
It appears that the results of the election in all the four (4) voting centers in Bgy. Teachers Village
East, Quezon City were contested. A revision and recounting of the ballots was conducted which
resulted in a tie. The votes obtained by both of the protagonists were as follows:
1. In Voting Center. No. 519:
MIGUEL = 126 votes
BAUTISTA = 180 votes
Protestant-appellant contested the ruling of the lower Court on the following ballots: Exhs. a, b, c,

d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, m, n, and o.
Protestee-appellee contested the ruling of the lower Court on the following ballots: Exhs. 1, 2, 3, 4
and 5.
2. In Voting Center No. 520:
MIGUEL = 152 votes
BAUTISTA = 122 votes
Protestant-appellant contested the ruling of the lower Court on the following ballots: Exhs. P, Q and
R.
3. In Voting Center No. 521:
MIGUEL = 150 votes
BAUTISTA = 136 votes
Protestant-appellant contested the ruling of the lower Court on the following ballots: Exhs. 6 and 7.
4. In Voting Center No. 522:
MIGUEL = 222 votes
BAUTISTA = 212 votes
Protestant-appellant contested the ruling of the lower Court on the following ballots: Exhs. AA, BB,
BB-1, BB-2 and CC.
Protestee-appellee contented the ruling of the lower court on the following ballots: Exhs. 8, 9, 9-a
10, 10-a, 11, 11-a, 12, 12-a, 13, 14, 14-a, 15, 15-a, 16 and 16-a.
5. Total Votes in all Voting Centers Nos. 519, 520, 521 and 522:
MIGUEL = 650
BAUTISTA = 650 (pp. 11-12, Rollo)
The trial court rendered a decision the dispositive portion of which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, Roberto Miguel is hereby declared to have received the same number of votes
as the protestee Sergio Bautista for the position of Bgy. Captain of Bgy. Teachers Village East,
Quezon City. (p. 12, Rollo)
From this decision of the city court, protestant Roberto Miguel filed an appeal to the Court of First
Instance of Rizal. * On July 29, 1982, judgment was rendered on the appeal which, as stated in the
first portion of this decision, declared protestant Roberto Miguel the duly elected Barangay Captain
of Bgy. Teachers Village East, Quezon City and setting aside as null and void the proclamation of
protestee Sergio Bautista. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring and proclaiming protestant-appellant
ROBERTO MIGUEL as the duly elected Barangay Captain of Barangay Teachers Village East,
Quezon City, in the Barangay elections held on May 17, 1982 with a plurality of twenty-four (24)
votes over and above his protagonist protestee-appellee SERGIO BAUTISTA; setting aside as null
and void the proclamation of protestee-appellee as the elected Barangay Captain made by the
Barangay Board of Canvassers on May 17, 1982; sentencing protestee-appellee to pay protestantappellant the costs and expenses that the latter has incurred in this protest, in accordance with
Sec. 7, of COMELEC Resolution no. 1568, to wit:
P 25.00 for filing and research fee for petition of
protest
2,500.00 for cash deposit for expenses for revision of
ballots;
25.00 for appellant docket and research fee;
50.00 for appeal bond deposit;
P 2,600.00 Total
The Clerk of Court is hereby directed to furnish 4 copies of this Decision to the Commission on
Elections, the Ministry of Local Governments, the Commission on Audit, and the Secretaries of the
Sangguniang Bayan and Sangguniang Barangay, in accordance with Sec. 15 of Comelec
Resolution No. 1566.
SO ORDERED. (pp. 87-88, Rollo)
Petitioner Sergio Bautista filed the instant petition for review by certiorari on August 13, 1982 on
the following questions of law:
1) Whether or not the supposed opinion of a person, who was brought by private respondent but
who was never presented as a witness, is competent and admissible evidence to support the
appellate court's (CFI) conclusion that no less than eighteen (18) votes cast in favor of your
petitioner were written by one and the same person.
2) Whether or not a ballot which does not contain the signature of the poll chairman be considered
a valid ballot.
3) Whether or not respondent Judge acted correctly in its appreciation of the contested ballots

(Exhibits "Z", "Z-I", "S", "5", "6", "7").

Considering that the term for the contested office had expired on June 7, 1988, 1 this petition has
become moot and academic. However, this case had already been submitted for decision as early
as December 19, 1984, prior to the expiration of the contested office. Hence, We deem it proper to
resolve this case on the merits and determine the true winner of that elections.
Anent the first question, petitioner Bautista questions the reliance by respondent court on the
opinion of one Desiderio A. Pagui, who was never presented and qualified as an expert witness.
The report of Pagui allegedly appeared only in the records of the case on file with the CFI which
was attached in the Memorandum for Protestant Miguel.
The ballots involved in this objection of petitioner are exhibits "B" to "O" which all pertained to
voting center No. 519 and Exhibits "T", "T-l", "U", "U-l", "V" and "V-1" from voting center No. 521.
Respondent court ruled:
b) Exhs. B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K, L, M, N and O were counted by the lower court for BAUTISTA,
over the objection of protestant-appellant that these ballots were written by a single hand. These
ballots and the writings therein contained were the subject of QUESTIONED HANDWRITINGS
EXAMINATIONS and PDIL REPORT NO. 09-682 of Atty. Desiderio A. Pagui, Examiner of
Questioned Documents (Ret. Chief Document Examiner, NBI), who was allowed by the lower court
to assist it in the appreciation of ballots contested by either party as having been written by a
single hand and to take photographs of the questioned ballots, his report and photographs having
been submitted by protestant-appellant to this Court accompanying his memorandum. The
pertinent portions of the FINDINGS in the said report read as follows:
Comparative examinations between and among the various letter designs, their structural
constructions and other characteristics appearing in Exhibits "B" to "O" inclusive, "T", "T-1", "U",
"U-I", "V" and "V-l", reveal the existence of significant identifying handwriting characteristics, more
particularly in
l. general style of writings;
2. size and propertion (sic) of letter designs; base and height alignments; and relationship between
adjacent letters;
3. lateral spacing; and initial and terminal strokes;
4. structural constructions and more perplexed elements embedded in the structures of letter
forms; and such characteristics are exemplified in the following words/ names: . . .; and the
scientific evaluation of the aforementioned writing characteristics includes the consideration of the
idiosyncrasies of natural variation as shown in the numerous similar letter forms, although at some
instances, the writer succeeded in having changed the entire letter designs of certain letters (at
different style), but somehow certain significant writing characteristics reappeared in the various
letters during the process of writing, thus be able to connect one writing from the others as having
emanated from one source."
The probative value of the above-mentioned writing characteristics are further augmented by the
presence of unusual structural construction of letter forms and/or in combinations with adjacentletters, thus . . .
The CONCLUSION of the said report states:
The questioned handwritings appearing in Exhs. "B" to "O", inclusive, "T", "T-1", "U", "V" and "V-l",
were WRITTEN BY ONE AND THE SAME PERSON.
Notwithstanding this report, this Court has taken pains and meticulous effort to examine with its
naked eye the questioned ballots and handwritings, and compare the same with each other in
order to determine whether or not they were indeed written by a single hand, and this Court is
convinced beyond doubt that Exhs. B, C, D, E, F, G, H, K, L, M, N and O, were written by a single
hand, considering the remarkable similarity if not almost identity of the writings on these ballots.
The lower Court's ruling on these twelve (12) ballots is hereby reversed, and the twelve (12) votes
for protestee-appellee based thereon should be deducted from him.
With respect to Exhs. I and J, this Court entertains some doubt on their having been written by a
single hand, and therefore resolves the doubt in favor of the validity of these two (2) ballots, as
votes for protestee-appellee. Therefore, the ruling of the lower Court counting Exhs. I and J for
protestee-appellee stands. (pp. 78-80, Rollo)
The contention of petitioner that respondent court relied on the report of an alleged handwriting
expert is misplaced. It should be noted that while respondent court considered the report of Atty.
Pagui, it did not rely solely on the said report. In the words of respondent court, "(I)t has taken
pains and meticulous effort to examine with its naked eye the questioned ballots and handwritings
and compare the same with each other . . ." In fact, in its effort to determine the true value of the
contested ballots and in order not to disenfranchise bona fide voters, it counted certain ballots in

favor of petitioner which the alleged handwriting expert found as written by only one person. It
contradicted said report as regards Exhibits "I", "J", "V" and "V-1". The respondent court was
circumspect in relying on its own findings on whether or not these contested ballots were prepared
by one person. The ballots are the best evidence of the objections raised. Resort to handwriting
experts is not mandatory. Handwriting experts, while probably useful, are not indispensable in
examining or comparing handwriting, this can be done by the COMELEC (in this case, the court
taking cognizance of the appeal in this election protest) itself (Bocobo v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
94173, November 21, 1990, 191 SCRA 576).
Petitioner also argues that respondent court misinterpreted and misapplied Section 36(f) of
Comelec Resolution No. 1539. It allegedly failed to take into consideration the other provisions of
said Section 36 of the Resolution.
We do not agree. Section 36 in its entirety provides:
Sec. 36. Procedure in the casting of votes. (a) Identification of votes. The chairman shall check
in the certified list of voters the name of the person offering to vote. He shall then announce the
voter's name distinctly in a loud tone. If there is no challenge, or if having been challenged and the
question is decided in his favor, the voter shall be allowed to vote and he shall affix his signature
on the proper space of the Voting Record (Comelec Form No. 5).
(b) Delivery of ballot. Before delivering the ballot to the voter, the Chairman shall, in the
presence of the voter, the other members of the board and the watchers present, affix his
signature at the back thereof and write the serial number of the ballot in the space provided in the
ballot, beginning with No. "1" for the first ballot issued, and so on consecutively for the succeeding
ballots, which serial number shall be entered in the corresponding space of the voting record. He
shall then fold the ballot once, and without removing the detachable coupon, deliver it to the voter
together with a ball pen.
(c) Instructions to the voter. If a voter so requests, the poll clerk shall instruct him on how to fill
the ballot. The voter shall be reminded that he should fill the ballot secretly and return it folded so
as not to show the names of the candidates he voted for. He shall also be warned not to use any
other ballot; not to show the content of his ballot; not to put any mark thereon; not to erase, deface
or tear the same; and not to remove the detachable coupon.
(d) Preparing the ballot. Upon receiving the ballot, the voter shall fill the ballot secretly.
(e) Returning the ballot. (1) In the presence of all the members of the Board, the voter shall affix
his right hand thumbmark on the corresponding space in the detachable coupon; and shall give
the folded ballot to the chairman; (2) The chairman shall without unfolding the ballot or looking at
its contents, and in the presence of the voter and all the members of the Board, verify if it bears his
signature and the same serial number recorded in the voting record. (3) If the ballot is found to be
authentic, the voter shall then be required to imprint his right hand thumbmark on the proper space
in the voting record. (4) The chairman shall then detach the coupon and shall deposit the folded
ballot in the compartment for the valid ballot and the coupon in the compartment for spoiled
ballots. (5) The voter shall then leave the voting center.
(f) When ballot may be considered spoiled. Any ballot returned to the chairman with its coupon
already detached, or which does not bear the signature of the chairman, or any ballot with a serial
number that does not tally with the serial number of the ballot delivered to the voter as recorded in
the voting record, shall be considered as spoiled and shall be marked and signed by the members
of the board and shall not be counted.
The ballots concerned were marked Exhibits "BB", "BB-1" and "BB-2" from voting center No. 522.
The respondent court ruled that:
b) Exhs. BB, BB-l and BB-2 were counted by the lower court for BAUTISTA over the objection of
protestant-appellant that these ballots are not duly authenticated by the absence of the signature
of the Chairman of the Board of Election Tellers at the back thereof. An examination of the back
portion of these ballots reveals that it is completely blank of any signature or initial. The mandatory
requirement of authentication of ballots is found in Sec. 14 of B.P. 222 and in Sec. 36 of
COMELEC Resolution No. 1539, and the legal consequence for the absence of such
authentication is stated precisely in Sec. 36, sub-par. (f), and generally in Sec. 152 of the 1978
Election Code, . . . (p. 84, Rollo)
The law (Sec. 14 of B.P. 222) and the rules implementing it (Sec. 36 of Comelec Res. No. 1539)
leave no room for interpretation. The absence of the signature of the Chairman of the Board of
Election Tellers in the ballot given to a voter as required by law and the rules as proof of the
authenticity of said ballot is fatal. This requirement is mandatory for the validity of the said ballot.
As regards exhibit "Z" and "Z-l", respondent court reversed the decision of the trial court which
ruled that these were not marked ballots and hence, were valid votes for petitioner BAUTISTA. In

reversing the trial court, respondent court ruled that the presence of an arrow with the words "and
party," was meant for no other purpose than to Identify the voter.
We agree. It cannot be said that these writings were accidental. As a general rule, a voter must
write on the ballot only the names of candidates voted for the offices appearing thereon. Certain
exceptions, however, are provided in Section 149 of the Revised Election Code. For example,
prefixes such as "Sr.," "Mr.", and the like and suffixes such as "hijo", "Jr.", etc. will not invalidate the
ballot (par. 5). Initials (paragraph 15), nicknames or appellation of affection and friendship will not
invalidate the ballot, if accompanied by the name or surname of the candidate, and above all, if
they were not used as a means to identify the voter. Even under a liberal view, the words written
on the ballots under consideration cannot be considered as falling within the exception to the rule.
Consequently, they are irrelevant expressions that nullified the ballots. (Lloren v. CA, et al., No. L25907, January 25, 1967, 19 SCRA 110). Hence, respondent court excluded Exhibits "Z" and "Z-l".
Exhibit "S" (Voting Center No. 521) was excluded by respondent court as a vote for petitioner. It
held:
a) Exh. S was counted by the lower court for BAUTISTA over the objection of protestant-appellant
that this ballot was found in the small compartment of the ballot box for spoiled ballots and the said
ballots appear to be in excess of the number of ballots actually used. The records show that as
reflected in the MINUTES OF VOTING AND COUNTING OF VOTES found inside the ballot box,
(1) there were 311 voters who cast their votes, and the ballots actually used bear Serial Nos. 1311, (2) 1 voter did not return his/her ballot, 8 ballots were spoiled ballots and 302 ballots
appreciated by the Board of Election Tellers. The questioned ballot, Exh. S, together with blank
questioned ballot, was found by the Committee in the small compartment for spoiled ballots. It
does clearly appear that these two (2) ballots, one of which is Exh. S, are in excess of the 311
ballots actually used and must be considered as "EXCESS BALLOTS" under Sec. 151 of the 1978
Election Code and "shall not be read in the counting of votes." In view of the foregoing
considerations, the ruling of the lower court on Exh. S is hereby reversed, and this ballot shall not
be counted as a vote of protestee-appellee and therefore deducted from him. (pp. 81-82, Rollo)
We affirm.
Petitioner objects to respondent court's ruling rejecting Exh. "5". The word "BLBIOY" was written in
the spare for Barangay Captain. "BIBOY", petitioner's nickname was duly registered in his
certificate of candidacy. Section 155 (11) of the 1978 Election Code provides:
11. The use of nicknames and appellations of affection and friendship, if accompanied by the first
name or surname of the candidate, does not annul such vote, except when they were used as a

means to identify the voter, in which case the whole ballot is invalid: Provided, That if the nickname
used is unaccompanied by the name or surname of a candidate and it is the one by which he is
generally or popularly known in the locality and stated in his certificate of candidacy, the same
shall be counted in favor of said candidate, if there is no other candidate for the same office with
the same nickname.
While the name written was "BLBIOY", there was no doubt that the voter intended to vote for
"BIBOY", the nickname of which petitioner was popularly known and which nickname was duly
registered in his certificate of candidacy. Hence, the respondent court's decision as regards Exhibit
"5" is reversed and the vote is counted for petitioner.
Exhibit "6" was invalidated by both respondent court and the city court as stray vote on the ground
that petitioner's name, written as "Bo. Barangay Bautista" was placed on the first line intended for
councilmen. In the case of Farin v. Gonzales and CA, G.R. No. L-36893, September 28, 1973, 53
SCRA 237, cited by petitioner, it was ruled that where the name of a candidate is not written in the
proper space in the ballot but is preceded by the name of the office for which he is a candidate, the
vote should be counted as valid for such candidate. Such rule stems from the fact that in the
appreciation of the ballot, the object should be to ascertain and carry into effect the intention of the
voter, if it could be determined with reasonable certainty. In this case, while the name of petitioner
was written in the space for barangay councilman, his name was preceded by the name of the
office for which he is being elected, that as Punong Barangay or Barangay Captain (See Exh. "6").
The respondent court ruled that what was placed before the name BAUTISTA was Bo. Barangay
and not Po. Barangay for Punong Barangay (or Barangay Captain). We believe however that the
voter's intention to vote for BAUTISTA as Barangay Captain was present and said vote should be
counted in favor of petitioner.
Respondent court correctly invalidated Exhibit "7". This ballot cannot be considered as a vote for
petitioner whose name was written seven (7) times in the ballot. The writing of a name more than
twice on the ballot is considered to be intentional and serves no other purpose than to identify the
ballot (Katigbak v. Mendoza, L-24477, February 28, 1967, 19 SCRA 543).
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of respondent court is MODIFIED as regards Exhibits "5" and "6".
Private respondent Roberto Miguel in declared the duly elected Barangay Captain of Barangay
Teachers Village East, Quezon City, with a plurality of twenty-two (22) votes. The temporary
restraining order issued Court on December 2, 1982 is hereby LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.