SUBJECT: CRIMINAL LAW

BP 22: Novation Not A Mode Of Extinguishing Criminal Liability

by The Lawyer's Post March 7, 2014 Comments Off on BP 22: Novation Not A Mode Of Extinguishing Criminal
Liability

Nilo was charged for violation of BP 22 by Filipro, now Nestle. According to the complainants, due to abnormally high
orders, the company decided to check the veracity of three customers. Nilo presented to the company representatives
three checks purportedly for payment of the goods ordered by the clients. When presented for payment, the checks
bounced. The first two checks were dishonoured because of significant differences with the signature on file with the
bank, while the third check was dishonoured for insufficiency of funds. When the company representative confronted
the clients, the latter denied receiving the goods nor issuing the checks. Nilo then admitted issuing the checks from his
bank account. According to him, he resorted to credit riding in order to meet the sales targets. During trial, Nilo first
denied that the signatures on the checks were his, then admitted that the third check was issued as replacement for the
first two which bounced. The RTC convicted him, affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The CA however did not impose
on him subsidiary imprisonment because according to the CA, BP 22 is a special law which provides no subsidiary
imprisonment.
In his appeal to the Supreme Court, Nilo interposed the defense of novation, a completely different defense from the one
he used in the lower courts. According to him, because of the incompatibility between the last check (Exh. C) and the
partial payment and written undertaking he executed, there was a novation of his original obligation so that any
incipient criminal liability which he might have had under the former obligation was thereby avoided.
The Supreme Court:
It is well-settled that the following requisites must be present for novation to take place: (1) a previous valid obligation;
(2) agreement of all the parties to the new contract; (3) extinguishment of the old contract; and (4) validity of the new
one. 4
These requisites, particularly the third, were not proven in this case. As the Court of Appeals held, the transaction
became a personal undertaking of the petitioner when he received the goods for delivery but made no delivery thereof
either to the credited dealer or to the credit rider. 5 Petitioner had an existing obligation to pay she value of the goods for
which the check was issued. This obligation was not extinguished when the check was dishonored and a new agreement
was reached by the two parties to pay in cash its value. The change in the mode of paying the obligation was not a
change in any of the objects or principal conditions of the contract. As Tolentino states, neither acceptance of partial
payment nor change of place or manner of payment involves novation. For novation cannot be presumed but must be
expressly intended by the parties.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for reconsideration on the ground, inter alia, that the written
undertaking was not presented as evidence. The records of the trial court show, however, that the existence of the

written undertaking was actually admitted by the prosecution during trial, although, for some reason, it was not formally
offered in evidence by the prosecution. However that may be, whether the written undertaking was presented or not, the
fact remains that there was no novation in this case.
Nor is novation a mode of extinguishing criminal liability. As held by this Court, novation may prevent the rise of
criminal liability as long as it occurs prior to the filing of the criminal information in court. In other words, novation
does not extinguish criminal liability but may only prevent its rise.
Petitioner claims that the new agreement took effect prior to the filing of the information in court on December 15,
1981. He argues that, therefore, there could not have been any criminal liability under B.P. Blg. 22.
The argument is untenable. The fact is that the supposed new agreement never took effect as petitioner never complied
with his undertaking. In Llamado v. Court of Appeals, a similar issue arose. An agreement to partially pay the
dishonored check was made, but the accused failed to comply with his promise. This Court ruled:
[T]he novation theory recognized by this Court in certain cases does not apply in the case at bar. While private
complainant agreed to petitioners offer to pay him 10% of the amount of the check on November 14 or 15, 1983 and
the balance to be rolled over for 90 days, this turned out to be only an empty promise which effectively delayed private
complainants filing of a case for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 against petitioner and his co-accused.
The Court thus held that the novation theory does not apply where the offer to pay by the debtor, and accepted by the
creditor, turns out to be merely an empty promise. In this case, the balance of the check was never paid, as witness
Anacleto B. Palisoc testified.
Indeed, the gravamen of the offense of violating B.P. Blg. 22 is the issuance of worthless checks. In this case, petitioner
admitted issuing the check which when presented was dishonored. Though he promised to pay its value when it was
dishonored, the fact remains that at the time it was presented to the drawee bank, it was not sufficiently funded.
Petitioner, as the drawer of the check, is presumed to have knowledge of the insufficient funds, and his failure to pay the
value of the check within five banking days from notice of dishonor did not dispute this presumption. On this, the Court
of Appeals correctly affirmed the trial court.
But we think it was error for the appellate court not to impose subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency on the
ground that there is no provision in B.P. Blg. 22 allowing for such penalty. This Court has, on several occasions,
imposed subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency to pay the fine for violation of special laws, notwithstanding the
absence of such provision in said laws. In Llamado v. Court of Appeals, we imposed subsidiary imprisonment on
petitioner who was convicted of violating B.P. Blg. 22.
SECOND DIVISION, G.R. No. 114823 December 23, 1999, NILO B. DIONGZON, petitioner, vs COURT OF
APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

SUBJECT: CIVIL LAW

In Employment Contracts, A Non-involvement Clause Is Not

Necessarily Void For Being In Restraint Of Trade As Long As
There Are Reasonable Limitations As to Time, Trade, And
Place
by The Lawyer's Post May 9, 2015 0 Comments

The Facts:
Platinum Plans Inc, (Platinum) a domestic pre-need company, rehired Daisy (Tiu) as
Senior Assistant Vice-President and Territorial Head for its Hongkong and Asean
operations. One of the salient features of the employment contract signed by Daisy
with Platinum provides:
8. NON INVOLVEMENT PROVISION The EMPLOYEE further undertakes that during
his/her engagement with EMPLOYER and in case of separation from the Company,
whether voluntary or for cause, he/she shall not, for the next TWO (2) years thereafter,
engage in or be involved with any corporation, association or entity, whether directly
or indirectly, engaged in the same business or belonging to the same pre-need
industry as the EMPLOYER. Any breach of the foregoing provision shall render the
EMPLOYEE liable to the EMPLOYER in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00) for and as liquidated damages.
On September 16, 1995, Daisy stopped reporting for work, and in November, 1995,
she was hired as vice-President for Sales of Professional Plans, Inc., another domestic
pre-need company.
Invoking the non-involvement clause of their employment contract, Platinum sued
Daisy for damages before the RTC of Pasig City, for alleged violation of their noninvolvement clause. In her answer, Daisy averred that the non-involvement clause
was unenforceable as it was contrary to public policy. The restraint imposed was much
greater than was necessary to afford Platinum a fair and reasonable protection. It was
also standard practice to transfer from one company to another within the same
industry; and since their products were more or less the same, there was nothing
unique to protect. Platinum did not invest anything in her training as she was already
knowledgeable even before she was hired; and third, it unnecessarily deprives her of
her right to engage in the only work she knows.

The RTC upheld the validity clause, ratiocinating the clause is valid provided there was
a limitation in time and place; the two-year restriction provided in the contract was
reasonable and valid. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court,
ruling that Daisy freely entered into the stipulation. Thus, Daisy filed a petition for
review on certiorari to the Supreme Court.
The Issue/s:
Whether or not the non-involvement clause in the employment contract Daisy signed
with Platinum was valid and reasonable.
The Courts ruling:
As early as 1916, we already had the occasion to discuss the validity of a noninvolvement clause. In Ferrazzini v. Gsell, we said that such clause was unreasonable
1

restraint of trade and therefore against public policy. In Ferrazzini, the employee was
prohibited from engaging in any business or occupation in the Philippines for a period
of five years after the termination of his employment contract and must first get the
written permission of his employer if he were to do so. The Court ruled that while the
stipulation was indeed limited as to time and space, it was not limited as to trade.
Such prohibition, in effect, forces an employee to leave the Philippines to work should
his employer refuse to give a written permission.
In G. Martini, Ltd. v. Glaiserman , we also declared a similar stipulation as void for
2

being an unreasonable restraint of trade. There, the employee was prohibited from
engaging in any business similar to that of his employer for a period of one year. Since
the employee was employed only in connection with the purchase and export of
abaca, among the many businesses of the employer, the Court considered the
restraint too broad since it effectively prevented the employee from working in any
other business similar to his employer even if his employment was limited only to one
of its multifarious business activities.
However, in Del Castillo v. Richmond, we upheld a similar stipulation as legal,
3

reasonable, and not contrary to public policy. In the said case, the employee was
restricted from opening, owning or having any connection with any other drugstore
within a radius of four miles from the employers place of business during the time the
employer was operating his drugstore. We said that a contract in restraint of trade is
valid provided there is a limitation upon either time or place and the restraint upon
one party is not greater than the protection the other party requires.
Finally, in Consulta v. Court of Appeals, we considered a non-involvement clause in
4

accordance with Article 1306 of the Civil Code. While the complainant in that case
5

was an independent agent and not an employee, she was prohibited for one year from
engaging directly or indirectly in activities of other companies that compete with the
business of her principal. We noted therein that the restriction did not prohibit the
agent from engaging in any other business, or from being connected with any other
company, for as long as the business or company did not compete with the principals
business. Further, the prohibition applied only for one year after the termination of the
agents contract and was therefore a reasonable restriction designed to prevent acts
prejudicial to the employer.
Conformably then with the aforementioned pronouncements, a non-involvement
clause is not necessarily void for being in restraint of trade as long as there are
reasonable limitations as to time, trade, and place.
In this case, the non-involvement clause has a time limit: two years from the time
petitioners employment with respondent ends. It is also limited as to trade, since it
only prohibits petitioner from engaging in any pre-need business akin to respondents.
More significantly, since petitioner was the Senior Assistant Vice-President and
Territorial Operations Head in charge of respondents Hongkong and Asean operations,
she had been privy to confidential and highly sensitive marketing strategies of
respondents business. To allow her to engage in a rival business soon after she leaves
would make respondents trade secrets vulnerable especially in a highly competitive
marketing environment. In sum, we find the non-involvement clause not contrary to
public welfare and not greater than is necessary to afford a fair and reasonable
protection to respondent .
6

In any event, Article 1306 of the Civil Code provides that parties to a contract may
establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem
convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order,
or public policy.
Article 1159 of the same Code also provides that obligations arising from contracts
7

have the force of law between the contracting parties and should be complied with in
good faith. Courts cannot stipulate for the parties nor amend their agreement where
the same does not contravene law, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy, for to do so would be to alter the real intent of the parties, and would run
contrary to the function of the courts to give force and effect thereto. Not being
8

contrary to public policy, the non-involvement clause, which petitioner and respondent
freely agreed upon, has the force of law between them, and thus, should be complied
with in good faith.

Thus, as held by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, petitioner is bound to pay
respondent P100,000 as liquidated damages. While we have equitably reduced
liquidated damages in certain cases, we cannot do so in this case, since it appears
10

that even from the start, petitioner had not shown the least intention to fulfill the noninvolvement clause in good faith.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated January 20,
2004, and the Resolution dated May 4, 2004, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
74972, are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

SUBJECT: CRIMINAL LAW

BP 22: Arrangement For Payments After Dishonor Negates

Element Of Lack Of Notice
by The Lawyer's Post December 2, 2014 Comments Off on BP 22: Arrangement For Payments
After Dishonor Negates Element Of Lack Of Notice

Ma. Rosario (Rosario) obtained a loan of P50,000.00 from First Womens Credit
Corporation. In return, she issued post-dated checks to FWCC as security for the loan.
Fourteen of these checks were dishonoured when presented to the drawee bank,
hence, FWCC filed cases for violation of BP 22 against Rosario. After her arraignment,
she did not attend anymore the hearings on the cases, hence, she was tried in
absentia. The MeTC after trial, convicted Rosario for violation of BP 22, hence she
appealed her conviction to the Regional Trial Court. In her appeal, she averred that she
did not receive any notice of dishonour. The prosecution only presented a demand

letter through registered mail, hence, not enough to convict her for violation of BP 22.
Further, she made subsequent arrangements for payments of the obligation to FWCC,
which is tantamount to good faith. Her appeal denied by the RTC and the Court of
Appeals, she is now before the Supreme Court to assail her conviction for violation of
BP 22.
The Supreme Court:
To be liable for violation of B.P. 22, the following essential elements must be present:
(1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;
(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not
have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in
full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee
bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the
drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.
The presence of the first and third elements is undisputed. An issue being advanced by
Campos through the present petition concerns her alleged failure to receive a written
demand letter from FWCC, the entity in whose favor the dishonored checks were
issued. In a line of cases, the Court has emphasized the importance of proof of receipt
of such notice of dishonor, although not as an element of the offense, but as a means
to establish that the issuer of a check was aware of insufficiency of funds when he
issued the check and the bank dishonored it, in relation to the second element of the
offense and Section 2 of B.P. 22. Considering that the second element involves a state
of mind which is difficult to establish, Section 2 of B.P. 22 creates a presumption of
knowledge of insufficiency of funds, as it reads:
Sec. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. The making, drawing, and
issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient
funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety days from the date of
the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or
credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon,
or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5)
banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.
In the instant case, both the RTC and the CA affirmed the MeTCs finding that the
required notice of dishonor from FWCC was received by Campos. Campos,
nonetheless, still maintains that her personal receipt of the notice was not sufficiently
established, considering that only a written copy of the letter and the registry return
receipt covering it were presented by the prosecution.

The Court has in truth repeatedly held that the mere presentation of registry return
receipts that cover registered mail was not sufficient to establish that written notices
of dishonor had been sent to or served on issuers of checks. The authentication by
affidavit of the mailers was necessary in order for service by registered mail to be
regarded as clear proof of the giving of notices of dishonor and to predicate the
existence of the second element of the offense.
In still finding no merit in the present petition, the Court, however, considers Campos
defense that she exerted efforts to reach an amicable settlement with her creditor
after the checks which she issued were dishonored by the drawee bank, BPI Family
Bank. Campos categorically declared in her petition that, [she] has in her favor
evidence to show that she was in good faith and indeed made arrangements for the
payment of her obligations subsequently after the dishonor of the checks. Clearly,
this statement was a confirmation that she actually received the required notice of
dishonor from FWCC. The evidence referred to in her statement were receipts dated
January 13, 1996, February 29, 1996, April 22, 1998 and May 26, 1998 issued by FWCC
to Campos for payments in various amounts ranging from P2,500.00 to P15,700.00.
Campos would not have entered into the alleged arrangements beginning January
1996 until May 1998 if she had not received a notice of dishonor from her creditor, and
had no knowledge of the insufficiency of her funds with the bank and the dishonor of
her checks.
Campos could have avoided prosecution by paying the amounts due on the checks or
making arrangements for payment in full within five (5) days after receiving notice.
Unfortunately for Campos, these circumstances were not established in the instant
case. She failed to sufficiently disclose the terms of her alleged arrangement with
FWCC, and to establish that the same had been fully complied with so as to completely
satisfy the amounts covered by the subject checks. Moreover, documents to prove
such fact should have been presented before the MeTC during the trial, yet Campos
opted to be tried in absentia, and thus waived her right to present evidence. While
Campos blamed her former counsel for alleged negligence that led to her failure to be
present during the trial, it is settled that the negligence of counsel binds his or her
client. Given the circumstances, the Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the ruling
of the CA which affirmed the conviction of Campos.
THIRD DIVISION, G.R. No. 187401, September 17, 2014, MA. ROSARIO P. CAMPOS,
PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND FIRST WOMENS CREDIT
CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS.

SUBJECT: REMEDIAL LAW

Pre-Trial: Failure To Appear By A Defendant Renders Him In

Default
by The Lawyer's Post November 14, 2014 Comments Off on Pre-Trial: Failure To Appear By A
Defendant Renders Him In Default

Joseph was appointed as agent of Philiamlife in 1991. As an active agent and at the
same time unit manager, Joseph was allowed to receive cash advances from
Philamlife, debited against his future commissions. At the time of his resignation in
February, 2000, Philamlife discovered that Joseph had an outstanding balance of
P1,237,336.20 which he was obligated to settle. Three successive demand letters were
served on Joseph, and when no settlement was reached, Philamlife filed a complaint
for collection of sum of money against Joseph before the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City. After Joseph filed his answer, the RTC set the case for pre-trial conference and
directed to file their pre-trial briefs. Joseph moved to have the the pre-trial, set on
December 3 and December 17, 2002 to be held on January 14, 2002 due to a conflict
of schedule, which the RTC received on December 2, 2002. During the hearing on 14
January, the parties agreed to settle the case, which prompted the RTC to set the pretrial to May 8, June 3 and July 1, 2003. Joseph again sent a telegram requesting for
postponement of the trial scheduled on May 8 due to medical reasons. The hearing on
June 3 pushed thru, where only Philamlife appeared. Counsel for Philamlife then moved
to have the defendant declared in default for failure to appear during the pre-trial,
which the RTC granted, declaring Joesph in default allowing the defendant to present
evidence ex-parte on July 1, 2003, reset to August 28, 2003. During the August 28,
2003 hearing, defendant again failed to appear, but filed a motion for reconsideration
of the order allowing default against him. Ohilamplife presented its evidence, and filed
its formal offer of evidence.
The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration filed by Joseph on its order of
default, and admitted the Formal Offer of Evidence filed by Philamlife. On February 24,
2004, it rendered judgment in favour of Philamlife.

Meanwhile, Joseph filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals alleging
grave abuse of discretion when on the part of the RTC when it declared in default
Joseph for failure to appear during the pre-trial, which the appellate court granted,
ordering the remand of the case to the RTC for pre-trial. It ruled that the RTC erred in
declaring Joseph in default since Section 5, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court explicitly
provides that failure to appear for pre-trial on the part of the defendant shall be cause
to allow the plaintiff to present evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment on
the basis thereof.
Philamlife filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court to contest the CA decision.
It avers that since Joseph failed to appear during the pre-trial, the RTC correctly ruled
that he is non-suited or in default.
The Supreme Court:
As the rule now stands, if the defendant fails to appear for pre-trial, a default order is
no longer issued. Instead, the trial court may allow the plaintiff to proceed with his
evidence ex parte and the court can decide the case based on the evidence presented
by plaintiff.
The position of Philamlife is in accord with the Rule. Indeed, the amendment did not
change the essence of the original provision. The legal ramification of defendants
failure to appear for pre-trial is still detrimental to him while beneficial to the plaintiff.
The plaintiff is given the privilege to present his evidence without objection from the
defendant, the likelihood being that the court will decide in favor of the plaintiff, the
defendant having forfeited the opportunity to rebut or present its own evidence.
Therefore, the June Order cannot be completely vacated because semantics aside, the
order substantially complied with Section 5 in relation to Section 4, Rule 18 of the
Rules of Court.
The importance of pre-trial in civil actions cannot be overemphasized. In Balatico v.
Rodriguez, the Court, citing Tiu v. Middleton, delved on the significance of pre-trial,
thus:
Pre-trial is an answer to the clarion call for the speedy disposition of cases. Although it
was discretionary under the 1940 Rules of Court, it was made mandatory under the
1964 Rules and the subsequent amendments in 1997. Hailed as the most important
procedural innovation in Anglo-Saxon justice in the nineteenth century, pre-trial seeks
to achieve the following:

(a) The possibility of an amicable settlement or of a submission to alternative modes

of dispute resolution;
(b) The simplification of the issues;
(c) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings;
(d) The possibility of obtaining stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents to
avoid unnecessary proof;
(e) The limitation of the number of witnesses;
(f) The advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a commissioner;
(g) The propriety of rendering judgment on the pleadings, or summary judgment, or of
dismissing the action should a valid ground therefor be found to exist;
(h) The advisability or necessity of suspending the proceedings; and
(i) Such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the action.
Therefore, pre-trial cannot be taken for granted. It is not a mere technicality in court
proceedings for it serves a vital objective: the simplification, abbreviation and
expedition of the trial, if not indeed its dispensation. This considered, it is required in
Section 4 of Rule 20 of the Rules of Court that:
Section 4. Appearance of parties. It shall be the duty of the parties and their counsel
to appear at the pre-trial. The non-appearance of a party may be excused only if a
valid cause is shown therefor or if a representative shall appear in his behalf fully
authorized in writing to enter into an amicable settlement, to submit to alternative
modes of dispute resolution, and to enter into stipulations or admissions of facts and
of documents. [Emphasis supplied]
Definitely, non-appearance of a party may only be excused for a valid cause. We see
none in this case even if the positions of the parties are given a second consideration.
Philamlife claims that respondent was absent the four (4) times that the case was
called for pre-trial on 3 and 17 December 2002, 8 May 2003 and 3 June 2003.
Philamlife underlines the belated filing of respondent of his motions for postponement.
The motion for the postponement of the 3 and 17 December 2002 pre-trial was
received by the trial court on 3 December 2002 while that for 8 May and 3 June 2003
pre-trial was received on 4 June 2003 or the day after the pre-trial, where and when
respondent was declared in default. Philamlife considers the manner by which
respondent moved for postponements, as well as his claim that he was not notified of

the 28 August 2003 when records show that he was in fact notified, as clear
demonstration of negligence, irresponsibility and contumacy.
Respondent counters that he moved for the postponement of the 3 and 17 December
2002 pre-trial due to a conflict of schedule while the 14 January 2003 pre-trial was
reset on account of the parties agreement to settle the case amicably. The 8 May
2003 pre-trial was also postponed due to medical reasons. While he did not appear on
the pre-trial of 3 June 2003, he filed on 30 May 2003 a motion for postponement,
although received by the trial court only on 4 June 2003. Respondent added that on 3
June and 1 July 2003 pre-trial days, petitioner was not even ready to present its
evidence. It was only on 28 August 2003 that Philamlife presented its evidence ex
parte, despite the unresolved motion for reconsideration of the 3 June 2003 order.
The Court of Appeals dismissed Philamlifes contention and declared that
respondents failure to appear for pre-trial on 3 June 2003 does not constitute
obstinate refusal to comply with the lower courts order and that only on that date was
respondent absent when the case was actually called for pre-trial.
Respondent undeniably sought for postponement of the pre-trial at least three (3)
times. First, he cited conflict in schedule as reason to seek postponement of the 3 and
17 December 2002 pre-trial. Second, the 8 May 2003 pre-trial was reset upon motion
of respondent through a telegram due to medical reasons. Third, respondent also filed
a motion to postpone the pre-trial for 3 June 2003 and he explained that defendant
and plaintiffs Cebu Office are still negotiating the ways for the projected settlement on
possible monthly basis with property as guarantee to be embodied in their
Compromise Agreement, and since plaintiffs Cebu Officer could not always be
available they have not yet wind-up to bring matters to plaintiffs Manila Office
through their counsel.
The first two (2) motions for postponement were granted by the trial court. Only the 3
June 2003 pre-trial proceeded in the absence of respondent during which the trial
court issued the default order. The trial courts denial of the motion for
reconsideration of the June Order amounted to a denial of his motion for
postponement of the 3 June 2003 pre-trial date.
A motion for postponement is a privilege and not a right. A movant for postponement
should not assume beforehand that his motion will be granted. The grant or denial of a
motion for postponement is a matter that is addressed to the sound discretion of the
trial court. Indeed, an order declaring a party to have waived the right to present
evidence for performing dilatory actions upholds the trial courts duty to ensure that

trial proceeds despite the deliberate delay and refusal to proceed on the part of one
party.
In deciding whether to grant or deny a motion for postponement of pre-trial, the court
must take into account the following factors: (a) the reason for the postponement, and
(b) the merits of the case of movant.
The trial court correctly saw the reason proffered by respondent as insufficient to
excuse his non-appearance. Indeed, when the 14 January 2003 pre-trial was
postponed to 8 May 2003, the parties were in fact given the opportunity to settle the
case amicably, as there was ample time for both parties to reconcile their records and
agree on compromise figures. We cannot see how, inspite of the length of time given
to him, respondent can still use as reason a possible settlement, about which
Philamlife even denies having any knowledge.
Notably, the trial court could not have acted timely in his favor because the trial court
received the motion one day after the pre-trial schedule. About this, we note further
the practice of respondent in filing his motions for postponement close to the
scheduled pre-trial date. In his motion to reset the 8 May 2003 pre-trial, his motion
was mailed on 7 May 2003. Likewise, his motion for postponement for the 3 June 2003
pre-trial was mailed on 30 May 2003. In those occasions, the trial court either
received his motions on the day of pre-trial or a day after the pre-trial date. The trial
court, which at the day of the 3 June 2003 pre-trial has not received any word from the
respondent would logically, as it did, proceed with the hearing.
Respondent tries in vain to reason out that by allowing Philamlife to present its
evidence ex parte, his right to due process was denied.
The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard
and submit any evidence one may have in support of ones defense. Where the
opportunity to be heard, either through verbal arguments or pleadings, is accorded,
and the party can present its side or defend its interest in due course, there is no
denial of procedural due process.
Respondent had been given more than enough time to present his evidence. The pretrial date was reset four (4) times for a total period of 6 months before the trial court
allowed Philamlife to present its evidence ex parte when respondent failed to appear
on the scheduled date.
With respect to the trial courts order for respondent to pay P1,122,781.66
representing the amount of his outstanding debit balance, we affirm its findings which
were based on records presented by Philamlife. As a consequence of respondents

non-appearance, he was deemed to have waived his right to present his own
evidence, if there was any.
FIRST DIVISION, G.R. No. 182075, September 15, 2010, THE PHILIPPINE AMERICAN LIFE
& GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, PETITIONER, VS. JOSEPH ENARIO, RESPONDENT.

SUBJECT: REMEDIAL LAW

Special Civil Action: Quo Warranto

by The Lawyer's Post November 8, 2014 Comments Off on Special Civil Action: Quo Warranto

The Office of the Ombudsman charged Generoso, Chief Accountant of the AFP General
Headquarters Accounting Center with dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct
prejudicial to the service. By virtue of AFP Special Order 91 dated April 1, 2006, , the
AFP reassigned Generoso to the PAF Accounting Center. His position was taken over by
Danilo, then Chief Accountant of the Philippine Navy. On August 30, 2006, Generoso
was place under preventive suspension. He was eventually dismissed from the service
on February 5, 2007, which he appealed to the Court of Appeals. After the lapse of his
six-month suspension (April 2, 2007), Generoso attempted to reassume his position at
the AFP General Headquarters but was unable to do so, since Danilo declined to yield
the position. Generoso then filed an action for quo warranto before the Regional Trial
Court, alleging that Danilo was merely detailed at the GHQ Accounting Center when he
placed under preventive suspension, hence after the lapse of his suspension, he is
entitled to reassume the position being held by Danilo, who is a usurper. On his part,
Danilo claimed that his assignment to the position was a permanent appointment,
Generoso having been assigned to the PAF Accounting Center even before his
suspension.
The RTC dismissed Generosos petition, holding that Danilo is holding the position on a
permanent appointment. Generosos reassignment to the PAF is valid up to one year,
and since his suspension took only six months, he is still required to report to the PAF
Accounting Center. Upon petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, the latter
reversed the RTC decision, holding that SO 91 was void because it did not indicate the
duration of the reassignment. Further, the order of dismissal of Generoso was
appealed to the CA, hence, not yet final and executory. Danilo thus elevated the case
to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court:
An action for quo warranto under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court may be filed against
one who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office. It may
be brought by the Republic of the Philippines or by the person claiming to be entitled
to such office. In this case, it was Del Castillo who filed the action, claiming that he
was entitled as a matter of right to reassume the position of GHQ Chief Accountant
after his preventive suspension ended on March 11, 2007. He argues that, assuming
his reassignment to the PAF Accounting Center was valid, the same could not exceed
one year. Since his detail at the PAF took effect under SO 91 on April 1, 2006, it could

last not later than March 31, 2007. By then, Moro should have allowed him to return
to his previous posting as GHQ Chief Accountant.
xxx
In quo warranto, the petitioner who files the action in his name must prove that he is
entitled to the subject public office. Otherwise, the person who holds the same has a
right to undisturbed possession and the action for quo warranto may be dismissed.
Here, Del Castillo brought the action for quo warranto in his name on April 4, 2007,
months after the Ombudsman ordered his dismissal from service on February 5, 2007.
As explained above, that dismissal order was immediately executory even pending
appeal. Consequently, he has no right to pursue the action for quo warranto or
reassume the position of Chief Accountant of the GHQ Accounting Center.
SECOND DIVISION, G.R. No. 184980, March 30, 2011, DANILO MORO, PETITIONER, VS.
GENEROSO REYES DEL CASTILLO, JR., RESPONDENT.

SUBJECT: REMEDIAL LAW

The RTC, In An Appeal Of The Judgment In An Ejectment

Case, Shall Not Conduct A Rehearing Or Trial De Novo
by The Lawyer's Post May 8, 2015 0 Comments

The Facts:
The Manalangs (petitioners herein) were the co-owners of Lot 4236 of the Guagua
Cadastre. Adjacent to the lot was Lot 4235, owned by the spouses Bienvenido and
Mercedes (Bacani). After a relocation and verification survey of Lot 4236, it appeared
that Lot 4235 encroached on the Manalangs property by 406 square meters, which
was confirmed by the preliminary survey of the the Land Management Section of the
DENR. When the spouses Bacani refused to vacate the encroached portion, the
petitioners filed a case for unlawful detainer against them before the MTC of Guagua.
Said MTC however dismissed the case, holding that the court had no jurisdiction as the
action involved a boundary dispute and no contract, express or implied, existed
between the parties that qualified the case as an unlawful detainer case. On appeal,
the RTC reversed the MTC decision, and remanded the case to the MTC for further
proceedings, disagreeing with the MTC that the latter had no jurisdiction over the
case. The latter court, however, again dismissed the case, holding that the petitioners
failed to adduce evidence that the spouses had encroached on the property.
Petitioners again appealed to the RTC. This time, the RTC ordered the petitioners to
conduct a relocation survey to determine the allegation of encroachment and received
the testimony of Engr. Limpin. After proceedings, the RTC rendered judgment
reversing the MTC decision and finding that the spouses encroached on the
petitioners property, ordered them to pay reasonable compensation, attorneys fees
and damages.
The spouses thus filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, which the CA
granted, holding that the RTC, by ordering the relocation survey and receiving
evidence over the objection of the spouses, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, had
acted as a trial court in complete disregard of the second paragraph of Section 18,
Rule 70 of the Rules of Court; since no evidence was present to make out a case of

unlawful detainer, the MTC had no jurisdiction over the case, and the proper action
taken should have been an accion reivindicatoria or accion publiciana to recover
possession of the alleged encroached portion. It therefore reinstated the MTC decision
dismissing the case for unlawful detainer. The petitioners, in their appeal to the
Supreme Court, maintain that the RTC had authority to receive evidence in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction in an ejectment case because it is not confined to
the records of the case. The spouses were estopped from assailing the decision of the
RTC since they actively participated in the conduct of the relocation survey and even
cross-examined the engineer.
Issue/s:
Whether the RTC may receive evidence in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over
MTC decisions in ejectment cases
The Courts ruling:
.The appeal has no merit.
To start with, the RTC, in an appeal of the judgment in an ejectment case, shall not
conduct a rehearing or trial de novo . In this connection, Section 18, Rule 70 of the
1

Rules of Court clearly provides:

Sec. 18. Judgment conclusive only on possession; not conclusive in actions involving
title or ownership. x x x.
xxxx
The judgment or final order shall be appealable to the appropriate Regional Trial Court
which shall decide the same on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in
the court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by the
parties or required by the Regional Trial Court. (7a)
Hence, the RTC violated the foregoing rule by ordering the conduct of the relocation
and verification survey in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and by hearing the
testimony of the surveyor, for its doing so was tantamount to its holding of a trial de
novo. The violation was accented by the fact that the RTC ultimately decided the
appeal based on the survey and the surveyors testimony instead of the record of the
proceedings had in the court of origin.
Secondly, on whether or not Civil Case No. 3309 was an ejectment case within the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC, decisive are the allegations of the
complaint. Accordingly, the pertinent allegations of the petitioners complaint follow:

2. Plaintiffs are co-owners of land known as Lot no. 4236 of the Guagua cadastre.
Plaintiffs inherited the said parcel of residential land from Tomasa B. Garcia-Manalang
who is the absolute owner of the said property and the same is declared for taxation
purposes in her name under Tax Declaration No. 07014906, a copy of which is hereto
attached as Annex A;
3. Lot No. 4236 is covered by an approved plan, Plan Ap-03-004154 (a copy made
Annex B) and it consists of 914 square meters;
4. Adjacent to plaintiffs [p]roperty is Lot No. 4235 of the Guagua Cadastre and
covered by approved plan As-03-00533 (copy made Annex C) which is being claimed
by defendants and is the subject matter of Cadastral Case No. N-229 of the Regional
Trial Court of Guagua, Branch 53 where a decision (copy made Annex D) was
rendered by said court on August 28, 1996 confirming the title over said lot in favor of
defendant Bienvenido Bacani. The said decision is now final and executory
5. On February 23, 1997, plaintiffs caused the relocation and verification survey of
cadastral Not No. 4236 of the Guagua Cadastre belonging to plaintiff and the adjoining
lots, particularly Lot No. 4235 being claimed by defendants;
6. The relocation and verification survey conducted by Engr. Rufo R. Rivera, a duly
licensed Geodetic Engineer per plan (copy made Annex F) revealed that defendants
had encroached an area of 405 square meters of the parcel of land belonging to
plaintiffs. In fact, the whole or part of the houses of the said defendants have been
erected in said encroached portion;
7. Sometime in June of 1997, plaintiffs through plaintiff Concepcion Gonzales lodged a
complaint before the Barangay Council of San Juan, Guagua, Pampanga against
defendants regarding the encroached portion. A preliminary relocation survey was
conducted by the Lands Management Sector of the DENR and it was found that
indeed, defendants encroached into the parcel of land belonging to plaintiffs. This
finding was confirmed by the approved plan Ap-03-004154;
8. Since defendants refused to vacate the premises and surrender the peaceful
possession thereof to plaintiff, the Barangay Captain of San Juan, Guagua, Pampanga
issued a certification to file action (copy made Annex G) dated March 4, 1997 to
enable the plaintiff to file the appropriate action in court;
9. On March 10, 1997, plaintiffs sent a formal demand letter (copy made Annex H) to
defendants to vacate the premises and to pay reasonable compensation for the use of
the said encroached portion;

10. Despite receipt of said demand letter per registry return cards attached to the
letter, defendants failed and refused to vacate the encroached portion and surrender
the peaceful possession thereof to plaintiffs;
11. Plaintiffs are entitled to a reasonable compensation in the amount of P 3,000.00
from defendants for the illegal use and occupation of their property by defendants;
12. By reason of the unjust refusal of defendants to vacate the premises and pay
reasonable compensation to plaintiffs, the latter were constrained to engage the
services of counsel for P30,00.00 plus P1,000.00 per appearance and incur litigation
expenses in the amount of P10,000.00 .
2

Given the foregoing allegations, the case should be dismissed without prejudice to the
filing of a non-summary action like accion reivindicatoria. In our view, the CA correctly
held that a boundary dispute must be resolved in the context of accion reivindicatoria,
not an ejectment case. The boundary dispute is not about possession, but
encroachment, that is, whether the property claimed by the defendant formed part of
the plaintiffs property. A boundary dispute cannot be settled summarily under Rule 70
of the Rules of Court, the proceedings under which are limited to unlawful detainer and
forcible entry. In unlawful detainer, the defendant unlawfully withholds the possession
of the premises upon the expiration or termination of his right to hold such possession
under any contract, express or implied. The defendants possession was lawful at the
beginning, becoming unlawful only because of the expiration or termination of his right
of possession. In forcible entry, the possession of the defendant is illegal from the very
beginning, and the issue centers on which between the plaintiff and the defendant had
the prior possession de facto.
Thirdly, the MTC dismissed the action because it did not have jurisdiction over the
case. The dismissal was correct. It is fundamental that the allegations of the complaint
and the character of the relief sought by the complaint determine the nature of the
action and the court that has jurisdiction over the action To be clear, unlawful
.3

detainer is an action filed by a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom
the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or
termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or
implied. To vest in the MTC the jurisdiction to effect the ejectment from the land of the
4

respondents as the occupants in unlawful detainer, therefore, the complaint should

embody such a statement of facts clearly showing the attributes of unlawful
detainer. However, the allegations of the petitioners complaint did not show that they
5

had permitted or tolerated the occupation of the portion of their property by the
respondents; or how the respondents entry had been effected, or how and when the

dispossession by the respondents had started. All that the petitioners alleged was the
respondents illegal use and occupation of the property. As such, the action was not
unlawful detainer.
Lastly, the conclusion by the MTC that the petitioners failed to show by clear and
convincing evidence that the respondents had encroached on the petitioners property
was also warranted. In contrast, the only basis for the RTCs decision was the result of
the relocation and verification survey as attested to by the surveyor, but that basis
should be disallowed for the reasons earlier mentioned. Under the circumstances, the
reinstatement of the ruling of the MTC by the CA was in accord with the evidence.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on October 18, 2002;
andORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION, G.R. No. 156995, January 12, 2015, RUBEN MANALANG, CARLOS
MANALANG, CONCEPCION GONZALES AND LUIS MANALANG, PETITIONERS, VS.
BIENVENIDO AND MERCEDES BACANI, RESPONDENTS.
1

Abellera v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127480, February 28, 2000, 326 SCRA 485, 491.

CA rollo, pp. 31-33.

Ten Forty Realty and Development Corp. v. Cruz, G.R. No. 151212, September 10, 2003, 410 SCRA 484,

493.
4

Estate of Soledad Manantan v. Somera, G.R. No. 145867, April 7, 2009, 584 SCRA 81, 88-89.

Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116192, November 16, 1995, 250 SCRA 108, 116.

SUBJECT: POLITICAL LAW

As A Rule, It Is The Consistent And General Policy Of The

Court Not To Interfere With The Ombudsmans Exercise Of
Its Investigatory And Prosecutory Powers; When There Is A
Clear Showing Of Grave Abuse Of Discretion, However, The

Court May Substitute Its Own Judgment For That Of The

Ombudsman
by The Lawyer's Post March 26, 2015 Comments Off on As A Rule, It Is The Consistent And
General Policy Of The Court Not To Interfere With The Ombudsmans Exercise Of Its Investigatory
And Prosecutory Powers; When There Is A Clear Showing Of Grave Abuse Of Discretion, However,
The Court May Substitute Its Own Judgment For That Of The Ombudsman

Jose was charged with Perjury, violation of Section 8 of Republic Act 6713, and serious
dishonesty and grave misconduct under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in
the Civil Service by Joselito Fangon, of the General Investigation Bureau of the Office of
the Ombudsman, for failure to file the required Statement of Assets and Liabilities and
Net Worth for the years 1898, 1990, 1991, 1993 and 1998; and failure to disclose in
his SALNs for the years 1999 to 2004, his wifes business interests in two corporations.
Jose denied the allegations; according to him, from the failure by the Head of Office to
order him to submit his SALNs for the periods as stated under Section 10 of CSC
Resolution No. 060231 there arises the presumption that he complied with the
submission of the SALNs. Further, he was not informed by his wife that he was
included In the list of incorporators in the corporations, hence there was no deliberate
and wilful assertion of a falsehood on his part. The corporations were already dissolved
by order of the SEC. Despite manifesting that his case be resolved early, the
Ombudsman did not act on it. Instead, he received an undated order placing him
under preventive suspension for six months without pay, to continue until the case is
terminated but not to exceed six months. He filed an Urgent Motion to Lift/Reconsider
Order of Preventive Suspension, arguing that his continued stay in the office will not
prejudice the investigation of the case against him. Still wary of the preventive
suspension, Jose then filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance of
temporary restraining order with prayer for preliminary injunction, which the CA
granted on April 26, 2011. During the hearing on May 11, 2011, the Ombudsman
representative manifested before the court that the preventive suspension order had
been lifted by order of the same date, thus the CA held in abeyance the preliminary
injunction. Even so, Jose moved that the case be decided on the merits; on the other
hand, the Ombudsman manifested that the preventive suspension order had been
lifted, thus the case had become moot and academic and should be dismissed.
The Court of Appeals sided with Jose, granted the petition and dismissed the criminal
case for perjury, ruling that the petition was not rendered moot and academic by the
mere lifting of the preventive suspension order. The CA held that the Ombudsman had
lost the right to prosecute Jose for non-fling of the SALN because it had prescribed in
accordance with Act No. 3326; the mere failure to disclose Joses spouses business

interest does not constitute serious misconduct and serious dishonesty since the
complaint-affidavit did not state that it was done deliberately, hence there was nothing
to warrant preventive suspension of Jose. The Ombusdman elevated the case to the
Supreme Court, arguing that the lifting of the preventive suspension rendered the
petition moot and academic, thus the CA had no more jurisdiction to act on the case
and render reliefs.
The Courts ruling:
The petition has no merit.
As a rule, it is the consistent and general policy of the Court not to interfere with the
Ombudsmans exercise of its investigatory and prosecutory powers. The rule is based
not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the
Constitution to the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. It is within the context of
this well-entrenched policy that the Court proceeds to pass upon the validity of the
preventive suspension order issued by the Ombudsman[1].
While it is an established rule in administrative law that the courts of justice should
respect the findings of fact of said administrative agencies, the courts may not be
bound by such findings of fact when there is absolutely no evidence in support thereof
or such evidence is clearly, manifestly and patently insubstantial; and when there is a
clear showing that the administrative agency acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of
discretion or in a capricious and whimsical manner, such that its action may amount to
an excess or lack of jurisdiction[2]. These exceptions exist in this case and compel the
appellate court to review the findings of fact of the Ombudsman.
In the instant case, the subsequent lifting of the preventive suspension order against
Capulong does not render the petition moot and academic. It does not preclude the
courts from passing upon the validity of a preventive suspension order, it being a
manifestation of its constitutionally mandated power and authority to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
The preventive suspension order is interlocutory in character and not a final order on
the merits of the case. The aggrieved party may then seek redress from the courts
through a petition for certiorari under Section 1[3], Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court.
While it is true that the primary relief prayed for by Capulong in his petition has
already been voluntarily corrected by the Ombudsman by the issuance of the order
lifting his preventive suspension, we must not lose sight of the fact that Capulong
likewise prayed for other remedies. There being a finding of grave abuse of discretion

on the part of the Ombudsman, it was certainly imperative for the CA to grant
incidental reliefs, as sanctioned by Section 1 of Rule 65.
The decision of the appellate court to proceed with the merits of the case is included in
Capulongs prayer for such other reliefs as may be just and equitable under the
premises. Such a prayer in the petition justifies the grant of a relief not otherwise
specifically prayed for[4]. More importantly, we have ruled that it is the allegations in
the pleading which determine the nature of the action and the Court shall grant relief
warranted by the allegations and proof even if no such relief is prayed for[5].
Significantly, the power of adjudication, vested in the CA is not restricted to the
specific relief claimed by the parties to the dispute, but may include in the order or
decision any matter or determination which may be deemed necessary and expedient
for the purpose of settling the dispute or preventing further disputes, provided said
matter for determination has been established by competent evidence during the
hearing. The CA is not bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence, to the end
that all disputes and other issues will be adjudicated in a just, expeditious and
inexpensive proceeding.
The requisites for the Ombudsman to issue a preventive suspension order are clearly
contained in Section 24[6] of R.A. No. 6770[7]. The rule is that whether the evidence of
guilt is strong is left to the determination of the Ombudsman by taking into account
the evidence before him. In the very words of Section 24, the Ombudsman may
preventively suspend a public official pending investigation if in his judgment the
evidence presented before him tends to show that the officials guilt is strong and if
the further requisites enumerated in Section 24 are present[8]. The Court, however,
can substitute its own judgment for that of the Ombudsman on this matter, with a
clear showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman.
Undoubtedly, in this case, the CA aptly ruled that the Ombudsman abused its
discretion because it failed to sufficiently establish any basis to issue the order of
preventive suspension. Capulongs non-disclosure of his wifes business interest does
not constitute serious dishonesty or grave misconduct. Nothing in the records reveals
that Capulong deliberately placed N/A in his SALN despite knowledge about his
wifes business interest. As explained by Capulong, the SEC already revoked the
registration of the corporations where his wife was an incorporator; hence, he deemed
it not necessary to indicate it in his SALN.
Ineluctably, the dismissal of an administrative case does not necessarily bar the filing
of a criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts, which were the subject of the

administrative complaint. The Court finds no cogent reason to depart from this rule.
However, the crime of perjury for which Capulong was charged, requires a willful and
deliberate assertion of a falsehood in a statement under oath or in an affidavit, and
the statement or affidavit in question here is Capulongs SALNs. It then becomes
necessary to consider the administrative charge against Capulong to determine
whether or not he has committed perjury. Therefore, with the dismissal of Capulongs
administrative case, the CA correctly dismissed its criminal counterpart since the
crime of perjury which stemmed from misrepresentations in his SALNs will no longer
have a leg to stand on.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing premises, the Decision dated July 29,
2011 and Resolution dated April 12, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
119071 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

SUBJECT: POLITICAL LAW

FIRST DIVISION, G.R. No. 201643, March 12, 2014, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,
PETITIONER, VS. JOSE T. CAPULONG, RESPONDENT.

[1] Office of the Ombudsman v. Evangelista, G.R. No. 177211, March 13, 2009, 581 SCRA 350, 355-356.
[2] Pleyto v. PNP-Criminal Investigation & Detection Group, 563 Phil. 842, 877 (2007).
[3] Sec. 1. Petition for certiorari.When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasijudicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may
require. (Emphasis ours)
[4] Primelink Properties & Development Corporation v. Lazatin-Magat, 526 Phil. 394, 414 (2006).
[5] Banco Filipino Savings & Mortgage Bank v. CA, 388 Phil. 27, 41 (2000).
[6] Sec. 24. Preventives Suspension. The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any
officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt
is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave
misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the
service; or (c) the respondents continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.
[7] AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE FUNCTIONAL AND STRUCTURAL ORGANIZATION OF THE
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
[8] The Ombudsman v. Valeroso, 548 Phil. 688, 695 (2007), citing Yasay, Jr. v. Hon. Desierto, 360 Phil.
680, 697-698 (1998).

SUBJECT: POLITICAL LAW

Pursuant To Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6770, Otherwise Known

As The Ombudsman Act Of 1989, The Ombudsman Is
Legally Authorized To Directly Impose Administrative
Penalties Against Errant Public Servants
by The Lawyer's Post May 8, 2015 0 Comments

The Facts:
Gilda (Daradal) filed a case for sexual harassment and oppression before the Office of
the Ombudsman (OMB) against Prudencio (Ramos). According to her, she was called
to his office by Prudencio and asked to massage his forehead. While doing so,
Prudencio made sexual innuendos against her, in the presence of her co-employees.
By virtue of a Memorandum, she was detailed to the Civil Service Commission office in
Catbalogan, Samar to perform the duty of a male utility personnel and excluded from
the payroll from August 16-31, 1996 because she refused to submit to his sexual
advances. In his defense, Prudencio alleged that Gilda was a VIP employee who
rebelled against him when he required her to work. During the pendency of the case,
Gilda submitted an affidavit of withdrawal of her case against Prudencio,which the
OMB denied. After hearings, the OMB imposed upon Prudencio the penalty of six
months suspension without pay for allegedly committing oppression, while dismissing
the case for sexual harassment against him. Prudencio thus filed a petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeasl, which granted it, and reversed the OMB decision.
Citing the case of Tapiador vs Office of the Ombudsman , the CA ruled that under
1

Section 13, subparagraph (3) of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the OMB can only
recommend, but not directly impose the penalty upon erring government officials. The
OMB filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the CA, averring that it is
Gilda, the person who is adversely affected by its ruling, and who is the real party in
interest, who can appeal the decision. The OMB is like a judge who should detach
itself from cases where its decision was appealed to higher courts, thus the OMB had
no right to appeal the CA decision. Posturing itself as the champion of the peoples
interest, it elevated its case to the Supreme Court, arguing that the Tapiador ruling had
been rejected by the Court in numerous cases as a mere obiter dictum. It added it has
the legal interest to appeal the CA decision.
The Issue/s:

1. Whether the Office of the Ombdusman may directly impose, not merely
recommend, its penalty upon erring government officials.
2. Whether it may appeal an adverse decision in administrative cases against erring
government officials.
The Courts ruling:
The Court grants the Ombudsmans petition.
Preliminary matters
The Ombudsman has the power to directly impose administrative penalties
against public officials or employees.
In the case of Ombudsman v. Apolonio , the Court categorically delineated the
2

Ombudsmans power to directly impose, not merely recommend, administrative

sanctions against erring public officials or employees, viz:
The Ombudsman has the power to impose the penalty of removal, suspension,
demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee, in the exercise
of its administrative disciplinary authority. The challenge to the Ombudsmans power
to impose these penalties, on the allegation that the Constitution only grants it
recommendatory powers, had already been rejected by this Court.
The Court first rejected this interpretation in Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, where the
Court, speaking through Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiago, held:
The creation of the Office of the Ombudsman is a unique feature of the 1987
Constitution. The Ombudsman and his deputies, as protectors of the people, are
mandated to act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against officers
or employees of the Government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Foremost among its
powers is the authority to investigate and prosecute cases involving public officers and
employees, thus:
Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions,
and duties:
(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any
public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.

Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989, was passed
into law on November 17, 1989 and provided for the structural and functional
organization of the Office of the Ombudsman. RA 6770 mandated the Ombudsman
and his deputies not only to act promptly on complaints but also to enforce the
administrative, civil and criminal liability of government officers and employees in
every case where the evidence warrants to promote efficient service by the
Government to the people.
The authority of the Ombudsman to conduct administrative investigations as in the
present case is settled. Section 19 of RA 6770 provides:
SEC. 19. Administrative Complaints. The Ombudsman shall act on all complaints
relating, but not limited to acts or omissions which:
(1) Are contrary to law or regulation;
(2) Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory;
(3) Are inconsistent with the general course of an agencys functions, though in
accordance with law;
(4) Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of facts;
(5) Are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper purpose; or
(6) Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justification.
The point of contention is the binding power of any decision or order that emanates
from the Office of the Ombudsman after it has conducted its investigation. Under
Section 13(3) of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, it is provided:
Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions,
and duties:
xxxx
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or
employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure,
or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith. (Emphasis, underscoring and
italization in the original.)
In Ledesma v. Court of Appeals (Ledesma), the Court definitively stated that the
3

statement in Tapiador regarding the Ombudsmans power was merely an obiter dictum
and, as such, could not be cited as a doctrinal pronouncement. Thus:

x x x [A] cursory reading of Tapiador reveals that the main point of the case was the
failure of the complainant therein to present substantial evidence to prove the charges
of the administrative case. The statement that made reference to the power of the
Ombudsman is, at best, merely an obiter dictum and, as it is unsupported by sufficient
explanation, is susceptible to varying interpretations, as what precisely is before us in
this case. Hence, it cannot be cited as a doctrinal declaration of this Court nor is it
safe from judicial examination.
The import of the Ledesma ruling is crystal clear. Although the tenor of the text in
Section 13(3), Article XI of the Constitution merely indicates a recommendatory
4

function, this does not divest Congress of its plenary legislative power to vest the
Ombudsman powers beyond those stated in the Constitutional provision. Pursuant to
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6770, otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989, the
Ombudsman is legally authorized to directly impose administrative penalties against
errant public servants. Further, the manifest intent of the lawmakers was to bestow on
the Ombudsman full administrative disciplinary authority in accord with the
constitutional deliberations. Unlike the Ombudsman-like agencies of the past, the
powers of which extend to no more than making findings of fact and
recommendations, and the Ombudsman or Tanodbayan under the 1973 Constitution
who might file and prosecute criminal, civil or administrative cases against public
officials and employees only in cases of failure of justice, the current Ombudsman,
under the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 6770, is intended to play a more active role
in the enforcement of laws on anti-graft and corrupt practices and other offenses
committed by public officers and employees. The Ombudsman is to be an activist
watchman, not merely a passive one. He is vested with broad powers to enable him
to implement his own actions .
5

The Ombudsman has the legal interest to intervene in the proceedings

before the CA.
The issue of whether or not the Ombudsman possesses the requisite legal interest to
intervene in the proceedings where its decision is at risk of being inappropriately
impaired has been laid to rest in Ombudsman v. De Chavez . In the said case, the
6

Court conclusively ruled that even if the Ombudsman was not impleaded as a party in
the proceedings, part of its broad powers include defending its decisions before the
CA. And pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 19 of the Rules of Court , the Ombudsman may
7

validly intervene in the said proceedings as its legal interest on the matter is beyond
cavil. The Court elucidated, thus:

x x x the Ombudsman is in a league of its own. It is different from other investigatory

and prosecutory agencies of the government because the people under its jurisdiction
are public officials who, through pressure and influence, can quash, delay or dismiss
investigations directed against them. Its function is critical because public interest (in
the accountability of public officers and employees) is at stake.
xxx
The Office of the Ombudsman sufficiently alleged its legal interest in the subject
matter of litigation. Paragraph 2 of its motion for intervention and to admit the
attached motion to recall writ of preliminary injunction averred:
2. As a competent disciplining body, the Ombudsman has the right to seek redress on
the apparently erroneous issuance by this Honorable Court of the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction enjoining the implementation of the Ombudsmans Joint Decision x x x x.
In asserting that it was a competent disciplining body, the Office of the Ombudsman
correctly summed up its legal interest in the matter in controversy. In support of its
claim, it invoked its role as a constitutionally mandated protector of the people, a
disciplinary authority vested with quasi-judicial function to resolve administrative
disciplinary cases against public officials. To hold otherwise would have been
tantamount to abdicating its salutary functions as the guardian of public trust and
accountability.
Moreover, the Office of the Ombudsman had a clear legal interest in the inquiry into
whether respondent committed acts constituting grave misconduct, an offense
punishable under the Uniform Rules in Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. It was
in keeping with its duty to act as a champion of the people and preserve the integrity
of public service that petitioner had to be given the opportunity to act fully within the
parameters of its authority.
It is true that under our rule on intervention, the allowance or disallowance of a motion
to intervene is left to the sound discretion of the court after a consideration of the
appropriate circumstances. However, such discretion is not without limitations. One of
the limits in the exercise of such discretion is that it must not be exercised in disregard
of law and the Constitution. The CA should have considered the nature of the
Ombudsmans powers as provided in the Constitution and RA 6770.
xxxx
Both the CA and respondent likened the Office of the Ombudsman to a judge whose
decision was in question. This was a tad too simplistic (or perhaps even rather

disdainful) of the power, duties and functions of the Office of the Ombudsman. The
Office of the Ombudsman cannot be detached, disinterested and neutral specially
when defending its decisions. Moreover, in administrative cases against government
personnel, the offense is committed against the government and public interest. What
further proof of a direct constitutional and legal interest in the accountability of public
officers is necessary? (Italics supplied. Citations omitted.)
As can be gleaned from the foregoing disquisition, the CA, in the present case, gravely
erred in disallowing the Ombudsmans motion to intervene. It failed to consider the
essence of the Ombudsmans constitutionally and statutorily conferred powers
establishing its clear legal interest in ensuring that its directive be implemented.
Substantive Aspect
Significantly, Section A, Subsection 13 of Civil Service Commission Memorandum
Circular No. 30, series of 1989 (CSC MC No. 30), the applicable rule then, expressly
provides:
A. Grave Offenses
xxxx
13. Oppression
1st Offense Suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year;
2nd Offense Dismissal.
In the present case, the Ombudsman found Quimbo administratively liable for the
grave offense of Oppression and correspondingly meted out a penalty of suspension
for six (6) months without pay. While his administrative liability for Oppression is
undisputed, it behooves the Court to adjust the penalty imposed upon him to conform
to CSC MC No. 30. Accordingly, the Court finds it necessary to modify the penalty to
suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day without pay to accurately reflect the
classification of the offense for which he was found liable.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The January 21, 2005 Decision and the May 2,
2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, Cebu City in CA-G.R. SP No. 54737 are
herebyNULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. The December 9, 1998 Resolution and the April 15,
1999 Order of the Office of the Ombudsman, in OMB-VIS-ADM-96-0486, are
hereby REINSTATED with MODIFICATION that the penalty of SUSPENSION to be
imposed upon Prudencio C. Quimbo be for SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY without
pay.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION, G.R. No. 173277, February 25, 2015, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,
PETITIONER, VS. PRUDENCIO C. QUIMBO, COURT OF APPEALS, 20TH DIVISION, CEBU
CITY, RESPONDENTS.
1

429 Phil. 47 (2002).

G.R. No. 165132, March 7, 2012, 667 SCRA 583, 592-594

503 Phil. 396 (2005).

Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties:

xxxx
3. Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at fa
5

Ombudsman v. Masing, 566 Phil. 253, 268-269 (2008).

G.R. No. 172206, July 3, 2013, 700 SCRA 399, 404-406, citing Ombudsman v. Samaniego, 586 Phil. 497

(2008)
7

Section 1. Who may intervene. A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the

success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a
distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with
leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether or not the intervention
will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the
intervenors rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.

SUBJECT: POLITICAL LAW

Where Concurrent Jurisdiction Exists In Several Tribunals,

The Body That First Takes Cognizance Of The Complaint
Shall Exercise Jurisdiction To The Exclusion Of The Others
by The Lawyer's Post February 22, 2015 Comments Off on Where Concurrent Jurisdiction Exists In
Several Tribunals, The Body That First Takes Cognizance Of The Complaint Shall Exercise Jurisdiction
To The Exclusion Of The Others

Alberto, a 3rd year high school teacher of Antadao National High School in Sagada, Mountain
Province, was conducting his MAPEH class when Robert, a second-year high school student
joined his class, who were then practicing basketball shots. When Alberto ordered the boys to
form two lines, Robert, who thought the order was to form three lines, inserted himself between
the two lines. Alberto then punched him in the stomach. As a result of the incident, Alberto was
hospitalised. He filed an administrative case for Grave Misconduct against Alberto, as well as a
criminal case for Slight Physical Injuries. In the administrative case, Alberto denied punching
Robert, claiming he merely stared them down when they became unruly. In the criminal case,
Alberto was found guilty of the crime and thus applied for probation. The Civil Service
Commission-Cordillera Administrative Region, after conducting hearing, found Alberto liable for
Simple Misconduct and ordered his suspension for six months without pay. Alberto appealed the
CSC-CAR ruling to the Civil Service Commission, but the latter affirmed with modification the
CSC-CAR ruling, finding him liable for Grave Misconduct and ordering his dismissal from the
service. It ruled that Albertos conviction in the criminal case, where he acquiesced, can be
admitted as evidence in the administrative case. Alberto was not denied due process when he
was not afforded opportunity to cross-examine Roberts witnesses, as the same is not
indispensable in administrative cases. His act was a wanton transgression of the proper norms
of conduct of a public school teacher. In his motion for reconsideration, Alberto raised for the
first time the issue of jurisdiction of the CSC over the case. He argued that his case should have
been referred to and investigated by a committee first in accordance with the Magna Carta For
School Teachers provided under RA 4670. However, the CSC denied his motion for
reconsideration, holding he is estopped from challenging the jurisdiction of the CSC. When
Alberto elevated his case to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed the ruling of the CSC.
Albertos last resort was before the Supreme Court. He argues that he should not have been
dismissed from the service, and the CA was wrong when it ruled that CSC had jurisdiction over
the case. The Supreme Court:
On Jurisdiction
Pat-og contends that Section 9 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4670, otherwise known as the Magna
Carta for Public School Teachers, provides that administrative charges against a public school
teacher shall be heard initially by a committee constituted under said section. As no committee

was ever formed, the petitioner posits that he was denied due process and that the CSC did not
have the jurisdiction to hear and decide his administrative case. He further argues that
notwithstanding the fact that the issue of jurisdiction was raised for the first time on appeal,
the rule remains that estoppel does not confer jurisdiction on a tribunal that has no jurisdiction
over the cause of action or subject matter of the case.

The Court cannot sustain his position.

The petitioners argument that the administrative case against him can only proceed under R.A. No. 4670 is
misplaced.
In Puse v. Santos-Puse[1], it was held that the CSC, the Department of Education (DepEd) and the Board of
Professional Teachers-Professional Regulatory Commission (PRC) have concurrent jurisdiction over
administrative cases against public school teachers.
Under Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, the CSC is the body charged with the establishment and
administration of a career civil service which embraces all branches and agencies of the government.
[2] Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292 (the Administrative Code of 1987[3]) and Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
807 (the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines[4]) expressly provide that the CSC has the power to hear
and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted with it or brought to it on appeal. Thus, the CSC, as
the central personnel agency of the government, has the inherent power to supervise and discipline all
members of the civil service, including public school teachers.
Indeed, under Section 9 of R.A. No. 4670, the jurisdiction over administrative cases of public school teachers
is lodged with the investigating committee constituted therein.[5] Also, under Section 23 of R.A. No. 7836
(the Philippine Teachers Professionalization Act of 1994), the Board of Professional Teachers is given the
power, after due notice and hearing, to suspend or revoke the certificate of registration of a professional
teacher for causes enumerated therein.[6]
Concurrent jurisdiction is that which is possessed over the same parties or subject matter at the same time
by two or more separate tribunals. When the law bestows upon a government body the jurisdiction to hear
and decide cases involving specific matters, it is to be presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive unless it
be proved that another body is likewise vested with the same jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies have
concurrent jurisdiction over the matter.[7]
Where concurrent jurisdiction exists in several tribunals, the body that first takes cognizance of the
complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others. In this case, it was CSC which first
acquired jurisdiction over the case because the complaint was filed before it. Thus, it had the authority to
proceed and decide the case to the exclusion of the DepEd and the Board of Professional Teachers.[8]
In CSC v. Alfonso[9], it was held that special laws, such as R.A. No. 4670, do not divest the CSC of its
inherent power to supervise and discipline all members of the civil service, including public school teachers.
Pat-og, as a public school teacher, is first and foremost, a civil servant accountable to the people and
answerable to the CSC for complaints lodged against him as a public servant. To hold that R.A. No. 4670
divests the CSC of its power to discipline public school teachers would negate the very purpose for which the
CSC was established and would impliedly amend the Constitution itself.

To further drive home the point, it was ruled in CSC v. Macud[10] that R.A. No. 4670, in imposing a
separate set of procedural requirements in connection with administrative proceedings against public school
teachers, should be construed to refer only to the specific procedure to be followed in administrative
investigations conducted by the DepEd. By no means, then, did R.A. No. 4670 confer an exclusive
disciplinary authority over public school teachers on the DepEd.
At any rate, granting that the CSC was without jurisdiction, the petitioner is indeed estopped from raising
the issue. Although the rule states that a jurisdictional question may be raised at any time, such rule admits
of the exception where, as in this case, estoppel has supervened.[11] Here, instead of opposing the CSCs
exercise of jurisdiction, the petitioner invoked the same by actively participating in the proceedings before
the CSC-CAR and by even filing his appeal before the CSC itself; only raising the issue of jurisdiction later
in his motion for reconsideration after the CSC denied his appeal. This Court has time and again frowned
upon the undesirable practice of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment
only if favorable, but attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse.[12]
On Administrative Due Process
On due process, Pat-og asserts that the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are of questionable
veracity having been subscribed in Bontoc, which is nearly 30 kilometers from the residences of the parties.
Furthermore, he claimed that considering that the said affiants never testified, he was never afforded the
opportunity to cross-examine them. Therefore, their affidavits were mere hearsay and insufficient to prove
his guilt.
The petitioner does not persuade.
The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, a fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain ones side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of.[13] Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict
judicial sense. In administrative proceedings, a formal or trial-type hearing is not always necessary[14]and
technical rules of procedure are not strictly applied. Hence, the right to cross-examine is not an
indispensable aspect of administrative due process.[15] The petitioner cannot, therefore, argue that the
affidavit of Bang-on and his witnesses are hearsay and insufficient to prove his guilt.
At any rate, having actively participated in the proceedings before the CSC-CAR, the CSC, and the CA, the
petitioner was apparently afforded every opportunity to explain his side and seek reconsideration of the
ruling against him.
As to the issue of the veracity of the affidavits, such is a question of fact which cannot now be raised before
the Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The CSC-CAR, the CSC and the CA did not, therefore, err in
giving credence to the affidavits of the complainants and his witnesses, and in consequently ruling that there
was substantial evidence to support the finding of misconduct on the part of the petitioner.
On the Penalty

Assuming that he did box Bang-on, Pat-og argues that there is no substantial evidence to prove that he did
so with a clear intent to violate the law or in flagrant disregard of the established rule, as required for a
finding of grave misconduct. He insists that he was not motivated by bad faith or ill will because he acted in
the belief that, as a teacher, he was exercising authority over Bang-on in loco parentis, and was, accordingly,
within his rights to discipline his student. Citing his 33 years in the government service without any adverse
record against him and the fact that he is at the edge of retirement, being already 62 years old, the petitioner
prays that, in the name of substantial and compassionate justice, the CSC-CARs finding of simple
misconduct and the concomitant penalty of suspension should be upheld, instead of dismissal.
The Court agrees in part.
Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behaviour.
To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with the performance of
the official functions and duties of a public officer. In grave misconduct, as distinguished from simple
misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or t1agrant disregard of an
established rule must be manifest.[16]
Teachers are duly licensed professionals who must not only be competent in the practice of their noble
profession, but must also possess dignity and a reputation with high moral values. They must strictly adhere
to, observe, and practice the set of ethical and moral principles, standards, and values laid down in the Code
of Ethics of Professional Teachers, which apply to all teachers in schools in the Philippines, whether public
or private, as provided in the preamble of the said Code.[17] Section 8 of Article VIII of the same Code
expressly provides that a teacher shall not inflict corporal punishment on offending learners.
Clearly then, petitioner cannot argue that in punching Bang-on, he was exercising his right as a teacher in
loco parentis to discipline his student. It is beyond cavil that the petitioner, as a public school teacher,
deliberately violated his Code of Ethics. Such violation is a flagrant disregard for the established rule
contained in the said Code tantamount to grave misconduct.
Under Section 52(A)(2) of Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, the
penalty for grave misconduct is dismissal .from the service, which carries with it the cancellation of
eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in the
government service.[18] This penalty must, however, be tempered with compassion as there was sufficient
provocation on the part of Bang-on. Considering further the mitigating circumstances that the petitioner has
been in the government service for 33 years, that this is his first offense and that he is at the cusp of
retirement, the Court finds the penalty of suspension for six months as appropriate under the circumstances.
Petition partially granted, Alberto was suspended for six months.

THIRD DIVISION, G.R. No. 198755, June 05, 2013, ALBERTO PAT-OG, SR., PETITIONER, VS.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION RESPONDENT.

[1] G.R. No. 183678, March 15, 2010, 615 SCRA 500, 513.
[2] Section 2. (1) The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of
the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.
xxxx
Section 3. The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the Government, shall
establish a career service and adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness,
progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service. It shall strengthen the merit and rewards system,
integrate all human resources development programs for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize a
management climate conducive to public accountability. It shall submit to the President and the Congress
an annual report on its personnel programs.
[3] Chapter 3, Title I(A), Book V:
Section 12. Powers and Functions. The Commission shall have the following powers and functions: x x
x (11) Hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal,
including contested appointments, and review decisions and actions of its offices and of the agencies
attached to it. x x x
[4] Section 9. Powers and Functions of the Commission. The Commission shall administer the Civil
Service and shall have the following powers and functions:
xxxx
(j) Hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it in accordance with Section
37 or brought to it on appeal;
xxxx
Section 37. Disciplinary Jurisdiction.

(a) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving the
imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty
days salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from Office. A complaint may be
filed directly with the Commission by a private citizen against a government official or employee in which
case it may hear and decide the case or it may deputize any department or agency or official or group of
officials to conduct the investigation. The results of the investigation shall be submitted to the
Commission with recommendation as to the penalty to be imposed or other action to be taken. x x x
[5] Section. 9. Administrative Charges. Administrative charges against a teacher shall be heard initially by
a committee composed of the corresponding School Superintendent of the Division or a duly authorized
representative who should at least have the rank of a division supervisor, where the teacher belongs, as
chairman, a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial or national teachers
organization and a supervisor of the Division, the last two to be designated by the Director of Public
Schools. The committee shall submit its findings and recommendations to the Director of Public Schools
within thirty days from the termination of the hearings: Provided, however, That where the school
superintendent is the complainant or an interested party, all the members of the committee shall be
appointed by the Secretary of Education.
[6] Section. 23. Revocation of the Certificate of Registration, Suspension from the Practice of the
Teaching Profession, and Cancellation of Temporary or Special Permit. The Board shall have the
power, after due notice and hearing, to suspend or revoke the certificate of registration of any registrant,
to reprimand or to cancel the temporary/special permit of a holder thereof who is exempt from
registration, for any of the following causes:
(a) Conviction for any criminal offense by a court of competent jurisdiction; (b) Immoral, unprofessional
or dishonorable conduct;
(c) Declaration by a court of competent jurisdiction for being mentally unsound or insane;
(d) Malpractice, gross incompetence, gross negligence or serious ignorance of the practice of the teaching
profession;
(e) The use of or perpetration of any fraud or deceit in obtaining a certificate of registration, professional
license or special/temporary permit;
(f) Chronic inebriety or habitual use of drugs;
(g) Violation of any of the provisions of this Act, the rules and regulations and other policies of the Board
and the Commission, and the code of ethical and professional standards for professional teachers; and
(h) Unjustified or willful failure to attend seminars, workshops, conferences and the like or the
continuing education program prescribed by the Board and the Commission.

The decision of the Board to revoke or suspend a certificate may be appealed to the regional trial court of
the place where the Board holds office within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the said decision or of the
denial of the motion for reconsideration filed in due time.
[7] Puse v. Santos-Puse, supra note 10, at 513.
[8] Id. at 516.
[9] G.R. No. 179452, June 11, 2009, 589 SCRA 88, 97.
[10] G.R. No. 177531, September 10, 2009, 599 SCRA 52,65; citing Ombudsman v. Masing, 566 Phil. 253,
274 (2008).
[11] CSC v. Macud, G.R. No. 177531, September 10, 2009, 599 SCRA 52,66.
[12] Rubio v. Munar. 561 Phil. 1, 9 (2007).
[13] Ombudsman v. Reyes, G.R. No. 170512, October 5, 2011, 658 SCRA 626, 640; citing Ledesma v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 166780, December 27, 2007, 541 SCRA 444, 452.
[14] Imperial v. GSIS, G.R. No. 191224, October 4, 2011, 658 SCRA 497, 505.
[15] Velez v. De Vera, 528 Phil. 763, 802 (2006).
[16] Ombudsman v. Reyes, G.R. No.l70512. supra note 22. at 637: citing Salazar v. Barriaga, A.M. No. P05-20 16. 550 Phil. 44. 48-49 (2007).
[17] Preamble. CODE OF ETHICS OF PROFESSIONAL TEACHERS.
[18] Section 58(a). Rule IV. UNIFORM RULES ON ADMINISTRATIVE CASES IN THE CIVIL
SERVICE.

SUBJECT: POLITICAL LAW

Dismissal Of An Employee Based On Speculation As To The Damage The Employer
Could Have Suffered Is An Injustice
by The Lawyer's Post February 11, 2015 Comments Off on Dismissal Of An Employee Based On
Speculation As To The Damage The Employer Could Have Suffered Is An Injustice

Aimee was employed as selling teller by Manila Jockey Club, Inc. On the night of April
25, 1998, two bettors placed their bets with her and suddenly left. She entered the
bets. However, one of the bettors returned and asked to cancel his bet, which she did,
as she also operates the negative machine. She then returned the money to the
bettor. Unknown to her, one of the bettors returned, claiming he won Race 14. Since
he was entered for the daily double, he only needs to win Race 15 to be able to collect
his winning. When Aimee turned to give his ticket, she discovered to her dismay that
the bet she cancelled was for the bettor who was entered in the daily-double. She
explained to the bettor the sitatuiona and promised to pay the dividends in case the
bettor indeed won the daily-double. He did not win hence her obligation did not
materliaze. However, the reliever-supervisior ordered her to submit a written
explanation of the incident, which she did, averring that the cancellation of the ticket
was an honest mistake on her part. Later that day, she was placed on preventive
suspension, and she learned that she was dismissed from work only when she saw
copies of inter-office memorandum posted in the betting stations. On the part of the
company, the latter averred that a certain field officer of the Games and Amusements
Board wrote them calling attention to the complaint of a bettor whose ticket was
canceled. That the cancellation of the ticket was a serious violation of company policy
amounting to dishonesty. That she was afforded due process of law in her termination.

The Labor Arbiter dismissed Aimees complaint, ruling that her gross negligence in the performance of
there duty warranted her termination. On the other hand, the NLRC reversed the LA decision, holding
that Aimee was liable only for an honest mistake that did not warrant dismissal. The company petition for
certiorari was denied by the Court of Appeals, hence, it elevated the case to the Supreme Court by way of
petition for review on certiorari. It posits that the termination of Aimee was warranted, since he held a
position of trust and confidence, and the unauthorised cancellation of the ticket would have greatly
affected the company had the bettor won the ticket, because surely Aimee could not pay the amount,
resulting in cases that maybe filed against the company.
The Supreme Court:
The appeal lacks merit.
MJCI posits that Trajano held a position of trust and confidence; that the act of canceling the ticket was
unauthorized because it was done without the consent of the bettor; that the CA thus erred in construing
the phrase unauthorized cancellation of ticket as referring to whether or not she was authorized to cancel
the ticket pursuant to company rules; that under the same premise, the loss of trust and confidence was
established because the unauthorized cancellation of the ticket was a serious misconduct on her part
considering that had the bet of P2,000.00 won the daily double race, the dividend to be paid could have
been such a big amount that she would be unable to pay on her own; that the repercussions of her act to
MJCI would have been disastrous had the bet won, with MJCI being sued by the bettor and being
scandalized in the media; that MJCI would have suffered great loss in both income and reputation due to
such unauthorized cancellation of ticket; and that, consequently, MJCI had the just cause to dismiss her.
[1]
We cannot sustain the position of MJCI.
The valid termination of an employee may either be for just causes under Article 282[2] or for authorized
causes under Article 283[3] and Article 284[4], all of the Labor Code.
Specifically, loss of the employers trust and confidence is a just cause under Article 282 (c), a provision
that ideally applies only to cases involving an employee occupying a position of trust and confidence, or to
a situation where the employee has been routinely charged with the care and custody of the employers
money or property.[5] But the loss of trust and confidence, to be a valid ground for dismissal, must be
based on a willful breach of trust and confidence founded on clearly established facts. A breach is
willful, according to AMA Computer College, Inc. v. Garay[6], if it is done intentionally, knowingly and
purposely, without justifiable excuse, as distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly,
heedlessly or inadvertently. It must rest on substantial grounds and not on the employers arbitrariness,
whims, caprices or suspicion; otherwise, the employee would eternally remain at the mercy of the
employer.[7] An ordinary breach is not enough.
Moreover, the loss of trust and confidence must be related to the employees performance of duties. As
held in Gonzales v. National Labor Relations Commission[8]:

Loss of confidence, as a just cause for termination of employment, is premised on the fact that the
employee concerned holds a position of responsibility, trust and confidence. He must be invested with
confidence on delicate matters such as the custody, handling, care and protection of the employers
property and/or funds. But in order to constitute a just cause for dismissal, the act complained of must be
work-related such as would show the employee concerned to be unfit to continue working for the
employer.
As a selling teller, Trajano held a position of trust and confidence. The nature of her employment
required her to handle and keep in custody the tickets issued and the bets made in her assigned selling
station. The bets were funds belonging to her employer. Although the act complained of the
unauthorized cancellation of the ticket (i.e., unauthorized because it was done without the consent of the
bettor) was related to her work as a selling teller, MJCI did not establish that the cancellation of the
ticket was intentional, knowing and purposeful on her part in order for her to have breached the trust and
confidence reposed in her by MJCI, instead of being only out of an honest mistake.
Still, to justify the supposed loss of its trust and confidence in Trajano, MJCI contends that the
unauthorized cancellation of the ticket could have greatly prejudiced MJCI for causing damage to both its
income and reputation.
We consider the contention of MJCI unwarranted. As the records indicate, MJCIs prejudice remained
speculative and unrealized. To dismiss an employee based on speculation as to the damage the employer
could have suffered would be an injustice. The injustice in the case of Trajano would be greater if the
supposed just cause for her dismissal was not even sufficiently established. While MJCI as the employer
understandably had its own interests to protect, and could validly terminate any employee for a just cause,
its exercise of the power to dismiss should always be tempered with compassion and imbued with
understanding, avoiding its abuse.[9]
In this regard, we have to stress that the loss of trust and confidence as a ground for the dismissal of an
employee must also be shown to be genuine, for, as the Court has aptly pointed out in Mabeza v. National
Labor Relations Commission[10]: x x x loss of confidence should not be simulated in order to justify
what would otherwise be, under the provisions of law, an illegal dismissal. It should not be used as a
subterfuge for causes which are illegal, improper and unjustified. It must be genuine, not a mere
afterthought to justify an earlier action taken in bad faith.

The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court unavoidably notes that the invocation of loss of trust and
confidence as a ground for dismissing Trajano was made belatedly. In its position paper dated September
2, 1998, MJCI invoked the grounds under Article 282 (a) and (b) of the Labor Code to support its
dismissal of her, submitting then that the unauthorized cancellation of the ticket constituted a serious
violation of company policy amounting to dishonesty. The first time that MJCI invoked breach of trust
was in its motion for the reconsideration of the decision of the NLRC. MJCI also thereafter urged the
ground of breach of trust in its petition for certiorari in the CA. Such a belated invocation of loss of
confidence broadly hints the ground as a mere afterthought to buttress an otherwise baseless dismissal of
the employee.
Anent compliance with due process, MJCI argues that Trajanos notification of her termination through
the posting in the selling stations should be deemed a substantial if not full compliance with the due
process requirement, considering that she herself even presented a copy of the posting as evidence; that
the rule on giving notice of termination to an employee did not expressly require the personal service of
the notice to the dismissed worker; and that what mattered was that she was notified in writing of MJCIs
decision to terminate her through the posting in its selling stations.
The argument is bereft of worth and substance.
The procedure to be followed in the termination of employment based on just causes is laid down in
Section 2 (d), Rule I of the Implementing Rules of Book VI of the Labor Code, to wit:
Section 2. Security of Tenure.
xxxx
(d) In all cases of termination of employment, the following standards of due process shall be
substantially observed:
For termination of employment based on just causes as defined in Article 282 of the Labor Code:
(i) A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds for termination, and giving
said employee reasonable opportunity within which to explain his side.
(ii) A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with the assistance of counsel if he so
desires is given opportunity to respond to the charge, present his evidence, or rebut the evidence presented
against him.
(iii) A written notice of termination served on the employee, indicating that upon due consideration of all
the circumstances, grounds have been established to justify his termination. In case of termination, the
foregoing notices shall be served on the employees last known address.
A review of the records warrants a finding that MJCI did not comply with the prescribed procedure.
In its October 27, 1999 decision, the NLRC declared that MJCI complied with the first notice requirement
by serving a copy of the first notice upon Trajano, who received the copy and affixed her signature
thereon on April 26, 1998. Such declaration seems to be supported by the records.

Yet, the NLRC concluded that the clarificatory meeting was not the hearing contemplated by law because
the supposed complainants were not there for Trajano to confront.
We disagree with the NLRCs conclusion, and instead find that there was a compliance with the second
requirement for a hearing or conference. It is undeniable that Trajano was accorded the real opportunity
to respond to the complaint against her, for she did submit her written explanation on April 26, 1998 and
was invited to the final clarificatory meeting set on June 5, 1998 in the presence of the MJCI Raceday
Union President.
Nor was it necessary at all for Trajano to be able to confront the complainant against her. In MuajeTuazon v. Wenphil Corporation[11], the Court has clarified that the opportunity to confront a witness is not
demanded in company investigations of the administrative sins of an employee, holding thusly:
xxxx
Petitioners must be reminded, however, that confrontation of witnesses is required only in adversarial
criminal prosecutions, and not in company investigations for the administrative liability of the employee.
Additionally, actual adversarial proceedings become necessary only for clarification, or when there is a
need to propound searching questions to witnesses who give vague testimonies. This is not an inherent
right, and in company investigations, summary proceedings may be conducted.
As for the last procedural requirement of giving the second notice, the posting of the notice of termination
at MJCIs selling stations did not satisfy it, and the fact that Trajano was eventually notified of her
dismissal did not cure the infirmity. It is notable, indeed, that the NLRC explicitly found in its October 27,
1999

decision

that

MJCI

did

not

comply,

to

wit:

In this case, there is the first written notice required but none of the second notice that informs her of the
employers or MJCIs decision to dismiss her. In fact, it was not even shown that the investigator, Atty.
Joey Galit, whose office is that of an assistant racing manager, has the companys authority to dismiss the
complainant, since that power is usually lodged with the head of the human resource department or with
the President, but unusual with an assistant manager. The complainant asserts that she was never
furnished a copy of her termination letter and what she had submitted as evidence on record (Annex A
for the complainant, Record, p. 25) was one of those copies posted on all selling stations of MJCI. This
accusation was not answered by the respondents nor have they ever proved that they had furnished the
complainant a written notice of the decision of MJCI to terminate her services on the ground of serious
violation of company policy (dishonesty[12]).
We uphold this finding of the NLRC, for the law on the matter has been clear. While personal service of
the notice of termination on the employee is not required, Section 2 (d), Rule I of the Implementing Rules
of Book VI of the Labor Code mandates that such notice be served on Trajano at her last known address,
viz:
xxxx

(iii) A written notice of termination served on the employee, indicating that upon due consideration of all
the circumstances, grounds have been established to justify his termination. In case of termination, the
foregoing notices shall be served on the employees last known address. (Emphasis supplied)
x

Accordingly, the CA did not commit any error in dismissing MJCIs petition for certiorari assailing the
decision of the NLRC. It is worth repeating that in termination cases, the employer carries the burden of
proving that its dismissal of the employee was legal.[13] The employers failure discharged its burden will
readily mean that the dismissal has not been justified, and was, therefore, illegal.[14] Accordingly, the
failure of MJCI to establish the just cause for terminating Trajano fully warranted the NLRCs finding
that Trajanos termination was illegal.
Considering the lapse of time between the rendition of the decision of the NLRC and this ultimate
resolution of the case, however, the Court holds that a review of the order of reinstatement and the award
of backwages is necessary and in order.
There is no question that an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to her reinstatement without loss of
seniority rights and other privileges, and to full backwages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits or
their monetary equivalent.[15]
In case the reinstatement is no longer possible, however, an award of separation pay, in lieu of
reinstatement, will be justified.[16] The Court has ruled that reinstatement is no longer possible: (a) when
the former position of the illegally dismissed employee no longer exists[17]; or (b) when the employers
business has closed down[18]; or (c) when the employer-employee relationship has already been strained
as to render the reinstatement impossible.[19] The Court likewise considered reinstatement to be nonfeasible because a considerable time has lapsed between the dismissal and the resolution of the case.
[20] In that regard, a lag of eight years or ten years is sufficient to justify an award of separation pay in
lieu of reinstatement.
Applying the foregoing to this case, the Court concludes that the reinstatement of Trajano is no longer
feasible. More than 14 years have already passed since she initiated her complaint for illegal dismissal in
1998, filing her position paper on September 3, 1998[21], before the Court could finally resolve her case.
The lapse of that long time has rendered her reinstatement an impractical, if not an impossible, option for
both her and MJCI. Consequently, an award of separation pay has become the practical alternative,
computed at one month pay for every year of service[22]
Anent backwages, Trajano is entitled to full backwages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their
monetary equivalent, computed from the time her actual compensation was withheld on June 6, 1998 up
to the finality of this decision (on account of her reinstatement having meanwhile become non-feasible
and impractical[23]). This ruling is consistent with the legislative intent behind Republic Act No. 6715.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on January 30, 2003, subject to the
MODIFICATIONS that: (a) separation pay computed at one month pay for every year of service be
awarded in lieu of reinstatement, and (b) backwages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their
monetary equivalent, computed from June 6, 1998, the date of respondents termination, until the finality
of this decision be paid to respondent.
The petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION, G.R. No. 160982, June 26, 2013, MANILA JOCKEY CLUB, INC.,PETITIONER,VS.
AIMEE O. TRAJANO, RESPONDENT.

[1]

Id.

at

25-26.

[2] Article 282. TERMINATION BY EMPLOYER

An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or will disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or
representative in connection with his work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized
representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any
immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative; and
(e)

Other

causes

analogous

to

the

foregoing.

[3] rticle 283. CLOSURE OF ESTABLISHMENT AND REDUCTION OF PERSONNEL.

The employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to the installation of labor-saving
devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the
establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this
Title, by serving a written notice on the worker and the Ministry of Labor and Employment at least one (1)
month before the intended date thereof. In case of termination due to the installation of labor saving
devices or redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall be entitled to a separation pay equivalent to at
least his one (1) month pay or to at least one (1) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher.
In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closures or cessation of operations of
establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay
shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half () month pay for every year of service,
whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered as one (1) whole year.
[4] Article 284. DISEASES AS GROUND FOR TERMINATION

An employer may terminated the services of an employee who has been found to be suffering from any
disease and whose continued employment is prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his health as well as to
the health of his co-employees; Provided, that he is paid separation pay equivalent to at least one (1)
month salary or to one-half () month salary for every year of service, whichever is greater, a fraction of
at

least

six

(6)

months

being

considered

as

one

(1)

whole

year.

[5] Azucena, C.A., The Labor Code with Comments and Cases, Volume Two, 2004 Ed., p. 630.
[6]

G.R.

No.

162468,

January

23,

2007,

512

SCRA

312,

316

-317.

[7] Citing Fujitsu Computer Products Corporation of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
158232,

March

31,

2005,

454

SCRA

737,

760.

[8] G.R. No. 131653, March 26, 2001, 355 SCRA 195, 207 -208; citing Sanchez v. National Labor
Relations

Commission,

G.R.

No.

124348,

August

19,

1999,

312

SCRA

727,

735.

[9] Blazer Car Marketing, Inc. v. Bulauan, G.R. No. 181483, March 9, 2010, 614 SCRA 713, 722.
[10]

G.R.

[11]

G.R.

[12]

No.
No.

118506,
162447,

April

18,

December

Supra

27,

1997,

271

2006,

note

SCRA

511

SCRA

2,

670,

683.

521,

531.

at

49

[13] Macasero v. Southern Industrial Gases Philippines, G.R. No. 178524, January 30, 2009, 577 SCRA
500, 505; L.C. Ordoez Construction v. Nicdao, G.R. No. 149669, July 27, 2006, 496 SCRA 745, 759.
[14] San Miguel Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 153983, May 26, 2009,
588 SCRA 179, 192; AMA Computer College-East Rizal v. Ignacio, G.R. No. 178520, June 23, 2009, 590
SCRA

633,

651.

[15] Fulache v. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, G.R. No. 183810, January 21, 2010, 610 SCRA 567,
588.
[16] Pangilinan v. Wellmade Manufacturing Corporation, G.R. No. 187005, April 7, 2010, 617 SCRA 567,
573.
[17] Asian Terminals, Inc. v. Villanueva, G.R. NO. 143219, November 28, 2006, 508 SCRA 346, 352.
[18] Philtread Tire & Rubber Corporation v. Vicente, G.R. No. 142759, November 10, 2004, 441 SCRA
574,
[19]

582.
Cabatulan

v.

Buat,

G.R.

No.

147142,

February

14,

2005,

451

SCRA 234,

247.

[20] Association of Independent Unions of the Philippines v. NLRC, G.R. No. 120505, March 25, 1999,
305 SCRA 219, 235 and Lambo v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 111042, October 26,
1999,
[21]

317

SCRA
Rollo,

420,
p.

430.
85.

[22] Gaco v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 104690, February 23, 1994, 230 SCRA 260,
268.
[23] General Milling Corporation v. Casio, G.R. No. 149552, March 10, 2010, 615 SCRA 13, 38.

SUBJECT: POLITICAL LAW

An Employee Like A Cashier Who Comes Into Possession Of

The Monies She Collected Enjoys The Confidence Reposed
In Her By Her Employer, Thus Should Be Held Liable For
Qualified Theft
by The Lawyer's Post May 7, 2015 0 Comments

The Facts:
Juanita (Flores), the private complainant, was engaged in the business of guaranteeing
purchase orders and gift checks from Shoemart and Landmark and disposing them for
consideration.

She initially hired Mera Joy (Eleuterio) as house help but was

transferred to her office performing clerical jobs, eventually being designated to bill
and collect from sub-gauarantors and to encash and deposit checks to her (Juanitas)
account. On July 15, 2004, Mera Joy collected from the sub-guarantors the amount of
P640,353.86, but did not deposit it to Juanitas account.

Instead she issued 15

personal checks which were subsequently dishonoured upon presentment for payment
as the account was closed.
The RTC convicted him as charged, finding abuse of confidence on her part. In her
appeal to the Court of Appeals, Mera Joy posits that since Juanita was abroad on July
15, 2004, she could not have known whether she (Mera) indeed collected the checks;
the mere issuance of the 15 checks does not prove that indeed she collected the
amount from the sub-guarantors or failed to remit it to Juanita. She theorised that the
checks might have been issued by her to the sub-guarantors as a result of some
transaction between them, and the sub-guarantors used it to pay their obligation to
Juanita.

The CA disbelieved the theory proffered by Mera, and disregarded her

contention on the fact that Juanita was abroad at the time of the commission of the
crime, being then immaterial to the crime itself. Mera Joy elevated her case to the
Supreme Court. She maintains that the mere issuance of the checks does not prove
unlawful taking.
The Issue/s:
1.Whether Mera Joy may be held liable for Qualified Theft;
The Courts ruling:

We concur with the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the
prosecution satisfactorily established all the elements of qualified theft, to wit: 1)
taking of personal property; 2) that said property belongs to another; 3) that the said
taking was done with intent to gain; 4) that it was done without the owners consent;
5) that it was accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against
persons, or of force upon things; and 6) that it was done with grave abuse of
confidence.

As correctly found by the appellate court:

Private complainant testified that Accused-appellant took the amount of P640,353.86

from her without her consent by failing to turn over the amount she collected from the
formers sub-guarantors. Instead, she issued fifteen (15) personal checks and
deposited the same to Private Complainants account which however, all bounced for
the reason account closed. The taking of the amount collected by Accused-appellant
was obviously done with intent to gain as she failed to remit the same to Private
Complainant. Intent to gain is presumed from the act of unlawful taking. Further, the
unlawful act was accomplished by Accused-appellant without the use of violence or
intimidation against persons, [or] of force upon things as the payment to her of the
said amount was voluntarily handed to her by the sub-guarantors as she was known to
be entrusted with the collection of payments.
The circumstance of grave abuse of confidence that made the same as qualified theft
was also proven. Accused-appellant herself testified that as a cashier, her functions
and responsibilities include billings and collections from their agents and making of
deposits and withdrawals in behalf of Private Complainant. Moreover, when the
payment for the purchase orders or gift checks becomes due, she would fill up the four
(4) blank checks given by the sub-guarantor with the knowledge and consent of
Private Complainant. It is beyond doubt that an employee like a cashier who comes
into possession of the monies she collected enjoys the confidence reposed in her by
her employer, as in the instant case.

We are one with the trial court and the appellate court in finding that the element of
taking of personal property was satisfactorily established by the prosecution. During
her cross-examination, private complainant Flores testified that upon having been
apprised of the unremitted collections, she conducted an investigation and inquired
from her sub-guarantors who admitted making payments to appellant.

She also

testified during cross-examination that when appellant arrived from Hongkong, the
latter went to Flores office and admitted to having converted the collections to her
personal use.

Interestingly, when it was her turn to testify, appellant did not rebut

Flores testimony. During her direct examination, appellant only testified thus:

Atty. Regino Question:

Madam Witness, you are being charged here with taking, stealing and carrying away
collected money in the total amount of P640,353.86, that is owned by Juanita J. Flores.
What can you say about this allegation?
Witness:
That is not true, sir.
Atty. Regino Question:
What is your basis in stating that?
Witness:
I never took that six hundred forty thousand that they are saying and, I never signed
any document with the sub-guarantors that I [took] money from them.

Notably, when Flores testified during her cross-examination that she talked to the subguarantors who admitted having made payments to appellant, the latters counsel no
longer made further clarifications or follow-up questions. Thus, Flores testimony on
this fact remains on record unrebutted. Clearly, it is futile on the part of the appellant
to belatedly claim in her Brief before the appellate court that the prosecution should
have presented these sub-guarantors so they could be cross-examined

There is

likewise no merit in her contention that the prosecution is guilty of suppression of

evidence when they did not present these sub-guarantors simply because the
7

defense, on its own initiative, could very well compel, thru the compulsory processes
of the court, the attendance of these sub-guarantors as witnesses . Moreover, we
8

note that appellant did not even attempt to discredit the testimony of Flores to the
effect that upon her arrival from Hongkong, appellant went to Flores office and
admitted to having committed the offense.
Significantly, when appellant was placed on the witness stand, she did not even make
any attempt to explain her issuance of the 15 checks. In fact, during her entire
testimony, she never made any mention about the personal checks that she issued
and deposited in Flores account. It was only in her Memorandum filed with the trial
9

court and her Brief submitted to the appellate court that the same was discussed.
10

However, her explanation as to its issuance is so convoluted that it defies belief. All
that appellant could claim is that the issuance of the checks only proves that the same
was for a consideration but omitted to explain what the consideration was. She also
theorized that she might have issued the checks to the sub-guarantors for her
personal transactions but likewise failed to elaborate on what these transactions

were. In any event, if indeed appellant did not steal the amount of P640,353.86
belonging to Flores, how come she issued 15 personal checks in favor of the latter and
deposited the same in her account, albeit they were subsequently dishonored?
Besides, we note that in appellants Counter Affidavit dated August 20, 2004
11

subscribed before 3rd Assistant City Prosecutor Hannibal S. Santillan of Makati City,
she already admitted having taken without the knowledge and consent of private
complainant several purchase orders and gift checks worth thousands of pesos. She
claimed though that she was only forced to do so by Edna Cruz and cohorts.
We also concur with the findings of the trial court and the CA that the prosecution
established beyond reasonable doubt that the amount of P640,353.86 actually
belonged to Flores; that appellant stole the amount with intent to gain and without
Flores consent; that the taking was accomplished without the use of violence or
intimidation against persons, or of force upon things; and that it was committed with
grave abuse of confidence.
Anent the penalty imposed, Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code state:
Art. 309. Penalties. Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the
thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the
value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum
period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten
thousand pesos, but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty
years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be
imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be
termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
xxxx
Art. 310. Qualified theft. The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next
higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding articles,
if committed by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the
property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts
taken from the premises of the plantation or fish taken from a fishpond or fishery, or if
property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or
any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.
Based on the foregoing, since the amount taken is P640,353.86, then the imposable
penalty shall be the maximum period of prision mayor in its minimum and medium
periods, or eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to ten (10) years, adding

one (1) year for each additional P10,000.00. Thus, from P640,353.86, we deduct
P22,000.00, giving us a balance of P618,353.86 which we divide by P10,000.00. We
now have sixty-one (61) years which we will add to the basic penalty of eight (8)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to ten (10) years. However, as stated in
Article 309, the imposable penalty for simple theft should not exceed a total of twenty
(20) years. Thus, if appellant had committed only simple theft, her penalty would be
twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal. Considering however that in qualified theft,
the penalty is two degrees higher, then the appellate court properly imposed the
penalty of reclusion perpetua .
12

Finally, we note that appellant has not yet been committed to prison. In view thereof
and based on our foregoing discussion, appellant must be ordered arrested and
committed to prison to start serving her sentence.
ACCORDINGLY, the assailed May 26, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR No. 31635 is AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 132
is DIRECTEDto issue a warrant for the arrest of appellant and to order her commitment
at the Correctional Institution for Women, and to submit to this Court a Report of such
commitment, all within ten (10) days from receipt of this Resolution. The
Superintendent, Correctional Institution for Women is DIRECTED to confirm to this
Court the confinement of appellant within ten (10) days therefrom.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION, G.R. No. 200308, February 23, 2015,PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. MERA JOY ELEUTERIO NIELLES, @ MERA NIELLES
DELOS REYES, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
1

See People v. Mirto, G.R. No. 193479, October 19, 2011, 659 SCRA 796, 807.

CA rollo, pp. 93-94.

TSN, May 25, 2005, p. 18.

Id. at 17.

TSN, July 19, 2006, pp. 16-17.

CA rollo, p. 30.

Id.

See RULES OF COURT, Rule 115, Section 1(g).

Records, pp. 194-200.

10

CA rollo, pp. 26-33.

11

Records, pp. 5-10.

12

People v. Mirto, supra note 13 at 814-816.

SUBJECT: CRIMINAL LAW

BP 22: Payment of The Value Of The Check Before Filing Of

Information In Court Erases Criminal Liability
by The Lawyer's Post February 19, 2015 Comments Off on BP 22: Payment of The Value Of The
Check Before Filing Of Information In Court Erases Criminal Liability

Ariel issued two checks payable to CASH as campaign contribution for Willie for the latters
candidacy in the 1998 elections. The latter then told him to stop payment of the checks as the
printing materials he ordered were delivered too late. The checks were therefore dishonoured
by the bank. The private complainant, whose demand letters were ignored by Ariel, filed a case
for violation of BP 22 against him. After receiving a subpoena from the Office of the Prosecutor,
Ariel then issued a replacement check for P200,000.00 which was encashed by Magda. Even
so, the Office of the Prosecutor filed two Informations for violation of BP 22 against Ariel. During
trial, the bank officer testified that the checks were drawn against insufficient fund. The MTC
thus convicted Ariel for two counts of BP 22. Upon appeal to the RTC, one case was dismissed
for improper venue, while Ariels conviction for the other count was upheld. Ariel elevated his
case to the Court of Appeals which affirmed his conviction. His appeal to the Supreme Court
invokes the ruling in Griffith v. Court of Appeals[1]. According to him, jurisprudence dictates
that the case against him should have been dismissed because he paid the amount of the
checks before the filing of the Informations. The Court of Appeals however disagrees with him,
citing that Griffith applied to corporate checks, not personal checks. Also, the fact that Ariel
paid the checks after receipt of the subpoena was taken against him by the Court of Appeals,
as he was motivated by a desire to avoid prosecution, not payment of the obligation. The
Supreme Court: In Griffith, the Court acquitted the accused therein due to the fact that two
years before the filing of the Information for violation of B.P. No. 22, the accused had, in effect,
paid the complainant an amount greater than the value of the bounced checks. The CA held
that the factual circumstances in Griffith are dissimilar from those in the present case. The
Court disagrees with such conclusion. The CA found Griffith inapplicable to the present case,
because the checks subject of this case are personal checks, while the check involved in
Griffith was a corporate check and, hence, some confusion or miscommunication could easily
occur between the signatories of the check and the corporate treasurer. Although the factual
circumstances in the present case are not exactly the same as those in Griffith, it should be
noted that the same kind of confusion giving rise to petitioners mistake very well existed in the
present case. Here, the check was issued by petitioner merely as a campaign contribution to
Castors candidacy. As found by the trial court, it was Castor who instructed petitioner to issue
a Stop Payment order for the two checks because the campaign materials, for which the
checks were used as payment, were not delivered on time. Petitioner relied on Castors word

and complied with his instructions, as it was Castor who was supposed to take delivery of said
materials. Verily, it is easy to see how petitioner made the mistake of readily complying with
the instruction to stop payment since he believed Castors word that there is no longer any
valid reason to pay complainant as delivery was not made as agreed upon. Nevertheless, two
months after receiving the demand letter from private complainant and just several days after
receiving the subpoena from the Office of the Prosecutor, accused issued a replacement check
which was successfully encashed by private complainant. The CA also took it against petitioner
that he paid the amount of the checks only after receiving the subpoena from the Office of the
Prosecutor, which supposedly shows that petitioner was motivated to pay not because he
wanted to settle his obligation but because he wanted to avoid prosecution. This reasoning is
tenuous, because in Griffith, the accused therein did not even voluntarily pay the value of the
dishonored checks; rather, the complainant was paid from the proceeds of the invalid
foreclosure of the accuseds property. In said case, the Court did not differentiate as to whether
payment was made before or after the complaint had been filed with the Office of the
Prosecutor. It only mattered that the amount stated in the dishonored check had actually been
paid before the Information against the accused was filed in court. In this case, petitioner even
voluntarily paid value of the bounced checks. The Court, therefore, sees no justification for
differentiating this case from that of Griffith. Records show that both in Griffith and in this case,
petitioner had paid the amount of the dishonored checks before the filing of the Informations in
court. Verily, there is no reason why the same liberality granted to the accused in Griffith
should not likewise be extended to herein petitioner. The precept enunciated in Griffith is herein
reiterated, to wit: While we agree with the private respondent that the gravamen of violation of
B.P. 22 is the issuance of worthless checks that are dishonored upon their presentment for
payment, we should not apply penal laws mechanically. We must find if the application of the
law is consistent with the purpose of and reason for the law. Ratione cessat lex, el cessat lex.
(When the reason for the law ceases, the law ceases.) It is not the letter alone but the spirit of
the law also that gives it life. This is especially so in this case where a debtors criminalization
would not serve the ends of justice but in fact subvert it. The creditor having collected already
more than a sufficient amount to cover the value of the checks for payment of rentals, via
auction sale, we find that holding the debtors president to answer for a criminal offense under
B.P. 22 two years after said collection is no longer tenable nor justified by law or equitable
considerations. In sum, considering that the money value of the two checks issued by
petitioner has already been effectively paid two years before the informations against him were
filed, we find merit in this petition. We hold that petitioner herein could not be validly and justly
convicted or sentenced for violation of B.P. 22. x x [2] (Emphasis supplied) In the more recent
case of Tan v. Philippine Commercial International Bank[3], the foregoing principle articulated in
Griffith was the precedent cited to justify the acquittal of the accused in said case. Therein, the
Court enumerated the elements for violation of B.P. Big. 22 being (1) The accused makes,
draws or issues a check to apply to account or for value; (2) The accused knows at the time of

the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with the drawee bank for
the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) The check is subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or it would have been
dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank
to stop payment.[4] To facilitate proving the second element, the law created a prima facie
presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds or credit, which is established when it is
shown that the drawer of the check was notified of its dishonor and, within five banking days
thereafter, failed to fully pay the amount of the check or make arrangements for its full
payment. If the check, however, is made good or the drawer pays the value of the check within
the five-day period, then the presumption is rebutted. Evidently, one of the essential elements
of the violation is no longer present and the drawer may no longer be indicted for B.P. Blg. 22.
Said payment within the period prescribed by the law is a complete defense. Generally, only
the full payment of the value of the dishonored check during the five-day grace period would
exculpate the accused from criminal liability under B.P. Blg. 22 but, as the Court further
elaborated in Tan: In Griffith v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that were the creditor had
collected more than a sufficient amount to cover the value of the checks representing rental
arrearages, holding the debtors president to answer for a criminal offense under B.P. Big. 22
two years after the said collection is no longer tenable nor justified by law or equitable
considerations. In that case, the Court ruled that albeit made beyond the grace period but two
years prior to the institution of the criminal case, the payment collected from the proceeds of
the foreclosure and auction sale of the petitioners impounded properties, with more than a
million pesos to spare, justified the acquittal of the petitioner. x x x x In the present case, PCIB
already extracted its proverbial pound of flesh by receiving and keeping in possession the four
buses trust properties surrendered by petitioner in about mid 1991 and March 1992 pursuant
to Section 7 of the Trust Receipts Law, the estimated value of which was about P6.6 million. It
thus appears that the total amount of the dishonored checks P1,785,855.75 -, x x x was more
than fully satisfied prior to the transmittal and receipt of the July 9,1992 letter of demand. In
keeping with jurisprudence, the Court then considers such payment of the dishonored checks to
have obliterated the criminal liability of petitioner. It is consistent rule that penal statutes are
construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. And since penal laws
should not be applied mechanically, the Court must determine whether the application of the
penal law is consistent with the purpose and reason of the law. x x x[5] (Underscoring supplied)
Thus, although payment of the value of the bounced check, if made beyond the 5-day period
provided for in B.P. Blg. 22, would normally not extinguish criminal liability, the aforementioned
cases show that the Court acknowledges the existence of extraordinary cases where, even if all
the elements of the crime or offense are present, the conviction of the accused would prove to
be abhorrent to societys sense of justice. Just like in Griffith and in Tan, petitioner should not be
penalized although all the elements of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 are proven to be present. The
fact that the issuer of the check had already paid the value of the dishonored check after

having received the subpoena from the Office of the Prosecutor should have forestalled the
filing of the Information in court. The spirit of the law which, for B.P. Big. 22, is the protection of
the credibility and stability of the banking system, would not be served by penalizing people
who have evidently made amends for their mistakes and made restitution for damages even
before charges have been filed against them. In effect, the payment of the checks before the
filing of the informations has already attained the purpose of the law. It should be emphasized
as well that payment of the value of the bounced check after the information has been filed in
court would no longer have the effect of exonerating the accused from possible conviction for
violation of B.P. Big. 22. Since from the commencement of the criminal proceedings in court,
there is no circumstance whatsoever to show that the accused had every intention to mitigate
or totally alleviate the ill effects of his issuance of the unfunded check, then there is no
equitable and compelling reason to preclude his prosecution. In such a case, the letter of the
law should be applied to its full extent. Furthermore, to avoid any confusion, the Courts ruling
in this case should be well differentiated from cases where the accused is charged with estafa
under Article 315, par. 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, where the fraud is perpetuated by
postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no
funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the
check. In said case of estafa, damage and deceit are the essential elements of the offense, and
the check is merely the accuseds tool in committing fraud. In such a case, paying the value of
the dishonored check will not free the accused from criminal liability. It will merely satisfy the
civil liability of the crime but not the criminal liability. In fine, the Court holds that herein
petitioner must be exonerated from the imposition of penalties for violation of B.P. Big. 22 as he
had already paid the amount of the dishonored checks six (6) months before the filing of
Informations with the court. Such a course of action is more in keeping with justice and equity.
Ariel was acquitted.
THIRD DIVISION, G.R. No. 190834, November 26, 2014, ARIEL T. LIM, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

SUBJECT: POLITICAL LAW

Relief Is Accorded To The Client Who Suffered By Reason Of

The Lawyers Palpable Mistake Or Negligence And Where
The Interest Of Justice So Requires

by The Lawyer's Post May 7, 2015 0 Comments

The Facts
In Civil Case No. 23-831, the spouses William and Ester Go (Spouses Uy) were able to
secure a favourable judgment from the defendant, Joseph Hung, and became the
highest bidder when the property covered by TCT No. 267949, was sold at auction.
After the lapse of the period of redemption and issuance in their favour of a Final Deed
of Sale, they proceeded to the Registry of Deeds to secure their new title. They were
unable to secure the new title as a new one was already issued in the name of Diana
Yap-Co (Diana), who allegedly acquired the property through an execution sale in Civil
Case No. 23-820. Thus, on October 27, 2009, the spouses Uy filed a complaint for
annulment of title and damages with prayer for issuance of writ of preliminary
injunction against Diana to prevent her from disposing the property, alleging that the
property was secured through fraud, since the documents necessary for the
registration of Dianas title were secured much later than the spouses. Dianas motion
to dismiss was denied, and the case proceeded to trial. At the initial presentation of
the spouses evidence on November 10, 2011, the spouses and their counsel failed to
appear. The judge gave them a chance to appear with a warning that their failure to
appear during the next hearing may merit dismissal of their case. Ester was able to
give her direct testimony, but did not attend the three subsequent hearings, and
instead filed a motion to pre-mark their documentary exhibits. Thus the RTC instead
issued an order striking out the direct testimony of Ester, and another denying their
motion to pre-mark exhibits. It also issued another order dismissing the spouses case
for failure to attend hearings despite notice. Their motion for reconsideration denied,
the spouses elevated their case through a petition for certiorari, which the Court of
Appeals granted, ascribing the fault to the spouses lawyer who failed to attend the
hearings and to notify them of the hearings, which should not bind his client.

It set

aside rules of technicalities and stated that the ends of justice will best be served if
the trial court conducted a full-blown trial of the case. Diana thus elevated her case to
the Court of Appeals.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the CA was justified in setting aside the RTCs dismissal of the case for
failure of the plaintiffs (respondents herein) to prosecute their case in accordance with
Section 3 Rule 17 of the Rules of Court.
The Courts ruling:
The petition lacks merit.

Petitioner failed to show that the CA committed reversible error in setting aside the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 09-122374 and directing the RTC to conduct a full-blown
trial of the case.
Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court provides that [i]f plaintiff fails to appear at the
time of the trial, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to
comply with these rules or any order of the court, the action may be dismissed upon
motion of the defendant or upon the courts own motion. This dismissal shall have the
effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise provided by the court.
However, the application of the foregoing rule is not, to the Courts mind, warranted in
this case since, as correctly found by the CA, respondents counsel acted negligently in
failing to attend the scheduled hearing dates and even notify respondents of the same
so as to enable them to travel all the way from Aurora, Isabela to Manila and attend
said hearings. Verily, relief is accorded to the client who suffered by reason of the
lawyers palpable mistake or negligence and where the interest of justice so requires.

Concurring with the CA, the Court finds that respondents would be deprived of the
opportunity to prove the legitimacy of their claims if the RTCs dismissal of the case
on a procedural technicality at that, which was clearly caused by the palpable
negligence of their counsel is sustained. Considering that respondents appear to
have legal and factual bases for their grievance, it would better serve the higher
interest of substantial justice to allow the parties conflicting claims to be resolved on
the merits. As the CA aptly observed:
At bench, if We sustain the ruling of the court a quo to strike out from the records the
testimony of Petitioner [hereinafter respondent] ESTER GO-UY and dismiss the case,
the Petitioners [hereinafter respondents] would lose any opportunity to prove the
legitimacy of their claims. We rule that the failure of the [respondents] former
counsel, Atty. AGUINALDO, to attend the court hearings scheduled on 01 and 22 March
2012 and to notify the [respondents] of said hearing dates for them to travel all the
way from Aurora, Isabela to Manila in order to attend the same should not bind
[respondents] because the latter appear to have legitimate grievances in the action
for annulment of title they filed with the court a quo. From the record, it remains
undisputed that a Decision dated 28 February 2007 was rendered in favor of herein
[respondents] against one JOSEPH CHUNG (hereinafter CHUNG) by the RTC, Branch 23
of Roxas, Isabela in Civil Case No. 23-831 for Sum of Money entitled Spouses William
T. Uy and Ester Uy vs. Joseph Chung. After said decision became final and executory,
[respondents] filed with the said court a motion for the issuance of a Writ of Execution
and was granted through an Order dated 18 January 2008. The implementation of the

said writ was coursed through the Office of the Clerk of Court of RTC, Manila and
assigned to Sheriff AUGUSTO J. FELICIDARIO (hereinafter Sheriff FELICIDARIO).
Thereafter, Sheriff FELICIDARIO caused the auction of the property covered by TCT No.
T-267949 registered in the name of CHING. During the scheduled auction sale on 07
May 2008, [respondents], as the sole bidder, submitted a bid of Php3,792,760.20,
hence, a Certificate of Sale was issued to them by Sheriff FELICIDARIO. On account of
CHUNGs failure to redeem the property with the period granted by law, the Sheriffs
Final Deed of Sale dated 21 May 2009, Certificate Authorizing Registration dated 05
June 2009 and other relevant documents were registered with the Registry of Deeds of
Manila on 17 June 2009. It was only on 08 September 2009 that Petitioners discovered
that the property covered by TCT No. T-267949 was transferred in the name of Private
Respondent [herein petitioner] CO under TCT No. 288213.

Further, it bears pointing out that while the RTC dismissed the case impliedly by
reason of respondents repeated failure to appear in court and prosecute their case, it
also inaccurately expressed the view that such dismissal may properly be taken as its
favorable action on petitioners standing motion to dismiss. The Court takes note,
however, that the cited motion to dismiss was not premised on the respondents
failure to prosecute their case but on the alleged failure of the complaint to state a
cause of action.

Fundamental is the rule that a motion to dismiss grounded on failure to state a cause
of action refers only to the insufficiency of the pleading. A complaint states a cause of
action if it avers the existence of the three essential elements of a cause of action,
namely: (a) the legal right of the plaintiff; (b) the correlative obligation of the
defendant; and (c) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said right . If
4

these elements are present such that the allegations furnish sufficient basis by which
the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed. In this case, the
5

Court finds that the subject complaint sufficiently averred actual fraud on the part of
petitioner in procuring her title to the subject property to the prejudice of respondents
who claim to have acquired it first. Thus, outright dismissal for failure to state a cause
of action was improper.
In fine, the CA correctly ordered the reinstatement and full blown trial of Civil Case No.
09-122374.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 23, 2013 and the
Resolution dated September 27, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
124674 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION, G.R. No. 209295, February 11, 2015, DIANA YAP-CO, PETITIONER, VS.
SPOUSES WILLIAM T. UY AND ESTER GO-UY, RESPONDENTS.
1

See Multi-Trans Agency Phils., Inc. v. Oriental Assurance Corp., 608 Phil. 478, 493-494 (2009).

SUBJECT: LABOR LAW

No Dismissal When Intention Was To Retire From

Employment
by The Lawyer's Post January 4, 2015 Comments Off on No Dismissal When Intention Was To
Retire From Employment

Luciano was hired as security guard by Kampilan Security and Detective Agency and
assigned to the Naga Power Barge of the National Power Corporation at Toledo City. For
not wearing his proper uniform, he was suspended for one month effective May 8,
2003. By letter of June 2, 2003, NPC informed Kampilan that it is not longer interested
in Lucianos service and requested his replacement. On June 17, 2003, Luciano
requested a certification from Kampilan in connection with his intended retirement
effective that month. which the agency obliged, issuing on him a Certification which
reads:
CERTIFICATION

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to certify that Mr. Luciano Paragoso Caedo whose address [is] at Lower Bunga,
Toledo City was employed by this agency from November 20, 1996 up to May 7, 2003
as Security Guard assign[ed] at NPC, Sigpit Substation. He was terminated from his
employment by this agency on May 7, 2003 as per clients request.
Done this 25th day of June 2003 at Cebu City, Philippines.
(Signed)
RAMONCITO L. ARQUIZA
General Manager
KSDAI
Luciano then filed a case for illegal dismissal against Kampilan before the NLRC,
alleging that his suspension was without valid ground. When he went back to report for
work after his suspension, he was surprised to find out that he was effectively
terminated from work by virtue of the Certification issued by Kampilan. The agency
denied the allegations of Luciano; the NPC terminated his services hence he had to be
pulled out of the posting; instead of waiting for a new assignment, he then filed a case
for illegal dismissal; it also denied his monetary claim, insisting that in fact Luciano
had a cash advance for P10,000.00 as shown by a cash voucher signed by him. The
Labor Arbiter ruled in favour of Luciano and declared him illegally dismissed. Kampilan
thus filed an Appeal before the NLRC contending that the Labor Arbiter ruled agains tit
based merely on the Certification; dismissal cannot be proven by said certification
alone but must be proved by direct evidence that Luciano was indeed dismissed; the
word terminated in said certification actually meant pulled out, as shown by the
phrase per clients request. At any rate, the certification was only issued in
connection with Lucianos intended retirement as shown by his letter dated June 17,
2003. The NLRC initially denied Kampilans appeal, but on motion for reconsideration
granted it, ruling that Luciano was not illegally dismissed. Luciano thus filed a petition
for certiorari with the Court of Appeals to contest the dismissal of his case. The CA
denied his petition, holding that Luciano was merely placed on temporary off-detail
which is not equivalent to dismissal, but upheld the illegality of his suspension.
Luciano then elevated his case to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court;
In illegal dismissal cases, [w]hile the employer bears the burden x x x to prove that
the termination was for a valid or authorized cause, the employee must first establish
by substantial evidence the fact of dismissal from service.1 The burden of proving the

allegations rests upon the party alleging and the proof must be clear, positive and
convincing.[35] Thus, in this case, it is incumbent upon petitioner to prove his claim of
dismissal.
Petitioner relies on the word terminated as used in the June 25, 2003 Certification
issued him by respondent Arquiza and argues that the same is a clear indication that
he was dismissed from service. We are, however, not persuaded. Petitioner cannot
simply rely on this piece of document since the fact of dismissal must be evidenced by
positive and overt acts of an employer indicating an intention to dismiss. Here, aside
from this single document, petitioner proffered no other evidence showing that he was
dismissed from employment. While it is true that he was not allowed to report for work
after the period of his suspension expired, the same was due to NPCs request for his
replacement as NPC was no longer interested in his services. And as correctly argued
by respondents, petitioner from that point onward is not considered dismissed but
merely on a floating status. Such a floating status is lawful and not unusual for
security guards employed in security agencies as their assignments primarily depend
on the contracts entered into by the agency with third parties.
Countering such status, petitioner contends that even at present, he is still not given
any new duties. A floating status can ripen into constructive dismissal only when it
goes beyond the six-month maximum period allowed by law. In this case, petitioner
filed the Complaint for illegal dismissal even before the lapse of the six-month period.
Hence, his claim of illegal dismissal lacks basis. Moreover and as aptly observed by the
NLRC, it was in fact petitioner who intended to terminate his relationship with
respondents through his planned retirement. This is further bolstered by his prayer in
his Complaint where he sought for separation pay and not for reinstatement.
At any rate, upon a close reading of the June 25, 2003 Certification, this Court is of the
opinion that petitioner was not dismissed from service. The import of the said
Certification is that petitioner was assigned in NPC from November 20, 1996 up to May
7, 2003 and that on May 7, 2003, respondents terminated his assignment to NPC upon
the latters request. This is the correct interpretation based on the true intention of the
parties as shown by their contemporaneous and subsequent acts and the other
evidence on record as discussed above. Section 12 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
states that in the construction and interpretation of a document, the intention of the
parties must be pursued. Section 13 of the same Rule further instructs that the
circumstances under which a document was made may be shown in order to ascertain
the correct interpretation of a document.

To recap, petitioner was suspended effective May 8, 2003. On June 2, 2003, NPC
requested for his replacement. He then intimated his desire to retire from service on
June 17, 2003. These circumstances negate petitioners claim that he was terminated
on May 7, 2003. Clearly, there is no dismissal to speak of in this case.
With respect to the additional benefits prayed for by the petitioner, suffice it to state
that this Court cannot grant him such reliefs. [I]t is settled that a non-appellant
cannot, on appeal, seek an affirmative relief. It was held that a party cannot impugn
the correctness of a judgment not appealed from by him, and while he may make
counter-assignment of errors, he can do so only to sustain the judgment on other
grounds but not to seek modification or reversal thereof for in such a case he must
appeal.
SECOND DIVISION, G.R. No. 179326, July 31, 2013, LUCIANO P. CAEDO,* PETITIONER,
VS. KAMPILAN SECURITY AND DETECTIVE AGENCY, INC. AND RAMONCITO L. ARQUIZA,
RESPONDENTS

SUBJECT: LAW

Statutory Construction: Every Statute Must Be So

Construed And Harmonized With Other Statutes As To Form
A Uniform System Of Jurisprudence
by The Lawyer's Post March 4, 2015 Comments Off on Statutory Construction: Every Statute
Must Be So Construed And Harmonized With Other Statutes As To Form A Uniform System Of
Jurisprudence

A petition for mandamus filed by former members of the Sangguniang Bayan

impleaded the Municipality of Saguiran to compel them to pay the terminal leave
benefits of the petitioners in the case, in accordance with Section 5 of Civil Service
Memorandum Circular Nos. 41 Series of 1998. The RTC dismissed the case, it averring
that the payment of the terminal leave benefits was not a ministerial duty since it had
to undergo the ordinary process of verification, approval or disapproval by municipal
officials. The RTC however ordered the municipality to include in its general or special
budget for the year 2009 the claims for terminal leave benefits. Not satisfied with the
RTC order, the municipality appealed the case to the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals then issued a notice requiring the Office of the Solicitor General to file a
memorandum within 30 days. At first, the OSG sought a suspension of the period,
averring that it had not received any documents or pleading in connection with the
appeal, and asked for 30 days from receipt of the documents to file its memorandum.
The CA denied the motion, and instead gave it 90 days to submit its memorandum. On
August 5, 2010, the OSG filed a Manifestation and Motion asking that it be excused
from filing the memorandum on the ground that it lacked the authority to represent
the Municipality of Saguiran, since the latter had to be represented by its legal officer
pursuant to Article XI (3) of Republic Act 7610. The Court of Appeals, however, denied
the motion, ruling that in the case of Province of Camarines Sur vs. Court of Appeals,
et. Al, held that a local government unit, in the performance of its political functions, is
an agency of the Republic and acts for tis benefits, hence, it is a loss as to why the
OSG would refuse representation of the municipality. Its motion for reconsideration
denied, the OSG elevated the case to the Supreme Court va petition for review on
certiorari.
The Supreme Court:

The petition is meritorious.

The OSGs powers and functions are defined in the Administrative Code of 1987
(Administrative Code), particularly in Section 35, Book IV, Title III, Chapter 12 thereof,
which reads:
Sec. 35. Powers and Functions. The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the
Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and
agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of a
lawyer. When authorized by the President or head of the office concerned, it shall also
represent government-owned or controlled corporations. The Office of the Solicitor
General shall constitute the law office of the Government and, as such, shall discharge
duties requiring the services of a lawyer. It shall have the following specific powers and
functions:
(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all
criminal proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court,
the Court of Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special
proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a
party;
xxxx
A cursory reading of this provision may create the impression that the OSGs mandate
under the Administrative Code is unqualified, and thus broad enough to include
representation of a local government unit in any case filed by or against it, as local
government units, indisputably, form part of the Government of the Philippines.
Towards a proper resolution of the pending issue, however, the OSGs mandate under
the Administrative Code must be construed taking into account the other statutes that
pertain to the same subject of representation in courts. As the Court explained in
Philippine Economic Zone Authority v. Green Asia Construction & Development
Corporation[1]:
Statutes are in pari materia when they relate to the same person or thing or to the
same class of persons or things, or object, or cover the same specific or particular
subject matter.
It is axiomatic in statutory construction that a statute must be interpreted, not only to
be consistent with itself, but also to harmonize with other laws on the same subject
matter, as to form a complete, coherent and intelligible system. The rule is expressed
in the maxim, interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi, or every

statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform
system of jurisprudence.[2]
On the matter of counsels representation for the government, the Administrative
Code is not the only law that delves on the issue. Specifically for local government
units, the LGC limits the lawyers who are authorized to represent them in court
actions, as the law defines the mandate of a local government units legal officer. Book
III, Title V, Article XI, Section 481 of the LGC provides:
Article Eleven
The Legal Officer
Sec. 481. Qualifications, Term, Powers and Duties.
(a) No person shall be appointed legal officer unless he is a citizen of the Philippines, a
resident of the local government concerned, of good moral character, and a member
of the Philippine Bar. x x x.
xxxx
The appointment of legal officer shall be mandatory for the provincial and city
governments and optional for the municipal government.
(b) The legal officer, the chief legal counsel of the local government unit, shall take
charge of the office of legal services and shall:
xxxx
(3) In addition to the foregoing duties and functions, the legal officer shall:
(i) Represent the local government unit in all civil actions and special proceedings
wherein the local government unit or any official thereof, in his official capacity, is a
party: Provided, That, in actions or proceedings where a component city or
municipality is a party adverse to the provincial government or to another component
city or municipality, a special legal officer may be deployed to represent the adverse
party;
x x x x (Emphasis ours)
Evidently, this provision of the LGC not only identifies the powers and functions of a
local government units legal officer. It also restricts, as it names, the lawyer who may
represent the local government unit as its counsel in court proceedings. Being a
special law on the issue of representation in court that is exclusively made applicable
to local government units, the LGC must prevail over the provisions of the
Administrative Code, which classifies only as a general law on the subject matter. The
Court held in Social Justice Society (SJS), et al. v. Hon. Atienza, Jr.[3]:

The special act and the general law must stand together, one as the law of the
particular subject and the other as the law of general application. The special law must
be taken as intended to constitute an exception to, or a qualification of, the general
act or provision.[4] (Citations omitted)
Further, the Court ruled in Vinzons-Chato v. Fortune Tobacco Corporation[5]:
A general statute is one which embraces a class of subjects or places and does not
omit any subject or place naturally belonging to such class. A special statute, as the
term is generally understood, is one which relates to particular persons or things of a
class or to a particular portion or section of the state only.
A general law and a special law on the same subject are statutes in pari materia and
should, accordingly, be read together and harmonized, if possible, with a view to
giving effect to both. The rule is that where there are two acts, one of which is special
and particular and the other general which, if standing alone, would include the same
matter and thus conflict with the special act, the special law must prevail since it
evinces the legislative intent more clearly than that of a general statute and must not
be taken as intended to affect the more particular and specific provisions of the earlier
act, unless it is absolutely necessary so to construe it in order to give its words any
meaning at all.[6] (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
Given the foregoing, the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed resolutions which obligated the OSG to
represent the Municipality of Saguiran. Such ruling disregarded the provisions of the
LGC that vested exclusive authority upon legal officers to be counsels of local
government units. Even the employment of a special legal officer is expressly allowed
by the law only upon a strict condition that the action or proceeding which involves the
component city or municipality is adverse to the provincial government or to another
component city or municipality.
The mere fact that the OSG initially filed before the CA a motion for extension of time
to file the required memorandum could not have estopped it from later raising the
issue of its lack of authority to represent the Municipality of Saguiran. Its mandate was
to be traced from existing laws. No action of the OSG could have validated an act that
was beyond the scope of its authority.
It bears mentioning that notwithstanding the broad language of the Administrative
Code on the OSGs functions, the LGC is not the only qualification to its scope.
Jurisprudence also provides limits to its authority. In Urbano v. Chavez[7], for example,
the Court ruled that the OSG could not represent at any stage a public official who was

accused in a criminal case. This was necessary to prevent a clear conflict of interest in
the event that the OSG would become the appellate counsel of the People of the
Philippines once a judgment of the public officials conviction was brought on appeal.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated October 18, 2010 and
August 25, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 02816-MIN are ANNULLED
and SET ASIDE. The Legal Officer of the Municipal Government of Saguiran, Lanao del
Sur, or if there is none, the Provincial Attorney of the Province of Lanao del Sur, and
not the Office of the Solicitor General, has the duty to represent the local government
unit as counsel in CA-G.R. SP No. 02816-MIN.

FIRST DIVISION, G.R. No. 199027, June 09, 2014, THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR
GENERAL (OSG), PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE
MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT OF SAGUIRAN, LANAO DEL SUR, RESPONDENTS.

[1] G.R. No. 188866, October 19, 2011, 659 SCRA 756.
[2] Id. at 764, citing Honasan II v. The Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the Department of Justice, G.R.
No. 159747, April 13, 2004, 427 SCRA 46, 69-70.
[3] 568 Phil. 658 (2008).
[4] Id. at 697
[5] 552 Phil. 101 (2007).
[6] Id. at 110-111.
[7] 262 Phil. 374 (1990).

SUBJECT: MERCANTILE LAW

Insurance Law: Fraudulent Intent On Part Of Insured Must

Be Established To Warrant Rescission Of Contract
by The Lawyer's Post December 23, 2014 Comments Off on Insurance Law: Fraudulent Intent On
Part Of Insured Must Be Established To Warrant Rescission Of Contract

Ernani, wife of Juliet, applied for a health care coverage with Philamcare Health
Systems Inc. To the question of whether or not he had been treated for high blood

pressure, heart trouble, diabetes, cancer, liver disease or peptic ulcer stated in the
standard application form, he answered NO. The application was approved for one
year, from March 1, 1988 to March 1, 1989; upon its termination, the same was
extended to March 1, 1990 and then from March 1, 1990 to June 1, 1990. Thus, under
the agreement, Ernani was entitled to hospitalisation benefits , as well as avail of outpatient benefits. On Marrch 1, 1990, Ernani suffered a heart attack and confined at the
Manila Medical Center, thus Juliet tried to claim benefits for her husband under the
health care agreement. However, the company denied her claim, saying that doctors
at the MMC allegedly discovered that her husband was hypertensive, diabetic and
asthmatic, contrary to his answer in the application form. Left with no recourse, Juliet
paid the hospital fees. Later Ermani died.
On July 24, 1990, Juliet filed a case for damages against Philamcare Health Systems
Inc., and its president, Benito. She asked for reimbursement of expenses as well as
moral damages and attorneys fees, which the trial court granted, ordering the
company to pay the P76,000.00 hospitalisation expenses incurred by Juliet as well as
payment of moral and exemplary damages as well as attorneys fees. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals deleted the award of damages and exonerated the president, hence,
the company appealed to the Supreme Court, alleging that the health care agreement
grants living benefits, such as medical check-ups and hospitalization which a
member may immediately enjoy so long as he is alive upon effectivity of the
agreement until its expiration one-year thereafter. Petitioner also points out that only
medical and hospitalization benefits are given under the agreement without any
indemnification, unlike in an insurance contract where the insured is indemnified for
his loss. Moreover, since Health Care Agreements are only for a period of one year, as
compared to insurance contracts which last longer, petitioner argues that the
incontestability clause does not apply, as the same requires an effectivity period of at
least two years. Petitioner further argues that it is not an insurance company, which is
governed by the Insurance Commission, but a Health Maintenance Organization under
the authority of the Department of Health.
The Supreme Court:
Section 2 (1) of the Insurance Code defines a contract of insurance as an agreement
whereby one undertakes for a consideration to indemnify another against loss,
damage or liability arising from an unknown or contingent event. An insurance
contract exists where the following elements concur:
1. The insured has an insurable interest;
2. The insured is subject to a risk of loss by the happening of the designated peril;

3. The insurer assumes the risk;

4. Such assumption of risk is part of a general scheme to distribute actual losses
among a large group of persons bearing a similar risk; and
5. In consideration of the insurers promise, the insured pays a premium.
Section 3 of the Insurance Code states that any contingent or unknown event, whether
past or future, which may damnify a person having an insurable interest against him,
may be insured against. Every person has an insurable interest in the life and health
of himself. Section 10 provides:
Every person has an insurable interest in the life and health:
(1) of himself, of his spouse and of his children;
(2) of any person on whom he depends wholly or in part for education or support, or
in whom he has a pecuniary interest;
(3) of any person under a legal obligation to him for the payment of money,
respecting property or service, of which death or illness might delay or prevent the
performance; and
(4) of any person upon whose life any estate or interest vested in him depends.
In the case at bar, the insurable interest of respondents husband in obtaining the
health care agreement was his own health. The health care agreement was in the
nature of non-life insurance, which is primarily a contract of indemnity. Once the
member incurs hospital, medical or any other expense arising from sickness, injury or
other stipulated contingent, the health care provider must pay for the same to the
extent agreed upon under the contract.
Petitioner argues that respondents husband concealed a material fact in his
application. It appears that in the application for health coverage, petitioners required
respondents husband to sign an express authorization for any person, organization or
entity that has any record or knowledge of his health to furnish any and all information
relative to any hospitalization, consultation, treatment or any other medical advice or
examination.
Specifically, the Health Care Agreement signed by respondents husband states:
We hereby declare and agree that all statement and answers contained herein and in
any addendum annexed to this application are full, complete and true and bind all
parties in interest under the Agreement herein applied for, that there shall be no
contract of health care coverage unless and until an Agreement is issued on this
application and the full Membership Fee according to the mode of payment applied for
is actually paid during the lifetime and good health of proposed Members; that no

information acquired by any Representative of PhilamCare shall be binding upon

PhilamCare unless set out in writing in the application; that any physician is, by these
presents, expressly authorized to disclose or give testimony at anytime relative to any
information acquired by him in his professional capacity upon any question affecting
the eligibility for health care coverage of the Proposed Members and that the
acceptance of any Agreement issued on this application shall be a ratification of any
correction in or addition to this application as stated in the space for Home Office
Endorsement.[11] (Underscoring ours)
In addition to the above condition, petitioner additionally required the applicant for
authorization to inquire about the applicants medical history, thus:
I hereby authorize any person, organization, or entity that has any record or
knowledge of my health and/or that of __________ to give to the PhilamCare Health
Systems, Inc. any and all information relative to any hospitalization, consultation,
treatment or any other medical advice or examination. This authorization is in
connection with the application for health care coverage only. A photographic copy of
this authorization shall be as valid as the original. (Underscoring ours)
Petitioner cannot rely on the stipulation regarding Invalidation of agreement which
reads:
Failure to disclose or misrepresentation of any material information by the member in
the application or medical examination, whether intentional or unintentional, shall
automatically invalidate the Agreement from the very beginning and liability of
Philamcare shall be limited to return of all Membership Fees paid. An undisclosed or
misrepresented information is deemed material if its revelation would have resulted in
the declination of the applicant by Philamcare or the assessment of a higher
Membership Fee for the benefit or benefits applied for.
The answer assailed by petitioner was in response to the question relating to the
medical history of the applicant. This largely depends on opinion rather than fact,
especially coming from respondents husband who was not a medical doctor. Where
matters of opinion or judgment are called for, answers made in good faith and without
intent to deceive will not avoid a policy even though they are untrue. Thus,
(A)lthough false, a representation of the expectation, intention, belief, opinion, or
judgment of the insured will not avoid the policy if there is no actual fraud in inducing
the acceptance of the risk, or its acceptance at a lower rate of premium, and this is
likewise the rule although the statement is material to the risk, if the statement is
obviously of the foregoing character, since in such case the insurer is not justified in

relying upon such statement, but is obligated to make further inquiry. There is a clear
distinction between such a case and one in which the insured is fraudulently and
intentionally states to be true, as a matter of expectation or belief, that which he then
knows, to be actually untrue, or the impossibility of which is shown by the facts within
his knowledge, since in such case the intent to deceive the insurer is obvious and
amounts to actual fraud. (Underscoring ours)
The fraudulent intent on the part of the insured must be established to warrant
rescission of the insurance contract. Concealment as a defense for the health care
provider or insurer to avoid liability is an affirmative defense and the duty to establish
such defense by satisfactory and convincing evidence rests upon the provider or
insurer. In any case, with or without the authority to investigate, petitioner is liable for
claims made under the contract. Having assumed a responsibility under the
agreement, petitioner is bound to answer the same to the extent agreed upon. In the
end, the liability of the health care provider attaches once the member is hospitalized
for the disease or injury covered by the agreement or whenever he avails of the
covered benefits which he has prepaid.
Under Section 27 of the Insurance Code, a concealment entitles the injured party to
rescind a contract of insurance. The right to rescind should be exercised previous to
the commencement of an action on the contract. In this case, no rescission was made.
Besides, the cancellation of health care agreements as in insurance policies require
the concurrence of the following conditions:
1. Prior notice of cancellation to insured;
2. Notice must be based on the occurrence after effective date of the policy of one or
more of the grounds mentioned;
3. Must be in writing, mailed or delivered to the insured at the address shown in the
policy;
4. Must state the grounds relied upon provided in Section 64 of the Insurance Code
and upon request of insured, to furnish facts on which cancellation is based.
None of the above pre-conditions was fulfilled in this case. When the terms of
insurance contract contain limitations on liability, courts should construe them in such
a way as to preclude the insurer from non-compliance with his obligation. Being a
contract of adhesion, the terms of an insurance contract are to be construed strictly
against the party which prepared the contract the insurer. By reason of the exclusive
control of the insurance company over the terms and phraseology of the insurance
contract, ambiguity must be strictly interpreted against the insurer and liberally in
favor of the insured, especially to avoid forfeiture. This is equally applicable to Health

Care Agreements. The phraseology used in medical or hospital service contracts, such
as the one at bar, must be liberally construed in favor of the subscriber, and if doubtful
or reasonably susceptible of two interpretations the construction conferring coverage
is to be adopted, and exclusionary clauses of doubtful import should be strictly
construed against the provider.
Anent the incontestability of the membership of respondents husband, we quote with
approval the following findings of the trial court:
(U)nder the title Claim procedures of expenses, the defendant Philamcare Health
Systems Inc. had twelve months from the date of issuance of the Agreement within
which to contest the membership of the patient if he had previous ailment of asthma,
and six months from the issuance of the agreement if the patient was sick of diabetes
or hypertension. The periods having expired, the defense of concealment or
misrepresentation no longer lie.
Finally, petitioner alleges that respondent was not the legal wife of the deceased
member considering that at the time of their marriage, the deceased was previously
married to another woman who was still alive. The health care agreement is in the
nature of a contract of indemnity. Hence, payment should be made to the party who
incurred the expenses. It is not controverted that respondent paid all the hospital and
medical expenses. She is therefore entitled to reimbursement. The records
adequately prove the expenses incurred by respondent for the deceaseds
hospitalization, medication and the professional fees of the attending physicians.
FIRST DIVISION, G.R. No. 125678, March 18, 2002, PHILAMCARE HEALTH SYSTEMS,
INC., PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND JULITA TRINOS, RESPONDENTS.

SUBJECT: LABOR LAW

In Illegal Dismissal Cases, No Essential Change Is Made By

A Re-computation Of The Monetary Award As This Step Is A
Necessary Consequence That Flows From The Nature Of
The Illegality Of Dismissal Declared By The Labor Arbiter
Decision..
by The Lawyer's Post May 6, 2015 0 Comments

The Facts:

Alberto (Hilongo) filed a case for Illegal Dismissal against Metroguards Security
Corporation (Metroguard), which the Labor Arbiter, by decision dated April 30, 2010,
decided in his favour, awarding him P170,520. 31 as monetary award consisting of
back wages, 13 month pay, service incentive leave, separation pay and attorneys
th

fees. The NLRC, on appeal, reversed the decision of the labor arbiter, hence Alberto
filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which granted his petition on
September 7, 2012. Metroguard no longer appealed the decision. Alberto then filed
motion for entry of judgment and motion for clarification, praying that additional
award be computed from May 1, 2010 to March 26, 2013, when the CA denied
Metroguards motion for reconsideration. The CA granted his motion, holding that it is
understood that a CA decision upholding the Labor Arbiters decision shall recompute
the award due an employee in order to account for the period between the Labor
Arbiters ruling and the finality of its decision. And no essential change flows out of a
re-computation as this is a necessary consequence of the illegality of dismissal
declared in that decision. A re-computation (or an original computation, if no previous
computation has been made) is a part of the law specifically, Article 279 of the Labor
Code and the established jurisprudence on this provision that is read into the
decision. By the nature of an illegal dismissal case, the reliefs continue to add on until
full satisfaction, as expressed under Article 279 of the Labor Code. The re-computation
of the consequences of illegal dismissal upon execution of the decision does not
constitute an alteration or amendment of the final decision being implemented. The
illegal dismissal ruling stands; only the computation of monetary consequences of this
dismissal is affected and this is not a violation of the principle of immutability of final
judgments, citing the case of Session Delights Ice Cream and Fast Foods v. Court of
Appeals , and Gonzales v. Solid Cement Corporation .
1

Alberto then filed a motion for issuance of writ of execution of the Labor Arbiters
decision, holding that a recompilation is necessary since the award of P170,520.13
was not enough as the CA decision became final on April 26, 2010. The Labor Arbiter
issued the writ of execution but limited the award to P170, 520.13 which according to
him prevails. Aggrieved, Alberto filed a petition for extra-ordinary remedies before the
NLRC, which also dismissed his petition. Alberto thus filed a petition for certiorari with
the CA, which granted his petition and remanded ti case to the labor arbiter for
recomputation to include te period from May 1, 2010 to June 11, 2013, or the day the
CA decision became final. It also ruled that computation of the monetary awards due
the employee should continue to run until the final determination of the case on
appeal. It was only on the finality of the decision on June 11, 2013 that the
termination of employment of Alberto effectively ended, hence the company must pay

the benefits due him in the interval. Metroguards elevated the case to the Supreme
Court for final determination.
The Issue/s:
Whether or not the company should pay Alberto the monetary award between the
time the Labor Arbiter decision rendered his decision up to the day it became final on
June 11, 2013. Whether the CA erred in ordering the re-computation of the monetary
award due Alberto.
The Courts ruling:
We rule in the negative.
The issue is not novel. In Nacar v. Gallery Frames, we have held that:
3

x x x no essential change is made by a recomputation as this step is a necessary

consequence that flows from the nature of the illegality of dismissal declared by the
Labor Arbiter in that decision. A recomputation (or an original computation, if no
previous computation has been made) is a part of the law specifically, Article 279 of
the Labor Code and the established jurisprudence on this provision that is read into
the decision. By the nature of an illegal dismissal case, the reliefs continue to add up
until full satisfaction, as expressed under Article 279 of the Labor Code. The
recomputation of the consequences of illegal dismissal upon execution of the decision
does not constitute an alteration or amendment of the final decision being
implemented. The illegal dismissal ruling stands; only the computation of monetary
consequences of this dismissal is affected, and this is not a violation of the principle of
immutability of final judgments.
Nacar reiterated the Courts ruling in the earlier cases of Session Delights and
Gonzales.
We thus cannot agree with petitioners contention that a decision that has acquired
finality becomes immutable and unalterable. The re-computation of the consequences
4

of illegal dismissal upon execution of the decision does not constitute an alteration or
amendment of the final decision being implemented. The illegal dismissal ruling
stands; only the computation of monetary consequences of this dismissal is affected,
and this is not a violation of the principle of immutability of final judgments.
Likewise without merit is petitioners contention that [i]t may very well be argued that
the NLRCs final decision reversing the Labor Arbiter is in fact the final decision that
effectively declared the employment relationship between Hilongo and [petitioners] as
ended on which date the computation of the separation pay and backwages awarded

by the Labor Arbiter ultimately ceased. We note that the CA, in its Decision dated
5

September 7, 2012, had reversed the NLRC Decision dated September 30, 2010 and
Resolution dated November 23, 2010, and reinstated the Labor Arbiters Decision
dated April 30, 2010. Thus, petitioners cannot claim that the NLRC decision which was
set aside with finality is the NLRCs final decision and the final decision that
effectively declared the employment relationship between the parties as ended.
Said CA Decision dated September 7, 2012 became final and executory on April 26,
2013. Thus, the April 30, 2010 Decision of the Labor Arbiter which ordered the
6

payment of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, effectively ended the employment

relationship of the parties on April 26, 2013, the date the CA decision became final.
Since the Labor Arbiters computation of Hilongos monetary award was up to the date
of his April 30, 2010 Decision only, the CA properly decreed the computation of
additional back wages and separation pay.
However, the CA incorrectly concluded that the April 30, 2010 Decision of the Labor
Arbiter became final on June 11, 2013, contrary to its own finding that it became final
7

and executory on April 26, 2013. This led to its erroneous computation of the
8

additional back wages and separation pay of Hilongo, as well as reckoning the date of
the 12% legal interest. Following the teaching of Nacar v. Gallery Frames that the
9

computation of the monetary consequences (back wages and separation pay) of the
illegal dismissal decision should be reckoned from its finality, the additional back
wages and separation pay of Hilongo should be computed from May 1, 2010 to April
26, 2013. Further, the payment of legal interest of 12% per annum should also be
from April 26, 2013 up to June 30, 2013. Thereafter, in accordance with Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas Monetary Boards Circular No. 799 , series of 2013, the legal interest
10

computed from July 1, 2013 until the monetary awards were fully satisfied will be 6%
per annum.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the instant petition and AFFIRM with MODIFICATION the
Decision dated July 22, 2014 and Resolution dated November 18, 2014 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 134501. The dispositive portion of the Decision dated July
22, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 134501 shall read as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated
November 29, 2013 and Resolution dated January 16, 2014 of public respondent
National Labor Relations Commission, Second Division, in NLRC LER N[o]. 11-32213/NLRC LAC N[o]. 07-001-485-10 (NLRC NCR-10-14411-09) are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE.

The case is hereby REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter for the RE-COMPUTATION of the
total monetary benefits due to petitioner [Hilongo]. The Labor Arbiter is
further DIRECTED to incorporate the following in the re-computation:
(1) Additional backwages and separation pay from May 1, 2010 to April 26, 2013, or
the date when the April 30, 2010 Decision of Labor Arbiter Macam became final and
executory;
(2) Interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum of the total monetary awards,
computed from April 26, 2013 to June 30, 2013 and six percent x x x (6%) per
annum from July 1, 2013 until their full satisfaction.
THIRD DIVISION, G.R. No. 215630, March 09, 2015,METROGUARDS SECURITY AGENCY CORPORATION
(FORMERLY KNOWN AS BEEGUARDS CORPORATION) AND MS. MILAGROS T. CHAN, PETITIONERS, VS.
ALBERTO N. HILONGO, RESPONDENT.
1

625 Phil. 612, 629 (2010).

G.R. No. 198423, October 23, 2012, 684 SCRA 344, 356.

G.R. No. 189871, August 13, 2013, 703 SCRA 439, 452.

Rollo, p. 18.

Id. at 26. Emphasis omitted.

Id. at 101.

Id. at 45. Page 8 of the July 22, 2014 Decision.

Id. at 101.

Supra note 24, at 453.

10

Salient portions of the circular provide:

The Monetary Board, in its Resolution No. 796 dated 16 May 2013, approved the following revisions governing the rate
of interest in the absence of stipulation in loan contracts, thereby amending Section 2 of Circular No. 905, Series of
1982:
Section 1. The rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods or credits and the rate allowed in
judgments, in the absence of an express contract as to such rate of interest, shall be six percent (6%) per annum.
Section 2. In view of the above, Subsection X305.1 of the Manual of Regulations for Banks and Sections 4305Q.1,
4305S.3 and 4303P.1 of the Manual of Regulations for Non-Bank Financial Institutions are hereby amended
accordingly.
This Circular shall take effect on 1 July 2013.

SUBJECT: LABOR LAW

A Quitclaim Executed Without Consideration Do Not Bar A

Case For Illegal Dismissal
by The Lawyer's Post March 3, 2015 Comments Off on A Quitclaim Executed Without
Consideration Do Not Bar A Case For Illegal Dismissal

Juvenstein was hired by Philippine Spring Water Resources Inc., as Vice-President for
Sales and Marketing for the Bulacan-South Luzon Area. In November, 2004, he was
designated as over-all chairman for the activities leading to the inauguration of the
Bulacan branch and Christmas party of the company. A few days after his designation,
he called all committee chairpersons for a meeting to discuss the activity, which was
reset to the next day because several guests of Juvenstein arrived to discuss the legal
problems of the company with respect to the inauguration. The next day he requested
Vicky, the vice-president for administration, to preside over the meeting since he had a
prior appointment in Makati with major clients. He learned that the meeting did not
push through because Vicky accompanied the daughter of Danilo, the CEO and
president of the company. The meetings proceeded without his presence, and Vicky
took charge of the preparation. At the actual event, he entertained some guests, but
his attention was called when Danilo got furious because he was not included in the
program to give an inaugural speech, nor his name called in the opening remarks.
According to Juvenstein, it is his understanding that Danilo does not want to
participate in the program, thus that portion was marked optional. The next day, he
was placed on preventive suspension for 30 days and made to explain why Danilo was
not recognised in the speech. Upon his return, he was prevented from reporting for
work. In March, 2005, he was informed via a Memorandum dated January 31, 2005
that his services were terminated effective February 1, 2005. A clearance certificate

was issued to him and payment made in the amount of P43,998.56 after he executed
a Release, Waiver and Quitclaim. He thus filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.
However, the Labor Arbiter dismissed his case under the principle of estoppel. He
ratiocinated by saying a person of sufficient intelligence like Juvenstein could not have
been forced to sign the Release, Waiver and Quitclaim, thus there was reasonable
consideration in the waiver sufficient for Juvenstein. The latter appealed his case to
the NLRC, which found in his favour, saying the execution of the waiver did not bar him
from filing a case for illegal dismissal, especially considering that there was no
reasonable consideration. On appeal to the CA by the company, the Court of Appeal
agreed at first that Juvenstein was illegally dismissed, but upheld the validity of the
quitclaim. Only a declaration of illegality of dismissal will an employee be entitled to
separation pay or back wages. In this case, the execution of the quitclaim prevented
Juevenstein from claiming backwages, according to the CA. Juvenstein, however,
argued in his motion for reconsideration of the CA decision that the ruling ran counter
to the reliefs provided under Art. 279 of the Labor Code. Ruling on the motion for
reconsideration, the CA reversed itself and ruled Juvenstein was illegally dismissed and
entitled to full back wages and separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, in view of the
strained relations with the company. The company elevated the case to the Supreme
Court arguing that the CA erred in applying Art. 279 in determining the legality of his
dismissal.
The Supreme Court:
The Court resolves the issues in seriatim.
The petitioners resorted to a
wrong mode of appeal; Rule and
Exceptions
There is a patent error in the mode of appeal selected by the petitioners. It is wellsettled that in assailing a decision of the CA, the available remedy is to file a petition
for review under Rule 45 and not the extraordinary writ of certiorari under Rule 65. The
proper remedy is to file a petition for review on certiorari under the Rules of Court
which should be instituted within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the assailed decision
or resolution. In a long line of cases, the Court has consistently emphasized that after
the lapse of the 15-day period to file a petition for review on certiorari, the special civil
action of certiorari under Rule 65 is not, and cannot be, a substitute for a lost remedy
of appeal.[1]

In the case at bench, the petitioners received the assailed Resolution of the CA on
December 17, 2012. The subject petition for certiorari was filed on February 5, 2013,
evidently beyond the 15-day period to file an appeal under Rule 45. In fact, even if a
30-day extension would be considered, the petition for certiorari was still filed out of
time.
Although the petitioners cause is purportedly grounded on grave abuse of discretion,
they still cannot avail of the Rule 65 remedy because an appeal is available under Rule
45. One of the requisites of certiorari is that there be no available appeal or any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy. Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper,
even if the ground therefor is grave abuse of discretion.
At any rate, in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in
the interest of substantial justice, this Court has before treated a petition for certiorari
as a petition for review on certiorari, particularly (1) if the petition for certiorari was
filed within the reglementary period within which to file a petition for review on
certiorari; (2) when errors of judgment are averred; and (3) when there is sufficient
reason to justify the relaxation of the rules.[2] In this case, considering the monetary
awards to Mahilum, the Court opts to resolve said issue.
Mahilum was a regular employee
In insisting that Mahilum was a contractual employee and that the period of probation
depended on the agreement of the parties, the petitioners proffer the Memorandum of
Agreement[3] entered into by the parties which provides:
6. THAT SECOND PARTY upon appointment shall be in a Probationary status for the
next six (6) months and may be extended a permanent appointment only if he can
satisfactorily perform his duties and functions as defined in the Personnels
Manual/Company House Rules on Discipline.
It is the petitioners theory that Mahilum, who was hired in June 2004, was not a
regular employee at the time of his dismissal because his probationary status would
end only if he could satisfactorily perform his duties and functions as defined in the
Personnels Manual/Company House Rules of Discipline. This suspensive condition
failed to arise.
For his part, Mahilum insists that he was a regular employee entitled to security of
tenure. Having been hired in June 2004, he must be considered to have already served
the company for eight (8) months at the time of his dismissal on February 1, 2005.
This fact calls for the application of Article 281 of the Labor Code:

Probationary employment shall not exceed six (6) months from the date the employee
started working, unless it is covered by an apprenticeship agreement stipulating a
longer period. The services of an employee who has been engaged on a probationary
basis may be terminated for a just cause or when he fails to qualify as a regular
employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer to
the employee at the time of his engagement. An employee who is allowed to work
after a probationary period shall be considered a regular employee. [Emphasis
supplied]
Contrary to the claims of the petitioners, Mahilum was correctly considered by the
NLRC and CA as a regular employee. No grave abuse of discretion may be attributed
for the application of Article 279 of the Labor Code[4] in determining the legality of
Mahilums dismissal.
A probationary employee, like a regular employee, enjoys security of tenure. In cases
of probationary employment, however, aside from just or authorized causes of
termination, an additional ground is provided under Article 281 of the Labor Code, that
is, the probationary employee may also be terminated for failure to qualify as a regular
employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer to
the employee at the time of the engagement. Thus, the services of an employee who
has been engaged on probationary basis may be terminated for any of the following:
(1) a just or (2) an authorized cause and (3) when he fails to qualify as a regular
employee in accordance with reasonable standards prescribed by the employer.[5]
As applied to the petitioners arguments, it would seem that PSWRI and Lua now
invoke the first and third ground for Mahilums termination. The Court, however,
cannot subscribe to the premise that Mahilum failed to qualify as a regular employee
when he failed to perform at par with the standards made known by the company to
him. In this case, it is clear that the primary cause of Mahilums dismissal from his
employment was borne out of his alleged lapses as chairman for the inauguration of
the Bulacan plant companys Christmas party. In fact, the termination letter to him
cited loss of trust and confidence as a ground for his dismissal. Under the
circumstances, the petitioners may not be permitted to belatedly harp on its choice
not to extend his alleged probationary status to regular employment as a ground for
his dismissal. Besides, having been allowed to work after the lapse of the probationary
period, Mahilum became a regular employee. He was hired in June 2004 and was
dismissed on February 5, 2005. Thus, he served the company for eight (8) months.
This is in consonance with CALS Poultry Supply Corporation v. Roco[6], where the Court

ruled that the computation of the 6-month probationary period was reckoned from the
date of appointment up to the same calendar date of the 6th month following.
Mahilum was illegally dismissed
According to the petitioners, Mahilums behavior during the inauguration/party was
allegedly tantamount to: 1] serious misconduct, as displayed by a drinking binge with
his own visitors causing the shame and humiliation of Lua; and 2] willful disobedience,
as shown by his refusal to carry out legitimate orders.
As previously explained, Mahilum was a regular employee who was entitled to security
of tenure. Thus, he could only be dismissed from service for causes provided in Article
282 of the Labor Code.[7] At this point, it bears stressing that the NLRC and the CA, in
their decisions, both found Mahilum to have been illegally dismissed.
The well-entrenched rule, especially in labor cases, is that findings of fact of quasijudicial bodies, like the NLRC, are accorded with respect, even finality, if supported by
substantial evidence. Particularly when passed upon and upheld by the CA, they are
binding and conclusive upon the Court and will not normally be disturbed. Although
this doctrine is not without exceptions, the Court finds that none is applicable to the
present case. Here, the CA affirmed the ruling of the NLRC and adopted as its own the
latters factual findings as to Mahilums illegal dismissal. Consequently, the Court finds
no reason to depart from the finding that Mahilums failure to effectively discharge his
assignment as the over-all chairman of the festivities was due to mere inadvertence
and the mistaken belief that he had properly delegated the details of the program to
another officer.
Further, his designation as the chairman of the whole affair did not form part of his
duty as a supervisor. Mahilum was engaged to supervise the sales and marketing
aspects of PSWRIs Bulacan Plant. Verily, the charge of loss of trust and confidence had
no leg to stand on, as the act complained of was not work-related. Simply put, the
petitioners were not able to prove that Mahilum was unfit to continue working for the
company. In the words of the CA:
Even as jurisprudence has distinguished the treatment of managerial employees or
employees occupying positions of trust and confidence from that of rank-and-file
personnel, insofar as the application of the doctrine of trust and confidence is
concerned, such is inapplicable to the instant case since as above-stated, private
respondents lapse was justified, unintentional, without deliberate intent and unrelated
to the duty for which he was engaged.

Likewise, warranting the agreement of the Court is the finding of the CA in its
Amended Decision that the quitclaim executed by Mahilum did not operate to bar a
cause of action for illegal dismissal. That the amounts received by Mahilum were only
those owing to him under the law indeed bolstered the fact that the quitclaim was
executed without consideration. Suffice it to say, the subject quitclaim may not be
considered as a valid and binding undertaking.
Entitlement to monetary claims
Article 279 of the Labor Code provides that an employee who is unjustly dismissed
from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges, to full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to other benefits or their
monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from
him up to the time of his actual reinstatement. Due to the strained relations of the
parties, however, the payment of separation pay has been considered an acceptable
alternative, when reinstatement is no longer desirable or viable. On the one hand,
such payment liberates the employee from what could be a highly oppressive work
environment. On the other, the payment releases the employer from the grossly
unpalatable obligation of maintaining in its employ a worker it could no longer trust.
[8] Thus, as an illegally or constructively dismissed employee, the respondent is
entitled to: (1) either reinstatement, if viable, or separation pay, if reinstatement is no
longer viable; and (2) backwages. These two reliefs are separate and distinct from
each other and are awarded conjunctively.[9]
Mahilum, as a regular employee at the time of his illegal dismissal, is entitled to
separation pay and backwages, computed from the time of his dismissal up to the
finality of the decision. As correctly ruled by the NLRC[10], reinstatement is no longer
viable considering the circumstances of animosity between Mahilum and Lua.
Propriety of awarding commissions
and damages
Be that as it may, the Court resolves to delete the inclusion of 0.25% commission on
cash and delivery sales as part of Mahilums backwages.
Back wages are granted on grounds of equity to workers for earnings lost due to their
illegal dismissal from work. They are a reparation for the illegal dismissal of an
employee based on earnings which the employee would have obtained, either by
virtue of a lawful decree or order, as in the case of a wage increase under a wage
order, or by rightful expectation, as in the case of ones salary or wage. The
outstanding feature of backwages is thus the degree of assuredness to an employee

that he would have had them as earnings had he not been illegally terminated from
his employment. [Emphasis supplied]
Backwages are granted on grounds of equity to workers for earnings lost due to their
illegal dismissal from work. They represent reparation for the illegal dismissal of an
employee based on earnings which the employee would have obtained, either by
virtue of a lawful decree or order, as in the case of a wage increase under a wage
order, or by rightful expectation, as in the case of ones salary or wage. The
outstanding feature of backwages is the degree of assuredness to an employee that
he would have had them as earnings had he not been illegally terminated from his
employment.[11]
It is well-established in jurisprudence that the determination of whether or not a
commission forms part of the basic salary depends upon the circumstances or
conditions for its payment. In Phil Duplicators, Inc. v. NLRC[12] the Court held that
commissions earned by salesmen form part of their basic salary. The salesmens
commissions, comprising a pre-determined percentage of the selling price of the
goods sold by each salesman, were properly included in the term basic salary for
purposes of computing the 13th month pay. The salesmens commissions are not
overtime payments, nor profit-sharing payments nor any other fringe benefit, but a
portion of the salary structure which represents an automatic increment to the
monetary value initially assigned to each unit of work rendered by a salesman. On the
other hand, in Boie-Takeda Chemicals, Inc. v. De la Serna[13], the so-called
commissions paid to or received by medical representatives were excluded from the
term basic salary because these were paid to the medical representatives and rankand-file employees as productivity bonuses, which were generally tied to the
productivity, or capacity for revenue production, of a corporation and such bonuses
closely resemble profit-sharing payments and had no clear direct or necessary relation
to the amount of work actually done by each individual employee.
In Mahilums case, Phil. Duplicator cannot be automatically applied without
considering his position as Vice-President for sales and marketing of the PSWRIs
Bulacan-South Luzon Area. This factor constrains the Court to hold that Mahilums
0.25% commission based on the monthly sales and 0.25% commission for cash
payments must be taken to come in the nature of overriding commission, not sales
commission. The latter is not properly includable in the basic salary as it must be
earned by actual market transactions attributable to the claimant. Curiously, Mahilum
did not comment on the petitioners objection to the award. Not being a salesman who
directly effected any sale of a product, the commission embodied in the agreement

partook of the nature of profit-sharing business based on quota. In fine, the alleged
commissions were profit-sharing payments and had no clear, direct or necessary
relation to the amount of work he actually performed.
For said reason, Mahilums backwages must be pegged at his basic salary, excluding
the commissions mentioned by the NLRC, to be computed from the time of his
dismissal up to the finality of this decision. Nonetheless, the award of backwages shall
earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum in accordance with
prevailing jurisprudence.[14]
Finally, the Court resolves to delete the award for moral and exemplary damages in
favor of Mahilum. Worth reiterating is the rule that moral damages are recoverable
where the dismissal of the employee was attended by bad faith or fraud or constituted
an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs,
or public policy. Likewise, exemplary damages may be awarded if the dismissal was
effected in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner.[15] No evidence thereof was
presented in this case.
Mahilum, however, is entitled to attorneys fees in the amount of ten percent (10%) of
his total monetary award, having been forced to litigate in order to seek redress of his
grievances, as provided in Article 111 of the Labor Code[16], as amended, and existing
jurisprudence.[17]
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The July 23, 2010 Amended Decision
and the October 31, 2012 Resolution of the Twentieth Division of the Court of Appeals
in CA G.R. SP No. 02636 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Accordingly, Philippine Spring Water Resources Inc. is hereby ordered to pay Juvenstein
B. Mahilum, his separation pay, full backwages inclusive of his basic salary,
proportionate 13th month pay, and unused leave credits, to be computed based on his
salary at the time of his illegal termination and attorneys fees.
These payments shall earn legal interest at the rate of six (6%) percent per annum
reckoned from their due date.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION, G.R. No. 205278, June 11, 2014, PHILIPPINE SPRING WATER RESOURCES INC. /DANILO Y.
LUA , PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND JUVENSTEIN B. MAHILUM, RESPONDENTS.

[1] VMC Rural Electric Service Cooperative, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 535 Phil. 345 (2006).
[2] agle v. Equitable PCIBank, 575 Phil. 384 (2008).
[3] Rollo, pp. 68-71.
[4] Art. 279. Security of Tenure In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an
employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work
shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages,
inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or other monetary equivalent computed from the time his
compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.
[5] Mylene Carvajal v. Luzon Development Bank and/or Oscar Z. Ramirez, G.R. No. 186169, August 1, 2012, citing
Robinsons Galleria/Robinsons Supermarket Corporation v. Ranchez, G.R. No. 177937, January 19, 2011, 640 SCRA
135, 142.
[6] 434 Phil. 720 (2002).
[7] ART. 282. Termination by employer. An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes:
a. Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in
connection with his work;
b. Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
c. Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized
representative;
d. Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of
his family or his duly authorized representative; and
e. Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
[8] Robinsons Galleria v. Ranchez, G.R. No. 177937, January 19, 2011, citing Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc. v. Daniel,
499 Phil. 491, 511 (2005).
[9] Siemens v. Domingo, 582 Phil. 86 (2008).
[10] Rollo, p. 58.
[11] Equitable Banking Corporation v. Sadac, 523 Phil. 781 (2006).
[12] G.R. No. 110068, November 11, 1993, 227 SCRA 747.
[13] G.R. Nos. 92174 and 102552, December 10, 1993, 228 SCRA 329.
[14] Nacar v. Gallery Frames, G.R. No. 189871, August 13, 2013, 703 SCRA 439.
[15] Triple Eight Integrated Services, Inc. v. NLRC, 359 Phil. 955, 970-971 (1998).
[16] 1. In cases of unlawful withholding of wages, the culpable party may be assessed attorneys fees equivalent to ten
percent of the amount of wages recovered.
2. It shall be unlawful for any person to demand or accept, in any judicial or administrative proceedings for the recovery
of wages, attorneys fees which exceed ten percent of the amount of wages recovered.
[17] Exodus International Construction Corp. v. Biscocho, G.R. No. 166109, February 23, 2011, 644 SCRA 76, 91.

SUBJECT: REMEDIAL LAW

Torts And Damages: The Unknown Organ Donor

by The Lawyer's Post November 1, 2014 Comments Off on Torts And Damages: The Unknown
Organ Donor

Amelito Logmao was brought to the East Avenue Medical Center by sidewalk vendors
who allegedly saw him fall from the overpass in Cubao, Quezon City. There, his
patients data sheet identified him as Angelito Lugmoso. The clinical abstract prepared
by the surgical resident identified him as Angelito (Logmao), however. Considering that
his deterioration progressively deteriorated, and no vacancy was available at the ICU
of East Avenue Medical Center, and upon recommendation by a resident physician of
the National Kidney Institute who also does the rounds at EAMC, Logmao/Lugmoso was
transferred to NKI. His name was recorded as Angelito Lugmose at the NKI. There
being no relatives around, Jennifer, the transplant coordinator, was instructed to locate
his family by enlisting the assistance of the police and the media. Dr. Ona, the
chairman of the Department of Surgery, observing the severity of the brain injury of
Angelito Lugmoso/Logmao, requested the Laboratory Section to conduct crossmatching and tissue typing, so that if Angelito expires despite the necessary medical
care and management, and found a suitable organ donor, provided his family would
consent to it, his organs could be detached and transplanted promptly to a compatible
beneficiary. Jennifer secured the patient data of Agelito from EAMC, where he was
identified as Angelito Lugmoso of Boni Avenue, Mandaluyong and contacted several
television and radio stations for the purpose of locating the family of Lugmoso. She
also sought the assistance of the Philippine National Police to locate the whereabouts
of Angelitos family. As proof, the radio and tv stations she contacted, as well as the
pertinent police station, issued Certifications attesting to her effort to locate Angelitos
family.
Angelito was eventually pronounced dead, hence Dr. Ona set in motion the removal of
organs of Angelito for organ transplantation. He sought permission from the Executive
Director, Dr. Filoteo Alano, who issued a Memorandum approving the transplant as
long as all the requisite requirements had been complied with and the NBI had been
informed of the planned transplant. The NBI thru Dr. Maximo Reyes gave verbal
approval to the planned transplant. Thus, a medical performed a series of surgeries to
remove Angelitps heart, spleen, pancreas, and liver. One kidney and the pancreas was
transplanted to Lee Tan Hoc, while the other kidney was transplanted to Alexis
Ambustan. A doctor then made arrangements with Funerario Oro for the embalmment

of the remains of Angelito for a period of 15 days to afford more time for the relative of
Angelito to locate his remains. The NBI also conducted an autopsy on Angelitos
cadaver where his cause of death was listed as intracranial haemorrhage secondary to
skull fracture.
On March 11, 1988, the NKI issued a press release announcing the successful organ
transplant. A cousin of Angelito heard on the radio that the donor was a certain
Angelitlo Lugmoso who is now at Funeraria Oro. Sensing a vague resemblance to
Angelito Logmao;s name, she reported it to his mother, Zenaida Logmao. When they
went to the Furearia Oro to see the remains, it was there that they discovered the
remains of Angelito in a cheap casket. Previously, Arnelitos sister Arlen reported on
March 3, 1988 that her brother, Arnelito did not return home after seeing a movie in
Cubao.
Because of this discovery, Zenaida filed a complaint for damages against Dr.
Emmanuel Lenon, Taurean Protectors Agency, represented by its Proprietor, Celso
Santiago, National Kidney Institute, represented by its Director, Dr. Filoteo A. Alano,
Jennifer Misa, Dr. Maximo Reyes, Dr. Enrique T. Ona, Dr. Manuel Chua-Chiaco, Jr., Dr.
Rose Marie O. Rosete-Liquete, Dr. Aurea Z. Ambrosio, Dr. Ludivino de Guzman, Dr. Mary
Litonjua, Dr. Jaime Velasquez, Dr. Ricardo Fernando, Dr. Myrna Mendoza, Lee Tan Koc,
Alexis Ambustan, Dr. Antonio R. Paraiso, La Funeraria Oro, Inc., represented by its
President, German E. Ortega, Roberto Ortega alias Bobby Ortega, Dr. Mariano B.
Cueva, Jr., John Doe, Peter Doe, and Alex Doe in connection with the death of her son
Arnelito. Plaintiff alleged that defendants conspired to remove the organs of
Arnelito while the latter was still alive and that they concealed his true identity.
Only Dr. Filoteo Albano was held liable for damages by the RTC. On appeal, the Court
of Appeals affirmed the decision with modification, by reducing the award of moral and
exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees.
Dr. Alano then filed his appeal before the Supreme Court. In his brief, he argued that
he when he gave authorization for the removal of the organs, he gave so only in
accordance with the letter of the law, Republic Act 349, and after instructions had
been made to locate the deceaseds relatives, even to the extent of disseminating the
information to the media and the police..
The Supreme Court:
Dr. Alano cannot be held liable for damages.
The Memorandum dated March 3, 1988 issued by petitioner, stated thus:

As shown by the medical records, the said patient died on March 3, 1988 at 9:10 in the
morning due to craniocerebral injury. Please make certain that your Department has
exerted all reasonable efforts to locate the relatives or next-of-kin of the said deceased
patient, such as appeal through the radios and television, as well as through police
and other government agencies and that the NBI [Medico-Legal] Section has been
notified and is aware of the case.
If all the above has been complied with, in accordance with the provisions of Republic
Act No. 349 as amended and P.D. 856, permission and/or authority is hereby given to
the Department of Surgery to retrieve and remove the kidneys, pancreas, liver and
heart of the said deceased patient and to transplant the said organs to any compatible
patient who maybe in need of said organs to live and survive.
A careful reading of the above shows that petitioner instructed his subordinates to
make certain that all reasonable efforts are exerted to locate the patients next of
kin, even enumerating ways in which to ensure that notices of the death of the patient
would reach said relatives. It also clearly stated that permission or authorization to
retrieve and remove the internal organs of the deceased was being given ONLY IF the
provisions of the applicable law had been complied with. Such instructions reveal that
petitioner acted prudently by directing his subordinates to exhaust all reasonable
means of locating the relatives of the deceased. He could not have made his
directives any clearer. He even specifically mentioned that permission is only being
granted IF the Department of Surgery has complied with all the requirements of the
law. Verily, petitioner could not have been faulted for having full confidence in the
ability of the doctors in the Department of Surgery to comprehend the instructions,
obeying all his directives, and acting only in accordance with the requirements of the
law.
Furthermore, as found by the lower courts from the records of the case, the doctors
and personnel of NKI disseminated notices of the death of respondents son to the
media and sought the assistance of the appropriate police authorities as early as
March 2, 1988, even before petitioner issued the Memorandum. Prior to performing the
procedure for retrieval of the deceaseds internal organs, the doctors concerned also
the sought the opinion and approval of the Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI.
Thus, there can be no cavil that petitioner employed reasonable means to disseminate
notifications intended to reach the relatives of the deceased. The only question that
remains pertains to the sufficiency of time allowed for notices to reach the relatives of
the deceased.

If respondent failed to immediately receive notice of her sons death because the
notices did not properly state the name or identity of the deceased, fault cannot be
laid at petitioners door. The trial and appellate courts found that it was the EAMC, who
had the opportunity to ascertain the name of the deceased, who recorded the wrong
information regarding the deceaseds identity to NKI. The NKI could not have obtained
the information about his name from the patient, because as found by the lower
courts, the deceased was already unconscious by the time he was brought to the NKI.
Ultimately, it is respondents failure to adduce adequate evidence that doomed this
case. As stated in Otero v. Tan, [i]n civil cases, it is a basic rule that the party making
allegations has the burden of proving them by a preponderance of evidence. The
parties must rely on the strength of their own evidence and not upon the weakness of
the defense offered by their opponent. Here, there is to proof that, indeed, the period
of around 24 hours from the time notices were disseminated, cannot be considered as
reasonable under the circumstances. They failed to present any expert witness to
prove that given the medical technology and knowledge at that time in the 1980s, the
doctors could or should have waited longer before harvesting the internal organs for
transplantation.
Verily, the Court cannot, in conscience, agree with the lower court. Finding petitioner
liable for damages is improper. It should be emphasized that the internal organs of the
deceased were removed only after he had been declared brain dead; thus, the
emotional pain suffered by respondent due to the death of her son cannot in any way
be attributed to petitioner. Neither can the Court find evidence on record to show that
respondents emotional suffering at the sight of the pitiful state in which she found her
sons lifeless body be categorically attributed to petitioners conduct.
THIRD DIVISION, G.R. No. 175540, April 14, 2014, DR. FILOTEO A. ALANO, PETITIONER,
VS. ZENAIDA MAGUD-LOGMAO, RESPONDENT.

SUBJECT: CRIMINAL LAW

Under Article 354, Every Defamatory Imputation Is

Presumed To Be Malicious, Even If True, If No Good Intention
And Justifiable Motive Is Shown.
by The Lawyer's Post March 18, 2015 Comments Off on Under Article 354, Every Defamatory
Imputation Is Presumed To Be Malicious, Even If True, If No Good Intention And Justifiable Motive Is
Shown.

On February 7, 1996, Alejando wrote a letter to House Speaker Jose de Venecia, and on
February 26, 1996 to Oil Carriers In., president Nemesio Prudente Jr. In it, he wrote to
inform the two gentlemen that he did not authorise his brother, Alexis Dodong
Almendras, to represent him in his dealings; the latter was a blackmailer who ran for
election against the wishes of his father, and filed cases against his brothers and
sisters, including their mother. He sought assistance that the letter be circulated to
concerned officials and secretariat of the House. The letters were allegedly distributed
by Alejandro in Digos, Davao and in Quezon City, hence Alexis filed an action for
damages against Alejandro arising from libel and defamation. During trial, Alejandro
was not able to present any evidence except his Answer, thus the court ruled in favour
of Alexis and found him liable for damages in the amount of P5,000,000.00,
P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, and attonerys fees equivalent to 25% of
whatever actually received by Alexis. Alejandro moved for reconsideration or new trial,
but it was denied by the trial court, hence Alejandro appealed to the Court of Appeals
which ruled against him, holding that he was not deprived of due process, since he
was given the opportunity to present evidence but disregarded it by frequently
absenting himself; and the defamatory letters he sent out were not privileged
communications, since he was not a member of Congress when he sent them.
Alejandro elevated his case to the Supreme Court to assail the decision of the Court of
Appeals.
The Supreme Court:
We deny the petition.
Petitioner anchors his appeal on the ground that his letters are covered by privileged
communications. He insists that he has the legal, moral, or social duty to make the
communication, or at least, had an interest to protect, being then a Congressman
duty-bound to insulate his office and his constituents from the dubious and mistrustful
pursuits of his elder brother. Moreover, the letters were also not meant to be circulated
or published. They were sent merely to warn the individuals of respondents nefarious
activities, and made in good faith and without any actual malice. Respondents
testimony that he learned the existence of the letter from others cannot be
countenanced, as no witness corroborated this. At best, it is only hearsay.
On the denial of his motion for reconsideration and/or new trial, he maintains that his
own counsel Atty. Leonardo D. Suario categorically admitted that he did not know of
petitioners ailment and thus did not make the proper manifestations in Court. His
failure to attend the hearing was not of his own volition, but because of his doctors
strict advice since he earlier underwent a quadruple coronary artery bypass at the St.

Lukes Medical Center-Heart Institute in Quezon City on 16 July 2001, just a day before
the Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial was filed. While his counsel represents
him, the latters mistakes should not deprive him of his day in court to present his
side.
As to the damages, petitioner avers that since respondent never testified on any
suffering he sustained or why he is entitled to them, the same must not be awarded.
On the other hand, respondent asserts that petitioners letters do not fall within the
purview of privileged communication because it was published and read by the
secretariat of the House of the Representatives, and not exclusively communicated to
persons who have some interest or duty in the matter and who have the power to
furnish the protection sought by the author of the statement. Moreover, he was not
acting as a member of congress when he sent the letters. The writing of a personal
matter (which petitioner admitted in the letters), not relating to the functions of a
member of Congress cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be deemed to be
privileged and insulated from suit arising therefrom.
Malice has also been sufficiently proven because the language of the letters in fact
shows that the writer had some ill-feeling towards the respondent by using the words
such as reknown blackmailer and bitter rival. There is sufficient showing that
petitioner bore a grudge against the respondent and that there was rivalry or ill-feeling
between them.
Anent the damages, respondent believes that they were rightly awarded, taking into
consideration his testimony in the lower court, and the financial and social standing of
the parties herein.
First, we rule that petitioner was not deprived of his right to due process.
Settled is the rule that a client is bound by the mistakes of his counsel. The only
exception is when the negligence of the counsel is so gross, reckless and inexcusable
that the client is deprived of his day in court. In such instance, the remedy is to reopen
the case and allow the party who was denied his day in court to adduce evidence.
However, perusing the case at bar, we find no reason to depart from the general
rule[1].
Petitioner was given several opportunities to present his evidence or to clarify his
medical constraints in court, but he did not do so, despite knowing full well that he had
a pending case in court. For petitioner to feign and repeatedly insist upon a lack of
awareness of the progress of an important litigation is to unmask a penchant for the
ludicrous. Although he rightfully expected counsel to amply protect his interest, he

cannot just sit back, relax and await the outcome of the case. In keeping with the
normal course of events, he should have taken the initiative of making the proper
inquiries from his counsel and the trial court as to the status of his case. For his
failure to do so, he has only himself to blame[2]. The Court cannot allow petitioner the
exception to the general rule just because his counsel admitted having no knowledge
of his medical condition. To do so will set a dangerous precedent of never-ending suits,
so long as lawyers could allege their own fault or negligence to support the clients
case and obtain remedies and reliefs already lost by the operation of law[3].
Second, we find that petitioners letters are libelous in nature and do not fall within the
purview of privileged communication.
For an imputation to be libelous under Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code, the
following requisites must be present: (a) it must be defamatory; (b) it must be
malicious; (c) it must be given publicity; and (d) the victim must be identifiable1[4].
Consequently, under Article 354, every defamatory imputation is presumed to be
malicious, even if true, if no good intention and justifiable motive is shown. As an
exception to the rule, the presumption of malice is done away with when the
defamatory imputation qualifies as privileged communication[5]. In order to qualify as
privileged communication under Article 354, Number 1[6], the following requisites
must concur: (1) the person who made the communication had a legal, moral, or social
duty to make the communication, or at least, had an interest to protect, which interest
may either be his own or of the one to whom it is made; (2) the communication is
addressed to an officer or a board, or superior, having some interest or duty in the
matter, and who has the power to furnish the protection sought; and (3) the
statements in the communication are made in good faith and without malice[7].
Were petitioners letters defamatory in nature? We believe so.
In determining whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are to be
construed in their entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural, and ordinary
meaning as they would naturally be understood by the persons reading them, unless it
appears that they were used and understood in another sense[8]. In the instant case,
the letters tag respondent as a reknown black mailer, a vengeful family member who
filed cases against his mother and siblings, and with nefarious designs. Even an
impartial mind reading these descriptions would be led to entertain doubts on the
persons character, thereby affecting that persons reputation.
Malice can also be presumed inasmuch as the letters are not privileged in nature.
Petitioners contention that he has the legal, moral or social duty to make the

communication cannot be countenanced because he failed to communicate the

statements only to the person or persons who have some interest or duty in the
matter alleged, and who have the power to furnish the protection sought by the author
of the statement. A written letter containing libelous matter cannot be classified as
privileged when it is published and circulated among the public1[9]. Examination of
the letters would reveal that petitioner himself intended for the letters to be circulated
(and they were so) when he said that:
May I therefore request the assistance of your office in circulating the above
information to concerned officials and secretariat employees of the House of
Representatives[10].
This lack of selectivity on his part is indicative of malice and is anathema to his claim
of privileged communication because such publication created upon the minds of the
readers a circumstance which brought discredit and shame to respondents
reputation[11].
Lastly, having duly proved that all the elements of libel are present in this case, we
rule that the damages awarded by the trial court and affirmed by the appellate court
must be modified and equitably reduced.
In awarding damages in libel cases, the court is given ample discretion to determine
the amount, depending upon the facts of the particular case[12]. Article 2219 of the
Civil Code expressly authorizes the recovery of moral damages in cases of libel,
slander or any other form of defamation. However, while no proof of pecuniary loss is
necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, x x x it is nevertheless
essential that the claimant should satisfactorily show the existence of the factual basis
of damages and its causal connection to defendants acts[13]. Considering that
respondent sufficiently justified his claim for damages (i.e. he testified that he was
embarrassed by the said letters [and] ashamed to show his face in [sic] government
offices[14] ), we find him entitled to moral and exemplary damages.
However, we equitably reduce the amounts[15] awarded because even though the
letters were libellous, respondent has not suffered such grave or substantial damage
to his reputation to warrant receiving P5,000,000 as moral damages and P100,000.00
as exemplary damages. In fact, he was able to successfully secure an elected position
in recent years. Accordingly, we reduce the award of moral damages from P5,000,000
to P100,000 and exemplary damages from P100,000 to P20,000.
The award of attorneys fees is not proper because respondent failed to justify
satisfactorily his claim, and both the trial and appellate courts failed to explicitly state

in their respective decisions the rationale for the award[16]. It is an accepted doctrine
that the award thereof as an item of damages is the exception rather than the rule,
and counsels fees are not to be awarded every time a party wins a suit. The power of
the court to award attorneys fees under Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands
factual, legal and equitable justification, without which the award is a conclusion
without a premise, its basis being improperly left to speculation and conjecture. In all
events, the court must explicitly state in the text of the decision, and not only in the
decretal portion thereof, the legal reason for the award of attorneys fees[17]. The
same is true for the award of litigation expenses because respondent failed to
satisfactorily justify his claim.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the instant petition. The 27 January 2006 Decision and 28
August 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 73088 are hereby
MODIFIED, in that: (1) the award of moral damages is reduced from P5,000,000 to
P100,000; (2) the award of exemplary damages is reduced from P100,000 to P20,000;
and (3) litigation expenses and attorneys fees are deleted.

FIRST DIVISION, G.R. No. 179491, January 14, 2015, ALEJANDRO C. ALMENDRAS, JR., PETITIONER, VS.
ALEXIS C. ALMENDRAS, RESPONDENT.

[1] Barza v. Sps. Dinglasan, 484 Phil. 242 (2004), citing Villa Rhecar Bus vs. Dela Cruz, 241 Phil. 14 (1988);
Producers Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 430 Phil. 812 (2002).
[2] Air Philippines Corporation v. International Business Aviation Services Phils., Inc., 481 Phil. 366 (2004), citing
Gold Line Transit, Inc. v. Ramos, 415 Phil. 492, 504 (2001).
[3] Building Care Corporation v. Macaraeg, G.R. No. 198357, 10 December 2012, 687 SCRA 643, citing Lagua v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 173390, 27 June 2012, 675 SCRA 176; Panay Railways, Inc. v. Heva Management and
Development Corp., G.R. No. 154061, 25 January 2012, 664 SCRA 1, 9.
[4] Diaz v. People, 551 Phil. 192 (2007), citing Novicio v. Aggabao, 463 Phil. 510 (2003).
[5] Brillante v. Court of Appeals, 483 Phil. 568 (2004), citing REVISED PENAL CODE, Art. 354, par. 1; Art. 354, par.
2
[6] REVISED PENAL CODE, Art. 354, Number 1 A private communication made by any person to another in the
performance of any legal, moral or social duty.
[7] Supra note 21, citing U.S. v. Bustos, 13 Phil 690, 701 (1909).
[8] Supra note 20.
[9] Buatis, Jr. v. People, 520 Phil. 149 (2006), citing Brillante v. Court of Appeals, 483 Phil. 568 (2004); Daez v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 47971, 31 October 1990, 191 SCRA 61, 69.
[10] Supra note 3.
[11] Supra note 25, citing Brillante v. Court of Appeals, 483 Phil. 568 (2004).
[12] Philippine Journalists, Inc., v. Thoenen, 513 Phil. 607 (2005), citing Guevarra v. Almario 56 Phil. 476 (1932).
[13] Mahinay v. Velasquez, Jr., 464 Phil. 146 (2004), citing Kierulf v. Court of Appeals, 336 Phil. 414 (1997).
[14] Rollo, p. 106.
[15] Id. at 107; The Decision states ?5,000,000 as moral damages and P100,000 as exemplary damages.
[16] Id. at 108, citing Koa v. CA, G.R. No. 84847, 5 March 1993, 219 SCRA 541.
[17] Inter-Asia Investment Industries, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 451 Phil. 554 (2003). See also PNB v. CA, 326 Phil. 504
(1996); ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. v. CA, 361 Phil. 499 (1999).

SUBJECT: REMEDIAL LAW

Affidavits Of Recantations After Conviction Are Always

Looked With Disfavor
by The Lawyer's Post December 30, 2014 Comments Off on Affidavits Of Rencantations After
Conviction Are Always Looked With Disfavor

Wilfredo and Anthony, former police officers filed a Motion for New Trial Due To Newly
Discovered Evidence, while Artemio, another police officer, filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Courts Resolution in G.R. No. 198338 dated February 20, 2013,
convicting them of the crime of robbery with homicide and sentencing them to a
penalty of reclusion perpetua on the ground that they obtained affidavits from
prosecution witnesses Arnel and Domingo who earlier implicated them of the crime of
robbery with homicide leading to their conviction. According them, the witnesses claim
that they made their testimonies under duress as they were forced by elements of the
PNP and NBI, as well as the former mayor of San Carlos city to point to the accused as
perpetrators of the crimes. They claim not to have actually witnessed the crime and
testified against the accused only out of fear of their lives.
The Supreme Court:
Reyes and Marcelos affidavits partake of a recantation which is aimed to renounce
their earlier testimonies and withdraw them formally and publicly. Verily, recantations
are viewed with suspicion and reservation. The Court looks with disfavor upon
retractions of testimonies previously given in court. It is settled that an affidavit of
desistance made by a witness after conviction of the accused is not reliable, and
deserves only scant attention. The rationale for the rule is obvious: affidavits of
retraction can easily be secured from witnesses, usually through intimidation or for a
monetary consideration. Recanted testimony is exceedingly unreliable. There is always
the probability that it will later be repudiated. Only when there exist special
circumstances in the case which when coupled with the retraction raise doubts as to
the truth of the testimony or statement given, can retractions be considered and
upheld. As aptly pointed out by the Court in Firaza v. People, viz.:
Indeed, it is a dangerous rule to set aside a testimony which has been solemnly taken
before a court of justice in an open and free trial and under conditions precisely sought
to discourage and forestall falsehood simply because one of the witnesses who had
given the testimony later on changed his mind. Such a rule will make solemn trials a

mockery and place the investigation of the truth at the mercy of unscrupulous
witnesses. x x x.
This Court has always looked with disfavor upon retraction of testimonies previously
given in court. The asserted motives for the repudiation are commonly held suspect,
and the veracity of the statements made in the affidavit of repudiation are frequently
and deservedly subject to serious doubt.
x x x. Especially when the affidavit of retraction is executed by a prosecution witness
after the judgment of conviction has already been rendered, it is too late in the day
for his recantation without portraying himself as a liar. At most, the retraction is an
afterthought which should not be given probative value.
Mere retraction by a prosecution witness does not necessarily vitiate the original
testimony if credible. The rule is settled that in cases where previous testimony is
retracted and a subsequent different, if not contrary, testimony is made by the same
witness, the test to decide which testimony to believe is one of comparison coupled
with the application of the general rules of evidence. A testimony solemnly given in
court should not be set aside and disregarded lightly, and before this can be done,
both the previous testimony and the subsequent one should be carefully compared
and juxtaposed, the circumstances under which each was made, carefully and keenly
scrutinized, and the reasons or motives for the change, discriminatingly analyzed. The
unreliable character of the affidavit of recantation executed by a complaining witness
is also shown by the incredulity of the fact that after going through the burdensome
process of reporting to and/or having the accused arrested by the law enforcers,
executing a criminal complaint-affidavit against the accused, attending trial and
testifying against the accused, the said complaining witness would later on declare
that all the foregoing is actually a farce and the truth is now what he says it to be in
his affidavit of recantation. And in situations, like the instant case, where testimony is
recanted by an affidavit subsequently executed by the recanting witness, we are
properly guided by the well-settled rules that an affidavit is hearsay unless the affiant
is presented on the witness stand and that affidavits taken ex-parte are generally
considered inferior to the testimony given in open court. (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
After a careful scrutiny of the records, the Court sees no sufficient reason to disturb its
Resolution dated February 20, 2013. In the case at bar, the trial court gave great
weight and credence to the collective statements of the four (4) prosecution
witnesses, including those of Reyes and Marcelo, as their testimonies were candid,
straightforward, and categorical. It is likewise worthy to mention that their respective

testimonies were deemed credible as they withstood extensive cross-examination, and

possibly, even re-direct and re-cross examinations. Absent any special circumstances
attendant to this case, Reyes and Marcelos recantations fail to cast doubt to the truth
and veracity of their earlier testimonies, and to the collective statements of all of the
prosecution witnesses as a whole.
Moreover, it should be noted that Reyes and Marcelo only executed their respective
affidavits of recantation after the Court issued its Resolution dated February 20, 2013
upholding accused-appellants conviction of the crime of robbery with homicide, or
more than a decade after they gave their testimonies in open court. These affidavits
should be seen as nothing but a last-minute attempt to save accused-appellants from
punishment.
SECOND DIVISION, G.R. No. 198338, November 13, 2013, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. P/SUPT. ARTEMIO E. LAMSEN, PO2 ANTHONY D. ABULENCIA,
AND SPO1 WILFREDO L. RAMOS, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

SUBJECT: REMEDIAL LAW

PD 1818 Proscribes The Issuance Of A Writ Of Preliminary

Injunction In Any Case Involving An Infrastructure Project Of
The Government
by The Lawyer's Post May 5, 2015 0 Comments

The Facts:
Hermano Oil Manufacturing (Hermano), by letter, requested the Toll Regulatory Board
that it be given an easement of right of way to access the NLEX, since it was deprived
of its enjoyment of its property when it was barred from entry and exit to the North
Luzon Expressway by the access fence that bounded its property located near the Sta.
Rita exit of NLEX. The TRB however denied the request, averring that it is a violation
of Section 7.0 of the Limited Access Highway Act (Republic Act 2000) and may have
detrimental effects on the scheduled rehabilitation and improvement of the NLEX.

Hermano thus filed a complaint for specific performance with prayer for TRO against
TRB, Engr. Jaime Dumlao, the TRB Executive Director, the Philippine National
Construction Corporation, and the Department of Public Works and Highways, alleging
that it was totally deprived of its enjoyment of its property by preventing ingress and
egress to it, and the only access being the road network in front of its property; that it
was denied equal protection of the law because other properties adjacent to it had
access to the NLEX; and it was deprived of its property without due process and just
compensation. The Office of the Solicitor General, appearing for the TRB, filed a
Motion to Dismiss, alleging that it is a suit against the State, and the proper remedy
was to file a petition for certiorari of the denial by the TRB not a complaint for specific
performance.
The RTC granted the motion to dismiss and dismissed the case, holding that the suit is
in the nature of a suit against the State although the defendants were being sued in
their personal capacities, since it would entail appropriation from the State if and when
they were held liable for damages. The RTC also had no jurisdiction over the case in
view of PD 1818 and RA 8975 which prohibits courts from issuing injections and TROs
in infrastructure projects of the government.
On appeal to the CA, the latter affirmed the dismissal of the case by the RTC, ruling
that the relief sought by Hermano in its complaint is in violation of the law (RA 2000);
when it bought the land, the NLEX was already in existence, as such, an easement of
right of way cannot be granted if the isolation was brought about by the owner; as to
non-suability, while the PNCC was sued along with other governments agencies, it is
performing a governmental function, which is the maintenance of highways; while it
put forward cases arguing that government agencies may be sued for performing nongovernment functions, still it did not indicate reasons why the NLEX should not be
considered a governmental function.
Hermano appealed to the Supreme Court via petition for review on certiorari.
The Issue/s:
1. Whether or not Hermano was deprived of due process and equal protection of the
laws when it was denied access to the NLEX.
2. Whether or not it is bound by its predecessors in interest thus cannot demand
easement of right of way.
3. Whether or not the suit is against the State.
The Courts ruling:

We concur with both lower courts.

In our view, the TRB, Dumlao and the DPWH correctly invoked the doctrine of
sovereign immunity in their favor. The TRB and the DPWH performed purely or
essentially government or public functions. As such, they were invested with the
inherent power of sovereignty. Being unincorporated agencies or entities of the
National Government, they could not be sued as such. On his part, Dumlao was acting
as the agent of the TRB in respect of the matter concerned.
In Air Transportation Office v. Ramos, we expounded on the doctrine of sovereign
1

immunity in the following manner:

An unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical personality of its
own enjoys immunity from suit because it is invested with an inherent power of
sovereignty. Accordingly, a claim for damages against the agency cannot prosper;
otherwise, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is violated. However, the need to
distinguish between an unincorporated government agency performing governmental
function and one performing proprietary functions has arisen. The immunity has been
upheld in favor of the former because its function is governmental or incidental to
such function; it has not been upheld in favor of the latter whose function was not in
pursuit of a necessary function of government but was essentially a business.
Nonetheless, the petitioner properly argued that the PNCC, being a private business
entity, was not immune from suit. The PNCC was incorporated in 1966 under its
original name of Construction Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) for a
term of fifty years pursuant to the Corporation Code. In 1983, the CDCP changed its
2

corporate name to the PNCC to reflect the extent of the Governments equity
investment in the company, a situation that came about after the government
financial institutions converted their loans into equity following the CDCPs inability to
pay the loans. Hence, the Government owned 90.3% of the equity of the PNCC, and
3

only 9.70% of the PNCCs voting equity remained under private ownership. Although
4

the majority or controlling shares of the PNCC belonged to the Government, the PNCC
was essentially a private corporation due to its having been created in accordance
with the Corporation Code, the general corporation statute. More specifically, the
5

PNCC was an acquired asset corporation under Administrative Order No. 59, and was
subject to the regulation and jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange
Commission. Consequently, the doctrine of sovereign immunity had no application to
6

the PNCC.

The foregoing conclusion as to the PNCC notwithstanding, the Court affirms the
dismissal of the complaint due to lack of jurisdiction and due to lack of cause of action.
It appears that the petitioners complaint principally sought to restrain the
respondents from implementing an access fence on its property, and to direct them to
grant it a right of way to the NLEX. Clearly, the reliefs being sought by the petitioner
were beyond the jurisdiction of the RTC because no court except the Supreme Court
could issue an injunction against an infrastructure project of the Government. This is
because Presidential Decree No. 1818, issued on January 16, 1981, prohibited judges
from issuing restraining orders against government infrastructure projects, stating in
its sole provision: No court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any
restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary order, preliminary mandatory
injunction in any case, dispute or controversy involving an infrastructure project.
Presidential Decree No. 1818 was amended by Republic Act No. 8975, approved on
7

November 7, 2000, whose pertinent parts provide:

Section 3. Prohibition on the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Orders, Preliminary
Injunctions and Preliminary Mandatory Injunctions.- No court, except the Supreme
Court, shall issue any temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction or
preliminary mandatory injunction against the government, or any of its subdivisions,
officials or any person or entity, whether public or private, acting under the
governments direction, to restrain, prohibit or compel the following acts:
(a) Acquisition, clearance and development of the right-of-way and/or site or location
of any national government project;
(b) Bidding or awarding of contract/project of the national government as defined
under Section 2 hereof;
(c) Commencement, prosecution, execution, implementation, operation of any such
contract or project;
(d) Termination or rescission of any such contract/project; and
(e) The undertaking or authorization of any other lawful activity necessary for such
contract/project.
This prohibition shall apply in all cases, disputes or controversies instituted by a
private party, including but not limited to cases filed by bidders or those claiming to
have rights through such bidders involving such contract/project. This prohibition shall
not apply when the matter is of extreme urgency involving a constitutional issue, such
that unless a temporary restraining order is issued, grave injustice and irreparable

injury will arise. The applicant shall file a bond, in an amount to be fixed by the court,
which bond shall accrue in favor of the government if the court should finally decide
that the applicant was not entitled to the relief sought.
If after due hearing the court finds that the award of the contract is null and void, the
court may, if appropriate under the circumstances, award the contract to the qualified
and winning bidder or order a rebidding of the same, without prejudice to any liability
that the guilty party may incur under existing laws.
Section 4. Nullity of Writs and Orders.- Any temporary restraining order, preliminary
injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction issued in violation of Section 3 hereof is
void and of no force and effect.
Section 5. Designation of Regional Trial Courts.- The Supreme Court may designate
regional trial courts to act as commissioners with the sole function of receiving facts of
the case involving acquisition, clearance and development of right-of-way for
government infrastructure projects. The designated regional trial court shall within
thirty (30) days from the date of receipt of the referral, forward its findings of facts to
the Supreme Court for appropriate action. x x x
As to what was embraced by the term infrastructure project as used in Presidential
Decree No. 1818, the Court has ruled in Francisco, Jr. v. UEM-MARA Philippines
Corporation :
8

PD 1818 proscribes the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction in any case

involving an infrastructure project of the government. The aim of the prohibition, as
expressed in its second whereas clause, is to prevent delay in the implementation or
execution of government infrastructure projects (particularly through the use of
provisional remedies) to the detriment of the greater good since it disrupts the pursuit
of essential government projects and frustrates the economic development effort of
the nation.
Petitioner argues that the collection of toll fees is not an infrastructure project of the
government. He cites the definition of infrastructure projects we used in Republic v.
Silerio:
The term infrastructure projects means construction, improvement and
rehabilitation of roads, and bridges, railways, airports, seaports, communication
facilities, irrigation, flood control and drainage, water supply and sewage systems,
shore protection, power facilities, national buildings, school buildings, hospital
buildings, and other related construction projects that form part of the government
capital investment.

xxxx
The definition of infrastructure projects specifically includes the improvement and
rehabilitation of roads and not just its construction. Accordingly, even if the Coastal
Road was merely upgraded and not constructed from scratch, it is still covered by the
definition.Moreover, PD 1818 itself states that any person, entity or governmental
official cannot be prohibited from continuing the execution or implementation of such
project or pursuing any lawful activity necessary for such execution or
implementation. Undeniably, the collection of toll fees is part of the execution or
implementation of the MCTEP as agreed upon in the TOA. The TOA is valid since it has
not been nullified. Thus it is a legitimate source of rights and obligations. It has the
force and effect of law between the contracting parties and is entitled to recognition
by this Court. The MCTEP is an infrastructure project of the government forming part of
the government capital investment considering that under the TOA, the government
owns the expressways comprising the project. (Emphasis supplied.)
There can be no question that the respondents maintenance of safety measures,
including the establishment of the access fence along the NLEX, was a component of
the continuous improvement and development of the NLEX. Consequently, the lower
courts could not validly restrain the implementation of the access fence by granting
the petitioner its right of way without exceeding its jurisdiction.
Nor did the establishment of the access fence violate the petitioners constitutional
and legal rights.
It is relevant to mention that the access fence was put up pursuant to Republic Act No.
2000 (Limited Access Highway Act), the enforcement of which was under the authority
of the DOTC. Clarifying the DOTCs jurisdiction under this law in Mirasol v. Department
of Public Works and Highways, the Court has said
9

RA 2000, otherwise known as the Limited Access Highway Act, was approved on 22
June 1957. Section 4 of RA 2000 provides that [t]he Department of Public Works and
Communications is authorized to do so design any limited access facility and to so
regulate, restrict, or prohibit access as to best serve the traffic for which such facility is
intended. The RTC construed this authorization to regulate, restrict, or prohibit access
to limited access facilities to apply to the Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH).
The RTCs ruling is based on a wrong premise. The RTC assumed that the DPWH
derived its authority from its predecessor, the Department of Public Works and
Communications, which is expressly authorized to regulate, restrict, or prohibit access

to limited access facilities under Section 4 of RA 2000. However, such assumption fails
to consider the evolution of the Department of Public Works and Communications.
xxxx
Upon the ratification of the 1987 Constitution in February 1987, the former Ministry of
Public Works and Highways became the Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH)and the former Ministry of Transportation and Communications became
the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC).
DPWH issued DO 74 and DO 215 declaring certain expressways as limited access
facilities on 5 April 1993 and 25 June 1998, respectively. Later, the TRB, under the
DPWH, issued the Revised Rules and Regulations on Limited Access Facilities.
However, on 23 July 1979, long before these department orders and regulations were
issued, the Ministry of Public Works, Transportation and Communications was divided
into two agencies the Ministry of Public Works and the Ministry of Transportation and
Communications by virtue of EO 546. The question is, which of these two agencies is
now authorized to regulate, restrict, or prohibit access to limited access facilities?
Under Section 1 of EO 546, the Ministry of Public Works (now DPWH) assumed
the public works functions of the Ministry of Public Works, Transportation and
Communications. On the other hand, among the functions of the Ministry of
Transportation and Communications (now Department of Transportation and
Communications [DOTC]) were to (1) formulate and recommend national policies and
guidelines for the preparation and implementation of an integrated and
comprehensive transportation and communications systems at the national, regional,
and local levels; and (2) regulate, whenever necessary, activities relative to
transportation and communications and prescribe and collect fees in the exercise of
such power. Clearly, under EO 546, it is the DOTC, not the DPWH, which has authority
to regulate, restrict, or prohibit access to limited access facilities.
Even under Executive Order No. 125 (EO 125) and Executive Order No. 125-A (EO 125A), which further reorganized the DOTC, the authority to administer and enforce all
laws, rules and regulations relative to transportation is clearly with the DOTC.
Thus, DO 74 and DO 215 are void because the DPWH has no authority to declare
certain expressways as limited access facilities. Under the law, it is the DOTC which is
authorized to administer and enforce all laws, rules and regulations in the field of
transportation and to regulate related activities. (Emphasis supplied.)
Moreover, the putting up of the access fence on the petitioners property was in the
valid exercise of police power, assailable only upon proof that such putting up unduly

violated constitutional limitations like due process and equal protection of the
law. In Mirasol v. Department of Public Works and Highways, the Court has further
10

noted that:
A toll way is not an ordinary road. As a facility designed to promote the fastest access
to certain destinations, its use, operation, and maintenance require close regulation.
Public interest and safety require the imposition of certain restrictions on toll ways that
do not apply to ordinary roads. As a special kind of road, it is but reasonable that not
all forms of transport could use it.

11

Clearly, therefore, the access fence was a reasonable restriction on the petitioners
property given the location thereof at the right side of Sta. Rita Exit of the NLEX.
Although some adjacent properties were accorded unrestricted access to the
expressway, there was a valid and reasonable classification for doing so because their
owners provided ancillary services to motorists using the NLEX, like gasoline service
stations and food stores . A classification based on practical convenience and common
12

knowledge is not unconstitutional simply because it may lack purely theoretical or

scientific uniformity .
13

Lastly, the limited access imposed on the petitioners property did not partake of a
compensable taking due to the exercise of the power of eminent domain. There is no
question that the property was not taken and devoted for public use. Instead, the
property was subjected to a certain restraint, i.e. the access fence, in order to secure
the general safety and welfare of the motorists using the NLEX. There being a clear
and valid exercise of police power, the petitioner was certainly not entitled to any just
compensation.

14

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; AFFIRMS the
decision promulgated on October 27, 2004; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the
costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION, G.R. No. 167290, November 26, 2014,HERMANO OIL MANUFACTURING & SUGAR
CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. TOLL REGULATORY BOARD, ENGR. JAIME S. DUMLAO, JR., PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION (PNCC) AND DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS
(DPWH), RESPONDENTS.
1

G.R. No. 159402, February 23, 2011, 644 SCRA 36, 42-43.

Strategic Alliance Development Corporation v. Radstock Securities Limited, G.R. No. 178158 & 180428, December 4,

2009, 607 SCRA 413, 448-449.

3

Id. at 449.

Id. at 449-450.

Philippine National Construction Corporation v. Pabion, G.R. No. 131715, December 8, 1999, 320 SCRA 188, 218

Id. at 210.

n Act to Ensure the Expeditious Implementation and Completion of Government Infrastructure Projects by Prohibiting

the Lower Courts from Issuing Temporary Restraining Orders, Preliminary Injunctions, or Preliminary Mandatory
Injunctions, Providing Penalties for Violation Thereof, and for Other Purposes.
8

G.R. No. 135688-89, October 18, 2007, 536 SCRA 518, 526-529.

G.R. No. 158793, June 8, 2006, 490 SCRA 318, 337, 341-344.

10

Id. at 351.

11

Id. at 353.

12

Rollo, pp. 354-355.

13

Supra note 24, at 352

14

See Didipio Earth Savers Multi-Purpose Association, Incorporated (DESAMA) v. Gozun, G.R. No. 157882, March

30, 2006, 485 SCRA 586, 604-607.

SUBJECT: REMEDIAL LAW

No Civil Liability When Acquittal Of Accused Was Based On

The Act Or Omission From Which Civil Liability Might Arise
Did Not Exist
by The Lawyer's Post February 17, 2015 Comments Off on No Civil Liability When Acquittal Of
Accused Was Based On The Act Or Omission From Which Civil Liability Might Arise Did Not Exist

In the afternoon of January 3, 2006, Marina was crossing the street when a Nissan Vanette
traversing EDSA ran her over. She was rushed to the hospital but she eventually died. Hence,
an information for Reckless Imprudence Resulting To Homicide was filed against Antonio, the
alleged driver of the Nissan Vanette. During the trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies
of Marla, Marinas daughter, who testified on the civil damages sustained by her family as a
result of Marinas death; Dr. Ortiz, the person who conducted the autopsy; PSI Gomez, who
conducted the police investigation, and Shem, who saw the incident. After the prosecution
rested its case, Antonio filed a demurrer to evidence, on the ground that he was not positively
identified as the driver of the vehicle, and no competent evidence was presented to show how
the incident happened. The trial court granted the motion, and dismissed the criminal case.
Marla filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court denied, ruling that it will violate
Antonios right against double jeopardy. On the civil aspect of the case, the trial court also
denied it, averring that no civil liability could be awarded in the absence of evidence to show
Antonio committed the crime. Marla elevated via appeal the MTC decision to the Regional Trial
Court but her apple was also denied, hence she filed a petition for review of the RTC decision,
maintaining that Antonio should be held civilly liable for her mothers death. The Court of
Appeals ruled in her favour and reversed the RTC decision, holding Antonio civilly liable for
actual damages, civil indemnity, and moral damages. It anchored its decision on the fact that
MTC decision showed the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable guilt. As such
he is not exonerated from civil liability. Further, pieces of evidence were considered by the CA
in adjudging him civilly liable: the inadmissible sworn statement by Antonio where he admitted
driving the vehicle; that he brought the victim to the hospital for medical attention; that the
person hit by the Nissan Vanette and the victim were one and the same person; and the fact
that the Nissan Vanette was registered in the name of Antonios aunt who authorised him to
claim it from the MTC. Thus, Antonio filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme
Court to reverse the CA ruling.

The Supreme Court:

The petition is meritorious.
Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. The acquittal of an accused of the crime charged,
however, does not necessarily extinguish his civil liability[1]. In Manantan v. CA[2], the Court expounded on the two
kinds of acquittal recognized by our law and their concomitant effects on the civil liability of the accused, as follows:
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the accused. First is an acquittal
on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or omission complained of. This instance closes the door to
civil liability, for a person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be
held liable for such act or omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil
action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict complained of. This is the
situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt
on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not
exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only.[3]
In Dayap v. Sendiong[4], the Court explained further:
The acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case. The
extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where: (a) the acquittal is based
on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the
accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of
which the accused is acquitted. However, the civil action based on delict may be deemed extinguished if there is a
finding on the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did
not exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him.
Thus, if demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused has the right to adduce evidence on
the civil aspect of the case unless the court also declares that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise
did not exist. This is because when the accused files a demurrer to evidence, he has not yet adduced evidence both on
the criminal and civil aspects of the case. The only evidence on record is the evidence for the prosecution. What the trial
court should do is issue an order or partial judgment granting the demurrer to evidence and acquitting the accused, and
set the case for continuation of trial for the accused to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case and for the
private complainant to adduce evidence by way of rebuttal. Thereafter, the court shall render judgment on the civil
aspect of the case.[5](Emphases supplied)
In case of an acquittal, the Rules of Court requires that the judgment state whether the evidence of the prosecution
absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either
case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.[6]

A punctilious examination of the MeTCs Order, which the RTC sustained, will show that Dalurayas acquittal was
based on the conclusion that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist, given that the
prosecution was not able to establish that he was the author of the crime imputed against him. Such conclusion is clear
and categorical when the MeTC declared that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are wanting in material
details and they did not sufficiently establish that the accused precisely committed the crime charged against
him.[7] Furthermore, when Marla sought reconsideration of the MeTCs Order acquitting Daluraya, said court
reiterated and firmly clarified that the prosecution was not able to establish that the accused was the driver of the
Nissan Vanette which bumped Marina Oliva[8] and that there is no competent evidence on hand which proves that
the accused was the person responsible for the death of Marina Oliva.[9]
Clearly, therefore, the CA erred in construing the findings of the MeTC, as affirmed by the RTC, that Dalurayas
acquittal was anchored on reasonable doubt, which would necessarily call for a remand of the case to the court a quo
for the reception of Dalurayas evidence on the civil aspect. Records disclose that Dalurayas acquittal was based on
the fact that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist in view of the failure of the
prosecution to sufficiently establish that he was the author of the crime ascribed against him. Consequently,his civil
liability should be deemed as non-existent by the nature of such acquittal.
FIRST DIVISION, G.R. No. 210148, December 08, 2014, ANTONIO L. DALURAYA, PETITIONER, VS. MARLA
OLIVA, RESPONDENT.

[1] Lumantas v. Calapiz, G.R. No. 163753, January 15, 2014.

[2] 403 Phil. 299 (2001).
[3] Id. at 308-309; citations omitted.
[4] 597 Phil. 127 (2009).
[5] Id. at 141, citing Hun Hyung Park v. Eung Won Choi, 544 Phil. 431, 444 (2007) and Salazar v. People, 458 Phil.
504, 515-517 (2003).
[6] Rules of Court, Rule 120, Section 2.
[7] Rollo, p. 147.
[8] Id. at 149.
[9] Id. at 150.

SUBJECT: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

When An Accused Appeals From The Sentence Of The Trial

Court, He Or She Waives The Constitutional Safeguard
Against Double Jeopardy And Throws The Whole Case Open
To The Review Of The Appellate Court, Which Is Then Called
Upon To Render Such Judgment As Law And Justice
Dictate
by The Lawyer's Post May 5, 2015 0 Comments

The Facts:
Baleriano (Limbag), the private complainant, testified that in the evening of May 14,
1989, he was roused from sleep in his house when accused Edigardo (Gercohe),
Roberto (Garde) and Generoso (Marfil), who entered his house without a warrant by
destroying the main door thereof, mauled him and struck him with a Garand rifle.
They were looking for firearms but instead found and took away his air gun. Thus, he
filed a complaint for Violation of Domicile and Less Serious Physical Injuries against the
accused. In their defense, the accused denied liability, insisting they were home the
night of May 14, 1989. The night before, however, they admitted conducting a roving
foot patrol due to rampant cattle rustling in the area.
After trial, the trial court found the accused guilty for Less Serious Physical Injuries, but
acquitted them of the charge of violation of domicile, holding that the prosecution
failed to prove that the accused were public officers, which is an element of the crime
of violation of domicile. Their admission that they were civilian volunteer
organisations (CVO) members t is not enough to prove that they were public officers.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals for their conviction on Less Serious Physical Injuries,
however, the appellate court set aside the trial court decision. It acquitted them of
Less Serious Physical Injuries, but convicted them of Violation of Domicile, considering
their judicial admissions that they were barangay tanod and members of the CAFGU.
Their motion for reconsideration denied, they elevated their case to the Supreme
Court.
The Issue/s:
1. Whether or not they may still be convicted for Violation of Domicile considering that
they merely appealed their conviction for Less Serious Physical Injuries, without

violating their right against double jeopardy and to due process, since they they
focused their arguments in their appeal for their conviction of Less Serious Physical
Injuries.
The Courts ruling:
We deny.
An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review on any question including
one not raised by the parties. When an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial
1

court, he or she waives the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and
throws the whole case open to the review of the appellate court, which is then called
upon to render such judgment as law and justice dictate. An appeal confers upon the
2

appellate court jurisdiction to examine the records, revise the judgment appealed
from, increase (or reduce) the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal
law. The appellate court may, and generally does, look into the entire records to
3

ensure that no fact of weight or substance has been overlooked, misapprehended, or

misapplied by the trial court.

Thus, when petitioners appealed the trial courts judgment of conviction for Less
Serious Physical Injuries, they are deemed to have abandoned their right to invoke the
prohibition on double jeopardy since it becomes the duty of the appellate court to
correct errors as may be found in the assailed judgment. Petitioners could not have
been placed twice in jeopardy when the CA set aside the ruling of the RTC by finding
them guilty of Violation of Domicile as charged in the Information instead of Less
Serious Physical Injuries.
The Court adopts the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the CA. In their
testimony before the open court as well as in the pleadings they filed, neither Geroche
denied that he was a barangay captain nor Garde and Marfil refuted that they were
CAFGU members. In holding such positions, they are considered as public
officers/employees.

As to the penalty imposed by the CA, however, We modify the same. Under Article 128
of the RPC, the penalty shall be prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods (two [2] years, four [4] months and one [1] day to six [6] years) if Violation of
Domicile be committed at nighttime or if any papers or effects not constituting
evidence of a crime be not returned immediately after the search made by the
offender. In this case, petitioners barged in the house of Baleriano while they were
sleeping at night and, in addition, they took away with them his airgun.

In imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the RPC, the Indeterminate
Sentence Law requires courts to impose upon the accused an indeterminate sentence.
6

The maximum term of the prison sentence shall be that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code. Yet the
penalty prescribed by Article 128 of the RPC is composed of only two, not three,
periods. In which case, Article 65 of the same Code requires the division into three
equal portions the time included in the penalty, forming one period of each of the
three portions. Applying the provision, the minimum, medium and maximum periods of
the penalty prescribed by Article 128 are:
Minimum 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 3 years, 6 months and 20 days
Medium 3 years, 6 months and 21 days to 4 years, 9 months and 10 days
Maximum 4 years, 9 months and 11 days to 6 years
Thus, applying in this case, the maximum term should be within the medium period or
from 3 years, 6 months and 21 days to 4 years, 9 months and 10 days, in light of the
provisions of Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code that if there are no other mitigating
or aggravating circumstances attending the commission of the crime, the penalty shall
be imposed in its medium period.
On the other hand, the minimum term shall be within the range of the penalty next
lower to that prescribed by the RPC for the crime. The penalty next lower to that
prescribed by Article 128 is arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period (or 4 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months).
The foregoing considered, in view of the attending circumstances in this case, the
Court hereby sentences the petitioners to suffer the indeterminate penalty from two
(2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to four (4) years,
nine (9) months and ten (10) days of prision correccional, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the Decision dated November 18, 2005 and
Resolution dated June 19, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA- G.R. CR No. 26418
finding petitioners Edigardo Geroche, Roberto Garde and Generoso Marfil alias Tapol
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Domicile, penalized under Article 128 of
the Revised Penal Code, with the MODIFICATION that the penalty that should be
imposed is an indeterminate sentence from two (2) years and four (4) months
of prision correccional, as minimum, to four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10)
days of prision correccional, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION, G.R. No. 179080, November 26, 2014,EDIGARDO GEROCHE, ROBERTO
GARDE AND GENEROSO MARFIL ALIAS TAPOL, PETITIONERS, VS. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
1

People of the Philippines v. Reynaldo Torres, et al., G.R. No. 189850, September 22, 2014.

People of the Philippines v. Reynaldo Torres, et al., G.R. No. 189850, September 22, 2014.

Garces v. People, 554 Phil. 683, 696-697 (2007).

People v. Dela Rosa, G.R. No. 201723, June 13, 2013, 698 SCRA 548, 554.

The CAFGU was created pursuant to Executive Order No. 264 for the purpose of complementing the

operations of the regular force formations in a locality. It was composed of civilian volunteers who were
tasked to maintain peace and order in their localities, as well as to respond to threats to national security.
As such, they were provided with weapons, and given the authority to detain or order detention of
individuals. (See People v. Flores, 410 Phil. 578, 587 [2001]).
6

Act No. 4103, as amended by Act No. 4225 and Republic Act No. 4203.

SUBJECT: CRIMINAL LAW

Death Of The Accused Pending Appeal Of His Conviction

Extinguishes His Criminal Liability As Well As Civil Liability
Based Solely Thereon
by The Lawyer's Post February 20, 2015 Comments Off on Death Of The Accused Pending Appeal
Of His Conviction Extinguishes His Criminal Liability As Well As Civil Liability Based Solely Thereon

Benjie was convicted for Murder for the death of Elizabeth Palmar. The Court of Appeals
affirmed his conviction on May 27, 2010, hence he elevated his case to the Supreme Court,
assailing the incredibility of his conviction. By a letter dated September 21, 2014, the Officer-InCharge of the New Bilibid Prison informed the Court that Benjie died on July 14, 2014, as shown
by the Death Certificate issued by the NBP Medical Officer III Ruth B. Algones, M.D.

The Supreme Court:

Owing to this development, the Court now addresses the effect of death pending accused-appellants appeal with regard
to his criminal and civil liabilities.
Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal Code is illuminating:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
(1) By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;
xxxx
In People v. Brillantes,[1] the Court, citing People v. Bayotas[2],[clarified that:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability
based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, the death of the accused prior to final judgment
terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense
committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore.
In the case at bar, accused-appellant died before final judgment, as in fact, his motion for reconsideration is still
pending resolution by the Court. As such, it therefore becomes necessary for us to declare his criminal liability as well
as his civil liability ex delicto to have been extinguished by his death prior to final judgment.[3]
WHEREFORE, the criminal and civil liability ex delicto of accused-appellant Benjie Consorte y Franco are declared
EXTINGUISHED by his death prior to final judgment. The judgment or conviction against him is therefore SET ASIDE.
SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION, G.R. No. 194068, November 26, 2014 , PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. BENJIE CONSORTE Y FRANCO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

[1] G. R. No. 190610, 25 April 2012, 671 SCRA 388,393.

[2] G.R. No. 102007, 2 September 1994, 236 SCRA, 255-256.
[3] People v. Agacer, G.R. No. 177751, 7 January 2013, 688 SCRA 42, 49.

SUBJECT: CRIMINAL LAW

Meet The Parents

by The Lawyer's Post August 29, 2014 Comments Off on Meet The Parents

May the parents-in-law be included in a petition for issuance of protection

order filed by the wife against her husband under Republic Act 9262?
After six years of marriage, Sharica, the wife, filed a petition for issuance of a
temporary protection order against Steve, her husband, and his parents, Perfecto and

Juanita. She alleged that Steven, in conspiracy with respondents, were causing verbal,
psychological and economic abuses upon her in violation of Section 5, paragraphs (e)
(2)(3)(4), (h)(5), and (i)7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262,8 otherwise known as the
Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004.
The parents filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition, citing that as parents of the
husband, they are not covered by the provisions of RA 9262. On the other hand, the
wife contended that the law should be applied liberally, and include the parents-in-law
in the protection order.
The Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition, ruling that, being the parents-in-law of
the petitioner, they are not included/covered as respondents under R.A. No. 9262
under the well-known rule of law expressio unius est exclusio alterius. On Motion of
Reconsideration by the wife, the RTC again denied the motion.
Sharica elevated the matter to the Supreme Court on pure questions of law.
Said the Supreme Court:
The Court rules in favor of the petitioner.
Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines [v]iolence against women and their children as
any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife,
former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether
legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely
to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse
including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary
deprivation of liberty.
While the said provision provides that the offender be related or connected to the
victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not
preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the RPC.
Indeed, Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly provides for the suppletory application of
the RPC, thus:
SEC. 47. Suppletory Application. For purposes of this Act, the Revised Penal Code and
other applicable laws, shall have suppletory application. (Emphasis supplied)
Parenthetically, Article 10 of the RPC provides:
ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. Offenses which are or in
the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of

this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should
specially provide the contrary. (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a
supplementary capacity to crimes punished under special laws, such as R.A. No. 9262,
in which the special law is silent on a particular matter.
xxx
Finally, Section 4 of R.A. No. 9262 calls for a liberal construction of the law, thus:
SEC. 4. Construction. This Act shall be liberally construed to promote the protection
and safety of victims of violence against women and their children. (Emphasis
supplied)
It bears mention that the intent of the statute is the law and that this intent must be
effectuated by the courts. In the present case, the express language of R.A. No. 9262
reflects the intent of the legislature for liberal construction as will best ensure the
attainment of the object of the law according to its true intent, meaning and spirit
the protection and safety of victims of violence against women and children.
Thus, contrary to the RTCs pronouncement, the maxim expressio unios est exclusio
alterius finds no application here. It must be remembered that this maxim is only an
ancillary rule of statutory construction. It is not of universal application. Neither is it
conclusive. It should be applied only as a means of discovering legislative intent which
is not otherwise manifest and should not be permitted to defeat the plainly indicated
purpose of the legislature.
G.R. No. 168852 September 30, 2008, SHARICA MARI L. GO-TAN,
Petitioner, vs. SPOUSES PERFECTO C. TAN and JUANITA L. TAN, Respondents.*

SUBJECT: CIVIL LAW

Article 2176, Whenever It Refers To Fault Or Negligence,

Covers Not Only Acts Not Punishable By Law But Also
Acts Criminal In Character, Whether Intentional And
Voluntary Or Negligent
by The Lawyer's Post January 30, 2015 Comments Off on Article 2176, Whenever It Refers To
Fault Or Negligence, Covers Not Only Acts Not Punishable By Law But Also Acts Criminal In
Character, Whether Intentional And Voluntary Or Negligent

The Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious corporation owns a parcel of land in
Silang, Cavite which contain water paths and contrivances, including an artificial lake. Adjacent
to their land is the land occupied by Natividad and Emmanuel. The water paths allegedly
inundated and eroded Natividad and Emmanuels land, causing a young man to drown,
endangered the lives of the spouses during the rainy season, and exposed plants and animals
and improvements to destruction. Thus, they filed a case before the Regional Trial Court of
Cavite for violation of Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code (destruction by means of
inundation). They also filed civil case against the corporation, this time for damages with
prayer for issuance of preliminary injunction. After the corporation filed its answer and
opposition to the issuance of preliminary injunction, the trial court ordered the suspension of
the civil case, until after judgment in the criminal case is rendered. The trial court also ordered
the dismissal of the civil case for lack of jurisdiction, as the criminal case which was instituted
ahead of the civil case was still unresolved, relying on Section 3, Rule III of the Rules of Court,
which states that civil and criminal actions arising from the same may be instituted separately,
but after the criminal action has been commenced, the civil action cannot be instituted until
final judgment has been rendered on the criminal action. The Court of Appeal denied the
spouses appeal, hence they elevated their case to the Supreme Court.The Supreme Court: It
is axiomatic that the nature of an action filed in court is determined by the facts alleged in the
complaint as constituting the cause of action. The purpose of an action or suit and the law to
govern it, including the period of prescription, is to be determined not by the claim of the party
filing the action, made in his argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its
allegations and prayer for relief. The nature of an action is not necessarily determined or
controlled by its title or heading but the body of the pleading or complaint itself. To avoid
possible denial of substantial justice due to legal technicalities, pleadings as well as remedial
laws should be liberally construed so that the litigants may have ample opportunity to prove
their respective claims. Quoted hereunder are the pertinent portions of petitioners complaint in
Civil Case No. TG-748:
4) That within defendants land, likewise located at Biga (Biluso), Silang, Cavite, adjacent on
the right side of the aforesaid land of plaintiffs, defendant constructed waterpaths starting from
the middle-right portion thereof leading to a big hole or opening, also constructed by

defendant, thru the lower portion of its concrete hollow-blocks fence situated on the right side
of its cemented gate fronting the provincial highway, and connected by defendant to a man
height inter-connected cement culverts which were also constructed and lain by defendant
cross-wise beneath the tip of the said cemented gate, the left-end of the said inter-connected
culverts again connected by defendant to a big hole or opening thru the lower portion of the
same concrete hollowblocks fence on the left side of the said cemented gate, which hole or
opening is likewise connected by defendant to the cemented mouth of a big canal, also
constructed by defendant, which runs northward towards a big hole or opening which was also
built by defendant thru the lower portion of its concrete hollow-blocks fence which separates
the land of plaintiffs from that of defendant (and which serves as the exit-point of the
floodwater coming from the land of defendant, and at the same time, the entrance-point of the
same floodwater to the land of plaintiffs, year after year, during rainy or stormy seasons.
5) That moreover, on the middle-left portion of its land just beside the land of plaintiffs,
defendant also constructed an artificial lake, the base of which is soil, which utilizes the water
being channeled thereto from its water system thru inter-connected galvanized iron pipes (No.
2) and complimented by rain water during rainy or stormy seasons, so much so that the water
below it seeps into, and the excess water above it inundates, portions of the adjoining land of
plaintiffs.
6) That as a result of the inundation brought about by defendants aforementioned water
conductors, contrivances and manipulators, a young man was drowned to death, while herein
plaintiffs suffered and will continue to suffer, as follows:

a) Portions of the land of plaintiffs were eroded and converted to deep, wide and long canals, such that the same can no
longer be planted to any crop or plant.
b) Costly fences constructed by plaintiffs were, on several occasions, washed away.
c) During rainy and stormy seasons the lives of plaintiffs and their laborers are always in danger.
d) Plants and other improvements on other portions of the land of plaintiffs are exposed to destruction.
A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint shows that the civil action is one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of
the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the
plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the
connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the
plaintiff.
Clearly, from petitioners complaint, the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation are alleged to
have inundated the land of petitioners. There is therefore, an assertion of a causal connection between the act of building
these waterpaths and the damage sustained by petitioners. Such action if proven constitutes fault or negligence which
may be the basis for the recovery of damages.
In the case of Samson vs. Dionisio, the Court applied Article 1902, now Article 2176 of the Civil Code and held that
any person who without due authority constructs a bank or dike, stopping the flow or communication between a creek
or a lake and a river, thereby causing loss and damages to a third party who, like the rest of the residents, is entitled to
the use and enjoyment of the stream or lake, shall be liable to the payment of an indemnity for loss and damages to the
injured party.
While the property involved in the cited case belonged to the public domain and the property subject of the instant case
is privately owned, the fact remains that petitioners complaint sufficiently alleges that petitioners have sustained and
will continue to sustain damage due to the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation. Indeed, the
recitals of the complaint, the alleged presence of damage to the petitioners, the act or omission of respondent
corporation supposedly constituting fault or negligence, and the causal connection between the act and the damage, with
no pre-existing contractual obligation between the parties make a clear case of a quasi delict or culpa aquiliana.
It must be stressed that the use of ones property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code provides that
the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person. SIC UTERE
TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which require
that each must use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of others.
Although we recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his land, such structures must be so constructed and
maintained using all reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand the
usual and expected forces of nature. If the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third
person, the latter can claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code imposes a civil liability on a person for damage caused by his act or omission
constituting fault or negligence, thus:
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay
for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this chapter.

Article 2176, whenever it refers to fault or negligence, covers not only acts not punishable by law but also acts
criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against
the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the
offended party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually charged also criminally), to recover damages on both scores,
and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two
cases vary.
The distinctness of quasi-delicta is shown in Article 2177 of the Civil Code, which states:
Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the
civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same
act or omission of the defendant.
According to the Report of the Code Commission the foregoing provision though at first sight startling, is not so novel
or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the
criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and independent negligence, which is a culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict, of
ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such
distinction between criminal negligence and culpa extra-contractual or cuasi-delito has been sustained by decisions
of the Supreme Court of Spain
In the case of Castillo vs. Court of Appeals, this Court held that a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal
institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent
from a delict or crime a distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for
quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from
a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code.
Therefore, the acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case, unless, of course, in the
event of an acquittal where the court has declared that the fact from which the civil action arose did not exist, in which
case the extinction of the criminal liability would carry with it the extinction of the civil liability.
In Azucena vs. Potenciano, the Court declared that in quasi-delicts, (t)he civil action is entirely independent of the
criminal case according to Articles 33 and 2177 of the Civil Code. There can be no logical conclusion than this, for to
subordinate the civil action contemplated in the said articles to the result of the criminal prosecution whether it be
conviction or acquittal would render meaningless the independent character of the civil action and the clear
injunction in Article 31, that his action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the
result of the latter.
G.R. No. 74761 November 6, 1990, NATIVIDAD V. ANDAMO and EMMANUEL R. ANDAMO, petitioners, vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (First Civil Cases Division) and MISSIONARIES OF OUR LADY OF LA
SALETTE, INC., respondents.