27

PHL 5 / CHRISTIANETHICS / THE MORALITY OF HUMAN ACTION

Private Use Only
Teacher: Susan Ong

For

The Three-Font Principle of (St. Thomas)1

Traditional moral theology has used the three-font principle for determining
the morality of human action. This principle still serves us well.
It is based on
an understanding of the relationship of the three aspects of moral action
intention, the act-in-itself, and the circumstances.
1. The act- in- itself and intention
The intention (finis operantis) is the internal part or the formal element of
the moral action. It is also called the end or that which we are after in doing
what we do, i.e. the whole purpose of our action. The intention gives personal
meaning to our action. The act-in-itself (finis operas), or the means-to-an-end is
the material element of the moral action. This aspect of the moral action is so
easily observed that it would even be photographed.
According to St. Thomas, the act-in-itself cannot be accurately evaluated as
moral or immoral apart from considering the intention of the person acting.
On these grounds two actions may be the same but can have different
meaning depending on the intention which directs the action. (e.g. a politician
and a volunteer group helping the poor/victims after natural calamities especially
when election is forthcoming) The moral quality of an action moves from the
intention, specially the agents intention to be loving or not. For example, making
a donation can be morally good when the intention is to bring relief to a person in
need, but morally bad if intended to satisfy ones vanity and to win praise.
We cannot judge the morality of the physical action without reference to the
meaning of the whole action which includes the intention of the agent. Intention
is part of the act taken in its totality; it is constitutive of the meaning of the
action. Unless we consider the intention and the physical action together, we are
not dealing properly with a human action as a moral action.
But can a physical action embody any intention whatever? Or to put it
another way, can the end justify the means? According to St. Thomas, the action
can be morally justified if it (action) is adequately proportionate to the intention.
In the case of self-defense, the use of violence which wounds or even kills the
assailant is justifiable when it falls within the limits of what is necessary to save
ones own life. However, violence which exceeds the bounds necessary to save
ones life is not justifiable because it is no longer properly proportionate to the
intention of self-defense. Therefore, in one case the violence which inflicts harm
1

Gula, Richard M. 1989. Reason Informed By Faith. New York, Paulist Press.

28
or even death can be justified, but in the other case it cannot. The difference lies
in the proportionality of the means to the end.
2. Circumstances
We determine the physical action is properly proportionate to the intention
by considering the action within the circumstances. The end (intention) and the
means (act itself) exist in relational tension to one another and to all the essential
aspects/conditions which make up the circumstances. We can uncover the
relevant circumstances by asking those reality-revealing questions who, when,
where, why, how, what else, and what if. According to St Thomas, actions are
good or bad according to circumstances. Only by considering the action in
reference to the intention within the total context of its qualifying circumstances
can we determine the true moral meaning of the action.
The points of reference for determining the morality of human action, then
are a) the physical act-in-itself (the object of the act, or the means); b) the
intention (the end); c) the circumstances (which include the consequences).
These three aspects of one composite human action make up the traditional
three-font principle. A proper moral evaluation of human action according to this
principle must take all three into considerations simultaneously. If the evaluation
is only focus on the physical action, this will give an act-centered morality
which forgets the person acting; or an intention only morality which does not
take seriously enough the act being done; or a situationalism which maintains
that circumstances make all the difference. But the traditional Catholic morality
of the three-font principle claims that we do not have a true evaluation of a
human action until all aspects are taken together. This leads to the theory the
theologians called proportionalism. The recent debates on proportionalism are
trying to show that we must understand the relationship of the various aspects of
an act in order to arrive at the total meaning of the act.
Intrinsic Moral Evil
Traditional moralists (and so with the teachings of the Church) have claimed
that certain actions (such as masturbation, contraception, sterilization, sexual
relations outside of marriage, direct killing of the innocents, etc.) are intrinsically
morally evil in themselves. These acts are regarded as either being contrary to
nature (following the order of nature interpretation of natural law which later we
will discuss) or by defect of right which means that in killing the innocent,
suicide, or divorce, for example, the human person is assuming absolute
dominion over life or marital union which belongs by right only to God. To qualify
any action as intrinsically morally evil means that no intention or set of
circumstances could ever justify the act. Its moral quality is already determined
before the person does it in whatever circumstances.

29
The understanding of the three-font principle has significant implications for
reevaluating intrinsic evil as a moral action which in turn would enlighten or
influence the present teachings/stance of the Catholic Church.
The Principle of Double-Effect
The premises for this principle can be found in St. Thomas discussion on
self-defense but the four condition of t principle finally formulated by Jean Pierre
Gury in the mid-nineteenth century. The four conditions are expressed in a
variety of ways, but are basically as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.

the action itself is good or indifferent;

the good effect is not produced by means of the evil effect;
the evil effect is not directly intended;
a proportionate reason support causing or tolerating the evil effect.

The classic example to illustrate this principle is the one of a pregnant woman
with cancerous uterus. If nothing is done, both the mother and the fetus will die.
If the uterus is removed, the fetus will die but the mother will live. The principle
of double effect allows the uterus to be removed because:
1. removing the uterus is a morally indifferent action;
2. saving the life of the mother is not produced by means of the death of the
fetus, but by removing the uterus;
3. the direct intention is to save the life of the mother;
4. the proportionate reason is the mothers life is at stake.
On the third condition, morally speaking, a person can have only one
intention which gives meaning to the full human act. Traditionally the principle of
double-effect used the distinction of the direct and indirect intention because it
regarded certain actions as intrinsically evil. Consequently, directness and
indirectness became all important in determining morality. An increasing number
of philosophers and theologians do not bind the moral quality of an action to the
intention in the way the traditional use of this principle does. Rather, many of
them agree that the person is responsible for the full range of foreseeable
consequences, directly intended or not. Here, the critical variable in making
assessment is not the intention but the persons foreknowledge (knowledge
beforehand) of effects. The person must be able to justify the risk of causing
some undesirable effects in the light of the undesirability of other options
(sometimes known as the least evil option).
According to the present state of the discussion, direct and indirect are
morally relevant to disclose something about the moral agent, rather than the
quality of an action. They show the relationship of the persons attitude of
approval or disapproval of an action.

30
The fourth condition is known as the master principle. It is ultimately
concerned with the true moral meaning of an action. It is concerned with the
relationship of the various aspects of an act to the total meaning of the act.
Moral actions are judged differently when taken in their totality rather than when
certain aspects are treated in isolation. This fourth condition of the traditional
principle of double effect is known today as the principle of proportionality,
proportionalism, or proportionate reason.
Proportionate Reason
The notion of a proportionate reason is the key to an analysis of the
morality of human action. It is a difficult notion to grasp and the discussion
surrounding it is often confusing. James Walter has carefully identified the three
levels of inquiry which operate in the discussion of proportionate reason. The
three levels of inquiry are:
1. the definition if proportionate reason;
2. the criteria that guide and establish the assessment of proportionate
reason;
3. the modes by which we know that the criteria have been fulfilled and
thus, a proportionate reason has been established.
Definition
a) The reason for action here refers to specific value at stake.
example;

For

1. in social issues the value may be property, freedom, truth, or

personal dignity;
2. in medical matters, the value may be life, health, bodily integrity,
or personal autonomy;
3. in sexual matters, the value may be personal dignity, procreative
capacity, unity, freedom, privacy, or stable institution for human
flourishing like the family.
b) The more adequate notion of proportion refers to what truly gives an
action its moral meaning: the relation of the means to an end. More broadly
speaking, proportionate refers to the relation between the specific value at
stake and the premoral evil (the limitations, the harm, or the inconvenience)
which will inevitably come about in trying to achieve that value.
So, a
proportionate reason refers to both a specific value and its relation to all the
elements in the action. From this perspective, proportionate reason truly defines
what a person is doing in an action.

31
Case:A. Pedro is suffering from a gangrenous leg; the doctor amputated the leg
to save the life of the patient.
B. Tomas is suffering from a severe fracture in one leg; the doctor amputated
the leg to save the life of the patient.
Which of the case the doctor exercised proportionate reason in amputating
the leg of the patient? Why?
Criteria
What criteria would help us decide whether a proper relation exist between
the specific value and the other elements of an act? Richard McCormick has the
clearest proposal of these criteria. The substances of his criteria are as follows:
1. The means used will not cause more harm than necessary
to achieve the value. In other words, the specific value sought
must be at least equal to the value being sacrificed. For example,
in self-defense, the values in conflict are equal the defenders life
is in conflict with the attackers life. In medical practice, the value
being sought may be restoring the patients wellbeing. The values
sacrificed, such as comfort, bodily integrity (e.g. losing a limb) are
not equal to the patients total well-being. The decision to have a
surgery or to use medications depends on which of these means
would cause the least amount of harm to achieve the good of the
patients well-being. Or, if surgery had to be done, this criterion
would demand that the surgeon should not cut out more than what
is necessary to restore health and to save life. Of course, this
criterion faces difficulty when we are confronted with hierarchy of
values and to determine which can be weighed one against
another.
2. No less harmful way exists at present to protect the value.
This criterion demands that we choose the best means available to
us at the time, even though this may have to change in the future.
In medicine, for example, many people who suffer cancer may
have to experience the pains of chemotherapy or radiation
treatment now until something is discovered which produces less
pain or discomfort with equal or more effects.
3. The means used to achieve the value will not undermine it.
This criterion suggests that in the case of trying to protect life, for
example, we do not engage in indiscriminate killing. The American
bishops reflect on this criterion in their pastoral letter, The
Challenge of Peace (1983), when they call for non-combatant
immunity in war. Their point is that we are not protecting the
value of life when we attack life indiscriminately.

32
Perhaps we can appreciate these criteria for a proportionate reason if we
see them at work in a more realistic example. Do we have a proportionate reason
to justify smoking? Does smoking cause more harm than necessary to achieve its
value of relaxation and enjoyment? It appears so, given what we know about the
risks of smoking to ones health. The physical harm one causes by smoking is not
equal to the relaxation one achieves when we have other less risky ways to
achieve the same relaxation such as: a whole array of recreational activities,
meditation techniques, or non-harmful oral compensations (like chewing
sugarless gum) are available. Smoking ultimately undermines the value it seeks
since it causes so much harm to ones health. Proportionalism does not seem to
support smoking as a moral action.
The basic rule for an ethics based on love is that in every situation in which
we have to choose between several possibilities, we ought to do what will
contribute as much as possible to t well-being and development of persons and
their social relations and to avoid as much as possible what harms or hinders
well-being.
Modes of Knowing
Contemporary theology is increasingly more sensitive to the historically
conditioned nature of all knowledge (i.e. knowledge is built up through time; thus
there are a lot of things that we know today which were not known or made
available during the time of our parents or grandparents or our ancestors). Our
present all types of knowledge are the accumulation of knowledge passed on to
us from one generation to another. Therefore, anyone who would claim that a
proportionate reason exists for doing a particular action is making a modest claim
and realizes that this judgment remains open to further clarification and revision
in the future; but at the moment with all the available knowledge and
understanding we have, this is our best judgment.
Richard McCormick has offered three modes of knowing whether we have a
proportionate reason.
1. Experience
One of the ways we know that a proper relation exist between a specific
value and all other elements of an act is through experience. For example,
experience tells us that private property contributes to the over all well-being of
persons and their social relations. This makes robbery counterproductive or
disproportionate. With regards to war, we are getting close to the claim that
waging war especially nuclear war is disproportionate to the value of protecting
life, since in war, we are all losers. Furthermore, experience teaches us that the
meaning of family, sexuality and procreation are best preserved in the context of
stable and permanent marriage. This would make actions which undermines the
stability and permanence of marriage disproportionate. Among such actions
would be adultery, divorce, the use of reproductive technologies employing an
outside donor, such as artificial insemination by donor and surrogate motherhood.

33
2. Sense of Outrage and Intuition
Another way of knowing whether relation exists is through our sense of
outrage or intuition that some actions are disproportionate. Torture, massacre
and forms of fanatical human experimentation fall under this category.
3. Trial and Error Method
This mode of knowing pertains especially to those areas where we have
little experience as yet and would proceed cautiously to support technological
advancement. Recombinant DNA and stem cell research would be an example.
4. Rational Analysis and Argument (addition by James Walter)
By gathering evidences and formulating logical arguments, we try to give
reasons to support our choice for certain values over others which we have
already grasped prior to reasoning. This mode of knowing would be necessary
supplement to McCormicks mode of trial and error and to knowing through a
sense of outrage or intuition.
The understanding of the proportionate reason thought-pattern just
presented is a relatively recent development in Catholic Moral Theology, through
its roots are well established in the tradition. It began to receive critical attention
shortly after Vatican II Council and has been the focus of ongoing development
and criticism ever since.