After
Tito, now what?A Sow-et takeover of Yugoslawa wouJd provide the USSR with a warm-water port, and it would
threaten NATOS Southern flank. CouJd Yugoslaw.as army
stop a Sowet invasion?
!g
~
N. Vem
..
YUGOSLAVGROUNDFORCES
celebrated as the anniversary
of the
Yugoslav armed forces (YAF) until Tltos
break with Moscow in 1948. Thereafter,
the anniversary date was changed to 22
December.
When the PLA was formally organized
at the end of 1942, it had 150,000 fighters
divided roughly into two corps, 37 brigades, 34 partisan detachments and 12
independent battalions.z Although the
brigades had more mobility and striking
power, the partisan detachments
remained an indispensable
part of the
PLA.3 During 1943-44, 44 additional divisions were added.1
The PLA became a regular army in
1945 when the Defense Ministry and the
General Staff were formed. Accordingly,
it changed its name to the Yugoslav
army. By May 1945, over 800,000 men
comprised the Yugoslav ground forces.5
Substantial aidprovided by the Western
Allies and the Soviet Union during the
last two years of the war allowed the PLA
to become atrulyviable
force.6
The partisans suffered heavy casualties
during the war years, with 305,000 killed
and 420,000 wounded.7 The Yugoslavs
claimed that the partisans pinned down
some 38 divisions during the war, 26 of
which were Germans They allegedly inflicted 450,000 Axis casualties. Although
these c]aims are exaggerated, it does not
diminish the overall success enjoyed
by Tito and his followers nor their contribution to the final Allied victories.
15
MILITARY REVIEW
number of US M4 Sherman andM47 Pat- ,
ton tanks, half-tracked armored carriers
~ (the M2 and M3) and other heavy weapons were introduced into service. Moreover, the United States transferred a
great many Soviet arms captured during
the Korean conflict.
Following Stalins death in 1953, the
threat of Soviet invasion was perceptibly
diminished, and the state of military
emergency proclaimed in 1948 was finally lifted in October
1954. The
Yugoslav leadership felt that with the
newest reorganization, it could mobilize
29 fully equipped divisions within two
weeks and have 15 more ready within six
weeks.
The attempts to modernize the armed
forces continued throughout the remainder of the decade and well into the 1960s.
In 1965, however, the YPA was still not a
modern or efficient force. The combat
units possessed neither adequate firepower nor mobility. The most serious deficiencies could be found in their antitank,
antiaircraft
and antiairborne
assault
defenses.
The All-PeoplesDefense
and the Roleof the GroundForces
16
sures designed
to strengthen
the
countrys defense posture. As a result, the
unique concept of the All-Peoples Defense (APD) was introduced.
The Yugoslav concept of the APD is, in
theory, the most universal and comprehensive national defenee system ever devised. The APD envisages a total and
systematic preparation
of the entire
Yugoslav society for the countrys defense. This system calls for the active participation of all citizene and political
organs in the resolution of problems concerning national defense.
The primary function of the APD would
be to mobilize all available human and
materieI resources in the event of armed
aggression. Further, the idea of the APD
demands a continued armed struggle to
prevent the occupation of Yugoslavia and
to ensure the ultimate victory over an invader. Therefore, all components of the
national defense must be permanently deployed in peacetime and must be maintained at the highest level of combat
readiness.
Although this concept was developed in
1966, it encountered strong resistance
from both the senior military and party
leadership. Neither group wanted to dilute the role of the YPA. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia,
however,
provided the necessary impetus for the
quick adoption of the APD concept by the
countrys leadership.
The YAF is only one of four components
upon which the countrye APD system
rests (Figure 1). The other three are civil
defense, internal security and the service of early warning
and alarmraising. 1~The federal constitution of 1974
states that the main role of the YAF is to
defend the countrys territorial integrity,
independence
and the constitutional
order. The YAF constitutes a simple
unified whole and consists of the YPA,
November
YUGOSLAVGROUNDFORCES
I
Polmcal System
I
Internal Policy
National S@curAy
I
. A1l.PeoplesDefense
Fore,gn POIIcy
Economy
1.
[
Service of Early Warning
snd Alerrn.Rabslng
CIVIIDefense
I
Internal .%cunty
I
I
~TrOrrDTFOrcrslsl
E=l
Ground FOJCPS
AIr FOICe
and Ant(atrctaft
Detense
stem
Figure
Marshal Josip Broz Tito, former president of the republic, was also the supreme
commander of the YAF and president of
the League of Communists of Yugoslavia.
All three posts were constitutionally tied
to Titos personality. When he died, all of
his duties were taken over by the Social-
t
1980
17
MILITARY REVIEW
as a member of the Federal Executive
Council (Cabinet) and the SFRY Presidencys National Defense Council.
The General Staff is the YPAs highest
staff organ. Among its most important responsibilities are those dealing with the
formulation of national strategy and
operational/tactical
doctrine for the
armed forces. Further, it is responsible for
organizing, force structuring and deploying the army. It prepares the mobilization
plans and coordinates and supervises the
plans for combat operations.
The most important directorates of the
General Staff (Figure 2) are those of operations, organizations and mobilization,
intelligence, security service (counterintelligence), political sector and personnel. It is a uniquely integrated staff body
in which all three YPA services are represented. There is, however, an inordinately great influence of the ground
forces in the organization and functioning
of the General Staff.
ist Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia
(SFRY) Presidency.
In existence since October 1971, the
SFRY Presidency is charged with command and control of the YAF. It advised
Tito concerning the organization, equipment and cadre policy of the YPA. A portion of its responsibilities was transferred
to the 31-member National Defense
Council. Until his death, Marshal Tito
was president of this council. In 1979,
the council was decreased to 11 members,
of which six are generals.
The Federal Secretariat of National
Defense (hereafter called the Defense
Ministry) is the highest staff and professional body of the SFRY Presidency.
It has the major responsibility for all
administrative work pertaining to matters of defense at the federa! level. The
Defense Ministry is headed by a fourstar general who serves simultaneously
The GroundForces,1969-79
Since 1968, the ground forces have undergone significant changes regarciing
both their organizational structure and
armament. After the new doctrine of APD
was adopted in 1969, it was found that a
large army was not suitable for the
Yugoslav conditions. It was then resolved
to build a numerically smaller army, but
better trained and armed with the most
advanced weapons. Emphasis was given
to the improvement of antitank, antiaircraft and antiair assault defenses. 13
In addition to the introduction of new
armament and equipment, the ground
forces are presently undergoing signi&
cant organizational changes. The trend is
away from divisions and toward brigade-
YUGOSLAVGROUNDFORCES
for Tertlforlal
Defense
r---+=n
I
Infantry
Ututs
++-+
Armored
OrganzatoandMOblzaton
II
tJn,t~
!ntelhgence
(2d)
1
Iechnrcal
L
Service
Antiaircraft
ArlIllerY
Operahons
Un(ts
(30)
Quartermaster
[
IransportallOn
Signal Units
Securdv Service and Mildary
Service
Pollee
Mater! al-Fmanc]al
Engineer Umts
Chemical, B,olog!cal
and Rad)ologlcal Defense Unds
Management
Admmtrat]on
Irammg
and Educatmn
Medical Service
Fronher Guards
,,
Personnel
1
Figure
1980
I
I
19
MILITARY REVIEW
size units. All tactical units will have a
mixed structure depending on their role
in the combat operations and the type of
terrain where they would be deployed in
war. i4
The realization
of the APD also
brought significant changes in the wartime logistical support of the ground
forces. They would be, except for armament, ammunition and special equip-,
ment, dependent upon the existing
infrastructure of sociopolitical communities, a common term for the constituent
republics and autonomous provinces and
municipalities.
The republics and the autonomous
provinces bear the responsibility for planning and organizing the logistic support
of YPA units deployeci on their territory.
In coordination with army region commands, they must provide logistical support
in regard to supply, transportation .
and medical and veterinary care. 15 The
municipalities would provide food and
veterinary care for the units operating
within their territories. 16
The infantry is the most numerous and
the most important part of the ground
forces. It consists of mechanized, field,
mountain and alpine units. Since 1971,
the infantry units have undergone significant organizational changes. The improvement in organization was aimed at
achieving greater flexibility in the employment of smaller units. Another goal
was to achieve a higher integration level
beginning with battalion-size units. Increased operational-tactical mobility was
achieved with the introduction of large
numbers of armored personnel carriers
(APCS) and greater firepower through the
introduction of advanced armament and
equipment.
The present five-year (1975-80) modernization program of the ground forces
calls for the mass introduction of auto-
20 ,
matic rifles and light mortars into all infantry units. The antitank defenses were
greatly strengthened by new artillery
pieces, ammunition of greater lethality
and effectiveness,
antitank grenade
launchers, third-generation
missiles,
modern infrared equipment and laser
range finders. The main emphasis in antiaircraft defense is in vehicle-mounted and
man-portable surface-to-air missiles and
light antiaircraft guns At present, the infantry divisions have firepower varying
from 50 to 71 tons per minute.17
The armored units have also been extensively reorganized and modernized
since 1971. Instead of the former tank divisions, the largest operational-tactical
armored unit is the tank brigade. R is organized into two to three tank battalions,
one or two mechanized infantry battalions and combat support units,s Current
plans envisage greater introduction of the
mechanized infantry units into the armored forces.
Because of numerical
inferiority
against potential aggressors, the main
emphasis in modernizing the armored
forces is on improving their overall capability in antiarmor and antiaircraft defenses. The increase in strength of
armored and mechanized units had as a
consequence the transformation of the engineer service into a combat branch of the
ground forces.
In the past few years, modern vehicles
and equipment for water-fording operations, armored recovery vehicles and antitank defensive mine devices have been
introduced into service. It should be emphasized that the Yugoslav ground forces,
similar to other East European armies,
pay extremely close attention to the problem of chemical, biological and radiological defense. All units are provided.
with a great variety of equipment for personal and collective protection.
November
1
. YUGOSLAVGROUND FORCES
ForceStructure
Federal Secretary
of Nabonal Defense
Federal Secretariat 01
Naf\onal Defense [Belgrade)
[
[
Figure 3
1980
21
MILITARY REVIEW
Austria
. A..-
Adriatic Sea
<
~;
-k..
~..
Army Regwn
A1)00!
1,,2
a-.
%b? Pa
k$!h
Figure 4
22
many administrative
responsibilities
such as the registration of draftees and
the construction and maintenance of military installations.
Their main responsibility, however, is the planning and
execution
of mobilization
in their
territories. :
November
YUGOSLAVGROUNDFORCES
In 1980. the stren~h of the m-ound
forces were estimate~ at 190,0;0 men
(130,000 conscripts). They were organized
in the following manner:lg
o
.
.
.
Armsmentsnd Equipment
1980
23
llght tanks
Recormalssance cars
BTR40PB/BRDM2
BalOeheld wow
40 [ro~ 7(1a)
Srtm
rockets
SSC2CSdmk14
to surface nl,ssles
t
Mu[tlDle,ocket
launchers
WJ?132{32,128)f3@
M63[32,1281Plamens
7 I ba, re!r
76mI M486141IBld2
Guns
155mm A42
coastal
130mm M46
100mm M1955
76mmSU765P W18)
122mnl M37
gs
G.nlhowtzm
122mm M38
122mm 030
130mm M54a
SA6 Gdroful
SA9 Gaskm
105mm M7E2
,
Antwcr#!
guns
l,t,ta,k
23mmZSU234 5P Shdkd
30mm M53i59 SPL,
37min M38/39
57mm M50
57mm SU572SPfS68J
85mm A444a
g.,ded m,,sz)es
at,tak
gs
,,,.
MO = Mechan,zeo,,,,,,,,
comb,, w,,,,
$,,, ,B,,g,ad,)
haro,maArnma(8dwa3e)
14 Mo081@d1J485,,,,,,,
Figure 5
November
I
vehicle inventory is of Soviet or Czech origin, a major part was domestically produced under Western licenses. On the
other hand, heavy engineering equipment is primarily Soviet-made.
Problemssnd Conclusions
1980
YUGOSLAVGROUNDFORCES
25
MILtTARY REWEW
the greatest potential threat to its security. Moreover, khe supply of spare parte for
Soviet-made armament is very irregular
and inadequate.
Perhaps the most impressive result of
the past decade was achieved in regard to
supply of arms and equipment from domestic defense industries. Great progress
was made to free the ground forces from
the arms purchases abroad and then to increase its overall combat readiness. Although the ground forces still depend on
foreign sources for many heavy and advanced arms such as tanks and surfacet.o-snrface and surface-to-air missiles, the
domestic defense industries are already
capabIe of satisfying the greater part of
the needs of the armed forces. The highest
degree of self-sufficiency is achieved with
respect to the infantry units which represent the backbone of the ground forces
and the territorial defense.
The ground forces have traveled a
1ong and difficult road since the early
days following the end of the war. Great
advances have been made, particularly
considering ,conditions at its beginning.
Despite some rather serious problems, the
Yugoslav ground forces should not be underrated. Their defensive capabilities, especially in unconventional
warfare,
would most likely deny a quick victory to
any potential aggressor.
NO1ES
1 colonelSogdan G!edov!ch. Ufog. J.gost8vvG . Dnwom
Svetskom Rat.. [me Role 07 Y.goslawa (. WorldWw III, Odbrana i
Z.W1. [Defense and Pmtecoom. Jan.afv.Febru.w,
1971. D 55
2 lb,a
3 1. 1942.43, the strength of a Paft,san aw,s!on was on average
WOO fgh!ws end, m 194445, was beIween 5,W0 m 6,GW f!ghlers A
COIVS.suallv mmonsed Iwo or three WM...
and some independent
C&bat ii
4 Voma Encmopedva lMdmw EncYcl.P.d!aJ, Sswmd Edmon.
VOJ.. EncikloPed,Ia. S.19rade, Y.go, 1972, Volume 4, p Izs
5 East E.mP. DaIIv, Fore,gn Broadcast Infonnal,on Sewlce, 23 May
1975. P 112
26
Novsmber
to
the
*976, p IC13
!...
Advanced Antiarmor
1980
Vehicle Evaluation.
Developments
Experimentation
21