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Hungary! Czechoslovakia! Afghanistan! Yugoslawa?

After
Tito, now what?A Sow-et takeover of Yugoslawa wouJd provide the USSR with a warm-water port, and it would
threaten NATOS Southern flank. CouJd Yugoslaw.as army
stop a Sowet invasion?

HE history of the Yugoslav ground


forces can be traced to the Peoples
Liberation War of 1941-45 where partisan detachments of the future Peoples

!g
~

Liberation Army (PLA) fought against


Axis occupiers and their domestic collaborators. Organized by the late Josip Broz
Tito, the partisane numbered some 80,000
men by the end of 1941.1 Their first
shock brigade was formed in the small
village of Rudo in Bosnia on Stalins
birthday, 21 December. This date was

A Look at the Past


and the Present
R*:
Milan

N. Vem

..
YUGOSLAVGROUNDFORCES
celebrated as the anniversary
of the
Yugoslav armed forces (YAF) until Tltos
break with Moscow in 1948. Thereafter,
the anniversary date was changed to 22
December.
When the PLA was formally organized
at the end of 1942, it had 150,000 fighters
divided roughly into two corps, 37 brigades, 34 partisan detachments and 12
independent battalions.z Although the
brigades had more mobility and striking
power, the partisan detachments
remained an indispensable
part of the
PLA.3 During 1943-44, 44 additional divisions were added.1
The PLA became a regular army in
1945 when the Defense Ministry and the
General Staff were formed. Accordingly,
it changed its name to the Yugoslav
army. By May 1945, over 800,000 men
comprised the Yugoslav ground forces.5
Substantial aidprovided by the Western
Allies and the Soviet Union during the
last two years of the war allowed the PLA
to become atrulyviable
force.6
The partisans suffered heavy casualties
during the war years, with 305,000 killed
and 420,000 wounded.7 The Yugoslavs
claimed that the partisans pinned down
some 38 divisions during the war, 26 of
which were Germans They allegedly inflicted 450,000 Axis casualties. Although
these c]aims are exaggerated, it does not
diminish the overall success enjoyed
by Tito and his followers nor their contribution to the final Allied victories.

Developmentof the Ground Forces, 1945-68

After the war in July and October 1945,


the Yugoslav leadership ordered the
demobilization of all soldiers older than
27, effectively cutting the army in half.
It then began to reorganize itself after

the Soviet model. In the Yugoslav view,


the Soviet army was not only the best,
but, more importantly, it was a socialistic arrny.s
Under the terms of the Soviet-Yugoslav
~eatyof
Friendship, Mutual Assistance
and Collaboration signed on 12 April
1945, it was stipulated that the Soviets
would provide military and economic aid
to Yugoslavia. The Russians were reluctant, however, to deliver the promised
quantities of arms and equipment. What
they did deliver was usually in a deteriorated state, and they charged exorbitant
prices for it. There were also continuous
problems in the regular resupply of spare
parts.
The Russians
wanted
the
Yugoslavs to keep only a small army
which could serve as an auxiliary to their
own. They justified this by saying they
would defend. Yugoslavia if necessary.
After the break with Moscow in 1948,
the Yugoslav ground forces were deployed along the borders of neighboring
Communist countries to counter any possible Soviet threat. The army at that time
was still suffering from serious deficiencies in armament, equipment, personnel and combat readiness. It was still
primarily a guerrilla force. The situation
was further complicated because it was in
the midst of its first postwar reorganizetion.
In the 20-year period after 1948, the
Yugoslav army changed it,s name to the
Yugoslav Peoples Army (YPA) and underwent numerous organizational and
structural changes. Bytheendof
December 1951, the army, consisting of 300,000
men, was organized into four army areas
with staffs in Belgrade, Zagreb, Ljubljana
and Sarajevo. Each of these army headquarters commanded two corps.l The
ground forces were rearmed with US
weapons and equipment, delivered in increasing quantities after 1951. A large

15

MILITARY REVIEW
number of US M4 Sherman andM47 Pat- ,
ton tanks, half-tracked armored carriers
~ (the M2 and M3) and other heavy weapons were introduced into service. Moreover, the United States transferred a
great many Soviet arms captured during
the Korean conflict.
Following Stalins death in 1953, the
threat of Soviet invasion was perceptibly
diminished, and the state of military
emergency proclaimed in 1948 was finally lifted in October
1954. The
Yugoslav leadership felt that with the
newest reorganization, it could mobilize
29 fully equipped divisions within two
weeks and have 15 more ready within six
weeks.
The attempts to modernize the armed
forces continued throughout the remainder of the decade and well into the 1960s.
In 1965, however, the YPA was still not a
modern or efficient force. The combat
units possessed neither adequate firepower nor mobility. The most serious deficiencies could be found in their antitank,
antiaircraft
and antiairborne
assault
defenses.

The All-PeoplesDefense
and the Roleof the GroundForces

The turning point in the postwar development of Yugoslavias army came in


August 1968 in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.
Suddenly, the Yugoslav
leadership
was
rudely awakened by the real possibility of
a similar occurrence involving their own
country. Moreover, they realized the YPA
was not capable of defending the country
by itself. This worsening of relations with
the Soviet Union provided the Yugoslav
leadership with an opportunity to mobilize public support for a series of mea-

16

sures designed
to strengthen
the
countrys defense posture. As a result, the
unique concept of the All-Peoples Defense (APD) was introduced.
The Yugoslav concept of the APD is, in
theory, the most universal and comprehensive national defenee system ever devised. The APD envisages a total and
systematic preparation
of the entire
Yugoslav society for the countrys defense. This system calls for the active participation of all citizene and political
organs in the resolution of problems concerning national defense.
The primary function of the APD would
be to mobilize all available human and
materieI resources in the event of armed
aggression. Further, the idea of the APD
demands a continued armed struggle to
prevent the occupation of Yugoslavia and
to ensure the ultimate victory over an invader. Therefore, all components of the
national defense must be permanently deployed in peacetime and must be maintained at the highest level of combat
readiness.
Although this concept was developed in
1966, it encountered strong resistance
from both the senior military and party
leadership. Neither group wanted to dilute the role of the YPA. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia,
however,
provided the necessary impetus for the
quick adoption of the APD concept by the
countrys leadership.
The YAF is only one of four components
upon which the countrye APD system
rests (Figure 1). The other three are civil
defense, internal security and the service of early warning
and alarmraising. 1~The federal constitution of 1974
states that the main role of the YAF is to
defend the countrys territorial integrity,
independence
and the constitutional
order. The YAF constitutes a simple
unified whole and consists of the YPA,

November

YUGOSLAVGROUNDFORCES

Yugoslav National Defense System

I
Polmcal System

I
Internal Policy

National S@curAy
I

. A1l.PeoplesDefense

Fore,gn POIIcy

Economy

1.

[
Service of Early Warning
snd Alerrn.Rabslng

CIVIIDefense

Yugoslav Armed Forces


i

I
Internal .%cunty
I
I

Yugoslav Peoples Army


I

~TrOrrDTFOrcrslsl

E=l

Ground FOJCPS

AIr FOICe

and Ant(atrctaft

Detense

.Wo.ld become. pan.1 the Y.gosla. armed lorces m war


..~oc,a~ ,e,,.oro~ec,,on ,, o, , ,,p.ra,.
~.rl al ,mtwa, secr,ty
D.: %s. . lmlewal pan of ..W% c.am.?onent o! the Nat,ona! 0!+1..s.

stem
Figure

or operational army, and the Territorial


Defense Forces (TDF).
When the idea of the APD was adopted,
the YPA remained, as it was earlier, controlled and financed by the central government. The Territorial Defense Forces
were formed in all constituent republics
and autonomous provinces during the period 1969-70.]Z They represent locally recruited, financed and organized forces of
the armed national resistance.

The Systemof Commandand Control

Marshal Josip Broz Tito, former president of the republic, was also the supreme
commander of the YAF and president of
the League of Communists of Yugoslavia.
All three posts were constitutionally tied
to Titos personality. When he died, all of
his duties were taken over by the Social-

t
1980

17

MILITARY REVIEW
as a member of the Federal Executive
Council (Cabinet) and the SFRY Presidencys National Defense Council.
The General Staff is the YPAs highest
staff organ. Among its most important responsibilities are those dealing with the
formulation of national strategy and
operational/tactical
doctrine for the
armed forces. Further, it is responsible for
organizing, force structuring and deploying the army. It prepares the mobilization
plans and coordinates and supervises the
plans for combat operations.
The most important directorates of the
General Staff (Figure 2) are those of operations, organizations and mobilization,
intelligence, security service (counterintelligence), political sector and personnel. It is a uniquely integrated staff body
in which all three YPA services are represented. There is, however, an inordinately great influence of the ground
forces in the organization and functioning
of the General Staff.
ist Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia
(SFRY) Presidency.
In existence since October 1971, the
SFRY Presidency is charged with command and control of the YAF. It advised
Tito concerning the organization, equipment and cadre policy of the YPA. A portion of its responsibilities was transferred
to the 31-member National Defense
Council. Until his death, Marshal Tito
was president of this council. In 1979,
the council was decreased to 11 members,
of which six are generals.
The Federal Secretariat of National
Defense (hereafter called the Defense
Ministry) is the highest staff and professional body of the SFRY Presidency.
It has the major responsibility for all
administrative work pertaining to matters of defense at the federa! level. The
Defense Ministry is headed by a fourstar general who serves simultaneously

The GroundForces,1969-79

Since 1968, the ground forces have undergone significant changes regarciing
both their organizational structure and
armament. After the new doctrine of APD
was adopted in 1969, it was found that a
large army was not suitable for the
Yugoslav conditions. It was then resolved
to build a numerically smaller army, but
better trained and armed with the most
advanced weapons. Emphasis was given
to the improvement of antitank, antiaircraft and antiair assault defenses. 13
In addition to the introduction of new
armament and equipment, the ground
forces are presently undergoing signi&
cant organizational changes. The trend is
away from divisions and toward brigade-

YUGOSLAVGROUNDFORCES

General Staff of the Yugoslav Peoples Army


r
Chief of the General Staff I
of the Yugoslav Peoples Army

Deputy Chlet at SfaO

Deputy Chief of Staff


for G.ound Forces

Deputy Chief of Staff

for Tertlforlal

Defense

r---+=n
I

Infantry

Ututs

++-+

Armored

OrganzatoandMOblzaton

II

Arms Supply and Procurement

tJn,t~
!ntelhgence

(2d)
1

Iechnrcal
L

Service

Antiaircraft

ArlIllerY

Operahons

Un(ts

(30)

Quartermaster

[
IransportallOn

Signal Units
Securdv Service and Mildary

Service

Pollee

Mater! al-Fmanc]al

Engineer Umts

Chemical, B,olog!cal
and Rad)ologlcal Defense Unds

Management

Admmtrat]on
Irammg

and Educatmn
Medical Service

Fronher Guards

,,

Personnel

1
Figure

1980

I
I

19

MILITARY REVIEW
size units. All tactical units will have a
mixed structure depending on their role
in the combat operations and the type of
terrain where they would be deployed in
war. i4
The realization
of the APD also
brought significant changes in the wartime logistical support of the ground
forces. They would be, except for armament, ammunition and special equip-,
ment, dependent upon the existing
infrastructure of sociopolitical communities, a common term for the constituent
republics and autonomous provinces and
municipalities.
The republics and the autonomous
provinces bear the responsibility for planning and organizing the logistic support
of YPA units deployeci on their territory.
In coordination with army region commands, they must provide logistical support
in regard to supply, transportation .
and medical and veterinary care. 15 The
municipalities would provide food and
veterinary care for the units operating
within their territories. 16
The infantry is the most numerous and
the most important part of the ground
forces. It consists of mechanized, field,
mountain and alpine units. Since 1971,
the infantry units have undergone significant organizational changes. The improvement in organization was aimed at
achieving greater flexibility in the employment of smaller units. Another goal
was to achieve a higher integration level
beginning with battalion-size units. Increased operational-tactical mobility was
achieved with the introduction of large
numbers of armored personnel carriers
(APCS) and greater firepower through the
introduction of advanced armament and
equipment.
The present five-year (1975-80) modernization program of the ground forces
calls for the mass introduction of auto-

20 ,

matic rifles and light mortars into all infantry units. The antitank defenses were
greatly strengthened by new artillery
pieces, ammunition of greater lethality
and effectiveness,
antitank grenade
launchers, third-generation
missiles,
modern infrared equipment and laser
range finders. The main emphasis in antiaircraft defense is in vehicle-mounted and
man-portable surface-to-air missiles and
light antiaircraft guns At present, the infantry divisions have firepower varying
from 50 to 71 tons per minute.17
The armored units have also been extensively reorganized and modernized
since 1971. Instead of the former tank divisions, the largest operational-tactical
armored unit is the tank brigade. R is organized into two to three tank battalions,
one or two mechanized infantry battalions and combat support units,s Current
plans envisage greater introduction of the
mechanized infantry units into the armored forces.
Because of numerical
inferiority
against potential aggressors, the main
emphasis in modernizing the armored
forces is on improving their overall capability in antiarmor and antiaircraft defenses. The increase in strength of
armored and mechanized units had as a
consequence the transformation of the engineer service into a combat branch of the
ground forces.
In the past few years, modern vehicles
and equipment for water-fording operations, armored recovery vehicles and antitank defensive mine devices have been
introduced into service. It should be emphasized that the Yugoslav ground forces,
similar to other East European armies,
pay extremely close attention to the problem of chemical, biological and radiological defense. All units are provided.
with a great variety of equipment for personal and collective protection.

November

1
. YUGOSLAVGROUND FORCES

only the staffs of the six armies are fully


stafTed. The army region normally covers
the territory of one of the constituent republics (Figure 4). There are two exceptions, howeve~ Serbia where two army
regions are located (Belgrade and Ni5)
and Montenegro where there is only an
independent militsry regional command.
The Split Naval Region command is
unique because its naval units include all

ForceStructure

The operational chain of command of


six army regions (mvrzijska obhzst), a
naval region (uojrzo-pomorska oblast) and
an independent military region (rrojrzo
podrudje) is directly subordinate to the
General Staff (Figure 3). In peacetime,

The Yugoslav Peoples Army Operational Chain of Command

Federal Secretary
of Nabonal Defense

Federal Secretariat 01
Naf\onal Defense [Belgrade)

General Statf ot the Yugoslav


Peoples Army (Belgrade]

[
[

Liubljana Army Region


(Llublpna)

SaIaIevo Army Region


(Sarqevo)

Zagreb Army Region


(Zagrab]

Belgrade Army Reg!on


(Belgrade)

NIX Army Regmn [N$$)


I

Ihe AIr Force and Anbamraft


Defense Command /Zemun)

Spht Naval Reg!on [Split)


I

Figure 3

1980

21

MILITARY REVIEW

Army Region Commands in Yugoslavia

Austria

. A..-

Adriatic Sea

<

~;

-k..

~..

Army Regwn
A1)00!
1,,2

a-.

%b? Pa
k$!h

B Zweh Arm Rem.


c Spl$tNaval Regbon
D Saraw. Amy Rwon
E Wrade AmtY Rwon
i W: Army RWO.
G.Skew Army Rwon
H Ttto~radMIMary Regron

Figure 4

ground troops deployed in the littoral


area.
Territorially, each of the army regions
comprise three to four military regions.
The latter, in turn, consist of several military districts (uojuz obktat). The military
territorial commands are charged with

22

many administrative
responsibilities
such as the registration of draftees and
the construction and maintenance of military installations.
Their main responsibility, however, is the planning and
execution
of mobilization
in their
territories. :

November

YUGOSLAVGROUNDFORCES
In 1980. the stren~h of the m-ound
forces were estimate~ at 190,0;0 men
(130,000 conscripts). They were organized
in the following manner:lg

o
.
.
.

Eight infantry divisions.


Twelve infantry brigades.
Onemarine infantry brigade.
Twelve field artillery regiments.
Six antitank regiments.
Seven tank brigades.
Two mountain brigades.
One airborne assault battalion.
Twelve antiaircraft regiments.

Beyond these, 24 antiaircraft


regiments and 25 coastal artillery batteries
were under the operational control of the
air force and the navy. In addition to combat troops, the ground forces have a considerable
number of diverse establishments, military-scientific
institutes,
schools, academies and training centers.

Armsmentsnd Equipment

The inventories of the ground forces


comprise a motley collection of Soviet,
US, ex-German and domestically produced armament and equipment (Figure
5). Significantly, almost all heavy and advanced arrhament and equipment are of
Soviet origin. Some 60 M47Pattorr, 400
M4 Sherman and 250 Soviet T34185 tanks
are maintained in reserve status. The
mechanized units comprise a large number of Soviet-produced BTR40PBIBRDM2
reconnaissance vehicles, BTR50PUcommando vehicles and BTR60 and BTR152
APCS.
There are still in service 300 domestically produced M60 APCS. Their design
was based on Soviet SU76 self-propelled

1980

(SP) guns. The M60 is powered, however,


by an Austrian engine built under license
in Yugoslavia. This vehicle, first publicIy
revealed in 1965, is fully amphibious. The
M60s are now being replaced by a new
fully amphibious M980 mechanized infantry combat vehicle (MICV). The M980
is also of Yugoslav design and was seen
for the first time in May 1975. The M980
is similar in appearance to the Soviet
BMP1 but has the same engine and other
components of the French AMXIOF
MICV. Some 200 M980s are in service,
and an additional 500 will be eventually
acquired by the ground forces.zo
The artillery units are equipped with
a great variety of weapons acqtired from
several foreign sources. The most recent
acquisitions included Soviet 130mm M46
field guns, 152mm M55 (D20) gun/howitzers and 122mm D30 howitzers. The
coastal artillery batteries are equipped
with Soviet SSC2C Sam let antiship missiles, 122mm M37 guns, ex-German
88mm Flak-36 and 150mm LFH18 guns.
The antitank artillery consists mostly of
Soviet-produced guns such as the 100mm
SUIOO SP, 100mm T12, 57mm ASU57 SP
and 85mm ASU85 SP.
In the 1950s, the Yugoslav army received some 300 US 76mm M18 Hellcat
and 90mm M36 J,ackson SP antitank
guns, almost all of which serve in reserve
units. In wide use are Soviet antitank
guided missilee (ATGMs)the
AT1
Snapper and AT3 Sagger. A new thirdgeneration ATGM of domestic design is
presently under development. Since 1975,
antiaircraft
defense has been greatly
strengthened by the introduction of Soviet surface-to-air miesiles and radsr-controlled, self-propelled antiaircraft guns.
In the last few years, heavy emphasis
has been given to advanced communication and target detection equipment.
Although a portion of the combat support

23

Ground Forces: Table of Organization and Equipment


Country of Origin
Weapon$ystem/Equtpmen
Medmm tanks

llght tanks

Armored personnel camem

Commando armored veh,cles

Recormalssance cars

BTR40PB/BRDM2

BalOeheld wow

40 [ro~ 7(1a)

Srtm

rockets

SSC2CSdmk14

to surface nl,ssles

t
Mu[tlDle,ocket

launchers

WJ?132{32,128)f3@
M63[32,1281Plamens
7 I ba, re!r

76mI M486141IBld2

Guns

155mm A42

coastal

130mm M46

100mm M1955

76mmSU765P W18)

122mnl M37

gs

G.nlhowtzm

88mm Ftak 36,


150mm LFH18n

152mm M55 (0201


157mm M374
I05mm M56q
155mm A463

122mm M38
122mm 030
130mm M54a
SA6 Gdroful
SA9 Gaskm

105mm M7E2
,

S47 Grad LS/relaJ

Antwcr#!

guns

70mm M55 Ismglt and lFICW:


20mm M57

l,t,ta,k

23mmZSU234 5P Shdkd
30mm M53i59 SPL,
37min M38/39
57mm M50
57mm SU572SPfS68J
85mm A444a

40nun L,60 Bolors


88mm Flak 36J
12 7mm kf55

g.,ded m,,sz)es

at,tak
gs

,,,.

1 !,0, ! ,,,,!,, ..,,,


4( 21, bereP!a,eO.!lb,O, M980MlLV

MO = Mechan,zeo,,,,,,,,

comb,, w,,,,

$,,, ,B,,g,ad,)
haro,maArnma(8dwa3e)

14 Mo081@d1J485,,,,,,,

Figure 5

November

I
vehicle inventory is of Soviet or Czech origin, a major part was domestically produced under Western licenses. On the
other hand, heavy engineering equipment is primarily Soviet-made.

Problemssnd Conclusions

Since 1945, the system of command


and control over the YAF, and particularly of the ground forces, has closely followed all changes in the countrys defense
doctrine. There were too many, and often
unnecessary,
organizational
changes
which drained already scarce financial resources. The ground forces lagged behind
most of the European armies because, for
too long, emphasis was upon quantity
rather than quality of personnel and srmament. As a result, the peacetime
strength of the ground forces was maintained at a consistently high level.
The biggest change in the organization
of the ground forces came during the implementation of the last two five-year
plans of the YPAs development (197080). During this time, the highest priority
was given to organizational-technical
modernization and to the personnel of the
armed forces, the ground forces in particular. Although the progress in the modernization
of the ground forces was
uneven in some areas, the results that
have been achieved so far are very impressive.
At present, the Yugoslav ground forces
possess many strengths and some serious
weaknesses. The trend toward having a
numerically smaller, but better armed
and trained, YPA is undoubtedly a positive one. The emphasis on strengthening
the antitank,
antiaircraft
and antiairbome assault defense came as a result
of the realistic assessment that the poten-

1980

YUGOSLAVGROUNDFORCES

ti 1 enemy would come from the Eaet


ra1 her than the West. The etressed role
a~d importance of infantry units also appears to be realistic because the ground
forces would never be capable of matching
the armored strength of a potential aggressor. The trend toward smaller operational-tactical units signifies perhaps a
belief that ground forces have to be capable of conducting guerrilla-type combat
operations from the very beginning of the
war.
Although significant results in the
modernization of the ground forces have
been achieved since 1968, some serious
problems and deficiencies still remain to
be eolved. The armored forces appear to
be numerically and qualitatively inadequate for allotted tasks. The Soviet tanks
currently in service are obsolete and must
be replaced soon. Because of heavy emphasis on the infantry, it is the best organized
and
armed.
The
mass
introduction of automatic infantry weapons and portable infrared and laser tergeting devices made the infantry units
fully capable for combat under all
conditions.
The antiarmor defense, although eigniticantly improved during the last few
years, is still based largely on light antitank weapons. There is an urgent need for
the introduction of longer ranged and advanced (tire and forget) ATGMs. A similar situation, despite a great etride made
in recent years, exists in regard to troop
antiaircraft defense. However, there is a
problem in regard to quantity rather than
quality of recently acquired mobile and
man-portable surface-to-air missiles and
radar-controlled antiaircraft guns. It appears that the only solution to offset the
numerical superiority
of a potential
enemy in both men and materiel can be
found in the mase introduction of precision guided munitions in the combat

25

MILtTARY REWEW

units of the ground forces.


Perhaps the greatest single deticieBcy
is the fact that extraordinarily
large
numbers of arms and equipment were acquired from too many foreign sources. It
should be noted that most of the ex-US/
West arms, although in the inventory, are
no longer in service or are maintained in
reserve. The great heterogeneity of arms
and equipment in the inventories was
caused by many factors.
First, there exists a conservative attitude within the top military leadership
toward the timely introduction of modern
weapons into the armed forces. Second,
there exists a lack of systematic arms
supply and procurement policy for the
ground forces. Third, the YPA, similar to
the Soviet army, retains for Iong periods
even the most obsolete weapons and
equipment in its inventories. Such a situation makes the problem of standardization next to impossible. Also, too great
a number of types and models of weaponry aggravates the problem of spare
parts.
There is still a very great and lamentable dependence of the ground forces on
Soviet-produced
heavy and advanced
arms. Although this situation can, to a
degree, be justified, it is not clear why
Yugoslavia came to depend on a military
bloc which, at the same time, represents

the greatest potential threat to its security. Moreover, khe supply of spare parte for
Soviet-made armament is very irregular
and inadequate.
Perhaps the most impressive result of
the past decade was achieved in regard to
supply of arms and equipment from domestic defense industries. Great progress
was made to free the ground forces from
the arms purchases abroad and then to increase its overall combat readiness. Although the ground forces still depend on
foreign sources for many heavy and advanced arms such as tanks and surfacet.o-snrface and surface-to-air missiles, the
domestic defense industries are already
capabIe of satisfying the greater part of
the needs of the armed forces. The highest
degree of self-sufficiency is achieved with
respect to the infantry units which represent the backbone of the ground forces
and the territorial defense.
The ground forces have traveled a
1ong and difficult road since the early
days following the end of the war. Great
advances have been made, particularly
considering ,conditions at its beginning.
Despite some rather serious problems, the
Yugoslav ground forces should not be underrated. Their defensive capabilities, especially in unconventional
warfare,
would most likely deny a quick victory to
any potential aggressor.

NO1ES
1 colonelSogdan G!edov!ch. Ufog. J.gost8vvG . Dnwom
Svetskom Rat.. [me Role 07 Y.goslawa (. WorldWw III, Odbrana i
Z.W1. [Defense and Pmtecoom. Jan.afv.Febru.w,
1971. D 55
2 lb,a
3 1. 1942.43, the strength of a Paft,san aw,s!on was on average
WOO fgh!ws end, m 194445, was beIween 5,W0 m 6,GW f!ghlers A
COIVS.suallv mmonsed Iwo or three WM...
and some independent
C&bat ii
4 Voma Encmopedva lMdmw EncYcl.P.d!aJ, Sswmd Edmon.
VOJ.. EncikloPed,Ia. S.19rade, Y.go, 1972, Volume 4, p Izs
5 East E.mP. DaIIv, Fore,gn Broadcast Infonnal,on Sewlce, 23 May
1975. P 112

26

6 Sehvee. October 1943 and May <945, m. Peoples LiosTaiIO.


Army WC3wecifrom tho Umted stales a.d Ihe Umad Kingdom ?07t@.5,
388 gun% 2,6ECImonius, ?3,447 mach,nquns and 137,9CiI nflns The
SOwet Union !. the penca 1944.45 provided 65 tanks 995 g.s, 3,354
mortars, 6s,w
mechtnegus ano 96,CiW rifles MJlrt31VE.qmloperia,
OD C!t
7 fb(d P 139.
3 Yugostav,a, edtied by Robed F. Symes, Prawer Publ,shws, N.Y
1957, p 1%
9 MIl!tarY EIICCIOPSdla,0P Clt P :40
10 Fmdn.h VJener, PcWW311ekampfsm Sslkan DIeRc4e de. Parb$.nenkamp: m Oer iu90sJawKche La.de...fle,a!n9n9.
Wrlag C.fl

Novsmber

Ueberrmfthw, Vmn.a, P,.*,

to
the

*976, p IC13

omcapt.1 theAf-People,sDefensa,ffw Y.wslav !ni i %Mar


temal secunlysystem,Sunlversdand QmvxehensweIt !ndud= no!
Oniyprcdessnma!
ssc.rr& oqms (PUMCandslateswurdySSNIC=3S),
bul
busmess%s mm pdmcal organmattons Brhny,
alsoall Cnlzens.WO!XWS,
lh8 Mfw am e.c2w,F@ti 10mpnll Imnwd,.stely any s,g of hosle 8CIIVW

which,accordingto .fhcal ,nterpmtwo., bmvotves


e,nytmghamsteahg
pubbcPmp=mv1. ,anbslate,cronesandtmonst m!s.
12 me Y.@av
fsdwatm. CV.W,!S of the fcllowmg ax rep.bl,cs
Basn,a and Herzegovina, Cmatm, M.qcaaoma, Montenegro, SetbM ana
SIowama, me two auionomo.s provmms, Kosovo ma Vo)vcdha, ho
wrlh,. mo rep.tim of Semm
13 East E.mDe Dmly, 24 December 1975, II 120
14 Lfeu!ea.t General Raik.a Tanasko,(ch, oKopnem deo VO,.ti,

(me Ground Forcss), Fmt, 9 May 1975,0 to


16 Colonel MiIenko Radwo@ti,
,Neke Pita.M iozadmskog obe.
zblod@@ jedmr.a ,ga%venske enn@ rSonM Oussbos on the f.cg!st!cal S.pptt
d the Y.gosm. Amy,), Vo/no Ekonomsk .mgled
(M,lrrary Ecmmmy SIV.J, NomIiDer.Decamber 1975, P 9S.
,. ,,+!.
17 East EumPe Daly, 5 December 1975. P IN ami 8 Janq
?976, g
110.
18 Winner, op cm. p 116
19 The M,lflary Wafanca 1978.79, The hltemaimd Insiflule for Sba.
tfwc st.d,~. ~.ti..
E.g.. 1979, P ss
20 NA70, Europe, w.ga%wa). Cafenss Meet Se fvira, Greenmch,
CQnn, 1978, P 7
!

!...

Milan N. Vego u a Ph.D. candidate at George


Wa.shmgton Uniuers@.
He m a 1961 graduate of
the Yugosluv Naval Academy and received a BA.
and an MA. in modem histo~ from the Philosophy Faculty, Belgrade, Yugoslnu ia. His asmgn.
ments as an officer m the Yug0s15u navy fmm
1961 to1973 include serving as a naval adviser to
the Royal Cambodum Navy and as commander
of lhggms
PT boats and the Shershen torpedo
boat group.

Advanced Antiarmor

Since July 1980, the US


Command, Fort Oral,
California, has been assisting the US Marines in a Department of
Defense test called Advanced Antiarmor Vehicle Evaluation, or
ARMVAL for short. Using realistic tactical scenarios, the ARMVAL
evaluation consists of a number of two-sided, force-on-force experiments. These are designed to evaluate the contribution of lightweight
combat vehicles (LCVS) to the effectiveness of forces engaging in
combat missions.
To make this assessment, friendly combined arms forces conduct
combat operations, first using current antiarmor systems to obtain
baseline data and then with the LCVS substituted for current systems. The enemy forces use conventional tanks and simulated
Warsaw Pact weapons systems to try to counter the punch of the
friendiies and their LCVS. In addition to LCVS, the Marines are using
their own LVTP7 amphibious personnel carriers. Both forces are.
composed of both Army and Marine Corps personnel.
Major issues of the test include an analysis of the contributions the
LCV can make to force effectiveness on the battlefield, and whether
LCVswhich trade off heavy armor protection for high agility and
mobility-will be survivable as members of combined arms forces on
the battlefield.
The collected data and the experience gained through plarr~ng,
instrumentation, conduct and analysis of this test may provide, for a
future Joint Operational Test and Evaluation Phase for an LCV as
technology evolves,
Army Combat

1980

Vehicle Evaluation.

Developments

Experimentation

21

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