Constitutional Law: Taada vs.

Tuvera 136 SCRA 27 (April 24,

1985) 146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)
TAADA VS. TUVERA
136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)
Publication in the Official Gazette (Enforceability of a Statute)
FACTS:
Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle that
laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of
mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various presidential
decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of
implementations and administrative orders.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case, contending that
petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes valid and
enforceable.
HELD:
Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the
law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give the general
public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens.
Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignoratia
legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustive to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official Gazette. The
word shall therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if
the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of public concern is to be given substance
and validity.
The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of
due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and
specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of general application
which have not been published have no force and effect.

TAADA VS. TUVERA

146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)
FACTS:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent argued
that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise as when the decrees
themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not as
to their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.
HELD:
The clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature
may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its previous
publication.
Laws should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking, all laws
relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A law without any
bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires
act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest eve if it might be
directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.
All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for
their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature.
Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of the
content of the law.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not
elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the
wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical.
The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.
J. Cruz:
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their
dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding
unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure
and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or
cut unless the naked blade is drawn.

G.R. No. 80718

January 29, 1988

FELIZA
P.
DE
ROY
and
VIRGILIO
RAMOS,
petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS BERNAL, SR., GLENIA BERNAL, LUIS BERNAL, JR.,
HEIRS OF MARISSA BERNAL, namely, GLICERIA DELA CRUZ BERNAL and LUIS
BERNAL, SR., respondents.

RESOLUTION
CORTES, J.:
This special civil action for certiorari seeks to declare null and void two (2) resolutions of the
Special First Division of the Court of Appeals in the case of Luis Bernal, Sr., et al. v. Felisa
Perdosa De Roy, et al., CA-G.R. CV No. 07286. The first resolution promulgated on 30
September 1987 denied petitioners motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration and directed entry of judgment since the decision in said case had become
final; and the second Resolution dated 27 October 1987 denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration for having been filed out of time.
At the outset, this Court could have denied the petition outright for not being verified as
required by Rule 65 section 1 of the Rules of Court. However, even if the instant petition did
not suffer from this defect, this Court, on procedural and substantive grounds, would still
resolve to deny it.
The facts of the case are undisputed. The firewall of a burned-out building owned by
petitioners collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of private
respondents, resulting in injuries to private respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal, a
daughter. Private respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate their shop in view of
its proximity to the weakened wall but the former failed to do so. On the basis of the foregoing
facts, the Regional Trial Court. First Judicial Region, Branch XXXVIII, presided by the Hon.
Antonio M. Belen, rendered judgment finding petitioners guilty of gross negligence and
awarding damages to private respondents. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was
affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in a decision promulgated on August 17, 1987, a copy
of which was received by petitioners on August 25, 1987. On September 9, 1987, the last day
of the fifteen-day period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension of time to file
a motion for reconsideration, which was eventually denied by the appellate court in the
Resolution of September 30, 1987. Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration on
September 24, 1987 but this was denied in the Resolution of October 27, 1987.

This Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit a grave abuse of discretion when it
denied petitioners motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, directed
entry of judgment and denied their motion for reconsideration. It correctly applied the rule laid
down in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon, [G.R. No. 70895, August 5, 1985,138 SCRA
461, that the fifteen-day period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot
be extended. In its Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, promulgated on July
30, 1986 (142 SCRA 208), this Court en banc restated and clarified the rule, to wit:
Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly
enforced that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration may be filed
with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the
Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending with the
Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which may in its sound discretion either grant or
deny the extension requested. (at p. 212)
Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases Division of the intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No.
73146-53, August 26, 1986, 143 SCRA 643], reiterated the rule and went further to restate
and clarify the modes and periods of appeal.
Bacaya v. Intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 74824, Sept. 15, 1986,144 SCRA
161],stressed the prospective application of said rule, and explained the operation of the
grace period, to wit:
In other words, there is a one-month grace period from the promulgation on May 30, 1986 of
the Courts Resolution in the clarificatory Habaluyas case, or up to June 30, 1986, within
which the rule barring extensions of time to file motions for new trial or reconsideration is, as
yet, not strictly enforceable.
Since petitioners herein filed their motion for extension on February 27, 1986, it is still within
the grace period, which expired on June 30, 1986, and may still be allowed.
This grace period was also applied in Mission v. Intermediate Appellate Court [G.R. No.
73669, October 28, 1986, 145 SCRA 306].]
In the instant case, however, petitioners motion for extension of time was filed on September
9, 1987, more than a year after the expiration of the grace period on June 30, 1986. Hence,
it is no longer within the coverage of the grace period. Considering the length of time from the
expiration of the grace period to the promulgation of the decision of the Court of Appeals on
August 25, 1987, petitioners cannot seek refuge in the ignorance of their counsel regarding
said rule for their failure to file a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period.
Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not be made to
apply to the case at bar owing to the non-publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official
Gazette as of the time the subject decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated. Contrary

to petitioners view, there is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in
the Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective.
It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions
of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated,
and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions (G. R. s) and in such
publications as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.
This Court likewise finds that the Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of discretion in
affirming the trial courts decision holding petitioner liable under Article 2190 of the Civil Code,
which provides that the proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the damage
resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs.
Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners argument that private respondents had the last
clear chance to avoid the accident if only they heeded the. warning to vacate the tailoring
shop and , therefore, petitioners prior negligence should be disregarded, since the doctrine
of last clear chance, which has been applied to vehicular accidents, is inapplicable to this
case.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court Resolved to DENY the instant petition for
lack of merit.
Fernan (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.

DIGEST: he firewall of a burned out building owned by Felisa De Roy collapsed and
destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of Luis Bernal resulting in injuries and
even to the death of Bernals daughter. De Roy claimed that Bernal had been warned prior
hand but that she was ignored.
In the RTC, De Roy was found guilty of gross negligence. She appealed but the Court of
Appeals affirmed the RTC. On the last day of filing a motion for reconsideration, De Roys
counsel filed a motion for extension. It was denied by the CA. The CA ruled that pursuant to
the case of Habaluyas Enterprises vs Japzon (August 1985), the fifteen-day period for
appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended.
De Roys counsel however argued that the Habaluyas case should not be applicable because
said ruling was never published in the Official Gazette.
ISSUE: Whether or not Supreme Court decisions must be published in the Official Gazette
before they can be binding.
HELD: No. There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decision in the Official
Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is
bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the
Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated and
published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions and in such publications as the
SCRA and law journals.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION
NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION G.R. No. 158761
ADMINISTRATION,
Petitioner, Present:
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
VICTORIANO B. GONZAGA, Promulgated:
Respondent.
December 4, 2007
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
For review under Rule 45 are the March 6, 2003 Decision[1] and June 10, 2003
Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 68769, which
dismissed petitioners appeal of the July 23, 2001 Order[3] of the Pagadian City
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 21 in Civil Case No. 4282-2K, and denied
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, respectively.
On November 13, 2000, respondent Victoriano B. Gonzaga filed his
Certificate of Candidacy for membership in the Board of Directors of Zamboanga
del Sur II Electric Cooperative, Inc., District II (ZAMSURECO). Later that day, the
screening committee resolved to disqualify respondent because his spouse was an
incumbent member of theSangguniang Bayan of Diplahan, Zamboanga del
Sur. Based on the Electric Cooperative Election Code (ECEC), promulgated by
petitioner National Electrification Administration (NEA), a candidate whose spouse

occupies an elective government position higher than Barangay Captain is prohibited

to run as director of an electric cooperative. ZAMSURECOs by-laws, however, do
not provide for such ground for disqualification.[4]
On November 21, 2000, respondent filed a Petition for Prohibition and
Damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 4282-2K with the Pagadian City RTC.
ZAMSURECO filed a Motion to Dismiss and Answer on November 24, 2000,
which the RTC denied. However, it issued a temporary restraining order, ordering
ZAMSURECOs officials to refrain from conducting the election for directorship set
on December 2, 2000.
The RTC said that the petition was dismissible because of the failure of
respondent to exhaust all administrative remedies, as required by Section 2, 2.C of
the ECEC Guidelines on the Conduct of District Elections for Electric Cooperative.
The section required that a protest arising from disqualification shall be filed with
the screening committeein not less than FIVE (5) days before the election. The
screening committee shall decide the protest within FORTY-EIGHT (48) hours from
receipt thereof. Failure of the applicant to file his/her protest within the above-cited
period shall be deemed a waiver of his right to protest.[5]
As observed by the RTC, respondent had urgently filed the petition
on November 21, 2000 because the election sought to be restrained was going to be
held on December 2, 2000 and November 20 was a holiday. Under the
circumstances, respondent had little time to exhaust the remedy in Sec. 2 of the
Guidelines, such that an exception could be made. More importantly, according to
the RTC, the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies cannot be invoked in the
instant case since the guidelines prescribing the administrative remedy is a subject
matter of the ECEC, which is at issue, and is exactly what is being sought to be
invalidated.[6]
On December 12, 2000, respondent filed a motion to withdraw the amended
petition, and to admit a second amended petition that impleaded NEA as
indispensable party.Respondent also averred that the ECEC was null and void
because it had not been published. On December 20, 2000, the RTC admitted the
second amended petition, issued a writ of preliminary injunction to prevent the

conduct of election for directorship, issued summons to NEA, and required NEA to
comment if the ECEC was published in any newspaper of general circulation.[7]
On January 29, 2001, NEA filed a motion for extension of time to file an
answer, and subsequently on April 10, 2001, a Motion for Leave to Admit Pleading
to which a Motion to Dismiss was attached. NEA questioned the jurisdiction of the
RTC and alleged that respondent failed to exhaust administrative remedies.[8]
In its July 23, 2001 Order,[9] the RTC denied petitioners Motion to Dismiss
for being filed out of time. More importantly, it noted NEAs failure to state whether
the ECEC was indeed published in a newspaper of general circulation as required by
the New Civil Code and the Administrative Code of 1987. The RTC said the failure
rendered the ECEC null and void. As regards the lack of jurisdiction and nonexhaustion of administrative remedies, the RTC noted that NEA erroneously relied
on Sec. 59 of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 269 and misapplied the cases it cited.
According to the RTC, Sec. 59 of PD 269 refers to order, ruling or decision
of the NEA in the exercise of NEAs quasi-judicial functions. And the RTC noted
that Secs. 51 to 58 refer to hearings, investigations, and procedures. On the other
hand, the validity of the ECEC, subject of the instant petition, was an exercise of
NEAs quasi-legislative function or rule-making authority.
Further, according to the RTC, NEA took Sec. 58 of PD 269 out of context
when it said Sec. 58 dealt with the administrative remedy available to petitioner. It
said that Sec. 58 presupposed a ruling or decision of the NEA and there was none in
the case before it. The RTC ruled in favor of Gonzaga, and ordered ZAMSURECO
to accept Gonzagas certificate of candidacy for director.[10] The RTC denied NEAs
motion for reconsideration.
The CA Ruled that the Courts Have Jurisdiction Over
Issues on Legality of Codes
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA. The CA denied due course and
dismissed the petition. It said that NEA was not exercising its quasi-judicial powers
but its rule-making authority. In the case before the trial court, the CA stressed that
the issue involved the interpretation of the ECEC, and to this extent, NEA had no
jurisdiction because the issue is within the province of the courts.

The CA denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in its June 10,

2003 Resolution. Hence, we have this petition.
The Issues
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT APPLYING
SECTION 59 OF P.D. 269
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING
THE TRIAL COURTS NULLIFICATION OF THE ECEC

Issues Involving NEAs Rule-Making Authority

Are Cognizable by Regular Courts
The petition has no merit.
Sec. 59 of PD 269 provides:
SEC. 59. Court Review.The Supreme Court is hereby given jurisdiction to
review any order, ruling or decision of the NEA and to modify or set aside such
order, ruling or decision when it clearly appears that there is no evidence before the
NEA to support reasonably such order, ruling or decision, or that the same is
contrary to law, or that it was without the jurisdiction of the NEA. The evidence
presented to the NEA, together with the record of the proceedings before the NEA,
shall be certified by the NEA to the Supreme Court. Any order, ruling or decision
of the NEA may likewise be reviewed by the Supreme Court upon writ of certiorari
in proper case. The procedure for review, except as herein provided, shall be
presented by rules of the Supreme Court. Any order or decision of the NEA may
be reviewed on the application of any person or public service entity aggrieved
thereby and who was a party in the subject proceeding, by certiorari in appropriate
cases or by a petition for review, which shall be filed within thirty (30) days from
the notification of the NEA order, decision or ruling on reconsideration. Said
petition shall be placed on file in the office of the Clerk for the Supreme Court who
shall furnish copies thereof to the NEA and other interested parties.

Petitioner argues that based on the foregoing provision, only the Supreme
Court has the authority to review the acts of NEA as an administrative body with
adjudicative and rule-making power. It cited NEA v. Mendoza, using the Courts
pronouncement that:

[T]he power of judicial review of NEAs order or decision pertains to the Supreme
Court as decreed in Section 59 of P.D. 269 which vests specifically on the Supreme
Court the jurisdiction to review any order, ruling or decision of the NEA and to
modify or set aside such orders, rulings or decisions.[11]

It is obvious that Sec. 59 of PD 269 refers to order, ruling or decision of NEA.

What is being challenged in this case is the decision of the screening committee of
ZAMSURECO to disqualify respondent. Likewise assailed is the validity of the
ECEC, particularly, whether the requirement of publication was complied with. The
ECEC was issued by NEA pursuant to its rule-making authority, not its quasijudicial function. Hence, the issue regarding the controversy over respondents
disqualification and the question on the ECECs validity are within the inherent
jurisdiction of regular courts to review. Petitioners reliance on NEA is
misplaced. The subject in that case was the electricity rates charged by a cooperative,
a matter which is clearly within NEAs jurisdiction. The issue in the present petition,
however, centers on the validity of NEAs rules in light of the publication
requirements of the Administrative Code and New Civil Code. The present issue is
cognizable by regular courts.
With regard to the second issue, we find no error in the appellate and trial
courts nullification of the ECEC. The CA correctly observed that while
ZAMSURECO complied with the requirements of filing the code with the
University of the Philippines Law Center, it offered no proof of publication in
the Official Gazette nor in a newspaper of general circulation. Without compliance
with the requirement of publication, the rules and regulations contained in the ECEC
cannot be enforced and implemented.
Article 2 of the New Civil Code provides that laws shall take effect after
fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is
otherwise provided.
Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of
1987, reinforced the requirement of publication and outlined the procedure, as
follows:

Sec. 3. Filing. (1) Every Agency shall file with the University of
the Philippines Law Center three (3) Certified copies of every rule adopted by
it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within
three (3) months from that date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction
against any party or persons.
(2) The Records Officer of the agency, or his equivalent functionary, shall
carry out the requirements of this section under pain of disciplinary action.
(3) A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the issuing agency and
shall be open to public inspection.
Sec. 4. Effectivity In addition to other rule-making requirements provided
by law not inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15)
days from the date of filing as above provided unless a different date is fixed by
law, or specified in this rule.
Sec. 18. When Laws Take Effect Laws shall take effect after Fifteen (15)
days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation, unless it is otherwise provided.

We have already emphasized and clarified the requirement of publication in

this Courts Resolution in Taada v. Tuvera:
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private
laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity which shall begin fifteen
(15) days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by
the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly
delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the
Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if
their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid
delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating
only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be
published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions
issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed
by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. (Emphasis supplied.) [12]

The aforequoted ruling was reiterated in Dadole v. Commission on

Audit, De Jesus v. Commission on Audit,[14] and Philippine International Trading
Corporation v. Commission on Audit.[15]
[13]

In the case at bar, the ECEC was issued by petitioner pursuant to its rulemaking authority provided in PD 269, as amended, particularly Sec. 24:
Section 24. Board of Directors. (a) The Management of a Cooperative shall
be vested in its Board, subject to the supervision and control of NEA which shall
have the right to be represented and to participate in all Board meetings and
deliberations and to approve all policies and resolutions.
The composition, qualifications, the manner of elections and filling of
vacancies, the procedures for holding meetings and other similar provisions shall
be defined in the By-laws of the Cooperative subject to NEA policies, rules and
regulations x x x.

The ECEC applies to all electric cooperatives in the country. It is not a mere
internal
memorandum,
interpretative
regulation,
or instruction to
subordinates. Thus, the ECEC should comply with the requirements of the Civil
Code and the Administrative Code of 1987. In previous cases involving the election
of directors for electric cooperatives, the validity of the ECEC was not put in
issue. The ECEC then enjoyed the presumption of validity. In this case, however,
respondent directly questioned the validity of the ECEC in his second amended
petition. The trial court thus required petitioner to show proof of publication of the
ECEC. Petitioner could have easily provided such proof had the ECEC actually been
published in the Official Gazette or newspaper of general circulation in the
country. This simple proof could have immediately laid this case to rest. Petitioners
failure to do so only implies that the ECEC was not published accordingly, a fact
supported by the certification from the National Printing Office.
Lastly, petitioner avers that a petition for mandamus and prohibition should
not have been resorted to by respondent. The proper recourse, according to
petitioner, is a petition for declaratory relief. Petitioner miserably errs on this
point. Rule 63 on declaratory relief states:

Section 1. Who may file petition.Any person interested under a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute,
executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation
may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional
Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a
declaration of his rights or duties thereunder.

As stated above, a requirement under Rule 63 is that the petition for

declaratory relief must be filed before any breach or violation the questioned
document may cause. In the instant case, it cannot be gainsaid that a breach has not
yet occurred since an actual dispute has already arisen between ZAMSURECO and
respondentthe screening committee of the cooperative on the erroneous
implementation of a code whose legality and implementation is being questioned.
On the other hand, it is familiar and fundamental doctrine that a writ of
prohibition or mandamus may issue when x x x a board unlawfully excludes another
from x x x enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled x x x.[16]

Considering that the screening committee of the board has excluded

respondent from being elected as board member of ZAMSURECO because of the
latters improper implementation of the code, a petition for mandamus and
prohibition is the proper recourse.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition, and AFFIRM IN TOTO the March
6, 2003 Decision and June 10, 2003 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 68769. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

[1]
Rollo, pp. 34-39. Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices
Portia Alio-Hormachuelos and Amelita G. Tolentino.
[2]
Id. at 40.
[3]
Id. at 41-49.
[4]
Id. at 45. Art. 2, Sec. 7 of the ECEC specifically provides:
8. He/she does not hold an elective office in the government nor appointed to an elective position
above the level of a Barangay Captain.
xxxx
12. His/her spouse is not disqualified under Nos. 6, 7 and 8.
xxxx
14. Any bonafide member seeking election or re-election and any incumbent director shall satisfy
all of the above-mentioned qualifications. Non-compliance with any single item shall mean
disqualification or termination.
[5]
Id. at 43-44.
[6]
Id.
[7]
Id. at 41.
[8]
Id. at 21, 41-42.
[9]
Supra note 3.
[10]
Id. at 42-44.
[11]
No. L-62038, September 25, 1985, 138 SCRA 632, 637.
[12]
No. L-63915, December 29, 1986, 146 SCRA 446, 453-454.
[13]
G.R. No. 125350, December 3, 2002, 393 SCRA 262.
[14]
G.R. No. 109023, August 12, 1998, 294 SCRA 152.
[15]
G.R. No. 132593, June 25, 1999, 309 SCRA 177.
[16]
RULES OF COURT, Rule 65, Sec. 2. Petition for prohibition.When the proceedings of any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without
or in excess of his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to
desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs
as law and justice may acquire.
xxxx
SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus.When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station,
or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled,
and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to
be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the
wrongful acts of the respondent. (Emphasis supplied.)

GARCILLANO vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, et.al G.R. No. 170338 December 23, 2008

Facts:

Tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped conversation purportedly between the President of the
Philippines and a high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) surfaced. The tapes,
notoriously referred to as the "Hello Garci" tapes, allegedly contained the Presidents instructions to
COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to manipulate in her favor results of the 2004 presidential
elections. These recordings were to become the subject of heated legislative hearings conducted
separately by committees of both Houses of Congress.

Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to due process considering that he is summoned to attend
the Senate hearings without being apprised not only of his rights therein through the publication of the
Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, but also of the intended legislation
which underpins the investigation. He further intervenes as a taxpayer bewailing the useless and
wasteful expenditure of public funds involved in the conduct of the questioned hearings.

The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on oral argument that the Senate
Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in newspapers of
general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006. With respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress,
however, of which the term of half of its members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was
undertaken for the publication of these rules when they first opened their session.

Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated publication by arguing that
the rules have never been amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in booklet form
available to anyone for free, and accessible to the public at the Senates internet web page.

Issue:

Whether or not publication of the Rules of Procedures Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation through
the Senates website, satisfies the due process requirement of law.

Held:

The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the Senate, or in pamphlet form available at
the Senate, is not sufficient under the Taada v. Tuvera ruling which requires publication either in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The Rules of Procedure even provide that the
rules "shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation,"
precluding any other form of publication. Publication in accordance with Taada is mandatory to comply
with the due process requirement because the Rules of Procedure put a persons liberty at risk. A person
who violates the Rules of Procedure could be arrested and detained by the Senate.

The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic
Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication through the internet is all the more
incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional
equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary purposes. In other words, the law merely
recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of electronic data messages and/or
electronic documents. It does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and
regulations.

Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of the
Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The
conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the
publication of the rules, because it can do so only "in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure."

Manzano vs Sanchez
Manzano vs. Sanchez
AM No. MTJ-001329, March 8, 2001

FACTS:

Herminia Borja-Manzano was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano having been married on May
21, 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish in Caloocan. They had four children. On March 22, 1993, her
husband contracted another marriage with Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. The marriage
contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were separated thus, respondent Judge ought to
know that the marriage was void and bigamous. He claims that when he officiated the marriage of
David and Payao, he knew that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years as
manifested in their joint affidavit that they both left their families and had never cohabit or
communicated with their spouses due to constant quarrels.

ISSUE: Whether the solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who both have an
existing marriage can contract marriage if they have been cohabitating for 5 years under Article 34 of
Family Code.

HELD:

Among the requisites of Article 34 is that parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other.
Considering that both parties has a subsisting marriage, as indicated in their marriage contract that they
are both separated is an impediment that would make their subsequent marriage null and void. Just
like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least 5 years does not severe
the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Clearly, respondent Judge Sanchez demonstrated gross
ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage.

G.R. No. 10010, Chu Jan v. Bernas,

34 Phil. 631
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
August 1, 1916
G.R. No. 10010
CHU JAN, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LUCIO BERNAS, defendant-appellant.
Sulpicio V. Cea for appellant.
ARAULLO, J.:
On the afternoon of June 26, 1913, a match was held in the cockpit of the municipality
of Tabaco, Albay, between two cocks belonging to the plaintiff and to the defendant
respectively. Each of said persons had put up a wager of P160; and as the referee of
the cockpit had declared the defendant's cock the winner in the bout, the plaintiff
brought suit against the defendant in the justice of the peace court of the said pueblo,
asking that his own rooster be declared the winner. The justice of the peace court
decided that the bout was a draw. From this judgment the defendant appealed to the
Court of First Instance of the province. For the purposes of the appeal, the plaintiff
filed his complaint and prayed this court to render judgment ordering the defendant to
abide by and comply with the rules and regulations governing cockfights, to pay the
stipulated wager of P160; to return the other like amount (both sums of wager being
held for safe-keeping by the cockpit owner, Tomas Almonte) and to assess the costs
of both instances against the defendant.
The defendant denied each and all of the allegations of the complaint and moved to
dismiss with the costs against the plaintiff. On September 11, 1913, the said Court of

First Instance rendered judgment dismissing the appeal without special finding as to
costs. The defendant excepted to this judgment as well as to an order dictated by the
same court on November 8th of the same year, on the plaintiff's motion, ordering the
provincial treasurer of Albay and, if necessary, the municipal treasurer of Tabaco of
the same province, to release the deposit of P160 and return it to its owner, the
plaintiff Chinaman, Chu Jan. These proceedings have come before us on appeal by
means of the proper bill of exceptions.
The grounds for the dismissal pronounced by the lower court in the judgment
appealed from ere that the court has always dismissed cases of this nature, that he is
not familiar with the rules governing cockfights and the duties of referees thereof; that
he does not know where to find the law on the subject and, finally, that he knows of
no law whatever that governs the rights to the plaintiff and the defendant in questions
concerning cockfights.
The ignorance of the court or his lack of knowledge regarding the law applicable to a
case submitted to him for decision, the fact that the court does not know the rules
applicable to a certain matter that is the subject of an appeal which must be decided by
him and his not knowing where to find the law relative to the case, are not reasons that
can serve to excuse the court for terminating the proceedings by dismissing them
without deciding the issues. Such an excuse is the less acceptable because, foreseeing
that a case might arise to which no law would be exactly applicable, the Civil Code, in
the second paragraph of article 6, provides that the customs of the place shall be
observed, and, in the absence thereof, the general principles of law.
Therefore the judgment and the order appealed from, hereinbefore mentioned, are
reversed and to record of the proceedings shall remanded to the court from whence
they came for due trial and judgment as provided by law. No special finding is made
with regard to costs. So ordered.
Arellano, C. J., Torres, Johnson, and Trent, JJ., concur.
Moreland, J., took no part.

G.R. No. 119987-88, People v. Veneracion et al., 249 SCRA

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

DECISION

October 12, 1995

G.R. No. 119987-88 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. LORENZO B. VENERACION, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial
Region, Branch 47, Manila, HENRY LAGARTO y PETILLA and ERNESTO CORDERO, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:The sole issue in the case at bench involves a question of law. After finding that an accused
individual in a criminal case has, on the occasion of Rape, committed Homicide, is the judge allowed any
discretion in imposing either the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua or Death?

, J.:

The sole issue in the case at bench involves a question of law. After finding that an accused individual in
a criminal case has, on the occasion of Rape, committed Homicide, is the judge allowed any discretion in
imposing either the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua or Death?

The facts antecedent to the case before this Court, as narrated by petitioner, 1 involve the perpetration
of acts so bizarre and devoid of humanity as to horrify and numb the senses of all civilized men:

On August 2, 1994, the cadaver of a young girl, later identified as Angel Alquiza wrapped in a sack and
yellow table cloth tied with a nylon cord with both feet and left hand protruding from it was seen
floating along Del Pan St. near the corner of Lavesares St., Binondo, Manila.

When untied and removed from its cover, the lifeless body of the victim was seen clad only in a light
colored duster without her panties, with gaping wounds on the left side of the face, the left chin, left
ear, lacerations on her genitalia, and with her head bashed in.

On the basis of sworn statements of witnesses, booking sheets, arrest reports and the necropsy report
of the victim, Abundio Lagunday, a.k.a. Jr. Jeofrey of no fixed address, and Henry Lagarto y Petilla, of 288
Area H. Parola Compound, Tondo, Manila were later charged with the crime of Rape with Homicide in
an Information dated August 8, 1994 filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, National Capital
Judicial Region. Said Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 94-138071, reads:

That on or about August 2, 1994, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and
confederating together with one alias "LANDO" and other persons whose true names, identifies and
present whereabouts are still unknown and helping one another, with treachery, taking advantage of
their superior strength and nocturnity, and ignominy, and with the use of force and violence, that is, by
taking ANGEL ALQUIZA y LAGMAN into a warehouse, covering her mouth, slashing her vagina, hitting
her head with a thick piece of wood and stabbing her neck did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of the person of said ANGEL ALQUIZA y LAGMAN, a minor, seven (7)
years of age, against the latter's will and consent and on said occasion the said ABUNDIO LAGUNDAY,
a.k.a. "LANDO" and others, caused her fatal injuries which were the direct cause of her death
immediately thereafter.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Subsequently thereafter, Ernesto Cordero y Maristela, a.k.a. "Booster," of 1198 Sunflower St., Tondo,
Manila, Rolando Manlangit y Mamerta, a.k.a. "Lando," of 1274 Kagitingan St., Tondo, Manila, Richard
Baltazar y Alino, a.k.a. "Curimao," also of 1274 Kagitingan St., Tondo, Manila, and Catalino Yaon y
Aberin, a.k.a. "Joel," of 1282 Lualhati St., Tondo, Manila were accused of the same crime of Rape with
Homicide in an Information dated August 11, 1994, docketed as Criminal Case No. 94-138138, allegedly
committed as follows:

That on or about the 2nd day of August, 1994, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused
conspiring and confederating with ABUNDIO LAGUNDAY Alias "JR," JEOFREY and HENRY LAGARTO y
PETILLA who have already been charged in the Regional Trial Court of Manila of the same offense under
Criminal Case No. 94-138071, and helping one another, with treachery, taking advantage of their
superior strength and nocturnity and ignominy, and with the use of force and violence, that is, by taking
ANGEL ALQUIZA y LAGMAN into a pedicab, and once helpless, forcibly bringing her to a nearby
warehouse, covering her mouth, slashing her vagina, hitting her head with a thick piece of wood and

stabbing her neck, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the
person of said ANGEL ALQUIZA y LAGMAN, a minor, seven (7) years of age, against the latter's will and
consent and on said occasion the said accused together with their confederates ABUNDIO LAGARTO y
PETILLA caused her fatal injuries which were the direct cause of her death immediately thereafter.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

The two criminal cases were consolidated to Branch 47 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, presided
over by respondent Judge.

Duly arraigned, all the accused, except Abundio Lagunday who was already dead, (allegedly shot by
police escorts after attempting to fire a gun he was able to grab from SPO1 D. Vidad on August 12,
1994), pleaded "Not Guilty." Abundio Lagunday was dropped from the Information.

After trial and presentation of the evidence of the prosecution and the defense, the trial court rendered
a decision 2 on January 31, 1995 finding the defendants Henry Lagarto y Petilla and Ernesto Cordero y
Maristela guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with Homicide and sentenced both
accused with the "penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the accessories provided for by law." 3
Disagreeing with the sentence imposed, the City Prosecutor of Manila on February 8, 1995, filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, praying that the Decision be "modified in that the penalty of death be
imposed" against respondents Lagarto and Cordero, in place of the original penalty (reclusion perpetua).
Refusing to act on the merits of the said Motion for Reconsideration, respondent Judge, on February 10,
1995, issued an Order denying the same for lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent portion reads:

The Court believes that in the above-entitled cases, the accused Lagarto and Cordero have complied
with the legal requirements for the perfection of an appeal. Consequently, for lack of jurisdiction, this
Court cannot take cognizance of the Motion for Reconsideration of the Public Prosecutor of Manila.

WHEREFORE, the order earlier issued by this Court regarding the Notices of Appeal filed by both herein
accused is hereby reiterated.

The Clerk of this Court is hereby directed to transmit the complete records of these cases, together with
the notices of appeal, to the Honorable Supreme Court, in accordance with Sec. 8, Rule 122 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

SO ORDERED.

Hence, the instant petition.

The trial court's finding of guilt is not at issue in the case at bench. The basis of the trial court's
determination of guilt and its conclusions will only be subject to our scrutiny at an appropriate time on
appeal. We have thus clinically limited our narration of events to those cold facts antecedent to the
instant case relevant to the determination of the legal question at hand, i.e., whether or not the
respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion and in excess of jurisdiction when he failed
and/or refused to impose the mandatory penalty of death under Republic Act No. 7659, after finding the
accused guilty of the crime of Rape with Homicide.

We find for petitioner.

Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice. If judges, under the guise of
religious or political beliefs were allowed to roam unrestricted beyond boundaries within which they are
required by law to exercise the duties of their office, then law becomes meaningless. A government of
laws, not of men excludes the exercise of broad discretionary powers by those acting under its
authority. Under this system, judges are guided by the Rule of Law, and ought "to protect and enforce it
without fear or favor," 4 resist encroachments by governments, political parties, 5 or even the
interference of their own personal beliefs.

In the case at bench, respondent judge, after weighing the evidence of the prosecution and the
defendant at trial found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with
Homicide. Since the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime for which respondent judge
found the accused guilty was Republic Act No. 7659, he was bound by its provisions.

Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659 provides:

Sec. 11. Article 335 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows:

Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances:

1. By using force or intimidation.

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons,
the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty shall be
death.

When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion
thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death. . . .
6

Clearly, under the law, the penalty imposable for the crime of Rape with Homicide is not Reclusion
Perpetua but Death. While Republic Act 7659 punishes cases of ordinary rape with the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua, it allows judges the discretion - depending on the existence of circumstances
modifying the offense committed - to impose the penalty of either Reclusion Perpetua only in the three
instances mentioned therein. Rape with homicide is not one of these three instances. The law plainly
and unequivocably provides that "[w]hen by reason or on the occasion of rape, a homicide is
committed, the penalty shall be death." The provision leaves no room for the exercise of discretion on
the part of the trial judge to impose a penalty under the circumstances described, other than a sentence
of death.

We are aware of the trial judge's misgivings in imposing the death sentence because of his religious
convictions. While this Court sympathizes with his predicament, it is its bounden duty to emphasize that
a court of law is no place for a protracted debate on the morality or propriety of the sentence, where
the law itself provides for the sentence of death as a penalty in specific and well-defined instances. The

discomfort faced by those forced by law to impose the death penalty is an ancient one, but it is a matter
upon which judges have no choice. Courts are not concerned with the wisdom, efficacy or morality of
laws. In People vs. Limaco 7 we held that:

[W]hen . . . private opinions not only form part of their decision but constitute a decisive factor in
arriving at a conclusion and determination of a case or the penalty imposed, resulting in an illegality and
reversible error, then we are constrained to state our opinion, not only to correct the error but for the
guidance of the courts. We have no quarrel with the trial judge or with anyone else, layman or jurist as
to the wisdom or folly of the death penalty. Today there are quite a number of people who honestly
believe that the supreme penalty is either morally wrong or unwise or ineffective. However, as long as
that penalty remains in the statute books, and as long as our criminal law provides for its imposition in
certain cases, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law regardless of their private
opinions. It is a well settled rule that the courts are not concerned with the wisdom, efficacy or morality
of laws. That question falls exclusively within the province of the Legislature which enacts them and the
Chief Executive who approves or vetoes them. The only function of the judiciary is to interpret the laws
and, if not in disharmony with the Constitution, to apply them. And for the guidance of the members of
the judiciary we feel it incumbent upon us to state that while they as citizens or as judges may regard a
certain law as harsh, unwise or morally wrong, and may recommend to the authority or department
concerned, its amendment, modification, or repeal, still, as long as said law is in force, they must apply it
and give it effect as decreed by the law-making body. 8

Finally, the Rules of Court mandates that after an adjudication of guilt, the judge should impose "the
proper penalty and civil liability provided for by the law on the accused." 9 This is not a case of a
magistrate ignorant of the law. This is a case in which a judge, fully aware of the appropriate provisions
of the law, refuses to impose a penalty to which he disagrees. In so doing, respondent judge acted
without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack of
jurisdiction in imposing the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua where the law clearly imposes the penalty of
Death.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is GRANTED. The case is hereby REMANDED
to the Regional Trial Court for the imposition of the penalty of death upon private respondents in
consonance with respondent judge's finding that the private respondents in the instant case had
committed the crime of Rape with Homicide under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659, subject to automatic review by this Court of the decision
imposing the death penalty.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Padilla, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Mendoza, Francisco and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

NARVASA, C.J., concurring:

I concur with the conclusions and dispositions set forth in the opinion of Mr. Justice Kapunan. I draw up
this separate opinion merely to address a question which may be raised in relation to the appeal taken
by the accused from the judgment of conviction rendered by respondent Judge. It will be recalled that
respondent Judge declined to act on the merits of motion for reconsideration filed by the prosecution praying that his decision sentencing both accused to suffer reclusion perpetua be "modified in that the
penalty of death be imposed" - for the reason that since the accused had already "complied with the
legal requirements for the perfection of an appeal," the Trial Court had lost jurisdiction over the cases. It
was precisely that refusal that prompted the institution in this Court of the special civil action of
certiorari at bar.

It is indeed axiomatic that once an appeal is perfected from a judgment, jurisdiction is lost by the court
rendering the judgment; and jurisdiction over the case passes to the appellate tribunal. This proposition
considered, and following respondent Judge's reasoning, this Court's directive for the remand of the
case "to the Regional Trial Court for the imposition of the penalty of death upon private respondents,"
might appear to be open to question, since it would require the Trial Court to act in cases over which it
had lost jurisdiction. Such a conclusion is not warranted.

The judgment in question is void, and has been annulled and set aside by this Court, because rendered
"without or in excess of . . . jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction," in so far as it imposes, in light of the facts found to have been proven beyond reasonable
doubt, a penalty other than that peremptorily prescribed by law. The judgment being void, the appeal
attempted to be taken therefrom is inefficacious. The Trial Court may not be deemed to have thereby
lost jurisdiction of the cases. It cannot thus be said that it is being required by this Court to act in cases
over which it has already lost jurisdiction. There exists no legal obstacle to the remand of the cases to it
and its modification of the judgment so that it may comply with the mandatory prescription of the law.

REGALADO, J., concurring:

I concur without reservation in the ponencia in this case and its directive that the court a quo impose
the correct penalty of death as provided by law and consequent to its findings of guilt on the part of
private respondents. Indeed, this separate opinion which explicates my conformity with the procedure
adopted and the mandate thereof would not have been necessary were it not for the contrary

observations that the petition herein should either have been dismissed or consolidated with the
criminal case elevated on appeal by private respondents.

Such digression from the judgment unconditionally accepted by the other members of the Court does
not impress me as being concordant with the Rules of Court and decisional law. What is before us in the
case at bar is an original civil action invoking the extraordinary writ of certiorari for the imposition of the
correct penalty specified by law, which legal duty respondent judge refused to comply with in grave
abuse of his judicial discretion. 1 On the other hand, the criminal case with which it is sought to be
consolidated is an appellate recourse wherein the relief sought is primarily the reversal of the finding of
guilt and the absolution of private respondents.

Evidently, the determinative issues involved and the limited relief sought in the present special civil
action are entirely different from the issues for resolution and the modificatory judgment desired in the
appealed criminal case. The basic rule in consolidation of cases in civil procedure 2 requires, among
others, the same subject matter and the existence of a common question of law or fact. This is
essentially the same as the rule on consolidation in criminal procedure 3 which contemplates charges
for offenses founded on the same facts, or forming part of a series of offenses of similar character.

Also, these reglementary requisites for consolidation require two or more ordinary civil or criminal
actions, and not a special civil action in combination with the former. The impropriety of the latter
situation is specially underscored where the resolution of the controversy in the special civil action is a
pre-judicial matter in the appealed criminal case. These considerations apply to both the trial courts in
the exercise of original jurisdiction and to the appellate courts in the implementation of revisory power.

The purpose of the present original action for certiorari is to have the erroneous judgment of
respondent judge - erroneous because he imposed the wrong penalty - corrected on that score in the
first instance. After such correction shall have been effected, then the appeal from his judgment shall
proceed for the desired review by this Court to determine the guilt or innocence of appellants. The
corrective action must proceed first and the resultant amended judgment containing the proper penalty
shall be the basis for the review as to whether appellants are truly guilty and have to be meted that
ultimate penalty. To have the certiorari action proceed simultaneously and in unification with the
appellate proceeding strikes me as an aberrant procedure. While it does not exactly square with the
figurative posture of putting the cart before the horse, it does result in the same absurdity of both the
horse and the cart moving abreast at the same time along the same judicial path.

It would even be worse if, as suggested, this certiorari action should be dismissed and the appellate
review be conducted with the judgment containing an unauthorized penalty as the basis therefor, with
this Court closing its eyes to such a flagrant mistake. This time the cart precedes the horse. True, an
appeal throws the judgment a quo open for review and the Court may raise the penalty to the

appropriate punitive level. But, as the People pertinently observes, what is there to prevent appellants
from withdrawing their appeal upon sensing from the arguments that, instead of the acquittal or
reduced penalty aspired for, the ultimate denouement would be the death sentence?

Jurisprudence tells us that before the case is submitted for decision, an appellant may withdraw his
appeal in the appellate court. 4 Generally, the withdrawal of an appeal before the filing of the appellee's
brief in this Court is permitted. 5 Assuming that the Court denies the withdrawal of the appeal in order
that the mistake in the penalty imposed may be corrected in the judgment of the case on the merits, 6
why should the appellate course of the proceedings still have to be subject to such contingencies - with
the inevitable waste of time and effort in the formulation of alternative theories in two sets of pleadings
by both parties - when with the decisive sweep of the adjudgment here the doubts are dissipated and
the real areas of contention are laid bare?

Nor is that all. Appellants have come to this Court through the medium of an appeal by writ of error
from a judgment of the trial court imposing the wrong penalty of reclusion perpetua. If the mistake in
the penalty is now rectified with the death sentence being substituted therefor, as undeniably it should
be, then the case will consequently be before this Court on automatic review. That provision calling for
automatic review when capital punishment is inflicted 7 serves equally the interests of both the defense
and the prosecution through protective features established by case law.

Thus, even if the accused had unnecessarily appealed from the judgment imposing the penalty of death
and he thereafter withdraws his appeal, the automatic review of the case shall nonetheless proceed,
albeit without the benefit of briefs or arguments from the accused. 8 The automatic review of the case
shall proceed even if the death convict shall escape, 9 as an exception to the provisions of Section 8,
Rule 124, and such automatic review cannot be waived. 10 The aforementioned beneficial effects are
not provided for and may not be availed of by the accused in an ordinary appeal to this Court.

The automatic review of the death sentence ensures the right of the condemned person to procedural
due process on appeal, and safeguards the interests of the State by exacting the corresponding penal
sanction decreed by law. The disposition adopted by the Court in this case subserves the ends of these
fundamental policies, hence my unqualified assent thereto.

VITUG, J., dissenting:

The ponencia itself indicates that the case against the convicted accused is already on appeal before this
Court. Thus, the instant petition, in my view, has become academic since an appeal brings the case wide
open for review and consideration. A ruling on the petition would be precipitate and might be so
perceived as peremptory on the imposition of the death penalty.

With all due respect, it is my personal view that if the Court is not disposed to dismiss the petition, it
should at the very least be consolidated with the appealed case.

Accordingly, I am constrained, at this time, to vote for the dismissal of the petition.

Davide, Jr., J. concurs.

Separate Opinions

NARVASA, C.J., concurring:

I concur with the conclusions and dispositions set forth in the opinion of Mr. Justice Kapunan. I draw up
this separate opinion merely to address a question which may be raised in relation to the appeal taken
by the accused from the judgment of conviction rendered by respondent Judge. It will be recalled that
respondent Judge declined to act on the merits of motion for reconsideration filed by the prosecution praying that his decision sentencing both accused to suffer reclusion perpetua be "modified in that the
penalty of death be imposed" - for the reason that since the accused had already "complied with the
legal requirements for the perfection of an appeal," the Trial Court had lost jurisdiction over the cases. It
was precisely that refusal that prompted the institution in this Court of the special civil action of
certiorari at bar.

It is indeed axiomatic that once an appeal is perfected from a judgment, jurisdiction is lost by the court
rendering the judgment; and jurisdiction over the case passes to the appellate tribunal. This proposition
considered, and following respondent Judge's reasoning, this Court's directive for the remand of the
case "to the Regional Trial Court for the imposition of the penalty of death upon private respondents,"
might appear to be open to question, since it would require the Trial Court to act in cases over which it
had lost jurisdiction. Such a conclusion is not warranted.

The judgment in question is void, and has been annulled and set aside by this Court, because rendered
"without or in excess of . . . jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction," in so far as it imposes, in light of the facts found to have been proven beyond reasonable
doubt, a penalty other than that peremptorily prescribed by law. The judgment being void, the appeal
attempted to be taken therefrom is inefficacious. The Trial Court may not be deemed to have thereby
lost jurisdiction of the cases. It cannot thus be said that it is being required by this Court to act in cases

over which it has already lost jurisdiction. There exists no legal obstacle to the remand of the cases to it
and its modification of the judgment so that it may comply with the mandatory prescription of the law.

REGALADO, J., concurring:

I concur without reservation in the ponencia in this case and its directive that the court a quo impose
the correct penalty of death as provided by law and consequent to its findings of guilt on the part of
private respondents. Indeed, this separate opinion which explicates my conformity with the procedure
adopted and the mandate thereof would not have been necessary were it not for the contrary
observations that the petition herein should either have been dismissed or consolidated with the
criminal case elevated on appeal by private respondents.

Such digression from the judgment unconditionally accepted by the other members of the Court does
not impress me as being concordant with the Rules of Court and decisional law. What is before us in the
case at bar is an original civil action invoking the extraordinary writ of certiorari for the imposition of the
correct penalty specified by law, which legal duty respondent judge refused to comply with in grave
abuse of his judicial discretion. 1 On the other hand, the criminal case with which it is sought to be
consolidated is an appellate recourse wherein the relief sought is primarily the reversal of the finding of
guilt and the absolution of private respondents.

Evidently, the determinative issues involved and the limited relief sought in the present special civil
action are entirely different from the issues for resolution and the modificatory judgment desired in the
appealed criminal case. The basic rule in consolidation of cases in civil procedure 2 requires, among
others, the same subject matter and the existence of a common question of law or fact. This is
essentially the same as the rule on consolidation in criminal procedure 3 which contemplates charges
for offenses founded on the same facts, or forming part of a series of offenses of similar character.

Also, these reglementary requisites for consolidation require two or more ordinary civil or criminal
actions, and not a special civil action in combination with the former. The impropriety of the latter
situation is specially underscored where the resolution of the controversy in the special civil action is a
pre-judicial matter in the appealed criminal case. These considerations apply to both the trial courts in
the exercise of original jurisdiction and to the appellate courts in the implementation of revisory power.

The purpose of the present original action for certiorari is to have the erroneous judgment of
respondent judge - erroneous because he imposed the wrong penalty - corrected on that score in the
first instance. After such correction shall have been effected, then the appeal from his judgment shall
proceed for the desired review by this Court to determine the guilt or innocence of appellants. The
corrective action must proceed first and the resultant amended judgment containing the proper penalty

shall be the basis for the review as to whether appellants are truly guilty and have to be meted that
ultimate penalty. To have the certiorari action proceed simultaneously and in unification with the
appellate proceeding strikes me as an aberrant procedure. While it does not exactly square with the
figurative posture of putting the cart before the horse, it does result in the same absurdity of both the
horse and the cart moving abreast at the same time along the same judicial path.

It would even be worse if, as suggested, this certiorari action should be dismissed and the appellate
review be conducted with the judgment containing an unauthorized penalty as the basis therefor, with
this Court closing its eyes to such a flagrant mistake. This time the cart precedes the horse. True, an
appeal throws the judgment a quo open for review and the Court may raise the penalty to the
appropriate punitive level. But, as the People pertinently observes, what is there to prevent appellants
from withdrawing their appeal upon sensing from the arguments that, instead of the acquittal or
reduced penalty aspired for, the ultimate denouement would be the death sentence?

Jurisprudence tells us that before the case is submitted for decision, an appellant may withdraw his
appeal in the appellate court. 4 Generally, the withdrawal of an appeal before the filing of the appellee's
brief in this Court is permitted. 5 Assuming that the Court denies the withdrawal of the appeal in order
that the mistake in the penalty imposed may be corrected in the judgment of the case on the merits, 6
why should the appellate course of the proceedings still have to be subject to such contingencies - with
the inevitable waste of time and effort in the formulation of alternative theories in two sets of pleadings
by both parties - when with the decisive sweep of the adjudgment here the doubts are dissipated and
the real areas of contention are laid bare?

Nor is that all. Appellants have come to this Court through the medium of an appeal by writ of error
from a judgment of the trial court imposing the wrong penalty of reclusion perpetua. If the mistake in
the penalty is now rectified with the death sentence being substituted therefor, as undeniably it should
be, then the case will consequently be before this Court on automatic review. That provision calling for
automatic review when capital punishment is inflicted 7 serves equally the interests of both the defense
and the prosecution through protective features established by case law.

Thus, even if the accused had unnecessarily appealed from the judgment imposing the penalty of death
and he thereafter withdraws his appeal, the automatic review of the case shall nonetheless proceed,
albeit without the benefit of briefs or arguments from the accused. 8 The automatic review of the case
shall proceed even if the death convict shall escape, 9 as an exception to the provisions of Section 8,
Rule 124, and such automatic review cannot be waived. 10 The aforementioned beneficial effects are
not provided for and may not be availed of by the accused in an ordinary appeal to this Court.

The automatic review of the death sentence ensures the right of the condemned person to procedural
due process on appeal, and safeguards the interests of the State by exacting the corresponding penal

sanction decreed by law. The disposition adopted by the Court in this case subserves the ends of these
fundamental policies, hence my unqualified assent thereto.

VITUG, J., dissenting:

The ponencia itself indicates that the case against the convicted accused is already on appeal before this
Court. Thus, the instant petition, in my view, has become academic since an appeal brings the case wide
open for review and consideration. A ruling on the petition would be precipitate and might be so
perceived as peremptory on the imposition of the death penalty.

With all due respect, it is my personal view that if the Court is not disposed to dismiss the petition, it
should at the very least be consolidated with the appealed case.

Accordingly, I am constrained, at this time, to vote for the dismissal of the petition.

Davide, Jr., J. concurs.

Footnotes

1 Rollo, p. 4, Except as to the penalty imposed, petitioner and respondent court are in agreement as to
the essential facts of the case.

2 Rollo, pp. 24-51.

3 Rollo, p. 28, The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered judgment is hereby rendered, dismissing the information as against
ROLANDO MANLANGIT for lack of evidence, and finding both accused HENRY LAGARTO y PETILLA and
ERNESTO CORDERO y MARISTELA "guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE WITH
HOMICIDE charged in the Information of these cases, and sentencing both accused the penalty of
reclusion perpetua with all the accessories provided for by law."

Said accused are further ordered to indemnify, jointly and severally, the private complainant the sum of
P100,000 for the death of the victim, ANGEL ALQUIZA; the sum of P500,000 for moral damages, and the
amount of P52,000.00 for actual damages representing expenses incurred for the wake and funeral of
the victim. They are further ordered to pay the costs of these suits.

SO ORDERED. (ANNEX 'A', Petition)

4 Act of Athens (1955).

5 Id.

6 Emphasis supplied.

7 88 Phil. 36 [1951]. 8 Id. at 43-44. 9 Rule 120, sec. 1. REGALADO, concurring: 1 People vs. Olaes, 105
Phil. 502 (1959); People vs. Limaco, 88 Phil. 35 (1951); People vs. Carillo, et al., 85 Phil. 611 (1950). 2
Section 1, Rule 31. 3 Section 14, Rule 119. 4 U.S. vs. Sotto, 38 Phil. 666 (1918). 5 People vs. Mendoza, 93
Phil. 581 (1953). 6 See People vs. Roque, G.R. No. 53470, June 26, 1981, 105 SCRA 117. 7 Sec. 10, Rule
122. 8 People vs. Villanueva, 93 Phil. 927 (1953). 9 People vs. Vallente, L-37937, September 30, 1986,
144 SCRA 495; People vs. Cornelio, et al., L-1289, June 10, 1971, 39 SCRA 435. 10 People vs. Daban, L31429, January 31, 1972, 43 SCRA 185.

Case Digest, People vs. Purisima, No. L -47757-61, January 28, 1980

FACTS: Informations were filed to 26 individuals from Manila and Samar, individually and separately,
before the Courts of First Instance of Manila and Samar for illegal possession of deadly weapon or
violation of Presidential Decree No. 9 pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated Sept 21 and 23, 1973.
On the motion to quash by the accused, the three respondent judges: Judge Purisima and Judge
Macaren, both of CFI of Manila; and Judge Polo of CFI of Samar, issued in the respective cases filed
before them an order to quash or dismiss the informations on a common ground Lack of essential
elements to constitute an offense penalized by PD No. 9. The respondent judges stated that to
constitute the said offense, two elements must be present; (1) possession of any bladed, blunt or
pointed weapon outside of residence as stated in par 3; (2) and intended to use it to commit or abet
subversion, rebellion, etc as stated in the preamble of the said PD. The People, as petitioners, thru the
Solicitor General, contended that the prohibited acts need not be related to subversive activities and the
intent of the accused are irrelevant since its is a statutory offense and punishing the possession of such
deadly weapon is not only to eradicate subversive acts but also criminality in general. The petitioners
also argued that the preamble is not an essential part of an act and cannot prevail over the text of the
law itself.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners arguments as to the intention and scope of PD No. 9 (3) correct?

HELD: NO. The Supreme Court says that the intention of PD No. 9 (3) is to penalize the acts which are
those related to the desired result of Proc. No. 1081 and Gen. Orders Nos. 6 and 7 which are to suppress
those who commit or abet lawlessness, rebellion, subversive acts and the like. The preamble of PD No. 9
also clearly concurs to that, though the preamble is not a part of the statute, it is the key to determine
what is the intent and spirit of the decree and determine what acts fall within the purview of a penal
statute.

Martinez v. Van Buskirk, 18 Phil. 79

FACTS: On Spetember 11, 1908, Martinez was riding a carromata in Ermita along the left side of the
street when a delivery wagon belonging to the defendant to which a pair of horses was attached came
along the street in the opposite direction at great speed. The horses ran into the carromata and
wounded Martinez servely. The defendant presented evidence that the cochero was a good servant and
a reliable and safe cochero. And that he was delivering stuff so he tied the driving lines of the horses to
the front end of the delivery wagon and went inside the wagon to unload the stuff to be delivered. But
while unloading, another vehicle drove by whose driver cracked a whip and made some noises which
frightened the horses and which made it ran away. The cochero was thrown from the inside of the
wagon and was unable to stop the horses. The horses collided with the carromata.

ISSUE: W/N the employer is liable for the negligence of his cochero

HELD: No. Defendant not liable. Cochero was not negligent. What happened was an accident. It has
been a custom or a matter of common knowledge and universal practice of merchants to leave horses in
the manner which the cochero left it during the accident. This is the custom in all cities. The public,
finding itself unprejudiced by such practice has acquiesced for years.

Van Dorn vs Romillo

Van Dorn vs. Romillo
139 SCRA 139

FACTS:

Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Filipino Citizen and private respondent, Richard Upton, a US citizen, was married
in Hong Kong in 1979. They established their residence in the Philippines and had 2 children. They were
divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982 and petitioner remarried, this time with Theodore Van Dorn. A suit
against petitioner was filed on June 8, 1983, stating that petitioners business in Ermita Manila, the
Galleon Shop, is a conjugal property with Upton and prayed therein that Alice be ordered to render an
accounting of the business and he be declared as the administrator of the said property.

ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and private respondent in Nevada is
binding in the Philippines where petitioner is a Filipino citizen.

HELD:

Private respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He would have no standing to sue
petitioner to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is estopped by his own representation before the
court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. Furthermore, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law. Petitioner is not bound to her marital obligations to respondent by virtue of her
nationality laws. She should not be discriminated against her own country if the end of justice is to be
served.

G.R. No. 37048, Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 58 Phil. 67

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

March 7, 1933

G.R. No. 37048

MANUELA BARRETTO GONZALEZ, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AUGUSTO C. GONZALEZ, defendant-appellant.
AUGUSTO C. GONZALEZ, Jr., ET AL., intervenors-appellees.

Quintin Paredes and Barrera and Reyes for appellant.

DeWitt, Perkins and Brady for plaintiff-appellee.
Camus and Delgado for intervenors-appellees.

HULL, J.:

Plaintiff and defendant are citizens of the Philippine Islands and at present residents of the City of
Manila. They were married in the City of Manila on January 19, 1919, and lived together as man and
wife in the Philippine Islands until the spring of 1926. They voluntarily separated and since that time
have not lived together as man and wife. Of this union four children were born who are now 11, 10, 8
and 6 years of age. Negotiations between the parties, both being represented by attorneys, continued
for several months, whereupon it was mutually agreed to allow the plaintiff for her support and that of
her children, five hundred pesos (P500) monthly; this amount to be increased in case of illness or
necessity, and the title of certain properties to be put in her name. Shortly after this agreement the
husband left the Islands, betook himself to Reno, Nevada, and secured in that jurisdiction an absolute
divorce on the ground of desertion, which decree was dated November 28, 1927. Shortly thereafter the
defendant moved to California and returned to these Islands in August 1928, where he has since
remained. On the same date that he secured a divorce in Nevada he went through the forms of

marriage with another citizen of these Islands and now has three children as a result of that marriage.
Defendant, after his departure from these Islands, reduced the amount he had agreed to pay monthly
for the support of his wife and four minor children and has not made the payments fixed in the Reno
divorce as alimony.

Shortly after his return his wife brought action in the Court of First Instance of Manila requesting that
the courts of the Philippine Islands confirm and ratify the decree of divorce issued by the courts of the
State of Nevada; that section 9 of Act No. 2710, which reads as follows:

The decree of divorce shall dissolve the community of property as soon as such decree becomes final,
but shall not dissolve the bonds of matrimony until one year thereafter.

The bonds of matrimony shall not be considered as dissolved with regard to the spouse who, having
legitimate children, has not delivered to each of them or to the guardian appointed by the court, within
said period of one year, the equivalent of what would have been due to them as their legal portion if
said spouse had died intestate immediately after the dissolution of the community of property.

be enforced, and that she and the defendant deliver to the guardian ad litem the equivalent of what
would have been due to their children as their legal portion from the respective estates had their
parents did intestate on November 28, 1927. It is also prayed that the community existing between
plaintiff and defendant be declared dissolved and the defendant be ordered to render an accounting
and to deliver to the plaintiff her share of the community property, that the defendant be ordered to
pay the plaintiff alimony at the rate of five hundred pesos (P500) per month, that the defendant be
ordered to pay the plaintiff, as counsel fees, the sum of five thousand pesos (P5000), and that the
defendant be ordered to pay plaintiff the expenses incurred in educating the three minor sons.

A guardian ad litem was appointed for the minor children, and they appear as intervenors and join their
mother in these proceedings. The Court of First Instance, after hearing, found against the defendant and
granted judgment as prayed for by the plaintiff and intervenors, with the exception of reducing
attorneys fees to three thousand, and also granted costs of the action against the defendant. From this
judgment defendant appeals and makes the following assignment of errors:

I. The lower court erred in not declaring that paragraph 2 of section 9 of the Philippine Divorce Law, is
unconstitutional, null and void.

II. The lower court erred in holding that section 9 of Act No. 2710 (Divorce Law) applies to the Nevada
decree of divorce issued in favor of appellant Augusto C. Gonzalez, said decree being entitled to
confirmation and recognition.

III. The lower court erred in not dismissing the complaint in intervention for lack of cause of action
against appellant and appellee.

IV. The lower court erred in not declaring the notice of lis pendens filed by intervenors to be null and
void.

V. The lower court erred in ordering the appellant to pay the sum of P500 per month for the support not
only of his children but also of his ex-wife, appellee herein, Manuela Barretto.

VI. The lower court erred in not holding that plaintiff- appellee, Manuela Barretto, is not entitled to
support from her ex-husband, herein appellant, over and beyond the alimony fixed by the divorce
decree in Exhibit A.

VII. The lower court erred in condemning defendant appellant to pay to plaintiff-appellee P3,000
attorney's fees.

VIII. The lower court erred in denying appellant's motion for new trial.

While the parties in this action are in dispute over financial matters they are in unity in trying to secure
the courts of this jurisdiction to recognize and approve of the Reno divorce. On the record here
presented this can not be done. The public policy in this jurisdiction on the question of divorce is clearly
set forth in Act No. 2710, and the decisions of this court: Goitia vs. Campos Rueda (35 Phil., 252); Garcia
Valdez vs. Soteraa Tuason (40 Phil., 943-952); Ramirez vs. Gmur (42 Phil., 855); Chereau vs. Fuentebella
(43 Phil., 216); Fernandez vs. De Castro (48 Phil., 123); Gorayeb vs. Hashim (50 Phil., 22); Francisco vs.
Tayao (50 Phil., 42); Alkuino Lim Pang vs. Uy Pian Ng Shun and Lim Tingco (52 Phil., 571); and the late
case of Cousins Hix vs. Fluemer, decided March 21, 1931, and reported in 55 Phil., 851.

The entire conduct of the parties from the time of their separation until the case was submitted to this
court, in which they all prayed that the Reno divorce be ratified and confirmed, clearly indicates a
purpose to circumvent the laws of the Philippine Islands regarding divorce and to secure for themselves
a change of status for reasons and under conditions not authorized by our law. At all times the

matrimonial domicile of this couple has been within the Philippine Islands and the residence acquired in
the State of Nevada by the husband of the purpose of securing a divorce was not a bona fide residence
and did not confer jurisdiction upon the Court of that State to dissolve the bonds if matrimony in which
he had entered in 1919. While the decisions of this court heretofore in refusing to recognize the validity
of foreign divorce has usually been expressed in the negative and have been based upon lack of
matrimonial domicile or fraud or collusion, we have not overlooked the provisions of the Civil Code now
in force in these Islands. Article 9 thereof reads as follows:

The laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity or persons, are
binding upon Spaniards even though they reside in a foreign country.

And article 11, the last part of which reads:

. . . the prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts and their property, and those intended to
promote public order and good morals, shall nor be rendered without effect by any foreign laws or
judgments or by anything done or any agreements entered into a foreign country.

It is therefore a serious question whether any foreign divorce relating to citizens of the Philippine
Islands, will be recognized in this jurisdiction, except it be for a cause, and under conditions for which
the courts of Philippine Islands would grant a divorce. The lower court in granting relief as prayed for
frankly stated that the securing of the divorce, the contracting of another marriage and the bringing into
the world of innocent children brings about such a condition that the court must grant relief. The
hardships of the existing divorce laws of the Philippine Islands are well known to the members of the
Legislature. It is of no moment in this litigation what he personal views of the writer on the subject of
divorce may be. It is the duty of the courts to enforce the laws of divorce as written by the Legislature if
they are constitutional. Courts have no right to say that such laws are too strict or too liberal.

Litigants by mutual agreement can not compel the courts to approve of their own actions or permit the
personal relations of the citizens of these Islands to be affected by decrees of foreign courts in a manner
which our Government believes is contrary to public order and good morals. Holding the above views it
becomes unnecessary to discuss the serious constitutional question presented by appellant in his first
assignment of error.

The judgment of the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila must therefore be reversed and
defendant absolved from the demands made against him in this action. This, however, without
prejudice to any right of maintenance that plaintiff and the intervenors may have against defendant. No
special pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

Avancea, C.J., Street, Villamor Ostrand, Abad Santos, Vickers, Imperial and Butte JJ., concur.

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. GEORGE I. FRANK, DefendantAppellant.

DECISION

JOHNSON, J.:

Judgment was rendered in the lower court on the 5th day of September, 1905. the Defendant appealed.
On the 12th day of October, 1905, the Appellant filed his printed bill of exceptions with the clerk of the
Supreme Court. On the 5th day of December, 1905, the Appellant filed his brief with the clerk of the
Supreme Court. On the 19th day of January, 1906, the Attorney-General filed his brief in said cause.
Nothing further was done in said cause until on about the 30th day of January, 1909, when the
respective parties were requested by this court to prosecute the appeal under penalty of having the
same dismissed for failure so to do; whereupon the Appellant, by petition, had the cause placed upon
the calendar and the same was heard on the 2d day of February, 1909.

The facts from the record appear to be as follows: chanrobles virtualawlibrary

First. That on or about the 17th day of April, 1903, in the city of Chicago, in the State of Illinois, in the
United States, the Defendant, through a representative of the Insular Government of the Philippine
Islands, entered into a contract for a period of two years with the Plaintiff, by which the Defendant was
to receive a salary of 1,200 dollars per year as a stenographer in the service of the said Plaintiff, and in
addition thereto was to be paid in advance the expenses incurred in traveling from the said city of
Chicago to Manila, and one-half salary during said period of travel.

Second. Said contract contained a provision that in case of a violation of its terms on the part of the
Defendant, he should become liable to the Plaintiff for the amount expended by the Government by
way of expenses incurred in traveling from Chicago to Manila and the one-half salary paid during such
period.

Third. The Defendant entered upon the performance of his contract upon the 30th day of April, 1903,
and was paid half-salary from the date until June 4, 1903, the date of his arrival in the Philippine Islands.

Fourth. That on the 11th day of February, 1904, the Defendant left the service of the Plaintiff and
refused to make a further compliance with the terms of the contract.

Fifth. On the 3d day of December, 1904, the Plaintiff commenced an action in the Court of First Instance
of the city of Manila to recover from the Defendant the sum of 269. 23 dollars, which amount the
Plaintiff claimed had been paid to the Defendant as expenses incurred in traveling from Chicago to
Manila, and as half-salary for the period consumed in travel.

Sixth. It was expressly agreed between the parties to said contract that Laws No. 80 and No. 224 should
constitute a part of said contract.

To the complaint of the Plaintiff the Defendant filed a general denial and a special defense, alleging in
his special defense that the Government of the Philippine Islands had amended Laws No. 80 and No. 224
and had thereby materially altered the said contract, and also that he was a minor at the time the
contract was entered into and was therefore not responsible under the law.

To the special defense of the Defendant the Plaintiff filed a demurrer, which demurrer the court
sustained.

Upon the issue thus presented, and after hearing the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause, the
lower court rendered a judgment against the Defendant and in favor of the Plaintiff for the sum of 265.
90 dollars. The lower court found that at the time the Defendant quit the service of the Plaintiff there
was due him from the said Plaintiff the sum of 3. 33 dollars, leaving a balance due the Plaintiff in the
sum of 265. 90 dollars. From this judgment the Defendant appealed and made the following
assignments of error: chanrobles virtualawlibrary

1.

The court erred in sustaining Plaintiffs demurrer to Defendants special defenses.

2.

The court erred in rendering judgment against the Defendant on the facts.

With reference to the above assignments of error, it may be said that the mere fact that the legislative
department of the Government of the Philippine Islands had amended said Acts No. 80 and No. 224 by
Acts No. 643 and No. 1040 did not have the effect of changing the terms of the contract made between
the Plaintiff and the Defendant. The legislative department of the Government is expressly prohibited by
section 5 of the Act of Congress of 1902 from altering or changing the terms of a contract. The right

which the Defendant had acquired by virtue of Acts No. 80 and No. 224 had not been changed in any
respect by the fact that said laws had been amended. These acts, constituting the terms of the contract,
still constituted a part of said contract and were enforceable in favor of the Defendant.

The Defendant alleged in his special defense that he was a minor and therefore the contract could not
be enforced against him. The record discloses that, at the time the contract was entered into in the
State of Illinois, he was an adult under the laws of that State and had full authority to contract. The
Plaintiff [the Defendant] claims that, by reason of the fact that, under that laws of the Philippine Islands
at the time the contract was made, made persons in said Islands did not reach their majority until they
had attained the age of 23 years, he was not liable under said contract, contending that the laws of the
Philippine Islands governed. It is not disputed upon the contrary the fact is admitted that at the
time and place of the making of the contract in question the Defendant had full capacity to make the
same. No rule is better settled in law than that matters bearing upon the execution, interpretation and
validity of a contract are determined b the law of the place where the contract is made. (Scudder vs.
Union National Bank, 91 U. S., 406.) cralaw Matters connected with its performance are regulated by
the law prevailing at the place of performance. Matters respecting a remedy, such as the bringing of
suit, admissibility of evidence, and statutes of limitations, depend upon the law of the place where the
suit is brought. (Idem.) cralaw

The Defendants claim that he was an adult when he left Chicago but was a minor when he arrived at
Manila; that he was an adult a the time he made the contract but was a minor at the time the Plaintiff
attempted to enforce the contract, more than a year later, is not tenable.

Our conclusions with reference to the first above assignment of error are, therefore.

First. That the amendments to Acts No. 80 and No. 224 in no way affected the terms of the contract in
question; and

Second. The Plaintiff [Defendant] being fully qualified to enter into the contract at the place and time
the contract was made, he cannot plead infancy as a defense at the place where the contract is being
enforced.

We believe that the above conclusions also dispose of the second assignment of error.

For the reasons above stated, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed, with costs.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Carson and Willard, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-7487 December 29, 1913

CONSTANZA YAEZ DE BARNUEVO, plaintiff and appellant,
vs. GABRIEL FUSTER,defendant and appellant.
O'Brien & DeWitt for plaintiff.
Chicote & Miranda for defendant.
JOHNSON, J.:
On the 7th of February, 1875, Gabriel Fuster and Constanza Yaez
were joined in a Catholic or canonical marriage in the city of Malaga,
Spain. In February of 1892, Gabriel Fuster came to the Philippine
Islands, settled, and acquired real and personal property. Toward
the middle of 1896, Constanza Yaez came to Manila, where her
husband was residing, and here lived with him in conjugal relations
until the month of April, 1899. On the 4th day of that month and
year they made an agreement, in a public document, by which they
"resolved to separate and live apart, both consenting to such
separation, and by virtue thereof the husband authorized the wife to
move to Spain, there to reside in such place as the said lady
pleases." (B. of E., p. 13.) In the same document, the husband
undertook to send his wife the sum of 300 pesetas monthly for her
support, payable in Madrid, Spain, from the month of June of the
said year 1899. The husband complied with this obligation until
August, 1899, after which time he ceased to make further
payments.
chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary

c hanro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry

In the beginning of March, 1909, the wife returned to the

Philippines, but the husband had absented himself therefrom in the
early days of February of the same year. On the 11th of March,
1909, the wife commenced divorce proceedings against her
husband, alleging as cause of action the adultery committed by him
in or about the year 1899 with a certain woman that she named in
the complaint and with whom he had lived and cohabited and by
whom he had had two children. She prayed that she be granted a
decree of divorce; that the court order the separation of the
properties of the plaintiff and the defendant, to date from the date
of the said decree; that the conjugal society be therefore liquidated,
and after the amount of the conjugal property had been

determined, that one-half thereof be adjudicated to her;

furthermore, as to the amount of pension owing for her support but
not paid to her, that the defendant be ordered to pay her the sum
of 36,000 Spanish pesetas, that is, 7,220 Spanish dollars, which,
reduced to Philippine currency at the rate of exchange on the date
of the complaint, amounted to P12,959.90.
chanroble svi rtualaw lib rary

chan rob les vi rtual law lib rary

The defendant denied that either he or his wife was a resident of the
city of Manila, as they had their domicile in Barcelona, Spain, and
he alleged that both of them were natives and subjects of Spain. He
admitted that he was married to Constanza Yaez; he also admitted
having executed the document of the 4th of April, 1899, in which he
had undertaken to make an allowance for the support of his wife in
Madrid, but he denied the other paragraphs of the complaint. As a
special defense with regard to the allowance, he alleged: "That in or
about the month of May, 1900, he wrote to his wife, the plaintiff,
instructing her to return to Manila, with a view of joining her
husband and being maintained by him in his own house; that the
communication was ignored by the plaintiff, who against the will of
the defendant, continued to live separately from him that from the
year 1901, the defendant did not know her address; that since
1900, the plaintiff has lived in comfort and has known where her
husband resided; that the plaintiff, during all of the time referred to,
in addition to dispossing of valuable property belonging to her
husband, possessed and still possesses property of her own,
acquired by her, in greater amount than that owned by her
husband; and that in any case the action has prescribed by
operation of law."(B. of E., pp. 7 and 8.) As to the divorce, he
admits that he had by the plaintiff two children that have died. He
expressly denied the contents of paragraph 5 of the complaint,
relating to the charge of adultery and also those of paragraphs 6, 7,
and 8, concerning the possession of real and personal property of
the conjugal partnership, the statement of their amount, and their
qualification as being all conjugal property. As a special defense, he
alleged that prior to the year 1899 he conferred powers of attorney
upon the plaintiff to administer and collect property and credits
pertaining to him to the value of about 200,000 pesos; that the
plaintiff accepted and exercised the said power of attorney, attached
the property and collected the credits without ever having rendered

any account of them. As a special preferred defense, he alleged that

neither the trial court nor any other court in the Philippine Islands
has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint, because,
as to the allowance for support, since neither the plaintiff nor the
defendant are residents of Manila, or of any other place in the
Philippine Islands, the agreement upon the subject was neither
celebrated, nor was it to be fulfilled, in the Philippine Islands; and
as to the divorce, because the action therefore ought to be tried by
the ecclesiastical courts. In conclusion, he prayed that the court
find: That the court was without jurisdiction over the two causes of
action; that even if it had jurisdiction, it could not order the
payment of the sum claimed as arrears of alimony; that, after all,
the action with regard to this cause of action has prescribed; and as
to the prayer for a decree of divorce, the defendant should be
acquitted, while on the other hand the plaintiff should be required to
render to the defendant an accounting, supported by proofs, of her
operations as his attorney and administratrix of his property in
Spain.
chanrob lesvi rtual awlib rary

cha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

In deciding the case, the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila
held itself to have jurisdiction, decreed the suspension of life in
common between the plaintiff and defendant, ordered the latter to
pay the former P5,010.17, directed that the communal property be
divided between the parties, with costs against the defendant, and
in event that the parties could not agree to the division, it was to be
effected by commissioners according to law.
chanroble svirtualawl ibra ry

chan roble s virtual law l ib rary

Both parties appealed from this judgment, but notwithstanding the

appeal, the partition of the property, by means of commissioners,
was proceeded with. These latter, after various vicissitudes,
rendered their report and account of the partition to the court, who
then rendered final judgment, from which, also, both parties
appealed.
chan roble svirtualawl ibra ry

chan roble s virtual law lib rary

I. DEFENDANT'S APPEAL.
The first error assigned is the utter lack of jurisdiction of the trial
court and of all other courts of the Islands to try the case, either
with regard to the fulfillment of the contract to furnish alimony, or
to decree a divorce or suspension of life in common between the

spouses: lack of jurisdiction over the persons and over the subject
matter of the litigation; and over the persons of the contending
parties, because neither of the spouses was a resident of the
Philippines on the date of the complaint.
chanrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary

c hanro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry

The lower court did not commit this error attributed to him. The
defendant had not proved that he had elsewhere a legal domicile
other than that which he manifestly had in the Philippines during
the seventeen years preceding the date of the complaint. On the
contrary, it plainly appears, without proof to the contrary, that
during this not inconsiderable period, extending from the year 1892
until a month prior to the arrival of his wife in the Philippines in
March, 1909, he had constantly resided in the said Islands, had kept
open house, and had acquired in the city of Manila quite a little real
property which is now the object of the division of the conjugal
society. It is also plainly shown, without proof to the contrary, that
his wife resided in this city of Manila from the middle of 1896 until
April, 1899, at which time she was permitted by him to change her
residence. It is affirmed by the defendant in point five of his answer
to the complaint, that in May, 1900, he sent a letter instructing the
plaintiff to return to Manila to live with her husband and to be
supported by him in his house, but that the plaintiff, against the will
of the defendant, continued to live part from him. (B. of E., p. 7.) It
is also affirmed in the said answer, that during all of the time
referred to in the complaint, and especially since 1900, the plaintiff
knew where her husband resided. (B. of E., p. 7.) It is also very
evident that the contract, by virtue of which he authorized his wife
to move to Spain and reside there in such place as was agreeable to
her, was executed in these Islands, "in the city of Manila on the 4th
of April, 1889," as is to be seen in the heading of the document. (B.
of E., p. 12.) Finally, at page 11 of his brief, he says that the record
shows him to be a Spanish subject, inscribed in the consulate of his
nation, and cities article 26 of the Civil Code, the Treaty of Paris and
the Philippine Bill.
ch anroble svirtualawl ibra ry

chan roble s vi rtual law lib rary

Granting these facts, there can be no doubt that the defendant,

although a Spanish subject, was a resident of these Islands. Article
26 of the Civil Code that he cites itself provides that "Spaniards who
change their domicile to a foreign country, where they may be

considered as natives without other conditions than that of residents

therein, shall be required, in order to preserve the Spanish
nationality, to state that such is their wish before the Spanish
diplomatic or consular agent, who must record them in the registry
of Spanish residents, as well as their spouses, should they be
married, and any children they may have." From this provision,
which is the exclusive and irrefutable law governing the defendant,
we are to conclude that the domicile of the defendant and the
plaintiff is fully proven, irrespective of the Treaty of Paris. Without
this supposition of having acquired his domicile and residence in
these Islands, he could not have required his wife to return to live
with him therein because this requirement could only be based on
articles 58 of the Civil Code of Spain, according to which the wife is
obliged to follow her husband wherever he wishes to establish his
residence, or on article 48 of chapter 5 of the Marriage Law in force
in the Philippines, which imposes upon the wife the duty of obeying
her husband, living in his company, or of following him to wherever
he transfers his domicile or residence. And just because he was
absent for a month before his wife returned to the Philippines, he
cannot be understood to have surrendered his habitual domicile of
more than seventeen years, without having established any other
afterwards, and without making any declaration in legal form,
before he absented himself, of it being his intention to change his
domicile, while at the same time he retains here his house, real
property and all manner of means of subsistence. Section 377 of the
Code of Civil Procedure leaves to the election of the plaintiff the
bringing of a personal action like the one at bar either in the place
where the defendant may reside or be found, or in that where the
plaintiff resides.
chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary

chanrob les vi rtual law lib rary

The litigating spouses have gained not only domicile ( domicilio) but
also residence (vecindad) in Manila. In this litigation the defendant
claims that, born as he says in Mallorca, in the Balearic Islands, he
is not subject, in his marriage, to the rules governing conjugal
property, that are in force in the territories of Spain that are
governed by the common law of Castillo (as the Philippines in their
day), because they are opposed to the Foral Law in force in the said
Islands and which is respected by the Civil Code. Even if this
defense could be sustained herein, paragraph 2 of article 15 of the

said Civil Code would be applicable. It provides: "For the purposes

of this article, residence ( vecindad) will be acquired: By residence
of ten years in common law provinces or territories, unless before
the termination of that time he manifests his will to the contrary; or
by a residence of two years, if the interested person declares this to
be his will . . . In any case, the wife will follow the condition of her
husband. . . ." On no occasion had the defendant manifested his will
to the contrary, not even as he was leaving, after a residence of
seventeen years, a month before the return of his wife to these
Islands. On the contrary, when he inscribed himself in the Spanish
consulate, he declared his intention of continuing to reside in the
Islands as a Spaniard and not as a Mallorquin, subject as such to
the common law of Spain.
chanroblesvi rt ualawlib ra ry

chan robles v irt ual law li bra ry

In an endeavor to demonstrate the lack of jurisdiction of the courts

of these Islands over the subject matter of the complaint that is to
try an action for divorce between two Catholic Spaniards, he alleges
in his appeal: That both litigants are Spanish subjects and that they
contracted a Catholic marriage; that in accordance with article 9 of
the Civil Code of Spain (the same as that of these Islands) the laws
relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons, govern Spaniards although they reside in
a foreign country; that, in consequence, "all questions of a civil
nature, such as those dealing with the validity or nullity of the
matrimonial bond, the domicile of the husband and wife, their
support, as between them, the separation of their properties, the
rules governing property, marital authority, division of conjugal
property, the classification of their property, legal causes for
divorce, the extent of the latter, the AUTHORITY to decree it, and,
in general, the civil effects of marriage and divorce upon the person
and properties of the spouses, are questions that are governed
exclusively by the national law of the husband and wife, and, in our
case, by the Spanish law by virtue of article 9 as above set out."
(Brief, p. 12.) The appellant and defendant continues his argument,
saying: That by the express provision of article 80 of the Civil Code
of Spain, "jurisdiction in actions for divorce and nullification of
canonical marriages lies with ecclesiastical courts," while that of civil
tribunals is limited to civil marriages; that this being so, the action
for divorce brought by the plaintiff in the cause does not fall within

the jurisdiction of the civil courts, according to his own law of

persons, because these courts ought to apply the Spanish law in
accordance with the said article 9 of the Civil Cod of Spain, and this
Spanish law grants the jurisdiction over the present cause to the
ecclesiastical courts, in the place of which no tribunal of these
Islands con subrogate itself. Says this appellant: "If a law of a
foreign country were of rigorous application in a given case, a North
American tribunal would have no jurisdiction upon an ecclesiastical
court and therefore the North American tribunal in applying it would
have to exercise a faculty which that law reserved to the
ecclesiastical court." (Brief, pp. 13, 14, and 15.)
chanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry

Unless we take the question itself for granted, the foregoing

reasoning cannot be upheld. The question is precisely whether the
courts of the Philippines are competent or have jurisdiction to
decree the divorce now on appeal, and it is taken for granted that
the power to decree it is one of the rights included in the personal
statute, but appellant does not prove by any law or legal doctrine
whatever that the personal statute of a foreigner carries with it, to
whether he transfers his domicile, the authority established by the
law of his nation to decree his divorce, which was what he had to
demonstrate.
chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary

c hanro bles vi rt ual law li bra ry

The authority of jurisdictional power of courts to decree a divorce is

not comprised within the personal status of the husband and wife,
simply because the whole theory of the statutes and of the rights
which belong to everyone does not go beyond the sphere of private
law, and the authority and jurisdiction of the courts are not a matter
of the private law of persons, but of the public or political law of the
nation. "The jurisdiction of courts and other questions relating to
procedure are considered to be of a public nature and consequently
are generally submitted to the territorial principle. . . . All persons
that have to demand justice in a case in which foreigners intervene,
since they can gain nothing by a simple declaration, should
endeavor to apply to the tribunales of the state which have coercive
means (property situated in the territory) to enforce any decision
they may render. Otherwise, one would expose himself in the suit to
making useless expenditures which, although he won his case,
would not contribute to secure his rights because of the court's lack

of means to enforce them." (Torres Campos, "Elementos de

Derecho International Privado," p. 108.) "Justice," says the same
professor, "is a principle superior to that of nations, and it should
therefore be administered without taking into any account
whatsoever the state to which the litigants belong. . . . In order to
foster their relations and develop their commerce, all civilized
nations are interested in doing justice, not alone to their own
people, but to those foreigners who contract within the country or
outside of it juridical ties which in some manner effect their
sovereignty. (Ibid, p. 107.) Might its courts, in some cases, in suits
between foreigners residing in its territory, apply the personal law of
the parties, but abdicate their jurisdiction, refrain from
administering justice because the personal law of the foreigner gave
the jurisdiction of the given case to some court that is not the
territorial one of the nation? This has never yet been claimed in any
of the theories regarding the conflict of laws arising out of questions
of nationality and domicile; it would be equivalent to recognizing
extraterritorial law in favor of private persons. The provisions of
article 80 of the Civil Law of Spain is only binding within the
dominions of Spain. It does not accompany the persons of the
Spanish subject wherever he may go. He could not successfully
invoke it if he resided in Japan, in China, in Hongkong or in any
other territory not subject to the dominion of Spain. Foreign
Catholics domiciled in Spain, subject to the ecclesiastical courts in
actions for divorce according to the said article 80 of the Civil Code,
could not allege lack of jurisdiction by invoking, as the law of their
personal statute, a law of their nation which gives jurisdiction in
such a case to territorial courts, or to a certain court within or
without the territory of their nation.
chanroblesv irt ualawli bra ry

chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry

It is a question that has already been settled in two decisions of the

Supreme Court (Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 3 Phil. Rep., 34, and
Ibaez vs. Ortiz, 5 Phil. Rep., 325).
chanro blesvi rt ualawlib ra rychan roble s virtual law lib rary

In the present action for divorce the Court of First Instance of the
city of Manila did not lack jurisdiction over the persons of the
litigants, for, although Spanish Catholic subjects, they were
residents of this city and had their domicile herein.
chanro blesvi rt ualawlib ra ry

chanrob les vi rtual law lib rary

The Courts of First Instance of the Philippine Islands have the power
and jurisdiction to try actions for divorce. That of the city of Manila
did not lack jurisdiction by reason of the subject matter of the
litigation.
chanroble svirtualawl ibra ry

chan roble s virtual law l ib rary

The second assignment of error is directed against the finding of the

court that the defendant had committed adultery with a certain
woman in this city from the year 1899 until 1909; the third was
against the finding that the adultery was accompanied by public
scandal and injured the dignity of his wife; and the fourth for having
decreed the divorce, suspension of the married life, and the
separation of the properties of the parties.
chanroble svi rtualawl ib rary

chan rob les vi rtual law lib rary

The evidence relating to the foregoing not being sent up on appeal,

we are unable to review it, so we accept the findings of the trial
court.
chanroble svirtualawl ibra ry

chan roble s virtual law lib rary

There is a point of law regarding the claim that the adultery, even
though it were proven would not be a cause for divorce, because no
public scandal resulted therefrom nor was there contempt displayed
for the wife. (Appellant's brief, p. 26.) The facts must be accepted
by this tribunal as they were found by the trial court, since the
evidence cannot be reviewed; moreover, the appellee affirms the
contrary and maintains that it is a proven fact, public and notorious,
an assertion that the trial court must have found to be proven.
(Appellee's brief, p. 5.) In law, it is not necessary that adultery, to
be a cause for divorce, should be accompanied by public scandal
and contempt for the wife. There is no law that requires this. Law 2,
title 9, of the Fourth Partida does not require it.
chanroblesv irt ualawli bra ry

chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry

The fifth and sixth assignments of error are directed against the
finding of the trial court that there exists conjugal property, a
finding that the appellant maintains is without foundation, and that
which holds that the property in the hands of the receiver (that
sought to be divided) is conjugal property, a conclusion which the
appellant claims to be contrary to the law which should be applied
to the case and according to which, as alleged in the tenth
assignment of error, the whole of the property should be
adjudicated to the defendant as being exclusively his.
chanrob lesvi rtualaw lib rary

cha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

Facts: The appellant affirms that he is a native of Mallorca in the

Balearic Islands and that is also the condition of his wife, the
plaintiff. Law: That although the rule of the Civil Code is that which
legally governs conjugal property, yet at the same time it admits, as
an exception, the laws, usages, and customs of the Foral Law,
according to which, as applied in the Balearic Islands, the law of the
family is that of the division of property and that of conjugal
property is not known; so that the property pertains exclusively to
the spouse who, by whatever title, has acquired it. In support of the
facts, appellant cites pages 27 to 37 and 39 to 41 in the bill of
exceptions; and of the law, the doctrinal authority of Manresa,
Gutierrez, and Alcubilla.
chan roble svirtualawl ibra ry

chan rob les vi rtual law lib rary

The citation from pages 39 to 41 of the bill of exceptions, the only

pertinent one, is but an affidavit filed by the defendant in which,
under oath, he himself testifies as to the Foral Law in the Balearic
Islands. The adverse party says with regard to this: "This affidavit
was never presented in proof, was never received by the trial judge,
and cannot seriously be considered as an effort to establish the law
of a foreign jurisdiction. Sections 300, 301 and 302 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, now in force in these islands, indicate the method
by which the law of a foreign country may be proved. We maintain
that the affidavit of a person not versed in the law, which was never
submitted as proof, never received by the trial court, and which has
never been subjected to any cross-examination, is not a means of
proving a foreign law on which the defendant relies." (Brief, pp. 6
and 7.)
chanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry

Furthermore, on the supposition that the defendant could invoke the

Foral Law as the law of his personal status in the matter of the
regimen of his marriage, and that to allege this he be considered as
authorized by article 15 of the Civil Code, we have said before, in
dealing with his law of domicile, that paragraph 2 of this article 15
of the Civil Code would be entirely adverse to his claim, and if it be
advanced that there is a similar Foral Law in the Philippines by
virtue of paragraph 1 of the said article 15, it might be said, though
there is not at present any need to say it, that it is not in force. The
two findings attacked are in perfect accord with the law. All the
property of the marriage, says article 1407 of the Civil Code, shall

be considered as conjugal property until it is proven that it belongs

exclusively to the husband or to the wife. No proof has been
submitted to this effect.
chanroblesv irt ualawli bra ry

chan robles v irt ual law l ibra ry

As seventh assignment of error it is alleged that the court below

erred in holding in the judgment that the plaintiff had brought to the
marriage a dowry of 30,000 Spanish dollars. But the defendant
himself adds that the court made no order or decree regarding the
alleged dowry. On the other hand, the plaintiff, in her fourth
assignment of errors, claimed that the court erred in not confirming
the report of the commissioners which gave to the said plaintiff the
sum of 30,000 Spanish dollars. It is unnecessary to say anything
further.
chanroble svirtualawl ibra ry

chan roble s virtual law l ib rary

The eighth error consists in that the court below ordered the
defendant to pay to the plaintiff P56,010.17 Philippine currency,
whereas the plaintiff had made no demand in her complaint with
respect to this sum; that no arrears of payment are owing for
alimony, even though payments had been stipulated in the contract,
unless they are claimed by the person who had furnished the actual
support, and that alimony is due only when it is necessary; so that,
as the plaintiff has had no need of it for ten years, nor has she
stated who has furnished it, there is no reason for awaring her the
amount of the arrears for all that time; that as she has allowed ten
years to elapse before claiming it, her action prescribed in 1904,
that is to say, after five years.
chanroblesvi rt ualawlib ra ry

chanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry

The plaintiff acknowledges that there is no petition or prayer in her

complaint as to this cause of action, but she considers that in equity
such an omission can be supplied.
chan roble svirtualawl ibrary

chanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry

Paragraph 3 of section 89 (90) of the Code of Civil Procedure

determines one of the requisites of the complaint: "A demand for
the relief which the plaintiff claims." The section goes on to say: "If
the recovery of money or damages is demanded, the amount
demanded must be stated. If special relief, such as an order for the
special restitution of property, etc., the ground of demanding such
relief must be stated and the special relief prayed for. But there
may be added to the statement of the specific relief demanded a

general prayer for such further or other relief as shall be deemed

equitable."
chanrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

In the complaint of the case at bar the provisions of paragraph 2 of

the said section 89 [90] are complied with by setting forth in its
paragraphs 4 and 5 the relation of the cause of action, that is, the
contract of the 4th of April, 1899, by which the defendant obligated
himself to send to the plaintiff in Spain a certain amount of money
monthly, for her support, and the failure to comply with this
obligation after the month of August, 1899. Paragraph 6, as a
consequence of the promise established in 4 and 5, says as follows:
"That the defendant Gabriel Fuster y Fuster actually owes the
plaintiff the sum of 36,100 Spanish pesetas, that is, 7,220 dollars,
which, reduced at the present rate of exchange, amounts to the
sum of P12,959.90, Philippine currency." (B. of E., p. 2.) In the case
of default on the part of the defendant "the court shall proceed to
hear the plaintiff and his witnesses and assess the damages or
determine the other relief to which the plaintiff may be entitled,
including the costs of the action, and render final judgment for the
plaintiff to recover such sum or to receive such other relief as the
pleadings and the facts warrant." The pleadings, not the prayer of
the complaint.
chanroble svirtualawl ibra ry

chan roble s virtual law li bra ry

This court has recently decided that the pleadings, not the prayer,
exactly, are the essential part of a complaint.
chanroble svirtualawl ibra ry

chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry

It is not a question of alimony for the present, nor for the future,
which constitutes the first cause of action, but of certain sums
stipulated in a contract. This contract is a law for the contracting
parties, a law which rises superior to those general laws which
regulate the nature of the subject matter of the contract (in the
present case an entirely voluntary one) and which govern judicial
action.
chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary

c hanro bles vi rtua l law li bra ry

An action arising out of a contract of this nature does not prescribe

like all personal ones, but, by the provisions of article 1964 of the
Civil Code, after fifteen years. But even though the provisions of
article 1966 were applicable, by which an action to compel the
fulfillment of an agreement to pay alimony prescribes in five years,
yet by section 50 of the Code of Civil Procedure, "when payment

has been made upon any demand founded upon contract . . . an

action may be brought . . . after such payment. . . ." And the
parties admit that on the 18th of August, 1908, the plaintiff secured
the payment of 6,365.68 pesetas by virtue of the contract of April 4,
1899. So that from August, 1908, until March, 1909, the date of the
complaint, the said period of five years had not elapsed.
chanrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary

cha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

The ninth assignment of error consists in that the court below erred
in empowering the receiver to proceed to the separation of the
property and in appointing commissioners to make the partition and
distribution between the spouses, since the principal question in this
action hinges upon the classification of the property; that it was
erroneously classified as conjugal property, whereas all of it
pertained to the husband alone and should be adjudicated to him
for the reason that, as it reiterated in the tenth assignment of error,
the conjugal partnership was not subject to the provisions of the law
governing conjugal property, because such provision are totally
foreign to the Foral Law of the Balearic Islands.
chanroblesvi rt ualawlib ra ry

chanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry

The action of the trial court, by the terms of section 184 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, was in accordance with law. The only question
before this court is the partition of real property. All that referred to
in the second decision appealed from, dated September 9, 1911, is
urban real estate. Its classification as conjugal property is in
accordance with law, as is shown in the foregoing reasoning, and
that no consideration of the Foral Law enters into the question has
also been demonstrated.
chanroblesvi rt ualawlib ra ry

chanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry

II. PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL.

As the trial court rendered judgment ordering the defendant to pay
to the plaintiff only P5,010.17, the petitioner here prays that the
judgment be reversed and that in its place this court order the
defendant to pay to the plaintiff her claim of P12,959.90, plus the
additional sum which the alimony amounts to at the rate of P107.70
per month, dating from the 1st of August, 1909, until the date of
payment, with legal interest upon the said P12,959.90 from the
date of the filing of the complaint until the date of payment, and,
furthermore, legal interest upon each of the monthly payments due

after the filing of the complaint, and which will continue to become
due until the close of this litigation.
chanro blesvi rt ualawlib ra ry

chanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry

The trial court made the following findings: First, that the total
amount of the alimony owing to the plaintiff amounted to
34,200 pesetas; second, that of this sum the plaintiff had collected
in Madrid 6,365.68; third, that the remainder, that is, 27,834.32,
was equivalent to $5,566.86 Mexican currency; fourth, that the
Mexican peso was worth 90 centavos Philippine currency; fifth, that
therefore the sum of $5,566.86 Mexican currency was equivalent to
P5,010 Philippine currency; and finally, as there was no evidence as
to the kind of pesetas agreed upon, it was to be presumed that it
was that current at the time and place where the agreement was
made, which was Mexican pesetas.
chanroble svi rtualaw lib rary

chan rob les vi rtual law lib rary

In her appeal, the plaintiff contends that these findings are

erroneous in that, firstly, the parties had admitted that
the pesetas referred to in the contract of the 4th of April, 1899,
were Spanish, and in view of this admission the court was not
empowered to define them as being different from the kind
admitted by the parties; secondly, if he were so empowered, his
interpretation should be governed by the terms of the law.
chanroble svirtualawl ibra ry

chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry

With regard to the first error, the plaintiff says that the statement is
made in her complaint that the defendant had obligated himself to
pay her a "monthly pension for her support of 300 Spanish pesetas,
that is, 60 Spanish dollars, which, reduced to Philippine currency,
amounts to P107.70;" that the defendant had admitted this in hi
answer to the complaint, and that by his finding in a sense other
than that accepted and not refuted in the answer of the defendant,
the court violated the provisions of section 94 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.
chanroblesv irt ualawli bra ry

chan robles v irt ual law l ibra ry

The court has not incurred this error, because it does not appear
that the defendant in his answer accepted the fact in the manner
alleged in the complaint. The defendant said that he admitted
having made the agreement referred to in paragraph 4 of the
complaint, and that he stood upon its contents. The contents of the
document to which he refers is of the following tenor: "Mr. Fuster
binds and obligates himself to pay to his said wife the sum of

300 pesetas, monthly, payable de su cuenta in the city and capital

of Madrid, for her support. . . ." He did not therefore admit the
matter of the Spanish pesetas; that does not appear in the contents
of the document - the only thing he admitted in his answer.
chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary

c hanro bles vi rt ual law li bra ry

As to the second error, the court did not commit it in applying the
rule contained in article 1287 of the Civil Code. "The usages or
customs of the country shall be taken into consideration in
interpreting ambiguity in contracts. . . ." If in the contract the word
"pesetas," not being specific, was ambiguous, then it was in
harmony with this precept to interpret it as being the peseta then in
use or current when and where the agreement was made, Mexican
being then the usual and current money in the Philippines.
Furthermore, the phrase de su cuenta clearly means that it was not
"Spanish pesetas" that the contracting parties had in mind, because
if the agreement had been a specific one to pay 300
Spanish pesetas in Madrid, everyone would of course understand
that the expense of following the fluctuations of change and of the
differences in value between the money current in the country, and
the Spanish pesetas, would have to be defrayed by the obligated
party; whereas, if nothing more than pesetas was mentioned, it was
necessary to decide which party should pay for the difference in
value so that the 300pesetas stipulated here should be 300
Spanish pesetas paid in Madrid. Against the reasons of the court
below for his decision this court can offer no legal grounds. The rule
of interpretation cited is the one applicable and it supports the
reasoning of the decision appealed from.
chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary

c hanro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry

The appellant also alleges as error that the court did not adjudicate
to her the 30,000 Spanish dollars which the commissioners
proposed in their report. First she characterizes this sum of 30,000
dollars as the dowry of the wife delivered to the husband, then,
later, as paraphernal property brought to the marriage.
chanroblesv irt ualawli bra ry

chan robles v irt ual law l ibra ry

According to the last instructions of the court to the commissioners,

this amount of 30,000 dollars could not enter into the partition, and
with reason. If, as was claimed, it was inherited by the plaintiff from
her uncle, it really constitutes paraphernal property under article
1381. "Paraphernal property is that which the wife brings to the

marriage without being included in the dowry and that she may
acquire after the creation of the same without being added thereto."
But it is a provision of article 1384 that "The wife shall have the
management of the paraphernal property unless she has delivered
the same to her husband, before a notary, in order that he may
administer said property. In such case the husband is obliged to
create a mortgage for the value of the personal property he may
receive, or to secure said property, in the manner established for
the dowry property." Not even was there offered in evidence the
public deed of delivery, nor the equally public mortgage deed that is
required by law. So that, therefore, the necessary proof of the
obligation to return paraphernal property as here demanded does
not exist.
chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary

cha nro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry

The partition of property decreed in the judgment appealed from of

the 9th of September, 1911, should be and is hereby confirmed.
chanroblesv irtualawli bra ry

law libra ry

The two judgments appealed from are hereby affirmed, without

special pronouncement of costs in this instance.
chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary

cha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

chan roble s virtual

Testate Estate of Bohanan v. Bohanan In the proceedings for the probate of the will, it was found out
and it was decided that the testator was a citizen of the State of Nevada because he had selected this as
his domicile and his permanent residence. (See Decision dated April 24, 1950, supra). So the question at
issue is whether the testamentary dispositions, especially those for the children which are short of the
legitime given them by the Civil Code of the Philippines, are valid. It is not disputed that the laws of
Nevada allow a testator to dispose of all his properties by will (Sec. 9905, Complied Nevada Laws of
1925, supra). It does not appear that at time of the hearing of the project of partition, the above-quoted
provision was introduced in evidence, as it was the executor's duly to do. The law of Nevada, being a
foreign law can only be proved in our courts in the form and manner provided for by our Rules. x x x We
have, however, consulted the records of the case in the court below and we have found that during the
hearing on October 4, 1954 x x x the foreign law, especially Section 9905, Compiled Nevada Laws. was
introduced in evidence by appellant's (herein) counsel as Exhibits "2". x x x Again said laws presented by
the counsel for the executor and admitted by the Court as Exhibit "B" during the hearing of the case on
January 23, 1950 before Judge Rafael Amparo. x x x In addition, the other appellants, children of the
testator, do not dispute the above-quoted provision of the laws of the State of Nevada. Under all the
above circumstances, we are constrained to hold that the pertinent law of Nevada, especially Section
9905 of the Compiled Nevada Laws of 1925, can be taken judicial notice of by us, without proof of such
law having been offered at the hearing of the project of partition.

Bellis v. Bellis A provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in
accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law
cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 now Article 16 of the Civil Code states
said national law should govern.

Issue:

What law should be applicable Philippine or California Law?

Ruling:

The court refers to Art. 16 (2) providing that intestate and testamentary successions with respect to
order of succession and amt. of successional right is regulated by the NATIONAL LAW OF THE PERSON.

California Probate Code provides that a testator may dispose of his property in the form and manner he
desires.

Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California provides that if no law on the contrary, the place where the
personal property is situated is deemed to follow the person of its owner and is governed by the LAW
OF HIS DOMICILE.

These provisions are cases when the Doctrine of Renvoi may be applied where the question of validity of
the testamentary provision in question is referred back to the decedents domicile the Philippines.

S.C. noted the California law provides 2 sets of laws for its citizens: One for residents therein as provided
by the CA Probate Code and another for citizens domiciled in other countries as provided by Art. 946 of
the Civil Code of California.

The conflicts of law rule in CA (Art. 946) authorize the return of question of law to the testators
domicile. The court must apply its own rule in the Philippines as directed in the conflicts of law rule in
CA, otherwise the case/issue will not be resolved if the issue is referred back and forth between 2 states.

The SC reversed the lower courts decision and remanded the case back to it for decision with an
instruction that partition be made applying the Philippine law.