1.)DENR et al VS.

YAP et al
G.R. No. 167707
October 8, 2008
FACTS:
On November 10, 1978, then President Marcos issued Proc. No. 1801 declaring
Boracay Island, among other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as
tourist zones and marine reserves under the administration of the Philippine Tourism
Authority (PTA). President Marcos later approved the issuance of PTA Circular 3-82
dated September 3, 1982, to implement Proclamation No. 1801.
Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them from
filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for
titling purposes, respondents-claimants Mayor . Yap, Jr., and others filed a petition
for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan
In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proc. No. 1801 and PTA Circular
No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands. They
declared that they themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay
since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. They declared their lands for
tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them. Respondents-claimants posited that
Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing Circular did not place Boracay beyond
the commerce of man. Since the Island was classified as a tourist zone, it was
susceptible of private ownership. Under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, they
had the right to have the lots registered in their names through judicial confirmation
of imperfect titles.
The Republic, through the OSG, opposed the petition for declaratory relief. The OSG
countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It
formed part of the mass of lands classified as public forest, which was not
available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of the Revised Forestry Code, as
amended. The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants reliance on PD No. 1801
and PTA Circular No. 3-82 was misplaced. Their right to judicial confirmation of title
was governed by Public Land Act and Revised Forestry Code, as amended. Since
Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable and disposable, whatever
possession they had cannot ripen into ownership.
On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents-claimants,
declaring that, PD 1810 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 Revised Forestry Code, as
amended.
The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied. The Republic then
appealed to the CA. On In 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC
decision. Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly denied. Hence,
the present petition under Rule 45.
On May 22, 2006, during the pendency the petition in the trial court, President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island partly
reserved forest land (protection purposes) and partly agricultural land (alienable and
disposable).
On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Sacay,and other landowners in Boracay
filed with this Court an original petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification
of Proclamation No. 1064. They allege that the Proclamation infringed on their prior
vested rights over portions of Boracay. They have been in continued possession of
their respective lots in Boracay since time immemorial.
On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two petitions

ISSUE:
Whether private claimants have a right to secure titles over their occupied portions
in Boracay.
HELD: petitions DENIED. The CA decision is reversed.
Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified land
of the public domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are
considered public forest under PD No. 705.
PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the
public domain as public forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a public forest as
a mass of lands of the public domain which has not been the subject of the present
system of classification for the determination of which lands are needed for forest
purpose and which are not. Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified lands, including
those in Boracay Island, are ipso facto considered public forests. PD No. 705,
however, respects titles already existing prior to its effectivity.
The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or
timber, such classification modified by the 1973 Constitution. The 1987 Constitution
reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with one addition: national parks. Of
these, only agricultural lands may be alienated. Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of
May 22, 2006, Boracay Island had never been expressly and administratively
classified under any of these grand divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land of
the public domain.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with
the presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that
there must be a positive act of the government, such as a presidential proclamation
or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of
Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure
a certification from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed
for the required number of years is alienable and disposable. The burden of proof in
overcoming such presumption is on the person applying for registration (or claiming
ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or
disposable.
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action,
report, statute, or certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of
evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private
claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and
disposable. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They
call for proof.
Proc. No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to classify Boracay Island
as alienable and disposable land. If President Marcos intended to classify the island
as alienable and disposable or forest, or both, he would have identified the specific
limits of each, as President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done
in Proclamation No. 1801.
2.) REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs CA et. al.
G.R. No. 155450
August 6, 2008
FACTS:
On 2 June 1930, the then Court of First Instance of Cagayan (trial court) issued
Decree No. 3819284 in favor of spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan
(spouses Carag), predecessors-in-interest of private respondents Heirs of Antonio
Carag and Victoria Turingan (private respondents), covering a parcel of land

identified as Lot No. 2472, Cad. 151, containing an area of 7,047,673 square meters
(subject property), situated in Tuguegarao, Cagayan. On 19 July 1938, pursuant to
said Decree, the Register of Deeds of Cagayan issued Original Certificate of Title No.
115855 (OCT No. 11585) in the name of spouses Carag.
On 2 July 1952, OCT No. 11585 was cancelled to discharge the encumbrance
expressly stated in Decree No. 381928. Two transfer certificates of title were issued:
(1) issued in the name of the Province of Cagayan, covering Lot 2472-B consisting of
100,000 square meters and (2) issued in the name of the private respondents,
covering Lot 2472-A consisting of 6,997,921 square meters.
On 19 May 1994, Bienvenida Taguiam Vda. De Dayag and others filed with the
Regional Office No. 2 of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), Tuguegarao, Cagayan, a letter-petition requesting the DENR to initiate the
filing of an action for the annulment of Decree No. 381928 on the ground that the
trial court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate a portion of the subject property
which was allegedly still classified as timber land at the time of the issuance of
Decree No. 381928.
The Regional Executive Director of the DENR created an investigating team to
conduct ground verification and ocular inspection of the subject property.The
investigating team reported thatA) The portion of the lot was found to be still within
the timberland area at the time of the issuance of the Decree and O.C.T. of the
spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan, and the same was only released as
alienable and disposable on February 22, 1982, and (B) Petitioner Bienvenida
Taguiam Vda. De Dayag and others have possessed and occupied by themselves and
thru their predecessors-in-interest the portion of the lot since time immemorial.
68 years after the issuance of Decree No. 381928, petitioner filed with the Court of
Appeals a complaint for annulment of judgment, cancellation and declaration of
nullity of titles9 on the ground that in 1930 the trial court had no jurisdiction to
adjudicate a portion of the subject property. The disputed portion was allegedly still
classified as timber land at the time of issuance of Decree No. 381928 and,
therefore, was not alienable and disposable until 22 February 1982 when the
disputed portion was classified as alienable and disposable.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint because of lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. However,
the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration.Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the then Court of First Instance of Cagayan had jurisdiction to
adjudicate a tract of timberland in favor of respondent spouses Antonio Carag and
Victoria Turingan
HELD:
Lack of jurisdiction, as a ground for annulment of judgment, refers to either lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the subject matter of the
claim.Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is determined by
the statute in force at the time of the filing of the action.
Under the Spanish regime, all Crown lands were per se alienableunless specifically
declared as mineral or forest zone, or reserved by the State for some public purpose
in accordance with law
In this case, petitioner has not alleged that the disputed portion had been declared
as mineral or forest zone, or reserved for some public purpose in accordance with
law, during the Spanish regime or thereafter.
The law prevailing when Decree No. 381928 was issued in 1930 was Act No. 2874,26
which provides:

SECTION 6. The Governor-General, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of

Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time classify the lands of the
public domain into (a) Alienable or disposable
(b) Timber and
(c) Mineral lands
and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to
another, for the purposes of their government and disposition.
Petitioner has not alleged that the Governor-General had declared the disputed
portion of the subject property timber or mineral land pursuant to Section 6 of Act
No. 2874.
Furthermore, Section 8 of Act No. 2874 provides that lands which are already private
lands, as well as lands on which a private claim may be made under any law, are not
covered by the classification requirement in Section 8 for purposes of disposition.
This exclusion in Section 8 recognizes that during the Spanish regime, Crown lands
were per se alienable unless falling under timber or mineral zones, or otherwise
reserved for some public purpose in accordance with law.
Clearly, with respect to lands excluded from the classification requirement in Section
8, trial courts had jurisdiction to adjudicate these lands to private parties. Petitioner
has not alleged that the disputed portion had not become private property prior to
the enactment of Act No. 2874. Neither has petitioner alleged that the disputed
portion was not land on which a private right may be claimed under any existing law
at that time.
Therefore, when the trial court issued the decision for the issuance of Decree No.
381928 in 1930, the trial court had jurisdiction to determine whether the subject
property, including the disputed portion, applied for was agricultural, timber or
mineral land. The trial court determined that the land was agricultural and that
spouses Carag proved that they were entitled to the decree and a certificate of title.
The government, which was a party in the original proceedings in the trial court as
required by law, did not appeal the decision of the trial court declaring the subject
land as agricultural. Since the trial court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the action, its decision rendered in 1930, or 78 years ago, is now final and beyond
review.
Also, even as Section 1, Article XII of the 1935 Constitution declared that all
agricultural, timber and mineral lands of the public domain belong to the State, it
recognized that these lands were "subject to any existing right, grant, lease or
concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this
Constitution." When the Commonwealth Government was established under the
1935 Constitution, spouses Carag had already an existing right to the subject land,
including the disputed portion, pursuant to Decree No. 381928 issued in 1930 by the
trial court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
3.) RURAL BANK OF ANDA, INC. VS. ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF
LINGAYEN-DAGUPAN
G.R. No. 155051, May 29, 2007
FACTS:
The lot in dispute, Cadastral Lot 736 (Lot 736), is located in the Poblacion of
Binmaley, Pangasinan. Lot 736 has a total area of about 1,300 square meters and is
part of Lot 3. Lot 3 is bounded on the north by Lot 1 of Plan II-5201-A and on the

south by the national road. In front of Lot 736 is the building of Mary Help of
Christians Seminary (seminary) which is on Lot 1.
Lot 1 of Plan II-5201-A, which adjoins Lot 3 on the north, is titled in the name of
respondent Roman Catholic Archbishop of Lingayen (respondent) under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 6375 (TCT 6375). An annotation on TCT 6375 states that the
ownership of Lot 3 is being claimed by both respondent and the Municipality of
Binmaley.
In 1958, the Rector of the seminary ordered the construction of the fence separating
Lot 736 from the national road to prevent the caretelas from parking because the
smell of horse manure was already bothering the priests living in the seminary.
On 22 December 1997, the Sangguniang Bayan of Binmaley, Pangasinan, passed
and approved Resolution Nos. 104 which converted Lot 736 from an institutional lot
to a commercial lotand Resolution No. 105 which authorized the municipal mayor to
enter into a contract of lease for 25 years with the Rural Bank of Anda over a portion
of Lot 736 with an area of 252 square meters.
In December 1997, Fr. Arenos, the director of the seminary, discovered that a sawali
fence was being constructed enclosing a portion of Lot 736 for the construction of
the building for the Rural Bank of Anda. He thereafter requested Mayor Domalanta
to remove the sawali fence and restore the concrete fence. However, Mayor
Domalanta informed respondent that the construction of the building of the Rural
Bank of Anda would resume. Thus, respondent filed a complaint for Abatement of
Illegal Constructions, Injunction and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Injunction in
the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan.

Both respondent and the Municipality of Binmaley failed to prove their right over Lot
736. Since Lot 736 has never been acquired by anyone through purchase or grant or
any other mode of acquisition, Lot 736 remains part of the public domain and is
owned by the state.
This is in accordance with the Regalian doctrine which holds that the state owns all
lands and waters of the public domain.[17] Thus, under Article XII, Section 2 of the
Constitution: All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife,
flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the state.
Municipal corporations cannot appropriate to themselves public or government lands
without prior grant from the government.[18] Since Lot 736 is owned by the state,
the Sangguniang Bayan of Binmaley exceeded its authority in passing Resolution
Nos. 104 and 105. Thus, Resolution Nos. 104 and 105 are void and consequently, the
contract of lease between the Municipality of Binmaley and the Rural Bank of Anda
over a portion of Lot 736 is also void.
4.)CRUZ vs. SECRETARY of DENR
FACTS:

Respondent claims Lot 736 based on its alleged open, continuous, adverse, and
uninterrupted possession of Lot 736. However, the records reveal otherwise.

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and
mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain
provisions and implementing rules of (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA).
Respondents who were the chairperson and commisioners of the
National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), and the government agency created
under the IPRA to implement its provisions defended the constitutionality of the
IPRA and pray that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit.
On October 1998, respondents Secretary of DENR and Secretary of the DBM filed
through the SolGen a consolidated Comment.
The Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the
ground that it grants ownership over natural resources to indigenous
peoples and prays that the petition be granted in part.
On November 1998, a group of intervenors (Flavier, et. al), joined the NCIP in
defending the constitutionality of IPRA and praying for the dismissal of the petition.
On March 1999, the Commission on Human Rights likewise filed a Motion to
Intervene and/or to Appear as Amicus Curiae and asserts that IPRA is an expression
of the principle of parens patriae and that the State has the responsibility to protect
and guarantee the rights of those who are at a serious disadvantage like indigenous
peoples.
On March 1999, another group (Haribon, et al.), filed a motion to Intervene with
attached Comment-in-Intervention. They agree with the NCIP and Flavier, et al. that
IPRA is consistent with the Constitution and pray that the petition for prohibition and
mandamus be dismissed.
The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations
were granted.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and its
Implementing Rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of
the States ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals
and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine
embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution:

The records show that Lot 736 is used as a pathway going to the school, the
seminary, or the church, which are all located on lots adjoined to Lot 736.[14] Lot
736 was also used for parking and playground.[15] In other words, Lot 736 was used
by the public in general.

(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, and
Section 3(b) which, in turn, defines ancestral lands;
(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains
including inalienable public lands, bodies of water, mineral and other resources

The trial court rendered a decision in favor of plaintiff [Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Lingayen-Dagupan holding that Lot 736 is not covered by any Torrens title either in
the name of respondent or in the name of the Municipality of Binmaley. The trial
court held that Lot 736 is public in nature. Since Lot 736 is property of public
dominion, it is outside the commerce of man. Thus, the Sangguniang Bayan of
Binmaley, Pangasinan exceeded its authority when it adopted Resolution Nos. 104
and 105 converting Lot 736 from an institutional lot to a commercial lot and
authorizing the municipal mayor to enter into a contract of lease for 25 years with
the Rural Bank of Anda.
CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether Resolution Nos. 104 and 105 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Binmaley are
valid.
HELD:
The petition has no merit.
Both respondent and the Municipality of Binmaley admit that they do not have title
over Lot 736. The Assistant Chief of the Aggregate Survey Section of the Land
Management Services in Region I testified that no document of ownership for Lot
736 was ever presented to their office.

found within ancestral domains are private but community property of the
indigenous peoples;
(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of
ancestral domains and ancestral lands;
(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples
over the ancestral domains;
(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples
over the ancestral lands;
(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the
harvesting, extraction, development or exploration of minerals and other natural
resources within the areas claimed to be their ancestral domains, and the right to
enter into agreements with nonindigenous peoples for the development and
utilization of natural resources therein for a period not exceeding 25 years,
renewable for not more than 25 years; and
(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain,
develop, protect and conserve the ancestral domains and portions thereof which are
found to be necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries,
wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or reforestation.
ISSUE: WON IPRA or Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL?
HELD: NO. The Supreme Court dismissed the case pursuant to the Rules of Civil
Procedure, since the SC failed to obtain a mjaority vote twice.
Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition.
Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition.
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not
obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting
remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.
Hence, ancestral domains may include natural resources somehow
against the regalian doctrine.
5.) Legarda vs. Saleeby
FACTS:
The plaintiffs and the defendant occupy, as owners, adjoining lots in the district of
Ermita in the city of Manila. There exists and has existed a number of years a stone
wall between the said lots. Said wall is located on the lot of the plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs, March 2, 1906, presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration
for the registration of their lot, which decreed that the title of the plaintiffs should be
registered and issued to them the original certificate provided for under the Torrens
system. Said registration and certificate included the wall.
Later the predecessor of the defendant presented a petition in the Court of Land
Registration for the registration of the lot now occupied by him. On March 25, 1912,
the court decreed the registration of said title and issued the original certificate
provided for under the Torrens system. The description of the lot given in the petition
of the defendant also included said wall.
On December 13, 1912 the plaintiffs discovered that the wall which had been
included in the certificate granted to them had also been included in the certificate
granted to the defendant .They immediately presented a petition in the Court of
Land Registration for an adjustment and correction of the error committed by
including said wall in the registered title of each of said parties.
The lower court however, without notice to the defendant, denied said petition upon
the theory that, during the pendency of the petition for the registration of the
defendants land, they failed to make any objection to the registration of said lot,
including the wall, in the name of the defendant.
ISSUE: Who is the owner of the wall and the land occupied by it?
HELD:

For the issue involved, The Land Registration Act (Act 496) affords no remedy.
However, it can be construed that where two certificates purports to include the
same registered land, the holder of the earlier one continues to hold title and
will prevail.
The real purpose of the Torrens system of registration, is to quiet the title
of the land; to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except
claims which were noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may
arise subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, once a title is
registered the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals
of the court, or sitting in the mirador de su casa, to avoid the possibility of losing
his land.
The law guarantees the title of the registered owner once it has entered into the
Torrens system.
6.) Traders Royal Bank vs. Court of Appeals, Patria Capay, et al G.R. No.
118862, Sept. 24, 1999 (315 SCRA 190)
FACTS:
A parcel of land owned by the spouses Capay was mortgaged to and subsequently
extrajudicially foreclosed by Traders Royal Bank (TRB).
To prevent property sale in public auction, the Capays filed a petition for preliminary
injunction alleging the mortgage was void because they did not receive the proceeds
of the loan.
A notice of lis pendens (suit pending) was filed before the Register of Deeds with the
notice recorded in the Day Book.
Meanwhile, a foreclosure sale proceeded with the TRB as the sole and winning
bidder. The Capays title was cancelled and a new one was entered in TRBs name
without the notice of lis pendens carried over the title.
The Capays filed recovery of the property and damages. Court rendered a decision
declaring the mortgage was void for want of consideration and thus cancelled TRBs
title and issued a new cert. of title for the Capays.
Pending its appeal before the court, TRB sold the land to Santiago who subsequently
subdivided and sold to buyers who were issued title to the land. Court ruled that the
subsequent buyers cannot be considered purchasers for value and in good faith
since they purchase the land after it became a subject in a pending suit before the
court. Although the lis pendens notice was not carried over the titles, its recording in
the Day Book constitutes registering of the land and notice to all persons with
adverse claim over the property. TRB was held to be in bad faith upon selling the
property while knowing it is pending for litigation. The Capays were issued the cert.
of title of the land in dispute while TRB is to pay damages to Capays.
ISSUE:
Who has the better right over the land in dispute in the present case?
HELD:
The purchasers in good faith.
The court ruled that a Torrens title is presumed to be valid which purpose is to avoid
conflicts of title to real properties. When the subsequent buyers bought the property
there was no lis pendens annotated on the title,Every person dealing with a
registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the title and is not obliged to
interpret what is beyond the face of the registered title. Hence the court ruled
that the subsequent buyers obtained the property from a clean title in
good faith and for value.
On one hand, the Capays are guilty of latches. After they filed the notice for lis
pendens, the same was not annotated in the TRB title. They did not take any
action for 15 years to find out the status of the title upon knowing the
foreclosure of the property. In consideration to the declaration of the mortgage
as null and void for want of consideration, the foreclosure proceeding has no legal
effect.
However, in as much as the Capays remain to be the real owner of the property it
has already been passed to purchasers in good faith and for value. Therefore, the

property cannot be taken away to their prejudice. Thus, TRB is duty bound to pay
the Capays the fair market value of the property at the time they sold it to
Santiago.
7.) G.R. No. 164687
February 12, 2009
SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC., Petitioner, vs. ANGELA V. MADAYAG, Respondent.
FACTS:
Respondent Angela V. Madayag filed with RTC of Urdaneta, Pangasinan an
application for registration of a parcel of land located in Barangay Anonas, Urdaneta
City, Pangasinan Attached to the application was a Survey Plan approved by the
Land Management Services (LMS) of the DENR (Region 1).
On August 20, 2001, petitioner SM Prime Holdings, Inc., through counsel, wrote the
Chief, Regional Survey Division, DENR, demanding the cancellation of the
respondents survey plan because the lot encroached on the properties it recently
purchased from several lot owners and that, despite being the new owner of the
adjoining lots, it was not notified of the survey conducted.
Petitioner then manifested its opposition to the respondents application for
registration. The Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, and the heirs of Romulo Visperas also filed their respective oppositions.
Petitioner filed its formal opposition. Petitioner alleged that it had recently bought
seven parcels of land in Barangay Anonas, Urdaneta, that it was approved by the
Land Registration Commission and previously covered by Survey Plan approved by
the Bureau of Lands. These parcels of land were covered by separate certificates of
title, some of which are already in the name of the petitioner while the others are
still in the name of the previous owners.
Later, the RTC declared a general default, except as to the petitioner. Thereafter,
respondent commenced the presentation of evidence.
Meanwhile, as per advised by the DENR Legal Services and Public Affairs, petitioner
formally filed with the DENR a petition for cancellation of the survey plan.
On July 17, 2002, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Suspend Proceedings 7 in the
land registration case, alleging that the court should await the DENR resolution of
the petition for the cancellation of the survey plan "as the administrative case is
prejudicial to the determination" of the land registration case.
RTC: The Court granted the instant motion and suspends the proceedings. Until the
receipt by the Court of a copy of the resolution of the petition for cancellation by the
DENR, the instant case is hereby ARCHIVED. Emphasizing that a survey plan is one
of the mandatory requirements in land registration proceedings, the RTC agreed with
the petitioner that the cancellation of the survey plan would be prejudicial to the
petition for land registration.
CA: Finding that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in suspending the
proceedings, the CA granted the petition for certiorari. The CA ratiocinated that the
survey plan which was duly approved by the DENR should be accorded the
presumption of regularity, and that the RTC has the power to hear and determine all
questions arising from an application for registration.
ISSUE/s:

WON THE SUSPENSION OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE LAND REGISTRATION CASE IS

LEGAL AND PROPER PENDING THE DETERMINATION AND RESOLUTION OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE BEFORE DENR -REGION 1.
HELD:
Every order suspending proceedings must be guided by the following precepts: it
shall be done in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and prevent vexatious litigations,
conflicting judgments, confusion between litigants and courts, or when the rights of
parties to the second action cannot be properly determined until the questions
raised in the first action are settled and none of the circumstances that would justify
the stay of proceedings is present. In fact, to await the resolution of the petition for
cancellation would only delay the resolution of the land registration case and
undermine the purpose of land registration.
The fundamental purpose of the Land Registration Law (Presidential Decree No.
1529) is to finally settle title to real property in order to preempt any question on the
legality of the title except claims that were noted on the certificate itself at the
time of registration or those that arose subsequent thereto. Consequently, once the
title is registered under the said law, owners can rest secure on their ownership and
possession.
P.D. No. 1529 eliminated the distinction between the general jurisdiction vested in
the RTC and the latters limited jurisdiction when acting merely as a land registration
court. Land registration courts, as such, can now hear and decide even controversial
and contentious cases, as well as those involving substantial issues. When the law
confers jurisdiction upon a court, the latter is deemed to have all the necessary
powers to exercise such jurisdiction to make it effective. It may, therefore, hear and
determine all questions that arise from a petition for registration.
The RTC need not wait for the decision of the DENR in the petition to cancel the
survey plan in order to determine whether the subject property is already titled or
forms part of already titled property. The court may now verify this allegation based
on the respondents survey plan vis--vis the certificates of title of the petitioner and
its predecessors-in-interest. After all, a survey plan precisely serves to establish the
true identity of the land to ensure that it does not overlap a parcel of land or a
portion thereof already covered by a previous land registration, and to forestall the
possibility that it will be overlapped by a subsequent registration of any adjoining
land.
SC: CAs Decisio and Resolution are AFFIRMED. The RTC of Urdaneta, Pangasinan is
DIRECTED to continue with the proceedings in L.R.C. Case and to resolve the same
with dispatch.
8.) G.R. No. 193785
Imperial Development Corporation v. Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the .Regional Executive Director, DENR, Region X, Cagayan
de Oro City
FACTS:
Presidential Proclamation No. 1795 withdrew from sale or settlement and reserved
for cultural site purposes Lot No. 3843, Case 5 of the cadastral survey of Cagayan,
Cad-237. A year later OCT No. 0-762 was issued to Carmel Realty and Development
Corporation (Carmel). OCT No. 0-762 covered Lots 3843-A and 3843-B, which
together comprised a 51,608-square-meter portion of Lot No. 3843.

By virtue of a Confirmation of Sale5, Carmel conveyed Lots 3843-A and 3843-B to

petitioner. On even date, TCT No. T-307206 was issued in the name of petitioner.
On 6 February 2003, the Republic filed before the RTC, a Complaint against Carmel
and petitioner. The Complaint was for cancellation of OCT No. 0-762 and all
derivative titles issued thereunder, particularly TCT No. T-30720 in the name of
petitioner. It also prayed for the reversion of Lots 3843-A and 3843-B to the mass of
land of public domain. The Republic alleged that these two lots were not susceptible
to private acquisition, as they were within the cultural center site reserved under
Proclamation No. 1795.
RTC: RTC dismissed the complaint of the Republic. The RTC observed that no petition
for the reopening of the land registration case had been filed by the Republic within
the one-year period from the issuance of OCT considering that a certificate of title
shall become incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from its issuance. The
final judgment became conclusive upon and against all persons, including the
national government.
CA: CA reversed and set aside the RTC Order. The Complaint of the Republic was
reinstated, and the case was remanded to the RTC for further proceedings. The CA
pointed out the Republic's contention that Lots 3843-A and 3843-B are inalienable
lands of public domain. It also emphasized that the right of reversion to the State is
not barred by prescription.
ISSUE/s: WON CA COMMITTED MANIFEST AND SERIOUS ERROR BY ITS FAILURE AND
REFUSAL TO APPLY THE PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING IN REM PROCEEDINGS IN
CADASTRAL CASES, RES JUDICATA, LACK OF EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION AND POWER
OF EMINENT DOMAIN.
HELD:
Reversion is a remedy availed of by the State to place inalienable land found under
private ownership back to the public domain. Considering the degree of public
interest involved as the government proceeds to assert its rights and recover its
property, no defense grounded on laches or prescription can be sustained thereon.
In this jurisdiction, we have had a number of occasions to rule that the indefeasibility
of titles does not operate to deprive the State of its right to recover lands of the
public domain from private ownership, if the lands were obtained through fraud or
misrepresentation. Likewise, indefeasibility does not obtain when the title to the land
or decree is void due to reasons other than fraud, such as when it was issued by
mistake and oversight because the land was in reality inalienable, or when the
grantee violated the conditions for the homestead patent grant.
In these cases, the State may seek the cancellation of the certificate of title and
reversion of the land to the mass of land of public domain even after the lapse of
one violated year from the issuance of the title.
SC: The petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution issued by the Court of
Appeals Cagayan de Oro City are AFFIRMED.
9.) G.R. No. 159310
CAMILO F. BORROMEO,
Respondent.

February 24, 2009

Petitioner, vs. ANTONIETTA

O.

DESCALLAR,

FACTS:
Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, arrived in the after he was assigned by his employer,
Simmering-Graz Panker A.G., an Austrian company, to work at a project in Mindoro.
In 1984, he transferred in Cebu for worked. He then met respondent Antonietta
Opalla-Descallar, a separated mother of two boys who was working as a waitress at
St. Moritz Hotel. Jambrich asked respondent to tutor him in English. After awhile,
Jambrich and respondent fell in love and decided to live together. Jambrich also
adopted the 2 sons of the respondent.
In the Contracts to Sell covering some properties, Jambrich and respondent were
referred to as the buyers. A Deed of Absolute Sale was likewise issued in their favor.
However, when the Deed of Absolute Sale was presented for registration before the
Register of Deeds, registration was refused on the ground that Jambrich was an alien
and could not acquire alienable lands of the public domain. Consequently, Jambrichs
name was erased from the document and so Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) over
the properties were issued in respondents name alone.
However, the idyll lasted only until April 1991. By then, respondent found a new
boyfriend while Jambrich began to live with another woman.
Sometime in1986, Jambrich met petitioner Camilo F. Borromeo who was engaged in
the real estate business. He also built and repaired speedboats as a hobby. Jambrich
purchased an engine and some accessories for his boat from petitioner, for which he
became indebted to the latter for about P150,000.00. To pay for his debt, he sold his
rights and interests in the Agro-Macro properties to petitioner for P250,000, as
evidenced by a "Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment." 6 However, when petitioner
sought to register the deed of assignment, he discovered that titles to the three lots
have been transferred in the name of respondent, and that the subject property has
already been mortgaged. Petitioner then filed a complaint against respondent for
recovery of real property before the RTC of Mandaue City.
Petitioner alleged that the Contracts to Sell and the Deed of Absolute Sale over the
properties which identified both Jambrich and respondent as buyers do not reflect
the true agreement of the parties since respondent did not pay a single centavo of
the purchase price and was not in fact a buyer; that it was Jambrich alone who paid
for the properties using his exclusive funds; that Jambrich was the real and absolute
owner of the properties; and, that petitioner acquired absolute ownership by virtue
of the Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment which Jambrich executed in his favor. In her
Answer, respondent belied the allegation.
RTC: The trial court upheld the sale by Jambrich in favor of petitioner and ordered the
cancellation of the TCTs in the name of respondent. Evidence on hand clearly show
that at the time of the purchase and acquisition of the properties under litigation
that Wilhelm Jambrich was still working and earning much and clearly show that
before defendant met Jambrich sometime in the latter part of 1984, she was only
working as a waitress at the St. Moritz Hotel with an income of P1,000.00 a month.
CA: Reversed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE/s:
WON JAMBRICH HAS NO TITLE TO THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION CONSIDERING THAT
THE SAID PROPERTIES WERE SOLELY REGISTERED UNDER THE NAME OF THE
RESPONDENT.
HELD:

The evidence clearly shows, as pointed out by the trial court, who between
respondent and Jambrich possesses the financial capacity to acquire the properties
in dispute. Having found that the true buyer of the disputed house and lots was the
Austrian Wilhelm Jambrich, it is settled that registration is not a mode of acquiring
ownership. It is only a means of confirming the fact of its existence with notice to the
world at large. Certificates of title are not a source of right. The mere possession of a
title does not make one the true owner of the property. Thus, the mere fact that
respondent has the titles of the disputed properties in her name does not
necessarily, conclusively and absolutely make her the owner. The rule on
indefeasibility of title likewise does not apply to respondent. A certificate of title
implies that the title is quiet, 23 and that it is perfect, absolute and indefeasible. 24
However, there are well-defined exceptions to this rule, as when the transferee is not
a holder in good faith and did not acquire the subject properties for a valuable
consideration.25 This is the situation in the instant case. Respondent did not
contribute a single centavo in the acquisition of the properties. She had no income of
her own at that time, nor did she have any savings. She and her two sons were then
fully supported by Jambrich.
10.) G.R. No. 171008
September 13, 2007
CARMELITAFUDOT, Petitioner

vs.

CATTLEYA LAND, INC., VELASCO, JR., JJ. Respondent.

Facts:
Sometime in July 1992, Cattleya Land, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as respondent) asked
someone to check, on its behalf, the titles of nine (9) lots, the subject land included, which it
intended to buy from the spouses Troadio and Asuncion Tecson. Finding no defect on the titles,
respondent purchased the nine lots through a Deed of Conditional Sale on 6 November 1992.
Subsequently, on 30 August 1993, respondent and the Tecsons executed a Deed of Absolute Sale
over the same properties. The Deed of Conditional Sale and the Deed of Absolute Sale were
registered with the Register of Deeds on 06 November 1992 and 04 October 1993,
respectively. The Register of Deeds refused to actually annotate the deed of sale on the titles
because of the existing notice of attachment pending before the Regional Trial Court of
Bohol. The attachment was eventually cancelled by virtue of a compromise agreement between
the Tecsons and their attaching creditor which was brokered by respondent. Titles to six (6) of
the nine (9) lots were issued, but the Register of Deeds refused to issue titles to the remaining
three (3) lots , because the titles covering the same were still unaccounted for.
Later, respondent learned that the Register of Deeds had already registered the deed of sale in
favor of petitioner and issued a new title herein.
The respondent filed its Complaintfor Quieting Of Title &/Or Recovery Of Ownership, Cancellation
Of Title With Damages before the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City.
Issue:
Is the issuance of Deed of Sale valid?
Held:
On 31 October 2001, the trial court rendered its decision: (i) quieting the title or ownership of the
subject land in favor of respondent; (ii) declaring the deed of sale between petitioner and
spouses Tecson invalid; (iii) ordering the registration of the subject land in favor of respondent;
(iv) dismissing respondents claim for damages against the Register of Deeds for insufficiency of
evidence; (v) dismissing Asuncions claim for damages against petitioner for lack of factual basis;
and (vi) dismissing petitioners counterclaim for lack of the required preponderance of evidence.