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JAN
M.
ZYTKOW
NORMATIVE
AND
AND
HERBERT
SYSTEMS
LOGIC
A.
SIMON
OF DISCOVERY
OF SEARCH
for logic
create a research
New
program
computer
systems of discovery
consist
of
of science.
These
rules and control
inference
systems
philosophy
are influenced
Their paths of discovery
that guide
the discovery
process.
by
knowledge
with
of results. The
the justification
data and the discovery
the available
steps coincide
can be described
of artificial
in terms of fundamental
concepts
process
discovery
ABSTRACT.
and
intelligence
traditional
as heuristic
such
distinction
in psychology,
science,
It becomes
and attractive
of computer
of discovery.
both reasonable
systems
were
in the same way as the criteria of justification
of discovery
the schemes
norms.
as
as
and
facts,
empirically
logically
1.
NORMATIVE
SYSTEMS
OF
to study
studied:
DISCOVERY
in
forms classes of objects based on regularities
states
in
terms
laws
of
and
these
classes.
data,
qualitative
qualitative
for finding numerical
includes heuristics
BACON
laws, for postulating
common
intrinsic
for
and
(theoretical
terms),
properties
noting
of data. GLAUBER
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66
JAN
M.
ZYTKOW
AND
HERBERT
A.
SIMON
divisors.
Since both systems are described
in numerous
publications
and their full discussion
the limits of this paper, we
goes well beyond
to the minimum
to support
will condense
their descriptions
required
the ideas of this paper.
BACON:
A System
That Discovers
Numerical
Laws
BACON
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NORMATIVE
SYSTEMS
OF
DISCOVERY
67
GLAUBER:
A Qualitative
Discovery
System
Classes.
GLAUBER
Noting Patterns and Defining
accepts such a set
of facts and searches for facts that have the same predicate,
the same
such a collection
attribute, and the same value for this attribute. When
creates a class (or classes) of values
of facts is discovered,
GLAUBER
that differ in these facts and a pattern which
is stated in the same
as the original facts, save that differing values are replaced by
on sodium
names. For instance,
that while
suppose
focusing
notes
that
this
combines
with
chemical
GLAUBER
hydroxide,
one
to
form
in
with
acid
sodium
chloride
nitric
acid
case,
hydrochloric
manner
class
to form sodium
Na2S04
would
contains
nitrate
(Glauber's
two
create
hydrochloric
acid,
nitric
acid,
and
sulfuric
acid, while
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the
JAN
68
M.
ZYTKOW
AND
HERBERT
A.
SIMON
Na2S04.
reactions.
Discovery
Systems
Preliminary
Conclusions
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NORMATIVE
SYSTEMS
OF
DISCOVERY
69
inference mechanism
both to the initial facts and to the intermediate
results on all levels of abstracting
their concepts
and laws. This
is
both
because
the same syntax, and
facts and laws have
possible
because
there is no formal difference
between
based on
concepts
direct observation
and the concepts
created in the abstraction
process.
Discovery
Systems
and Heuristic
Search
can be viewed
BACON
and other systems of discovery
out the search through a space that includes possible
laws,
and other entities
entertained
the
the
scientists.
From
concepts,
by
of
view
search
both
the
is
the
point
program
programming
guided
by
on. From the point of view of artificial
and by the data it operates
use heuristic
the programs
search. Their
intelligence
principles,
GLAUBER,
as carrying
heuristics
about the discovery
and in
process,
comprise
knowledge
clude both heuristics
that make
local moves
of
rules
of
by application
and heuristics
that affect global control strategies.
inference,
is search crucial in problem
Why
solving, and why may heuristics be
so helpful?
If we do not know a method
that allows us to solve the
The less we
problem
directly, we search, trying various possibilities.
know the more we must grope
in the dark. But even in blindfolded
there may be a method which may even guarantee
that the
wandering
solution can be found at last. We can at least be systematic,
not trying
the same place twice and not skipping others. Such a control strategy
is treated as a very weak method.
The
less we know,
the weaker
are then inapplicable
methods we use, for strong methods
(they would
are not satisfied).
lead us astray when
their presuppositions
The
we use,
the methods
even
For problems
weaker
solution.
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JAN
70
M.
ZYTKOW
AND
HERBERT
states
A.
SIMON
Other
heuristics
may
select
of heuristics.
In parti
fails to find a
cular, they use data to direct their search. If BACON
one changes
two variables,
it tests whether
linear dependency
between
with
of
If
the
the
other.
is
the
this
case, the
growth
monotonously
a new concept,
in the
the ratio of both variables,
system considers
hope that the new concept will be linearly related to other concepts
to the system. For the inversely monotonous
relation
the
available
in this direction
is created. By continuing
product of both variables
for instance, Kepler's
third law, R3/T2 =
BACON
quickly discovers,
const. GLAUBER'S
search for regularities
is also guided by data. For
heuristic picks a fact and creates a schema
instance its FORM-LAW
the system searches
by fixing one attribute and one of its values. Then,
rest
of
for
this
the
data
facts
that
match
schema.
In this
the
through
that was not originated
is considered
the
initial
way no schema
by
data.
for cutting
down
search
used
is problem
technique
can
If
the
and
be decom
(divide
conquer).
problem
decomposition
a
a
of
then
for
the final
into
search
collection
simpler problems,
posed
solution reduces to a sequence of searches for partial solutions. Partial
are easier to find, and they are usually combined
until the
solutions
Another
and GLAUBER
final solution
is reached. Both BACON
apply this
the systems keep cumulating
their findings as long
method. Moreover,
as they can and the final solution each of them reaches
is the maximal
can
from
data
with
abstracted
the inference
that
be
the
given
theory
Both
be
called
of
the
may
systems
system.
knowledge
capabilities
are
of
whose
laws
and
solutions
concepts
systems,
partial
cumulating
for their lack of
which may be later abandoned
lesser generality,
of final laws and concepts. What
within
the collection
importance
are
most
the
clear at the
and
laws
valuable
may only become
concepts
end of the search process.
of
of search go beyond
the technical
Some properties
description
of
of
with
the
BACON
the program.
complies
principle
simplicity
it applies
its heuristics.
order in which
knowledge
by the particular
are tried first, and if they succeed, more complex
Simpler possibilities
are
at all. The principle
not
of simplicity
is
considered
competitors
of
the
in an implicit way, detectable
observed
system.
by meta-analysis
It is analogous
to similar properties
of logical
systems.
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NORMATIVE
OF
SYSTEMS
DISCOVERY
71
are criteria
for selection
and priority. They may be
Heuristics
in search programs
in a variety
of ways:
in control
incorporated
that select the node in the search tree from which
the search
processes
is to continue or that mark certain nodes as unpromising,
in processes
to be applied
to a node,
that select the operator
in restriction of the
a
to
to the
subset that promises
operator
especially
rapid progress
that evaluate progress.
goal, or in processes
Discovery
Systems:
Search
and Logic
and operators
heuristics
change one state into another,
they are
to inference
rules in logic. Deductive
rules in
inference
analogous
the deductive
and hence
that guarantee
logic are operators
validity
of transformations.
in a broad sense, do
the non-creativity
Heuristics,
or
not guarantee
but instead they
deductive
validity
completeness,
Since
increase
the efficiency
of search.
TABLE
I.
Search
Logic
Space of syntactically
correct
formulas
Search
rules
Inference
Logical
consequence
of
Decidability
of
(space
states)
heuristic
Operators,
Point reached
a formula
Set of consequences
a premise
space
knowledge
of possible
rules
in search
space
from
state
given
tree
Search
Computational
from
a given
state
complexity
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JAN
72
M.
ZYTKOW
AND
A.
HERBERT
SIMON
all possible
here one that makes
inferences
from a given
permitted
automata
state (formal
rather than
theory notion of indeterminism)
one that selects one of the inferences
and that can make
randomly
at different
different
inferences
times (physical
notion
of indeter
A system of heuristic
search is deterministic.
The order in
minism).
in the search space is determined
which
points will be reached
by
new points
and operators
that generate
heuristics
from the points
to which
that determines
already reached, and by a control structure
point in the space of states they will be supplied.
a logic, viewed
as a non-deterministic
In other words,
algorithm,
can be supplemented
to determine
rules of in
which
by heuristics
to determine
structure
ference will be applied and a control
where
they will be applied (i.e., which premises
already proven will be taken
an automatic
as the inputs to the inference
theorem
rules). Thus,
of a logic combined
with a superimposed
system consists
proving
structure. Of course
and a control
this superim
system of heuristics
search. Or, it
say, a breadth-first
posed structure may be very simple
in the interest of efficiency,
be very complex
may,
say a best-first
to determine
to
function
search using some kind of an evaluation
of
which
the already-proven
the next
theorems
operator
should
be
applied.
and the control structure may be desig
The ordering of operators
not only
to issues of efficiency,
but also to con
ned to respond
of decidability,
siderations
completeness,
consistency,
validity of con
can be applied
same criteria
to the
and so on. The
sequences,
and control structure of any heuristic
search system.
heuristics
and Inference
Heuristics
We
have
earlier
as
characterized
rules of
systems
terms, the inferences
BACON
Rules
inductive
some
of
inference.
the
Let
they make.
s heuristics
are a collection
of FIND-LINEAR-REGULARITY
The premises
of
statements
that tell what values of dependent
variable
y go together
=
with what values of independent
variable
jci. For instance "if jci 2
=
=
=
9". The conclusion
of FIM>LIN
then y
7", "// jti 3 then y
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(1)
= 2& b= 3&
AxxEy
Eab(a
DISCOVERY
is a statement
heuristic
EAR-REGULARITY
OF
SYSTEMS
NORMATIVE
73
of the form
=
axx + b
y).
since it is intensionally
conclusion
is an inductive generalization,
two new quantitative
to the input data.
In addition,
limited
a and b, with their values of 2 and 3 respec
are created,
concepts
and the conclusion
the premises
(1) are only a partial
tively. Both
state
that
BACON
associates with them,
of
the
knowledge
description
if
variables have their values fixed. Even
for several other independent
are not involved
in the inference
since
these variables
explicitly,
for
in another place, they are needed
BACON
keeps this information
com
in
for
of
BACON's
reconstruction
reasoning,
particular
logical
This
not
bining
different
(2)
Ex2,
inferences.
& xn
where
x3,...,
xn(x2
has
Thus,
ml&...
= 2& b =
3) & AxxEy
mn)Eab(a
the form
=
axx + b
y
rrin are
numbers.
On
level of BACON's
the next
are
link
that
and
b
considered
and if the
x2,
a,
abstraction,
regularities
search is successful,
conclusions
similar to (2) are found.
While
the statement
for a and b on
(2) with regularities
combining
a statement
we
the next higher level of BACON's
obtain
abstraction,
mx,...,
...
Ex3
xn(x3
m3 &
... &
xn
m?
=
=
=
& Ecdef(c
l,d
l,e
2,f=l
=
& Ax2Eab(a
+d8c
b = ex2 +f
cx2
+ b = y))).
& AxlEyaxl
This
to
conclusion
the
can be transformed
of
sequence
steps:
discovery
& Ax2,
X\ Ey y
(jc2+1)xi
in a similar way,
combined,
...
X3y X4,
in his
as
AxEyPxy
decomposed
intermediate
tikka's
...
xn(x3
m3
omits
&
... &
reference
xn
rrVn
5Xn.
Hintikka
AE-facts.
bottom
initial
into
(1988)
facts,
atomic
conclusions
of the form
A?-statements
that they need not be further
argues
to notice
facts. It is interesting
that the
are of the same form as such
of BACON
considers
and
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JAN
74
M.
ZYTKOW
AND
HERBERT
A.
SIMON
can
to Hintikka's
add a few words of justification
If
claim.
an
as
a
is
atomic
is
fact
agree,
"pluto
dog"
philosophers
generally
what we know about processing
in
then, considering
complexity
we
can
vision
and pattern
that
AE
computer
agree
recognition,
statements may be facts, too, if their scope is limited to the duration of
We
observation.
Heuristics
GLAUBER'S
FORM-LAW
heuristic of GLAUBER
conclusions
very
produces
to BACON's
similar in their logical structure
FIND-LINEAR.
They
can be represented
in first order
logic in the form of a pair of
statements
The
Ax Ey Pxyc
and
Ay Ex Pxyc,
in the case of two or more classes of differing values, x and y, and one
c in common. They can be represented
in the form
object
Ax Pxa
and Transfer
of Justification
far we
GLAUBER
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NORMATIVE
SYSTEMS
OF
DISCOVERY
75
For a deductive
scheme of inference
premises
given the conclusions.
the first situation
is called deduction,
the second, reduction.
Initial data are taken to be true by BACON
and GLAUBER.
we
can
of
conceive
that
may
systems
Although
reject some data
and Simon 1986, Langley et al. 1987), we do
(STAHL system, Zytkow
not consider
such a possibility
in this paper. Conclusions
of inductive
are less certain
as additional
inferences
than the premises,
facts can
contradict
them. For exactly the same reason, conclusions
have larger
contents.
This refers only to possible
to
facts as opposed
empirical
if the latter contradict
because
the conclusion
then an
schema
of
must
inductive
inference
have
been
used.
as implemented,
BACON
and GLAUBER
do not insist on
However,
exact fits to the laws they find. BACON
small deviations
of
accepts
observed
from theoretical
values
and GLAUBER
values,
permits
some exceptions
from its generalizations.
In both cases, the precision
in the programs.
required is controlled
by parameters
known
facts
incorrect
Bootstrap
Confirmation
inDiscovery
Systems
Scientific
role of a
laws, some of them at least, play the double
a
definition
and a genuine empirical
law
which
Can
is used
regularity.
as a definition
be also empirically
confirmed?
confirmation
Bootstrap
criterion
answer to this ques
1980) justifies an affirmative
(Glymour
are
tion. Bootstrap
confirmation
that
situations
requires
empirical
on
such
that
the
values
defined
based
the
tested
possible
(computed)
can eventually
contradict
the hypothesis.
The bootstrap
hypothesis
can be used
to justify some
criterion
confirmation
inferences
in
In
the
criterion
cari
the
for
schema
BACON,
systems.
discovery
justify
introduction
of intrinsic variables.
a simple version of Ohm's
Consider
law (we adapt
rediscovering
et al. 1987, chapter 4). Experiments
here an example
from Langley
a simple circuit
consist
in arranging
(a battery and a resistor) and
the current in the circuit (I, dependent
numerical
variable).
measuring
Let the two independent
variables
under the control of the experi
menter
be voltage
and the choice
of the
(V, numerical
variable)
resistor wire (W, nominal variable).
In the initial sequence
of experi
ments
let voltage
be fixed as vu and let the experimenter
vary the
resistor wire, each time measuring
the resultant current. Since W is
a new numerical
introduces
variable
that we will
nominal, BACON
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76
JAN
M.
ZYTKOW
AND
HERBERT
A.
SIMON
and defines
the reciprocal of the resistance),
call C (the conductance,
currents.
its values for all the wires by the values of the corresponding
FIND-LINEAR-REGULARITY
its
this, BACON
applies
Following
that / is linearly related to C with the slope (S)
heuristic and discovers
in view of
of 1.0 and the intercept of zero. This result is tautological
were
determined.
the values of C
the way in which
vari
varies the next independent
the experimenter
But later, when
same
of
of
the
the
collection
able V, while using the
wires,
findings
same
uses
the
The system
justification.
system are subject to genuine
circuit. For the valuers
value of C for the same wire placed in whatever
the
Then,
v2 and v3 of V, the slopes will be s2 and s3, respectively.
to V and S gives in
of
FIND-LINEAR-REGULARITY
application
S = aV
that a = V\. Taken
result S = aV. We may notice
together,
=
some
to Ohm's
values
of I,
law. If
and I
SC are equivalent
law would not
from the actual values, Ohm's
however, were different
the example
and three resistors
With
three batteries
be discovered.
the values of
includes nine facts. Three of them are used for defining
the propor
is used to calculate
C. Another
s2, and thus to propose
for
facts
all
other
confirmation
V.
But
and
S
between
provide
tionality
the discovered
regularities.
in discovery
of justification
In our discussion
systems, we have seen
that the very process of discovery,
along the lines of the systems we
the
involves
have described,
against
testing tentative generalizations
it has also been
available data. By the time a law has been discovered,
a large part of
to be consistent with these data. Hence,
demonstrated
law takes place during the process of
of any scientific
the verification
new data that may be
involves
verification
it. Further
discovering
to
the level
Of course, whatever
the discovery.
obtained
subsequently
no
there is
attained at the time of discovery,
of verification
guarantee
that new data will
Norms
inDiscovery
not
invalidate
found.
Processes
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NORMATIVE
SYSTEMS
OF DISCOVERY
as discovery
reconstructed
systems. For
we
of norms,
three
may
types
distinguish
analysis
norms.
and SHOULD
MUST, MAY,
methods
77
norms
to
to
norms
are weaker
and
allow
3. Usually
methods
The
the problem
situation
(Simon
1973,
p. 477).
are improved,
Of course, when
methods
the improved
SHOULD
versions
the old ones. In terms of our earlier comparison
supersede
norms correspond
to logic as a
between
search and logic, MUST
norms
to various
non-deterministic
MAY
algorithm,
correspond
of heuristics
and control,
while
SHOULD
systems
superimposed
norms correspond
to satisficing
that are relatively
theorem-provers
efficient.
to
In characterizing
different
types of norms we referred norms
norms.
are
to
source
of
crucial
validation
Goals
the
is
the
What
goals.
on
concentrates
of goals
for discovery
One
systems?
approach
to reconstruct
and attempts
scientific practice
the goals of real science
(scientists)
concept
generation,
of activity.
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M.
JAN
78
ZYTKOW
AND
HERBERT
A.
SIMON
may
second
type.
the comparison
between
logic and search,
goals delimit
are satisfied
of
search spaces, while additional
efficiency
requirements
search.
for
heuristic
selective
by arranging
Within
Normative
Discovery
Systems:
Research
Paradigm
a research paradigm
with discovery
for
systems provides
Experience
This paradigm
to
the normative
both
theory of discovery.
belongs
of science.
artificial intelligence
and to the philosophy
1. Take
one
or
computer
system
that will
program
make
Rather,
up
the goal
instance,
goal of finding a
a few scientific
a
goals at a time and construct
a
that reaches
these goals. Do not try to develop
circumstances.
satisfy the goals under all possible
a reasonable
substitute
for the general
goal. For
of finding a law is understood
as the
BACON
by
law that can be decomposed
into linear regularities.
for discovery
Schemes of inference and control strategies
be abstracted
from case studies of particular
discoveries
advice of particular
scientists,
including ourselves.
systems can
or from the
operator
a new
pro
to the
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NORMATIVE
SYSTEMS
OF
DISCOVERY
79
the normative
3. Validate
the range of goals it
system by investigating
can reach and its efficiency
in attaining
the goals. Validation
employs
a combination
of experimentation
and theoretical
analysis. Theoretical
forms that a law
analysis can tell, for instance, the range of functional
can
state of knowledge,
which
is impossible
in experiments
with humans.
can vary the program
and compare
under
the results obtained
to the evaluation
of
different versions. All these tests may contribute
the system.
We
Individual components
of the system may also be subject to validation.
A concrete
rule of inference
that generates
particular
periodic
pat
terns is justified by a requirement
for periodicity
heuristics. Periodicity
in turn, along with monotonicity,
conservation
heuristics,
symmetry,
and so forth, are justified by a requirement
for pattern
heuristics,
(regularity) detection.
Evaluation
criteria may vary from one system to another, as these
criteria we use for
systems differ in their tasks. Whatever
acceptance
the purpose
of evaluation
of a given
system, we admit that these
criteria are neither necessary
in
(the same goals may be achieved
different ways,
for many MAY
norms) nor sufficient
allowing
(the
realistic criteria are subject to exceptions).
What we are really trying
to evaluate
is whether
are "conducive"
the system's
to
processes
discovering
regularities.
The normative
approach
to discovery
of
consists,
therefore,
and sets of criteria
parts: systems of discovery
complementary
judging the efficacy and efficiency of these systems.
4. Cumulate
systems
them to interact with
of discovery
into a larger
each other. This procedure
two
for
system by allowing
is best illustrated by
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M.
JAN
80
a number
ZYTKOW
AND
HERBERT
A.
SIMON
of examples
the scope
of that law.
individual
the scientific
5. Reconstruct
system of goals. Each
system
of discovery
takes care of limited goals. If the individual
systems are
between
the need for understanding
interrelations
combined
together,
for
of
is
also
of
crucial
validation
becomes
crucial.
Clarity
goals
goals
In the descriptive
normative
clarity of goals
systems.
perspective,
in its variety.
of
science
crucial for a comprehensive
understanding
is
in philosophy
of science,
and other
Long experience
psychology,
that
the
of
reveals
disciplines
going beyond
analysis
single goals or
small systems of goals presents
formidable
research problems.
Here
simulation may be essential
the aid of computer
and by the experi
we may come
to understand
mental
study of systems of discovery
systems of goals better.
complex
in science may be generally
Parts of the goal/subgoal
hierarchy
science. For instance,
for the whole
the goal of extending
applicable
the scope of the laws to the new range of a variable may call for the
that work
in the new range. But
devices
construction
of measuring
too. Thus
there are domain-dependent
the
relations,
goal/subgoal
a particular
tissue-slice
method
biochemical
may be called within
to analytical
is relevant
the liquid electrode method
chem
context,
of domain
(maybe even prevalence)
istry, and so forth. The existence
of the scientific goal structure.
dependent
goals adds to the complexity
from
and
separate
discovery
justification.
Discovery
are
at
An
in
intertwined
science.
processes
attempt
justification
manner
of
would
in
the
them
hypothetico-deductivism
separating
of discovery
the performance
systems.
handicap
6. Do
not
can be separated
and discovery
course,
conceptually,
justification
the systems of discovery may be studied from both perspectives.
and GLAUBER,
Such an analysis, when applied to BACON
demon
Of
and
strates
that
regularities
justified.
Since a typical
discovery
are discovered
process
at
proceeds
the
same
time
in a sequence
they
are
of steps,
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NORMATIVE
SYSTEMS
OF
DISCOVERY
81
In fact, justification
processes.
new evidence
that had not been
is needed
considered
a
only to match
as a part of the
Descriptive
and Normative
View
of Discovery
Systems
to codify
been many
the
attempts
history
throughout
are the well-known
accounts
method.
There
of Bacon,
and Mill, as well as hundreds of accounts
of scientific method
Newton,
0
in textbooks
of all times. The main problem with all these studies is
that they leave a gap between
the advice
and the
they provide
of this advice
in the practice
of making
A
discoveries.
application
a strategy of discovery
in a detailed,
program
computer
incorporates
it is executed,
it actually makes
dis
way, so that, when
procedural
There
have
scientific
advice.
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JAN
82
M.
ZYTKOW
AND
HERBERT
A.
SIMON
and descriptive
criteria will be satisfied.
both normative
to the dis
facts and values corresponds
The distinction
between
that study the facts of real science
tinction between
disciplines
(psy
and
that
economy,
chology,
sociology,
history),
disciplines
study the
of
of
the
scientific
method
science,
logic,
epis
validity
(philosophy
to
return
distinction
in
of
We
will
this
the
second
the
part
temology).
of the contexts of justification
and discovery.
paper in our discussion
deal more with norms than
In fact, the existing systems of discovery
how scientific discoveries
facts. They usually demonstrate
might
the
have been made or may be made, and rarely claim that they model
actual path of discovery.
with
Conclusions
an existence
have presented
systems of
proof for normative
and
the
of
such
the
construction
extrapolation
systems
by
discovery
by
for further research. Since the best existence
of them into a paradigm
do we need to further justify our claim? A
proofs are by construction,
a
to
is that they are merely
the
systems
existing
typical objection
So far we
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NORMATIVE
SYSTEMS
OF
DISCOVERY
83
we
of real-life
imitation
Before
discovering
capabilities.
us
even
note
that
if self-contained
this claim
let
examine
systems
to the remote future,
belong
capable of making
impressive discoveries
can benefit
of science
and even
scientists
from the
philosophers
us
recall the analogy with the formal notion of
systems. Let
existing
proof. This notion is only remotely akin to real proofs in mathematics
are second-rate
and the existing
theorem provers
imitations of the
remote
mathematicians'
capability of proving. But the notion of formal proof
and related logical concepts
exerted a considerable
influence on the
on
of science
and
the foundations
of mathematics.
The
philosophy
are ready to play a similar role.
of discovery
normative
systems
if self-contained
the existing
Further,
systems are yet to be developed,
to claim that
support the normative
systems
paradigm well enough
are a legitimate program within
normative
the
systems of discovery
of science.
philosophy
Are our systems a remote imitation of discovering
Yes
capabilities?
a
and no. If we consider
of
actions
that
the whole
variety
capable
scientist may perform, our systems are far behind. But if we consider
tasks in their areas of strength,
limited scientific
they are not doing
worse
and are perhaps
than real-life
scientists. When
doing better
BACON
faces a particular
of data, it discovers
collection
Kepler's
laws or Black's
law (including
the notion of specific heat) in a more
or Black. GLAUBER
efficient and elegant way than Kepler
does not
in developing
the regularity
yield to Johann Glauber
involving acids,
alkali, and salts.
Additional
features can and are added to the existing
systems, and
we do not see limits to the range of discoveries
they will be able to
make. The method
used in the development
of discovery
is
systems
not a search for the philosophers'
stone but rather a mundane
work of
which
adds more
features
and increases
the
gradual
improvement
of
systems would satisfy the opponents
capability of the systems. What
to discovery
we cannot say. But refusal to
the normative
approach
accept
discovery
systems
that
actually
make
discoveries
is merely
dogmatism.
2.
EVALUATING
THE
EXISTING
STEREOTYPES
of science
in the philosophy
Finally, we wish to discuss two stereotypes
of
niche for normative
that claim that the ecological
systems
discovery
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JAN
84
M.
ZYTKOW
AND
HERBERT
of Discovery"
"Logic
vs. Discovery
A.
of "the
SIMON
logic of discovery"
Systems
(Popper
1966, p.
15).
Our
to heuristic
of the concepts
search with
related
comparison
can
that
be con
demonstrates
systems
logical concepts
discovery
in logical terms and that they can be parts of the logic of
sidered
if only we relax the criteria for such a logic. Three criteria
discovery,
to be lowered:
of inferences,
need
(logical validity)
non-fallibility
of the unique, best solution, and applicability
of one system
existence
to all data.
In the logical tradition, the label of "validity"
is often limited to an
infallible rule of inference or to a system of such rules. We do not
to
intend to seek non-fallible
results as it is unreasonable
inductive
treat validity as a relative notion:
seek the impossible. We
there are
more and less valid systems. Even
if it is not clear how a given system
can be improved,
it worse. Thus we see room for
it is easy to make
we
even
not
if
Bacon's
do
share Francis
inductive
overly
logic
a
is
that
method
that
leads
belief
there
infallibly to scientific
optimistic
errors. In a similar way we reject the task of
truth, without producing
In doing
best
this we follow
the
and
conclusions.
seeking
unique
that dominates
of science.
solves
Science
the actual practice
of uniqueness
the problems
and non-fallibility
them.
by ignoring
on
some
of
will
work
fine
of
data
and
types
discovery
Finally, systems
learn only very slowly,
will fail on some others. Scientists
and science
over centuries,
how to use new forms of data and how to seek for new
of
that summarize
them.
types
regularities
of discovery
Our
of
demonstrates
the
systems
existing
analysis
norms
can
in
that
used
between
be
discoveries
relationship
making
attitude
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NORMATIVE
SYSTEMS
OF DISCOVERY
85
Context
of Discovery
vs. Context
of Justification
context
of
of science,
it is rather talking about discoveries
the philosophy
actually
of historical
reconstructions
made
cases), not about the nor
(usually
It was the normative
mative
processes.
aspect that
aspect of discovery
was denied
its place under the sun by a great number of philosophers
if the existing
in the tradition of logical positivism.
Even
systems of
a
create
the
and
make
strong enough
discovery
paradigm
they
for themselves,
the context
of dis
the vigor with which
argument
an
was
to
in
the
first
is
covery
place
rejected
interesting phenomenon
so
were
context
the
the
of
arguments
against
discovery
explain. Why
to these arguments
breach
is caused by
agreed on? What
widely
the existing discovery
systems? In order to address these questions we
will first recall
The Distinction,
the problem
the Thesis,
the Argument,
and
the Reasons
occurs
in the posi
simple and tempting distinction
repeatedly
us
Let
it in a quo
recall
literature.
tivistically oriented
philosophical
tation from Feigl:
The
It is one
at our
thing
and what
the testing,
the confirmation
govern
of knowledge
claims of science
(Feigl
scientific
knowledge
general,
or disconfirmation
1965,
claims...
it is another
p. 472).
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JAN
86
in the passage
and
...
M.
AND
ZYTKOW
A.
HERBERT
SIMON
from Reichenbach:
to remain
in correspondence
tendency
to obtain
valid
the tendency
thinking;
task. (Reichenbach
and the critical
descriptive
the
with
from
and
actual
so we
1938,
have
thinking must
to distinguish
be
separated
between
the
p. 7)
were applied
in both quotations:
Different
distinctions
the
conceptual
to
first opposes
while
the
second
confronts
justification
discovery,
norms with descriptions.
The two pairs of concepts
used at the same
the borderline
time determine
between
the context of discovery
and
the context of justification.
both contexts
The distinction
between
is
is of interest
followed by the claim that only the context of justification
to philosophy.
For Reichenbach,
and for many
others
"... episte
in
context
is
of
the
mology
only occupied
constructing
justification"
in
claim can be illustrated
(Reichenbach
1938, p. 7). This dominant
II.
Table
TABLE II.
Discovered
How
are
laws
Justified
(A) Psychology
context
(descriptions)
(B) Psychology
of
discovery
How
should
laws be
(C) Logic
of discovery
non-existent,
not possible
(norms)
(D) Epistemology
context
of
justification
the
of
the emptiness
(C) are essentially
a previous
we
in
discussed
that
of
discovery
logic
arguments
against
to be empty both actually
and
section. The area (C) was believed
Another
of
seemed
the
because
impossible.
discovery
logic
potentially
refers to (D). In order to keep the intended
important observation
to distinguish
it is important
the two contexts,
between
distinction
a traditional
In
context
of
from
the
justification.
justification processes
context
to
while
a
the
of
discovery
finding
proof belongs
example,
even
context
But
to
of
a
the
justification.
proof belongs
checking
in
Actual
work.
creative
a
involve
proofs
proof may
checking
of
never
standard
the
mathematics
proof proclaimed
satisfy
virtually
This
thinking to be understood.
by formal logic, and require creative
The
arguments
for
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NORMATIVE
SYSTEMS
OF
DISCOVERY
87
to the
is not an isolated example. Most
processes
justification
belong
context of discovery.
Take, for instance, Popper's urge for severe tests
severe tests is nothing
of hypotheses.
less than discovering
Designing
new experimental
to the
and although
this belongs
arrangements,
to the context of
it certainly does not belong
process of justification,
in the justification
is the
processes
Similarly
important
justification.
new methods
of preparation,
etc.
of new instruments,
discovery
In conclusion,
if the area (D) is determined
"how
by the question
to the context
should laws be justified?",
then it only partially belongs
of justification,
to the context
because
it also partially
of
belongs
are intertwined
contexts
Both
and the scope
of the
discovery.
to tests that answer
context
is very limited. It is reduced
justification
the question
"Is such and such justification
valid?", and is destitute of
constructive
if so limited,
of
has the context
then,
steps. Why
justification
the context
sequence.
reasons made
Several
the context of
on an attractive
formal
domain,
It was
attractive.
justification
This
formal,
logic.
promised
- all
and general
results
abstract,
difficult,
analytical,
precise,
on logical foundations
of
scientifically
By concentrating
prestigious.
could
abstract
from
of
the
processes
justification
philosophers
scientific
and avoid criticism of their results by scientists.
justification
of the new field. Since
This gave them an exclusive
the
possession
of mathematics
in the foundations
that were
exciting
developments
based
to research
in the
logic could be also applied
yielded
by formal
some philosophers
of science,
that they might
foundations
believed
or right
even
whether
tell scientists
in their
wrong
they were
the domain of expertise was com
justification
procedures.
Finally,
was supposed
to enter the stage only
fortably limited. The philosopher
of the solution were
after all pieces
for his inspection.
arranged
all pieces
of the puzzle
else had to organize
Someone
and the
was supposed
to check whether
the proposed
solution was
philosopher
to carry out this job, the philosopher
really a solution. To be prepared
has had to carry out a prior task: finding the examination
criteria and
the way to apply them.
In contrast,
the context
reconstructions
Attempted
ingly far from satisfying
of discovery
any payoffs.
hardly offered
of the creative
process were embarrass
the scientific standards of formalism, general
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88
JAN
M.
ZYTKOW
AND
HERBERT
A.
SIMON
a
and testability. No
offered
ity of principles,
respected
discipline
source of transfer of ideas and solutions.
The
idea of a logic of
was dismissed.
was con
While
the scope of attention
discovery
narrow
context
well
for
work
within
of
and
determined
the
veniently
or
area
to
to
reconstruct
of
focus
the
any
required
explain
justification,
to be overwhelmingly
broad. By narrowing
it
seemed
given discovery
we
ad
since
consider
the
down we risk the explanation
hoc,
being
only
is relevant
relevant
facts. But how do we know what
before
the
has been made?
discovery
But an even more principled
that
problem was seen. Big discoveries
of
attracted
and
attention
influenced
the
image
particularly
discovery
were said to go beyond
structures
the limits of the existing conceptual
and beyond
the existing ways of thinking. Thus no matter how big the
was
in which
the discovery
framework
the discovery
considered,
consists
Reasons
in going
beyond
that framework.
for Rehabilitation
system.
of
in attitude was brought
about by the development
on
and
heuristic
search
fast
systems
computers.
symbolic processing
we can
of systems of discovery
Instead of arguing for the possibility
now present a constructive
in
form
of
the
running systems. The
proof
are
of the field.
the
for
the
systems
plausibility
existing
key argument
The
change
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NORMATIVE
SYSTEMS
OF
DISCOVERY
89
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The