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M.

AKIF KHALID
ROLL NO: 12135
Awais Anwar
ROLL NO: 12131

What is unlawful Interference

(1) Any of the following done, or attempted to be done,


without lawful authority is an with unlawful interference aviation:
(a) taking control of an aircraft by force, or threat of
force, or any other form of intimidation or by any trick or false
pretence;
(b) destroying an aircraft that is in service;
(c) causing damage to an aircraft that is in service
that puts the safety of the aircraft, or any person on board or
outside the aircraft, at risk;
(d) doing anything on board an aircraft that is in
service that puts the safety of the aircraft, or any person on board
or outside the aircraft, at risk;
(e) placing, or causing to be placed, on board an
aircraft that is in service anything that puts the safety of the
aircraft, or any person on board or outside the aircraft, at risk;
(f) putting the safety of aircraft at risk by
interfering with, damaging or destroying air navigation facilities;
(g) putting the safety of an aircraft at risk by
communicating false or misleading information;
(h) committing an act at an airport, or causing any
interference or damage, that puts the safe operation of the
airport, or the safety of any person at the airport, at risk.
(2) However, unlawful interference with aviation does not
include lawful advocacy, protest, dissent or industrial action that
does not result in, or contribute to, an action of a kind mentioned
in paragraphs (1)(a) to (h)

Aircraft hijacking (also known as skyjacking and sky


controlling) is the unlawful seizure of an aircraft by an

individual or a group. In most cases, the pilot is forced to fly


according to the orders of the hijackers. Occasionally,
however, the hijackers have flown the aircraft themselves,
such as the September 11 attacks of 2001. In at least one
case, a plane was hijacked by the official pilot
There are various offences that can be perpetrated by
private
individuals or groups of individuals against civil aviation, the
earliest
common species of which was hijacking of aircraft. Hijacking,
in the late
1960s started an irreversible trend which was dramatised by
such
incidents as the skyjacking by Shiite terrorists of TWA flight
847 in June
1985. The skyjacking of Egypt Air flight 648 in November the
same year
and the skyjacking of a Kuwait Airways Airbus in 1984 are
other early
examples of this offence. Aviation sabotage, where
explosions on the
ground or in mid air destroy whole aircraft, their passengers
and crew, is
also a threat coming through the past decades. The
destruction of Air
India flight 182 over the Irish Sea in June 1985, PAN AM flight
103 over
Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988, and the UTA explosion over
Niger in 1989
are examples. Missile attacks, where aircraft are destroyed
by surface
to air missiles (SAM) have also occurred as early as in the
1970's. The
destruction of the two Viscount aircraft of Air Rhodesia in late
1978/

early 1979 are examples of this offence. A re-emerging


threat, namely
armed attacks at airports, shows early occurrence in
instances where
terrorists opened fire in congested areas of airport terminals.
Examples
of this type of terrorism are: The June 1972 attack by the
Seikigunha
(Japanese Red Army) at Ben Gurion Airport, Tel Aviv; the
August 1973
attack by Arab gunmen on Athens Airport; and the 1985
attacks on
Rome and Vienna Airports. Finally, the illegal carriage by air
of narcotics
and other psychotropic substances and crimes related
thereto such as the
seizure of, or damage to, aircraft, persons and property is
also a threat
that cannot be ignored in the present context, although, like
other
examples cited, it has been a perennial issue.
The issue of State responsibility for private acts of unlawful
interference against civil aviation was not a contentious issue
until the
paradigm shift of 11 September 2001, when terrorists
engaged in
hijacking aircraft with a view to using them as weapons of
mass
destruction, causing damage to civilians on the ground.
Now I m giving the detail of one of the most famous
hijacking case of Indian airline.

Case*1
Indian Airlines Flight 814
Some details of flight 814
Indian Airlines Flight 814

Taliban militia in front of the hijacked plane


Hijacking summary

Date

December 24, 1999-January 1, 2000

Type

Hijacking

Site

Hijacked between Kathmandu, Nepal, and Delhi, India, in Indian


airspace, landed at Amritsar, India; Lahore, Pakistan; Dubai; and
Kandahar, Afghanistan

Passengers

178

Crew

15

Injuries

17

Fatalities

1 (Rupin Katyal)

Survivors

192

Aircraft type

Airbus A300

Operator

Indian Airlines

Registration

VT-EDW

Flight origin

Tribhuvan International Airport, Kathmandu, Nepal

Destination

Indira Gandhi International Airport, Delhi, India

Hijacking
Indian Airlines Flight 814 (call sign IC-814) was an Indian Airlines
Airbus A300 en route from Tribhuvan International Airport
(Kathmandu, Nepal) to Indira Gandhi International Airport (Delhi,
India) when it was hijacked by five Pakistani nationals[1] on 24
December 1999. Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, a Pakistan-based terrorist
group, was held responsible for the hijacking.
The aircraft was hijacked by armed gunmen shortly after it
entered Indian airspace at about 17:30 hours IST. After touching
down in Amritsar, Lahore and Dubai, the hijackers forced the
aircraft to land in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The hijackers released
27 of 176 passengers in Dubai but fatally stabbed one and
wounded several others.
India's lack of recognition of the Taliban-regime in Afghanistan
complicated negotiations between Indian authorities and the
hijackers. Taliban moved its well-armed fighters near the hijacked
aircraft in an attempt to prevent Indian special forces from

storming the aircraft. The hijacking lasted for seven days and
ended after India released three Islamic militants Mushtaq
Ahmed Zargar, Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh (who was later
arrested for the murder of Daniel Pearl) and Maulana Masood
Azhar (who later founded Jaish-e-Mohammed).
Indian and U.S. intelligence agencies reported of credible links
between the hijackers, the al-Qaida and the Taliban. The five
hijackers and the three released militants were provided a safe
passage by the Taliban. The dubious role played by the Taliban
was widely condemned and led to further deterioration of
relations between India and the Taliban
The identities of the hijackers according to the Indian
Government were:
1.

Ibrahim Azhar, Bahawalpur, Pakistan

2.

Shahid Akhtar Sayed, Karachi, Pakistan

3.

Sunny Ahmed Qazi, Karachi, Pakistan

4.

Mistri Zahoor Ibrahim, Karachi, Pakistan

5.

Shakir, Sukkur, Pakistan

Anil Sharma, the chief flight attendant on IC-814, later recalled


that a masked, bespectacled man threatened to blow up the
plane with a bomb and ordered Captain Devi Sharan to fly west.
The hijackers wanted Captain Sharan to divert the aircraft
over Lucknow and head towards Lahore, but Pakistani authorities
quickly refused permission as they were wary of being linked with
the terrorists. Also, the fuel was not sufficient. Captain Sharan
told the hijackers that they had to land in Amritsar, India.

Landing in Amritsar, India

At Amritsar, Captain Sharan requested refueling the aircraft.


However, the Crisis Management Group in Delhi directed Amritsar
Airport authorities to ensure that the plane was immobilized,
which armed personnel of the Punjab police were already in
position to try to do. They did not receive approval from New
Delhi. Eventually, a fuel tanker was dispatched and instructed to
block the approach of the aircraft. As the tanker sped towards the
aircraft, air traffic control radioed the pilot to slow down, and the
tanker immediately came to a stop. This sudden stop aroused the
hijackers suspicion and they forced the aircraft to take off
immediately, without clearance from air traffic control. The
aircraft missed the tanker by only a few feet.

Landing in Lahore, Pakistan


Due to extremely low fuel level, the aircraft requested emergency
landing in Lahore, Pakistan. Pakistan denied the request fearing
that their country might be linked with the terrorists. Pakistan
also shut down their Air traffic services, thus effectively
blackening the whole of Pakistan airspace for the Indian Airlines
flight, and switched off all lights at Lahore Airport.With no help
from ATC, Captain Sharan banked on his visual instincts and
began descending on what he thought was a runway, only to find
out that it was a well lit road, and ascended the aircraft in time.
On understanding that the only other option for the aircraft was
to crash land, Lahore Airport switched on its lights and allowed
the aircraft to land. Lahore airport officials refueled the aircraft
and allowed it to leave Lahore at 22:32 hours IST. Moreover,
Pakistani officials rejected IC-814 pilots request to offload some
women and children passengers.

Landing in Dubai, UAE


The aircraft took off for Dubai where 27 passengers aboard the illfated flight were released. The hijackers also released critically
injured 25 year old Indian male, Ripan Katyal, who was stabbed
by the hijackers multiple times. Ripan later succumbed to his
injuries, becoming the first and only casualty of the hijacking.

Soon after the release of these passengers, the hijacked plane


left for Kandahar International Airport.

Landing in Kandahar, Afghanistan


After the aircraft landed in Kandahar, Taliban authorities, in an
attempt to gain international recognition, agreed to cooperate
with Indian authorities and took the role of mediators between
the hijackers and the Indian government. Since India did not
recognize the Taliban-regime, it dispatched an official from its
High Commission in Islamabad to Kandahar. Indias lack of
previous contact with the Taliban-regime complicated the
negotiating process.
However, the intention of Taliban came under doubt when its
armed fighters surrounded the hijacked aircraft. The Taliban
maintained that the forces were deployed in an attempt to
dissuade the hijackers from killing or injuring the hostages but
some analysts believe it was done to prevent Indian military
operation against the hijackers.

Release of militants
The hijackers initially demanded the release of 35 Islamic
militants in Indian jails and US$200 million in cash but Indian
negotiators succeeded in persuading the hijackers in reducing
their demand to the release of three prisoners. These were:

Maulana Masood Azhar founded Jaish-e-Muhammed in


2000 which gained notoriety for its alleged role in 2001
Indian Parliament attack.
Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh arrested in 2002 by Pakistani
authorities for the abduction and murder of Daniel Pearl.
Mushtaq Ahmed Zargar has played an active role since
release in training Islamic militants in Pakistan-administered
Kashmir.

Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh, who had been imprisoned in


connection with 1994 Kidnappings of Western tourists in India,
went on to murder Daniel Pearl and also allegedly played a
significant role in planning the September 11 attacks in the
United States.
After the three militants landed in Kandahar, the hostages aboard
the flight were freed. On 31 December 1999, the freed hostages
of the Indian Airlines Flight 814 were flown back to India on a
special plane.

INVESTIGATION
The case was investigated by Central Bureau of Investigation
(CBI) which charged 10 people out of which seven including the
five hijackers were still absconding and are in Pakistan. On 5 Feb
2008, a special anti hijacking Patiala House Court sentenced all
three convicts namely Abdul Latif, Yusuf Nepali and Dilip Kumar
Bhujel to life imprisonment. They were charged for helping the
hijackers in procuring fake passports and to take weapons on
board. However, CBI moved Punjab and Haryana High Court
demanding death penalty (instead of life imprisonment) to Abdul
Latif. The case is set to come up for regular hearing in high court
in September 2012. On 13 September 2012,the Jammu and
Kashmir Police arrested terror suspect Mehrajuddin Dand, who
allegedly provided logistical support for the hijacking of IC-814 in
1999. He allegedly provided travel papers to IC-814 hijackers
Similarly here I discuss another case of UNLAWFUL
INTERFERENCE

Case* 2

'Unlawful Interference' Cited in 1997 Accident:


Report on SilkAir Crash Alludes to Pilot Suicide
Some details of flight 185

SilkAir Flight 185

Illustration of 9V-TRF
Occurrence summary

Date

19 December 1997

Type

Murdersuicide (disputed) Pilot Error

Site

Musi River Palembang, Indonesia


22730S 1045612E2.45833S 104.93667ECoordinates:
22730S 1045612E2.45833S 104.93667E

Passengers
Crew

97

Injuries

Fatalities
Survivors
Aircraft type
Operator
Registration
Flight origin
Destination

104 (all)
0
Boeing 737-36N
SilkAir
9V-TRF
Soekarno-Hatta International Airport
Singapore Changi Airport

Flight History
The Boeing 737-300 operating as Flight MI 185 was the newest in
SilkAir's fleet, delivered to the airline on 14 February 1997, ten
months before the crash
Carrying 97 passengers and a crew of seven, the Boeing departed
Jakarta's Soekarno-Hatta International Airport's runway 25R at
15:37 local time (08:37 UTC) for a planned 80 minute flight to
Singapore Changi Airport, with the captain at the controls.
Generally fair weather was expected for the route, except for
some thunderstorms near Singkep Island, 120 km south of
Singapore.
The jetliner was cleared to climb to flight level 350 (35,000
feet/10,668 m above mean sea level), and to head directly to
Palembang At 15:47 the aircraft climbed through FL245 (24,500
feet/7,468 m). The crew then requested a clearance to proceed
directly to PARDI. At 15:53 the crew reported reaching its cruise
altitude of FL350 and was cleared to proceed directly to PARDI,
and to report abeam Palembang. At 16:05 the cockpit voice
recorder (CVR) ceased recording. According to the TV series
Mayday, Captain Tsu took the opportunity of dropping his
headphones to trip the circuit breaker. At 16:10 the controller
informed the flight that it was abeam Palembang. The controller
instructed the aircraft to maintain FL350 (35,000 feet/10,668 m)
and to contact Singapore Control upon reaching PARDI. First

Officer Duncan acknowledged this call. At 16:11:27 the flight data


recorder (FDR) ceased recording.

Crash
Flight 185 remained level at FL350 (35,000 feet/10,668 m) until it
started a rapid and nearly vertical dive, as shown on Jakarta
radar, around 16:12:18. The aircraft broke up in flight, and its
debris crashed into the Musi River, near Palembang, Sumatra.
From the moment it dived to impact took less than 1 minute. The
plane was travelling faster than the speed of sound for a few
seconds before it broke up.
All 104 people on board, including the 41-year-old Singaporean
captain, Tsu Way Ming () and the 23-year-old co-pilot, New
Zealander Duncan Ward, died in the crash.
The aircraft broke into pieces before impact, with the debris
spread over several kilometres, though most of the wreckage was
concentrated in a single 60-metre (200 ft) by 80-metre (260 ft)
area at the river bottom. There was not a complete body, body
part or limb found, as the entire aircraft and passengers
disintegrated upon impact. Only six positive identifications were
later obtained from the few recovered human remains.
Among those killed in the crash was Singaporean model and
author Bonny Hicks.

Investigation and Final Report


The accident was investigated by the Indonesian National
Transportation Safety Committee (NTSC), which was assisted by
expert groups from the U.S., Singapore and Australia, and the
American National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB).
Approximately 73% of the wreckage (by weight) was recovered,
partially reconstructed and examined. Both "black boxes" the
Cockpit voice recorder (CVR) and Flight data recorder (FDR)

were successfully retrieved from the wreckage, and their data


was extracted and analyzed.
According to Mayday, At 16:00 Captain Tsu left the cockpit; 5
seconds later, the CVR stopped recording. It was believed that
Captain Tsu tripped the CVR circuit breaker before leaving the
cockpit. NTSC and NTSB investigators postulated that, if Captain
Tsu was responsible for the crash, he returned and then
concocted a pretense for First Officer Ward to leave the cockpit.
Several minutes later, as recorded by Indonesian radar, the plane
entered a rapid descent, broke up and crashed into the Musi
River, disintegrating on impact.
On 14 December 2000, after three years of intensive
investigation, the Indonesian NTSC issued its final report, in which
it concluded that the evidence was inconclusive and that the
cause of the accident could not be determined:
The NTSC has to conclude that the technical investigation has
yielded no evidence as to the cause of the accident.
The U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), which also
participated in the investigation, concluded that the evidence was
consistent with a deliberate manipulation of the flight controls,
most likely by the captain.
In a letter to the NTSC dated 11 December 2000 the NTSB wrote:
The examination of all of the factual evidence is consistent with
the conclusions that: 1) no airplane-related mechanical
malfunctions or failures caused or contributed to the accident,
and 2) the accident can be explained by intentional pilot action.
Specifically, a) the accident airplanes flight profile is consistent
with sustained manual nose-down flight control inputs; b) the
evidence suggests that the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) was
intentionally disconnected; c) recovery of the airplane was
possible but not attempted; and d) it is more likely that the nosedown flight control inputs were made by the captain than by the
first officer.

Geoffrey Thomas of The Sydney Morning Herald said that "A


secret report confirmed that the Indonesian authorities would not
issue a public verdict because they feared it would make their
own people too frightened to fly."] Santoso Sayogo, an NTSC
investigator who worked on the SilkAir 185 case, said in an
episode of the Canadian television series Mayday (Air Crash
Investigation, Air Emergency) that the NTSB opinion was in fact
shared by some Indonesian investigators who were overruled by
their boss.

Indonesian investigators have concluded that


"unlawful interference" may have caused the mysterious crash of
a Singapore jet in December 1997 that killed all 104 people on
board, the Singapore government said Wednesday. The finding,
contained in a new report by the official Indonesian body
investigating the crash, is the closest authorities have yet come
to confirming persistent rumors that pilot suicide might have
been the cause.
SINGAPORE

It will likely have a significant bearing on the class-action suit that


relatives of dead passengers are reportedly preparing against the
airline, SilkAir, the regional unit of Singapore Airlines Ltd.
All 97 passengers and seven crew aboard the SilkAir Boeing 737300 jet died when the plane, which had been recently serviced
and was only 10 months old, plunged from sky in good weather
into a mangrove swamp near the Indonesian town of Palembang
while on a routine flight from Jakarta to Singapore.
The Singapore government said it had been advised by Giri
Hadihardjono, the communications minister of Indonesia, that the
team investigating the ill-fated flight had "found indications
raising suspicions that unlawful interference may have been a
factor in the accident."
The police in both Indonesia and Singapore had been informed,
the government said.

The Indonesian update on the investigation released Wednesday


said there were indications that in the last seconds of the cockpit
voice recorder, the pilot, Tsu Way Ming, "was in the process of, or
intending to, leave the cockpit."
The report also said there were indications that at the time of the
accident Mr. Tsu was "facing financial problems, and had
experienced several company disciplinary actions."
It said that wreckage investigation and the flight data recorder
indicated that when the jet struck the ground, "the horizontal
stabilizer had a nose-down trim which was different from the last
known trim setting for cruise flight." This, the Indonesian
investigators concluded, "could indicate a manual input from the
cockpit," although they added that they were not yet able to
establish who was responsible for this action.
Mak Swee Wah, the general manager of SilkAir, said in a
statement that the reference to financial difficulties, and to an
unknown person setting the horizontal stabilizer to point the nose
of the aircraft toward the ground, were new to the company.
"We were not aware of this until now," Mr. Mak said. "SilkAir is
saddened and disturbed to learn that human intervention may
have caused the crash of MI 185."
But the airline confirmed Wednesday that Mr. Tsu had been
reprimanded for breaches of flying procedure three times in the
10 months before the fatal crash.
As a result of one of the breaches for deactivating the cockpit
voice recorder before takeoff so that his conversation would not
be recorded he was demoted from the position of line
instructor pilot to his previous rank of captain.
In another incident, Mr. Tsu made an unsuccessful landing
approach but did not file a report. After SilkAir subsequently
learned of this, it said it had instituted an inquiry but did not

say what the outcome was or whether disciplinary action had


been taken.
In the third incident, Mr. Tsu encountered power deficiency in one
of the engines of the plane he was flying and correctly returned
for a landing but again did not file a report, for which he was
"counseled verbally and in writing," SilkAir said.
"These three incidents should be judged in the context of Captain
Tsu's otherwise satisfactory flying record, " Mr. Mak said. "The
incidents did not give reason to take more severe action, such as
grounding Captain Tsu. Deactivation of the cockpit voice recorder
is not a safety hazard and therefore the aircraft was not in any
danger."
The Ministry of Communications and Information Technology of
Singapore said Wednesday that it was not aware of these
disciplinary incidents as they did not infringe safety regulations or
warrant action by the Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore against
the pilot.
SilkAir said Wednesday that it had reviewed its recruitment and
handling of Mr. Tsu, who had joined the company as a first officer
in 1992 after 17 years of service with the Singapore Air Force
where he had a "good record" as a highest-level instructor and a
member of the elite Black Knights aerobatics team.
"Captain Tsu was a skilled and experienced pilot," Mr. Mak said.
"He passed his regular medical checks and competency tests. By
the best standards in the industry, he was fit to fly."
The copilot on the flight, Duncan Ward, had also passed his
regular medical examination.
Mr. Mak drew attention to the fact that the Indonesian update
report had noted that "both pilots were properly trained, licensed
and qualified to conduct the flight," and that there was "no
evidence found to indicate that the performance of either pilot

was adversely affected by any medical or physiological


condition."
Mr. Mak said that SilkAir would work to settle the claims of nextof-kin fairly and promptly, adding that the airline was adequately
insured to cover compensation claims.

Case*3
Accident:TAMEE190atQuitoonSep16th2011,
overranrunway
Ecuador's Accident Investigation Commission JIA have released
their final report in Spanish concluding the probable cause of the
accident was:
the crew's decision to continue the approach and landing without
actioning the relevant checklists (EMERGENCY AND ABNORMAL
Procedures), that were required for malfunctions of the slat/flap
systems by the Quick Reference Handbook, resulting in too long a
landing.
The aircraft and crew had been scheduled to fly the sectors LojaQuito-Cuenca-Quito that evening. There had been discussion
between the captain and dispatch, the captain argued that the
sector Quito-Cuenca-Quito should be flown by another crew
which was turned down.

The departure from Loja had been delayed by 46 minutes, past


the official opening hours of that aerodrome. With the permission
of the head of the aerodrome the aircraft departed, the crew took
the decision to depart due to the subsequent sectors to be flown.
The aircraft departed Loja with 4000kg of fuel on board, 1626 kg
of fuel was planned for the sector Loja-Quito, 1013 kg for the
diversion to the planned alternate aerodrome Manta and 1265 kg
of reserve fuel.
The captain (55, ATPL, 6,160 hours total, 1,879 hours on type)
was pilot flying for the sector, the first officer (51, CPL, 4,891
hours total, 2,807 hours on type) was pilot monitoring.
Following an uneventful departure and cruise the aircraft was
vectored onto the ILS approach for Quito's runway 35. The crew
was instructed to reduce speed to 230 KIAS while being vectored
towards the final approach and further instructed the aircraft to
reduce to minimum approach speed due to separation to the
preceding aircraft, the crew selected the flaps to the landing
configuration but received indication that the slats remained
retracted and the flaps only moved to position 2. The crew
attempted to reset the flap system 5 times, however without
success, and decided to continue the approach, but did not work
the related abnormal checklist procedures, for example the crew
did not compute their reference speed and landing distance
required in view of the slat failure. The captain indicated to the
first officer he wanted to lower the gear as late as possible
voicing concern about the fuel situation, at that point the aircraft
had consumed 1730kg of fuel (planned 1626kg). About 3.5
minutes after encountering the first trouble the crew reported
established on the localizer and was handed off to tower, the
crew switched to tower frequency and reported on tower
frequency over the outer marker. Tower instructed to continue
the approach, winds were calm, the runway was wet and
instructed to report runway in sight. The crew inquired about
their separation to the preceding A320, tower replied that his
radar was out of service, 30 seconds later the tower reported the
A320 had landed and another 30 seconds later the A320 had

vacated the runway. The crew reported they had the runway in
sight and were cleared to land on runway 35, winds were calm,
braking action average, after that transmission was
acknowledged the tower instructed the crew to turn on their
landing lights. The flight data recorder identified the main wheels
touched down 880 meters/2900 feet past the runway threshold,
overran the end of the runway, travelled past the runway end
safety area of 166 meters/540 feet, took down 6 of the 14 the
localizer antennas and broke through the aerodrome perimeter
wall knocking down 19 meters of the wall before coming to a stop
about 300 meters/1000 feet past the runway end.
The tower controller had watched the landing and pressed the
crash button immediately when the aircraft went past the runway
end. Emergency services responded and reached the aircraft 50
seconds after the aircraft came to a stop. The aircraft spilled fuel
from the wing tanks, emergency services therefore foamed the
aircraft. The occupants of the aircraft were evacuated via the 2L
and 2R slides. The forward left slide did not inflate and the safety
pin could not be removed, the forward right slide was blocked by
a housing wall although it had normally inflated. Slide 3R could
not be used due to obstacles.
6 crew and 5 passengers received minor injuries.
The aircraft received substantial damage including fracture of the
left and right main gear struts, displacement of the nose section
due to impact with the wall, the main wheel tyres received cuts
as result of impact with the wall.
In addition to the damage to 6 of 14 localizer antennas and
destruction of 19 meters of aerodrome perimeter wall the wall of
a house's living room below the final position of the aircraft was
damaged over a length of 9 meters.
The JIA stated that with landing flaps applied the landing distance
required would have been 880 meters at a Vref of 119 KIAS for
the present weight of the aircraft and environmental conditions.

However, with the flaps extended only to position 2 and slats


remaining retracted, the Vref would have been 149 KIAS and the
landing distance required would have been 1940 meters (runway
length 3125 meters, elevation 9230 feet). The aircraft however
crossed a point 80 meters before the runway threshold below 50
feet AGL at a speed of 163.8 KIAS, the main wheels touched
down 880 meters past the runway threshold about 9 seconds
later, the spoilers deflected 950 meters past the threshold, the
thrust reversers deployed 1280 meters past the threshold and
the brakes were operated 1660 meters past the threshold, full
brakes were applied 2300 meters past the threshold with antiskid
modulating the brakes pressure correctly. Due to the 15 knots
higher approach speed than Vref, the long flare and the late
application of the brakes the needed landing distance was
significantly longer than 1950 meters.
The JIA analysed that despite the higher fuel burn encountered on
the way to Quito there was still sufficient fuel on board to divert
to Manta following a go-around from low height and arrive in
Manta above final fuel reserve (editorial note: sum up the
planned fuel figures, sum is 3904 kg!) and indicated that
according to cockpit voice recorder the fuel meters even read
4070kg of fuel on board at the time of departure from Loja.
The JIA established that all brakes were functioning normally and
were no factor contributing to the accident.
According to the computerized maintenance logs of the aircraft
there had been 53 cases of slat failure indications since July 19th
2011 to the date of the accident, 6 on approach, 47 enroute. 3 of
the events were on the accident date. The JIA queried the
efficiency of the corrective actions taken and reported that all 16
slat actuators were taken to the manufacturer's facility for
testing.
These tests showed that two actuators, 5 left and 6 right, did not
rotate freely due to binding with the other 14 rotating without
binding. These two actuators also failed the cold testing after

being exposed to -40 degrees C over night. Moisture was


detected inside 3 of the actuators, including 5L and 6R, following
disassembly. A 4th actuator contained rust coloured grease.
Actuator 6R was re-assembled using new grease and
subsequently tested successfully, without any binding or torque
issues.
Slide 1L was tested, with the door armed and opened it did not
inflate. After removing the decorative cover the safety pin was
found still installed, although the maintenance manual required
the safety pin removed before that cover is being installed.

CONCLUSION:

The JIA thus analysed that the crew did not work the relevant
checklists after encountering the slat failure, did not abort the
approach although the stabilized approach criteria were never
met, and applied brakes late and irregular thus preventing the
aircraft to stop within the shortest landing distance possible. The
crew was under significant discomfort and stress, especially the
captain following the argument with dispatch and the delay in
Loja, their performance was therefore impaired. The JIA stated:
"the human factor, including a good deal of time spent during
flight in conversation about these issues unrelated to the conduct
of the flight, was a dominant factor into the accident sequence
leading to loss of situational awareness and inappropriate
decision making".
A TAME Embraer ERJ-190, registration HC-CEZ performing flight
EQ-148 from Loja to Quito (Ecuador) with 97 passengers and 6
crew, landed on Quito's runway 35 in rain at around 19:00L
(00:00Z Sep 17th) but could not stop on the runway. The aircraft
went over soft ground, through the localizer antenna and came to
a stop at the airport perimeter wall about 275 meters/900 feet
past the runway end. 4 people received minor injuries, the
aircraft received substantial damage.

ILS runway 35 approach chart (Graphics: AIP


Ecuador):

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