CASE No.

111
CIPRIANO vs. COMELEC
AUGUST 10, 2004
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 158830

August 10, 2004

ELLAN MARIE P. CIPRIANO, a minor

represented by her father ROLANDO
CIPRIANO, (AND OTHER YOUTH OF
THE LAND AFFECTED AND SIMILARLY
SITUATED), petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION
ON
ELECTIONS,
DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT, Election Officer
LOPE GAYO, JR., 1st District, Pasay City,
SANGGUNIANG BARANGAY thru its
Chairman JOHNNY SANTIAGO of
Barangay 38, Pasay City, GREG PAOLO
ALCERA in his capacity as SK Federation
President of Pasay City, EDNA TIBAR a
minor assisted by parents, KRISTAL GALE
BONGGO a minor assisted by parents, SK
Chairman RUEL TAYAM DECENA of
Barangay
142,
Pasay
City,
THE
PRESIDENT OF THE PAMBANSANG
KATIPUNAN NG MGA SANGGUNIANG
ABATAAN, and ALL SK OFFICERS AND

YOUTH OF THE LAND SIMILARLY

SITUATED and THEIR AGENTS AND
REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.

the findings of the Law Department that

petitioner and all the other candidates affected
by said resolution were not registered voters in
the barangay where they intended to run.2

DECISION
PUNO, J.:
May
the
Commission
on
Elections
(COMELEC), on its own, in the exercise of its
power to enforce and administer election laws,
look into the qualifications of a candidate and
cancel his certificate of candidacy on the
ground that he lacks the qualifications
prescribed by law? This is the issue that needs
to be resolved in this petition forcertiorari filed
by Ellan Marie P. Cipriano, the duly elected SK
Chairman of Barangay 38, Pasay City, whose
certificate of candidacy was cancelled by the
COMELEC motu proprio on the ground that
she was not a registered voter in
the barangay where she intended to run.
On June 7, 2002, petitioner filed with the
COMELEC her certificate of candidacy as
Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK)
for the SK elections held on July 15, 2002.1
On the date of the elections, July 15, 2002, the
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 5363
adopting the recommendation of the
Commissions Law Department to deny due
course to or cancel the certificates of candidacy
of several candidates for the SK elections,
including petitioners. The ruling was based on

Petitioner, nonetheless, was allowed to vote in

the July 15 SK elections and her name was not
deleted from the official list of candidates.
After the canvassing of votes, petitioner was
proclaimed
by
the Barangay Board
of
Canvassers the duly elected SK Chairman of
Barangay 38, Pasay City.3 She took her oath of
office on August 14, 2002.4
On August 19, 2002, petitioner, after learning
of Resolution No. 5363, filed with the
COMELEC a motion for reconsideration of
said resolution. She argued that a certificate of
candidacy may only be denied due course or
cancelled via an appropriate petition filed by
any registered candidate for the same position
under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code
in relation to Sections 5 and 7 of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6646. According to petitioner, the
report of the Election Officer of Pasay City
cannot be considered a petition under Section
78 of the Omnibus Election Code, and the
COMELEC cannot, by itself, deny due course
to or cancel ones certificate of candidacy.
Petitioner also claimed that she was denied due
process when her certificate of candidacy was
cancelled by the Commission without notice
and hearing. Petitioner further argued that the
COMELEC en banc did not have jurisdiction to
act on the cancellation of her certificate of

candidacy on the first instance because it is the

Division of the Commission that has authority
to decide election-related cases, including preproclamation controversies. Finally, she
contended that she may only be removed by a
petition
for quo
warranto after
her
5
proclamation as duly-elected SK Chairman.
On October 7, 2002, the COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 5781,6 resolving petitioners
motion for reconsideration. It cited its previous
resolution, Resolution No. 5584, in relation to
Resolution No. 4801. The Commission stated
in Resolution No. 5584 its policy on
proclaimed candidates found to be ineligible
for not being registered voters in the place
where they were elected. It explained:
A portion of Resolution No. 5584
explained the procedure adopted by
the Commission in denying due course
the certificate of candidacy of a
candidate. It reads:
Under
COMELEC
Resolution
No.
4801,
Election Officers were given
the duty to: (1) verify
whether
all
candidates
for barangay and sanggunian
g kabataan positions are
registered
voters
of
the barangaywhere they filed
their
certificates
of
candidacy; and (2) examine

the entries of the certificates

of candidacy and determine
on the basis of said entries
whether
the
candidate
concerned possesses all the
qualifications of a candidate.
Further, Election Officers are
mandated to report by
registered mail and by rush
telegram
to
the
Law
Department
of
this
Commission the names of
candidates who are not
registered voters in the place
where they seek to run for
public office within three (3)
days from the last day for
filing of certificates of
candidacy. The names of
these candidates, however,
shall still be included in the
certified lists of candidates
until the Commission directs
otherwise.
By virtue of the said report,
the Law Department makes a
recommendation
to
the
Commission En Banc, and
the latter, by virtue of an En
Banc Resolution either gives
due
course
to
or
denies/cancels the certificates

of candidacy of the said

candidates.
Verily, the administrative
inquiry of the Commission on
the eligibility of candidates
starts from the time they filed
their
certificates
of
candidacy. The candidates, by
virtue of the publication of
COMELEC Resolution No.
4801 on May 25, 2002 in the
Manila Standard and Manila
Bulletin are deemed to have
constructive notice of the said
administrative inquiry. Thus,
the Commission, by virtue of
its administrative powers,
may motu
proprio deny/cancel
the
certificates of candidacy of
candidates who are found to
be not registered voters in the
place where they seek to run
for public office.
Any registered candidate for
the same office may also file
a verified petition to deny
due course to or cancel a
certificate
of
candidacy
pursuant to Section 69
(nuisance candidate) or Sec.
78
(material
misrepresentation in the

certificate of candidacy) of
the Omnibus Election Code
either personally or through a
duly
authorized
representative within five (5)
days from the last day for
filing of certificate of
candidacy directly with the
Office of the Provincial
Election Supervisor or with
the Office of the Election
Officer concerned.
Hence, as long as the
Election Officer reported the
alleged
ineligibility
in
accordance with COMELEC
Resolution No. 4801, or the
petition to deny due course to
or cancel a certificate of
candidacy was filed within
the reglementary period, the
fact that the Resolution of
this Commission, denying
due course to or canceling the
certificate of candidacy of an
ineligible candidate, was not
promulgated or did not arrive
prior to or on the day of the
elections is therefore of no
moment. The proclamation of
an ineligible candidate is not
a bar to the exercise of this
Commissions power
to
implement
the
said

Resolution
of
the
Commission
En
Banc
because it already acquired
the jurisdiction to determine
the ineligibility of the
candidates who filed their
certificates of candidacy even
before elections by virtue of
either the report of the
Election Officer or the
petition to deny due course to
or cancel the certificate of
candidacy filed against them.
On the matter of petitions for
disqualification,
the
provisions of COMELEC
Resolution No. 4801 are
likewise clear: (1) A verified
petition to disqualify a
candidate on the ground of
ineligibility or under Section
68 of the Omnibus Election
Code may be filed at
anytime before
proclamation of the winning
candidate by any registered
voter or any candidate for the
same office, (2) All
disqualification cases filed on
the ground of ineligibility
shall survive, although the
candidate has already been
proclaimed.

Clearly, by virtue of the

above-quoted provisions, the
proclamation of a candidate
who is found to be
disqualified is also not a bar
to the Commissions power to
order a proclaimed candidate
to cease and desist from
taking his oath of office or
from assuming the position to
which he was elected.
By way of contrast, in case of
proclaimed candidates who
were found to be ineligible
only after they were elected
and
proclaimed,
the
provisions of Section 253 of
the Omnibus Election Code
are clear: The remedy of
losing candidates is to file a
petition
for quo
warranto before
the
metropolitan or municipal
trial court. This is logical
The Commission did not
acquire jurisdiction over
these proclaimed candidates
prior to election (i.e., There
was no report from the
Election Officer regarding
their ineligibility and no
petition to deny due course to
or cancel certificate of
candidacy and/or petition for

disqualification was filed

against them.) Thus, the
Commission
has
no
jurisdiction to annul their
proclamation on the ground
of ineligibility, except in
cases
wherein
the
proclamation is null and void
for
being
based
on
incomplete canvass.
Thus, the Commission ruled:
Premises considered, the Commission,
RESOLVED,
as
it
hereby
RESOLVES, to establish a policy as
follows:
ON PROCLAIMED CANDIDATES
FOUND TO BE INELIGIBLE FOR
BEING
NOT
REGISTERED
VOTERS IN THE PLACE WHERE
THEY WERE ELECTED.

implement the resolution of

the Commission deleting the
name of the candidate whose
certificate of candidacy was
denied due course;
2. To DIRECT the candidate
whose name was ordered
deleted to cease and desist
from taking his oath of office
or from assuming the position
to which he was elected,
unless
a
temporary
restraining order was issued
by the Supreme Court; and
3. To RECONVENE the
Board of Canvassers for the
purpose of proclaiming the
duly-elected candidates and
correcting the Certificate of
Canvass of Proclamation.7

Commission RESOLVED, as
it hereby RESOLVES, to
APPROVE
the
recommendation
of
Commissioner Sadain to
amend Resolution No. 5584
promulgated on 10 August
2002 with modification.
Accordingly, Resolution No. 5584
shall now read as follows:
I
ON PROCLAIMED CANDIDATES
FOUND TO BE INELIGIBLE FOR
BEING
NOT
REGISTERED
VOTERS IN THE PLACE WHERE
THEY WERE ELECTED XXX XXX
(a) xxx
(b) xxx

The Commission further stated:

(a)
For
a
proclaimed
candidate whose certificate of
candidacy was denied due
course to or cancelled by
virtue of a Resolution of the
Commission En
Banc
albeit such Resolution did not
arrive on time.

Considering that there are queries as

to the status of the proclamation of
disqualified candidates as an offshoot
of Resolution No. 5584, the same was
amended by virtue of Resolution No.
5666, the dispositive portion of which
now reads:

1. To DIRECT the Election

Officers
concerned
to

Considering
the
abovequoted
provision,
the

(c) xxx
(d) For both (a) and (b), in
the event that the disqualified
candidate is proclaimed the
winner
despite
his
disqualification or despite the
pending disqualification case
filed before his proclamation,
but which is subsequently
resolved against him, the

proclamation
of
said
disqualified candidate is
hereby declared void from
the beginning, even if the
dispositive portion of the
resolution disqualifying him
or canceling his certificate of
candidacy does not provide
for such an annulment.8
Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition
seeking:
a)
To
declare
illegal
and
unconstitutional
the
COMELEC
Resolution No. 5363 promulgated on
15 July 2002 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 5781 promulgated on
October 7, 2002 and any other
COMELEC actions and resolutions
which are intended to summarily oust
and remove petitioner as SK Chairman
of Barangay 38, Pasay City without
any notice, inquiry, election protest,
petition
for quo
warranto,
investigation and hearing, and
therefore a clear violation of due
process of law.
b) To declare illegal the aforesaid
COMELEC Resolutions sitting en
banc which does not have authority to
decide election related case, including
pre-proclamation controversies, in the
first instance, in consonance to this

Honorable Courts ruling in the cases

of Sarmiento vs. COMELEC, G.R.
No. 87308, August 29, 1989 and
Garvida vs. Sales, G.R. No. 124893,
April 18, 1997.
c) To declare unconstitutional Sections
6 and 7 of R.A. 9164 and also to
declare the age of membership and its
officers of the KK or SK organization
from 15 to 21 years old in accordance
with Sec. 39 (f) and Sec. 423 (b) and
other provisions of R.A. 7160
otherwise
known
as
Local
Government Code of 1991.
d) If Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 9164 are
sustained as constitutional to direct all
SK Officers and Members who are
now more than 18 years old to cease
and
desist
from
continuously
functioning as such SK Officers and
Members and to vacate their
respective SK Officers position, as
they are no longer members of the
Sangguniang Kabataan organization or
Katipunan ng Kabataan organization
for being over age upon attaining the
age of 18 years old.
e) To direct respondents to pay the
salary, allowance and other benefits of
the petitioner as SK Chairperson of
Barangay 38, Pasay City.9

Stripped of the non-essentials, the only issue in

this case is the validity of Resolution No. 5363
of the COMELEC.
Petitioner argues that she was deprived of due
process when the COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 5363 canceling her certificate
of candidacy. She claims that the resolution
was intended to oust her from her position as
SK Chairman without any appropriate action
and proceedings.
The COMELEC, on the other hand, defends its
resolution by invoking its administrative power
to enforce and administer election laws. Thus,
in the exercise of such power, it may motu
proprio deny or cancel the certificates of
candidacy of candidates who are found to be
unqualified for the position they are seeking.
The Commission further contends that the
publication of COMELEC Resolution No. 4801
governing the conduct of the Barangayand SK
elections in two newspapers of general
circulation is sufficient notice to the candidates
regarding the Commissions administrative
inquiry into their certificates of candidacy.
The petition is impressed with merit.
The COMELEC is an institution created by the
Constitution to govern the conduct of elections
and to ensure that the electoral process is clean,
honest, orderly, and peaceful. It is mandated to
"enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an

election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and

recall."10 As an independent Constitutional
Commission, it is clothed with the three powers
of government - executive or administrative,
legislative, and quasi-judicial powers. The
administrative powers of the COMELEC, for
example, include the power to determine the
number and location of polling places, appoint
election officials and inspectors, conduct
registration of voters, deputize law enforcement
agencies and government instrumentalities to
ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and
credible elections; register political parties,
organization or coalitions, accredit citizens
arms of the Commission, prosecute election
offenses, and recommend to the President the
removal or imposition of any other disciplinary
action upon any officer or employee it has
deputized for violation or disregard of its
directive, order or decision. It also has direct
control and supervision over all personnel
involved in the conduct of election.11 Its
legislative authority is found in its power to
promulgate rules and regulations implementing
the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code or
other laws which the Commission is required to
enforce and administer.12 The Constitution has
also vested it with quasi-judicial powers when
it was granted exclusive original jurisdiction
over all contests relating to the elections,
returns and qualifications of all elective
regional, provincial and city officials; and
appellate jurisdiction over all contests
involving elective municipal officials decided
by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or

involving elective barangay officials decided

by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.13
Aside from the powers vested by the
Constitution, the Commission also exercises
other powers expressly provided in the
Omnibus Election Code, one of which is the
authority to deny due course to or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy. The exercise of such
authority, however, must be in accordance with
the conditions set by law.
The COMELEC asserts that it is authorized
to motu proprio deny due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy based on its broad
administrative power to enforce and administer
all laws and regulations relative to the conduct
of elections.
We disagree. The Commission may not, by
itself, without the proper proceedings, deny due
course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy
filed in due form. When a candidate files his
certificate of candidacy, the COMELEC has a
ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge its
receipt. This is provided in Sec. 76 of the
Omnibus Election Code, thus:
Sec. 76. Ministerial duty of receiving
and acknowledging receipt. - The
Commission,
provincial
election
supervisor, election registrar or officer
designated by the Commission or the
board of election inspectors under the
succeeding section shall have the

ministerial duty to receive and

acknowledge receipt of the certificate
of candidacy.
The Court has ruled that the Commission has
no discretion to give or not to give due course
to petitioners certificate of candidacy.14 The
duty of the COMELEC to give due course to
certificates of candidacy filed in due form is
ministerial in character. While the Commission
may look into patent defects in the certificates,
it may not go into matters not appearing on
their face. The question of eligibility or
ineligibility of a candidate is thus beyond the
usual and proper cognizance of said body.15
Nonetheless, Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code allows any person to file before
the COMELEC a petition to deny due course to
or cancel a certificate of candidacy on the
ground that any material representation therein
is false. It states:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to
or cancel a certificate of candidacy. A verified petition seeking to deny due
course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy may be filed by any person
exclusively on the ground that any
material representation contained
therein as required under Section 74
hereof is false. The petition may be
filed at any time not later than twentyfive days from the time of the filing of
the certificate of candidacy and shall

be decided, after notice and hearing,

not later than fifteen days before the
election.
Under Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, the petition shall be heard
summarily after due notice.
It is therefore clear that the law mandates that
the candidate must be notified of the petition
against him and he should be given the
opportunity to present evidence in his behalf.
This is the essence of due process. Due process
demands prior notice and hearing. Then after
the hearing, it is also necessary that the tribunal
shows substantial evidence to support its ruling.
In other words, due process requires that a
party be given an opportunity to adduce his
evidence to support his side of the case and that
the evidence should be considered in the
adjudication of the case.16 In a petition to deny
due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy, since the proceedings are required to
be summary, the parties may, after due notice,
be required to submit their position papers
together with affidavits, counter-affidavits, and
other documentary evidence in lieu of oral
testimony. When there is a need for
clarification of certain matters, at the discretion
of the Commission en banc or Division, the
parties may be allowed to cross-examine the
affiants.17
Contrary to the submission of the COMELEC,
the denial of due course or cancellation of ones

certificate of candidacy is not within the

administrative powers of the Commission, but
rather calls for the exercise of its quasi-judicial
functions. Administrative power is concerned
with the work of applying policies and
enforcing orders as determined by proper
governmental organs.18 We have earlier
enumerated the scope of the Commissions
administrative functions. On the other hand,
where a power rests in judgment or discretion,
so that it is of judicial nature or character, but
does not involve the exercise of functions of a
judge, or is conferred upon an officer other than
a judicial officer, it is deemed quasi-judicial.19
The determination whether a material
representation in the certificate of candidacy is
false or not, or the determination whether a
candidate is eligible for the position he is
seeking involves a determination of fact where
both parties must be allowed to adduce
evidence in support of their contentions.
Because the resolution of such fact may result
to a deprivation of ones right to run for public
office, or, as in this case, ones right to hold
public office, it is only proper and fair that the
candidate concerned be notified of the
proceedings against him and that he be given
the opportunity to refute the allegations against
him. It should be stressed that it is not
sufficient, as the COMELEC claims, that the
candidate be notified of the Commissions
inquiry into the veracity of the contents of his
certificate of candidacy, but he must also be
allowed to present his own evidence to prove

that he possesses the qualifications for the

office he seeks.
In view of the foregoing discussion, we rule
that Resolution No. 5363 and Resolution No.
5781, canceling petitioners certificate of
candidacy without proper proceedings, are
tainted with grave abuse of discretion and
therefore void.
We need not rule on the question raised by
petitioner as regards the constitutionality of
Sections 6 and 7 of Republic Act No. 9164
lowering the age of membership in the SK as it
is not the lis mota of this case.
IN
VIEW
WHEREOF,
COMELEC
Resolution No. 5363 promulgated on July 15,
2002 and COMELEC Resolution No. 5781
issued on October 7, 2002 are hereby SET
ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
CASE No. 112
CAYETANO vs. MONSOD
G.R. No. 100113, SEPTEMBER 3, 1991

FACTS: Monsod was nominated by President

Aquino to the position of Chairman of the
COMELEC on April 25, 1991. Cayetano
opposed the nomination because allegedly
Monsod

does

not

possess

the

required

qualification of having been engaged in the

of advising clients as to their rights under the

Consecutive

practice of law for at least ten years.

law, or while so engaged performs any act or

Challenging the validity of the confirmation by

acts either in court or outside of court for that

the Commission on Appointments of Monsods

purpose, is engaged in the practice of law.

Position. Section 2 thereof provides:

SEC. 2. The EPSA shall consist of a
Plaque of Appreciation, retirement and gratuity
pay remuneration equivalent to the actual time
served in the position for three (3) consecutive
terms, subject to the availability of funds as
certified by the City Treasurer. .xxx..
Pursuant to the ordinance, the City
made partial payments to some former city
councilors including herein petitioners the total
amount of P9,923,257.00.
The Director, Legal and Adjudication
Office (LAO)-Local of the COA issued ND No.
06-010-100-05 dated May 24, 2006.
The COA sustained the Notice of
Disallowance

nomination, petitioner filed a petition for

Certiorari and Prohibition praying that said

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the

confirmation and the consequent appointment

Philippine

of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on

examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86.55%.

Elections be declared null and void because

He has been a dues paying member of the

Monsod did not meet the requirement of having

Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its

practiced law for the last ten years.

inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying

Bar,

having

passed

the

bar

his professional license fees as lawyer for more

ISSUE: Whether or not Monsod satisfies the

than ten years. Atty. Monsods past work

requirement of the position of Chairman of the

experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-

COMELEC.

manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a

lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-

HELD: The practice of law is not limited to the

legislator of both the rich and the poor verily

conduct of cases in court. A person is also

more than satisfy the constitutional requirement

considered to be in the practice of law when he:

that he has been engaged in the practice of

. . . for valuable consideration engages in the

law for at least ten years.

Terms

in

the

Same

ISSUE: (1) Whether the COA has the authority

to disallow the disbursement of local
government funds

business of advising person, firms, associations

or corporations as to their rights under the law,
or appears in a representative capacity as an
advocate

in

proceedings

pending

CASE No. 113

VELOSO vs. COA
G.R. No. 193677, SEPTEMBER 6, 2011

or

prospective, before any court, commissioner,

FACTS: On December 7, 2000, the City

referee, board, body, committee, or commission

Council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8040

constituted by law or authorized to settle

entitled An

controversies. Otherwise stated, one who, in a

Conferment of Exemplary Public Service

representative capacity, engages in the business

Award to Elective Local Officials of Manila

Ordinance

Authorizing

the

Who Have Been Elected for Three (3)

(2) Whether the COA committed grave

abuse of discretion in affirming the
disallowance of P9,923,257.00 covering the
EPSA of former three-term councilors of the
City of Manila authorized by Ordinance No.
8040.
RULING: Under the 1987 Constitution,
however, the COA is vested with the authority

to determine whether government entities,

including LGUs, comply with laws and
regulations in disbursing government funds,
and to disallow illegal or irregular
disbursements of these funds.
Thus, LGUs, though granted local
fiscal
autonomy,
are
still
within
the audit jurisdiction of the COA.
However, in line with existing
jurisprudence, we need not require the refund
of the disallowed amount because all the parties
acted in good faith.
CASE No. 114
PARENO vs. COA
G.R. No. 162224, JUNE 7, 2007
FACTS: a petition for certiorari assailing the
January 9, 2003 decision and January 13, 2004
resolution of the COA filed by 2lt Salvador
Parreno (ret) represented by his daughter.
Salvador Parreno served in the AFP for 32
years and was retired on January 1982. He
received payment of his lump sum pension and
started receiving his monthly pension in 1985.
Petitioner migrated to Hawaii and became a
naturalized American citizen. In January 2001,
the AFP stopped petitioners monthly pension
in accordance with sec. 27 of P.D. 1638 which
provides that a retiree who loses his Filipino
citizenship shall be removed from the retired
list and his retirement benefits terminated upon
loss of Filipino citizenship. Petitioner requested
for reconsideration but AFP JAGO denied his
request.
Petitioner filed a claim before the COA for the
continuance of his monthly pension but on

January 9, 2003, COA denied his claim for lack

of jurisdiction. COA ruled that the issue at hand
requires the courts as mandated by the
constitution to determine the validity of the law
re: P.D. 1638 sec. 27.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but
on January 13, 2004, in its resolution COA
denied the motion further ruling that even if
assumed jurisdiction over the claim,
petitioners entitlement to the retirement
benefits he was previously receiving must
necessarily cease upon the loss of his Filipino
citizenship in accordance with sec. 27 of P.D.
1638 as amended.
Petitioner argued that P.D. 1638, as amended
applies prospectively and should apply only to
those who joined the military service after its
effectivity.
ISSUE: Is the petitioner correct in maintaining
that P.D. 1638, as amended applies
prospectively and should apply only to those
who joined the military service after its
effectivity?
HELD: Yes, petitioner is correct in saying that
P.D. 1638 applies prospectively. There is no
question that P.D. 1638 as amended applies
prospectively and it does not provide for its
retroactive application. But in petitioners
contention that it should only apply to those
who joined the military service after its
effectivity, he is wrong because P.D. 1638 as
amended, is about the new system of retirement
and separation from service of military
personnel, it should apply to those who were in
the service at the time of its approval. Sec. 2 of
P.D. 1638, as amended provides that, the decree
shall apply to all military personnel in the
service of the AFP. P.D. 1638 as amended was
signed into law on September 10, 1979 while
petitioner retired in 1982, which is long after

the approval of P.D. 1638, as amended. Hence,

the provisions of P.D. 1638, as amended, apply
to petitioner.
CASE No. 115
PSPCA vs. COA
G.R. No. 169752, SEPTEMBER 25, 2007
FACTS: PSPCA was incorporated as a
juridical entity by virtue of Act No. 1285 by the
Philippine Commission in order to enforce laws
relating to the cruelty inflicted upon animals
and for the protection of and to perform all
things which may tend to alleviate the suffering
of animals and promote their welfare.
In order to enhance its powers, PSPCA was
initially imbued with (1) power to apprehend
violators of animal welfare laws and (2) share
50% of the fines imposed and collected through
its efforts pursuant to the violations of related
laws.
However, Commonwealth Act No. 148 recalled
the said powers. President Quezon then issued
Executive Order No. 63 directing the
Commission of Public Safety, Provost Marshal
General as head of the Constabulary Division
of the Philippine Army, Mayors of chartered
cities and every municipal president to detail
and organize special officers to watch, capture,
and prosecute offenders of criminal-cruelty
laws.
On December 1, 2003, an audit team from the
Commission on Audit visited petitioners office
to conduct a survey. PSPCA demurred on the
ground that it was a private entity and not under
the CoAs jurisdiction, citing Sec .2(1), Art. IX
of the Constitution.
ISSUE: WON the PSPCA is subject to CoAs
Audit Authority.

HELD: No.The charter test cannot be applied.

It is predicated on the legal regime established
by the 1935 Constitution, Sec.7, Art. XIII.
Since the underpinnings of the charter test had
been introduced by the 1935 Constitution and
not earlier, the test cannot be applied to PSPCA
which was incorporated on January 19,
1905. Laws, generally, have no retroactive
effect unless the contrary is provided. There are
a few exceptions: (1) when expressly provided;
(2) remedial statutes; (3) curative statutes; and
(4) laws interpreting others.
None of the exceptions apply in the instant
case.
The mere fact that a corporation has been
created by a special law doesnt necessarily

qualify it as a public corporation. At the time

PSPCA was formed, the Philippine Bill of 1902
was the applicable law and no proscription
similar to the charter test can be found therein.
There was no restriction on the legislature to
create private corporations in 1903. The
amendments introduced by CA 148 made it
clear that PSPCA was a private corporation, not
a government agency.
PSPCAs charter shows that it is not subject to
control or supervision by any agency of the
State. Like all private corporations, the
successors of its members are determined
voluntarily and solely by the petitioner, and
may exercise powers generally accorded to
private corporations.

PSPCAs employees are registered and covered

by the SSS at the latters initiative and not
through the GSIS.
The fact that a private corporation is impressed
with public interest does not make the entity a
public
corporation.
They
may
be
considered quasi-public
corporations which
are private corporations that render public
service, supply public wants and pursue other
exemplary objectives. The true criterion to
determine whether a corporation is public or
private is found in the totality of the relation of
the corporate to the State. It is public if it is
created by the latters own agency or
instrumentality, otherwise, it is private.