Opening The Floodgates

Opening
the Floodgates:
How Globalization and

Climate Change
Threaten Asias Food Sovereignty
Asia Pacific Network for Food

Sovereignty (APNFS)
2014
Opening the Floodgates:
How Globalization and Climate Change

Threaten Asias Food Sovereignty
Published by Asia Pacific Network for Food Sovereignty (APNFS)

with funding support from Catholique Comite Contre La Faim Et Pour
Developpment (CCFD) Terre Solidaire
Copyright @ Asia Pacific Network for Food Sovereignty,
2014
All Rights Reserved.
APNFS gives permission for excerpts from this book to be cited/

photocopied/reproduced provided the source is properly acknowledged.
Editorial Board: Arze Glipo, regional coordinator.

Ananeza Aban & Arturo Francisco, regional secretariat
Copy Editors: Vanessa Almeda & Misael Paranial
Book Designer and Lay-out Editor : Tyrone Velez
CONTENTS
The Path to Food Sovereignty
in Indonesia
Between G33 Proposal and the National Food Policy

by RACHMI HERTANTI & RIKA FEBRIANI
Indonesia for Global Justice (IGJ)
/1
Confronting a Changing Climate

in Indonesia
A Case Study of Rice, Onion and Salacca Farmers in

Central Java
by MIDA SARAGIH
Indonesia Civil Society Forum for Climate Justice
/ 41
Not Seeing the Forests

for the Trees
The Perils of Green Economy in Ancestral

Communities of Bukidnon
by ANANEZA ABAN
Integrated Rural Development Foundation
/ 71
Shackling the Nine Dragons
A Rapid Impact Assessment of the Mekong

Mainstream Dams on Farming Villages
in the Mekong Delta
by LAM DINH UY & LAM THI THU SUU
Vietnam Rivers Network
DINH NHAT LAM & LE DUY

Southern Institue Of Ecology
/ 93
Opening the Floodgates
FOREWORD
Facing Up to Asias
Twin Sustainability Challenges
ASIA is facing two intertwining sustainability problems -- 1) sustaining the
regions eco-system amidst extremes in global climate behaviour and general
environmental degradation in the different Asian countries, and 2) sustaining
jobs and livelihoods in an integrating regional economy that is increasingly
subjected to global competition and economic liberalization.
Nowhere are these sustainability challenges more deeply felt than in the
agricultural sector of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
The sector is unable to provide the food and nutritional requirements of the
regions 600 million people, as liberalizing ASEAN has increasingly become
dependent on agricultural imports coming from the big agribusinessproducing countries of the world United States, Europe and Australia-New
Zealand. The widening agricultural deficit is also due to the increasing fragility
of the regions eco-system and consequently, the declining productivity of the
sector. With increasing regularity, the region has been witnessing each year
the occurrence of production-crippling deadly storms, droughts and weather
disturbances, which are aggravated by man-made disasters such as forest
fires and large-scale despoliation of the environment by irresponsible mining,
logging and agri-chemical companies.
The biggest victims of the asymmetry in an unequal global agricultural trading
system and natural and man-made environmental and climate-changerelated disasters are the poor, especially the small farmers, many of whom
are driven further to deeper debt and poverty and even displaced from their
own land. Hence, a big challenge to development workers and farmers
organizations is how to push governments and policy makers to craft or frame
food and agricultural policies that help empower the small farmers while
strengthening at the same time the economic and environmental sustainability
of each ASEAN/Asian country. This is not easy given precisely the agricultural
and environmental policy regime that is in place in most countries under
globalization.
This is where books and studies such as Opening the Floodgates: How
Globalization and Climate Change Threaten Asias Food Sovereignty play a
central role in deepening our understanding of the kind of policy reforms
that the farming world in the ASEAN region and other parts of the world
urgently need. The book gives us a good overview, in the context of the
Indonesian experience, of the anti-farmer and anti-development clauses found
in the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) of the World Trade Organization (WTO)
and how such clauses are used by rich agricultural-producing countries of the
world to flood the world with subsidized products that erode the agricultural
capacity and sovereignty of liberalized developing countries.
Opening the Floodgates also gives an empirical analysis of seemingly complex
policy issues on the environmental front. The Green Economy concept
advanced by rich polluting corporations in the name of carbon mitigation
through the carbon trading mechanism under the formula of the Reducing
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) has turned out
to be a dangerous proposition because it has become not only a rationale
for the continued pollution of the atmosphere by the participating polluting
companies but, as implemented in some areas of the indigenous peoples (IPs),
has become an instrument for the alienation of the IPs from their own sociocultural-ecological systems. The carbon traders have transformed the IPs into
paid forest keepers while opening the forests for further commercial and
mining explorations!
Of course, one should not confuse the challenge of greening the economy
with the Green Economy concept of the big REDD-participating corporations.
Transforming vulnerable agricultural communities into resilient and climatechange ready communities through a switch to organic farming and the
institution of appropriate anticipation-adaptation-adjustment measures is a
must and doable as discussed in the book itself. A genuine Green Economy
should be built based on peoples needs and peoples participation in the
greening and transformation processes. This is what the book is asking
when it discusses the serious environmental and agricultural implications of
more dams being built to sequester waters of the mighty Mekong River that
connects the agriculture of the six Asian countries because they can disrupt
lives and cause environmental damage across the region.
To conclude, going sustainable economically and environmentally -- is a
must for all countries in the region. But going in such direction will not be easy
for this requires an overhaul of the unadulterated free market orientation
in development planning as well as a rethinking of environmental reforms
by simply relying on corporate leadership without peoples participation.
Opening the Floodgates tells us that it is time to change the development
framework to ensure a sustainable life for all.
DR. RENE OFRENEO
Former Dean, School of Labor and Industrial Relations

University of the Philippines
Chairperson of the Board of Trustees, Integrated Rural Development
Foundation
INDONESIA
THE PATH TO FOOD

SOVEREIGNTY IN
INDONESIA
Between G33 Proposal and the

National Food Policy
RACHMI HERTANTI
RIKA FEBRIANI
Indonesia for Global Justice (IGJ)
Acronyms
AMS
AoA
APEC
API
ASEAN
BPS
BULOG
CIF
EU
FOB
FTA
GATT
GATS
GKP
G33
HPP
RASKIN
TRIMS
TRIPS
USA
WTO
aggregate measurement of supports

Agreement on Agriculture
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
Indonesian Peasant Alliance
Association of South East Asia Nations
Central Statistic Agency
Indonesian Bureau of Logistics
cost, insurance, and freight
European Union
free on board
Free Trade Agreement
General Agreement on Tariff and Trade
General Agreement on Trade in Services
Dry grain harvest
The Group of Developing Countries in WTOs Agriculture Committee
government purchase price
rice for the poor
Trade Related Investment Measures
Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights
United State of America
World Trade Organization
Indonesia | G33 & Food Sovereignty
Executive Summary
In the midst of an increasingly severe world food crisis, the member
countries of the Group 33 (G33) issued a public stockholding proposal
to protect the poor and low-income farmers and achieve food security.
Submitted by the G33 in November 2012, the proposal on public
stockholding was negotiated in the 9th WTO Ministerial Conference in
Bali, Indonesia last December 2013.
The proposal allows developing countries to buy food for their reserves
and food aid needs at prices determined by each government. That
the state can determine the prices is contrary to economic logic.
High pricing at the domestic level requires the intervention of other
factors, such as import protection, production quotas, phyto-sanitary
regulations, export bans or subsidies, etc. These factors may lead to
distortions in the trade.
This paper intends to figure out the food profile in ASEAN member
countries; the complexity of food issues in rice-producing countries,
particularly Indonesia; and the main agenda of the developing
countries in the G33 proposal. It will then evaluate the effectiveness
of the G33 proposal in achieving food sovereignty for Indonesia. The
evaluation is based on a study of the countrys national food reserve
system, including the role of the State Logistics Agency (Bulog) in
providing national food necessities.
The G33 proposal has been presented at the WTO Ministerial
Conference last December 2013. However, a decision on this proposal
has not been reached nor any single permanent solution has been
made. Hence, in the aftermath of the Bali Conference, the G33 will be
renegotiated in order to reach a deal.
To that end, the analysis obtained from this paper will be the basis
for Indonesian civil society organizations for further advocacy actions
related to the negotiation of G33 proposal, post-Bali.
AGRICULTURAL LIBERALIZATION
WTO Agriculture Liberalization in ASEAN Region

To date, the implementation of the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA)
has significantly affected ASEAN countries agriculture. The AoA
regulations have forced developing countries to open their market and
reduce government subsidies, not to achieve national food security,
but to make agricultural products become trade commodities in the
global market. Such practice eliminates the states obligation to fulfill
peoples rights to food.
As a consequence of low agricultural subsidies, some ASEAN
countries who used to be big food producers, are now food importers.
Moreover, the food price instability brought about by liberalization
has eliminated peoples access, especially the poor, to affordable food.
Market access facilitation has increased agricultural product imports
from developed countries to ASEAN countries. Imported products are
priced cheaper than local products because of the large government
subsidies in developed countries. ASEAN statistical data shows that
developed countries such as United States of America and European
Union are placed as the top agricultural product exporters to ASEAN.
USA captured the largest ASEAN market share in the years 2010 and
2011 with 12% and 11% respectively; and was followed by EU which
controlled 11.5% in 2010 and 9.7% in 2011.1 The following are the top
ten agricultural import commodities in 2011.
Diagram 1. ASEAN Top 10 Agricultural Import Commodities
Source:IGJ Data Center, taken from ASEAN Statistic 2012
The high quantity of agricultural product imports vis a vis the lower
number of local products that penetrate the market has resulted in
the decline of local agricultural commodities growth, weakening the
competitiveness of local farmers.
From 2007-2011, there was a growth decline in ASEAN agricultural

commodities, such as rice and soybeans. While there has also been
an increase in the growth of other top commodities during the same
period, it is not considered as significant. The following is a chart
showing the growth rate of ASEANs major food commodities.
Diagram 2. Growth Rate of ASEAN Five Major Food Commodities 2007-2011
Source: IGJ Data Center, taken from ASEAN Statistical Yearbook 2012.
The slow growth of several top products because of the agricultural

performance drop will affect the availability of staple crops in ASEAN
countries, especially rice. This causes dependency on imports. For
example, the import value of rice in 2012 was still high.
Diagram 3. Import Value on Rice in Several ASEAN Countries (2012)
Source: IGJ Data Center, taken from AFSIS Report 2012
The loss of potential income due to their inability to compete with

imported products has threatened farmers livelihood. The following
diagram shows a decrease in the number of workforce in the
agricultural sector from the year 2010-2011.
Diagram 4. Agricultural Sector Workforce Percentage 2010-2011 (%)
Source: IGJ Data Center, taken from ASEAN Statistical Yearbook 2012
Data released by Grain in 2013 shows that almost all farmers in ASEAN
countries are small farmers. These are further categorized as farmers
with limited land ownership. Hence, they are very vulnerable to
poverty caused by the loss of their livelihood. The following is diagram
on percentage of small farmers in ASEAN countries.
Diagram 5. Percentage of Small Farmers in Several ASEAN Countries
Source: IGJ Data Source, taken from Land Distribution Data, Grain 2013.
The above data shows that the ASEAN agricultural performance is

declining in quantity and quality. This is alarming since agriculture
supports development in these countries. The following table shows
the agricultural sectors share against the Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) of ASEAN countries from 2009-2011. While some countries
experienced an increase, it is still not significant.
Table 1. Agricultural Sectors Share against GDP of ASEAN Countries 2009-2011
Country

2009
2010
2011
Brunei Darussalam
1.2
1.1
1.1
Cambodia
29.5
29.4
28.0
Indonesia
13.6
13.2
12.7
Lao PDR
32.5
31.6
30.0
Malaysia
7.5
7.7
7.8
Myanmar
41.8
39.9
37.8
Philippines
12.5
11.6
11.5
Singapore
Thailand
8.9
8.3
8.6
Vietnam
17.0
16.4
16.6
Source: IGJ Data Center, taken from ASEAN Statistical Yearbook 2012.
All these data show that the impact of AoA on ASEAN agriculture
has been largely negative. Without government protection, AoA
implementation has the potential to destroy local agriculture.
Therefore, we need to study whether the G33 proposal will adequately

protect the ASEAN countries by reasserting their food sovereignty in
the face of AoA and other regional and bilateral free trade agreements.
Agricultural Liberalization in Indonesia
The elimination of import tariffs, brought about by the implementation
of free trade in goods in WTO or FTA, has opened up the market
access of goods in Indonesia to a maximum of 0%. Local products now
compete with similar but cheaper imported goods, to the detriment
of local industries.
In its food sector, the negative impact of free trade is considerable. The
increase in food import has weakened the competitiveness of local
farmers products and destroyed the local food market. In 2009 the
value of food import reached USD 8.4 billion and increased by more than
2-folds to USD 17.2 billion in 2012. This is very detrimental to farmers as
they are unable to compete with the influx of imported products.
To make matters worse, the incentives for farmers are dwindling:
irrigations systems are unimproved, seed subsidy is nearly zero, pressure
on price by the downstream actors2, and the governments financial
assistance through food security loan is not yet optimally absorbed.
The Indonesian Peasant Alliance (API) calculated the loss suffered
by its members due to a massive flooding of onion imports to local
markets in 2011. They found out that Indonesian onion farmers may
have experienced a loss of Rp 14.8 trillion, equivalent to 1.04 million
tons, due to the import surge of onion. At the same time, local chili
farmers may have experienced a loss of Rp 26.6 trillion or equivalent
to value of 1.3 million tons chili.3
Less absorption of local food due to the surge of imported food has
threatened Indonesian agriculture and even potentially depressed
the Farmers Parity Power (NTP). This would result in increased
unemployment and poverty. The Statistics Central Bureau (BPS) stated
that the NTP has been declining from year to year, i.e. from 105.67 in
January 2013 to 101.95 in January 2014.
Massive food imports resulted in the decline of local food production
due to the deterioration of the employment rate in the agriculture
sector. In 2009, the employment absorption of the agri-sector was
38.36 million; this later decreased to only 36.54 million in 2011. This
means that there were 1.82 million people who faced unemployment
and poverty.
The opening of import access allows importers to take control of the

local markets, giving rise to cartel practices.
A case in point: from November 2011 to February 2013, the shortage
of garlic in Indonesian markets resulted in the increase of garlic
price from Rp 40,000/kg to Rp 90,000/kg. Upon examination by the
Commission of Business Competition Supervisory (KPPU), 19 importer
companies were found to have formed a cartel by controlling 56.68 %
of garlic supply.4 This showed that the government had neglected its
role and obligation to strictly control and supervise trade practices of
importers.
IMPACT OF WTO BALI PACKAGE

NEGOTIATIONS ON LOCAL AGRICULTURE
WTO Bali Package: Agriculture vs. Trade Facilitation
In order to achieve the Doha Round agreement that has been
negotiated since 2001, WTO member countries agreed to start the
Doha Round Settlement during the 9th Ministerial Conference, which
was held last December 2013. The priority issues that were discussed
in the conference are: (1) trade facilitation, (2) the G-33 proposal,
especially in agriculture, (3) and the least developed countries
development package. The three issues were summarized in one
negotiation package called the Bali Package.
The Bali Package during the 9th WTO Ministerial Conference is
important for developed countries because it allows their giant
industrial corporations easy access to the local markets of developing
countries. Given the recent wave of economic crisis which resulted in

the slow growth of the economies of developed countries, this strategy
will allow them to find new markets in the developing world as well as
strengthen the WTO free trade system.
Global economic growth affects global trade. Last 2013, economic
growth in development countries like the US and EU countries was
predicted to only reach 1.2%. In contrast, Asian countries were
forecasted to reach a high economic growth. For example, South
Asian countries were predicted to have a 5.2% economic growth while
East Asians and the Pacific countries were predicted to reach a 7.2%
economic growth in 2013.5
It is for this reason that G20 and APEC countries are keen on making
Asia the worlds growth engine. One of their strategies to get out
of their economic crises is by prohibiting protection and promoting
investment and trade liberalization through Free Trade Agreement
agendas6 (FTA) or the multilateral trade system in WTO. This will allow
them to increase their export volume to developing countries so that
they could run the economic machines in trade or services sectors in
developed countries.
In order to execute the strategy, developed countries need a strong
instrument to facilitate the trade requirements in promoting trade
facilitation agenda in various international fora such as the G20, APEC,
and especially, WTO. It is for this reason that developed countries
have such a strong interest in the WTOs Bali Package becoming the
main issue during the 9th WTO Ministerial Conference in Bali.
In addition to trade facilitation, the Bali Package also touches on
agricultural issues. Since the Doha Round, agriculture has been a
sensitive issue, given the large investment stake of both developed
and developing countries on this sector. Because of major differences
in the interests of both parties, negotiations on this area have yet to be
settled. This is why agriculture became the main issue in Bali Package
negotiations during the 9th WTO Ministerial Conference. It was even
used to increase the bargaining power of each party to win trade
facilitation negotiations.
Essentially, the Bali Package covers the following issues:
a. Trade Facilitation
Trade facilitation agreement an issue of interest to developed countries
is also part of Singapore Issues7, which was proposed in the 1st WTO
Ministerial Conference in 1996 in Singapore but was repudiated by all
10
WTO members. However, this issue successfully passed the discussion

during the 4th WTO Ministerial Conference in 2001 in Doha, and the
Council for Trade in Goods was mandated to discuss the issue as part
of Doha Development Agenda.
This agreement will manage trading in goods across national borders
(exports-imports) by simplifying and harmonizing custom procedures
on the borders. It aims to make the movement of goods faster, more
efficient and effective.
It consists of two parts. The first part stipulates all regulations and
obligations regarding trade facilitation implementation also called
technical issues such as custom procedures, goods in transit, custom
brokers, etc. which are binding. The second part calls for flexibility
for developing and least developed countries such as special and
differential treatments, capacity buildings, and other technical issues8.
b. Agriculture
Under this issue, there are several negotiation points that have not
been settled since the Doha Round was launched in 2001. These
include tariff-rate quota administration and export competition which
was proposed by G20 countries. In addition, developing countries of
G33 also proposed a list of general services and public stockholding
for food security purposes.9
However, it is the public stockholding proposal by G33 countries that
is the most interesting part of the Bali Package. Initiated by India, it
attracted many discussions within the whole negotiation than most
proposals and drew protests from developed countries like the US and
EU. This is because it seeks to amend the domestic support regulations
in the AoA which were found to be disadvantageous for developing
countries.
c. Development Package for Least Developed Countries
The development package negotiation is being lobbied by the least
developed countries which are considered vulnerable in WTOs trade
agreements implementation. The Doha Development Agenda gives
mandate to prioritize the development package for these countries
because the flexibility, special and differential treatment regulations
for least developed countries are not fully enforced.10
Therefore, during the Bali Package negotiation, the least developed
countries (LDCs) demanded immediate settlement on development
issues that stimulate trade. The package includes (1) duty free, quota
free market access, for LDCs, especially for cotton products from LDCs;
11
(2) preferential rules of origin; and (3) services waiver for LDCs .
G-33 Proposal: Public Stockholding for Food Security
The agricultural sector is the most sensitive issue in the Doha Round.
Because of this, it was prioritized during the discussions at the 9th
Ministerial Conference. There were three points during the discussion:
(1) the G-33 proposal on public stockholding for food security, (2) the
G-20 proposal regarding export subsidies, and (3) the proposal on
tariff rate quotas. Of the three, however, it is the G-33 proposal that
is most contentious, drawing a lot of attention during the conference.
The G-33 proposal aims to give exceptions to subsidies for public
stockholding for the purpose of food security on aggregate
measurement of supports (AMS) calculation. The proposal is meant
to help poor farmers and increase local food security by stopping
agricultural liberalization.
The rationale behind this proposal is that while AoA regulates the
subsidy for public stock holding for food security to be placed in Green
Box (See page 19), the value still has to be counted into AMS. This is
regulated in footnote 5 paragraph 3 in Annex 2 AoA. The following is
the proposed amendment:
12
Footnote 5, Paragraph 3,
Annex 2 of AoA
For the purposes of paragraph
3 of this Annex, governmental
stockholding programs for food
security purposes in developing
countries whose operation is
transparent and conducted
in accordance with officially
published objective criteria or
guidelines shall be considered
to be in conformity with the
provisions of this paragraph,
including programs under
which stocks of foodstuffs
for food security purposes
are acquired and released at
administered prices, provided
that the difference between the
acquisition price and the external
reference price is accounted for in
the AMS.
Proposed Amendment
For the purposes of paragraph
3 of this Annex, governmental
stockholding programs for food
security purposes in developing
countries whose operation is
transparent and conducted
in accordance with officially
published objective criteria or
guidelines shall be considered
to be in conformity with the
provisions of this paragraph,
including programs under which
stocks of foodstuffs for food
security purposes are acquired
and released at administered
prices, provided that However,
acquisition of stocks of foodstuffs
by developing country Members
with the objective of supporting
low-income or resource-poor
producers shall not be required to
be accounted for in the AMS.
India and the rest of the G-33 countries strongly feel that the value
of subsidies for public stockholding for food security should be taken
out of the aggregate measurement of supports calculations without
exception. Furthermore, they contend that the AMS calculation
mechanism has many shortcomings. It is clear that the basic problem
that G33 proposal seeks to address is related to the AMS calculation
mechanism.
The AMS calculation is regulated in Article 6 and 7 as well as in Annex
3 of the AoA. All commitments on domestic subsidy reduction except
ones in green box have to be included into the total AMS calculation.
Each members commitment to reduce subsidy can be seen in Part IV
of the Schedule of Commitments which was set last January 1, 1995.11
The AMS calculation is done to specific and non-specific products,
both subsidies given on national and local level, including government
and its agencies budget and revenue foregone. It is calculated by
multiplying the gap between an external reference price and the
applied administered price by the total production of specific or nonspecific products.12
The external reference price is based on the average price in the years
1986 to 1988 and generally, the average f.o.b. (free on board) unit
13
value and the average c.i.f. (cost, insurance, and freight) net value for
the basic agriculture product in a net importing country.13 This is due
to the actual tariff rate which was applied on September 1986 when
the WTO Uruguay Round negotiations started.14
Nevertheless, the aggregate measurement of support could be
exempted from reduction so a country does not need to include its
domestic subsidy into total AMS calculation. It can be applied if the
subsidy does not exceed 5% for developed countries and 10% for
developing countries of the total value of production of specific and
non-specific products. This is called de minimis level.15
The G-33 views that AMS has been used as a loophole by developed
countries to cheat on total subsidies calculation. According to the
G-33, AMS shortcomings are as follows:16
(1) AMS calculation is based on the reference price of the base period
1986-1988 thus, the real expenses are eventually not accounted for in
the AMS calculation.
(2) The period 1986-1988, on which the AMS calculation is based,
is irrelevant in the light of the current situation where inflation and
market commodity price increases occur which force the governments
to increase the intervention price, causing developing countries to
suffer losses.
Not surprisingly, the G-33 proposal received its share of critiques from
other members. The biggest opposition to the proposal comes from
the EU and the US. They are afraid that unlimited public stockholding
which is not accounted for in the aggregate measurement of supports
calculation will distort market prices. They also state that there is
no guarantee that the subsidized products will stay in the domestic
market and will not enter the international market.
Nevertheless, the United States is a country which provides a large
amount of domestic subsidies which continue to increase to this day.
And yet, the country has never given updates related to aggregate
measurement of supports calculation based on their current expenses
to WTO.17
The G-33 countries are trying to address the shortcomings and
loopholes in the aggregate measurement of supports mechanism
through AMS calculation revision. There are two emerging points: first,
the G-33 demands a change in the reference price and that the AMS
will be based on the current actual price, not the reference price in
14
the base period of 1986-1988; second, the G-33 seeks to increase the
total production limit on the de minimis calculation for developing
countries from 10% to 15%.18
To stop the settlement on the G-33 proposal, the developed countries
responded with a counter-proposal called the peace clause strategy.19
The peace clause proposals by developed countries are as follows: (1)
temporary waiver for all regulations in the Agreement on Agriculture,
(2) a two-year flexibility period given to developing and leastdeveloped countries to allow them to provide more subsidies than the
agreed limits. Developed countries are pushing for a time frame of
four years for the implementation of the Peace Clause but this is still
subject to debate.
At the negotiation process in Geneva, prior to the 9th WTO Ministerial
Conference in December 2013 in Bali, the debate got heated. WTO
member countries were even made to agree on the draft text
regarding this proposal which was issued by the WTO Director General
on November 25, 2013. However, the G33 countries, especially India,
insisted on refusing the draft text that would manage the peace clause
without first reaching a permanent solution regarding their public
stockholding proposal. The following are the points in question from
the draft text:20
ISSUES
DESCRIPTION
Peace Clause
All WTO member countries are demanded

to exercise due-restraint in challenging
developing countries when they give
subsidies to public stockholding for food
security over the AMS or de minimis
calculation. The time frame given for
this is only four years until the 9th WTO
Ministerial Conference.
There is no guarantee The draft text only mentions work

of achieving permanent programs that need to be set in order
solution
to find a permanent solution to the
public stockholding proposal until the
XI WTO Ministerial Conference without
mentioning the permanent solution
demanded by the G33. Therefore, there
is no legal certainty that a permanent
solution will be settled until the agreed
deadline.

There is no guarantee of
dispute free in the WTO
Dispute
Settlement
System
15
Since a
permanent solution is not
guaranteed, there is chance for developing
countries to be disputed under the WTO
Dispute Settlement System.
Injustice in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture

The Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) has been in effect since the
formal establishment of the WTO last January 1, 1995. It is one of the
free trade agreements, which are regulated by WTO and bind all of
its members by requiring them to adopt the agreement onto their
national policies.
As part of the Bretton Woods system, WTO was established to push
the global free trade agenda of industrialized countries such as the
United States and European Union, who wish to expand their markets
and take over the natural resources of least-developed and developing
countries.
The goal of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture is to liberalize its
members agricultural sector. Liberalization is exercised by eliminating
both tariff and non-tariff trade barriers, thereby opening the countrys
market economy to outsiders. This reduces the states role in managing
trade and development while letting multinational corporations take
a bigger role.
The AoA regulates a couple of main points: (a) market access and
(b) commitment to reduce subsidies that distort trade.21 Agricultural
products that will be liberalized are divided into two categories
raw materials and processed products, except for fishes and forest
products as regulated in the Agreement on Agriculture Annex 1.
a. Market Access
Agricultural market opening is carried out by reducing tariff barriers
which impede foreign agricultural products from entering a country.
The tariff reduction for agricultural products is applied under a
scheduled commitment to use rates that are bound from January
1st, 1995; or for unbound tariffs, the actual rate charged in September
1986 when the Uruguay Round began.22
Developed countries were required to reduce tariffs and subsidies
over six years from 1995 to 2000, whereas developing countries were
given concession to do it from 1995 to 2004. Only the least-developed
countries were not required to make a commitment to reducing tariffs
16
and subsidies. The following table is the schedules of commitments and

the rate of tariff reduction for developed and developing countries.23

Table 2. Schedules of Commitments to Reduce Tariffs on Agricultural Products
Type of Commitments
Developed countries:
6 years (1995-2000)
Developing countries:
10 years (1995-2004)
Average cuts for all

agricultural products
36%
24%
Minimum
product
15%
10%
cuts
per
Source: WTO (2012) compiled by IGJ (2013)
b. Subsidies Reduction
The AoA prohibits subsidies on agriculture because they are considered
as the cause of trade distortion. There are two main foci in reducing
subsidies: (1) domestic support and (2) export subsidies. Schedules of
commitments are also applied on the subsidy reduction regulation.
Domestic support is regulated in article 6 of the AoA.
Domestic support is the subsidy given by the government to its
agricultural sector. However, in accordance with its objective, the AoA
prohibits governments to provide agricultural subsidies that could
distort trade, thus they need to be reduced or even eliminated. These
subsidies refer to ones that have direct effect on price and productions.
These subsidies fall into the Amber Box category.
Subsidy reduction is calculated using the total aggregate measurement
of supports (AMS) in the period of 1986-1988. The subsidy cannot be
more than the AMS, which is calculated using the base year of 19861988. The following is the table for subsidy reduction commitments
for developing and developed countries:
Table 3. Schedules of Commitments to Reduce Agriculture Subsidies
Type of Commitments
Developed countries:
6 years (1995-2000)
Developing
countries:
10 years
(1995-2004)
Average cuts for domestic

subsidy from total of AMS in
the base years of 1986-1988
20%
13%
Calculating Total AMS:

(Agricultural product subsidy world market price) X Quantity of
Production = Total AMS
Source: WTO (2012) compiled by IGJ (2013)
17
However, the commitment to reduce subsidies cannot be applied if the

subsidies both for market prices or productions are given at certain
minimum limits or also known as de minimis. Subsidy limitation as
allowed by this regulation is 5% of the total value of agricultural
production in developed countries and 10% of the total value of
agricultural production in developing countries.
Subsidy regulation, which requires one to limit production within
defined minimal levels, is also an exception to the subsidy reduction
commitment as long as the subsidies do not increase production or
exceed the production level agreed in the base years of 1986-1988.
These subsidies fall into Blue Box category. However, some of the
subsidies in the Amber Box are also included in the Blue Box.
The other exception to the subsidy reduction commitment is a subsidy
that is deemed to have no trade-distorting effects. This subsidy can be
increased and is allowed without limits. This is categorized as Green
Box as defined in Annex 2 of the AoA. Green Box subsidies can be
given through government-funded programs and must not involve
price support to producers.24
The following are government programs that fall into Green Box
category:
(1) General services programs such as research, pest and
diseases control, agricultural training and consultation,
inspection services, including general inspection and
inspection of particular products for health, safety, grading
or standardization purposes, marketing and promotion
services, and infrastructural services which include electricity
reticulation, roads and other means of transport, market and
port facilities, water supply facilities, etc.; (2) Public stockholding
programs for food security purposes; (3) domestic food aid
for the poor; (4) direct payment to producers that will not
distort trade; (6) government financial participation in income
insurance and income safety-net programs; (7) natural
disasters assistance; (8) structural adjustment assistance
provided through investment aid; (9) environmental program
aid; and (10) various regional assistance programs.25
Developing countries receive special treatments for their public
stockholding programs for food security purposes. However, they are
still required to include the purchase price and world food price into
the AMS calculation.
18
AoA also prohibits developing

countries from providing export
subsidies to local agricultural
products because they could distort
market. And yet, most developed
countries provide export subsidies
to their agricultural producers.
Export subsidies that are prohibited
by the agreement include direct
payment by the government to
exporters, non-commercial stock
sales below domestic market price,
producer-funded subsidies (that
will affect production), production
cost reduction action upgrading,
handling, and shipments, subsidies
for internal transport to ports, and
subsidies on incorporated products.
The AoA also requires developed countries to cut the value of export
subsidies by 36% and quantity of export subsidies of the base years
of 1986-1988 by 21% in a span of six years, up to the year of 2000.
Developing countries meanwhile, are required to cut their value of
export subsidies by 24% and the quantity of export subsidies of the
base years of 1986-1988 by 14% during the time span of ten years, up
to the year of 2004.
These commitments on subsidy reduction, both domestic and exports,
have triggered a strong debate between developed and developing
countries because of the huge differences. Developed countries
urge developing countries to reduce or even eliminate subsidies for
their agricultural sectors, but developed countries do not intend to
reduce their own agricultural subsidies. In fact, the data shows that
they even increase the subsidies every year. The OECD Report states
that agricultural subsidies of OECD countries26 were increasing from
US$350.65 in 1996 to US$406.74 in 2011.
This sharp difference between the developed countries interest
and that of developing countries has caused the dead-lock in the
negotiations during the 4th Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar in
2001. To this day, this round of negotiation also known as the Doha
Round has not yet been settled.
In practice, the AoA only benefits developed countries. Its three main
components opening of market access, regulation of domestic
19
subsidies and prohibition of export subsidies merely ensure that

the developing countries are bound to support the economy of the
developed nations.
Domestic support regulations require developed and developing
countries to reduce their government subsidies for agriculture which
fall into the Amber and Blue Box categories within a certain period of
time. All subsidies should be included in the AMS calculation using the
base price of 1986-1989 and countries are prohibited from providing
subsidies which exceed the AMS calculation. In accordance with the
agreed commitments, they even have to reduce the subsidies. (See
Table 4)
But in practice, developed countries apply a higher final bound total
AMS than that of developing countries, which mostly apply zero
AMS. This allows developed countries to continue giving subsidies
to their domestic agriculture while at the same time, accomplish their
commitment to reduce their subsidies up to 20% over a period of six
years (1995-2001).
Even after the year 2001 when there is no more commitment to reduce
AMS, developed countries like the US could still provide subsidies of
US$19 billion and EU can still provide subsidies of US$72 billion.
In stark contrast, developing countries do not have room for more
subsidies, except for the 10% limit of total production (de minimis).27
The following shows various countries level of commitments on AMS:
Table 4. WTO Member Countries Level of Commitment on Subsidies
Source: Action Aid, 1998.
The other deception instigated by developed countries includes the

strategy to place certain types of subsidy which normally fall to the
Amber Box category into the Green Box category. This sharply increases
their agricultural subsidies in contrast with that of developing countries.
WTO data shows that the US Green Box subsidies increased from US$46
billion to US$120 billion from 1995-2010.28 Similarly, EUs Green Box
subsidies increased from 19 million to 64 billion within same time
period.
20
Developing countries, meanwhile, cannot do the same because their

Green Box subsidies are limited to public stockholding for food security
purposes where the implementation is limited to the aggregate
measurement of supports. As previously pointed out, the developing
countries commitment to AMS with 0 AMS is already at the highest
level. This is why the developing countries were determined to push
for the public stockholding proposal during the 9th WTO Ministerial
Conference in Bali last December 3rd - 6th, 2013.
WTO AND FOOD POLICY IN INDONESIA

Indonesias commitment to Agreement on Agriculture
In 1995, Indonesia joined WTO right after it enacted a national law
ratifying the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. This
made Indonesia an original member of WTO, and one which is obligated
to obey WTOs regulations, particularly the Agreement on Agriculture.
There are three main impacts of WTOs agriculture liberalization. First,
the market access opening has caused an increase in the number
of agricultural import commodities penetrating Indonesias market.
Second, the restriction on subsidies for local farmers in Indonesia has
caused a decrease in agricultural productivity due to the high production
cost which led to the farmers inability to compete against cheaper
import commodities. Third, the role of Indonesian Bureau of Logistic
or Bulog--a state owned company--as a staple price stabilizer has been
weakened through privatization so that the state funding is no longer
significant and Bulog is now more of a government official importer.29
In committing to reduce tariff in its agriculture sector, Indonesia now
binds 100% of its tariff post. According to the regulation applied to
developing countries, Indonesia has to reduce its tariff by as much as
24% within 10 years, from the period 1995-2004, with a minimum 10%
reduction per product. The following is Indonesias commitment to tariff
reduction for agricultural products based on the WTO schedule XXI.
Table 5. Indonesias Commitment to Agricultural Product Tariff Reduction
1995-2004
Bound tariff
in 1994 (%)
Bound tariff
in 2004 (%)
Cloves
75
60
Dairy products
50-238
40-210
21

Soybean meal
45
40
Garlic
60
40-50
Wheat
30
27
Wheat flour
30
27
Rice
180
160
Sugar
110
95
Soybeans
30
27
Alcoholic beverages
170
150
Souce: IGJ Data Center (2013) taken from FAO and WTO Schedule XXI
Regarding domestic subsidies, Indonesia in principle does not

commit to reduce its domestic subsidies. Some of its domestic
subsidy programs fall into the Green Box category, hence, special
and differential treatments can be applied, exempting Indonesia
from domestic subsidy reduction.30 Several of Indonesias domestic
subsidy programs such as general service,31 agricultural development
program, certain commodity price management, and domestic food
aid are recorded in AoA schedule IV. Below is Indonesias domestic
subsidies since 1995 to 2008 which were eligible for exempt from
subsidy reduction commitment.
Table 6. Indonesias Domestic Subsidy Green Box Category 1995-2008 (IDR,
billion)
Data is not available for years 2001, 2002 and 2003

Source: IGJ Data Center (2013) taken from WTO Notification concerning
domestic support commitments 2000, 2001, 2012, 2013.
Because it has no commitment to reduce subsidies under AoA,

Indonesia is subject to the de minimis regulation. In 2000, Indonesias
domestic subsidy for rice product was included into AMS calculation.
The subsidy was more than de minimis level, which was 10% from
total production. The de minimis level is calculated by multiplying the
total value of production by maximum subsidy, which is 10%. The total
value of production is calculated by multiplying the intervention price
by total production. The following is an example:
22
Intervention price: IDR 2,645/Kg

External Reference Price 1988-89: IDR 1,632/Kg
Total Production of rice in the yearof 2000: 2.174.807.000 Kg
Total value of production of rice = 2645 x 2.174.807.000
= IDR 5.752.364.515.000
De minimis Level of rice in the year of 2000
= 10/100 x 5.752.364.515.000 = 575.236.451.500
AMS = (2645-1632) x 2.174.807.000 = 2.203.079.491.000
From the AMS it can be seen that the subsidy is over de minimis level.
Therefore, Indonesia had to reduce its subsidy on rice in the year of 2000
as regulated in AoA.
Food Reserve Management in Indonesia

In 2012, the Indonesian government enacted the new Food Law
No. 18. The law obligates the government to ensure a national food
supply from its domestic production and national food reserves.
Imports can only be done if the two main sources cannot fulfill the
need. However, in this condition where agriculture liberalization and
extreme climate change are occurring, food self-sufficiency is difficult
to achieve. Therefore, a Food Reserves Policy is essential to achieve
food security. The new Food Law obliges the government to establish
a national food reserve in anticipation of the following conditions: first,
food shortage; second, food surplus; third, food price fluctuation; and
fourth, for emergency purposes. Under this law, national food reserves
will consist of the central governments and local governments food
reserves.32
The government must determine the type of commodity and the
amount of food reserves of which procurement should come from
domestic production, especially during harvest time. Food reserves
distribution will be done in response to food shortage, price fluctuation,
social and natural disasters, and emergency.33
Law No. 18 also mandates that the type of food crops available in
the national food reserves will be determined by how critical it is
for Indonesian consumption, i.e. whether or not a disruption in its
availability and price will cause economic instability and social turmoil.
However, until now the national food reserves are focused on rice as
the countrys staple.
This rice supply is being managed by the Indonesian Bureau of
Logistics (BULOG), the national food agency.
23
Despite the new food law issuance, a new technical regulation regarding
food reserves was not been completed. Thus, food reserve matters
were referred to the old technical regulation. In order to secure rice
stock, the Indonesian government issued Presidents Instruction No. 8
of year 2011 to maintain rice price stability and anticipate a disruption
in production and price increase.
The instruction covered rice stock security for both governments
rice stock and the rice stock allotted for the subsidized rice program
for low income families. The instruction also mandates BULOG as
a government rice stock procurement implementer. BULOG was
mandated to procure rice by taking the government purchase price
(HPP) into account. However, if the prevailing market price for rice was
higher than the HPP, then procurement was to be done at the higher
price than HPP by taking the market price that was recorded by the
Central Bureau of Statistics into consideration.34
The HPP scheme was implemented to provide a price guarantee over
price equilibrium, especially during harvest time so that farmers
income and business could improve.35 Such price intervention required
a national rice policy, which is laid out in the Presidents Instruction No.
3 of Year 2012.
The Instruction states that the rice price is determined by the
national government through the HPP scheme and that rice purchase
and procurement will be done by Bulog.36 The HPP covered by the
instruction are as follows:
1. Domestic dry grain purchase price with a maximum of 25% (twenty
five percent) water content and a 10% (ten percent) gross content is
IDR 3,300 (three thousand and three hundred rupiah) per kilogram
from farmers and IDR 3,350 (three thousand and three hundred fifty
rupiah) per kilogram from a rice milling company, or IDR 4,200 (four
thousand and two hundred rupiah) per kilogram at a Bulog warehouse;
2. Domestic dry grain purchase price with a maximum of 14% (fourteen
percent) water content and a 3% (three percent) gross content is IDR
4,150 (four thousand and one hundred fifty) per kilogram at a rice
milling company or IDR 4,200 (four thousand and two hundred) per
kilogram at a Bulog warehouse.
3. Domestic dry grain purchase price with a maximum of 14% (fourteen
percent) water content, 20% (twenty percent) broken grains, 2% (two
percent) grouts level, and minimum of 95% rices whitening degree is
24
IDR 6,600 (six thousand and six hundred rupiah) per kilogram at Bulog
warehouse.
The Instruction also covers the possibility of rice procurement through
importation which will only be done if the domestic stock is not
sufficient to meet the stocking need or the government rice reserves,
and to maintain domestic price stability. The rice imports will also be
procured by Bulog.
Bulog is also tasked to implement the governments rice reserve
distribution which is mainly for low-income families or families eligible
to receive rice for the poor (Raskin). However, rice reserves may also be
distributed through the market operation mechanism also conducted
by Bulog- in order to stabilize the market price.
As per Minister of Trade Regulation No. 4/M-DAG/PER/1/2012, rice
distribution is done through market operation only when the price
increases up to 10% or more than the normal price for one week
or when its troubling the people.37 The market operation is done
in the traditional and main markets, and other places accessible by
consumers where the highest retail price can be found during the
market operation that is consistent with normal price in each region.38
The Role of the Indonesian Bureau of Logistics (Bulog) in National
Food Reserves Procurement and Distribution
Bulog is the government agency which was established in 1967 to
control the price and supply of basic food. These include crop staples
such as rice, sugar, wheat, and soybean. Other commodities under
Bulogs jurisdiction include cattle feed, cooking oil, eggs, and beef, as
well as spices. In recent years, however, Bulogs development role has
been getting smaller.
Bulog as a public corporation had two roles: public service obligation
and commercial entity. Bulogs role in public service obligation was
to manage the governments food reserves to stabilize prices and to
distribute basic food to certain communities.39 Bulog was required to
absorb local farmers production, yet was still allowed to import in
particular conditions.
In 1998, when the economic crisis struck the region, the Indonesian
government agreed to accept financial assistance from the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) to end its fiscal disaster. Part of the IMFs bailout package included a demand for the government to discontinue
25
Bulogs regulatory role over basic commodities. Consequently,

Presidential Decree No.19 of year 1998 was passed, limiting Bulogs
role to managing rice commodity while other commodities will be
managed by the market.40
In 2003, Bulog underwent privatization, becoming a profit-oriented
company instead of a public corporation. The Government Regulation
No. 7 of year 2003 regarding Bulog public corporation establishment
was amended by the Government Regulation No. 61 of year 2003 to
include the provision that not only Bulog shares will be governmentowned but will also be open to joint-venture projects or investment
by other companies.41
Bulog used to have a monopoly on rice imports in Indonesia. But with
the opening of the market through the issuance of the Indonesian
Minister of Trade Regulation No. 12/M-DAG/PER/4/2008 which
regulated rice export and import, private companies can now import
rice. Bulog has now been relegated to importing low quality rice for
the purpose of stabilizing price, or as an emergency response in cases
of food insecurity or for the general consumption of low-end income
market.
Because of its role in public service obligation, Bulog receives funds
set by the Ministry of Finance to procure government rice reserves
each year. However, for commercial purposes, Bulog uses commercial
credit to procure the rice.
Bulog is required to buy rice from farmers at a government purchase
price (HPP) which is determined by the government. Ideally, this would
benefit farmers since they can increase their income but Bulog did not
implement the policy as regulated.
Bulog works with rice milling companies or rice grain management
units to procure domestic rice. A company has to meet several
requirements to become Bulogs partner. First, they must have a
business license; second, deposit money amounting to 98.5% of the
first rice grain supply value to Bulog as collateral for grain procurement
work contract; third, provide a drying floor, rice huller and warehouse;
and fourth, provide guarantee for rick and sack procurement.42
In practice, however, grain rice management units buy grains directly
from the farmers or vendors, using applicable prices during transaction.
Afterwards, the units resell the rice to Bulog at HPP terms. This is the
reason why the policy has not significantly increased farmers welfare.
26
Subsidies for Food Security in Indonesia

The Indonesian government has budgeted subsidies for food security
and the food price stabilization program. These subsidies aim to
improve food production, price affordability and food distribution,
food diversification and quality and types of processed food, as well
as provide protection and empowerment to farmers. The following
are subsidies for food security in Indonesia for the fiscal year of 2013
and 2014:
Table 7. Subsidy for Indonesia Food Security 2013-2014
Subsidies in FY 2013
Subsidies in FY 2014
Activities
The value of
subsidy
Activities
The value of
subsidy
1. Irrigation
infrastructure
development in
111,251 acre and
construction of 275
lakes.
IDR .19,5 Trillion
1.Food security for

price stabilization and
fulfill peoples need
of food.
Ministry of
Agriculture:
IDR 15,5 Trillion
Ministry of Maritime
and Fishery:
IDR .6,5 Trillion.
2. Raskin or rice for

poor provision with
target of 15.5 million
households.
IDR 17.2 Trillion
2. Raskin or rice for

poor provision with
target of 15.5 million
households.
IDR 18.8 Trillion
3. Strengthening
food security which
is used for a. increase
food production
targeting 10 tons rice
surplus; b. improve
price affordability and
food distribution
IDR 63.2 Trillion
3 Governments rice
reserves managed by
Bulog reached 240
million tons. Price
stability for soybean,
beef, and granulated
sugar.
IDR 2 Trillion+ IDR

4,95 Trillion
4. Government rice
reserves managed by
Bulog
IDR 2 Trillion
4. Fertilizer subsidies
IDR 21 Trillion
5. Fertilizer subsidies
IDR 16.2 Trillion
5. Seeds subsidies
IDR 1.6 Trillion
6. Seeds subsidies
IDR 1.5 Trillion
6. Credit interest
subsidies
IDR 3.2 Trillion
7. Credit interest
subsidies
IDR 1.2 Trillion
7. tax subsidies to
support basic need
price stabilization
IDR 4.7 Trillion.
Total (Curs
11,000/1 USD)
IDR 120,8 Trillion

(US$ 10.98
Million)
Total (curs
12.000/1 USD)
IDR 78,25 Trillion

(US$ 6,52 Million)
Source: IGJ Data Center, taken from Ministry of Finance Republic of Indonesia,
State Budget of 2013 and 2014
27
Comparatively, the subsidies provided by the EU and US to their

agriculture are way higher than that of Indonesias. In 2009 alone, the
EU subsidy on agriculture reached US$ 106 billion, while the US in
2010, provided 130 billion.43 This is the consequence of a one-sided,
unjust WTO Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) which is being imposed
on developing countries.
In practice, agricultural subsidies - both quality and quantity, have
problems. The government of Indonesia was not able to bring down
the agricultural production cost which is a burden among farmers.
The governments intervention strategy through the imposition of the
government purchase price even failed to stabilize the rice market,
resulting in low government rice reserves.
The implementation of subsidies for seeds and fertilizer also face
similar problems. The private business sector essentially takes the
states budget allocation because the subsidy distribution goes to seed
and fertilizer companies. Farmers become victims of high retail prices
implemented by official distributors which are limited and are often
located far from the farmers. This mechanism rather puts farmers at
a disadvantage. Moreover, seed and fertilizer production businesses
are controlled by transnational companies (TNCs). For example, TNCs
control 100% of pesticides products (insecticides, fungicides, and
herbicides), hybrid rice and corn seeds and horticulture seeds while
national corporations control 100% of inbred rice seeds. Indonesian
corporations control 70% of fertilizer products while the TNCs control
the remaining 30%.44
IMPLICATIONS OF THE G33 PROPOSAL FOR FOOD

SOVEREIGNTY IN INDONESIA
The fate of the G33 proposal floats in WTO
The agreement on the Bali Package at the 9th WTO Ministerial Conference
last December 2013 nullified the gains of the G-33 proposal. No longer
were the discussions focused on achieving permanent solutions to the
proposal; instead, it was focused on the implementation period of the
Peace Clause which is being pushed by developed countries like the
US and the EU. Moreover, support for the G-33 proposal from the G-33
member countries was diminishing. India became the only country to
retain the proposal until the final seconds of the Ministerial Conference.
In the end, it capitulated to the Peace Clause in exchange for a trade
28
off on the Trade Facilitation Agreement with Agriculture a strategy

launched by the developed countries.
What was agreed upon within the Bali Package deal was to float the
fate of the G-33 proposals for public stockholding without clarity and
legal certainty. Nowhere in the text generated in the Bali Package was
a permanent solution drafted. In fact, all member countries of the WTO
were asked to negotiate the G33 proposal in order to find a permanent
solution to the pre-determined time period.
Some of the terms agreed in the Peace Clause essentially provide
flexibility for developing countries to increase their subsidies for public
food reserves subject to the applicable rules.
When we see it in details, the textual content of the Bali agreement on
the public stockholding proposals is very weak. (See text in Appendix)
Developing countries who want to make exemptions to the AoA
provisions relating to domestic subsidies, especially on public food
reserves, must meet several mandatory requirements which are not
easy to follow. For example, the State should notify and fill out the
form on relevant information about statistical data of commodities
which will be exempted from the AoA rules. There is also a consultation
process which must be conducted with all WTO country members. A
request of a State for an exception takes a long time, and there is
no guarantee that all member countries will approve the application.
Even the 4-year time frame provided is not enough to make the
consultation process. Therefore, the effectiveness of the Bali deal is
very questionable.
G33 Proposal in Indonesia Food Policy
The failure of the G33 proposal in the Bali negotiations should become
a reflection for the Indonesian food policymakers. Limitations of
the rules which appear in the agreement text will not do much for
Indonesia. Moreover, the national food policies also still have some
drawbacks.
The main target in the G33 proposal is to amend Annex 2, paragraph 3,
footnote 5 (refer to page 13) of the AoA. This will exclude the unlimited
subsidy for the benefit of public food reserves from the calculation of
AMS. If this is not achieved, then the alternative solution is to revise
the reference price adjusted to the actual price and increase the de
minimis limit of maximum levels from 10% to 15% to benefit the public
food supplies of developing countries.
29
The Indonesian government subsidizes public food reserves only for

rice, which it considers as staple food. The food security subsidy that
goes into the category of public food reserves, as defined in the AoA
Annex 2 paragraph 3, are managed by the government and the Bulog
rice supply for the poor (Raskin).
In 2013, the Indonesian government has been distributing subsidized
food reserves to stabilize prices using the intervention price for rice
procurement totaling to Rp.2 Trillion. In addition, the provision for
Raskin in 2013 has reached Rp.17, 2 Trillion. With a budget of Rp 2
trillion in 2013, Bulog is only able to absorb 606,060 tons of grain in
order to increase the governments rice reserves. With a budget of
Rp.17, 2 trillion, Bulog has channelled as much as 2.79 million tons.
Bulog claims that in 2013, it absorbed as much as 3.5 million tons of
rice, of which 3.43 million tons were set for Raskin.45
In practice, however, the absorption of the product by the domestic
rice farmer does not work out well as imagined. Ideally, increasing the
HPP (farmers basic price) can become an opportunity for increasing
farmers income since it will increase the value of the public subsidy
reserves. But in reality, the HPP does not guarantee wealth creation
for farmers. This is because often times, the HPP is way below the
market price, so farmers are not able to profit from their produce. For
instance, the data gathered by the Indonesian Peasant Alliance (API)
during the period of January-June 2013 showed that the average price
of rice crop increased to $ 3.962/kg, far above the HPP which is only
Rp 3300/kg.46
Local farmers experience losses because Bulog does not buy directly
from farmers. The API research revealed that farmers sell their rice
produce immediately after harvest in the form of a dry grain harvest
(GKP) and even unprocessed paddies or paddies which are newly cut
from the field to the milling business unit. As a consequence, farmers
do not benefit from post-harvest added value.47
Based on data from the Central Statistics Agency (BPS), Indonesias
national rice production in 2013 is equivalent to 50.41 quintal/hectare
in a year.48 On the average, a farmer per hectare is only able to earn
an income of Rp 1.41 million/month on the value of HPP. This value is
way below the average of monthly household consumption value of
Rp 5.58 million,49 which explains how poor the life of farmers in the
village.
Raskin also has many disadvantages. Its budget of Rp 17.2 trillion can
30
only be used to distribute rice to 15.5 million poor families, who are
rationed by as much as 15 kg/month. Based on the BPS assumption
that the average annual consumption of rice per person is as much
as 113.7 kg or 9.5 kg/month, a family of four then requires as much
as 38 kg/month.50 Therefore, with only a small portion distributed
to Indonesias poor, the government-delivered food aid cannot really
meet the over-all rice requirement.
Distribution of food aid should be enhanced to meet the food needs
of the poor in Indonesia in consideration of the increasing population
of poor people in the country.
From March September 2013, the BPS recorded an increase in rural
poverty which amounted to 0.48 million people. Significantly in 2013,
the population of poor people in Indonesia reached a total of 28.55
million people, with poverty rates reaching 17.92 million people in the
rural level and 10.63 million people in the urban level.
Bulogs intervention in stabilizing prices has its drawbacks. Simply put,
its effect on the market is only temporary. This is because, food prices
are left to the market mechanism and the government does not have
the authority to set the price. Price fluctuation does not only occur in
rice, but also in other food commodities such as meat, soy, and sugar.
All of these basic commodities do not enter into government food
reserve program and are instead released to the market mechanism.
31
In addition, the import activity is not stopped entirely by the

Government. From 2009-2013, the value of food imports increased
from U.S. $ 5.94 billion to U.S. $ 7.21 billion. The worst spike was in the
year 2012, which amounted to U.S. $ 12.05 Billion.51
The influence of the G33 Proposal to the national food policy is
questionable. The strength of the proposal is the removal of restrictions
on subsidies to public reserve that will open up opportunities for
increasing the value of subsidy for national food reserves. This means
the recipients of food aid will increase and the aid value can possibly
increase to 39.5% of the total rice needed for a month, as has been
implemented in the Raskin program.
However, we need to keep in mind that the rules of AoA do not allow
food price distortion. So, it will be difficult for government to set a
purchase price which is higher than the average price. The G33 proposal
does not intend to eliminate the rules relating to the determination of
food price benchmark, but only seeks to change the benchmark of the
worlds food prices. Price distortion is still a big enemy to agriculture
liberalization.
These gaps in Indonesias national food policy have hampered its
objective of food self-sufficiency. This will also affect the effectiveness
of the G33 proposal in the country. For example, Bulogs new mandate
to restrict itself only to rice market regulation has made it unable to
stop Indonesias dependency on imported food such as sugar, meat,
and other basic commodities. Bulogs market operations cannot
answer the issue of fluctuations in prices of other food commodities.
Therefore, revising the national food policy should become the
governments priority agenda. The G33 proposal will not make a
significant impact if the national food policy is not revised.
G33 Proposal & Food Sovereignty
The weaknesses of the Bali Agreement text and the limitations of G33
Proposal on ending agricultural liberalization are obstacles towards
Indonesias goal of food sovereignty.
Food sovereignty is the only answer to the liberalization of the
agricultural system today. Wahono (2011) recommended several
steps that can be done to restore the concept of food sovereignty:
first, the need for state intervention in setting prices, so that the public
can access affordable food and encourage welfare for farmers; second,
32
food (agriculture) should not be treated as a trade commodity, but

as a basic right to life of the people; third, access and control over
agricultural, especially land, water, and biodiversity should be given
to farmers; fourth, women farmers must be put at the forefront of
community organizing and not just a complement in agricultural
system; fifth, support from the state in the form of production
subsidies in order to maintain the resilience and protect local farmers
culture; sixth, the implementation of a cooperative system which
will generate good management of the agricultural communities in
both upstream and downstream and not just profit-oriented; seventh,
preserving local culture based on food sovereignty, which can be done
through compulsory curriculum in the formal educational system of
government.52
In the light of Wahonos articulations, we posit that the G-33 proposal
cannot stop agricultural liberalization in Indonesia. This is because the
proposal does not set out to eliminate the rules which open the market
to import goods. It even limits its regulation to a single national staple
crop, allowing the prices of other basic food commodities like meat,
soybean, sugar to keep increasing. As a whole, the proposal does
not encourage the G33 to change the commitments that have been
established by the Government of Indonesia to the national staple
food commodities.
The G33 proposal will not be able to return the control of agricultural
resources, such as land, to the farmer. The biggest obstacle is related
to the conversion of land that eventually displaces many farmers from
food production. The BPS data in 2009 mentioned the conversion
of 8,106,858 hectares of land. Land conversion is done with 41.32%
allocated for plantations, 28.73% for residential, 4.82% for offices and
industries, and 16.60% for other uses. This juxtaposes the fact that
farmers in the villages only possess 0.5-1 acre of land. The population
of farmer families has already reached 14.24 million, making land
distribution for farmers a major responsibility that government should
comply.
Likewise, the G33 proposal has not eliminated the obligation of
Member States to ensure subsidies that would not distort the market
price as provided in the AoA. This is because G33 Proposal only aims
to change the basic reference price. A member state still cannot define
their own food prices in accordance with the peoples purchasing
power. Thus, any increase in food prices cannot be anticipated by a
State. So, the benchmark price for the farmers still has to refer to the
AoA.
33
An example is the increasing cost of agricultural production which

results in the decline of agricultural productivity. The BPS data states
that in 2013, there was an increase of 2.95% in the producer price
index in agriculture and when compared to 2012 (year on year/ yoy),
the increase was up to 4.39%. 53 This increase eventually led to the
decline of the Farmers Exchange54 (NTP). BPS states further that in
January 2014, there was a decline of 0.37% in the NTP. This is due to the
increase in the index price paid by growers which is 1.09% compared
to the index price received by farmers that is only 0.92%.
Hence, the G33 proposal will not be able to achieve national food
security and sovereignty for Indonesia. The concept of food sovereignty
is not included in the G33 proposal. This is because the instrument of
AoA favors multinational corporations (MNCs) that will compete with
each other for control of food resources in developing countries. Even
developing countries are competing among themselves to win trade
liberalization.
Priority Agenda
We cannot expect WTO to help Indonesia achieve food sovereignty. The
AoA implementation has resulted in poverty and hunger for farmers
everywhere. The G33 proposal cannot even stop the agricultural
liberalization since it is a temporary fix to the flaws brought about by
the AoA.
It is difficult to ascertain whether the post-Bali negotiations on the
G33 Proposal will progress towards a permanent solution. The
competing interests of both developed and developing countries will
only continue. In fact, there are even competing interests between
developing countries regarding this issue!

In 2015, Indonesia and others ASEAN member countries will be
integrated as the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). This will also
have an impact on the ongoing liberalization of the ASEAN agricultural
landscape. The liberalization of the agricultural sector in AEC 2015 will
run through the opening of market access and opening investment
flows. That is, the multinational corporations (MNCs) will be the key
players to control the industrialization of agriculture (agro-industry).
This will further marginalize the role of farmers in agriculture. The
ASEAN Economic Integration will only strengthen the rules related to
foreign investment flows to support agricultural industrialization which
has already been established by the Government of Indonesia through
Presidential Decree No. 36 of 2010. This Decree allows ownership of
foreign corporations of up to 95% dealing with agricultural cultivation
34
and the processing industry.

WTO cannot resolve Indonesias national food issues. The Bali Text
Agreement should be refused because this is difficult to implement
and will only harm national interest. Further, the success of the G33
proposal cannot be an indicator in stopping agricultural liberalization.
Achieving a permanent solution under the G33 proposal is only the
first step in the struggle for food sovereignty.
Therefore, the main agenda of the Government of Indonesia in the face
of agricultural liberalization should be to revise the national food policy
by restoring the regulatory oversight role of Bulog and stop imports
from flooding the market. This effort will increase competitiveness and
sovereignty of small farmers in Indonesia.
More importantly, the struggle to restore food sovereignty and the
fulfillment of national food needs should start with the farmers reasserting their sovereignty.
Endnotes
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
Compiled by IGJ from ASEAN Statistical Yearbook 2012 on ASEAN Major Origin of
Agricultural Import Commodities 2010-2011
Erani Yustika, Food and Inflation Disaster, Kompas daily, 1 Agustus 2013.
The Import and the Loss Caused by ACFTA: Agriculture, Food and Fishery Sectors,
Free Trade Watch Edition II-Indonesia for Global Justice, July 2011, page 89-91
Bisnis Indonesia Daily, 25th July 2013, Garlic Cartel: 19 Companies Become the
Reported
World Bank: Regional Growth Forecast 2013.
FTA Agendas, which draw attention in Asia Region are ASEAN RCEP and Trans Pacific
Partnership.
Singapore Issue, also called New Issue, consists of investment, government
procurement, competition policy, and trade facilitation.
South Centre Analytical Note, May 2011, Trade Facilitation State of Play and
Implications of an Early Harvest on Developing Countries.
South Centre Informal Note, WTOs MC9: Summary of Issues, November 2013.
South Centre Informal Note, WTOs MC9: Summary of Issues, November 2013.
Article 7 paragraph 2 AoA and Article 6 paragraph (1) AoA.
Annex 3 paragraph 1, 2, 3, and 8.
Annex 3 paragraph 9.
The Understanding WTO Agreement: Agreement on Agriculture, 2004, Page 5.
Article 6 paragraph 4 AoA.
WTO Document, October 2013, Informal Meeting Report on Agriculture
Negotiations.
Jacques Berthelot, Analysis of the G-33s proposal to change the AoA provision on
public stockholding for food security, 2013.
WTO Document, October 2013, Informal Meeting Report on Agriculture
Negotiations.

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
35
A legitimate mechanism is regulated in the AoA without violating the AoA

regulations. Developed countries use this to avoid the G-33 amendment proposal.
Draft text on public stockholding for food security purposes, WTO Trade Negotiation
Committee Document JOB/TNC/29, 25 November 2013.
The WTO Agreement Series: Agriculture, 2003, page.4
The Understanding WTO, 2012, page.28.
Ibid.
Article 1, Annex 2, Agreement on Agriculture.
Article 2-13 Annex 2, Agreement on Agriculture.
OECD countries include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel,
Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxemburg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United
Kingdom, and United States.
South Views, WTO Food Security Issue South Experts Report, November 2013,
www.southcentre.int
Ibid.
Bonnie Setiawan, Agriculture Globalization: Threats to Nations Sovereignty and
Farmers Welfare, 2003, page: 85-88.
FAO Report, WTO Agreement on Agriculture The Implementation Experience,
Developing Country Case Studies: Indonesia, 2003.
General services includes: agricultural research and development programs,
agricultural training and extension programs, livestock development programs, estate
crops development programs, agribusiness development programs, food crops and
horticulture development programs (regulated in Annex 2).
Article 23, 24, and 27 Law No.18 of year 2012 regarding food.
Article 28 and 31 UU No.18 of year 2012 regarding food. .
M.Nuruddin, et. al., the Effectiveness of Government Purchase Price on grain and
rice for the year 2012 and the price multi-quality implementation, Indonesian Farmer
Alliance, 2013, page.30.
Ibid, page. 31.
First and third instructions of Presidents Instruction No.3 of year 2012, issued in
Jakarta, on February 27, 2012
Article 2 paragraph (2), article 1 no. 2, Ministry of Trade Regulation No.4/MDAG/PER/1/2012 regarding government rice reserve use for the purpose of price
stabilization on January 18, 2012
Article 2, paragraph (1), article 6, Ministry of Trade Regulation No.4/M-DAG/
PER/1/2012 regarding government rice reserve use for the purpose of price
stabilization on January 18, 2012.
Article 6 Government Regulation No.7 of year 2003 regarding the establishment of
Bulog on January 20, 2003
Bulog Profile, downloaded from http://www.Bulog.co.id/sejarah_v2.php on June 8,
2012
Article 9 Government Regulation No.7 of year 2003 regarding the establishment of
Bulog on January 20, 2003
M.Nuruddin, et al.., the Effectiveness of Government Purchase Price on grain and
rice for the year 2012 and the price multi-quality implementation, Indonesian Farmer
Alliance, 2013, page:43.
South Views, WTO Food Security Issue South Experts Report, November 2013,
www.southcentre.int
Dwi Andreas Santosa, Opportunities and Challenges on Agricultural Liberalization
Agenda, 2013.
Bulog, disbursement figures RASKIN Grain Procurement and Internal Affairs, as of
January 2, 2014.
M.Nuruddin, et al., p: 37.
Ibid. Page: 52
The production of rice crops across the province in 2013, the BPS.
36
49.
50.
51.
52.
Cost of Living Survey 2012, BPS.

Bappenas, Social Protection Programme Implementation Report, 2014.
Ministry of Agriculture, Book IV Macro Agricultural Statistics, 2013.
Francis Wahono, Kedaulatan Pangan: Agriculture bukan Agribusiness, Mensiasati
Negara Lupa Bangsa, Bina Desa, 2011, hal.31-32.
53. BPS Statistics, Producer Price Index Developments Third Quarter, 2013.
54. benchmarks farmers income
Photo credits : https://www.flickr.com/photos/endwto
37
Annex 1
PUBLIC STOCKHOLDING FOR FOOD SECURITY PURPOSES
MINISTERIAL DECISION OF 7 DECEMBER 2013
The Ministerial Conference,
Having regard to paragraph 1 of Article IX of the Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the
World Trade Organization;
Decides as follows:
1. Members agree to put in place an interim mechanism as set out
below, and to negotiate on an agreement for a permanent solution1, for
the issue of public stockholding for food security purposes for adoption
by the 11th Ministerial Conference.
2. In the interim, until a permanent solution is found, and provided
that the conditions set out below are met, Members shall refrain
from challenging through the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism,
compliance of a developing Member with its obligations under Articles
6.3 and 7.2 (b) of the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) in relation to
support provided for traditional staple food crops2 in pursuance of
public stockholding programmes for food security purposes existing
as of the date of this Decision, that are consistent with the criteria of
paragraph 3, footnote 5, and footnote 5&6 of Annex 2 to the AoA when
the developing Member complies with the terms of this Decision.3
NOTIFICATION AND TRANSPARENCY
3. A developing Member benefiting from this Decision must:
a. have notified the Committee on Agriculture that it is exceeding or
is at risk of exceeding either or both of its Aggregate Measurement
of Support (AMS) limits (the Members Bound Total AMS or the de
minimis level) as result of its programmes mentioned above;
b. have fulfilled and continue to fulfil its domestic support notification
requirements under the AoA in accordance with document G/AG/2
of 30 June 1995, as specified in the Annex;
c. have provided, and continue to provide on an annual basis,
additional information by completing the template contained in the
Annex, for each public stockholding programme that it maintains
for food security purposes; and
d. provide any additional relevant statistical information described
in the Statistical Appendix to the Annex as soon as possible after
it becomes available, as well as any information updating or
correcting any information earlier submitted.
38
The permanent solution will be applicable to all developing Members.

This term refers to primary agricultural products that are
predominant staples in the traditional diet of a developing Member.
3
This Decision does not preclude developing Members from
introducing programmes of public stockholding for food security
purposes in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Agreement
on Agriculture.
1
2
ANTI-CIRCUMVENTION/SAFEGUARDS
4. Any developing Member seeking coverage of programmes under
paragraph 2 shall ensure that stocks procured under such programmes
do not distort trade or adversely affect the food security of other
Members.
5. This Decision shall not be used in a manner that results in an increase
of the support subject to the Members Bound Total AMS or the de
minimis limits provided under programmes other than those notified
under paragraph 3.a.
CONSULTATIONS
6. A developing Member benefiting from this Decision shall upon
request hold consultations with other Members on the operation of its
public stockholding programmes notified under paragraph 3.a.
MONITORING
7. The Committee on Agriculture shall monitor the information
submitted under this Decision.
WORK PROGRAMME
8. Members agree to establish a work programme to be undertaken
in the Committee on Agriculture to pursue this issue with the aim
of making recommendations for a permanent solution. This work
programme shall take into account Members existing and future
submissions.
9. In the context of the broader post-Bali agenda, Members commit to
the work programme mentioned in the previous paragraph with the aim
of concluding it no later than the 11th Ministerial Conference.
10. The General Council shall report to the 10th Ministerial Conference
for an evaluation of the operation of this Decision, particularly on the
progress made on the work programme.
Annex 2
Template
[Developing Members name]
General information
1. Factual information confirming that DS:1 notifications and relevant
supporting tables for the preceding 5 years are up-to-date (e.g. date and
document details)
2. Details of the programme sufficient to identify food security objective and
scale of the programme, including:
a. Name of the programme
b. Traditional staple food crop(s) covered
c. Agency in charge of implementation
d. Relevant laws and regulations
e. Date of commencement of the programme
f. Officially published objective criteria or guidelines
3. Practical description of how the programme operates, including:
a. Provisions relating to the purchase of stocks, including the way the
administered aquisition price is determined
b. Provisions related to volume and accumulation of stocks, including any
provisions related to pre-determined targets and quantitative limits
c. Provisions related to the release of stocks, including the determination
of the release price and targeting (eligibility to receive procured stocks)
4. A description of any measures aimed at minimising production or trade
distortive effects of the programme
5. Statistical information (as per the Statistical Appendix below)
6. Any other information considered relevant, including website references
39
40
Statistical Appendix (per crop) (data for the latest three years)
Unit
[Name of the crop]
a. Opening balance of stocks
b. Annual purchases under the programme
(value)
c. Annual purchases under the programme
(quantity)
d. Annual releases under the programme
(value)
e. Annual releases under the programme
(quantity)
f. Purchase prices
g. Release prices
h. End-year stocks
i. Total production (quantity)
j. Total production (value)
k. Information on population beneifting
from the release of this crop and quantities
released:
- Estimated number of beneficiareis at the
national level and, if possible, at subnational level
- Quantity released to the beneficiaries at
the national level and, if possible, at the
sub-national level
- Other
l. In the case of government aid to private
storage, statistics on the support
granted and any updated statistics
m. Total imports (value)
n. Total imports (quantity)
o. Total exports (value)
p. Total exports (quantity)
[Year 1]
[Year 2]
[Year 3]
INDONESIA
CONFRONTING A
CHANGING CLIMATE IN
INDONESIA
A Case Study of Rice, Onion and
Salacca Farmers in Central Java
MIDA SARAGIH
Indonesia Civil Society Forum

for Climate Justice
42
INTRODUCTION
Development practice, policy, and outcomes are critical to shaping
climate risk. High exposure and vulnerability1 are generally the
outcome of skewed development processes such as those associated
with environmental degradation, rapid and unplanned urbanization in
hazardous areas, wasteful energy consumption, failures of governance,
and the scarcity of livelihood options for the poor. Increasing global
interconnectivity and the mutual interdependence of economic and
ecological systems can sometimes give contrasting effects, reducing
or amplifying vulnerability and disaster risk.
According to an IPCC Report in 2012, there is evidence that some
extremes have changed as a result of anthropogenic2 influences,
including the persistent increase in atmospheric concentrations of
greenhouse gases. It is likely that anthropogenic influences have led
to warming of extreme daily minimum and maximum temperatures
at the global scale. Anthropogenic influences have contributed to
intensification of extreme precipitation at the global scale. Also, it is
likely that there has been an anthropogenic influence on increasing
extreme coastal high water due to an increase in mean sea level.3
Climate change is a clear evidence of the failure of the prevailing
development paradigm today. Ways to address climate change in the
international rounds of negotiations, which later revealed to be the
policy of the Republic of Indonesia, are not targeting the root causes
of the ecological crisis of the earth, namely excessive production and
consumption of natural resources based on the model of capitalistic
economy. In connection with the development practice, in May 2011
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono issued a policy called The
Masterplan for Acceleration and Expansion of Indonesias Economic
Development (MP3EI) 2011-2025 under Presidential Regulation No. 32
in 2011.4 MP3EI is an ambitious plan of the Indonesian government to
accelerate the realization of becoming a developed country. Through
the MP3EI, the Government of Indonesia aims to be one of the worlds
developed countries by 2025 with an expected per capita income of
USD $14,250-$15,500 and total gross domestic product of USD $4.0$4.5 trillion. To achieve this objective, real economic growth of 6.4 to
7.5 percent is expected for the period of 2011-2014. This economic
growth is expected to coincide with a decrease in the rate of inflation
from 6.5 percent in 2011-2014 to 3.0 percent in 2025. The combined
growth and inflation rate is perceived to reflect the characteristics of
a developed country.
Indonesia | Climate Change & Farming in Central Java
43
Important part of the MP3EI is the development of economic corridors

in Indonesia based on the potentials and advantages inherent to each
region throughout the country. By taking into consideration these
potentials and strategic roles of each major island, six economic
corridors have been identified:
Sumatra
Center for production and processing of

natural resources and the nations energy
reserves
Java
Driver for national industry and service

provision
Kalimantan

national mining and energy reserves
Sulawesi

national agricultural, plantation, fishery, oil &
gas, and mining
Bali - Nusa
Tenggara
Gateway for tourism and national food support
Papua - Moluccas
Center for development of food, fisheries,

energy, and national mining
MP3EI still focus on exploitation of natural resources as a key driver

of economic growth, especially in the economic corridors mentioned
above. While other areas outside the corridor are expected to obtain
benefit from the spill over of these economic corridors. Obviously
MP3I will exacerbate the threat to the people and agriculture. Not
only that, the global model of development that is wasteful of land,
water and fossil fuels will continue to be maintained under MP3EI, and
certainly will exacerbate impacts of climate change.
Indonesias agricultural sector plays an important role in peoples
lives and the national economy, especially that the sector is the main
producer of food, industrial raw materials and bioenergy. It also
generates environmental services and a variety of other environmental
and social functions such as provider of employment for about 40%
of Indonesias workforce, contributor to economic growth and food
security, provider of landscape amenities and maintains watershed
hydrology.
In the previous years, from 2004-2008, the agricultural sector managed
to increase rice production of 54.1 million tons of paddy to 60.3 million
44
tonnes, an average increase of 2.8% per year. And even in year 20062008, the rate of increase in rice production was 5.2% per year. Corn
and soybean production also increased respectively by 9.5% and
3.14% per year (Directorate General of Food Crops, 2009).
One of the fundamental problems in the agricultural sector is the
limited land resources, both from the aspects of socio-economic and
physical, which is characterized by (a) the degradation of the quality
of land that decreases or reduces productivity, (b) the uncontrolled
conversion of productive agricultural land and the limited availability
of potential land for agricultural extension, and (c) the fragmentation
of land holding.
Conversion of productive agricultural land in Indonesia is one of the
serious threats to the sustainability of national food security. In the
period 1999-2003, wetland conversion already reached 424,000 ha
(106,000 ha/ year) (Sutomo, 2004). In addition, there are about 9.55
million households that own land <0.5 ha and the figure is likely to
increase as a result of land fragmentation and the higher the incentive
for businesses in the non-agricultural sector. Climate change, with
all its impact, will put more pressure on the agricultural sector in
achieving the objectives of agricultural development, such as increased
production and farmers welfare.
This is the circumstance why climate justice plays an important role.
Climate justice is a fairer perspective to comprehend and tackle
climate change. The repressive and rapacious system is the main issue
of climate injustice. Government must acknowledge that the present
political-economic system is wrong and must therefore be corrected or
replaced. The government, in order to clarify its political stance, must
issue a public statement discarding this wrong system. Civil society in
Indonesia, in the context of climate justice, is demanding government
response to this injustice.
The vital guiding principles in changing the system should be human
security, ecological debt sponsorship, recognition of community
control over resources through their management of production
and application of materials and energy consumption to meet the
social metabolism of the people and not for monetary accumulation
for corporate interest and a few other groups. By abiding by these
principles, government can ensure human safety (human security), pay
ecological debt, guarantee the peoples right to land, justice in the
pattern of production and fair consumption.
45
Rice farmers at work in Boyolali
OVERVIEW OF CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACT ON

FARMERS
According to the latest IPCC report which was delivered at a conference
in Yokohama, Japan, increasing carbon emissions will increase the
risk of conflict, famine, floods, economic disruption, and the mass
migration of people in the earth. Carbon emissions will cause damage
to the ecosystem and increase the cost of development of climate
defense systems. This risk will increase every one degree increase in
air temperature due to global warming.
Global warming will increase the likelihood of severe impacts,
widespread and cannot be changed. Global warming will disrupt
rainfall patterns and increases the risk of significant flooding, especially
in Europe and Asia. On the other hand, the higher the risk of drought
will be felt in arid regions. All of this will have an impact on agriculture
and health (Kompas Newspaper, April 1, 2014).
Indonesia, one of the countries in Asia that lies in the equator is
vulnerable to climate change. An archipelagic country, Indonesia is
also characterized as an agriculture-based economy with more than
half of its population tilling in farms or relying on agriculture-based
subsistence.
Global warming or what is commonly termed as climate change will
greatly impact society and civilization. Climate change as defined is
the condition of some climate elements which are magnified or the
intensity tends to change or deviate from the dynamics and average
46
conditions heading to a certain (increased or decreased) direction

(trend).
The main cause of climate change is human activity (anthropogenic)
which is associated with the increasing greenhouse gas emissions (GHG)
such as CO2, methane (CH4), NO2, and CFCs (chlorofluorocarbons)
that drives the occurrence of global warming and has been ongoing
since almost the last 100 years.
Climate change is a very serious threat to the agricultural sector.
It potentially brings new problems for the sustainability of food
production and the agricultural production systems. Its effect is
multidimensional starting from resources, agricultural infrastructure
and agricultural production systems, until aspects of resilience and
self-sufficiency, as well as the welfare of farmers and the community
is affected.
These effects can be differenciated into two indicators namely
vulnerability and impact. Literally, vulnurability to climate change is the
condition that can decrease the capability (human, plant, and animal)
to do adaptation and/or carry out the physiological or biological
functions, development/phenology, growth and production, or
optimal reproduction (reasonable) due to the stress of climate change.
The impact of climate change can cause disorders or losses, whether
physically, socially or economically.
Thus, adaptation efforts need to be carried out. For the people,
especially farmers, mitigation is the answer for tomorrows uncertainties.
Government, on the other hand, has yet to decisively act on the issue
as initial observations indicate it has not been able to anticipate the
negative impact of climate change. Existing policies have not been
effective in preventing and addressing the impact of climate change.
IMPACT OF SHIFTING PATTERN ON RAINFALL AND

EXTREME WEATHER
Shifting pattern on rainfall has been occuring since the last few
decades in some regions in Indonesia. The start of rainy season has
become varied in certain period. In addition, there is a tendency on
the change of monthly rainfall intensity with the variety and deviation
as well as the frequency of extreme weather. There is also a noticeable
47
shift in wind movement and tidal flooding.

Some experts predicted that the shift in the rainfall intensity on the
western part of Indonesia, notably in North Somatera and Kalimantan,
tends to be lower.
In contrast, in the southern part of Indonesia, namely Java and Bali,
rainfall intensity tends to be higher and occur in a shorter period
(Naylor, 2007). Nationally, Boer, et al. (2009) argue that trends of the
shifting pattern spatially shows that the rainfall in rainy season has
more variants compared to dry season.
Land and Water Resources
In general, climate change will affect the size (shrinkage) and eventual
degradation of land resources, water and irrigation infrastructure, that
invariably cause drought or flooding. On the other hand, the need for
residential, industrial, tourism, transport and agriculture are increasing
as a result of population growth and development.
According to Irawans analysis (2001), in 1981-1999 there was an
over function of 1,002,055 hectares of wetland area in contrast to the
expansion of rice land of 518,224 hectares.
In 1999-2002, land conversion of wetland area totaled 167,150
hectares or a shrinkage of 107,482 hectares (Sutomo, 2004) The data
of shrinking wetland is still a matter of controversy though but the
facts on the ground indicate that the intensity of land conversion is
getting higher and becoming more difficult to control.
After 2000 though, the trend in land conversion in rainfed areas in Java
registered a decline.
Meantime, the situation was different outside of Java. In 19952000, approximately 300,000 hectares were converted into oil palm
plantations. In addition, the level of damage to the irrigation network
also increased. It is estimated that only 70% of the irrigation system
is functioning properly or the efficiency of water use is reduced (DG
PLA, 2007).
The shift in rainfall patterns lead to a decrease in the availability of
water in reservoirs particularly in Java. For instance, for 10 years, the
average volume of water flowing into the Citarum reservoir decreased
from 5.7 billion m3 to 4.9 billion m3 per year (Bappenas, 2009). These
conditions resulted to the decline in the ability of Jatilahur reservoir to
48
irrigate rice fields in the northern coast of Java. The same conditions
were found in some other reservoirs in Java, such as Gajahmungkur
and Kedung Ombo. The data showed that the level of vulnerability of
agricultural land experiencing drought is different between regions,
especially in some areas of rice fields in Sumatra and Java. From 5.14
million ha of rice fields evaluated, 74 thousand ha are very vulnerable
and about one million hectares are prone to drought.
Wider areas also suffered drought during the period 1989-2006 where
El Nino occurred. It was estimated that more than 2,000 ha per district
experienced drought like the North Coast of West Java in Indramayu;
most of the North Coast of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, Lampung,
East Kalimantan, West Sulawesi, South Kalimantan and Lombok. The
threat of flooding is becoming more frequent in the rice fields, which
is also one of the impacts of climate change on the agricultural sector.
This led to reduction on crop areas and rice production. The increasing
frequency of flooding can further affect production due to the presence
of pest snails in rice plants. In addition, there are also indications that
flooded rice fields in the previous season are more likely to experience
an explosion in the attack of brown planthopper.
Plant
Agriculture, particularly food crops are the most vulnerable to the
shift in rainfall patterns. Generally, food crops are relatively sensitive
to stress (excess and lack of water). Technically, the vulnerability of
A woman farmer displays her onion harvests in Brebes.
49
food crops is closely connected with the system of land use and soil
properties, cropping pattern, technological management of soil, water,
plants and varieties (Las et al., 2008b).
Therefore, the vulnerability of crops to rainfall patterns will impact on
acreage planted and harvested, productivity and quality of crops. Here
are some bad effects caused by extreme weather, especially El-Nino
or La-Nina : (a) decrease in the cultivation index (IP) productivity and
production, (b) damage to agricultural resources, (c) increase in the
frequency, size, and weight/intensity of drought; (d) an increase in
humidity, and (e) an increase in the intensity of disturbance of plant
pests (OPT) (Las et al., 2008a).
Food Crops and Drought
The levels of vulnerability of agricultural land to drought vary among
regions. Out of the 5.14 million ha of rice fields evaluated, 74 thousand
ha were found very vulnerable and about one million hectares are
prone to drought ( Wahyunto , 2005). In the period 1991-2006, the
area planted with drought-stricken rice ranged from 28,580 to 86,793
ha. per year (Bappenas , 2010) .
Wider drought occurred during El Nino years. The Ministry of
Environment (2009) identified an average of more than 2,000 ha. per
district during the 1989-2006 drought. These areas are the North
Coast of West Java, especially Indramayu district; most of the North
Coast of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, Lampung, East Kalimantan, West
Sulawesi, South Kalimantan, and Lombok. The frequency of drought
on paddy rice cultivation, especially in Java, registered three times in
four years and generally showed a sharp increase during El Nino (Boer
et al . , 2009).
Plant Food and Flood
The increase in the frequency of flooding causes the crop acreage to
decrease and rice production to significantly fall. Flood frequency in
the rice field totaled 2-3 times in 4 years and increased sharply during
La Nina (Boer.et al.2009).
Indirectly, the increase in flood intensity will affect production due
to increased pest attack. According to Wiyono (2009), the increasing
intensity of flood can cause some problems such as pest snails in
rice plant. Farmers in Tinawun Malo, Bojonegoro, said that there
were no pest snails in their areas prior to the flooding in 2007. After
50
the incident, the pest suddenly appeared in very large numbers and
destroyed young rice plants.
Plant Food and Shifting Patterns of Rainfall
Shifting patterns of rainfall has affected agricultural resources and
infrastructure that led to the shifting of planting time, seasons, and
cropping patterns and land degradation. There is a tendency of
a shorter rainy season while increased rainfall in the southern Java
and Bali which resulted in changes in the start and duration of the
growing season. This affected the IP, acreage planted, early planting
and cropping patterns.
The change of the rainy season pattern for 30 days can reduce rice
production in West Java, Central Java and Bali as much as 6.5%. It
reached 11% out of the normal condition. In contrast, Northern
Sumatra and Kalimantan have extended rainy seasons but with lower
intensity. This resulted to longer period of plant growth and the
subsequent increase in IP. However, the productivity of land in Sumatra
and Kalimantan is not as good as Java.
Horticulture Plant
The impact of extreme climate change is not only affecting rice
production but also horticulture and other crops that triggered an
increase in the national inflation (Bisnis Indonesia, 2010). Most plants
and horticultural crops were threatened by climate change such as
pepper and onion in several production centers. Therefore, anticipation
can be pursued through the creation of sedinet or deeper trench to
prevent the plants from the water bath.
The extreme climate events like La Nina or rainfall that occurred almost
throughout the year in 2010 has led to a drop in the production of
various horticultural commodities, both in quantity and quality. The
production of mangoes, apples, bananas, and oranges went down to
20-25%, 15-20% of mangosteen, some 20-25% vegetable crops, and
ornamental plants (Ditlin Horti, 2011).
Increasing Air Temperature
According to the IPCC (2007), the temperature rise in the period
2000-2100 is predicted at 2.1 to 3.9C. An indication of increased
temperature is reflected with the melting glacier in South America
based on the identification in 1928 and 2004. According to the NASA
report, 2005 was the hottest year in the last century.
51
Temperature in Indonesia from 2005-2035 will increase by an average

of 1-1.5C. According to the research of Runtunuwu and KONDOH
(2008) there have been an increase in global temperature over the
last 100 years at the average of 0.57C. According to Boer (2007),
the increase in air temperature in Jakarta in the period 1880 to 2000
reached an average of 1.4C in July and 1.04 C in January.
Land and Water Resources
The increase in temperature due to climate change also led to an
increase in the rate of evaporation, whether from the water surface
(sea, lakes, and rivers) or soil and plant surfaces. Meteorologically, it will
increase the potential of global precipitation. However, various climate
models show that the effect is not evenly distributed in the areas that
are in high latitude regions and some low latitude. Precipitation can
be increased to 10% in the winter, while some regions in the lower and
central latitudes will experience a decrease in rainfall.
Water resources in the arid and semi-arid regions are very sensitive
to the shifting of temperature and rainfall. At low latitudes, although
the increase in temperature is relatively small, it gives impact to the
availability of ground water through runoff capacity dynamics.
Plant
The increase in temperature has caused the occurence of increasing
transpiracy which could decrease productivity of the plant (Las, 2007),
increase water consumption, accelerate the ripening of fruits seeds,
decrease the quality of results and the development of a variety of
pests and diseases (OPT). The results of the Tschirley research (2007)
indicate that there has been a decline in agricultural output of more
than 20% when the temperature rise by more than 4oC .
By using a simulation model of the plant, John Sheehy ( IRRI , 2007)
states that the increase in rice yield due to the increase in the
concentration of 75 ppm of CO2 is 0.5 t/ha and yield reduction due
to the increase in temperature of 1C is 0.6 ton/ha. According to
Peng et al. (2004), any increase in the minimum temperature of 1C
would reduce rice yields by 10%. Central Java, Yogyakarta, West Java,
and other areas, especially in the lowlands, will experience a decline
in food production. Although it still needs to undergo further study,
Handoko et al. (2008) indicate that without intervention in the form
of adaptation, a decrease in corn production will likely reach 10.5 to
19.9% by 2050 due to rising temperatures.
52
A new research from KP3I (Boer, 2008) showed that temperature

increases due to rising of CO2 concentrations will lower the crop
yields. If the wetland conversion rate of 0.77% per year and no increase
in the index of planting, the rice production in the district in 2025 will
decrease by 42,500-162,500 tons, unless balanced by an increase in
cropping index.
The fact shows strong indication regarding climate change and the
relation of the temperature increase on plant disease. However,
to understand this problem in a comprehensive way, it needs extra
effort to specifically learn about the impact of climate change on the
development of plant diseases. At this stage, it is safe to assume that
government and society must anticipate these occurrences.
In a condition where the temperature increases, an attack of a
population of various pest and diseases is likely to increase, especially
if this is followed by an increase in air humidity. Pest thrips thrive in the
dry season and will increasingly grow if the temperature is hotter and
dry. In Taiwan, pest thrips on eggplant increased at a temperature of
25-30 C (Chen and Huang, 2004).
Gemini virus infection in pepper and tomato is another example of
the phenomenon. Five years ago, gemini virus is not recognized as a
critical illness but now it has become the destroyer of pepper plants
and tomato in almost all of the production centers in Java (Bogor,
Cianjur, Wonosobo, Magelang, Klaten, Boyolali, Kulonprogo, Blitar,
and Tulungagung). Data from the Directorate of Plant Protection,
Horticulture Department of Agriculture also showed an increase in
transmission of the gemini virus in the last three years. The disease
causes the yellowing of plant leaves that drastically decreases fruit
production. Epidemi gemini disease is determined partly by the
population dynamics of insect vectors, i.e. whitefly (Bemisia tabaci).
High temperatures and droughts support the development of whitefly.
Wiyono research (2009) showed that for the last three years there is
a decline in leaf blight on tomato caused by Phytopthora infestants.
Previously, this disease used to be the most destructive on tomato
plant in the plateau. Leaf blight of tomato is more developed at 1822oC temperature. In 1999, fur mildew disease caused by the fungus
Peronospora was the most destructive to onion and scallion in the
highlands. Although there is no empirical evidence, the condition is
thought to be related to the increase of earths temperature which
causes the plateau to become warmer.
53
IMPACT OF SEA LEVEL RISE AND TIDAL FLOODING

The impact of sea level rise also occured in Indonesia (Meiviana etal.
2004). In 1925-1989, the sea level surface rose to 4.38 mm/year in
Jakarta, 9.27 mm/year in Semarang and 5.47 mm/year in Surabaya.
Sofian research (2010) in Boer (2011) showed that sea level rise in
Indonesia in 1993-2008 ranged between 0.2-0.6 cm/year.
The temperature of sea surface increased around 0.0020-0.023 C/year.
On August 2010, a giant iceberg the size as big as Jakarta province
with a thickness around 500m fell down in the North Pole. Experts
believe that in the North Pole, there is always an iceberg erosion due
to global warming. Therefore, the observation on the sea surface
becomes very important as almost all of the major cities in the world
and the industrial zone areas are near the sea.
In Pantura, West Java, the impact of sea level rise to the decrease in
production is due to salinity that occured in Indramayu. The result of
the Boer study (2011) show that the level of salinity in Indramayu, West
Java is medium to very high at a depth of 0-30 cm and 30-70 cm.
According to Grattan et al. (2002), the level of salinity below 2.0 dS/m
has no effect on rice yield. If salinity increases above 2 dS/m then the
result will decrease by 10% for every increase of 1 dS/m.
Research Purpose and Objectives
1. To identify and categorize the impact of climate change on rice,
onion and salacca farmers
2. To analyse the impact of climate change on rice, onion and salacca
farmers
Methods
1. Conduct a field survey
2. In-depth interview
3. Focus Group Discussion
4. Secondary data processing
Location and Time Research
This research was carried out in Central Java in September-November
2013. It was conducted in the 3 districts, namely: Boyolali for rice
farmers, Brebes for onion farmers and Semarang for salacca farmers.
54
GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF RICE, ONION AND

SALACCA FARMING
RICE FARMING
Rice is one of the most important crop in human civilization. Although
it mainly refers to the type of crop cultivation, rice also refers to some
kind of clan (genus) which is called wild rice. Rice, is the third in terms
of production output compared to other kinds of cereal like maize and
wheat. However, rice is the main source of carbohydrates. Majority of
the worlds population consume it.
In Indonesia, there are around 14.4 millions farmers of gurem rice who
are still living in poverty (landless farmers own land around or more
than 0.25 ha). According to government statistics, the farmers get an
average income of below Rp500,000 (around US$50) per month which
is far from the living standard for rural eligibility.
The general process of rice cultivation in Indonesia :
Seeding. There are several stages to plant or cultivate rice in order
to get the maximum result. Before planting, the rice crop should be
embedded first. The seedbed has to be prepared well in order to
obtain the best seed. To select a good seed, the seed should be soaked
into the water. The good seed will sink while the empty seeds will float.
The seeds that float will then be removed. An advantage in doing this
immersion method is that the seed will germinate quickly. The period
of soaking is around 24 hours, then the seed is taken and wrapped in
banana leaves and put on a sackcloth. The incubation period takes 8
hours.
In a wet seedbed, when the seeds are sown, all areas are waterlogged
for 24 hours then dried. Water stagnation is intended to make the
seeds spread up evenly. The drying process after flooding for 24 hours
is intended to make the seeds to not decay easily. In a dry seedbed,
irrigation is done by water seepage. Water included in the gutter
between the embankment will continue to get water and the seeds
will grow without experiencing dryness. When the seedlings are large
enough, irrigation is done by looking at the situation.

Soil Management. Soil management for rice has to be prepared two
months before planting. It can be implemented in two ways: traditional
or modern. Traditional soil management means using simple tools
like sickles, hoes, plows and harrows. These tools are either used by
55
humans or assisted by animals. Modern soil management refers to

the use of agricultural machines like tractor and tools and other soil
treatment.
Preservation. Water is an absolute requirement for the growth of rice.
Irrigation is one of the important factors that should get full attention.
The water used for irrigation is derived from the river. Water from the
river contains a lot of mud and dirt-containing impurities which are
very useful for the growth of soil and plants. The water that comes
from a water source is not good for irrigation because the water is
clear and does not contain mud and dirt.
Clearing and Stitching. After planting, once the rice seedlings are
dead, these should be immediately replaced (stitched). Stitching crop
can be matched with the other if the replacement of new seeds have
not reached more than 10 days after planting. Besides stitching, we
need to weed wild grass that grow around the rice plants that take the
nutrients away. Weeding is done twice after the first 3-week-old rice
and the second after the 6-week-old rice.
Fertilizing. The purpose of fertilizing is to add more substance and
elements needed for the plants. For rice plant, the fertilizers used are
the following: 1) natural fertilizer: as a basic fertilizer it is given 7-10
days before the plant can use natural fertilizer like green fertilizer,
manure, and compost. The amount is approximately 10 tonnes/ha; 2)
synthetic fertilizers are given after planting. For example: ZA / Urea,
DS / TS, and ZK.
ONION FARMING
Onion (Allium cepa) is one of the horticulture commodity that is mostly
consumed by Indonesians. Onion production in Indonesia reaches 1.1
million tons per year. The areas planted with onion in Indonesia are
approximately 100,000 ha. and more than 200 thousand farmers plant
onion as their source of livelihood.
Process of onion production:
Pre-planting
Growing terms: Red onion can be grown in a field or moor, the texture
is medium to clay, alluvial soil, humus or Latosol Glei, with pH 5.6 - 6.5.
Altitude 0-400 mdpl, humidity 50-70%, and temperature of 25-320C.
Soil treatment
Organic fertilizer must be spread on the land with a dose of 0.5-1
56
tons per 1,000 m2.

Land should be plowed then raked (leave it for more than 1 week).
Make beds with a width of 120 -180 cm.
Between the planting beds make a water channel (canal) with a
width of 40-50 cm and a depth of 50 cm.
If the soil pH is less than 5.6, it should be given dolomite dose
+ 1.5 tonnes/ ha spread on the beds mixed well with the soil and
leave it around 2 weeks.
Basic fertilizer
Farmers use fertilizer such as urea around 2-4; ZA around kg 7-15 kg,
and SP-36 around 15-25 kg evenly over the beds and mixed well with
the soil. As an option, farmers also use NPK Compound Fertilizer with
a dose of 20 kg /1,000 m2 mixed to the ground in beds.
Seed selection
a) The optimal size of seed tuber is around 3-4 g per tuber
b) The best seed tubers are those which have been saved 2-3 months
and are still in the bond (leaves are still visible)
c) Seed tubers should be healthy, marked by a compact form of seeds
(not rotten), tuber skin is not injured (not chipped or sparkling)
Planting phases
Plant distance
During dry season, the plant distance is 15 x 15 cm. for varieties such
as Ilocos and Tadayung or Bangkok. During rainy season it is around
20 x 15 cm for Tiron varieties.
Weeding and pembumbunan (landfill at the base of clumps)
The first weeding should be implemented for plants in ages 7-10 HST
(HST - hari setelah tanam, the day after planting) and mechanically
carried to dispose of weeds or wild plants that may be used as the host
caterpillar pests of onion. The egg retrieval of pest of onions is done
while weeding.
Pembumbunan is to stockpile soil near the plant. Therefore the roots
of onions are always covered with soil. Besides damaged beds or
landslides it needs to be trimmed back by strengthening the edges
of the ditch with mud from the bottom of the channel. This practice is
called melem in Brebes.
Fertilization maintenance / follow-up
Fertilizer dosage depend on the type and condition of the local soil.
57
If the urea or ZA is in excess, it can lead to a thick neck of tuber and

also lead to small size of tuber. But if it is lacking, plant growth will
be hampered and leaves will be yellowish and pale. Besides, the
disadvantages of KCl can also lead to the tip of the leaves becoming
dry and the size tuber is smaller.
Irrigation
For the first growth, watering must be done twice a day. This will be
once in the morning and once in the afternoon. Watering in the early
morning is done when the scallion still looks wet in order to reduce
and prevent diseases. Watering in the afternoon needs to be stopped
when the percentage of crops has grown more than 90% of water.
High salinity is unfavorable to the growth of onion. Height of water
surface in the channel (canal) has to be maintained as high as 20cm
from the surface of the planting embankment.
Vegetative phase ( 11- 35 HST / day after planting )
Plant management
a) Second weeding is done at the age of 30-35 HST and continuous
penggemburan (loosening the soil), stockpiling and repair of
damaged beds.
b) Watering can be done once a day in the morning. If pest thrips
will attack and spatter, watering can be done in in the afternoon.
Tuber formation phase ( 36 - 50HST )
HPT (plant, pests, and diseases) testing phase is the as same as
vegetative phase. Irrigation should be a priority. During the dry season
watering has to be done twice a day.
Tuber maturation phase ( 51- 65 HST )
In this phase, watering once a day in the afternoon is enough.
Harvest phase
Harvesting is done when 60-90 % of leaves have fallen. Harvesting in
the low land will start at the age of 55-70 days while 70 90 days in
plateau. It should be done in a sunny morning and when the ground is
not muddy. The method is by revoking its stems and leaves. Thereafter,
5-10 clumps are bonded together (this process is called dipocong in
Java language).
Post Harvest phase
Onions are dried by using bamboo shoots (known as gedeg in Java).
The first drying will be done 5-7 days with the leaves facing up in order
58
to dry the leaves. The second drying will be 2-3 days with the tuber
facing up in order to dry the tube. This is done so that the remaining
dirt and soil will be cleaned. Onions with around 85-89% of moisture
content should be stored in the new warehouse.
For storage, a bundle of onions are hanged on bamboo racks. Aeration
needs to be organized well with warehouse temperature at around 2629 degree C and humidity around 10-80%. Warehouse must be clean.
SALACCA FARMING
Salacca is a kind of tropical fruit which originated from Indonesia.
It has become one of the leading crops in the area and suitable for
development. In Indonesia, there are many kinds of salacca, such as:
pondoh salacca, swaru salacca, enrekeng salacca, gula pasir salacca,
bali salacca, padang sidempuan salacca, gading ayu salacca, pangu
salacca, sibakua salacca, sngata salacca, condet salacca, manonjaya
salacca, kersikan salacca, and bongkok salacca. Among these various
types of salacca, varieties such as pondoh, swaru, nglumut, enrekang,
gula batu and bali salaccahave higher commercial value. The
government identifies these as superior varieties for development.
Some regions in Indonesia are noted as production centers of
salacca, namely: Padangsidempuan (West Sumatra); Serang (Banten),
Sumedang, Tasikmalaya, Ciamis, Batujajar (West Java); Magelang,
Ambarawa, Wonosobo, Banyumas, Purworejo, Purbalingga,
Banjarnegara (Central Java); Sleman (Yogyakarta); Bangkalan, Pasuruan
(East Java); Karang Asem (Bali); and Enrekang (South Sulawesi). In
general, these regions are producing special types of Salacca.
Pondoh Salacca has higher concentration of vitamin C, sugar, and
lower acid level compared to other types of Salacca (Agromedia,
2007). The average level of vitamin C in Pondoh Salacca is 19.63mg per
100g. The sugar acid ratio is around 3.93 mg. Pondoh Salacca also has
competitive advantage compared to others, in terms of sweet taste
when it is still young and a longer storage life. Because Pondoh Salacca
is categorized as a fruit with non climatic respiration and has longer
storage age or around 13 days of storage life in room temperature
(Santoso, 1990), it is also one of the local fruit that can enter the local
supermarket.
Generally, the process of salacca cultivation can be decribed as follows:
59
Salacca farmers doing field work in Semarang
Selection and land preparation

Salacca pondoh grows well in lowland areas until an altitude of 800
mdpl; in wet climate and land types such as podzollik, regosol or
latosol. The soil may have various texture, from loam argieux (geluh
lempungan) to sandy loam (geluh pasiran). Salacca pondoh requires a
shade during planting phase. Even young salacca pondoh plants need
a strong shade in order to decrease transpiration and evaporation. So
the land has to be prepared by planting protection plants in advance,
or intercropped with other crops.
Seeds supply
The main purpose of supplying seeds is to prepare a good quality of
male and female seeds to produce the best quality of salacca pondoh.
The seeds are derived from the existing seeds (generative) or from
tillers (vegetative). Generative hatchery is seeding by using seeds
obtained from the trees parent. However, hatchery from existing seed
is less popular in the salacca pondoh cultivation.
Vegetative hatchery can be obtained by seperating the tiller, whether
directly or not, or even seperating the tiller by transplantation. Seeds
which are derived from vegetative propagation have several advantages
compared to seed originated from seeding, such as : 1) The result of
plants obtained has the natural characteristics the same as its parent
60
seed; 2) The plants gender can be ascertained in advance; 3) It grows

its flower fast and the fruits are more uniformed or relatively similar.
The negative side of seed derived from transplantation is the difficulty
to obtain many uniform-old seed; and the root system is not as good
as seeds from the seedling.
Land management
Land management includes: 1) Flattening the ground to set up the
irrigation system, facilitate spacing, arrangement for shade trees,
flattening the land, and setting beds and waterways, 2) Cleaning the
grass, the rocks and woods 3) plowing and hoeing the ground to
loosen the soil and; 4) Making beds/ mounds.
An ideal plant spacing is 2.5 x 2.5 m or 2 x 2.5 m, where 2.5 m is the
distance between the array and 2 m is the spacing between plants in a
single array. Beds are made along the array with a depth of 15 cm and
a width of 100 cm. Soil excavation is placed on the right and left of the
array and then flattened forming a raised bed with a width of 150 cm,
25 cm height and length to adjust the size of the garden. The array
should be created stretching from east to west.
The hole of the plant is made with a size of 50 x 50 x 50 cm. On a
hard ground, the size of the hole can be enlarged to provide bigger
space for root development. When making the hole, the upper side
excavated soil ( 25 cm) is placed on the east hole, while the bottom
side (under 25 cm), on the west of the planting hole. It is necessary
to leave the hole of the plant for 2-3 weeks, then backfill it. At the
time of accumulation, the bottom land is returned to its original
position, while the upper soil is mixed with organic fertilizer (manure
or compost) with a ratio of 1:1 along with farming lime/ dolomite as
much as 0.25 to 0.5 kg per planting hole. Thus, in the former hole will
form a mound. The mound does not need to be compacted but left in
order to shrink by itself.
Planting seeds
Seeding is to plant the best quality of male and female seeds. Planting
the male seed is for the source of pollen and female seed to produce
fruits. In an area of salacca plantation, around 4-10 percent of male
seeds are needed. Male seed planting can be done in two ways : 1)
planted in the middle of female seeds 2) male seed planted in the
edge of the land as hedgerows.
Seeds of salacca pondoh are generally planted in the early days of
the rainy season when the soil contains enough water or about 60-80
percent. Loose soil and enough moisture allow the root of the seed to
61
stay alive and grow well. Planting is done in the hole which have been
provided.
Seed planting into the hole of the plant can be done by immersing it
in the seed basket or polybag. Before the seed is inserted into the hole,
the seed basket or polybag are cut first by ripping the sides and the
bottom. Take off the basket or polybag carefully so it will not damage
other roots.
Stitching
Stitching is needed to replace the dead plant or plant which did not
grow well. The purpose is to maintain the plant population in the
garden. Stitching should be done at the beginning of the rainy season
with plants of the same age or the same size as the surrounding plants.
Farming maintenance
Maintaining salacca pondoh cover several activities like weeding,
pembubunan (landfill at the base of clumps), pruning, fertilization,
pollination, and pest control (OPT).
Weeding- This is to clean and remove the grass or other weeds that
grow in the garden. If the weeds are not eradicated, it will compete
with the nutrients and water needed for the salacca plant to grow.
Pembubunan (landfill at the base of clumps)- This is done after the end
of the stem or the base of the leaf reaches the ground or above the
surface of the ground. Soil that is used for hoarding comes from the
right or left of the array which is previously the bed.
Pembubunan aims to deepen the roots, strengthen the plant, stimulate
the growth of shoots, and bring together the distance between the
ground surface lateral roots that grow just below the leaf which failed
to reach the ground.
Pruning- This is done through : 1) pruning the leaf, and 2) reducing the
number of tillers. Pruning the leaf means to cut the unproductive, dry,
dead and sick plant. The purpose of pruning leaf is to obtain the ideal
salacca plant (ie. 7-9 leaves). This means productivity and quality of the
fruit produced in the maximal condition and stimulate the formation
of female flowers. Pruning plants begin when it reaches one year as
it seeks to regulate vegetative growth towards a more productive
generative growth.
Pruning the leaves can be done every two months but preferably done
during the blossom season. It can be done more often in two ways : 1)
62
Pruning the leaf until its midrib because it has no further use for the
plant, or 2) trimming the midrib of salacca by leaving the base of the
stem that can be used as buffer bunches.
While pruning or making distance between tillers is to reduce and
manage the number of child in a family of plants.
Fertilization- Fertilizing salacca pondoh plant generally can be done
2 (two) times a year or at the start and end of the rainy season in
April and September; or in October and September; and February and
March. The timing and dosage of fertilizing crop salacca can be done
based on the age and condition of the plant, such as:
When the plant is 0-36 months, fertilizing can be done every 3 months
using urea or ZA fertilizer as much as 30 grams per clump; SP-36
fertilizer as much as 20 grams per clump; and KCl as much as 15 grams
per clump. While utilizing organic fertilizer and dolomite lime can be
done every 6 months at a dose of organic fertilizer as much as 5-10 kg
per clump and as much as 0.25 to 1 kg per clump.
For a pondoh plant aged over 36 months and 6 months onwards,
fertilizing can be done with organic fertilizer once at 5-10 kg / clump,
dolomite lime as 0.25 to 1 kg / clump, Urea / ZA as much as 70 grams
/ clump, SP 50 -36 g / clump, and KCl as much as 30 grams / clump.
Fertilization for salacca plants can be done with two ways, namely:
The fertilizer is put in hole ditches encircling the salacca plant.
Holes made around the plant will have a distance from the salacca
plant at 50 to 100 cm, width 20 cm and depth of 15 to 30 cm.
Fertilizer should be embedded into the hole and covered with soil,
Fertilizer should be placed in a hole which is made between two
salacca plants in the same line. The hole is made with a length of 100
cm, width 50 cm and length 15 to 30 cm. The distance between the
holes with base plant is about 75 cm. Fertilizer must be embedded
into the hole and then covered with soil.
Pollination- The salacca palm is dioecious, meaning, the male and
female flowers are produced on separate individual plants. This means
that the plant cannot pollinate itself but through cross-pollination
(allogami). The cross-pollination need intermediaries. Pollination on
salacca palm occurs through an insect or it is man-made.
Manual pollination can be done after the buds of the female flower in
the cob looks pink in bloom. The male flower is often referred to as a
63

Left: Male (left) and
female (right) salacca
flowers.
Below Hand pollination

by tapping male flower
above female flower
(left) and flower covered
after pollination to
protect from the weather
(right)
cob or spike. The flower sheath is cleaned by cutting until the cobs or
spike appears then it is tapped over the female flower using finger to
release its pollen.
For the male flower bud that have not bloomed (not visible pollen),
press the bud with the fingernail and then a knock on top of the female
flower, until the pollen falls evenly on the whole cob. A cob male flower
can be used for pollinating around 10 cobs female flowers.

Pollinated flower cobs must be covered with a lid (made from leaves
or plastic bottles) to protect it from rain and wind providing a chance
for pollination to occur. The lid is removed 3-5 days after pollination.
Best time for pollination is during good weather (not raining) or in the
morning or late afternoon.
Spacing the fruits - Spacing the fruits aim to decrease the amount of
fruit in each bunch in order to get a fruit with optimal quality and
quantity based on the target set.
The way to make space between fruits are: 1) Fruit selection two months
after pollination where the size of the fruit is as big as marble. Discard
fruits that are damaged by pests and diseases or those considered
normal fruits but are deformed; 2) The second spacing is a month
64
after the first spacing with the same way; and 3) wrap the fruit bunch
in a woven bamboo basket.
Harvesting
The characteristics of a salacca fruit ready for harvest are: having rare
scales, hairs are gone, and the color of the skin is reddish or dark
yellow. The first harvest using vegetative seeds begin when salacca
age at 2 to 3 years.
Harvesting is also done 7-8 months after pollination occurs. This
should be carried out by cutting them together with the bunches. The
average production of salacca palm is around 10 kg per year.
Post-harvest management
Management aims to improve the quality of the goods in order to
strengthen its resiliency and increase its value.
Just like other fruits, salacca is also easily damaged and fragile. The
damage can be characterized by a foul odor and the fruit becomes
soft and brownish. The fruit undergoes physiological change once
picked. To maintain its freshness, it is important that a post-harvest
management is done by cleaning, sorting, labelling and packaging
fruits based on the size and quality standards that have been
determined.
The criteria for packaging are the following: 1) the package must be
perforated to provide air circulation; 2) packaging must be durable
such as bamboo baskets, wooden crates and cardboard cartons to
protect fruits from the external pressure and can be easily transported;
3) the size of the packaging should be adjusted to the amount of fruit.
Pondoh salacca can be stored up to a maximum of 21 days and should
be free from pest or disease. Proper air ventilation should be followed
when stored.
RESULTS
Climate change distorts farmers agricultural calendar
Rainy or dry season are uncertain (not compatible with traditional
calendar like: pranoto mongso). Rice farmers in Boyolali experience
this unpredictable season since 2008. The rainy season usually starts
65
from October until April while the dry season from May to September.
However, the situation now is uncertain. This phenomenon is also felt
by onion farmers in Brebes and Salacca farmers in Semarang.
Since 2008, rainfall has been very unpredictable that it even rains
during the dry season. This phenomenon has occurred in 2009 and in
2010. From 2011 to 2013 rainfall is less than the previous years. This
phenomenon is known as wet dry.
The change of weather pattern proves difficult for rice and onion
farmers. Rice farmers have to revise their planting calendar. They
feel being the most disadvantaged since they do not use intensive
irrigation. Onion farmers also experience the same thing. Onion is a
kind of plant that does not grow well when rainfall is too high.
Salacca farmers in Semarang also feel the disadvantage of the change
in weather pattern. Unpredictable weather condition has made salacca
harvest uncertain.
Climate change contributes to the decline of farmers production
and its quality
For the last 5 years, rice farmers in Boyolali feel the 10% decline of
rice production due to climate change and extreme temperature.
Rice must adapt to extreme temperatures but not all rice varieties are
able to adapt easily. Varieties that are not capable in adaptation can
decrease grain production.
For example, gabah rice seed that is still wrapped in its skin is
found empty. Continuous rain made the yield of gabah rice grains
worse. When the temperature is very warm, the quality of the grain
deteriorates. Rice grains become brittle and dull-colored making the
market price lower.
Onion farmers also experience a similar situation. Extreme temperature
has made them bear the brunt of losses of up to 15% decrease in
production. Onion plants that are incapable of adaptation decreased
in terms of quality and quantity.
Onion farmers in Brebes stated that the quality of onion has decreased
due to extreme weather. The size of onions is smaller when rain is
continuous or when the weather is too dry. The decline in the quality
of harvest also resulted to the decline of farmers bargaining power
with distributors.
66
Salacca farmers in Ungaran experience the loss of production during

the last 5 years by about 5%. This is also due to a decrease in the ability
of the salacca plant to adapt.
These farmers also suffer due to the decline of the quality of production.
Extreme weather has made salacca vulnerable as it decays. Thus, the
market price becomes lower.
Climate change increases pest attack and plant disease
Rice farmers in Boyolali said that there is an increasing pest attack
and disease in their produce. Some pests that attack rice are: 1) Birds.
Many of them attack the yellowish rice variety; 2) Grasshopper (walang
sangit). Grasshopper assault occur when the rice is still young 3) Mice.
Mice can be detrimental because they can destroy large areas in a
single event; 4) Caterpillar. These insects hatch their eggs on the
leaves and the worms damage rice stems and leaves.
Onion farmers in Brebes also experience the same condition claiming
that there is an increase in the disease of onion plants. The following
are some of the pest diseases in onions:
Onion caterpillar (Spodoptera exigua atau S litura). Usually,
onions are more frequently attacked by caterpillar like ulat grayak
(Spodoptera Exigua). This is characterized by a black line in the
belly or black necklace in the neck.
Black cutworm (Agrotis sp). Cutworms live in the topsoil and eat
the plants main stem. During daylight, caterpillars hide in soil and
attack plants at night. Because the target is the stem, it is easily
identifiable. The plant stem is porous or broken.
Layu Fusarium (wilt disease). The symptom of this disease is
characterized by the discoloration of onion leaves by turning to
yellow and the plant wilts rapidly (known as ngoler in Java language).
Thrips. It starts to attack at the age of 30 days after planting because
the humidity around the plant is relatively high with an average
temperature of above normal. Attacked scallions get shiny and
white just like silver. A severe attack occurs when the temperature
is above normal and humidity is above 70%.
67
Purple spotting disease or Trotol. It is caused by the alternaria porii

fungus through media like tuber or water splash from the soil.
Symptoms of attack is marked with the presence of concentric
circle purple spots or white-gray leaves and yellow leaves on the
edge and ends. The attack results in tuber rot or it turns watery
yellow to brownish red.
Antraknose disease. It is caused by the Colletotricum Gloesporiodes.
Symptoms are characterized with white patches on the leaves which
will later form indentation that will cause simultaneous breakage of
the leaves (in Brebes, it is known as otomatis). If the symptoms
appear, the infected plant must be burned immediately.
Viral disease. The symptoms of viral disease are stunted growth,
yellowing, curling and drooping leaves in all directions and few
tillers. It usually attacks after the harvest. To avoid this virus, virusfree seeds should be used and crop rotation must be done (by not
only planting tubers).
Bacteria. Tubers with bacteria attacks become rotten and smelly.
In Ungaran, diseases in salacca have also increased like:
White fungus (cendawan putih in Bahasa). The symtom of white
fungus disease is rotten fruits. The color of the infected fruit
becomes un-interesting. The fungus makes them loss its quality.
Black spot disease. It is caused by Pestalotia sp which can be
identified with black spots on salacca leaves.
Red rot disease (pink rot). It is caused by corticium salmonicolor.
Symptom is rotten fruit and stems.
Weeds. For medium sized land, the farmers are still using the
manual method to handle weed by pulling them with hand or hoe.
For large and open vast lands like those of farmers in Ungaran,
herbicides are usually applied to cut labor costs and to get
immediate results. Chemical reactions that kill weeds are also very
fast and negative. Herbicides contain toxins that can harm other
living beings including livestock and humans.
In general, an increase of pests and diseases in rice, onion and salacca
are obviously detrimental to farmers. Farmers need to deal with the
68
additional cost to avoid pest attack.

Climate change decreases farmers income
Rice farmers in Boyolali have lost 10% in rice grain production. Average
land owned by rice farmers is only 0.25 ha. with productivity around
1.5 tons of rice grain. Farmers have felt at least 10% reduction in their
production or an equivalent of Rp450,000 (around US$45) per season
with grain prices around Rp3.000 (US$0.3) per kilogram.
Onion farmers in Brebes are also suffering the losses due to a decrease
in production of up to 15%. With an average land tenure of 0.25 ha,
onion farmers lose at least Rp3,000,000 (US$300) per season at onion
price of Rp 15.000 per kilogram.
Salacca farming in Ungaran have experienced deterioration in
production by 5% making it very detrimental to farmers. With an
average land tenure of 0.25 ha and salacca price of Rp 4.000 per
kilogram (US$0.4), farmers lose around Rp2,000,000 per year (US$200).
Climate change reduces farmers bargaining power in the market
The farmers in Boyolali suffer losses due to continuous rainfall. Rice
grain harvest have decreased. The prices are low. During the first
harvest season in February and March 2013, farmers can only sell
rice grain with the price under the Government Purchase Price (HPP).
Farmers sold dry rice grain of Rp 2.900 per kilogram (US$0.29), while
HPP at that time was Rp 3,200 (US$0.32).
Onion farmers in Brebes are also short-changed due to the
unpredictable weather. Many diseases, pest and rain continuously
reduces the quality of onions. In January-February of 2013 the price of
onions in the market are still above Rp 25,000 (US$2.5), while in June
2013, farmers can only sell them at Rp 15.000 (US$1.5).
Salacca farmers in Ungaran, Semarang also experience weak bargaining
power. Farmers have no choice but to sell salacca at Rp4.000 per
kilogram (US$0.4). This is due to the abundance of fruits which are not
bought by merchants and are left rotten. Only during normal weather
condition do farmers sell them at Rp 5.000 per kilogram (US$0.5).
69
Climate change increases the burden of women in farm work

Due to extreme weather condition, women farmers in Boyolali spend
more working hours on the farm. They have to be more careful in
selecting rice seeds. Women farmers who have land approximately
0.25 hectares should add one (1) working day for weeding and drying
process.
Women farmers in Brebes also have to give extra time in weeding,
observing diseases, and drying the onions. In addition, those who
plant salacca spend working hours for weeding and fertilizing. Both
need to be done more often, since the weeds increase during extreme
weather.
In onion farming, women farmers require additional two (2) working
days for weeding and drying. While the women farmers who grow
salacca must add three (3) more working days for weeding, and one
(1) more working day for fertilization.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Climate change has adversely affected the farmers because of the
changing weather pattern, dryness and flooding, and also due to
the increase in pests and diseases. These elements have dramatically
declined farmers income, reduced their bargaining power, and notably
increased the workload of women farmers which contributed to their
multiple burden.
Various field findings also indicate that climate change could threaten
food production processes due to risk of drought and flooding, and
harvest failures resulting from pest attack. If the situation continues,
climate change can threaten the availability of food thereby increasing
the risk of hunger and malnutrition.
Consciously or not, government so far has not been able to anticipate
the negative impacts of climate change on farmers. Existing policies
have not been effective in preventing and addressing the impact of
climate change
As revealed by the experiences of rice farmers in Boyolali, onion farmers
in Brebes and salacca farmers in Semarang, they need agricultural
70
systems that are able to anticipate the impacts of climate change.

Sustainable farming systems like organic farming, natural farming and
ecological agriculture are the alternatives which are more resilient to
extreme climate change situations.
Farmers need government intervention for the development of a viable
adaptation system including the setting up of early warning devices
against flooding, implementation of climate resilient programs, proper
management of farmers affected by crop failure and providing them
compensation.
Government should provide incentives and support policies to farmers
who innovate including the production of environment-friendly rice
seeds; who practice local wisdom to save water resources and preserve
traditional food; and should support communities which protect their
environment.
Thus, adaptation efforts are needed to be carried out the soonest time
possible for the people, especially the farmers.
CSF-CJI (Indonesia Civil Society Forum for Climate Justice) see a lot
of home work that the government should do such as establishing
agriculture infrastructures among them are irrigation and food
stockholding, the development of adaptive systems and support for
organic/natural farming, and other policies promoting environment
preservation and protection.
Endnotes
1 Vulnerability is the degree to which a system is susceptible to, and unable to cope
with adverse effects of climate change, including climate variability and extremes.
Vulnerability is a function of the character, magnitude and rate of climate change and
variation to which a system is exposed, its sensitivity and its adaptive capacity.
2 Anthropogenic: resulting or produced by human beings
3 IPCC, 2012: Summary for Policymakers. In: Managing the Risks of Extreme Events
and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation [Field, C.B., V. Barros, T.F. Stocker,
D. Qin, D.J. Dokken, K.L. Ebi, M.D. Mastrandrea, K.J. Mach, G.-K. Plattner, S.K. Allen, M.
Tignor, and P.M. Midgley (eds.)]. A Special Report of Working Groups I and II of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
UK, and New York, NY, USA, pp. 1-19.
4 Indonesia legislation comes in different forms. The following official hierarchy of
Indonesia legislation (from top to bottom) is enumerated under Law No. 10 Year 2004 on
the Formulation of Laws and Regulations: (i) 1945 Constitution (Undang-Undang Dasar
1945 or UUD45); (ii) Law (Undang-Undang or UU) and Government Regulation in Lieu
of Law (Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang or Perpu); (iii)Government
Regulation (Peraturan Pemerintah or PP); (iv) Presidential Regulation (Peraturan Presiden
or Perpres), and; (v) Regional Regulation (Peraturan Daerah or Perda
PHILIPPINES
NOT SEEING
THE FORESTS FOR
THE TREES
The Perils of Green Economy

in Ancestral Communities of
Bukidnon
ANANEZA ABAN
Integrated Rural Development Foundation
72
ABSTRACT
The global and national agencies provide much attentiveness to the
specifics of the Green Economy within the milieu of climate change.
But there is little concern for the people- the forest dwellers and other
rural communities dependent on the forest ecosystem for survival. The
state, the funding institutions and the private sector, by monetizing the
trees, are not really seeing the whole picture: the eventual deleterious
impact of Green Economy on the lives of the communities dependent
on the forest.
As a tribal chieftain once expressed, the forest is more than just
trees trapping carbon dioxide. It is life itself, interweaving with the
economic and socio-cultural fabric of ancestral tribes who have long
lived in harmony with their environment.
The Integrated Rural Development Foundation1 has been working with
tribal communities in Bukidnon, south of the Philippines, to empower
them against threats to their environment and their lifestyles. The case
of the Green Economy is one threat in the making.
Philippines | Forests & Ancestral Communities in Bukidnon
73
INTRODUCTION
Green Economy and Global Forest Carbon Trading
Green investments in developing countries have been given a major
boost under the Green Economy paradigm introduced in the Rio Plus
20 Summit2 in Brazil as a strategy to mitigate global warming which in
the fullest sense, has actually optimized the role of private corporations
in environmental management.
During this Rio Summit, the Green Economy has been promoted as a
global initiative for catalyzing renewed national policy development and
international cooperation and support for sustainable development.
(United Nations Department on Economic and Social Affairs) For
the purposes of the Green Economy Initiative, the United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP) regard the term green economy
as the realization of a vision where people have improved their lives
under an equitable society with reduced environmental risks.
The Rio+20 Outcome Document recognizes forest ecosystems as
integral to sustainable development through the provision of goods
and services which are environmentally sound, enhance food security
and the poors livelihoods, invigorate production and economic growth
(UN 2012, paragraph 52). This Outcome Document also reaffirms the
need to promote, enhance and support more sustainable forestry
that eradicates hunger and is economically viable, while conserving
biodiversity and water resources and enhancing resilience to climate
change and natural disasters (UN 2012, paragraph 111). (United
Nations Environment Programme, 2013)
Although there has been a growing international interest to this
initiative, the discourse on this concept between Member States remain
challenging during the Rio+20 mainly because of the absence of an
internationally agreed definition or universal principle and the lack
of clarity around what the policy measures encompass and how they
integrate with state priorities and objectives towards economic growth
and poverty reduction. (United Nations Department on Economic and
Social Affairs)
While the Summit did not reach a decisive consensus on the Green
Economy, transnational companies came out with a parallel declaration
acknowledging nature as capital and agreeing to put more investments
and financing on instruments that place financial value on nature and
its functions such as carbon sequestration, biodiversity conservation,
water stability, and soil fertility. (Water Watch, 2012) Their declaration
74
may have found support from UNEP which also perceives nature as
capital, both as an economic asset and source of public benefits for
the poor. With that perspective, UNEP defines the green economy
as that driven by public and private investments that reduce carbon
emissions and pollution, enhance energy and resource efficiency and
prevent loss of biodiversity and ecosystem services. (United Nations
Environment Programme)
The concept of the Green Economy is being materialized through
global trading with the belief that developing countries can benefit
from opportunities to trade and sell forest credits nationally or
internationally through public and private investments in forest. This
market orientation of forest conservation is through the interfacing
approach called the Reduced Emission from Deforestation and Forest
Degradation Plus (REDD+) and the payment for ecosystem services
(PES) which are understood as Green Economy measures that will lead
to positive trade impacts. (United Nations Environment Programme,
2013) Notably, PES is recognized as the most high profile of such
initiatives as this pays forest owners and other stakeholders on a local
Portion of the
Mt. Kitanglad
Watershed in
Bukidnon
75
and national scale for their provision of services such as watershed

protection, carbon storage, recreation and wildlife habitats. (Forest
Trends et al. 2008 in UNEP, 2013)
Climate change mitigation through REDD+ is considered a costeffective strategy for a green economy which has a set of policy
approaches and positive incentives designed to financially reward
developing countries for strengthening their forest governance.
The plus (+) includes conservation, sustainable management and
enhancement of forest carbon stocks. Promoters of REDD+ and PES
are convinced that if managed well, these can offer opportunity for
countries and landholders to capture the economic value of their
forest ecosystem services. Giving this a backing, the Parties to the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
are negotiating the inclusion of REDD+ under the new international
climate regime to be agreed by year 2015. (United Nations Environment
Programme, 2013)
On the contrary, the experience of local people to this kind of global
climate change initiative has not been that optimistic as has been
assumed. The Green Economy framework of development has not been
widely accepted and more importantly, not extensively comprehended
by ordinary citizens who include the forest dwellers.
Based on their current situation, this market-based mechanism towards
the changing climate is rather flawed and does not really address the
root causes of greenhouse gas (GHGs) emissions that degrade the
environment but tend to provide big incentives to polluters and benefit
the emitters. (Rio+20 Time to Act, 2011) Many have cast doubts on the
success of these green investments since deforestation is the work
of large companies that are given the right to commercially exploit
the forest. They should therefore not be given the responsibility to
manage forest. (Lang, Pramono, & Sarwadi, 2008)
The Indonesian experience of reforestation under REDD+ in Central
Kalimantan and Central Sulawesi was already observed that there were
practices of full neglect of the Free Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) as
well as narrow implementation of FPIC rights. (Steni & Setyasiswanto, 2011)
Financialization of Nature in the Philippine Context
As a party to the UN convention on sustainable development, the
Philippine government has localized this global framework by pushing
the National Greening Program (NGP) (Executive Order 26) under the
76
public-private partnership (PPP) program that institutionalizes the

REDD+ scheme in rehabilitating and protecting Philippine forests.
For its coverage, the NGP aims to plant 1.5-Billion trees covering about
1.5 Million hectares for a period of six (6) years from 2011 to 2016,
in lands considered as public domain, among them are: forestlands,
mangrove and protected areas, ancestral domains, civil and military
reservations, urban areas under the greening plan of the LGUs, inactive
and abandoned mine sites and other suitable lands. All the tree
planting initiatives shall be harmonized under NGP. All government
institutions shall produce appropriate quality seedlings every year
for the NGP.3 The technical assistance shall be provided under the
Convergence Initiative.
Consistent with the governments goal of harmonization, the National
Convergence Initiative (NCI) is a response to the fragmented delivery
of agriculture and rural development services toward improved
governance and maximize use of resources. It aims to facilitate better
governance of sustainable rural development in an institutionally
horizontal manner while adopting the watershed and ecosystem
management approach. This will be done through: enhancing
institutional efficiencies; expanding opportunities for agro-enterprise
and agribusiness development; and achieving spatial integration.4
Spearheaded by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), fund sources of the NGP will include private investments and
the Payment for Environmental Services (also PES). The DENR has
identified water districts, carbon market, mining companies, LGUs,
as the potential buyers of ES. The ES are classified into four broad
categories: watershed protection, carbon sequestration, biodiversity
conservation, and landscape/seascape beauty. (Mendoza)
However, while the NGP and NCI seem to champion a noble cause,
the trick is in the details. Watershed management and reforestation
are being pursued not really to sincerely rehabilitate the degraded
ecosystems for its ecological and cultural value but for their monetary
equivalence that will provide companies and investors the opportunity
to engage in the carbon stocks market and have increasing control
over resources that supposedly are public goods managed by the
State for the people. Such is embedded in the governments National
Climate Change Action Plan that likewise promotes water as a tradable
commodity. (Water Watch, 2012)
Tribal communities have expressed that the concept of providing
incentives to forest dwellers for planting trees in the forest may be
77
acceptable to some, but this scheme may also run in contrary to their
principle of forest management and social justice as this will interfere
their ancestral domain claims.
Indigenous communities, since time immemorial have been dependent
on the forest ecosystem for their survival, livelihoods and cultural
identity. Under the PES and REDD+ strategy, instead of claiming
these resources as part of their ancestral domain, tribal people will be
treated as mere forest guardians being paid for their labor, therefore
diminishing the value of their human and cultural existence in these
resources that has thrived in the absence of corporate intervention.
Bringing communities into the cash economy by offering them the PES
is no replacement for traditional livelihoods, cultures, and place-based
traditions. By buying them out of their forest-dependent livelihoods,
REDD may even leave forests more vulnerable to predatory interests.
(Global Justice Ecology Project, 2014)
Even with the existence of Philippine laws, particularly the Indigenous
Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), which is suppose to protect the rights
of indigenous peoples over their ancestral domain that substantially
include the forest ecosystem, there is no assurance that indigenous
peoples will still have the opportunity to utilize the forest for their
survival, tradition and customary practices if the areas have already
been subject for reforestation under the carbon trading scheme that
involves the private sector or the corporations. There is still no clear cut
Banana plantation in the sprawling hills of Bukidnon
78
policy to ensure that the IP communities will have greater access and
control over their ancestral domain under REDD+.
The debate on REDD+ and its adverse impact to rural communities,
especially to the indigenous peoples is ongoing in the country which
involved civil society organizations. Meanwhile, pending the issuance
of protocol guidelines on forest carbon trading, government through
the DENR, issued a memorandum ordering all its directors not to
entertain any initiative on forest carbon trading until further notice.5
Another agency, the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples
(NCIP) also issued its own directive instructing all its directors to
refrain from approving projects on carbon trading. 6 The effectivity of
these directives however, remains to be seen in the event that private
companies have started to initiate their own reforestation project by
attempting to harmonize it with the NGP.
The clause on the PPP is so broad and devious that even private
companies that have obviously disrupted the environment are given
another window opportunity to expand their business, and not really
to pay for the misdeeds they have committed. Although there was
little assertion on the Right to Pollute principle under the REDD+
financing scheme which allows corporations to continue their business
that releases GHG emissions for as long as they finance reforestation
projects, existing companies which have started to implement the
NGP can capitalize this corporate social responsibility clause, a
rather deceptive term that usually gives a good impression to the
general public since it provides voluntary public service by claiming to
voluntarily reduce carbon emissions.
This Right to Pollute principle integrated in the carbon market was
globally rejected and criticized to be flawed as this does not really help
reduce global warming and minimize the adverse impact of climate
change. This can be done through the carbon market mechanism
which allows rich countries and companies to use the carbon credits
they buy from developing countries in order to continue their business
as usual to pollute and release carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.
(Lang, Pramono, & Sarwadi, 2008)
A carbon credit, internationally known as Certified Emission Reductions
which has a monetary value, is created when the equivalent of one
metric tons of carbon dioxide is sequestered from entering the
atmosphere. Among the shortcomings of this current carbon trading
system is that the money-makers penetrated this in their best interest.
Huge profit-centers prefer to purchase carbon credits as it is easier
and cheaper to pollute than to innovate the production processes.
79
Bukidnon
watersheds
(Chaturvedi, 2014) Critics also argue that the science of measuring

forest carbon sequestration is highly inaccurate as forest carbon is
inherently volatile. Trading industrial pollution for forest protection
results to no actual reduction in GMG emissions at source. Overall
emissions actually increase if deforestation is stopped in one area but
increases elsewhere. Therefore, there is no guarantee that forest will
be saved by REDD programs. (Global Justice Ecology Project, 2014)
The link of this NGP to international finance institution is also
something to worry about. Aside from providing loans to the Philippine
government for infrastructure projects, multilateral institutions such as
the Asian Development Bank (ADB) has currently pump-primed the
government to encourage private sector investments in water resource
management in congruence to their global commitment for climate
change mitigation. One of those is the Integrated Water Resource
Management (IWRM) (Water Watch, 2012) which encourages greater
participation of the business sector in managing water resources that
belongs to the public.
80
As a complementary strategy to promote IWRM, ADB is also financing

the Integrated Natural Resources and Environment Management
(INREM) program to link it to the climate change initiatives of UNFCCC.
(Asian Development Bank, 2011)
At the time of this writing, the affected communities have but a scant
knowledge on these climate initiatives.7 Their limited information
about the climate revolves around their firsthand experience on climate
change that has dramatically affected their way of life, especially since
the coming of private companies that operated in their territories.
The concept of carbon trading is but extremely foreign to the rural
communities, especially to the tribal people who hardly monetize the
value of forest, except that a tree is equivalent to life itself.
THE CASE OF BUKIDNON

Bukidnon, home to many indigenous communities, is a land-locked
province located in the northern part of Mindanao, south of the
Philippines. This province as a critical watershed hosts the headwaters
of six major rivers in Mindanao namely: Pulangi, Tagoloan, Cagayan,
Maridugao, Agusan Cugman and Davao Salug rivers that supply water
for domestic, irrigation, agro-industrial, commercial and hydroelectric
power generations. (Aban & Glipo, 2013)
A company-driven reforestation project has been pushed in this
province which actually targets the ancestral domain claims of the
indigenous people. The case became more pronounced when the
tribal leaders expressed their reservation over this project. This has
been compounded by the fact that the company owns vast tracts of
agribusiness plantations operating in Bukidnon.
The Bukidnon provincial government has earlier attested that the
expansion of these agribusiness plantations plus the decreasing forest
cover in the province were to be blamed for the decreasing water
supply, degradation of water quality, siltation of irrigation canals and
poor rice production. (Calingasan, 2011) However, there is so far no
local policy to strictly regulate the operation of these companies.
As described by tribal leaders, both men and women, in many
conversations about REDD+ and this reforestation project, they have
felt a decrease of food production in their area with the massive
conversion of prime agricultural lands into export crops such as
bananas and pineapples. Maintaining their agricultural heritage such
as planting root crops for local food consumption has been disturbed
81
as family members became plantation workers.

The Hineleban Foundation, a corporate organization associated
with the multinational agribusiness corporation, Unifrutti Group of
Companies, a major fruit exporter that operates large-scale banana
and pineapple plantations in Bukidnon has negotiated with tribal
leaders to jumpstart its rainforestation project within Bukidnons
important watersheds.
Because private investments are being encouraged under the
NGP strategy, Hineleban expressed to participate in watershed
management. Its rainforestation project will calculate the individuals,
familys or corporates carbon emissions then offset it. Its carbon
footprint auditor will do the math to know how many hectares of
trees are needed to plant to neutralize a participants carbon footprint.
(Hineleban Foundation)
The Project PEARL
Business magnate and Hinelebans founder-chairman emeritus John
Paul Perrine said that the French Development Agency (AFD) has
earmarked 15 Million (Php795-million at Php53 per Euro) for its
flagship initiative called the Program for Equitable Advancement of Rural
Livelihoods (PEARL). (Balane, Perrine bows to tribal leaders demand:
submit to NCIP process, 2013) The PEARL project aims to directly
support the countrys NGP by rehabilitating around 44,000 hectares of
denuded forests of priority mountain ranges: Kitanglad, Kalatungan,
Matigsalog and Pantaron for Bukidnon province, and Bumbaran, Wao
AFD team (Thierry Liabastre, Franois Jullien, Luc Le Cabellec and Adeline Dontenville)
with Bumbaran Mayor Mastura Manabilang, Hedjarah Lydia Manabilang, John Perrine
(CEO, Unifrutti) and Urooj Malik (Chairman, Hineleban Foundation)
82
for the Lanao province over a 15-year period. Being also in the coffee
trade, it promotes its brand of coffee to complement its PEARL. It says:
for every Hineleban coffee bag purchased, the foundation plants one
tree in behalf of the buyer. (Hineleban Foundation)
In June 2011, an AFD mission in the agro-forestry sector visited
Bukidnon and Lanao del Sur that will likely benefit from projects
using the integrated watershed management approach. (Embassy of
France in Manila, 2012) (See photo) 8
While Perrine publicly announced that their project has been endorsed
by government agencies before proposing it to AFD, the Philippine
Government through its National Economic and Development
Authority- Regional Development Council (NEDA-RDC) Region 10
invoked its earlier resolution and stated that such endorsement must
not be construed as full endorsement pending the submission of the
required final documents that will still be subject to the established
government procedure on program evaluation or project proposal.
The NEDA-RDC 10 required Hineleban to submit among others, a
feasibility study on their PEARL project. It also emphasized that Hinelebans
introduction of the Calliandra calothyrsus tree specie, a non-endemic
forest specie, within the countrys protected areas, is prohibited by law.9
The Mt. Kitanglad Range Natural Park was declared a protected area in
year 2000 by virtue of Republic Act 8978. (Aban & Glipo, 2013)
Growing in warm climates, Calliandra calothyrsus is a colonist with
relatively rapid early growth and often invade areas of continual
disturbance according to the Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO). 10 This tree originated from northwestern Panama to southern
Mexico and was introduced in Indonesia in 1936 and later to many other
tropical countries like the Philippines where it is used in agroforestry
systems for fuelwood, plantation shade, as an intercrop hedgerow and
as livestock forage. (Gutteridge, Macqueen, & Palmer)
Dividing the tribal communities
The Unifrutti, Hineleban and a number of tribal leaders have signed a
Sacred Customary Compact on Peace and Progress to signify their
partnership for the PEARL project.11 However, this agreement was met
with a parallel protest of another block of tribal councils.
Anxious about the implications of this customary compact, leaders
of diverse Bukidnon tribal councils coming from the PEARL target
mountain ranges, filed a unified complaint before the NCIP- Regional
83
Hearing Office 10 asking this body to issue a temporary restraining

order on this project for the lack of consultation with communities,
substantial comprehension about the project and the agreement,
and in the absence of a FPIC that is required by law under IPRA.12
Aside from this, the leaders have organized series of consultations and
awareness-raising in partnership with NGOs in order to investigate the
project further.13
As of December 2013, some of the tribal leaders revealed that the
NCIP has granted their plea. The hearing of the case has commenced
and a FPIC process will have to be realized as required by law. The
Hineleban Foundation has reportedly accepted the decision. Tribal
leaders asserted that their customary process has to be followed
before the company can plant their trees even with the prior consent
of another group of tribal leaders.
DENR and Hineleban partnership
The Hineleban Foundation has coined many names for their project:
Mindanao Rainforestation Initiative, Enhanced NGP, and PEARL. A
technical working committee (TWC) was organized with Hineleban
acting as a secretariat to ensure that their project will be integrated in
the NGP. DENR Region 10 was reported to have considered Hinelebans
ENGP as a regular NGP.14
However, the DENR Central Office-Forest Management Bureau
denied any financial investment or engagement with the Foundation.
It clarified that if Hineleban benefitted from the NGP budget, it was
the decision of the partner peoples organization (PO) of PENRO. The
budget is a localized intervention of DENR which gives authority to the
local DENR body by virtue of its devolved function, in this sense the
PENRO, to decide who among the POs should receive allocation from
the NGP budget. (Calderon, 2013)
Despite FPIC violations allegedly committed by Hineleban, PENROBukidnon has downloaded a total of Php 1.7 Million budget to their
PO partners who in turn have transacted with Hineleban for the
Calliandra tree planting under the ENGP- Mindanao Rainforestation
Initiative. These PO organizations will reportedly buy the Calliandra
tree seedlings from the Foundation at P1.50 per seedling. The total
2013 target for NGP implementation in the province of Bukidnon
is 16,882 hectares under various NGP components.15 The project
components were:
1. Survey and mapping
2. Nursery establishment/ production of Calliandra seedlings
84
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Research activities
Social mobilization
Institutional development and strengthening
Process documentation
Project assessment
The PO recipients are the following:

1. Kitanglad Guard Volunteers (KGV)- Kalugmanan, Manolo
Fortich represented by the their president, Radil Tanlayon: Php
458,000.00
2. Kalatungan Lilingayon Association for Human and Ecological
Improvement (KALAHEI) represented by their president, Allen
B. Abarquez: Php 831,000.00
3. KGV- Licoan, Sumilao represented by their president, Johnny L.
Tundaan: Php 335,000.00
The ADB-INREM project (Aban & Glipo, 2013) which promotes REDD
is another funding window. The Upper Bukidnon River Basin is among
the four ADB project target areas around the Philippines which has an
estimated budget of Php 36-Million for the target 16 Municipalities of
Bukidnon plus some areas in Misamis Oriental province. Meanwhile,
DENR-FMB said that the carbon policy under INREM needs further
discussion. The ownership of carbon and carbon rights are details that
the DENR needs to clarify further. (Mirasol, Jr. & Calderon, 2013)
Reforestation and Mining
Some tribal leaders confessed that Hineleban has once outwitted
them when it introduced coffee farming as a livelihood in their
community and yet allegedly engaged into mining exploration in their
area. (Integrated Rural Development Foundation, 2013) Given this,
they cannot just dismiss the possibility of a mining agenda behind this
reforestation project.
Two important watersheds identified in the PEARL/ ENGP projects are
currently subject to mining interests. Portion of San Fernando town
which form part of the Salug Watershed (Matigsalog Watershed for
Hineleban) is already being exploited for mining operations. A spate
of human rights violations in the area, including summary executions
had happened. Tribal leaders who are staunch anti-mining advocates
and holders of Certificate of Ancestral Domain Claim in the area, have
their share of harassment for their cause. (Mordeno, 2012)
The municipal government of Impasug-ong has been lobbying for a
Minahan ng Bayan subjecting 2,000 hectares in this town for mining
85
One of the tributaries in the Upper Bukidnon River Basin
exploration even when this area is dubbed as the tribal capital of

Bukidnon, (Balane, Proposed Minahang Bayan in Bukidnon town put
on hold, 2013) therefore an important repository of the local history
and culture. Impasug-ong has also been the site of oil palm plantation
in the province. (International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, 2013)
The Pantaron Range which is one of the PEARL/ ENGP target area, is
just adjacent to these mountains subject for mining and agribusiness.
ANALYSIS
Corporations and the climate crisis
Under the market-oriented concept of REDD+ or a corporate-led
reforestation project, it is not a guarantee that mining companies or
multinational agribusiness corporations will have a solution to the
climate crisis that their business corporations have contributed.
The NGP or REDD+ does not absolve these corporations or any other
pollutive business company from their transgressions by contributing
to ecological destruction that has deprived people of their fundamental
right to food and to enjoy the natural resources that are essentially
public goods.
Considering the Mindanao context which prevails to be the hotspot
for corporate investments in the name of growth and progress, the
NGP becomes an enabling environment for private corporations
86
to continue their pollutive or damaging business activities and just

offset their carbon emissions through participation in this government
reforestation program.
It is therefore a question of credibility, sustainability and consistency
of NGP. The climate initiatives that the global agencies propose and
which the state implements, is not necessarily just and fair for the
affected people and the environment itself. In the case of Bukidnon
which boasts of contiguous mountain ranges, one area allotted
for reforestation while another site for deforestation cannot really
contribute to mitigating climate change and reducing the vulnerability
of the people from its adverse impact.
While NGP harmonizes initiatives of different government entities, it
has deeply divided rural communities, clans and families especially the
indigenous peoples over their decision to manage their forests and
ancestral domain. Moreover, it diminishes the value of local governance
because the role of the barangay, the very basic local government unit
in the Philippines, will only be as a project recipient hardly able to
grasp the concept and implications of carbon trading and the NGP to
local land use and development plan.
The NGP has somehow strengthened the conflicting policies that have
already deprived indigenous peoples of their land tenure and right
over these important resources even when these rights have been
guaranteed by law. Under the NIPAs Act, people including the tribes
are technically not allowed to enter the protected areas even when
these are the very bastions of their cultural identity, the foundation of
their birth and therefore a crucial fraction of their ancestral domain.
Although DENR recognized a number of tribal people as forest
guards, this is not a guarantee of their right to pursue the kind of
forest management they want to operationalize that is coherent with
their sustainable cultural practices and indigenous knowledge. As the
NGP manifests, the power to control and manage the forests still rests
within the hands of the DENR and local governments. And this time,
with the greater influence and support of the private sector under the
public-private partnership.
The Philippines should learn from the Indonesian experience of
reforestation under REDD+ in Central Kalimantan and Central Sulawesi.
The ADB link
The implementation of the ADB-INREM project in Bukidnon will only
complicate the situation. It was a positive action of the different tribal
87
councils to have called the attention of Hineleban to stop its project

implementation by virtue of the FPIC process that it has yet to comply.
Meanwhile, government agencies in the leadership of the DENR,
is facilitating the multi-million-peso ADB-INREM project. There is
therefore a need for the tribal leaders and communities to strengthen
their capacity to assert their common forest management agenda
before the government and ADB.
WAYS FORWARD
In the advent of the growing concern on international investments that
undermine local farming, indigenous governance, communitybased natural resource management, the Philippine government
and international aid agencies such as the AFD should only allow
responsible and socially just investments or projects which truly and
sustainably contribute to the interest of the majority of the Filipino
people. The ADB should not impose its own framework of resource
management and should abide by the respective forest management
plans of community people as well as respect the customary laws and
practices of the people who have claims over these resources.
Submitting the countrys forest resources and ancestral domain
to corporate control and the carbon market is non-negotiable. The
project should not push through in the absence of social acceptability
and inadequacy of information.
A broader consultation with
stakeholders should be implemented first since Bukidnon is identified
as the headwaters of many provinces in Mindanao. Disapproval of
communities over the project should be respected.
A meeting of indigenous peoples in Bukidnon.
88
There should be a full disclosure of the project. Affected communities

or supposed beneficiaries should have a meaningful participation
in the investigation of reforestation projects by virtue of being the
primary stakeholders of the resources. A thorough scientific analysis
on using tree species not endemic in the particular rainforests
should be presented to the communities in such a way that they can
comprehend in order to help them make guided decision of whether
to accept the project or not.
Mandatory processes such as the FPIC pursuant to IPRA must be
upheld at all times.
The importance of culture among the tribes should be invoked in
making decisions. Documentation of their culture must be done as an
important reference for decision making.
Corporations should be held accountable for the pollution and
damages they have incurred to the people and the environment in
the context of peoples fundamental rights and freedoms (including
freedom to breathe clean air, use clean water and a healthy wellbeing)
based on international human rights laws. Carbon emissions should
be reduced at source and not by pursuing reforestation in one side of
the globe but maintaining or increasing carbon footprints in the place
where the company operates. Business as usual cannot be an option.
The framework of climate justice by invoking the precautionary
principle should be upheld during dialogue and consultation. The call
for climate justice must generate more stakeholders, especially from
the grassroots whose voices are more crucial.
Since the impact of climate change is global and the pursuit for justice
against REDD+ and other forms of corporate control over commons is
an international agenda, a global support to the farmers and indigenous
peoples of Mindanao is needed to oppose any manipulation of their
resources and violation of their fundamental rights.
Increased pressure on responsible international institutions such as the
AFD, ADB, UNFCCC and others which are at the forefront in promoting
the Green Economy should be strategically formed. Finally, stronger
support to rural communities in their claim over their resources must
be urgently mobilized.
89
Endnotes
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
IRDF currently serves as the regional secretariat of the Asia Pacific Network for
Food Sovereignty (APNFS)
The Rio+20 Summit was the United Nations Conference on Sustainable
Development held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in June 2012; themes of the conference
are focused on green economy in the context of sustainable development, poverty
eradication and the institutional framework for sustainable development
NGP is especially under the DA, DAR, DENR, DILG, CHED and DepEd.
Policy and Implementation Framework for the DA-DAR-DENR Joint Memorandum
Circular No. 01; Series of 2010
DENR Memorandum No. 297: Interim Policy on Forest Carbon Trading and
Registry of REDD-Plus Activities; signed by Ramon J.P. Paje, CESO
NCIP Memorandum Order No. OED-84-2010 Series of 2010: Directive to Refrain
from Approving Projects on Carbon Trading; signed by Masli A. Quilaman, CEO VI
Based on series of meetings and consultations with Bukidnon council of leaders
of indigenous peoples living in the proposed project area, 2013.
Photo from http://www.ambafrance-ph.org/ (accessed April 2013)
NEDA-RDC10 Resolution No. 39 (s. 2011): Endorsing the Concept and Methodology
of the Proposed Program for Equitable Advancement of Rural Livelihoods (PEARL)
NEDA-RD 10 Resolution No. 39 (s.2011)
Sacred Customary Compact on Peace and Progress between Walu Ha Pasagi
of First Nations in Mindanao and Hineleban Foundation, Inc. and another with
Unifrutti Group Philippines, signed on 26 November 2012, Brgy. Songco, Lantapan,
Bukidnon
Affidavit of Complaint submitted to NCIP-Regional Hearing Office 10, 7 February,
2013, Malaybalay, Bukidnon
IRDF-APNFS has been instrumental in the awareness-raising of these tribal leaders
especially on ADB-INREM & REDD+ issue
Minutes of the ENGP First Technical Working Committee Meeting, April 26, 2013
Bids and Awards Committee Resolutions, Series of 2013, PENRO- Bukidnon,
Malaybalay City, approved by Bukidnon OIC PENR Officer Felix Mirasol, Jr.
References
Rio+20 Time to Act. (2011, August 29). Retrieved June 2013, from Time to Act: www.
timetoactrio20.org
Aban, A., & Glipo, A. (2013). Privatizing Forests and Water: the ADB-INREM Project in the
Upper Bukidnon River Basin. In N.-F. o. ADB, Integrated Water Resources Management
and the People of Asia. Quezon City: NGO-Forum on ADB.
Asian Development Bank. (2011, March 17). Global Environment Facility (GEF). Retrieved
April 10, 2012, from http://www.TheGEF.org
Balane, W. (2013, March 18). Perrine bows to tribal leaders demand: submit to NCIP
process. Retrieved April 2013, from Bukidnonnews: http://www.Bukidnonnews.net
Balane, W. (2013, July 29). Proposed Minahang Bayan in Bukidnon town put on
hold. Retrieved August 2013, from Mindanews: http://www.mindanews.com/topstories/2013/07/29/proposed-minahang-bayan-in-bukidnon-town-put-on-hold/
Calderon, R. (2013, August). Interview with DENR FMB Director. (A. Aban, & D. Cereno,
Interviewers)
Calingasan, A. (2011). Local Government Approach to Financing Watershed Protection.
Philippine Conference on Capturing Economic Benefits from Ecosystem Services (p.
22 slides). Manila: Asian Development Bank.
Chaturvedi, S. (2014, February 2). Right to Pollute? An Understanding on the Implications
of International Carbon Trading Market. OIDA International Journal of Sustainable
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Development, 06 No. 10, 17-22.

Embassy of France in Manila. (2012, May 24). French Development Agency Mission to
Mindanao. Retrieved April 2013, from http://www.ambafrance-ph.org/Mission-de-lAgence-francaise-de,2106
Gutteridge, R., Macqueen, D., & Palmer, B. (n.d.). Calliandra calothyrsus- a Multipurpose
Tree Legume for Humid Locations. Retrieved May 2013, from Food and Agriculture
Organization: http://www.fao.org/ag/AGP/AGPC/doc/publicat/gutt-shel/x5556e09.
htm#references
Hineleban Foundation. (n.d.). Enhanced National Greening Program. Retrieved May
2013, from Hineleban Foundation: http://www.hineleban.org/enhanced-nationalgreening-program
Hineleban Foundation. (n.d.). Grow your own forest. Retrieved May 2013, from Hineleban
Foundation: http://www.hineleban.org/grow-your-own-forest/
Integrated Rural Development Foundation. (2013). Mindanao Consultation on Corporate
Investments in Forests. Minutes of the Consutation with Mindanao Tribal Leaders on
Corporate Investments in Forests. Davao: IRDF.
International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs. (2013, May 22). Philippines: Oil Palm
Expansion Threatening Indigenous Communities. Retrieved November 2013, from
http://www.iwgia.org/news/search-news?news_id=786
Lang, C., Pramono, T., & Sarwadi, S. (2008, December 12). Small farmers victims of forest
carbon trading. Retrieved May 2012, from Via Campesina and an Indonesian farmer
denounce the Harapan Rainforest project in Indonesia: http://www.redd-monitor.
org/2008/12/12/via-campesina-and-an-indonesian-farmer-denounce-the-harapanrainforest-project-in-indonesia/#more-1122
Mendoza, M. (n.d.). The National Greening Program: Promoting Public-Private
Partnerships in Rehabilitating Philippine Forests. Department of Environment and
Natural Resources- Philippines.
Mirasol, Jr., F., & Calderon, R. (2013, July-August). Interview on ADB-INREM Project in
Bukidnon. (A. Aban, & D. Cereno, Interviewers)
Mordeno, H. (2012, March 21). Paramilitary group accussed of harassing sitio folk in
Bukidnon town. Retrieved April 2013, from Mindanews: http://www.mindanews.
com/top-stories/2012/03/21/paramilitary-group-accused-of-harassing-sitio-folk-inbukidnon-town/
Steni, B., & Setyasiswanto, S. (2011). No Reason to Delay: Portrait of FPIC in REDD+
Demostration Activities Project in Central Kalimantan and Central Sulawesi. Jakarta:
Perkumpulan HuMa.
United Nations Department on Economic and Social Affairs. (n.d.). Green Economy in the
Context of Sustainable Development and Poverty Eradication. Retrieved November
2013, from United Nations Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform: http://
sustainabledevelopment.un.org/index.php?menu=1224
United Nations Environment Programme. (2013). Green Economy and Trade- Trends,
Challenges and Opportunities. Retrieved November 2013, from Green Economy:
http://www.unep.org/greeneconomy/GreenEconomyandTrade
United Nations Environment Programme. (n.d.). About GEI- Green Economy Initiative.
Retrieved November 2013, from http://www.unep.org/greeneconomy/AboutGEI/
WhatisGEI/tabid/29784/Default.aspx
Water Watch. (2012). Peoples Response to Water Privatization and Resource Grabbing:
Strategies to Reclaim Water and Commons. Quezon City: Water Watch.
91
ANNEX
Indonesia has been the site of many REDD+ Demonstration Activity
(DA REDD+) projects. Among them are the project in Central
Sulawesi by the UN-REDD (the UN Collaborative Programme on
REDD in Developing Countries) and the Kalimantan Forests Climate
Partnership operating in Central Kalimantan.
Steni and Setyasiswanto (2011) argued in their study that the DAREDD/REDD+ in these regions have not adopted the FPIC rights
of communities living in and around the project areas. None
of the inspected projects has implemented FPIC principles and
norms as outlined by UN human rights agencies and other UN
technical cooperation agencies. They further said that there was a
narrow interpretation of FPIC from the pre-implementation up to
the implementation project phase which is inconsistent with the
Cancun Agreement and the General Comments of the Human Rights
Agreement Agencies of the UN with regards to the principles and
substances of FPIC rights.
These are the FPIC issues outlined in Central Kalimantan and Central
Sulawesi:
1. Practices of full neglect of FPIC
2. Narrow implementation of FPIC rights
a. Rights to seek, obtain and disseminate sufficient information
o People fail to understand the mechanisms for the project
implementation, consequences, benefits
o Erroneous explanation on greenhouse gas- from dry agri
fields
b. Rights to make decisions freely without coercion
o People worry about the tenurial status of or access to their
land
o No consultation with communities
c. Right to fully participate in the formulation of project policies
o No representation of customary communities in the
government-initiated Task Force; government-concentrated
representation of formed bodies
o Token participation of local peoples representative
resulting to minimum involvement in the policy process
o Local people as mere potential workers
o Threat of authoritarian policies issuance by government
dominated Task Force
d. Violation of the right to participate in project implementation
92
o Formulation of control mechanism

o Community involvement
o Application of outsourcing scheme
e. Violation on right to a proper compensation
o Wages for workers in the land rehab: peoples daily income
from the utilization of natural resources is less than the
targeted seedling planting in every block (minimum age vs.
pakyaw [wholesale] system)
o Sub-contractor determines compensation for the seedling
planting project; disregarding local minimum wage
standard
o 5% cut for villages treasury fund without transparency and
accountability
f. Violation of womens rights
o Womens involvement is just a formality to meet the quota
in the project documents
o Insufficient knowledge and understanding of KFCP on
condtion of womens fundamental civil and political rights
o No women in leadership position; women only as workers
VIETNAM
SHACKLING THE
NINE DRAGONS
A Rapid Impact Assessment

of the Mekong Mainstream
Dams on Farming Villages
in the Mekong Delta
LAM DINH UY & LAM THI THU SUU

Vietnam Rivers Network
DINH NHAT LAM & LE DUY

Southern Institue Of Ecology
94
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The authors are indebted to the Asia Pacific Network for Food
Sovereignty (APNFS) for funding support for this research. We are
also very grateful to the Center for Social Research and Development
(CSRD) for facilitating and fully supporting the survey team during
field work.
Special thanks also to the Department of Agricultural and Rural
Development (DARD) and the Department of Natural Resources and
Environment (DONRE) of An Giang and Tra Vinh Provinces for allowing
us to use their river monitoring results for this report.
Finally, we are most grateful for the participation of the farmers,
fishermen and local officials who graciously spent their valuable time
answering our interviews and facilitating our surveys.
Vietnam | Impact of Dams in Mekong Delta
95
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In recent years, the plan to build a cascade of eleven (11) mainstream
dams along the entirety of the Mekong River has caused serious
regional arguments and movements because of its potential severe
impact to the whole Mekong Sub-region. These disagreements
between the six nations sharing the river are further aggravated by the
lack of firm scientific evidence to support the proposal.
This research documented the impact these upstream dams may have
on the livelihood of the Mekong Delta communities who depend on
the current water regime. The researchers extensively interviewed a
motley group of 105 participants, from local farmers and fisherfolks,
to local governors in An Giang province (situated at the top of Mekong
Delta) and Tra Vinh province (located at the coastal area of the Delta).
The research found out that the dams will change the water regime
of the Delta, inducing saline intrusion, sediment degradation and
lower fish productivity. These drastic changes will severely impact the
riparian communities in Vietnam whose livelihoods are dependent on
the unique ecology of the Mekong Delta.
Therefore, the research agrees with the International Centre for
Environmental Management (ICEM) strategic environmental
assessment report which recommended that the construction of 11
dams be postponed for at least 10 years until sufficient mitigating
solutions have been reached at by the regions stakeholders.
96
INTRODUCTION
The Mekong River is the 12th longest river in the world, flowing 4,909 km
through six countries: China, Myanmar, Thailand, Lao PDR, Cambodia,
and Viet Nam. It is the worlds second most biodiverse river; its waters
support the worlds largest inland fisheries. The Lower Mekong River
is central to the lives and cultures of more than 60 million people
living within the basin. Its connectivity and flood-drought cycles are
essential for maintaining the rivers rich ecology, its fisheries and the
sediment-nutrient balance necessary for the sustainable production of
food crops on its fertile floodplains.
In Vietnam, the Mekong River is divided into many tributaries which
flow towards the sea through nine estuaries (including nh An, Ba
Thc, Trn , i, Tiu, Hm Lung, C Chin, Cung Hu, and Ba
Lai) (See Figure 1-1). These nine estuaries helped make Mekong Delta
one of the most fertile and important deltas in the world, providing
Viet Nam with rice, fish and fruit. It is also for this reason that the
Vietnamese also fondly revere Mekong, referring to it as the Nine
Dragon Delta.
In recent years, however, the demand for more energy has spurred
some countries in the region to propose the construction of 11 hydropower dams on the Mekong River mainstream, sparking concerns on
the potential adverse impact of these dams on food security.
In early 2012, LAO PDR begun construction on the first hydro-power
project in the cascade called Xayaburi. As the first mainstream project,
the Xayaburi Dam served as a significant test for the Mekong River
Commission and the future of river and regional cooperation. As
signatories of the 1995 Mekong Agreement, the governments of
Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand and Vietnam have agreed to jointly
protect the river and seek regional approval for all mainstream projects.
But while Lao PDR first initiated the Xayaburi Dams regional decisionmaking process in late 2010, the concerns raised by neighboring
countries on the need to carry out a trans-boundary impact assessment
and further public consultation were not adequately responded. Given
that LAO PDR proceeded with the dam construction in the absence
of a regional agreement, the Mekong Agreement is largely viewed as
a failure and raises significant concerns for future mainstream dam
projects. Last 2013, Lao PDR has publicly announced the construction
of a second dam - the Don Sahong- on the Mekong, again without
properly taking into account the concerns of the neighboring countries.
97
Figure 2.1 Locational map of the Mekong River mainstream dams

(Source: http://newswatch.nationalgeographic.com/files/2011/03/Mekong-dams-thumb425x6001.jpg)
In recent years, the Mekong Delta has gone through many severe
changes which has adversely impacted local peoples livelihoods. The
change in the river water regime because of the operation of upstream
hydro-power dams in China (See Figure 2-1) is considered as a major
reason. This research was undertaken to find facts about this problem.
FIELD MISSION DESCRIPTION

Objectives
This research aimed to show the potential impact of the Cascade 11
project by documenting how the current water regime affects people
living in the Vietnam Mekong Delta. The research sought to answer
the following questions:
How does Mekongs water resource support local livelihood and
their food production?
What impact will the Xayaburi Dam and other proposed dams
98

Figure 2.2 Locational
map of survey area
(Source: http://www.
mekong-delta-travelguide.com/assets/
images/mekong_
delta_map_en.jpg)
in the Mekong have on the water quantity and quality for farming
communities in the two provinces of Vietnam Mekong Delta?
Time and location
The field mission was conducted from November 10-21, 2013 in An
Giang and Tr Vinh provinces. An Giang province is located in the
top portion of the Vietnam Mekong Delta, while Tr Vinh province is
located in the coastal area.
Methodology
Participatory methods were used to generate qualitative and
quantitative data. These include the following:
99
Collecting secondary information and data from the internet

and relevant agencies such as Department of Agricultural and
Rural Development (DARD), Department of Natural Resources and
Environment (DONRE), and etc.
Household interview and group discussion: 105 farmers were
interviewed using a questionnaire drafted by the researchers.
Semi-structured interview: Local governors from commune to
province level were interviewed using a semi-structured format.
RESULTS
Change of water regime
The main livelihood activities of local people in the delta are paddy field
cultivation, vegetable and fruit gardening, river fishery, aquaculture,
and related services such as fish processing. They occupy dominant
ratios in the total Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as shown in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1 Population and GDP ratio of two projects provinces
GDP ratio (%)
Province
Population
Agriculture,
Forestry and
Aquaculture
Industry and Service

Construction
An Giang
2,152,342
33.65%
12.45%
53.90%
Tra Vinh
1,020,800
48.4%
15.3%
36.3%
(Source: Annual statistic book and socio-economic report of An Giang Province and Tra
Vinh Province in 2013)
All these activities are strictly dependent on the water regime of the
Mekong River (see Figure 1.1). In the past, the water regime was stable
annually so local people could easily adjust and adapt their agricultural
and livelihood activities. This entailed a reliance on century-old
seasonal cultivation calendars (e.g. fish-rice field in the rainy season
when the river water is fresh and plenty; and shrimp feeding in the dry
season when the river water gets saltier due to the sea water intrusion)
creating a traditional and unique way of agriculture in the area. But in
recent years, the river water regime has changed drastically that people
could no longer predict when the upstream water flow is high, making
it difficult for them to adapt and adjust their livelihood activities.
100
During the interview, 95% of the farmers confirmed that they lost their
crops badly when the upstream water didnt arrive on time. A paddy
farmer from Tra Vinh province said: In 2011, my crop totally failed
because the upstream water didnt arrive in time to drive back the
salt water intrusion. Since their income is 90% 100% sourced from
farming, their economic status has been negatively affected. In fact,
many farmers could no longer plant long-period rice varieties, which
require 5-6 months before harvest, because they can no longer predict
the waters arrival time.
To avoid salt water intrusion, they had to shift to short-period rice
varieties which only require 3-4 months before harvest. The lack of
upstream freshwater replenishment has also led to incidences of
massive fishkill. Fisherfolk have to resort to extracting underground
water to change the dirty fishpond water. However, exploitation of the
aquifer is prohibited by the local government because of its impact
on fresh water source and the risk of land sinking. As a result, only a
few of the interviewees are still keeping with their traditional way of
farming and fishing.
Increase of saline intrusion
During the dry season, the low flow of the upstream river current
results in salt water intruding into the Mekong Delta. But during rainy
seasons, Mekong Rivers flow becomes much stronger, off-setting
the effects of the salt intrusion and giving the Mekong Delta a flood
season. This flood is very essential to farmers and fishes because it
helps replenish the water in the rice paddies, clean the salt and alum,
supply natural fertilizer, provide abundant natural aquatic products,
etc. Many fish species, such as the Cirrhinus jullieni, also appear only
during the flood season, helping provide food and income to local
communities.
However, during the survey, 100% of the interviewees confirmed that
the flood peak has been decreasing by an average of 30% in the last
5 years. This means that there is a decrease in the amount of annual
upstream freshwater. Thus, the coastal areas of the Mekong Delta
such as Tra Vinh Province suffer the brunt of saline intrusion such as
degradation of cultivation soil quality, salinity of underground water,
dead of plants and aquatic products, etc.
According to the river monitoring results of the local government,
there is a clear relation between flood and salinity: the lower the flood
peak, the higher is the salinity (Figure 3.1).
101
Figure 3.1 Relation between flood and salinity
(Source: Department of Natural Resources and Environment of An Giang Province and

Tra Vinh Province)
The monitoring results of the local government also showed that saline
intrusion became more and more severe in recent years. In 2010, salinity
intruded up to 70 km inland and caused massive losses of agriculture
in the Mekong Delta. Since saline intrusion causes adverse changes in
water quality, agricultural crops and aquatic animal husbandries (fish,
shrimp, and etc.) are immediately affected.
Figure 3.2 Area affected by saline intrusion in Mekong Lower Basin,
Vietnam in 2010
(Source: Quoi L.P et al., 2010)
Saline intrusion also wreaks economic havoc on rice farmers. According

to them, once the rice field is contaminated with saline water, it will
102
take much time, effort and cost to refine it. A farmer from Chu
Thnh District of Tr Vinh Province said: My paddy field got saline
intrusion in 2010. It took me 2 years to refine it. I had to spend 200,000
VND/1,000m2 for quicklime for 2 times/year, and another 350,000
VND/1,000m2 for land plough for 2 times/year.
Degradation of sedimentation/alluvium

The Mekong River deposits a total of 160 million tons of alluvium
annually (Xue,et.al. 2011). This is very important for all farming villages
along the Mekong River, including the Delta, because it is a natural
source of fertilizer for soil cultivation.
Dams keep sediment inside the reservoir and degrade sedimentation
downstream. After the Manwan dam was built in China, Lu and Siew
(National University of Singapore,) conclusively demonstrated in 2006
that the sediment in Mekong Delta was decreased approximately 6
times (Figure 3.3).
Figure 3.3 Change of sediment in the Mekong River due to Manwan dam
A similar effect was observed by the farmers interviewed for this

study. All of them confirmed that the sediment in their field (as natural
fertilizer) was significantly reduced by an average of 40-60% for the
last five years. Therefore, all of them had to buy chemical fertilizers
and soil treatment in average of 2 times (500 700 USD/ha/crop).
Thus, water pollution also increased 2-5 times due to those chemical
fertilizers.
On the other hand, it is also recognized widely by the local people and
scientists that sediment-hungry water increased river-bank erosion
in the Mekong Delta (Figure 3.4).
103
Figure 3.4 River-bank erosion in the Mekong Delta
((Source: http://www.thanhniennews.com/Uploaded/2013/2010/Picture/VW023/con-bai.jpg)
Degradation of natural fish productivity

Dams also block the spawning routes of hundreds of migratory fish
species in the Mekong River. The Department of Aquatic Protection
of An Giang Province has reported that natural fish productivity has
decreased in the last twelve years. (figure 3.5) At present, there is still
no effective methodology to mitigate this impact.
Figure 3.5 Natural fish productivity in An Giang province
from 2000 to 2012
(Source: Department of Aquatic Protection of An Giang Province, 2013)
The natural productivity of the Mekong River fisheries is dependent on

the migratory fishes that use the river as spawning routes. However,
the development of mainstream hydro-power dams in the headwaters
in China and other lower tributaries threaten the natural fecundity of
104
the river ecosystem. In the survey, most of the fishermen declared that
their fish production decreased by up to 80% in the last five years.
Even with investing on more fishing gear and time, they could only
catch approximately 2 kg/day, in contrast to 10 kg/day during peak
season.
They also noticed that the local fish population has also declined.
Migrant fishes like the Pangasianodon Gigas, Catlocarpio siamensis,
Henicorhynchus sp., Probarbus jullieni, etc., have become rare or most
likely, disappeared. Overfishing and the blocking of the migrant fish
routes by the hydropower dams are believed to be the cause. If the
Cascade of 11 dam project is completed, respondents believe that fish
productivity will further decline, ending the local fisheries industry and
jeopardizing Vietnams food security.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Conclusion
The construction of any mainstream dam in the Mekong River will
damage the Mekong Delta by disrupting its water regime, allowing
saline intrusion, degradation of sedimentation and declining natural
fish productivity. Therefore, it also threatens the national food security.
In Vietnamese language, the Mekong Delta is called Nine Dragon
Delta, and the rivers are considered as Dragons vessels which keep
the Dragons life. Any obstruction of the vessel such as damming will
threaten the Dragons health and the well-being of the people.
The more dams are constructed, the worse it will be for all riparian
communities in the downstream because then, water control will
be fully in the hands of the dam operators. The lack of cooperative
mechanism between Mekong countries is a significant indicator that
should concern all Mekong river stakeholders.
If Lao PDR insists on developing the Xayaburi and Don Sahong dams,
many adverse impacts could happen, including:
The dwindling of Mekong river into several small tributaries.
The disruption of a centuries-old indigenous and sustainable
agrarian culture
The loss of the livelihood of a million people living along the
riverbanks
The loss of opportunities from water biodiversity and tourism
An imbalance in the regions macro economy; upstream countries
will benefit from the hydropower development while downstream
countries will be negatively affected.
Vietnam |Impact of Dams in Mekong Delta
Figure 5.1
105
Mekong River as Nine Dragons in Mekong Delta
Recommendation
Since its inception, the proposed cascade of 11 mainstream dams
in the Mekong River has caused significant international arguments
and movements because of the potential severe impact on the
regions social, economic and ecological climate. In October 2010, the
International Centre for Environmental Management (ICEM) conducted
a Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) for the Mekong River
Commission (MRC) which recommended that the proposal should be
postponed for at least 10 years to get a comprehensive understanding
of the impact this project will have on the region.
During the survey, the respondents were also not in favor of mainstream
hydropower dam development. They suggested to stop the project
immediately and prohibit similar proposals in the future.
106
References
Annual Statistic Book of An Giang Province and Tra Vinh Province. 2013
(2013). Environmental Monitoring Report of Tra Vinh Province. Department of
Natural Resources and Environment.
(2013). General environmental status report in 2006-2010 of Tra Vinh Province.
Department of Natural Resources and Environment
(2010). Strategic Environmental Assessment of Hydropower on the Mekong
Mainstream. International Centre for Environmental Management
Lu and R. Y. Siew. (2006) Water discharge and sediment ux changes over the
past decades in the Lower Mekong River: possible impacts of the Chinese
dams.
(2013). Socio-Economic Reports of An Giang Province and Tra Vinh Province
in 2013
107
ANNEX 1
Interview data collection template

No.
Name of
Address Name of
interviewer
interviewee
Male/
Ethnicity
Female
(M/F)
Purpose
of water
use?
Implemented
year
(1)
(2)
(5)
(7)
(8)
(3)
(4)
(6)
Scale of
Income
(%)
Describe
in detail
changes
of water in
recent 10
years
When did
it change
remarkably?
Cause of
changes
What and
how that
change
affext to?
How did
you deal
with that
change?
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
What do
you think
about next
proceed
Is this water
use purpose or
source of income
replaceable?
Why?
What did
other
environmental
issues change
due to
change of
water?
What is your
opinion
about the
construction
of mainstream
dam?
Remarks
(15)
(16)
(17
(18
(19
108
ANNEX 2
Photos during field survey
Some common
natural fishes in
Mekong Delta
Interviewing a
fisherwoman
A shrimp
pond
109
A fish farm
A group
discussion
Interviewing a farmer
110

Saltwater
prevention
dyke
Saltwater
prevention dyke
Interviewing
fishermen
111
Interviewing a fish
farmer
A rice field
Harvesting rice
About APNFS
APNFS is a regional platform of farmers,
fishers and civil society organizations
that advocates for food sovereignty as
a framework for agriculture and food
policymaking. APNFS seeks to enlarge
the voices of grassroots organizations in
local, regional and international decisionmaking in relation to food and agriculture.
It has been actively engaging regional and
international institutions such as ASEAN
and UN agencies as well as international
finance institutions to promote its
advocacies on food sovereignty, economic
and social rights, climate justice, peoples
right to resources and trade justice.
As a network, it conducts studies and
researches on agriculture, water, trade
and climate issues. It launches regionwide campaign around these issues. The
secretariat office is currently based in
Quezon City, Philippines.
APNFS would like to acknowledge the
financial support of CCFD-Terre Solidaire
for the publication of this book.

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Published by Asia Pacific Network for Food Sovereignty (APNFS)

APNFS gives permission for excerpts from this book to be cited/

Editorial Board: Arze Glipo, regional coordinator.

Between G33 Proposal and the National Food Policy

Confronting a Changing Climate

A Case Study of Rice, Onion and Salacca Farmers in

Not Seeing the Forests

The Perils of Green Economy in Ancestral

Shackling the Nine Dragons

A Rapid Impact Assessment of the Mekong

DINH NHAT LAM & LE DUY

Opening the Floodgates

DR. RENE OFRENEO

Former Dean, School of Labor and Industrial Relations

THE PATH TO FOOD

Between G33 Proposal and the

Opening the Floodgates

aggregate measurement of supports

Indonesia | G33 & Food Sovereignty

Opening the Floodgates

Source:IGJ Data Center, taken from ASEAN Statistic 2012

Indonesia | G33 & Food Sovereignty

From 2007-2011, there was a growth decline in ASEAN agricultural

The slow growth of several top products because of the agricultural

Source: IGJ Data Center, taken from AFSIS Report 2012

The loss of potential income due to their inability to compete with

Opening the Floodgates

The above data shows that the ASEAN agricultural performance is

Indonesia | G33 & Food Sovereignty

Therefore, we need to study whether the G33 proposal will adequately

Opening the Floodgates

The opening of import access allows importers to take control of the

IMPACT OF WTO BALI PACKAGE

Indonesia | G33 & Food Sovereignty

countries. Given the recent wave of economic crisis which resulted in

Opening the Floodgates

WTO members. However, this issue successfully passed the discussion

Indonesia | G33 & Food Sovereignty

Opening the Floodgates

Indonesia | G33 & Food Sovereignty

Opening the Floodgates

All WTO member countries are demanded

There is no guarantee The draft text only mentions work

Indonesia | G33 & Food Sovereignty

Injustice in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture

Opening the Floodgates

and subsidies. The following table is the schedules of commitments and

Average cuts for all

Source: WTO (2012) compiled by IGJ (2013)

Average cuts for domestic

Calculating Total AMS:

Indonesia | G33 & Food Sovereignty

However, the commitment to reduce subsidies cannot be applied if the

Opening the Floodgates

AoA also prohibits developing

Indonesia | G33 & Food Sovereignty

subsidies and prohibition of export subsidies merely ensure that

Source: Action Aid, 1998.