COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

1. University of Pangasinan vs. NLRC, 218 SCRA 65 2013 CASE..

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2. UST Faculty union vs. Bitonio, BLR/Mario
GRN 131235 November 16, 1999
Panganiban, J.:
FACTS:
Private respondent Mario et al are duly elected officer of UST
faculty. The union has a 5-year CBA with its employer and is set to
expire on May 31,1998. On September 21, 1996, Sec Gen of the
union posted a general assembly announcement to be held on
October 5, 1996. Various UST club presidents requested a general
faculty assembly thus union and non-union faculty members
convened. New set of officers were elected, violative of the CBL and
that GA was held with the attendance of non-union members.
Current union officers were served with a notice to vacate the union
office as new set of offices were already elected. CBA was likewise
ratified by an overwhelming majority. Mad-Arbiter declared the
election conducted was violative of the unions CBL. BLR Director
Bitonio upheld the decision with a ruling that the CBL which
constituted the covenant between the union and its members, could
not be suspended during the general assembly of all faculty
members, since it had not been authorized by the union.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the public respondent committed grave abuse of
discretion in refusing to recognize the officers elected during the
general assembly.
RULING:
Self-organization is a fundamental right guaranteed by the
constitution and labor Code. Corollary to this right is the
prerogative not to join, affiliate with or assist a labor union.
Therefore, to become a union member, an employee must not only
signify the intent to become one but also take some positive steps
to realize that intent. The procedure for union membership is
usually embodied in the unions CBL. An employee who becomes a
union member acquires the rights and the concomitant obligations
that go with the new status and becomes bound by the unions
rules and regulations.
v Union election hold pursuant to the unions CBL, and the
right to vote in it is enjoyed only by union members.
v Certification election is the process of determining,
thorough secret ballot, the sole and exclusive bargaining
agent of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit
for the purpose of collective bargaining the purpose to
ascertain whether or not a majority of the employees
wish to be represented by a labor organization and by
which particular labor organization.
3. Benjamin Vidoriano Vs Elizalde Rope Workers union GR No. L25246 September 12 1974
FACTS: Benjamin victoriano a member of iglesia ni cristo had been in
the employ of the Elizalde Rope factory Inc since 1958. Her was a
member of elizalde rope workers union which had with the company a
CBA containing a closed shop provision which reads as follow
Membership union shall be required as a condition of employment for all
permanent employees worker covered by this agreement. RA 3350 was
enacted introducing an amendment to paragraph (4) subsection (a) of
section 4 of RA 875 as follows but such agreement shall not cover
members of any religious sect which prohibit affiliation of their member in
any such 0labor organization Benjamin victoriano presents his
resignation to appellant union thereupon the union wrote a formal letter
to separate the appellee from the service in view of the fact that he was
resigning from the union as member of the company notified the apellee
and his counsel that unless the appellee could achieve a satisfactory
arrangement with the union the company would be constrained to
dismiss him from the service . this prompted appellee to file an action for
injunction to enjoin the company and the union from dismissing apallee.
ISSUE: WON RA 3350 is unconstitutional
HELD: the constitution provision only prohibits legislation for the support
of any religious tenets or the modes of worship of any sect, thus
forestalling compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the
chosen form of religion within limits of utmost amplitude. RA 3350 does
not require as a qualification on condition in joining any lawful
association membership in any particular religion on in any religious sect
neither does the act requires affiliation with a religious sect that prohibits
its member from joining a labor union as a condition on qualification for
withdrawing from labor union RA 3350 only exempts member with such
religious affililiation from the required to do a positive act to exercise
the right to join or to resign from the union. He is exempted from form the
coverage of any closed shop agreement that a labor union may have
entered into. Therefore RA 3350 is never an illegal evasion of
constitutional provision or prohibition to accomplish a desired result
which is lawful in itself by vering or following a legal way to do it.
4. FULLTEXT
G.R. No. 93468 December 29, 1994
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF TRADE UNIONS (NATU)-REPUBLIC
PLANTERS BANK SUPERVISORS CHAPTER,petitioner,
vs.
HON. RUBEN D. TORRES, SECRETARY OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT and REPUBLIC PLANTERS BANK,respondents.
Filemon G. Tercero for petitioner.
The Government Corporate Counsel for Republic Planters Bank.

BELLOSILLO, J.:
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF TRADE UNIONS (NATU)-REPUBLIC
PLANTERS BANK SUPERVISORS CHAPTER seeks nullification of the
decision of public respondent Secretary of Labor dated 23 March 1990,
which modified the order of Med-Arbiter Manases T. Cruz dated 17
August 1989 as well as his order dated 20 April 1990 denying
reconsideration.
On 17 March 1989, NATU filed a petition for certification election to
determine the exclusive bargaining representative of respondent Bank's
employees occupying supervisory positions. On 24 April 1989, the Bank
moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the supposed
supervisory employees were actually managerial and/or confidential
employees thus ineligible to join, assist or form a union, and that the
petition lacked the 20% signatory requirement under the Labor Code.
On 17 August 1989, Med-Arbiter Manases T. Cruz granted the petition
thus
WHEREFORE, . . . let a certification election be
ordered conducted among all the regular employees
of the Republic Planters Bank occupying supervisory
positions or the equivalent within 20 days from
receipt of a copy of this Order. The choice shall be:
(1) National Association of Trade Unions (NATU)Republic Planters Bank Supervisors Chapter; and
(2) No Union.
The payroll three months prior to the filing of this
petition shall be utilized in determining the list of
eligible voters . . . . 1
Respondent Bank appealed the order to the Secretary of Labor on the
main ground that several of the employees sought to be included in the
certification election, particularly the Department Managers, Branch
Managers/OICs, Cashiers and Controllers were managerial and/or
confidential employees and thus ineligible to join, assist or form a union.
It presented annexes detailing the job description and duties of the
positions in question and affidavits of certain employees. It also invoked
provisions of the General Banking Act and the Central Bank Act to show
the duties and responsibilities of the bank and its branches.
On 23 March 1990, public respondent issued a decision partially granting
the appeal, which is now being challenged before us
WHEREFORE, . . . the appeal is hereby partially
granted. Accordingly, the Order dated 17 August
1989 is modified to the extent that Department
Managers, Assistant Managers, Branch Managers,
Cashiers and Controllers are declared managerial
employees. Perforce, they cannot join the union of
supervisors such as Division Chiefs, Accounts
Officers, Staff Assistants and OIC's (sic) unless the
latter are regular managerial employees . . . . 2
NATU filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied on 20
April 1990. 3 Hence this recourse assailing public respondent for
rendering the decision of 23 March 1990 and the order of 20 April 1990
both with grave abuse of discretion.
The crucial issue presented for our resolution is whether the Department
Managers, Assistant Managers, Branch Managers/OICs, Cashiers and
Controllers of respondent Bank are managerial and/or confidential
employees hence ineligible to join or assist the union of petitioner.
NATU submits that an analysis of the decision of public respondent
readily yields certain flaws that result in erroneous conclusions. Firstly, a
branch does not enjoy relative autonomy precisely because it is treated
as one unit with the head office and has to comply with uniform policies
and guidelines set by the bank itself. It would be absurd if each branch of
a particular bank would be adopting and implementing different policies
covering multifarious banking transactions. Moreover, respondent Bank's
own evidence clearly shows that policies and guidelines covering the
various branches are set by the head office. Secondly, there is absolutely
no evidence showing that bank policies are laid down through the
collective action of the Branch Manager, the Cashier and the Controller.
Thirdly, the organizational setup where the Branch Manager exercises
control over branch operations, the Controller controls the Accounting
Division, and the Cashier controls the Cash Division, is nothing but a
proper delineation of duties and responsibilities. This delineation is a
Central Bank prescribed internal control measure intended to objectively
establish responsibilities among the officers to easily pinpoint culpability
in case of error. The "dual control" and "joint custody" aspects mentioned
in the decision of public respondent are likewise internal control
measures prescribed by the Central Bank.
Neither is there evidence showing that subject employees are vested
with powers or prerogatives to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall,
discharge, assign or discipline employees. The bare allegations in the
affidavits of respondent Bank's Executive Assistant to the President 4 and
the Senior Manager of the Human Resource Management
Department 5 that those powers and prerogatives are inherent in subject
positions are self-serving. Their claim cannot be made to prevail upon
the actual duties and responsibilities of subject employees.
The other evidence of respondent Bank which purports to show that
subject employees exercise managerial functions even belies such
claim. Insofar as Department Managers and Assistant Managers are
concerned, there is absolutely no reason mentioned in the decision why
they are managerial employees. Not even respondent Bank in its appeal
questioned the inclusion of Assistant Managers among the qualified
petitioning employees. Public respondent has deviated from the real
issue in this case, which is, the determination of whether subject
employees are managerial employees within the contemplation of the

Labor Code, as amended by RA 6715; instead, he merely concentrated

on the nature, conduct and management of banks conformably with the
General Banking Act and the Central Bank Act.
Petitioner concludes that subject employees are not managerial
employees but supervisors. Even assuming that they are confidential
employees, there is no legal prohibition against confidential employees
who are not performing managerial functions to form and join a union.
On the other hand, respondent Bank maintains that the Department
Managers, Branch Managers, Cashiers and Controllers are inherently
possessed of the powers enumerated in Art. 212, par. (m), of the Labor
Code. It relies heavily on the affidavits of its Executive Assistant to the
President and Senior Manager of the Human Resource Department. The
Branch Managers, Cashiers and Controllers are vested not only with
policy-making powers necessary to run the affairs of the branch, given
the independence and relative autonomy which it enjoys in the pursuit of
its goals and objectives, but also with the concomitant disciplinary
authority over the employees.
The Solicitor General argues that NATU loses sight of the fact that by
virtue of the appeal of respondent Bank, the whole case is thrown open
for consideration by public respondent. Even errors not assigned in the
appeal, such as the exclusion by the Med-Arbiter of Assistant Managers
from the managerial employees category, is within his discretion to
consider as it is closely related to the errors properly assigned. The fact
that Department Managers are managerial employees is borne out by
the evidence of petitioner itself. Furthermore, while it assails public
respondent's finding that subject employees are managerial employees,
petitioner never questioned the fact that said officers also occupy
confidential positions and thus remain prohibited from forming or joining
any labor organization.
Respondent Bank has no legal personality to move for the dismissal of
the petition for certification election on the ground that its supervisory
employees are in reality managerial employees. An employer has no
standing to question the process since this is the sole concern of the
workers. The only exception is where the employer itself has to file the
petition pursuant to Art. 258 of the Labor Code because of a request to
bargain collectively. 6
Public respondent, invoking RA 6715 and the inherent functions of
Department Managers, Assistant Managers, Branch Managers, Cashiers
and Controllers, held that these officers properly fall within the definition
of managerial employees. The ratiocination in his Decision of 23 March
1990 7 is that
Republic Act No. 6715, otherwise known as the
Herrera-Veloso Law, restored the right of
supervisors to form their own unions while
maintaining the proscription on the right to selforganization of managerial employees. Accordingly,
the Labor Code, as amended, distinguishes
managerial, supervisory and rank-and-file
employees thus:
Art. 212 (m) Managerial
employee is one who is vested
with powers or prerogatives to
lay down and execute
management policies and/or to
hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off,
recall, discharge, assign or
discipline
employees. Supervisory employ
ees are those who, in the
interest of the employer,
effectively recommend such
managerial actions, if the
exercise of such managerial
authority is not routinary in
nature but requires the use of
independent judgment. All
employees not falling within any
of the above definitions are
considered rank-and-file
employees (emphasis supplied).
At first glance, pursuant to the above-definitions and
based on their job descriptions as guideposts, there
would seem to be no difficulty in distinguishing a
managerial employee from that of a supervisor, or
from that of a mere rank-and-file employee. Yet, this
task takes on a different dimension when applied to
banks, particularly the branches thereof. This is so
because unlike ordinary corporations, a bank's
organizational operation is governed and regulated
by the General Banking Act and the Central Bank
Act, both special laws . . . .
As pointed out by the respondent, in the banking
industry, a branch is the microcosm of a banking
institution, uniquely autonomous and
self-governing.
This relative autonomy of a branch finds legal basis
in Section 27 of the General Banking Act, as
amended, thus:
. . . . The bank shall be
responsible for all business
conducted in such branches to
the same extent and in the
same manner as though such

business had all been

conducted in the head office.
For the purpose of this Act, a
bank and its branches shall be
treated as a unit (emphasis
supplied).
Conformably with the above, bank policies are laid
down and/or executed through the collective action
of the Branch Manager, Cashier and Controller at
the branch level. The Branch Manager exercises
over-all control and supervision over branch
operation being on the top of the branch's pyramid
structure. However, both the controller and the
cashier who are called in banking parlance as
"Financial Managers" due to their fiscal functions are
given such a share and sphere of responsibility in
the operations of the bank. The cashier controls and
supervises the cash division while the controller that
of the Accounting Division. Likewise, their assigned
task is of great significance, without which a bank or
branch for that matter cannot operate or function.
Through the collective action of these three branch
officers operational transactions are carried out like:
The two (2)-signature requirement of the manager,
on one hand, and that of the controller or cashier on
the other hand as required in bank's issuances and
releases. This is the so-called "dual control" through
check-and-balance as prescribed by the Central
Bank, per Section 1166.6, Book I, Manual of
Regulations for Banks and Financial Intermediaries.
Another is in the joint custody of the branch's cash in
vault, accountable forms, collaterals, documents of
title, deposit, ledgers and others, among the branch
manager and at least two (2) officers of the branch
as required under Section 1166.6 of the Manual of
Regulations for Banks and Other Financial
Intermediaries.
This structural set-up creates a triad of managerial
authority among the branch manager, cashier and
controller. Hence, no officer of the bank ". . . have
(sic) complete authority and responsibility for
handling all phases of any transaction from
beginning to end without some control or balance
from some other part of the organization" (Section
1166.3, Division of Duties and
Responsibilities, Ibid).This aspect in the banking
system which calls for the division of duties and
responsibilities is a clear manifestation of
managerial power and authority. No operational
transaction at branch level is carried out by the
singular act of the Branch Manager but rather
through the collective act of the Branch Manager,
Cashier/Controller (emphasis supplied).
Noteworthy is the "on call client" set up in banks.
Under this scheme, the branch manager is tasked
with the responsibility of business development and
marketing of the bank's services which place him on
client call. During such usual physical absences
from the branch, the cashier assumes the reins of
branch control and administration. On those
occasions, the "dual control system" is clearly
manifest in the transactions and operations of the
branch bank as it will then require the necessary
joint action of the controller and the cashier.
The grave abuse of discretion committed by public respondent is at once
apparent. Art. 212, par. (m), of the Labor Code is explicit. A managerial
employee is (a) one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay
down and execute management policies, or to hire, transfer, suspend,
lay off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees; or (b) one who
is vested with both powers or prerogatives. A supervisory employee is
different from a managerial employee in the sense that the supervisory
employee, in the interest of the employer, effectively recommends such
managerial actions, if the exercise of such managerial authority is not
routinary in nature but requires the use of independent judgment.
Ranged against these definitions and after a thorough examination of the
evidence submitted by both parties, we arrive at a contrary conclusion.
Branch Managers, Cashiers and Controllers of respondent Bank are not
managerial employees but supervisory employees. The finding of public
respondent that bank policies are laid down and/or executed through the
collective action of these employees is simply erroneous. His discussion
on the division of their duties and responsibilities does not logically lead
to the conclusion that they are managerial employees, as the term is
defined in Art. 212, par. (m).
Among the general duties and responsibilities of a Branch Manager is
"[t]o discharge his duties and authority with a high sense of responsibility
and integrity and shall at all times be guided by prudence like a good
father of the family, and sound judgment in accordance with and within
the limitations of the policy/policies promulgated by the Board of
Directors and implemented by the Management until suspended,
superseded, revoked or modified" (par. 5, emphasis supplied). 8 Similarly,
the job summary of a Controller states: "Supervises the Accounting Unit
of the branch;sees to the compliance by the Branch with established
procedures, policies, rules and regulations of the Bank and external

supervising authorities; sees to the strict implementation of control

procedures (emphasis supplied). 9 The job description of a Cashier does
not mention any authority on his part to lay down policies, either. 10 On
the basis of the foregoing evidence, it is clear that subject employees do
not participate in policy-making but are given approved and established
policies to execute and standard practices to observe, 11 leaving little or
no discretion at all whether to implement said policies or not.12 It is the
nature of the employee's functions, and not the nomenclature or title
given to his job, which determines whether he has rank-and-file,
supervisory or managerial status. 13
Moreover, the bare statement in the affidavit of the Executive Assistant to
the President of respondent Bank that the Branch Managers, Cashiers
and Controllers "formulate and implement the plans, policies and
marketing strategies of the branch towards the successful
accomplishment of its profit targets and objectives," 14 is contradicted by
the following evidence submitted by respondent Bank itself:
(a) Memorandum issued by respondent Bank's
Assistant Vice President to all Regional Managers
and Branch Managers giving them temporary
discretionary authority to grant additional interest
over the prescribed board rates for both short-term
and long-term CTDs subject, however, to specific
limitations and guidelines set forth in the same
memorandum; 15
(b) Memorandum issued by respondent Bank's
Executive Vice President to all Regional Managers
and Branch Officers regarding the policy and
guidelines on drawing against uncollected deposits
(DAUD); 16
(c) Memorandum issued by respondent Bank's
President to all Field Offices regarding the
guidelines on domestic bills purchased
(DBP); 17 and
(d) Memorandum issued by the same officer to all
Branch Managers regarding lending authority at the
branch level and the terms and conditions thereof. 18
As a consequence, the affidavit of the Executive Assistant cannot be
given any weight at all.
Neither do the Branch Managers, Cashiers and Controllers have the
power to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, discharge, assign or
discipline employees. The Senior Manager of the Human Resource
Management Department of respondent Bank, in her affidavit, stated that
"the power to hire, fire, suspend, transfer, assign or otherwise impose
discipline among subordinates within their respective jurisdictions is
lodged with the heads of the various departments, the branch managers
and officers-in-charge, the branch cashiers and the branch controllers.
Inherent as it is in the aforementioned positions, the authority to hire, fire,
suspend, transfer, assign or otherwise discipline employees within their
respective domains was deemed unnecessary to be incorporated in their
individual job descriptions; By way of illustration, on August 24, 1989, Mr.
Renato A. Tuates, the Officer-in-Charge/Branch Cashier of the Bank's
Dumaguete Branch, placed under preventive suspension and thereafter
terminated the teller of the same branch . . . . Likewise, on February 22,
1989, Mr. Francis D. Robite, Sr., the Officer-in-Charge of International
Department, assigned the cable assistant of the International
Department as the concurrent FCDU Accountable Forms Custodian." 19
However, a close scrutiny of the memorandum of Mr. Tuates reveals that
he does not have said managerial power because as plainly stated
therein, it was issued "upon instruction from Head Office." 20 With regard
to the memorandum of Mr. Robite, Sr., it appears that the power he
exercised was merely in an isolated instance, taking into account the
other evidence submitted by respondent Bank itself showing lack of said
power by other Branch Managers/OICs:
(a) Memorandum from the Branch Manager for the
AVP-Manpower Management Department
expressing the opinion that a certain employee, due
to habitual absenteeism and tardiness, must be
penalized in accordance with respondent Bank's
Code of Discipline; and
(b) Memorandum from a Branch OIC for the
Assistant Vice President recommending a certain
employee's promotional adjustment to the present
position he occupies.
Clearly, those officials or employees possess only recommendatory
powers subject to evaluation, review and final action by higher officials.
Therefore, the foregoing affidavit cannot bolster the stand of respondent
Bank.
The positions of Department Managers and Assistant Managers were
also declared by public respondent as managerial, without providing any
basis therefor. Petitioner asserts that the position of Assistant Manager
was not even included in the appeal filed by respondent Bank. While we
agree with the Office of the Solicitor General that it is within the
discretion of public respondent to consider an unassigned issue that is
closely related to an issue properly assigned, still, public respondent's
error lies in the fact that his finding has no leg to stand on. Anyway,
inasmuch as the entire records are before us, now is the opportunity to
discuss this issue.
We analyzed the evidence submitted by respondent Bank in support of
its claim that Department Managers are managerial employees 21 and
concluded that they are not. Like Branch Managers, Cashiers and
Controllers, Department Managers do not possess the power to lay down
policies nor to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, discharge, assign or
discipline employees. They occupy supervisory positions, charged with

the duty among others to "recommend proposals to improve and

streamline operations." 22 With respect to Assistant Managers, there is
absolutely no evidence submitted to substantiate public respondent's
finding that they are managerial employees; understandably so, because
this position is not included in the appeal of respondent Bank.
As regards the other claim of respondent Bank that Branch
Managers/OICs, Cashiers and Controllers are confidential employees,
having control, custody and/or access to confidential matters, e.g., the
branch's cash position, statements of financial condition, vault
combination, cash codes for telegraphic transfers, demand drafts and
other negotiable instruments, 23 pursuant to Sec. 1166.4 of the Central
Bank Manual regarding joint custody, 24 this claim is not even disputed by
petitioner. A confidential employee is one entrusted with confidence on
delicate matters, or with the custody, handling, or care and protection of
the employer's property. 25 While Art. 245 of the Labor Code singles out
managerial employees as ineligible to join, assist or form any labor
organization, under the doctrine of necessary implication, confidential
employees are similarly disqualified. This doctrine states that what is
implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed,
as elucidated in several cases 26 the latest of which is Chua v. Civil
Service Commission27 where we said:
No statute can be enacted that can provide all the
details involved in its application. There is always an
omission that may not meet a particular situation.
What is thought, at the time of enactment, to be an
all-embracing legislation may be inadequate to
provide for the unfolding events of the future. Socalled gaps in the law develop as the law is
enforced. One of the rules of statutory construction
used to fill in the gap is the doctrine of necessary
implication . . . . Every statute is understood, by
implication, to contain all such provisions as may be
necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to
make effective rights, powers, privileges or
jurisdiction which it grants, including all such
collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be
fairly and logically inferred from its terms. Ex
necessitate
legis . . . .
In applying the doctrine of necessary implication, we took into
consideration the rationale behind the disqualification of managerial
employees expressed in Bulletin Publishing Corporation v.
Sanchez, 28 thus: ". . . if these managerial employees would belong to or
be affiliated with a Union, the latter might not be assured of their loyalty
to the Union in view of evident conflict of interests. The Union can also
become company-dominated with the presence of managerial
employees in Union membership." Stated differently, in the collective
bargaining process, managerial employees are supposed to be on the
side of the employer, to act as its representatives, and to see to it that its
interests are well protected. The employer is not assured of such
protection if these employees themselves are union members. Collective
bargaining in such a situation can become one-sided. 29 It is the same
reason that impelled this Court to consider the position of confidential
employees as included in the disqualification found in Art. 245 as if the
disqualification of confidential employees were written in the provision. If
confidential employees could unionize in order to bargain for advantages
for themselves, then they could be governed by their own motives rather
than the interest of the employers. Moreover, unionization of confidential
employees for the purpose of collective bargaining would mean the
extension of the law to persons or individuals who are supposed to act
"in the interest of" the employers. 30 It is not farfetched that in the course
of collective bargaining, they might jeopardize that interest which they
are duty-bound to protect. Along the same line of reasoning we held
in Golden Farms, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja 31 reiterated in Philips Industrial
Development, Inc. v. NLRC, 32that "confidential employees such as
accounting personnel, radio and telegraph operators who, having access
to confidential information, may become the source of undue advantage.
Said employee(s) may act as spy or spies of either party to a collective
bargaining agreement."
In fine, only the Branch Managers/OICs, Cashiers and Controllers of
respondent Bank, being confidential employees, are disqualified from
joining or assisting petitioner Union, or joining, assisting or forming any
other labor organization. But this ruling should be understood to apply
only to the present case based on the evidence of the parties, as well as
to those similarly situated. It should not be understood in any way to
apply to banks in general.
WHEREFORE, the petition is partially GRANTED. The decision of public
respondent Secretary of Labor dated 23 March 1990 and his order dated
20 April 1990 are MODIFIED, hereby declaring that only the Branch
Managers/OICs, Cashiers and Controllers of respondent Republic
Planters Bank are ineligible to join or assist petitioner National
Association of Trade Unions (NATU)-Republic Planters Bank Supervisors
Chapter, or join, assist or form any other labor organization.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the majority opinion's conclusion that respondent Bank's
Branch Managers/OICs, Cashiers and Controllers, being confidential

employees of the Bank, are disqualified from joining or assisting

petitioner labor union or joining, assisting or forming any other labor
organization, including a supervisor's union.
However, I dissent from its conclusion that respondent Bank's
Department Managers and Department Assistant Managers are not
disqualified from joining a labor union including a supervisors' union. My
years of experience in the banking industry (perhaps irrelevant to this
case) have shown that positions of such Department Heads (Managers)
are as confidential, if not more, than the position of Branch Managers. In
fact, most of such Department Heads are Vice-Presidents of the Bank,
which underscores their status both as managerial employees and
confidential personnel of the Bank. It would be incongruous for a
Department Manager who, as already stated, is usually a Vice-President,
to be a member of the same labor organization as his messenger or
supervisory account executives. It would be even more untenable and
dangerous for a Department Manager who usually is a Vice-President,
being a member of a labor union, to be designated a union
representative for purposes of collective bargaining with the
management of which he is a part. I think the public respondent is
correct in disqualifying from membership in a labor union of supervisors,
those who are Department Managers and Assistant Managers.
I, therefore, vote for the affirmance in toto of public respondent's decision
of 23 March 1990 and order of 20 April 1990.
# Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the majority opinion's conclusion that respondent Bank's
Branch Managers/OICs, Cashiers and Controllers, being confidential
employees of the Bank, are disqualified from joining or assisting
petitioner labor union or joining, assisting or forming any other labor
organization, including a supervisor's union.
However, I dissent from its conclusion that respondent Bank's
Department Managers and Department Assistant Managers are not
disqualified from joining a labor union including a supervisors' union. My
years of experience in the banking industry (perhaps irrelevant to this
case) have shown that positions of such Department Heads (Managers)
are as confidential, if not more, than the position of Branch Managers. In
fact, most of such Department Heads are Vice-Presidents of the Bank,
which underscores their status both as managerial employees and
confidential personnel of the Bank. It would be incongruous for a
Department Manager who, as already stated, is usually a Vice-President,
to be a member of the same labor organization as his messenger or
supervisory account executives. It would be even more untenable and
dangerous for a Department Manager who usually is a Vice-President,
being a member of a labor union, to be designated a union
representative for purposes of collective bargaining with the
management of which he is a part. I think the public respondent is
correct in disqualifying from membership in a labor union of supervisors,
those who are Department Managers and Assistant Managers.
I, therefore, vote for the affirmance in toto of public respondent's decision
of 23 March 1990 and order of 20 April 1990.
5. SAN MIGUEL UNION VS. LAGUESMA
G.R. No. 110399 August 15, 1997
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION SUPERVISORS AND EXEMPT UNION
AND ERNESTO L. PONCE, President V. HONORABLE BIENVENIDO E.
LAGUESMA IN HIS CAPACITY AS UNDERSECRETARY OF LABOR
AND EMPLOYMENT, HONORABLE DANILO L. REYNANTE IN HIS
CAPACITY AS MED-ARBITER AND SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION
FACTS: Petitioner union filed before DOLE a Petition for Direct
Certification or Certification Election among the supervisors and exempt
employees of the SMC Magnolia Poultry Products Plants of Cabuyao,
San Fernando and Otis.
Med-Arbiter Danilo L. Reynante issued an Order ordering the conduct of
certification election among the abovementioned employees of the
different plants as one bargaining unit.
San Miguel Corporation filed a Notice of Appeal with Memorandum on
Appeal, pointing out, among others, the Med-Arbiters error in grouping
together all three (3) separate plants, into one bargaining unit, and in
including supervisory levels 3 and above whose positions are
confidential in nature.
The public respondent, Undersecretary Laguesma, granted respondent
companys Appeal and ordered the remand of the case to the MedArbiter of origin for determination of the true classification of each of the
employees sought to be included in the appropriate bargaining unit.
Upon petitioner-unions motion, Undersecretary Laguesma granted the
reconsideration prayed for and directed the conduct of separate
certification elections among the supervisors ranked as supervisory
levels 1 to 4 (S1 to S4) and the exempt employees in each of the three
plants at Cabuyao, San Fernando and Otis.
ISSUE:
1. Whether Supervisory employees 3 and 4 and the exempt employees
of the company are considered confidential employees, hence ineligible
from joining a union.
2. If they are not confidential employees, do the employees of the three
plants constitute an appropriate single bargaining unit.
RULING:
(1) On the first issue, this Court rules that said employees do not fall
within the term confidential employees who may be prohibited from
joining a union.
They are not qualified to be classified as managerial employees who,
under Article 245 of the Labor Code, are not eligible to join, assist or form

any labor organization. In the very same provision, they are not allowed
membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but
may join, assist or form separate labor organizations of their own.
Confidential employees are those who (1) assist or act in a confidential
capacity, (2) to persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate
management policies in the field of labor relations. The two criteria are
cumulative, and both must be met if an employee is to be considered a
confidential employee that is, the confidential relationship must exist
between the employee and his supervisor, and the supervisor must
handle the prescribed responsibilities relating to labor relations.
The exclusion from bargaining units of employees who, in the normal
course of their duties, become aware of management policies relating to
labor relations is a principal objective sought to be accomplished by the
confidential employee rule. The broad rationale behind this rule is that
employees should not be placed in a position involving a potential
conflict of interests. Management should not be required to handle labor
relations matters through employees who are represented by the union
with which the company is required to deal and who in the normal
performance of their duties may obtain advance information of the
companys position with regard to contract negotiations, the disposition
of grievances, or other labor relations matters.
The Court held that if these managerial employees would belong to or
be affiliated with a Union, the latter might not be assured of their loyalty
to the Union in view of evident conflict of interest. The Union can also
become company-dominated with the presence of managerial
employees in Union membership.
An important element of the confidential employee rule is the
employees need to use labor relations information. Thus, in determining
the confidentiality of certain employees, a key question frequently
considered is the employees necessary access to confidential labor
relations information.
(2) The fact that the three plants are located in three different places,
namely, in Cabuyao, Laguna, in Otis, Pandacan, Metro Manila, and in
San Fernando, Pampanga is immaterial. Geographical location can be
completely disregarded if the communal or mutual interests of the
employees are not sacrificed.
An appropriate bargaining unit may be defined as a group of employees
of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of
employees, which the collective interest of all the employees, consistent
with equity to the employer, indicate to be best suited to serve the
reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining
provisions of the law.
A unit to be appropriate must effect a grouping of employees who have
substantial, mutual interests in wages, hours, working conditions and
other subjects of collective bargaining.
6. Pepsi-Cola Products Phils. v. Secretary of Labor (1999)

Facts: Pepsi-Cola Employees Organization-UOEF (PCEU) filed a

petition for certification election with the Med-Arbiter seeking to be the
exclusive bargaining agent of supervisors of Pepsi-Cola Philippines
(Pepsi). The petition was granted, but with the explicit statement that
PCEU was affiliated with Union de Obreros Estivadores de Filipinas
(UOEF) and 2 other rank-and-file unions, the PCLU and the PEUP.
Pepsi then filed a petition for cancellation with the BLR against PCEU, on
the grounds that: (a) the members of PCEU were managers and (b) a
supervisors' union cannot affiliate with a federation whose members
include the rank and file union of the same company. It also filed an
urgent ex-parte motion to suspend the certification election.
PCEU argued that Art. 245 of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 6715,
did not prohibit a local union composed of supervisory employees from
being affiliated to a federation which has local unions with rank-and-file
members as affiliates. Furthermore, Book V, Rule II, Section 7 of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code provides the grounds for
cancellation of the registration certificate of a labor organization, and the
inclusion of managerial employees is not one of the grounds.
However, on 1992, or before the SC decision, the PCEU issued a
resolution withdrawing from the UOEF.
Issue: Whether or not PCEU may be affiliated with the rank-and-file
unions.
Held: PCEU's withdrawal from the affiliation made the case moot and
academic. But for the guidance of others similarly situated, the Court
ruled No.
If the intent of the law is to avoid a situation where supervisors would
merge with the rank and file or where the supervisors' labor organization
would represent conflicting interests, then a local supervisors' union
should not be allowed to affiliate with the national federation of union of
rank-and-file employees where that federation actively participates in
union activity in the company.
The limitation is not confined to a case of supervisors' wanting to join a
rank-and-file union. The prohibition extends to a supervisors' local union
applying for membership in a national federation the members of which
include local unions of rank and file employees. The intent of the law is
clear especially where, as in this case at bar, the supervisors will be co-

mingling with those employees whom they directly supervise in their own
bargaining unit.
In the collective bargaining process, managerial employees are
supposed to be on the side of the employer, to act as its representatives,
and to see to it that its interests are well protected. The employer is not
assured of such protection if these employees themselves are union
members. It is the same reason that impelled this Court to consider the
position of confidential employees as included in the disqualification
found in Art. 245 as if the disqualification of confidential employees were
written in the provision. Said employees may act as spies of either party
to a collective bargaining agreement.

7. [G.R. No. 88957 June 25, 1992]PHILIPS INDUSTRIAL

DEVELOPMENT, INC. vs.NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION
FACTS: PIDI is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacturing
and marketing of electronic products Since 1971, it had a total of six (6)
collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) with private respondent Philips
Employees Organization-FFW (PEO-FFW), a registered labor union and
the certified bargaining agent of all the rank and file employees of PIDI.
In the first CBA (1971-1974), the supervisors referred to in R.A. No. 875,
confidential employees, security guards, temporary employees and sales
representatives were excluded from the bargaining unit. In the second to
the fifth CBAs (1975-1977; 1978-1980; 1981-1983; and 1984-1986), the
sales force, confidential employees and heads of small units, together
with the managerial employees, temporary employees and security
personnel, were specifically excluded from the bargaining unit. The
confidential employees are the division secretaries of light/telecom/data
and consumer electronics, marketing managers, secretaries of the
corporate planning and business manager, fiscal and financial system
manager and audit and EDP manager, and the staff of both the General
Management and the Personnel Department.
In the sixth CBA covering the years 1987 to 1989, it was agreed upon,
among others, that the subject of inclusion or exclusion of service
engineers, sales personnel and confidential employees in the coverage
of the bargaining unit would be submitted for arbitration.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision ordering the respondent to
conduct a referendum to determine the will of the service engineers,
sales representatives as to their inclusion or exclusion in the bargaining
unit. It declared however that Division Secretaries and all Staff of general
management, personnel and industrial relations department, secretaries
of audit, EDP, financial system are confidential employees and as such
are deemed excluded in the bargaining unit.
The NLRC reversed decision and ordered inclusion of all the employees
concerned.
ISSUE: W/N security personnel are disqualified from joining labor unions.
W/N confidential employees may join union for rank and file employees
HELD: 1. A palpable error was committed by the NLRC in ruling that
under the law, all workers, except managerial employees and security
personnel, are qualified to join a union, or form part of a bargaining unit.
At the time Case No. NLRC-NCR-00-11-03936-87 was filed in 1987,
security personnel were no longer disqualified from joining or forming a
union.
Section 6 of E.O. No. 111 repealed the original provisions of Article 245
of the Labor Code disqualifying security personnel. By virtue of such
repeal and substitution, security guards became eligible for membership
in any labor organization.
1.

All the subject employees, with the exception of the service

engineers and the sales force personnel, are confidential employees.
Their classification as such is not seriously disputed by PEO-FFW; the
five (5) previous CBAs between PIDI and PEO-FFW explicitly considered
them as confidential employees. By the very nature of their functions,
they assist and act in a confidential capacity to, or have access to
confidential matters of, persons who exercise managerial functions in the
field of labor relations. As such, the rationale behind the ineligibility of
managerial employees to form, assist or join a labor union equally
applies to them.
RATIONALE OF PROHIBITION
In Bulletin Publishing Co., Inc. vs. Hon Augusto Sanchez, this Court
elaborated on this rationale, thus:
. . . The rationale for this inhibition has been stated to be, because if
these managerial employees would belong to or be affiliated with a
Union, the latter might not be assured of their loyalty, to the Union
in view of evident conflict of interests. The Union can also become
company-dominated with the presence of managerial employees in
Union membership.
In Golden Farms, Inc. vs. Ferrer-Calleja, 14 this Court explicitly made this
rationale applicable to confidential employees:

This rationale holds true also for confidential employees such as

accounting personnel, radio and telegraph operators, who having
access to confidential information, may become the source of
undue advantage. Said employee(s) may act as a spy or, spies of
either party to a collective bargaining agreement. This is specially
true in the present case where the petitioning Union is already the
bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees in the
establishment. To allow the confidential employees to join the existing
Union of the rank-and-file would be in violation of the terms of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement wherein this kind of employees by the
nature of their functions/ positions are expressly excluded.

8. FULL TEXT
G.R. No. L-13573

February 20, 1960

ALHAMBRA CIGAR and CIGARETTE MANUFACTURING COMPANY

and KAPISANAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA ALHAMBRA
(FOITAF), petitioners,
vs.
ALHAMBRA EMPLOYEE'S ASSOCIATION (PAFLU), respondent.
Angel S. Gamboa for petitioners.
Cipriano Cid and Associates for respondent.
BARRERA, J.:
This is a petition to review on certiorari the order of the Court of Industrial
Relations (in Case No. 392-MC) dated December 12, 1956, and its
resolution en banc December 27, 1957.
Respondent Alhambra Employees' Association (PAFLU) filed with the
above-mentioned court a petition, which was later amended, praying that
it be certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent for all the
employees, 82 in number, in the administrative, sales, engineering, and
dispensary departments of petitioner Alhambra Cigar & Cigarette
Manufacturing Company. Petitioner company, later joined by the copetitioner Kapisanan Ng Manggagawa sa Alhambra (FOITAF), as
Intervenor, opposed the petition, on the ground that there was in force an
existing collective bargaining agreement covering all the workers of the
company, signed by the latter and Intervenor union.
The case was referred to Hearing Examiner Antonio P. Amistad who, on
November 19, 1956, submitted his report to the court, which reads as
follows:
REPORT
This concerns an amended petition filed by the Alhambra
Employees' Association (PAFLU), a legitimate labor
organization, in which it is prayed that said union be certified
as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent for all the
employees paid either on the monthly, daily or commission
basis in the administrative, sales, engineering and dispensary
departments of the Alhambra Cigar and Cigarette
Manufacturing Company, a business concern existing under
and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines, engaged in the
manufacture of cigars and cigarettes, with postal address at 31
Tayuman Street, Tondo, Manila.
The petition is opposed by the Company and another
legitimate labor organization, the Federacion Obrera de la
Industria Tabaquera de Filipinas (FOITAF). The opposition is
based principally on two grounds, namely, that the appropriate
collective bargaining unit is the employer unit not the smaller
unit sought by petitioner and that there is an existing collective
bargaining agreement between the company and the FOITAF
which constitutes a bar to the instant certification proceeding.
The first issue to be resolved by the Court concerns the
composition of the appropriate unit. The petitioner contends
that all the employees paid on the monthly, daily or
commission basis in the administrative, sales, engineering,
and dispensary departments constitute an appropriate unit,
while both the company and the FOITAF maintain that the
appropriate unit is the employer unit. While the two contending
unions as well as the company were agreed that confidential
employees should be excluded, they could not agree on the
exclusion or inclusion of the technical employees. The
FOITAF'S stand is that technical employees should also be
excluded, while the petitioner favors their inclusion. The
company on the other hand, manifested that it did not care
whether the technical employees are included or not in the
bargaining unit.
The evidence shows that there are eight departments existing
in the company, namely, the administrative department,
manlalasi or raw leaf department, cigar department, cigarette
department, engineering department and garage, precinteria
department, dispensary, and sales department.
In the manlalasi or raw leaf department, the work consists
mainly of classifying the tobacco leaves removing the middle
ribs from them. The cigar and cigarette departments are
engaged in producing cigars and cigarettes while the packing
of the finished products is done in the precinteria department.
The work in the engineering department and garage is devoted
to operation of the machines and the maintenance of the
machineries, buildings, garage as well as all the vehicles used
by the company. The employees in the sales department are

engaged in selling the products of the company and they

perform their duties outside the factory premises. The
dispensary department consists of one doctor and two nurses.
In the administrative department are found the office
personnel, watchmen, porters and cleaners.
Judging from the nature of the work performed in the different
departments, the workers in the manlalasi, cigar, cigarette,
precinteria and engineering departments may be considered
as production and maintenance employees because they are
engaged directly in producing the manufactured products of
the company and in operating and maintaining its machines,
buildings and vehicles.
On the hand the employees in the administrative, sales and
dipensary departments are engaged in an entirely different
kind of work which does not involve production and
maintenance and the places where they work are separate
from those of the workers in the other departments. It can be
said therefore that they have a community of interest among
themselves which is entirely separate and distinct from the
production and maintenance employees. This paramount
consideration has led the undersigned to conclude that all the
employees in the administrative, sales and dispensary
departments constitute an appropriate collective bargaining
unit subject to the exclusions which are discussed
hereinbelow. However, petitioner's contention that the
employees in the engineering department and garage should
also be included in said unit is without merit. As pointed out
earlier, the workers in said department are maintenance
employees and for purposes of collective bargaining it is the
better policy to group together production and maintenance
employees.
The second issue which was raised in this case is whether or
not the collective bargaining agreement entered into between
the company (and the FOITAF constitutes a bar to the instant
proceeding. Said agreement, marked as Exh. "3-Alhambra",
Exh. "S-Petitioner", and Exh. "1-Intervenor", was entered into
on Aug. 18, 1954 and it stipulated that the agreement would be
effective until June 30, 1955. The effectivity was extended to
June 30, 1957, pursuant to a subsequent agreement entered
into on Feb. 24, 1955. (Exh. "3-A Alhambra", Exh. "TPetitioner", and Exh. "2-Intervenor".)
After a close examination of the agreement, in question, the
undersigned notes that in so far as the fixing of the terms and
condition of employment is concerned it did not expressly
cover the employees in the administrative, dispensary and
sales departments. As a matter of fact, the recognition clause
states that the FOITAF was acting in representation of all the
laborers of the "ALHAMBRA" and certainly it can not be said
that all the employees in the administrative, dispensary and
sales departments are laborers'. Furthermore, almost all the
persons referred to with definite particularly in paragraph 6 of
the agreement (Exh. "3-Alhambra",) are those working in the
production and maintenance departments. The same
observation applies to the two subsequent agreements marked
as Exh "3-A Alhambra" and Exh "3-B Alhambra". It was only in
the agreement entered into on June 25, 1956 (Exh. "3-C
Alhambra", Exh. "V-Petitioner", and Exh. "4-Intervenor") that
employees in the administrative department were specifically
covered. The coverage, however, was extended only to the
security guards. Under the premises, the undersigned is of the
opinion that the interests of the employees in the
administrative, dispensary, and sales departments with the
exception of the security guards are not adequately protected
in the collective bargaining agreement between the
company and the FOITAF and said agreement therefore could
not be validly invoked as a bar to the instant proceeding.
The evidence also shows that there are 45 employees in the
administrative department, 3 in the dispensary, and 19 in the
sales department so that all in all there are 67 employees in
the said departments. The evidence for the company shows
that the watchmen and porters in the administrative
department numbering 16 in all are security guards. (See Exh.
"3-C Alhambra"). Following established precedents of this
Court, these security guards should be excluded from the
bargaining unit sought to be represented by the petitioner. In
the sales department there are 2 sales supervisors, who
should also be excluded pursuant to a specific provision of
Rep. Act No. 875. Although it was agreed upon by all the
parties that confidential employees should also be excluded,
the evidence does not indicate the particular employees whose
positions are confidential. Excluding the 16 security guards
and 2 sales supervisors, there are 49 employees who are
eligible for inclusion in the appropriate unit in this case.
The evidence also conclusively shows that 23 employees in
the administrative department, 2 in the dispensary, and 16 in
the sales department or a total of 41 are members of the
petitioning union. There is no question therefore that said
union has been duly selected or designated as the exclusive
representative for collective bargaining purposes by the
majority of the employees in an appropriate unit.
In view of all the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that
the Alhambra Employees Association (PAFLU) be certified as
the exclusive bargaining representative of all the employees in

the administrative, dispensary and sales departments of the

Alhambra Cigar and Cigarette Manufacturing Company with
the exception of supervisors, security guards and confidential
employees. (Emphasis supplied.)
On December 12, 1956, the court, by a vote of three to one, with one
abstention, adopted the above-quoted report in toto, in its order which, in
part, states:
The foregoing report has been found to be completely in
accordance with the evidence and the entire record of the
case, and the conclusions therein contained are hereby
adopted in toto.
Wherefore, and as recommended by the Hearing Examiner,
the Alhambra Employees' Association (PAFLU) is hereby
certified as the exclusive collective bargaining representative
of all the employees in the administrative, dispensary, and
sales departments of the Alhambra Cigar and Cigarette
Manufacturing Company with the exception of supervisors,
security guards and confidential employees. So ordered.
Their motions for reconsideration of the foregoing order having been
denied, the Company and FOITAF filed the present petition for review.
Petitioners claim that the lower court erred (1) in holding that all the
employees in the administrative, sales, and dispensary departments of
petitioner company, with the exception of the supervisors, security
guards, and confidential employees therein, constitute an appropriate
separate collective bargaining unit; (2) in holding that the collective
bargaining agreement between petitioner company and petitioner labor
union (FOITAF) did not cover said employees; and (3) in including in said
independent unit the physician and two nurses composing the
dispensary department.
1. In arriving at the conclusion that all the employees in the
administrative, sales, and dispensary department of the company, with
the exception of the supervisors, security guards, and confidential
employees therein, constitute an appropriate collective bargaining unit,
the lower court considered the fact that said employees are engaged in
"an entirely different kind of work" which does not involve production and
maintenance, and the additional fact that the places where they work are
separate from those of the workers in the other departments of the
company.
We find no reason to disturb said finding of the lower court. There can
hardly be any doubt that, since said employees in the administrative,
sales, and dispensary departments perform work which have nothing to
do with production and maintenance, unlike those in the raw leaf
(manlalasi), cigar, cigarette, packing (precinteria), and engineering and
garage departments whose functions involve production and
maintenance, they have a community of interest which justifies their
formation or existence as a separate appropriate collective bargaining
unit. (II Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining, 925-931.)1 The
existence of such a unit will, it is believed, insure to said employees in
the three departments its the full benefit of their right to self-organization
and collective bargaining and, thereby, effectuate the policies enunciated
in the Industrial Peace Act.2
2. Examination of the collective bargaining agreement entered into
between the company and FOITAF on August 18, 1954 (Exh. 3Alhambra) and the agreements entered subsequent thereto between the
same parties dated February 24, 1955 (Exh. 3-A Alhambra) and August
25, 1955 (Exh. 3-B Alhambra) discloses beyond doubt that they
expressly cover only the workers in the five departments of the company,
namely, the raw leaf (manlalasi), cigar, cigarette, packing (precinteria),
and engineering and garage departments. Exhibits 3 Alhambra and 3-A
Alhambra are conspicuous for their repeated use of the term "laborers".
In no single instance is the term "employees" mentioned to convey the
idea that those in the other three departments, namely, the
administrative, sales, and dispensary departments, are also covered by
said agreements. Exhibit 3-B Alhambra consistently uses the term
"Precinteros", referring to the workers in the packing or precinteria
department. It is, furthermore, significant to note that the workers who
are divided into several categories in Exhibit 3-Alhambra, all belong to
the five-mentioned departments of the company, which again
unmistakably conveys the impression that said agreement was not
intended to cover or apply to those workers or employees in the
administrative, sales, and dispensary departments.
We agree with the observation of the lower court that it is only in Exhibit
3-C Alhambra (executed on June 25,1956) that the employees in the
three-mentioned departments were expressly covered. Nevertheless,
said coverage was limited or confined only to the security in said
departments.
While it may be true that the benefits granted under said agreements
were extended to, and enjoyed by, all the workers in all the eight
departments of the company, the fact remains that those in the
administrative, sales and dispensary departments were not expressly
covered and, should the company, at any time, decide not to extend to
them said benefits, they can not legally demand their extension to them
as they would have nothing to invoke in support of said demand. In fine,
they have no legal right to said benefits enforceable before the courts.
3. Although the physician and two nurses in the dispensary department
perform functions which may properly be designated as technical or
professional, the lower in our opinion, did not err in including them in the
bargaining unit sought to be represented by respondent labor
organization, since, as already stated, they are performing functions
which have nothing to do with production and maintenance and,
consequently, have a community of interest with the employees in the
administrative and sales department.

Wherefore, finding no reversible error in the order resolution of the

court a quo appealed from, the same are hereby affirmed in all respects,
with costs against the petitioners. So ordered.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes,
J.B.L., Endencia and Gutierrez David, JJ.,concur.
9. FULL TEXT
G.R. No. 94716 November 15, 1991
ASSOCIATION OF COURT OF APPEALS EMPLOYEES
(ACAE), petitioner,
vs.
HON. PURA FERRER-CALLEJA, in her capacity as Director, Bureau
of Labor Relations, and UNION OF CONCERNED EMPLOYEES OF
THE COURT OF APPEALS (UCECA), respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:p
We are asked in this petition to ascertain the power, if any, of the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), more specifically the
Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR), to supervise the activities of
government employees; in this case, unions of judiciary personnel who
serve in the Court of Appeals.
The question of power is quite significant. Hitherto, the BLR has
concentrated on labor relations in the private sector. Its enforcement
machinery and the mass of law and jurisprudence governing its functions
are entirely geared to the handling of the peculiar problems arising in
private employment. In this case, the BLR has tasked itself to intervene
not only in a quarrel between two groups of government employees but
more important, in a quarrel between employees working for an
independent branch of government, the Judiciary.
The two issues raised in this petition are: (1) whether or not the
respondent Bureau of Labor Relations acted with grave abuse of
discretion when it granted the petition for certification election to
determine the certified bargaining agent to represent the rank-and-file
employees of the Court of Appeals; and (2) whether or not a petition for
cancellation of registration of the union requesting for a certification
election is a bar to the resolution of a prior petition for certification
election.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
On April 4, 1990, the respondent Union of Concerned Employees of the
Court of Appeals (UCECA), a registered union filed a petition for
accreditation and/or certification election with the Bureau of Labor
Relations (docketed as BLR Case No. 4-11-90) alleging that the
petitioner, Association of Court of Appeals Employees (ACAE) which is
the incumbent bargaining representative, no longer enjoys the support of
the majority of the rank-and-file employees. The UCECA alleged that
there was a mass resignation of ACAE members on April 14, 1989.
On May 10, 1990, the ACAE filed its Comment and/or Opposition. It
stated that the listing by the ACAE of its membership at three hundred
three (303) employees was a product of fraud. It charged the UCECA
with misrepresentation, forgery and perjury in attaching to its (UCECA)
petition, a copy of the names of members some of which were twice
listed, written without consent or unsigned, and some of the signatures of
which were forged. In addition, the petitioner alleged that some of the
UCECA members, upon learning of the fraudulent act, resigned from the
union.
In its reply, the UCECA stated that its registry book was not smeared with
fraud and claimed that any mistakes were only clerical errors.
On June 18, 1990, petitioner ACAE filed a Petition for Cancellation of
Certificate of Registration of the UCECA in BLR Case No. 6-19-90 on the
ground of fraud and misrepresentation by UCECA in obtaining its
Registration Certificate No. 159 and in preparing its Registry Book of
members. On June 28, 1990, the ACAE moved for deferment of the
resolution of the case of BLR 4-11-90 pending the case of BLR 6-19-90.
On July 16, 1990, the UCECA filed a motion to dismiss BLR 6-19-90 for
being dilatory, to which ACAE replied that the maxim of res ipsa
loquitur should be applied as the "fraudulent documents submitted by
UCECA speak for themselves."
On July 30, 1990, the Bureau of Labor Relationsruled that BLR 6-19-90
(cancellation proceedings) is not a bar to the holding of a certification
election. It granted the UCECA's prayer for a certification election. The
BLR found that UCECA was supported by three hundred three (303) or
forty (40%) percent of the seven hundred sixty two (762) rank-and-file
employees of the court. ACAE's motion for reconsideration was denied.
On August 21, 1990, the respondent Bureau conducted a pre-election
conference.
Feeling that it was being stampeded into participating in a certification
election, ACAE filed this petition forcertiorari and prohibition. We issued a
temporary restraining order effective August 29, 1990.
The first question that arises is the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Labor
Relations to handle disputes among associations of employees working
for the judiciary.
There is no question that government employees may organize provided
the purposes behind such organization are legitimate.

No less than the Bill of Rights specifically identifies government

employees as having the right of self-organization. It provides:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those
employed in the public and private sectors, to form
unions, associations, or societies for purposes not
contrary to law shall not be abridged. (Article III,
1987 Constitution)
In the provisions governing the Civil Service Commission, we find:
Sec. 2. (1) The civil service embraces all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 2. (5) The right to self-organization shall not be
denied to government employees.
xxx xxx xxx
(Article IX-B, Section 2 (1) and (5), Constitution)
The article on Social Justice and Human Rights adds:
Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor,
local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and
promote full employment and equality of
employment opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to selforganization, collective bargaining and negotiations,
and peaceful concerted activities, including the right
to strike in accordance with law. They shall be
entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of
work, and a living wage. They shall also participate
in policy and decision-making processes affecting
their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.
(Article XIII, Section 3, 1st and 2nd paragraphs)
xxx xxx xxx
The issue of what governs and who supervises unions of government
employees is of more than passing concern especially when those who
organize and hope to engage in certain forms of concerted action are
court employees.
Government personnel find themselves in an equivocal and ambivalent
position. They have a right but it is not clear to what extent they may
exercise it. Congress has not legislated as yet on the complicated
problems arising from unionism in government as distinguished from
unionism in the private sector. Obviously, the same rules do not and
cannot apply under the present state of the law. A major re-ordering of
government, notably its civil service laws and budgetary and fiscal
procedures would result if Congress, in enacting the laws required by the
constitutional provisions, gives exactly the same rights and privileges to
all workers in the public and private sectors.
At present, the terms and conditions of employment in the government
service are governed by law, not by the relative strengths of
management and labor as they hammer out mutually acceptable terms
across the collective bargaining table. Paradoxically, all the
representatives of "labor" and "management" in government
areemployees. At the same time, everybody forms part of the "owner" of
the enterprise, the sovereign people. The qualifications and eligibilities of
civil servants, their appointment and promotion, standardization of
salaries, disciplinary actions, fringe benefits, and retirement gratuities,
among others, are governed by statutes, rules, and established
principles which are the products of decades of experience, not to
mention borrowings from civil service systems abroad.
The provisions of civil service law on the terms and conditions of
employment including the regulation of labor-management relations in
the government sector, unless Congress decides to amend or repeal
them, form part of the response to any requests or demands of
organized groups of government personnel. Any understanding between
the top officials of a government agency and the union which represents
the rank-and-file is subordinate to the law governing the particular issue
or situation.
We emphasize the above because in ascertaining what agency should
supervise certification elections in the public sector, we limit the
determination strictly to the question before us the holding of
certification elections. Jurisdiction over questions which may arise after
the certified bargaining representative flexes its muscles and engages in
concerted action will have to await the filing of more appropriate cases
and, hopefully, the enactment of applicable legislation.
The Constitution provides that the rights of all workers to selforganization, collective bargaining, and peaceful concerted activities,
including the right to strike, are guaranteed provided these are in
accordance with law. There is reference to the need for a law governing
the procedures incident to self-organization.
What is the law which governs certification elections in the Court of
Appeals?
The Solicitor General argues that the applicable law is Executive Order
No. 180 issued on June 1, 1987 entitled "Providing Guidelines for the

Exercise of the Right to Organize of Government Employees; Creating a

Public Sector Labor-Management Council; and for Other Purposes."
The pertinent provisions of Executive Order No. 180 are:
SECTION 7. Government employees' organizations
shall register with the Civil Service Commission and
the Department of Labor and Employment. The
application shall be filed with the Bureau of Labor
Relations of the Department which shall process the
same in accordance with the provisions of the Labor
Code of the Philippines as amended. Applications
may also be filed with the Regional Offices of the
Department of Labor and Employment which shall
immediately transmit the said applications to the
Bureau of Labor Relations within three (3) days from
receipt thereof.
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 8. Upon approval of the application, a
registration certification shall be issued to the
organization recognizing it as a legitimate
employees' organization with the right to represent
its members and undertake activities to further and
defend its interest. The corresponding certificates of
registration shall be jointly approved by the
Chairman of the Civil Service Commission and
Secretary of Labor and Employment.
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 10. The duly registered employees'
organization having the support of the majority of the
employees in the appropriate organizational unit
shall be designated as the sole and exclusive
representative of the employees.
SECTION 11. A duly registered employees'
organization shall be accorded voluntary recognition
upon a showing that no other employees'
organization is registered or is seeking registration,
based on records of the Bureau of Labor Relations,
and that the said organization has the majority
support of the rank-and-file employees in the
organizational unit.
SECTION 12. Where there are two or more duly
registered employees' organizations in the
appropriate organizational unit, the Bureau of Labor
Relations shall, upon petition, order the conduct of a
certification election and shall certify the winner as
the exclusive representative of the rank-and-file
employees in said organization unit. (Rollo, pp. 235237)
It is obvious that Executive Order No. 180 is at best a stop gap measure
for a limited purpose. Certain provisions and procedures in the Labor
Code were engrafted into a decree governing the entirely novel situation
of unionism in the governmental sector. Enacted a little over one month
and a half before Congress reconvened after the revolutionary
government was replaced by the present government, it unfortunately
lacks a legislative record, parliamentary debates, and the insights that
only the elected representatives of all the people can bring to bear in the
regulation of a complicated and sensitive relationship.
The petitioner questions the validity of Executive Order No. 180 but limits
its challenge to an alleged violation of the separation of powers doctrine.
The argument is self-defeating because, followed to its logical
conclusion, only this Court would have the power to supervise
certification elections in the Court of Appeals. The task is not for us and
we certainly have no intention to undertake it.
It is the function of this Court, and we will not hesitate to exercise the
power, to regulate all activities of Judges and court personnel, the
Supreme Court included, to the end that the independence,
effectiveness, and integrity of the judiciary as mandated by the
Constitution are not impaired or compromised. It is axiomatic, for
example, that any demands of court employees for higher compensation
or improved facilities must be viewed in the context of the fiscal
autonomy guaranteed by the Constitution to the Judiciary. (Constitution,
Article VIII, Section 3). Neither DOLE, the Civil Service Commission
(CSC), nor any other agency would have jurisdiction to adjudicate such
claims. And since unresolved legal questions commenced elsewhere are
ultimately decided by us, the final decision on all such questions would
still be with this Court.
All this does not mean that the separation of powers doctrine requires us
to supervise the details of self-organization activities in the courts. In the
same way that CSC validly conducts competitive examinations to grant
requisite eligibilities to court employees, we see no constitutional
objection to DOLE handling the certification process in the Court of
Appeals, considering its expertise, machinery, and experience in this
particular activity. Executive Order No. 180 requires organizations of
government employees to register with both CSC and DOLE. This

ambivalence notwithstanding, the CSC has no facilities, personnel, or

experience in the conduct of certification elections. The BLR has to do
the job.
Executive Order No. 180 states that certificates of registration of the
legitimate employee representatives must be jointly approved by the
CSC Chairman and the DOLE Secretary. Executive Order No. 180 is not
too helpful in determining whose opinion shall prevail if the CSC
Chairman and the DOLE Secretary arrive at different conclusions. At any
rate, we shall deal with that problem when it occurs. Insofar as power to
call for and supervise the conduct of certification elections is concerned,
we rule against the petitioner.
One final point on the petitioner's objection to the jurisdiction of the BLR.
ACAE cannot persuasively challenge the validity of Executive Order No.
180 because its very personality to bring this suit is premised on its
having organized under the same executive order. The first paragraph of
the petition reads:
1. Petitioner ASSOCIATION OF COURT OF
APPEALS EMPLOYEES, ACAE for brevity, is an
association of government employees duly
organized and existing under and by virtue of
Executive Order No. 180, duly accredited as the
exclusive representative of the rank-and-file
employees of the Court of Appeals, with office
address at the Court of Appeals Compound, M.
Orosa Street, Ermita, Manila. (Rollo, p. 2)
The petitioner argues that the respondent UCECA failed to prove that it
no longer enjoys the support of the rank-and-file employees. ACAE
claims that it has 395 members. It states that if the fraudulently entered
names numbering 88 are all deducted from the 303 listed names for
UCECA, there would actually be 215 members only left. Even assuming,
therefore, that the petitioning union has satisfied the required percentage
of signatures (20%) according to section of Rule VI, Rules and
Regulations to Govern the Exercise of the Right of Government
Employees to Self-Organization, no election can be had if the incumbent
bargaining representative still has the clear majority.
It is precisely because the respondent union has been questioning the
majority status of the petitioner that a petition for certification election
was filed. Nowhere in the rules is there a further requirement for a
petitioning union to prove the lack of a majority status of the incumbent
representative or who among its listed members are not actually affiliated
with it. What is merely required for a petition for certification election to
be granted is the filing of a verified petition which is supported by the
signatures of at least twenty (20%) percent of the covered employees. It
is also essential that it is not filed within one (1) year from the date a
declaration of a previous final certification election result was issued.
The BLR has satisfied itself that the private respondent has faithfully
complied with the bare requirements for the petition. It is a well-settled
rule that "a certification proceeding is not a litigation in the sense that the
term is ordinarily understood, but an investigation of a non-adversarial
and fact finding character." (Associated Labor Unions (ALU) v. FerrerCalleja, 179 SCRA 127 [1989]; Philippine Telegraph and Telephone
Corporation v. NLRC, 183 SCRA 451 [1990]) Thus, the technical rules of
evidence do not apply if the decision to grant it proceeds from an
examination of the sufficiency of the petition as well as a careful look into
the arguments contained in position papers and other documents.
The public respondent has found the petition to be sufficient in form and
substance there being compliance with the twenty (20%) percent support
signatures. The factual findings of the Bureau of Labor Relations on this
matter appear to be supported by substantial evidence and we,
accordingly, accord them great weight and respect. They shall not be
disturbed by the Court in the absence of proof of reversible error. (See
Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) v. Ferrer-Calleja, 162
SCRA 426 [1988]; Airtime Specialists, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja, 180 SCRA
749 [1989]) On the basis of its findings, it was only proper for the public
respondent to order the holding of a certification election which is
mandatorily required by Section 12, Executive Order No.180:
Section 12. Where there are two or more duly
registered employees' organizations in the
appropriate organizational unit, the Bureau of Labor
Relations shall, upon petition, order the conduct of a
certification election and shall certify the winner as
the exclusive representative of the rank-and-file
employees in said organizational unit."
(Underscoring Supplied)
Even assuming there were fraudulently included names or signatures,
respondent UCECA would still have complied with the twenty (20%)
percent requirement. The remaining membership, i.e. 215, alleged by
petitioner ACAE constitutes twenty eight (28%) percent of the rank-andfile court employees.
The result of the certification election shall determine who between the
petitioner and the private respondent is telling the truth. As we have ruled
in Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) v. Ferrer-Calleja,
(supra):

Whenever there is doubt as to whether a particular

union represents the majority of the rank-and-file
employees, in the absence of a legal impediment,
the holding of a certification election is the most
dramatic method of determining the employee's
choice of their bargaining representative. It is the
appropriate means whereby controversies and
disputes on representation may be laid to rest, by
the unequivocal vote of the employees themselves.
(At page 431)
The petitioner likewise argues that the certification proceedings should
be suspended pending its petition for the cancellation of union
registration of the UCECA.
The records show that UCECA was registered with the Civil Service
Commission on March 16, 1990. (Rollo, p. 45) When the said union was
organized, some of its members allegedly used to be members of the
ACAE who tendered mass resignations on August 14, 1989 and on
September 29, 1989. (Rollo, pp. 27-35) On January 30, 1990, the
officers of ACAE, in Board Resolution No. 8 resolved that the
resignations tendered were irregular and must be accomplished
individually. (Rollo, p. 55) Thereafter, for some reasons, some of the
listed members in the Registry Book of the UCECA wrote individual
letters to UCECA in April, 1990 either questioning the inclusion of their
names or tendering their resignations.
On June 18, 1990, the petitioner herein filed its petition to cancel the
union registration of UCECA. The act of the petitioner in charging
commissions of fraud and misrepresentation against UCECA only after
realizing the rising membership of the latter and the subsequent petition
for certification election raises grave suspicions as to whether or not it
wants to subvert the right of the employees to determine the proper
exclusive representative or agent now that they are given two unions
from which to choose. Assuming for the sake of argument that the
petitioner ACAE had lawful grounds to challenge the existence of the
UCECA, it should have done so, soon after the date it had notice or
knowledge of the registration of the latter to protect its own interests and
not at a later time when its bargaining position was already at the risk of
being lost.
At any rate, the Court applies the established rule correctly followed by
the public respondent that an order to hold a certification election is
proper despite the pendency of the petition for cancellation of the
registration certificate of the respondent union. The rationale for this is
that at the time the respondent union filed its petition, it still had the legal
personality to perform such act absent an order directing a cancellation.
It is the policy of the State in protecting the rights of labor to ensure and
maintain industrial peace. For this reason, all employees of an
appropriate bargaining unit shall be given an opportunity to organize and
to determine which labor organization should be their exclusive
bargaining representative. Hence, a petition for certification election filed
by an interested labor organization shall be dealt with accordingly, with a
view to attaining this objective. This is especially true when it involves the
ultimate respect for and protection of the rights of government
employees. In granting to employees in the civil service the right to
organize, a procedure has been enacted to allow them to select what
union shall be the recognized representative for all those in one agency,
i.e., a certification election. (Sections 5, 6 and 12; Executive Order No.
180; Sections 3 and 4, Rule V and Rule VI, Rules and Regulations to
Govern the Exercise of the Government Employees to Self-Organization)
The freedom of choice given to workers is a constitutional right.
Therefore, the holding of a certification election, being a statutory policy,
should not be circumvented. (Associated Trade Unions-ATU v. Noriel, 89
SCRA 264 [1979]; Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) v.
Ferrer-Calleja, supra; Airtime Specialists, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja, supra)
WHEREFORE, the petitioner having failed to show grave abuse of
discretion committed by the public respondent, the petition is hereby
DISMISSED. The assailed orders of the public respondent are
AFFIRMED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued on August 29,
1990 is LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
10. DAVAO CITY WATER DISTRICT vs CSC
201 SCRA 593
Ponente: MEDIALDEA
FACTS:
Petitioners are among the more than five hundred (500) water
districts existing throughout the country formed pursuant to the
provisions of PD No. 198, as amended by PDs. 768 and 1479,
otherwise known as the "Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973
which was issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos by
virtue of his legislative power. It authorized the different local
legislative bodies to form and create their respective water
districts through a resolution they will pass subject to the
guidelines, rules and regulations therein laid down. The decree
further created and formed the "Local Water Utilities
Administration" (LWUA), a national agency attached to the

National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), and

granted with regulatory power necessary to optimize public
service from water utilities operations.
The respondents, on the other hand, are the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) and the Commission on Audit (COA), both
government agencies and represented in this case by the
Solicitor General.
There exists a divergence of opinions between COA on one
hand, and the (LWUA), on the other hand, with respect to the
authority of COA to audit the different water districts.
COA opined that the audit of the water districts is simply an act
of discharging the visitorial power vested in them by law
On the other hand, LWUA maintained that only those water
districts with subsidies from the government fall within the
COA's jurisdiction and only to the extent of the amount of such
subsidies, pursuant to the provision of the Government Auditing
Code of the Phils.
Petitioners' main argument is that they are private corporations
without original charter, hence they are outside the jurisdiction
of respondents CSC and COA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Local Water Districts formed and created
pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 198, as
amended, are government-owned or controlled corporations
with original charter falling under the Civil Service Law and/or
covered by the visitorial power of the Commission on Audit
HELD:
After a fair consideration of the parties' arguments coupled with
a careful study of the applicable laws as well as the
constitutional provisions involved, We rule against the
petitioners and reiterate Our ruling in Tanjay case declaring
water districts government-owned or controlled corporations
with original charter.
Ascertained from a consideration of the whole statute, PD 198 is
a special law applicable only to the different water districts
created pursuant thereto. In all its essential terms, it is obvious
that it pertains to a special purpose which is intended to meet a
particular set of conditions and cirmcumstances. The fact that
said decree generally applies to all water districts throughout
the country does not change the fact that PD 198 is a special
law.
It is clear that what has been excluded from the coverage of the
CSC are those corporations created pursuant to the Corporation
Code. Significantly, petitioners are not created under the said
code, but on the contrary, they were created pursuant to a
special law and are governed primarily by its provision.
ACCORDINGLY, petitioners are declared "government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charter" which fall under
the jurisdiction of the public respondents CSC and COA.
11. Executive Order 180
PROVIDING GUIDELINES FOR THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT TO
ORGANIZE OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, CREATING A PUBLIC
SECTOR LABOR-MANAGEMENT COUNCIL, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
In accordance with the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, I, CORAZON
C. AQUINO, President of the Philippines, do hereby order:
I. Coverage
Sec. 1. This Executive Order applies to all employees of all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies, of the Government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters. For this purpose, employees, covered by this Executive Order
shall be referred to as "government employees".
Sec. 2. All government employees can form, join or assist employees'
organizations of their own choosing for the furtherance and protection of
their interests. They can also form, in conjunction with appropriate
government authorities, labor-management committees, works councils
and other forms of workers' participation schemes to achieve the same
objectives.
Sec. 3. High-level employees whose functions are normally considered
as policy-making or managerial or whose duties are of a highly
confidential nature shall not be eligible to join the organization of rankand-file government employees.
Sec. 4. The Executive Order shall not apply to the members of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, including police officers, policemen,
firemen and jail guards.
II. Protection of the Right to Organize
Sec. 5. Government employees shall not be discriminated against in
respect of their employment by reason of their membership in
employees' organizations or participation in the normal activities of their
organization. Their employment shall not be subject to the condition that
they shall not join or shall relinquish their membership in the employees'
organizations.
Sec. 6. Government authorities shall not interfere in the establishment,
functioning or administration of government employees' organizations

through acts designed to place such organizations under the control of

government authority.
III. Registration of Employees' Organization
Sec. 7. Government employees' organizations shall register with the Civil
Service Commission and the Department of Labor and Employment. The
application shall be filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations of the
Department which shall process the same in accordance with the
provisions of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended.
Applications may also be filed with the Regional Offices of the
Department of Labor and Employment which shall immediately transmit
the said applications to the Bureau of Labor Relations within three (3)
days from receipt thereof.
Sec. 8. Upon approval of the application, a registration certificate be
issued to the organization recognizing it as a legitimate employees'
organization with the right to represent its members and undertake
activities to further and defend its interest. The corresponding certificates
of registration shall be jointly approved by the Chairman of the Civil
Service Commission and Secretary of Labor and Employment.
IV. Sole and Exclusive Employees' Representatives
Sec. 9. The appropriate organizational unit shall be the employers unit
consisting of rank-and-file employees unless circumstances otherwise
require.
Sec. 10. The duly registered employees' organization having the support
of the majority of the employees in the appropriate organizational unit
shall be designated as the sole and exclusive representative of the
employees.
Sec. 11. A duly registered employees' organization shall be accorded
voluntary recognition upon a showing that no other employees'
organization is registered or is seeking registration, based on records of
the Bureau of Labor Relations, and that the said organizations has the
majority support of the rank-and-file employees in the organizational unit.
Sec. 12. Where there are two or more duly registered employees'
organizations in the appropriate organizational unit, the Bureau of Labor
Relations shall, upon petition, order the conduct of a certification election
and shall certify the winner as the exclusive representative of the rankand-file employees in said organization unit.
D. Terms and Conditions of Employment in Government Services
Sec. 13. Terms and conditions of employment or improvements thereof,
except those that are fixed by law, may be the subject of negotiations
between duly recognized employees' organizations and appropriate
government authorities.
VI. Peaceful Concerted Activities and Strikes
Sec. 14. The Civil Service laws and rules governing concerted activities
and strikes in the government service shall be observed, subject to any
legislation that may be enacted by Congress.

VII. Public Sector Labor-Management Council

Sec. 15. A Public Sector Labor Management Council, hereinafter referred
to as the Council, is hereby constituted to be composed of the following:
1) Chairman, Civil Service Commission Chairman
2) Secretary, Department of Labor and Employment
Vice Chairman
3) Secretary, Department of Finance Member
4) Secretary, Department of Justice Member
5) Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management Member
The Council shall implement and administer the provisions of this
Executive Order. For this purpose, the Council shall promulgate the
necessary rules and regulations to implement this Executive Order.
VIII. Settlement of Disputes
Sec. 16. The Civil Service and labor laws and procedures, whenever
applicable, shall be followed in the resolution of complaints, grievances
and cases involving government employees. In case any dispute
remains unresolved after exhausting all the available remedies under
existing laws and procedures, the parties may jointly refer the dispute to
the Council, for appropriate action.
IX. Effectivity
Sec. 17. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.
Done in the City of Manila, this 1st day of June, in the year of Our Lord,
nineteen hundred and eighty-seven.