VICTORIA ONG DE OCSIO vs. the RELIGIOUS OF THE VIRGIN MARY (Feb.

28, 1989)
FACTS
A cadastral proceedings initiated by the Director of Lands, in behalf of the Republic, for the settlement and
adjudication of title to a large tract of land situated in the City of Iligan.
Victoria Ong de Ocsio (herein petitioner) seasonably presented an answer to the petition. She alleged
that she was the owner, by purchase, of two (2) parcels of land with specific boundaries comprehended in
the cadastral proceeding. As owner, she had been in possession of both lots for fifteen (15) years, and
her predecessors-in-interest, for sixty (60) years. Title to the same parcels of land was however claimed
by the Religious of the Virgin Mary. In its answer, it averred that it had bought the lots from Victoria Ong
de Ocsio and had been in possession as owner thereof for over four years, and its possession and that of
its predecessors was immemorial.
The Cadastral Court rendered judgment, declaring that the evidence satisfactorily established that
Victoria Ong de Ocsio had in truth sold the lot to the Religious of the Virgin Mary in virtue of a deed of
sale dated April 12, 1956.
De Ocsio now asserts that as the private respondent is a religious corporation, it is disqualified to obtain
judicial confirmation of an imperfect title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act which grants that right
only to natural persons.
ISSUE
Whether or not the contention was correct.
HELD
No. Private respondent, a religious corporation, may obtain judicial confirmation of an imperfect title.
Open, continuous and exclusive possession of alienable public land for at least thirty (30) years in
accordance with the Public Land Act ipso jure converts the land to private property, and a juridical person
who thereafter acquires the same may have title thereto confirmed in its name.
In this case, a private corporation had purchased the land originally of the public domain from parties who
had, by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest, possessed and occupied it since time
immemorial. It had thereafter instituted proceedings for confirmation of title under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act.
The prohibitions in the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions against acquisition or registration of lands by or in
behalf of private corporations do not apply to public lands already converted to private ownership by
natural persons under the provisions of the Public Land Act. In the present case, Virginia Ong de Ocsio
and her predecessors-in-interest having possessed Lot No. 1272 for the period and under the conditions
prescribed by law for acquisition of ownership of disposable public land prior to the sale of the property to
the Religious of the Virgin Mary, confirmation of title thereto in the latter's name is, under the precedents
referred to, entirely in order.

IGNACIO PALOMO vs. COURT OF APPEALS (January 21, 1997)

FACTS
On June 13, 1913, then Governor General of the Philippine Islands, issued Executive Order No. 40 which
reserved for provincial park purposes a land situated in the Province of Albay pursuant to the provisions of
Act 648 of the Philippine Commission.
Subsequently, the then Court of First Instance of Albay ordered the registration of 15 parcels of land
covered by Executive Order No. 40 in the name of Diego Palomo. Diego Palomo donated these parcels of
land to his heirs, herein petitioners, Ignacio and Carmen Palomo two months before his death in April
1937.
Claiming that the aforesaid original certificates of title were lost during the Japanese occupation, Ignacio
Palomo filed a petition for reconstitution with the Court of First Instance of Albay. The Register of Deeds of
Albay issued Transfer Certificates of Titles.
On July 10, 1954 President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 47 converting the area
embraced by Executive Order No. 40 into the "Tiwi Hot Spring National Park," under the control,
management, protection and administration of a division of the Bureau of Forest Development. The area
was never released as alienable and disposable portion of the public domain and, therefore, is neither
susceptible to disposition under the provisions of the Public Land Law (CA 141) nor registrable under the
Land Registration Act (Act No. 496).
On October 11, 1974, the Republic of the Philippines filed a civil case for the annulment and cancellation
of Certificates of Title involving the 15 parcels of land registered in the name of the petitioners.
ISSUE
whether or not the alleged original certificate of titles issued pursuant to the order of the Court of First
Instance in 1916-1917 and the subsequent TCTs issued in 1953 pursuant to the petition for reconstitution
are valid.
HELD
No. The OCT and the subsequest TCTs are not valid.
The lands are still not capable of appropriation. The adverse possession which may be the basis of a
grant of title in confirmation of imperfect title cases applies only to alienable lands of the public domain.
There is no question that the lands in the case at bar were not alienable lands of the public domain. As
testified by the District Forester, records in the Bureau of Forestry show that the subject lands were never
declared as alienable and disposable and subject to private alienation prior to 1913 up to the
present. Moreover, as part of the reservation for provincial park purposes, they form part of the forest
zone.

It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be owned by private
persons. It is not registrable and possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, cannot convert it into private
property, unless such lands are reclassified and considered disposable and alienable.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS (March 16, 1987)

FACTS
Lot No. 622 of the Mariveles Cadastre was declared public land in a decision rendered before the last war
in Cadastral Case No. 19, LRC Cadastral Record No. 1097.
On July 6, 1965, Lot 622 was segregated from the forest zone and released and certified by the Bureau of
Forestry as an agricultural land for disposition under the Public Land Act.
On April 26, 1967, Respondents filed in the Court of First Instance of Bataan a petition to reopen
Cadastral Case No. 19, LRC Cadastral Record No. 1097 to perfect their rights and register their titles to
said lots, having allegedly acquired ownership and possession of said parcels of land by purchase from
the original owners thereof, whose possession of the same including that of the herein Respondents, has
always been continuous, open, active, exclusive, public, adverse, and in the concept of owners thereof for
more than 30 years
The petition was approved and the Commissioner of Land Registration was directed to issue the
corresponding decrees of registration of said land.
On May 7, 1979, petitioner Republic of the Philippines filed a petition for review of the decrees of
registration under Section 38, of Act No. 496, as amended, and the corresponding decision of the lower
court, on the grounds that the parcels of land subject matter of the petition to re-open cadastral
proceedings are portions of the public domain, admittedly within the unclassified public forest of
Mariveles, Bataan, opened for disposition only on or about July 6, 1965; that subsequently, respondents
do not have a registerable title to the land subject matter of the proceedings.
ISSUE
Whether or not the lots claimed by respondents could legally be the subject of a judicial confirmation of
title under the Public Land Act, as amended.
HELD
No. It cannot be claimed by the respondents.
Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, as amended, applies exclusively to public agricultural land. Forest lands or
areas covered with forests are excluded. They are incapable of registration and their inclusion in a title,
whether such title be one issued during the Spanish sovereignty or under the present Torrens system of
registration, nullifies the title. Thus, possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private
ownership. A parcel of forest land is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond
the power and jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under the Torrens System.
Thus, even if the reopening of the cadastral proceedings was at all possible, private respondents have not
qualified for a grant under Sec. 48(b) of Commonwealth Act 141, the facts being that private respondents
could only be credited with 1 year, 9 months and 20 days possession and occupation of the lots involved,
counted from July 6, 1965, the date when the land area in sitio San Jose, barrio Cabcaban, Mariveles,
Bataan, which includes the lots claimed by respondents, had been segregated from the forest zone and

released by the Bureau of Forestry as an agricultural land for disposition under the Public Land Act.
Consequently, under the above mentioned jurisprudence, neither private respondents nor their
predecessors-in-interest could have possessed the lots for the requisite period of thirty (30) years as
disposable agricultural land.

REPUBLIC vs. DE GUZMAN (Feb. 28, 2000)

FACTS
Conflicting applications for confirmation of imperfect title were filed by Norma Almanzor and private
respondent Salvador De Guzman over parcels of land located in Silang, Cavite. After trial on the merits,
the lower court rendered judgment in favor of private respondent De Guzman.
The Republic now raised the issue in a petition that the trial court erred in not declaring that the de
Guzman have not overthrown the presumption that the lands are portions of the public domain belonging
to the Republic of the Philippines and that they have fulfilled the time required by law to justify
confirmation of an imperfect title.
It is not disputed that the subject parcels of land were released as agricultural land only in 1965 while the
petition for confirmation of imperfect title was filed by private respondents only in 1991. Thus the period of
occupancy of the subject parcels of land from 1965 until the time the application was filed in 1991 was
only twenty six (26) years, four (4) years short of the required thirty (30) year period possession
requirement under Sec. 14, P.D. 29and R.A. No. 6940.
In finding that private respondents' possession of the subject property complied with law, the Court of
Appeals reasoned out that
(W)hile it is true that the land became alienable and disposable only in December, 1965, however,
records indicate that as early as 1928, Pedro Ermitao, appellees' predecessor-in-interest, was
already in possession of the property, cultivating it and planting various crops thereon. It follows
that appellees' possession as of the time of the filing of the petition in 1991 when tacked to Pedro
Ermitao's possession is 63 years or more than the required 30 years period of possession. The
land, which is agricultural, has been converted to private property.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the time required by law to justify confirmation of an imperfect tile is satisfied in this case.
HELD:
No. It is not satisfied.
In the case before us, the property subject of private respondents' application was only declared alienable
in 1965. Prior to such date, the same was forest land incapable of private appropriation. It cannot be
registered and possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, could not convert it into private property,
(unless) and until such lands were reclassified and considered disposable and alienable.
In summary, therefore, prior to its declaration as alienable land in 1965, any occupation or possession
thereon cannot be considered in the counting of the thirty year possession requirement.
The rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land classified as forest
land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain.

While we acknowledge the Court of Appeals' finding that private respondents and their predecessors-ininterest have been in possession of the subject land for sixty three (63) years at the time of the application
of their petition, our hands are tied by the applicable laws and jurisprudence in giving practical relief to
them. The fact remains that from the time the subject land was declared alienable until the time of their
application, private respondents' occupation thereof was only twenty six (26) years. We cannot consider
their thirty seven (37) years of possession prior to the release of the land as alienable because absent the
fact of declassification prior to the possession and cultivation in good faith by petitioner, the property
occupied by him remained classified as forest or timberland, which he could not have acquired by
prescription. Further, jurisprudence is replete with cases which reiterate that forest lands or forest
reserves are not capable of private appropriation and possession thereof, however long, cannot convert
them into private property. Possession of the land by private respondents, whether spanning decades or
centuries, could never ripen into ownership.