Aristotle

ARISTOTLE
O N SO P H IS T IC A L R E F U T A T IO N S
O N C O M IN G -T O -B E A N D P A S S IN G -A W A Y
O N T H E COSM OS
J T L E . s i
///
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS
ON COMING-TO-BE AND
PASSING-AWAY
BY
f E . S. FORSTER, M .A .
EMERITUS PROFESSOR OF OREEK IN THE UNIVERSITY OF SHEFFIELD
ON THE COSMOS
BY
D . J. F U R L E Y , M .A .
LECTURER IN OREEK AND LATIN IN UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, LONDON
LONDON
W IL L IA M
H E IN E M A N N
CAMBRIDGE,
HARVARD
LTD
MASSACHUSETTS
U N IV E R S IT Y
MCMLV
PRESS
CONTENTS
P refatory N ote *
PAOS
\t}
D e S o p h is tic is E le n c h i s
Introduction
&
T ext and Translation
10
D e G e n e r a t io n e e t C o r r u p t i o n s
Introduction
159
Text and Translation
162
383
344
To D e Sophisticis Elenchis
H3
To D e Generatione et Corruptione
415
To D e Mwido
D e M undo
Introduction .
T ex t and Translation
I*:
I n d ic e s
PREFAT ORY NOTE

P r o f e s s o r E. S. Forster completed his versions of D e
Sophisticis Elenchis and D e Generatione et Corruptione

before he died.
I have checked the proofs and added
a brief index.
D . J. F u r l e y
London
January 1955
DE SOPHISTICIS
ELENCHIS
IN TR O D U C TIO N
I . T h e P la c e o f t h e
T o p ic a
in t i i e O r g a x o x
B o t h the Topica and the D e Sophisticis Elenchis have
always been regarded as genuine works of Aristotle.

The two treatises are elosely connected ; the D e
Sophisticis Elenchis is an appendix to the Topica and
its final section forms an epilogue to both treatises ;
indeed Aristotle himself seems sometimes to regard
the two as forming a single work, since he twice
quotes the D e Sophisticis Elenchis under the title of
the Topica.
It is generally admitted that what we call logic
and Aristotle himself calls analytic was an early pre
occupation of the philosopher and a direct outcome
of discussions on scientific method held in the Platonic
Academy. Plato himself, however, never attempted
a formal treatment o f the subject and the theories
put forward, for example, in the Theaetetusy Sophist,
Parmenides and Politicus were never developed into
a regular system. But while Aristotles systematic
treatment of the process of inference and, above all,
his discovery of the syllogism owe little to Plato, it
has been generally recognized that the Platonic dia
logues contain some o f the germs from which the
Aristotelian system was afterwards developed ; for
2
example, in the Theaetetus the doctrine of the cate
gories is already implicit in the recognition o f the
abstract notions of substance, quality, quantity, re
lation, activity and passivity.
O f the logical treatises of Aristotle, which sincc
about a .d . 200 have passed under the title of the
Organon or f instrument * of science, the most im
portant are (1) the Prior Analytics, in which he sets
forth the doctrine of the syllogism in its formal aspect
without reference to the subject-matter with which
it deals, (2) the Posterior Analytics, in which he
discusses the characteristics which reasoning must
necessarily possess in order to be truly scientific,
(3) the Topica, in which he treats of the modes of
reasoning, which, while syllogistically correct, fall
short of the conditions of scientific accuracy. The
Categories and the D e Interpretation are subsidiary
treatises dealing, in the main, with the term and the
proposition.
A great deal o f time and ingenuity has been
expended, particularly by German scholars, in an
attempt to fix the exact order in which the various
treatises which constitute the Organon were com
posed. The problem is complicated by the fact that
the treatises, in the form in which they have come
down to us, seem to consist of rough notes, which
were evidently subjected to a certain amount of
revision due to the modification and development
of his original doctrines. This process has naturally
given rise to minor inconsistencies such as would
naturally occur if corrections were made or additions
inserted which were not completely adapted to the
context in which they were placed.
It has been generally recognized that the whole
ARISTOTLE
of the Topica does not belong to the same date.
H. Maier holds that the oldest portion consists of
Books II-V II. 2 and that it was written under the
direct influence of the Academy and belongs to the
same period as the Aristotelian Dialogues, which have
survived only in fragments ; in particular, he points
out that the term o-t>AAoy/.<r/zos is not used in the
technical sense which it afterwards acquired (or, if it
is used in that sense, e.g., in 130 a 7, it is a late inser
tion), whereas in the second half of Book V II the
term is used in its well-known Aristotelian sense, and
that, consequently, Books II-V II. 2 were composed
before the philosopher made his greatest contribu
tion to logic. He holds that Books I and V III belong
to the same period as Book V II. 4-5, and form an
introduction and conclusion to the treatise written
after the discovery o f the syllogism and that the De
Sophisticis Elenchis was a subsequent addition to
the Topica. On the other hand, F. Solmsen and
P. Gohlke a hold that Books I-V II form the earlier
portion of the work and that Book V III and the De
Sophisticis Elenchis were added subsequently.
As regards the relation of the Topica to the rest of
the Organon, Maier considers the Topica as a whole
to be earlier than the Analytics ; Solmsen suggests
that the order was (1) Topica I-V II, (2) Posterior Ana
lytics I, (3) Topica V III and De Sophisticis Elenchis,
(4) Posterior Analytics II, (5) Prior Analytics ; Gohlke
holds that the traditional order of the two Analytics
is correct, and that the Topica and De Sophisticis
Elenchis presuppose the Analytics.
In short, there is general agreement that the bulk
of the Topica embodies Aristotle's earliest contribua See Bibliography.
tion to the systematic study of logic and that it was
written in part before his discovery of the syllogism.
II. T h e C o n t e n t o f t h e T o p ic a
The purpose of the Topica is, in the words o f its
author (100 a 18 ff.), to discover a method by which
we shall be able to reason from generally accepted
opinions about any problem set before us and shall
ourselves, when sustaining an argument, avoid saying
anything self-contradictory * ; that is to say, it aims
at enabling the two participants, the questioner *and
the * answerer/ to sustain their parts in a dialectical
discussion. The subject, then, of the treatise may
be described as the dialectical syllogism based on
premises which are merely probable as contrasted
with the demonstrative, or scientific, syllogism, which
is the subject of the Posterior Analytics and is based
on premises which are true and immediate. The
probable premises which make up the dialectical
syllogism are described (100 b 21 f.) as 4 those which
commend themselves to all or to the majority or to
the w ise/ The uses of dialectic are, we are told,
three in number, (1) for mental training, (2) for general
conversation, and (3) for application to the sciences,
because (a) if we can argue a question pro and con,
we shall be in a better position to recognize truth and
falsehood, and (b) since the first principles of the
sciences cannot be scientifically demonstrated, the
approach to them must be through the study of
the opinions generally held about them.
After the general introduction in Book I, Aristotle,
in Books II-V II. 3, gives a collection of the tottol which
ARISTOTLE
give their name to the treatise. The term tottoi is
somewhat difficult to define. They may be described
as 4 commonplaces * of argument or as general prin
ciples o f probability which stand in the same relation
to the dialectical syllogism as axioms stand to the
demonstrative syllogism ; in other words, they are
4 the pigeon-holes from which dialectical reasoning
is to draw its argum ents/
Books II and III deal with the problems of accident;
Books IV and V with those of genus and property ;
Books V I and V II. 1-3 with those of definition. Books
V II. 4-5 and Book V III, after giving some additional
notes, conclude the treatise by describing the practice
o f dialectical reasoning.
I II. T h e D e S o p h i s t i c i s E l e n c h i s
Just as Aristotle treats of the demonstrative and
the dialectical syllogism in the Posterior Analytics and
the Topica, respectively, so in this treatise, which
forms a kind of appendix to the Topica, he deals with
the sophistical syllogism. A knowledge of this is
part of the necessary equipment of the arguer, not
in order that he may himself make use of it but that
he may avoid it, and that the unwary may not be
ensnared in the toils of sophistical argum ent; in
fact, Aristotle is carrying on the Socratic and earlyPlatonic tradition by attacking the Sophists, who
taught the use of logical fallacy in order to make the
worse cause appear the better.
The term Ay\'os is strictly applied to the confuta
tion of an actual adversary, but it is also used more
a \V. D. Koss, Aristotley p. 59.
widely o f the confutation of an imaginary opponent.
The treatise is, in fact, a study of fallacies in general,
which are classified under various headings and fall
into two main classes, those which depend on the
language employed and those which do not. Some
of these fallacies would hardly deceive the most
simple minds ; others, which Aristotle seems to have
been the first person to expose and define, are capable
not only of deceiving the innocent but also of escaping
the notice o f arguers who are employing them.
After two introductory chapters the work naturally
falls into two parts, chapters 3-15, the refutation of
fallacies, and chapters 16-33, the solution of fallacies,
while chapter 34 forms an epilogue to the work.
IV . T h e M a n u s c r ip ts
The chief manuscripts for the
Sophisticis Elenchis are :
A
B
C
D
u
C
P
f
q
N
i
T
O
Urbinas 35
Marcianus 201
Coislinianus 330
Coislinianus 170
Basileensis F. 11.21
Vaticanus 1024
Vaticanus 207
Marcianus App. IV. 5
Ambrosian us M . 71
Laurentianus 72. 18
Laurentianus 72. 15
Laurentianus 72. 12
Marcianus 204
Topica and D e
saec. ix-x ineunt.
an. 955
saec. xi
saec. xiv
saec. xi-xii
satis vetustus *
* non recens *
saec. xiv
saec. xv
saec. xv
saec. xiv
saec. xiii
saec. xiv
O f these A and B are in a class by themselves.
ARISTOTLE
Bekker preferred A , W aitz B ; the Teubner Editors
give a slight preference to B, the readings o f whieh
are sometimes supported by papyrus fragments. C
sometimes preserves the true reading.
V. S e le c t B ib lio g r a p h y
e d it io n s
J. T. Buhle, T ext, Latin Translation and Notes,

Biponti, 1792.
I. Bekker, Text, Berlin, 1831, Oxford, 1837.
T . W aitz, Text and Notes, Leipzig, 1814-1846.
Y . Straehe and M . Wallies, Teubner T ext, Leipzig,
1923.
E. Poste (De Sophisticis Elenchis only), T ext, Para
phrase and Notes, London, 1866.
tr a n s la tio n s
T. Taylor, London, 1812.

O. F. Owen (Bohn's Classical Library), London, 1902.
W . A . Pickard-Cambridge (Oxford Translation),
Oxford, 1928.
In Freneh :
J. B. Saint-Hilaire, Paris, 1837.
In German :
J. H . von Kirchmann, Heidelberg, 1877.
E. Rolfes, Leipzig, 1922.
ARTICLES a n d d is s e r t a t io n s
P. Gohlke, Die Entstehung der aristoielischen Logik,

Berlin, 1936.
8
H. Maier, Die Syllogistik des Aristoteles, Tiibingen,
1900.
F. Solmsen, Die Ejitnicklung der aristotelischen Logik

und Rhetorik, Leipzig, 1929.
J. L. Stocks, The Composition of Aristotles Logical
W orks, Classical Quarterly, 1933, pp. 115-124.
I n translating the Topica and De Sophisticis Elenchis I

have used the text of Bekker in the Berlin Edition,
and when I translate any other reading this is noted
at the foot of the page. I have constantly referred
to the Teubner text of Strache-Wallies, which does
not, however, seem to me to mark any considerable
advance on that of Bekker. I have found W aitzs
edition of the Organon of great use, and the Latin
version o f Pacius is often helpful. I have frequently
consulted the Oxford translation by W . A . PickardCambridge. For the De Sophisticis Elenchis the notes
and paraphrase in Postes edition are often enlighten
ing, though I cannot always agree with his interpreta
tion.
M y aim in translating has been to represent Aris
totles meaning as closely and faithfully as I can in
simple English without resorting to paraphrase or
trying to express it in modern terminology.
I have to thank my friend and former colleague
Professor W . S. Maguinness, of Kings College,
London, for reading through my version and giving
me the benefit of lus fine scholarship and accuracy.
He has suggested several improvements in the text
which I have been glad to adopt.
API2 TOTEAOT2 riEPI

2 0 <1>I2 TIKS2N EAETXQN
164 a 20
I . Ylepl Sc TU)V <JO<f)lOTlK&V cACyÔJV Kal T(x)V

<f>acvopvojv jJLv iXiyxoJv ovtosv Sc 7Tapa\oyiafia>v
aAA ovk eA 4yx<ov Aeywfiev, apijdfAevot Kara <f>vcnv
a m rGiv irptoTWV.
* 0 n fiev ofiv ol fiv ciai avXXoyiapoi, ol S

ovres SoKouac, <f>avpov.
25 aW ojv
rovro
ylvcrai
cbairep yap Kal eirl
Sia n vos
in i 7(op Xoywv d)cravTo>g c^ci.

ol fiev
exovaiv
ovk
tcov
opoioTqros, Kal
Kal yap rrjv
e$t ol Sc <f>alvovrai, ^vXeriKws
Kal Tn<JKvd<javrcs avrovs, Kal KaXol

ol [lev Sta KaXXos, ol Sc <f>awovrai, Koppwaavre^
avrovs.
7tl re row a*fivxu>v (jbaavrojs' Kal yap
rovroyv r a akv apyvpos ra Sc ypuao? iariv aXindws,
164 b 20 <f>vorjoavT$
'
ra o
*
'
i /
S>'
'
'
" A
cart pev ov, (pawtrai oc Kara rr\v atuurjaiv,
olov ra fiev Xidapyvpiva Kal r a K a m rip iva apyvpa,
25 ra Sc ôAojSa^tm xpvaa.
rov avrov Sc rpoirov
Kal avXXoyifjpos Kal cAcyô? o pev cariv, o 8*
ovk
The reference appears to he provision o f memhers o f the

tribal choruses at Athens for choral competitions (see Xen.
Mem. iii. 1, 5).
10
A R IS T O T L E
S O P H IS T IC A L
ON
R E F U T A T IO N S
I. L et us now treat o f sophistical refutations, th at

is, arguments which appear to be refutations but
are really fallacies and not refutations, beginning,
as is natural, with those which com e first.
That some reasonings are really reasonings, but

that others seem to be, but are not really, reasonings,
is obvious. For, as this happens in other spheres
from a similarity between the true and the false, so
it happens also in arguments.
For some people
possess good physical condition, while others have
merely the appearance of it, by blowing themselves
out and dressing themselves up like the tribal
choruses ; again, some people are beautiful because
of their beauty, while others have the appearance
of beauty because they trick themselves out. So too
with inanimate things ; for some of these are really
silver and some gold, while others are not but only
appear to our senses to be so ; for example, objects
made of litharge b or tin appear to be silver, and
yellow-coloured objects appear to be gold. In the
same way also reasoning and refutation are some
times real and sometimes not, but appear to be real
b Protoxide of lead, a by-product in the separation of
silver from lead.
11
in t a o -
(^hs? Mi).N
between
an*drefutatious which
andgthoseC
ht are^
entf<aJ!Par
sPhlsfcieal-
ARISTOTLE
164 b
cort fievy <f>atverai Sc Sta rfjv diretplav ol yap
a7TtpoL uioirep av a7rexovres noppcoOev Oecopovoiv.

165 a o fiev yap ovXXoytofios K nvcbv eo n redevrcov
wore Xeyetv erepov rt e dvayKrjs rcbv Keifievcov

Sta rcbv Keifievcov, eXey^ps Sc ovXXoyiofios pier
dvn<f>doecos
rov
ovfnrepaofiaros.
ol
Sc
rovro
7TOIOVOI fiev ov, Sokovoc Sc Sta noXXas airlas, <&v

5 els rottos ev<f>vevrar6s e o n
Sta rcbv ovofiarcov.
Kal Srjfiooicbraros o
errel yap ovk eonv avra ra
irpayfiara BcaXeyeoOai <f>epovras, aAAa rois ovofiaoiv avrl rcov irpayfidrcov ^pc6/xc0a avfifioXois,
ro ovfipalvov im rcov ovofiarcov Kal cm rcbv irpayfiarcov rjyovfieda
ovfifialveiv,
Kaddirep em
rcov
10 if/rjcfxov rocs Xoyiôfievois ro S> ovk eonv ofioiov.

ra fiev yap ovofiara rreTrepavrat, Kal ro rcbv Xoycov
7rXr]dosy ra Sc irpayfiara rov aptdfiov dnetpd eonv.
dvayKalov ovv TrXelco rov avrov Xoyov Kal rovvofia
ro ev orjfialvetv.
cooTrep ovv KaKel ol firj Setvol
15 ras tp*q<f>ovs <f>epeiv vtto rcbv einorrffiovcov napaKpovovrat, rov avrov rpoirov Kal cm rcbv Xoycov ol
rcbv ovofiarcov rrjs Svvdfiecos aireipoi irapaXoylovrai Kal avrol SiaXeyofievoi Kal aXXcov aKovovres
Sta fiev ovv ravrrjv rfjv alrlav Kal ras XexOrjoo-
fievas eon Kal ovXXoyiofios Kal eXeyxos (f>atv6fievos

20 fiev ovk cbv Sc.
eirel S* cart rtcrt fiaXXov irpo epyov
to SoKeiv elvat oo<f>ols fj ro etvai Kal firj SoKeiv
(eon yap rj oocf>LonKrj <f>aivofievrf oo<f)la ovoa S ov,

12
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, i
owing to men's inexperience ; for the inexperienced
are like those who view things from a distance.
Reasoning is based on certain statements made in
such a way as necessarily to cause the assertion of
things other than those statements and as a result
of those statements ; refutation, on the other hand,
is reasoning accompanied by a contradiction of the
conclusion.
Some refutations do not affect their
object but only appear to do so ; this may be due
to several causes, o f which the most fertile and wide
spread division is the argument which depends 011
names. For, since it is impossible to argue by intro
ducing the actual things under discussion, but we
use names as symbols in the place of the things, we
think that what happens in the case of the names
happens also in the case of the things, just as people
who are counting think in the case of their counters.
But the cases are not really similar ;(Yor names and
a quantity of terms are finite, whereas things are
infinite in number ; and so the same expression and
the single name must necessarily signify a number
of things.S A s, therefore, in the above illustration,
those who are not clever at managing the counters
arc deceived by the experts, in the same way in
arguments also those who are unacquainted with the
power of names are the victims of false reasoning,
both when they are themselves arguing and when
they are listening to others. For this reason, there
fore, and for others which will be mentioned here
after, there exist both reasoning and refutation which
appear to be genuine but are not really so. But
since in the eyes of some people it is more profitable
to seem to be wise than to be wise without seeming
to be so (for the sophistic art consists in apparent and
IS
ARISTOTLE
165 a
Kal
cro<l>icrrf)s
x P rHxaTLCrrV ?
(f> a w o fiev rfs
a o(f> la s aAA> ovk o v a r j g ) , 8rjX o v o n

to i?
Kat
to
a v a y K a lo v r o v -
ao(f>ov e p y o v 8 o K e iv i r o ie lv fia X X o v
to u
25 7/ 7TOlLV K a l flT) 8o K lV .
ZoTL 8*
CU?
7T/00? V
17TLV e p y o v 7Tpl Ka(JTOV TOV lS 6 tO $ dlf/v8eLV f i e v

a v r o v 7r e p l cLv o t 8 e , r o v 8 c \ fsev 8 6 fievo v ifi< f> avi^ eiv
h v v a a O a i.
8ovvai
rovs
ravra
Aoyoy,
to
fio v X o fie v o v s
30 X o y c o v y e v o s
8* i a r l
8
iv
ro
rcb
fiev
o o < f> io r e v e iv
^ r jr e iv ' ir p o
iv
X a fie t v .
epyov
ro
r c b h v va crO a i
a v a y K t)
rcb v
yap
oZ v
e lp r jfie v a jv
ia n v
rj y a p
r o i a v r r j 8 v v a f i i s TTovrfvei (f> a lv eo 6 a i aocfrov, oS r v y -
X<ivovcn r r jv ir p o a i p e a i v e x o v r e s .
wO ti fiev ovv e c n n
roiovrov Xoycov ycVos*, Kal
o n roiavrrjs i<f>Uvrai 8vvdfiews ovs KaXovfiev cro<f>iaras, 8fjXov.
iroaa 8* iarlv et8i] rcbv Xoycov rcbv
35 ao<j>iariKcbv, Kal K iroacov rov
apiOfiov rj 8vva-
fits avrrj avvearrjKe, Kal iroaa fiiprf rvyxdvei rrjs

7rpayfiarelas ovra, Kal irepl rcbv aAAcuv rcbv avvreXovvrcov els rrjv r e x vrlv Tavrrjv rj8r) Xtywfiev.
II.
'#E a n 8rj rcbv iv rcb 8iaXeyea0ai Xoycov r e r -
rapa yivr), 8i8aaKaXiKol Kal 8taXeKnKol Kal ireipa165 b oriKol Kal iptariKoi, StSacr/caAt/cot fiev oi iK rcbv
oiKeicov apx<bv eKaarov
fiaOrffiaros Kal
ovk
iK
rcbv rov avoKpivofievov So<bv avXXoytôfievoi ( 8 ei

yap iriareveiv rov fiavOavovra), SiaXeKnKol 8* ol
itc rcov iv8owv avXXoyianKol dvn<f>daecos, ireipa14
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, i - ii
not real wisdom, and the sophist is one who makes
money from apparent and not real wisdom), it is clear
that for these people it is essential to seem to perform
the function of a wise man rather than actually to
perform it without seeming to do so. To take a single
point of comparison, it is the task of the man who has
knowledge of a particular subject himself to refrain
from fallacious arguments about the subjects of his
knowledge and to be able to expose him who uses
them. O f these functions the first consists in being
able to give a reason, the second in being able to
exact one. It is essential, therefore, for those who
wish to play the sophist to seek out the kind of argu
ment which we have mentioned ; for it is well worth
his while, since the possession of such a faculty will
cause him to appear to be wise, and this is the real
purpose which sophists have in view.
It is clear, then, that a class of arguments of this
kind exists, and that those whom we call sophists
aim at this kind of faculty. Let us next discuss what
are the various kinds of sophistical arguments and
what are the various component parts of this faculty,
and into what different divisions the treatment of
the subject falls, and all the other elements which
contribute to this art.
II. O f arguments used in discussion there are four Four kinds
kinds, Didactic, Dialectical, Examination-arguments SsJd^diiland Contentious arguments. Didactic arguments are cussion:
those which reason from the principles appropriate to
each branch of learning and not from the opinions of
the answerer (for he who is learning must take things
on trust). Dialectical arguments are those which, (2) Diastarting from generally acccpted opinions, reason to lectlcalestablish a contradiction. Examination-arguments (3) Exami
nation.
15
ARISTOTLE
165 b
5 ariKol 8y ol K TUSV SOKOVVTOJV TO) aTTOKpiVOfliva)

Kal avayKalcov el8ivai
to>
irpocrTTOLOVfxivcp e x iv
TTJV iTTLOT'qjX'qv (ov TpOTTOV 6, hl(bpLOTCLl V CTtpOLs),

ip u rr iK o l
OVTCOV
(J v W o y iG T lK o l
oi
rc b v
< j> a iv o fx iv w v
iv 8 o w v
f ir j
Tj (fxUVOfAZVOl a v X X o y iG T L -
K O I. 7T p l fx k v OVV TCOV d lT o 8 eiKTlK(A)V V TOCS A v a io Xvtlkols Lp7]Tai, 7r e p l 8c tu> v SiaAc/cTt/cajv K a l

7Tipa<JTLK<bv i v TOIS d X X o tS * 7TC/H Sc TGJV a yW V K JT lk o jv K a l ip i a r i K t b v v v v X i y c o f i e v .
II I. Uptbrov 8rf XrjTrriov

iv
ttoocov aroxdôvrai oi
Xoyois ayajvLôfxevoL Kal 8ia<f>iXovtKovvTs.
Sc 7TVT Tama tov apiOfxov, eXeyxos Kal
to is
ccrrt
15 \frev8os Kal 7rapd8o ov Kal croXoiKiofios Kal 7Tfi7rrov

t o iro irjo a i d S o A c a â a t to v 7T poo8iaX eyofievov
t o v t o S io T i t o 7roAAa/a? a v a y K a ê a O a i r a v ro
X ey eiv fj t o firj ov, aAAa t o (ftaivofxevov Ka<TTov
etv ai to v to } v .
fid X ia ra fxev y a p rrpoaipovvT ai
(fralveaOai eAcyxovTCs*, 8 evTepov Sc i/jv86fivov t i
20 8eiKvvvaL,
T p v ro v
els ttapahoôv ayeiv, TeTapTov
Sc goXoiKiêiv iroieiv to v t o 8 ic T i t o 7roirjaai

Trj Xeei fiapfiapiêiv iK to v Xoyov to v diroKpwoTeXevTaiov Sc t o nXeovaKis TavTO Xeyeiv.
IV. TpoTroi 8 elcrl to v f i e v iX eyxîv Suo* o l f i e v
y a p e la i 7Tapa ttjv Xegtv, o l S ca> Trjs Xeijeoos.
25 eoTi Sc Ta piev ir a p a ttjv Xeiv if n ro io v v r a ttjv
<f>avTaalav c f tov dpiO fxov T avT a 8 corty o fn o v v fila t
dfjb(/)LpoXlaf avvO eais, S ia lp e v is , 7Tpoacp8la, a x i f x a
Aeêojs*. tovtov Se ttlotis fj T Sta Trjs irra y c o y ijs
Kal avXXoyiOfios , av tc X
ti s aXXos, Kal oti
fie v o v
a Topics 151) a 25 ff.

6 Topks i-viii.
16
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, ii- iv

are those which are based on opinions held by the
answerer and necessarily known to one who claims
knowledge of the subject involved (in what manner,
has been described elsewhere a). Contentious argu- ^ 9 ^ "
ments are those which reason or seem to reason
from opinions which appear to be, but are not really,
generally accepted. Demonstrative arguments have
been treated in the Analytics, and dialectical argu
ments and examinations have been dealt with else
where.6 Let us now deal with competitive and
contentious arguments.
III. W e must first of all comprehend the various t h e p e r objects at which those aim who compete and contend tio ? of
in argument. They number five : refutation, fallacy,
paradox, solecism, and, fifthly, the reduction of one's m-xv).
opponent to a state of babbling, that is, making him Jolftentiou?
to say the same thing over and over again ; or, if argument
, ,i
i ,
,
, ,i
n
are five in
not the reality, at any rate the appearance ot each number.
of these things. Their first choice is a plain refutation,
their second to show that their opponent is lying,
their third to lead him on to a paradox, their fourth to
make him commit a solecism (that is, to make the
answerer, as a result of the argument, speak un
grammatically), and, lastly, to make him say the
same thing over and over again.
IV. There are two modes of refutations ; one has (A) bieto do with the language used, the other is unconnected fc^h-xi).
with the language. The methods of producing a ^ n^ lUa~
false illusion in connexion with language are six in faUaJbs
num ber: equivocation, ambiguity, combination, di- p^ton
vision, accent and form of expression. The truth of diction,
this can be verified by induction and by syllogistic
are
proof based on this (thongh some other assumption number,
i
n
being uu6
is also possible), that this is the number of ways in to:
17
ARISTOTLE
165 b
T oaavrax& S
30 r a v r o
Slv t o i s
a v r o l s o v o f i a c r i K a l X o y o i s fir )
S r jX c o o a ifie v .
Sc
e ia l
ira p a
fie v
v v f ii a v o l to io c S c r c b v X o y c o v , o t o v o n
ol
ta
em a T a fiev o f
a ir o G T O fia n ^ o fie v a
v o v csiv
oi
y p a fifia r iK o i.
v v fio v ,
to
re
ro
tjv v ie v a i
X a fifia v e iv
S itt o v
yap
7 T oX X a K i$
cti
to v
Kal
8eovra
to
im
Kal
avT ov
tco v
T ayada
Sc
oa n ep
ooirep vyiaêt o
Kal
K aK a
vyiaiver avicrraro
K aK ov
Kal
ti
e lv a i.
K a fiv eiv
e o T T jK e v ,
yap
a v fifia iv e i
<f>afiev
eo r a v a i,
to
ra
yap
d v ia r a r o ,
Kal vyiaêTo o Kafivcov.

otiovv 7roieiv
(e a r n
S eovra
Kal
yap
o fic b -
em a rrffir f
a v a y K a io v , o
K a K cov
fia v O a -
Sc K a K a S e o v r a .
a y ada , ra
t
o fic o -
fia v O a v e iv
K a l ira X iv o n
K a O fj o O a i
v y ia iv e iv .
yap
;^ > o 6 /ici'o v r f j
S eov, t o
Kal
a v a y K a io v ),
to
im o r r jfir fv .
35 a y a d d * t<x y a p
166 a
yap
rr/ v
fia v O a v o v c n v
K al
o Kadrjfievos
tov
Kafivovra
rj irdoxeiv oi>x V arjfiaivei,
aAA* o t c
fiev o n o vvv Kafivcov,1 o t c S os* eKafive upoTepov.

5 7tAr jv
v y ia ^ ero
fie v
Kal
K a fiv c o v
Kal
K a fiv c o v
v y i a l v e i 8 9 o v K a fiv co v , aAA o K a fiv c o v , o v v v v , a X X 9

7T poT pov.
o
to
o
7 ra p a S c
fto v X eo O a i
t is
X a fie T v f i e
ttjv
d fi< f> ifio X ia v o i
tovs
r r o X e fiio v s .
y iv c o o K e i, to O to y iv c o o K e i;
to
oK ovra
Kal
a K ovra
cr rjfirjv a i t o u t t o r e p
y iv c o o K 6 fie v o v
Kal y a p
cV S c^C T a t
X o y tp .
T O to tS c ,
Kal
y iv c o -
cos
y iv c b -
K al & pa o
1 Deleting rj KaO-qixevos after Kapvwv with Wallies.

i.e. can write or spell.
b i.e. ought to be.*
18
apy
tov
opa
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, iv
which we can fail to indicate the same thing by the
same terms or expressions. Arguments sueh as the
following are based on equivocation : Those who
know, learn ; for it is those who know the use of
letters that learn what is dietated to them . Here
learn * is equivocal, meaning * understand by using
knowledge * and * acquire know ledge/
Or again,
4 Evils are good, for what must exist is good, and
evil must exist.* Here * must exist * is used in
two senses ; it means what is necessary,* whieh is
often true of evils (for some evil is necessary), and we
also say that good things must exist.* b Or again,
the same man is seated and standing and is
a sick man and restored to h ealth ; for it is the
man who stood up that is standing, and it is he who
was recovering his health that is restored to health,
but it was the man who was seated that stood up and
the man who was siek that was recovering.* For that
the siek man * does sueh and sueh a thing or has
sueh and sueh a thing done to him, has not one
meaning only but at one time means the man who
is now sick,* and at another time the man who was
formerly sick.* But it was the siek man who began
to recover his health when he was actually siek, but
he is in good health when he is not sick and is not
the siek man now but the man who was formerly
siek. The following examples are connected with (2) Amambiguity : To wish me the enemy to capture, bi8>ty.
and * when a man knows something, surely there is
knowledge of this *; for it is possible by this expres
sion to signify both the knower and the thing known
as know ing/ And 1 what a man sees, surely that
*
i.e. knowledge o f this can mean either knowledge on the
part o f the knower or knowledge o f the thing known.
19
ARISTOTLE
166 a
10 tls,
opa;
opa Se tov KLOva, <jjot opa o
Kal apa o ov (f>ffs elvat, tovto ov <fyrjs eZvat;
<firjs Si XiOov etvat, ov apa (f>fjs AtOos ivai.
Kal
ap' eoTi otyw vra Xeyeiv;
Slttov yap Kal to olya)VTa Xeyeiv, to t tov Xeyovra oiyav Kal to ra
Xeyofieva.
elol Si Tpels Tpoixoi to>v irapa rrjv
is oficovvfiiav Kal ttjv dfi<f>ifSoXiav, els fiev orav fj o
Xoyos fj Tovvofia Kvplws orjfxaivrj TrXeloj, olov aeros
Kal kvcov els Se or av elwOoTes a>fiev ovtoj X eyeiv
Tpiros Se OTav to owreOev rrXelco orffialvrj,
piofievov Se a7rXojs, olov to in Lot arai ypdfXfiara.
eK&repov fiev yap, el ervx^v, ev tl orffxalvei, to
20 emcrrarat Kal ra ypdfifjbara* afJL<f><o Se TrXelo), ff to
Ta ypdfifxaTa az5ra errLOTrffirjv exeiv fj rtov ypafifiaTtov aXXov.
CH fie v o v v dfJL(/)ipoXla Kal ofU D W fiia rrapa t o v t o v s t o v s T porrovs i o T i v , 7rapa Se TTjv a vvO eo iv ra
TotaSe, o lo v t o S vv a a d a i KaOrjfievov p a S i^ e iv Kal
tovto
klcdv.
25 firf
av
yp d(f)ovra
SieXa>v t l s
KaOrffxevov
ypd<f>eiv.
elrrrj
Kal
jS a S i^ e ty 2* Kal
ov
ya p
o v v d eis,
TavTO
a rjfia ivei,
o)S S v v a t o v
t o v O * dxxavTCus
clv
to 1
tls
avvO fj , ro firj ypa<f>ovTa ypa<j>eiv orffia ivei y a p a>s
eêt SvvafiLv t o v fir) ypa<f>ovTa ypd<f>eiv.

30 firj
ovvO fj, o t l
e ^ e t SvvafiLv,
1 Heading t o for
Deleting
Wallies.
2
Kal
ore
ov
ia v
Se
ypd(f>ei, t o v
to v .
firj
ypd<f>ovr a
yp d (f> e iv
after
with
The personal pronoun not being expressed in Greek,

. being neuter, can be either the subject or object of the
verb o p a .
b 4eagle * or pediment.
c * Dog,* dogstar or Cynic philosopher/
d In which case the meaning is that a man, while sitting,
has the power to walk (if he wishes to do so).
to v to
20
ON* SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, iv

(he) a sees : a man a pillar sees, therefore the pillar
s e e s/ Again, Surely you insist on being what you
insist on being. You insist on a stone being : there
fore, you insist on being a sto n e/ Again Surely
speaking is possible of the silen t/ * Speaking of
the silent * can also be taken in two ways, either
that the speaker is silent or the things spoken of
are silent. There are three modes connected with
equivocation and ambiguity : (1) when the expres
sion or name properly signifies more than one thing,
such as aeros b and #a W ,c (2) when we customarily
use a word in more than one sense, (3) when a word
has more than one meaning in combination with
another word, though by itself it has only one mean
ing, for example, knowing letters ; for it may
so happen that taken separately knowing * and
* letters * have only one meaning, but taken together
they have more than one meaning, namely, either
that the letters themselves have knowledge or that
someone else has knowledge of the letters.
Ambiguity and equivocation then take these (3) Comforms. The following examples are connected with ofwortis.
the combination of words, for instance, * A man can
walk when sitting and write when not writing/ The
significance is not the same if one utters the words
separately d as it is if one combines them, namely, * a
man can walk-while-sitting/ e and, similarly, in the
other example, if one combines the words and says
a man can write-when-not-writing/ for it means
that he can write and not write at the same time ;
whereas if one does not combine the words it means
that, when he is not writing, he has the power to
e In which case the meaning is that it is possible for a
man to walk and sit at the same time.
21
ARISTOTLE
166 a
ypd(f>LV. Kal, fiavddvei vvv ypafifiara, elirep ifiavdavev a iirlararaL.

e n ro iv jiovov Svvdftevov
<f>ipLv TToXka hvvaaOai <f>4peiv.
Hapa S e rrjv Siatpcaiv, o n ra ttvt ear I Svo
Kal rpla, Kal nepirra Kal apn a, Kal ro jxciôv lgov
35 rocrovrov yap
Kal e n 7Tpos.
o yap avros Xoyos
Sirjprj/icvos Kal crvyKelfievos ovk del ravro 017/ i a i O//

f
(( I /
> Uf\
O a\
V J
veiv av oogeiev, olov
ey<o cr eUrjKa oovAov ovr
iXevOepov 99 Kal ro
TrevrrjKovr
avhpa>v iKarov
Xl7T 810s 9A xtX X evs

166 b
U a p a S e r r jv T rp ov cp h ia v i v jx e v r o t s a v e v yp a< j)fjs
h ia X tK r iK o Z s
ov
y e y p a fjifid v o is
* 0 fi r jp o v
5 cos
O fifip tp .
ro
ev io i
d ron cos
ov
p a h io v
Kal
S e rots*
Kal r o v
ir o ir j a a i X o y o v ,
S io p O o v v r a t
e lp r jK o r a
ro
rrp os
fiev
rovs
0$
iX e y x o v r a s
K a rarrvO erai
X v o v c tl y a p a v r o r f j i r p o o c o h ia , X e y o v r e s
o ifv r e p o v .
K al
9A y a / x i f i v o v o s , o n
fiev Se o l $ x o s
reA A ero
iv
rroLrjfiaoL fx a X X o v , o l o v
S iS o v c u .
ro
7repl
ro
iv v ir v io v
rov
o v k a v r o s o Zeus* e h r t v S t S o -
d p ic r d a L ,' a X X a ru> i v v n v l c o
ra
fx e v
ovv
r o ia v r a
napa
eV er r jv
7T poacphiav i a r l v .
10
0 1 Se rrapa ro oxfjfia rrjs Ae'êtus* avfiftalvovoiv,

a With a different combination of words this can mean,
4 He understands now what he knows because he has under

stood letters.
6 This can also be taken to mean, 4 Being able to carry
many things, yon can carry one single thing only.*
c If 5 = 2 and 3, 5 = 2 and 5 = 8 , and so 5 is both odd and
even : again, if 5 = 2 and 5 = 3 , then 3 = 2 , *.#. the greater=
the less, since 3 is also 2 + 1.
d From an unknown source in Greek comedy imitated by
Terence, Andria 37.
22
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, iv
write. Again, * He now understands letters, since
he has understood what he knows * a ; and further,
1 One single thing being able to carry, many things
you can carry/ b
The following propositions are connected with divi- (4) Division
. _
* i*
j j
j
j.i_ of words,
sion :
5 is 2 and 3,
5 is odd and even,
the
greater is equal to the less/ for it is so much and
something more.c For the same sentence divided
would not always seem to have the same meaning
as when taken as a whole, for exam ple,1 Free I made
thee a slave *d and 1goodly Achilles left a hundred
(and) fifty men/ e
It is not easy to construct an argument relating (5) Accent,
to accent in discussions which are not written down,
but it is easier in written matter and poetry. For
example, some people emend Homer to meet the ob
jection of critics that his phrase to /ikv ofi Karairv^Tat
onppy is a strange o n e / For they solve the difficulty
by a change of accent, pronouncing the ov more
sh arply/ Also in the passage about Agamemnons
dream h they say that Zeus himself did not say, * But
we gran t* him to secure the fulfilment of his prayer *
but bade the dream to grant i t / Such examples,
then, depend on accentuation.
Refutations which depend on the form o f expres- (6) Form of
expression.
* Probably quoted from some Cyclic poem. The words can
mean either * left 150 men * or 4left a hundred men fifty/
/ II. xxiii. 328 ; 4part of which decays in the rain/
9
i.e. substituting ov, 4 not/ for o 5 : 4and it does not decay
in the rain.
* II. ii. 1-35 ; but the actual words quoted occur in II. xxi.
297 and are spoken by Poseidon. For this and the following
example see Poet. 1461 a 22-23.
i i.e. hihofiv.
1 i.e. 8t86fiv=8t86vat, the infinitive being used as an
imperative.
23
ARISTOTLE
166 b ot o v
f irj r a v r o
to
a p p e v OrjXv rj t o
o j u a v r c o s 4 p f ir)v e v 7 )T a c , o to v t o
drjX v a p p e v , fj
f x e ra ^ v O arep o v
to
TOVTCOV, fj TTaXcV TO 7TOIOV TTOOOV f j TO 7TO<JOV 7TOCOV,

fj TO 7TOCOVV T r a o y o v V T
& L a K e lf ie v o v
15 T aX X a S \ <bs 8irjp T )T cu n p o T e p o v .
7T O itiv , K a l
e o rc y a p t o
fif)
T & V 7TOCCV OV (OS TCOV 7TOICIV T l T jj A cfct <Jr)fiaCVCV.
olov t o
v y calve iv ofiotcos t c o oxVfJLart TV$ ^4 ecus
X4yerac ra> T4fxvecv fj olKoSofxecv KacToc

7rocov t c Kal ScaKelfxevov itc o s SrjXoc, t o
t o v avrov Se Tpovov Kal 4m tc o v aXXcov.
tc .
O t f ie v
20
fiev
to
Se 7rocecv
tcov
ovv 7rap a
e la lv
toitcov
ttjv
X4cv e X e y \o c 4 k
tcov
tovtcov
ea> T rjs X 4eco$ i r a p a -
X o y co ficb v ecSrj 4 o t I v 4 ttt<xs ev f ie v T ra p a
c rv fi-
to
p e f lr jK o s , S e v T e p o v S e t o a ir X tb s fj f ir j a7rX cb$ aX X a
7rfj fj 7TOV fj 7TOT fj 7TpOS TC X 4y O 0 a C , TpCTOV 8 4 TO
ir a p a
25 T ra p a
ttjv
to
tov
4X 4yxov
ayvocav,
4 'rro fie v o v , 7T4[i7TTOv 8 e
a p x f j X a fifia v e c v *
ck to v
tc 6 4 v a t ,
8e
c/?S ofxov
to
rc ra p T o v
T ra p a (
Sc
to)
to
t o ev
S e t o firj a c r c o v cos acT cov
to
t<x TrXelco
4 p c o T ijfia T a
ev
TTOCCV.
V.
Ot
fie v
ovv
ir a p a
to
a v fi^ e p r jK O s
rra p aX o-
y c o f i o l e c o c v , o r a v o f i o l c o s o t c o v v a c co 9 fj t c o 7T p a y-
30 fiaTC K a l t c o crvfipeprjK O T c v i r a p x * c v .
a v T co
7roAAa
c rv fip 4 ^ r jK e v ,
ovk
e ir e l y a p t c o
a va yK rf
7 ra a t
to cs
K a T 7 )y o p o v [i4 v o c $ t K a l /ca0* o v K a T r jy o p e c T a c , T a v T a *
ir a v T a
v ira p x ^ cv .
o to v
1 Reading napa <ro>
el
K o p lo K o g
erep ov
av-
t o ev apxfi Xafxpaveiv with Strache.

* Reading ravra with Casaubon.
24
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, iv-v

sion occur when what is not the same is expressed
in the same form ; for example, when the masculine
is expressed by the feminine or vice versa, or the neuter
by the masculine or feminine ; or again when a
quality is expressed by a quantity or vice versa, or the
active by a passive or a state by the active, and so
forth according to the distinctions previously made.
For it is possible for something which is not of the
nature of an action to signify by the language used
something which is of the nature of an action ; for
example, to flourish * is a form of expression like
to * cut * or to build *; yet the former denotes a
quality and a certain disposition, the latter an action.
So too with the other possible examples.
Refutations, then, connected with language are {b)Byfajbased on these commonplaces.
O f fallacies unconnected with language there are seven kinds :
on
(1) those connected with A cciden t; (2) those in These are
which an expression is used absolutely, or not abso- ^JSber
lutely but qualified as to manner or place or time or depending
relation ; (3) those connected with ignorance of the on *
nature of refutation ; (4) those connected with the
consequent; (5) those connected with the assump
tion of the original point to be proved ; (6) those
which assert that what is not a cause is a cause ; (7)
the making of several questions into one.
V.
Fallacies connected with Accident occur when (l) Acciit is claimed that some attribute belongs similarly to dent*
the thing and to its accident; for since the same
thing has many accidents, it does not necessarily
follow that all the same attributes belong to all the
predicates of a thing and to that of which they are
predicated. For example, * If Coriscus is different
Topics 103 b 20 ff.
25
ARISTOTLE
166 b
dpdtTTOVy avros avrov erepos * e o n yap avOpcoiros*

fj el HcoKparovs erepos, o Sc S o iKparrjs avBpcorros,
35
erepov avOpwTTOV cf>aolv cbfioXoyrjKev ai Sta ro ovfijSeflrjKevai, ov
e<f>rjoev erepov etvai, rovrov etvai
avQpcorrov.
Ot Sc napa ro airXcbs roSc
rrrj XeyeoOai Kal firj
Kvpicos, orav ro ev fiepec Xeyofievov cos anXcbs

167 a
elprjfievov Xrj(f>0fj, olov el ro firj ov i o n 8oaorov,

o n ro firj ov e o n v ov yap ravrov etvai re rt Kal
etvai anXcbs.
rj 7raXiv o n ro ov ovk eonv ov, el
rcbv ovrcov n firj eon v, olov el firj avdpco7ros>

5
ov
yap ravro firj etvai n Kal anXcbs firj etvai* <f>alverai

Sc Sta
to
rrapeyyvs rfjs Xeecos Kal fiiKpov 8iacf>e-
peiv ro etvai n rov etvai Kal ro firj etvai n rov firj

etvai.
ofioicos Sc Kal ro rrapa ro rrrj Kal ro arrXcbs.
olov el o IvSoj oAos* fieXas cov XevKos eo n rovs

oSovras* XevKos apa Kal ov XevKos eo n v .
10 afi(f>co rrrj, o n
afia ra evavrla vrrapxei.
rj el
ro Sc
roiovrov en evicov fiev rravrl Oecoprjoat pa8iov, otov

el Xafidjv rov A tfltW a etvai fieXava rovs o8ovras
epoir* el XevKos' el ofiv ravrrj XevKos, o n fieXas
Kal
ov
fieXas,
oioiro
SieiXexOai
reXeicboas rrjv epcorrjoiv.
26
ovXXoyioriKcbs
err* evicov Sc XavOavei
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, v
from man, he is different from himself, for he is a
man *; or if he is different from Socrates, and
Socrates is a man,* they say that it has been admitted
that Coriscus is different from a man, because it is
an accident that the person from which he said that
Coriscus is different is a man.
Fallacies connected with the use o f some particular (2) The
expression absolutely or in a certain respect and not absolutely19
in its proper sense, occur when that which is pre- ^ veIthuali_
dicated in part only is taken as though it was predi- flcation.
cated absolutely. For example, * I f that-which-is-not
is an object of opinion, then that-which-is-not is 1 ;
for it is not the same thing * to be something * and
1 to be absolutely. Or again, That-which-is is not,
if it is not one of the things which are, e.g. if it is not
a man.* For it is not the same thing * not to be some
thing 1 and * not to be * absolutely ; but, owing to
the similarity of the language, 4 to be something *
appears to differ only a little from to be, and not
to be something * from not to be.* In like manner
when something is predicated in a certain respect
and absolutely ; for example, I f an Indian, being
black all over, is white in respect of his teeth, then
he is white and not w h ite/ Or if both attributes
belong in a certain respect, they say that the contrary
attributes belong simultaneously. In some cases this
sort o f fallacy can be easily perceived by anyone ;
if, for example, after securing an admission that the
Ethiopian is black, one were to ask whether he is
white in respect of his teeth, and then, if he be white
in this respect, were to think that he had finished
the interrogation and had proved dialectically that
he was both black and not black. In some cases, on
the other hand, the fallacy escapes detection, namely,
27
ARISTOTLE
167 a
15 7to\\<xkis,
oacov,
e<*
orav
KOV TO
7Tjj A ey q T a t,
arrXcos Soêiev aKoXovOelv, Kal iv ocrois fir) paSiov

decoprjaai rrorepov avrcov Kvplu>s diroSoreov.
rat Se
ytVe-
roiovrov iv ots ofiouos vrrdpêt ra avri-
to
Kelfieva* SoKel yap fj afitjxx) fj fir)8erepov SoTeov

on-Acas
etvai
20 XevKov to
KarrjyopeZv,
fjfiicrv
otov
fieXav,
el to
rrorepov
fiev fjfjuav
XevK0 v
fj
fieXav;
Ot 8c Trapa
ff
to
fir) 8 lwp lordai
eXeyxos, aXXa Trapa
ti
ttjv
tI
i o n avXXoyicrfios
eAAetifiiv ylvovTat
Xo y o v eXeyxos fiev yap avruf>aais
tov
tov
avrov Kal
evos, fir) ovofiaros aAAa rrpayfiaros, Kal ovofiaros

25 fir) avvoivvfiov aAAa tov a vtov , K tcov Sodevrcov,
avayKTfs, fir)
avvapiOfiovfievov
iv
tov
dpxfj,
Kara ravro Kal rrpos ravro Kal (oaavrcos Kal iv

tw
avTu> x p o v y -
tjsevaaadai rrepl
tqjv
to v
avrov Se rporrov Kal
tlvos.
eVtot 8c
XexOevTCDV <f>alvovrai iXeyx^w, otov
ott
30 8t7rAaatov feat ov SirrXdaiov ra yap 8vo

evos SnrXacna,
avTo
tov
tcov
Se rpiGxv ov SiTrXacria.
ti
ravro
tov
fiev
f) el
to
a vtov SiTrXacriov Kal ov SinXdoiov, aAA
ov Kara r a v r o 9 Kara fiev yap

Kara Se
to
aTroXiTrovres
to
to
nXdtos ov SirrXdaiov.
firjKos SirrXdcnov,
fj el
tov
avrov
Kal Kara ravro Kal (vaavrcus, aAA ovx a/xa* hiorrep

35 iarl <f>aiv6fievos eAeyôj.
eA/cot 8 av
tls tovtov
Kal els rovs rrapa rrjv Xeiv.

O t 8e rrapa t o
28
iv dpxfj XafifiaveLV ylvovrai fiev
where, when an attribute is ascribed in some respect
only, an absolute attribution would also seem to
follow, and where it is not easy to see which of the
attributes can be properly assigned. A n instance
of this occurs when both the opposite attributes
belong similarly ; for then it is generally held that
it must be conceded that either both or neither can
be predicated absolutely ; for example, if something
is half white and half black, is it white or black ?
Other fallacies arise because no definition has been
given of what a syllogism is and what a refutation,
and there is some defect in their definition. For a
refutation is a contradiction of one and the same
predicate, not of a name but of a thing, and not of
a synonymous name but of an identical name, based
on the given premisses and following necessarily
from them (the original point at issue not being
included) in the same respect, relation, manner and
time. A false statement about something also occurs
in the same manner. Some people, however, appear
to refute, omitting some of the above-named points,
showing, for example, that the same thing is double
and not double, because two is the double of one but
not the double of three. Or, they show that if the
same thing is double and not double of the same
thing, yet it is not double in the same respect; for
it is double in length but not double in breadth. Or,
if it is double and not double of the same thing and
in the same respect and manner, yet it is not so at
the same time ; and so there is only an apparent
refutation.
One might, indeed, force this fallacy
also into the category of those connected with
language.
Fallacies connected with the assumption of the
29
'
(4) Petitio
prindpii.
ARISTOTLE
167 a
ov rto s
Kal
T o a a v r a )(co s
o cra^cS s* i v S e v e r a l
a p X V * CLireicrOai, <f>alvovrat S
S u vaaflat c r v v o p a v t o
167 b
eO
to
eA eyêiv S ta t o
/X17
TauTov feat t o
erep ov,
Sc Trapa ro errofievov eXeyxos Sta to olecOai
avrtarpe<f>etv rrjv aKoXovdrjcriv.
orav yap
rovSc
ovros i avayKrjs ro8l fj, Kal rov8e ovros otovrai

Kal Oarepov etvai i avayKrjs.
oOev Kal at 7repl
5 rrjv 8oav iK rrjs aloOrjaews arrarai yivovrai.

rroXXaKis yap rrjv xXrjv /^cAt vneXafiov Sta to 7tco0at to âvffov x/)a>/xa ra) fieXirr Kal irrel ovfifialvei rrjv yrjv vaavros yivecrOai Staj8pox<>v, Kav
fj
Staj8poxo$y VTToXajLâvofiev vaai.
avayKaiov.
to
ovk
ev t c Tots* prjropiKois at Kara ro crrj-
fieiov a7To8elis iK rw v errofievoiv elalv.
/3ovXo-
10 fievot yap Setfat 0Tt fio r d s , ro errofievov eXafiov,

or 1 KaXXcomorrjs fj ore vvKrwp opar at irXaviofievos7toXXols Sc TauTa fiev V7rapxi, t o Sc Karrjyopovfievov ovx virapx^-
ofiolws Sc Kal iv rots crvXXo-
yioriKois, otov o MeXtcraov Xoyos o n arretpov ro

avavy AajScov ro fiev arrav ayevrjrov (ck yap firj
15 ovros ov8ev av y eve adat), ro Sc yevofievov i apxtfs

yevecrOai.
el firj ofiv yeyovev, apxrjv ovk c^ct to
rrav, w ar
arreipov.
ovk avayKrj Sc rovro ovfi-
ftaiveiv ov yap el ro yevofievov arrav a pxty *Xi>

Kal et Tt apxrjv eêt, yeyovev, a>07rep ouS* el o
20 7Tvperra)v Oepfios, Kal rov Oepfiov avayKrj rrvperreiv.

30
original point to be proved arise in the same manner
and in the same number of ways as it is possible to
beg the original p o in t; they have an appearance of
achieving a refutation because men fail to perceive at
the same time what is the same and what is different.
The refutation connectcd with the consequent is (5) The
due to the idea that consequence is convertible. For conse<*uentwhenever, if A is, B necessarily is, men also fancy
that, if B is, A necessarily is. It is from this source
that deceptions connected with opinion based on
sense-perception arise. For men often take gall for
honey because a yellow colour accompanies honey ;
and since it happens that the earth becomes drenched
when it has rained, if it is drenched, we think that
it has rained, though this is not necessarily true. In
rhetorical arguments proofs from signs are founded
on consequences ; for, when men wish to prove that
a man is an adulterer, they seize upon the consequence
of that character, namely, that the man dresses him
self elaborately or is seen wandering abroad at night
facts that are true of many people, while the
accusation is not true. So, too, in dialectical reason
ings ; for example, the argument of Melissus that
the universe is infinite assumes that the universe has
not come into being (for nothing could come into
being from what does not exist) and that everything
which has come into being has come from a beginning;
if, therefore, the universe has not come into being,
it has no beginning and therefore is infinite. But
this does not necessarily follow ; for even if what
has come into being always has a beginning, anything
that has a beginning need not have come to be, any
more than it follows that a man who is hot must be
in a fever because a man who is in a fever is hot.
31
ARISTOTLE
167 b
* 0 Se
Xrj<f)07]
napa t o firj alriov cos a in ov, orav n poo-
to
iX eyxov.
av a in ov cos nap' eKelvo yevofievov rod

ovfiftalvei
Se t o
to lo vto v ev to is els
to
aSwaTov ovXXoyiofiols ev to v to is yap avayKaiov

25 avalpelv n tcov Keifievcov.
eav ovv iyKaTapiOfirjOrj
iv toIs avayKaiois ipcorrjfiaoi npos to avfifiatvov

aSvvaTov, Soêi napa
to v to
yiveoOai noXXaKis o
eXeyxos, otov o n ovk eoTi iftvx?) f<ai corj T a v to v

el yap cf>9opa yeveois iva vn ov, Kal trj n v l cf)0opa
eorat
tis yeveois iv a vn ov*
o Se
Oavatos cf>Oopd t is
30 Kal ivavTtov o>fj, w ore yeveois rj corj Kal t o r}v

ylveoO a t* to v to
ahvvarov ovk apa TavTov fj
ifn>xy Kai V t w V m v
ovXXeXoyioTai * ovfifiaivei
ya p , Kav firj t i s TavTo cfyrj tt)v ^corjv Tjj *ftvxfj>

aSvvaTov,
aAAa
fiovov ivavn ov corjv fiev Oavarco
ovti cf>6opa, <j)Qopa

35 ovv a7rAcus
ovk
to
Se
eiolv ol
yeveoiv.
tovs
Xoyoi, npos
toiovtoi
npoKelfievov aovXX6yiOToi.
oi>x ffTTov a vtovs
aovXX6yioTOi fiev
Se
to
Kal XavOavei noXXaKis
ipcoTcovras
Oi fiev ovv napa to enofievov
to toiovtov.
Kal
napa to firj
aitiov Xoyoi to io vto i eloiv* ol Se napa to to. Suo

ipcoTrjfiara ev noielv, o to v XavOavrj nXelco ovra
168 a cos i v o s o v r o s anoSoOfj d n o K p ia is fiia.
fiev oSv pahiov I8elv o n nXeico
32
Kal
Kal
in ' evicov
o n ov 8ot4ov
The refutation connected with taking as a cause (6) Mfewhat is not a cause, occurs when that which is n o t taken cause'
a cause is foisted into the argument as though the
refutation were due to it. Such a case occurs in
reasonings leading up to an impossibility ; for in
these one is bound to destroy one of the premisses.
If, therefore, what is not a cause is enumerated among
the questions which are necessary for the production
of the resultant impossibility, the refutation will
often seem to come about as the result of i t ; for
example, in the argument that soul and 1 life * are
not identical. For if coming-into-being is contrary
to perishing, then a particular kind of coming-intobeing will be contrary to a particular kind of perishing;
now death is a particular kind of perishing and con
trary to life ; life, therefore, is a coming-into-being
and to live is to come-into-being. But this is im
possible ; and so the soul and life are not identical.
But this conclusion is not the result of reasoning ;
for the impossibility occurs even if one does not
assert that life is identical with the soul but merely
says that life is contrary to death, which is a perishing,
and that coming-into-being is contrary to perishing.
Such arguments are not absolutely inconclusive but
only inconclusive as regards the point at issue, and
the questioners themselves are often equally uncon
scious of such a state of affairs.
Such, then, are the arguments connected with the (7) Plurconsequent and the falsely imputed cause. Those questions,
which are connected with the union of two questions
in one occur, when it is not noticed that they are
more than one and one answer is given as though
there was only one question. Sometimes it is easy
to see that there is more than one question and
33
ARISTOTLE
168 a
drroKpioiv, olov rrorepov rj yrj daXarra eonv fj o

ovpavos ;
eV* evicov S tfrrov, Kal cos evos ovros
rj ofioXoyovoi ra> fir] airoKplveodai ro epwrcofievov,

5 fj iXeyxâdat <f>alvovrai, otov ap' oSros Kal oSros
eon v avOpcorros;
&or
rovrov , avdpcorrov
aA A
av ris rvrrrrj rovrov Kal

ovk
avdpcorrovs rvrrrrfoei.
ff rraXiv, <Lv ra fiev eonv ayada ra 89

rravra ayada fj
ovk
ayada;
ovk
ayada,
orrorepov yap av </>jj,
eo n fiev cos eXeyxov rj ipev8os <f>aivofievov 86eiev

10 av 7roieiv ro yap <f>dvai rcov fir] ayaOcbv n
etvai
dyadov rj rcov ayadcov fir] dyadov ipev8os ore Se

TTpooXr]<f)devr(jov nvcov Kav eXeyxos yivoiro dXrjdivos,
olov ei n s
8 olr]
ofioicos ev Kal noXXa Xeyeodai
XevKa Kal yvfiva Kal rv</>Xd.

fir] exov oifsiv ire^vKos
15 r a
el yap rv<f>Xov ro
ex*iv, Kal rv<j>Xa eorai
fir] e\ovra oifjiv rre^vKora S ^Xlv-
orav ovv
to fiev exj) to Se fir] exV> T(* dfi<f>co eorai fj opcovra

fj rv<f>Xd* 07rep a8vvarov.
V I.
*H
8 rj o u r cos
Siaipereov rovs </>aivofievovs
avXXoyiOfiovs Kal eXeyxovs, fj rravras avaKreov

els rrjv rov eXeyxov ayvoiav, apxrjv ravrrjv rroir]20 oafievovs* eon yap arravras avaXvoai rovs Xexdev-
ras rporrovs els rov rod eXeyxov 8iopiofiov. rrpcorov

fiev el aovXXoyioroi* Set yap K rcov Keifievcov
ovfifialveiv ro ovfirrepaofia, wore Xeyeiv et; avayKrjs
aA A a
34
fir] <f>alveodai.
erreira Kal Kara ra fieprj rov
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, v-vi

that an answer should not be given, for example,
when it is asked 1 Is the earth sea, or is the sky ? *
Sometimes, however, it is less easy, and thinking
that there is only one question, people either give
in by not answering the question or suffer an apparent
refutation. For example, Is A and is B a man ? *
* I f so, if a man strikes A and B, he will strike a man,
not men ? * Or again, Where part is good and part
evil, is the whole good or evil ? * Either answer
might possibly seem to involve an apparent refuta
tion or false statem en t; for to say that something
is good when it is not good or not good when it
is good is a false statement. Sometimes, however,
if eertain premisses are added, there might be a
genuine refutation. For example, if one agrees that
a single thing and a number of things are alike called
* white * or 4 naked * or blin d/ For if * blind * is
used of something which does not possess sight
though it is its nature to possess it, it will also deseribe
a number of things which do not possess sight though
it is their nature to possess it. W hen, therefore,
one thing has sight while another has not, they will
either both be able to see or both be blind ; which is
impossible.
V I.
W e must either divide apparent reasonings [Note (a),
and refutations in the manner just described or else feutdes can
refer them all to a false conception of refutation, gen{j?dr|re*
making this our basis ; for it is possible to resolve all forms of a
the kinds of fallaey which we have mentioned into fa"y e/e 1violations of the definition of refutation. Firstly, we ignoratio
must see if they are inconclusive ; for the conclusion dench^
ought to follow from the premisses laid down, so that
we state it of necessity and do not merely appear to
do so. Next, we ought to see if they aecord with the
35
ARISTOTLE
168 a
Siopiofiov,
tcov
fiev yap iv Trj Xeei ol jiiv eloi
25 7Tapa TO SlTTOV, otoV fj T OflOJVVflia Kal o Xoyos

Kal fj ofioioox^fioovvrj (ovvrjOes yap
iravTa cos
to
orjfialveiv), fj 8c ovvOeois Kal Sialpeois Kal
to Se t i
TTpooLoSla
tco
fifj
tov
Tovvofia Sia<f>epov,
avrov
etvai
eSei Se Kal
tov
Xoyov fj
tovto ,
KaOamep
Kal to rrpayfia, Tavtov, el fieXXei eXeyxos fj crvX30 Xoyiofios eoeoOai, otov el Xcottiov, fifj ifidnov ovXXoyioaoBai aAAa Xcottiov,
aXrjOes fiev yap KaKelvo,
aAA* ov avXXeXoylotat, aAA e n

oti
TavTov orjfiaivei,
ttpos tov
epcortffiaTos Set,
l^rjTovvTa
to
0 1 Se Trapa to ovfiêprjKos opioOevros

35 Xoyiofiov <f>avepol yivovrai,
8el Kal
tov
tov
iX eyxov yiveoOai,
Sta
tov
tL
ovA-
avrov yap opiofiov

ttXtjv
TrpooKelodai
dvTL(f>aoLV o yap eXeyxos ovXXoyiofios a v n -
ttjv
<f>aoecj)s.
el ovv firj i o n
ovXXoyiofios rov ovfi-
flefSrjKOTOS, ov ylverai eXeyxos ov yap el rovrw v

ovtcov
avayKrj t o 8
etvai,
tovto
io rl XevKov,
40 avayKrj XevKov etvai Sia rov ovXXoyiofiov,
ou8*
168 b el ro rpiycovov Svolv opOalv loas exei, ovfiPe^yjKe

S
avrcp
oxtffian
etvai
oxfjfid fj &Pxh V TTpcbrov

ovS*
fj 7rpcorov,
\
aXX
\
o fioicos o e Kai e m
6 o v X X o y io fio s
eX eyxos.
36
fj
TrpdjTco fj
tovto ,
fj rpiycovov,
v\\
rcov aAAcov,
TiSy o v k
aAAa Trapa
av
eirj o
tovto
apxfj>
oti
ov yap fj oxfjfia
tf
coot
fj
K a ra
Kal
ol
airoSeigis,
f v\
ei o e A e y x o s
ovfifJefirjKos
Tc^wTat Kal
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, vi
remaining parts of the definition. For of the fallacies illustrations
connected with language, some are due to a double faci^demeaning, for example equivocation and ambiguous pending
phraseology and similarity of formation (for it is (l^diction.
customary to indicate everything as a particular
substance), whereas composition, division and accen
tuation are due to the phrase not being the same or
the name different. For the name also, like the thing
signified, ought to be the same, if refutation or
reasoning is to result. For example, if the subject
is a mantle, you should come to a conclusion about
a mantle, not about a cloak ; for the latter con
clusion is also a true one, but the reasoning is not
complete, and a further question must be asked to
prove that words mean the same thing, if the answerer
asks how you have refuted him.
Fallacies connected with Accident become obvious (2) Acciwhen proof has been defined.
For the same en *
definition ought to be true also of refutation, except
that 1the contradictory is added ; for refutation is
a proof of the contradictory.
If, therefore, there
is no proof of the accident, no refutation takes place.
For if, when A and B are, C is, and C is white, it
does not necessarily follow that it is white because
of the syllogism. And again, if the triangle has its
angles equal to two right angles, and it happens to be
a figure, element or principle, it does not necessarily
follow that because it is a figure, element or principle
it has this character ; for the demonstration is con
cerned with it not qua figure or qua element but qua
triangle. And so likewise with the other instances.
Thus, if refutation is a kind of proof, an argument
depending on an accident could not be a refutation.
Y e t it is along these lines that specialists and men of
37
ARISTOTLE
168 b
oAoos*
ot
iiriOTTj/loves
v no
rcov
dveniarr] fiovcov
iXeyXov ra r Kara avfiê^rjKos yap noiovvrai

avW oyujfiovs npos
tovs
elSoras.
tovs
ol 8* ov Svva-
fievoi Siaipeiv rj ipcorcbpievoi StSoaatv rj ov Sovres
10 oiovrai SeScoKevai.
Ot Se napa ro nfj /cat anXcbs, or t ov rov avrov
rj Kara<f>aois Kal rj anocfracns. rov yap nfj XevKov
ro nfj ov XevKov, rov S anXcos XevKov to anXcbs
ov XevKov anocfraais. el oiv 8 ovros nfj etvai XevKov
15 a >s anXa>s elprjfievov Xafifiavei, ov noiei eXeyxov,
cf>alverai Se Sta rrjv ayvoiav rov ti iariv eXeyxos
t&avepcoraroi Se navrcov oi nporepov XexOevres
napa rov rov eXeyxov Siopiapiov Sto Kal npocrrjyopevOrjaav ovrcos' napa yap rov Xoyov rrjv
20 eXXeixpiv rj <j>avraala ylverai, Kal Siaipovfievois
ovrcos koivov ini naai rovrois Oereov rrjv rov
Xoyov eXXeuffiv.
Ot re napa
to
Xapifidveiv
to
iv apxfj Kal
to
dval-
riov cos ain ov nOevai SrjXoi Sta rov opiofiov.

yap ro ovpnepaafia
25 onep
ovk
tfv iv
tois
tco
Set
ra v r 5 etvai1 vvfifialveiv,
avairiois* Kal naXiv firj apiO-
fiovfxevov rov i dpxtfs, onep
ovk
exova iv ol napa
rrjv atrrjaiv rov iv dpxfj-
01 Se napa to enofievov fiepos elal tov crvpLpe*

fir)kotos* ro yap enojievov avfiêPrjKe, Sia<f>epei Se
1 Omitting airta
tov
after ctvai with ABC.
l(>7 a 2 1 ff.
b napaXoyiofiol from napa anti Xoyos in the sense of * de

finition.
38
science in general are refuted by the unscientific ; for
they argue with the men of science with reasonings
based on accident, and the latter, being incapable of
making distinctions, either give in when questioned,
or think that they have done so when they have not.
Fallacies which depend on whether a statement (3) The
is made in a limited sense or absolutely occur be- ofD
aô?ute
cause the affirmation and denial are not of the same
QalinPfi SiiltiPthing. For * not partly white is the negation of ments.
* partly white, and * not absolutely white * of 4 abso
lutely w h ite/ If, then, one takes the admission that
something is partially white to mean that it is abso
lutely white, he does not cause a refutation but only
seems to do so owing to ignorancc of what a refuta
tion is.
The clearest fallacies of all are those already (4) Defecm entioneda as connected with the definition of t!on.dcfim
refutation (hence also their name) b; for the semblance
of a refutation is due to the defect in the definition,
and, if we distinguish fallacies in this way, we must
put down defect of definition * as common to all these
cases.
Fallacies due to assuming the original point and (5) Petitw
stating as a causc what is not a cause are clearly Prinei^ 1'
exposed by means of the definition. For the con
clusion ought to follow becausc this and that is so,
which is not the case when the alleged cause is not
the cause ; and, again, the conclusion should follow
without the original point being included, which is
not true of arguments based on the begging of the
original point.
Fallacies connected with the consequent form part (6) The
of those due to accident; for the consequent is an conse(*uentaccident but differs from the accident because the
39
ARISTOTLE
168 b
TOV
C F V K O T O S y O TI TO fl V
O V flfiep rfK O S
30 i<f>' evos fiovov Xafietv, olov ravro etvai t o

Kal fieXi Kal t o XevKov Kal k v k v o v ,
jjl v o v
del ev rrXelooiv
Kal aXXrjXois aiovfiev

napa t o
Ta
to
Sc
eO TlV
avdov
Trap7r6-
yap evl ravrco ravra
etvai T a ira Sio yiverai
errofievov eXeyxos
eon
S ov rrdvTios
aXrjBeSy otov av fj XevKov Kara ovfifiefirjKos' Kal

35 yap rj x L^ v K aL k v k v o s t c o X c v k c o ra v t o v .
rj
rrdXivs cos iv t c o M eXiooov Xoycp, t o avro etvai
Xafifiavei t o yeyovevai Kal dpxfjv exîv, fj t o
10a 1
ylveoOai Kal ravro fieyeOos Xafiftaveiv.
yap
t o yeyovos c^ct dpxtfv, Kal t o
on
exov apX7)v yeyovevai
aioi, cos afi</)co ravra ovra rep apx^v exîv, ro

40 t c
yeyovos Kal t o
169 a errl t c o v
io c o v
tterrepaofiev o v .2 ofioicos Sc Kal
yivofievcov el ra t o
avro fieyeOos
Kal ev Xafiftavovra toa yiverai, Kal ra toa yivofieva

ev fieyeOos Xafifiavei.
coore t o errofievov Xafi/Savei.
errel ovv o Trapa t o
ovfipe^rjKos
ayvoia to v eXeyxovs cf>avepov o n

5 errofievov.
Ol
eXeyxos ev rfj
Kal o Trapa ro
emoKeTrreov Sc to v to Kal aXXcos.
Sc rrapa t o ra rrXeico epcorijfiara ev rroieiv ev
rep firj Sta pOpovv rjfias ff fir) hiaipeiv rov rrjs rrpordoecos Xoyov.
r) yap rrporaols e o n v ev KaOy evos
1 Reading toa for toois.

2 Bekker misprints ireirepaofidvov as ireircpaofievtav.
But it does not follow that because snow is white and
swan is white, therefore snow is swan.
* Cf. 167 b 13 f.
c Cf. 179 a 26 ff., 181 a 22 ff.
40
accident can be secured in the case of a single thing
by itself, for example, a yellow thing and honey are
identical, and so is a white thing and a swan, whereas
the consequent always exists in more than one thing ;
for we claim that things which are the same as one
and the same thing are the same as one another ;
and this is how refutation proceeds when the con
sequent is involved. It is not, however, always true,
for example, in the case of accidental whiteness ;
for both snow * and * swan arc the same in respect
of whiteness. Or again, as in the argument of
Melissus,5 someone takes to have come into being *
and 1 to have a beginning * as the same thing, and
* to become equal as the same thing as * to take on
the same m agnitude/ For because what has come
into being has a beginning, he claims also that what
has a beginning has come into being, on the ground
that * having come into being * and * being finite *
are both the same thing, because both have a begin
ning. Similarly, too, in the case of things which
become equal, he assumes that, if things which take
on one and the same magnitude becomc equal, then
also things which become equal take on the same
magnitude. In doing so he is assuming the conse
quent. Since, then, the refutation where accident
is concerned depends on ignorancc of the nature of
refutation, so also, it is clear, does the refutation
where the consequent is concerned. But we must
examine this question from other points of view also.c
Fallacies connected with the union of several (7) The
questions in one are due to our failure to differentiate several
or distinguish the definition of the term * proposi- J}]1^ 0118
tio n / For a proposition is a single predication about
a single subject. For the same definition applies
41
ARISTOTLE
169 a
0 yap avros opos ivos fiovov Kal anXws rov n p a y10 fiaros, olov avOpconov Kal evos fiovov avOpconov
ofiolws Se Kal enl rw v aXXwv.
el ovv fila nporaois
rj ev Kad evos a^tovoa, Kal anXws eorai nporaois

rj rotavrrj ipwrrjois.
in el 8* o ovXXoyiofios k
nporaoewv, o 8* eXeyxos ovXXoyiofios, Kal o eXeyXos ecrrai K nporaoew v.
el oSv rj nporaois ev
15 KaO'* evos, <f>avepov o n Kal oSros ev rfj rov eXeyxov
ayvoia- <f>aiverai yap etvai nporaois rj

nporaois,
ovk
oSoa
el fiev ofiv SeScokcv anoKpioiv ws npos
fiiav epwrrjoiv, ecrrai eXeyxos, el Se firj SeSwKev

aAAa <f>aiverai, <f>aivofievos eXeyxos.
w ore navres
01 rpoiroi1 nlnrovotv els rrjv rov eXeyxov ayvoiav,
20 ot fiev ofiv napa
rrjv
Xeijiv,
on
<f>aivofievrj rj2
avrtyaois, onep rjv iSiov rov eXeyxov, ol 8* aAAot

napa rov rov ovXXoyiofiov opov.
V II .
*H
dnarrj yiverai rwv fiev napa rrjv
ofiwvvfii\av Kal rov Xoyov rw firj SvvaoOai Siaipetv

ro
noXXaxws
Xeyofievov (evia yap
ovk
evnopov
25 SieXeiv, otov ro ev Kal ro ov Kal ro ravrov), rcov
Se napa ovvOeoiv Kal Siaipeoiv rw firjSev oieoOai

Siacjyepeiv ovvnOejievov fj Siaipovfievov rov Xoyov,
KaOanep enl rwv nXeiorwv.
ofiolws Se Kal rw v
napa rrjv npoow Slav ov yap aAAo SoKei orjfialveiv

aviefievos Kal enireivofievos o Xoyos, in ' ovSevos
1 Heading rponoi for roirot with Michael Ephesius.
2 Adding 17 with Wallies.
42
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, v i - v i i
to * one single thing * and to the thing * simply ;
the definition, for example, of * man * and of * one
single man * is the same, and so, too, with the other
instances. If, therefore, a * single proposition * is
one which elaims a single predicate for a single sub
ject, a * proposition,1 simply, will also be a question
of this kind. And since reasoning is based on pro
positions, and refutation is a process of reasoning,
refutation will also be based on propositions.
If,
therefore, a proposition is a single predication about
a single thing, clearly this fallacy also depends on
ignorance of the nature of refutation ; for what is
not a proposition appears to be one. If, therefore,
a man has given an answer as though to a single
question, there will be a refutation, but if he has not
given it but only appears to have done so, there will
be only an apparent refutation. Thus all the kinds
of fallacy fall under the heading of ignorance of the
nature of refutation those connected with language
beeause the contradiction, wrhich is a particular char
acteristic of refutation, is only apparent, and the
rest beeause of the definition of reasoning.
V II.
In fallacies connected with verbal equivoea- [Note O).
tion and ambiguous phrases the deception arises from abowfalthe inability to distinguish the various meanings of a
term (for there are some w'hich it is not easy to distin- fused thinkguish, for example, the meanings of u n ity / being * jjiabiutyô
and4 identity ). In fallacies connected with combina- make^distion and disj unction the deception is due to the supposi- inc 10ns
tion that it makes no difference whether the term is
combined or disjoined, as indeed is generally the case.
So, too, in those connected with accentuation ; for
it does not seem ever, or seems very seldom, to alter
the significance of the wrord whether it is pronounced
43
ARISTOTLE
169 a
30 fj
ovk
ttjv
errl
rroXXcov.
o fio to T r jT a
tco v
ttjs
Trapa
Se
X d g e to s.
o ^ /x a Sta
TO
7 ^P
x a ^ 7r v
S ie X e iv
rroia c b o a v T c o s K a l rroia cos e r e p c o s X e y e r a i * a x ^ S o v

yap
to v to
O ecopeiv
rrav
to
35 X a f i p d v o f i e v roSe rt
iv l
Kal
/O
fj
/xaAtcrra So/cet
to v
iTTiOTraTai1 o w e m -
K a T r jy o p o v jie v o v
rooe rt /cat ro ov.

oSt OS
cart
eyyvs
tiv o s
K a l cos e v v r r a K o v o f i e v
o v o ia
Troieiv
/xaAtara S
T aX rjO es*
OTt
v ev eiv ,
S v v d fie v o s
v tto -
tco
rrapeTrecjOai
\
oio /cat tow Trapa
<
ttjv
yap
to
\ />
Aeîv
o TPOTTOS 0eTOS, TTpCOTOV Jlkv OTI JJL&XXoV fj
aTraTrj yiverai f.xer
aXXcov OKOTrovfievois fj KaO*
avToiis (fj fiev yap /xer* aAAou OKeiftis Sia Xoycov,

40 fj Sc /ca0* avTOv ovx fjTTov Si* avrov rod rrpdy169 b fiaTos), etra /cat /ca0* avrov anaTaodai avfifiaivei,
OTaV in i TOV Xoyov TTOlfjTai TTJV GKlf/lV Tl fj flV
aTTOLTTJ e/C TTJS OflOlOTTJTOS, fj S OfJLOlOTTJS K TTJS
Aeêajs*.
tcov
Se Trapa
5 ev Kal noXXd, jirjSe

Travra raura /cat
Se /cat
tcov
to
ovjJipeprjKos Sta ro firj
ravrov /cat ro erepov Kal
tois
7roioiS tcov KaTrjyoprjfjLaTcov
tco
Trapa
ovfifiefir)kotos
to
to
SvvaoOai SiaKpiveiv
TTpayjian ovfifiefHrjKev.
to
ojjloicos
eirojievov fiepos yap
errofjievov.
ert /cat errl
ti tov
ttoXXcov
cf>alveTai Kal aiovrai ovrcoSi el roSe a7rd rouSe

firj xa>pterat, firjS' a7ro flarepou x<optea0at 0a io Tepov.
tcov
Se Trapa
ttjv
eXXeuftiv
tov
Xoyov Kal
1 Heading with Postc imanaTai for eVtorarat.

44
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS,
v ii
with a lower or a higher pitch. In fallacies connected

with the form of expression the deception is due to
similarity of language ; for it is difficult to distinguish
what sort of things belong to the same and what to
different categories ; for he who can do this very
nearly approaches a vision of the truth. W hat in
particular seduces us into giving our assent to the
fallacy is the fact that we suppose that every predi
cate o f something is an individual thing and it pre
sents itself to our ears as a single thing ; for it is to
the one and to substance that individuality and
1 being are generally held most truly to be attached.
On this account also this kind of fallacy must be
classed among those connected with language ; firstly,
because the deception occurs more commonly when
we arc inquiring with others than by ourselves (for
an inquiry with someone else is carried on by means of
words, whereas in our own minds it is carried on quite
as much by means of the thing itse lf); secondly,
because, even in solitary inquiry, a man is apt to be
deceived when he carries on his inquiry by means of
words ; and, thirdly, the deception arises from the
similarity, and the similarity arises from the language.
In fallacies connected with accident the deception is
due to inability to distinguish the identical and the
different, the one and the many, and what kinds of
predicates have all the same accidents as their sub
ject. So, too, in fallacies connected with the con
sequent ; for the consequent is a branch of the
accident. Furthermore, in many eases it appears
to be true and is treated as axiomatic that, if A
is inseparable from B, then also B is inseparable
from A . In fallacies connected with the defect in
the definition o f refutation and with the distinction
45
ARISTOTLE
169 b
rcbv napa
to
rrrj Kal arrXojs iv to) Trapa fiiKpov rj
anarr) * (Ls yap ovSev TTpooorjfiatvov to
ti
77a)s* ^ to v w KaOoXov avyx<*>podfiev.
ofiolcjs Se
/cat 7rt tojv to
rj Try fj
eV apxfi Aafifiavovrwv Kal
tcjv
avaiTiiov, Kal ocrot Ta TrXeio) epcorrffiara a>s ev
15 7rotovcrtv ev aTraoi yap rj arrarrf Sta to 7rapa

puKpov ov yap Sta/cpij8o/xev ovtc rijs Trporaaecos
ovre
tov
ovXXoyicfiov
tov
opov Sta
ttjv
elprffievrjv
air lav.
V III.
sE7Tt S eô/xev Trap* oaa ylvovrat ol (f>a t-
vo/xevot ovXXoyiofiol, exofiev Kal Trap* OTroo-a ot

20 ao<f>iariKol yevoivr
av ai/AAoytcr/xot /cat eAeyôt.
Aeyco Se ao^tort/cov eXeyxov /cat avXXoyiofiov ov

fiovov to v (fyawojievov avXXoyiofiov rj eXeyxov, /x^
ovra Se, aAAa /cat tov ovra fiev, <j>aivofievov Se
ot/celov toO rrpayfiaros.
etat S o^rot ot /x^ /card
to rrpayfia eXeyxovres Kal SeiKvvvres- ayvoovvras,

25 o77ep tjv ttJs TreipavTiKfjs.
ecrrt S ^ rreipaariKr]
fiepos rrjs StaAe/CTt/CTj? auV^ Se Suvarat o'l/AAoytea0at ifsevSos St ayvotav to v SiSovtos to v Xoyov.
ot Se ooffytaTiKol eAeyôt, av /cat auAAoyt^cavrat t^ v
avrlcfraatv, ov ttoiovgl SrjXov el ayvoet* /cat yap tov
etSora ifiTTohlôvai rovrots to is Aoyoisr.
30
" O n S exofiev avrovs rfj avrfj fieOoSco, 8rjXovm

Trap oaa yap <f>alverai rocs aKovovoriv a>s rjpcorrjfieva ovXXeXoytodat, Trapa ravra /cav ra> aTroKpivofievto Soetev, coot* eoovrai ovXXoyiofiol ifjevSeis
Sta Toimov 7} Travrojv fj eviW * o yap firj epcorrjOels
46
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, vn-vni

between a qualified and an absolute statement the
deception is due to the minuteness of the difference ;
for we regard the qualification of a particular case or
respect or manner or time as having no extra signifi
cance and concede the universality of the proposition.
So, too, when people assume the original point and
when the wrong cause is assigned and when several
questions are united in one ; for in all these cases
the deception is due to the minuteness of the differ
ence ; for we fail accurately to carry out the definition
of * proposition * and reasoning * from the abovementioned cause.
V III.
Since we know the various sources from (e) B y rewhich apparent reasonings arise, we also know those {
18
from which sophistical reasonings and refutations
would arise. By sophistical refutation and reasoning I to be germane
mean not only the seeming but unreal reasoning or re- uê/dis-01
futation but also one which, though real, only seems cussion.
to be, but is not really, germane to the subject in hand.
These are those which fail to refute and show up
ignorance within the sphere of the subject in hand,
and this is the function of examination. Now this is
a department of dialectic, but it may reach a false con
clusion owing to the ignorance of the person under
examination. But sophistical refutations, even if they
prove the contradictory of his view, do not make clear
whether he is ignorant; for men try to entrap even
the man of scientific knowledge by these arguments.
That we know them by the same method is clear ; [Note (a),
for the same reasons which make the hearers think refutetVons
that a conclusion has been reached as a result of ^ cs^ eon
questions, would make the answerer think so too, lines as
so that there will be false proofs as a result of all or p ^ f jnt
some of these causes ; for what a man thinks he has
47
ARISTOTLE
169 b
35 o te r a i SeSoi/ccVat, Kav ipw TrjO els Oelr).
nXrjv i n i
y e tivw v dfxa o v fifialv ei n p o o e p w ra v to iv S ees Kal

to
ifjevhos ifitfravllêiv, otov iv to is Trapa ttjv Xeiv
K al tov ooXoLKLGfjiov,
e l ovv o l n ap a X o y c o fio l TTJS
avTi(f>dows Trapa tov <f>aivofievov eXeyxov e l o i ,8 f j Xov oti ir a p a T ooav T a a v K al tu >v i/ievScov e lrja a v
40 ovX X oyiofiol Trap * o aa K al o <f>aivofievos eX eyxos .

170
ra
o 8 e < f> a iv o fie v o s T r a p a
otov y a p
T ra p a
iKXeiTTOVTOS
to
fir )
<j>aveir)
SiSo
av
Sta tov
o v fifia iv o v
aS vvaT ov K al o T as
f i o p i a tov d X r jO iv o v * K a eX eyxos,
X oyov,
K al
to
to
fir )
rt
in r o fie v o v
to v t o v
irrl
t o v Aoyou
o v fjb p a lv e iv
d v r i< f> a o iv
Kal
K a ra
(L a a v rc o s n a p a Te
Tt n a p a
10 a p x f j
to
to
napa
to v
eW
T avT o
w ot
to
to v
a vrl
Kal
T r a p a to
to
aAA
en l
K aO oX ov
tt)v
n p a y fia ro s
f ir ) i v a p i Q f i o v f i e v o v
X a fifid v e iv .
els
T ra p a
fio p to v ,
npos
e n l Tt rj n a p
o l n a p a X o y io fio i n a p a
o lo v
i p a j T r j o e i s f i l a v ttolojv T r a p a
ttjv n p o T a o i v t K a l ovt I tov K a O * a vto o
5 o v fi^ e ^ r fK o s ,
to v to
K al
eKaoTov to v t c v v
to v
iv
e x o ifie v a v n a p
ap x fj to iv
* oaa
y lv o v r a i
n X e l w f i e v y a p ovk a v e t e v ,
8 e T a e lp r ffie v a e o o v r a t n d v T e s .
"E a rt S o
oo^ iotlkos
eXeyxos ovx anXws eXey-
X os , aAAa npos Ttva* Kal o ovXXoyiofios (boavTws

48
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, viii

conceded without being questioned, he would grant
if he were to be questioned. But of course it some
times happens that, as soon as we ask the requisite
question, we make the falsehood obvious* as happens
in verbal fallacies and those due to solecism. If,
therefore, false proofs of the contradictory depend on
the apparent refutation, it is clear that proofs of
false conclusions must be also due to the same
number o f causes as the apparent refutation. Now
the apparent refutation depends on the elements
which compose a genuine one ; for, if any one of
these is lacking, there would only be an apparent
refutation, for example, that which is due to the
conclusion not resulting from the argument (the
reduction to an impossibility), and that which unites
two questions in one and is due to a fault in the pro
position, and that which is due to the substitution
of an accident for the essence of a thing, and a
subdivision of the last mentioned that which is due
to the consequent; moreover, there is the case where
the result follows in word only and not in reality, and
also where, instead of the contradiction being uni
versal and in the same respect, relation and manner,
there is a restriction in extent or in connexion with
another of these qualifications ; and then again there
is the case of the assumption of the original point due
to a disregard of the principle o f not reckoning it in.
Thus we should know the various conditions under
which false proofs occur, for there are no further
conditions under which they could occur, but they
will always result from the above causes.
A sophistical refutation is not an absolute refuta- [Note (*).
tion but is relative to some person, and so likewise ^1 rerntais a sophistical proof. For unless the refutation which tion is not
49
ARISTOTLE
170 a
av
fie v
y a p
15 o r j f i a l v e i v
fio v o v
o v re
ro v
firj
K al
ro S e
X a firf
o
n a p a
K al
aX X oi
o l
ovX X oyLopLoi
e p w rw fie v o v
re
ira p a
ttjv
w o a v rw s,
e o o v ra i,
eav
ovO 9
e o o v ra i, a n X w s
ev
e lX rf < f> a o iv ,
o fiw v v fio v
aAAa
o v r9
anX w s
AajScoat,
Se
e p w rw fie v o v
o rjfia iv o v
ro
o f io L o o x ^ fio o v v r jv
ovk
n p o s
ev
ro
eX eyxoi
o u re
tT p o s
fie v
e o o v ra i*
ov
ro v
y a p
< f)a iv 6 fie v o v , K a l n a p a
ro v S e .
I X . II a p a nooa S eXeyxovr a t ol eXeyxofievoi,
20
ov Set neipaoOai Xafifiaveiv avev rrjs rcov ovrwv

entorrjfiTjs anavrcov.
v t]S '
aneipoi yap
o t i /cat
oaa
to v to
lo c o s
at ano8eleis.
yap
eon v
S ovSefitas eorl rex~
a t eniorrjfiai, w ore SrjXov
eXeyxoi S elol Kal aXrjOeZs*
anoSeZâi, e o n
Kal eXeyâi rov
26 Oefievov rrjv avrlcfyaoiv rov aXrjOovs, otov el ovfi-
fierpov rrjv Siafierpov eOrjKev, eXeyêiev av

anoSelêi o n
aovfifierpos .
tls
rfj
w ore navrcov Serfoei
emorrjfiovas etvai* ol fiev yap eoovrai napa ras

ev yecofxerpla dpxds Kal ra rovrcov ovfinepaofiara,
ol Se napa ras iv larpLKjj, ol Se napa ras rcov
so aXXwv emorrfficov.
aAAa firjv Kal ol ifjevSeZs eXeyxoi
ofiolcos ev aneipois' KaO eKaorrjv yap rexyrfv eorl

i/jevSrjs ovXXoyiofios, olov Kara yecofierpiav o yecofierpLKos /cat Kara larpiKrjv o larpiKos.
ro Kara rrjv
35 SrjXov ovv
50
o tl
to
Xeyco Se
Kara ras eKeivrjs apxds.
ov ndin'wv rcov Xeyx<ov aAAa rwv
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, viii- ix

depends on equivocation assumes that the equivocal absolute
term has only a single meaning, and unless that which Native
depends on similarity of termination assumes that ^JJrer
there is only substance, and so on, neither refutation
ver r
nor proof m il be possible, either absolutely or rela
tively, to the answerer ; whereas, if they do make
these assumptions, they will be possible relatively to
the answerer, but not absolutely ; for they have not
seeured a statement which has a single meaning but
only one which appears to be such, and only from a
particular person.
IX .
W ithout a knowledge of everything which [Note (y). A
exists we ought not to try and grasp the various ways ^ p le0fcf aii
in which the refutation of those who are refuted is
brought about. This, however, is not the function sibie, beof any art ; for the sciences are possibly infinite, and a?e inanfte
so clearly demonstrations are also infinite.
Now in number.]
there are true as well as false refutations ; for wher
ever demonstration is possible, it is possible also to
refute him who maintains the contradictory of the
truth ; for example, if a man maintains that the
diagonal of a square is commensurate with its sides,
one should refute him by proving that it is incom
mensurate.
So we shall need to have scientific
knowledge of everything ; for some refutations will
depend on the principles of geometry and their con
clusions, others on those of medicine, and others on
those of the other sciences. Moreover, false refuta
tions also are among things which are infinite ; for
every art has a false proof peculiar to it, geometry a
geometrical proof and medicine a medical proof. By
4 peculiar to an art * I mean 4 in accordance with the
principles of that art.* It is clear, then, that we
need not grasp the commonplaces of all refutations
51
ARISTOTLE
170 a
napa tt]v StaA c ktiktjv XrjnTeov tovs Tonovs* ovroi

yap kolvoI 7rpos anaoav rexvrjv Kal Svvafiiv. Kal
tov fiev Ka0y eKaaTrjv emorrifirfv eXeyxov tov cm cTTrjfiovos eoTi Oecopeiv, ctTc firj tov (f>alveTai ei t
OTL, S ta Ti COTr TOV S C/C Ttov KOlVtOV Kal VTTO
40 firjhefilav Texyrjv tcov SiaXeKTiKtov. el yap exofiev
<Lv ol ev8ooi avXXoytOfiol nepl otlovv, exofiev
170 b e d)v ol eX eyxoi * o yap eX eyxos eonv dvn<f)doe(os
ovXXoyiofios, w o t fj ets fj 8vo ovXXoyiofiol a vn (f)doeojs eXeyxos cotiv.
exofiev apa Trap* onooa
navres elolv ol toiovtoi . el 8 c to v t exofiev, Kal
5 ras Xvoeis exofiev aI yap t ovrtov evoraoeis Xvoeis
elolv. exofiev 8 c , Trap * o7 rooa ylvovr a t, /cat t o v s
(f>aivofievovs, (f>aivofievovs 8 c
oV a > ow aAAa t o i s
toioIo Sc* aopiora yap eon v, eav tls OKonfj nap*
onooa <f>alvovra t T ot? tvxovolv.
wore (f>avepov
otl tov SiaXeKTiKov eo n t o 8vvao9ai XafieTv nap
o a a ylverai Sta tc o v /cotvah' t) div eXeyxos fj <f>aivo~
10 fievos cAcyôs*, /cat 77 StaAc/CTt/co? t) (fyaivofievos
StaA c ktlkos f) neipaoTLKos.
X . Ou/c cart Sc 8 ia<f>opa tcjv Xoytov fjv Xeyovol
TLves, t o
elvaL to v s
fiev npos Tovvofia Xoyovs,
c tepovs 8c 7rpo? ttjv 8 iavoiav aT0770V yap t o vn o-
16 XafipavcLV dXXovs fiev etvai npos Tovvofia Xoyovs,

erepovs Sc 7r/>o? rqv Siavoiav, aAA o v
tovs *
a v ro v s.
Tt yap eoTi t o firj npos ttjv Siavoiav aAA fj orav
fiTf XPVTat T(p ovofiaTt, c< <5 olofievos epwTaoOat,1

1 Heading with Poste < <5 oiofjLtvos ipwraaOai for olofievos
ipwraaOai tj>' <Lof the mss.
52
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, ix-x

but only those which concern dialectic ; for these are
common to every art and faculty. And it is the func
tion of the scientific man to examine the refutation [Note ().
which is peculiar to each science and see whether it is tions of the
apparent only and not real, or, if it is real, why it is so ; ^ e^^clan
whereas it is the function of dialecticians to examine a scientist
refutation which depends on common principles which j^hed.]
do not fall under any one art. For if we know the
sources of generally accepted proofs about any par
ticular subject, we know also the sources of the refu
tations ; for a refutation is a proof of a contradictory,
and so one or two proofs of a contradictory make up a
refutation. W e know, then, the various sources of all
such proofs, and, knowing these, we also know their
solutions ; for the objections to these are the solu
tions. W e also know' the various sources of apparent
refutations apparent, that is, not to everyone but
only to a certain kind o f mind ; for it would be an
endless task to examine the various ways in which
they are apparent to the man in the street. It is,
therefore, clear that it is the function of the dia
lectician to be able to grasp the various ways in
which, on the basis of common principles, a real or
apparent refutation, that is, dialectical or apparently
dialectical or part of an examination, is brought about.
X.
No real distinction, such as some people p r o - [Note ().
pose, exists betwreen arguments used against the wrord Unctions?/8
and those used against the thought; for it is absurd <) Argnto suppose that some arguments are used against against the
the word and others against the thought, and not the gJJJ* x
same in both cases. For what is failure to use the against the
argument against the thought except what happens thoughtwThen a man does not apply the term in the meaning
about which the man questioned thought that he
53
ARISTOTLE
170 b
0 ipOJTWfieVOS eh(X)KV;
7Tpos
T ovvofia.
to
20 4> ehcoKV hiavor)8eis,

to v
TO 8* CLVTO TOVTO OTl K al
he npos rr)v h ia v o ia v , ot av </>*
ovofiaros o io ito
el hf)1 nXeia) orjfiaivovros

ev or)fia w eiv Kal o epcorcov
Kal o epcoTcofievos, olov locos t o ov rj t o ev noXXa

orjfiaivei, aAAa Kal o anoKpivofievos Kal o epcorwv2
ev olofievos etvai r)pd)rr)oe) Kal eon v o A d y os o t i
ev navra, oSros npos Tovvofia c o t ai fj npos t t )v
25 hiavoiav t o v epcorcofievov hieiXeyfievos;
i he ye
t i s noXXa oierai or)fiaiveiv, hrjXov o t i ov npos rr)V

hiavoiav.
npwrov fiev yap nepl t o v s to i o v to v s
eorl Aoyoi;? to npos rovvofia Kal npos rf)v hiavoiav

0 0 0 1 nX eiw o rffiaiv o v o iv , e t r a n e p l o v n v o v v i o r i v
ov y a p ev t w Xoycp e o r l to n p o s t r)v h ia v o ia v e tv a i,
30
aAA ev t o ) t o v anoK pivofievov ex îv no)S n p o s r a
h eh o fiev a.
e tr a
a v r o v s e tv a i.
n p o s ro v v o fia n a v r a s
e v h e \e T a i
t o y a p n p o s ro v v o fia t o fir) n p o s
Tr)v h ia v o ia v e tv a i e o n v e v r a v d a .
e l y a p fir) n a m e s ,
e o o v r a i Tives e re p o i ovT n p o s ro v v o fia o v re n p o s

trjv h ia v o i a v o i he <j>aoi n a v r a s , K al h ia ip o v v ra i
35 fj n p o s ro v v o fia fj n p o s rr)v h ia v o ia v e tv a i n a v r a s ,
aAA o v s
n a p a ro
oi?.
aAAa fif)v
o o o i ovX X oyiofioi e lo i
nX eovaxcos, r o v r w v e lo i r iv e s o l n a p a
1 Omitting t i s after el S17.

* Omitting Zyvwv after epwrwv as a gloss.
54
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, x
was being questioned when he made the concession ?
And this is equivalent to using it against the word ;
whereas to use it against the thought is to apply it
to the sense about which the man was thinking when
he made the concession. If, then, when the word has
more than one meaning, both the questioner and
the man questioned were to think that it had only
one meaning as, for example, unity * and * being *
have several meanings but both the answerer answers
and the questioner puts his question on the supposi
tion that there is only one meaning and that the
argument is that all things are one will the argu
ment have been directed against the word and not
rather against the thought of the man questioned ?
If, on the contrary, one of them thinks that the word
has several meanings, obviously the argument is not
directed against the thought. For application to
the word and application to the thought belong
primarily to arguments which signify several things
ambiguously, but, secondarily, to any argument what
soever ; for the application to the thought does not
depend on the argument but on a certain attitude
of mind in the answerer towards what has been con
ceded. Next, it is possible for all arguments to be
applied to the word ; for in the case under dis
cussion * to be applied to the word * means * not to
be applied to the th ou ght/ For if all are not applied
to the word or the thought, there will be a third class
not applied to either ; but they declare that the
classification is exhaustive and divide them into those
applied to the word and those applied to the thought,
and there is no other class. But, as a matter of fact,
reasonings dependent on the word are amongst those
dependent on a multiplicity of meanings. For it is an
55
ARISTOTLE
170 b
rovvofia .
aroncos fiev yap Kal eiprjrai ro napa
rovvofia <f>aval navras rovs Trapa rrjv Xetjiv aAA*

ofiv eloi rives napaXoyiojiol ov rep rov airoKpivofievov npos rovrovs XLV ncos, aAAa ra> roiovSl
40 ipcbrrjfia rov Xoyov avrov exiv> o nXeico orjjiaivei.

171 wOAa>? re aronov ro nepl eXeyxov 8iaXeyeoOai,
aAAa fifj 7rporepov nepl ovXXoyiofiov o yap eXeyxos
ovXXoyiofios e o n v , diore xpV f<al nepl ovXXoyiofiov

nporepov fj nepl iftevhovs eXeyxov * e o n yap o roiov&ros eXeyxos (f>aivdfievos ovXXoyiofios a vn<f)doecos.
8io rj ev rep ovXXoyiofiw eorai ro a in ov rj iv rfj
a vn<f)doei
(npooKeioOai
yap
8ei rrjv avri<f>aoiv),
ore S iv dfi<f>oiv, av rj <f>aivofievos eXeyxos

8e o fiev rov oiycbvra Xeyeiv iv rfj a vn ^ a oei,
eon
ovk
iv ra> ovXXoyioficp, o 8e, a firj e ^ ot n s , S o w a t , iv
10 dfi<j>oiv, o 8e o n fj
kvk Xov
iv rw
fO firjpov noirjois oxrjfia S ta rov
ovXXoyioficp.
o S
iv firj8erepco
aXrjOrjs ovXXoyiofios .
A A A a 8rj o6ev o Xoyos rjXOe, norepov ol iv roTs
fiaOrjfiaoi Xoyoi npos rrjv Siavoiav eloiv rj o v ;
/cat
ei n v i 8oKeT noXXa orjfiaiveiv ro rpiycovov, Kal
16 e8coKe firj cos

on
tovto to
oxrjfia icfS ov ovvenepavaro
Si5o opOai, norepov npos rrjv 8iavoiav oSros
SieiXeKrai rrjv iKeivov fj o v ;

* E r t el 7roAAa fiev orjfiaivei rovvofia, o 8 e firj voei
56
absurd statement that 4 dependent on the name *
describes all arguments connected with language.
The truth is that there are some false arguments
which do not depend on a particular attitude of
mind on the part of the answerer towards them but
are due to the fact that the argument itself involves
the kind o f question which ean bear more than one
meaning.
It is quite absurd to diseuss refutation without (Refutation
previously discussing proof; for refutation is a proof, and Proof^
and so we ought to diseuss proof before discussing
false refutation ; for such refutation is an apparent
proof of a contradiction. Therefore the cause of
falsity will lie either in the proof or in the contra
diction (for the contradiction must be added), but
sometimes in both, if there be a merely apparent
refutation. In the argument that the silent speaks/
the refutation lies in the contradiction, not in the
p ro o f; in the argument that * a man ean give away
what he has not g o t / it lies in both ; in the argu
ment that 4 Homers poetry is a figure * because it
forms a cy cle/ it lies in the proof. The argument
that errs in neither respect is a true proof.
But to resume from the point whence the argu
ment digressed, Are mathematical arguments always
applied to the thought or not ? I f anyone thinks
that the term triangle has several meanings and
has granted it in a sense other than a figure which
he has proved to contain two right angles, has the
questioner reasoned against the answerers thought
or not ?
Further, if the name has several meanings but the
answerer does not think or imagine that this is so,
170 b 40.
57
ARISTOTLE
171a
firjh* oierai, na>s oStos ov npos rrjv hiavoiav S tetAe/CTat;

20 etr
nebs Set epcorav nXrjv StSovat hialpeoiv,
fj
ipcorrjoei1 tis et e a r t oiycovra Xeyeiv
v
\ t
* *t
eart fiev cos ov, eo n o
fj
ov,
fj
^ /
et ot) t is ootTj
cos vat;
firfhaficbs, o Se hiaXexOeirj, ap o i 7rpos rrjv hiavoiav

StetAe/crat;
/catrot o Aoyos* So/cet tcuv 7rapa to u -
vofia etvat.
ovk
apa eart yevos* rt Aoycov to npos
aAA* oi /xev 77/009 rovvofia eloi* /cat
rrjv hiavoiav.
25 roiovroi ov navres, ovx o n oi eXeyxoi, aAA ovS*

ot <j>aivofivoi eXeyxoi.
etcxt yap Kal firj napa rrjv
Aetv (fraivofievoi eXeyxoi, oJov ot 7rapa to ovfi-
fieprjKos Kal erepoi.

E t
S e/ T t s
Xeyeiv
30 npcorov
to
ipcorcbfievov
<f>avepov yap
r > s /
e o K e fifie v c o f i r j r
Aojs' A e'yera t.
ro is
Se
a ty o u v ra
rovro y* eorl
e ^ e tv ,
n a O e iv ;
e o n
e io o n
a p a
lo a i
e lo i
r a
Se
aA A
o n
v\
aA-
f if j h m X o is r i K coX vei
fjio v a h e s r a i s
e v a v rlc o v
fie v
fila
f ie v y v c o o r a r a
h v a o iv
ev
cbhl e v o v o a i
e m o rrjfirj
S*
fj
a y v c o o ra .
1 Reading c?r* epwrrjaei for ttr* cpwrrjoeie,

58
ri
to )
v n o A a fip a v o v n
Se SvaSes* a t
/cat a p a t o ) v
e v a v rla
at
S o /cet
aS vvaT ov
S tS a a / c e tv
noirjoei cos e ^ e t
//) f \
o/
firju
eV et /cat ev Tots*
re rra p o iv ;
a t Se coSt.
o v ;
noXXa%a)S
o firj oierai)' eneira ro
e a T a t;
35 t o v t o
S a > S t, a A A a
fiev aronov, ro aîovv (eviore yap ov
S ta tp e tv
hiaipeiv, o n Xeyco
a to t
fiev cbhl ra
Ta
has not the questioner reasoned against his thought ?
Or how else must the question be asked except by
offering a distinction ? In which case one will ask,
1 Is it or is it not possible for a man to speak when
silent, or is the answer in one sense N o/* in another
Yes ? * But if the answerer were to refuse to
grant the possibility in any sense and the questioner
were to argue that it is possible, has he not argued
against the thought of his opponent ? Y e t the argu
ment is generally regarded as among those connected
with the name ; there is not, therefore, any class
of argument which is directed against the thought.
Some arguments are directed against the name, and
such arguments are not all of them even apparent
refutations, still less true refutations. For there are
also apparent refutations which are not connected
with language, for example, amongst others, those
connected with accident.
But if one claims to make distinctions, saying,
By the silent speaking * I mean sometimes one
thing and sometimes another,* this claim is, in the
first place, absurd (for sometimes the question does
not seem to involve any ambiguity, and it is impos
sible to make a distinction where no ambiguity is
suspccted) ; and, secondly, what else will didactic
argument be but this ? For it will make clear the
position to one who neither has considered nor knows
nor conceives that a second meaning is possible.
For why should not the same proccss be used where
there is no double meaning ? Are the units in four
equal to the twos ? Bear in mind that the twos are
contained in one sense in one way and in another
sense in another way.* Again, Is the -knowledge
of contraries one or not ? Notice that some contraries
59
ARISTOTLE
171 b door* eoiKev ay v o eiv o

8i8a o K e iv
aijicov
to v to
8 ia X e y e o 0 a i9 /cat
to v
otl
ere p o v
Set r o v
otl
to
fiev
S iS ao K o v ra firj epcorav aAA* a v ro v 8rjX a iro ieiv , ro v

S ep co rav .
X I . vE r t
<f>avai fj a7To<f>avai a iovv o v 8 c t -
to
t a r iv, aAAa v eip a v X a fifia vovros.
/c iw r o ?
5 TTeipaoriKTf e o n
el8 o r a
aAAa r o v
ff y a p
StaAe/CTt/a? rts* /cat Oecopei o v r o v

/cat 7rpoo7TOiovfievov.
a y i'o o u v T a
fiev ofiv K ara t o irpayfia Oecopcov r a KOiva S ta -
A e/crt/cos, o Sc
tovto
Kal ov X X oyiofios
c/>aivofievcos 7toicov oo<j>ioriKos*
ep ioriK os
Kal oo<f>ioriKos e o n v
els /xcv o <j>aivofievos ov X X o y io fio s , 7rcpt cov 17 S t a -
10 AeKTLKTj TreipaoTLKTj
e o n , Kav aXrjdes t o o v fin e p a o fia
r o v y a p S ta r i aTrarTfriKos e a n m Kal o o o i firj

o v re s
K ara
rrjv
e /c a o r o v
fieOoSov
8 o k o v o iv etvai K ara ttjv re^yrfv.
rrapaX oyiofiol
r a y a p \ftev8oypa -
<f>r)fiara o v k ep ioriK a (K ara y a p r a w to rrjv reyyrjv

o t ira p a X o y io fio i) , o v S c y
15 Trepl
et r i e o n if*ev8oypd<f>rffia
dXrjdeSy olov t o eIrnroK parovs fj o r e r p a y t o -
v io fio s
Sta
tcov firfvioKojv .
aAA*
cos
B pvocov
irerp a ycovi^ e r o v kvkX ov , ct /cat rerp a ycov i^ era i o

k v k X os, aAA o n
oocfrioriKos .
o v K ara t o
cScttc
tc
7Tc/3t
jrp a y fia , Sta t o v t o

tc DvS c
ovX X oyiofios e p io riK o s X oyos, Kal o K a ra
cf>aiv6fievos
to
ir p a y fia
a On the method of squaring the circle by means of

hinnies and those employee! by Hippocrates and Bryson see
Ivor Thomas, Greek Mathematical HorA** (Loeb Classical
Library), vol. I, pp. 234-253, 310-313 (Hippocrates); 314317 (Bryson); and E. Poste, Soph, El. pp. 245 ff.
60
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, x-xi

are knowable, others are not.* Thus the man who (&) Didactic
makes this elaim seems not to know that didactic is *ai arguone thing and dialectic another, and that the man ment*
who employs didaetie should not ask questions but
himself make things clear, while the dialeetieian
asks questions.
X I.
Further, to demand that the answerer should (Êxaraieither affirm or deny is not the function of one who contentious
is displaying something but of one who is making dialectical*
an examination.
For the art of examination is a argument,
kind of dialectic and has in view not the man who
knows but the man who is ignorant and pretends
to know. The man, then, who views general prin
ciples in the light of the particular case is a dia
lectician, while he who only apparently does this is
a sophist. Now one form of contentious and sophistic
reasoning is reasoning which is only apparent, with
whieh dialectic deals as a method of examination,
even though the conclusion be true ; for it is deceptive
in the matter of cause. Then there are those false
reasonings which do not aeeord with the method of
inquiry peculiar to the subject yet seem to aeeord
with the art concerned. For false geometrical figures
are not contentious (for the resultant fallacies aeeord
with the subject-matter of the art), and the same is
the ease with any false figure illustrating something
which is true, for example, Hippocrates figure or the
squaring of the cirele by means of lunules. On the
other hand, Brysons method of squaring the circle,
even though this be successful, is nevertheless
sophistieal, beeause it does not aeeord with the subjeet-matter concerned. And so any merely apparent
reasoning on these topics is a eontentious argument,
and any reasoning whieh merely appears to accord
61
ARISTOTLE
171 b
20 <f>aivojievos
otikos
ovXXoyiofios 9 Kav fj ovXXoyiofios, epi-
Xoyos * <f>aivofievos yap e o n Kara
arrarrjriKOS Kal aSiKos.
wot
aywvi aSiKia elSos

ti?,
ovtws
rrpayfia,
eêt Kal e o n v aSiKOfiaxia
ti
ev avnXoyia
e o n v KL T yap ol
to
worrep yap rj ev
a S tfco/xa ^ ta
rj epioriKrj
viKav rrpoaipovfievoi
ttovtws
25 iravrwv arrrovrai Kal evravOa ol epioriKoi .
ol fiev
ovv rrjs viktjs airrjs X-Plv toiovtoi epioriKoi av Opwrroi Kal (fxAepihes Bokovoiv etvai, ol Se 8 orjs
yapiv
t rjs
els
ao<j>iGTiKTf
tis
XPVf1UTiofiov
eon v,
worrep
oo<j>ioriKor
elrrofiev,
rj
yap
xPr)liaTLariKV
anto oo<f>las <f>aivofievrjs, 8 io <f>aivofievrjs arro -
30 8elews e<f>levrai.
Kal rw v Xoywv rw v avrwv fiev
eloiv ol <f>iXepiSes Kal oo<f>iorai, aAA ov

eveKev.
tw v
avrwv
Kal Aoyos* o avros fiev eorai oo<j>ioriKos
Kal epiGTiKoSy aAA ov Kara ravrov, aAA* fj fiev

viktjs
tiko s '
<f>aivofievrjs, epioriKoss fj 8e oo<f>las, oo<f>ioKal yap rj oo<f)ioriKrj e o n <f>aivofievrj oo<j>ia
35 TIS aXX OVK OVOa.
ex<*>v rrpos
tov
tov
O S iplGTlKOS GTl 7TWS ovtws
SiaXeKTiKov w s o ifjev8oypa<f>os rrpos
yew fierpiKov
ck
yap
twv
avrwv r w SiaXeKriKw1
rrapaXoyiêrai Kal o ipev8oypd(f>os rw yewfierprj .*

aAA* o fiev ovk epioriKos , o n
K rw v apx&v Kal
172 a ovjnrepaofiarwv tw v into rrjv rexvrjv \jjev8oypa<f>er
o o
<
'
'
V7ro rrjv oiaAeKriKrjv rrepi fiev raAAa
ff
oti
1 Reading tu> hiaXcKriKip with Wallies for 8iaXctcriicr}.

2 Reading rw yeajfierpr) with Poste for rov yewfierprjv.
165 a 22.
62
>
epi-
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xi
with the subject-matter, even though it be genuine
reasoning, is contentious argum ent; for it only
apparently accords with the subject-matter and so
is deceptive and unfair. For just as unfairness in an
athletic contest takes a definite form and is an unfair
kind of fighting, so contentious reasoning is an un
fair kind of fighting in argum ent; for in the former
case those who are bent on victory at all costs stick
at nothing, so too in the latter case do contentious
arguers. Those, then, who behave like this merely M Conto win a victory, are generally regarded as contentious sophistical
and quarrelsome, while those who do so to win a argument,
reputation which will help them to make money are
regarded as sophistical. For, as we have said, the
art of the sophist is a money-making art which trades
on apparent wisdom, and so sophists aim at apparent
proof. Quarrelsome people and sophists use the same
arguments, but not for the same reasons ; and the
same argument will be sophistical and contentious
but not from the same point o f view. I f the semblance
of victory is the motive, it is contentious ; if the
semblance of wisdom, it is sophistical : for sophistry
is an appearance of wisdom without the reality. The () Further
contentious arguer bears much the same relation to b ^ eenSnS
the dialectician as the draw er of false geometrical andtea-US
figures bears to the geometrician ; for he reasons lectical
falsely on the same basis as the dialectician, while "S '11611**
the drawer of false figures argues on the same basis
as the true geometrician. But the latter is not a
contentious reasoner, because he constructs his false
figure on the principles and conclusions winch come
under the art of geometry, whereas the former,
arguing on principles which come under dialectic,
will clearly be contentious on the other subjects.
63
ARISTOTLE
172 k
OTiKOS ecrrai SrjXov.
otov o rerpaywvtafios o fiev
TCOV flTJVlOKCOV OVK eplOTlKOS, o Se B pvacovos

ipiGTLKOS* /cat TOV /XCV OU/C COTt jLtCTCVCy/CCtV aAA
5 *>) 7TpOS* yix)flTplaV fJLOVOV Sta TO C/C TOJV tSlOJV
etvai apx&v, tov S c Trpos* noAAovs, ocrot /x'ty taaat
to
SvvaTov iv c/caoraj /cat t o aSuvarov dpfiooei
yap. 77 cos1 'Avtk/mjov eVcTpaycuvtfev. ^ ct t i ? p/q
<f>alrj fieAttov etvai anto heinvov nepinareiv Sta t o v
Ztfvcovos Aoyov, oi/c larpiKos koivos yap- ct /xev
10 oiJv navrrj ofJbolcug efyev o ipiOTiKos npos tov StaAcktikov tco i]sevhoypd(f>cp npos tov yecofieTprjv, ovk
av rjv nepi e/cetvouv ipioTiKos. vvv S ou/c c o t i v o
SiaAeKTiKos nepl yevos ti cbpiofjievov, ouSc Sct/ctikos ovSevos, ovSe toiovtos otos o KaOoAov, ovre
yap car tv anavra iv evl tivi yevei, ovre el eirj, otov
15 t c vno Tas avTas dpx&s etvai Ta ovra. c o c tt* ovSc/xta Texyr\ tcov Setkvvovocov Tiva <f>vaiv epcoTT}TiKTj ecrriv ot; yap eijecrnv onoTepovovv tcov fiopicov
Sovvar ovAAoyiofjios yap ov ytvcTat i ajxcf>oiv, rj
Sc StaAeKTiKrj ipcoTrjTiKrj iativ.
el S eSet/cvvev,
ct /cat /Lti7 navra, aAAa Ta y c npcoTa Kal Tas olKeias
2 0 apxeis ovk av ^ p c u T a .
/z/q S i S o v t o s 1 yap ov/c av c t i
ct^cv e (ov CTt StaAc^CTat TTpos* ttjv evcrracriv. rj
Sid
1 Bekkers SiSovras is a misprint for SiSovro?.

B See PAys. 185 a 17; Ivor Thomas, op. ci7. pp. 310-317.
6 That motion is impossible ; see Phys. 239 b 10 ff.
64
For example, the squaring of the eirele by means of
lunules is not contentious, whereas Brysons method
is contentious.
It is impossible to transfer the
former outside the sphere of geometry beeause it
is based on principles which are peculiar to geo
metry, whereas the latter can be used against many
disputants, namely, all those who do not know what
is possible and what impossible in any particular
case ; for it will always be applicable.
And the
same is true of the way in whieh Antiphon used to
square the cirele. Or, again, if someone were to
deny that it is better to take a walk after dinner
beeause of Zenos argument,6 it would not be a
medical argum ent; for it is of a general application.
Accordingly, if the eontentious argument stood in
every respect in the same relation to the dialectical as
the constructor of false figures stands to the geo
metrician, there would be no contentious argument
on those topics. But, as it is, dialectical argument
has no definite sphere, nor does it demonstrate any
thing in particular, nor is it of the nature of the
universal. For there is no genus which ineludes all
things, and, if there were, it would not be possible for
them to come under the same principles. So no art
whieh aims at showing the nature of anything pro
ceeds by interrogation ; for it is impossible to grant
either one of two portions of the question ; for a proof
eannot result from both of them. Dialectic, however,
does proceed by interrogation, whereas, if it aimed
at showing something, it would refrain from ques
tions, if not about everything, at any rate about
primary things and particular principles ; for if the
opponent refused to grant these, dialeetie would no
longer have any basis on whieh to argue against the
65
ARISTOTLE
172 a
8 a v rr j K al T reipaoriK rj.
ov 8c y a p rj rreip a a riK rj
r o i a v r r j e a r lv o ia rj y e c o fie rp la , aAA rjv a v

K al firj elScos t i s *
e x te rn y a p ire ip a v Xafieiv K al
r o v firj e lS o ra to rrp a y fia r o d firj e lh o r o s , eirrep

25 K al hihcoaiv ovk e <Lv oiSev o v 8* K tcov ISicov,
aAA K TCOV 7TOflVCOV, oo*a TOLaVTa ioTIV a etSoTa
fiev ouSev KcoXvei firj elS ev ai rrjv re x v rjv , firj e tS o ra

avayK rj
a y voelv .
w o re
<f>avepov oti ovSevos
copiofievov rj 7TipaoTiKrj eirio rrjfirj i o r i v .
8to K al
7repl n a v rw v e o r l ' n a v a i y a p at r e y y a i % pcovrai

30 K al koivois n o i v .
Sto 7ravTs K al o i IS iw r a i rp o rro v
n v a x p a tv r a i t fj SiaXeKriKrj K al rre ip a o riK fj' ttovtgs

y a p fi^XP1 tw os e y x îp o v o iv avaK piveiv tovs eVayyeX Xofievovs .
r a v r a 8 e o r l Ta /cotva* r a v r a y a p
ov8ev fjTTOv lo a o iv a v r o i , Kav hoK w oi Xiav eijco

X eyeiv .
iX eyxovoiv
ofiv
a ir a v r e s '
drexv<os
yap
35 fie re x o v o i r o v r o v o S e v re ^v o js rj StaAcktiktj e o n ,
StaAe/<Tt/cds.
'
/
1
Kara iravrcov, ov
K a l o T e x v y o v X X o y to riK rj r r e ip a o r iK o s
i t
C7Tt o
\
\\>
<
> '1
eoTi rroXAa fiev Tavra
ro ia v r a
S coore
ofov at
aTTO<f>aaeis ,
c/>voiv n v a
etv a i
Ta S ov
Kal y e v o s ,
ro ia v r a
aAA*
aAAa tSta,
eWtv /c tovtoji' 7re/ot d7ravrajv neipav Xafi/3aveiv,
1 Heading ravra for ravra with HC and omitting kcu with

AB.
66
objection. Dialectic is at the same time an art of
examination ; for neither is the art of examination
o f the same nature as geometry but it is an art which
a man could possess even without any scientific
knowledge.
For even a man without knowledge
of the subject can examine another who is without
knowledge, if the latter makes concessions based
not on what he knows nor on the special principles
o f the subject but on the consequential facts, which
are such that, though to know them does not prevent
him from being ignorant of the art in question, yet
not to know them necessarily involves ignorance of
it. Clearly, therefore, the art o f examination is not
knowledge of any definite subject, and it therefore
follows that it deals with every su b ject; for all the
arts employ also certain common principles. Accord
ingly, everyone, including the unscientific, makes
some kind of use of dialectic and the art of examina
tion ; for all, up to a certain point, attempt to test
those who profess knowledge. Now this is where the
common principles come in ; for they know these of
themselves just as well as the scientists, even though
their expression of them seems to be very inaccurate.
Thus they all practise refutation ; for they perform
unmethodically the task which dialectic performs
methodically, and the man who carries out an
examination by means of an art of reasoning is a
dialectician. Now there are many identical principles
in every sphere, but these are not such as to have
a particular nature and form a particular class
resembling, in this respect, negations while others
are not of this kind but limited to special spheres ;
it is, therefore, possible by means o f these to hold ex
aminations on every subject, and that there can be an
67
ARISTOTLE
l7 2 b K a t e t v a i r i x vr] v T w (*> K a l W
aI
b e iK V V o v o r a i.
S io n e p
ro ia v r rfv
e p io r iK o s
etv a i
ovk
o la i
ea n v
o v r a i s e x o j v n a v r r j o j s o i p e v & o y p d c fr o s ' o v y a p e c r r a i
n a p a X o y ic r n K o s
aAAa
rtv o?
(b p io fie v o v
yevovs
apx& v,
n e p l n a v y e v o s ecrra i o ep ia r iK o s .
TpOTTOi f i e v o v v e ic r i v o S r o i r c o v cro<f>icrnK cbv e X e y X cu v o n
rov rcov
Kal
Sci v
ecrrl r o v
S ia X e K r iK o v r o
ravra
8vvaa6ai
yj y a p
ra?
n epl
O e c o p fjo a i n e p l
n o ie iv ,
n p o r a c r e is
ov
fie O o S o s
x a ^ 7T v
a n a cra v
x * i r a v r r f v r r jv d eco p la v .
X II.
K al
nepl fiev rcov eXeyxov eiprfrai rcov
10 <f>aivo[ievcov nepl
rov Xoyov els
rov i/jev86fievov n 8eiai Kal
Sc
ayayeiv
aSoov
yap yv Bev-
(to v to
repov rfjs cro</>icrriKfjs npoaipecrecos) npcorov fiev ovv

eK rov nvvOaveoOal ncos Kal
avfifiaivei fiaXicrra.
S ta
rfjs epcorrjcrecos
yap npos firjSev opioavra
to
Keifievov epcorav OrjpevriKov ecrn rovrcov eiKfj yap
15 Aeyovres afiapravovai fiaXXov eiKrj Sc Xeyovcriv,

orav firjSev
c ^ t ocri
npoKeifievov.
ro
re
epcorav
noXXa, kav wpiafievov ff npos o SiaXeyerai, Kal ro

ra
S oKovvra
Xeyeiv aiovv noiei n v
evnopiav rov
els dSoôv ayayeiv rj i/jevSos* eav re epcorwfievos

<f>rj ff ano(f>rj rovrcov n ,
20 evnopei.
Svvarov
Sc
a y e tv
npos a emxeipfjfiaros
vvv tfrrov KaKovpyeiv
rovrcov fj nporepov anairovvrai yap ri

to
ev apxfj
o r o t i c to v
nvos ff dSoov
68
to
Sc
rov
rv ^ c tv
to v to
S ta
npos
fj ifjevSovs
firfhefiiav evOvs epcorav Oecriv,
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xi- xii

art of doing this, though not o f the same kind as the
demonstrative arts. For this reason the contentious
arguer is not in all respects in the same position as
the constructor of a false geometrical figure ; for the
contentious arguer will not reason falsely on principles
of a definite class but will deal with every kind.
These, then, are the modes of sophistical refuta
tions. It is easy to see that to investigate them and
to be able to apply them is the task of the dialeetieian;
for the method of dealing with propositions constitutes
the whole of this study.
X II.
W e have now dealt with apparent refutations. (B) FalAs for showing that the answerer is stating a fallacy (C)Para!
and leading the argument towards a paradox for
these
this was the second aim of the sophist this is, in the are to be
first place, best achieved by some kind o f inquiry caused:
and by questioning. For to ask a question without <) By askdefining it in relation to a subject laid down is a good IJKions.
method of hunting out things of this so rt; for people
are more likely to fall into error when they speak at
random, and they speak at random when they have no
definite subjcct set before them. Also to ask a number (ft) By askof questions, even though the point against which one {JJJ qusc.r
is arguing is defined, and to demand that the answerer tions.
should say what he thinks, gives ample opportunity
of leading a man into a paradox or fallaey, and also,
if, when asked, he says * yes * or no * to any of the
questions, of leading him to topics on whieh one has
abundant material for attacking him. This unfair
method, however, is mueh less practicable than
formerly; for people demand, * W hat has this to do
with the original question ? * An elementary rule
for obtaining a fallacious or paradoxical statement
is not to put any thesis directly but to pretend that
ARISTOTLE
172 b
aAAa <f>aaKiv epwrav fiaOetv fiovXofievov âl/oav
yap enixeiprffiaros rj OKeifsis noieT.
25
IIpos Se
orlk o s ,
i/jevSofievov Seiai iSios ron os o oocf>i-
to
a yew
to
npos roiavra
7Tpos a
evnopei
Xoycov* eorai Se Kal KaXws Kal firj KaXws
to v to
7roieiv, KaOanep eXexdr) nporepov.

IlaAiv npos
to
napaSoâ Xeyeiv OKoneiv K rlvos
30 yevovs o SiaAeyofievos, elr

Xois
oStoi
en epwrav o
OTOIXÎOV 8 c TO VTW V TO T a S eK a O T W V
T l TOIOVTOV
elXrj<f>evai Qeoeis ev rats nporaoeoiv.

to v tc o v
ov Sta
35
rj TTpoorjKovoa cj>eperai
to v
ttoA-
tois
Xeyovoi napaSoôv e o n yap eKaorois
Xoyov ovfifialvei
to
Xvois Se Kal
efi<f>aviêiv o n
to
aSoôv* a el Se
to v to
Kal fiovXerai o aycoviôfievos.

vE rt
8ow v.
S
ov
eK
tw v
yap
fio v X rfo ew v
ravra
aAAa
X e y o v o i fie v t o v s
yw vy
fio v X o v ra i
8c ra
Kal
fio v X o v r a i
tw v
T
e v o x ^ fio v e o r a r o v s
< f> a iv o fie v a
< f> a v ep w v
Kal
tf> a o iv ,
tw v
X v o ir e X e iv ,
Xoo lo v
173 a reOvavai KaXws fiaXXov ff tfiv fjSews <f>aol Seiv Kal

neveoOai SiKalws fiaXXov fj nXovreiv aloxp&S, fiovXovrai Se ravavria.
rov fiev oSv Xeyovra Kara ras
fiovXrjaeis els ras cf>avepas S6as a Kreov, rov Se

Kara ravras els ras anoKeKpvfifievas* afi<f>orepws
5 yap avayKaiov napa8oa X eyeiv ff yap npos ras
<f>avepas ff npos ras a<f>aveis Soâ? epovoiv evavria.
Topics I l l b 32 ff.
70
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xn
one is asking from a desire to learn ; for this method
of inquiry gives an opening for attack.
A special method o f showing up a fallacy is the (c) By insophistical method, namely, to lead on es opponent op^Jlfent68
to the kind of statements against which one has ^ ^ n e ntg
plenty of arguments ; it will be possible to do this in which can
a right and in a wrong way, as has already been said. refuted^
Again, to elicit a paradox, you should see to what (A) By
school the person who is discussing with you belongs, him on'the
and then question him on some pronouncement of tenets of the
that school which most people regard as paradoxical; cai school to
for every school has some tenet of this kind. An bdoiigsfor
elementary rule in this connexion is to have a ready- his views in
made collection of the theses of the different schools general*
among your propositions. The proper solution here
too is to make it clear that the paradox does not
result because of the argument; now your opponent
always desires that this should be so.
Furthermore, you should seek for paradoxes in
mens wishes and professed opinions. For they do
not wish the same things as they declare that they
wish, but they give utterance to the most becoming
sentiments, whereas they desire what they think is
to their interest. They declare, for example, that a
noble death ought to be preferred to a pleasurable
life and honourable poverty to discreditable wealth ;
but their wishes are the opposite of their words. H e,
therefore, whose statements agree with his wishes
must be led to express the opinions usually professed,
and he whose statements agree with the latter must
be led to state the opinions usually hidden ; for in
both cases they must necessarily fall into paradox,
for they will contradict either their professed or their
secret opinions.
71
ARISTOTLE
173 ft
I I A e iO T O S
8e
COTt
T 07T 0S
TOV
T T O ie iV
X e y e i v , a x jT r e p K a l o
K a X X iK X r j s e v r w
y p a iT T a i
oi
X eycov,
10 ( j v f j b fi a i v e i v ,
v o fio v
Kal
to
T ra p a
ev a v ria
yap
8 c rra v res
a p ^ a to t
K ara
T T apd8o d
T o p y ia
<j>vaiv
Kal
ye-
w ovto
K a ra
tov
e l v a i <f>vaiv K a l v o f i o v , K a l
ttjv
8 i K a i o a v v r f v K a r a v o f i o v f i e v e l v a i K a X o v K a r a <j>vo iv
8 etv o v v
K aX ov.
ov
rrpos
fie v
v o f i o v C7rl
15 X e y e i v
ttjv
T r a p a S o tja .
8okovv.
ff
fie v o v
to o t c
r jv
S r jX o v
eX ey a i
ff
Sc
to
tcov
oti
fie v
KaTa
to
KaTa
c o tc u 1
<f>voiv
t o i s tto XX o i s
K a K e iv o i, K a O d rrep K a l o i
rrap a S o^ a
er r e x e ip o v v
*E v ta Sc
tov
<f>vaiv a y e tv * d fi< f)O T ep co s y a p
auTots* t o a X r jO e s , t o S c K a T a v o f i o v
vvv,
eh rovra
tov
K a T a $ v o i v K a T a v o f i o v a n a v T a v , T rp os Sc
X e y e iv
tov
d r r o K p iv o -
r r o ie iv .
e p c o T r ffi a T c o v e ^ e t afi< f>O T ep cos a S o o v
20 e t v a i TTfV a r r o K p i o i v , o t o v r r o T e p o v
t o is
o o< f> ois ff
tco
7r a T p l S e t r r e l O e a d a i , K a l T a a v fi< f> e p o v T a r r p a T T e i v
f j r a S t /c a t a , #cat a h iK e ic r O a i a l p e T c o T e p o v fj p X a r r T e i v .
S et
a y e iv
e ls
Ta
t o is
e v a v T ia , e a v fie v X eyrj
25 e l s
Ta
t o is
t o is
ttoX X o i s ,
ev X o y c o .
t is
ea v
cf>aal y a p
tto XX o i s
cos
cos
ol
K al
o l rrep l
ol
X oyovs,
ttoX X o i ,
fie v
crocf>ois
t o is
tovs
en l
a v a y K r js
Ta
tov
e v S a l f i o v a S t/c a to v e fv a t* Tots* S e 77oA A o t? a S o o v t o

f i a o i X e a fir j e v h a i f i o v e l v .
a 8oa o v v a y e iv
K aTa
v o fio v
30 S o a tcDv
to
v r r e v a v T ic o a iv
tto XX cov ,
eo n
a i) T o to > e l s
8c to
ttjv
a y e tv *
ovtcos
fie v
yap
v o fio s
o l Se oo cf> o l K a T a cf>vcriv K a l /caT*
a X r fd e ia v X e y o v a i v .
1 Heading Icrrai for elvai.

Plato, Gorgias 482
72
els Ta
K a T a <f>voiv K a l
e.
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xn
A commonplace rule which makes men utter para
doxes in abundance is the application of the standards
of nature and law, whieh Callicles is represented as
applying in the Gorgias a and whieh all the ancients
regarded as valid ; for according to them Nature and
Law are opposites, and justice is a good thing accord
ing to law but not according to nature. Therefore,
to a man who speaks in terms of nature you must
reply in terms of law, and when he speaks in terms
of law you must lead the argument to terms of nature ;
for in both cases the result will be that he utters
paradoxes. In the view of the ancients what aceorded
with nature was the truth, while what aecorded with
law was the general opinion of mankind. It is, there
fore, clear that they also, like the men of to-day, tried
to refute the answerer or to make him utter paradoxes.
Some questions involve a paradox whichever wayJjO BJe k
they are answered ; for example, Ought one to t?ons,Ufcho
obey the wise or ones father ? and, Ought one ^hTchmust
to do what is expedient or what is just ? and Is beparait preferable to suffer or to inflict a wrong ? You doxical*
ought to lead men to opinions opposed to those of
the majority and of the wise if a man speaks as
trained arguers do, you should lead him to opinions
opposed to the majority ; if he speaks as do the
majority, to opinions opposed to expert reasoners.
For some say that the happy man is necessarily just,
but in the view of the majority it is paradoxical that a
king should not be happy. To lead a man to paradoxes
of this kind is the same thing as to bring him into
opposition to the standards of nature and law ; for
law is the opinion of the majority, but the utterances
of the wise accord with the standards of nature and
truth.
73
ARISTOTLE
173 a
X III.
K ai ra
Ae y o f i e v
rototS c
ol
35 B ia <f> ep ei
to
&\
oe
Be
e l p r f K a f i e v rjB rf.
X oyoi
tovto
o v o fia
fj
\/
tovtcov
tov
X oyov
e ln e lv ,
) /
o fiev
n a vT es Be
fio v X o v T a i n o i e l v
e /
B e l fy jT e lv
aSoAca^ctv,
n o ifja a i
tov
aSoAca^ctv,
to
c/c
f i e v n a p a B o ija
7T pl
tcov to t t c o v
el
f ir j B e v
B in X d c r i o v
) v
) t c /
apa cartv r j f i i
k a i o m A a a io v r jfiia e o s t c l v t o , e i
a eos
/cat
carat
B m X a a io v s
r r a X iv a v
t e O f j,
a v rt
Tpis c a r a t
B m X a a io v .
40 S ca rtv
Kal
to v
fffila e o s
fffila e o s
SwrAaatoV .
B m X a a io v B m X a a io v fffila e o s
e lp r jfie v o v , fffila e o s fffila e o s fffila e o s
apa c a r tv
o p e i s fj B e o s *
ff e m O v f i l a f j B e o s ;
c a r tv apa
to v to
ff e m O v f i l a o p e ^ i s
fjB e o s fjB e o s .
173 b
E tat Sc navres ol
trpos
ti,
r t A cy cra t, /cat npos

5
Xoycov ev r c
t o i o v t o i tco v
rj r c opeîs
tiv o s
8vfilas Kal
to
to
a v r o /cat ev anoSlSoTai (otov
opetjis Kal fj emOvfila
BmXaaiov
tiv o s
ev
tco
enl
ti
tiv o s
en i-
BmXaaiov Kal
nXaaiov fffilaeos)* Kal oacov fj ovala

npos
to Is
oaa fifj fiovov r a yevrj aAAa /cat a u ra npos
ovk
81-
o v tco v
oXcoS, c5v ctatv eeis fj naOrj fj rt ro to u ro v ,

Xoyco avrcov npoaSrjXovrai KaTrjyopovfievcjov
to v to is *
olov
nepiTTOv apiOfios fieaov eyoov'
to
c a r t S apidfios nepirros' ca rtv apa apiOfios fieaov
10 câ>v apidfios.
/cat ct r o
aifiov KoiXoTrjs pivos
ca rtv , eaTi Be pis aififft cartv apa pis pis KolXrj.

O a tv ov ra t Sc 7rotctv
n poon vvO a vea O a i
ct
o v n o io v v T es
a r jfia lv e i
a 165 b 16.
74
ti
cvtorc Sta r o
K aO
fifj
au ro Ac^0cv
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xin

X III.
It is, then, by these commonplace rules that d > ) b a b you should seek to obtain paradoxes. N ext, as to How this
making people babble, we have already said what
we mean by this term. Arguments o f the following
kind all have this end in view ; * I f it makes no
difference whether one uses the term or the definition
o f it, and double and double of h alf are the same
thing, then if double is double of half, it will be
double of half of half ; and if double of half be
substituted again for double, there will be a triple
repetition, ** double of half of half of half. * Again,
* Is not desire desire of pleasure ? N o w 14desire
is an appetite for pleasure : therefore 44 desire is an
appetite for pleasure of pleasure. *
All arguments of this kind take place (a) when
relative terms are used, where not only the genera
but the terms themselves are relative and are ren
dered in relation to one and the same thing (for
example, appetite is appetite for something, and
desire is desire of something, and double is double
of something, namely, double of half), and (b) where
terms are used of which, though they are not relative
at all, the substance (namely, the things of which they
are states or affections or the like) is indicated in their
definition, since they are predicated of these things.
For exam ple,4 odd is a 4 number which has a middle
unit,* and an 4odd number exists, therefore an 4 odd
number is 4 number-that-has-a middle-unit number.
Again, if 4snubness is 4concavity of the nose, and
there is a 4 snub nose, then a 4snub nose is a 4concave-nose nose.
Men sometimes appear to induce 4 babbling * when
they do not really do so, because they do not further
inquire whether 4 double used by itself has a signifi-
75
ARISTOTLE
173 b
to SmXaaiov rj ovSev, Kal et t i arffiaivei, noTepov

15 to
fj eVepov, aAAa to avfinepaafia Xeyeiv
avro
aAAa <f>atverat Sta to to ovofia
evBvs.
X IV .
elvai
YioXoiKiapids S otov fiev eortv eiprfTai v p o eaTi Se to v to Kal noietv Kal firj 7toiovvto
Tepov.
<f>aiveoBai
20
tglvto
Kal arjfiaIveiv.
tovto
Kal
ttoiovvto
firj
SoKelv,
KoBanep
UpcoToyopas eXeyev, el o firjvis Kal o TrrfXrf^ appev

eoTiv* o fiev yap Xe'ycov ovXofievrjv aoXoiKiêi fiev
kot* eKeivov, ov (f>alvTat Se toIs aXXois, o Se ouAofievov (f>aivTai fiev aAA* ov aoXoiKiêi.
8?}Aov ovv
OTI KOV TXVr) Tis TOVTO SvVaiTO TTOielv StO TToXXol

tcov Xoycov ov avXXoyiôfievoi aoXoiKiafiov <f>atvov25 Tat avXXoyiêaBai, KaOairep ev to is eXeyôis.
Etcrt Se 7ravre? crêSdv ot
T ra p a t o
aAAa
B rjX v S r jX o l
a r j f i a i v e i , to
30 f i e T a ^ v
a r jfia iv e iv , n o X X a K is
to v
fie v
at
c f y e p o v a iv
at S
to f i e T a t j v .
to
o v t t j B fjX v t o
e K a .T e p o v , o l o v t i
okos.
< f> a iv o fie v o i a o X o i K i a f i o l
t o S e , K a l o t o v rj t t t c o o i s f i r y r e a p p e v fir f T e
touto ;
o fiv
Se
S oB evT O S
a p p evos
Srj
7T T c o a iv
Sta
c lv t
to k o i v o v
1(55 b
76
a X X r js .
20.
etv a i
o
to
a p p ev
B eX ei fi e v t o
a r ffia iv e i
Kal t o v
n o X X a K is
IfiV T at <1)S e l p r j f i e v o v t o v t o v '

35
o v to s
K a .K e iv c o v
K o X X io ttt], v X o v ,
iT T c o a e is a i r a a a i , t o v
ov.
fiev
Se t o v t o
Se
K o/ h -
0 -q X e o s
at
S e fie T a v
to v to ,
Stafie v
a v X X o y i-
o f i o l c o s S e K a l a X X rjv
ir a p a X o y ia fio s
to v to
TrAetovcuv
tverat
T T T cba ecov
b Beeause it is in fact feminine.
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xm-xiv

cation or no, and, if it has, whether the same or a
different one, but they appear to draw the conclusion
immediately. It appears, however, to have the same
signification also because the word is the same.
X IV .
W hat solecism is has already been stated. <E) soleIt is possible to commit it, and not to commit it, Sow this
yet to seem to do so, as well as to commit it, yet
seem not to do so. If, as Protagoras used to say,
p{jvis (wrath) and Try)Arj (helmet) are masculine,
according to him, he who calls wrath a destructress * (ovXofxevriv) commits a solecism, though he
does not appear to anyone else to do so,b but he
who calls it a * destructor (ovAoftei ov) appears to
commit a solecism but does not do so. It is obvious,
therefore, that one might produce this effect by art
also ; therefore many arguments appear to infer a
solecism, when they do not really do so, as happens
also with refutations.
Almost all apparent solecisms occur owing to the
word 1 this or 1 it * (rode) and when the inflection
denotes neither the masculine nor the feminine but
the neuter. 4 He * (ofo-os) denotes a masculine, * she *
(a vttj) a feminine, whereas * this * or * i t ' ( t o v t o ) ,
though meaning to signify a neuter, often signifies
either a masculine or a feminine.
For example,
4 W hat is this ( t o v t o ) ? * 4 It is Calliope/ or 4 It is
a log or 4 It is Coriscus/ The case-forms of the
masculine and feminine are all different, but some
of those of the neuter are different and others not.
Often, therefore, when 4 it ( t o v t o ) has been granted,
people argue as i f 4 him * ( t o v t o i ' ) had been used, and
they similarly use another case in place o f some
other. The false reasoning arises because 4 it * ( t o v t o )
is common to more than one case ; for it signifies
77
ARISTOTLE
173 b
to y a p t o v t o orffxaivei o tc fiev o v ro s o tc
Sc t o v t o v .
Set S ivaXXa orjfjialveiv, f i e r a fiev t o v
o v to s , fie Ta Sc to u
eirai
eon
to
to to v t o v , otov e o n
K o p io K o s, etv a i K oploK ov, K al e n l tcov OrjXewv

40 o v o fia rw v w o a v r w s , K al e n l tcov Xeyofievwv fiev
174 a (jKevcbv e\6vTCOv Se OrjXelas ff appevos KXrjoiv.
yap els
oaa
t o o Kal t o v reXevra, ravra fiova oKevovs
eyei KXrjoiv, olov vXov, oxoiviov, Ta Se firj ovrw s

appevos rj OrjXeos, chv evia cj>epofiev enl Ta OKevrj,
5 olov atJKos fiev appev rovvofia, kXivtj Sc OrjXv.

8 ionep Kal enl tcov to io v tw v w oavrw s to e o n Kal
t o etvai Sloloei.
Kal rponov n v a Sfioios i o n v o
ooXoiKiofios t o is napa t o
Xeyofievois eXeyôiS-
tol firj ofioia ofiolcos
atonep yap eKeivois in i tcov
npayfiarwv, rovrois in i tw v ovofiarwv ovfininTei

ooXoiKtêiv avQpwnos yap Kal XevKov Kal npayfia
Kal ovofia i o n v .
(Davepov ovv o t i to v ooXoiKiofiov neipareov iK
io
tw v elprjfievwv nrw oew v ovX\oyleoOai.

EiS^ fiev ovv T a v r a tw v aywvioriKwv Xoywv Kal
fieprf tw v eiSwv Kal rponoi ol eiprjfievoi.
8iacf>epei
S ov fiiKpov, iav raxOfj n w s ra nepl rrjv ipwrrjoiv
15 npos t o
XavOaveiv, wonep
iv t o i s
SiaXeKriKois*
icfreijrjs ovv t o i s elprjfievois Tavra npwrov XeKreov,

X V . " E o n 8fj npos ro iXeyxîv ev fiev firjKos
i.e. the fallacy from the figure of speech (fiyura dictionis).

78
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xiv-xv

s o m e t im e s h e " (oSros) a n d s o m e t im e s * h im *
{tovtov). I t o u g h t t o s ig n ify th e m a lte r n a te ly ; w ith
t h e in d ic a t iv e * is * (kern) it o u g h t t o s ig n ify th e
n o m in a tiv e h e * (oStos^ ; w ith th e in fin itiv e t o b e *
(e m u ) it o u g h t t o s ig n ify * h im * ( t o O t o v ) , f o r e x a m p le ,
I t is C o r is c u s , [ I b e lie v e ] it t o b e C oriscu s.* S o
lik e w is e w ith fe m in in e n ou n s a n d w ith s o -c a lle d
a rticle s o f u se , w h ich ca n h a v e e it h e r a m a s cu lin e
o r a fe m in in e d e s ig n a tio n ; f o r o n ly th o s e w h ich e n d
in -ov h a v e t h e d e s ig n a tio n w h ic h b e lo n g s t o an
a r tic le o f u se , e.g., r A o v ( lo g ) , (t \ o i v l o v (r o p e ). T h o s e
w h ich d o n o t ta k e th is fo r m h a v e a m a s cu lin e o r a
fe m in in e te r m in a tio n , a n d s o m e o f th e s e w e a p p ly
t o a rticle s o f u se ; f o r e x a m p le , aovcos (w in e -s k in ) is
m a s cu lin e a n d k Xlvt] (b e d ) is fe m in in e . T h e r e f o r e , in
su ch ca se s t h e r e w ill b e t h e s a m e d iffe r e n c e w h e n
t h e in d ic a t iv e is * (lo -n ) is u s e d a n d th e in fin itiv e
t o b e * (etra*).
A ls o , in a w a y , s o le c is m r e s e m b le s
th e k in d o f r e fu t a tio n w h ich is d u e t o th e u se o f
sim ila r te r m s f o r d issim ila r th in g s 0 ; f o r as in th e o n e
ca s e it h a p p e n s th a t w e c o m m it a s o le c is m in th e
c a t e g o r y o f a ctu a l th in g s , s o in th e o t h e r w e c o m m it
it in th a t o f n a m e s ; f o r m a n a n d w h ite * a re b o th
n a m e s a n d th in g s .
C le a r ly , th e n , w e m u s t t r y a n d a rg u e u p t o a s o le
cis m o n t h e b a sis o f th e a b o v e -m e n t io n e d ca s e -fo r m s .
T h e s e a re th e b r a n c h e s o f c o m p e t it iv e a rg u m e n ts
a n d th e ir s u b -d iv is io n s , a n d th e a b o v e a re th e m e t h o d s
o f e m p lo y in g th e m . N o w it m a k e s n o sm a ll d iffe r e n c e
w h e th e r th e a c c o m p a n im e n t s o f th e q u e s t io n a re
a r r a n g e d in a c e r ta in w a y w ith a v ie w t o c o n c e a lm e n t ,
as in d ia le c tic s . T h e r e fo r e , as a s e q u e l t o w h a t has
b e e n sa id a b o v e , w e m u s t first tr e a t o f th is s u b je c t .
X V . T o e ffe c t a r e fu t a tio n o n e e x p e d ie n t is le n g t h ; How to ask
79
ARISTOTLE
174 a
X aX en d v y a p
20Taôs
op yr)
o r o ix ^ io is
v o r e p l^ o v r e s
yap
tc
ovtw s
' a fia
r d v a v r ia
Ta
npos
Kal n p o s
eon
30
rov
npos
elv a i
ea v
re
yap
o v fifia iv e i
K p v tjjtv
ttjv
fj
npos
(frv X a K rjv .
X exO evra
n p orep ov
rovs
a va vevovra s
X oyov,
tov
e p w r r jo iv
X a fie iv
fjr r o v
fie p w v
S i8 w
35 K a O o X o v
fx e v w
a S r jX o v
cf
drr
av
a n o < f)d o e w s
n s
^ p ^ o tc o v *
S w K evai
yap
ovros
S v o K o X a iv o v o iv .
to
n o X X a K is
Kal r o is
KaO
ovk
ev lo r e
t is
o n
ovx
fj
npos
n X eiw
oX w s
w s r o v v a v r i o v f i o v X o fJ i e v o v , fj K a l c f
r r jv
n X eio v s
K al
Sc
navra
x P V (7LlJ'a
K p vif/ is
c X a d e lv r r js a n a r r js .
X a O e iv x ^ P LV>
npos
ovrw s
d y w v tG T L K O v s A o y o u s * rj y a p
tovs
Sc
o n
a h iK e iv
evaA A af r a
T rp o s r a v r o
K al
n o ie ia Q a t r r jv
to
Su-
r r js o p y r js
^ o v X o fie v o v
en
en
tfr r o v
Sc
o r o ix e ta
tr o i e t v
n O e v a i, ea v r e
Ao y o v s ,
yap
Sc
ev
r jr r o v n p o o p w o iv .
a v a to x v v reiv .
napanav
e p w r r jfia r a
e x j)
cauTov
< f> a v ep ov
Kal to
25
x p r jo r io v .
K a l < j> iX o v eiK ia ' r a p a r r o f i e v o i
v a v r a i < j> v X a rre< jQ a i n a v r e s .

to
e l s Sc t o fir jK o s
a jx a n o X X d cr v v o p a v .
n p o e ip r jfie v o is
t o is
yap
aK ovovoi
to o v n o io v v r a
rov
ora v
cfcacrrov,
e p w r r jr e 'o v ,
o h )6 w o w
ep w r r jr e o v ,
ri
fio v X e r a i
en l
rw v
en ayovra
aA A
ws
ro
ScSo-
a vrol
Sc-
< f> a iv o v r a i S t a r r j v
r r js
o io v r a i
a Topics viii.
1.
Kal
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xv
for it is difficult to keep many things in view simul- questions
taneously. To produee length the above-mentioned (l^Bypro^
elementary rules must be employed. One resource
d
is speed ; for when people lag behind they see less
far ahead. Further, there are anger and contentious
ness ; for when people are agitated they are always
(ess eapable of being on their guard. Elementary
rules for rousing anger are to make it plain that one
wishes to aet unfairly and to behave in an altogether
shameless manner. Another device is to put ones (2) By
questions alternately, whether one has several argu- Juesttons*
ments leading up to the same point or whether one
has arguments proving both that this is so and that
this is not so ; for the result is that the answerer is
on his guard at the same time against either several
or contrary attacks. In a word, all the resources for
concealment mentioned before are also useful against
competitive arguments ; for concealment is for the
purpose of escaping detection, and escape from
detection is for the purpose of deception.
When dealing with those who refuse to consent to (3) By inanything whieh they think is in favour of your f^[gatIon
argument, you must put your question in a negative negation,
form, as though you wanted the opposite of what you
really want, or, at any rate, as if you were asking
your question with indifference ; for people are less
troublesome when it is not clear what one wants to
secure. Often, when in dealing with particulars a (4) By asman grants the individual case, you ought not, in thûniver-1
the proccss of induction, to make the universal the
lias been
subjeet of your question but assume that it is granted
and use it accordingly ; for sometimes people think .
that they have themselves granted it and appear
to their hearers to have done so, beeause they recall
81
ARISTOTLE
174 ft
enaywyrjs five Iav, ws
av rjpwrrjfieva fidrrjv.
ovk
ev ols re fir] ovofian orjfialverai ro Ka&oXov, aAAa

rfj ofiotorrjrt xprjoreov npos ro ovfi<f>epov Xavdavei
40 yap r) ofioiorrjs noXXaKis npos re ro AajSctv rrjv
174 b nporaoiv rovvavrlov napafiaXXovra XPV nvvOaveotov el Scot Aa/Jctv o n Set navra rw narpl
o6ai.
neiOeoBai, norepov aTravra Set neiOeoOai rots y o vevoiv fj navr
aneiOetv;
Kal ro noXXaKis noXXa,
norepov noXXa ovyx<opr]reov fj oXiya;
fiaXXov yap,
5 etnep avayKrj, Sofctev av etvai noXXa napanOefievwv yap
e y y v s rw v evavriwv, Kal fietcu Kal
fieyaXa <f>aiverai Kal ^ctpw Kal fieXnw rots avdpwn ois.

S ^ o S p a Sc
ro
io
fia X ia r a
rw v,
ro
ro
K a l n o X X a K is n o i e i
o o ^ io t ik o v
aAAa
o v X X e X o y io fie v o v s ,
'L o < f> ia n K o v
< f> a iv o fie v o v
yap,
ovrw
av
a io v v
K al
apa
to
to
K e ifie v o v
ro
n orep ov
e ln e lv ,
ws
napahoôv
n p o K e ifie v o v
to
rod
e p w r r jfia
ooi
cov
S o /c c t ;
a va yK rj
o v X X o y io fio s ,
fj
n a p a S o ijo v y iv e o O a i, S o v r o s fie v e X e y x o v ,
a Cf. Topics 156 b
82
K al
to
d n oK p tv eoO a i
n o ie to O a i,
fj
fj
Sc
o v fin e p a v r iK w s
ovk
e i; a p x t f s , K a l r r jv e p w r r j o i v r w v t o i o v -
hoK odvTos
eX eyxov
iX r jX e y x O a t
f i r j S e v o v X X o y i o a j i e v o v s f ir ] e p w r r j f i a n o i e i v
r e X e v r a lo v ,
15 t w v
Sofcctv
o v K o < f> d v r r jfia r w v e p w r w v -
10 ff.
the process of induction and think that the question
would not have been asked without some object.
Where there is 110 term to signify the universal, you
should nevertheless use the resemblance o f the
particulars a for your advantage ; for the resemblance
often passes unnoticed. Also, in order to secure your (5) By
premiss, you should contrast it with its contrary in ttat^proyour question. For example, if you want to secure
the premiss that one ought to obey ones father in through
all things, you should ask whether one should obey
ones parents in all things or disobey them in all contrary,
things. I f you want to establish that the multiplica
tion of a number many times over results in a large
number, you should ask whether it should be con
ceded that it is a large 01* that it is a small number ;
for, if pressed, one would rather that it should seem
to be large.
For the juxtaposition of contraries
increases the quantity and quality o f things, both
relatively and absolutely, in the eyes of men.
Often the most sophistical o f all frauds practised (6) By
by questioners produces a striking appearance of |Usutemit
refutation, when, though they have proved nothing, * ^ tion
they do not put the final proposition in the form of 8 n*
a question but state conclusively, as though they had
proved it, that * such and such a thing, then, is not
the case.
Another sophistical trick is, when the thesis is a (7) By
paradox, to demand, when the generally accepted pênton
view is originally proposed, that the answerer should ^ horns
reply what he thinks about it, and to put ones dilemma,
question in some such form as Is that your opinion ? *
For, if the question is one of the premisses of the
argument, either a refutation or a paradox must
result. I f he grants the premiss, there will be a
83
ARISTOTLE
174 b
/i f ) Sovros S e fir)S e S o K e iv <f>aoKOVTOS aSofov, fir)

Sovros Se SokcZv 8* ofioXoyovvros iXeyxoeiSes.
"E n KaOanep Kal ev roZs pr)ropiKoZs> Kal ev tois

20 eXeyKTiKols ofioitos Ta ivavndfiara 6ecoprjreov fj
npos ra v<j> eavtov Xeyofieva, fj npos ovs ofioXoyet

KaXcbs Xeyeiv fj nparreiv, e n npos tovs SoKodvras
toiovtovs fj npos tovs ofioiovs fj npos tovs nXelotovs f) npos navras.
noXXaKis,
wanep re Kal anoKpivofievoi
orav eXeyxcovrai, noiovoi
Sirrov,
av
25 fieXXrj ovfifialveiv iXeyxOrfoeoQai, Kal ipajrwvras

Xpycrreov nore rovrcp npos rovs eviorafievovs, av
d)Sl fiev Gvfxpaivr) wSl 8c firj, o n ovra)? etXrjêv,
olov o KAeo<f>a>v noieZ iv rw MavSpofiovXa>.
Set Se
Kal aîarafievovs to v Xoyov ra Xoma rwv inix*iprjfiarojv inirefjiveiv, Kal rov anoKpivofievov, av
30 npoaiadavrjrai, npoevioraoOai Kal npoayopeveiv.
inixeiprjreov 8 iviore Kal npos aAAa rov elprjfievov, iKeZvo iKXaflovras, iav fir) npos to Keifievov
exx) tis inixeipeZv- onep o AvKO(f>pa)v inoirjue npopXrjOevros Xvpav iyKU)fiidêiv.
airovvras npos n
npos Se rovs an-
inixeipeZv, ineiSrj SoKeZ SeZv
35 anoSiSovai rrjv air iav, XexOevrcjv 8 iviwv ev<f>vXaKTorepov, ro KaOoXov ovfi/3aivov iv roZs iXeyxois
Xeyeiv, rrjv avri<j>aaiv, o n e<f>rjaev dno<f>rjaai, fj
0 It has been conjectured that the author of this dialogue

was Spetisippus.
84
refutation ; if he refuses to grant it and even denies
that it is the generally accepted view, he utters a
paradox ; if he refuses to grant it but admits that
it is the generally accepted view, there will be the
appearance of a refutation.
Moreover, as in rhetorical arguments, so likewise (8) By seekalso in refutations, you ought to look for contradic- dictions"
tions between the answerers views and either his between the
own statements or the views of those whose words your opand actions he admits to be right, or of those who are the school
generally held to bear a like character and to re- to which he
semble them, or of the majority, or of all mankind. bel0I,gsAlso, just as answerers, when they are being refuted, (9) By
often draw a distinction, if they are on the point of that^term
being refuted, so questioners also ought sometimes, has a double
when dealing with objectors, if the objection is valid
against one sense of the word but not against another,
to resort to the expedient of declaring that the
opponent has taken it in such and such a sense, as
Cleophon does in the MandrobulusS1 They ought also (ip) By
to withdraw from the argument and cut short their ftomyour1
other attacks, while the answerer, if he perceives this
to
move in time, should raise anticipatory objections and attack,
get his argument in first. One should also sometimes (ii) By
attack points other than the one mentioned, excluding fêvant
it if one can make no attack on the position laid down, points,
as Lycophron did when it was suggested that he
should deliver an encomium on the lyre. To those (12) By >
who demand that one should take some definite {totûr*8
point of attack (since it is generally held that one object is^
ought to assign the object of a question, whereas if eontradiecertain statements are made the defence is easier), 0pp0e,$sr
you should say that your aim is the usual result of thesis,
refutation, namely, to deny what your opponent
85
ARISTOTLE
174 b
a n e< f> r)o e <f>fjcrai, aAAa fir) o n t w v i v a v r i w v f j a v r f )
TTLOTr)fX't] Tj 01>X fj OLVTTj. OV 8L Se TO 0VfJL7TpCLOfJ,a
TTpOTOTLKWS pWT&V VL(L 8 Ol58 pWTTJTOV, aAA*
40 ws ofioXoyovfievois1 XPV(TT*0V'
175 a X V I . E f J)V fiev ofiv aI ipWTr)0LS, Kal 7TWS
e p w r r jr e o v i v r a is d y w v ic r n K a is S ia r p ifta T s , e i p r ) r a i m
7TpL 8e d n O K p l(J W S , KCLl TTWS X P V AulV K a l T I , K a l
7T p o s r i v a x P ^ o i v o i
t o io v t o i
tw v
X o y w v w < j> e X ifio i,
r a u r a Ae K r e o v .
X/oijatyWH fiev o5v eicrl npos fiev (f>iXocro<f)iav 8ia
fx erd
Suo. npwrov fiev yap ws ini t o noXv yivofievoi

napa t t j v Xetjiv afieivov e^civ noiovoi npos t o
nocrax&s e K a v T o v Xeyerai, K a l noTa ofiolws K a l
noTa erepws ini re t w v npay/iarwv avfiflaivei K a l
10 ini t w v ovofiarwv. 8evrepov 8c npos ras KaO*
avrov r)rr)aeismo yap v<f>* erepov pahiws napaXoyiôfievos K a l t o v t o fiff alaOavofievos Kav avros
v<f>* avrov t o v t o nadoi noXXaKis. rpirov 8c K a l
t o Xomov en npos 8oâv, t o nepl navra yeyvfivaoOai 8OKeTv K a l firjbevos aneipws eXLV' ro yap
15 Koivwvovvra Xoywv i/jeyeiv Xoyovs, fir)Sev eXovra
hiopiêiv nepl rfjs <f>avX6rr)ros avrwv, vnoiplav
StScoai rod SoKeTv Svox^paiveiv ov Sia rdXr)0es
aAAa 8t aneiplav.
*AnoKpivofxevois 8e nws anavrrfreov npos rovs
Xoyovs, <f>avepov, einep opdws elprjKafiev
nporepov i t ; wv elalv oi napaXoyicrfioi, K a l ras i v
20 rw nvvOaveuOai nXeoveias iKavws Si eiXofiev. ov
ravrov 8* earl Xafiovra re rov Xoyov IBeTv Kal Xvaai
rf)v fJioxOrjpiav, K a l epwrwfievov dnavrav hvvaaOai
to lo v to v s
86
Reading ofioXoyovfievois with Wallies for ofiohoyovfievtp.
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xv-xvi

affirmed and affirm what he denied, and not to prove
that the knowledge of contraries is the same or not
the same. One should not ask the conclusion in the
form of a proposition, and some propositions should
not be asked at all but treated as admitted.
X V I.
W e have now dealt with the sources of ques- t h e
tions and how they ought to be asked in competitive qfLfal? N
arguments. W e must next treat o f answering, and how l a c i e s
solutions are brought about, and what are their sub- xvi-xxxiii).
jects, and for what purpose such arguments are useful. ^narks
They are useful for philosophy for two reasons. The reasons
In the first place, as they generally turn on language, soiudous?118
they put us in a better position to appreciate the
various meanings whieh a term can have and what
similarities and differences attach to things and their
names. Secondly, they are useful for the questions
which arise in ones own mind ; for he who is easily
led astray by another person into false reasoning and
does not notice his error, might also often fall into this
error in his own mind. A third and last reason is that
they establish our reputation, by giving us the credit
of having received a universal training and of having
left nothing untried ; for that one who is taking part
in an argument should find fault with arguments with
out being able to specify where their weakness lies,
rouses a suspicion that his annoyance is apparently
not in the interests of truth but due to inexperience.
How answerers should meet sueh arguments is The necesobvious if we have adequately described above the practice,
sources of false arguments and distinguished the
fraudulent methods of questioning. To take an argu
ment and see and disentangle the fault in it is not
the same thing as to be able to meet it promptly when
165 b 24 ff.
87
ARISTOTLE
175 a
ra ^ eco?.
o y a p l o f i e v , n o X X a K is fie T a T iO e fie v o v a y -
v o o v fiev .
e r e S ', w a n e p i v t o Ts a X X o is t o OaTTOv K a l
r o f i p a S v r e p o v iK t o v y e y v fi v a c r O a i y l v e r a i fia X X o v ,
25 ovtco
Kal
in i
tcov
X oycov
e x * i>
fjlev rjfjuv T], a fie X e T r jT o i 8

Ka ip c o v n o X X a K i s .
t o is
w a re,
av
S rjX ov
w f i e v , v o r e p o v f i e v tcov
o v fifia iv e i Se n o r e , K aO anep i v
S i a y p a f i f i a o i v ' K a l y a p K i a v a X v o a v r e s i v i o r e
o v v O e iv a i
30 i X e y x o i s ,
rra X iv
e 18 o r e s
a S v v a T o v fie v
Trap9 o
iv
t o is
o v fifia iv e i
Kal
ovv-
ovtco
X oyos
e ip a i, S ia X v o a i to v X o y o v a n o p o v fie v .
X V I I . YlpcoTOv fiev ovv, wonep
ovXXoyiêoOai
<f>afiev iv8ow s 7Tore fiaXXov fj dXrjdws npoaipeTaOai

Seiv, o v t c o Kal Xvreov nore fiaXXov iv8ocos fj Kara
TaXrjOes.
oXcos yap Trpos t o v s
ipiOTiKovs fi&X~
35 reov oi>x tbs iXeyxovras aAA ws <j>aivofievovs* ov

yap <f>a{iev ovXXoylêordal ye
to
fifj SoKeiv Siopdwreov.
avrovs, ware Trpos
el yap e o n v o eXeyxos
avri<f>aois fif] ofiwvvfios eK t i v w v , ovSev av Seoi

SiaipeToOai npos rafi<f>ifioXa Kal t t j v
ov yap Troiei avXXoyiafiov.
40 X (*P IV TTpooSiaipeTeov aAA9 fj
<f>aiveTai iXeyxoeiSes.
to
o ti
ovkovv to
8ok T v evXajSrjreov, inel t o
ofiwvvfiiav
aAA ovSevos* aAAov

to
ovfinepaofia
iXeyxOijvai aAAa
y 9 ipw rav afi<f>tfioXa
175 b Kal Ta napa rfjv ofiwvvfiiav, oorai r
aXXai roiavrai
napaKpovaeis, Kal t o v aArjdivov eXeyxov aâviêi

Kal t o v
noieT.
88
iXeyxofievov Kal fifj iXeyxofievov aSrjXov

inel yap eêanv in i reXei ov/inepavafievov
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xvi- xvii

one is asked a question.* For we often fail to
recognize something which we know when it is pre
sented in a different form. Furthermore, as in other
spheres a greater degree of speed or slowness is
rather a question of training, so in argument also ;
therefore, even though something may be clear to us,
yet, if we lack practice, we often miss our opportuni
ties. The same thing happens sometimes as with geo
metrical diagrams ; for there we sometimes analyse
a figure but cannot reconstruct i t ; so too in refuta
tions we know how the argument is strung together,
but we are at a loss how to take it to pieces.
X V I I.
In the first place, then, just as we say that Apparent
we ought sometimes deliberately to argue plausibly rather than
rather than truthfully, so too we ought sometimes reaj^must
to solve questions plausibly rather than according to besought
truth. For, generally speaking, when we have to
fight against contentious arguers, we ought to regard
them not as trying to refute us but as merely appear
ing to do so ; for we deny that they are arguing a
case, so that they must be corrected so as not to
appear to be doing so. For if refutation is unequi
vocal contradiction based on certain premisses, there
can be no necessity to make distinctions against
ambiguity and equivocation ; for they do not make
up the proof. But the only other reason for making
further distinctions is because the conclusion looks
like a refutation. One must, therefore, beware not
o f being refuted but of appearing to be so, since the
asking of ambiguities and questions involving equi
vocation and all similar fraudulent artifices mask even
a genuine refutation and make it uncertain who is
refuted and who is not. For when it is possible in
the end, when the conclusion is reached, to say that
89
ARISTOTLE
175 b
5 firj
077ep e</>rjcrev a7T0(/>fjaai Xeyeiv, aAA* ofiwvvfiws,
/\
j w
1*
' i '
Vfr \
et k at ort fiaAicn eTiêv em ravrov <pepwv3 abrjAov
et
el eXrjXeyKTai aSrjXov yap el aXrjOrj Xeyei vvv.
5 \ \ /
b i e A w v rjpeTO
oe
\ f /
t o o f i w v v f i o v rj
o v k a v a S rjX o s rjv o e X e y x o s .
\ > j /n \
t o a fit p ip o A o v ,
o t * e in t^ T O V c n v v v
f i e v fjT T o v T r p o r e p o v S e fia X X o v o i e p iG T iK o i, t o
10 vat
fj
ov
a r r o K p iv e o d a i
to v
e p w T W fie v o v ,
fj
e y iv e r *
v v v S e Sta t o firj K a X w s e p w T a v t o v s n v v O a v o -
av.
fie v o v s
a va yK rj
T T p oG a -n oK piveoO al rt
f i e v o v , S io p O o v v r a t t j v
tov
fio x ^ r jp ia v t r js
epw rw -
n p oT a aew s,
e rr e l SteAo f i e v o v y e I k o v w s fj vat fj o v a v a y K r j X e y e i v
t o v a r r o K p iv o jie v o v .
15
E t S e t i s VTToXrjifjeTai t o v K a T a o f i w v v f i i a v e X e y x o v
e tv a ij
rporrov
Xâda t
tov
a v a y K a io v
T iv a
eoT a i
e<f>rj(jev airo(f>rjcrai
e<f>rjae (f>fjaai.
20 o(f>eXos
ovk
S ia<f>vyeiv t o
a r r o K p i v o f i e v o v erri
ov
ws
yap
yap
yap
o v o fia , K al
S io p Q o v v ra l
K o p tW o v
K a l a fio v c r o v , a A A a t o v t o v t o v K
K o p ic r K o v a f i o v o o v .
e c r r a i Aoyos* t o
tovtov 1
tov
K o p io K o v
ouS ev
fio v a iK o v
yap
tw
a vtos
tovtov
K o p i o K o v a f i o v a o v e t v a i fj f i o v c r i K o v o v e p a f i a
<j>rjoi t c
/c a t aTro<f>rj<jiv.
aA A
f i a i v e f o v S e y a p e/cet T o v v o f i a .
lo w s
ov
ravro
crrj-
c5 o r e t i Sta<e/>et;2
1 rovrov added by Waitz.

2 Poste reads ri for rt and adds the question mark.
90
an-
fio v a iK o v
0pi<JK0 V
Kal tov to v tov
tov
T iv e s ,
<f>acrlv e t v a i
eX ey-
opaT w v
tw v
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xvn

ones opponent contradicted what he asserted only
by means of an equivocation, however true it may be
that he happened to be tending in the same direction,
it is uncertain whether a refutation has taken place ;
for it is uncertain whether he is speaking the truth
now. If, however, one had made a distinction and
questioned the equivocal or ambiguous term, the re
futation would not have been uncertain. Also, the
object of contentious arguers though it is less their
aim in these days than formerly would have been
carried out, namely, that the person questioned
should answer * Yes * or * No *; as it is, however,
because the questioners put their questions im
properly, the person questioned is obliged to add
something in his answer by way of correcting the
unfairness of the proposition, since, if the questioner
makes adequate distinctions, the answerer must say
either Yes * or * N o .
I f anyone is g o in g to imagine that an argument if one supi_.
.
o .o
6 .
. .
.i, poses that
which rests on equivocal terms is a refutation, it will
argube impossible for the answerer to avoid being refuted
in a certain sense ; for in dealing with visible things equivocaone must necessarily deny the term which he asserted ^Station
and assert that which he denied. For the correction the answerer
which some people suggest is useless. For they do escape being
not say that Coriscus is musical and unmusical, but
that this Coriscus is musical and this Coriscus is un
musical. For it will be making use of the same
expression to say that this Coriscus is unmusical (or
musical) as to say that this Coriscus is so ; and one
is affirming and denying this at the same time. But
perhaps it does not mean the same th in g ; for
neither did the name in the former case ; so what
is the difference ? But if he is going to assign to the
91
ARISTOTLE
175 b
25 ct Sc t w fiev t o d7rAa>s* Xeyeiv Koptcr/cov anobcocrei,
tw Sc npooOfjaei t o rtva fj to v Sc, aT onov ouScv
yap fiaXXov OaTepco* onoTeptp yap av ovSev Sta<f>epei.
Ou f i f j v aAA* e n e i h f j a S r jX o s f i e v cortv o f i fj Sto p i o d f i e v o s ttjv dfi<j>ifioXiav n o r e p o v iX r jX e y K T a i fj o v k
30 e X r jX e y K T a i, ScSorat S e v
t o is
X o y o is
to
StcActv,
<p a v e p o v o t i t o fi fj Stoptaavra SoOvat r f j v epioT T jcn v
aAA aTrAcD? d fia p T T jfia cortv, coorc /cav e l fi f j a v t o s ,

aAA o y e X o y o s eX r jX e y fiev c p o f i o i o s cartv.
fia iv e i
fiev ro i
n o X X a K is
op covras
r fjv
o v fi-
dfi<f>ifioXiav
o K v e iv S ia ip eT o O a i Sta r f j v n v K v o T T jr a tcov ra ro t-
35 a v r a
n p o T e iv o v T c o v ,
h v o K o X a iv e iv
ctr
o n cos
ovk
av
fi fj
npos
olrjO evT cov
anav
napa
S okcocii
tovto
y e v e o O a i t o v X o y o v , n o X X a K is d n r ji n r j o e n a p a 8 o o v .
coot
e n e i S f j ScSorat Statpctv, o v k O K vrjT eov, K a d d n e p
eX exO rj n p o r e p o v .
Et Sc ra Suo epooTTjfiaTa fifj ev noiel tis ipcoTTjfia,

40 oi5S av o napa rfjv oficovvfilav /cat rfjv dficf>if}oXiav
eyivero napaXoyiOfids, aAA fj eXeyxos fj ov.
ti
176 a yap 8iacf>epei epcoTrjcrai el KaAAta? /cat OefiicjTOKXrjs
fiovaiKoi eloiv fj ct dficf>oTepois cv ovofia fjv erepois

oficriv;
ct yap nXeico S77A01 evos, nXeico fjpcoTTjcrev.
ct ofiv fifj opOov npos Svo epuyrrjcreis fiiav anoKpioiv

atjiovv Aa/x/Savctv anXd)s, cf>avepov
5 TjKei
92
tcov
oti
ovSevi npoo-
oficovvficov anoKpiveoOai anXcbs, ov S ct
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, x v i i
one person the simple appellation * Coriscus,* while
to the other he adds4 a certain *or * that, it is absurd ;
for the addition belongs no more to the one than to
the other ; for it makes no difference to whichever
of the two he adds it.
However, since, if one does not distinguish the
meanings of a doubtful term, it is not clear whether
he has been confuted or not, and since the right to
draw distinctions is conceded in arguments, it is
obvious that to grant the question simply, without
making distinctions, is a mistake ; so that, even if
the man himself does not appear to be refuted, yet
his argument certainly appears to be so. It frequently
happens, however, that, though people see the
ambiguity, they hesitate to make the distinction,
because of the numerous occasions on which people
propose subjects of this kind, in order to avoid seeming
to be acting perversely all the time. Then, again,
though people would never have thought that the
argument would hinge upon this point, they are often
confronted with a paradox. So, since the right to
draw a distinction is conceded, we must not hesitate
to use it, as was said before.
If one does not make two questions into one, the
fallacy which depends on equivocation and ambiguity
would not exist either, but either refutation or absence
of refutation. For what is the difference between asking whether Callias and Themistoeles are musical and
asking the same question about two people both with
the same name ? For if one indicates more things
than one, one has asked more questions than one. If,
therefore, it is not correct to demand simply to
receive one answer to two questions, clearly it is not
proper to give a simple answer to any equivocal
93
The am-
musfbe
explained,
The ques-
ambiguity
makes two
uJtoonef
ARISTOTLE
176 a
K ara
yap
7id v rco v
rovro
dXrjOes, c o o n e p d i o v o i r i v e s . o v 8 e v
8ia<f>epei
fj
el
r jp e r o ,
K opiOKOS
K al
KaAAias n o r e p o v o i k o i e i o lv fj o v k o i k o i , e i r e n a p o v rcuv
djjuf>oiv
n X e io v s
10 r o v r o
eire
fifj
n a p ovrcov'
dfi<f>orepcos y a p
at n p o r a o e i s ' o v y a p e l aX rjdes e i n e v ,1 Sta
f ii a
fj ep co rrjo i s .
e y x o )p e i y a p
K al fiv p ia
e r e p a ip w r r jO e v r a e p c o r fjfia r a a n a v r a fj v a l fj o v
aX rjdes e lv a i X e y e i v
aAA oficos o v k a n o K p ir e o v f i i a
d iroK p loei* d v a ip e ir a i y a p r o S ia X ey eo O a i.
rovro
S o f io i o v d)s e l K al r o a v r o o v o fia r ed eirj t o i s

e r e p o is .
e l o v v fifj 8 e i n p o s 8 v o e p c o r fjo e is fila v
15 a n o K p io iv 8 i8 o v a i, <j>avep6v o n
covvficov t o
v a i fj o v X eK r eo v .
oi58
e n l r co v o f i -
o v 8 e y a p o eln d )v
aAA* eiprjK ev. aAA* aftouTat2 n co s ev

t o i s 8 ia X e y o fie v o is Sta t o X avO aveiv t o crvfifia ivov.
a n o K K p ira i
* lo n e p
ovv
e v n o fie v ,
e n e iS fjn e p
ov8*
eX eyxoi
20 r i v e s o v r e s S o k o v o i v e l v a i, K a r a r o v a v r o v r p o n o v
K al X v o e is S o k o v o iv e l v a i r i v e s o v k o S o a i X v o e is *
a s 8 fj <f)afiev e v i o r e fia X X ov Setv <j>epeiv fj r a s aX rjO eis ev t o i s
8 itto v
a y c o v io r iK o ls X o y o is K al r f j n p o s t o
d n a v r f jo e i .
a n o K p ir e o v
89 en l
fie v
rco v
S o k o v v tc o v r o e o r c o A cy o v ra * /cat y a p o v r c o s fjK io r a
25 y i v o i r ' a v n a p e ^ e X e y x o s * a v 8 e n
/c a f ^ r a t
X e y e iv ,
ev ra v O a
napa8oov a v a y-
fid X io r a
n pood ereov
to
8 ok IV o v tco y a p av o u r eX ey x o s o v r e n a p a 8 o ov
y iv e o O a i 8 o e ie v .
94
e n e l 8 e n eb s a l r e i r a i t o ev
1 Heading etnev for cittuv.

2 Heading aftovrat for a(iovvra{ with Wallies.
ap x f j

question, even though the term is true of all the
subjects, as some people claim that one ought. For
this is just the same as asking * Are Coriscus and
Callias at home or not at home ?, whether they are
both at home or not there ; for in both cases the
number of propositions is more than one. For if the
answer is true, it does not follow that the question
is a single one. For it is possible that it is true to
say 4 yes * or 4 no 9 when asked a countless number
of questions ; but, for all that, one ought not to
answer them with a single reply, for that means
the ruin of discussion. This resembles the case of
the same name being applied to different things. If,
therefore, one must not give one answer to two
questions, it is obvious that neither should one say
4 yes * or 4 no * where equivocal terms are used ; for
then the speaker has not given an answer but made
a statement, but it is regarded in a way as an answer
amongst those who argue, because they do not
realize what is the result.
As we said, then, since there are some seeming'liiow the
refutations which are not really refutations, in like ^Pmade!
manner also there are some seeming solutions which
are not really solutions. These we say that we ought
sometimes to bring forward in preference to true
refutations in competitive argument and in meeting
ambiguity. In the case of statements which appear to
be true one must answer with the phrase 4granted *;
for then there is the least likelihood of any accessory
refutation ; but if one is obliged to say something
paradoxical, then in particular one must add that it
seems so, for then there can be no appearance either
of refutation or of paradox. Since it is clear what
4 begging the original question * means and since
95
ARISTOTLE
176 a
S tJAov , otovrai Se 7rdvr$, av1 $ o v v e y y v s, aval/>e-
reov /cat fifj ovyxcoprjTeov etvai evia ws
to
iv apxfj
30 aiTovvTos, orav t o 2 roiovrov aioi tis 8 avayKaiov
fiev ovfifiaiveiv Ik tt}s Oeoews, fj Se iftevSos fj a S o f o v ,

TavTo A e /cre 'o v Ta yap i avayKrjs Gvfiâivovra
ttjs avrrjs etvai So/cet Oeoews.
e r t o r a v t o KaOoXov
fifj ovofiaTi Xrjtf>0fj aAAa rrapafio\fjy Xe/cre o v o ti oi>x

35 d)s iSoOrj
ov8y ws npovTeive Aa/zj8avet* Kal yap
napa to v to ytv e T a t noXXaKis e A e y x o ? .

'Eijeipyofievov Se
in i
tovtwv
to
Set^flat nopevTeov, dnavTcbvTa KaTa
fifj KaXws S etov
etprjfievov
SlOplGflOV.
Ev fiev ofiv
Kvpiojs Xeyofievois ovofiaaiv
to is
avayKrj anoKpiveaOai fj anXcbs fj Siaipovfievov.

40 Se Gvvvnovoovvres t i Oefiev, otov o a a
176 b aAAa
KoXofiajs
ipw rdrai,
napa
fifj oa</>u>s
ovfij3aivi
to v to
o eAeyôs, otov a p9 o av $ 'AOrjvatwv, KTrjfia eorrtv

*AOrjvaiwv;
vat.
ofiolws Se /cat in i
aAAa fifjv o avOpwnos ecrTt tojv t^wwv;

apa o avOpwnos
5 tw
tw v
tw v
)wv Xeyofiev,
A aK w vw V y
o ti
o ti
tw v
aXXwv.
vat.
KTrjfia
tov yap avOpwnov
aia>v.
a)ov eort, Kal AvoavSpov
AaKWV.
SrjXov oSv ws iv ols
aoacfyes to npOTeivofievov ov avyx<*>prjTeov anXws.

* O ra v
Se
Suotv
o vtoiv
OaTepov fiev
1 Heading av for av with Wallies.

* Reading t o for rc with Wallies.
0 168 a 17 ff.
96
o v ro s
ef

people always consider that assumptions which lie
near the conclusion must be demolished and that
some of them must not be conceded on the ground
that the opponent is begging the question, so when
someone claims something of such a nature that it
must necessarily follow from the thesis and it is false
or paradoxical, we must use the same plea ; for the
necessary consequences are generally regarded as
part of the same thesis.
Furthermore, when the
universal which has been obtained has no name but
is indicated by a comparison only, we must say that
the questioner takes it not in the sense in which it
was granted nor as he proposed i t ; for a refutation
often hinges on this point too.
W hen we are excluded from these expedients, wc
must have recourse to the plea that the argument
has not been properly set forth, attacking it on the
basis of the classification of fallacies given above.
When terms are used in their proper senses, one What is
must answer either simply or by making a distinction. aSargu-n
It is when our statement implies our meaning without ment must
expressing it for example, when a question is not Smply
asked clearly but in a shortened form that refutation needed,
ensues. For instance, Is whatever belongs to the
Athenians a property of the Athenians ? * Yes ; and
this is likewise true of everything e lse / W ell, then,
does man belong to the animals ? * Y e s / 4Then man
is a property of the animals. For we say that man
" belongs to the animals because he is an animal,
just as we say that Lysander belongs to the Laco
nians because lie is a Laconian/ Obviously, there
fore, when the premiss is not clear, it must not be
conceded simply.
When it is generally held that, if one of two things other deE
97
ARISTOTLE
176 b
avayK rjs d a re p o v e tv a i 8 okt}, d a re p o v Se tovto fifj

10 e f a v ay K rjs, ipcorcofievov n o re p o v 1 Set to eXa ttov
StSdvat âAc7Tcbrepov y a p o v X X oyloaodai e/c 7rAeto-
vow.
eav S e.7Ti\eipfi
A OJ
tco o
ovk
eo T iv ,
cf>dvaiy ovofia Se
av
oti tco
f \/
A oyos
fifj K e io d a i
fiev i o n v iv a v r lo v
\ /) \
a A rjU rjs
tov
>
ff,
evavn ov
erep ov.
Ewet 8* evia fiev cov Xeyovoiv ol noXXol
tov
fir)
15 ovyxcopovvra i/jevSeoOai av cf)aiev evia S ov, otov

ooa
d f i< f> i 8 o o v o iv ( n o r e p o v y a p c f)d a p r fj rj d d d v a r o s
f j i f t v x fj
cpcov, ov Sicopiorai to is ttoXXois), iv
tcov
ots oSv aSrjXov norepcos etcode Xeyeodai
to
npo-
reivofievov, norepov cos ai yvcbfiai (ko Xovoi yap

yvcbfias
K al
ras aXrjOeis Sofas
Kal
ras oXas
a n o < f> a -
20 oeis), fj cos fj Sidfierpos aovfifierpos, e n r e 2 oS

raXrjdes dficf>i8oêirai, fiaXiora fiera<j>epcov av n s
XavOavoi ra ovofiara
nepl
rovrcov.
Sta fiev yap
to
aSrjXov elvai norepcos eêt raXrjdes, ov S ofet oocf>ttêoOai, Sid Se r o dficf>i8o{;eiv ov S o fe t ipev8eodai*
25 fj y a p 9 f i e r a c f ) o p d n o i r j o e i r o v X o y o v d v e ^ e X e y K r o v .
vE r t o o a av
n p oevora reov
fia X io r a r o v
t is
K al
npoaiodavrjrai rcbv ipcorrjfiarcov,

n poa yop evreov*
ovtco
n v v d a v o fie v o v K c o X v o e ie v .
1 Heading norepov for nporepov.

2 Inserting re after en.
3 Heading yap for hk with AH.

98
yap
av

is true, then the other is necessarily true, but, if the vices to be
second is true, the first is not necessarily true, when employe(1,
asked which is true, we ought to concede the less
inclusive ; for the greater the number of premisses,
the more difficult it is to draw a conclusion. I f the
disputant tries to establish that A has a contrary
while B has not, if his contention is true, we ought
to say that both have a contrary but that no name
is laid down for one of the two.
Regarding some of the statements which they
make, most people would declare that anyone who did
not concede them was lying, while they would not
say so about others, for example, about subjects on
which people disagree (for instance, most people have
no decided opinion whether the soul of living creatures
is destructible or immortal). Therefore, when it is
uncertain in which sense the suggested premiss is
generally used, whether as maxims are employed (for
people call both true opinions and general affirmations
by the name of 1 maxims *) or like the statement,
the diagonal o f a square is incommensurate with its
sides,* and further, where the truth is a matter of
uncertainty, in these cases one has an excellent
opportunity of changing the terms without being
found out. For, because it is uncertain in which sense
the premiss bears its true meaning, one will not
be regarded as playing the sophist, and, because of
the disagreement on the subject, one will not be
regarded as lying ; for the change will make the
argument proof against refutation.
Furthermore, wiienever one foresees any question,
one must be the first to make ones objection and say
what one has to say, for thus one can best disconcert
the questioner.
99
ARISTOTLE
176 b
XVIII. >E7ret S*
cotIv
f) fiev opdr) Xvois ifi<f>d-
30 viois iftevSovs ovXXoyiofiov, nap' onoiav epcorrjoiv
ovfifiaivei
tfievSos, o Se
to
ifievSrjs ovXXoyiofios
A eyerat Stâ)s {rj yap et 0 vXXeX6y i 0 Tai ipevhos, ff

ei fir) cbv ovXXoyiofios Sokci etvai ovXXoyiofios),
etrj av fj t c eiprffievr) vvv Xvois Kal fj t o v </>aivofievov ovXXoyiofiov napa
35 fia T iD V hiopdcoois.
fiev
ovXXeXoyiofievovs
ti
cf)atverat rcbv epcorr)-
ovfifiaivei
o > o t
aveXovra,
fievovs SieAovra Xveiv.
tc o v
Xoycov
naXiv S inel
to v s
Se cf>aivo-
to v s
to s v
ov
AAe-
Xoyiofievcov Xoycov oi fiev aXrjOes oi Se ipevhos

ex v o i
ovfinepaofia,
to
to v s
fiev
KaTa
to
ovfi-
nepaofia tjjevS e ij Si^cbs eVSe'êrat X veiv Kal yap

aveXeiv
40 t c o
ti
177 a ovfinepaofia
npOTaoeis
aXrjOes.
tco v
fjpcorrjfievcov, Kal
ovtcos* tovs
eôv ovx
tco
cooTe
aveXeiv
tois
ti
fio vo v
to
tc o
$eiai t o
Se KaTa ra?
yap ovfinepaofia
fiovXofievois Xveiv Xoyov npcbTOv
fiev OKenTeov et ovXXeXoyiorai fj aovXXoyioTos,

eVra noTepov aXqOes
5 oncos
to
ovfinepaofia fj ipevSos,
ff StaipovvTes fj avaipovvTes Xvcofiev,
Kal
dvaipovvTes ff cSSe fj cSSe, Kadanep iXexOrj npOTepov.

8iacf>epei Se nXeloTov epcoTcofievov re Kal firj Xveiv
Aoyov ro fiev yap npoi8eiv x ^ e n o v , t o Se k ara
oxoXrjv ISeiv paov.
X IX . Tcov fiev ovv napa Trjv oficovvfiiav Kal r f)v

10 dficf>ij3oXiav eXeyxcov oi fiev eXovoi tcov epcoTrjfiaTCov
ti
nXeico orjfiaivov, ol Se
a In ch, xvii.
100
to
ovfinepaofia noXXaxcbs
6 176 b 36 ff.
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, x v i i i - x i x
X V I II . Since a correct solution is an exposure of Genuine
false reasoning, indicating the nature of the question solufc!on*
on which the fallacy hinges, and since false reason
ing can mean one of two things (for it occurs either
if a false conclusion has been reached or if what is
not a proof appears to be such), there must be both
the solution described just now, and also the rectifica
tion of the apparent proof by showing on which of the
questions it hinges. The result is that one solves the
correctly reasoned arguments by demolishing them,
the apparent reasonings by making distinctions.
Again, since some correctly reasoned arguments
are true, while others are false, in their conclu
sions, it is possible to solve those which are false
in their conclusion in two ways, either by demolishing
one o f the questions or by showing that the conclusion
is not as stated. Those arguments, on the other hand,
which are false in their premisses can only be solved
by the demolition of one of the premisses, since the
conclusion is true. Those, therefore, who wish to
solve an argument should observe, firstly, whether
it has been correctly reasoned or is not reasoned,
and, next, whether the conclusion is true or false,
in order that we may achieve a solution either
by making a distinction or by demolishing a pre
miss and doing so in one or other of the two ways
just described.6 There is a very wide difference
between solving an argument when one is being
questioned and when one is not ; for in the latter case
it is difficult to see what is coming, but when one is
at leisure it is easier to see ones way.
X I X . O f the refutations which hinge upon equi- (A) The
vocation and ambiguity some involve a question refuta- ^
which bears more than one sense, wrhile others have NS (9J18*
xix-xxxu).
101
ARISTOTLE
r7 a
Xeyofievov, olov iv fiev rw OLywvra XeyeLV

nepaafia Slttov, iv Se
emordfjievov ev
\
to
* \
ore
olttov
15 ( jr j f ia iv e L
to
TrpoXafirj1
tw
tov
avayKrj
aAAa
SinXovv
< o>
ecrriv, ore
to
fie v
tw
ov
to
Kal
>\\ \
ecrnv, aAAa
ovk
8*
to
re Aet
ov.
ovk
noXXaXcbs, av firj
avricpacjLV, ov y ever at eXeyxos, olov
rvcf>Xov op a v avev yap dvTicf>daew$

oaois S iv
tovto
tols
K al
o Xoyos.
ovojia
K al
o t l c o t l v co s,
ovk
ipwrrjfiaoLv,
yap npos
ovk
tovto
iv a pxfj fiev ofiv
Xoyov
OTL eCTTLV WS, CTL S WS

XeyeLV,
tov
ipwrrjfidrwv dfi<f>lfio\ov.
irpoaT T o< j> rjoaL t o S l t t o v * o v
S ta
crvfi-
firj crvvenLcrraoOaL
tco
f ie v
S itt o v
t t jv
rjv eXeyxos.
20
fiev ofiv iv
" O ctols
iv
twv
to
O V,
ecrrt 8*
ovtw s
to
anoKpvreov,
WOnp TO CFLyWVTa
cos ov.
K al
Ta Seovra
rcpaKTeov eoTLV a, ecrTL S a o v * T a yap Seovra

25 Ae'yeTat
noXXaxcbs.
iav Se AaOrj, in i reXei npoorL-
Oevra rfj ipwrrjcreL SiopOwreov* dp* eorL otyebvra

A e'yetv;
ov, aAAa TovSe cfLywvra.
exovcrL Se
to
ovk
ovtw s
iv
tols
nXeovaxws iv rals nporaaecLV ofiolws .
apa ovvenlaravraL o r t inicrravraL;
ovx ol
val, aAA
inLcrrafievoL* ov yap ravrov icrrLV

1 R e a d in g npoXdprj w ith B .
102
K al
otl
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xix
a conclusion which can bear several meanings

for (a) Those
example, in the argument about the speech of the diction: ^
silent, the conclusion has a double meaning, and ^ J j *ix*
in the argument that * a man who knows is not (l) Equiconscious of wrhat he knows, one of the questions vocatlon*
involves ambiguity. Also, that which has a double
meaning is sometimes true and sometimes false, the
term * double * signifying that which is partly true
and partly untrue.
W hen the diversity of meaning occurs in the con- (2) Amclusion, no refutation takes place, unless the ques- biguity#
tioner secures a contradiction beforehand, as, for
example, in the argument about the seeing of the
blind ; for there never was refutation without con
tradiction. Where the diversity of meaning occurs
in the questions, there is no need to deny the ambi
guity beforehand; for the argument is not directed
towards it as a conclusion but carried on by means
of it. A t the beginning, therefore, one ought to
reply to an ambiguous term or expression in the
following manner, that 4 in one sense it is so and in
another it is not so *; for example * the speaking of
the silent is possible in one sense but not in another.
Or again, * what needs must is to be done sometimes
and not at other times ; for the term * what needs
must can bear several meanings. I f one does not
notice the ambiguity, one should make a correction
at the end by adding to the questioning : Is the
speaking of the silent possible ? * No, but speaking
of this particular man when he is silent is possible.
So likewise also where the variety o f meaning is
contained in the premisses : Are not people conscious
o f what they know ? Y es, but not those who know
in this particular way ; for it is not the same thing
103
ARISTOTLE
177 a
ZOovk e o n ovveTrioraoOai /cat ort rovs* <081 cmcrrafievovs
ovk
eon v.
oAoj? tc
fiaxereov,
av
/cat
arrXajs ovXXoyl^rjr at, o t l oi)^ o e<f>r]oev a ir e ^ a e

TTpayfia, aAA* ovofia* coot* ou/c eXeyxos.
Oavcpov Sc /cat rot)? 7rapa r^v Statpcatv
XX.
/cat ovvOeoiv tt& s X v reov av yap hiaipovfievos
K al
35 ovvrL0efievos o Xoyos erepov orffiaivrj, ovfirrepaivofievov Tovvavrlov Xc/ctcov.
eloi Se 7ravTs* ot rot-
ourot Aoyot 7rapa r^v ovvOeoiv rj Staipcatv.

ai
C tS c ?
ovtos;
<7tJ> T O V T O V
T V T T T O fieV O V ,
K al <L irv T T re ro ,
tovto)
TOVTO)
dp*
TVTTTTO
C^Ct
o v e tS e s ;
177 b fiev ofiv Tt /ca/c to)v dfi<f>ifi6Xo)v ip0)rrjfjLaT0)v, aAA

cart 7rapa ovvOeoLV.
ttjv
ov y a p cart Strrov to Trapa
S ia lp e a iv (ov y a p o a v r o s X oyos ylv eraL Statpou-
jie v o s ), Cl7TCp flTJ K al t o o p o s K al o p o s tt} TTpoawSla

XexOev arjfia lv e i e re p o v .
5
(aAA ev fiev
fievocs r a v r o v o v o fia , o r a v c/c
tcov
tols
a v rw v
y e y p a ji-
o t o l x ^lw v
y ey p afifiev o v f K al w aavTCos, /ca/cct 8* rjSrj T rapdo rjfia TToiovvrai , ra Sc (frOeyyofieva ov r a v r a . )

ov
Slttov
to
rra p d SialpeoLV .
ov T ravres o i eXeyxoL rra p d
cScrr*
<f>avepov Sc /cat
to
Slttov,
otl
K aO dnep
TLves </>aoLv.
10
A ta tp crcov ofiv rip dnoKpLVOfievw ov yap ravrov

8
In both examples the meaning ean be cither 1 with a
stick * or 4 with your eyes.
b i.e. breathings and accents.
104
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xix-xx

to say that it is not possible for those who know to
be eonseious of what they know and that those who
know in a particular way eannot be eonseious of their
knowledge. Generally speaking, too, even though
o nes opponent argues in a straightforward manner,
one must contend that what he has eontradieted is
not the actual fact whieh one affirmed but merely its
name, and so there is no refutation.
XX.
It is evident, too, how fallacies which turn <3) Amon the division and combination of words should be division,
solved ; for, if the expression signifies something jôusam"
different when it is divided and when it is combined, combination
when the opponent is drawing his eonelusion we must of words*
take the words in the eontrary sense.
All sueh
expressions as the following turn upon the combina
tion or division o f words : 4 W as so-and-so being
beaten with that with which you saw him being
beaten ? and 1 Did you see him being beaten with
that with which he was being beaten ? * a The argu
ment here has something of the fallacy due to
ambiguous questions, but it actually turns on com
bination. For what turns on the division of words
is not really ambiguous (for the expression when
divided differently is not the same), unless indeed opos
and opos, pronouneed aeeording to the breathing,
constitute a single word with different meanings.
(In written language a word is the same when it is
written with the same letters and in the same manner,
though people now put in additional signs,6 but the
words when spoken are not the same.) Therefore an
expression whose meaning turns on division is not
ambiguous, and it is clear also that all refutations do
not turn upon ambiguity, as some people say.
It is for the answerer to make the division ; for
105
ARISTOTLE
177 b
ISeiv to is o<j>6 aXfxols tviTTopievov Kal t o <j>dvoi ISeiv

to ls 6<f>0aAfioTs tviTTOfxevov,
Kal o EvOvBrjfjiov 8 e
Aoyos1, dp* ot 8 os ov vvv ovoas iv Weipaiei Tpiijpeis

iv 2t/ceAla dov;
Kal iraAiv, dp' l o r iv ayaOov ovra

eh) 8 * av tis ayaOos cbv
15 oKvrea fioxOrjpov etvai;

OKvrevs
fJLoxO'ripos'
fioxOrjpos.
coot*
eoTOi
ayaOos
oKvrevs
dp* <Lv at iTTiOTfjfiai OTrov8 aiai, ottov-
Sata r a fiadrjfiaTa;
to v 8 e kokov onovSaiov t o
fjLa0r)[jLa' onovSaiov apa fidOrjfjia t o kokov,
aAAa
[M7)v Kal kokov Kal fiaO^fjia t o kokov, woTe kokov

fidOrjfia t o kokov.
20 OTTjp/r)*
aAA io rl kokcov O7rov8 ala im ~
dp* aArjOes elneiv vvv o ti ov y e y o v o s ;
yeyovas apa vvv,
fj aAAo orjfioivei StatpeOev;
y e y o v a s.
aA77-
ov yeyova s, aAA ov vvv
Oes yap elirelv vvv o n
ap* cos Svvaoai /cat a Svvaoai, ovtcos
Kal rav ra iroirfoais a v;
ov KiOapi^cov S exîs
Svvafjuv to v KiOaptêw' KiOapioais av apa ov KiOapi-
25 cov.
fj ov to v to v
ttjv 8 vvap.1v to v ov KiOapi-
cov KiOapiêiv, aAA* ore ov Troiei, to v iroieiv;

A v o vo i 8 e Tives to v to v Kal aAAcos.
el yap e8 coKev
cos 8 vv o to i noieiv, ov <j>aoi ovfifialveiv firj KiOapiovTa Ki0apieiv ov yap irdvTcos cos SwaTat iroieiv,
30 8e8oo0ai 7Toir)oeiv ov to v to v S elvai cos S iW r a t
a See Rhet,
106
1101 a 27 and Cope and Sandys note.
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xx
* I-saw-a-man-being-beaten with my eyes is not
the same thing as to say I saw a man being-beatenw ith-m y-eyes/ Then there is Euthydemus saying,
4 Do you know now in Sieily that there are triremes
in Piraeus ? a 9 And, again, Can a good man who
is a cobbler be bad ? 9 * N o / But a man who is
good can be a bad cobbler ; therefore he will be a
good-bad eobbler/ Again, 1 Things of which the
knowledge is good are good objects of learning, are
they not ? * Y e s / But the knowledge of evil is
good ; therefore evil is a good object of learning/
But, further, evil is both evil and an object of
learning, so that evil is an evil object of learning ;
but it has already been seen that the knowledge of
evils is g o o d / Is it true to say at the present
moment you are born ? * Y e s / Then you are born
at the present m om ent/ Does not a different division
o f the words signify something different ? For it is
true to say-at-the-present-moment that you are
born, but not to say you are born-at-the-presentmoment. Again, Can you do what you ean and as
you can ? * Y e s / And when you are not playing
the harp you have the power of playing the harp ;
and so you eould play the harp when you are not
playing the harp. * In other words, he does not possess
the power of playing-when-he-is-not-playing, but he
possesses the power of doing it when he is not doing
it.
Some people solve this in another manner also.
If he has granted that a man can do what he can do,
they say that it does not follow that he ean play the
harp when he is not playing i t ; for it has not been
granted that he will do it in every way in which he
ean, for it is not the same thing to do it in the way
107
ARISTOTLE
177 b
aAAa cf>avep6 v o n
/cat TTavTays cos Sdvarat noieiv.
ov KaAcbs Avovaiv rw v yap napa ravrov Aoyw v rf

avrrj Averts, avrrj S ovx apfioaei enl navras ovSe
navrws epwrwfievovs, aAA e a n 7Tpos to v epwrwvra,
ov npos to v Aoyov.
35
X X I . II a p a Se rrjv npoawSlav Aoyoi fiev

elaiv, ovre
tcov
yeypap,(ivcov ovre
twv
ovk
Aeyofievwv,
nArjv ei n v e s oAlyot yevotvr av, otov ofiros o Ao y o s.

apa y
earl
to oS
178 a ov KaraAveis
tov
KaraAvets ot/cta ;
vat.
ovkovv to
KaraAveis anocf>aais; vat. e<f>rjaas
S ctvat r o o5 KaraXvets o Ikla v rj ot/cta a p a a n ocf>acns.
cos 8 rj Avreov, StJAov ov yap ravro arjfiaivet
ovTpov t o Se fiapvrepov prjOev.

X X I I . AtJAov Se /cat tois* n a p a t o w o a v r w s Ae5 yead ai
Ta
firj
T avra
nws
a n a v r r jr e o v ,
e x o fie v r a y ev rj r w v K a r r jy o p tw v .
e p w r r jO e ls
fir]
v n a p x ^ iv
o r j f i a i v e c o S
noow V y
fir jv
K a ra
Sokovvtwv S e r i e a n
a fia
opav
n o t e tv r e
ye
ravro
n o ielv n ;
verai
rovrw v
ov.
A oyw .
a r jf t a iv e t v
ri
com
ov.
K al ew p a K ev a i to
ap
earl tl
Sta r r jv
evSeêrat to
ap*
K a l n e n o ir jK e v a t;
a fia
e v S e ^ e r a i.
o fio iw s
oaa
e S e t e v v n d p x o v t i tw v n p o s t i rj
A eftv, o t o v e v r w S e t w
10 auTo
rt
e n e in e p
o fie v y a p eS w K ev
rw v
avro
aAAa
Kal
n a a x ^ iv
ovkovv t o r e f i v e r a t K a i e r a t a l o O a A ey era i,
/cat 7ravra 7raaêtv n
o r j-
a The point here is the difference of breathing and the

presence or absence of the circumflex accent.
108
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xx-xxn

in which he can and in every way in which he can.
But clearly this solution is not a good one ; for the
solution of arguments which turn on an identical
principle is identical, whereas this solution will not
suit every argument nor every form of question into
which it can be put, but is directed against the
questioner, not against the argument.
X X I . Arguments do not arise owing to aecentuation either in written or in spoken language, though
a few might occur such as the following : A house
is where you lo d g e (oS KaraAveis), isnt it? Yes.
Is not * you do not lodge (ou KaraAveis) the nega
tion of * you lodge * (*caTaAvei$) ? Yes. But you said
that 1 where you lodge * (o$ KaraAveis) was a house ;
therefore a house is a negation. It is obvious how
this must be solved ; for the spoken word is not the
same with the acuter and with the graver accent.
X X I I . It is plain also how we must meet arguments
that turn on the identical expression of things which
are not identical, seeing that we possess the various
kinds of categories. Suppose that one man when
questioned has granted that something which denotes
a substance is not an attribute, and another man has
shown that something is an attribute which is in the
category of relation or quantity but generally held,
because of its expression, to denote a substance, as
for example in the following argum ent: Is it possible to be doing and to have done the same thing
at the same time ? No. But it is surely possible to
be seeing and to have seen the same thing at the same
time and under the same conditions. Or again, Is
any form o f passivity a form of activity ? No. Then
* he is cut, * he is burnt, he is affected by a sensible
object * are similar kinds of expression and all denote
109
(5) Wrong
accen '
(6) similar
forPdifferent
things,
Examples,
ARISTOTLE
178 a
p a lv e t'
Se t o
r r a X tv
Aeyetv rpeêtv
opav
o p o tco s
15 a X X y X o t s X e y e r a f aAAa f i r j v t o y ' o p a v a l a O a v e c r O a i
rt
ea rtv , coa re
Se
tls
K al
Kal
e/cet So v s
7T7TOLrjKvai,
iy X o o p e iv ,
o v ttc o
7raorêtv t t
apa
eVSeêaât
p rj
to
opav
et
ra vro
et
tto u lv
ecopa/ceVat
K al
iX r jX e y K r a t ,
K a l rr o teiv .
apa
</>atr]
Aeyot t o opav
p rj
7rottv Tt aAAa 7raaêtv 7rpoaSet yap toutou tou

20 i p c o r r j p a r o s '
aAA
U7ro
to
jSaverat SeScu/cevat, ore t o
7T7T O ir]K v a i
r e r p r jK e v a t
o p o tco s
Aeyerat.
(Ik o v o v to s
vnoX ap-
r e p v e tv n o tetv
Tt /cat to
eSa>/ce,
to yap Aot7rdv
a K o v c o v (L s o p o t c o s
ov#
o p o tco s ,
aAAa
oaa
Aeyo/zevov t o Se Aeyerat /xev

Se Sta
< f> a tv ra t
K al
a v r o s T T p o o r iO rjG iv
r r jv
Aeftv.
to auro
25 Se G v p f i a l v e t o n e p ev rats* S p c o v v p e a t s * oterat yap
eV rot?
o p co v v p o ts
aTTO<j>rjGat i t p a y p a ,
ip c o r r jp a r o s ,
o v tc o s y a p
f,O p o t o t
ayvcos
ovk
et e^* ev
tco v
ovopa to
fiX e n co v
X oycov
e ^ r jG e v
Se eTt 7rpoaSet
Aeyet to
op ebvvp ov
Sovtos* carat eAeyôs*.

Se /cat otSe ot Aoyot
r o v ro ts,
et o rts*
30 e^cov v a r e p o v p i ] eêt a 7rejSaAev o yap eva p o v o v

a n o fia X c o v a a r p a y a X o v o v \
f]
8e
efet Se'/ca
a a rp a ya X ovs.
p e v p f ] e ^ e t r r p o r z p o v e ^ a jv , a i r o f i e f i X r j K e v , o a o v
p r]
eêt 77 oaa, oi5/c
a va yK rj r o a a v r a
a 7ro/?aAetv.
Knucklebones were used as dice by the Greeks.

110
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, x x i i
some form o f passivity ; and, on the other hand, 4 to
say, * to run, and to see ' are forms of expression
similar to one another ; but to see is surely a way
of being affected by a sensible object, so that passivity
and activity occur at the same time. In the former
case, if someone, after granting that it is impossible
to be doing and to have done the same thing at the
same time, were to say that it is possible to see a
thing and to have seen it, he has not yet been refuted
supposing that he declares that seeing is a form not
of activity but of passivity. For this further question
is necessary, though he is supposed by the hearer to
have granted it when he granted that * to cut * is * to
be doing something ' and to have cut * is to have
done som ething/ and so with similar forms of expres
sion. For the hearer himself adds the rest, on the
supposition that the significance is similar, whereas
it is not really similar but only appears so owing to
the expression. The same thing occurs as in fallacies
of ambiguity ; for in dealing with ambiguous terms
the man who is not an expert in argument thinks
that his opponent has denied the fact which he
asserted, not the term, whereas yet another ques
tion needs to be asked, namely, whether he is
using the ambiguous term with his eye upon one
meaning only ; for if he grants this, a refutation will
be achieved.
Similar to the above are also the following argu- Examples
ments : Has a man lost what he had and afterwards (<eonhmied^
has not ? For he who has lost one die only will no
longer have ten dice. Is not what really happens
that he has lost something which he had before but
no longer has, but it does not follow that he has lost
the whole amount or number which he no longer
111
ARISTOTLE
178 a
epwrrjaas ovv o
35
Sc/ca TToad.
a w a y cl enl rov oaa * r a yap
ct ovv rjpero cf
^ P X IS et*
ocra
ti?
firj
)(i nporepov côjv, apa ye a7rop^Xr)K roaavra,

ov8els av cSwkcv, aAA* y roaavra fj tovtw v T t.
o n 8olr) av tls o fir) c^ct.
aarpayaXov.
ouSc
to io v S c
ov yap c^ct cva fiovov
rj ov Sc'Sto/ccv o ovk elx^v, aAA ws
ovk c ^ c , T v eva;
178 b
Kal
ro yap fiovov ov t o S c arjfialveL
ov Sc t o o o v S c , aAA* ws e^ct npos n ,
olov o n ov fier aAAov.
warrep odv ct rjpcro ap' o
firj n s c^ct Solt] av, firj <f)dvros Sc cpotTO ct 8olrj

av rls tl ra%ws fir) x<*>v rax*ws> <j>rjoavros Sc
avXXoylÔLTo otl
6
8olrj av tls
o fir] e^ct.
Kal
(f>avpov otl ov avAAcAoyLcrraL* t o yap rax^ws ov
roSc StSovat aAA <5Sc StSovat ia r lv ws Sc fir) c^ci

tls, 8olrj av, otov f)8ews c^cov Sony av Xvrrqpws.
UfJLOLOL o c /cat ol TOLOLce rravres.
^ctpt tvtttol a v ;
ap f) fir) c^ct
rj w firj c^ct 6(f)9aXfiw tSot a v;
10 ov yap cêt eva fiovov.
Ai/ouat jitcr ovv Ttvcs* A c-
y o v r cs1 /cat cos c^ct cva fiovov K al 6</>9aXfJLov Kal
112
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xxn

has ? In the question, therefore, he is dealing with
that which he has, in the conclusion with the total
number ; for the number was ten. If, therefore, he
had asked in the first place whether a man who
formerly possessed a number of objects which he no
longer possesses, has lost the total number of them,
no one would have granted this, but would have said
that he had lost either the total number or one of the
objects. Again, it is argued that a man could give
what he had not g o t ; for wiiat he has not got is one
die only. Is not what really happens that he has not
given that which he has not got but has given it in a
manner in which he has not got it, namely, as a single
unit ? For 4 single unit * does not denote either a
particular kind of thing or a quality or a quantity
but a certain relation to something else, namely,
dissociation from anything else. It is, therefore, as
though he had asked whether a man could give what
he has not got, and on receiving the answer 4 No,*
were to ask whether a man could give something
quickly when he had not got it quickly, and, on
receiving the answer Y e s / were to infer that a man
could give what he had not got. It is obvious that
he has not drawn a correct inference ; for 4giving
quickly * does not denote giving a particular thing
but giving in a particular manner, and a man could
give something in a manner in which he did not get
i t ; for example, he could get it with pleasure and
give it with pain.
Similar also arc all the following arguments : Further
* Could a man strike with a hand that he has not got examPles
or see with an eye that he has not got ? ' For he has
not got only one eye. Some people, therefore, solve
this by saying that the man who has more than one
113
ARISTOTLE
178 b
aAA
otlovv
o nXeico e^cov.
ol Se Kal cos o eêt
eAafiev* iSlSov yap fiiav fiovov ovros if/r}<f>ov Kal

ovros
y*
eêt,
(f>aai, filav
fiovrjv napa
rovrov
ol S evOvs rrjv epcorrjOLv avaipovvres, o n
ifjrj<f)ov.
15 evSe'xerai o firj eAafiev eêiv, otov olvov Xafiovra

aAA
fjSvv, 8ia<j>0apvros ev rfj XrjifjeL, ex^LV ovv.
onep eXex@r) Kal nporepov, ofiroi ndvres ov npos

rov Xoyov aAAa npos rov avdpconov Xvovoiv.
el
yap fjv avrrj Xvgls, Sovra ro avnKeifievov ovx otov

re XVLV, KaOanep enl rcov aAAcov olov el e a n fiev
20 o ecrrt S o ov, rj Xvgls, av a 7rAa)9 Sw XeyeaOai,

Gvfinepalverat* eav Se firj avfinepalvrjraL,
eir) XvaiS' ev Se
tols
ovk
av
npoeLprjfievoLS ndvrcov StSo-
fievcov ov Se <f>afiev ylveoOaL avXXoyLGfiov.

\hn o e KaL
lgl r o v r c o v rco v A oycov.
olo
25 o y e y p a n r a L , eypa(/>
tls;
ap
y e y p a n r a L Se v v v o n a v
KaOrjaaL, ipevSfjs X o y o s* fjv S aXrjdrjs, o r * eypd<f>ero*

a fia
apa
eypd<j>ero
tpevSrjs K al aXrjdrjs*
ro
yap
i/jevSrj rj aXrjOrj X o y o v fj S o a v etvaL o v roS e aAAa
TotovSe arjfialveL * o y a p a v r o s X o y o s K al e n l r f js
30 S6 rjs.
K al d p * o fia vO a vei o fiavO avcov, r o v r
o fia v O a v e i;
r o l v v v o fia v d a v e i aAA <bs fia vO a vei etprjK ev.

a p ' o j8aSiei
e a r lv
fiavOaveL Se r t? t o fip a S v r a x v .
tls
n a r e l;
ov
K al
j8aSiet Se rrjv fjfie p a v
It seems probable that a new argument is dealt with here,

cf. b 36 kat on k t X . oi he possibly introduced a second solu
tion of the previous argument which has fallen out.
6 Hut H may already possess other pebbles.
* 177 b 33. *
111-
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xxn

eye (or whatever it is) has also only one. There is
also a the argument of some people that * what a man
has, he has received * : A only gave one pebble, and
B has, they say, only one pebble from A .6 Other
people argue by directly demolishing the question
raised, saying that one can have what one has not
received; for example, one can receive wine that is
sound but have it in a sour condition if it has gone
bad in the process of transfer. But, as was said b e fo r e /
all these people direct their solutions not to the argu
ment but to the man. For if this were a real solution,
it would be impossible to achieve a solution by grant
ing the opposite, as happens in all other cases ; for
example, if it is partly so and partly not so * is the
solution, an admission that the expression is used
without qualification makes the conclusion v alid ;
but if no conclusion is reached, there cannot be a
solution. In the above examples, even though every
thing is conceded, yet we say that no proof has been
effected.
Moreover, the following also belong to this class
of arguments : * I f something is written, did someone
write it ? * It is written that 1 you are sitting *; this
is a false statement, but was true at the time when
it was written ; therefore what was written is at the
same time false and true. No, for the falsity or truth
of a statement or opinion does not denote a substance
but a quality ; for the same account applies to an
opinion as to a statement. Again, Is what the
learner learns that which he learns ? * A man learns
a slow march quick ; it is not then what he learns
that is meant but how he learns it. Again, Does a
man trample on that through which he walks ? *
But he walks through the whole day. W as not what
115
ARISTOTLE
178 b
rj ovx o jSaStfet aAA* ore /?aStet elprjKev
oXrjv.
ouo
/\
)\\)
>>
35 /cat a/>* o tis* otSev ^ fiaOwv fj evpwv otSev;
wv Se
fiev evpe t o S efiaOe, Ta afi<f>w ov8erepov.
to
orav rqv KvAiKa niveiv, o mvet aAA e ov.
fj o
fiev anav, a S (ou^) aTravTa;1 /cat OTt eo n n s rpiros avOpwnos nap' avrov /cat rovs KaO e/cacrrov. ro
yap avOpwnos Kal arrav ro koivov ov ro8e Tt, aAAa
TotovSe n rj npos n fj nebs ff rcov roiovrwv n orj179 a fiaivei.
ofioiws Se /cat enl rov KopioKos Kal Ko-
pioKos fiovariKos, norepov ravrov fj erepov;
ro
fiev yap ToS e n ro Se T otovSe orjfialvet, w ar1 ovk

e o n v avro e /c0e'<70ai * ov ro e /cTt0e<70at Se 7rotet rov
rpirov avOpconov, aAAa t o onep ToSe n etvai o v y -
5 \wpeiv.
ov yap eorai r o 8 e ri e tv a i, o n e p KaXXias,
/cat o n e p avOpwnos e o n v .
ov S et n s ro eKnOe-
fievov fir] onep ro8e ri etvai Xeyoi aAA onep noiov,

ov8ev Stotaet* eorai yap ro napa rovs noXXovs ev
T t , o to v
o avOpwnos .
ToSe Tt e tv a i t o
</>avepov oSv o n ov 8oreov
Koivfj Karrjyopovfievov enl ndaiv ,
10 aAA rjroi noiov fj npos ri f] nooov f) rw v roiovrw v

Tt arffiaiveiv.
X X III. "OAojs* S ev tois napa rf]v Ae'ftv Xoyois

d.et Kara to avriKeifievov eorai f] At/ats1 f] nap9 o
1
116
Heading a S* <ovx> anavra with Pickard-Ca inbridge.
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xxn-xxm

was meant not what he walks through but when he
walks ? Just as when we talk of a man drinking a
cup, we refer not to what he drinks but to that out
of which he drinks. Again, 4 Is it not either by
learning or by discovery that a man knows what he
knows ? * But, supposing that of two things he has
discovered one and learnt the other, he has not either
discovered or learnt the two taken together. Is it
not true to say that what he knows is each single
thing, but not all the things taken together ? There
is also the argument that there is a 4 third man *
beside * man and * individual m en. This is not so,
for * man * and every generic term denotes not an
individual substance but a quality or relation or mode
or something of the kind. So, too, with the question
whether 4 Coriscus * and 4 the musician Coriscus * are
the same thing or different. For the one term denotes
an individual substance, the other a quality, so that
it is impossible to isolate i t ; for it is not the process
of isolation which produces the 4 third man * but the
admission that there is an individual substance. For
4 man * will not be an individual substance as Callias
is, nor will it make any difference if one were to say
that what is isolated is not an individual substance
but a quality ; for there will still be a one as con
trasted with the many, for instance 4 man.* It is
obvious, therefore, that it must not be granted that
the term predicated universally of a class is an in
dividual substance, but we must say that it denotes
either a quality or a relation or a quantity or some
thing of the kind.
X X III.
To sum up, in dealing with arguments Summary of
whieh turn on language the solution will always de- sSution of
pend on the opposite of that on which the argument fallacies
117
ARISTOTLE
179 a
eortv o Adyos1.
otov el -trapa ovvOeoiv o Ao yo s, ff
Xvois SteAovrt, el Se 7rapa Scatpeaiv, ovvOevn.
naXiv
15 et rrapa npoowSiav ofecav, rj fiapeia npoawZia

Xvois, et Se napa fiapeTav, rj o f eta.
ofiwvvfiiav,
eari to
et Se Trap9
avTiKeifievov ovofia elnovra
Xveiv, otov el aifjvôv1 ovfifiaivei Xeyeiv, ano<f)rjoavra fiff etvai, SrjXovv ws eortv efiifjvxov el S
ai/ivxov e<f>r}oev, o S efitfjvxov ovveXoylaaTO, Xeyeiv
20 ws eoriv axfjvxov.
poXlas.
ofiolws Se Kal enl ttjs afi<f>i-
el Se nap ' ofioiorrjTa Xetjews, to avTiKei-
fievov e o r at Xvois.
^ T rt \ v
ap o fir) eêt, 8oirj av r t? ;
\\1 f
*/
tt
rj ov x o fir) eêt, aAA ws ovk eêt, otov eva fiovov

aorpayaXov.
en Lota ra i;
ap
o inioTaTai, fiaOwv f) evpwv
aAA ou^ a in loTarai.
25 Traret, aAA ou^ ore.
ofiolws
/cat* o j3a8tet
Se feat enl tw v
aXXwv.
X X IV .
npos 1 Se rou? n a p a to ovfifiefirjK os f iia
fiev rq avTT) X vois n p o s a 7ravra?.
e n e l y a p aStipiOTOV eoT i to n o r e Ae/cre'ov e n l tov n p a y fia T o s ,
orav e n l tov ovfifie fir) kotos v n a p x f), x a l i n ' eviw v
30 fiev SoKei K al <f>aoiv, i n ' iv iw v 8* ov <f>aoiv a v a y K aiov e lv a i, prjTeov ovv ov/ifiifiaoOevTOS* o fio iw s
n p o s a n a v r a s o ti ovk a v a y K a io v . eêtv Se Set
npo<f>epeiv to o to v . e lo i Se n a v r e s ot rototSe tw v
Xoy w v n a p a to ovfiflefirfKos. a p ' o tS a s o fieXXw
1 Reading aipvxov with Poste for efupvxov.

2 Omitting et after K a l .
3 Reading ovtifiifiaodevros with A.
See note on 178 a 31.
118
6 See 178 b 32-33.
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, x x i i i - x x i v
turns ; for example, if the argument turns on com- which
bination, the solution will be by division, if on division, dfction. n
by combination. Again, if it turns on acute accentua
tion, grave accentuation will be the solution, and
vice versa. I f it turns on equivocation, it can be solved
by the use of the opposite term ; for example, if it
so happens that one says something is inanimate
after having denied that it is so, one must show that
it is animate ; and, if one has said that it is inanimate
and one's opponent has argued that it is animate,
one must assert that it is inanimate. Similarly, too,
in the case of ambiguity ; if the argument turns on
similarity of language, the opposite will be the solu
tion.
4 Could one give what one has not got ? *
Surely not what he has not got but he could give it in
a way in which he has not got it, for example, a single
die a by itself. 4 Does a man know the thing which
he knows by learning or discovery ? * Y es, but not
4 the things which he knows.* Also a man tramples
on the thing through which he walks, not on the time
through which he walks.6 And similarly, too, with
the other instances.
X X I V . To meet arguments which turn upon acci- <b) Soludent one and the same solution is universally appli- depenl^nt
cable.
It is undetermined on what occasions the
attribute should be applied to the subject where it xxx).
belongs to the accident, and sometimes it is generally êntCd
held and stated to belong and sometimes it is denied
thc
that it necessarily belongs. W e must, therefore, when consequence
a conclusion has been reached, assert in every case [ 2 5
i.i
i
i
. 111
. accidcnt to
alike that it does not necessarily belong. But we must the subject.
have an example to bring forward. All such arguments
as the following turn on accident: 4Do you know what
I am about to ask you ? * 4 Do you know the man
119
ARISTOTLE
179 a
a e ip c o r a v ;
a p * ot8 a s r o v n p o a io v ra rj
KKa\vfifievov;
tov
cy-
a p o avBpias aov e o n v e p y o v , fj
35 ads o /ciJcov n a r r jp ; ap a r a oX iyaK is oAtya o A ty a ;
<f>avepov y a p iv a n a a i
Ka r a
tov
tovto is oti ovk
avfifiefirj kotos Kal K ara
aArjOeveoOai'
fio v o is
yap
tois
tov
K a ra
avayKrj
to
n p a y fia r o s
rrjv
o v a lav
a8ia(j>opois Kal ev ofiaiv a n a v ra 8 ok i T a v ra v n a p 179 b
xlv* T<?
& ayaOq> o v r a v r o v i o n v ayaO w r etvai

Kal fieX X ovn ip c o ra a d a i , ov 8 e ra ) n p o a io v n fj i y -
KKaXv(ifiva) n p o a io v n r e etvai Kal K op ioK ip ' c o o t *

o v k e l ot8 a r o v K o p io K o v , ayvocb 8e r o v n p o a io v r a ,
r o v a v r o v o l8 a Kal a y v o a r ouS* el r o v r
ia r lv ifio v ,
5 e a r i 8* ep y o v , ifio v i o n v e p y o v , aAA* fj KTrjfia rj

n p a y fia rj aAAo T t.
tov
a v r o v 8e r p o n o v Kal i n i
rcbv aAA cov.

A v o v a i 8e r iv e s a v a ip ov v res rrjv ip cb rrja iv </>aol
y a p ivh exeoO a i r a v r o rrpayfia elSevai Kal a y v o eiv ,
aAAa firj K ara r a v r o r o v ofiv rrpoaiovra o v k elh o r es ,
10 t o v
8e K opiaK ov e lh o r es , r a v r o fiev elSevai Kal
a y v o eiv (j>aaiv, aAA o v K ara r a v r o .
K airoi npcbrov
fie v , KaOanep rj8rj e in o fie v , 8ei rcbv n a p a r a v r o

Xoycov rrjv avrrjv etvai
8iopO coaiv
avrrj S o v k
e a r a is av n s firj i n i r o v ciSevat aAA i n i r o v etvai

rj nebs eXeiv t o a v r o aîcofia Xafifiavrj, olov e l o8e
a See 179 b 15. C f Plato, Euthydemus 298 e.
b The reference here is to the question (a 33) 4 Do you
know what I am about to ask you ? * The reply is no.*
41 am going to ask you about the good ; therefore, you do
not know about the good.
c 177 b 31.
120
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xxiv

who is coming towards us ? * or * the man with his
face covered ? * Is the statue your wrork ? * or Is
the dog your father ? * a Is the result of multiplying
a small number by another small number itself a
small number ? It is obvious that in all these
instances it does not necessarily follow that the
attribute which is true of the accident is also true of
the subject. For it is only to things wrhich are in
distinguishable and one in essence that all the same
attributes are generally held to belong ; but in the
case of the good, it is not the same thing to be good
and to be about to be the subject of a question.5 Nor
in the case of * the man who is coming towards us
(or with his face covered *), is to be coming towards
us * the same thing as * to be Coriscus *; so that,
if I know Coriscus but do not know the man who is
coming towards me, it does not follow that I know*
and do not know the same man. And again, if this
is mine * and if it is also a piece of work, it is not
therefore * a piece of my wrork but may be my
possession or chattel or something else. The other
instances can be treated in the same wray.
Some people obtain a solution by demolishing the
thesis of the question ; for they say that it is possible the original
to know and not to know the same thing but not Questlonin the same respect; when, therefore, they do not
know the man who is coming towards them but know
Coriscus, they say that they know and do not know
the same thing but not in the same respect. Y e t in
the first place, as we have already said,c the method
of correcting arguments which turn on the same
principle ought to be identical, yet this will not be so,if
one takes the same axiom to apply not to knowledge *
but to existence ' or * being in a certain state * ; for
121
ARISTOTLE
179 b
15 io rl narrjp, e o n Sc oos* el yap in ' evicov r o v r '

io rlv
aXrjdes
Kal
ivSexerai
ravro
elSevai
Kal
ayvoeiv, aXX' ivravOa ovSev Koivcovei ro AexOev.

ovSev Se
exeiv.
kcoXvci
rov avrov Xoyov nXeiovs fwxOrjpias
aXA' ovx rj ndorjs djiaprias ifufravtois Xvois
i o r i v iyxcopet yap o n fiev ipevSos ovXXeXoyiorai
20 SeiaI n v a , nap* o Se jirj Setfai, olov rov TJjvtavos

Xoyov, o n
ovk
eon
KivrjOrjvai.
coore Kal et n s
emxeipoiT) ovvayeiv ws aSvvarov, dfiaprdvet, Kav

el fJLvpiaKis fj ovXXeXoyiofievos * ov yap i o n v avrrj
Xvois.
fjv yap rj Xvois ifJL<f)dviois ipevSovs ovXXoyi-
ofiov, nap' o ipevSrjs' el ovv jirj ovXXeXoyiorai rj

25 Kal aXrjdes fj ifjevSos (ipevScbsY imxe^pei ovvayeiv,
rj iKeivov SrjXcoois Xvois io riv.
iocos
Se Kal rovr'
in ' evicov ovSev KcoXvei ovjxfiaiveiv nXrjv in i ye

rovrcov ovSe rovro 8oeiev a v Kal yap rov K opiokov
o n KopiOKOS otSe, Kal ro npooiov o n n poo
iov.
ivSexeodai Sc SoKei ro avro elSevai Kal jvrj,
30 otov o n jjtev Xcvkov elSevai, o n Se
jxovoikov
yvcopiêiv ovrco yap ro avro otSe Kal

aXX' ov Kara ravrov.
ovk
firj
otSev,
ro Se npooiov Kal KopioKov,
Kal o n npooiov Kal o n KopioKos, otSev.

cQfjioicos S' ajiaprdvovoi Kal oi Xvovres, o n anas
1 Reading with W . A. Pickard-Cambridge tpcv&os <tpvhws>.
0
father.
122
Cf. a
34 f., the false conclusion being, This dog is your

example, * this dog is a father, this dog is yours/ a
Though it is sometimes true and it is possible to know
and not to know the same thing, yet the suggested
solution is quite inapplicable in the above instance.
But there is no reason why the same argument should
not contain several flaws, but it is not the exposure
o f every fault that forms a solution ; for it is possible
for a man to show that a false conclusion has been
reached without showing on what point it turns, as,
for instance, in Zenos argument that motion is im
possible. Even, therefore, if one were to attempt
to infer the impossibility of this view, he is wrong,
even though he has given countless proofs ; for this
procedure does not constitute a solution, for a solu
tion is, as we saw, an exposure of false reasoning,
showing on what the falsity depends. If, therefore,
he has not proved his case or else if he attempts to
draw an inference, whether true or false, by false
means, the unmasking of this procedure is a solution.
But perhaps, though in some cases there is nothing
to prevent this happening, yet it would not be gener
ally admitted in the instances given above ; for he
knows that Coriscus is Coriscus and that what is
coming towards him is coming towards him. But
there are cases in which it is generally held to be
possible to know and not to know the same thing ;
for instance, one can know that someone is white
but be ignorant of the fact that he is musical, thus
knowing and not knowing the same thing but not
in the same respect ; but as to what is coming towards
him and Coriscus, he knows both that it is coming
towards him and that he is Coriscus.
An error similar to that made by those whom we (Erroneous
have mentioned is committed by those who solve S?ution!)0f
123
ARISTOTLE
179 b
35 a p iO fio s
o X ty o s ,
d jo n e p
th ro fi e v
ovs
el
yap
fir)
<TVfl7TpaiVOflVOV, TOVTO TTapaXlTTOVTtS> aATjOks G V fl-
n e n e p d v O a i c fra o l, n d v r a
yap
e tv a i K al noX vv K al
o X iy o v , d f x a p r d v o v o i v .
" E v i o i 8 e K a l T tp hiTT cp X v o v o i
tovs
o v X X o y io f io v s ,
o lo v OTI cro s G T l n aT T fp fj ViOS fj S oC X oS '
K aiT O l
180 a <j)avp6v co s i n a p a t o n o X X a x ^ s X e y e a O a i cf)a lv e T a i
o e X e y x o s , 8 e i r o v v o f i a fj
n X e io v c o v m
to
8c
t o v S
X o y o v K v p ic o s e t v a i
tov
e tv a i T ovSe
o v S e ls
tc k v o v
X ey ec K v p tc o s , e l S e o n o r r f s e o r l T K v o v aAAa n a p a
5 t o a v f ifie f irf K o s fj o v v O e o is e o T iv .
gov;
v a t.
t kvov
oti
lore. 8 e
d p ' ear!
tovto tckvov;
o v f ip e fir fK e v e l v a i K a l
gov
gov
apa
K al
to v to
tovto
4 kvov,
aAA OV GOV TKVOV.

K at t o e tv a i
tcov
K aK cbv
ti
a y a O o v * fj y a p </)pov7]-
GIS eOTIV eTTlGTTffirj TCOV K aK W V .
TO 8 e TOVTO TOV-
10 tcov e t v a i o v X e y e r a t n o X X a x & S , aAAa K T rjf ia .

8 a p a 7roX X ax<bs (K a l y a p
tov
avO pconov
(f>afiev e t v a i , aAA o v r t K T rjfia ) K a l e a v

K a K a X e y rfT a i ( b s
aAA o v
anX cbs
tovto
t iv o s ,
tcov
cf> atv T at.
Sta
t o v t o tcov
K aK cb v .
K a lro i
napa
ev S ex erat
15 e t v a i Tt Tcbv K aK cbv 8 it t c o s , aAA*

tovtov,
aAA e i
fia X X o v .
io c o s
ti
to
tcov
tc
cp(OV
n p o s Ta
K aK cbv e o T i v ,
n fj ovv K al
to c o s
ayaO ov
ovk e n l tov X o y o v
S ov Xov eirj a y a O o v fi o x O r jp o v ,
8 ouS*
o v t c js * o v y a p e l a y a O o v K a l
When it is equivalent to our 4so-and-sos.
124
el

the argument that every number is sm a ll; for if,
when no conclusion has been reached, they pass over
the fact and say that a conclusion has been reached
and is true because every number is both large and
small, they are committing an error.
Some people, too, solve these reasonings by the
principle of ambiguity, saying, for example, that
yours * means your father * or your son * 01* your
slav e/ Y e t it is obvious that, if the refutation turns
upon the possibility of several meanings, the term
or expression ought to be used literally in several
senses ; but no one speaks of A as B s child in the
literal sense if B is the childs master, but the com
bination is due to accident. Is A yours ? * Y e s /
Is A a child ? * Y e s / Then A is your child/ for
he happens to be both yours and a child ; but for all
that he is not your child/
There is also the argument that something of
evils is good ; for wisdom is a knowledge of
evils/* * But the statement that this is * of so-andso *a is not used with several meanings but denotes
possession. Granting, however, that the genitive has
more than one meaning (for we say that man is of
the animals/ though not a possession of theirs), and if
the relation of so-and-so to evils is expressed by the
genitive, it is therefore a so-and-so * of evils/ but soand-so is not one of the evils. The difference seems to
be due to whether the genitive is used in a particular
sense or absolutely. Y e t it is perhaps possible for the
saying Something of evils is good to be ambiguous,
though not in the example given above, but rather in
the phrase a slave is good of the wicked/ But per
haps this example is not to the point either ; for if
something is 1 good * and of so-and-so/ it is not at
125
ARISTOTLE
180 a
t o v t o v , a ya O ov t o v t o v a fia ,
c/>dvai
tw v
20 y a p
^ cb co v
7TOT T l
elv a i
ov
X eyera i
n oX X a xcb s*
7r o v s
80s
/cat
to
yap
IAtaSa
n oX X axcb s*
ov
d(f>eA 6v T S , TOVTO
O T jfia iv O fl V
yerai
fio i
o v S e t o t o v avO pcon ov
fjfiic jv
X e-
eln o m e s
o r jfia iv o fie v ,
o lo v
to
to v
fir jv iv
a e i S e O e a.
v v t r
nov
'
XXV.
5 '
nebs
fj
npos
25 Av r e o v ( jK o n o v v T t
to
<f>aoiv, e l e v S e v e r a l
ev a v rla
'
lo u s oe
/cat Ta
ir a p a
ti
to
X eyea O a i
/cat
eK a rep ov
fj
fj
npos
ti
fj
K c o X v e i,
n eb s,
n ep a o fia n
O ec o p r jre o v n p o s
rj
nr}
a n X cbs,
a v ri-
ttjv
/cat
fie v
toSc
tovto
ttjv
Ta y a p
an6<f>aaiv
a v rcb , n fj fie m o i
to
el
cocjt
30 T o S e S e n f j , o v n c o e X e y x o s .
firj
npos
<f>oxjiv
tco
ovSev
rooe
n e n o v O e v a i,
to vtco v t i
a n X cbs fie v a S v v a r o v v n a p x e iv
a n X cbs,
Kal
o v fin e p a a fia
a m iK e ifie v a
K V picos
S*
n fj
fie v
ev
to
anX cbs
o v fi-
tco
a m lcf>a cn v,
E tat Se n a m es ol t o i o v t o i Xoyoi rovr* e x o m e s.

t >5 /
t
^
f
\\ '
\ *
r
ap
ti
evoexera i
firj o v ,
35 e o r a t
to
om cov.
ti
tcov
Kal
a fia
a vrcb
e lv a i;
n ,
a A A a firjv e o T i y e
ov o v k
S.py e v S e 'x e r a i
e n io p K eiv ;
n e lO e o O a i
ec rra i o v y a p
tov
d p * eyx<op ei
Kal
e lv a i r t K a l elv a i r a v r o v ;
ea n
126
tco
ov
o f io i c o s S e /cat t o
e v o p K e iv
ro
firj
a v r o v a fia
a n e iO e iv ;
to
avrov
tov
S e fifj o v ,
/cat c o t i v aTrAco?* ou t* e l e v o p K e i
fj
ovre
ovk
to
el
S e fj
rj
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xxiv-xxv

the same time * so and-sos g o o d / Nor is the state
ment that * man is of the animals used with several
meanings ; for a phrase does not acquire several
senses every time we express its meaning in an ellip
tical form ; for we express, Give me the Iliad ' by
quoting the half line Sing, goddess, the wrath/
XXV.
Arguments which turn upon the use o f an (2) The use
expression not in its proper sense but with validity withor*
in respect only of a particular thing or in a particular w^hout^
respect or place or degree or relation and not ab- Son. C*
solutely, must be solved by examining the conclusion
in the light of its contradictory, to see if it can possibly
have been affected in any o f these ways. For it is
impossible for contraries and opposites and an affirma
tive and a negative to belong absolutely to the same
su b ject; on the other hand, there is no reason why
each should not belong in a particular respect or
relation or manner, or one in a particular respect and
the other absolutely. Thus if one belongs absolutely
and the other in a particular respect, no refutation has
yet been reached. This point must be examined in the
conclusion by comparison with its contradictory.
A ll the following arguments are of this kin d : Is Examples,
it possible for what is-not to be ? But surely it is
something which is not. Similarly, too, Being will
not be ; for it will not be any particular thing which
is. Is it possible for the same man at the same time
to keep and to break his oath ? Is it possible for the
same man at the same time to obey and disobey the
same order ? Is it not true, in the first place, that
being something and Being are not the same thing ?
On the other hand, Not-being, even if it is something,
has not absolute being as well. Secondly, if a man
keeps his oath on a particular occasion or in a par-
127
ARISTOTLE
180 a
rfjSe, avayKrj K al eiopKeiv, o 8* ofiooas emopKTjoeiv

180 b VOpKl imOpKCOV TOVrO flOVOV, VOpKL 8e OV' OV8*
o aneiOcbv rreiOerai, aAAa n
o
rreiOerai.
ofioios S
AcJyos* Kal nepl rov ipev8eo0ai rov avrov afia Kal
aXrjOeveiv aAAa Sta ro firj etvai evOecbprjrov, 7rorepay$ av n $ ano8olrj ro anXcos aXrjOeveiv rj ifrevhe5 oOat, SvokoXov <f>alverai. Ko>Auet S rov aurov1 ouSev
a7rAo)s fiev etvai ipev8r}, rrrj S aA^fltJ, 1} rtvos* Kal
etvai aArjOfj n v a , aXrjOfj 8e (a v ro v) firj} . ofioicos Se
Kal enl rcov npos n Kal 7tov Kal n o r e 7ravres yap
ot
t
toiovtoi
rj vyieia
Xoyoi napa rovro ovfifiaivovoiv.
* * \A
> /)/
rj o nAovros ayauov;
ap'
>\\\ * VJ
aAAa n o aqypovi
10 Kal firj opOws x/ow/uevaj vk ayaO ov ayaOov apa

Kal
ovk
ayaOov,
noXei ayaOov;
apa
to
aAA* e o n v ore ov fieX n o v ravrov
apa r<o avrto ayaOov Kal

k (o Xvei
vyiaiveiv rj 8vvao0ai ev
ovk
ayaOov.
rj ov8ev
anXcos ov ayaOov np8e firj etvai ayaOov, fj
ra>8e fiev ayaOov, aAA oi) vvv fj
ovk
evravO' ayaOov;
15 ap' o firj fiovXoir' av o </>povifios, KaKov;
an o-
fiaXeiv 8' ov fiovXerai rayaO ov KaKov apa rayaOov.

ov yap ravrov elneiv rayaOov etvai KaKov Kal ro
dno fiaXeiv rayaOov.
1 Reading
128
to v
ofioicos Sc Kal o rov KXenrov

avrov or
to v to v
for avTov.
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xxv

tieular respect, it does not necessarily follow that
he is a keeper of oaths, but he who he has sworn that
he will break his oath keeps his oath on this particular
occasion only by foreswearing himself, but is not a
keeper of oaths ; nor is he who disobeys obedient,
except to a particular order.
The argument is
similar which deals with the question whether the
same man can say what is at the same time both true
and false ; but it presents apparent difficulties be
cause it is not easy to see whether the qualification
4 absolutely * should be applied to true or to fa lse/
But there is no reason why the same man should not
be absolutely a liar yet tell the truth in some respects,
or that some of a mans words should be true but he
himself not be truthful. Similarly, too, if there are
qualifications of relation or place or time. All the
following arguments turn upon a point of this kind.
Is health (or wealth) a good thing ? But to the
fool who misuses it, it is not a good thing ; it is,
therefore, a good thing and not a good thing. Is
health (or political powrer) a good thing ? But there
are times when it is not better than other things ;
therefore the same thing is both good and not good
for the same man. Or is there no reason wrhy a thing
should not be absolutely good but not good for a
particular person, or good for a particular person, but
not good at the present moment or here ? Is that
wThich the wise man would not wish, an evil ? But he
does not wish for the rejection of the good ; therefore,
the good is an evil. This is not true ; for it is not the
same thing to say that the good is an evil and that
the rejection of the good is an evil. So likewise with
the argument about the th ie f; it does not follow',
2 Heading aX-qOrj 8c <avrov> /xtj.

F
129
ARISTOTLE
180 b
A oyos.
ov
20 X a f i e i v
rayaO ov
vooos
apa
yap
el k ok ov
to
yap
X a fie lv
eon v,
kokov
to
S ik o io v
25
av
ifs e v S fj,
ov
oS L kov
T ig
K p iv r j
K v p ia
K aTa
io n v
a S iK o v fie v o v
T avra
a S ik w s
a Ip eroV y
aAA*
r jv
to
aTrAcos f i e v
a vrov
S ik o io v , t o
K a ra
r a v r r jv
8oav
io n v
vooov.
S iK a lw g
avT ov,
to
to v
Kav
a v to
fj
apa
to
yap
X e y e iv
to v
T oSt
S iK a lco s,
Kal t o
ov
K p lv a v r o s* o v
S ik o io v
yap
el
S t-
fie v r o i
e x LV
K p io iv
ovSev KcoXvei, otov
O' <0/
\ f \
P/
Toot rj ajot, Kai a7TAa)S oikoiov.
e l rr a O eiv t i
a ip en J o rep o v
Se r a X X o r p ia
etv a i
aA A a fir jv K a l
ik o v w s
ov
ff S i k o I o j s .
S ik o io v
to v
ttjv
v o fio v
T a a S t /c a ;
a S Ik w s
K coX vei a S i k w s
fj
to
fj
K a l r r o r e p a Set K p lv e iv t o v
a h iK a .
ovS ev
fie v r o i
a n o fia X e lv
Kal
8oav
to v
S ik o io v
erra O ev
s'
to
Kal
a p a S ik o io v e o n v T a a v T o v e x ^ iv e K a o r o v ;
S ik o io v K al o v S ik o io v .
30 k o i w
ayaO ov.
aAA d r r o d a v e iv d S iK w g a i p e -
T a S tV a ta X e y o v r a fj t o v
to v
K X e n T r js , K a l t o
ayaO ov
aA A
to v
a S iK to s a lp e T W T e p o v ;
tc o T e p o v .
eon v
o v k o v v t o k o k o v f i o v X e r a i , aAAa
eorl k o k o v
av
S ik o io v
/
\
ofioiog oe kat
35 d8 iKa ovra ovSev KcoXvei Xeyeiv ye avra Sikoiov

etvat* ov yap
el Xeyeiv Sikoiov, avayKrj St/cata
etvai, worrep ov S
ofiolojg Se Kal i n i
ISO
el <l)(f)eXifiov Xeyeiv > <L<f>eXifia.

tw v
Sikoiwv.
wot*
ovk
el
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xxv

if the thief is an evil, that to acquire things is also an
evil. The thief, therefore, does not wish for what is
evil but for what is good ; for to acquire something
good is good. Also disease is an evil, but to get rid
o f disease is not an evil. Is what is just preferable
to what is unjust and are just circumstances prefer
able to unjust ? But it is preferable to be put to
death unjustly. Is it just that each man should
have his own ? But judgements which a man passes
in accordance with his personal opinion, even if they
are false, are valid in the eyes of the law ; the same
thing, therefore, is just and not just. Again, should
judgement be given in favour of him who says what
is just or of him who says what is unjust ? But
it is just for the victim of injustice to state in full
the things which he has suffered, and these things
were unjust. For if to suffer something unjustly is an
object of choice, it does not follow that unjust cir
cumstances are preferable to just, but, absolutely,
justice is preferable ; but this does not prevent unjust
circumstances being preferable to just in a particular
case. Again, it is just that a man should have his
own, and it is not just that he should have what
belongs to another ; but there is no reason why any
judgement which is given in accordance with the
ju dges opinion should not be j u s t ; for, if it is just
in a particular case and in particular circumstances,
it is not also absolutely just. Similarly, too, there is
no reason why, though things are unjust, merely
saying them should not be just. For if to say things
is just, it does not follow that they are just, any more
than, if it is expedient to say things, it follows that
those things are expedient. Similarly, too, with things
that are just.
So that if what is said is unjust,
131
ARISTOTLE
180 b
ra
Xeyofieva aSiKa, o
Xeycov aSt/ca vitca Xeyei
yap a Xeyeiv earl StKaia, anXcos Se Kal naOeTv

aSiKa.
I8la
X X V I . Tot? Se napa rov opiofjuov yivofievois rov

eXeyxov, Kadanep vneypdc/>rf nporepov, dnavrrfreov
GK07T0VCJI t o avfirrepaafia npos ttjv avrtyaoiv, oncos
eorai t o avro Kal Kara t o avro Kal npos t o avro
5 Kal coaavrcos Kal ev tco avtco xpovcp.
eav S ev
apxfj npoaeprfra t, ovx ofioXoyrjreov cos aSvvarov

avt o elvai SmXaoiov Kal firj SmXaaiov, aAAa
to
cf>areov, firj fievroi coSi, cos n or' rjv t o eXeyXea9ai

SicofioXoyrjfievov.
napa to t o i o v to .
io otSe ro n payfia;
elal
Se n am es
oES* ot Aoyot
ap* o elScbs eKaarov o ti eKaarov,

Kal o ayvocov coaavrcos;
elScbs
Se tis rov KopioKov o n KopioKos, ayvooirj av o n

fiovaiKos, cbare ravro enlararai Kal ayvoei.
rerpanrfxv rov rpmrjxeos fieiôv;
to
dpa
yevoiro S
av eK rpmrfxovs rerpanrfxv Kara ro firjKos' ro Se

fieitpv eXarrovos fietôv avro apa avrov fieiôv
Kal eAarrov.
15
X X V I I . T ovs Se napa ro
fiaveiv
to
aireioQai Kal Xafi-
ev apxfj nwOavofievco fiev, av fj SrjXov,
ov Soreov, ov S av evSoov fj, Xeyovra raXrjOes.

av Se XaOrj, rrjv ayvoiav Sta rrjv fioxOrjplav rcbv
167 a 23.
132
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xxv-xxvn

it does n ot follow th at it is a case o f th e m an w ho
uses unjust pleas w inning his cause ; fo r he is saying
things w hich it is ju s t for him to say b u t w hich are,
ab solu tely, u njust fo r an yone to suffer.
X X V I . R efu tation s w hich are co n n e cte d w ith th e (3) ignoratio
definition o f th e refutation m ust, as su g gested a b ov e,0 elenchu
b e m et b y exam inin g th e conclu sion in th e lig h t o f
its con tra d ictory and seein g h ow the sam e term shall
b e p resen t in the sam e resp ect and in th e sam e
relation, m anner and tim e. In p u ttin g this additional
qu estion at th e beg in n in g , y ou m ust n ot ad m it th at
it is im possible for th e sam e th in g to b e b oth d ou ble
and n ot d ou ble b u t m ust adm it th e possibility bu t
n ot in th e w ay th at was on ce a d m itted to fulfil th e
condition s o f a refu tation . A ll th e follow in g argu
m ents d ep e n d upon a p oin t o f this kind. * D oes he
w ho know s th at A is A , k n ow the th in g A ? A n d ,
sim ilarly, 4 D oes h e w ho does n ot kn ow th at A is A ,
n ot k n ow th e th in g A ? * B ut on e w ho know s th at
Coriscus is Coriscus, m igh t n ot kn ow th a t he is
m usical, so th at h e b oth know s and is ign oran t o f
the sam e th in g. A g a in , 4 Is an o b je c t w hich is fou r
cubits lo n g g rea ter than an o b je c t w hich is th ree
cubits lo n g ? * B u t an o b je c t th ree cubits lon g m igh t
b ecom e fou r cubits lon g. N ow th e g rea ter is g rea ter
than th e less ; th erefore th e o b je c t is itse lf g rea ter
and less than itself.
X X V I I . In refutations w hich are con n e cte d w ith (4) Petttio
th e b e g g in g and assum ing o f th e original poin t at pnnciPn'
issue, it should n ot b e g ra n ted to a qu estion er, i f his
p roced u re is obviou s, even th ou gh his view is g e n e r
ally a ccep ted , bu t y ou should state th e truth. If,
on the oth er hand, his p roced u re is not d e te cte d , y ou
should, ow in g to the badness o f such argum ents,
133
ARISTOTLE
1a
X oycov
t o io v t w v
ws
ov
e ls
e?0 o n
20 a p x y s .
aAA* ws npos
ep corcovra
tov
h ie tX e y fie v o v '
yap
eh oO r) o v x
tovto
fie T a a r p e n T e o v
eX eyxos
a>S
tovtw
avev
rov
x p ^ o o fie v o v ,
orvXXoyiovfievov rovvavrlov rj
enl rw v napeijeXeyxcov.
X X V III. K a t
tovs
f3if3dovras err* avrov

rj
hiTTT)
25
tw v
ev fie p e i
ya p , el
Sta
tov
roS e
fie r d
a v r iK e ifie v w
MeAtcraou
rou S e, /cat r o S
to
jir j
eêtv,
30 vos, /cat dneipos .
to
to
w ov
tw
yeyovos
c o o t
ovk
et
Se
nap
eêt
tw
a^tourat
elv a i fie r a
roS e
a v r iK e ifie v o v .
X oyos' el yap
atot
a y e v r jT O V
e<m Se
enofievwv aKoXovdrjcns ff yap ws

K a O oX ov, o lo v d v ftp w n w
to
fj K a r a T a s a v r i d e a e i s ' e l y a p
tw
napenofievov orvfi-
tov
Xoyov heiKTeov.
t o v Se.
a K o X o v O ei,
/cat
a p x r jv ,
tov
to
a y e v r jT O S o o v p a -
eoT iv avanaXiv yap
fj aKoXovOrjais.
X X I X . wO a o t r e n a p a to npooT iO evai r t auAAo-
y l t p v r a i , oK oneiv e l a<f>atpov(ievov a v fifia iv e i firf&ev

rjTTov to aSvvaT ov.
K a n e ir a tovto if i^ a v ia T e o v ,
/cat XeKTeov w s e8wi<ev o v x ^

35 npos
Xoyov, o Se
tov
K e x p r jT a i
S okovv aAA w s
ovhev npos
tov
Xoyov.
XXX.
Tlpos Se
noiovvras
evOvs
tovs
ev
ra nXeiw
apxfj
epwTTffiara ev
BiopiOTeov.
yap fiia npos fjv fiia dnoKpiais eoTiv,

134
epwTrjois
w ot
* ovre
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xxvn-xxx

m ake y ou r ig n oran ce recoil on th e h ead o f th e qu es
tion er, on th e g rou n d th at h e has n o t argu ed p r o p e r ly ;
for refu tation m ust p ro ce e d w ith ou t any assum ption
o f th e original poin t. N e x t, y o u m ust argue th at th e
p oin t was g ra n ted w ith th e id ea th at h e was g o in g
to use it n ot as a prem iss b u t in order to argue th e
op p osite view to it or fo r th e pu rpose o f refutations
on side issues.
X X V I I I . A g a in , th ose refutations w hich draw
th eir conclusions th rough th e con seq u en t m ust b e
e x p osed in th e argum ent itself. T h ere are tw o w ays
in w hich con sequ en ces fo llo w : E ith er as th e universal
follow s from th e particular, as * anim al * follow s from
* man *; fo r it is claim ed th at, i f A accom panies B,
th en B also accom panies A . O r else th e process g o e s
b y op p osites ; for i f A follow s B , A s op p osite will
follow B s opp osite. It is on this, to o , th at th e argu
m en t o f M elissus d epen ds ; fo r he claim s th at, if
th at w hich has com e to b e has a b eg in n in g , th at
w hich has n ot c om e to b e has no b eg in n in g , and so,
if th e h eaven has n ot com e to b e , it is also eternal.
B ut this is n ot tru e ; fo r the seq u en ce is th e reverse.
X X I X . In refutations w hich are a rgu ed b y m eans
o f som e ad dition, y ou m ust exam in e w h eth er th e
im possibility occu rs n one th e less w hen th e addition
has been w ithdraw n. I f so, th en th e answ erer should
m ake this fa ct clear and should state th at he gra n ted
th e ad dition n ot becau se h e b e lie v e d in it b u t for
th e sake o f th e argu m en t, b u t th at his op p on en t has
m ade no use o f it at all for his argum ent.
X X X . In d ea lin g w ith th ose w ho m ake several
qu estion s in to on e, y o u should draw a distin ction
im m ed ia tely at th e begin n in g . F or a qu estion is
single to w hich th ere is on ly on e answ er, so th at on e
135
(5) The
(6) inser-
Relevant
matter,
(7) Multi
questions,
ARISTOTLE
181 a
rrXeiw kclO9 evos ovre ev Kara ttoXXwv, aAA ev KaO*

181 b evos <f>areov fj anocfyareov.
warrep he enl rw v ofiw -
vvfiwv ore fiev dficf)oiv ore S ovherepw vrrdpxî,

ware firj arrXov ovros rov ipwrrffiaros gcttAo)? dbro-
K ptvofievois ovhev a v fifia iv e i T iaay eiv , o fio iw s K al

771 rovrw v
orav fiev ofiv ra rrXeiw rw evl rj ro
5 ev rots noXXois v ita pxjj, rw avXws hovn K al afiaprovn
ravrrjv
rrjv
dfiapriav
ovhev
vrrevavriwfia
ovfifiaiver orav Se rw fiev rw Se firj, rj rrXeiw Kara

nXeiovwv, Kal e o n v ws V7rapx*i afi(f>6 repa afi<f)orepois, e a n S ws ovx vnapxei rraXtv, ware r o v r 5
evXafirjreov.
otov ev roiahe rocs Xoyois.
el ro fiev
10 i o n v ayaOov ro he KaKov, o n ravra aXrjOes elrreiv

ayaOov Kal KaKov Kal 7raXiv firjr
KaKov (ovk
eon
yap
ayaOov firjre
eKarepov eKarepov),
wore
ravro ayaOov Kal KaKov Kal ovr ayaOov ovre KaKov.

K a l el e K a a r o v a v r o a v r w r a v r o v , K a l
aAAo v
e re p o v ,
o 'i
' >\\
*
\ ff
7reiorj ovk aAAots ravra aAA avrois, Kai erepa
15
avrwv, ravra eavrois erepa Kal ra vra .
e n el ro
fiev ayaOov KaKov ylverai, ro Se KaKov ayaOov

i o n v , hvo yevoir
pov avro avrw
av.
hvoiv re Kal avlowv eKare
ioov, ware toa Kal avioa avra
a vrois.
yRfi7ri7rrovoi fiev ovv ofiroi Kal els aXXas Xvoeis*
20 Kal yap ro aficf>w Kal ro airavra rcXeiw orjfiaivei'

ovkovv
ravrov, rrXrjv ovofia, ovfi/3aivei cf>rjoai Kal
1 Heading
136
for cVcl 8* with Poste.
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xxx

must not affirm or deny several things of one thing
nor one thing of several things, but one thing of one
thing. But just as in the case of equivocal terms, a
predicate is sometimes true of both meanings and
sometimes of neither, and so, though the question
is not simple, no detriment results if people give a
simple answer, so too with these double questions.
W hen, therefore, the several predicates are true of one
subject, or one predicate of several subjeets, no con
tradiction is involved in giving a simple answer, though
he has made this mistake. But when the predicate
is true of one subject but not of the other, or several
predicates are true of several subjeets, then there is
a sense in whieh both are true of both but another
sense, on the other hand, in which they are not : so
one must be on ones guard against this. The follow
ing arguments illustrate this : (1) Supposing A is
good and B evil, it is true to say that they are good
and evil and, on the other hand, that they are neither
good nor evil (for A is not evil and B is not good), so
that the same thing is good and evil and neither good
nor evil ; (2) I f everything is the same as itself and
different from anything else, sinee things are not the
same as other things but the same as themselves,
and also different from themselves, the same things
are both different from themselves and the same as
themselves ; (3) Moreover, if that whieh is good
becomes evil and that which is evil is good, they
would become two ; and of two unequal things eaeh
is equal to itself, so that they are both equal and
unequal to themselves.
These refutations also fall under other solutions ;
for the terms both * and * all * have several meanings,
so that to affirm or deny the same thing is verbal only,
137
ARISTOTLE
181b
a n o ffa r jo a i' t o v t o
o tl
f ir j f i i a s
aAA
ev
K au
evos
aAAa
o v k fjv e X e y x o s .
e p to T T fo e to s
tco v
n X e lo v o jv
(f> a v e p o v
y iv o fie v r fs ,x
(p a vT O S r) a n o t p a v T o s , o v k
eorai
to a S v v a T o v .
X X X I. IIep l
25
n o X X a K is
Se
eln e iv ,
tc o v
a n a y o v r to v
<f>a vep 6v
tb s
ov
8o tIo v
t l X e y o fie v to v o rffia lv e iv t l x ^ p ^ l ^ e v a s
Tas
tco v
K aO '
K a rrfy o p la s, o lo v 8 m X a o io v a v ev t o v
eVos
Se/ca
8 eovoi
K a l o X to s e v t f j
e lv a i.
to
cb on ep
ov
8e
oi)8e
ov8e
o fito s
o r ffia iv e i o v 8 e v
e v T tp f f f i i o e i * e l 8
to v to
aAA
ovk
f i r j e lv a L X e v K o v , X e y e i a v r o X e v K o v
S m X a o io v
to
ev to ls
n o i r j o a i e v t t o fi r ) n o i r j o a i ,
a n o ( f > a o e i f) ( f ) d o i s *
Aeyot ToSt
el tls
aAA
Kal t o
npos
auras
h m X a o io v
/cat yap Ta 8e/ca
f f f i l a e o s , o t l efi< f> a iv eT a L .
30
to * to v to
e ls
apa /cai
lo to s ,
o rffia iv e i,
o v 8 f) e n iO T r ffir f
K a l o v v r jp r ffie v o v .
35 e v T tp e i S e i , o l o v e l e o T i v f) la T p iK T ) e n i O T r )fi r )y o n e p
TO K O IV O V
Se
to ls
CKeiVO
8 Ly
to v
X eK T eo v , tb s o v
fjv
en iO T T ffir)
S r jX o v r a i
to
a vro
K a T T fy o p o v fie v o is
x > p ls
S r jX o v fie v o v .
to
8 r )X o l e n l t o v
o ifio v K al t o v
182 a 8e oi58ev
K coX vei
yap
k o lX o v
aAAa, t o
enLGTTfTOV.
to v to
K a l e v T tp X o y t o t o
K o iv fj
fie v
to
avTo
p o iK o v , n p o o r iO e fie v o v
fie v
G K e X e i , o r f f i a l v e i v 3* e v O a f i e v y a p
r fj
to
p iv l
to
8e
t to
o ifio v , ev 9 a 8 e
1 Heading yivop.ivt]s for ytvofiivwv.

2 Inserting t o before r a M .
3 Heading arffiatvctv (arjfiaivci ABD).

138
ev
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xxx-xxxi

and this, as we saw, is not a refutation. But clearly,
if one of the several questions is not asked but the
answerer affirms or denies a single predicate of a
single subject, the reduction to an impossibility will
not occur.
X X X I.
As regards those who lead one on to repeat (B) Soiuthe same thing several times over, it is clear that arguments
one must not allow that predications of relative tending to
nAOTTlNfl
terms have any signification in themselves when
separated from their correlatives ; for example,
that double * apart from the expression * double of
half* is significant, just because it appears in that
expression. For ten ' appears in the expression
ten minus one * and do * in the expression * not
d o / and affirmations in general in negations ; but,
all the same, if one were to say this fc not w h ite/
one is not saying that it is white. * Double ' has
possibly no signification at all, just as the * in * the
half * too signifies nothing. I f it has any signification,
it is not the same as in the combined expression.
Nor is knowledge * of a specific kind, such as medi
cal know ledge/ the same as knowledge * as a
general te r m ; for the latter has always meant
knowledge of the knowable/ When dealing with
terms which are predicated of the terms by means
of which they are defined, you must say that the
term defined is not the same when taken separately
as it is in the combined expression. For concave *
has the same general meaning when used of the
snub-nosed and of the bandy-legged, but when it is
combined in the one case with the nose and in the
other with the leg, there is no reason why it should
not signify different things, for in the first case it
signifies sn u b/ in the other ban d y/ and it makes
139
ARISTOTLE
182 a
t o p a i f i o v o r f f ia iv e i* K a l o v h e v Staxfrepei e l n e i v p i s
o if ir f f) p i s K o iX rj.
en
e v 6 v ' i/je v h o s y a p e o n v .
aAAa p i v o s
5 KoiXrj
T o h i,
ov
S o t I ov
ttjv
ov y a p i o n
o to v
ira d o s,
A e iv /car
to
o i f io v p i s
wot
oi5Sev
CLTOTTOV, el 7) pis ff OlflT) plS ioTIV )(OVOa KOlXoTTJTa

pivos*
X X X II. l\epl he tw v ooXoiKiofiwv, nap
o ti
fiev <f>aivovrai ovfifiaiveiv, einofiev irporepov, w s

he Xvteov, in ' avTWv tw v Xoywv eorai <f>avepov.
10 anavres
yap
OKevaêiv.
oi rototSe to v to
fiovXovTai
Kara-
ap o Xeyeis aXrjOws, Kal eoTi to v to

<f>fjs S etvai t i X16o v e o n v apa t i Xidov.
aXrjOws;
ff t o Xeyeiv XiOov ovk e o n Xeyeiv o aAA ov, ovhe

to v to aAAa to u to v et ovv epoiTo n s , ap9 ov aXrjOws
Xeyeis,
eori to v to v ,
ovk
av
hoKoirj
eXXrfvlêiv,
15 worrep ovh 9 el epoiTo, dp fjv Xeyeis etvai, e o n v
o v to s ;
firfT
vXov S elneiv o v tw s ,1 fj ooa fifyre OfjXv
appev orffiaivei, ovhev hia<f>epei.
hid Kal ov
yiveTat ooXoiKiofios, el o Xeyeis etvai, e o n t o v t o ;

vXov Se Xeyeis etvai' e o n v apa vXov.
Kal t o ovros appevos eêt KXrjoiv.
dp ov tos i o n v avrrj;
20 ovtos i o n K opioK os;
o he At60 s
et Se's t is epoiTo,
etra 7raAtv, t i S ;
ovx
efr ehreiev, e o n v apa o v tos
avTrf, ov ovXXeXoyiorai to v ooXoiKiofiov, ovh et

1
H e a d i n g c iV e t y o v t w s
for
cct t v o t o s .
2 Reading Sc for hrj.

B 1(55 h 50 f.
b The argument is clear in the original, because Greek is
an inflected language, whereas English docs not distinguish
140
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xxxi-xxxn

no difference whether you say * a snub nose * or 4 a
eoneave nose.* Further, the expression must not
be allowed to pass without qualification ; for it is
a falsehood. For snubness is not a eoneave nose but
something, namely a condition, appertaining to a
nose ; so there is nothing absurd in supposing that
a snub nose is one whieh possesses nasal concavity.
X X X II.
As regards solecisms, we have already (C) Soiustated a the apparent eause of their occurrence ; arguments
how they should be solved will be clear in the actual tending to
arguments.
All the following arguments aim at
producing this result : 4 Is a thing truly that whieh
you truly affirm it to be ? You affirm something
to be a stone (accusative masculine) b ; therefore
something (nominative neuter) is a stone (accusative
masculine). Or does speaking of a stone (a maseuline
word) involve the use of the relative 4 whom ' rather
than 4which * and the pronoun 4him * rather th an 4it * ?
If, then, one were to ask, 4 Is a stone him whom you
truly state him to be ? / he would not be considered
to be talking good Greek any more than if he were
to ask, 4 Is he whom you state her to be ? * But the
use of the word 4 stick/ or any other neuter word,
in this way, involves no difference between the
nominative and accusative ; therefore no solecism
is committed if you say, 4 Is this what you affirm it
to be ? * You affirm it to be a stick ; therefore it is
a stick. 4 S to n e/ however, and 4 he * have the mascu
line gender. Now if one were to ask, 4 Can 44 he
be a 44 she ? / and then again, 4 W h y ? Is he not
Coriseus ? ' and then were to s a y ,4 Then he is a sh e /
he has not proved the solecism even if Coriseus
between the nominative and accusative except in the personal
pronouns and the relative.
141
ARISTOTLE
182 a
ro ViopioKos orjfiaivei orrep avrrj, firj 8/8coat Se

o airoKpivofievos, aAAa Set rovro TTpooepuirrjOrjvai.
et Se firyr
e o n v firfre StScoatv, ov ovXXeXoyiorai
ovre ra) o v n ovre 7rpos rov rjpwrrjfievov.
25 ovv Set KaKel rov XiOov orjfiaiveiv ofiros.
ojjlolcos
el Se
firjre e a n firjre StSorat, ov XeKreov ro ovfirrepaofia

<f>aiverai Se Trapa ro
rrjv avofioiov tttcjoiv rov
ovofiaros ofioiav (f>aiveo0ai.
ap aXrjOes icrnv el-
Trelv o n e o n v avrrj, orrep elvai <f>rjs avrrjv; elvai

V
V
W
/P
oe (pfjs a o m o a ecrrtv ap a a v rr j acrm oa.
rj ovk
30 av ay K rj, et jwq to a v rr j ao m S a o rjfiaiv ei aAA* d o rr is ,

\ C> 9
/O
t o o aomoa ravrrjv;
ovo
I\
<
et o 977? etvat to u to v ,
ecrrtv ovtos*, <f>jjs S etvat KAe'cova, eoriv apa oSros*

KAecova* ov yap e o n v oSros KAecov.a' eiprjrai yap
o n o <f>rjfjii elvai rovrov, e o n v ovros, o v t o v t o v
ouSe yap av eXXrjviôi ourcos* ro ipwrrjfia XeftOev.
35 ap im ora oa i t o v t o ;
oraoai apa XiOos.
t o v t o S eart Atflos** eVt-
7} ou rauro
orjfiaivei t o t o v t o
iv tco dp irrioraoai rovro Kal iv r<o t o v t o
Se
XiOos, aAA* iv fiev r<p TTpcbrq) rovrov, iv Se rai

vorepa) o v ro s;
to v to ;
182
b Xidov.
ap' ov imorrjfirjv e\eis, irrloraoai
iTTiorrjjxrjv S eêts* XiOov eVterraoat apa

rj
t o fiev rovrov XiOov Xeyeis, t o Se rovrov

a But Cleon.
142
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, x x x i i
signifies a 4 she,* th ou gh th e answ erer refuses to
c o n ce d e this ; b u t this m ust b e th e su b ject o f a
fu rther qu estion . B u t i f n eith er this is so nor does
he c o n c e d e it, th en th e solecism has n ot b een p roved
eith er in fa c t or relatively to th e person to w hom th e
qu estion was pu t. Sim ilarly, th erefore, in th e first
ex am p le also, 4 he * m ust sign ify th e stone. If, h ow
ev er, this is n eith er true nor is c o n c e d e d , the co n
clusion m ust n ot b e stated, th ou gh it is apparently
tru e, becau se th e case w hich is used o f th e w ord,
w hich is u nlike, appears to b e like. 4 Is it true to
say th at this o b je c t is w hat y o u affirm it to be ? 1
Y o u affirm it to b e a shield (accu sative), th erefore
it is a shield (accusative). O r is this n ot necessarily
so, i f 4 this o b je c t * (n om in ative) signifies n ot shield
(accusative) b u t sh ield (n om in ative), w hile 4 this
o b je c t * (accusative) signifies shield (accu sative).
N or again i f he is w hat y ou affirm h im to b e , and y ou
affirm him to b e C leona (accusative o f C leon ), is he
th erefore C leona ? for h e is n ot C leona a ; for th e
statem en t was th at he n ot him is w hat I affirm him
to b e. F or the qu estion i f asked in this form b w ould
n ot b e G reek eith er. 4 D o y ou kn ow this ? * B ut
this is a ston e (n om in ative) ; th erefore y ou kn ow a
stone (n om in ative). Has n ot 4 this ' a different fo rce
in th e qu estion 4 D o y o u k n ow this ? ' and in 4 This
is a s t o n e / in th e first case stan din g for an accusative
and in th e s cco n d for a nom in ative ? W h e n y ou
ex ercise recog n ition o f an o b je c t , d o y ou n ot recog n ize
it ? Y o u exercise recog n ition o f a ston e ; th erefore
y ou recog n ize 4 o f a s t o n e / D o y ou n ot in th e on e
case pu t th e o b je c t in th e g en itiv e and say 4 o f th e
s t o n e / and in th e oth er case in th e accusative and
6 tV*. with the subject in the accusative.

143
ARISTOTLE
182 b
A i O o v iS o O r j
S , o
eêts,
e T T io r r jfir fv
r o v r o v , a A A a t o v t o , w o t 9 o v A L dov
* 0 tt
fie v o v v o l t o i o v t o i t w v
o v t at o o A o L K i o f x o v
5 <f>aiVOVTai
Kal
< f> a v ep ov k
Aet Se
fie v
re p o i,
T ra p a
e lo i
tl
K al
paovs
K al
a K o v o v r a , tt o A A o l k l s o l
10 t o v
Sta rt re
K al
aTTaVTTfTeOV
TTpOS
a vrovs,
e lp r ffie v w v .
X X X III.
ol
t o v Aid o v .
A o y w v o v o v A A o y i-
aAAa âtvovrat,
TTWS
tw v
A oyw v
iT T io r a o O a i, o v
aAAa
Iv
K a r a v o e iv
K a n h e iv
tlv l
aurot
o ti
tto v tw v
ot Se âAe7rcu-
T r a p a A o y itp v ra i
k lv o ls o v r e ? .
to v
to v
au-
Set K a A e i v t o v T ra p a r a v r o y i v o Se Aoyos* t o l s f i e v T r a p a r r j v A e ^ i v
rot? Se T r a p a t o o v f i f i e f t r f K o s t o l s Se 7 r a p 9 e r e p o v
Soêtev a v e l v a i Sta t o f i e r a < f > e p 6 f i e v o v e K a o r o v fir ]
yap
fiev o v
A oyov
o fio lw s
a vros
e t v a i S r jA o v .
o fiw v v fiia v s o orrep

15 t w v
w ovep
T r a p a A o y io fiw v , t o . fie v
S rjA a ( K a l y a p
napa
ot
Kal
to ls
Kal to ls
o ttio 0 V
o tto v
otov
io ri
a v r j p i< f> e p e r o K a r a K A i f i a K o s
oreA A eoO e;
dfi<f>w .
20 S r j r a t aTTKT0V7]Ke y a p
p evov.
etv a i
tv \ o v o iv
T rp o s
ttjv
K a l T T orep a t w v f i o w v e fn r p o o O e v r e ^ e r a i ;
aAA
T ra p a t t j v
e v r fO e o r a r o s
A o y o i o ^ eS o v o l y e A o io i rrd v res e lo i
t t jv A e iv ),
St(j) p o v ,
o fiv i v
S o k c i T p orros
ap* K v a p x o s ;
Kal
to v
K aO apos
tttw ^ o v
o v S r jr a ,
K ep a ia v .
ovS erep a ,
fio p ea s;
Kal to v
ov
w vov-
aAA 9A t t o A A w v l S y j s .
a The two meanings of the phrase are uncertain ; the

Oxford translation suggests ( 1) a man got the body of the
car taken off its chassis, and ( 5?) 4 he came a sitter (8l<f>po$)
down from the ladder.
b The reply takes the word in the sense of To what do you
fasten the sail when you furl it ?
e The answer understands the question to mean * which
cow will calve forwards ?
114
tw v
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xxxii-xxxin

say a ston e * ? B ut it was g ra n ted th a t, w hen
you ex ercise recog n ition o f a th in g, y o u recog n ize
* i t 9 n o t 1 o f i t / so that y ou recog n ize n ot o f a stone *
but * a sto n e /
T h a t argum ents o f this kin d, th en , d o n ot prove
solecism b u t on ly appear to d o so, and w hy th e y
appear to d o so and h ow y o u m ust fa ce th em , is clear
from w hat has b een said.
X X X III.
It m ust be n oted a b ou t argum ents in Note on the
gen eral th at in som e it is easier and in som e m ore d e ^ S aofVe
difficult to see w h y and w here th e y m islead th e ^ detec-
listen er, th ou gh o fte n th e la tter are id en tica l with th e tion of
form er. F or an argum ent m ust b e called iden tica l fallacies*
w hen it d epen ds on th e sam e p rin cip le, b u t th e sam e
argum ent m igh t b e h eld b y som e p eop le to d ep en d on
d iction , b y oth ers on a ccid en t and b y others on som e
th in g else, becau se each , w hen a p plied in different
c on tex ts, is n ot equ ally clear. So, ju st as fallacies du e
to equ iv oca tion , w hich are g en era lly reg a rd ed as th e
stu p idest form o f fa lla cy, som e are obviou s even to
ordinary m inds (for alm ost all th e m ost laughable
rem arks d ep en d upon diction ). F or e x a m p le ,1 A m an
was carried over the stan din g board o f th e fram ew ork
o f th e ch a riot * ; and * W h ith er are y ou bou n d ? '
4 T o the yard-arm ' 6 ; W h ich o f th e tw o cow s will
calve in fron t ? ' * N either, b u t b oth b e h in d / c Is
th e north w ind d clear ? * * N o, certain ly n o t ; for he
has killed th e b e g g a r and th e p u rc h a se r / e 1 Is he
E varchus ? * 4 C ertain ly n o t ; he is A p o llo n id e s / *
d The answerer takes Boreas as a proper name.
* Kal r6v wvovficvov is almost certainly corrupt; Poste
suggests xai tis o wvovfievos;
f The literal meaning of these names might be rendered
* good-manager and * sqtianderson.
145
ARISTOTLE
182 b
rov avtov Se rponov Kal rcov aXXcov oêSov ol nXeioroi, Ta Se Kal to v s efineipordrovs <j>alverat X a v
Oavetv orjfieiov Se to v to jv o ti fiaxovrat noXXaKis
nepl tcov ovofiarcov, otov norepov t avrov orffial25 vei Kara navrcov t o ov Kal t o ev fj erepov.
rots
fiev yap SoKei ravrov orffialveiv t o ov Kal t o e v
01
Se rov ZtJvo>vos Xoyov Kal TLapfievSiov Xvovoi
Sia ro noX\ax<bs (f>dvai t o ev XeyeoOai Kal t o ov.

ofioicos Se Kal rcov napa t o ovfifiefirfKos Kal napa1
rcov aXXcov eKaarov ol fiev eoovrai paovs iSeiv ol
30 Se x a^ncorepoi rcov Xoycov* Kal AajSeiv ev Ttvi yevei,
Kal norepov eXeyxos
ff ovk
eXeyXo s, ov paSiov
ofioicos nepl navrcov.

* E o n Se Spifivs Aoyo? Sorts anopeiv noiel fiaAiora* Sa/cvet yap ovros fiaXiora. an op la S eorl
hiTTTjy ff fiev ev rots ovXXeXoytofievois, o n
aveXrf
35 ris tcov epcorrjfidrcov, ff S ev to is ipioriKots, nuts

einrj n s t o nporaOev.
8 ionep iv to is ovX X oyion -
kois ol hptfivrepoi Xoyoi tprfreiv fiaXXov notovoiv.

e o n Se ovXXoytortKos fiev Xoyos 8pifivraros, av
o n fiaXiora Sokovvtcov o ti fiaXiora ev8 oov avatprj.
els yap cov o Aoyos* fieranOefievrjs rrjs dvn(f>daecos
I83aa7ravra? ofiolovs eei rovs ovXXoyiOfiovs' del yap
e iv 8 ocov ofioicos ev8 oov avatpfjoei ff KaraoKevaoei, 8 ionep anopeiv avayKaiov.
fiaXiora fiev ofiv
o roiovros 8pifivSt o i 10ov t o ovfinepaofia noicov

5 tois ipcorfffiaoi, 8 evrepos S o e an dvr cov ofioicov
1 Heading with Poste
r w v Trapa t o
t w v n e p l t o v o v fip e p r jK o r o s K al n e p l.
116
o v fip c p r)K 6 s K al n a p a
for
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xxxm

A n d so on w ith alm ost all th e rest o f th e am bigu ities,
but" som e even th e m ost e x p e rt seem to fail to dis
cern. A p r o o f o f this is th at p e o p le o fte n dispu te
ab ou t th e term s used, for ex a m p le, w h eth er B ein g
and 4 U n ity * alw ays m ean th e sam e th in g or som e
th in g d iffe r e n t; fo r som e p e o p le h old th at B ein g *
and U n ity * are iden tica l in m eaning, w hile others
solve th e argu m en t o f Z en o and P arm enides b y saying
th at U n ity * and * B ein g * are u sed in several senses.
Sim ilarly, to o , o f th e argum ents w hich are d ep en d en t
on a ccid en t and each o f the oth er classes, som e will
b e easier to d e te c t and others m ore difficult, and it
is n ot alw ays eq u a lly easy to grasp in to w hich class
th ey fall and w h eth er refu tation takes p la ce or n ot.
A shrew d argu m en t is on e w hich causes m ost Shrewdness
e m b a rra ss m e n t; fo r it bites d eep est. E m barrass- entfU"
m en t is o f tw o kinds. In a reason ed discussion one
is in d ou b t w hich o f th e questions on e should su bvert,
w hereas in con ten tiou s argum ents it is a b ou t th e w ay
in w hich on e is to express th e proposition . H en ce it is
in reason ed discussions th at shrew der argum ents are
m ore stim ulative o f inquiry. N ow a reason ed argu
m en t is shrew dest w hen from th e m ost g en era lly
a ccep ted prem isses possible it subverts th e m ost
gen erally a c ce p te d thesis possible. F or th e single
argum ent, i f th e con tra d ictory is ch a n g ed a b ou t,
will result in all th e syllogism s b ein g alike ; fo r from
gen erally a ccep ted prem isses it will su bvert or estab
lish an equ ally g en era lly a c ce p te d conclu sion ; th ere
fore em barrassm ent m ust n ecessarily arise.
Such,
th en , is th e sh rew dest argum ent w hich puts th e co n
clusion on an equ ality with th e prem isses. T h e n ext
shrew dest is th at w hich argues from prem isses w hich
are all on an equ ality ; fo r this will cause an equal
14*7
ARISTOTLE
183 a
ovros yap ofioicos tToirjvei anopeiv otto tov rcbv

pa>T7]fjLaTa>v dvaepereov. to v to Se xaAe7rdv avatpereov fiev ya p , o t l S9 avaipereov, aSrfXov. tcov S9
ipLOTLKCOV S pL flV T aT O S fl V
O TTpWTOV v vS a S rfX o S
norepov avAAcAdytorat ff ov, K a l trorepov napa

i/tevSos rj Sialpeolv otlv ff Xvols, Sevrepos Se tcov
10 aXXcov o SrjXos fiev o tl napa Sialpeoiv rj avalpeolv
i o n , firf <f>avepos S cov Sta tivos* tcov fjpcorrffievcov
avaLpecfLV ff Statpecrtv Xvreos eorlv, aAA ff1 norepov
avrrf napa t o ovfinepaofia ff napa t l tcov epcorrffiarcov eorlv.
Eviotc fiev ovv o firf ovXXoyLoSels Xoyos evffSrfs
15 eorlv, eav fj Xlav aSoâ ff ifjevSrj ra Xfffifiara*
evlore S ovk &los Kara<f)povelo8aL. orav fiev yap
eXXelnrf t l tcov tolovtcov epcorrffiarcov, nepl ofi o
Aoyos* Kal St o, Kal firf npooXaficov rovro Kal
firf ovXXoyLoafievos evffSrjs o ovXXoyiofios, orav
20 Se rcbv ecoOev, ovk evKaracfypovrfros ovSaficos, aAA
o fiev Xoyos inLeiKrjs, o S epcorcov ffpcbrrjKev ov
KaX<bs"E c r t r e, d>onep Xveiv ore fiev npos rov Xoyov ore
Se npos rov epcorcovra Kal rrjv epcbrrfoiv ore Se
npos ovSerepov rovrcov, ofioicos Kal epcorav e o n
Kal ovXXoyleo 8 ai Kal npos rrjv Seoiv Kal npos t o v
25 anoKpLvofievov Kal npos rov xpovov, orav fj nXelovos XPV0V Seofievrj ff Averts* ff rov napovros
Kaipov.s
X X X IV .
Ek 7rdorcov fiev oSv K a l nolcov ylvovraL
to ls SiaXeyofievois ol napaXoyiofiol, K a l nebs Selofiev re t/jevSofievov K a l napdSoija Xeyeiv noiff-
1 Heading aAA* rj with Wallies.

2 Omitting with Waitz to hiaX exO rjvai irp o s t t j v X vaiv as a gloss,
148
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, x x x i i i - x x x i v
em barrassm ent as to w hich kin d o f qu estion ou g h t to
be su bverted. T h e difficulty lies in this, th at som e
th in g m ust b e su bv erted b u t it is n ot clear w hat. T h e
shrew dest o f con ten tiou s argum ents is th at w hich,
in th e first p la ce, im m ed ia tely m akes it u ncertain
w hether th e reasoning is conclusive or n ot, and also
w hether th e solution is du e to a false prem iss or a
distinction.
O f th e rest, th at com es n e x t w hich
clearly depen ds on a distin ction or a su bversion, bu t
it is n ot clear which o f th e prem isses it is on th e
subversion or distin ction o f w hich th e solution d e
pen ds, bu t on ly w h eth er this process dep en d s upon
th e conclu sion or on e o f th e prem isses.
N ow som etim es an in ad eq u a tely reason ed argum en t is stupid i f the prem isses assum ed are to o parad ox ical or false ; b u t som etim es it is n ot deservin g
o f con tem p t. F or w hen som e qu estion is w an tin g
such as con ccrn s th e argum ent or the m eans o f
carry in g it on , th e reason in g w hich has fa iled to
su pply this and is n ot p roperly argued is stupid ; bu t
w hen som eth in g w hich is m erely extran eou s has been
om itted , th e reason in g is b y no m eans to be ligh tly
con d em n ed b u t is resp ecta b le, th ou gh th e qu estion er
has n ot asked his questions w ell.
A s it is possible to address th e solution som etim es
to th e argu m en t, som etim es to th e q u estion er and
his m od e o f q u estion in g and som etim es to n eith er
o f th ese, so likew ise also it is possible to address o n e s
questions and reasonings both to th e thesis and to
th e answ erer and to th e tim e, w hen th e solution needs
m ore tim e than th e presen t occasion supplies.
X X X I V . T h e num ber, th en , and the nature o f th e
sources from w hich fallacies arise in discussion, and
h ow w e are to show up a p reten d er and m ake him
r
r
149
stupid
arsumcnt8*
epi(i^summary of
results.
ARISTOTLE
183 s
30
CTt S'
o o fiev ,
7t o j s
K al
fia T c o v ,
X o y o i,
ncos
r iv co v
e p c o r r fr e o v
CTt
o v fifia lv e i
Kal
tis
rj
o o X o iK io fio s ,l
r a ^ is
Kal
nepl
aTrAais*
a n o K p lo e c o s
tovs X o y o v s
X v tIo v
K al
to v s
fip a x v
ip c o r r j-
tc n a c r q s
apxys
nepl
n p oO eoecos
a v r r js
Kal
Sc
X om ov
a v a fiv r jo a o iv
T eX os
K al
o o X o i K i o j J i o v s ,*
e l p r f o O c o n e p l a n a v r c o v rip .iv T a v r a .
35 T r js
tc o v
i r p o s ti x p r \ G ip io i n a v r e s e l o l v o l t o i o v t o i
nepl
Tt
th rew
e m O e iv a i
to is
e lp r)-
fiev o is .
U p o eiX o fie O a
X o y iO T iK T jv
fie v
n epl
to v
ovv
e v p e iv
S v v a fiw
n p o fiX r fO e v r o s
X o v t c o v cos e v S o ^ o r a r c o v t o v t o
yap
c/c
T iv a
tco v
ov
e p y o v e o r l T r js
183 b S i a X e K T iK r js K aO * a v T r jv K a l t r j s n e i p a o T i K r j s .
Sc
n p ooK a T a oK eva ^ eT a i
npos
A-
vnap-
a v ttjv
Sta
en el
ttjv
T r js
GO(f>iOTiK7js y e i r v l a o w , c o s o v f i o v o v n e i p a v h v v a r a i
X a f i e t v S ia X e K T iK c b s
ov
fio v o v t o
T ela s ,
to
aAAa /cat
X exO ev e p y o v
X oyov
S vvaoO
at
cos
ctSco s , Sta
v n eB e fie O a
X a fie w ,
T r js n p a y f i a -
aAAa /cat
X o y o v v n e x o v T e s c j> v X a o fie v T rfv d e o i v c o s

TaTCOV o f i o T p o n c o s .
en el
K al
Sta
to v to
tr jv
ev to is
10 tov to
ovk
r fp co T a ,
ctScvat.
aXX
ovk
ScS7yAa>Tat
c/c
n oocov
K a l o d ev e v n o p r fo o fie v to v t c o v ,
CTt Sc
n poT epov
corat,
o n cos
St* cvSoo-
a iT ia v e lp r fK a fie v t o v t o v ,
X c o K p a rrfs
a n eK p iv eT O * c b fio X o y e i y a p
to v to
Kal n p os
nooa
Kal
n c o s e p c o T T fT e o v f j Ta/CTCov T rfv e p c o T r f o w n a o a v , K a l
1 Reading with Pacius aoXoiKiafios for ovXXoytafios.
150
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xxxiv

u tter paradoxes, and, fu rth er, in w hat circum stances
a solecism occu rs, and how to ask qu estion s, and
w hat is th e righ t arran gem ent o f qu estion s, and,
m oreov er, w hat is th e use o f all such argum ents,
and also ab ou t all answ ering o f questions in gen eral
and in particular h ow to solve argum ents and sole
cism s, on all th ese su bjects le t the treatm en t w e have
g iven suffice. T h ere rem ains to call to m ind our
original pu rpose and say a few w ords a b ou t it and
th en brin g our treatise to an end.
O ur pu rpose, th en , was to discover a fa cu lty w hich (2) Concou ld reason on the prob lem set b efore us from th e remarks on
m ost g en erally a ccep ted prem isses th at e x i s t ; fo r dialectic,
this is th e fu n ction o f d ia lectic in itse lf and o f the
art o f exam ination . B u t, since th ere is fu rth er added
to it, on accou n t o f its close affinity w ith th e art o f
sophistry, th at it can u ndertake an exam ination n ot
on ly d ia lectically b u t also w ith a p reten ce o f kn ow
led g e , w e th erefore p rop osed as th e purpose o f our
treatise n ot on ly th e a b ove-m en tion ed task o f b ein g
able to con d u ct an argu m en t b u t also th e discov ery
h ow , w hen su pportin g an argum ent, w e arc to d efen d
our thesis b y m eans o f th e m ost g en era lly a cce p te d
prem isses in a consistent m anner. O f this w e have
given th e reason ; for this was w h y Socrates used to
ask questions b u t n ever answ ered th em , becau se he
con fessed ign oran ce. A n indication has been g iven ,
in w hat has b een said a b ove, o f th e n um ber o f cases
in w hich this w ill a p ply and o f th e various kinds o f
m aterial w hich can be used for this and th e various
sources from w hich w e m a y obtain an abundance
o f th em ; m oreov er also h ow questions m ust be
asked and abou t th e arran gem ent o f questions in
* Reading with Pacius
aoXoiKiafiovs for avXXoyiafxovs.

151
ARISTOTLE
183 b
7repl re anoKplaewv Kal Xvaewv tw v npos to v s

ovXXoyiGfJbovs.
8 e$rjXwrai Se Kal nepl tw v aXXwv,
oaa ttjs avrrjs jxeOoSov tw v Xoywv earIv.
npos
rovrots nepl tw v napaXoyiojiwv hteXrjXvOapLev,

15 wanep elprjKafjLev rjhrj nporepov.
o ti p,ev oSv eêt
reXos tKavws a npoeiXofieOa, <f>avepov Set S' rjfjtas

jxrj
XeXrjdevat
npayfiareiav.
to
avfxfiefirjKos
nepl
ravrrjv
ttjv
tw v yap evptoKOftevwv dnavrwv tol
fiev nap erepwv Xrj<f>Oevra nporepov nenovrjfieva

Kara fiepos entheSwKev vno
tw v
napaXafiovrwv
20 va rep ov r a S e vnapxrjs evptoKojjieva jxtKpav t o

npwTov enlhoatv Xafiftavetv etcode, xPr}GLljiOJT*Pav
jxevrot noXXw Trjs varepov k rovrw v av^rjaews.
jxeytarov yap tows apxrj navros, wanep Aeyerar Sto
Kal x a^*nwTaTov oaw yap Kpdrtarov rfj Svvdfiei,
25 roaovrw fiiKporarov ov t w [JteyeOet âAe77ojTaTdv
ear iv o<f>0rjvat.
t avrrjs S' evprjfievrjs paov t o npoa-
rtOevat Kal avvavetv ro Xotnov ear t v
onep Kal
nepl rovs prjropiKovs Xoyovs av jmfiefirj Ke, crêSov Se

Kal nepl ras aXXas nacras reyyas-
oi fiev yap ras
apxds evpovres navreXws enl jiiKpov rt n porjyayov

30 ot Se vvv evSoKLfjbovvres napaXafiovres napa noXXwv
olov k StaS0 ^ 9 Kara jiepos npoayayovrwv ovrw s
rjv^rjKaat, Ttalas fiev fxera rovs npw rovs, Qpaavjiaxos Se jiera Ttatav, QeoSwpos Se fiera rovrov,
Kal noXXol noXXa avvevrjvdxaat fieprj- Stonep ovSev
Oavfxaarov eêtv rt nXrjOos r rjv reyyrjv.
152
ravrrjs Se

g en eral, and a b ou t answers and solutions applicable
to th e reasonings e m p loy ed . A ll th e oth er poin ts
h ave also b een set forth w hich b e lo n g to th e sam e
system o f argum ent. In addition to th ese w e have
also ex p lain ed a b ou t fallacies, as w e have already
rem arked above. T h a t w hat w e pu rposed has b een
satisfactorily carried th rough to th e end is plain ;
bu t w e m ust n ot fail to observe w hat has h app en ed
rega rdin g this inquiry. In all discoveries, cith e r th e
results o f oth er p eo p le s w ork have b een taken over
an d after h aving b een first ela borated have been
su bsequ en tly ad va n ced step b y step b y th ose w ho
to o k th em ov er, or else th ey arc original inventions
w hich usually m ake progress w hich at first is small
bu t o f m uch g rea ter u tility than th e later d ev e lo p
m en t w hich results from th em . It is perhaps a true
p roverb w hich says th at th e b eg in n in g o f an yth in g is
th e m ost im p o r t a n t; h en ce it is also th e m ost difficult.
F or, as it is v ery pow erfu l in its effects, so it is v ery
small in size and th erefore v ery difficult to see. W h en ,
h ow ever, th e first b eg in n in g has b een discov ered , it
is easier to add to it and d ev elop th e rest. This has
h a ppen ed, to o , w ith rhetorical com position , and also
w ith practically all th e oth er arts. T h ose w ho dis
co v e re d th e begin n in gs o f rh etoric carried th em
forw ard qu ite a little >vay, w hereas the fam ous
m odern professors o f th e art, en terin g in to th e h eri
ta g e, so to speak, o f a lo n g series o f predecessors w ho
had gradually advanced it, have brou g h t it to its
presen t p erfection Tisias follow in g th e first in
ventors, T hrasym achus follow in g Tisias, T h eodoru s
follow in g Thrasym achus, w hile num erous oth ers have
m ade num erous contribution s ; h en ce it is n o w onder
that the art possesses a certain am plitude. O f our (3]
153
ARISTOTLE
183 b
35 T rjs T T p a y iL a re la s o v t o ( le v q v t o
y a a fx e v o v ,
tw v ir e p l
S ovk i jv
T rp o eijeip -
aAA* ouSey 7ravTeAcu? v 7rrjp xe v. Kal y a p

to v s ip t c r r iK o v s A o y o v s fJLLaO apvovvrw v
o fjio la t ls rjv rj r r a lh e v o is T jj Y o p y io v itp a y f ia r e la .
Ao y o v s
yap
eStSooaV
184 a w tfO rjcrav

Ta%La
o l p.v prjT O pLK ovs o l Se ip a n rjT L K O V S
K fiavO aV LV, LS OVS TrXkLOraKLS fJL7TL7TTLV

e K a re p o i
jjlv
to vs
a X X rjX w v X o y o v s .
arexvos 8* fjv rj SiSao/caAta
h io rre p
tols
fiav-
Qavovai 7rap9 a v r w v ov yap TXvr)v <*AAa Ta arro

Trjs Texyrjs 8 lSovts Traiheveiv vTreXafipavov, wcrrrep
5 av et
tls
emcmj/jLrjv <f>aoKWV rrapahwaew m
firjhev 7tovlv
tovs
to
iroSas, etra ot/cvtoto/u/c^v fiev
firj StSaa/cot, firjh* oOev hvvrjoer at TroplêaOai
tol
TotauTa, hoirj 8e 7roXXa yevrj 7ravToha7rwv imohr)fiaTw v oSros yap pporj8r)K fxev irpos
TXVr)V 8* OV 7TapehwKV.
ttjv
xpetav,
Kal 7Tpl fJLV TWV p7)~
184 b TopLKwv xmrjpxe ?roAAa Kal 7raAata Ta Xeyofxeva,

nepl Se
to v
avXXoyL&vOaL TravreXws ovhev etôftej/
TTpoTepov aAAo Aeyetv, aAA* rj Tpififj rjTodvres rroXvv

Xpovov
vjjllv
ws
7TovovfjLv.
et
e/c
apx^js xmapxovTWv
tolovtwv
Se
<f>aivTaL
OeaoafJbevoLS
eêtv
rj
5 fiedohos Ik ovw s rrapa Tas aAAa? 7Tpayfia.retas Tas
e/c TrapahoGtws rjv^rj/xevas, Xolttov av etrj iravrwv

vfj,wv rj t w v rjKpoafxevwv ep yov t o l s fiev rrapaXeXeLfifievoLS Trjs fieOohov avyyvwp.r)v t o l s 8 evprjfxevoLS rroXXrjv eêtv X^Plv '
154

present inquiry, however, it is not true to say that present
it had already been partly elaborated and partly reat e*
n o t ; nay, it did not exist at all. For the training
given by the paid teachers of contentious argument
resembled the system of Gorgias. For some of them
gave their pupils to learn by heart speeches which
were either rhetorical or consisted of questions and
answers, in which both sides thought that the rival
arguments were for the most part included. Hence
the teaching which they gave to their pupils was
rapid but unsystematic ; for they conceived that they
could train their pupils by imparting to them not an
art but the results of an art, just as if one should
claim to be about to communicate knowledge for the
prevention o f pain in the feet and then were not to
teach the cobblers art and the means o f providing
suitable foot-gear, but were to offer a selection of
various kinds of shoes ; for he has helped to supply
his need but has not imparted an art to him. Also,
on the subject o f rhetoric there already existed much
material enunciated in the past, whereas regarding
reasoning we had absolutely no earlier work to
quote but were for a long time labouring at tentative
researches. If, therefore, on consideration, it appears (4) Appeal
to you that, in view of such original conditions, our âder.
system is adequate when compared with the other
methods which have been built up in the course of
tradition, then the only thing which would remain
for all of you, or those who follow our instruction,
is that you should pardon the lack of complete
ness of our system and be heartily grateful for our
discoveries.
155
DE GENERATIONE ET
CORRUPTIONE
IN T R O D U C T IO N
T h a t the D e Generatione et Corruptione is a genuine
work of Aristotle has never been disputed. It belongs
to the group of physical treatises which also includes
the Physics, the D e Caelo and the Meteorologica. Its
composition has been generally ascribed to the period
covered by Aristotles residence in the Troad, in
Mitylene and in Macedonia, that is, circa 347 to
335 B.C.
Professor H . H . Joachim, to whose work I am deeply
indebted, tells us that during the preparation of his
version for the Oxford Translation of Aristotle he
realized that something more was called for. It
soon became evident, he writes, that a mere
translation would be of little or no value, since the
intrinsic philosophical interest of the original depends,
to a large extent, upon what it implies and presup
poses. In short, Aristotles fascinating and masterly
little treatise calls for a commentary in almost every
sentence. It is full of allusions to the speculations
of his predecessors and contemporaries, and inex
tricably interwoven with the theories elaborated in
his other works, particularly in the Physics, D e Caelo
and Meteorologica, of which no modern English edi
tions exist. Anyone who attempts to translate the De
Generatione et Corruptione must feel that a translation
by itself is unsatisfactory, but the present translator
159
ARISTOTLE
has found it impossible, within the scope o f a Loeb
version, to do more than provide brief explanatory
notes on some of the major obscurities and to give
the references where Aristotle is obviously referring
to passages in his other treatises, and to recommend
those who require something more to consult Pro
fessor Joachims masterly commentary (Aristotle on
Coming-to-be and Passing-away, Oxford, 1922).
Amongst the other works whieh have been con
sulted most u & h a s been made of the Latin Version
of Franciscus Vatablus in vol. iii of the Berlin Aristotle
and of Aristotle on Coming-to-be and Passing-away :
Some Comments by Dr. W . T. Verdenius and Dr. T . H.
Waszink (Leiden, 19 ^6), which was kindly sent to me
by a friend, Dr. H . J. Drossaart Lulof. The summary
of the treatise given by Sir W . D . Ross in his Aristotle
(pp. 99-108) has also been very useful.
The text which has been used is that of I. Bekker
in the Berlin Aristotle, any divergences from which,
except for obvious misprints, have been noted.
The D e Generatione et Corruptione discusses the iraOij
to which the natural bodies in the sublunary sphere
are liable, namely, coming-to-be (yevco-ts) and
passing-away (<f>0opa). In Book I these processes
are explained and distinguished from alteration
(ciAAotWts) and from growth and diminution
(air/cns Kal <pOurts) ; incidentally the views of Anaxa
goras and Empedocles are examined and shown to be
inconsistent. In the second half of the book it is
shown that what comes-to-be is formed by combina
tion (/xti?) of certain natural constituents, a process
which implies action and passion pt (irouiv Kal
7rd(r\uv), which in their turn imply contact (</}).
Book II proves that the material constituents of
160
COMING-TO-BE AN D PASSIN G-AW AY

all that comes-to-be are the elements or simple
bodies, Earth, Air, Fire, and W ater, and shows the
manner in which they are transformed into one
another and how they combine.
Aristotle then
briefly discusses the material, formal and final causes
of coming-to-be and passing-away, in particular
criticizing the theory of Socrates in the Phaedo. He
further states that the efficient cause of the double
process is the suns annual movement, and, in con
clusion, shows that what comes-to-be is necessary,
since absolute necessity is characteristic of n sequence
of events which is cyclical, that is to say, continuous
and returning upon itself.
J=
E=
F=
H=
L=
a n u sc r ip t s
Vindobonensis, phil. Graec. 100 (10th century)

Parisiensis Regius 1853 (10th century)
Laurentianus 87. 7 (12tli century)
Vaticanus 1027 (12th century)
Vaticanus 253 (14th or 15th century)
Diels = Die Fragmente der Yarsokratiker, by Hermann

Diels (rec. W . Kranz, 5th edition. Berlin,
1934)
161
API2TOTEAOT2 TIEPI
rENE2EQ2 KAI 4>0OPA2
A
314 a i
1. Tlepl Se yeveoew s Kal <f>Oopas rw v <j>voei y iv ofievwv Kal <f>6etpofievwv, ofioiws Kara navra)v, rag
re alrias Statpereov Kal rovs Xoyovs avrwv, e n
Se 7repl avijrfoews Kal aXXoiwoews, r i eKarepov,
5 Kal
norepov rrjv avrrjv vnoXrjnreov <f>voiv etvai
aXXoiwoews
Kal
yeveoew s, fj
ôopt?, wanep St-
wpiorat Kal rots ovofiaoiv.

T w v fiev ovv apxdiwv ol fiev rrjv KaXovfievrfv
anXrjv yeveotv aXXoiwotv elvai (f>aoiv, ol S erepov
aXXoiwotv Kal yeveotv.
oooi fiev yap ev rt
to
7rav
Xeyovoiv elvai Kal 7ravra ei; evos yew w oiv , rovro is

10 fiev avayKrj rffv yeveotv aXXoiwotv <f>avai Kal ro
Kvpiws ytvofievov aXXotovo9at oooi Sc nXeiw rrjv
vXrjv evos nOeaotv, otov 'EfineSoKXrjs Kal *Avaayopas Kal AevK innos, rovrots Sc erepov.
/catTot
'Avaa yopas ye rrjv ot/cctav <f>wvrfv ffyvorjoev Xeyei

162
A R IS T O T L E
C O M I N G -T O -B E
AND
ON
P A S S IN G -A W A Y
BOOK I
1. In discussing coming-to-be and passing-away ofchs. 1-5.
things which by nature come-to-be and pass-away, ê^ndPasas exhibited uniformly wherever they occur, we must *ing-aw ay
distinguish their causes and definitions ; further, we a lte ra must deal with " growth and alteration, and
inquire what each of these terms means, and whether growth a n d
we are to suppose that the nature of alteration d*minuttonand coming-to-be is the same, or whether each is of
a separate nature corresponding to the names by
which they are distinguished.
O f the ancient philosophers some assert that what views of
is called simple coming-to-be is alteration, the Momsta
while others hold that alteration and coming-to- Piuraliats
be are different processes. Those who hold that the cxam n
universe is a simple entity and who generate all
things from a single thing, must necessarily maintain
that coming-to-be is " alteration, and that what
comes-to-be in the proper sense of the term under
goes alteration. Those, on the other hand, who
hold that the matter of things is more than one, must
vregard the two processes as different Empedocles,
for example, and Anaxagoras and Leucippus. Anaxa
goras, however, misunderstood his own statement ;
163
ARISTOTLE
314 s
yovv
ws
ro
15 KaOeonrjKe rw
ylvead ai
Kal
aXXoiovaOai.
anoXXvadai
7roAAa 8 c
aroixîa, KaOanep Kal erepov.

yap ra fiev awfiariKa r err apa ,
rw v
ravrov
A cy ct ra
*Efine8oKXfjs fiev
8 c iravra fiera
Ta
Kivovvrwv e rov apiOfiov, Avaijayopas 8 c
aneipa Kal AevKinnos Kal krjfioKpiros. o [lev yap

ra Sfioiofieprj crrot^ eta rlOrjoiv, otov oar ovv Kal
20 crapKa Kal jiveXov,
avvwvvfiov
to
Kal rwv aXXwv <Lv eKaarov

fiepos ear tv ktffioKpiros 8 e Kal
AevKinnos k awfiarwv a8iaiperwv ra A A a a v y Ketadal <f>aai, ravra S ' aneipa Kal ro nXfjOos etvai
Kal ras fiop<f>ds9 avra Sc npos avra S ta <j>epeiv r o v rois e wv elal Kal Oeaei Kal raijei rovrw v. evav25 riw s S c <j>aivovrai Xeyovres ol nepl 'Avai;ayopav
nepl E/LtTTcSo/cAca* o fiev yap (ftrjai nvp Kal

v8wp Kal aepa Kal yfjv aroixîa reaaapa Kal anXa
etvai fiaXXov ff adpKa Kal oar ovv Kal ra roiavra
rwv ofwiofiepwv, ol 8 c ravra fiev anXa Kal aroi ^ c t a , yffv 8 c Kal nvp Kal v8wp Kal aepa ovvOera
314 b navanepfilav yap etvai rovrw v.
to is
T o ts fiev ofiv e evos ndvra KaraoKevdôvaiv

avayKaiov Xeyeiv rffv yeveaiv Kal rffv <f>9opav aA Xolwaiv del yap filveiv ro vnoKelfievov ravro Kal
ev ( t o Sc roiovrov aXXoiovadal <f>afiev)* rois Sc Ta
5 yevrf nXelw noiovai 8ia<f>epeiv rrjv aAAolwaiv rfjs
0 Diels, fr. 17.
b i.e. compounds (though, it may be, in different propor
tions) of the same four simple bodies Earth, Air, Fire and
Water such as wood, the metals, and blood, flesh and
marrow in animals. Such compounds, when divided, still
retain the same constituents.
164
COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 1

for example, he says that coming-to-be and destruc
tion constitute the same process as being altered, a
though, like others, he says that the elements are
many. Thus Empedocles holds that the corporeal
elements are four, but that all the elements, including
those which create motion, are six in number, while
Anaxagoras, Leucippus and Democritus hold that
their number is infinite. For Anaxagoras puts down
as elements things which have like parts,6 for example
bone, flesh and marrow, and anything else of which
the part bears the same name as the whole ; whereas
Democritus and Leucippus say that all other things
are composed of indivisible bodies, and that these
are infinite both in number and in the forms which
they take, while the compounds differ from one
another in their constituents and the position and
arrangement of these. Anaxagoras and his school
obviously take* a view directly opposite to that of
Empedocles and his school; for Empedocles says
that Fire, W ater, Air and Earth are four elements
and arc simple rather than flesh and bone and
similar things which have like parts, whereas Anaxa
goras and his school assert that the things which have
like parts are simple and are elements, but that
Earth, Fire, W ater and Air arc composite, for each
of them is, they say, a general seed-ground for
things which have like parts.
Those, therefore, who construct everything out of
a single element must necessarily say that comingto-be and passing-away are alteration/ for their
substratum remains the same and one (and it is such
a substratum which we say undergoes alteration ) ;
but those who make the kinds of things more than
one must hold th a t11 alteration differs from coming-
165
ARISTOTLE
314 b
y e v e o e w s ' o v v i o v r w v y a p K a l S ia X v o fie v w v rj y e v e o i s
o v fifia iv e i
TpOTTOV
Io tiv J
o ti
10
aAAa
fiev
ou tw
e tv a i
to v to v
<f)VOlS
to v
OuScVOS*
StaAAa^ts* r e f i i y e v r w v J *
Ao y o s a v r w v r f j v r r o O e o e i
fio v o v fii^ is r e
ovv
o iK eio s
S rjX ov,
ti
</)dvai
fie v r o i K a ra
ra
o ti
op O w s,
X e y o fie v
Kal
o ti
X eyovot
Sc /cat TOUTOts
a v a y K a io v
fiev
Sto Acyct
<f>0opa.
'JLfJL7TehoK\i}s9 ; OTI
<f)dvai,
to v to v
rj
Kal
Kal
v tt'
Trapa
r r fv
to v
ttjv
rporrov
a X X o iw o iv
y e v e o iv ,
a d vva rov
c/cctvcov X e y o f i e v a . t o v t o S
paStov o w i 8 e l v . w o t r e p y a p
o p w f i e v rfp efio v c r rfs r r j s o v o i a s
e v a v r r j fie r a fio X r fV
15 K a r a f i e y e O o s , r r jv K a X o v fie v r jv a v ^ r j o iv K a l (f>0ioiv,
ovrw
K a l a X X o iw o iv .
aAA*
o v firfv
o i T rX eiovs a p % a s r r o i o v v r e s f i i a s
o v o O a i.
fi a i v e t v ,
otov
20
ra
yap
8 ia (f> op a l
O e p fio v
rraOrf, KaO 1
rw v
iftv x p o v ,
aAAot-
</>afiev r o v r o
o r o v y e iw v
X evK ov
w v X ey o v a iv
a S vva rov
e io iv ,
f i e Aav,
o v fi-
X eyw
vypov,
ijrjp o v
fia X a K o v o k X t j p o v K a l r w v a X X w v e K a a r o v , w o r r e p
K a l <j>rfolv 'E fiT reS o K X ijs r fe X io v f i e v X e v K o v o p a v
K a l O e p fio v a T ra v rrf, o j i f i p o v
tc
\ /
ptyaAcov
Xoittwv,
tc,
war
it
e v r r a o iv 8vo<f>oevrd
>Y
ofioiws oe oiopiQei /cat em t o j v

ei firf Svvarov c/c rrvpos yeveoOai
v8wp firfh* c vSaros yrjv, ov S c/c XevKov fieAav

25 eorai ovoev ovo c/c fiaAaKov OKArfpov o o avros
Adyos /cat rrepl rwv aXXwv. t o v t o S fjv aXXoiwois.

fj /cat <f>avep6v o t i fiiav del rois evavriois v t t o 0 Diels, fr. 8.
166
b Diels, fr. 2\ lines 3 and 5.

to-be, for coming-to-be and passing-away occur when
things come together and are dissolved. This is the
reason why Empedocles also is speaking to this effect,
when he says that there is no origin of anything,
but only a mingling and separation of things which
have been mingled. It is clear then, that their
description of coming-to-be and passing-away in this
way accords with their assumption and that they
actually describe them in this way ; they also must,
however, admit that alteration is something
different from coming-to-be, though they cannot
possibly do so consistently with the views which they
express. It is easy to see that we are correct in
saying this ; for just as we see changes in magnitude
taking place in a thing while its substance remains
unchanged (what we call increase and diminu
tion ), so also we see ** alteration occurring. Never
theless, the statements of those who suppose the
existence of more than one first principle make it
impossible for alteration to take placc. For the
qualities, in respect of which we say that altera
tion occurs (for example, hot and cold, white and
black, dry and moist, soft and hard, etc.) are differ
ences affecting the elements. As Empedocles says,
The sun is white to look upon and hot
In every part, the rain is dark and chill 6 ;
and he likewise characterizes also the other elements.

Hence, as it is impossible for W ater to come-intobeing from Fire, or Earth from W ater, neither will
black come into existence out of white, nor hard out
of s o ft ; and the same argument applies also to the
other qualities. Now this is what alteration has
always meant. From this it is also clear that it must
be assumed that a single matter belongs to the con-
167
ARISTOTLE
314 b
dereov vXT)v> av re fierapdXXrf Kara tottov , av re

av^rjaiv Kal </>0iaiv, av re /c a r aXXoiwoiv.
e n S ofJLotcos avayKaiov elvat to v to Kal aXXoiwoiv'
/car*
315 a eire yap aXXolwais e a n , Kal t o

aroixetov Kal fiia rf rravrwv vXrj
aXXrjXa fierafioX'qv, Kav el
to
vrroKelfievov ev
tw v
e\ov tw v els
vrroKeifievov ev, e o n v
aXXolwais.
'FjfL7Te8 oK\rjs fiev ofiv eoiKev evavrla Xeyeiv Kal
tTpo$ ra </>aiv6fieva Kal 7rpos avrov a vros.
afia
5 fiev yap ov <j>r]oiv erepov e erepov yiveodai rwv
aroixeiwv ovhev, aXXa raXXa rravTa Ik rovrw v,

afia 8 * orav els ev ovvayayrf rrfv arraoav (f>voiv
rrXrfv rov
eKaarov.
veiKovs,
war
e/c rov evos yiveoOai rraXiv
et; evos tivos SrjXov oti 8 ia<f>opaTs
rial xwpilôfievwv Kal ndQeoiv eyevero to fiev vSwp

10 ro Se 7rvp, KaOarrep Xeyei rov fiev rjXiov XevKov Kal
Oepfiov, rrfv
Se yrjv fiapv Kal OKXrjpov.
a<f>aipov-
fievwv ofiv to v tw v rwv 8 ia<f>opwv (eloi yap d(f>aiperal yevofieval ye) SrjXov ws avayKrf yiveodai Kal
yrjv e xiSaros Kal vSwp eK yrjs, ofiolws Se Kal
rwv aXXwv eKaarov, ov rore fiovov aXXa Kal vvv,
15 fierapdXXovTa
ye
rois rrdOeaiv.
ea n
S e wv
eiprfKe Svvdfieva rrpoayiveaOai Kal x^piêodai 7raXiv, aXXws re
Kal fiaxofievwv aXXrfXois e n
veiKovs Kal rrjs <f>iXias.
rov
Siorrep Kal Tore e evos
eyevvrfdrfoav ov yap Srf rrvp ye Kal yrj Kal vSwp
a i.e. when the elements originally came-to be.
168

trary poles, whether they change in respect of place,
or of growth and diminution, or of altera
tion ; furthermore, that the existence of a single
matter and that o f alteration are each as neccssary
as the other, for, if alteration takes place, then
the substratum is a single element, and so all things
which change into one another have a single matter,
and, conversely, if the substratum is one, 44 altera
tion takes place.
Empedocles, then, seems to contradict the observed
facts and himself as well. For he denies that any one
of his elements comes-to-be from any other element,
but declares that all other things eome-to-be from
these elements, and at the same time, after collecting
all nature, except Strife, together into one, he declares
that each thing again comes-to-be out of the One.
Hence it is clear that out of a One, when separation
took place owing to certain differences and qualities,
one thing came-to-be W ater and another Fire, as is
shown by his calling the sun white and hot and
the earth heavy and hard. If, therefore, these
differences are taken away (and it is possible to take
them away, since they came-to-be), it is dear that
Earth must necessarily come-to-be out of Water, and
Water out of Earth, and similarly with each of the
other elements, not only then a but also now,6 when
they undergo a change in their qualities. According
to his statements, the qualities can be attached and
can be separated again, especially as Strife and Love
are still fighting against one another. This is also the
reason why the elements were originally generated
from the One ; for, I suppose, Fire, Earth and Water
b i.e. when according to Empedocles Strife is gaining
the upper hand.
169
ARISTOTLE
315 a
ert
20
ovra
ev
fjv
to
nav.
K a l y r jv
a S r jX o v
a v o T o t^ a
Kal r a
be
Kal
n orep ov
e v fj r a n o X X a , X e y w S e n v p
apX V v a v rw v O ereov t o
to v tco v .
fj fie v
yap
ws
v X rf v n o K e i r a i y e o v f i e r a p a X X o v r a S t a r r j v K L v r ja w
y iv o v r a i y fj
fie v
K
S
e K e lv a
K al n v p , t o
eK
o r o t i c tov * f j S e t o v t o
ev
y tv cra t
a vvO ea ew s
e/cetvtov,
a v v io v rw v
O TotêtcoScorrc/oa
S ia X v crec o s,
eK e lv a
25 K a l n p o T e p a t t j v < f>votv.
2.
w0 A a > ?
S^
re
n epl
yevea ew s
a n X r js X e K T e o v , n o r e p o v
/c a t n e p l
e o T iv ,
tc o v
e a r iv
a X X cov
K al
a n X cov
n epl
vn ap% ei
oara
to ls
e o K e x fr a r o
n p a y fia a i,
a A A a T r js t c o v
n a o r js
ovre
yeveaew s
fj
tc o v
nepl
aX X cov
rt
aX X on ba ew s
e m n o X fjs
nepl
35 A r ffio K p L T O V .
315 b < j>p ovT L oa i,

n epl
y o fie v , o
tl
fjS rf S c e v
a v ija v o v r a L
fir f
tov
1 rov
eot/cc
fie v
tvxcov
n epl
tw
S ico p L crev ,
eln e L e v ,
o fio iw
otl
(tto j?
ofioiov aeldidi.
a i.e. Water and Air.

* Namely, that set up by Strife.
c Timaeus 52 v if.
170
ert
rtv a
oX w s Se n a p a
e n e a T r ja e v
n c o s S ia < f> ep ei.
ovS ev
ovS ev
a v ijfja e c o s ,
o v S e ls
ov
S e a a p K e s fj
to lo v tw v ,
n p a y fia o L V .
o fio io v 1
yeveaecos
ncos
n epl
tw
o v S e ls
kolv
nepl
tco v
fie v o v v
< f> 0 op a s, o n c o s
ovre
ovS evos
o v to s
a v ijfjo e c o s
K al
O T o c x e tc o v
T ponov vn a p xov a c to ls
Ta
Kal
K L v ff a e w v , o l o v
II A a r c o v
n e p l a v ^ ffa e c o s K a l a X X o L w a ew s.
30 f i o v o v
< f>6opas T r js
e a r t /c a t n c o s
fj o v k
a *
an a vT cov
ovre
yap
w a n ep
A c-
n p o a io v r o s
Se
tovto
COMING-TO-BE AN D PASSIN G-AW AY, I. 1-2

did not exist separately at all while they were still
one. Now it is also not clear whether we must ascribe
to him the One as his starting-point, or the Many
by which I mean Fire and Earth and their co
ordinates.0 For the One, in as much as it forms, as
its matter, the substratum from whieh Earth and
Fire come-to-be through the change due to motion,6
is an elem en t; on the other hand, in as much as the
One comes-to-be through a process of composition,
due to the coming together of the M any, whereas
the Many are the result of dissolution, the Many arc
more elementary than the One and by nature
prior to it.
2.
W e must, therefore, deal in general with the
subject of unqualified coming-to-be and passingaway, and diseuss whether they exist or not, and how
they exist, and with the other simple motions, such
as growth and alteration. Plato,c it is true, Platos
investigated coming-to-be and passing-away, but only jirrojj/00
as to the manner in which passing-away is inherent in
things, and as regards coming-to-be he did not deal
with it in general but only that of the elements ; he
never inquired how flesh or bones or any other similar
things eame-to-be, and, further, he did not discuss
how alteration and growth are present in
things. In fact no one at all has applied himself to
any of these subjects, except in a superficial manner,
with the single exception of Democritus. He seems Views of
to have thought about them all, and from first to last ^ locritua
he excels in his manner of treatment. For, as we Leucippus,
assert, no one else made any definite pronouncement
about growth, except such as any man-in-thestreet might make, namely, that things grow by the
coming together of like with like (without a word as
171
ARISTOTLE
315 b
O V K T l), OV Se
5 cos th r e w
fll e W S , OVS e
77 p t
o i3 S e v o ? , o to v r o u
7T /H
i r o ie w K a l
TCOV ClAAcOV
tov
n a o x e iv ,
r l v a TpOTTOV TO flV 7T O t t TO S e 7 T (X a ^ t TOLS </>VOlKaS
ArffioKpiros Se Kal AevKinnos
noiffoeis.
oavres
eK
tol
oxtffiara rrjv aXXoiwoiv Kal
to vtcov
ttjv
noifjyeveow
noiovoi, Sta/cptcret fiev Kal ovyKploei
yeveow Kal (frOopdv, raijei Sc /cat 6 eoei aXXoiwoiv.

10 enel S
Kal
cjo v to
aneipa
tw
<f>alveo8ai, evavrla Se
<f>aw6fieva,
Ta oxfjfiara aneipa
raXrfOes ev
ra
enolrjoav, ware Tat? fierafioXais
tov
o v y Keifievov
avro evavrlov So/cetv aXXw Kal aXXw, Kal fiera-
to
Kiveiodai fiiKpov ififiiyvvfievov, Kal oXws erepov

</>alveo0ai evos fieraKivrf0evros' eK
15
tw v
avrwv yap
rpaywhla Kal Kwfiw8 ia y Iverai ypafifiarwv.
E7ret Se So/cet aêSov n d o w e r e p o v e l v a i ye'veot?

K al
a X X o lw o is ,
o v y K p w o fie v a
fie ra fia X X c v T W v
K al
y iv e o d a i
tw v
ws
ovk
noX X a
a n o p l a s y a p e% ei r a v r a
e l f ie v y a p
a 8v v ara
eon
o v fifia lv e i'
avay/caort/cot K a l
eVSeêTat a X X w s eêtv.
K p io is ff y e v e o i s , ff o X w s
172
< f> 0elp eo 0ai
Se
n a O rffia rw v , n e p l r o v r w v e n i-
20 n o X X a s K a l e v X o y o v s .
X oyoi e re p o i
K al
/cat Sta/cptvo/xeva, a X X o io v o O a i
o r f f o a o i O e w p r f re o v .
ff y e v e o i s ,
f ie v
ovk
ovk
K al
o v y K p io is
e lo i
S a v
etforopot StaAuetv
et Se1 f ifj e o n o v y eon
y e v e o i s ff a X -
COMING-TO-BE AN D PASSIN G-AW AY, I. 2

to how this happens), and they tell us nothing about
mixing and practically nothing about the other
terms, such as action and passion, that is, how
one thing acts upon and another is affected by physical
action. Democritus, however, and Leucippus postu
late the figures and make 44 alteration and
coming-to-be result from these, attributing comingto-be and passing-away to their dissociation and
association, and 44 alteration to their arrangement
and position ; and, since they held that the truth
consisted in appearance, and appearances are con
trary to one another and infinite in number, they
made the 44 figures infinite in number, so that, owing
to changes in the compound, the same thing seems
to be contrary to different people and to be 44 trans
posed by the mixing in of a small ingredient and
to appear quite different owing to 44 transposition
o f one constituent. For a tragedy and a comedy are
composed of the same letters.
Since almost all philosophers think (a) that comingto-be and 44 alteration are different processes and
(6) that things come-to-be and pass-away by 44 associa
tion and 44 dissociation, whereas they undergo
44 alteration by a change of their qualities, we must
fix our attention on these views and examine them ;
for they present many arguable questions for dis
cussion. For if coming-to-be is 44 association, many
impossible situations arise ; and, on the other hand,
there are other compelling arguments, not easy to
disentangle, to prove that coming-to-be cannot be
anything else. If, on the other hand, coming-to-be
is not 44 association, either coming-to-be does not
1 et 82 scripsi: eire codd.
173
ARISTOTLE
315 b
AOICOOIS, fj1 K al TOVTO StaAt?<7<U âAc7T0V OV 7TtpaTeoV.
25
*Apx?) Se t o v tc o v iravTCov, ttorep ov o v tco yivera t

/cat aX Xoiovrai /cat a v^ a v era i r a o v r a /cat T avavrla
t o v t o i s 7rao'Xt, ra)v npoor cov VTrapypvrcov fieyeOcov
aSiaipeTcov, rj ovSe'v c a r t fieyeO os aS ialperov' S ta<f>epei y a p t o v t o rrXeiOTov.
Kal ndXw e l fieyed rj,
TTOTepov, cos Arj/jboKpiTos Kal AevKiTTTTos, ocofia ra

30 T a v t
e a r tv, rj wcrrrep iv tco Tt/xata), inirreSa.
t o v t o fiev oSv a v r o , KaOarrep Kal iv aXXois elprfK afiev ,
aX oyov
fii^ p i
fiaXXov evX oyov
emê'Saiv
ocofia ra
efvat
/cat T a v ra 7roXXf)v eêt a X oylav.

aXXoicooiv Kal y e v e o w
SiaX voai.
aS tatpera.
oficos Se t o v t o i s
iv S eyeTat iroielv, KaOanep
35 etprjTai, Tp07rfj Kal SiaOiyfj fieT aK w ovvra t o
316 a /cat
r a t?
tcov
Sto
aAAa
oxrjfiarcov
Siacf>opais,
onep
avro
rroiel
ArjfioKpcTos (Sto /cat xpotav ou cf>rjow etvai Tpo7rfj

y a p xpoofiaTlêoOai), t o i s S eis im n e S a S iaipovow
o v k c t t* ouSev yap ytverat 7tAt) v o r e p ea
ovvriO e-
fiev c o v naO os y a p ovS9 iy x e ip o v o i y e w av ouSev e

ai)rd)v.
A trto v Se
e7r* eA arrov SvvaoOai tol o fioX oyov -
to u
fieva ov v op a v rj a n eip ia .
Sto oa ot ivcoKTfKaoi fiaX
Xov iv t o l s <f)voiKois, fiaXXov Suvavrat vnoTiOeoOai

T ota v ra s
apxas
at e m
rroXv Suvavrat
o v v elp e w
1 et post i} omisi cum EH.

a Plato, Thnaeus 53 c ff.
* De Caelo 299 a 6 ff.
* These terms are explained in
174
985 b 15 ff.

exist at all or it is alteration ; or else we must try
to unravel this problem too, difficult as it is.
The starting-point for dealing with all these pro- There are
blems is the question, Do things which exist come- dfvi^'ble
to-be and 1 alter and * grow, and undergo the magnitudes,
contrary changes, because the primary existences
are indivisible magnitudes ? Or is 110 magnitude in
divisible ? For it makes a great difference which
view we take. Again, if primary existences are in
divisible magnitudes, are they bodies, as Democritus
and Leucippus assert ? Or are they planes, as is the
view expressed in the Timaeus ? a To resolve them
into planes and to stop at that point is, as we have
said elsewhere,6 in itself contrary to reason. Hence
it is more reasonable to hold that they are indivisible
bodies, though this view also involves considerable
irrationality. Nevertheless, as has been said, it is
possible with these bodies to bring about altera
tion and coming-to-be if one transposes the
same thing by turning and intercontact c and
by variations of the figures/* as Democritus does
(hence he denies that colour exists, for coloration,
he says is due to the turning of the figures **) ;
but it is impossible for those who divide bodies into
planes to bring about alteration and coming-to
be ; for, when planes are put together, nothing can
result except solids ; for they never even try to
generate any quality from them.
The reason why we have not the power to compre
hend the admitted facts is our lack of experience.
Hence those who have lived in a more intimate com
munion with the phenomena of nature are better able
to lay down such principles as can be connected to
gether and cover a wide field ; those, on the other
175
ARISTOTLE
316 a
Ot 8 K TCOV 7ToXXwV X6yCOV dOecbpTfTOl TCOV VTTOLp10 xovtojv
paov.
ol
o v r e s , Trpos oXLya fSXeif/avres aTro<f>aivovrai

iSoi 8 a v
(fivaiKcbs
t is
K al
K al e/c
tovtcov ooov
AoyiK cbs
okottovvt S*
a r o f i a elv a i fieyeO rf o l fie v cfracrw
tov
r p iy c o v o v
Siacf>epovoiv
rrepl
TroXXa c a r a t , A r jfio K p ir o s S
yap
avro-
o ti t o
a v <f>aveirj
OLKetOLS K al <f>VOlKOlS X6yOlS '7T7Teto0ai.
SrjXov 8
e a r a t o Ae y o f ie v T rpoiovoiv.
15
* E ^ e t y a p d rro p la v , e t
t is
Oelrf a cb fia
fie y e O o s rrdvrr) S ia ip e r o v , K al
yap
Svvat o v .
tovto
e a r at orrep rrfv Scatp e o iv hia<f>evyei;
Travrrf S ia ip e r o v , K al
tovto
K av
tovto
S v v a r o v , Kav a fia etrf
y e v o ir o ,
o v S ev
etrf
av
aS vvarov.
K al /c a r a r o f ie a o v co a a v r c o s , K al oXcos Se,
Travrrf
ea ra i
tovto
ti
el yap
Travrrf Sirjprjfievov, K al e l firf a f i a S iffp rfra i
el
20 o vk o vv
et
etv a i K al
ti
Tre<f>VKe S ia ip e r o v ,
aS vvarov
K av
S iaipeO fj,
y e y o v o s , e7ret ov S '
av
e ls
ov S ev
fiv p ia
fiv p ia K is Sirfprjfieva fj, o v S ev a S v v a r o v /ca tr o t to co s

o v S e ls a v SteAot.
to
e7ret r o i v v v Travrrf r o i o v r o v e a n
a cb fia , SirfprfoOco.
25 y e O o s ;
t L ovv
e o r a i Xoittov;
o v y a p o to v re* e o r a i y a p r t o v Strfprffievov,
fjv Se Travrrf S ia ip e r o v .
aAAa firjv e l firjSev e o r a i
a i.e. the Platonists.

b See De Lin. Insec. 968 a 9 ff.
176
fie -

hand, who indulge in long discussions without taking
the facts into account are more easily detected as
men of narrow views. One can see, too, from this
the great difference which exists between those whose
researches are based on the phenomenon of nature
and those who inquire by a dialectical method. For
on the subject of atomic magnitudes one school a
maintains their existence on the ground that other
wise the 41 ideal triangle will be many,6 while
Democritus would appear to have been convinced by
arguments germane to the subject and founded on
the study of nature. W hat we mean will be clear as
we proceed.
I f one postulates that a body, that is, a magnitude, Difficulty
is divisible throughout and that such a division is theaSumppossible, a difficulty arises, namely, what will the tionâtg
body be which escapes division ? If it is divisible divisible
throughout and this procedure is possible, it might throughout,
be simultaneously divided throughout, even though
the divisions have not been made simultaneously,
and, if this were to result, no impossibility would be
involved. Therefore, supposing it is of a nature to
be divisible throughout, by a series of similar bisec
tions or on any other principle, nothing impossible
will have been achieved if it has actually been
divided, since, even if it has been divided into in
numerable parts innumerable times, there is no
impossibility, though perhaps no one would carry
out this division. Since, therefore, the body is divi
sible throughout, let us suppose that it has been
divided. W hat then will be left ? A magnitude ?
No : that is impossible, since then there will be some
thing which has not been divided, and it was divisible
throughout But if no body or magnitude is to be left
177
ARISTOTLE
316 a
<Tcofia firfSe fieyeOos, Siaipeois S eorai, fj k

onyfiwv ecrrai, Kal afieyeOrj
cSv ovyKeirai, fj
ovSev navranaoiv, wore Kav yivoiro eK firfSevos
Kav eirj ovyKeifievov, Kal to nav 8rj ovSev aAA* fj
30 <f>aivofievov. ofioiws Sc Kav fj eK onyfiwv, ovk
carat ttooov. oôre yap rjnrovro Kal ev fjv fieyeOos
Kal afia fjoav, ouScv enoiovv fieiôv to nav. StatpeOevros yap els 8vo Kal nXeiw, ovSev eXattov ovSc
fieiôv to nav tov nporepov, wore Kav naoai ovvreOwoiv, ovSev noirjoovoi fieyeOos. aAAa fiffv Kal
3i6b ct r t Statpovfievov olov eKnpiofia ylverai rov awfiaros, Kal ovtws eK tov fieyeOovs owfia r t anep^ c ra t, o avros A oyos, c/cctvo nws Siaiperov; el
oe firf owfia aAA ctoos* rt x w P L(7T0 V V 7T a S
anrjXOev, Kal cart ro fieyeOos onyfial fj a<f>al roSl
5 naOovaai, aronov eK firj fieyeOwv fieyeOos etvai.
crt Sc nov eoovrai Kal aKivrjroi fj Kivovfievai at
<TTiyfiai; a<j>ff re act fiia Svolv rivwv, ws ovros
nvos napa rrjv a</>rjv Kal rrjv Siaipeoiv Kal rrjv
oriyfiffv. el 8fj ns Ofjoerai onovv fj omjAiKovovv
owfia etvai navrrj Siaiperov, navra ravra ovfiio /JaiVct. crt eav SieXwv ovvOw ro vXov rj rt aAAo,
naXiv ioov re Kal ev. ovkovv ovtws c^ct SrjXovon
Kav rifiw ro vXov KaO* dr tow cnjfielov. navrrj
apa Sifjprjrai Svvafiei. ri ofiv eon napa rrfv StatO '
'
\ \ )
f s /
* i.e. the sum of the separated parts.

178
/ n

and yet division is to take place, the body either will
consist o f points, and its constituents will be things
o f no magnitude, or else it will be absolutely nothing ;
and so it would come-to-be and be compounded of
nothing, and the whole would be nothing but an
illusory appearance. Similarly, if it consists of points,
it will not be a magnitude ; for when the points were
in contact and formed a single magnitude and were
together, they did not make the whole any larger.
For when it was divided into two or more parts, the
whole was no smaller or larger than before ; so that,
if all the points were to be put together, they will
not make any magnitude. Further, if, when the body
is being divided, a minute portion of it, like a piece
of saw-dust, is formed and in this way a body is
detached from the magnitude, the same argument
holds good, and the question arises : In what sense
is this portion divisible ? If it was not a body which
was detached but a separable form or quality, and
if the magnitude is points or contacts thus qualified,
it is absurd that a magnitude should be composed
of things which are not magnitudes. Furthermore,
where will the points be ? And, are they motionless
or do they move ? Also a contact is always a contact
o f two things, since there is always something as well
as the contact or the division or the point. All this
results, if one is going to posit that any body of any
size whatever is divisible throughout. Furthermore,
if, after having divided a piece of wrood or some other
object, I put it together again, it is again both equal
to what it was and a unity. Obviously this is so at
whatever point I cut the wood. The wood has, there
fore, been divided potentially throughout. W hat
then, is there in the wood besides the division ? For
179
ARISTOTLE
316 b
el yap Kal ecrri rt iraOos, aAAa nws els

raura StaAucrat /cat yiver ai /c roura)y; t} mD?
15 ^coptêrat raura; o5crr einep aSvvarov i a<f>cbv
peoiv;
rj o n y fiw v elvai ra fieye9rf, avayKJ] elvai owfiara

dSiaipera Kal fieyeOrf.
ov firjv aAAa /cat raura
9efievois ovx fjTTOV crvfLpaivei aSvvarov.
20
eoKerrrai
8c nepl avrwv ev erepois. aAAa raura neipareov

Xveiv Sto naXiv ei; apxys rrjv dnopiav XeKreov.
To fiev ovv dnav owfia aloOrfrov elvai Siaiperov
Ka9 ortouv orffieiov Kal aSiaiperov ovSev d r o n o v
ro fiev yap Svvafiei Siaiperov, ro S evTeXeXeia
vnapei. ro S etvai afia Travrrf Siaiperov Svvafiei
aSumrov Sogeiev av etvai. el yap Svvarov, Kav
yevoiro,
c^CTTe etvai
ovx
25 aSiaiperov Kal
oriovv crrjfieiov.
afia
dfi<f>w evreXexeia
Strfprjfievov, aAAa Strfprjfievov /ca0

ovSev apa ecrrai Xomov, Kal els
aowfiarov e<f>9apfievov ro owfia, Kal yevoiro S av

naXiv ffroi eK o n y fiw v ^ oXws e ovSevos.
Kal
rovro nw s Svvarov;
AAAa firjv o n ye Siaipeirai els x w p w KaL êt
els eXarra) fieye9rf Kal els dnexovra Kal /ce^copt30
ofieva, <f>avepov.
ovre Srj Kara fiepos Siaipovvn eirf
av aneipos ff 9pvi/jis, ovre afia otov re SiaipeBfjvai

Kara nav orffieiov (ov yap Svvarov) aAAa fiexpi to v .
avayKrj
apa
aAAous* re
arofia
evvnapxeiv
fieyeOrj
dopar a,
Kal einep eorai yeveois Kal (f>9opa ff
i.e. points of division and quality.

b Vhys. TAX a 2MF.
e i.e. uncuttable.
ISO

even if there is some quality, how is it dissolved into
these constituents a and how does it come-to-be out
of them ? And how are these constituents separated ?
Therefore, since it is impossible for magnitudes to
consist of contacts or points, there must be indivisible
bodies and magnitudes. However, if we posit these,
an equally impossible consequence arises, which has
been the subject of discussion elsewhere.6 But we
must try to solve these difficulties, and so the problem
must be stated again from the beginning.
It is, then, in no wise absurd that every perceptible
body should be divisible at any point whatsoever and
also indivisible ; for it will be potentially divisible and
actually indivisible. But it would seem impossible
that it should be, even potentially, divisible through
out at the same time ; for, if that were possible, it
would actually happen, with the result, not that it
would actually be simultaneously both things in
divisible and divided but that it would be divided
simultaneously at any and every point. Nothing will,
therefore, be left, and the body will have passed-away
into a state o f incorporeity, and so it also might cometo-be again either from points or absolutely from
nothing. And how is this possible ?
It is clear, however, that a body is divided into
magnitudes which are separable and grow smaller
and smaller and come apart from one another and
are separated. If you divide a body piece by piece,
the process of breaking it up would not be infinite,
nor can it be divided simultaneously at every point
(for this is not possible), but the process can only be
carried on within a ccrtain limit. There must, then,
exist in a body atomic c magnitudes which are in
visible, especially if coming-to-be and passing-away
181
ARISTOTLE
316 b
fiev
Sta Kpioei fj Se ovyKploei. o fiev ovv avayKaêiv
317 a Sokwv Xoyos elvai fieyeOrf arofia ofiros eoriv o t i
Sc Aa vOavei napaXoyi ôfievos, /cat
XavOavei,
fj
Ac-
ywfiev.
*E 7ret yap oi5/c cart a n y firj a n yfifjs ixofievrf, ro
rravrrf elvai Siaiperov cart /Ltcv cos vrrapxei rots
fieyeOeaiv, cart S cos ot>.
5 r eOfj, /cat
otttjovv
So/cct S oTav tov to
/cat rravrrj onyfirjv etvai, coot*
avayKaiov etvai SiaipeOfjvai ro fieyeOos els firjSev *

rravrrf yap etvai o n y fiffv ware ff c a^cov 77 c/c
to
o n y fiw v etvai.
cartv cos vrrapxei rravrrf,
o n fiia OTTjfovv eo rl, Kal rraoai w s c/caarq, rrXeiovs

O'
10
/ )/
/\
oc /Lttas* ou/c eioiv (e<pe^rfs yap ovk eioiv), war ov

rravrrf.
ct yap /cara fieaov Siaiperov, /cat /car*
exofievrfv onyfirfv eorai Siaiperov ovxl Sc1* oi5
yap carty exofievov orffieiov orffieiov ff a n y firf
a n yfifjs . rovro S cart Siaipeois Kal1 ovvOeois.
"Clor* e o n Kal Sta/cptats* /cat ovyKpiois, aAA our*
ct? arofia Kal c arofiwv (iroXka yap ra aSw ara)
15
ourc
yap
ct?
ovrw s
wore
rravrrf
Siaipeoiv
yeveaOai
(ct
exofievrj a n y firf a n yfifjs, to u t av tJv), aAA

fiiKpa
eXarrovwv.
Kal eXarrw
earl,
Kal
ovyKpiois
aAA* ou^ ff arrXrj Kal reXeia yeveois
ovyKpioei /cat Sta/cptact wpiorai, ws rives <f>aoiv,

rrjv 8 cV rw ovvexe? fierafioXrfv aXXoiwoiv.
1 ovî Sc J : 0111. cet. co d d .
2 *a i II i
182
aAAa

are going to take place by association and dissocia
tion respectively. This, then, is the argument which
is thought to necessitate the existence o f atomic
magnitudes, but let us now show that it conceals a
false inference, and where this false inference lies.
Since no point is contiguous to another point, the
divisibility throughout of a body is possible in one
sense, but not in another sense. When such divisi
bility is postulated, it is generally held that there is
a point both anywhere and everywhere in it, so that
it follows that the magnitudes must be divided until
nothing is left. For, it is urged, there is a point every
where in it, so that it consists either of contacts or
of points. But divisibility-throughout is possible only
in the sense that there is one point anywhere within
it and that all its points taken separately are within
i t ; but there are not more points than one any where
in it (for the points are not consecutive ), so that
it is not divisible throughout; for then, if it was
divisible at its centre, it will also be divisible at a
contiguous point. But it is n o t ; for one moment
in time is not contiguous to another, nor is one point
to another. So much for division and composition.
Hence both association and dissociation occur but Coming-toneither into atomic magnitudes and out of them (for dSleto0t
the impossibilities involved are numerous), nor in ^ 81^ 1t1ion
such a way that division-throughout occurs (for this particles
would be possible only if point were contiguous to JwayTo*118*
point) ; but dissociation occurs into small, or relatively their dissmall, parts, while association occurs out of relatively 8cIation
small parts. But unqualified and complete comingto-be is not defined as due to association and dis
sociation, as some people assert, while they say that
change in what is continuous is alteration. In fact,
183
ARISTOTLE
317 a
20 tout*
io n v
iv
q>
o fia X X c T a i
ir a v r a .
eon
yap
y e v e o i s arrXrj K a l <f>0opa o v o v y K p i o e i K a l S i a K p i o e i ,
aAA
o r a v fieT a fia X X r} iK
Sc otovrat
a X X o iw o iv
rovS e
rra oa v
fjL eT a p o X rjv t o Sc Sia<f>epei.

to
25
fiev
eora i
ovv
iv
to v to is
orav S
rj <f>8opa,
K p iv o fjie v a
ev<f>0apra
iX aT TO ) v S a n a
30 Sc
fj
iv
tois*
to is
y iv e r a i.
Sc
vvv
/cara
Sc
r r fv v X rjv.
y e v e o is
ir a B e o i K a l K a r a
cav
S ia ip e O fj, O o lt t o v
vorepov.
ol
T o ia v r r jv
/xcrajSoAiJ,
ff
Sc
S ia K p iv o f ie v a
o v y K p i O fj, fi p a S v T e p o v .
ev
rr/v
i v y a p r w v r r o K e ifie v w
fiev i o t i K aTa t o v X o y o v , t o
orav
o v fi^ e p r jK O S , a X X o l w o i s .
e is t o Se oX ov.
e lv a i
Kal o v y yap
e ls
a rfp y i v e r a i ,
ia v
fia X X o v
to o o v to v
fiev
S c a ra t
SrjX ov
S iw p io O w , o t i
a S v v a r o v e l v a i t t j v y e v e o i v o v y K p i o i v , o t a v Srj T iv e s
(fya oiv.
3.
Sc
A iw p io fie v w v
u oT ep ov
eon
i) K v p i w s f i e v o v o e v ,
35
o io v
iK
K & fxvovT O S
317 b v o v r o S y ff f i i K p o v
K al
raAAa
tovtcov,
ti y i v o f i e v o v
act
O e cD p rjT e o v
c fr O e ip o fi e v o v ,
e K tivos K a i t i , A e y w
v y ia iv o v
iK
ir p w T o v
a7rXws Kal
fie y a X o v
Kal
K a jiv o v
K al fie y a
r r a v r a tovtov tov T p o r r o v .
ct
it;
iK
v y ia lfiiK p o v ,
y a p a ir X w s
e o r a i y e v e o i s , a T rX tb s a v y l v o i T o i K fir j ovtos , w o t
a X r jO e s
av
e trj X e y e i v
o n
vn apxei
328 a 23-b 22.

184
n o l
to
f ir j
ov.
COMING-TO-BE AN D PASSIN G -AW AY, I. 2-3

this is where the whole mistake occurs ; for unqualified
coming-to-be and passing-away are not due to associa
tion and dissociation, but take place when something
as a whole changes from this to that. But
some philosophers hold that all such change is altera
tion, whereas there is a difference. For in that
which underlies the change there is a factor corre
sponding to the definition and a material factor ;
when, therefore, the change takes place in these,
coming-to-be or passing-away will occur, but, when
the change is in the qualities (that is to say, there
is an accidental change), alteration will result.
Things which are associated and dissociated become
liable to pass-away ; for if drops of water are divided
into still smaller drops, air comes-to-be from them
more quickly, whereas, if they are associated together,
air comes-to-be more slowly. This, however, will
be clearer in what follows ; for the moment let us
assume this much as established, namely, that
coming-into-being cannot be association of the kind
which some people assert it to be.
3.
Having made the above distinctions, we must Do unquaiifirst inquire whether there is anything which comes- to-beand 8
to-be and passes-away in an unqualified sense, or J ^ inf ' tu_
whether nothing comes-to-be in the strict sense, but ally occur?
everything comes-to-be something, and out of some
thing for example, comes-to-be healthy out of being
ill, and ill out of being healthy, or small out of being
large, and large out of being small, and so on in the
other instances which one might give. For, if there
is to be coming-to-be without qualification, something
must come-to-be out of not-being without qualifica
tion, so that it would be true to say that there are
things of which not-being can be predicated ; for
185
ARISTOTLE
317
rls fiev yap yeveois i
firj ovros
tivos,
olov k
5 firf XevKov rj firf KaXov, ff Se arrXfj i arrXws firf
ovros.
T o S a7rXws rjroi ro rrpwrov orffiaivei Kad'

iKaorrjv Karrjyopiav rov ovros, rj ro KaOoXov Kal
ro rravra nepiiypv.
el fiev ofiv ro rrpwrov, ovoias
eorai yeveois iK firf ovoias.

firfSe
<5 Sc firf vrrapxei ovola
roSe, SrjXov w s ov Se rwv aXXwv ovSefiia Karrf-
10 yopiwv,
otov ovre rroiov ovre irooov ovre t o ttov
Xwpiora yap av eirj ra rraOrf rw v ovoiw v.
el
Sc
t o firf ov oXws, arr6<j)aois eorai KadoXov 7Tavrwv,
w ore iK firjSevos avayKrf yiveodai ro yivofievov.

Uepl fiev ofiv rovrw v iv aXXois re SirjTroprjrai Kal
15 Siwpiorai rois Xoyois irri rrXeiov ovvrofiws
Sc Kal
vvv XeKreov, o n rporrov fiev n v a iK firf ovros arrXws
/
v\\
> v
> / \ \
yiverai, rporrov oe aAAov eg ovros* act* r o yap
Svva/iei ov ivreXexela Sc firj ov avayKrf 7rpov7rdpxeiv
Xeyofievov dfi<f)orepws.
o Se Kal rovrw v Siwpi-
ofievwv exei Oavfiaorffv arropiav, rraXiv c7rava7ro-
20 Sioreov,
rrws e o n v arrXfj yeveois, ctr
ovros ofioa eire Kal 7rws aXXws.
iK Svvafiei
arropffoeie yap av
tis apy e o n v ovoias yeveois Kal rov rovSe, aAAa

firf rov rotouSc Kal rooovSe Kal 7rov (rov avrov Sc
a Phys. i. 6-9.
b i.e. as 44 being and as 44 not-being.'
186
COMING-TO-BE AN D PA SSIN G -A W A Y, I. 3
some kind of coming-to-be proceeds from some kind
of not-being, for example, from not-white and
not-beautiful, but unqualified coming-to-be pro
ceeds from unqualified not-being.
Now unqualified signifies either (a) that which Themeanis primary in each category, or (b) that which is Unqualified.
universal and universally comprehensive. If, then,
it signifies that which is primary, there will be a
coming-to-be of substance out of not-substance ; but
that which has not a substance o r a this obviously
cannot have any predicate from the other categories,
either, for example, quality, quantity or position,
for then the properties would exist apart from the
substances. If, on the other hand, unqualified notbeing signifies that which does not exist at all, this
will be a general negation o f all being, and, there
fore, what comes-to-be must come-to-be out of
nothing.
This problem has been discussed and settled at
greater length elsewhere ; but a short restatement
of it is called for here : In one way things come-to-be
out of that which has no unqualified being, in another
way they always come-to-be out o f what is ; for there
must be a pre-existence of that which potentially is,
but actually is not, in being, and this is described in
both ways.6 This having been established, a ques
tion involving extraordinary difficulty must be re
examined, namely, how can there be unqualified
coming-to-be, whether it comes from what exists
potentially or in some other way ? For one might Are comingraise the question whether there is a coming-to-be j2ssing-d
of substance (that is, of the this ) at all, and not away con.1
* , tv
,
,t
a
cernedwith
rather ot a
such
or a
so-great
or a
some- substance
where ; and the same question might be asked
187
ARISTOTLE
317
rporrov /cat rrepl (/>0opas) .
et yap rt yiverai, SrjXov
ws eorai Svvafiei Tt? ovoia, evreXex^la S ov, it;

25 fjs fj yeveois eorai /cat els ffv avayKrj fieraflaXAeiv
to
(f)deipofievov.
norepov ovv vrrapêi t i rovrw
tw v aXXwv evreXexela;
TTOOOV
fj
fj
7TOIOV
Xeyw
S otov ap* ecrrai
TTOV TO S w d f l l flOVOV
arrXws Se firj roSe firfS ov;
ToSe
K O I OV,
et yap firfSev aAAa
rrdvra Svvafiei, x<*>pior6v re ovfiftalvei ro firf ovrw s
30 ov, Kal e n , o fiaXiora (froftovfievoi SiereXeoav oi

rrpwroi <f>iXooo(/)'qoavres, t o
TTpovTTapxovros9 et Se
to
eK firjSevds yiveodai
fiev etvai roSe n fj ovoiav
ovx tfpet, tw v S aAA(ov rt rw v etprffievwv, eorai,

KaOarrep ehto fiev, x (x)Plur1 r<* rraOrf rw v ovoiwv.
rrepl re rovrw v ovv ooov evSeêTat rrpayfiarevreov,
35 /cat ris airia rov yeveoiv del etvai, Kal rffv drrXfjv
Kal rrjv Kara fiepos.
3i8a
v o r fs
a lria s
fiia s
fie v
o6 ev
r r jv
a p x r fv
etv a i
(j> a fie v r r j s K i v f f o e w s , f i i a s S e r f j s iiX r js , r r j v r o i a v r r f v

rr ep l f i e v y a p e K e iv r js e ip r jr a i r r p o -
a i r la v X e K reo v .
rep ov
ev
ro is
rrep l
fie v a K iv r fr o v r o v
d e l.
rovrw v
Se
K iv ffo e w s
X o y o is ,
arra vra x p o v o v , r o
rrep l fie v r f j s
o n
eorl
to
S e K iv o v fie v o v
a K iv fjr o v
a p x r js r r js
e r e p a s K a l 7 T p o r e p a s S i e X e i v e o r l (f>iX ooo<f>ias e p y o v
In lines 10, 11 above.

b i.e. qualified, that is, changing in respect of quality,
quantity or position.
e Phys. 258 b 10 ff*
188
COMING-TO-BE AN D PASSIN G -A W A Y, I, 3
about passing-away also. For, if something comesto-be, it is clear that there will be substance, not
actually but potentially, from which the coming-to-be
will proceed and into which that which is passingaway must change. Will any other attribute then
belong actually to this supposed substance ? For
example, I mean, will that which is only potentially
a this (and only potentially exists), and which is
not a ** this and does not exist without qualification,
possess size or quality or position ? For, (1) if it
actually possessed none of these determinations but
possesses them all potentially, the result is (a) that
a being which is not a determined being can possess
a separate existence, and (6) that coming-to-be arises
out of nothing pre-existent a view which inspired
great and continuous alarm in the minds of the early
philosophers. On the other hand, (2) if, although it
is not to be a ** this or a substance, it is to possess
some o f the other attributes which we have men
tioned, then, as we said, the qualities will be separ
able from the substance. W e must, therefore, deal
with these matters to the best of our ability, and also
with the causes of continuous coming-to-be, both
the unqualified and the partial.6
Now there arc two meanings of** causc, one being
that which, as we say, results in the beginning of
motion, and the other the material cause. It is the
latter kind with which we have to deal here ; for with
cause in the former sense we have dealt in our dis
cussion of Motion, when we said that there is some
thing which remains immovable through all time and
something which is always in motion. To come to
a decision about the first of these, the immovable
original source, is the task of the other and prior
189
ARISTOTLE
318 a
7Tepl Se
tos
tov
Sta
voTepov
to
ovvex&$ KiveiaOai TaXXa
arro S o t eo v ,
tl
tolovtov
e /ca o ra Xeyofievcov atTtov eortv .
vvv Se
k iv o v v -
tco v
KaO9
t t jv cos
ev
10 vXrjs eiSei ri9efievr)v alrtav eirTCOfiev, St* t)v aet

<f>9opa Kal yeveois ovx w oAetVet rrjv </>voiv afia
yap av
locos
tovto
yevoiro SrjXov, Kal nepl
tov
vvv aTToprjdevTOS, 7rcos tto tc Set Aeye tv /cat rrepl Trjs

arrXrjs <f>6opds Kal yeveaecos.
*Eêt S arroplav iKavrjv Kal t l t o
ovveipeiv rrjv yeveaiv, et7rep
atTtov to v
<f>9etp6fievov els t o
to
is fifj ov arrepxerai, t o Se firj ov firjSev eoT iv ovre

yap t l ovre itolov ovre 7tooov ovre 7tov
to
firf ov.
eirrep ovv del t l tcov ovtcov arrepx^Tai, Sta t l ttot

ovk avffXcoTai ndXai Kal cf>povSov t o rrav, et ye
rrerrepaofievov fjv
eKaarov;
e ov
ov yap Srj Sta
ytverat
to
tcov yivofievcov
arreipov etvai e o$
20 ylverai, ovx v7roAetVet* to v to yap aSvvarov.

evepyeiav fiev yap ovSev e o n v
8 7Tt rrjv Siaipeoiv, coot
kot
arreipov, Svvafiei
eSei ravrrjv etvai fiovrfv
trjv firj v 7ToXeirrovoav tco yiveodai t i del eX arrov

vvv Se to v to ovx opcofiev.
TA p9 oSv Sta t o
rffv
t o v Se
<f>9opav aAAov etvai
25 yeveotv /cat rrfv rovSe yeveaiv aXXov etvai cf)9opdv
a Usually called npwrrj <f>i\ooo<f>ia.

b See 336 a 13 ff.
c Or specific causes, as opposed to causes in the
universal sense : c f Phys. 19.5 a J
( 7 ff.
190
COMING-TO-BE A N D PASSIN G -AW AY, I. 3

branch of philosophy, while, regarding that which
moves all other things by its own continuous motion,
we shall have to explain later 6 which of the individualc
causes is of this kind. For the moment let us deal
with the cause which is placed in the class of matter,
owing to which passing-away and coming-to-be never
fail to occur in nature ; for perhaps this may be
cleared up and it may become evident at the same
time what we ought to say about the problem which
arose just now, namely, about unqualified passingaway and coming-to-be.
W hat is the cause of the continuous process of what is the
coming-to-be is a perplexing enough problem, if it coming-ftois really true that what passes-away vanishes into he and
what is not and what is not is nothing ; for Sway"?
what is not ** is not anything and possesses neither
quality nor quantity nor position. If, therefore, some
one of the things-which-are is constantly vanishing,
how is it that the whole of being has not long ago
been used up and has not disappeared, provided, of
course, that the source of each of the things which
come-to-be was limited ? For, I suppose, the fact
that coming-to-be never fails is not because the
source from which it comes is infinite ; for this is
impossible, since nothing is actually infinite but only
potentially so for the purpose of division, so that
there would have to be only one kind of comingto-be, namely, one which never fails, because some
thing which comes-to-be is successively smaller and
smaller. But, as a matter of fact, we do not see this
happening.
Is it, then, because the passing-away of one thing W h y is the
is the coming-to-be of another thing, and the coming- change f
to-be of one thing the passing-away of another thing, unceasing ?
191
ARISTOTLE
318 a
airavorov avayKaiov elvai

fiev oiv
eKaoTov
tov
r r jv
fierapoXfjv ;
nepl
yeveotv etvai Kal <f>9opav ofiolws nepl

ovtw v,
tw v
tovtov
Sta rt 8 e
iKavrjv air lav,
olrjTeov etvai naoiv
7rore
r a fiev anXws y i
veodai XeyeTai Kal <f>delpeo9ai ra S ov\ anXws,

30 naXiv oK7TTeov, t7rep
t o v SI
<j>9opa
t o v St*
Se
yap
oti
t o v S I,
Se
rfT ei
to
avro eoTi yeveois fiev
/cat <f>9opa fiev
yap Tiva
tovto
35
ylveTai fiev
tov
yeveois
Aeyofiev
</)9elpTai vvv anXws, Kal ov fiovov roSt*
Kal avrrf fiev yeveois anXws, avrrf

Se
t o v SI
Xoyov.
t i,
ylverat
8*
Se
<f>9opa.
t o SI
arrXws ov* </>afiev yap
fiav9avovra ylveo9ai fiev entorfjfiova, ylveo9ai
S anXcos ov.
318 b
Ka9anep ovv noXXaKts Siopltôfiev Xeyovres o ti to.

fiev ToSe t i orffiaivei Ta S ov, Sta to v to ovfijSalvet
t o ^rjTOVfievov Sta<f>epet yap els a fierafidXXei t o
fierafidXXov olov tows ff fiev els nvp oSos yeveois
5 fiev anXfj, (j>9opa Se tivos eoTiv, otov yrjs, ff Sc yfjs

yeveois tIs yeveois, yeveois S ovx '7rAa>s, <f>9opa
S anXws, otov nvpos, wonep llapfievlSrfs Xeyei SiJo

t o ov Kal t o firf ov elvai <f>doKwv, nvp Kal yf\v.
to
Srf Tavra fj TOiav9* erepa vnoTi9eo9at Sta<f>epei

ovS ev to v yap Tponov tprfTodfiev, aAA ov t o vno-
Fr. 8 lines 53 if. (I)iels), but Parmenides mentions this

theory as being wrong.
192
COM ING-TO-BE A N D PA SSIN G -A W A Y, I. 3

that the process of change is necessarily unceasing ?
As regards the occurrence of coming-to-be and
passing-away in everything which exists alike, the
above must be regarded by all as an adequate cause ;
but why some things are said to come-to-be and to
pass-away without qualification and others with quali- between
fication, must be examined once more, if it is true luaiified **
a .1
*
a ii . i i) and
un*
that the same process is a coming-to-be of
this, qualified.**
but a passing-away of 44 that, and a passing-away
of this but a coming-to-be of 44 that ; for the
question calls for discussion. For we say
It is now
passing-away without qualification, and not merely
This is passing-away ; and we call this a 14 comingto-be, and that a 44 passing-away, without qualifica
tion. But this 44 comes-to-be-something, but does
not do so without qualification ; for we say that the
student 44 comes-to-be learned, not 44 comes-to-be
without qualification.
Now we often make a distinction, saying that some
things signify a 44 this, and others do n o t ; and it is
because of this that the point which we are examining
arises, for it makes a difference into what that which
is changing changes.
For example, perhaps the
passage into Fire is 44 coming-to-be without quali
fication but 44 passing-away-of-something (for in
stance, of Earth), while the coming-to-be of Earth
is qualified (not unqualified) coming-to-be, but un
qualified passing-away (for example, of Fire). This
agrees with Parmenides * theory, for he says that the
things into which change takes place are two and
asserts that these two things, what is and what is not,
are Fire and Earth. Whether we postulate these or
other things of a like kind makes no difference ; for
we are seeking not what underlies these changes, but
H
193
ARISTOTLE
318 b
10 K elfieV O V .
flkv ofiv IS TO f ir f OV anXws 6 8 6 s
ff
<f>6opa an Afj, fj
S els
to
anXcos ov yeveois anXrj.
ots ofiv SiwpiOTai eire nvpl Kal yfj eire aXXois Tioi,
t o v t c o v eoTai t o
Tponov t o v t c o
fiev ov t o Se firf ov.

Sioioei t o
anXws t i
eva fiev ofiv

yiveoOai Kal
(f)6eipeo6ai t o v firf anXcos, aXXov Se rfj vXrf onoia

15 t i s
av fj' tfs fiev yap fiaXXov a I 8ia<j>opal
roSe
ti
orffialvovot, fiaXXov ovoia, fjs Se OTeprjoiv, firf ov,

olov t o
fiev Oepfiov Karrfyopia t i s
Kal etSos, ff Se
ipvxpOTrfs OTeprjais * 8ia<f>epovoi Se yfj Kal nvp Kal
ra u ra is rats* 8ia<f>opaisAo/ccI Se fiaXXov t o i s
noXXois t w
aloOrjrw Kal
20 firf aloOrjTw Sia<j>epeiv orav fiev yap els aloOrjiffv

fieTafiaXXrf vXrjv, yiveoOai <f>aoiv, orav
S els a<f>avfj,
<f)0eipeo0ar t o yap ov Kal t o firf ov t w
aloOaveoOai
Kal t w
firf aloOaveoOai 8lopitpvotv, wonep t o fiev
emoTryrov ov, t o 8 ayvwoTov firf o v ff yap aioOrjois

enioTrffirjs e\ei Svvafiiv.
25 aloOaveoOai
ff
vofilôvoiv, o v t w
194
tw
KaOdnep ofiv airrol t w
SvvaoOai
Kal
Kal
X^fjv Kal
elvai
r a npayfiara, Tponov Tiva

the manner in which they take place. The passage,
then, into that which is not without qualification
is unqualified passing-away, while the passage into
that which is without qualification is unqualified
coming-to-be. Hence, whatever it is by which the
things which change are distinguished from one
another whether it be Fire and Earth or some other
pair one will be a being, the other a not-being.
One way, then, in which unqualified will differ from
qualified coming-to-be and passing-away is obtained
by this method. Another way of distinguishing them
is by the special nature of the material of that which
changes ; for the more the differences of material
signify a this, the more is it a real being, whereas
the more they signify a privation, the more unreal
it is. For example, hot is a positive predication
and a form, while cold is a privation, and Earth
and Fire are distinguished from one another by these
differences.
In the opinion of most people the difference be- A note on
tween qualified and unqualified depends rather on people st
perceptibility and imperceptibility ; for when there WenUfy^the
is a change to perceptible material, they say that the perceptcoming-to-be takes place, but, when they change to ^[eafwithe
invisible material, they say that passing-away occurs : the imperfor they distinguish between that which is and cePtlb,e*
that which is not by their perception and non
perception, just as what is knowable is and what is
unknowable is not (for to them perception has the
force of knowledge). A s, therefore, they themselves
think that they live and have their being in virtue of
perceiving or having the power to perceive, so, too,
they consider that things exist because they perceive
them and, in a way, they are on the right road to
195
ARISTOTLE
318 b
SicoKovres rdArj9ess avro Se Aeyovre? ovk aA rjOes*

ovfifiatvet 8 rf Kara 8 oav Kal Kar aXrf9etav aAAa>?
ro y tveo9 at re onrXaJS Kal ro <f>9eipeo9af rrvevfia
yap Kal arfp Kara fiev rrjv ato9rjotv fjrrov iartv (Sto
30 Kal r a <f>9etpofieva avAcos rfj et? ravra fierafioAfj
<f>0etpeo9at Aeyovotv, ytveo9at 8 * orav et? anrov Kal
et? yrjv fierapaAArf) , Kara S aAfj0etav fiaAAov ro Se

Tt
Kal et8 os ravra rrjs yfjs.

T o v fiev ovv etvat rrjv fiev arrAfjv yeveotv <f>8opav
ovoav rtvoSy rrjv
Se <f)0opav rrjv anArjv yeveotv ovoav

(Sta yap ro rrjv vArjv Sta-
35 tivos, etprjrat ro ain ov
319 a </>epetv rj r<x> ovoiav etvat fj rep firj, rj rip rrjv fiev
fiaAAov rrjv Se fifj, fj rep rrjv fiev fiaAAov aloOryrrjv

etvat rrjv vArjv e fjs Kal els rjv, rrjv Se fjrrov efvat)
rov Se ra fiev arrAtbs ytveoOat AeyeoOat, ra Se rt
fiovov, firf rfj e oAAtJAcov yeveoet, KaO* ov etrrofiev
5 vvv rpoiTov (vvv fiev yap rooovrov Staiptorat, rt 8rj
rrore rraorjs yeveoecos ovorjs <f)9opas aAAov, Kal
7rdorjs (f)9opas ovorjs erepov rtvos yeveoecos ov\
ofioicos drro8t8ofiev ro ytveoOat Kal ro <f>9etpeo9at
rots els aAArjAa fierafiaAAovotv. t o S vorepov elprjfievov ov rovro 8tarropet aAAa rt rrore ro fiav9avov
io fiev ov Aeyerat a7rAa>? ytveo9at aAAa ytveo9at errtorfjfioVy ro Se <f>v6fievov ytveo9at)i ravra Se Stcoptorat rats Karrjyopiats* T a fiev yap ro8e rt
a t o v f i e v (318 b 33) is answered by t o v

c (319 a 3), and the
construction is broken by the parenthesis.
b i.e. in 318 a 33 ff.
e i.e. to the question raised in lines 3-5 above.
196
COMING-TO-BE AN D PASSIN G -AW AY, I. 3

the truth, though what they actually say is not true.
Indeed, the popular opinion about the way in which
unqualified coming-to-be and passing-away occur,
differs from the truth ; for W ind and Air have less
reality according to our perception of them (hence,
too, things which pass-away are said to do so in an un
qualified sense by changing into Wind and Air, and to
come-to-be when they change into what is tangible,
namely, into Earth), whereas in truth they are more
a definite something and a u form than Earth.
W e have now stated the reason why a there is un- Summary
qualified coming-to-be, which is the passing-away of argument.
something, and unqualified passing-away, which is Tnd8 ass
the coming-to-be of something (for it depends on ing-away*SS
the difference of the material, from which and into of aîngie68
which the change takes place, and on its being sub- transforma.
.
V
.
i
n ii
tion of sub*
stance or not, or on its having more or less of the stance into
nature of substance, or on its being more or less substance,
perceptible) ; but why are some things said to cometo-be without qualification, while others come-to-be
some particular thing only and not by coming-to-be
reciprocally out of one another in the manner which
we described just now ? (For up to the present we
have only determined this much, namely, why,
although all coming-to-be is a passing-away of some
thing else and all passing-away is a coming-to-be of
some other thing, we do not attribute coming-to-be
and passing-away uniformly to things which change
into one another ; but the problem afterwards raised .b
does not discuss this difficulty, but why that which
learns is said to come-to-be learned and not to cometo-be without qualification, yet that which grows is
said to come-to-be). The answer c is that this is
determined by the differences of the categories ; for
197
ARISTOTLE
9a
orjfiaivei, ra Se roiovSc, ra Sc rroaov* oaa otfv jn-q

ovatav orjfiaivei, ov Xeyerai anXws, aAAa ri y i
veodai.
ov firjv aAA* ofioiws ev rraoi yeveois fiev
15 Kara ra ev rfj erepa
auarot^ta Xeyerai, otov ev fiev
ovaia eav rrvp aAA o v k eav yfj , ev Sc rw rroiw eav

emorrjfiov aAA ov% orav avemorfjfiov.
Ilcpt fiev ovv rov ra fiev anXws yiveoOai ra Sc

fiff, Kal oXws Kal ev rais ovoiais avrais , eipryrai,
Kal Sion rov yeveaiv etvai ovvex&S alria ws vXrf
20 ro V7toKeifievov, o n
fiera^XrjriKov els rdvavria,
Kal e o n v ff Oarepov yeveois del errl rw v ovoiwv
aAA ov <f>0opa Kal ff aAA ov <f>0opa aAA ov yeveois.

aAAa fiffv ov S arropfjoai Set Sta r i yiverai del
arroXXvfievwv wanep yap Kal ro <j>0eipeo0ai arrXws
</>aoiv, orav els
a valoOrfrov eXOrf Kal ro [iff ov,
25 ofioiws Kal yiveoOai c/c firf ovros </>aoiv, orav c
avaioOfjrov.
eir
ovv ovros tivos rov vrroKeifievov
eire fiff, yiverai eK fiff ovros.
w ore ofioiws Kal
yiverai eK firf ovros Kal <f>Oeiperai els ro [irf ov.

eiKorws ovv ovx VTroXeirrei' ff yap yeveois <f>0opd
rov firf ovros , ff Se <f>0opa yeveois rov firf ovros .
30
A A A a rovro ro firf ov arrXws drropffoeiev av n s

i.e. the two parallel columns containing co-ordinate
pairs ; see W . D. Ross on Met. 1054 b 35.
198

some things signify a 14 this, others a 44 such-andsuch, others a 44 so-much. Those things, therefore,
which do not signify substance are not said to cometo-be without qualification, but to come-to-be some
thing. However, coming-to-be is said to take place
in all things alike when a thing comes-to-be some
thing in one of the two columns : in substance if it
comes-to-be Fire, but not if it comes-to-be Earth ;
in quality, if it comes-to-be learned, but not if it
comes-to-be ignorant.
It has already been stated how some things cometo-be without qualification and others do not, both
generally and in the substances themselves, and that
the substratum is the material cause why coming-tobe is a continuous process because it is subject to
change into the contraries, and, in the case of sub
stances, the coming-to-be of one thing is always a
passing-away of another, and the passing-away of
one thing anothers coming-to-be. It is, however,
not necessary even to raise the question why comingto-be goes on when things are being destroyed ; for,
just as people use the term passing-away without
qualification when a thing has passed into the im
perceptible and into apparent non-existence, so like
wise also they talk of coming-to-be from non-exist
ence, when a thing appears out of imperceptibility.
Whether, therefore, the substratum is something or
is not, what comes-to-be does so from not-being ;
and so it comes-to-be from not-being and passesaway into not-being in the same manner. Therefore
it is probable that coming-to-be never fails ; for it
is a passing-away of that which is not, and passingaway is a coming-to-be of that which is not.
But about that which 44 is not, unless you qualify
199
ARISTOTLE
319 a
7r o r e p o v
K al rd
e re p o v
to
fia p v
n\
rc o v
e v a v riw v
io riv ,
firf o v , n v p S c K a l r o
'
' O '
otov
kovc />o v 1
r\
yrj
o v , fj
e
ov, aAA e o n k a t yrj ro ov, ro oe firf ov vArj rf rrjs

yfjs, Kal nvpos w oavrw s-
319 b repov ff vXrf, rj

ivavricov;
>/
ovk
Kal dpa y e erepa Ka-
av yivoiro et; aXX'qXwv ov8 * e
rovro is yap vnapxei ravavria, nvpi, yfj,
u o a T t , aepi.
*/
\ e e
* / v
o >wes erf
rf e o n fiev cos rj avrrf, e o n o
erepa o fiev yap nore ov vnoKeirai ro avro, ro
S elvai ov ro avro.
nepl fiev ovv rovrcov enl
5 rooovrov eipffoOw.
4. Ilepl Se yeveoecos Kal aXXoiwoews Xeywfiev r i
Siacfrepovoiv (f>afiev yap ere pas etvai ravras ras
fierafioXas aXXrjXwv.
eneiSrj ofiv eori n ro vnoKei
fievov Kal erepov ro naOos o Kara rov vno Keifievov
10 XeyeoOai ne(J>vKev, Kal e o n
fierapoXff
eKarepov
rovrw v, aXXolwois fiev e o n v , orav vnofievovros rov

vnoKeifievov, aloOrfrov
ov to s*,
fieraâXXrf iv rois
avrov naOeoiv, rj ivavriois ofioiv ff fieraijv, otov

rd owfia vyiaivei Kal naXiv Kafivei vnofievov ye
ravro, Kal o
15
âA/cos* orpoyyvX os,
avros ye wv.
orav
oA o v
o tc 8c
ywvioeiSrjs
fierafiaXXrf firf vn o-
fievovros aioBrfrov t i v o s c o s vnoKeifievov rov avrov,

aAA
otov eK rfjs yovfjs atfia naorfs fj i vSaros
arfp ff
c a epos
navros iiSwp,
y e v c o ts
rjSrj
t o T o to t?-
rov, rov Se cf)0opd, fiaXiora Se, av ff fierafloXrf

1 post Kov<f>ov add. ro EL.
200

it, one might well be puzzled. Is it one of the two
contraries ? For example, is Earth, and that which
is heavy, not-being, but Fire, and that which is
light, being ? Or is this not so, but is Earth also
what is, while what is not is matter the
matter o f Earth and of Fire alike ? And is the matter
of each different, or else they would not come-to-bc
out of one another, that is, contraries out of con
traries ? For the contraries exist in these things,
namely, in Fire, Earth, W ater and Air. Or is the
matter the same in one sense, but diiferent in another ?
For their substratum at any particular moment is the
same, but their being is not the same. So much, then,
on these subjects.
4.
Let us now deal with coming-to-be and altera- Alteration
tion and discuss the difference between* them ; for quaUtyT f
we~say tKeSe forms o f change differ from one another. cominMoSince, then, the substratum is one thing and the passingproperty which is of such a nature as to be predicated c^ngesof
of the substratum is another thing, and since change substance,
takes place in each of these, alteration occurs
when the substratum, which is perceptible, persists,
but there is change in its properties, which are either
directly or intermediately contrary to one another :
for example, the body is healthy and then again sick,
though it persists in being the same body, and the
bronze is spherical and then again angular, remaining
the same bronze. But when the thing as a whole
changes, nothing perceptible persisting as identical
substratum (for example, when the seed as a whole
is converted into blood, or water into air, or air as a
whole into water), such a process is a coming-to-be
and a passing-away of the other substance particu
larly if the change proceeds from something imper-
201
ARISTOTLE
319 b
ylvTfrai
avaio9fjrov els alo9rfrov fj a<f>fj fj iraoais
20 Tat? ato9fjoeoivJ otov orav vSa)p yevrfrai fj <j>9apfj

et? aepa* o yap arjp iirieiKcbs dvalo9rfrov.
iv Se
TouTot? av rt V7ro[ivrj iraOos to avro ivavncboecos

iv
tco
yevofievco /cat
tco
<f>9apevn (olov orav i
aepos v 8 cop, et aficfyco 8 ia<f>avfj fj tfrvxpd), ov Set

toutou 9arepov 7ra9os etvat et? o fiera/?aAAet.
25 8 fifj, eorai aAAoicocrt?.
et
olov o fiovoiKos avOpconos
icf>9dprj, avOpcoiros S a/xouao? eyevero, o S av9pco7TO? V7TOjJLVt TO aV TO .
et /iV o5v TOVTOV flTf 77(100?
/ca0* auTo fj fiovoiKrf /cat 17 afiovola, rov fiev

yeveois fjv av, tou Se ^0opa* Sto avOpconov fiev
ravra TrMrj, dvOpcbrrov Se fiovoiKov /cat avOpcorrov
30 afiovoov yeveois /cat cf>9opa' vvv Se 77a0o? tov to

tov viTOjievovros.
Sto oAAotcuat? Ta roiavra.
f/0Tav /zev o5v /cara to 77oaov 17
f ie r a f to X r f r r j s
evavrtakrea)?, a v r j /cat cf> 9lois, o r a v Se /cara T0770V,

cfropd, o r a v Se /caTa 'rrdO o s K a l
t o ttoiov ,
a X X o lc o o is ,
320 a orav Se f i r j S e v v i r o f i e v r j o v O a r e p o v nd9os fj o v f i -
fteftrjKos oAco?, yeveois, ro Se cf>9opd.

jxaXiora fiev /cat KVplcos
to
eori Se uAtj
viroKeifievov yeveoecos Kal
<f>9opas Se/CTt/cov, rpoirov 8e n va Kal
to
rais aXXais
5 fier aftoAais, o n rravra SezcTt/ca Ta vrroKeifieva iv av202

ceptible to something perceptible (either to touch
or to all the senses), as when water comes-to-be out
of, or passes-away into, air ; for air is pretty well
imperceptible. But if, in these circumstances, any
property belonging to a pair of contraries persists
in being the same in the thing which has come-to-be
as it was in the thing which has passed-away if, for
instance, when water comes-to-be out of air, both
are transparent or cold that into which it changes
is not necessarily another property of this thing ;
otherwise the change will be alteration.
For
example, the musical man passed-away and an un
musical man came-to-be, but the man persists as
identically the same. Now if musicality (and unmusicality) were not in itself a property of man,
there would be a coming-to-be of the one and passingaway of the other ; therefore, these are qualities of
a man, but the coming-to-be and the passing-away
of a musical man and of an unmusical man ; but,
in fact, musicality (and unmusicality) arc a quality
of the persistent identity. Consequently such changes
are alteration.
W hen, therefore, the change from one contrary
to another is quantitative, it is growth and diminu
tion ; when it is a change of place, it is motion ;
when it is a change of property (or quality), it is
alteration ; but when nothing persists of which
the resulting state is a property or an accident of any
kind, it is a case of coming-to-be, and the contrary
change is passing-away. Matter, in the chief and
strictest sense of the word, is the substratum which
admits of coming-to-be and passing-away ; but the
substratum of the other kind of change is also in
a sense matter, because all the substrata admit of
203
ARISTOTLE
0a
T iw o ew v n v w v .
eire
fiff,
Kal
nre p i f i e v o v v y e v e o e c o s , 1 e i r e e o n v
nw s
eon ,
Kal
nepl
a X X o iw o e w s
81-
(JOploOcO T O V T O V TO V TpOTTOV.
5 . H e pi 8 avfjoews Xomov elneiv, r i re 8 ia <f>epei yeveoecos Kal aXXoiwoews, Kal ncos avaverai
10 tcov avtjavofievwv eKaarov Kal <f)9tvei on ovv tw v

cfrOivoi'rwv.
oKenreov 8rj npwrov norepov fiovws
ev tco nepl o e o n v avrwv ff npos aXXrfXa 8ia</)opd,

olov o n fj fiev eK rovSe els to 8 e fierafioXff, olov eK
Svvafiei ovoias els evreXexela ovoiav, yeveois e o n v ,
ff Se nepl fieyeOos avtjrfois, ff Se nepl naOos aX15 Aoiwois* afi<f)6repa 8 c eK Svvafiei ovrwv els evreXexeiav fierafioXrf rwv elprjfievwv eoriv, fj Kal o
rponos 8ia<f>epei rfjs fierafioXfjs * <f>aiverai yap t o
fiev aAAoiovfievov ovk e avayKTfs fieraftaXXov Kara
ronov, ovSe ro yivofievov,
20
to
to
8 avijavofievov Kal
(f)0ivov, aAAov Se rponov rov <f>epofievov.
t o fiev
yap c/yepofievov oXov dXXarrei ronov, ro S' avavofievov wonep ro eXavvofievov rovrov yap fievovros ra fiopia fierafiaXXei Kara ronov, ov\ wonep
rd rfjs ocf>alpas* Ta fiev yap ev rw low ronw fierafidXXei rov oXov fievovros, rd Se rov av(;avofie25 vov del enl nXeiw ronov, en' eXarrw Se ra rov
<f>0ivovros
1 Kat (f>Qopas post yV0ws ad<l. Bekker.
204

certain kinds of contrariety. L et this, then, be our
decision on the question about coming-to-be, whether
it exists or not, and how it exists, and about altera
tion.
5.
It remains, therefore, for us to deal with The nature
growth and to discuss (a) how it differs from com- of srowthing-to-be and from alteration, and (b) how
growth takes place in each thing that grows and
how diminution occurs in each thing that dimin
ishes. First we must consider whether the difference
between them lies only in the sphere of each. For
example, is it because the change from one thing
to another (for instance, from potential to actual
substance) is coming-to be, while the change in re
spect of magnitude is growth ; and the change
in respect of property is alteration, and both the
last two involve a change from what is-actually to
what is-potentially ? Or does the difference also lie
in the manner o f the change ? For it is manifest that,
whereas neither that which is altering nor that which
is coming-to-be necessarily changes in respect of
position, that which is growing and that which is
diminishing do change in this respect but in a manner
different from that in which that which is moving
changes. For that which is moving changes its place Growth is
as a whole, but that which is growing changes its respect of
position like a metal which is being beaten o u t ; for, size,
while it retains its place, its parts undergo local
change, but not in the same manner as the parts of
a revolving globe. For the latter change their places
while the whole remains in an equal space, whereas the
parts of that which is growing change so as to occupy
an ever larger space, and the parts of that which is
diminishing contract into an ever smaller space.
205
ARISTOTLE
320 a
* 0 rt juev oSv fj fieraftoXrf Sta<j>epi ov fiovov nepl
o aAAa /cat ws
tov
re yivofievov /cat aXXotovfievov
/cat avavofievov, St}Aov.
nepl Se o io t w ff fiera -
fioArj ff rfjs avtjfjoews /cat ff
t fjs
<f>Oioews (nepl
fieyeOos Se So/cet etvat to avaveoOai /cat <f>0iveiv),

30 norepws
vnoXrjnreov,
norepov
e/c
Svvafiei
fiev
fieyeOovs /cat owfiaros, evTeAeêta S aowfiarov

/cat dfieyeOovs yiveoOai owfia
tovtov
8 lx<*>s
av^rfOLs yivera i;
evhexofievov
/cat fieyeOos, teal
Xeyeiv,
norepcos
ff
norepov e/c Kexcopiofievrjs avrrjs
KaOy avrrjv rrjs vXrjs, fj evvnapxovorfs ev aXXw

320 b ocbfiari;
fj aSvvarov dfi<f>orepws;
x a)PL(TTV
fl * v
yap ovoa fj ov Seva KaOetjei ronov, [fj] otov on yfifj

ris, ff /cevov eorai fj owfia ovk atoOrjrov.
rovrcov
Se to fiev ovk evSeêTat, ro Se avayKaiov ev rw i

etvai aet yap nov eorai to ywofievov ef; avrov,
5 wore /ca/cetvo, fj Ka0y avro fj Kara ovfifSefirjKOS.
aAAa firjv et y* ev n v i vnapêi, el fiev Kex<jopiofievov
ovrcos coore firf eKelvov KaOy avro fj Kara ovfipeftrfKos rt etvai, ovfififjoerat noXXa Kal aSvvara.
Aeyaj Sy otov el yiverai arfp et; vSaros, ov rod
vSaros eorai fierafidXAovros, aAAa Sta to wonep
io ev
ayyeicp
rw
vSan
evetvai
rrfv
vXrjv
a vrov.
dneipovs yap oi5Sev KwXvei vXas etvai, w ore Kal

yiveoOai evreAeêta.
en
oi)8* ovrw
<f>aiverai
i.e. either as itself occupying a place, or contained in

something else.
206

It is clear, then, that the changes both of that
which comes-to-be and of that which alters and
of that which grows, differ not only in sphere but
also in manner. But how are we to conceive the
sphere of the change which is growth and diminu
tion ? Growth and diminution are generally re
garded as taking place in the sphere of magnitude.
Are we, then, to suppose that body and magnitude
come-to-be out of what is potentially body and magni
tude but is actually incorporeal and without magni
tude ? And since this can be meant in two different
senses, in which of these senses does growth take
place ? Does it come from matter which exists
separately by itself or matter previously existing in
another body ? Or is it impossible for growth to take
place under either of these conditions ? For, since
the matter is separate, either it will take up no space,
like a point, or else it will be void or, in other words,
an imperceptible body.
O f these alterations the
first is impossible, and in the second the matter must
be in something. For, in the first case, what comesto-be from it will always be somewhere, so that the
matter too must exist somewhere, either directly or
indirectly a ; in the second case, supposing it is to
be in something else, if it is so separated as not to
belong to that something, either directly or indirectly,
many impossibilities will arise. For example, if Air
comes-to-be from W ater, it will not be due to any
change in the W ater but owing to the presence of
the matter of the Air in the W ater, as in a vessel.
For there is nothing to prevent there being an
infinite number of matters contained in the W ater,
so that they might actually c o m e - t o - b e ; and,
furthermore, the Air cannot be seen coming-to-be
207
ARISTOTLE
320 b
yvvofievos arjp i
vSaros, otov
et;iwv vnofievov-
TQS
B eAnov tolvvv noieiv naoiv axwpvorov rrjv vArjv
ws ovoav rrjv avrrjv Kal filav rw apvOfiw, rw Aoycp
15 Se firj fiiav.
aAAa firjv ovSe o n y jia s Oereov ovSe
ypafifias rrjv rov

air las*
owfiaros vArjv Sta ras avras
eKevvo Se oS ravra eoxara, fj vArj, rjv
ovSenor9 avev naOovs otov re etvai ovS9 avev fioptfyfjs.

yiverai fiev ovv anAws erepov e erepov, wonep
Kal ev aAAois Svwpvorav, Kal vno n v o s Sc evreAexela
20 ovros fj ofiovoevSovs fj ofioyevovs, otov nvp vno

nvpos fj avOpwnos vn avOpwnov, fj i n
evreAexelas'
OKArjp6v yap ovx *>n6 OKArjpov yiverai.
enel 8
eorl Kal ovoias vArj owfiarvKrjs, owfiaros S9 rjSrj

roiovSl (owfia yap kovvov ovSev), fj avrrj Kal fie
yeOovs Kal naOovs eorl, rw fiev Aoyw xwpvorff,
25 ron w S ov x ^ P ^ r fj, el firf Kal rd naOrj x^pvora.
<t>avepov Srj eK rw v Svrjnoprjfievwv o n ovk e o n v
fj avrjois fierafSoArj eK Svvafiei fieyeOovs, evreAeXela Se firfSev exovros fieyeOos* x wPLCrr v Y^P
evrf rd Kevov, rovro 8 o n
erepois nporepov.
aSvvarov, elprjrai ev
e n S fj ye roiavrrj fierafloArj
30 ovk avijffoews vSios aAAa yeveoew s* fj yap avrjols

eon
rov
ew napxovros fieyeOovs
enlSoois, ff Se
(8to Srj exLV Tt
fieyeOos t o
<f>0lois fielwois
a See Met. 1032 a 12 ff.

6 Or 44 form ; see Met. I.e. 25 ff.
c In 320 a 27-b 12.
d Phys. iv. 6-9.
208
in this manner out of Water, namely, issuing forth

while the Water is left as it was.
It is better, therefore, to suppose that the matter
in anything is inseparable, being the same and
numerically one, though not one by definition.
Further, for the same reasons also, we ought not to
regard the matter of the body as points or lines ;
matter is that which has points and lines as its limits
and cannot possibly ever exist without qualities and
without form. Now one thing comes-to-be, in the
unqualified sense, out of another, as has been deter
mined elsewhere and by the agency of something
which is actually either of the same species or of
the same genusfor example, Fire comes-to-be
through the agency of Fire and Man through that
of Manor through an actuality b (for that which
is hard does not come-to-be through that which is
hard). But since there is also a matter out of which
corporeal substance comes-to-bc, but already be
longing to a body of such-and-such a kind (for there
is no such being as body in general), this same matter
is also the matter of magnitude and quality, being
separable by definition but not in place, unless the
properties are also separable.
Now it is clear from the difficulties which we have
discussed, that growth is not a change from a
potential magnitude which actually has no magni
tude ; for then, the void would be separable, and
that is impossible, as has already been stated elsewhere.d Moreover, such a change is not peculiar
to growth but characteristic of coming-to-be ; for
growth is an increase, just as diminution is a reduc
tion, of the already existing magnitude (hence that
which grows must already possess a certain magni-
ARISTOTLE
320 b
avavofievov),
w o t
afieyiOovs vArjs Set eTvat
ovk
rrjv avrfoiv els evreAeêtav fieyeOovs yeveois yap

av eirf owfiaros fiaAAov, o v k av^rfois. Arfnreov Srf
321 a fiaAAov otov amofievovs rrjs rjrfjoews e dpxffS,
noiov rivos ovros rov avaveoOat ff rov <f>0lveiv rd

aina tflrovfiev.
OatVerat Srf rov avijavofievov o n ovv fiepos rfifjoOai, ofioiws he Kal ev tw <f>6iveiv eAarrov y e
yovevai, e n Se npooiovros rivos ai>aveoOai Kal
5 dm ovros <f>0iveiv.
avayKaiov Srf ff aowfiarw av-
aveoOai fj o w fia n .
Xwpiorov rd
el fiev ofiv aowfiarw, eorai
Kevov
etvai xwpiorffv,
aSvvarov
wonep
Sc fieyeOovs vArjv
etpryrai nporepov
el Se
o w fia n , 8 vo ev rw avrw owfiara ron w eorai, ro

re
10
avofievov Kal ro
a3ov
eon
Se Kal rovro
aAAa firfv ov S ov tw s evSex^rai Aeyeiv
aSvvarov.
yiveoOai rrfv avrfoiv /cat rrjv <f>0ioiv, wonep orav

e vSaros affp' rore yap fiei^wv o oyKos y e y o v e v
ov yap av^rfois rovro aAAa yeveois fiev rov els o
fiereftaAev eorai, <j>0opd Se r o v evavriov avijrjois
Se ovSerepov, aAA ff ovSevos ff ct rt koivov dfi<j>oiv
15 vnapxî, rw yivofievw Kal rw (f>8apevri, otov el

a
owfia .
to
ro o vowp
fiev anoAwAe
rfvrfrai.
to
aAAa /cat
ovk
Sc yeyovev
to u t
a In 320 a 27 ff.
210
*/>
c >/
\\
rfvgrfrat ot>o o a rfp, aAAa

to
owfia Se, einep,
aSvvarov.
Set yap ow -
b i.e. steam.
tude), so that growth must not be from matter

without magnitude to an actuality of magnitude ;
for that would be rather a coming-to-be of a body
and not a growth. We must, therefore, lay hold
more closely and, as it were, get to grips with our
inquiry from the beginning as to the nature of growth
and diminution, the causes of which we are seeking.
It appears that every part of that which grows What is
has increased, and likewise in diminution every part growth^60
has become smaller, and, further, that growth occurs takes place?
when something is added and diminution when
something departs. Growth, then, must be due to
the addition of something incorporeal or of a body.
If it is due to something incorporeal, there will be
a void existing separately ; but, as has been stated
before, it is impossible for matter of magnitude to
exist separately ; whereas, if it grows by the addition
of a body, there will be two bodies in the same place,
one which grows and the other which causes the
growth, and this also is impossible. But neither is
it admissible for us to say that growth or diminution
occurs in the manner in which it occurs when air b
is produced from water. For then, the volume has
become greater ; for it will not be a case of growth
but of a coming-to-be of that into which the change
has taken place, and a passing-away of its contrary.
It is a growth of neither, but either of nothing or
of something (for example, body ) which belongs
in common both to that which is coming-to-be and
to that which has passed-away. The water has not
grown nor has the air, but the former has perished
and the latter has come-to-be ; and the body, if
anything, has grown. But this is also impossible ;
for in our account we must preserve the character21 1
ARISTOTLE
321 a
t,eiv rw Xoyw rd vrrdpxovra rw avavofievw Kal

<f>0ivoi>n.
ravra
Se rpia eorlv, wv ev fiev e o n ro
20 o n ovv fiepos fietôv ylyveoOat rov avâvofievov
fieyeOovs, otov el oap rrjs oapKos Kal t t pooiovros

rivos, Kal rplrov ocoôfievov rov avtjavofievov Kal
vrrofievovros' ev fiev yap rw yiveoOai ri arrXws
ff <j>0elpeo0ai ovx vrrofievei, ev Se rw aXXoiovoOai
ff av^dveoOai ff <j>0lvetv vrrofievet ro avro ro a v-
25 ijavofievov fj aXXoiovfievov aAA* evOa fiev ro rrdOos

evOa Se to fieyeOos ro avro ov fievei. el Srj eorai
ff elprjfievrj avijrjois, evSexoir av firfSevos y e
tt
p
o o
iovros firjSe vrrofievovros avaveoOat Kal firfSevos

dm ovros (f>0Iveiv Kal fiff vrrofieveiv ro avavofievov.
30
aAAa Set rovro oweiv' vrroKetrat yap ff av^rjots

rotovrov.
*Arropfjoete S av n s Kal r i e o n to av{;av6fievov, rrorepov w t t p
o or 10era I ri, otov el rrjv Kvfjfirjv
avavei, avrrj fiei^wv, <5 Se avijavet, ff rpotfyfj, ov.
Sta Tt Srf ovv ovk afi<f>w rjv^rfra t;
fietov yap Kal
o Kal <5, worrep orav fiitjrfs otvov vSarr ofioiws

yap rrXeiov eKarepov. fj o n rov fiev fievei ff ovoia,
35 rov S ov, olov rrjs rpo<f>fjs, e7ret Kal evravOa to
321 b errikpar ovv Xeyerai ev rfj fiiêi, olov o n otvos
rroiei yap ro rov otvov epyov aAA* ov ro rod vSaros
rd ovvoXov fiiyfia. ofiolws Se Kal err' aXXoiwoews,
el fievei oapl\ ofioa Kal ro r i e o n , rraOos Se n
0 i.e. the generation of air from water.

i.e. the persistence of that which grows.
e In line 22 above.
d With AcyeTCu understand nXetov.
212

isties whieh belong to what is growing and diminish
ing. These characteristics are three : (a) that every
part of the growing magnitude is greater (for example,
if flesh grows, every part of it grows) ; (6) that it
grows by the accession of something ; and (c) that
it grows beeause that which grows is preserved and
persists. For while a thing does not persist in un
qualified eoming-to-be or passing-away, in alteration
and growth or diminution that which grows or alters
persists in its identity, but, in the ease of alteration
the quality, and, in the case of growth, the magnitude
does not remain the same. Now if the change men
tioned above a is to be growth, it would be possible
for something to grow without anything being added
to it or persisting and to diminish without anything
going away, and for that whieh grows not to persist.
But this quality b must be preserved; for it has been
assumed c that growth has this characteristic.
One might also raise this difficulty : W hat is it What is it
whieh grows ? Is it that to whieh something is
grows
added ? For example, if a man grows in his leg, is
it his leg which is greater, while that which makes
him grow, namely, his food, is not greater ? W hy
have not both grown ? For both that which is added
and that to which the addition was made are greater,
just as when you mix wine with water ; for each
ingredient is similarly increased. Or is it beeause
the substancc of the leg remains unchanged, but that
of the other (i.e. the food) does not ? For in the
mixture of the wine and water it is the prevailing
ingredient which is said to inerease,** namely the
wine ; for the mixture as a whole performs the
function o f wine and not of wrater. Similarly, too,
in the proeess o f " alteration, flesh is altered, if
213
ARISTOTLE
321 b
vn apxei
rw v
5 fjX X o iw r a i
rren ovd ev,
ff
a p x ff
K ad'
Se
ore
T r js
elo eX O d v
to
10 r r v e v f i a .
av
o w fia ,
aAA*
KIVOVV OVK i v
ev
t o v t o is
y e v o ir
a vrov
n p orep ov
o i> x
fjX X o iw r a i,
aAAa
K a K e lv o .
K iv ffo e w s
a X X o io v fie v w 0 e v
X avoav
avro,
r o v r o <5 S
rcb
yap
ore
to
to
k iv o v v ,
fie i^ o v ,
o lo v
el
K al
K al
rcb
errel
K al
K al r o
elo e X d o v
rovro
ovS ev
a X X o io v v
a v ^ a v o fie v c p
rrore
e c f> 6 a p r a l y e
v r r fjp x e v ,
fiev
a rro-
y ev o iro
rrad ov,
K al
ro
TOVTW .
'E n el Sc Sirjnoprjrai rrepl avrwv iKavws, Sei Kal

rfjs drropias rreipaoOai Xvoiv evpeiv, ocblpvras ro
vrrofievovros re rov avavofievov Kal rrpooiovros
tivos avaveoOai, am ovros Se cf>0Iveiv, e n
Se t o
oriovv orffieiov alodrjrov ff fieitpv fj eXarrov y e y o 15 vevai, Kal firjre Kevov elvai ro owfia firjre Suo ev
rep avrw rorrw fieyedrj firjre aowfiarw avaveo 8a i.
Xrfrrreov Se t o a in ov hiopioafievois rrpwrov ev fiev
on
Ta avofioiofieprj avijaverai rw rd ofioiofiepfj
avijaveodai
20
(ovyKeirai yap
eK rovrw v
eKaorov),
errei0y o n oap Kal oorovv Kal eKaorov rw v roiovrw v fiopiwv eorl S lttov, wonep Kal tw v aXXwv rw v
ev vXrj etSos ex o v rw v Kal yap fj vXrj Xeyerai Kal
rd
etSos oaptj fj oorovv.
ro
ofiv otlovv fiepos
avijaveoOai Kal rrpooiovros rivos Kara fiev ro etSos

e o n v evSexofievov, Kara Se rrjv vXrjv ovk e o n v .
i.e. the organic parts.
214
b i.e. the tissue.

it remains flesh and its substance remains the same,
but some inherent quality now belongs to it which
did not belong before ; but that by which it has been
altered sometimes has not been affected but some
times has also been affected. But that which causes
alteration and the source of movement reside in that
which grows and in that which is altered (for the
motive agent is within them) ; for that which has
entered might sometimes become greater as well as
the body which benefits by it (for example, if, after
entering in, it were to become wind), but after having
undergone this process, it has passed-away and the
motive agent is not in it.
Now that the difficulties have been adequately Conclusions
discussed, we must try to find a solution of the
problem. In doing so we must maintain the doctrine
that growth occurs, when that which grows persists
and grows by the accession of something (and
diminishes by the departure of something), and that
every perceptible particle has become greater (or
less), and that the body is not void, and that there
are not two magnitudes in the same place, and that
growth does not take place by the addition of anything
incorporeal. W e must grasp the cause of growth
by making the distinctions (i) that the parts which
are not uniform a grow by the growth of the parts
which are uniform b for each part is composed of
these and (ii) that flesh and bone and every such
part, like all other things which have their form in
matter, are of a double nature ; for the form as well
as the matter is called flesh or bone. It is quite
possible, then, that any part can grow in respect of
form by the addition.of something, but not in respect
of matter ; for we must regard the process as like that
215
ARISTOTLE
321 b
Set yap
voffoat wonep et r t ? fierpoiq rw
avrqt
25 fierpw {ISwp* a et yap aAAo /cat aAAo t o yevofievov.
o v tw
avtjaverai ff vXrf rfjs oapKos, /ca t ovx
otw ovv rravrl rrpooylverai, aAAa r o
fiev vrreKpet
t o Se rrpooepxerai, to v Se oxfffiaros /cat t o v etS ov ?
otw ovv fioplw.
em
Se t<3v avofiotofiepwv to v to
fiaXXov SrjXov, olov ^ e tp o s , OTt a v a A o y o v rfvj-rfrar
30
yap
vAt? erepa oSoa SfjXr] fiaXXov rov
evravda fj em
oapKos /cat tw v
etSovs
ofioiofiepwv Sto
/cat redvewros fiaXXov av Soêtev etvat e n

/ca t o o r o w
ws
^ x e'LP Ka'L jS p a ^ tW .
oap
dxFTe e o n
on o vv rrjs oapKos rjvgrjTat, e o n
fiev
w s ov.
Kara fiev yap t o etSos otw ovv rrpooeXfjXvdev, Kara

35 Se rrjv vXrfv ov.
322 a r r p o o e X d o v r o s
fietôv fievrot t o
fiev
tlvo s,
oA ov yeyove
K a X etr a t
evavrtov, fierafidXXovros Se els
to
Tpo<f>ff
Kal
avro etSos, otov
el rfpw rrpootot vypov, rrpooeXdov Se fierafidXot

Kal
yevono ijrfpov eon fiev yap ws
ofioiw avâverat, eon S9 ws
to
to
ofiotov
avofiotov1 avo-
fioiw.
9A r r o p f f o e t e S
a v ^ a v era t.
el
oap,
av
<f>avepov
S v v d fi e t
n s
r r o to v
Srf
on
oapK a.
(y ev eo ts y a p
1 to
216
e tv a t
to
S v v d fi e t
e/cetvo,
ei/reAeêta
apa
<j>6apev Srf t o v t o o a p i ; y e y o v e v .
KaO* a v r o
Set
ovkovv
ovk
a v ff v , o v k a v ^ r f o t s ) '
avofioiov a d d id i.
<L
o lo v
aAAo*
avro
aAAa
COMING-TO-BE A N D PASSIN G-AW AY, I. 5

which happens when a man measures water with
the same measure, for there is first one portion and
then another in constant succession. It is in this w'ay
that the matter of the flesh grows ; something flows
out and something flows in, but there is not an addi
tion made to every particle of it, but to every part
of its figure and form. That the growth has taken
place proportionally is more obvious in the parts
which are not uniform, for instance, in the hand ;
for there the matter, being distinct from the form,
is more noticeable than in the flesh and the parts
which are uniform ; for this reason one is more likely
to think of a corpse as still possessing flesh and bone
than that it has a hand and an arm. Therefore, in
one sense it is true that every part of the flesh has
grown, but in another sense it is untrue ; for in
respect to its form there has been an accession to
every part, but not in respect to its matter ; the
whole, however, has become greater (a) by the acces
sion of something which is called food, the 44 con
trary o f flesh, and (6) by the change of this food
into the same form as that of the flesh, just as if moist
were to be added to dry, and, after having been
added, wrere to change and become dry ; for, it is
possible that 44 like growls by like and also that
44 unlike grows by unlike.
One might raise the question what must be the
nature of that by which a thing growrs. It is clear
that it must be potentially that which is growing, for
example, potentially flesh, if it is flesh which is
growing ; actually, then, it is something different.
This, therefore, has passed-away and come-to-be
flesh not alone by itself (for that would have been
a coming-to-be and not growth) ; but it is that winch
217
ARISTOTLE
322 a
avtjavo/ievov r o v t c o .
to
[ rjvÔrf]1;
tl
o v v t t aOov v t t o t o v t o v
f\ fiixdev, wonep olvcp ct t i s
10 vSwp, o Sc Svvairo otvov noieiv t o
cm^cot
fiiydev;
Kal
(jOOTTCp TO TTVp dlffdfievov TOV KOVOTOV, OVTWS V

t w avijavo fievw K al o v ti eWcAc^cta o ap K i t o evov
avijrjTiKov npooeX d o v to s S vvafiei o ap K o s enoirfoev
cWcAc^cta o a p K a .
y e v e o is .
ovkovv a f i a ovto s* ct y a p x*pfe>
g o ti fiev y a p o v tw ttv p n o ir jo a i e m t o
t5 VTrapxov em O ev ra v \a .
aAA o v tw fiev a v ^ rfo is ,
o r a v 8 c a v T a Ta vXa acfrdrj, y e v e o is .
I lo a o v
8c
to
fiev KadoXov ov y iv e r a i, w o n e p
ovSe wov o f if jr a v d p w n o s firjre rw v K ad e K a o r a

aAA
ws
e v ra v d a
to
KadoXov, /ca/cct t o
nooov.
o ap i; 8 c fj o o ro v v ff x e lp K al r o v r w v r a ofio io fiep rj,
20 n poo eX d o v ro s
7ro o fjs.
fiev Srj riv o s tto o o v , aAA ov o ap K o s
fj fiev oSv S vvafiei r o o vvafufrorepov, otov
TTooff o a p tj, r a v r r f fiev a v e c K al y a p n o o rjv Set

yeveodai
K al a a p /ca * fj Se fiovov o a p lj, rpe<j)ei
r a v r r f y a p 8ia<f>epei rpo(j>rf K al av rjo is rep Xoy(p.

8 to
rpe<f>erai fiev e w s a v
25 a v i- a v e ra i Se o v k a c t .
av ro
fiev, t o
o w ty fr a i
K al (f>divov,*
/cat ff rpo(/)ff r f j a v ^ffo e i t o
e tv a i aAAo* fj fiev y a p
e o ri
1 rjv(yOr) seclusit Joachim.
<f>0lvov J j: <f>0Cvi F
<f>0tvr] H.
0 And not a growth of already existent tissue.

218
to

grows which now comes-to-be flesh owing to the food.
How has the food been affected by the growing
thing ? Is it by admixture, as if one were to pour
water into wine, and the latter were able to convert
the mixture into wine ? And like fire when it takes
hold of inflammable material, so the principle of
growth present in that which grows (i.e. in what is
actually flesh) lays hold of the added food which is
potentially flesh, and turns it into actual flesh. The
added food must, therefore, be together with that
which grows ; for, if it is separate, it would be a case
o f coming-to-be.0 For it is possible to produce fire
by placing logs on the fire which is already in exist
ence ; in this case there is growth, but, when the
logs themselves are set on fire, there is a comingto-be of fire.
Quantum-in-general does not come-to-be, just
as anim al/* which is neither man nor any other
particular animal, does not come-to-be ; but what
animal-in-general is in coming-to-be, that quantum-in-general is in growth. But what comes-to-be
in growth is flesh or bone or hand and the uniform
parts of these, by the accession of such-and-such a
quantity of something, but not of such-and-such a
quantity of flesh. In so far, then, as the combination
o f the two, e.g., so much flesh, is a potentiality, it
produces growth ; for both quantity and flesh must
come-to-be, but in so far as it is potentially flesh only,
it nourishes ; for it is here that nutrition and growth
differ in their definition.
Therefore the body is
nourished as long as it is kept alive, even when it is
diminishing, but it is not always grow ing; and
nutrition, though it is the same as growth, is different
in its being ; for, in so far as that which is added is
219
ARISTOTLE
322 a
n p o o io v
b v v d fie i
oapK os,
fj
T ovto 8e to
tvs
ev
v X rj
30 h v v a f i e i
e o o v ra i
%r o o r j
S e jx o v o v
eav
a v X o s ,2 e ^ o i / a a
fie l^ o v s
S e'
ttooov
eav
a v X o i .2
Se
v X rj,
o v o a
S u v a /x e t, o S r o i
jirjK e n
n o ie iv
d e l 7 rA e to v j i i y v v j i e v o v
v S c o p o iv c p
/cat
vhcop,
fie v e i.
n o ie i
n p o o L rj
t is
/cat t o
T O V TTO OO V, T O S e l h o S
v h a p fj
/x ev a v ^ r j r i K o v
a a p , rp o c / y ij.
e t S o ? [ a v e v tJ A ^ s * ],1 o l o v a v X o s , 2 B v v a f i l s
e o rlv .
S v v r j r a i , aA A 9 o fo v
tc A o s *
e ra p , r a v r r j
h v v d jie i
t o t
< f> 6 L o iv
n o ie ira i
6. E ^ e t Se trpcorov Set 7rept r^s* vXrjs /cat t<Sv

KaXov fiev cov oT oixeicov eln elv , e ir e o r iv etTe firj,
/cat n o re p o v aiSiov eK a orov i) y iv e r a i n cos, /cat
et y iv e r a i, n o r e p o v e aXXrjXcov y iv e r a i rrdvra r o v
5 avrov r p o n o v rj r i npcorov ev a v rw v e o r lv , avayKrj
hrj n p o rep o v ein eiv n ep l c5v a h ioplorcos X ey era i
vvv. n a v r e s y a p ot T Ta OTOtêta y e w w v r e s Kal
o l r d e/c rcbv o r o ix elc o v Sta/cptaet xpaivrat /cat
o v yK p loei /cat to ) 7rotetv /cat n a o x e iv .
eart 8*
^ o v y K p io is [ili;is ttcos Se jily w o O a i X eyojiev,
o v hicbpiorai oa<j>cbs. aAAa firjv o v S aAAotovaflat
10 SuvaTov, o*58e Sta/cptveaflat Kal ov yK p lv eod a i, firjhevos ttoiovvtos tirjhe n a o x o v r o s * /cat y ap ot nXeico
r d o r o ix ^ ia n o io v v r e s y e w c b o i rep n o ieiv Kal
322 b
n a o x e iv
f > a>A\A\r n
jA c o v ,
v tt
'
/cat
ro ts *
eg
c<
evo?
a v ay K rj
1 avev vXrjs seclusit Joachim.

2 avXos . . . avXos . . . avAot Joacliim : avXos . . . avXos . .
avXoi codd : tibia . . . tibia . . . tibiae vertit Vatablus.
In
ff.
6 i.e. the Pluralist*, like Anaxagoras, Democritus and

Plato, who regard Earth, Air, Fire and Water as composed
of some prior constituents.
c i.e. other Pluralists, like Empedocles, who regard them
as actual elements.
220
COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 5-6

potentially so much flesh, it is productive of the
growth of flesh, but, in so far as it is only potentially
flesh, it is nutriment.
This form of which we spoke is a kind of power
present in matter, as it were a channel. If, therefore,
matter is added which is potentially a channel and
also potentially possesses such-and-such a quantity,
these channels will become bigger.
But if the
form is no longer able to function, but, as water
mixed with wine in ever-increasing quantities eventu
ally makes the wine waterish and converts it into
water, it will cause a diminution of the quantity,
though the form still persists.
6.
W e must first deal with the matter and the Chs. 6- 10.
so-called elements and determine whether they come^Me
exist or not, and whether each is eternal, or whether *
f
there is a sense in which they come-to-be, and, if so, constituents
whether they all come-to-be in the same manner coiMuUion
out of one another, or whether one among them is Combinasomething primary. W e must, therefore, first deal
with matters about which people at present speak
only vaguely. For all those who generate the ele- involve
ments b and those who generate the bodies composed contort-M
of the elements, apply the terms dissociation
and association and
action and passion.
Now association is a process of mixing ; but
what we mean by mixing has not yet been clearly
defined.
But there cannot be alteration any
more than there can be dissociation and associa
tion without an agent and a patient. For
those who suppose the elements to be several in
number ascribe the generation of composite bodies
to the reciprocal action and passion of these
elements, whereas those who derive them from a
221
ARISTOTLE
322 b
X ey eiv
r r jv
n o ir jo iv ,
Kal
15 n o i e i v K a l t o n a o y e i v v n
ifjv X to O a i
to u t*
opO w s
Kal
to v to
a v fjv t o
d X A rfX w v, o t o v t o
B tp fia iv to O a i
Ato-
X eyei
e l firj c e v o s fjv d n a v r a , o v k
y e v r js , o t i
n a \ iv
O e p fio v
ov
ya p
fj O tp fio r r js f i t r a jSaAAct K a l rj t /jv x p o r r js t l s a X X rjX a,
aAAa
S rjX ov
o ti
to
v n o K eifiev o v .
n o ieiv
to ri
Kal
to
n a o x eiv ,
elv a i
ttjv
v n o K e i f i e v r jv
20 e l v a i T o i a v r a
<j)voiv.
<f>aoKeiv o v k
w ore
avayK rj
to
ev
o ts
to v tc o v
fie v
aA rjO es, a X X
oSv
ev
to
fiia v
navr
o o o is
v n * aXXrjXcov e o r i v .
to
AAAa firjv el nepl
tov
noieiv Kal naoxeiv Kal
nepl fiiêcos Oewprjreov, avayKrj Kal nepl acfrrjs*

ovre yap noieiv Tavra Kal naoxeiv Svvarai Kvpicos
a fifj olov re aiftaoOai aXXfjXwv, ovre firj di/jdfieva
25 ncos evhex^rai fiixOrjvai npcbrov.
wore nepl rpicbv
rovrwv Siopioreov, ri a<j>rj Kal ri flints Kal ri

noirjois.
*Apxfjv he Aaj8wfiev rfjvhe.
avayKrj yap rwv
ovrwv ooois eorl fii&s, etvai ravr aXXfjXwv anriKa *

Kav ei t i noiei, t o S c naoxî Kvpiws, Kal t o v t o i s
woavrws. Sto npwrov XeKreov nepl a<f>fjs. aêSov
30 fiev ovv, wonep Kal rwv aXXwv ovofiarwv eKaorov
Xeyerai noXXaxws, Kal rd fiev ofiwvvfiws rd Sc
Oarepa ano t w v erepwv Kal rwv nporepwv, ovrws
exti Kal nepl a<f>fjs. ofiws Sc t o Kvpiws Xeyofievov
t o is
t\ovoi Oeoiv. Oeois S olonep K a l
323 a vnapxî
a Fr. 2 (Diels).
222

single element must necessarily hold that there is
action ; and Diogenes is right in saying that
there could not be reciprocal action and passion,
unless all things were derived from one. For example,
what is hot would not become cold, and the cold
become hot again ; for it is not heat and cold which
change into one another, but it is obviously the
substratum which changes; so that, where action
and passion exist, their underlying nature must be
one. It is not, however, true to say that all things
are of this kind ; but it is true of all things between
which there is reciprocal action and passion.
But if we must go into the question of 44 action What is
and passion and of commingling, we must also contacfc
investigate Mcontact. For action and passion ought
properly to be possible only for such things as can
touch one another; nor can things be mixed with
one another in the first instance without coming in
some kind of contact. Hence we must decide about
these three things, namely, what is contact, what
is 44 mixture, and what is action.
Let us take this as our starting-point. All existing
things which can undergo mixture must be able to
come into contact with one another, and this must
also be true of any pair of things, one of which acts
and the other is acted upon in the proper sense of
the word. Therefore we must first speak about
44 contact. Practically speaking, just as every other
term which is used in several senses is so used owing
to verbal coincidence or because the different senses
are derived from different prior meanings, so it is
also with 14 contact. Nevertheless, 44 contact in
its proper sense belongs only to things which have
44 position, and 44 position belongs to those things
223
ARISTOTLE
3a
T07T0S* K al y a p
fia O rjfia riK ois o f io i w s a n o S o -
tols
r e o v d<f>rjv K al r o n o v , e i r 9 e o r l K e x o ip to fie v o v
o r o v a v r w v e i r 9 aAAo v
Siw ploO rj
n p orep ov,
tp o n o v .
an reoO ai
to
5 ex ^ tv a f i a , T a v r a a v a n r o i r o
e/ca-
el ovv e o n v , w on ep
to
ccrâra
Ta
aXXrjXwv o o a S iw p i-
o f ie v a fieyeO rj K al O eoiv e x o v r a a f i a
ra lo ^ a r a .
e n e l Se Oe'ois fie v o o o i s K al r o n o s v n a p x ^ v , r o n o v
Se Sia<j>opd n p w r r j r o a v w K al K ara ) K al r a r o i a v r a
rw v
a v T iK eifiev w v , a n a v r a
ra aXXrjXwv a n r o f i e v a
fia p o s a v e x i V K o v fy o rrjr a , rj dfi<f>w rj d a r e p o v .

10 r d Se r o i a v r a naOrjriKa Kal n o ir jr iK a * w o r e </>avepov
o tl ra vra
a n r e o O a i ne<j)VKev aXXrjXwv, w v Sirjprj-
fie v w v fie y e O w v a fia r a eaâra e o n v , o v r w v Kivrjt l k w v Kal K ivrjrw v v n 9 aXXrjXwv.
e n e l Se r o k iv o v v
o v x o fio lw s Kivei t o K ivo vfie vo v, aAAa r d fie v avayK rj

K ivo vfievo v Kal a v r o k iv e iv , t o
15
Ao v o n K al e n l
K al y a p
k iv e iv .
ov
yap
rd
o v firjv
o lo v
re
n o io v v r o s
tov
kivo vv
8* aK ivrjrov o v , Srj-
e p o v fie v w o a v r w s *
n o ie i v r i <f>aoi K al r d
aAAa Sia<f>epei y e K al Set 8 loptêiv

nav
rd
kivo vv
n o ie i v ,
e in e p
n o io v v d v n O fjo o fie v r w
n d oxovn , rovro
K ivrjois
Se KaO 9 o o o v
n aO os,
naO os
a P/tys. 226 b 21-23.

224
n o io v v
to
8* ofs* fj
a X X o io v ra i
COMING-TO-BE AN D P A SSIN G -A W A Y , I. 6
which have also a place ; for place, just as much
as contact, must be attributed to mathematical
objects, whether each exists in separation or in some
other manner. If, therefore, as has been defined in
a previous work, for things to be in contact they
must have their extremities together, only those
things would be in contact with one another, which,
possessing definite magnitudes and a definite posi
tion, have their extremities together. Now, since
position belongs to such things as also have a place,
and the primary differentiation of placc is above
and below and other such pairs of opposites, all
things which arc in contact with one another would
have weight and lightness, either both of these
qualities or one or other of them. Now such things
are capable of acting and being acted upon ;
so that it is clear that those things are of a nature
to be in contact with one another, the extremities
of whose separate magnitudes are together and
which are capable of moving one another and being
moved by one another. But, since that which moves
does not always move that which is moved in the
same way, but one mover must move by being it
self moved, and another while itself remaining un
moved, it is clear that we must speak in the same
terms about that which acts ; for the moving
thing is said to act (in a sense) and the acting
thing to move. There is, however, a difference,
and a distinction must be made ; for not every
mover can act, if we are going to employ the
term agent in contrast to the term patient,
and the term patient is applied only to those
things for which the movement is an affection 6
b See Met. x. 1022 b 15 ff.

I
225
ARISTOTLE
323 a
20 fio v o v , o lo v
to
X evK ov Kal t o O epfiov* a A A a t o Kiveiv
7 t I TcXioV TOV 7TOLLV io T L V .
KLVO S OVV <f)avep6v ,
OTL COTl fl V W S T a
KLVOVVTCL T W V KtVTJTWV S. TTOLT
*
v
av, e o n
)\\> r 5.
KaOoXov
ws ov.
fie v
aAA
tw v
e^ o vT W v
Kal
tt
/\
o o io p io fio s t o v a n r e o u a i
O eoiv
tov
fiev
KLVTJTIKOV TOV Se KIV7JTOV, 7TpOS aXXrjXa S c , KLV7J25 TLKOV KOI KLVTfTOV V OLS V n d pX *l TO 7TOLLV Kal TO
n a oxeL V .
eon
fie v oS v w s e n l t o
fie v o v a n r o fie v o v a n r o f i e v o v
7toXv t o a n r o K ivei k lvov -
Kal y a p
fiev a n a v r a a x e S o v r d i fi n o S w v , o o o i s a vayK rj Kal

<f>aiverai t o
antto fie v o v a n r t o O a i
S , w s e v io r e (f>afiev, t o
Ki v o v fie v o v , t o
30 f i e v o v
k iv o v v
a n rofie v o v
aTTTOfievov firj a n r e o O a i
a n ro-
K iveiv klvov fie va T a
o fio y ev rj,
ava yK rj SoK ei etva i a n r o fie v o v a n r e o O a i.
w o r e et
ti
a A A a S ta t o
eori
a n r e o O a i fio v o v t o v
K ivei
KivrjTov,
a K ivrjrov
eK eivo v
o v , eK eivo
Se o v S e v
fiev
av
a n r o ir o
<f>afiev y a p
e v io r e
tov
tov
Xv n o v v r a a n r e o O a i rjfiw v, aAA* o v k a v r o l e K e iv o v .
rrepl fie v o v v a<j>fjs r f js ev r o i s v o l k o is S iw pioO w
TOVTOV TOV rpOTTOV.
323 b
7. Y lepl S c t o v n o ie iv Kal n a o x e i v X eK reo v </>* fjs , napeiXfj</>afiev Se n a p a r w v n p o r e p o v v n e v a v -
226

(an 44 affection, that is, such as whiteness and heat,
in virtue of which they only undergo alteration ),
whereas to 44 move is a wider term than to 41 act.
But this, at any rate, is clear, that there is a sense in
which the things which move can come into contact
with the things which are capable of being moved,
and a sense in which they cannot do so. But the
distinction between contact in the most general sense
and 44 reciprocal contact is that, in the first sense,
two objects should have position and that one should
be capable of moving and the other of being moved ;
in the second sense, that there should be one thing
capable of moving and another of being moved,
possessing, respectively, the qualities of 44 agent
and 44 patient. Generally, no doubt, if one thing
touches another, the latter also touches the former ;
for almost all things, when they move, cause motion
in the things which stand in their way, and in these
cases that which touches must, and obviously does,
touch that which touches it. But it is possible, as
we say sometimes, for that which causes motion
merely to touch that which is moved, and that which
touches need not touch something which touches i t ;
but because things of the same kind impart motion
by being moved, it seems to follow necessarily that
they touch that which touches them. Hence, if any
thing causes motion without being itself moved, it
might touch that which is moved, though not itself
touched by anything ; for we say sometimes that
a man who grieves us 44 touches us, though we
ourselves do not 44 touch him. So much for our
definition of contact in the realm of Nature.
7.
Next we must deal with 44 action and 44 pas- Action
sion. W e have inherited conflicting accounts from Passion ;
227
ARISTOTLE
323 b
rlovs aXXfjXois Xoyovs.
ol fiev yap nXeioroi rovro
y e ofiovorjriKibs Xeyovoiv, a>s ro fiev ofioiov vno

5 rov ofioiov nav anaOes ea n Sia ro fir)8ev fiaX
Xov noirjriKov fj naOrjriKov elvai darepov Oarepov
(navra yap ofiolajs vnapxîv ravra rois ofiolois),
rd 8 avofioia Kal rd 8ia<f>opa noieiv Kal n doyeiv
els dXXrjXa ne<f>VKev.
Kal yap orav ro
eXarrov
nvp vno rov nXelovos <f>Oelprjrai, Sia rrjv evavrlojoiv

io rovro <f>aoi n a a x eiv evavrlov yap etvai ro noXv
rep oXlyci).
ArjfioKpiros Se napa rovs aXXovs ISlcos
eXelje fiovos* <f>r]ol yap ro avro Kal ofioiov etvai

re noiovv Kal
to
to
n a o x o v ov yap eyx<opetv ra
erepa Kal Sia<f>epovra naoxeiv v n * aXXfjXtov, aAAa

Kav erepa ovra noifj n
els aXArjXa, ovx fj erepa
15 aAA* fj ravrov ri vnapxî, ravrrf rovro ovfifialveiv

avro is.
Ta fiev ofiv Xeyofieva ra vr

oi
rovrov
rov
rponov
veoOai Xeyeiv.
ain ov
Seov oXov n
eorlv, eolKaoi Se
Xeyovres
vnevavrla
Se rrjs evavnoXoylas
Oetuprjoai fiepos n
<f>alon
rvyxdvovoi Xe
yovres Karepoimro re yap ofioiov Kal ro navrrj

20 navrcos aSia</>opov evXoyov firj naoxeiv vno rov
ofioiov firjSev (rt yap fiaXXov Oarepov eorai noirjnK ov fj Oarepov;
ei re1 vno rov ofioiov n naoxeiv
Svvarov, Kal avro v<f> a vrov* Kalroi rovrcov ovn os

exovnov ovSev av eir] ovre a<j>0aprov ovre aKlvrjrov, einep ro ofioiov fj ofioiov noirjriKov, avro yap
1 et re
228
Bonitz :
etre
Bekker.

our predecessors. For most of them agree in de- êwof
daring that (i) like is always unaffected by like be- phiiocause, of two things which are like, neither is, they sPhereargue, at all more liable than the other to act or to be
acted upon (for all the same properties belong in a
like degree to things which are like), and (ii) things
which are unlike and different are naturally disposed
to reciprocal action and passion ; for, when the lesser
fire is destroyed by the greater, it is said to be thus
affected owing to its contrariety, the great being
the contrary of the small. Democritus, however, in
disagreement with all other philosophers, held a view
peculiar to him self; for he says that the agent and
the patient are the same and alike, for (he declares)
it is not possible for things which are other and
different to be affected by one another, but even if
two things which are other do act in any way upon
one another, this occurs to them not in as much as
they are o th er/ but because some identical pro
perty belongs to them both.
These, then, are the views expressed, and it appears
that those who so expressed them were obviously
in opposition to one another. But the reason of this
opposition is that each school, when they ought to
have viewed the problem as a whole, in fact only
stated part of the truth. For, firstly, it is reasonable
to hold that that which is like another thing, that is,
in every respect absolutely without difference from
it, cannot be in any way affected by the other thing
which is like it. (For why should one be more likely
to act than the other ? And if like can be affected
by like, it can also be affected by itse lf; yet, if that
were so if like were liable to act qua like nothing
would be indestructible or immovable, for everything
229
ARISTOTLE
323 b
25 avro
Kivfjoei nav) to
re
ro fiTjSafifj ravrov w oavrw s.
navreXws
erepov
Kal
ovSev yap av 7raOoi
XevKorrjs vnto ypafififjs fj ypafifirj
vtto
XevKorrjros,
nXrjv e l fifj 7tov K ara ovfifteftrjKos, otov e l o v f ifteprjKe XevKrjv fj fieXaivav etvai rrjv ypafifirjv *
ovk
itjlorrjoi yap aXXrjXa rrjs <f>voews 00 a fifjr ivavria

/ > *> >
t /
>\\> > *
> t
%
30 firjr eg evavnwv e o n v .
aAA enei ov ro rvxov
7T<f>VK
rraoyeiv Kal noieiv,
eorlv fj ivavrlwoiv
ro naoxov t w
rw
aAA00 a
fj evavria
avayKrj Kal ro noiovv Kal
yevei fiev ofioiov etvai Kal ravro,
8 eiSei avofioiov Kal ivavn ov (ne</>vKe yap
owfia
324 a xp&fia
fiev
vno
ow fiaros, Xvf1^
vno
xpwfiO'TOS naoxeiv,
ofioyeves vno rov ofioyevovs.
Xvlxo^>
oXws Se ro
rovrov 8 * ain ov o n
ravavria iv ravra) yevei ndvra, noiei 8e Kal n a ox*i ravavria vn
aXXrjXwv), coor avayKrj nw s fiiv
etvai ravra ro re noiovv Kal ro naoxov, n w s 8*

H
\ > /
>\\ /\
J <
t
/
5 erepa Kai avofioia aAArjAois. enei oe Kai ro n a
oxov Kal t o noiovv t w fiev yevei ravra Kal o/ioia
rw 8* eiSei avofioia, roiavra Se ravavria, <j>avep6 v
on
naOrjnKa Kal noirjriKa aXXrjXwv i o n
ra r
ivavria Kal ra fiera^v* Kal yap oXws </>0opa Kal

yeveois iv t o v t o is .
10
A 10 Kal evX oyov rjSrj t o r e n vp Oepfiaiveiv Kal

rd ipvxpov ifivxîv, Kal oXws t o noirjriK ov ofioiov v
e a v r w t o n a o x o v t o r e y a p n o io v v Kal r o n a o x o v
iv a v ria i o r i , Kal fj y e v e o is els ro v v a v rlo v .
230
to o r9

will move itself.) And, secondly, the same thing
happens if there is complete difference and no kind
of identity. For whiteness could not be affected in
any degree by line, or line by whiteness, except per
haps incidentally, if, for example, it happened that
the line was white or black ; for unless the two things
are contraries or made up of contraries, one cannot
displace the other from its natural condition. But,
since only such things as possess contrariety or are
themselves actual contraries and not any chance
things are naturally adapted to be acted upon and
to act, both agent ** and patient ** must be alike
and identical in kind, but unlike and contrary in
species. For body is by nature adapted so as to be
affected by body, flavour by flavour, colour by colour,
and in general that which is of the same kind by
something else of the same kind ; and the reason of
this is that contraries are always within the same kind,
and it is contraries which act and are acted upon
reciprocally. Hence agent and patient are Aristotle's
necessarily in one sense the same, and in another e^ n t f
sense other and unlike one another ; and since ?,nd
agent and patient are identical in kind and pa en '
like, but unlike in species, and it is contraries which
have these characteristics, it is clear that contraries
and their intermediates are capable of being
affected and of acting reciprocally indeed it is
entirely these processes which constitute passingaway and coming-to-be.
It is, then, now reasonable to hold both that fire
heats and that what is cold cools and, in general,
that what is active assimilates that which is passive
to itse lf; for the agent and patient are contrary to
one another, and coming-to-be is a process into the
231
ARISTOTLE
324 a
avayKr)
ovtco
15
koto.
ro
yap
naoxov
cot at
Xoyov Srj
els
noiovv
to
fieraftaXXeiv
els rovvavriov fj yeveois.
to
Kai
firj Tavra Xeyovras afi<f>orepoxjs
ojicos anreoOai rrjs (f>voecos.
Xeyofiev yap naoxeiv
ore fiev to vnoKeifievov (otov vyiaeoOai rov avOpconov Kal OepfiaiveoOai Kal i/jvxôOai Kal raXXa rov
avrov rponov), ore Se OepfiaiveoOai fiev ro fa xp ov,
vyidêoOai Se to Kafivov dficftorepa S eorlv aXrjOrj
20 (rov avrov Se rponov Kal enl rov noiovvros* ore

fiev yap rov dvOpconov <f>afiev Oepfiaiveiv, ore Se
to Oepfiov- e o n fiev yap cos fj vXrj naoxî, e o n S
cos rovvavriov).
oi fiev ovv els e/cetvo pXeipavres
ravrov Tt Setv (hfjOrjoav
to
7rotow eêtv Kal
to
n aoxov, ol S els Oarepa rovvavriov.

25
Tov avrov Se Xoyov vnoXrjnreov elvai nepl

noieiv Kal naoxeiv ovnep Kal nepl
KiveioOai.
Sixcos yap Xeyerai Kal
tov
to
tov
Kiveiv Kal
kivovv -
ev
(o re yap fj apx^j rrjs Kivfjoecos, So/cet rovro Kiveiv

(fj yap apx^j npiorrj rcov alricov), Kal naXiv ro
eoxarov
npos
to
Kivovfievov
/cat
rrjv
yeveoiv.
ofioicos Se /cat nepl rov noiovvros* /cat yap rov

30 larpov (f>afiev vyidêiv Kal rov otvov.
npcorov
rov
kivovv
etvai
(in'
to fiev ovv
ovSev KioXvei ev fiev Kivfjoei aKivrjevicov
Se
/cat
avayKaiov),
to
eaâTOV aet Kiveiv Kivovfievov, enl Se noifjoecos
0 i.e. immediately next to that which is moved.

232

contrary, so that the patient must change into the
agent, since only thus will coming-to-be be a process
into the contrary. And it is reasonable to suppose
that both schools, though they do not express the
same views, are yet in touch with the nature of things.
For we sometimes say that it is the substratum which
is acted upon (for example, we talk of a man as being
restored to health and warmed and chilled and so
on), and sometimes we say that what is cold is being
warmed and what is ill is being restored to health.
Both these ways of putting the case are true (and
similarly with the agent : for at one time wc say that
it is the man that causes heat, and at another time
that it is that which is h o t ; for in one sense it is the
matter which is acted upon and in another sense it
is the contrary ). One school, therefore, directed
its attention to the substratum and thought that the
agent and patient must possess something identical,
the other school, with its attention on the contraries,
held the opposite view.
W e must suppose that the same account holds
good of action and passion as about moving
and being moved. For move is also used in two
senses ; for that in which the original source of
motion resides is generally held to cause motion (for
the original source is the first of causes), and so also
is that which is last in relation to that which is moved a
and to the proccss of coming-to-be. Similarly, too,
in the case of the a g e n t; for we speak of the doctor,
and also of wine, as healing. Now, in motion, there
is nothing to prevent the first mover being unmoved
(in fact in some cases it is actually necessary), but
the last mover alwrays causes motion by itself being
moved ; and in action, there is nothing to prevent
233
ARISTOTLE
324 a
ro fiev
n p w ro v anaO es,
to
S e o x o r o v
Kal a v r o
n a o x o v o a a y a p firj c^ci rrjv avrrjv vXrjv, 7rotct

35 anaOfj o v r a
324 b
v y ieia v
(olov fj larpiKrj, aurq
ovhev
naoxî
vno
rov
yap
7roiouaa
v y ia ^ o jiev o v ),
to
he o tr lo v n o io v v Kal a v r o n a o x ^ i n mfj y a p O epfiaiv er a i fj i/jvx*rai fj aAAo r i n a o x ^ i

eon
a fia n o io v v ,
he fj fiev larpiKrj w s a p x fj, r o 8c o ir io v r o
e o x o r o v Kal a n r o fievov,
5
" O a a fiev ovv fifj ev vXrj c^ct rrjv fiopcjy/jv, r a v r a
fiev anaOfj r w v noirjriK w v, o a a 8 ev vXrj, naOrjriK a ,

rfjv
rrjv fiev y a p vXrjv X eyofiev o fio iw s w s ein eiv

avrrjv
w onep
etvai
yevos
rw v
ov, r o
avrtK eifievw v
on orepovovv,
he hvvdfievov
Oepfiov etvai
n a p o v ro s r o v O epfiavriKov Kal n X rjoia^ ovros avayKrj

io O epfiaiveoOai * Sto,
noirjriK w v
KaOanep eiprjrai, r d
anaOrj r d
8c
naOrjriKa,
fiev r w v
Kal
w onep
e n l K ivfjoew s, r o v a v r o v c^ct r p o n o v Kal en l r w v

n o irjr iK w v c/cc? r e y a p t o n p w r w s
kivovv
aKivrjrov,
Kal en l r w v noirjriK w v r o n p w ro v n o io v v anaO es.

eon
Sc t o
15 K ivfjoew s.
noirjriK ov a i n o v w s oOev fj a pyvj rrjs

ro
ou
eveKa o v noirjriK ov
(hid fj
v y ie ia o v noirjriK ov, el firj K ara fiera<j>opav)% Kal

y a p r o v fiev
n o io v v r o s o ra v
v n a p x j}, y iv e r a i n
rd n a o x o v , r w v 8* etjewv n a p o v o w v o v K e n y iv e r a i,
>\\
ft
aAA e o n v rjorj r a o
\ \
t\
a O f which the two opposites are species.

b Such as health * or disease.
234
eiorj Kai r a reArj eg eis r iv e s .

the*first agent being unaffected, but the last agent
is itself also affected. For those things which have
not the same matter act without being themselves
affected (for example, the art of the physician which,
while it causes health, is not itself acted upon by
that which is being healed), but food, while it acts,
is itself all somehow acted upon, .for, while it acts,
it is at the same time being heated or cooled or
affected in some other way. Now the art of the
physician is, as it were, an original source, while the
food is, as it were, the final mover and in contact with
that which is moved.
O f the things, then, which are capable of acting,
those of which the form does not consist in matter
are not affected, but those o f which the form consists
in matter are liable to be affected ; for we say that
the matter o f either of the two opposed things alike
is the same, so to speak, being, as it were, a kind a ;
and that which is capable of being hot must become
hot, if that which is capable of heating is present and
near to it. Therefore, as has been said, some of the
active agencies are unaffected, while others are liable
to be acted upon ; and what holds good of motion
is also true of the active agencies ; for as in motion
the first mover is unmoved, so among active agencies
the first agent is unaffected. The active agency is
a cause, as being the source from which the origin
of the movement comes, but the end in view is not
active (hence health is not active, except meta
phorically) ; for, when the agent is present, the
patient becomes something, but when states 6
are present, the patient no longer becomes but
already is, and the forms, that is the ends,
are a kind of state, but the matter, qua matter,
235
ARISTOTLE
324 b
ff S vArf fj vArf naOrjriKov.
to fiev ofiv nvp
iv
20 vArj t o Oepfiov el 8 e t i eir] Oepfiov x ^ p iorov, touto

ouSev av nacrxoc.
rovro fiev ofiv tow s aSvvarov
elvai x ^ p w r o v el S io rlv evia roiavra, in

vwv av eirj ro Aey ofievov aArjOes.
ii<ei-
rt fiev ofiv ro
noieiv Kai naoxeiv io r l Kai riotv vnapxet Kai Sta

Tt
25
Kai n w s, StwptoOw rovrov rov rponov.

8. II <2? Se cvSeêTai
Aeywfiev.
rovro
ovfiftaiveiv, naAiv
rois fiev ofiv SoKei naoxeiv eKaorov Sta
n vw v nopwv eloiovros rov noiovvros io x d ro v Kai

Kvptwrarov, (cat rovrov rov rponov Kai opav Kai
aKoveiv fffias <f>aol Kal ras aAAas aloOffoeis aloOaveoOai naoas, e n 8 e opaoOat Sta re aepos Kal uSa30 ros Kal rcov 8 ta<f>avcov, Sta to nopovs exeiv 0,0 parovs
fiev Sta fiiKporrfra, nvKvovs 8 e Kal Kara orotxov,
Kal fiaAAov ex*tv rd 8 iacf>avfj fiaAAov.
Ot fiev ofiv in i nvcov ovtco
Kal
EfineSoKAfjs,
ov
fiovov
Sicopioav, wonep
in i
rw v
noiovvrwv
Kal n aoxovrw v, aAAa Kal filyvvoOal <f>aoiv oowv

35
01 nopoi ovfifierpoi npos
325 a Sc fiaAtora
Kal nepl
aAAtfAovs
navrwv
evl
o8 w
8 iwpl-
e io iv
Aoyw
Kaoi AevKinnos Kal ArjfioKptros, apxyv noirjoafievoi Kara <f>voiv fjnep io riv.
iviois yap rw v
/
VJ >
! * * > /
A
f
%
apxdiwv eooge ro ov eg avayKrjs ev elvai Kai
aKivrjrov ro fiev yap Kevov ovk ov, KtvrjOrjvai S
5 ovk av SvvaoOat firj ovtos Kevov Kexcoptofievov,
ov 8 * afi noAAa elvai fiff ovtos to v Stetpyovros.
a Namely, Parmenides and Melissus.
236
CO M ING-TO-BE AN D PASSIN G -AW AY, I. 7-8

is passive.
Now fire holds the heat embodied in
matter : but, if there were such a thing as the hot
apart from matter, it could not be acted upon at all.
Heat, therefore, perhaps cannot exist separately ;
but, if there are any such separate existences, what
we are saying would be true o f them also. L et this,
then, be our explanation of action and " passion,
and when they exist, and why and how.
8.
L et us now go back and discuss how it is possible How do
for action and passion to occur. Some people hold andCtlon
that each patient is acted upon when the last agent
the agent in the strictest sense enters in through omir

certain pores, and they say that it is in this way that
we also see and hear and employ our other senses.
Furthermore, they say that things are seen through
air and water and the other transparent bodies,
because they have pores, which, owing to their
minuteness, are invisible, but are set close together
and in rows, and are more transparent the closer
together and in more serried array they are.
Some philosophers (including Empedocles) held The
this theory as regards certain bodies, not confining theorôf
it to those which act and are acted upon ; but mixture Empedoeles.
also, they assert, takes place only between bodies
whose pores are symmetrical with one another. The
most methodical theory, however, and the one of
most general application has been that enunciated
by Leucippus and Democritus, taking what is the
natural starting-point.
For some of the ancient
thinkers a held that what is must necessarily be
one and immovable ; for they argued that the void
does not exist, but that, if there is not a void existing
separately, what is could not be moved ; nor,
again, could there be a multiplicity of things, since
237
ARISTOTLE
325 a
TOVTO S ovSev 8 ia<f>plV, 1 Tis OLTCLl fJUVj OVVeê?

etvai t o rrav aAA arrreodai Sirjprjfievov, to v <f>avai
ttoXXcl Kal jifj ev etvai Kal Kevov.
el fiev yap Travrrf
Siaiperov, ovSev etvai ev, toore ovSe rroXAa, aAAa

io Kevov ro oXov' el Se rfj fiev rfj Se firj, TrerrXaofievco
n vl
tout
eoiKevai* fieypi ttooov yap Kal Sta r l
rd fiev ovrcos e%ei rov oXov Kal rrXrjpes e o n , ro

Se Sirjprjfievov;
etvai
Kivrjoiv.
en
ofioicos <f>aval avayKaiov firj
e/c fiev ovv tovtcov tcov Xoycov,
VTrepfiavres rrjv aioOrjoiv Kal 7rapi86vres avrrjv cos
15 rep Xoycp Seov aKoXovOeiv, ev Kal aKivrjrov ro rrav

etvai <f>aoi, Kal arreipov evior
a iveiv av irpos ro Kevov.
yap rrepas rrep-
to
ot fiev ovv
o vtco?
/cat
Sta ravras ras air las aTre(f>fjvavro rrepl rrjs aXrjdeias' ert Se errl fiev rw v Xoycov So/cet Tavra o v jifiaiveiv, em Se r<ov rrpayfiarcov fiavla rraparrXfjoiov
20 etvai ro Soaeiv ovrcos* ovSeva yap rcbv fiaivofiev cov eijeoravai rooovrov w ore t o rrvp ev etvai
So/cetv /cat rov KpvoraXXov, aAAa fiovov ra /caAa
Kal ra <j>aivofieva Sta ovvfjBeiav, ra v r evlois Sta
rrjv fiaviav ovSev So/cet 8 ia<f>epeiv.
AevKiTTnos S extv (prjOrj Xoyovs oinves rrpos rrjv
atoOrjoiv ofioXoyovfieva Xeyovres
25
ovk
avaipfjoovoiv
ovre yeveaiv ovre <f>9opav ovre Kivrjoiv Kal

rw v ovrcov.
to
fievoiSi rois Se ro ev /caraor/cevafovotv cos

1 ovk
E;
o vt
FHJL.
i.e. the Monists.
238
rrXrjdos
ofioXoyrjoas Se ravra fiev rois <f>aivoovk
av

there is nothing which keeps them a p a rt; and they
declare that, if one holds that the universe is not
continuous but maintains contact in separation, this
does not differ from saying that things are many
(and not 44 one ) and that there is a void. For if
the universe is divisible throughout, there is no 44 one/*
and therefore no 44 m any, but the whole is void ; but
to suppose that it is divisible at one point but not
at another seems like a baseless invention. For how
far is it divisible ? And why is part of the whole in
divisible and a plenum, and part divided ? Moreover,
they say that it is equally necessary to deny the
existence of motion. As a result, then, o f these
arguments, going beyond and disregarding senseperception, on the plea that they ought to follow
reason, they assert that the universe is one and
immovable ; some add that it is infinite as well, for
the limit would be a limit against the void. Some
philosophers, then, set forth their views about the
truth in this manner and based them on these grounds.
Furthermore, though these opinions seem to follow
logically from the arguments, yet, in view of the facts,
to hold them seems almost madness ; for no madman
is so out of his senses as to hold that fire and ice are
44 one ; it is only between things which are good
and things which, through habit, seem to be good,
that some people, in their madness, see no difference.
Leucippus, however, thought that he had argu- The
ments, which, while agreeing with sense-perception, volcr^8and
would not do away with coming-to-be and passing- theory of^
away, or motion, or the multiplicity of things which andCDemoare. While making these concessions to things as rritus*
they appear, and conceding to those who postulate
the oneness of things a that there could not be motion
239
ARISTOTLE
325 *
Kivrjoiv ovoav avev Kevov t o re Kevov firj ov, Kal to v

ovtos ovSev fifj ov <f>rjotv etvai.
yap Kvpiws ov
to
nafinXrjdes o v aAA* etvai t o roiovrov ovx *v> ÂA*

30 aneipa t o nXrjdos Kal aopara Sta ofiiKporrjra tcov
Tavra S ev rw Kevw <f>epeo0at (kcvov yap
oyKoov.
etvai) y Kal ovviordjieva fiev yeveaiv noieiv, StaXvofieva Se <f>0opav.
noieiv Se Kal naoxeiv fj r v y -
Xavovoiv anrofieva (ravrrj yap ovx
etvai), Kal
35 ovvridefieva Se Kal nepmXeKOfieva y e w a v
eK Se
rov Kar aXrjOeiav evos ovk av yeveoOai nXfjdos, ov8*

eK rcov aXrjOcos noXXwv ev, aAA* etvai rovr* aSvva-
325 b rov,
aAA* wanep 7JLfineSoKXrjs Kal tw v aXXwv rives
</>aoi naoxeiv Sta nopwv, o v tw naoav aXXoiwoiv

Kal nav t o naoxeiv rovrov yiveodai rov Tponov, Sta
rov Kevov yivofievrjs rrjs StaXvaews Kal rfjs </>0o5 pas, ofioiws Se /cat rrjs av^fjoews, vneiaSvofievwv
orepewv.
SêSov Se Kal *Eft7re8o/<Aei avayKaiov Xeyeiv,
wonep Kal AevKinnos </>rjoiv etvai yap arra ore pea,
aStaipera Se, et fifj navrrj no pot avvexe is eioiv.
tovto
S aSvvarov ovSev yap eorai erepov orepeov
napa
tovs
nopovs, aAAa nav Kevov.
avayKrj apa
io Ta fiev anrofieva etvai aStaipera, ra Se fieraijv

avrwv Keva, ovs eKeivos Xeyet nopovs.
Kal AevKinnos Xeyet nepl
/
/)
a r t
i fie v
n a o x et,
240
ovv
rp on oi
axeS ov
ovroi
K av
tov
ovs
X eyovra f
ovtws
Se
noieiv Kal naoxeiv.

\
t
\
ra
fie v
n o tei r a
K al n e p l fie v
oe
rov-

without a void, he declares that the void is 44 not
being, and nothing of 44 what is 99 is 44 not being ;
for 44 what is in the strictest sense is a complete
plenum. 44 But this 4plenum,* he says, 44 is not one
bnt many things of infinite number, and invisible
owing to the minuteness of their bulk. These are
carried along in the void (for there is a void) and,
when they come together, they cause coming-to-be
and, when they dissolve, they cause passing-away.
They act and are acted upon where they happen to
come into contact (for there they are not one), and
they generate when they are placed together and
intertwined. But from that which is truly one, a
multiplicity could never come-into-being, nor a one
from the truly many ; but this is impossible. B u t 99
(just as Empedocles and some of the other philo
sophers say that things are acted upon through their
pores) 44 all 4 alteration * and all 4 passion * occur in
this way, dissolution and passing-away taking place
by means of the void, and likewise also growth, when
solids creep into the voids.
Empedocles, too, is almost compelled to take the
same view as Leucippus ; for he says that there are
certain solids, but they are indivisible, unless there
are continuous pores throughout. But this is im
possible ; for then there will be nothing solid except
the pores, but the whole will be void. It necessarily
follows, therefore, that those things which are in
contact are indivisible, but the spaces between them,
which he calls pores, must be void. This is also
Leucippus* view about 44 action and 44 passion.
These, then, are, roughly speaking, the accounts
given of the way in which some things 44 act and
other things are 44 acted upon.
As regards this
241
ARISTOTLE
325 b
tw v , Kal nw s Xeyovoi, SrjXov, Kal npos ras avrwv

15 Oeoeis a Is XP^)VraL oxeSov ofioXoyovfievws (f>aive-
rai ovfifiaivov. to is 8 * aXXots fjrrov, olov *Efin eSo/cAei riva Tponov ecrrai yeveois Kal <f)0opa Kal
aXXoiwois, ov SrjXov.
ra
npwra
tw v
to is fiev yap eoTiv aSiaipera
owfiarwv,
oxfjfian
Sta<f>epovra
fiovov, e wv npwTwv ovyKeirai Kal els a eorâra
20 SiaXverai' *KfineSoKXel Se ra fiev aAAa <f>avepov

o ti fiexpi tw v oroixelwv eêi rrjv yeveotv Kal rrjv
<f>0opav, avrwv Se rovrw v nw s yiverai Kal <f>0eiperai ro owpevofievov fieyeOos, ovre SrjXov ovre
eVSeêrai Ae'yeiv avrw fir) Xeyovrt Kal t o v nvpos
etvai OTOtxeiov, ofiolws Se Kal tw v aXXwv anavrwv,
25 wonep ev t w
Tifiaiw yeypa<f>e IIAara>v to o o v to v
yap Sia<f>epei t o v fir) to v avrov rponov AevKinnw

Xeyeiv, o n
o fiev crepe a o S 7ri7reSa Aeyei Ta
aSiaipera, Kal o fiev aneipots wptoOai oyrffiaot

[tw v aStaiperwv orepewv eKaorov], o Se wpiofievois,
enel aSiaipera ye afi</>6repoi Xeyovoi Kal wpiofieva
3 oxfjfiaoiv.
eK Sf) rovrw v at yeveoeis Kal ai Sta-
Kpioets AevKinnw fiev [Suo rponoi av etev,] Sta re

rov Kevov Kal Sta rrjs a<j>rjs (ravrr) yap Siaiperov
eKaorov), XlXarwvi Se Kara rf)v a<f>f)v fiovov Kevov
yap o v k etvai <f>r)otv.
Kai nepl fiev rw v aStaiperwv entneSwv elpfjKafiev iv rots nporepov Xoyots* nepl Se rw v aSt35 atperwv
orepewv r d
fiev enl nXeov Oewprjoai
a i.e. Leucippus and the other A tomists.

b i.e. the Atornists.
21-2
to

school, it is obvious what their views are and how they
state them, and they are clearly more or less consistent
with the suppositions which they adopt. This is less
clearly the case with the other school; for example,
it is not clear how, in the view of Empedocles, there
are to be coming-to-be and passing-away and " altera
tion. For to the other school b the primary bodies,
from which originally bodies are composed and into
which ultimately they are dissolved, are indivisible,
differing only in structure ; but to Empedocles, it
is clear that all the other bodies, down to the elements,
have their coming-to-be and passing-away, but it
is not evident how the accumulated mass of the ele
ments themselves comes-to-be and passes-away; nor
is it possible for him to give an explanation without
asserting that there is also an element of fire and like
wise of all the other kinds, as Plato has stated in the
Timaeus.c For Plato is so far from giving the same Platos
account as Leucippus that, while both of them declare pS^wHh
that the elementary constituents are indivisible and ^ f c{pils
determined of figures, (a) Leucippus holds that the
indivisibles are solid, Plato that they are planes, and
(6) Leucippus declares that they are determined by
an infinite number of figures, Plato by a defi
nite number. It is from these indivisibles that the
comings-to-be and dissolutions resu lt: according to
Leucippus, through the void and through the con
tact (for it is at the point of contact that each body
is divisible) ; according to Plato, as a result of contact
only, for he denies that a void exists.
Now we have dealt with indivisible planes in Neither the
earlier discussions d ; but with regard to indivisible Empedocles
solids, let us leave for the moment further discussion nor that
* 53
ff.
d De Caelo 298 b 33 ff.
243
ARISTOTLE
b ovfifiaivov
a<f>eloOw ro
vvv,
(bs Se fiiKpov rrapeK-
a fiaoiv elrreiv, avayKaiov anaOes re eKaarov Xeyeiv
rcov aSiatpercov (ov yap otov re naoxeiv aXX rj

Sta tou Kevov) Kal firfSevos noirjriKov naOovs ovre
yap ifjvxpdv ovre OKXrjpdv olov r
rovro y e
/catrot
elvat.
aronrov, ro fiovov dnoSovvai rq> 7repi-
5 </>epei oxfjfian ro Oepfiov' dvayKrj yap Kal rovvav

riov to tfjvxpov aAAto n v l npoorfKeiv rtbv ox^ffidrtov.
aronov Se Kav el Taura fiev vnapxî, Xeyto Se
Oepfiorrfs Kal iftvxpdrrjs, j8apvrrfs Se Kal Kovtf>6rr)s
Kal OKXrfporrjs Kal fiaXaKorrfs fiff vndpêr Kairoi
fiapvrepov
ye
Kara
rfjv
vnepoxtfv
<f>rjoiv
etvai
10 ArffioKpiros eKaarov rtbv aStatper tov, w ore SrjXov

o n Kal Oep/iorepov.
vni
roiavra S ovra fifj iraoxeiv
aXXijXtov aSvvarov, olov vnro rov nroXi) vnep-
fidXXovros Oepfiov to
fjpefia Oepfiov.
el oKXrjpov, Kal fiaXaKov.

naoxeiv n
aAAa fiffv
ro Se fiaXaKOV fjSrj rat
Xeyerai to yap vneiKnKov fiaXaKov.
15 aAAa fifjv arorrov Kal el fir)Sev vnapxei aAA
rj
fiovov oxfjfia Kal el vnapxei, ev Se fiovov, olov ro

fiev ijjvxpov to Se Oepfiov ovSe yap av fiia n s eir)
f) <f)\)Ois avrwv.
ofioltos Se aSvvarov Kal el nrXeito
rw evl* aSiaiperov yap ov iv rw avrw eijei rd nrdOrj,
20 w ore
Kal
eav nrdoxT) einrep tfwxerai,
Kal aAAo rroiffoei ff neioerai.
ravrrf Tt1
rov avrov Se rponov
Kal inrl rtbv aXXtov nraOr)fidrtov rovro

ravrrj rot J
a i.e. of the Atomists.
yap
; H.
Kal

of what they involve and deal with them in a short of the
digression. It is a necessary part of the theory a that
each indivisible is incapable of being acted upon for^* action(for it cannot be acted upon except through the void) passion.
and incapable of producing an effect on anything
else ; for it cannot be either cold or hard. Y e t it
is certainly strange that heat can only be attributed
to the spherical figure; for then it necessarily
follows that its contrary, cold, must belong to another
of the figures.. It is also strange if these properties,
I mean heat and cold, belong to the indivisibles,
while heaviness and lightness and hardness and soft
ness are not going to belong. Y e t Democritus says
that the more each of the indivisibles exceeds, the
heavier it is, so that clearly it is also hotter. Being
of this kind, it is impossible that the indivisibles should
not be acted upon by one another, for example, the
slightly hot should be acted upon by what far sur
passes it in heat. Again, if an indivisible can be
hard, it can also be s o f t ; and the soft is always
so-called because it can be acted upon ; for that
which yields to pressure is soft. But, further, it is
strange that no property except figure should attach
to the indivisible ; and that, if properties do attach
to them, only one should attach to each, e.g. that one
14 indivisible should be cold and another h o t ; for,
then, neither would their substance be uniform. It
is equally impossible, too, that more than one pro
perty should belong to one indivisible, for, being
indivisible, it will possess these properties in the
same place ; so that if it is acted upon by being
chilled, it will also, in this way, act or be acted upon
in some other way. And similarly with the other
properties also ; for this problem also confronts in
245
ARISTOTLE
326
orepea Kal
to ls
ovfifHaivei
to v
enineSa Xeyovoiv aSiaipera
to ls
avrov Tponov ovre yap flavor epa
ovre nvKvorepa otov Te yiveoOai Kevov firj ovros

25 ev
ahiaiperois
to ls
e n 8* arorrov Kal ro fiiKpa
fiev aSiaipera etvai, fieyaXa Se \ifj vvv fiev yap

eiXoyw s ra fieiw 0paver ai fiaXXov rw v fiiKpwv ra
fiev yap SiaXverai paSiws, otov ra fieydXa* n p ooKorrrei yap noXXois
Se aSiaiperov oXws
to
fiaXXov in dpyei rw v fieyaXwv rots fiiKpois;
rt
30 8e
rrorepov
fiia
navrwv
fj
<f>vois
eKeivwv
S ta
en
rw v
orepewv, fj Sia<f>epei Oarepa rw v erepwv, wonep

av el ra fiev elr) nvpiva, ra Se yfjiva rov oyK ov;
el fiev yap fiia <f>vois eorlv an avrwv, r i
oav;
fj
ri o i
S ta
yiverai
vowp voaros orav uiyrj;

35 repov rov nporepov.
326 b
el
SrjXov ws ravra Oereov
axftafieva
ovoev yap oiacpepei

S
\wpi~
to
ev, wonep
to
erepa, noia r a v r a ;
a pyas
Kal alrias
flaivovrwv fiaXXov fj ra oyrffiara.
tw v
e n Se
vo-
Kal
ovfi-
S t a<f>e-
povra rrjv </>voiv, Kav noifj Kav naoxfl Oiyyavovra

aXXrjXwv.
en
Sc
tl
to
k iv o v v ;
el fiev yap erepov,
naOrjriKa1* el S a ir o a ir o eKaorov, fj Siaiperov

5
eorai, Kar
aXXo fiev
k iv o v v
Kar9
aAAo
Se
klvov-
fievov, fj Kara r a ir o ravavria inapêi, Kal ff vXr\

ov fiovov apiOfiw eorai fiia aAAa /cat Svvafiei.
*O ooi fiev oSv Sta rrjs rwv nopwv Kivfjoews </>aoi
1 iraOrjriKa EHL :
-ov
F.
* See Phys. 190 b 24, 192 a 1 ff.

246

the same way both those who assert that indi
visibles are solid and those who say they are planes,
for they cannot become either rarer or denser, because
there can be no void in the indivisibles. Further,
it is strange that there should be small indivisibles
but not large ones ; for it is natural to suppose at
this stage that the larger bodies are more liable to
be shattered than the small, for the former, like
large things in general, are easily dissolved, since
they come into collision with many other bodies.
But why should indivisibility in general attach to
small things rather than large ? Furthermore, is the
substance of all these solids uniform or does it differ
in different groups, as if, for example, some were
fiery and some earthy in their bulk ? For if they are
all of one substance, what has separated them from
one another ? Or why do they not become one when
they come into contact, just as water does when it
touches water ? For there is no difference between
the two cases. But if they belong to different classes,
what are their different qualities ? Indeed it is clear
that we ought to postulate that these classes rather
than the figures are the origins and causes of
the resulting phenomena. Moreover, if they were
different in substance they would act and be acted
upon reciprocally if they touched one another. Again,
what sets these in motion ? For if it is something
other than themselves, they must be liable to be
acted upon ; but, if each is its own mover either it
will be divisible, in part causing motion and in part
being moved, or contraries will belong to it in the
same respcct, and the matter o f it will be not only
arithmetically but also potentially one.a
As for those who say that the processes of being
247
ARISTOTLE
326 b
ra
naOrj ovfifialveiv,
el fiev Kal nenXrjpwfievwv
rw v nopwv, nepiepyov oi n op or et yap ravrrj rt

10 naoxei to 7rav, Kav fifj nopovs eôv aAA* avro
ovvexes ov naoxoi rov avrov rponov. e n Se nw s
eVSeêrai 7rept rov Stopav ovfiftalveiv cu? Xeyovoiv;
ovre yap Kara ra s a<f>as evSeêrat Sttevat Sta toDv
hia<f>avwv, ovre Sta ra>v nopwv, el nXfjprjs eKaoros
rt yap Stotcret tou /xt) eêtv n opovs;
nav yap
15 ofiolws eorai nXfjpes. aAAa fifjv el Kal kcva fiev
ravra (avayKrj Se owjiara ev avrois eêtv), Tauro
ovfiftfjoerai naXiv.
et Se rrjXiKavra ro fieyeOos
wore fifj hexeoOai owfia firjbev, yeXoiov ro fiiKpov
fiev oieoOai Kevov etvai, fieya Se /X17 /*^S orrrjXikovovv, fj to Kevov aAAo Tt oieoOai Xeyeiv nXfjv
20 x<*>Pav ow fiaros, w ore SrjXov o n navrl ow fia n rov

oyKov ioov eorai Kevov.
"OXws Se t o nopovs noieiv nepiepyov* et /xev yap
firjSev noiei Kara rfjv a<f>fjv, ouSe Sta tojv nopwv
noifjoei Sttov et Se to) anreoOai, /cat /x^ nopwv
ovrwv ra fiev neioerai ra Se noifjoei rw v npos
25 aXXrjXa rovrov rov rponov ne^vKorwv.
o n fiev
ovv ovrw s Xeyeiv rovs nopovs w s n v e s vnoXafifidvovoiv, fj ifjevSos fj fiaraiov, <f>avepov eK rovrw v
e o r lv Statperwv S ovrwv navrrj twv owjiarwv
nopovs noieiv yeX oiov fj yap Statper a, Svvarai
X<*)pleoOai.
0 i.e. the body is none the Jess impenetrable, even if it is

held that the pores, though they contain bodies, are them
selves, qua pores, empty channels.
b i.e. the very fact that a body is everywhere divisible
makes it possible to open up a channel in it.
248

acted upon occur through movement in the pores,
if this happens although the pores are filled, the pores
are an unnecessary supposition ; for if the whole
body is acted upon at all in this way, it would be
acted upon in the same way even if it had no pores,
in its own continuous self. Again, how is it possible
to carry out the process of seeing through a medium
as they describe it ? For it is not possible to pene
trate through the transparent bodies either at the
points of contact or through the pores, if each pore
is full. For how will this condition differ from the
possession of no pores at all ? For the whole will
be equally full throughout. Furthermore, if these
channels, though they must contain bodies, are void,
the same result will occur again ; but if they arc
of such a size that they cannot admit any body, it
is absurd to suppose that there is a small void but
not a big one, of whatever size it be, or to think that
a void means anything except a space for a b o d y ;
so that it is clear that there will be a void equal in
cubic capacity to every body.
In general, then, it is superfluous to postulate the
existence of pores ; for if the agent effects nothing
by contact, neither will it effect anything by passing
through pores. If, however, it effects anything by
contact, then, even without there being any pores,
some of those things which arc by nature adapted
for reciprocal effect of this kind will be acted upon,
while others will act. It is clear, therefore, from what
we have said that it is either false or useless to talk
of pores of the kind which some people suppose to
exist, and, since bodies are everywhere divisible, it
is ridiculous to postulate pores at a l l ; for sincc bodies
are divisible, they can be separated into parts.6
249
ARISTOTLE
326 b
9- TtVa Se rponov vnapxei rois ovot ye w a v Kal
30 noieiv Kal naoxeiv, Aeywjiev Xafiovres apxVv r Vv

et yap e o n t o fih/ Svvafiei
noXXaKis elprjfievrjv.
to
S evTeAeêta to io v to v ,
7Te<j)VKv
ov rfj fiev rfj
8* ov naoxeiv, aAAa navrrj KaB* ooov earl toio vto v ,

fjrrov Se Kal fiaXXov fj to io vto v fiaXXov i o n Kal
7ropovs
fjrrov * Kal ravrrj
av t is
Xeyoi fiaXAov,
35 KaOanep ev to ls fieraXXevofievois Siarelvovoi to v

327 * 7Ta0rjTiKov (frXefies ovvexeis.
\
>
n /
ovfi<f>ves fiev ovv eKa-
c'
'
'
Z)
cttov Kat ev ov anaues.
ofioiws oe Kai fir) u iyya -
vovT a fif\T avrwv fifjr
aXXwv, a noieiv
Kal naoxeiv.
7re^VKe
Xeyw 8* o fo v ov fiovov anro fievov
Bepfialvei t o nvp, aAAa Kav dnoBev f to v fiev yap
5 aepa
to
nvp, o 8* afjp t o owfia Bepfiaivei, ne<f>VKws
noieiv Kal n aoxeiv .
to Se
rfj fiev oieoBai naoxeiv
rfj Se fifj, SioploavTas ev apxfj to v to XeKreov.

fiev yap fir) navrrj Siaiperov
owfia
aSiaiperov
10 naOrjriKov,
to
rj nXaros,
el
fieyeBos, aAA* e o r t
ovk
av
eirj navrrj
aAA* ouSe ovvex^s ovS ev el Se rovro
ipevSos Kal nav owfia Siaiperov, ovSev S ta <f>epet

SirjprjoBai fiev anreoOai Se, fj Siaiperov elvai et
yap SiaKplveoBai Svvarai Kara ras a<f>as, wonep
<j>aol rives, Kav jifjnw fj Strjprjfievov, eorai Sirjprja It is difficult to extract any meaning from this sentence
as it stands. Joachim supposes a lacuna after rfj 8^ firj,
250
COMING-TO-BE A N D P A SSIN G -A W A Y, I. 9
9.
L et us now deal with the question about the Aristotles
way in which existences have the power of generating ofâctlcm^
and of acting and being acted upon, starting from and-pasthe principle which we have often enunciated. For
if there exists that which is potentially of a certain
kind as well as that which is actually so, it is of a
nature, in so far as it is what it is, to be acted upon
in every part, and not in some part but not in another,
and to a more or a less extent according as it is more
or less of that particular nature ; and one might
speak of pores as having a particular nature in a
greater degree, just as there are veins of substance
which can be acted upon which stretch continuously
in metals which are being mined. Every body, then,
which is coherent and one is not acted upon ; and
this is equally true of bodies which do not touch
either each other or other bodies which are o f a
nature to act or be acted upon. Fire is an example
of what I mean : it heats not only when it is in con
tact with something, but also if it is at a distance ;
for it heats the air, and the air heats the body, being
o f a nature both to act and to be acted upon. But
having enunciated the theory that a body is acted
upon in one part but not in another, we must first
make the following declaration a : if the magnitude
is not everywhere divisible, but there is a divisible
body or plane, no body would be liable to be acted
upon throughout, but neither would any body be
continuous ; but, if this is not true and every body
is divisible, there is no difference between having
been divided but being in contact and being
divisible ; for if it is possible for a body to be " sepa
rated at the points of contact a phrase which some
people use then, even if it has not yet been divided,
251
ARISTOTLE
327 a
fievov Svvarov yap hiaipeOfjvar yiverai yap ovhev
15 aSvvarov.
oAcos* he ro rovrov yiveoOai rov rpoirov
oxôfievcov rcbv ocofiarcov arorrov avaipei yap

tos
o Aoyos* aXXoicooiv, opcbfiev he
to
ov
avro ocofia
ovvexes ov ore jaw vypov ore Se irerrrjyos, ov hiaipeoei Kal ovvOeoei rovro iraOov, ovSe rpo7rfj Kal
hiaOiyfj,
KaOairep
Xeyei
ArjfioKpiros*
ovre
yap
20 fierareOev ovre fierafiaXdv rrjv <j>voiv ireirrjyos e

vypov y e y o v e v ovS ivvirdpxei rd OKXrjpa Kal rre7rrjyora ahiaipera rovs oyK ovs' aAA ofioicos airav
vypov, ore Se oKXrjpov Kal Trenrjyos e o n v .
S ovS a v fy o iv olov r
en
elvai Kal <j)0ioiv * ov yap
o n ovv eorai yeyovos fieiôv, elirep eorai irpooOeots,

25 Kal fifj irav fierafiefiXrjKos, fj fiixOevros tivos fj
KaO* avro fieraftaXovros.
"O n fiev ofiv e o n r o y e w a v Kal r o iroieiv Kal ro

yiv eoO a i r e Kal ira oxeiv
rp oirov
e v h e x er a i,
vir* aXXfjXcov, Kal r iv a
Kal r iv a
<f>aol fiev
r iv e s
ovk
evh ex^ rai h e, Sicopiodco r o v r o v rov rpoirov.

ao
10. Aot7rov Se Oecopfjoai irepl fiiêcos K ara r o v

a v r o v rpoirov r fjs fieO o h o v r o v r o y a p fjv r p iro v
rcbv irporeOevrcov e a p x fjs .
oK eirreov Se r i r
eartv fj fiiîs Kal r i r o fiiK rov, Kal r io iv vira pxei
rcbv ovrcov Kal ircbs, e n Se irorepov e o n fii^ is fj
r o v r o ipevhos' aSvvarov y a p i o n fiixO fjvai n e r e 35
pov erepco, KaOarrep X e y o v o i r iv e s ' ovrcov fiev y a p
327 b e n rcov fiiyOevrcav Kal fir) fjXXoicofievcov ovhev /iaXa The other two being ttyr} (eh. 0) and iroictv tea1 iraoxeiv
(chs. 7-9).
252

it will be in a condition of having been divided ; for
since it can be divided, nothing impossible results.
And, in general, it is strange that it should happen
in this way only, namely, if the bodies are being
sp lit; for this theory does away with alteration,
whereas we see the same body remaining in a state
of continuity, though it is at one time liquid and at
another solid, and it has not undergone this change by
division or composition, nor yet by turning and
mutual contact, as Democritus declares ; for it has
not become solid instead of liquid through any change
of arrangement or alteration of its substance, nor do
there exist in it those hard and congealed particles
which are indivisible in their bulk, but it is liquid and at
another time hard and congealed uniformly through
out. Furthermore, it is also impossible for there to
be growth and diminution ; for if there shall be any
addition as opposed to a change in the whole, either
by the admixture of something or by a change in the
body itself no part of it will have become greater.
Let this, then, be our explanation of the way in
which things generate and act and come into being
and are acted upon by one another, and the manner
in which these processes can occur and the impossible
theories which some philosophers enunciate.
10.
It now remains to consider mixture by the The nature
same kind of method ; for this is the third of the ^ 5?^
subjects originally proposed. W e must consider ^Wnawhat mixture is and what it is that can be mixed how it
and of what things mixture is a property and how ; takes pIace*
and, further, whether there is such a thing as mixture,
or is it a fiction. For, according to some people, it is
impossible for one thing to be mixed with another ;
for (a) if the ingredients still exist and are not altered
253
ARISTOTLE
327 b
Aov vvv fiepuxOai </>a(JLv V nporepov, aAA* ofioicos

e^ctv, Oarepov 8c cfrOapevros ov fiefiixOai, aAAa
/lev
etvai ro
to
S ovk etvai, rrjv Se fiiiv ofioicos
5 exovrcov etvai rov avrov Sc rponov Kal ct afi(f>orepcov ovveXOovrwv
e</)0aprai rcbv fiiyvvfievcov
eKarepov ov yap etvai fiefiiy[leva rd y e oXcos ovk

ovra,
OSros fiev ovv o Xoyos cot/cc rjreiv Siopioai r i
Sia<f>epei fiiis yeveoecos Kal cf>0opds, Kal r i ro fiiktov rov yew rjrov Kal c/>0aprov* SrjXov yap cos Set
io Sia<j>epeiv, einep e o n v .
w ore rovrw v ovrwv <avc-
pwv ra SianoprjOevra Xvoivr av.

*
AAAa fifjv ovSe rrjv vXrjv r w
cj>afiev ov Sc fiiyvvoO ai Kaiofievrjv, ovr
nvpl fiefiixOai
avrrjv avrrjs
rois fiopiois ovre rw nvpl, aAAa t o fiev nvp yiveoOai,

rrjv Se <f>0eipeoOat.
rov avrov Se rponov ovre rw
15 ow fia n rrjv rpocfyrjv ovre ro oxfjfia rw Krjpw fiiyvvfievov oxrjfiariêiv rov o y K o v ovSe ro owfia Kal ro
XevKov ovS' oXws ra naOrj Kal ras eeis otov re
fiiyvvoOai rots n p a yjia oiv owôfieva yap oparai.
aAAa fifjv ov Se
to
XevKov y e Kal rrjv eniorfjfirjv
evSex^rai jiixOfjvai, ov S aAAo rw v firj x^pvorw v
20 ovSev.
aAAa rovro Xeyovoiv ov KaXws oi navra
nore ofiov <j>aoKovres etvai Kal fiefiixOai ov yap

i.e. u white and knowledge cannot exist by them-
254

at all, they are no more mixed than they were before,
but are in a similar state ; and (6) if one ingredient
is destroyed, they have not been mixed, but one
ingredient exists while the other does not, whereas
mixture is composed of ingredients which remain
what they were before ; and in the same way (c) even
if, both the ingredients having eome together, each
o f them has been destroyed, there is no mixture ; for
things whieh have no existence at all cannot have
been mixed.
This argument, then, seems to seek to define in
what respect mixing differs from coming-to-be and
passing-away, and how that which is mixed differs
from that whieh comes-to-be and passes-away ; for
obviously mixture, if there is such a thing, must
be something different. W hen, therefore, these ques
tions have been cleared up, our difficulties would be
solved.
Now we do not say that wood has mixed with fire
nor that it mixes, when it is burning, either with its
own particles or with the fire, but we say that the
fire comes-to-be and the wood passes-away. Similarly
we do not say that the food mixes with the body or
that the shape mixes with the wax and so forms the
lump. Nor can body and white be 14 mixed
together, nor, in general, can properties and
44 states be mixed with things ; for we see them
persisting unchanged. Again, ** white '* and know
ledge cannot be mixed together, nor any of the
terms which cannot be used separately. This is
what is wrong in the theory of those who hold that
formerly all things were together and mixed ; for
selves; a man can be white ** and learned, but these attri
butes can only exist as properties of someone.
255
ARISTOTLE
327 b
anav an avn fiiKrov, aAA* vnapxîv Set xcopiarov

eKarepov
Xcopiorov.
rcbv fitxOevrwv'
enei
rcbv
Se
naOwv
ov Sev
eart ra fiev ovvafiet ra o
evepyela rcbv ovrcov, evSeêrat ra fiixOevra etvai

25 ttcos Kal fifj etvai, evepyela fiev erepov ovros rov
yeyovoros e avrwv, Svvafiei S ert eKarepov arrep

fjoav nplv fiixOrjvai, Kal
anoXwXora rovro
ovk
yap o Xoyos Sirjnopei nporepov9 cf)alverai Se ra

fiiyvvfieva nporepov re e/c Kexcopiofievcov ovviovra
Kal Svvdfieva x<*>pl&oOai naXiv.
ovre Siafievovoiv
so ofiv evepyela wonep ro owfia Kal ro XevKov, ovre

(f>Oelpovrai, ovre Oarepov ovr
fj Svvafiis avrw v.
dfi<f>co' owêrai yap
Sto ravra fiev dcf>eloOw ro
Se avvex^s rovrois anoprjfia Statpereov, norepov fj

filis npos rfjv aioOrjoiv r l e o n v .
*Orav yap ovrw s els fiiKpa SiaipeOfj rd fityvv35 fiev a,
Kal reOfj nap* dXXrjXa rovrov rov rponov
w ore fifj SrjXov eKaorov etvai rfj aloOfjoei, rore

328
a fie fiiK ra i fj o v , aAA* e o n v w o re o n o v v n a p * ortovv etvai fiopiov rw v fiixOevrwv ;
Xeyerai fiev ofiv
eKelvws, olov KpiOas fiefilxOat nvpots, orav fjn oovv

napy ovnvovv reOfj.
einep Kal e o n
5 onovv
256
el Sy eorl nav owfia Siaiperov,
owfia ow fia n fiiKrov ofioiojiepes,
av Seoi fiepos yiveoOai napy o n o vv .
enel

everything cannot be mixed with everything, but
each of the ingredients which are mixed must origi
nally exist separately, and no property can have a se
parate existence. Sinec. however, some things have
a potential, and other things an actual, existence, it
is possible for things which combine in a mixture
to be in one sense and not-be in another, the
resulting compound formed from them being actnally
something different but each ingredient being still
potentially what it was before they were mixed and
not destroyed. (This is the difficulty which arose in
our earlier argument, and it is clear that the ingredi
ents of a mixture first come together after having
been separate and can be separated again.) They
do not actually persist as body and white, nor
are they destroyed (either one or both of them), for
their potentiality is preserved.
Let us, therefore,
dismiss these questions, but the problem closcly con
nected with them must be discussed, namely, whether
mixture is something relative to perception.
When the ingredients of the mixture have been
divided into such small particles and so set side by
side with one another that each is not apparent to
the sense-pcrception, have they then been mixed ?
Or is this not so, and is mixture of such a nature that
every particle of one ingredient is side by side with
a particle of the other ingredient ? The term cer
tainly is used in the former sense ; for instance, we
say that barley is mixed with wheat when each grain
of barley is placed side by side with a grain of wheat.
But if every body is divisible, then since body mixed
with body is made up of like parts, every part of each
ingredient ought to be side by side with a part of the
other. But since it is not possible for a body to be
K
257
ARISTOTLE
328
e o n v els raXaxôra StaipeOrjvai, ovre ovv -
ovk
deois ravro Kal fiiîs aAA* erepov, SrjXov ats ovre

Kara
fiiKpa
owôfieva
Set r a
fiiyvvfieva
<f>aval
fiepuxOaL (ovvOeois yap eorai Kal ov Kpaois ovSe
10 filijts, ov8' eei rov avrov Xoyov rw oXw ro fiopiov.

</)afiev he heiv,1 einep fiefii Krai,2 ro fiixOev ofioiofiepes etvai, /cat wonep rov vharos ro fiepos vhwp,
ovrw
av S fj Kara fiiKpa
Kal rov KpaOevros.
ovvOeois fj filijis, ovOev ovfiftfjoerai rovrw v, aAAa

fiovov fiefiiyfieva npos rrjv atoOrjoiv Kal ro avro
15 rw fiev fiefiiyfievov, eav fifj fiXenrj ov, rw A v y Kei S ovSev fiefiiyfievov) ovre rfj hiaipeoei wore
o n ovv nap* on ovv fiepos* ahvvarov yap ovrw SiatpeOrjvai.
fj ovv
ovk
e o n filîs, fj XeKreov rovro
nw s evhexerai yiveoOai naXiv.
"Eart hfj, ws etf>afiev, rw v ovrwv ra fiev noirjriKa,

ra 8* vno rovrw v naOrjriKa.
ra fiev ovv a v n -
20 orpe<f>ei, oowv fj avrfj vXrj eori, Kal noirjriKa aAXfjXwv /cat naOrjriKa vn * aXXrjXwv* ra
anaOrj ovra, oowv fifj fj avrfj vXrj.
oSv
ovk
e o n fiiîs* Sto ovS* fj larpiKfj noiei vyieiav
ovh* fj vyleia fiiyvvfievrj rois owfiaoiv.

r
Sc noiei
rovrw v fiev
2 f it f i t K T a t
F:
1 5> E^
f i f i i x O a t
E : Set f i f i i x O a t
rw v he
I#.
a One of the Argonauts, famous for his keen sight

(Apollonius Rhodius i. 153 ff.).
258

divided into its smallest parts and composition
and mixture are not the same thing but different, it
is clear (a) that we must not say that the ingredients,
if they are preserved in small particles, are mixed
(for this will be composition and not blending
or mixing, nor will the part show the same ratio
between its constituents as the whole ; but we say
that, if mixing has taken place, the mixture ought
to be uniform throughout, and, just as any part of
water is water, so any part of what is blended should
be the same as the whole. But if mixing is a com
position of small particles, none of these things will
happen, but the ingredients will only be mixed
according to the standard of sense-perception, and
the same thing will be a mixture to one man, if he
has not sharp sight, but to the eyes of Lynceus a
will not be mixed) ; it is also clear ([b) that we must
not say that things are mixed by means of a division
whereby every part of one ingredient is set by the
side of a part of the other ; for it is impossible for
them to be thus divided. Either, then, there is no
mixing, or another explanation must be given of the
way in which it occurs.
Now, as we maintained, some of those things winch
exist are capablc of action and others capable of
being acted upon by them.
Some things, then,
namely, those whose matter is the same, recipro
cate, that is, are capable of acting and being acted
upon by one another, while other things, namely,
those which have not the same matter, act but are
not liable to be acted upon. O f the latter, then, no
mixing is possible ; hence, neither the art of healing
nor health mixing with the patients bodies can pro
duce health. But of things wrhich are capable of
259
ARISTOTLE
328 a
rroirjriKwv Kal rraOrjnKwv ooa v8 t,a(pTa,

25 fiev
7ToXXa
oXlyois Kal fieyaXa fiiKpois ovvnOefieva ov
rroiei fiiijiv, aAA avrjoiv rov Kparovwos fierafiaXXei yap Oarepov els ro kpar ovv t olov oraXayfios
otvov fivplois x ^Gtv vSaros ov filyvvrai Xverai
yap rd ethos Kal fieraftaXXei els ro
orav Se rats
rrav v 8 a>p.
hvvdfxeoriv tera77 7tods, rore fiera-
30 jSaAAet fiev eKarepov els ro Kparovv eK rrjs avrov

<j>voews, ov yiverai Sc darepov, aAAa fiera^v Kal
k o iv o v .
O a vepov ovv o n ravr
e o n fiiKra ooa evavriwotv
e^ et rw v rroiovvrwv ravra yap
eorl rradrjriKa.
filyvvrai
8fj vr: aXArjXcuv
Kal fiiKpa Se fiiKpois rrapanOefieva
fiaXXov paov
yap
Kal
Oarto v
aXXrjXa
35 (leOlorrjoiv.
ro Se ttoXv Kal vtto noXXov xpovitos
8pa.
810 ra evopiora tw v Staiperwv Kal
328 b rovro
7radrjTiKcbv fiiKra (Siaipeirai yap els fiiKpa ravra

paSwsmrovro yap tfv ro evoplorw elvai), otov ra
vypa fxiKra fiaXiora rcbv o w fia rw v evopiorov yap
fiaXiora t o vypov tw v Siaiperwv, eav firj yXioxpov
ravra yap
8fj rrXeiw Kal fiei^w fiovov rroiei
rev oyKov.
orav S 77 Oarepov fiovov rraOrjriKOv fj
o<j>68pa, t o
Se rrdfirrav rjpefia, fj ov 8 ev rrXeiov ro
260

action and capable o f being acted upon, those which
are easily divisible, when many of one of them are
compounded with few of another or a large bulk with
a small, do not produce a mixture but an increase of
the predominant ingredient, for there is a change
of the other ingredient into the predominant. (For
example, a drop o f wine does not mix with ten thou
sand measures of w'ater, for its form is dissolved and
it changes so as to become part of the total volume
of water.) But when there is some sort of balancc
betwreen the active powers, then each changes from
its own nature into the predominant ingredient,
without, howrever, becoming the other but something
betw'een the twro with common properties.
It is clear, therefore, that those agents are capable Aristotles
of admixture which show contrariety, for these can tixture.
be acted upon by one another ; and they mix all the
better if small particles of the one ingredient are
set side by side with small particles of the other, for
then they more easily and more quickly cause a
change in one another, whereas a large quantity of
one takes a long time' to be affected in this way by
a large quantity o f the other. Hence, those of the
divisible and susceptible materials whose form is
easily modified are capable of mixture ; for they are
easily divided into small particles (for that is w'hat
to be easily modified in form means) ; for example,
the liquids are the most mixable of bodies, since
of divisibles liquid is the most easily modified in
form, provided it is not viscous (for viscous liquids
merely increase the volume and bulk). But when
one only of the ingredients is susceptible to action
or is excessively susceptible, wrhile the other in
gredient is only slightly so the result of the mixture
261
ARISTOTLE
328b
fllXOeV
d[l<f)0 iv fj flLKpOV, 07Tp OVflfiaivei 7Tpl
rov Karr irepov Kal to v xoXkov.
evia yap ifteXAi-
10 erai npos aXXrjXa tcov ovrcov Kal enajitjxyreplêr

<f>aiverai
yap
ncos
Kal
[uktcl
fjpefia,
Oarepov fiev Scktikov Oarepov 8* etSos.
Kal
cos
onep enl
tovtcov ovfiftaiver o yap Karrirepos cos naOos t l

cov avev vXrjs rov âA/cov oxeSov d<j>avieTai, Kal
fiLxOels aneioi x p ^ f^ ^ io a s fiovov.
ravro Se to v to
ovfipaiveL Kal icff erepaiv.

15
<&avepov roivvv Ik tcov elprjfievcov Kal o tl e o n

fii^LS Kal r i e o n Kal Sia ri, Kal nola finera rcbv
ovrcov, enelnep eorlv evia roiavra ota naOrjriKa
re vn aXXfjXcov Kal evopiora Kal evSiaipera 9 ravra
yap
ovr*
ecf>0dp0<u avayKrj
fiefiiyfieva
ovr
en
ravra anXcbs etvai, ovre ovvOeoiv etvai rrjv fiiîv
20 avrebv, ovre npos rrjv aioOrjoiv aAA* e o n fiiKrov

fiev o av evopiorov ov naOrjnKov fj Kal noirjriKov
Kal Toiovrcp fiiKrov (npos oficbvvfiov yap to jilktov),
fj Se fiiijis rcbv fiiKrcbv aAAoicoOevrcov evcoois.

of the two is no greater in volume or very little
greater, as happens when tin and copper are mixed.
For some things adopt a hesitant and wavering atti
tude towards one another, for they appear somehow
to be only slightly 44 mixable, one, as it were, acting
in a 44receptive manner, the other as a 44form. This
is what happens with these metals ; the tin almost
disappears as though it were a property of the copper
without any material of its own and, after being
mixed, almost vanishes, having only given its colour
to the copper. And the same thing happens in other
instances too.
It is clear, then, from what has been said, that there
is sueh a process as mixing, and what it is, and how
it occurs, and what kind of existing things are mixable, seeing that some things are of such a nature
as to be acted upon by one another and easily modi
fied in shape and easily divisible. For it does not
necessarily follow either that they are destroyed by
having been mixed, or that they simply remain
still the same, or that their 44 mixture is composi
tion, or only dependent on perception ; but any
thing is mixable whieh, being easily modified in
shape, is eapable o f acting or being acted upon, and
is 44 mixable with something o f the same kind as
itself (for the term 14 mixable is used in relation to
something else which is also called 44 mixable ), and
mixture is the union o f 44 mixables, when they have
undergone alteration.
B
328
b 26
1. II Cpt flV ofiv flleiOS Kal a(f>7JS Kal TOV nOieiV

Kal 7rackety elprjrai ttcos vnapxî Tfe /tCTajSaAAovat Kara c/)voiv, ti Sc 7rcpt yeveaecos Kal <j>0o~
30
pas tt\s anXrjs, ttcos Kal tivos1 earl Kal Sta t'iv
aiTiav. ofioicos Sc Kal nepl aXXoicboecos eiprjTat, rt
ro aXXoiovoOai Kal t w c^ct 8ia<f>opav avrcDv. Aot7rov
Sc Oecoprjaat 7rcpt r a KaXovfieva oroixîa tcov acofiaTCov.
rcVecrts* /x cv
a v v e o T c b a a is
fia r c o v '
35 cf> a o w
yap
to v tc o v
etv a i
/c a t
o v a ia is
Sc
fiia v ,
<f>9opa
ovk
ttjv
o to v
a vev
329 a f i e r a ^ v t o v t c o v , a c b f i a r c
n X e ic o
to v
a p td fio v
a io O r jT c b v o c o -
v n o K e ifie v y jv
a epa
evos,
ov
oi
r a tS cf> vo et
n a a a is
tc o v
v X r jv
r tflc W c ?
/cat
fie v
i)
ol
x a)Pl(JT^v>
nvp
fie v
7rvp 17 r t
Kal
oi
Sc
y r jv ,
oi
S c T a v r a t c /cat a e p a T p fr r o v , o t 8 c /cat v8a>p t o v t o j v

T era p rov,
fie v c o v
Kal
w on ep
'J Z f in e h o K X r j s '
Sta/cp* v o f i e v c o v
rj
e(j
cov
o v y K p iv o -
a X X o io v fie v c o v
o v fi-
5 f i a i v e w t t j v y e v e o w K a l t t j v (f> 9 o p o v t o i s n p a y f i a a i v .
fiev ofiv Ta npebra apxas Kal o t o t ^ c t a / c a Xeyeiv, c o t 10 avvofioXoyovfievov, e cov

fieTapaXXovrcov rj Kara ovyKpioiv Kal S t a /c p t a t v fj
"O ti
Acas*
c^ ct
1 7tu>$
7TU)S H L .
264
Kal tiv o s
.PI)'* i tIv o s
Kai
ttcos E.l* :
Kai
tiv o s
Kai
BOOK II
1. W e have now dealt with the way in which mixture, chapters
contact and action-and-passion are attributable to j n ^ cowes.
things which undergo natural change ; we have, to-be and
passes-away
moreover, explained how unqualified coming-to-be consists of
and passing-away exist, and with what they are
concerned and owing to what cause they occur, simple
Similarly, we have dealt with alteration and ex- *w/t'are
plained how it differs from coming-to-be and passing- they
away. It remains to consider the so-called elements combine /
of bodies.
Coming-to-be and passing-away occur in all natu- views held
rally constituted substances, if we presuppose the schools^"8
existence of perceptible bodies. Some people assert
that the matter underlying these bodies is one ; for
example, they suppose it to be Air or Fire, or an
intermediate between these two, but still a single
separate body. Others hold that there are more than
one material, some thinking that they are Fire and
Earth, others adding Air as a third, others (like
Empedocles) adding Water as a fourth ; and it is,
they say, from the association and separation or
alteration o f these that coming-to-be and passingaway of things comes about.
Let us, then, be agreed that the primary materials
from the changes of which, either by association or
by separation or by some other kind of change,
26$
ARISTOTLE
329 m
Kar aXXrjv fierafioXrjv ovfifiaivei yeveaiv etvai Kal

cf)9opdv. aAA oi fiev noiovvres filav vXrjv napa
10 r a elprjfieva, ravrrjv Sc owfiariKrjv Kal xwpiorfjv,
afiapravovoiv * aSvvarov yap avev evavnw oew s et
vai ro owfia rovro aioOrjrrjs1' fj yap Kod<f>ov rj
fiapv fj i/wxpov rj Oepfiov avayKrj etvai ro arretpov
r ovro, o Xeyovoi rives etvai rrjv apxfjv. w s S ev
rw Tifiaiw yeypan rai, ovSeva ex*i Siopiofiov* ov
15 yap eiprjKe oa<f>ws ro navSexes, el x wP%Tai rw v
oroixîwv.
ov Sc xPVrai vSevs <f)fjoas etvai vnoKeifievov ri rois KaXovfievois oroixîois nporepov,
olov xPvov rois pyois rois x/twcrot?. (Kairoi Kal
rovro ov KaXws Xeyerai rovrov rov rponov Xeyofievov, aAA wv fiev aXAolwois, e o n v ovrw s, wv
20 Sc yeveois Kal (j>6opd, aSvvarov cVccivo n p ooa yopeveoOai c ov yeyovev.
Kairoi y e <f>rjoi fiaKpw
aXrjOeorarov etvai XPV V Aeyeiv eKaorov etvai)
aAAa rwv oroixîwv ovrwv orepewv fiexpi enmeSwv
noieirai rrjv avaXvoiv aSvvarov Se rrjv nOfjvrjv
Kal rrjv vXrjv rrjv npwrrjv ra enineSa etvai. fjfie is
25 Sc <f>afiev fiev etvai n v a vXrjv rw v owfiarwv rw v
aloOrjrwv, aAAa ravrrjv ov x ^ P ^ rrjv aAA act fier*
evavn w oew s, c fjs yiverai ra KaXovfiev a orot^cla.
Siwpiorai Se nepl avrwv ev erepois aKpifteorepov.
ov firjv aAA eneiSfj Kal rov rponov rovrov e o n v
eK rrjs vXrjs ra owfiara ra npw ra, Siopioreov Kal
30 nepl rovrw v, apxyjv fiev Kal npwrrjv olofievois etvai
1 a l a O r jr ijs 1 1 J :
a lo O rjro v
to
a ia O r jr o v
a t o O r jT o v o v L .
Plato, Timaeus 51 a .
b Ibid. 49 d 50 c.
c Ibid. 53 c IF.
d Ibid. 49 a .
Phys. i. 6 and 7.
266
COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, II. 1

coming-to-be and passing-away occur, are rightly
described as sources and41elements/* But (a) those
who postulate that there is a single matter, besides
the bodies which we have mentioned, and that this
is corporeal and separable, are mistaken ; for it is
impossible that this body can exist without " per
ceptible contrariety, for this infinite, which some
say must be the source of reality, must be either
light or heavy, or hot or cold. And (6) what is written
in the Timaeus a is not accurately defined ; for Plato
has not clearly stated whether his omnirecipient99
has any existence apart from the elements, nor does
he make any use of it, after saying that it is a sub
stratum prior to the so-called elements, just as gold
is the substratum of objects made of gold. (Y et put
in this way the statement is not a happy one. Things
of which there is coming-to-be and passing-away
cannot be called after that out of which they have
come-to-be, though it is possible for things which are
altered to keep the name of that o f which they are
alterations.
However, what he actually says 6 is
that by far the truest account is to say that each of
the objects is gold.) However, he carries the ana
lysis of the elements, though they are solids, back
to planes, and it is impossible for the Nurse, d
that is the primary matter, to consist of planes. Our
theory is that there is matter of which the perceptible
bodies consist, but that it is not separable but always Aristotle's
that
accompanied by contrariety, and it is from this that view
the ele
ments
are
the so-called elements come into being ; but a more
primary
accurate account of these things has been given else matter
certain
w here/ However, since the primary bodies are also and
** con
derived in this way from matter, we must explain trarieties.
about these also, reckoning as a source and as primary
267
ARISTOTLE
329
Sc rots
rrjv vArjv rfjv axwpiorov fiev, vnoKeifievrjv
evavriois' ovre yap ro Oepfiov vArj rcb ifjvxpw ovre

rovro
rcb
Oepficb,
aAAa ro
vnoKeifievov dfi(f>otv.
w ore npwrov fiev ro Svvafiei ocbfia aloOrjrov apxfj,

Sevrepov
S ai evavnw oeis, Aeyw S otov Oepfiorrjs

S rjSrj nvp Kal vSwp Kal rd
35 Kal ifjvxporrjs, rpirov
329 b roia vra ravra fiev yap fierafiaAAei els aAArjAa,
(ouSc
S evavnwoeis ov fiera-
Kal ovx ***$ *EfineSoKAfjs Kal erepoi Aeyovoiv

yap av fjv aAAoiwois), ai
aAA* ovSev fjrrov Kal ws owfiaros
paAAovoiv.
noias Kal nooas AeKreov apxds' ol fiev yap aA5
Aot vnoOefievoi xp&vrai, Kal ovSev Aeyovoi Sta r i

avrai fj rooavrai.
2. *E7Tt ofiv ^rjrovfiev at oOrjrov owfiaros apxas,

~
naoai
at
rovro o e o n v anrov, anrov o ov rj atoorjois

(f>avepov o n
ov
evavnw oeis
owfiaros
io ct'S^ Kal apxds noiovoiv, aAAa fiovov at Kara rrjv

acf>fjvmKar evavriwolv re yap Siacfrepovoi, Kal Kara
dnrfjv evavrlwoiv.
Sto ovre AevKorrjs Kal fieAavia
ovre yAvKvrrjs Kal niKporrjs, ofioiws
aAAwv
oiScv
rw v
oroixeiov.
aloOrjrwv
evavnwoew v
ot5Se rw v
noiei
Kairoi nporepov oiftis a<f>fjs, wore Kal
15 to vnoKeifievov nporepov.
aAA ovk e o n owfiaros
anrov naOos fj anrov, aAAa KaO erepov, Kal el

ervx* rfj cf>voei nporepov.
A vrw v Se npwrov rwv anrwv
npwrai Siacftopal Kal evavn w oeis.
Statpereov noiai
eloi
evavn
woeis Kara rrjv d(f>rjv aiSe, Oepjiov t/tvxpov, tjrjpov
268
COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, II. 1-2

the matter which is inseparable from, but underlies,
the contrarieties ; for the hot is not matter for
the cold, nor 44the cold for the hot, but the sub
stratum is matter for them both. Therefore, firstly,
the potentially perceptible body, secondly, the con
trarieties (for example, heat and cold), and thirdly,
Fire and W ater and the like are 44 sources. For the
bodies in this third class change into one another
and are not as Empedocles and others describe them a
(otherwise alteration could not have taken place),
whereas the contrarieties do not change. Neverthe
less, even so the question must be decided what kinds
of contrariety and how many of them there are which
are sources of body ; for all other philosophers assume
and make use of them without stating why they are
these and why they are of a particular number.
2.
Since, therefore, we are seeking the sources of The conperceptible bodies, and this means tangible, and areF hot
tangible is that of which the perception is touch, it and coki^'
is clear that not all the contrarieties constitute and moist."
44 forms and 41 sources of body, but only those con
nected with touch ; for it is in the matter of con
trariety that they differ, that is, tangible contrariety.
Therefore neither whiteness and blackness, nor sweet
ness and bitterness, nor any of the other perceptible
contrarieties constitute an element. Y e t sight is
prior to touch, so that its subject is also prior ; but
it is a quality of tangible body not in virtue of its
tangibility but because of something else, even though
it happens to be naturally prior.
O f the tangible differences and contrarieties them
selves we must distinguish which are primary. The
following are contrarieties according to touch : hot
a i.e. as immutable.
2 69
ARISTOTLE
329 b
20 vypov, fiapv Kovcf>ov, OKXrjpov fiaXaKov, yXioxpov

K pavpov,
rpaxy
Xeiov,
Xenrov.
na^v
to v tco v
Se
f!apv fiev Kal Kovcf>ov ov noirjriKa ov Se naOrjriKa*

ov yap tco noietv n erepov fj iraoxeiv vcf>9 erepov
Xeyovrai .
Set Se noirjriKa
naOrjriKa r a
oroix^ta*
25 jSaAAct els aXXrjXa.

vypov
tco
Kal
ijr jp o v
ra
etvai
fily v v r a i
aXXrjXcov
yap
Kal
Kal fie r a -
Oepfiov Se Kal ifjvxpov Kal

fie v
rep noirjriKa etvai
naOrjriKa Xeyerai Oepfiov yap eori
ra
Sc
ovy-
to
Kptvov ra ofioyevrj (to yap SiaKpiveiv, onep cf>aol

TTOietv
TO
TTVp, O V y K p lV lV
O T l TOL OflO<f)VAa* O V f l -
jSatVct yap eaipetv ra aXXorpia), ifwxpov Se ro

30 ovvayov Kal oxryKptvov ofioicos ra re ovyyevrj Kal
ra
fiff 6fio<f>vXa,
Sc to
vypov
e v o p io ro v ov, ijrjpov Sc
opcp, Svoopiorov Sc.
y X io x p o v
K al
at
K al
aXXai
to
a o p io r o v
e v o p io ro v
o lK eicp
fie v
o p to
olKeicp
to Sc Xenrov Kal naxv Kal
K pavpov
S ia cf> o p a l
Kal
O K X r jp o v
Kal
eK
rovrcov
en el
35 avanXrjoriKov e o n rov vypov Sta
to
fia X a K o v
yap
ro
firj coploOai
330* fiev evopiorov S etvai Kal aKoXovOetv tco anrofievcp,
ro
Se Xenrov
avanXrjoriKov
(Xenrofiepes
y a p , Kal r o fiiK pofiepes av a n X rjoriK ov oXov y a p

270

and cold, dry and moist, heavy and light, hard and
soft, viscous and brittle, rough and smooth, coarse
and fine. O f these heavy and light are not active nor
yet passive ; for they do not get their names because
they act on something else or are acted upon by some
thing else ; elements, on the other hand, must be
mutually active and passive, for they mix and change
into one another. But hot and cold, and dry and
moist are terms of which the first pair get their names
because they are active, the second pair because they
are passive ; for hot is that which associates things
of the same kind (for to dissociate, which, they say,
is an action of Fire, is to associate things of the same
class, since the result is to destroy things which are
foreign), but cold is that which brings together and
associates alike both things which are of the same
kind and things which are not of the same class.
Moist is that which, though easily adaptable to form,
cannot be confined within limits o f its own, while dry
is that which is easily confined within its own limits
but is not easily adaptable in form. From the moist
and the dry are derived the fine and the coarse, the
viscous and the brittle, the hard and the soft and the
other contrasted pairs. For since capacity for filling
up something is characteristic of the moist, because
it is not confined within bounds but is adaptable in
form and follows the shape of that which comes into
contact with it,&and that which is fine is capable
of filling up something (for it consists of small par
ticles, and that which consists of small particles is
capable of filling up something, for the whole is in
a Aristotle means liquid.
*
e.g.%water conforms with the shape of the vessel into
which it is poured.
271
ARISTOTLE
330 4
oXov a7TTTCU* TO Sc Ac7rTOV fldXlOTa TOLOVTOV),

<fxLVpOV OTL TO flV XeTTTOV eOTOL TOV VypOV, TO
5 Trayy tov ijrjpov.
nrdXw Sc to fiiv yX ioxpov
Si
tov
v ypov ( t o y a p yX ioxpov vypov 7T7T0v66 s tl cotlv,

olov to eAalov), to Si K pavpov tov ijrjpov K pavpov
yap
COOT* Kal 7T7T7)yVaL St*
TO TcAcO)? fypOV,
eXXen/jLV vyporrjros- 'tl to fiiv fiaXaKov tov vypov

(fiaXaKov yap to vrreLKov ct? iavro Kal fifj fie0LOTa10 flVOV, 07Tp 7TOLL TO VypOV StO Kal OVK OTL TO
vypov fiaXaKov, aAAa to fiaXaKov
Sc oKXrjpov
rrrjyos,
to
tov
Si
tov
vypov), to
ijrjpov oKXrjpov yap iorL
rreTrrjyos ijrjpov.
to
rre-
Aeyerat Sc ijrjpov
Kal vypov 7rAcovaâ)?* avTt/cetTat yap to) ijrjpcp Kal

to
vypov Kal
15 ijrjpov Kal
ijrjpov Kal
to
Siepov, /cat 7raAtv to) uyp<J> /cat to
rrerrrjyos arravra Sc
to
tov
vypov
tw v
tovt *
eorl tov
7tpoorcov XexOivTCov.
errel
yap avTt/cctTat to) Stcpa) to ijrjpov, Kal Siepov fiev

ioTL to
exov aXXoTpiav vypoTtjTa errLrroXfjs, fte-
ftpeyfievov
Si
to
Tavrrjs, (f>avep6v
els fiaOos, ijrjpov

otl to
20 t o S avTLKelfievov ijrjpov
Si
to
vypov Kal
yap eoTL
Si
to
7rrjyos
25
to
to
Si
to
eoTeprjfievov
fiiv Stcpov carat tou vypov,

tov
rrpcbrov ijrjpov. iraAiv
rrerrrjyos cboavTWS' vypov fiiv
exov olKeiav vypoTrjTa , fiefipeyfievov

j8a0et, ire-
exov aXXoTpiav vypoTrjTa ev
tco
Si
w ore Kal
to
ioTcprjfievov Tavrrjs.
Si
tcov
corat to fiiv ijrjpov
otl
rraoaL at aAAat 8ta<opat avayovraL
to
vypov.
See 329 h 30 ff.

272
SrjXov
tov
tolvvv
els Tas
COMING-TO-BE AN D PASSIN G-AW AY, II. 2

contact with the whole, and that which is fine consists
of the smallest possible particles), it is clear that the
fine is derived from the moist and the coarse derived
from the dry. Again, the viscous is derived from the
moist (for that which is viscous is moisture which
has undergone a certain treatment, as in the case of
oil), and the brittle is derived from the dry ; for the
completely dry is brittle, so that it has bccome solid
through lack of moisture. Further, the soft is derived
from the moist (for the soft is that which gives way
and sinks into itself but docs not change its position,
as does the m o ist; hence, too, the moist is not soft,
but the soft is derived from the moist). The hard,
on the other hand, is derived from the dry ; for that
which has solidified is hard, and the solid is dry.
Now dry and moist are used in several senses ;
for both moist and damp are opposed to dry, and,
again, solid as well as dry is opposed to moist.
But all these qualities are derived from the dry and
the moist which we mentioned originally. For the
dry is opposed to the damp, and the damp is that
which has foreign moisture on its surface, soaked
being that which is damp to its innermost depth,
while dry is that which is deprived of foreign moisture.
Therefore, clearly the damp will be derived from
the moist, and the dry, which is opposed to it, will
be derived from the primary dry. So likewise, on
the other hand, with the moist and the solidified ;
for moist is that which contains its own moisture in
its depth, while soaked is that which contains foreign
moisture there, and solidified is that which has lost
its foreign moisture ; so that of these the latter
derives from the dry, the former from the moist. It
is clear, then, that all the other differences are re-
273
ARISTOTLE
330 m
npwras r err apas.

avrai Se ovKen els eXarrovs'
ovre yap ro Oepfiov onep vypov fj onep ijrjpov, ovre
to
vypov onep Oepfiov fj onep tfivxpov, ovre ro
i/jvxpov /cat t o ijrjpov ovO vn' aXXrjX ovO* vno ro
Oepfiov Kal ro vypov e io iv w or avayKrj rerrapas
elvai ravras.
30
3 . 9Knel Se rerrapa ra oroixeia, rcbv Se r e r rapcov
a I oveveis, ra S9 evavria ov n ecf>vKe
ovvSvaeoOai (Oepfiov yap Kal xjjvxpov elvai ro avro
Kal naXiv ijrjpov Kal vypov aSvvarov), <f>avepov
o n r err apes eoovrai ai rcbv oroixeiwv ovêvijeis,
330 b Oep/iov Kal rjpov, Kal Oepfiov Kal vypov, Kal naXiv
ipvxpov Kal vypov, Kal iffvxpov Kal ijrjpov.
Kal
fjKoXovOrjKe Kara Xoyov rois anXois <f>aivofievois
owfiaoi, nvpl Kal aepi Kal vSan Kal yrj t o fiev
yap nvp Oepfiov Kal ijrjpov, o S9 afjp Oepfiov Kal
5 vypov (olov dr fils yap o a fjp), ro S' vScop if/vxpov,
Kal vypov, fj Se yrj iftvxpov Kal ijrjpov, w o r 9 evXoyws
SiavefieoOai ras Siacf>opas rois npwrois owfiaoi,
Kal t o nXfjOos avrwv elvai Kara Xoyov. anavres
yap oi ra anXa owfiara oroixeia noiovvres ol [lev
tt
( ^t o /
r
^
ev, oi oe ovo, oi oe rpia, oi oe rerrapa n oiovoiv.
io oooi fiev ovv ev fiovov Xeyovoiv, etra nvKVwoei
Kal fiavwoei raXXa yewcboi, rovrois ovfifiaivei Svo
noieiv ras apxds, ro re jiavov Kal ro nvKvov fj
ro Oepfiov Kal ro ibvxpov ravra yap rd Srjuiovp^
\
t r
A /
*\
< O*
yovvra, ro o ev vnoKeirai Kauanep vArj.
oi o
evOvs Svo noiovvres, wonep YlapfieviSrjs nvp Kal
15 yrjv, rd fieraijv fiiyjiara noiovoi rovrw v, otov
aepa Kal vSwp. w oavrw s Se Kal oi rpia Xeyovres,
274
a i.e. are mathematically possible.
COM ING-TO-BE A N D PASSIN G-AW AY, II. 2-3

duced to the first four, and these cannot be further
reduced to a lesser num ber; for the hot is not that
which is essentially moist or essentially dry, nor is the
moist essentially hot or essentially cold, nor do the
cold and the dry fall in the category of one another
nor in that of the hot and m o ist; hence these must
necessarily be four of these elementary qualities.
3.
Now since the elementary qualities are four in The four
number and of these four six couples can be formed, quislesry
but contraries are not of a nature which permits of <hot>cold,
their being coupled for the same thing cannot be byybeingS
hot and cold, or again, moist and dry it is clear that together in
the pairs of elementary qualities will be four in different
number, hot and dry, hot and moist, and, again, X?tSeCftar
cold and moist, and cold and dry. And, according
to theory, they have attached themselves to the Earth, Air,
apparently simple bodies, Fire, Air, W ater and water?d
Earth ; for Fire is hot and dry, Air is hot and moist
(Air, for example, is vapour), W ater is cold and moist,
and Earth is cold and dry. Thus the variations are
reasonably distributed among the primary bodies,
and the number of these is according to theory.
For all those who make out that the simple bodies
are elements make them either one or two or three
or four. Therefore (a) those who hold that there is
only one and then generate everything else by con
densation and rarefaction, as a result make the sources
two in number, the rare and the dense or the hot
and the cold ; for these are the creative forces, and
the one underlies them as matter. But (6) those
who hold that there are two from the beginning
as Parmenides held that there were Fire and Earth
make the intermediates, Air and W ater, mixtures
of these ; and (c) the same thing is done also by
275
ARISTOTLE
330 b
KaOanep ITAarcov iv rats 8iaipeoeoiv ro yap fieoov
fiiyfia noiei*
Kal oêSov raura Aeyovoiv ot re
Suo Kal ol Tpla noiovvres* nArjv ol fiev refivovoiv
els Svo to fieoov, ol 8* ev fiovov noiovoiv.
evioi
20 8* evOvs rerrapa Aeyovoiv, otov JLfineSoKAfjs* ovvayei 8e Kal ovros els r a 8vo' rw yap nvpl raAAa
ndvra avnrlOTfoiv.
A )
V
*
\
a
<
> \
\
tt
U vk eart oe r o nvp Kai o arjp Kai eKaorov
rcbv elprjfievwv anAovv, aAAa fiiKrov. ra 8 anAa
roiavra fiev e o n v , ov fievroi ravra, otov el rt ra>
nvpl ofioiov, nvpoeiSes, ov nvp, Kal ro rep dept
25 aepoetSeV ofioiws Se /cam rcbv aAAwv. ro Se nvp
eorlv vnepf3oAvj Oepfiorrjros, wonep Kal KpvoraAAos
i/jvxporrjros* fj yap nfjgis Kal fj eois vnepfioAai
rives eioiv, fj fiev ipv^porrjros, fj Se Oepfiorrjros
el ovv o KpvoraAAos e o n nfjis vypov \fjv\pov, Kal
ro nvp eorai eois rjpov Oepfiov. Sto /cat ovSev
so ov r eK KpvoraAAov yiverai ovr * e/c nvpos,
"Ovrcov Se rerrdpwv rcbv anAwv owfiarwv, e/carepov roiv St>otv eKarepov rcbv ronwv eoriv nvp
fiev yap Kal afjp rov npos rov opov <f>epofievov, yfj
Se /cat v8cop rov npos ro fieoov.
Kal a/cpa fiev
/cat elAiKpiveorara nvp Kal yfj, fieoa Se Kal fie331 a fiiyfieva fiaAAov v8cop Kal afjp. Kal e/carepa e/carepois evavria nvpl fiev yap ivavriov v8cop, dept
Se yfj' ravra yap eK rcbv ivavricov naOrjfiarwv
a It is doubtful what is meant here. The commentator
Philoponos suggests that it was a collection of otherwise
unpublished doctrines of Plato and thinks that Aristotle is
referring to a theory of Plato that there was the great and
the small '* and a third apxji which was a mixture of these
and served as matter; but tnere is nothing to support this
theory. II. II. Joachim takes the Divisions to mean the
27fi

those who hold that there are three, as Plato does in
the Divisions, a for he makes the middle a
mixture. Those who hold that there are two and
those who postulate three say practically the same
things, except that the former divide the middle
into two, while the latter treat it as one. But (d)
some declare that there are four from the start, for
instance Empedocles, though he also reduces these
to two, for he too opposes all the others to Fire.
Fire, however, and Air and each of the other bodies
which we have mentioned are not simple but mixed,
while the simple forms of them are similar to them
but not the same as they are ; for example, that
which is like fire is fiery, not fire, and that which
is like air is air-like, and similarly with the rest.
But fire is an excess of heat, just as ice is an excess of
cold ; for freezing and boiling are excesses, the former
of cold, the latter of heat. If, therefore, ice is a
freezing of moist and cold, so fire will be a boiling
of dry and h o t ; and that is why nothing comes to
be from ice or from fire.
The simple bodies, then, being four in number,
make up two pairs belonging to two regions ; for
Fire and Air form the body which is carried along
towards the limit, while Earth and W ater form the
body which is carried along towards the ccntre b ;
and Fire and Earth are extremes and very pure,
while W ater and Air are intermediates and more
mixed. Further, the members of each pair are con
trary to the members o f the other pair, W ater being
the contrary of Fire, and Earth of Air, for they are
sections in the Timaens (35 a f f . ) , where Plato makes the
middle of his three kinds of substance a blend of the other
two.
6 Cf. De Caelo 308 a 14 ff.
277
ARISTOTLE
331a
ovveorrjKev. ov fifjv aAA* aTrAca? ye rerrapa ovra

evos eKaorov eon, yrj fiev ijrjpov fiaAAov rj ifwxpov>
vSwp Se ifwxpov [iciAAov fj vypov, afjp S vypov
fiaAAov 77 Oepfiov, nvp Se Oepfiov fiaAAov fj r)pov.
4.
E7ret Se Siwpiorai nporepov o n rois anAois
owfiaoiv e aAAfjAwv fj yeveois, apa Se Kai Kara

rrjv aioOrjoiv <f>aiverai yivofieva (ou yap av fjv aA-
10 Aoiwois Kara yap ra rw v dnrwv naOrj ff aAAoiwois

eon v), AeKreov ris o rponos rrjs els aAArjAa fierafioAfjs,
Kal
norepov
anav
anavros
yiveoOai
Svvarov fj ra fiev Svvarov rd 8* aSvvarov.
o n fiev
ofiv an avra ne<f>VKV els aAArjAa fierafidAAeiv, <j>avep o v ff yap yeveois els evavria Kal
evavriwv, ra
15 8e oroixeia navra eêt evavriwoiv npos aAArjAa

Sta to Tas Sia</>opds evavrias etvai rois fiev yap
dfi<f)6repai evavriai, otov nvpl Kal vSan (to fiev
yap rjpov Kal Oepfiov, to S vypov Kal ifivxpov),
rois S fj erepa fiovov, olov dept Kal vSan (to fiev
20 yap vypov Kal Oepfiov, ro 8e vypov Kal ipvxpov) .

w ore KaOoAov fiev <f>avepov o n nav Ik navros y i
veoOai ne<f>vKev, rjSrj 8e KaO* eKaorov ov âAe7rov
ISeiv n w s anavra fiev yap
e dndvrwv
eorai,
Sioioei Se rw Odrrov Kal fipaSvrepov Kal rw paov

Kal x a^7rcorepov.
25
ooa
fiev yap
eêt
ovfifioAa
npos aAArjAa, Taêta rovrwv fj fierdjHaois, ooa Se

De Caelo 304 b 23 ff.
278
COMING-TO-BE AN D PASSIN G-AW AY, II. 3-4

made up o f different qualities. However, since they
are four, each is described simply as possessing a single
quality, Earth a dry rather than a cold quality, Water
a cold rather than a moist, Air a moist rather than
a hot, and Fire a hot rather than a dry.
4.
Since it has been determined in a former dis- The four
cussion that the coming-to-be of simple bodies is b S s
out o f one another, and at the same time, too, ^ngejnto^
it is evident from sense-perception that they do in various
come-to-be (for otherwise there would have been no mannersalteration for alteration is concerned with the
qualities of tangible things), we must state (a)'what
is the manner of their reciprocal change, and (b)
whether any one of them can come-to-be out of any
other one of them, or some can do so and others
cannot. Now it is manifest that all of them are of
such a nature as to change into one another ; for
coming-to-be is a process into contraries and out of
contraries, and all the elements are characterized
by contrarieties one to another, because their dis
tinguishing qualities are contrary. In some of them
both qualities are contrary, for example, in Fire and
W ater (for the former is dry and hot, the latter is
moist and cold), in others only one, for example, in
Air and Water (for the former is moist and hot, the
latter is moist and cold). Hence, it is clear, if we
take a general view, that every one of them naturally
comes-to-be out o f every one of them and, if we take
them separately, it is not difficult now to see how
this happens ; for all will be the product of all, but
there will be a difference owing to the greater and
less speed and the greater and less difficulty of the
process. For the change will be quick in those things
which have qualities which correspond with one
279
ARISTOTLE
331 a
/ it]
c ^ c t , ppaoeia, oia t o
paov elvai t o ev rj ra
noXXa fieraftaXXeiv, otov k ttvpos fiev eorai arjp
darepov fierafidXXovros ( t o fiev yap fjv Oepfiov Kal
ijrjpov, t o Se Oepfiov Kal vypov, w ore av KparrjOfj
t o ijrjpov vno to v vypov, arjp eor a t ) .
naXiv Sc eij
30 aepos vSwp, eav KparrjOfj t o Oepfiov vtto to v ifjvxpov

(to
fiev yap fjv Oepfiov Kal vypov, t o Se ipvxpov Kal
vypov, w ore fierafiaXXovros to v Oepfiov vSwp eor at ) .

to v avrov Se rponov Kal eij vSaros yfj Kai k yfjs
TTvp' c^ct yap afi<f)w repos afi(f>w ovfijHoXa* t o fiev
35 yap vSwp vypov Kal ipvxpdv, fj Se yrj tfsvxpov Kal
ijrjpov, w ore KparrjOevros rov vypov yfj eorai.
Kal
331 b naXiv enel ro fiev nvp ijrjpdv Kal Oepfiov, fj Se yfj
ifjvxpov Kal i;rjp6v, eav <f>0apfj t o x/jvxpov, nvp eorai
io
k y fjs .
"Qore <f>avepov o n kvkXw re eorai fj yeveois
rois anXois owfiaoi, Kal paoros o v t o s o rponos
rrjs fierafioXfjs S t a t o ovfifioXa evvnapxeiv rois
e<f>eijfjs- k nvpos Se vScop Kal eij aepos yrjv Kal
naXiv eij vSaros Kal yfjs aepa Kal nvp evSexerai
fiev yiveoOai, ^ a A c 7 r c o T epov S c S t a t o nXeiovcov
etvai rrjv fierafioXfjv avayKrj yap, el eorai eij
vSaros nvp, </>0apfjvai Kal t o ifjvxpov Kal t o vypov,
Kal naXiv el k yfjs afjp, <f>Oaprjvai Kal ro ifjvxpov
Kal t o ijrjpov. woavrws Se Kal el k nvpos Kal
aepos vS(op Kal yfj, avayKrj dfi(/)6repa fieraftaXAeiv.
avrrj fiev ofiv xPOVL(x)T^Pa V yeveois * eav S c / c a a avfipoXa was originally used of two pieces of wood or
bone broken away from one another and kept by the two
parties to a contract as a means of identification.
280
COMING-TO-BE A N D PASSIN G-AW AY, II. 4

another, but slow when these do not exist, because
it is easier for one thing to change than for many ;
for example, Air will result from Fire by the change
of one quality ; for Fire, as we said, is hot and dry,
while Air is hot and moist, so that Air will result if
the dry is overpowered by the moist. Again, W ater
will result from Air, if the hot is overpowered by the
cold ; for Air, as we said, is hot and moist, while
Water is cold and moist, so that W ater will result if
the hot undergoes a change. In the same way, too,
Earth will result from W ater, and Fire from Earth ;
for both members of each pair have qualities which
correspond to one another, since W ater is moist and
cold, and Earth is cold and dry, and so, when the
moist is overpowered, Earth will result. Again, since
Fire is dry and hot, and Earth is cold and dry, if
the cold were to pass away, Fire will result from
Earth.
It is clear, therefore, that the coming-to-be of
simple bodies will be cyclical; and this manner of
changc will be very easy, because the corresponding
qualities are already present in the elements which
are next to one another. The change, however, from
Fire to W ater and from Air to Earth, and again from
W ater and Earth to Air and Fire can take place, but
is more difficult, because the change involves more
stages. For if Fire is to be produced from W ater,
both the cold and the moist must be made to passaway ; and, again, if Air is to be produced from
Earth, both the cold and the dry must be made to
pass-away. In like manner, too, if W ater and Earth
are to be produced from Fire and Air, there must
be a change of both qualities. This method of comingto-be is, therefore, a lengthier process ; but if one
281
ARISTOTLE
331 b
Tepov <f>dapfj Oarepov, paujv [xev, ovk els aXXrjXa

Se
fierdfiaois, aAA c/c nvpos fiev Kal vSaros
carat
15 vStop.
yfj Kal afjp, iij aepos Se Kal yfjs nvp

orav fiev yap rov
vSaros <f>0aprj to
/cat
iftvxpov
rov Se nvpos ro tjrjpov, afjp eorai (Xeinerai yap

rov fiev to Oepfiov rov Se to vypov), orav Se rov
fiev nvpos t o Oepfiov to v
Sta
to
XeineoOai to v
ifjvxpov.
vSaros ro vypov, yrj
fiev to
tjrjpov rov
Sc
to
(Loavrws Se Kal eij aepos Kal yrjs nvp
20 /cat vStop orav
fiev yap to v aepos <l>0apfj to Oepfiov
rrjs Se yrjs t o
ijrjpov, vStop eorai (Xeinerai yap
rov fiev t o vypov rrjs Se ro iftvxpov), orav

fiev aepos to vypov rrjs Se yrjs t o
Sta to
rov
XeineoOai rov fiev t o Oepfiov rrjs Se t o rjpov,
anep fjv nvpos.
25 fj
Sc
if/vxpov, nvp
Sc /cat
ofioXoyovfievrj
rfj aloOfjoei
rov nvpos yeveois 9 fiaXiora fiev yap nvp fj </>Xoij,
avrrj
eorl Ka7rvos Kaiofievos, o
Sc
Kanvos ei;
aepos Kal yrjs.
Ev Sc
rois e<f>efjs ovk ivSe'xerai <f>0apevros ev
eKarepco Oarepov rtbv oroix^ltov yeveoO at fiera ftaoiv els ovSev rw v otofidrtuv
afi<f)oiv fj ravra
30 eyxôpei
fj ravavria.
yiveoOai otbfia,
<f>0 apeirj t o ijrjpov, rov
otov el rov fiev nvpos
S* aepos
yap iv dfi(f>oiv ro Oepfiov iav

Oepfiov,
Xeinerai
Sta to XeineoOai ev
cf ovSerepwv Sc
ravavria,
ro v y p o v Xeinerai
S cf
ijrjpov
eKarepov ro
Kal
vypov.
i.e. those which pass into one another by the cyclical

process described in 331 b 2 ff.
282

quality of each element were to be made to pass away,
the change will be easier but not reciprocal ; but
from Fire and W ater will come Earth and (alterna
tively) Air, and from Air and Earth Fire and (alter
natively) W ater ; for when the cold of the W ater
and the dryness of the Fire have passed-away, there
will be Air (for the heat of the Fire and the moisture
of the W ater are left), but, when the heat o f the Fire
and the moisture of the W ater have passed-away,
there will be Earth, because the dryness of the Fire
and the cold of the W ater are left. In the same
manner also Fire and W ater will result from Air and
Earth ; for when the heat of the Air and the dryness
of the Earth pass-away, there will be W ater (for the
moisture of the Air and the cold of the Earth are
left), but when the moisture of the Air and the cold
of the Earth have passed-awray, there will be Fire,
because the heat of the Air and the dryness of the
Earth, wrhich are, as we sawr, the constituents of
Fire, are left. Now* the manner in which Fire comesto-be is confirmed by our sense-perccption; for
flame is the most evident form of Fire, and flame is
burning smoke, and smoke is composed of Air and
Earth.
No change, howrever, into any of the bodies can
take place from the passing-away of one of the
elements in each of them taken in their consecutive
order, because either the same or the contrary
qualities are left in the pair, and a body cannot cometo-be out of identical or contrary qualities ; for
example, it would not result if the dryness of Fire
and the moisture of the Air were to pass-awray (for
the heat is left in both), but, if the heat passes-away
from both, the contraries, dryness and moisture, are
283
ARISTOTLE
331 b
ofioiws Se /cat iv rots* aAAots* iv arraoi yap rois

i<f)^rjs ivvTrapxei ro
S* ivavriov.
fiev ravro r o
35 cooO9 afia SrjXov o n ra fiev i evos els ev fieraftaivovra ivos <f>0apivros yiverai, ra 89 e/c SvoTv
o n fiev ovv arravra e/c ttavros
332 a els ev rrXeiovwv.
yiverai, Kal riva
rpoirov els aXXrjXa fieraftaois
yiverai, eiprjrai.
5.
O v fifjv aAA* e n
avrwv.
Kal cSSe Oewpfjowfiev nepl
el yap i o n rcbv <(>voikwv owfiarwv vXrj,
5 worrep
Kal So/cet iviois,
vSwp
Kal afjp Kal ra
roiavra, avayKrj fjroi ev rj Svo etvai ravra rj TrXeio).

ev fiev Srj rrdvra ovx * v T> ^ v &epa rrdvra fj
vScop fj nvp fj yrjv, eirrep fj fieraftoXfj els ravavria.
et yap etrj afjp, el fiev
aAA ov yeveois.
vttofievei,
aXXolwais eorai
afia S ov S ovrcu So/cet, a>ore
* v\\)
io vowp etvat afia Kai aepa rj aAA o n o v v .

ns
evavrtajois
fiopiov
to
vvp
/cat 8ia<f>opa fjs
efet rt
5/
eorat orj
Oarepov
aAAa firjv ovk
otov Oepfiorrjra.
eorai ro ye rrvp afjp Oepfios* dXXoiwois re yap ro

to io v to v , Kal ov </>aiverai.
15 e/c 7wpos afjp, to v
fiaXXovtos
eora i.
afia Se rraXiv el eorai
Oepfiov els rovvavriov fieravrrapêi apa rw
K al eorai o afjp ifsvxpov rt.
w ore aSvvarov t o
nvp aepa Oepfiov etvai' afia yap
to
0 See Phys. 2M a 21 ff.

284
aepi rovro,
avro Oepfiov

left. So likewise with the others too ; for in all the
consecutive elements there exists one identical and
one contrary quality. It is, therefore, at the same
time clear that some elements come-to-be by being
transformed from one into one by the passing-aw ay
of one quality, but others come-to-be by being trans
formed from two into one by the passing-away of
more than one quality. W e have now stated that
all the elements come-to-be from any one o f them,
and how their change into one another takes
place.
5.
Let us, however, proceed to discuss the following Restatepoints about them. I f W ater, Air and the like are, SJSrfae of
as some people hold, matter for the natural bodies, chapter4,
there must be either one or two or more than two of tional
them.
Now they cannot all o f them be one (for evidence*
example, they cannot all be Air or Water or Fire or
Earth), because change is into contraries. For if
they were all Air, then, if Air continues to exist,
alteration will take place and not coming-to-be.
Furthermore, no one holds that W ater is at the same
time also Air or any other element. There will, then,
be a contrariety (or difference),6 and the other member
of this contrariety will belong to some other element,
for example, heat will belong to Fire. Fire, howrevcr,
will certainly not be hot air ; for such a change is
an alteration and also is not observed to happen.
Another reason, too, is that, if Air is to be produced
from Fire, it will be due to the changing of heat into
its contrary. This contrary, therefore, will belong
to Air, and Air m il be something cold ; hence it is
impossible for Fire to be hot air, for, in that case,
b e.g.%if Air is to alter into Fire, we must assign one of a
pair of contrary qualities to Air and the other to Fire.
285
ARISTOTLE
SS2>
aAAo Tt
K a l ifjv x p o v e o r a i .
e a r a t , K a l a X X rj
t i? uAtj
a p * dfi</> r e p a
to auro
K o iv ff.
cO S auTo? Aoyo? Trept d7rdvra)v, oti ouk eartv

20 ev toutodv e f o5 Ta Travra.
ye
napa
a ep os
otov
Kal n v p o s,
rtb v
Se
fier
e v a v n o r r jr o s '
a v r iw v
25
ra vra ,
a ep os
X en rorep ov
w or
ovk
fie a o v
fie v
eorai
aAAa
ov
n
fi r j v
a ep os
ovS
n a xvrep ov
yap
a fjp
* aAAo Tt
K a l v S a r o s fj
Kal n v p os,
Kal n v p
e/cetvo
a r e p r ja is r o e r e p o v r tb v ev -
eVSe'êTat
f i o v o v o d a i e K e i v o ox 58e-
n o r e , w a n e p <f>aai r i v e s r o a n e i p o v K a l r o n e p i e x o v .
o fio lw s
apa
onovv
rovrw v
fj o v S e v .
Et ovv firjSev atoOrjrov ye nporepov rovrwv, rav
ra av etrj ndvra . avayKrf rotvvv fj del jievovra Kal

dfierdftXrjra els aXXrjXa, fj fieraftaXXovra, Kal tj
dnavra, fj rd fiev rd S ov, wanep ev rw Tifiaiw
30 nAaTa>v eypaifjev.
o n fiev roivvv fier aftaXXeiv
avayKrj els aXXrjXa, SeSet/crat nporepov o n S ovx
ofiolws rax^ws aAAo e f aAAov, eiprjrai nporepov,
o n rd fiev exovra ovfiftoXov Oarrov yiverai e f
aXXffXwv, rd S o v k exovra ftpaSvrepov. el fiev
roivvv fj evavnorrjs fiia eorl KaO* fjv fieraftaX35 Xovoiv, avayKrf Suo etvat fj yap vXrj ro fieaov
Aristotles npwrr) vXtj.
b i.e. without having some quality attached to it.
e This was the doctrine of Anaximander.
d The boundless cannot exist without being qualified
by a contrary ; if it is qualified by a contrary, it is one of the
elements.
r i.e. there can be no simple bodies but Earth, Air, Eire
and Water.
1 Tinmens 54 b-u.
0 331 a 12 ff.
h See 331 a 23 ff. and note.
286

the same thing will be hot and cold. Both Fire and
Air will, therefore, be something else which is the
same, that is, there will be some other matter a
which is common to both.
The same argument holds good of all the elements
and shows that there is no single one of them from
which all are derived. Y e t neither is there anything
other than these from which they come, for example,
an intermediate between air and water (coarser than
Air, but finer than Water) or between Air and Fire
(coarser than Fire, but finer than Air). For the
intermediate will be Air and Fire with the addition
of a pair of contraries ; but one of the contraries will
be a privation, so that it is impossible for the inter
mediate to exist by itself,6 as some people c declare
that the boundless or all-embracing exists ; it
is, therefore, one of the elements (it does not matter
which), or nothing.*
If, therefore, there is nothing nothing perceptible
at any rate prior to the four elements, these must
be all that there are e ; it follows, therefore, neces
sarily, that they must either persist and be unable
to change into one another, or they must undergo
change, either all of them or some of them only, as
Plato wrote in the TimaeusS Now it has been shown
above 9 that they must change into one another;
and it has previously been stated that they do not
come-to-be equally quickly from one another, because
elements which have a corresponding quality h cometo-be more quickly out of one another, while those
which have not this do so more slowly. If, therefore,
the contrariety, in virtue of which they change, is
one, the elements must be two ; for the matter, which
is imperceptible and inseparable, is the intermediate
287
ARISTOTLE
avalodrjros ofioa Kal axwpioros. erret Se nXeiw

oparai ovra, Suo av efev at eXaxiorai. Svo S
ovrcov ovx *v rc rpia etvat, aAAa reooapa, (bo
nep (j>aiverar rooavrai yap at ovvyiar eij yap
ovowv ras Svo aSvvarov yeveoOat Sta t o evavrias
5 etvat aXXyXais.
332 b
H e pi fiev ofiv rovrcov eiprjrai nporepov* o n
eneiSfj fierafidXXovoiv els aXXrjXa, aSvvarov apxfjv

n v a etvai avrwv fj enl rw aKpco fj fieaw, e/c rwvSe
SfjXov.
enl [lev ovv rois aKpois
ovk
eorai, oti
nvp eorai fj yfj n avra* /cat o avros Xoyos rw cf>aval
10 e/c nvpos fj yfjs etvat navra* o n S oiSe fieaov,

wonep So/cet Ttoxv arjp fiev Kal els nvp fieraftaXXeiv
Kal els vSwp, vSwp Se Kal els aepa Kal els yfjv,
ra S eoxcira ovKen els aXXrjXa e/c TaivSe SrjXov' *
Set fiev yap arrjvai Kal fifj els aneipov rovro levai
en
evOeias e<f> eKarepa* aneipoi yap at evavrto-
15 rrjres enl rov evos eoovrai.

yrj ecf> w F , vSwp
(f> ai T , arjp e ft w A , nvp e fi w II. el Srj ro A
fieraftaXXei els r o II /cat T , evavnorrjs ear at t<Sv
A ll.
earw ravra XevKorrjs Kal fieXavla.
naXiv
el els rd T to A , eorai aAArf ov yap ravro ro T
/cat I I.
earw Se ijrjporrjs Kal vyporrjs, ro fiev
20 S rjporrjs, ro Se T vyporrjs . o v k o v v el fiev fievei
t o XevKov, vndpei ro vSwp vypov Kal XevKov, et
Se fifj, fieXav eorai t o vSwp- els ravavria yap fj
fieraftoXfj.
avayKrj apa fj XevKov fj fieAav efvat
1 K rufvhe hijXov add. Joachim.

a Bk. II. chs. 2 and 3.
288

between them. But since the elements are seen
to be more than two, the contrarieties would be at
least two ; but if the latter are two, the elements
cannot be three but must be four, as is evidently the
case ; for the couples are of that number, since,
though six are possible, two of these cannot occur
because they are contrary to one another.
These matters have been dealt with before, but
that, when the elements change into one another,
it is impossible for any one of them, whether at the
end or in the middle of the series, to be a source
is clear from the following considerations. There
will be no source at the ends, since they will all
be Fire or Earth ; and this is the same as arguing
that all things are derived from Fire or Earth. That
t h e 41 source cannot be in the middle either as some
people hold that Air changes both into Fire and into
Water, and Water both into Air and into Earth, while
the end-elements are not further changed into one
another is clear from these considerations. There
must be a halt, and the process cannot continue in
either direction in a straight line to infinity ; for,
otherwise, the number of contrarieties belonging to
a single element will be infinite. Let E stand for
Earth, W for W ater, A for Air and F for Fire. Then
(a), if A changes into F and W , there will be a con
trariety attaching to A F . Let this contrariety be
whiteness and blackness. Again (6), if A changes
into W , there will be another contrariety ; for W is
not the same as F. Let this contrariety be dryness (D)
and moisture (M ). If, then, the whiteness persists,
Water will be moist and white ; if not, W ater will be
black, for change is into contraries. W ater, therefore,
must be either white or black. Let it, then, be the
289
ARISTOTLE
332 b
to
e o r w hr) t o n p w r o v .
o fio ic o s r o iv v v
II t o S v n d p ^ e i rj tjrjp o rrjs . e o r a i a p a
25 Kai rep II rep n v p l fie r a fto X f) e ls r o v h w p * i v a v r i a
y a p v n a p x e i' r o fie v y a p n v p t o n p w r o v fie X a v fjv ,
v8a>p.
K a l rep
*r
& \
eneira be grjpov, ro o vowp vypov, eneira oe

XevKov, <f>avep6v hr) o n ndoiv c f aXXf)Xwv eorai
f) fierafioXf), Kal eni ye rovrwv, o n Kal ev rw T
rfj yfj
30 fieXav
vnapkei ra Xoma Kal hvo ovfiftoXa, ro

Kal ro vypov
Tatrra
yap ov ovvhehvaorai
nw s .
v r\
f /
> w
*t
\
Uri o eis aneipov ov% oiov r levai, onep fieAXffoavres Seiijeiv enl rovro efinpooOev fjXOofiev, hfjXov k rwvhe. el yap naXiv ro nvp, e<f> w H , els
aAAo fieraftaXei Kal firj avaKcxfixfiei, otov els ro *,
evavnorrjs n s rw nvpl Kal rw ' F
aAA rj vnapei
35 rwv elprjfievwv ovhevl yap ro avro vnoKeirai rwv

333 a T T A I I t o \ F . eorw hr) rw fiev I I to K , rw he
XF t o O . t o hr) K ndoiv vnapijei rois P T A I I *
aAAa yap rovro
aAA* eKeivo hfjXov,
o ti el naXiv ro ' F els aAAo, aAArf evavrtorrfs Kal
rw XF vnapijei Kal rw nvpl rw I I .
ofioiws S
fierapaXAovoi yap els aXXrjXa.

fiev eorw fifjnw heheiyfievov
del fierd rov npoorlOefievov evavnorrjs n s vnapijei

rois efinpooOev, w or
el aneipa, Kal evavnorrjres
aneipoi rw evl vnapovoiv.
el he rovro, ovk eorai
ovre opioaoOat ovhev ovre yeveoOar hef)oei yap,

el
aAAo eorai c f aAAou, rooavras SicfcXOeiv ev-
io avnorrjras,
290
Kal e n
nXeiovs,
w o r * els
evia fiev

first of these. Similarly, D will also belong to F ; there
fore a change into W ater will be possible also for Fire
(F) ; for it has qualities which are contrary to those of
W ater, since Fire was first black and then dry, while
Water was first moist and then white. It is clear,then,
that the change of all the elements from one another
will be possible, and that, in the above examples, E
(Earth) will possess also the two remaining corres
ponding qualities, blackness and moisture (for these
have not yet been in any way coupled together).
That the process cannot go on to infinity which
was the thesis that we were about to prove when we
digressed to the above discussion will be clear from
the following considerations. I f Fire (F) is to change
in turn into something else and not to revert again,
for example into Z, another contrariety other than
those already mentioned will belong to Fire and Z ;
for it has been laid down that Z is not the same as
any of the four, E , W , A and F. Let K belong to
F, and ct to Z ; then K will belong to E W A F ; for
they change into one another. But, let us admit
that this has not yet been demonstrated ; yet this is
evident that, if Z in turn is to be changed into
another element, another contrariety will belong
both to Z and also to Fire (F). Similarly, with
each addition which is made, a fresh contrariety will
attach to the preceding elements of the series, so
that if the elements are infinite in number, infinitely
numerous contrarieties 'will also attach to the single ele
ment. But if this is the case, it will be impossible to
define any element and for any element to come-to-be.
For if one is to result from another, it will have to
pass through so many contrarieties and then through
still more. Therefore (a), change into some elements
291
ARISTOTLE
333 a
ovSenor' eorai fieraftoXfj3 olov el aneipa ra fieraijv*
avayKrj S\ einep aneipa
r a t 8e
oroixeia*
ra
aepos els nvp3 et aneipoi
ef
ert
ov 8
evavnorrjres.
at
y tv e -
Kal navra e v avayKrj yap naoas vnapxetv
II
rots fiev Karco rov
avwOev,
r a ? to )v
ro u ro ts* S e
KarwOev, w ore navra ev eor a t .
15 ras* to > v
6. Qavfiaoeie
evos ra
8*
a ro t^ e ta
av t is
rcbv Xeyovrwv
nXeiw
ow/iarwv wore fifj fiera-
to j v
paXXeiv els aXXrjXa, KaOanep 'EfineSoKXfjs cf>rjol3

nw s
navra J*
Tt
Kairoi Xeyei o v r w
et
e tv a t
ovfij3Xrjrd ra
ravra yap tod re
fiev ofiv Kara ro nooov, avdy/crj ravro
etvai vndpxpv anaoi rots ovjxfiXrjrots w
rpovvr a t ,
S e /c a
avrcb.
25 cis*
Xeyeiv avrots
eV Seêrat
20 o r o t ^ e t a .
to
o to v
et
avro
et
ttooov
Se
e/c
Tt
/x/q
ef
u Saros*
dfi<j>w, el fierpetrai rw
?}v a p a
ovtco
n ooov,
/x e -
KorvXrjs etev aepos
/c a T a
aAA*
to
7ro<xov
o o o v
ovfifSXrjra
S iW r a t,
KorvXrj vSaros ioov Svvarai tfwxeiv Kal
o lo v
Se'/ca
et
aepos,
Kal ovrw s Kara t o nooov ovx $ nooov ovjifiXrjra,

aA A $
S vv avT at T t.
e t^ 8 a v /c a t
fifj rw r o v n o
oov fierpw ovjifidXAeoOai ras Svvdfieis,
30
8* cos' T o S e
orjfiaivei ev fiev noicp ro ofioiov,
ToSe
Kar*
aA A a
o to v
noow t o ioov.
ws
XevKov roSe Oepfiov.
dvaXoyiav,
to
ev 8 e
dronov Srj <j>aiverai3 el rd owfiara
dfierdpXrjra ovra
fifj dvaXoyia
ovfifiXrjra e o n v ,
a Fr. 17 line 27 (Diels).

b i.s. if one element is as hot as another is white, they have
b}' analogy M the same amount, one of heat, the other of
whiteness.
292

will never take place, for instance, if the interme
diates are infinite in number (and they must be so if
the elements are infinite) : and further (b), there
will not even be a change from Air into Fire, if the
contrarieties are infinitely many : and (c) all the
elements become one, for all the contrarieties of the
elements above F must belong to those below F , and
vice versa ; they will all, therefore, be one.
6.
One may well express astonishment at those Examinawho, like Empedocles, declare that the elements of Station
bodies are more than one (and, therefore, do
change into one another), and ask them how they Emp^docan assert that the elements are comparable. Y e t
Empedocles says,a For these are all not only that his four
equal. . . . Now (a) if what is meant is that they coJTdnot
are equal in amount, all the comparables must all
possess something identical by means of which they into one
are measured, if, for instance one pint of W ater is anotherequivalent to ten pints of Air, in which case both have
always had something identical about them, since
they were measured by the same standard. But
(b) if they are not comparable in amount (in the sense
that so much of the one is produced from so much
of the other), but in power (for instance, if a pint of
water and ten pints of air have an equal cooling
power), even so they are comparable in amount,
though not qua amount, but qua so much power.
And (c) it would be possible also to compare their
power not by the measure of quantity, but by an
analogy : for exam ple, as X is hot, so Y is white. b
But analogy, while it signifies similarity in quality,
signifies equality in quantity. Now it is obviously
absurd that the bodies, though unchangeable, are
comparable not merely by analogy, but by the
ARISTOTLE
33 a
aAAa fierpw rw v 8 vvdfiewv Kal
etvai
tw
tows1
Oepfiov fj ofiolws* nvpos rooovSl Kal aepos noXXa-
35
t3 b
7rXa(7i o v
to
to io v to v
ei-ei t o v Xoyov.
yap avro nXeiov t w
ofioyeves etvai
A A A a fiffv ov S avijrjois av eirj Kar E/XTreSo/cAca, aAA* rj KaTa npooOeoiv nvpl yap aufct
Sc x#a)V fiev o<j>erepov 8 efias*
n vp avei
to
Tavra Sc npoonO erar So/cct

S* ovx ovtcjs aveoOai Ta avijavofieva. noXv Sc
aWepa
S* a W rjp
XaXenwTepov anoSovvai nepl yeveoew s Trjs Kara

5 </>voiv.
v
r q t
r a yap yivofieva <f>voet navra yiverai fj
<
<
' 5 '
'
act woi rj ws em ro noAv, ra oe napa

ws enl
to
act /cat
noXv and ravrofiarov Kal ano rvxrjs.
to
rt ovv rd atrtov rov c f avOpwnov avOpwnov rj act

rj ws enl
to
fir] cAatav;
noXv, Kal c/c rov nvpov nvpov aAAa

fj Kal, eav w 8 l ovvreOfj, oo ro v v;
ov
io yap onws ervx* ovveXOovrwv ovSev yiverai, /caff* a 4

eKeivos (f>rjoiv, aAAa Xoyw
atTtov;
n vL
ov yap 8f] nvp y e f] yrj.
r i ovv rovrw v
aAAa fif]v ovS*
f] <f)iXla Kal to veiKos* ovyKpioews yap fiovov, ro

Sc SiaKploews atTtov.
rovro S* eorlv f] ovota fj
eKaorov, aAA* ov fiovov filijis re StaAAafts* tc

15 fiiyevrw v,** wonep
eKeivos (fyrjoiv.
rvxr] S
enl
rovrw v ovofiaêrai, aAA* ov Xoyos* e o n yap fiixOrjvai ws
ctit^cv.
1 laws : laov codd.
3 befias H : ycvos EFL.
tw v
Sf] <f>voei ovrwv a in ov
2 ofiolats K : ofioiov KHL.

4 Ka$a EH I , : KaOaircp F.
Empedocles, fr. 37 (Diels).
294

measure of their powers ; that is, that so much Fire
and many times as much Air are comparable because
they are equally or similarly hot. For the same
thing, if greater in amount, will, by being of the same
kind, have its ratio increased correspondingly.
Further, according to Empedocles, growth, too,
would be impossible except by addition : for in his
view Fire increases by Fire and Earth increases its
own body, and ether increases ether, a and these are
additions ; and it is not generally held that things
which increase do so in this way. And it is much
more difficult for him to give an account of coming-tobe by a natural process. For the things which cometo-be naturally all comc-to-be, cither always or
generally, in a particular way, and exceptions or
violations of the invariable or general rule are the
results of chance and luck. W hat, then, is the reason
why man always or generally comes-to-be from man,
and why wheat (and not an olive) comes-to-be from
wheat ? Or does bone come-to be, if the elements are
put together in a certain manner ? For, according to
Empedocles, nothing comes-to-be by their coming
together by chance but by their coming together
in a certain proportion. W hat, then, is the cause of
this ? It is certainly not Fire or Earth ; but neither
is it Love and Strife, for the former is a cause of
association only and the latter of dissociation only.
No : the cause is the substance of each thing and not
merely, as he says, a mingling and separation of
things mingled b ; and chance, not proportion, is the
name applied to these happenings : for it is possible
for things to be mixed by chance. The cause, then,
of things which exist naturally is that they are in
b Empedocles, fr.
8 (Diels); see also above, 314 b 7 f.

295
ARISTOTLE
333 b
t o ovrw s ^Xtv> Ka* V eKaarov cf>vois avrrj, nepl
fjs ovhev Xeyet.
ovSev apa nepl cf>voews Xeyet.
aAAa firjv Kat ro ev roxno kat a ya u ov o oe rrjv
20 filtv ptovov enaivei.
/catVot rd ye orotyela Sta-
Kptvet ov t o vetKos, aAA* fj <f>tXta rd <f>voet npore pa

rov Oeov Oeol Se Kal ra v r a .
vE t i
Se
n ep l
K tvfjoew s
Xeyet*
a7rAa>?
ov
yap
tKavov e tn e tv .8 to r t fj <f>tXta Kal r o vetKos Ktvet, et

fifj r o v r * fjv <f>iXla etvat r o Ktvfjoet r o ta S t, vetKet
T o ta S t.
eS e t ovv fj op loaoO ai fj vnoO eodat
> 5 <*>
* >
o~ *
\
a
/
rj a n o o e ig a i, rj aK pipw s rj fiaAaKWS, rj aAAws y e
25 S e t o
n w s.
e n S en el <f>atverat Kal j5ta /cat n a p a <j>votv
klvovfieva r d
oc b fia r a y Kal K ara (f>votv (otov r o
n v p avw fiev o v (Ha, K a n o Se jSta), r w Se jSta t o

K ara <f>votv eva vrlov , e o n
30 /cat t o
Ktvet, fj o v ;
eon v
Se t o
K ara <j>votv KtvetoOat.
apa
ra v rrjv ovv fj <f>tXta
r o v v a v r io v y a p rrjv yrjv Kara)1 Kal
S ta/cptaet e o t /c e v /cat fiaXXov r o veiKos o lr to v r fjs
Kara <f>votv K ivfjoew s fj fj <f>tXla.

n a p a <f>votv f) <f>tXla av eirj
w o r e Kal oXws
jiolXXov .
anXcbs Se et
firj fj cf>tXla fj t o vetK os Ktvet, a v rw v rcbv ocofiarcov

35 ovS efita
334 a e n
to
Ktvrjols e o r tv oi5Se fiovfj.
aAA*
aron ov.
Se /cat <f>alverat klvovfieva' hieKpive fiev y a p
veiKos, fjvexOrj S
veiKovs,
aAA*
ot
a vco
o aWfjp ovx v
fiev cf>rjoLv wonep
ano
1 KaTU) KFl : avu) KL.

Although it is entitled nepl Overeats.
h i.e. natural motion.
ru
rvxys

such and-such a condition, and this is what constitutes
the nature of each thing, about which he says nothing.
There is nothing About the Nature of Things in his
treatise. And yet it is this which is the excellence
and the good of each thing, whereas he gives all the
credit to the mixing process. (Y e t it is not Strife
but Love that dissociates the elements which arc by
nature prior to God, and they are also gods.)
Further, his account of motion is superficial. For
it is not enough to say that Love and Strife move
things, unless Love has been given a certain faculty
of movement and Strife a certain other. He should,
then, have either defined or laid down or demon
strated their powers of movement either accurately
or loosely, or at any rate in some manner. Further
more, since the bodies are seen to move by compul
sion (that is, unnaturally) and also naturally (for
example, Fire moves upwards without compulsion,
but downwards by compulsion), and that which is
natural is contrary to that which is by compulsion,
and movement by compulsion actually occurs, it
follows that natural motion also occurs. Is this, then,
the motion which Love sets going, or not ? No : for,
on the contrary, it b moves the Earth downwards and
resembles dissociation, and Strife rather than Love
is the cause of natural motion ; and so, generally
speaking, Love rather than Strife would be contrary
to nature, and unless Love or Strife is actually setting
them in motion, the simple bodies themselves have
no motion or rest at all. But this is strange ; and,
moreover, they are actually seen to move.
For
although Strife caused dissociation, it was not by
Strife that the ether was carried upwards, but at one
time Empedocles talks as if it were due to chance,
297
ARISTOTLE
334 a
( OUT60 y a p <JVVKVp<J 9 ito v TOT, TToXXaKl S

aAAeo? ), ore Se cf>rjoi 7re(j)VKvai to rrvp avco
5 c/>epeo9a t, o 8 alO fjp, <f>rjolt fiaK pfjoi K aTa x 9 o v a
$/
f/v
oucto peats.
>
o'
a fia
'
oe K ai to v
Koofiov ofioicos
\IV (j>rjolv 7tI T TOV VlK0VS VVV K al 1TpOTepOV

7Tt TTjS (f)lXiaS. Tl oSv OTl TO KIVOVV TTpCOTOV K al
atTtov
ttJ?
/ctvôeous1;
ov yap hfj fj <f>iXla Kal t o
veiKos, aAAa tivos Kivfjoecos T a v r a a iT ia , et eortv1
KlVO apXV'
10
MArorrov Sc Kal el fj f o x y k tcov cjtoixîcov fj

ev t i avrcbv* at yap aXXoicooeis at Trjs
eaovrat, otov t o jiovoikov etvat Kal rraXiv afiovaov,
rj fivfjfirj fj Xfj9rj;
hfjXov yap oti el fiev rrvp fj
foxV> T<* wafliy vrrapêi avrfj ocra 7rvpl fj trvp* el

Se fiiKTOv, Ta cjcofiaTiKa tovtcov S ouSev ocofia15 TIKOV.
A A A a rrepl fiev tovtcov erepas epyov eart

rrepl Se toDv oroix^lcov e cov Ta ocbfiara
ovveorrjKev, ocrois fiev So/cet t i etvat koivov fj fierajSaAAetv els aXXrjXa, avayKrj el 9arepov tovtcov,
Kal Oarepov ovfifialveiv* oooi Se firj noiovoiv e f
aAAÂcuv yeveotv firjS' cos e f e'/cacrrou, 7tA^ v cos k
7.
Oecoplas.
20 Tolxov 7rXlv0oVS, QLTOTTOV TTCOS CKCIVCOV OOVTat
oapKes
Kal
oora Kal tcov aXXcov onovv. eêt Se

arroplav Kal tois e f aXXfjXcov yev-
to Aeyo/ievov
1 a lari K H J : eonv F : ct b* can.
0 Fr. 53 (Diels).
298
b Fr. 54 (Diels).

saying, For thus in its rush it encountered them
then, but oft-times in other wise, a whereas on
another oceasion he says that it is the nature of Fire
to be borne upwards, and ether, he says, sank with
long roots into the Earth. 6 A t the same time he
also says that the Earth is in the same condition now
under the rule of Strife as it was formerly under that
of Love. W hat, then,is the prime mover and cause
of motion ? It certainly is not Love and Strife ;
but these are the causes of a secondary motion, if
the prime mover is the original source.
It is also strange that the soul should eonsist of the
elements or be one of them ; for how, then, will the
alterations in the soul take place ? How, for
example, eould the change from being musieal to
being unmusical occur, or could memory or forget
fulness occur ? For evidently, if the soul is Fire, only
such effects m il be produced upon it as ean be pro
duced by Fire qua Fire ; whereas, if it is a mixture
of elements, only the corporeal effects will be pro
duced ; but no one of these effeets is eorporeal.
7.
The diseussion, however, of these questions is How single
the task of another investigation. But, as regards combined
the elements of which bodies are composed, those to form
who think that they all have something in common compoun 5or that they ehange into each other, if they hold one
of these views, must necessarily hold the other. For
those, on the other hand, who do not make them
eome-to-be out of each other nor one from another
taken singly (except in the sense that bricks eometo-be out of a wall), there is the paradox as to how
flesh and bones and any of the other compounds will
result from the elements. This suggestion involves
a difficulty also for those who generate the elements
299
ARISTOTLE
334 a
vwoiv, riva Tponov yiverai e avrwv erepov n

nap' avra.
Xeyw S olov eonv etc nvpos vSwp
Kal k rovrov yiveoOai nvp e o n yap ri koivov

25 to
vnoKeifievov.
aAAa
hfj Kal oapij e avrwv
yiverai Kal fiveXos* Tavra Sfj yiverai nws I
eKei-
vois re yap rots Xeyovoiv ws 'EfinehoKXrjs ris

eorai rponos;
avayKrj yap ovvOeoiv etvai KaOanep
k nXivOwv Kal XiOwv r o l l s Kal ro fityfia Se

rovro
k owt,ofievwv fiev eorai rwv oroiyeiwv,
30 Kara fiiKpa Se nap* aXXrjXa ovyKeifievwv.

8rj crapf Kal rwv aXXwv eKaorov.
ovrw
ovfifiaivei Sfj
fifj e f orovovv fiepovs oapKos yiveoOai nvp Kal

v'Swp, wonep k Krjpov yevoir
av eK fiev rovBl
rov fiepovs o(f>atpa, nvpapls S e f aAAov rivos

f
t t
j\\> > 5 /
>
/
/ a
aAA eveoeêTO ye eg eKarepov eKarepov yeveouai.
35 t o v t o
fiev 8 fj rovrov yiverai rov rponov ck rrjs
334 b oapKos e f orovovv dfi(j)w rots 8 eKeivws Xeyovoiv
ovk evhexerai, aAA ws k roiôv XiOos Kal nXivOos,

eKarepov e f aAAov ronov Kal fiepovs ofioiws Se
Kal rots noiovoi filav avrwv vXrjv eêt nva anopiav, nws eorai ri e f dfi<f>orepwv, olov ijsvxpov Kal
5 Oepfiov rj nvpos Kal yrjs.
et yap eonv fj oapi; ef
afi<f>otv Kal firjherepov cKeivwv, firjS aS ovvOeois

owtpfievwv, ri Xeinerai nXfjv vXrjv etvai
300
ro e f

from each other, namely, in what manner does any
thing else other than the elements themselves cometo-be out of them. The following is an example of
what I mean : W ater can come-to-be out of Fire
and Fire out of W ater (for their substratum is some
thing common to both), but flesh, too, and marrow
come-to-be out of them ; how do they eome-to-be ?
W hat manner of coming-to-be is ascribed to them
by those who hold such a view as that of Empedocles ?
They must maintain that the process is composition,
just as a wall comes-to-be from bricks and stones ;
moreover, this mixture will consist of the elements
preserved intact but placed side by side with one
another in minute particles. This, supposedly, is
what happens in the case of flesh and each of the
other compounds. The result is that Fire and W ater
do not come-to-be out of any and every part of the
flesh ; for example, while a sphere might come-to-be
from one part of a piece of wax and a pyramid from
another, yet it was possible for either shape to have
come-to-be out of either part of the material. This,
then, is how coming-to-be occurs when both Fire and
Water come-to-be out of any part of the flesh. But
for those who hold the above view this is impossible,
but the process can only take place as stone and brick
come-to-be out of a wall, that is, each out of a different
place and part. Similarly, a difficulty arises also for
those who make out that the elements have a single
matter, namely, how anything will result from two
of them taken together, for instance, cold and hot
or Fire and Earth. For if flesh consists of both and
yet is neither of them, and again is not a compound
in which they are preserved intact, what possibility
remains except that the result of their composition
301
ARISTOTLE
334
eK eivw v;
fj y a p Oarepov <f>0opa fj Oarepov n oiei rj
rfjv vArjv.
TAp* ovv eneiSfj e a n Kal fiaAAov Kal fjrrov Oepfiov

Kal if/vxpov, orav fiev anAws fj Oarepov evreAex^la,
10 Svvafiei Oarepov eora i orav 8c fifj navreAws, aAA*
ws fiev Oepfiov ipvxpov, ws Se ipvxpov Oepfiov Sia
rd fiiyvvfieva <f>0eipeiv ras vnepoxds aXAfjAwv, rore
ovO' fj vArj eorai ovre eKeivwv rw v evavriwv eKa
repov evreAexela aTrAai?, aAAa fiera^v' Kara Se to
15 Svvafiei fiaAAov elvai Oepfiov fj ifjvxpov fj rovvavriov,
Kara rovrov rov Aoyov SmAaoiws Oepfiov

fj i/jvxpov, fj rpm Aaoiws, fj Kar aAAov
to io v to v ;
eorai Sfj fiixOevrwv raAA* k t w
riwv fj t w v oroix*iw v, Kal ra oroixeia e f
Svvafiei
rponov
v evav
eKeivwv
Svvafiei n w s ovrwv, ovx v Ta) Se ws fj vArj, aAAa

20 rov etprjfievov rponov Kal e o n v ovrw fiev fiiis,
eKeivws 8c vArj t o
yivo fievov.
enel Se Kal naoxov
ravavria Kara rov ev rois npwrois Siopiofiov

e o n yap ro evepyela Oepfiov Svvafiei iftvxpov Kal
ro evepyela ifrvxpov Svvafiei Oepfiov, w ore eav fifj
loatft, fieraftaAAei els aAArjAa.
ofioiws Se Kal enl
25 rw v aAAwv evavriwv* Kal npwrov ovrw ra o roiXeia fier aftaXAei, k Se rovrw v oapKes Kal oora
Kal ra roiavra, ro v fiev Oepfiov yivo fievov f a x '
pov, t o v 8c if/vxpov Oepfiov, orav npos t o fieoov
a It is difficult to see any meaning in the words and they
should perhaps he omitted.
*
i.e. the case where one contrary destroys the other,
(lines 6, 7).
e See 323 b 1 ff., where the law of the reciprocal actionand-passion of contraries is stated.
302

is matter ? For the passing-away of either of them
produces either the other or the matter.
Is the following a possible solution based on the
fact that there are greater and less degrees in hot
and cold ? W hen one of them is actually in being
without qualification, the other will be potentially
in existence ; but when neither completely exists
but (because they mix and destroy one anothers
excesses) there is a hot which, for a hot, is cold, and
a cold which, for a cold, is hot, then the result will be
that neither their matter nor either of the two con
traries will be actually in existence without qualifica
tion but an intermediate, and according as it is
potentially more hot than cold or, vice versa, it will
possess a power of heating greater in proportion
whether double or treble or in some such ratio
than its power of cooling. The other bodies will
result from the contraries (that is,from the elements)
when mixed together, and the elements will result
from the contraries existing somehow potentially
not in the sense in which matter exists potentially
but in the manner already explained. Thus mix
ture takes place, whereas what comes-to-be in the
other case b is matter. But since the contraries also
are acted upon according to the definition given in
the first part of this treatise c for the actually hot
is potentially cold, and the actually cold is potentially
hot, so that, unless the hot and cold are equalized,
they change into one another (and the like happens
in the case of the other contraries) thus in the first
place the elements are transformed; but out of them
flesh and bones and the like come-to-be when the hot
is becoming cold and the cold becoming hot and they
reach the mean, for at that point there is neither hot
SOS
ARISTOTLE
334 b v
eAOr)' iv ra v O a y a p
o v h erep o v , t o Se fieao v noXv

K al o v k a h ia ip e ro v . o fio iw s Se K al t o rfpov K al
30 vypov Kal r a r o i a v r a K a r a f ie o o r r jr a n o io v o i
a a p K a K al o o ro v v K al ToAAa.
8.
*Anavra Se Ta fiiKra owfiara, ooa rrepl rov
rov fieoov ronov eorlv, e f anavrcov ovyKeirai rtbv
anXwv. yfj fiev yap evvnapxei ndai Sta ro eKaorov
elvai fiaXiora Kal nXeiarov ev r w oiKeiw rona>,
Se Sta t o Setv fiev opleoOai ro ovvOerov,

a fiovov S etvat rwv anXwv evopiorov ro vbwp, e n
Se Kal rffv yrjv avev rov vypov fir) hvvaoOai ovfLfieveiv, aAAa r o v r etvai ro ovv exov* el yap e f-
35 v8a>p
335
aipeOelr) reXews e avrfjs ro vypov, Bianlnroi av.

r fj fiev ofiv Kal vha>p Sta ravras evvnapxei ras
Se /cat nvp, ori evavria earl yfj Kal

v8 a n * yfj fiev yap aepi, v8wp Se nvpl evavrlov eorlv,
5 air las, arjp
ws evSe'x^rai ovo lav ovala evavrlav etvai.
enel
ofiv ai yeveaeis e/c rw v evavriwv eioiv, evvnapxei

Se Oarepa a/cpa rw v evavriwv, avayKr) Kal Odrepa
evvnapxeiv, war ev dnavri rw avvOerw navra rd
fiaprvpeiv S eot/ce /cat f) rpo<fyf)
io anXa eveorai.
eK a orw v an avra fiev yap rpe<f)erai rois avro is ef
wvnep eorlv, anavra Se nXelooi rpe<f>erai. Kal yap
dnep av Sofetev evt fiovw rpe<f>eoOai, rw vSan rd
(j)vra, nXelooi rpe<j>erar fiefiiKrai yap rw v&an
i.e. the Earth as the centre of the universe.

b i.e. because the region in which mixed bodies exist con
sists mainly of earth.
c i.e. cold-dry (Earth) and cold-moist (Water).
d i.e. hot-moist (Air) and hot-dry (Fire).
304

nor cold.
(The mean, however, has considerable
extension and is not indivisible.) In like manner
also it is in virtue of being in a mean condition that
the dry and the moist and the like producc flesh and
bone and the other compounds.
8.
All the mixed bodies, which exist about the Every comregion of the centre, are compounds of all the simple mustdhavey
bodies.
For Earth enters into their composition,
because every simple body exists specially and in the bodies as
greatest quantity in its own place b ; and W ater forms Jftltuents.
part of them, because that which is composite must
have limits, and W ater is the only one of the simple
bodies which is easily confined within limits, and
furthermore, the Earth cannot remain coherent with
out moisture, and this is what holds it together ; for
if the moisture were entirely removed from it, it
would fall apart.
Earth, therefore, and Water enter into the com
position of simple bodies for these reasons ; so also
do Air and Fire because they are contraries of Earth
and Water Earth of Air, and W ater of Fire, in the
sense in which one substance can be contrary to
another substance. Since, then, comings-to-be result
from contraries, and one pair of extreme contraries
is already present, the other paird must also be
present, so that all the simple bodies are found in
every compound. The food of each compound serves
to supply evidence of this ; for they are all nourished
by foods which are identical with their constituents,
and all arc nourished by more than one food. For
indeed the plants, which would seem to be nourished
by one food only, namely, W ater, are fed by more
than one food, for there is Earth mixed with the
Water and this, too, is why farmers experiment by
305
ARISTOTLE
335 m
yrj' Sto Kal oi yew pyoI rreLpwvraL fiiâvres apSctv.
lfr enel S icrrlv fj fiev rpo<j)f] rrjs vXrjs, t o Sc Tpe<f>o-
fievov o w e iXrjfievov rfj vXrj fj fiop<f>fj Kal t o etSos,

evXoyov fjSrj t o fiovov tw v arrXwv owfiarwv Tpe<f>eo6 ai t o
7Tvp arravrwv c f aXXijXwv yivo fievwv,
worrep /cat ot rrporepoi X eyovo iv fiovov yap o t t

/cat /xaAtora to v ctSovs* t o 7rp Sta t o rre^VKevat
20
</>epeoOat
77700s*
to v opov.
eKaorov Sc rre<f>VKV els
rrjv eavrov \wpav <f>epeodar ff S fiop<f>fj Kal to

etSos arravrwv ev to ls Spots.
Ta owfiara
cf
Sti fiev ofiv arravra
a7ravTa>v ovveorrjKe tw v
arrXwv,
elprjrai.
9- Ettci S cottv
25
cvta yevrjra Kal <f>0aprd, Kal
ycvcats Ti/yâvct oSaa cv t w 7repl t o fie o o v r o -
7tw ,
Ac/ctcov rrepl rraorjs y e v e o e w s o fio lw s rrooai t c
/cat Ttvcs* avrrjs at a p ^ a r pa ov y a p ovtw Ta Kad
eK a orov O ew pfjoofiev, St av rrepl
tw v
KadoXov A a -
fiw fiev rrp w rov .

Etatv ovv Kal rov apiOfiov tcrat /cat rfj.
ftcv
Set Sc Kal rrjv
rpirrjv e n rrpoovrrapxeiv ov yap t/cavat rrpos

yevvrjoai at Suo, KaOarrep oi5S* cv
tols
to
rrpwroLS.
ti? /X6v o5v uATy to& yevrjroLS e o n v atTtov to 8uvaT0v etvat /cat /x/q cZvat.
Ta /xcv yap c f avayKrjs
35 eorlv, olov ra cuSia, Ta S c f avayKrjs
See 321 b 16 ff.

306
ovk
eorLV,

making mixtures and use them for watering. Now
whereas food is of the nature of matter, and that
which is fed is the 44 shape and 44 form taken to
gether with the matter, it is reasonable to suppose
that of the simple bodies, while all come-to-be out
of one another, Fire is the only one which is fed, as
is the view also of the earlier philosophers.
For
Fire alone and to a greater extent than the rest
is o f the nature o f 44 form, beeause it naturally tends
to be borne towards the limit. Now each of the simple
bodies tends to be borne to its own plaee, and the
44 shape and 44 form 99 of all o f them depend on their
limits. It has now been explained that all the com
pound bodies are composed of the simple bodies.
9.
Since some things are of a nature to come-to-be Chapters
and to pass-away, and since eoming-to-be actually jf/S? causes
takes place in the region about the eentre, we must
diseuss the number and the nature of the sources of away ?
all eoming-to-be alike ; for we shall more easily form
a theory about the particulars when we have first and final
grasped the universals.
causes.
These sources, then, are equal in number to and
identical in kind with those which exist among eternal
and primary things. For there is one in the sense of
material cause, a second in the sense o f formal cause,
and the third too must be present also ; for the two
sources are not enough to generate things which
come-to-be, just as they are not enough in the case
of primary things either. Now cause in the sense
of matter for things which are of a nature to come-tobe is 44 the possibility of being and not-being. For
some things exist of necessity, for example, the things
which are eternal, and some things of necessity do
not e x ist; and o f these two classes it is impossible
307
ARISTOTLE
335 a
rovrw v Sc r a fiev aSvvarov firj etvai, ra Sc aSi/335 b varov etvai Sta to fiff evSexeoOai napa ro avayKaiov
aXXws exLV-
evia Sc /cat etvat /cat fifj elvai Suvara,
onep earl ro yevrjrov Kal </>0aprov nore fiev yap

earn rovro, nore S
ovk
eon v.
w or
avayKrj y e -
5 vcCTtv efvat /cat <f>9opav nepl ro Svvarov etvai Kal

fifj etvai.
Sto /cat ws fiev vXrj ro vr* eorlv a in ov
rois yevrjrois, cos Se ro oS cvc/ccv fj fiop<f>rj Kal ro

etSos* rovro S cartv o Aoyo? o rrjs eKaarov ovoias.
A ct Sc npooeivai Kal rrjv rpirrjv, fjv anavres

oveipcorrovoi, Aeyei o ovoeis, aAA ot fiev
io iKavfjv wfjOrjoav atrtav etvat npos ro yiveoOai rrjv
rcbv eiSwv <f>voiv, wonep o ev OatScuvt S wKparrjs*
/cat yap eKeivos, enirififfoas rois aXXots ws ouScv
elprjKooiv, vnor 10er at o n eorl rw v ovrwv ra fiev
eiSrj ra Sc fieOeKriKa rw v eiSwv, Kal o n etvai fiev
eKaorov Xeyerai Kara ro etSos*, yiveoOai Se Kara
fiev
15 rrjv fierdXrjipiv Kal <f>0eipeo0ai Kara rrjv anofioXfjv,

w or
el ravra aXrjOfj, ra eiSrj oierai c f avayKrjs
atrta etvai Kal yeveoew s /cat <f>0opas. ot S avrrjv

rrjv vXrjv ano r avrrjs yap etvat rrjv Kivrjoiv. o v Serepoi Se Xeyovoi KaXws. el fiev .yap e o n v atrta
ra eiSrj, Sta r i ovk act ycvva ovvexebs, aAAa nore
20 fiev nore S ov, ovrwv Kal rw v eiSwv act /cat ra>v
Plato, Phaedo 96 a 99 c.
.S08
COM ING-TO-BE AN D PASSIN G-AW AY, II. 9

for the first not to be, while for the second it is im
possible to be, because they cannot be other than
they are in violation of the law of necessity. Some
things, however, can both be and not be. This is the
ease with that which can come-to-be and pass-away ;
for at one moment it exists, at another it does not
exist. So coming-to-bc and passing-away must occur
in the sphere of what can-be-and-not-be. This, then,
is the cause, in the sense of material cause, of things
which are o f a nature to come-to-be, whereas cause,
in the sense of their end in view, is their shape and
form ; and this is the definition of the essential
nature of each of them.
But the third source must also be present, of which criticism
everyone dreams but never puts into words. But
pr0.
some people have thought the nature of the forms posed in
was enough to account for coming-to-be. Socrates,
for instance, did so in the Phaedo a ; for he, after and the
finding fault with the other philosophers for having theoryf 8
made no pronouncement on the subject, lays it down
that some of the things which exist are forms and
others partakers in the forms, and that each thing
is said to exist in virtue of the form and to cometo-be in virtue of its participation in the form and
to pass-away because of its rejection of it. Hence
he thinks that, if this is true, the forms are neces
sarily the causes of both coming-to-be and passingaway. On the other hand, some have thought that
the matter in itself was the cause ; for it is from this,
they said, that movement arises. But neither of
these schools of thought is right. For, if the forms
are causes, why do they not always generate con
tinually but only intermittently, since the forms
and the partakers in them are always there ? Further-
309
ARISTOTLE
335 b
Tt
jJL0KTLKO)V;
to
ain ov
ov
8* 77* iviwv
vyieiav yap o
OeWpOVfieV aAAO
larpos
ifinoiei Kal
eniOTrjfirjv o eniOTrjfiwv, ovorjs Kal vyieias avrrjs

Kal
eniOTrjfirjs
Se Kal enl
tw v
Kal
rcbv
fieOeKTiKwv
aXXwv rcbv
koto.
w oavrw s
Svvafiiv n par-
el Se t rjv vXrjv n s <f>fjoeie y e w av Sta
rofievwv.
25 t fjv Kivrjoiv, <f)voiKix)Tpov fiev av Xeyoi TO>V OVTCO

X eyovrw v
yap aXXoiovv Kal
to
alnwrepov T
tovto
Xeyeiv
Kal ev
tois
aAAa
Kal
ovk
to
tcov
Sta
tjvXov
Teyvr\ Kal enl
336 m
k Xivtjv,
tovto
35 novoi
ttjv
fjv etvai
to
X eyovo iv
ov
Trjs
KiveioOai,
to
fifjv
fiev
to
Se
<f>voei yivo fiev w v
twv
vSwp wov c f avTov, ov Se
aAA* fj Texvrj).
Xeyovoiv
ovk
wore Kal
opOws, Kal o n
ovtoi
napaXei-
KvpiWTepav a ln a v eijaipovoi yap
K al
anoSiSoaoi
<f>voei
tois
kivtjtikov.
noieiv erepas Svvdfiecos (SrjXov Se
ov yap avro noiei

to
opOws
naoxeiv e o n Kal
to
Kiveiv Kal
fieTaoxrjfianôv
noiovv, ofioicos ev T
ano Teyyrjs, o av fj
o Stoi
30 yap vXrjs
Kal enl
to
to
yevvav, Kal iv anaoiv eiwOafiev
tov
Tfjv fiop<f>ffv.
t o is
en Se
ow fiaoi,
St*
K al T a s
as
to t I
Svvdfieis
yevvw oi,
Xiav
opyaviKws, d<f>aipovvres Tfjv Kara
to
eneiSfj yap ne<f>VKV,
fiev Oepfiov Sta-
Kpiveiv
5 eKaorov
Xeyovoi
310
to
to
<f>aoi,
to
etSos alriav.
Se xfsvxpov ovviordvai, Kal

fiev noieiv
Kal Sta
to
tovtw v
tw v
aXXwv
Se naoxeiv, eK rovrw v
anavra raXXa yiveoOai

more, in some cases we see that something else is the
cause ; for it is the physician who implants health
and the scientific man who implants scientific know
ledge, although health itself and science itself exist
and also the participants in them ; and the same
thing is true of the other operations carried out in
virtue of a special faculty. On the other hand, if one
were to say that matter generates by means of its
movement, he would speak more in accordance with
the facts of nature than those who state the view
given above ; for that which alters and transforms
is a more potent cause of bringing things into being,
and we are always accustomed, in the products alike
of nature and of art, to make out that whatever can
cause motion is the acting cause. However, these
thinkers are also wrong ; for to be acted upon, that
is, to be moved, is characteristic of matter, but to
move, that is to act, is the function of another power.
(This is evident both in the things which come-to-be
by art and in those which come-to-be by nature ;
for water does not itself produce an animal out of
itself, nor does wood produce a bed, but art). So, for
this reason, these thinkers are not correct in what
they say, and also because they omit the most potent
cause ; for they exclude the essential nature and the
form. Moreover, also, when they do away with
the formal cause, the powers which they attribute
to bodies and which enable them to bring things into
being are too instrumental in character. For since,
as they assert, it is the nature of the hot to separate
and of the cold to bring together and of each of the
other qualities the one to act and the other to be
acted upon, it is out of these and by means of these,
so they say, that all the other things come-to-be and
311
ARISTOTLE
326 a
/cat <f>0eipeo0ar <f>aiverai Sc Kal t o nvp avro klvov{levov Kal n aoxov.

crt Sc napanXfjoiov noiovoiv
a)07Tp Ct Tt? TW nploVL Kal KaOTW TWV OpyaVWV
10 anovefioi TTjv air lav tw v yivofievw v dvdyKTj yap
npiovros Siaipeiodai Kal fc ovtos XealveoOai, Kal
in i
tw v
aXXwv
ofioiws.
w ot
ct
otl
fiaXiora
noiei Kal Kivei t o nvp, aAAa nw s Ktvet ov n pooOewpovoiv ,1 otl x tyov fj Ta opyava. fjfiiv Sc /ca0oXov t c nporepov elprjrai nepl tw v alriwv, Kal vvv
15
Siwpiorai nepi tc rrjs vXrjs Kal ttjs fiop<f>fjs.

10. vE ti Sc inei rj Kara ttjv <f>opav kivtjols ScSctKTat o ti atStos, avayKrj to v tw v ovtwv Kal yeve-
oiv etvai ovvex&S' fj yap <f>opa noifjoei Tfjv yeveoiv

ivSeXex&S Sta to npooayeiv Kal anayeiv t o y e v vrjTiKov. afia Sc SrjXov o tl Kal tol nporepov KaXws
20 elprjrai, t o npwrrjv rw v fierafioXwv rfjv <f>opav
aAAa fifj rfjv yeveoiv eln eiv noXv yap evXoyw repov t o ov rep fifj o v n yeveoew s atTtov etvat fj t o
fifj ov rip ovri rod etvai.
ro fiev ofiv <f>epofievov
e o n , to Sc yivo fievov ovk e o n v Sto /cat fj <j>opa
nporepa rfjs yeveoew s. in el S vnoKeirai Kal Sc25 Sct/cTat ovvexfjs ofioa rois npayfiaoi Kal yeveois
Kal </>0opa, (fyafiev S air lav etvai rfjv <f>opav to v
yiveodai, <f>avep6 v o n fiias fiev ovorjs rfjs <f>opas
ovk ivSexerai yiveoOai afi<f>w Sta to ivavria etvai
1 ov irpoa0ajpovGi: ov npoaOeojpotaiv E : ov irpodetopovatv H :
ovx opcjaiv F L .
Phys. ii. 3-9.
b See 335 a 3 2 -b 7.
c Phys. viii. 7-9.
d i.e. the sun, see below.
e Phys. 260 a 26 ff.
312

pass-away. But it is evident that Fire itself is moved
and is acted upon ; moreover, they are doing much
the same thing as if one were to ascribe to the saw
or to any other tool the causation of objects which
are brought into being ; for division must take place
when a man saws and smoothing when he uses a
plane, and a similar effect must be produced by the
use of the other tools. Hence, however much Fire
is active and causes motion, yet they fail to observe
how it moves things, namely, in a manner inferior to
that in which the tools act. W e have ourselves dealt
with causes in general in a previous work, and we
have now b distinguished between matter and form.
10.
Moreover, since the change caused by motion The
has been proved to be eternal, it necessarily follows, SaJweof
if that is so, that coming-to-be goes on continuously ; coming-tofor the movement will produce coming-to-be un- passinginterruptedly by bringing near and withdrawing the
annual
generator. d A t the same time it is evident that movement
our statement in a former work e was also right in Ecliptic
which we spoke of motion, not coming-to-be, as the circle primary kind of change. For it is far more reason
able that that which is should be a cause of comingto-be of that which is not, than that that which is not
should be cause of being to that which is. For that
which is being moved exists, but that which is comingto-be does not e x is t; therefore movement is prior to
coming-to-be. Now since it has been suggested and
proved f that coming-to-be and passing-away happen
to tilings continuously, and we maintain that motion
is the cause of coming-to-be, it is clear that, if motion
is simple, both processes cannot go on because they
are contrary to one another ; for nature has ordained
* Cf. 317 b 33 ff.

313
ARISTOTLE
336 a
t o yap avro Kal w oavrw s exov

T a^r<> rre<f>VKe
ttoilv.
w ore fjroi yeVeats* del eorai fj <j>0opa. Set
30 Se rrXeiovs etvai ras* Kivfjoeis Kal evavrlas, f) rfj
<f>opa rj rfj avwjiaXla rw v yap evavriwv ravavria
atrta.
Ato Kal ovx V irpwT7] <f>opa atrta eorl yeveoew s
Kal <f>0opds, aAA* f) Kara rov Xoov kvk Xo v ev
ravrrf yap Kal ro ovvexes e o n Kal ro KiveioOai
Suo Kivfjoeis' avayKrf yap, et y e del eorai ovvexfjS
336 b yeveois Kal <f>0opa, del fiev rt KiveioOai, iva firf
emXeirrwoiv aSrat at fieraftoXai, Svo S*, orrws fifj
Oarepov ovfifiaivrj fiovov. rrjs fiev oSv ovvexelas
fj rov oXov <f>opa atrta, rov Se rrpooievai Kal
amevai fj eyKXiois* ovfifiaivei yap ore fiev rroppw
5 yiveoOai ore
eyyvs.
avioov Se rov
Siaorff-
fiaros ovros avwfiaXos eorai fj Kivrjois* w or el

rw rrpooievai Kal e y y v s etvai y e w a, rw amevai
ravrov rovro Kal rroppw yiveoOai <f>0eipei, Kal el
rw rroXXaKis rrpooievai y e w a, Kal rw rroXXaKis
arreXOeiv <f>0elper rw v yap evavriwv ravavria atrta.
io Kal ev low XPViP Ka'L V <l>0opd Kal fj yeveois fj
Kara <f>voiv. Sto /cat ol xpdvoi Kal ol jStot eKaorwv
apiOfiov eôuat /cat rovrw Sioplôvrar rravrwv yap
e o n r a ft?, /cat rrds filos Kal XPv s fierpeirai
rrepioSw, rrXfjv ov rfj avrfj rravres, aAA ol fiev
The revolution of the n p w r o s o v p a v o s or outermost sphere
whieh revolves once every twenty-four hours.
b The annual course of the sun in the ecliptic circle.
e i.e. of the T T p w r o s o v p a v o s , which also involves the revolu
tion of the concentric spheres.
d The inclination of the ecliptic to the equator of the outer-
314

that the same thing, as long as it remains in the same
state, always produees the same result, so that either
coming-to-be or passing-away will always result.
The movements, however, must be more than one
and contrary to one another either in the direction
of their motion or in their irregularity ; for con
traries are the causes of contraries.
It is not, therefore, the primary motion a which is
the eause o f coming-to-be and passing-away, but the
motion along the inclined circle b ; for in this there
is both continuity and also double movement, for
it is essential, if there is always to be continuous
eoming-to-be and passing-away, that there should be
something always moving, in order that this series
of ehanges may not be broken, and double movement,
in order that there may not be only one change
occurring. The movement of the whole c is the cause
of the continuity, and the inclinationd causes the
approach and withdrawal of the moving body ; for
since the distance is unequal, the movement will be
irregular. Therefore, if it generates by approaching
and being near, this same body causes destruction
by withdrawing and becoming distant, and if by
frequently approaching it generates, by frequently
withdrawing it destroys ; for eontraries are the cause
of contraries, and natural passing-away and comingto-be take plaee in an equal period of time. There
fore the periods, that is the lives, of each kind of
living thing have a number and are thereby dis
tinguished ; for there is an order for everything,
and every life and span is measured by a period,
though this is not the same for all, but some are
most sphere ; according to Aristotle, the equator of the
Universe is in the same plane as the earths equator.
315
ARISTOTLE
336
eXarrovi ol Se rrXeiovi' rois fiev yap eviam os, rois

Sc fiel^tov, rois Sc eXarrcov 7reploSos1 e a n ro
fierpov.
OatVcrat Sc Kal rd 2 Kara rrjv a loOrjoiv ofioXoyovfieva rois Trap' rjjicbv Xoyois' opcbfiev yap o n
rrpooiovros fiev rod fjXlov yeveois e o n v , dm ovros
Sc <j)0iois> Kal ev loco xpovio eKarepov loos yap o
Xpovos rrjs <f>0opas Kal rrjs yeveoecos rrjs Kara
20 (j)v0 iv.
aAAa ovfjifiaivei rroXXaKis ev eXarrovi
<f)0eipeo9at Sta rfjv rrpos aXXrjXa ovyK p a oiv avcojiaXov yap ovorjs rrjs vXrjs Kal ov rravraxov rfjs
avrfjs avayKrj Kal ras yeveoeis avajfiaXovs etvai
Kal ras fiev ddrrovs ras Sc ftpaSvrepas, coore
ovfiftaivei Sta rfjv rovrcov yeveoiv aXXois yiveoOai
<j)0opdv.
25
A c t S , ooorrep elprjrai, ovvexfjs eorai fj yeveois
Kal fj (frOopa, Kal ovSerrore vrroXeiiJjei St fjv elrrofiev
air lav.
rovro S evXoycos ovfifteftrjKev errel yap
ev arraoiv del rov fteXrlovos opeyeoOai <j>afiev rfjv
cj>voiv, peXnov Sc to etvai fj ro fifj etvai (to S etvai
30 rrooaxcbs Xeyofiev, ev aXXois elprjrai), rovro S
aSvvarov ev arraoiv vndpxîv Sta to rroppco rfjs
apxfjs d</>loraoOaiy rip Xeirrofievip rporrip o w e rrXfjpcooe ro oXov o Oeos, evSeXextf rroifjoas rfjv
y e v e o iv ovrco yap av fiaXiora ow elpoiro ro etvai
Sta to eyyvra ra etvai rfjs ovoias ro yiveoOai del
337 a Kal rfjv yeveoiv. rovrov S a in ov, coorrep elprjrai
15
1 r) ante TreploSos
2ra
0111isi.
a d d id i.
3 cVScAyyj FH :
0 See 318 a 9 ff.

b Metaphysics, passim.
316

measured by a smaller and some by a greater period ;
for some the measure is a year, for others a greater
or a lesser period.
The evidence of sense-perception clearly agrees
with our views ; for we see that coming-to-be occurs
when the sun approaches, and passing-away when it
withdraws, and the two processes take an equal time ;
for the space of time occupied by natural passingaway and coming-to-be is equal. It often happens,
however, that things pass away in too short a time
owing to the commingling of things with one another ;
for, their matter being irregular and not everywhere
the same, their comings-to-be must also be irregular,
sometimes too quick and sometimes too slow . The
result is that the coming-to-be of certain things
becomes the cause of the passing-away of other
things.
As has already been remarked, coming-to-be and Aristotle
passing-away will take place continuously, and will ^theory1
never fail owing
given. liow
explains
O to the cause which we have O
This has come about with good reason. For nature, coming-toas we maintain, ahvays and in all things strives after p|Sg"ng.
the better ; and being (wre have stated elsewrhere away mainthe different meanings of being b) is better than continuous
not-being, but it is impossible that being can be alteration,
present in all things, because they are too far away
from the original source. God, therefore, following
the course which still remained open, perfected the
universe by making coming-to-be a perpetual pro
process ; for in this way being wrould acquire the
greatest possible coherence, because the continual
coming-to-be of coming-to-be is the nearest approach
to eternal being. The cause of this continuous pro
cess, as has been frequently remarked, is cyclical
317
ARISTOTLE
337 a
cfyopa' j i o v r j yap ovvex^fS. 8 to

fierafiaXXei ct? aXXrjXa Kara ra
7Tad7) /cat ras Svvafiets, otov ra a7rXd ocbfiara,
fitfietrat t t ) v k v k X co <f>opdv orav yap c f vSaros
5 afjp yevrjrat /cat c f aepos Trvp /cat naXiv c/c nvpos
vScop, k v k X co <f>afiev 7TepteXrjXv0evat t tjv yeveotv Sta
to 7raAtv avaKafiTrretv.
alarc /cat 07 cvflcta </>opa
fitfiovfievT) ttjv k v k X co ovvex^js eor tv.
7ToX\aKLSt f j
X co
kvk
/cat raAAa oaa
"A fia
Se
Sta Tt,
10 p o f i e v o v
ra
fierd p a o ts'
Kal
<j> o p a v
15
el
yap
fifj
S n r X ijv
e v S e 'x e r a t
tco
a ir to v y a p
a ir e tp c o
eK a orov
fie v e tv
rov
fie v
Sta Sc to
ot58cv a v r c b v
S te o ra o t
e o r l v f j e l s a X X rjX a
e jie v e v
vtto
a n o p o v o tv ,
o t K e t a v <f>e-
ttjv
X P ^ v tP
fie r a fla X A e t
ovoa v
riv e s
e ls
rovrov
jie r e p a X X e v
Ste o T T j K e o a v .
av
rovrcov
rcb v o c o fia r c o v
x<*>pav, e v
o c b fia r a .
Xp9opa Kal Sta

TtV alrtav, Kal rt
to
yevrjrov /cat <f>0apr6v, <f>a-
vepov c/c rcbv elprjfievcov.

rt
to
k iv o v v ,
el
k I vtjols
cVct S
avayKrf etvat
eorat, cboTrep etprjrat rrpo-
repov ev erepots, Kal el act, ort act Tt Set etvat, Kal
20 ct ow exrfs, cv to auTo Kal
clklvtjtov
Kal ayevrj-
rov Kal avaXXoicorov Kal el nXeiovs etev at kvkXco

Ktvrjoets, irXetovs fiev, naoas Se 7rcos etvat ravras
avayKT)
vtto
fitav a p x ^ v
ovvexovs S
Phys, 255 b 31 ff.

318
ovtos* rov

motion, the only motion which is continuous. Hence
also the other things which change into one another,
for instance, the simple bodies, by being acted upon
or having power to act, imitate cyclical movement.
For when Air comes-to-be from W ater, and Fire from
Air, and W ater again from Fire, we say that comingto-be has completed the cycle, because it has come
back to its starting-point. Hence motion in a straight
line is also continuous because it imitates cyclical
motion.
This at the same time clears up a point which some
people find puzzling, namely, the reason why, since
each o f the bodies is being borne along towards its
own place, the bodies have not become separated
in the infinity of time. The reason is their reciprocal
change of position ; for if each remained in its own
place and was not transformed by its neighbour,
they would have long ago been parted. Their trans
formation, then, is due to the movement of a double
kind ; and, owing to their transformation, none of
them can remain in any fixed position.
From what has been said, it is evident that comingto-be and passing-away take place, and why this is
so, and what it is that comes-to-be and passes-away.
But if there is to be movement, there must, as has
been explained elsewhere in an earlier treatise, be
something which causes movement, and if movement
is to go on always, that which causes it must go on
always and, if it is to be continuous, that which causes
it must be one and the same and unmoved, un
generated and unalterable ; and if the cyclical move
ments are to be more than one, they must, in spite
of being more than one, be all subject somehow to
one cause ; and since time is continuous, the movc-
319
ARISTOTLE
337 a
Xpovov
avayKrj rrjv Kivrjoiv avvexfj
etvat,
aSvvarov xpdvov x ^ P 1* Kivfjoews etvai.
eirrep
ovvexovs
25 apa rivos apiOfios o XPVS, rrjs kvkXco apa., Kadarrep ev rois ev apxfj Xoyois SiwploOrj.
8* fj Kivrjcris rrorepov rep ro
ovvexrjs
Kivovfievov ovvex^S
etvai fj rw ro ev w Kiveirai, olov rov rorrov Xeyw

fj t o rraOos;
SrjXov Srj o n rep ro Kivovfievov rrws
yap ro rrados ovvex^s aAA fj rep ro rrpayfia <L

ovfifiefirjKe ovvexes
etvai;
el Se Kal rep ev to,
30 fiovtp rovro rep rorrco vrrdpxet' fieyeOos yap n ext*

rovrov
Se ro
kvkXw fiovov avvexes, w ore
avrw del avvexes.

Kivrjaiv,
to
avro
rovro apa eorlv o rroiei avvexrj
kvkXw acbfia <f>epofievov fj Se kIvtjois
rov xpovov.
11. 'Errel 8 ev rois ovvexebs Kivovfievois Kara
35 yeveaiv fj aAAolwoiv fj oXcos fierafSoXrjv opwfiev
337 b t o
firj
i(f>erjs ov Kal yivofievov roSe fiera ro Se ware

SiaXelrreiv,
OKerrreov rrorepov
ea n
ef
avayKrjs earai, fj ovSev, aAAa rravra evSexerai firj

yeveoOai.
oTt
fiev yap evia, SfjXov, Kal evOvs ro
eorai Kal ro fieXXov erepov Sia r o v r o * o fiev yap

5 aXrjOes elrreiv o n ecrrai, Sei rovro etvai rrore aXrjdes
o n ear i v o Sc vvv aXrjOes elrreiv o n fieXXei, ovSev
Phys. 217 b 29 ff.

320
COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, II. 10-11

ment must be continuous, because it is impossible
for there to be time without movement. Time, then,
is a way of reckoning some kind of continuous move
ment and, therefore, of cyclical movement, as was
laid down in our original discussion. But is move
ment continuous because that which is moved is
continuous or because that in which it moves is con
tinuous (for example, the place or the quality) ?
Clearly because that which is moved is continuous ;
for how could the quality be continuous except
because the thing to which it belongs is continuous ?
And if it is because the place in which it occurs is
continuous, continuity is to be found only in the place
in which it occurs ; for it has a certain magnitude.
But of that which moves, only that which moves in a
circle is continuous in such a way that it is always
continuous with itself. This, then, is wiiat produces
continuous motion, namely, the body wiiich is moved
in a circle, and its movement makes time continuous.
11.
When in things winch are moved continuously Things
in the course of coming-to-be or alteration or change
to-be
generally, we observe a sequence, that is, one thing do so of
coming-to-be after another in such a wray that there because^
is no cessation, wre must inquire whether there is
anything wiiich will necessarily exist in the future changes is
or whether there is no such thing, or wThether any
necesone of them may possibly fail to come-to-be. For sity.
it is evident that some of them fail to come-to-be,
and the readiest example is the difference which for
this reason exists between something will be and
something is about to be ; for if it is true to say
something will b e, it must be true at some future
date to say that it is. On the other hand, though it is
true now' to say that something is about to happen,
M
321
ARISTOTLE
337 b
KwXvei fifj yeveoOai * fieXXwv yap av j8a8it,eiv n s

oXws S , eVet ei/Scêrat evia
av fiaSioeiev.
ovk
rwv ovrwv Kal fiff etvai, SrjXov
10 ovr ws efet, Kal
ovk
oti
Kal rd yivo fieva
ef avayKrjs rovr earai. rrore-
pov ofiv arravra roiavra fj ov, aAA* evia avayKaiov

arrXws yiveodai, Kal e o n v
worrep errl rov etvai
rd fiev dSvvara fiff etvai rd Se Svvara, ovrw s Kal

rrepl rffv yeveoiv;
otov rporras apa avayKrf y e
veoOai, Kal ovx otov re fiff evSexeoOai.
Et
8ff rd
15 varepov
rrporepov
eorai
(otov
avayKrf
el
yeveoOai,
el
to
ot/cta, OefieXiov,
el
Se
ro vro , rrrfXov), dp ofiv Kal el defieXios yeyovev,

avayKrf oIkiov yeveoOai;
fj ovK en , el fiff /ca/cetvo
avayKrj yeveoOai arrXws;
el Se rovro, avayKrj Kal
OefieXiov yevofievov yeveoOai oIkIov movrw yap fjv

rrporepov exov rrpos ro varepov, war
to
20 eorai,
avayKrj eKeivo rrporepov.
el eKeivo
el r o iw v avayKrj
yeveoOai ro varepov, /cat ro rrporepov avayKrj /cat

el ro rrporepov, Kal ro varepov roivvv avayKrj, aAA
)
5 ) eKeivo,
~
) \ \ > ft
t /
aAA o n vrreKeiro
ov oi
fievov.
ev ots apa
t o v t o is
d v n o rp e (f> e i,
to
322
>
avayKrjs eoo-
varepov avayKrj etvai, ev
K al
25 fievov avayKrj yeveoOai
>>
to
del
ro v
rrp o re p o v
varepov.
yevo-

there is nothing to prevent its not happening a man
might not go for a walk, though he is now about to
do so. In general, since it is possible for some of the
things which are also not to b e, obviously things
which are coming-to-be arc also in this case and their
coming-to-be will not necessarily take place. Are,
then, all the things which come-to-be of this kind ?
Or is this not so, but it is absolutely necessary for
some o f them to come-to-be ? And does the same
thing happen in the sphere of coming-to-be as in that
of being, where there are some things for which it is
impossible not to be and for others which it is
possible ? For example, solstices must come-to-be and
it is impossible that they should be unable to occur.
I f it is necessary for that which is prior to come-tobe if that which is posterior is to be for example,
foundations must have come-to-be if a house is to
exist, and there must be clay if there are to be foun
dations does it follow that, if the foundations have
come-to-be, the house must necessarily do so ? Or
is this no longer so, if there is no such absolute neces
sity ? In this case, however, if the foundations have
come-to-be, the house must come-to-be ; for such
was the assumed relation of the prior to the posterior
that, if the posterior is to be, the prior must have
preceded it. If, therefore, it is necessary that the
posterior should come-to-be, it is necessary also that
the prior should have come-to-be, and, if the prior,
then also the posterior, not, however, because of the
prior, but because the future being of the posterior
was assumed as necessary. Hence, whenever the
posterior is necessary, the reverse is also true, and
always when the prior has come-to-be, the posterior
must also come-to-be.
323
ARISTOTLE
337 b
E t flV oSv IS CL7TlpOV etoiV 77*1 TO KOTW, OVK
earai avayKrj t o
aXX*
ef
varepov t o Se yeveoOai arrXws,
vrroOeoews* del
yap
erepov
efirrpooOev
avayKrj earai, St o eKeivo avayKrj yeveoOai.
war
el fifj e o n v apXV r v arreipov, ovSe rrpwrov eorai
30 ovhev, 8 i 9 o avayKaiov eorai yeveoOai.

ouS* ev roig rrepas eypvot rovr
aAAa fifjv
earai elrreiv aXrj
Ows, o n arrXws avayKrj yeveoOai, olov oIkiov, orav

OefieXios yevrjrat* orav yap
yevrjr ai,
el fifj del
rovro avayKrj yiveoOai, ovfifirjoerai ael etvai ro

ev 8 exofievov fifj del etvai.
aAAa Set rfj yeveoei del
35 etvai, el e f dvdyKrfs avrov eorlv fj yeveois * ro yap

338 a e f avayKrjs Kal del afia* o yap etvai avayKrj ovx
/ > > *
> > /
/
r/
\ t
oiov re firj etvat* w or et eortv ef avayKrjs, aioiov
e o n , Kal el atStov, e f avayKrjs.
Kal el fj yeveois
roivvv e avayKrjs, atSto? fj yeveois rovrov, Kal

et atoto?, eg avayKrjs.
Et
apa
n vds
ef
avayKrjs
arrXws
5 avayKrj dvaKVKXeiv Kal avaKafirrreiv.
fj
yeveois,
avayKrj yap
fjroi rrepas exeiv rfjv yeveoiv fj firj, Kal el fifj, fj

The argument is as follows : let x be one of the future
members of the series of events, x's oeenrrence is contingent
on the future occurrence of a still later member of the series,
whieh is itself contingent on a still later member, y. The
occurrence of every subsequent member of the infinite series
is therefore conditionally, not absolutely, necessary. If a?\s
occurrence were absolutely necessary, x would be the begin321.
COMING-TO-BE AN D PASSIN G -AW AY, II. 11

Now if the series is to go on indefinitely down
wards, any particular later member of the series
must come-to-be not by absolute, but only by con
ditional, necessity ; for it will always be necessary
that another later member of the series should exist
first in order to make it necessary that the earlier
member of the series should come-to-be. Hence, since
the infinite has no beginning, neither will there be
any primary member of the series which will make
it necessary for the other members to come-to-be .0
fftnd further, it will not be possible to say with truth,
even in the case of members of a series which is
limited, that there is an absolute necessity that they
should come-to-be. For example, a house will not
necessarily come-to-be when its foundations have
come-to-be ; for unless it is always necessary for a
house to come-to-be, the result will be that when its
foundations have come-to-be, a thing, which need
not always be, must always be. No : if its comingto-be is of necessity, there must be an always
about its coming-to-be ; for wrhat must necessarily be,
must at the same time always be, since what must
necessarily be cannot not-be ; hence, if a thing
is of necessity, it is eternal, and, if it is eternal, it
is of necessity ; if, therefore, the coming-to-be of
a thing is of necessity, it is eternal and, if it is
eternal, it is of necessity.
If, then, the coming-to-be of anything is absolutely
necessary, it must be cyclical and return upon itse lf;
for coming-to-be must either have a limit or not have
a limit, and if it has not a limit, it must proceed either
ning of the series (i.e. would necessitate the earlier members);
but the series is infinite and therefore has no beginning or
end.
325
ARISTOTLE
338 a
ct?
ovk
fifjr
p rrjr
ev0v
rj k v k X c o ,
ct? e v 0 v o l o v
av K a r o n , w s
avw >
ws
to v tco v
re
Sta
em
to
tw v
e tir e p
fir jS a iiw s
carat atSto?,
cfvat ap X V v
i c r o f i e v w v , X a jifid v o fJ L ev ,
errl t w v y i v o f i e v w v
S etvat
atStov cfvat.
a va yK rf
10 d p x t f v , fj/tj rr erre p a o fJ L ev rjs o v a r j s , K a i
Sto a v a y K r j k v k X w e t v a i . d v n o r p e < f > e i v a p a a v a y K r j

carat, ofov e l r o S l cf a v a y K r j s , /cat ro r r p o r e p o v
a p a aAAa f ir j v e l t o v t o , K a l t o v a r e p o v a v a y K r j
y e v e o 0 a t.
/cat r o v r o d e l Srj awcâ)?* o v S e v y a p
t o v t o S ia cj> ep ei X e y e i v Sta S v o f j r r o X X w v .
ev rfj
15 k v k X c o a p a K i v f j a e i /cat ycvcact e a r l r o cf a v a y K r j s
a rrX w sm K al
e ire
k v k X w s a va yK rj
/cat ycyovcvat, /cat ci
a v a y K r j,
eK a a rov
fj
rovrw v
y iv e o O a i
ycvcat?
kvkX w .
T a v ra jiev Srj evX oyw s, errel atSto? Kal aXXws

(f>dvrj fj kvkX w
kIvtjois Kal fj r o v
ovpavovs o n
338 b r a v r a c f avayKrjs y iv e r a i Kal carat, ocrat ra v rrjs

Ktvrjaeis Kal o a a i Sta r a v r r jv
ct yap ro kvkXw
Kivovjievov d e l rt /ctvct, avayKrj Kal t o v t w v kvkXco

etvai rfjv Kivrjoiv , olov ri}? avw cf>opas ovorjs k v
kXw o rjXios1 w Sl, errel S o v r w s , at cSpat Sta r o v r o
1 kvkXo) o rjXios F, Bonitz.
326
Rectilinear movement, proceeding ad infinitum, does

in a straight line or in a circle. But of these alter
natives, if it is to be eternal, it cannot proceed in a
straight line, because it can have no source,a whether
we take the members o f the series downwards as
future events or upwards as past events. But there
must be a source of coming-to-be, though without
coming-to-be itself being limited, and it must be
eternal. Therefore, it must be a cyclical process.
It will, therefore, have to return upon its e lf; for
example, if a certain member of the series is neces
sary, then the one before it is also necessary, and
further, if the latter is necessary, then the one which
follows must necessarily come-to-be. And this goes
on always continuously ; for it makes no difference
whether we speak of a sequence of two or many
members of the series. Therefore, it is in cyclical
movement and cyclical coming-to-be that absolute
necessity is present, and if the process is cyclical,
each member must necessarily come-to-be and have
come-to-be, and, if this necessity exists, their comingto-be is cyclical.
This conclusion is only reasonable, since cyclical
movement, that is, the movement of the heavens,
has been shown b on other grounds to be eternal,
because its own movements and the movements
which it causes come-to-be of necessity and will con
tinue to do so ; for if that which moves in a cycle is
continually seeking something else in motion, the
movement of those things which it moves must also
be cyclical. For example, since the upper revolution
is cyclical, the sun moves in a particular way, and
since this is so the seasons come-to-be in a cycle and
not involve an apxq from which coming-to-be might derive
its necessity.
6 Phys. viii. 7-9.
327
ARISTOTLE
9b5 k v k X co
tco
y iv o v r a i
K al a v a K a jir r r o v o iv ,
y i v o f i e v c o v rraX iv r a
vnro
to vtco v
ov
to vtco v.
Tt ofiv 877 7tot ra /Ltcv o v t c o <f>alverai, olov vSara

/cat a^/o k v k X c o yivo fiev a, Kal ct fiev ve<f>os carat,
Set iJaat, Kal ct uorct yc, Set /cat vecf>os etvat, avOpco7rot Sc /cat a)a ou/c avaKafirrrovoiv els avrovs a>ore
10 7raAtv yiveodai rov avrov (ou yap avayKrj, et o
rrarfjp iyevero, oe yeveoOai aAA* ct av, eKeivov,
els evOv Sc eoiKev elvai avrrj fj y e v e o is ); apx*l
rrjs OKeifjecos nraXiv avrrj, rrorepov ofioicos arravra
avaKcxfirrrei fj ov, aAAa ra fiev apiOficp ra Sc ctSct
fiovov.
oocov fiev ofiv acj)0apros ff ovola fj
k iv o v -
15 fievrj, cf>avepov o n Kal apiOficp ravra eorai (fj yap

Kivrjois aKoXovOel tco Kivovfievcp), oocov Sc firj aAAa
cf>0aprff, avayKrj rep ctSct, apiOficp Sc fifj avaKafirrretv. Sto vScop eij aepos Kal afjp cf vSaros
eiSei o avros, o v k apiOficp.
el Se Kal ravra
apiOficp, aAA* ovx
V oôla yiverai ovo a roiavrrj
ota evSexeoOai fifj etvai.
a The sun moves in a circle in the ecliptic, and solar motion
causes the cyclical changes of season, on which depend the
vital periods of living things upon the earth.
6 And not to be cyclical.
e In some cycles the same individual always recurs, in
others successive individuals of the same species.
d As was the doctrine of Empedocles (cf. 315 a 4- ff.).
328

return upon themselves ; and since they come-to-be
in this manner, so do those things whieh they cause
to come-to-be.a
W h y , then, is it that some things evidently cometo-be cyclically, for example rains and air, and if
there is to be cloud, it must rain, and if it is to rain,
there must also be a cloud, yet men and animals do
not return upon themselves, so that the same creature
comes-to-be a second time ? For there is no neces
sity, because your father came-to-be, that you should
eome-to-be ; but if you are to come-to-be, he must
have done so ; and in this case the course of eomingto-be seems to be in a straight line.ft The startingpoint for the discussion of this problem is this, to ask
the question again whether all things alike return
upon themselves, or whether some things recur
numerically and others only specifically. Therefore,
obviously, those things o f whieh the substance (which
is what is moved) is imperishable will be numerically
the same ; for the nature of the movement depends
on that of the thing moved ; but those things which
are not of this kind but perishable must reeur speci
fically and not numerically. Hence, when W ater
comes-to-be from Air or Air from W ater, the W ater
or the Air is the same specifically but not numeri
cally ; and if these things also do seem numerically
the same/* yet this is not true of those things whose
substance comes-to-be, when it is such that it is
possible for it not to be.
329
PSEUDO-ARISTOTLE
DE MUNDO
IN T R O D U C T IO N
A n a l y s is
T h e treatise opens with a short introductory chapter,
commending to Alexander the study o f the cosmos

and the greatest things in the cosmos, and continues
with a description of the various parts of the cosmos,
working from the region of the aether on the outside
of the sphere to the earth at the centre. Chapter 2
describes the shape, the arrangement and the material
of the heavens, and indicates very briefly the nature
of the fiery element and the air that lie inside the
outer sphere of aether.
Chapter 3 describes the
geography of the sea and the earth ; the author
naturally concentrates on the inhabited world,
though he maintains that there are other inhabited
worlds also, beyond the seas. Chapter 4* is a very
summary account of the most notable phenomena
in and about the inhabited world ; a section on
meteorology, including an elaborate catalogue of
winds, is followed by a description of the things that
happen on or in the earth or sea volcanic eruptions,
earthquakes, tidal waves, etc.
The last sentence of Chapter 4 introduces the main
theme of the work : there arc many changes in the
sublunary world, but the system as a whole remains
constant, and is subject neither to generation nor to
333
[ARISTOTLE]
destruction. In Chapter 5 the language is heightened
in what is virtually a hymn to the eternal cosmos.
Chapters 6 and 7 tell of the cause that ensures its
eternity the god who rules everything with his allpervading power. This god is described in Chapter
6 by means of a series of similes, whieh show how a
remote and transeendent god ean maintain the order
and arrangement of the cosmos without personal
intervention ; Chapter 7 lists a number o f names by
whieh God is known and shows how they arise from
various aspects of his function.
P h il o s o p h y a n o R e l ig io n
Before examining the problem of the authorship

and date o f the D e Mundo, we must consider its pur
pose and its philosophical position. It is an open
letter, written with the most careful attention to
style and language, summarizing persuasively the
results of a study o f the cosmos. The open letter was
a common form o f literary expression, particularly
for protreptie discourses ; the outstanding examples
are Isocrates* Ad Nicoclem and Aristotles lost
Protrepticus, addressed to Themison, the prince of
Cyprus. The D e Mundo shows many similarities to
these protreptie addresses in style ; but the authors
purpose, emphasized several times, is to provide a
summary of his subject, and in this he approaches the
pattern of Epicuruss letters or the popular Intro
ductions (c/traycoyat) of the Hellenistic period.
The authors attitude of mind is given in a word
in the first chapter : let us theologize (flcoAoycV**')
about all these things. A .-J . Festugifere has shown a
a Le Dieu rosmiqne, pp. 311 ff.
334
ON THE COSMOS
how typical this is of that koine spirituelle which
grew in the late Hellenistic age and flowered in the
Roman Empire ; nature is explored, not as the object
of scientific enquiry, but as the expression of the
cosmic deity, and the results are presented straight
forwardly as dogma.
The tneology and cosmology of the D e Mundo is,
in general, Peripatetic, but the author borrows his
details from many schools. Parallel passages and
possible sources have been analysed in great detail by
W . Capelle, W . L. Lorimer and Joseph P. Maguire,"
and there is no need to repeat their analysis. Capelle
traced many of the details to Posidonius, and this
view was for many years generally accepted. Maguire,
however, found no reason to believe that anything
came from Posidonius except some of the meteorology, and showed that the closest parallels arc in
the Neo-Pythagorean writers; he established at least
that we cannot attribute a doctrine to Posidonius
simply because it occurs in the D e Mundo, but it
would be surprising if a work written after the time
of Posidonius were not considerably influenced by
him. The paramount difficulty is that the author
was an eclectic, living in an age when eclecticism was
the fashion and there was a great deal of common
ground between different schools ; it is therefore
sometimes impossible to say which authors, or even
which schools, were chosen as sources.
The scientific chapters of the D e Mundo are typical
of many introductions and summaries, and very
likely are themselves derived from similar elementary
handbooks rather than from the detailed expositions
of original authors. The doctrine of the cosmic deity,
a See Bibliographical Note, below.
335
[ARISTOTLE]
which is the climax of the book, developed gradually
in the history of Greek religion. Its chief exponents
were the Stoics, and no doubt the D e Mundo is in
fluenced by Stoic religious thought. But the author
rejects an important part of the Stoic doctrine : his
god is not immanent in the world, interpenetrating
all things, but remote, unmoved and impassive. He
maintains the order of the cosmos by means o f an
undefined power, which relieves him of the dis
honourable necessity of personal intervention.
Clearly we have here a development, however
remote, of Aristotles Unmoved Mover.
A t first
sight the god of the D e Mundo seems far removed
from the god of Physics viii and Metaphysics A , who
is inferred as the necessary result of a theory of
motion, whose only activity is thought which has
itself as its object, and who moves as the object of
love.
Aristotle himself, however, seems to have
spoken with a rather different voiee in his published
works. In the D e Pkilosopkia he said that the orderly
movement of the heavenly bodies was one of the
reasons for mans belief in gods. Cicero reports an
elaborate passage from Aristotle to this effecta :
suppose there were men who had lived all their lives
in caves under the earth and were then released ;
when they saw, suddenly, the earth and seas and
sky, when they learnt the vastness of the clouds and
the forcc o f the winds, when they beheld the sun
and learnt its great size and beauty and the cfficacy
of its work, that it spreads its light over all the sky
and makes day, and when night darkened the lands
and then they saw the whole sky adorned with a
pattern o f stars, and the changes in the moons light
Cic. De Nat. Deor. ii. 37 = Arist. fr. 12 Rose.
336
ON THE COSMOS
as it waxes and wanes, and the rising and setting of
them all, and their eourses planned and immutable for
all eternity when they saw this, they would think
at onee that there are gods and that these mighty
works are the works of gods. This is close to the
spirit of the D e Mundo.
In one other important respect the author sides
with the Peripatetics and Neo-Pythagoreans against
the Stoics. Most of the Stoics believed that the
element o f fire was more powerful than the other
elements, and that it periodically enveloped the
cosmos in a universal conflagration (cfttrppajcrts).
Pseudo-Aristotle is emphatie in his rejection of this
doctrine : the elements are equally balaneed and
there is no universal conflagration, nor any other kind
of eosmie destruction. The eternity o f the cosmos
was maintained by Aristotle in the lost D e Philosophia,a and in the D e Caelo.h In Hellenistic times
it was believed by the Stoic Panaetius, but his
successor Posidonius apparently reverted again to
cKirvptixris. There are two Hellenistic treatises extant
whieh argue that the cosmos is eternal D e Universi
Natura, falsely attributed to the Pythagorean Ocellus
of Lueania, and Philo (or Pseudo-Philo), D e Aeternitate Mundi.
A uthor
and
D ate
It is almost universally agreed that this treatise is

not a genuine work of Aristotle. The style and vari
ous details of doctrine all make it unthinkable that
it was written either by Aristotle himself or during
his lifetime ; but no such certainty is possible about
the identity of the author or the date of composition.
0 C f fr. 22 Rose.
> Bk. I. 10-12.

337
[ARISTOTLE]
The first problem to be decided is whether the
treatise was attributed to Aristotle by the author or
by someone else. The probability is that it was a
deliberate forgery. Attempts have been made to
show that the Alexander to whom the work is ad
dressed is someone other than Alexander the G r e a t:
but it is difficult to find another Alexander who might
be called " the best of princes.
Probably the
author followed the example of an earlier forger, the
author of the Rhetoric to Alexander, in the hope that
his work might be taken as a respectful tribute from
the master to his most famous pupil.
The late Hellenistic author Demetrius 6 says that
Aristotles letters to Alexander were more like
treatises (<rvyypdpfiaTa) than real letters. A man
called Artemon, who is mentioned by Demetrius,
arranged the letters then supposed to be by Aristotle
into eight books. W e can conclude from this that
at the time of Demetrius, who was roughly contem
porary with Pseudo-Aristotle, there was in circulation
a collection of Aristotles letters, which included
letters to Alexander which were in the form of
treatises. It would seem therefore that the author
of the D e Mundo had ample precedent for the form
of his work, whether the D e Mundo was known to
Demetrius or not.
The habit of attributing ones writings to an older
and greater author in the same tradition was par Max Pohlenz (Die Stoa, 11)48, pp. 361-362) returns to a
suggestion of Bernays that the addressee is Tiberius Alex
ander, nephew of Philo and governor of Egypt soon after
a.d. 63.
b On Style iv. 234. Demetrius wrote some time after 100 b . c .
(see J. F. Lockwood, in C,R. Hi (1938), p. 59) and pro
bably before a . d . 100.
338
ON THE COSMOS
ticularly common among the Pythagoreans of the
Hellenistic age ; the author of the D e Mundo owes
much to these Neo-Pythagoreans, and he certainly
reproduces enough genuinely Aristotelian thought
to make it reasonable that he should wish to usurp
Aristotles name.
This is an important point. Those who have proved
that the work is a forgery have sometimes overlooked
that it is a forgery of Aristotle, and that in this fact
we might find a little help in dating the treatise. For
if the author is imitating Aristotle at all, it is surely
the Aristotle of the Protrepticus and D e Pkilosophia,
the Aristotle whose flumen orationis aureum was
praised by Cicero, rather than the Aristotle of the
school-treatises which survive to-day. The schooltreatises were either lost or disregarded after the
death of Theophrastus, and did not begin to occupy
the attention o f the learned world again until the
appearance of Andronicuss edition in the late first
century b . c . 6
These considerations will be variously interpreted.
Those who believe that knowledge of Aristotles work
was absolutely confined to the published writings until
Andronicuss edition, will say that the author of
the De Mundo shows knowledge of doctrines (e.g. of
the Unmoved Mover, if this was not contained in the
D e Pkilosophia, and various meteorological details)
which were known only after Andronicus. But it is
likely that much of Aristotles doctrine was known
throughout the period, at least in his own school,
a Acad. Pr. ii. 38. 119.
b The date usually given for this is c. 40 b .c . I. During
(Notes on the History o f the Transmission of Aristotle's
Writings, Goteborg, 1950) thinks this is the earliest possible
date, and would prefer 40-20 b .c .
339
[ARISTOTLE]
even though it did not appear in the published works.
I am inclined to believe that the author o f the D e
Mundo could have known all the Aristotelian matter
that he reproduces before the publication of Andro
nicuss edition, and that the style and manner of
the work indicate a date before this edition made
Aristotles sehool-treatises more widely known.
Other evidence for the date is confused and diffi
cult.
It is certain that Apuleius D e Mundo is a
translation of the Greek, but it is not quite certain
that this is genuinely by Apuleius. I f it is, we have
a terminus ante quern of c. a . d . 140. The work seems
to have been known to Maximus of Tyre and must
therefore be before a . d . 1 80-190. From other reports,
references and imitations in later authors nothing
firmer than this can be deduced.
To reach a terminus post quern by an analysis of the
sources is equally difficult, since it is usually hard to
say who was the first to express a particular doctrine.
Nevertheless some of the meteorology appears to
depend on Posidonius and his pupil Aselepiodotus,
and we might therefore give c. 50 b . c . as the terminus.
There is no agreement about the date of the NeoPythagorean sources.
Attempts have been made
to argue from the silence o f Ciccro, Seneca and Pliny,
but arguments from silence do not carry much
weight.
The date has been given by various scholars as
follows : Zeller, 1st cent. a . d . ; Diels, in the reign
of Augustus ; Wilamowitz, in the Julio-Claudian
dynasty ; Capelle, the first half o f the 2 nd cent. a . d . ;
Lorimcr, probably a . d . 40-140 ; Maguire and Fcstngiere, the first few decades of the 1 st cent. a . d . In
my view there is some slight reason for saying that
340
ON THE COSMOS
it was written before or not long after Andronieuss
edition, and virtually no reason for choosing any
other time within the limits already mentioned.
B ibliographical N ote
The editio princeps (1497) was based on a single m s .,
and this remained the common text until Bekker
added the results of collation of four more m ss . in the
Berlin Aristotle (1831). Parts of the treatise were
edited by Wilamowitz and Wendland and printed in
Wilamowitzs Griechisches Lesebuch, Text II ( 1906 ),
pp. 188-199.
W . L. Lorimer took into account the readings of
over seventy m ss ., the quotations in Stobaeus and
others, the Latin version of Apuleius, the Armenian
and Syriac versions, and two mediaeval Latin versions.
He published his results in three books : The Text
Tradition o f Ps.-Aristotle D e Mundo (St. Andrews
University Publications, xviii, 1924) ; Some Notes on
the Text o f Ps.-Aristotle D e Mundo (St. Andrews
University Publications, xxi, 1925) ; and Aristotelis
D e Mundo (Paris, 1933). The last of these contains
the Greek text with a very detailed apparatus criticus
and a German translation by E . Konig of the Syriac
version (chaps, v-vii only).
On the sources, the most important works are :
W . Capelle, Die Schrift von der W elt/*' Neue Jahrb.
f d. klass, Alt. xv (1905), pp. 529-568 ; and Joseph
P. Maguire, The Sources o f Ps.-Aristotle * De
M u n d o/ Yale Classical Studies, vi (1939)*
The important article by Hans Strohm, Studien
a Prof. E. H. Warmington has pointed out to me that the
geography of ch. 3 confirms an early date.
341
[ARISTOTLE]
zur Schrift von der W e lt, Mus. Helv. ix (1952),
pp. 137-175, did not reach me until this book was
in proof. Strohm agrees with me in minimizing
the influence of Posidonius and in marking the con
nexions with early Aristotle.
The late Prof. E . S. Forster translated the D e
Mundo for the Oxford translation o f Aristotle (1914?).
A .-J . Festugiere translates most o f it into French, and
adds important comments, in La Revelation d*Hermes
1'rismegiste, vol. ii, Le Dieu cosmique (Paris, 19^9)*
I am indebted to all these, and particularly (as all
students of the D e Mundo must be) to W . L. Lorimcr.
T ext
The text is based on Bekker *s edition in the Berlin

Aristotle ; I have indicated deviations from Bekker,
except those that seem trivial.
The four m ss . used by Bekker are designated as
follows :
0 = Vat. 316.
P = Vat. 1339.
Q = Marc. 200 .
R = Paris. 1102 .
Where necessary I have added references to
collated by Lorimer, as follows :
B=
C=
D=
E=
F=
G=
W =
Z=
342
Hieros. Patr. 108.

Laur. 87, 14.
Paris. 1302.
Vat. Urbin. 125.
Laur. 87, 16.
Vat. 1025.
Paris. 1038.
Paris. 2381.
m ss .
ON THE COSMOS
Stob. = Stobaeus. Ap. indicates reading confirmed
by the Latin of Apuleius, D e Mundo.
Nearly all the deviations from Bekker follow
Lorimer ; to avoid complicating the notes unduly,
where I have followed Lorimer against Bekker and
the m ss . are fairly equally divided, I have used the
abbreviations Bekk. and L o r / without listing
the mss . Lor. (Notes) refers to the second and
Lor. (De Mundo) to the third o f Lorimer s works
cited in the Bibliographical Note above.
I wish to record my indebtedness to Professor
T. B. L. Webster for reading m y work in typescript;
I am very grateful for his criticisms and suggestions.
D . J. F.
343
A PI2TO TEA O T2
n E P I KOSMOT
1 . UoXXdKLS flV eflOtye OetOV Tt Kal SatflOVlOV
391 a 1
ovr cos xPVIi a & AAe'favSpe, fj <f>i\oao<f)la e8oev

eZvat, fiaXtara Se ev ot? fiovrj Stapafievrj Trpos rfjv
rcbv oXcvv Oeav ia7rovSaae yvcbvat rfjv iv avrols
5 aXfjOetav, /cat ra)v aAAcov r avrrjs arroaravrcov Sta
ro
{h/to? /cat to
eSetaev
ot5S*
fieyeOos, avrrj ro
aurqv
tcSv
/caAAtorcov
rrpayfia ovk
arrrjîcjaev,
aAAa /cat avyyevearrarrjv eavrfj Kal fiaXiora rrperrovaav ivofiiaev etvai rfjv e/cetvcuv fiaOrjaiv.
irreiSfj
yap ovx * v T
T<? ocofian els rov ovpavtov
a<j>iKeaOai rorrov Kal rfjv yrjv e/cAt7rovTa tov ovpa10 vtov e/cetvov x&pov Karorrrevaat, KaOarrep oi avorj-
roi rrore irrevoovv AAajaSat, 97 yovv foxTI ^

<f)iXooo<f)las, Xafiovcra fjyefiova rov vovv, irrepaicvOrj
Kal iêSfjfirjaev, aKorriarov n v a oSov evpovaa, /cat
Ta
7rAetcTT0V
aXXfjXcov a<f>earcbra rots rorrots rfj
Stavota ovve<j>povrjae, paSicos, otfiai, rd
avyyevrj
15 yvcDpiuaoa, Kal Oeicp tf/vxfjs ofifian r a Oeta Kara0 See Introduction, p. 338.
344
A R IS T O T L E
ON
THE
COSM OS
1 . I have often thought, Alexander, that philosophy

is a divine and really god-like activity, particularly
in those instances when it alone has exalted itself
to the contemplation of the universe and sought to
discover the truth that is in i t ; the other scienccs
shunned this field of inquiry because of its sublimity
and extensiveness ; philosophy has not feared the
task or thought itself unworthy of the noblest things,
but has judged that the study of these is by nature
most closely related to it and most fitting. It was
not possible by means of the body to reach the
heavenly region or to leave the earth and explore that
heavenly place, in the manner once attempted by
the foolish Aloadae b : so the soul, by means of philo
sophy, taking the mind as its guide, has crossed the
frontier, and made the journey out of its own land
by a path that does not tire the traveller. It has
embraced in thought the things that are most widely
separated from each other in placc ; for it had no
difficulty, I think, in recognizing things that were
related to it, and with the souls divine eye c it
6 Otus and Ephialtes, the mythical Giants, who tried to
reach heaven by piling Pelion on Ossa.
c Probably a quotation : c/. the eye of the soul in Plato,
Rep. 533
345
[ARISTOTLE]
391 a
X a fio v o a ,
tols
r e a v O p w n o is n p o (f)7 ]re v o v o a .
to vto
Se e n a d e , KaO7 o o o v o lo v r e fjv , n a o i v d<f>06vws

fie r a S o v v a i flovXrjdeT oa t w v n a p 7 a v r f j r i f i l w v . Sto
K al
tovs
fie r a
o n o v S rjs
S ia y p a ifja v ra s
fjfiiv
evos
r o n o v <f>voiv fj f ii a s a xV li a n o A e w s fj n o r a f i o v f i e y e 20 Oos fj o p o v s K aX X os, o ld r i v e s fjSrj n e n o i fjK a o i,

(fyp a tp vres o i fie v r fjv *O o o a v , o l Se ttjv N u a a a v ,1
o t Se r o K w pvK L ov a v T p ov f o l h e o n o v v e r v x *
tw v
7TL flipOVS, o Ik TL<TLV OV TLS TTjS f l l K p o f o x ^ S , T<X

T vxd vT a iK n e n X r jy fie v o v s K al f i e y a <f>povovvTas e m
25 dewpLa fjiLKpa. t o v t o Se ird a x o v o L Sta t o a d e a r o c
tw v
K p e ir r o v w v
K o o jiw
etv at,
fie y io r w v
K o o fio v
ouSeV oTe y a p
X eyw
K al t w v
av to v to is
iv
y v f j-
391 b o l w s i m o r f j o a v r e s iO a v fia ^ o v t l t w v aX X w v, aAAa

n a v r a a v r o l s r d aAAa fiiK p a Kare<f>aivero a v K al
o v S e v o s a f t a n p o s r f jv r o v r w v v n e p o x tfv .
A e y w f i e v 8 fj fjfie is K a l, KaO7 o o o v i<f>iKrov,
B eo X o y w fiev n e p l t o v t w v o v f i n a v r w v , w s e K a o r o v
5 eêt <f>voews K al d e o e w s K al K iv fjo e w s . n p e n e iv 8e
y e o tfia i K al o o l , o v r i f jy e fio v w v d p l o r w , r f jv r w v
fie y lo r w v
lo r o p la v
fie n e v a i,
<f>iXooo<f>la r e
firjh ev
fiiK p o v i n i v o e i v , aAAa r o i s t o i o v t o l s S w p o is S e ftovoO ai r o v s a p lo r o v s .
2. K oofios fiev ovv i o n ovorrjfia ef ovpavov K al

io yfjs Kal rwv iv t o v t o i s nepiexofievwv <f>voewv.
Xeyerai Se K al erepws Koofios fj rw v oXwv rais re
K al SiaKoofirjois, vno Oeov* re K al Sta Oeov* <f>vXar1 Nucraai^ Lor. : Nuaay Bekk.
* Otov codd. Stob. L o r.: 0u>v codd. al. Bekk.
3 Oeov codd. L o r.: Oewv codd. al. Stob. Bekk.
a C f Pausanias x. 32. 2.
b C f Introduction, p. 334.
346
ON THE COSMOS, 1-2

grasped things divine, and interpreted them for man
kind. This came about because it wished to impart to
all unsparingly, as far as possible, a share o f its own
privileges. So those who have earnestly described
to us the nature of a single place, or the plan of a
single city, or the size of a river, or the beauty of
a mountain, as some have done before now some
of them tell us of Ossa, some of Nyssa, others of the
Corycian cave, or whatever other detail it hap
pens to be all these might well be pitied for their
meanness of spirit, since they are overawed by
commonplaces and pride themselves on insignificant
observations. The reason is that they are blind to the
nobler things I mean the cosmos and the greatest
features of the cosmos. For if they once genuinely
gave their attention to these things, they would never
wonder at any other ; everything else would appear
small and worthless to them, in comparison with the
matchless superiority of these.
Let us, then, take up the subject, and so far as they
are attainable let us theologize b about all the greatest
features of the cosmos, discussing the nature, position
and motion of each. It is right, I think, that even
you, the best of princes, should undertake the study
of the greatest things, and that philosophy should
have no humble intentions, but should greet the most
excellent men with worthy gifts.
2.
Cosmos, then, means a system composed of
heaven and earth and the elements contained in
them. In another sense, cosmos is used to signify
the orderly arrangement of the universe, which is
preserved by God and through God. The centre o f
e So also Chrysippus ap. Arius Didymus fr. 31 (Diels, Box.
Graec. pp. 465-466), and Posidonius ap. Diog*. Laert. vii. 138.
347
[ARISTOTLE]
391 b
r o fie v r j.
r a v r r j s S c t o f i e v f i e a o v , a K lv r jr o v r e K a l
e S p a io v
cocov
ov,
fj
e a r la
</>epeaj3ios
re
o fio a
15 a v r r j s , r ra v r e
avcorarco,
e tX r jx e
K a l fifjr r jp .
K a l r ra v rr f
Oecbv
y fj,
r ra v ro S a rrcb v
to
Sc
vrrep O ev
rrerr e p a r co f i e v o v
o tK T jr fjp io v ,
ovpavos
e ls 1 r o
c b v o fia a r a t.
rrX fjprjs S c co v a c o f i a r t o v O elco v, a Srj K a X eiv a a r p a

e tu id a f ie v , K i v o v f i e v o s K iv r ja tv a lS io v , /x ta r r e p t a y c o y fj
K a l k v k X c o a v v a v a x o p e v e i r ra a t r o v r o is a r r a v a r c o s
S t
a Icbvos*
20 K o a f i o v
a rr e p
ean
rov
a < j> a tp oeiS ovs
e lr r o v ,
a v firr a v r o s
ovros
K al
evS eX e^ w s, S vo
ovpavov
re
Kal
K i v o v f i e v o v , K aO -
aK tvrjra
cf
a va yK rjs
a r j f i e t a , K a r a v r iK p if a X X fjX cov, K a O a rrep r f j s e v
ropvcp
KVKXo</>opovfievrjs a<f>alpas, a r e p e a
Kal a v v e y o v r a
25 k v k X c o
cov
Sc
el
r r jv
a<f>aipav, rrep l a
a rp e cf> e r a t2* K a X o v v r a t
v o r ja a tfie v
Se o v r o t
e r r e ^ e v y fie v r jv
fiev o v r a
rrd s S yK O s
rroX of
ev d eia v ,
rjv
S t
r iv e s
392 a a t jo v a K a X o v a t, S t d f i e r p o s e a r a i r o v K o a f i o v , f i e a o v *
f i e v e x o v a a r r jv y f j v , r o v s
S c S iio r ro X o v s r r e p a r a .
r c b v S c a K iv fjr c o v rroX cov r o v r c o v o f i e v d e l cf>avepos

ea rtv
v rrep
a p K riK o s
Kopvcfyrjv
cov
K a X o v fiev o s , o
K a ra
Sc
ro
vtto
fio p e to v
y r jv
d el
K X ifia ,
K a ra K e-
5 K p v r r r a t, K a r a r o v o r t o v , a v r a p K r t K o s K a X o v fi e v o s .
Ovpavov Se Kal aarpcov ovalav fiev aWepa KaXov1 c t? c o d d . L o r . : 1)$ P B e k k .

2 7ras o y x o s kvk Xo> oTpdforai S t o b . L o r . ; rras kog /xos Ktvctrai.
o fiev ofiv KoofjLos iv k v k Xco trcpioT ptytr ai c o d d . B e k k .
348
ON THE COSMOS, 2
the cosmos, which is unmoved and fixed, is occupied
by life-bearing earth,'* * the home and mother of
living beings of all kinds. The region above it, a
single whole with a finite upper limit everywhere,
the dwelling of the gods, is called heaven. It is full
of divine bodies which we call stars ; it moves eter
nally, and revolves in solemn choral dance 6 with all
the stars in the same circular orbit unceasingly for
all time. The whole of the heaven, the whole cosm os/
is spherical, and moves continuously, as I have said ;
but there are necessarily two points which are un
moved, opposite one another, just as in the case of
a ball being turned in a lathe ; they remain fixed,
holding the sphere in position, and the whole mass
revolves in a circle round them ; these points are
called poles. If we think of a straight line joining
these two together (some call this the axis), it will be
a diameter of the cosmos, having the earth at its
centre and the two poles at its extremities. One of
these two stationary poles is always visible, above our
heads in the North : it is called the Arctic d pole. The
other is always hidden under the earth, in the South :
it is called the Antarctic pole.
The substance of the heaven and the stars wc call
C f Hesiod, Theog. 693.
6 Ps.-Aristotle seems to recall Euripides, Ion 1079 ore Kal
Atos darepCDiros avexopevacv alOrjp, xopevct
aeXava. Cf. also
Soph. Ant. 1146 f. He develops the same image below,
399 a 14.
9
Ps.-Aristotle here uses Koap.os in a third sense, as a
synonym for ovpavos. This sense is quite common from Plato
onwards.
d The terms Arctic and Antarctic do not appear in extant
literature before Hipparchus (2nd cent. b . c . ) .
3
fieaov TW Z Lor. : fiearjv codd. cet. Bekk.
349
[ARISTOTLE]
2a
<5? Ttvcs*, Sta to
f ie v , o v x
i r e p l t t jv
fie v r fv
aAAa Sta to act
h v v a fiiv ,
crrotêtov
f ie v r jv ,
a K T jp a ro v r e
10 a c r r p c o v
r a
f ie v
ScbSeK a
15 T o ts
tt p
w 8 iw v
o r e p o ts
aAA
a A A rfA o is ,
a v rw v
ovv
ro v
e ls
C7TTa
k v k
Xols
fie l^ w
X o is
k v k
K a ra
Xo s
Sc,
irX a v rfT a
fie p r)
i(f> e rjs
K e ifie v o is ,
v T T O K a rw
ifiT re p ie x e o d a iy
e lv
k v k a o is
at,
w oT e
to v s
T ra v ra s*
ye
aTrXavwv cr<f>alpas TrepieiXrj(/)Oai.
o v re
, c o a re
a v e b re p o v .
im c fy a v e ia s
tw v
ev
T rX a v f jT W V ,
t o c f o v t o is
del
cort
avw T epw
tov
e n rra
tc
f ifjv
rcb v
e ls
a v e ije v p e r o v
K iv o v fie v w v
K e c f ta X a io v f ie v o v ,
Sta
o v ra , o v re
etvat, t o 1 Sc
* to Sc
ovp av o v
o v fifie o o s
T recf> V K ev
T rX rjd o s e a r w
e rrl f ic a s
w v
h irjp rjfie v o s
K iv e la O a i
dnX avcbv
ovpavcp
iy K a p c rio s
fie p o s
T rp o a y e io re p o v
tw v
rerrd p c o v ,
eS p as,
x < *> pas, r a
a v fiT T a v ro s
to v
o v fiira v T i
o fio ra x c b s
a v O p w T T O is , K a l i r e p
rfjs
rcb v
e v e T e p o ts K a i e r e p o is
to 1 f i e v
f ie v
to
K V K X o < f> o p o v -
O e iv
exovT a
K a X o v fie v o s
Stca>orat,
a 7 r r )X X a y -
y e f if jv if n r e p ie x o f ie v w v
tco
a v ra s
a ffle a d a i,
rrv p o s
e re p o v
tcov
a n X av fj
r a s
f w o cf> 6p o s
T pom K cbv
T rX e ic rT O V
ovoav
K a l O e lo v .
T r e p tc jT p e c f > e T a i ,
20
T rv p w S rf o f ia a v
T rX rjfifie X o v v re s
iv
v tto
a X X fj-
T rjs
tw v
a v v e x ff Sc c^ct act
t t jv Oeoiv TavTT) o t o v OatvovTo? a fia Kal K p o v o v

25 K a X o vfievo s
kvkX os,
i(f>efjs
Kal2 At o s X e y o f i e v o s , elO* o
Sc o t o v
OacflovTO?
U v p o e i s , Hpa/cAcov?
tc Kal *A p e o s Trpocrayopevofievos, eijrjs Sc o S tiA /Jojv,
ov
lep o v
1 to
. . .
Kal
*E p fi o v
K a X o vo iv
cvtot,
T ives
Sc
Lor. : t o v . . . rov Bekk.

Lor.: o Kal BD : om. cett.
to
a The author follows Aristotle in making aether a fifth
350
ON THE COSMOS, 2
aether,a not, as some think, because it is fiery in nature
and so burns (they fall into error about its function,
which is quite different from that of fire), but because
it always moves in its circular o rb it; it is an element
different from the four elements,6 pure and divine.
Now, of the stars which are encompassed in it, some
arz fixed and move in concert with the whole heaven
always keeping the same position in i t ; in the middle
of these the circle o f the zodiac, as it is called, set
obliquely through the tropics, passes round like a
girdle, divided into the twelve regions o f the zodiac.
The others, the planets, move, according to their
nature, at speeds different from the fixed stars and
from each other, each in a different circle, in such a
way that one is nearer the earth, another higher in
the heavens. The number of the fixed stars is not
to be known by men, although they all move on one
visible surface, namely that o f the whole heaven :
but the class of planets contains seven units, arranged
in the same number o f circles in a series, so that the
higher is always greater than the lower, and all the
seven, though contained one within another, are
nevertheless encompassed by the sphere of the fixed
stars. The circle which is always in the position next
to this sphere is that which is called the circle of
Phaenon (the Bright one) or Cronus (Saturn) ; then
comes the circle of Phacthon (the Shiner) or Zeus
(Jupiter) ; next Pyroeis (the Fiery one), named after
Heracles or Ares (Mars) ; next Stilbon (the Glittering
one) which some dedicate to Hermes (Mercury), some
element: the Stoics identified it with fire. He rejects the
derivation of the word from alQcoOai (to burn) and relates it
to del Qelv (move always), as Plato and Aristotle did (rf. Plato,
Crat. 410 b , Aristot. De Caelo 270 b 22).
6 Earth, air, fire and water.
351
[ARISTOTLE]
392 &
*ArroXXcovos* fJLeO OV O TOV O c OOcfiOpOV, ov A <j>poS tr rjs, oi Se vHpas rrpoaayopevovaiv, eira o fjXiov,
Kal reXevraios o ttjs oeXfjvrjs fieXP1 YV$ opiêrai .

30 o Se aWfjp to. re Oeia ijirrepiexei ocofiara Kal ttjv
TTJS KlvfjOeCOS TalV.
Merd Se t t j v aldepiov Kal deiav <f>vcnv, fjvnva
rerayjievrjv aTroâlvofiev, e n Se arperrrov Kal av
er epoicorov Kal arraOfj, avve^fjs ean v fj St oXwv
rradrjrfj re Kal rperrrfj, Kai, t o avfirrav elrreiv,
35 c/>0aprfj re /cat irriKrjpos. tavrrjs Se avrrjs rrpcorrj
392 b fiev icrnv fj XerrrofJiepfjs Kal cf>Xoycb8rjs ova la, vrro
rfjs alOepiov <f>voecos rrvpov/ievrj Sta t o fieyedos
avrrjs Kal rfjv oijvrrjra rfjs Kivfjoecos* iv Se rfj
rrvpcoSei Kal araKrco Xeyojievrj rd re aeXa Starret
/cat <f)X6yes aKovriôvrai Kal So/ctSe? re /cat fioOvvoi
5 Kal Kojifjrat Xeyofievoi arrjpiôvrai Kal ofiewvvrai
rroXXaKis.
Se r a v rrjs o afjp vrroK exvr at, o(f>co8rjs
cov Kal rrayercbhrjs rfjv cf>vaiv vrro Se Kivtfcrecos1
Xafirrojievos a jia Kal SiaK aiojievos Xafxrrpos2 r e
y iv e r a i Kal aX eeivos .
iv Se r o v rco , rrjs rraOrjrfjs
o v n Kal avrcb Svvdfiecos Kal rravroSarrcbs aA10 Xoiovjxevcp, vecf)Tj r e o v v io r a r a i Kal ojifipoi K a ra p a a a o v a i, stoves r e Kal rrdxyai Kal xaAaat
rrvoai r e dvejicov Kal rvc/>covcov, e n r e fipovra l Kal
1 Klvt)s BCWZ Stob. Ap. Lor. : Kivrjoccus codd. cet. Bekk.
2 Xafinpos Lor. : Aafiirporepos Bekk.
a This is the Pythagorean order of the planets, adqpted
by Aristotle, Eudoxus, Eratosthenes, and probably the early
Stoics. The other order commonly given by ancient writers,
the Chaldean, puts Venus and Mercury below the sun ;
this order was adopted by Panactius, and probably also by
352
ON THE COSMOS, 2
to Apollo ; after this is the circle of Phosphorus (the
Light-bearer), which some call after Aphrodite
(Venus) and others after Hera ; then the circle of the
sun a ; and the last, the circle of the moon, is bounded
by the terrestrial sphere.6 The aether, then, contains
the divine bodies and their ordered orbits.
After the aetherial and divine element, which is
arranged in a fixed order, as we have declared, and is
also unchangeable, unalterable and impassive, there
comes next the element that is through the whole
of its extent liable to change and alteration, and is,
in short, destructible and perishable. The first part
o f this is the fine and fiery substance that is set aflame
by the aether because of the latters great size and
the swiftness of its motion. In this fiery and disorderly
element, as it is called, meteors and flames shoot across,
and often planks andpite and comets, as they are called,
stand motionless and then expire.
Next under this is spread the air, opaque and icy
by nature, but when it is brightened and heated by
movement, it becomes bright and wrarm.d In the
air, which itself also has the power to change, and
alters in every kind of way, clouds are formed and
rain falls in torrents ; there is snowr, frost and hail,
and gales and whirlwinds ; thunder and lightning,
Posidonius. Lorimer writes (Notes, p. 51) that there were
few upholders of the 44 Pythagorean
order after 200 b.c.,
though it appears in an unknown astronomer in Rhodes of
about 100 b.c. (I.G.Ins. i. 913).
b yrj here must refer to the whole sublunary sphere, not
to the earth proper.
e This is inconsistent with 395 a 29 If. where these pheno
mena are put in the air.
d The coldness of the air is a Stoic doctrine ; Aristotle said
it was warm and capable of being inflamed by motion
(Meteor. 341 a 18).
N
353
[ARISTOTLE]
392 b
a<JTpCL7Tal K a l 77Tc6atS* K p a w w v fJLVpLCOV T yvo<f>(JJV
o vfinXrjy aSes.
3.
8 c rfjs deplov <f>v<Jd)S yfj Kal OaXaaaa
15 ipf)pioraiy <f)VTots fSpvovara Kal q>ois nrjyals re Kal
noTafiols, to ls fiev ava yfjv eXiTTOfievoLS, to ls Se
avepevyofievois els OaXaocrav. nenoiKiXTai 8 e Kal
xAoais fivpiais opeai re vifrqXoLS Kal fiaOvijvXois
SpvfioTs Kal noXeaiv, as t o ao</>ov a )ov, o avOpwnos,
20 iSpvaaro, vfjaois re evaAtots* Kal ffneipois. rffv fiev
ovv OLKovfievrjv o noXvs Aoyos* els T vffaovs Kal
rjneipovs SieiXev, ayvocbv o tl Kal fj avfinaoa fiia
vrjaos iaTiv, vno Trjs 'ArXavTiKfjs KaXovfievrjs 0aXaaaTjs nepipptofievrj. noXXas Se Kal aXXas clkos
rfjaSe dvTmopOfiovs anioOev KCiaOaL, Tas fiev fiei25 ovs avrrjs, r a s 8 c iXarrovs, fffiiv Se 7ra<ra9 nXffv
rfjaSe aoparovs* onep yap at nap * fffiiv vrjaoi
npos ravrl r a neXayrj nenovOaai, to v to fjSe ff
oiKovfievrj npos ttjv ' ArXavrcKrjv OaXaocrav noXXai
T CTepai npos ovfinaaav ttjv OaXaaaav Kal yap
aSrai ficyaXai Tives elai vrjaoi fieyaXois nepiKXv30 IfifievaL neXayecTLV.
ff Se ovfinaoa to v vypov
</>vaLS eninoXaôvaa, KaTa TLvas Trjs yfjs aniXovs
ras KaXovfievas avane<f>ayKvial oiKovfievas, e^fjs
av elrf Trjs aeptov fiaXLcrra <f>vcrews. /xera Se ravrrjv
ev to ls fivdois Kara t o fiecrairarov to v Koafiov
ovveprjpeLOfjLevrj yfj naaa Kal nemeofievrj avvearrj35 Kev, aKLvrfTos Kal aaaXevTOS* Kal t o u t eart to v
1 avair<l>ayKvta coni. Usener Lor.: dvan(f>vKvZa codd; Bekk.
a Aristotle apparently thought nothing but sea lay from
Gibraltar westwards to India ( Meteor. 362 b 28). Strabo (i.
4. 6 = 65 c) notices the possibility of other inhabited worlds
in his discussion of Eratosthenes.
354
ON THE COSMOS, 2-3

too, and falling thunderbolts, and the clash of
innumerable storm-clouds.
3.
N ext to the element of air comes the fixed mass
of earth and sea, full o f plants and animals, and
streams and rivers, some winding about the surface
of the earth, others discharging themselves into the
sea. This region is adorned with innumerable green
plants, high mountains, deep-shaded woodland, and
cities established by the wise creature, man ; and
with islands in the sea, and continents. The in
habited world is divided by the usual account into
islands and continents, since it is not recognized that
the whole of it is really one island, surrounded by
the sea which is called Atlantic. Far away from this
one, on the opposite side of the intervening seas,
there are probably many other inhabited worlds,
some greater than this, some smaller, though none
is visible to us except this one ; for the islands we
know stand in the same relation to our seas as the
whole inhabited world to the Atlantic Ocean, and
many other inhabited worlds to the whole ocean; for
these are great islands washed round by great seas.
The whole mass o f the wet element lies on the surface
of the earth, allowing the so-called inhabited worlds
to show through where there are projections of the
earth ; it is this element that would properly h be
next in order to the air. After this, set in the depths
at the centre of the cosmos, densely packed and com
pressed, is the whole mass of the earth, unmoved and
unshaken. And this is the whole of that part o f the
6
Taking fiaXiora with the verb ; it is probably postponed
for rhythmic effect. The meaning is that water is in theory
next to air, but earth sometimes protrudes through the water.
aniXovs (properly stains or marks ) in the previous line
seems to be used in the sense of antXahas ( projections ).
355
[ARISTOTLE]
392 b
KOOflOV TO Tldv O KaXovfiev KaTCO.

393 a
x â Tavra iv rrevre
â/pats*
7TVT 8 TJ OTOt,-
o<j>aipiKcbs iyKeifieva,
rrepiexofievrjs del rrjs eXarrovos rfj fieiôvi Aiy w

Se yrjs fiev iv vS a n , vSaros Sc iv dipt, aepos Se
iv rrvpif rrvpos Se iv alOepi rov oXov Koofiov ovveorfjoaro, Kal ro fiev avco rrav decov arreSeitjev
5 oiKrjrf)piov, rd Karco 8 c icf>rifiepcov cpcov. avrov
ye firjv rovrov to fiev vypov i o n v , o KaXeiv rrorafiovs Kal vafiara Kal OaXaooas elOiofieOa, to Se
I;rjpov, o yrjv re Kal fjrrelpovs Kal vffoovs ovofiaofiev.
Tcov Se vrjocov al fiev eloi fieyaXai, KaOarrep fj

AcAc/crat rroXXal re erepat
fieyaXois rrepippeofievai rreXayeoiv, al Sc iXarrovs,
cj>avepal re rjfiiv Kal ivros ovoai. Kal rovrcov al
fiev atjioXoyoi, 2t/ccAta /cat ZapSco /cat K vpvos
K pfjrrj re Kal EtJjSota /cat Kvrrpos Kal Aeofios, al
15 Sc vrroSeeorepai, cLv al fiev 2 rropaSes, al Se K v /cAaScs*, al Se aXXcos ovofidôvrai.
ncAayos* Sc to fiev eijco rfjs oiKovfievrjs *ArXavtikov re Kal *Q.Keavos /caActrat, rrepippecov fffias.
iv Sc rep rrpos Svoeis orevorropco Siavecoycbs1
orofian, Kara ras fHpa/cActou? Xeyofievas orfjXas
20 rov ctopovv els rrjv eoco OaXaooav cos av els Xifieva
rroieirai, Kara fiiKpov Sc imrrXarvvofievos avaXetrai, fieyaXovs rrepiXafipdvcov koXttovs aXXfjXois
ovva<f>els, rrfj fiev Kara orevorropovs avxevas aveoroficofievos, rrfj Sc rraXiv rrXarvvofievos. rrpebrov
fiev ovv Xeyerai iyKeKoXrrcboOai iv Sefta elorrXeovn
25 ras ' llpaKXeiovs orfjXas, Sixcbs, els ras KaXovfievas YtVpreis, cLv rrjv fiev MeyaXrjv, rffv Se MtKpav,
KaXovoiv errl Oarepa Se ovkcti ofioicos drroKoXnov10 ovfirraoa fjSe oiKovfievrj
S5 G
ON THE COSMOS, 3
cosmos that we call the lower part. So these five
elements, occupying five spherical regions, the larger
sphere always embracing the smaller earth in water,
water in air, air in fire, fire in aether make up the
whole cosmos ; the upper part as a whole is distin
guished as the abode of the gods, and the lower part
as that of mortal creatures. O f the latter, some is
wet, and this part we call rivers and springs and seas ;
the rest is dry, and this part we name land and con
tinents and islands.
There are various kinds of island : some are large,
like this whole inhabited world of ours, as I have said,
and many others which are surrounded by great
oceans ; others are smaller, visible to us and within
the Mediterranean. Some of these are quite con
siderable Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica, Crete, Euboea,
Cyprus and Lesbos ; some are smaller, like the Sporades, the Cyclades, and others with various names.
The ocean that is outside the inhabited world is
called the Atlantic, or Ocean, and surrounds us. To
the W est o f the inhabited world, this ocean makes
a passage through a narrow strait called the Pillars
o f Heracles, and so makes an entry into the interior
sea, as if into a harbour ; gradually it broadens and
spreads out, embracing large bays joined up to each
other, here contracting into narrow necks of water,
there broadening out again. They say that the first
of these bays that the sea forms, to starboard, if you
sail in through the Pillars of Heracles, are two, called
the Syrtes, of which one is called the Major, the other
the Minor ; on the other side it does not form gulfs
1 hiav(M>ya>s L o r.; 8tavccoyos Bekk.
357
[ARISTOTLE]
393 a
fxevos r p i a 7rotct n eX ay rj, to tc ZapSovtov Kal to

r aX artK ov KaXovfievov K al A S ptav, i rjs Sc t o v t w v
iy K a p a io v t o St/ccAt/cov, /jltol S c t o v t o t o K prjTiKOV,
30 OWC^C? Sc
a v r o v , Tjj jUCV TO PilyVTTTlOV TC K al
X\apL<f>vXiov K al Zuptov, tt} Sc

MuprOJOV.
A tya to v
to
tc
/cat
aVTL7TaprjKL Sc TOL LpT)fJLVOLS TToXv-
/XpOTaTOS COV O U.OVTOS, ofi TO [lV fl t/âtTaTOV

/caActrat, to S c cfco n p o s to v 'EAA tJct7TOVTOV OWaveOTOfltOTaL Tjj KaXovfJLVr} II pOTTOVTthl.
393 b M a td m ?
ripos* yc fjLrjv Tats* avaa^ccrcat tou fjXcov rraXiv

iop4tov o 'Q.Kavos, to v IvSt/cov tc /cat Ilcpcrt/cdv
8 iavolas koXttov, ava<f>alvi ovvexy TVV 'Epvdpav

5 0aAacrcrav StctAr/^cas*.
orcvov
tc
/cat
cm 0ctcpov Sc Kepas Kara
imfifjK'q
SirjKtov
au^cva,
ttoXlv
avvpvvTaLt Trfv ' Yp/cavtav tc /cat K aam av optfcuv

t o Sc vnkp TavTTjv ftaOvv c^ct tov vrrep ttjv Matoimv
XlfJivr]v tottov.
cfra /caT? oAtyov virkp to v s ^KvOas
tc
/cat
KcATt/c^v
io tc
tov
raAaTt/cov
cr^tyyct rfjv
oLKovfierrqv Trpos
koXttov Kal tols
TTpoeLprjfievas
*H pa/cAciov? oTrjXas, tbv cfco TrepLppeei ttjv yrjv o

a The Ocean makes three separate incursions into the in
habited world the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean and the
Caspian (see n. c below). Festugicre (op. cit. p. 465) thinks
these Eastern seas are spoken of as prolongations of the
Mediterranean ; but iraAiv elopcajv here is parallel to tov
elapovv . . . iroieirat at 393 a 19.
Are these two gulfs or one ? If two, they are respectively
the Gulf of Cutch (or the Gulf of Cambay) and the Persian
G u lf; if one, probably the Persian Gulf is meant. The Greek
could be interpreted either way.
c By 'VjpvOpa (red) the author probably means what was
358
ON THE COSMOS, 3
at first in the same way, but makes three seas, the
Sardinian, Galatian and Adriatic ; next to these, and
across the line o f them, is the Sicilian sea ; after this,
the Cretan ; and continuing this on one side are the
Egyptian and Pamphylian and Syrian seas, on the
other the Aegean and Myrtoan.
Lying opposite
these that I have described, in another direction, is
the Pontus, and this has very many parts : the inner
most part is called Maeotis, and the outermost part,
towards the Hellespont, is joined by a strait to the
sea called Propontis.
In the East, the Ocean again penetrates (the in
habited world) a ; it opens out the gulf o f India and
Persia 6 and without a break reveals the Red S e a /
embracing these as parts o f itself. Towards the other
promontory (o f Asia } / 1 passing through a long narrow
strait and then broadening out again, it makes the
Hyrcanian or Caspian se a e ; beyond this, it occupies
a deep hollow beyond Lake Maeotis. Then little by
little, beyond the land of the Scythians and Celts, it
confines the inhabited world as it passes towards the
Galatian Gulf and the Pillars of Heracles, already
described, on the farther side o f which the Ocean
generally called the Erythraean Sea, which might include
our Red Sea (called the Arabian Gulf at 393 b 28).
d Lorimer (Notes, p. 80, n. 3) quotes Mela i. 2 (9) to confirm
this interpretation. In Mela, the two promontories are the
land between the Nile and the Red Sea, and that between the
Tanals and the Caspian.
*
Or bounding the Hyrcanian and Caspian country
(Forster). But OaXaaaav is easier to understand here than
yrjv ; admittedly opifav has an odd sense (perhaps marking
out ), but the author is running short of synonyms for
forming seas. At all events, he means the Caspian Sea,
which was thought of as a gulf of the Northern Ocean from
the time of Alexander to Ptolemy.
359
[ARISTOTLE]
393 b
Q .K eavos. iv to v tc o y e fifjv vrjaoi fieytG T at1 r v y X avovotv o v o a t S vo, B p e rra v iK a l 2 X eyofievat, AXfSlcdv3 Kal I epvrj, tcov rrp o taro p rjfiev cov fie i^ o v s , vrrep
TOVS KcArois1 KlflVat. t o v t w v Se OVK iXaTTOVS
15 fj T T arrp o fiav r] rrip a v IvSdh', Aofj rrpos Tfjv
otK ovfievrjv , K al f) Ocj8oA KaXovfievrj, K aTa to v
A pafiiK ov Ketfievrj koX ttov. o v k oX iyat Se fitK pal
rrepl Ta? U peTTavtK as K al Tfjv *Ifirjp tav kvkXco
rrepteaTecjidvcovTai Tfjv otKovfievrjv TavTTjv, fjv Sfj
vfjaov elpfjK ajiev' fjs rrXaTos fiev io T t KaTa t o f3 a6v 20 Ta to v t t j s fjrrelpov P p a \ v an o S e o v TeTpaKtofivpicov
GTaStcov, a>s cf>aatv ot eS yecoypacfyfjaavres, fifjKos
Sc rrepl irrT aK tofiv p to v s fiaXtOTa. S ta tp e tT at Se
ets T Evpcbrrrjv K al * A a ta v K al AtjBvrjv.
JLvpcorrrj fiev ovv icFTiv fjs opot kvkXco (jrrjX al
t 'llp a K X e o v s Kal jLVXpl IldvTou 0aAarra rc rT p 25 K av la, KaO rjv cjTevoTaTos tcrOfids e ls to v W ovtov
StfjK et * Ttves Se av rl* t o v IgOjjlov T a v a tv rroTafiov
elpfjK aoiv. A at a Sc eW t to drro r o d etprj fievov
Iodfiov t o v tc IldvTOU K al t t j s 'Y p K a v ta s OaXaoGrjs
fiexpt* OaTepov loO fiov, o s fieTai> KctTat to v tc
*A pafiiK ov koX ttov Kal t t j s e aw OaXaGorjs, rrep t 1 post fiiyiarai add. r e Bekk.
2 BpeTTaviKai Lor. : BperavviKal Bekk.
3 'A\pla>v Lor. : *AAfiiov Bekk.
* a v r l Stob. Lor. : airo codd. Bekk.
a Very mysterious. It might well be Socotra, as Bochert
suggests (A rh t. Krdkunde, p. 9 3 ); Capelle (op. cit. p. 539)
suggests Madagascar; Mullenhoff (Deutsche Altertumskunde, pp. 322 f.), quoted with approval by Lorimer (Notes,
p. 37, n. 1), suggests it is the island in Lake Tana (Psebo in
Strabo) in Abyssinia, magnified and transplanted.
360
ON THE COSMOS, 3
flows round the earth. There are two very large
islands in it, called the British Isles, Albion and
Ierne ; they are larger than those already mentioned,
and lie beyond the land of the Celts. No smaller than
these are Taprobane (Ceylon) beyond the Indians,
which lies obliquely to the inhabited world, and the
island known as Phebol,* by the Arabian Gulf. There
is quite a number of other small islands round the
British Isles and Spain, set in a ring round this
inhabited world, which as we have said is itself an
island ; its breadth, at the deepest point of the con
tinent, is a little short of 40,000 stades, in the opinion
of good geographers,6 and its length is approximately
70,000 stades. It is divided into Europe, Asia and
Libya.
Europe is the area which is bounded in a circle by
the Pillars of Heracles and the inner parts of the
Pontus and the Hyrcanian Sea, where a very narrow c
isthmus passes between it and the Pontus ; but some
have said the river Tanais, instead of this isthmus.d
Asia is the region from this isthmus of the Pontus
and the Hyrcanian Sea to another isthmus, which lies
between the Arabian Gulf and the Mediterranean ;
b Posidonius put the length of the otVou/ucVn at 70,000
stades, hut no one reports his figure for the widtn ; since he
thought the Ocean was quite close to Maeotis in the North,
his figure would presumably be under 30,000 stades in
agreement with the view then current (Thomson, History
o f Ancient Geography, p. 213). Eratosthenes estimated the
length at 70,800 stades (with the addition of 7,000 for bulges
and possible islands), and the width at 38,000.
c Strabo reports (xi. i. 5= 4 9 1 c) that Clitarchus and others
made this isthmus absurdly narrow, while Posidonius thought
it was 1500 stades.
d These variant opinions are noted by Eratosthenes ap.
Strabo i. 4. 7 (65 c).
361
[ARISTOTLE]
393 b
30
x6fJLVO$ VTTO
TC
IVTTJS K al TOV n e p l f
ClKeaVOV'
rives he1 a 7to TavaiSos* fiexpi NeiAou arofidrwv
Trjs A o la s riOevrai opov.
tov
394 a
Aij3vrj he to and
5ApafiiKov laOfiov ews 'HpaKXeovs arrjXwv.
tov
oi he ano t o v NeiAou </>aolv ecos eKeivwv.
tt jv Se
A iy v n T o v , v n o tw v tov Nei'Aov o r o f ia r w v n e p ip p e o fievrfv, o i fiev tt) 'A o i a , o i Se tt) A ipvrj n p o o a n r o v a i , K al T as v fjao v s o i fiev e ^ a ip e ro v s n o io v a iv ,
o i he n p o a v e fio v a i r a i s y eL roaiv a e l f io ip a is .
5
Vrjs fiev hr) K al d a X d rrrjs <j>voiv K al Oeoiv, fjvTiva
KaXeiv eiw O afiev oiK ovfievrjvy Toidvhe n v a ia r o p rj K afiev.
4.
Ylepl Se tw v afjioXoywrdrwv ev avrfj Kal nepl
avrf)v naOwv vvv Xeywfievy avra Ta avayKaia Ke<f>aXaiovfievoi.

Avo y a p hr) Tives a n
avrrjs avaO vfiiaaeis a v a -
io <f>epovrai o w e ^ d j s els r o v vn ep fffias a e p a , X en ro -
fiep eis Kal a o p a r o i n a v r a n a a iv , et [ t i ] 2 fir) Kara

r a s ew a s e o n v ai [ r e ] Sta3 n o ra fiw v r e Kal v a fid r w v ava<f>epdfievai O ew povvrai.
r o v r w v Se f) fiev
e a n tjrfpa Kal Kanvwhrjs f and rrjs yrjs a n o p p eo v a a ,

f) Se v o re p a Kal arfiw h rfs , a7ro rrjs v yp a s avaO v15 fiiw fievrj
<f>vaews*
y iv o v r a i
Se a7ro
fiev
ra v rrfs
o fiix Aat Kal h poaoi Kal n a y w v iheai ve<f>rj r e Kal

ofifipoi Kal x^dves Kal xd X a ai, and he rrjs {;r)pas
d vefioi r e Kal n v ev fid rw v hia<f>opai fip ov ra i r e Kal
a a r p a n a l Kal nprjarrjpes Kal Kepavvol Kal r a aAAa
1 post
362
add.
to
CGZ Bekk.
ti
seel. Lor.
ON THE COSMOS, 3-4

it is surrounded by the Mediterranean and the en
circling stream of the Ocean ; but some say that Asia
stretches from the Tanais to the mouths of the Nile.
Libya lies between the Arabian isthmus and the
Pillars of Heracles (but some say from the Nile to
the Pillars). E gypt, which is encompassed by the
mouths of the Nile, is attached by some to Asia, and
by others to Libya, and some make the islands
separate, others attribute them to their nearest
region of mainland.
W e have now given some account of the nature
and situation of the land and sea which we call the
inhabited world.
4.
Now let us turn to the most notable phenomena
in and about the inhabited world, summarizing only
the most essential points.
There are two exhalations a from it, which pass
continually into the air above us, composed of small
particles and entirely invisible, except that in the
early mornings some can be observed rising along
rivers and streams. One o f these is dry and like
smoke, since it emanates from the earth ; the other
is damp and vaporous, since it is exhaled from the
wet element. From the latter come mists, dews, the
various kinds of frost, clouds, rain, snow and h a il;
from the dry exhalation come the winds and various
breezes, thunder and lightning, fiery bolts (V/nprriJpcs) b
and thunderbolts and all the other things of the same
0
For the two exhalations and their products cf. Aristot.
Meteor. i. 4-12. M uch of this chapter derives, ultimately, from
Aristotle; the proximate sources are discussed by Maguire
(op. cit. pp. 128-133).
b Cf. 395 a 10 and note.
s at [re] Sta scripsi: at
Lor. (De Mundo) : at [t]
r Sta vel at re K
and Lor. (Notes).
codd. :
ore airo
363
[ARISTOTLE]
394a
a oi] rovrois e o n ovfitpvAa.
e o n oe ofiixAr) fiev
20 arficoSrfs avadvfiiaois dyovos vSaros, aepos fiev

77axvrepa, ve<f>ovs Se apaiorepa- yiverai Sc rjroi cf
apXys ve<f>ovs fj cf vTroXeififiaros avriiraXos Sc
avrfj Xeyerai re Kal e o n v alOpla, ovhev aAAo ovoa
rrXfjv afjp ave<f>eXos Kal avofiixXos Spoo os Se e o n v
vypov cf aWpias Kara ovaraoiv Xenrfjv <f>epofievov,
25 KprioraXXos Se aOpoov vScop cf aldplas TTerrrjyos,
Trdyyr) Se Spooos TreTTTjyvia, SpoooTraxyr] Sc fffiiirayfjs Spooos.
ve<f>os Se e o n iraxos arficbSes
ovveorpafifievov, yovifiov vharos' ofifipos Se yiverai
fiev Kar eKmeofiov ve<f>ovs eS fiaXa tterraxvo fievov,
Sia<f>opas Sc to^ct r o v acrSc ooas Kal ff rov ve<f>ovs
30 OXiifjis' fpria fiev yap ovoa fiaXaKas i/jaKaSas StaOTreipei, o<f>oSpa Se aSporepas Kal rovro KaXovfiev
verov, ofifipov fieii^co Kal avvexff ovorpefifiara em
yfjs <f>epofievov.1 XL<^ V ^ yiverai Kara ve<f>(bv TreTTVKvajfievojv aTToOpavaiv Trpo rfjs els vSa>p fiera35 ftoXrjs avaKQTievnov' epyaêrai Se f] fiev KOTrf] ro
d<f)pcb8es Kal eKXevKov, ff Sc ovfiTTTjîs rov evovros

vypov rf]V ifjvxporrjra ovm o ûffcWo? ouSc fjpauo394 b fievov.
o(f>oSpa Se a v t t j Kal aOpoa K a r a t e pofievrj
vi<f)er6s ibvofiaarai.
x<zAaa Sc yiverai vi<f>erov
ovorpa(f>evros Kal fipWos c/c mXfjfiaros els Kara<f)Opdv raxvrepav Xaf3ovrosmTrapa Sc rd fieyeOr) rwv
dTTopprjyvvfieviov Opavofiarwv ot re oy/cot fieiôvs
5 at rc <f>opal yivovrai fiiaiorepai. ravra fiev ovv
c/c rfjs vypas avadvfiiaoews ire^vKe avfiTrinreiv.
E/c Sc rfjs rjpas vtto ipvxovs fiev woOeiorjs wore
peiv avefios eyevero' ovSev yap e o n v ovros TrXffV
364
ON THE COSMOS, 4
class. Mist is a vaporous exhalation which does not
produce water, denser than air but less dense than
cloud ; it conies into being either from a cloud in the
first stage of formation or from the remnant o f a
cloud. The condition contrary to this is rightly called
a clear sky, for it is simply air, with no cloud or mist.
Dew is moisture that falls out of a clear sky in a light
condensation ; ice is solidified water, frozen in a clear
sky : hoar-frost is frozen dew, and dew-frost is half
frozen dew. Cloud is a dense, vaporous formation,
productive of water : rain comes from the compression
of a well-compacted cloud, and varies in character
according to the pressure on the clou d: if the pres
sure is light it scatters gentle drops of rain, but if it
is heavy the drops are fuller : and we call this latter
condition a downpour, for it is larger than a shower of
rain and pours continuous drops of rain upon the
earth.
Snow occurs when well-condensed clouds
break up and split before the formation of water :
the split causes the foamy and brilliantly white con
dition of the snow, and its coldness is caused by the
coagulation o f the moisture contained in it, which has
not had time to be either fused or rarefied. I f there
is a thick and heavy fall of snow, we call it a snow
storm. Hail occurs when a snow-storm is solidified
and gathers weight because of its increased density
so as to fall more rapidly ; the hailstones increase in
size and their movement increases in violence accord
ing to the size of the fragments that are broken off
the cloud. These then are the natural products of
the wet exhalation.
From the dry exhalation, when it is forced to flow
by the cold, wind is produced : for this is nothing but
1 (f>pofievov
L o r. :
<f>epofieva
Bekk.
365
[ARISTOTLE]
394 b
arjp rroXvs pewv Kal a9poos* oar is afia Kal rrvedfia
10 Xeyerai.
Xeyerai Se Kal erepws rrvedfia rj re iv
(f>vrois Kai wois Kal Sia rravrwv SiffKovaa ejj^jv\6s

re Kal yovifios ovala , rrepl fjs vvv Xeyeiv ovk avay
ra Se ev aepi rrveovra rrvevfiara KaXovfiev
Kaiov.
avejiovs, avpas Se ras e f vypov c/>epofievas iKirvoas.

rw v Se avefiwv ol fiev e/c vevonafievrjs yrjs rrveovres
15 drroyetoi Xeyovrai, ol Se eVc KoXrrwv Sieârrovres
iyKoXrrlai* rovrois Se avaXoyov ri exovaiv ol e/c
ol Se Kara prjiv ve<f>ovs
rrorafiwv Kai Xifivwv.
yivojievoi Kal avaXvaiv rov rrd)(ovs rrpos eavrovs

rroiovfievoi
iKve<f>iai
KaXovvrai*
fied*
aOpows payevres1 i^vSpiai Xeyovrai.
Se
vSaros
Kal ol fiev
20 arro avaroXfjs avvexeis evpoi KeKXrjvrai, fiopeai Se

oi
arro apKrov, ecf>vpoi Se ol arro Svaews, voroi
Se ol arro fiearjfjLppias.
rw v y e firjv evpwv KaiKias
fiev Xeyerai o arro rov rrepl ras Oepivas avaroXas

rorrov rrvewv avejios, arrrjXiwrrjs Se o arro rov rrepl
ras larjfiepivas, evpos Se o arro rov rrepl ras
25 fiepivas.
Kal rw v ivavriwv e<f>vpwv apyearrjs fiev
o arro rrjs Oepivrjs Svaews, ov rives KaXovaiv oXvfi/
) /
Y f1
>
m a v, oi oe larrvya* Qe<pvpos oe o arro rrjs iarjfiepivrjSy XIi/j Se o arro rrjs Xlfêpivrjs.
Kal rw v
fiopewv ISiws o fiev etjrjs rw /cat/aa KaXelrai fiopeas,

arrapKrlas Se o i<f>ei;rjs arro rov rroXov Kara ro
30 fiearjfiftpivdv rrvewv, OpaaKias Se o irjs rrvewv rw
1 payevres B Lor. : payevros codd. cet. Bekk.
This is a common Greek way of describing points of
the compass. They divided each quarter by three; so their
366
ON THE COSMOS, 4
air moving in quantity and in a mass. It is also called
breath. In another sense " breath means that sub
stance found in plants and animals and pervading
everything, that brings life and generation ; but
about that there is no need to speak now. The breath
that breathes in the air we call ivind, and the breath
that comes from moisture we call breeze. O f the
winds, some blow from the earth when it is wet and
are called land-winds ; some arise from gulfs o f the
sea and are called gulf-ninds. There is a similarity
between these winds and those which come from
rivers and lakes. Those which arise at the breaking
up of a cloud and resolve its density against them
selves are called cloud-tvinds : those which burst out
all at once accompanied by water are called rain-winds.
Eurus is the name o f the winds that blow steadily
from the East, Boreas is the name of the North winds,
Zephyrus of the W est winds, and Notus of the South
winds. One of the Euri is called Caecias : this is
the one that blow's from from the direction of the
summer sunrise. Apeliotes is the one that comes
from the direction of the equinoctial sunrise, and
Eurus proper the one that comes from the direction
of the winter sunrise. O f the Zephyri, which blow
in the opposite direction, Argestes comes from the
direction of the summer su n set; some call this
Olympias, and some Iapyx. Zephyrus proper comes
from the direction o f the equinoctial sunset, Lips
from the direction o f the winter sunset. O f the winds
called Boreas, the one properly so-called is next to
Caecias ; next to it is Aparctias, which blowrs from
the North pole to the South ; Thrascias is the one
minor points cannot be translated simply into modern terms.
Equinoctial sunrise and sunset can be taken as E. and W .
367
[ARISTOTLE]
394 b
a p y e a rrj,
35
ov
e v io i
K ip K ia v 1
K a X o v o iv .
K al
ra> v
VOTCDV O fJLV <X7TO TOV a<f>CLVOVS TToXoV <f>pOflVOS

avriiraXos rq> arrapKrla KaXeirai voros , evpovoros
8 c o fxeraijv vorov Kal evpov rov S c c m
Oarepa
fieraijv Xifios Kal vorov ol (lev Xifiovorov, ol S c
Xlfio<f>oLviKas KaXoVGiV.
T a>v
Sc
a v tjjic jv
h ie K irv e o v a i
395 & TTvooL ,
TTpoou)
K a O a ire p
o l
fx ev
k o t
e la iv
e v d v n v o o i,
e v O e ia v ,
K a iK ia s
o l
o n o ao i
Sc a v a K a p a fji-
X e y o fie v o s ,
K al
X^LfJiiOVOS, <JL>G7Tp 01 VOTOl, 8waCFTVOVTS,
o l
[x e v
OL Sc
depovs, <I)S ol irrjaiai Xeyofxevoi, puijiv Zxovres rcov

re a 7 to rrjs apKrov <f>epo[JLva)v Kal e<f>vpcov ol Se
opviOiai KaXovfJievoi, eapivoi rives ovres avefioi,

elal rep yivei.
Ta>v ye firjv piattov nvevfiarcov Karaiyls fxev ia n
rrvevfxa ava)0ev rvirrov iai</>vr)s> dveXXa S c rrvedfxa
fiiaiov Kal a<f>voj TTpooaXXofievov, XaiXai/j S c Kal
orpofiiXos TTvevfia elXovfievov Kara)dev avco, ava<f>vo7jfjLa S c yfjs irvevfia avu) <f>epofievov Kara rrjv
10 K fivOov n vos fj prjyfiaros avaboaiv orav S c
elXovfievov 7toXv <f>epr)rai, 7rpr]arr}p yQovios eanv.
elXrjdev S c irvevfxa ev ve<f>ei Trayei re Kal vorepai ,
Kal ecoodev S t * avrov , fiialcos prjyvvov ra o w c ^ a )
mXrjfiara rov ve<f>ovs, fipofiov Kal irarayov fieyav
a/neipyaaaro, jSpovrrjv Xeyofievov, oxjiTep ev v8an
5 jSopcai
1 KipKiav Forster : Katxiav codd. Hekk.

a Phenomena connected with wind and those connected
with thunder and lightning are not clearly distinguished in
Greek, and translation is difficult. Here irprjar/jp seems to
368
ON THE COSMOS, 4
next Argestes, though some call this Circias. O f the
winds called Notus, the one that comes from the
invisible pole, opposite to Aparctias, is properly called
Notus, and Euronotus is the one between Notus and
Eurus. The one on the other side, between Notus
and Lips, is sometimes called Libonotus, sometimes
Libophoenix.
The current of some winds is direct that is, they
blow straight ahead ; the current of others varies
in direction, as in the case of Caecias. Some of them
prevail in the winter, like the N o ti ; some prevail in
the summer, like those called Etesian winds, which
are a mixture of North winds and Zephyri. Those
which are called Ornithian winds, which occur in the
spring, belong to the class Boreas.
O f the violent types of wind, a squall is a wind that
strikes suddenly from above ; a gust is a violent wind
that suddenly jumps up at you ; a whirlwind, or
cyclone, is a wind that whirls upwards in a spiral. A
blast of wind from the earth is a gust caused by the
expulsion of wind from some pit or chasm ; when it
moves with a fierce whirling motion, it is an earthhurricane (jrpjju-Typ) W hen the wind whirls round
in a thick cloud full of water and is pushed out through
it and forcibly breaks up the closely packed material
of the cloud, it makes a great din and crash, which is
called thunder as air does when it is passed violently
mean some kind of whirlwind, but in 394? a 18 and 395 a 24
it is a sort of thunderbolt. Aristotle says (Meteor. 371 a 15):
When it (i.e. the cloud pulled down by a descending whirl
wind) is inflamed as it is pulled downwards . . . it is called a
TTprfOTrjp; for it inflames (ovvK7r(fi7rpr}oi) the neighbouring air
and colours it with its fire. The name implies a connexion
with fire and perhaps here the npyjar'qp comes up from a fiery
chasm (cf. 395 b 20).
369
[ARISTOTLE]
395 a
15 7T v e v f j i a
V<j>OVS
a < j)o 8 p c L )s
K p 7 ] lV
a< JT pa7T 7)
iX a v v o fie v o v .
T T V p U )0 k v
X 4 y e ra r
7TpOCr7TO eV, V (J T p O V
Sr j
TO
K a ra
7TVV flCL
n p o rep o v
Sc
K al
rrjv
ro v
X d fU p aV
rrjs
f tp o v r rjs
yeVO fJLZVOV, 7TL TO
aK OVOTOV
vito rov oparov 7T<f>vK <f>0ava0ai, rov fiev Kal

Troppuodev optofJLevov, rov S c 7Ti8av ifnreXdoT] rfj
20 aKofji Kal fxaXiara orav t o fxev raxicrrov $ rwv
ovrcDv, Xeyou S c t o 7TVpa>$$, t o S c fjrrov ra yy%
a cp cD S cs* o v , c v rfj 7rXrj^L irpos aKorjv ac/ytKvovfjievov.
t o Se aorpaipav dvairvpwdtv, fStaLcos axpt rrjs yrjs
8iK0ov, Ktpavvos KaXtZrai, iav S c rjiiinvpov ij,
oc/)o8p6v S c a A A c o s Kal a Opoov, rrprjorrjp, iav S c
25 avvpov 7TavrX(x)s, rv<f>cbv eKaorov S c rovrcov KaraOKrjijjav els rrjv yrjv oKr)7rrds o v o / x a ^ c r a i . t o > v S c
Kepavvcov ol fJLcv aWaXu>8eis ipoXoevres Xiyovrai,
ol S c T a ^ c a i ? S t a rrovres apyrjres, c A i / a a i S c ol
ypafifioeiScjs fepopievoi, oKTjTrrol S c o a o i KaraG K TjVrO VQ LV 1 S' T t .
JlvXX'qfi&'rjv 8c raw cV acpi <f>avraofidru>v ra fiev

icrn kot fJL<f>aaiv, ra Sc /ca0* i}7rocrTaoiy /caT*
[i<f>aoiv fiev ZptScs* kcu /JajSSot /cat Ta TotavTa, Ka6*
VTTooraoiV Sc crcAa tc /<at hiarrovrts Kal KOfJirjrai
Kal ra rovrois 7rapa7rXrjata. tpis fiev ovv icrnv
efi<f>aais rjXlov rfirjfiaros rj oeXrjvrjs, iv vi<f>.t votcpcp Kal koiXo) Kal ovvex^ rrpos <f>avraoiavt <bs iv
35 Karoirrptp, OecopovfiivT) Kara kvkXov 7TpL(f>piav.
pd/38os Sc icrnv t/otSos* fi<f>aais d50cla. aXcjs Sc
395 b ionv
fjL<j)aois XafiTrponrjros aarpov 7TpiavyO$'
30
See p. 368, n. a.
*
is often a typhoon or hurricane (c/. 400 a 29), but
here it is connected with lightning. In mythology Typhon
370
ON THE COSMOS, 4
through water. Because of the breaking up of the
cloud the wind is set on fire, and flashes : this is called
lightning. This lightning falls upon our senses before
the thunder, though it occurs later, because what is
heard is by nature slower than what is seen : for the
latter is seen a great way off, the former only when
it approaches the ears ; particularly when one is that
swiftest thing of all, the element of Fire, while the
other is less swift, since it is of the nature of air and
impinges upon the hearing by physical contact.
When the flashing bolt is aflame and hurtles violently
to the ground it is called a thunderbolt; if it is half alight,
but in other respects strong and dense, it is called
a fie ry bolt a ; if it is altogether fireless it is called a
smoking bolt b ; but each one of these when it falls upon
the ground is called a falling-bolt.
Lightning c is
called smoky when it looks dark, like smoke ; vivid,
when it moves very rapidly ; and forked, when it
moves along jagged lines ; but when it falls on to
something it is called a falling-bolt.
Briefly, the phenomena of the air are divided into
those which are mere appearances and those which
are realities : the appearances are rainbows and
streaks in the sky and so on ; the realities are lights
and shooting stars and comets and other such things.
A rainbow is the appearance in reflection of a portion
o f the sun or moon, seen, like an image in a mirror,
in a cloud that is wet and hollow and presents an
unbroken surface, and shaped like an arc o f a circle.
A streak is a straight rainbow. A halo is an appear
ance of brightness shedding its light round a star ;
is the son of Typhos, the giant, who causes the eruption of
Etna ; hence the connexion with fire.
e Kcpawos is used for lightning and thunderbolt.
371
[ARISTOTLE]
395 b
hia<j>epei Sc ipiSos ort rj fiev Ipis c Ivavrias <f>atverai rjXiov Kal creXrjvyjs, rj Sc aXws k vk Xco navros
aarpov.
aeXas Sc cort nvpos aOpoov etjatfjis ev
>/
o \
\ /
\ \ s
/y
c\c>\
aepi.
ra>v oc acAacuv a fiev aKOvnêr ai, a oc
5 orrjpliêrai.
o fiev ovv eaKovnofios eari 7rvpos
yeveois c/c 7TaparpLifj<jos iv aepi </>epofievov Ta^ccos*

/cat <f>avraolav firjKovs efi<j>aivovros Sta to Taôs1,
0 Sc (JTTjpiyilOS CCTTt
Taor(s> /cat olov aarpov
4>Op&S 7TpOfJLTjK7]S Kpvots' rrXarvvofievrf Sc
/caTa Oarepov KOfirjrrfs /caActrat.
7roAAa/cts Sc rtbv
10 oeXdtov ra fiev iirifievei nXelova xP vov> T<* ^

Trapaxpy]fia ofievvvrat,.
7roXXal Sc /cat aXXai </>av-
ravfiarw v tScat Oewpovvrai, XafinaSes re KaXovfievat /cat So/ctScs /cat m'0ot /cat poOvvoi, Kara rrjv
7rpos ravra ofioiorrjra alSc 7rpoaayopev0el<Tai. Kal
ra fiev rovrcuv ecnrepta, ra Sc c<pa, Ta Sc afi(j)i<l>afj
is decopetrai, onaviws Sc jSopcta Kal voria. ?raj/Ta
Sc ajScjSata* ouScttotc yap n rovrcuv del (f>avepov
laroprjrai Karecrrrjpiyfievov.
ra fiev rolvvv aepia
ro tavra.
'Efnrepiexet Sc /cat rj yr} iroXAas ev avrfj, KaOanep
v8aros, ovrcos Kal w evfia ros Kal nvpos 7n)yds*
20 rovrojv Sc at fiev vtto yrjv eloiv aoparoi, 7roAAat Sc
a m 7rvoa? côi/at /cat dva<j)varfoeis, cboirep Atmipa
tc /cat Atrvrj Kal ra ev AloXov vtfoois' at S^ 1 /cat
peovcri 7roXXaKLS norafiov SIktjv, Kal fivSpovs arappnrrovcn hiairvpovs. cvtat Sc U7ro
ovoai ttXt)oiov TTTfyalcov ySaTCUV depfialvovai ra vra , /cat Ta
25 fiev Âtapa t& v vafidrwv aviacn, ra Sc vnepêora,
ra Sc cu exovra Kpdaecos.
372
ON THE COSMOS, 4
it differs from a rainbow in that the rainbow appears
opposite the sun or moon, but the halo is in a circle
round the whole of the star. A light is the kindling
of a mass of fire in the air. Some lights shoot like
javelins, others are set in one position in the sky.
The shooting is a generation of fire by friction in the
air ; the fire moves rapidly, giving the impression
of length because of its rapidity. The latter, the
stationary light, is extended and lengthy but keeps
the same position, as if it were an elongated star ; if
it spreads out towards one end it is called a comet.
Often there is a variation in the duration of the light,
some lasting a long time, some being extinguished
at once. There are also many phenomena of different
kinds to be seen, called torches and planks and ja rs
and pits, taking their names from their likeness to
these objects. Some of these can be seen in the W est
and some in the East, and some in both ; they rarely
appear in the North and South. All of them are
unstable ; for none of them has ever been described
as always visible in the same place. So much, then,
for the things of the air.
The earth contains in itself many sources, not only
o f water, but also of wind and fire. Some of these
are subterranean and invisible, but many have vents
and blow-holes, like Lipara and Etna and the vol
canoes in the Aeolian islands. These often flow like
rivers and throw up fiery, red-hot lumps. Some of
the subterranean sources, which are near springs of
water, impart heat to these : some of the streams
they make merely lukewarm, some boiling, and some
moderately and pleasantly hot.
1 at By codd. L o r.: at Se Bekk.
373
[ARISTOTLE]
395 b
'O fiolw s Sc /cat t (x) v rrvevfiarojv TroAAa 7roAAaôu

yfjs arofiia avecpKrai* c5 v r a fiev evOovaiav Troiei
rovs efirreXaôvra s, ra Sc arpo<f>eiv, ra Sc XP1?
aficohelv, uyorrep ra ev A cA ôfe /cat AejSaScta, Ta
30 Sc /cat rravranaoiv avaipei, KaOanep t o cV O p u yta*
7ToAAa/ct? Sc /cat o-uyycvcs rrvevfia evKparov
ev y fj Trape^coaOev cts* fivxlovs arjpayyag avrrjs,
c^cSpov ycvdftcvov c/c tw v oiKeiwv t o t t c o v , rroXXa
fieprj avveKpaSavev. 7roAAa/cts* Sc 7roAv yevofievov
ea) ev eyKareiXrjOrf t o is ravrrjs KoiXdifiaai /cat
35 a7ro/cActcr0cv cdSot> fiera ftlas avrrjv avver ivaê,
tpqrovv c|oSov cauTa), /cat arreipyaaaro Trados
396 a TOVTO O KaXeiV l(x)0afiev VeiGflOV. TCJV Sc OeiGflWV
oi
fiev els 7rXayia oeiovres kot oelas yojvias cm k XIvtoi KaXovvrai, ol Sc ava> piTrrovvres Kal K a ro
Kar opOas ya)vlas ftpaarai, ol Sc avvil^rjaeis Trotovvres els Ta /cotAa Ifyfiarlai1oi Sc âo/LtaTa avot'5 yovTCS* /cat rrjv yrjv avapp'qyvvvres prjKrai KaXovvrai.
rovrcov Sc ot /zcv /cat rrvevfia TTpoaavaftaXXovaiv,
ot Sc nerpas, ol Sc TTrjXov, ol Sc 7rr)yas <f>alvov<ji ras
rrporepov ovk ovaas. rives Sc avarperrovai2 /caTa
/xtav 7rp6ojcriv, ovs KaXovaiv djcrras. ol Sc avra7rondXXovres* Kal rais els eKarepov eyKXlaeai Kal
to a7T07TaXaecn SlopOovvres act to oeiofievov rraXfiariai
AcyovTat, rpoficp rraOos ofioiov arrepyaôfievoi. y ivovrai Sc /cat fivKrjral aeiafiol, oelovres rrjv yrjv
fiera fipofiov.
7roXXaKis Sc /cat âjpts oeiofiov
yiverai fivKrjfia yrjs, OTay to 7rvevfia oeieiv fiev firj
avrapKes
eveiXovfievov Sc cV a vrfj Konrrjrai fiera
1
it,Tj(lariat Z Lor. (cf. Johann. Lyd. T)e Ost. 5i) : xco/xaruu
Stob. : xaafiariai codd. cet* Hekk.
374
ON THE COSMOS, 4
Similarly, too, there are in many places on the
earths surface open vents for the winds, which* have
various effects on those who approach them, causing
ecstatic inspiration, or wasting sickness, or in some
cases prophecy, like those at Delphi and Lebadeia,
or even complete destruction, like the one in Phrygia.
Often, too, a moderate earth-born wind, forced into
deep, hollow caves in the earth and becoming dis
lodged from its home, causes shocks in many places.
Often when a large quantity from outside is confined
within the hollows of the earth and cut off from exit,
it shakes the earth violently, seeking an exit for
itself, and produces the effect that we call an earth
quake. Earthquakes which shake the earth obliquely
at a very acute angle we call horizontal; those which
blast upwards and downwards perpendicularly are
called heaving earthquakes ; those which cause a
settlement of the earth into hollows are called sinking
earthquakes ; and those which open up chasms and
split the earth are called splitting earthquakes. Some
of them stir up a wind, or rocks, or mud ; and some
reveal springs that were not there before. Some,
called thrusting earthquakes, overturn things with a
single heave. Others cause recoil this way and that,
and in the process of lurching to one side and re
bounding again the things that are shaken are held
upright: these are called oscillating earthquakes,
and their effect is a sort of trembling. There are also
roaring earthquakes, which shake the earth with a
great din. There is often, also, a roaring of the earth
without an earthquake, when the wind is not sufficient
to shake the earth but lashes about enveloped in the
2 a u a rp en ova L
Lor. : d v a r p e n o v T e s Bekk.
Lor. : avairaAAoptcs Bekk.
3 dvrairoTraXXovTS
375
[ARISTOTLE]
396 a
15 poOiov filas.
avaGCt>[iaT07r0iiTai Sc ra tloiovra
TrvevfXara K a l vit o t c j v iv rf} yfj v y p c o v K C K p v f i flV(X)V.
T a Sc avaXoyov ovfnri'nreL to v to is Kal iv 9aXaoarf âcr/xara t c yap ytverat, OaXaoarj$ Kal avaXojprjfiara noXXaKis Kal Kvfidrajv imSpofial, 7rore
20 fiev avTavaKOTTrjv exovoai, t t o t c S c irpooxjiv fiovov,
a>aiTp LGTopetrat 7repl CE At/07 r t c Kal Bovpav.
noXXaKis Sc Kal dva<j>v<jrj(iaTa ylverat irvpos iv rfj
daXaaurj /cat 7rr}yajv avafiXvaeis Kal iroraficov c/cfioXal Kal hivhpcuv iK<f>voet,s poal re Kal Stvai rats*
ra>v Trvevfiarojv avaXoyov, at fiev iv fieoois 7re25 Xayeaiv, at Sc Kara to v s evpfarovs re /cat iropQfiovs.
TToXXai re dfi7ra>Teis Xiyovrai Kal Kvfiarcuv apcrets*
ovfiirepioheveiv del rfj aeXrfvrj Kara rw as djpiofievovs Kaipovs.
'Q s Sc t o 7rav etTretv, t c o v g t o i x ^ i c o v c y /c c /c p a fievcjv aXXrjXois iv d e p t r e /c a t yfj Kal OaXdaarj
30 Kara t o ct/cos* a t t o > v TraO&v ofioiorrfreg avvlarav r a t , T ots1 fiev ini fiepovs <f>6opas Kal yeveaeis
<f>epovaai, t o Sc ovfnrav avwXeOpov t c Kal ayevrjrov
<f>vXaTTOvcrai.
5. KatVot yc Tts* iOavfiacre ttcos 7totc, ct c/c tcSv
ivavTLOJV apx&v GvvearrfKev o Koofios, Xeyco Sc
35 ijrfpcov tc /cat vypcov, ifivxptov tc /cat Oepficov, ov
396 b 7raAat hii(f>OapTaL Kal airoXojXev, <Ls Kav ct 7roXiv rives Oavfiaôiev, ottcds Siafievei avveorrjKvia
c/c tojv ci/avTtcuTaTOJV1 cflvtov, 7revrjT(x)v Acya> Kal
ttXovgLojv, vctuv yepovrc&v, aoOevu>v laxvpcov, ttovt)pcjv xPr)GT^)V'
ayvoovci Sc 6Vt to u t rjv iroXin-
1 eVo^Ttctfrarcoi'codd. pier. Lor, : eVavTtaw codd. eet, Bekk.
376
ON THE COSMOS, 4-5

earth with tumultuous force. The blasts of wind that
enter the earth are recondensed also by the moisture
that is hidden in the earth.
There are also analogous happenings in the sea :
chasms occur in the sea, and its waves often withdraw;
and there are incursions of waves, sometimes with
a recoil, sometimes with a forward rush only, as they
say was the case at Helice and Bura.b Often too
there are exhalations of fire in the sea and eruptions
of fountains, and rivers are shot forth, and trees grow,
and there are currents and vortices like those of the
winds, some in the middle o f the oceans, some in the
narrows and straits. There are many tides and tidal
waves too, which are said to occur in concert with the
moon at certain definite times.
To sum up, since the elements are mingled one with
another, it is natural that phenomena in the air and
land and sea should show these similarities, which
involve destruction and generation for the individual
parts of nature, but preserve the whole free from
corruption and generation.
5.
Some people, however, have wondered how the
cosmos, if it is composed of the opposite ** principles
(I mean dry and wet, cold and hot), has not long ago
been destroyed and perished ; it is as if men should
wonder how a city survives, composed as it is of the
most opposite classes (I mean poor and rich, young
and old, weak and strong, bad and good). They do not
recognize that the most wonderful thing of all about
a i.e., wind entering the earth may (a) cause an earth
quake, (b) cause a roar only, or (c) be recondensed and so
cause neither.
b Cf. Strabo viii. 7. 2 (384 c), i. 3. 10 (54 c), Aristot. Meteor.
343 b 1, etc., on the destruction of these two cities in Achaia.
The date was 373/2 b . c .
377
[ARISTOTLE]
396 b
5 k t)s
o fio v o la s
tto X X w v
to
fiia v
d a v fjb a a tc o r a r o v ,
K al
o fio la v
S c t o 1 c/c
X eyco
d 7r o r e X e .l v 1
a v o fio ic jo v
S i a d e a i V y v n o S e x o f i e v y j v 2 n a o a v K a l <f>vcriv K a l r u ^ v .
tocos* S c K a l rG xv i v a v r l c o v rj </)vot,$ y X l \ e r a i K a l c/c
ovfjL<f)tDvov, o v k c/c t c o v o / i o i c o v ,
ro v rw v d n oreX el t o
o jo T r e p d f i e X e i t o
10 o v x
eK a rep ov
d p p e v o v v r jy a y e irp o s t o
npos
to
6 fio < f> v X o v ,
O rjX v K a l
K a l r r jv
T r p w r r jv
o fjio v o ia v
S ta
o fio ic o v .
e o i K e S c K a l rj r e x v r ) r r j v <f>vatv f i i f i o v f i e v r j
rovro
rG x v
T T o ie iv .
fie X a v c D V ,
a fia
w y p a < f> la
<I)Xp<ov r e
K ep a o a fiev r j
15 f i e v o i s
iv a v r lc o v
< f> v oeis
<X7TCTCAC<7C
a rjvrjif/ ev,
fie v
yap
K al
ip v d p & v ,
ra s
elK O v a s
OVfl<f>(X)VOVS,
K a l fia p e Z s , fia K p o v s r e
S ta
ov
X e v K a jv
tc o v
re
K al
^/oa>/xdTCt>v c y roZ s
irp o y fy o v Sc
flOVGLKTj
o fc t?
K a l f i p a x e Z s < f> B o y y o v s
f i i ^ a a a e v S t a < f>opois <f>a)vaZs f i i a v d i r e r e X e o e v d p f i o v ia v y
y p a fifia r iK T )
y p a fifia r c o v
an
20 t o
a v r a iv
napa
K p a a iv
Sc
c/c
< f> c jv r je v r o jv
T r o ir fo a fie v T )
(jv v e a r r jo a r o .
rep
O K o r eiv co
ra vro
ttjv
K al
a<f>a>vtt)v
o X r jv
r e x v rfv
Sc t o u t o
tJv /cat
X e y o fie v o v
H p a /c A c tT W *
o v v d x j j i e s o X a K a l o v x ^ A a , a v f i< f> e p o fie v o v S ta</>ep6~

fie v o v ,
evos
avvaS ov
n a v r a ." 3
ara oL V ,
25 K o o f i o v ,
ovpavov
S ta S o v
Kal
c/c
7r a v r c o v e v
o v r cx > s o S v /cat t t j v
Acyco
/c a t y r j s
rov
tw v
re
K al
oX cov a v o v fin a v r o s
S t a r r j s r a )V e v a v r i w r d r c D V K p a o e w s a p x & v
. . d n o T c X e t v L or. : o n . . . d n o T e X c l B e k k .
2 virohcyofievrjv L o r. : vnodexoficvn B e k k .
3 sic Diels ( V o r so k r.* 2 2 B 1 0 ) : v . L or. ad loc.
1 to
0
T h e idea that art im itates nature occurs in A ristotles
P r o t r e p tic u x (see Jaeger, A r i s t o t l e , p p. 74 f .) , and in P h y s .
B 199 a 15, M e t f o r . 381 b 5 , b e P a r t . A n h n . (J39 b 15 fF. But
in A ristotle the point o f com parison concerns teleology, not
378
ON THE COSMOS, 5
the harmonious working o f a city-eommunity is this :
that out of plurality and diversity it achieves a homo
geneous unity capable of admitting every variation
of nature and degree. But perhaps nature actually
has a liking for opposites ; perhaps it is from them
that she creates harmony, and not from similar things,
in just the same way as she has joined the male to
the female, and not each o f them to another of the
same sex, thus making the first harmonious com
munity not of similar but of opposite things. It seems,
too, that art does this, in imitation of nature a : for
painting mixes its whites and blacks, its yellows and
reds, to create images that are concordant with their
originals ; music mixes high and low notes, and longs
and shorts, and makes a single tune of different
sounds ; by making a mixture of vowels and con
sonants, grammar composes out of them the whole of
its art. This is precisely what Heracleitus the Dark b
meant when he said Junctions are wholes and notwholes, concord and discord, consonance and disso
nance. One out of A l l ; All out of O n e. So in the
same way the complex of the Universe, I mean heaven
and earth and the whole cosmos, by means of the
mixture of the most opposite elements has been
the harmony of opposites. The four colours mentioned by
Pseudo-Aristotle are the colours of the restricted palette used
by the Four Colour Painters, of whom the earliest recorded
is Polygnotus and the latest Aetion in the age of Alexander
the Great. Cf. Pliny, N .ll. xxxv. 50, and A. Kumpf, JUS
lxvii (1947), p. 16. It has been suggested that Empedocles
comparison of painting and creation (Diels, Vorsokr,6 31
B 23) was inspired by Four Colour Painting.
b It is not likely that the author read Heracleitus in the
original, or that the whole context is to be attached too
closely to Heracleitus. Maguire (op. cit. pp. 134 ff.) finds the
closest parallels to this passage in the Neo-Pythagoreans.
379
[ARISTOTLE]
396 b
/ x i a S i e K o a / A r j c r e v a p / x o v t 'a * ^ r j p o v y a p
8c
\j)v x p < A )s j S a p c t t c
< j> e p i ,
17A 10V
/cat
vy p w ,
K al
S aX aoaav
7r a v T C o v
S irjK o v o a
/cat i r t p o lc o v , a i p o s
v S a ro s,
ro v
iv
av p L T T a v ra
a v rw
X o y rja a i
K al
o c o rrjp la v ,
397 a fx rjS e v
iK
lo rjv
K al
r a
8c
c/c t c o v
S v v a jx is ,
tc
/ca t
7 tA c o v
v p o s
K al
/ca t
a X X rjX a is
ra v rrjs
fx k v
e re p o v
a v ro v .
ro
tc
o n
y a p
K aX bv rra v
r e ra y jiiv o v ,
a rro
'3 ? '
ira v rl
O T O t^ c ta jv
r u jv
la o fio tp L a
to
rrjs
ro v
> '
av
K al
h v v a o O a i*
< j> v o e c o s
ta o v
K o v < f> a
irrl
rco v
a c o a riK O V
y a p
e irrrj2 n s ,
irrd iv v fio v
to
rrjv
i tcos
rra v rc o v y e v e rrjp o s
ris
k o o /i o v
o f io -
re p
c ^ c t T a jS a p c a r r p o s r a
o f i o v o i a s , rj S c d ju o v o ta r o v
r jv
rj
rj
irip o v
6 a r e p a ,1
S tS a (J K o v o rjs
K p e irrc o v ;
c v a v rto u -
a v a y K a o a a a
firjx a v rja a p iiv r}
5 /cat rre p L K a X X e a ra ro v K o a f io v .
ro v Sc
a /x t/c -
/co a /x o v S r jf x i o v p y T ja a o a
o fio X o y ia s
d v ria ra o iv
O e p f ia
[x e i^ o v c o v
/cat
K al n v p o s
ro v rc o v
Sc
rrjs
a v rw v
y a p
(f> v a e is
a lr ia
35 o / x o A o y t a ,
to
rre p i-
tc
a W ip a
)tx ta S t a A a / J o v c r a a < f > a i p a s c V i ^ a v c t a T a ? t c

r a r a s
ic rn v
0c p / x o v
opO dv
/ c a t o - c A ^ v ^ v / c a t r o v o A o v o v p a v o v S tc /c o o -ju /q c rc
/x ta rj S t a
30 to jv
7r a o * a v
re
y rjv
^ ov p u y iv ,
k ov
io n
av
c t r j < f> v c n s
c o rtv
fiip o s
ro v ro v
Xcy o /x c v o v
* *
K al
ko-
>>
t i oc to>v C7rt fiepovs ovvair av egicrco-.

Orjvat tt) /caT* ovpavov Ta^ct tc /cat <f>opa rcov
io aorrpojv rjXiov tc /cat oeXrjvrjs, Ktvovfiivcov iv a/cptofjirjouat.
fieordroLS fxerpois i altovos els erepov alcova;

Sc y iv o ir
ns
av a^cdSeia t o taSc, rjvnva <j>vXdrrovaLV
at /caAat /cat yovt/xot tw v oAojv cSpat, Oiprj tc /cat

TCTay/u-cvtos* rj/xipas tc /cat
Xeificbvas eVayoucrai
1 Barepa ETZ Lor. : ra Oarepa codd. cet. Bekk.

380
ON THE COSMOS, 5
organized by a single harmony : dry mixed with
wet, hot with cold, light with heavy, straight with
curved the whole of earth and sea, the aether, the
sun, the moon and the whole heaven have been set
in order by the single power which interpenetrates
all things : from things unmixed and diverse, air and
earth and fire and water, it has fashioned the whole
cosmos and embraced it all in the surface of a single
sphere, forcing the most opposite elements in the
cosmos to come to terms, and from them achieving
preservation for the whole. The cause of its pre
servation is the agreement of the elements, and the
cause o f the agreement is the principle of equal shares
and the fact that no one of them has more power than
each o f the others : for the heavy is in equipoise with
the light, and the hot with its opposite. In these
greater matters nature teaches us that equality is the
preserver of concord, and concord is the preserver of
the cosmos, which is the parent of all things and the
most beautiful of all. For what being could be better
than this ? Anything that might be suggested is a
part of it. And everything that is beautiful takes its
name from this, and all that is well-arranged ; for
it is called well-ordered (#cc#cocr/A>}cr0<u) after this
universal order (* 007*0$). W hat particular detail
could be compared to the arrangement of the heavens
and the movement of the stars and the sun and moon,
moving as they do from one age to another in the
most accurate measures of time ? W hat constancy
could rival that maintained by the hours and seasons,
the beautiful creators of all things, that bring summers
and winters in due order, and days and nights to make
* L7Tj) EP L o r.: clttol codd. cet. Bekk.
3 rt L o r.: ris Bekk.
381
[ARISTOTLE]
397 m
vvktcls els firjvos arroreXeofia Kal eviavrov; Kal

15 firjv fieydOei fiev oSros1 'navvTrepraros, KivrjaeijSe
otjvraros, XafiTTporrjn Sc evavyeora ros, hvvdfiei Sc
ayrjpcus re Kal a<f>0apros.
o^to? ivaAicov ala>v
Kal rretjbv Kal aepiojv <f>vaeis exa>pf>cre Kal fiiovs
ifierprjcre rats eavrov Kivrjoeaiv. c/c rovrov rrdvra
ifirrveZ re Kal *f*v)(7]v laêi ra <pa. rovrov Kal aI
20 TrapahotjoL veoxfiaiaeis rerayfievcus diroreXovvrai,
ovvaparrovraiv fiev avifiajv vavroiuiv, m7Trovra)v
Sc c ovpavov Kepavvwv, prjywfievcuv Sc x Lp<^VO}V
eijaiGicov. Sta Sc rovrcov ro vorepov eKmeôfievov
ro re 7rvpa>8 es Sta7rveofievov els ofiovoiav ayct to
rrav Kal KaOlorrjaiv. rj re yrj <f>vroZs Koficooa rravro25 8 anoZs vdfiaol re rrepifiXvôvoa Kal rrepioxovfievr)
<ots, Kara Kaipov K<f>vovaa re rravra Kal rpe<f>ovoa Kal Sexofievrj, fivplas re <f>epovoa tScas Kal
Trddrj, rrjv dyrjpaj <f>voiv 6fiOLOJS rrjpeZ, /catVot /cat
oeiofioZs nvaaaofievrj Kal rrXrffivpiaiv imKXvôfievr)
30 TTvpKa'iaZs re Kara fiepos (frXoyiôfievr]. ravra Sc
7ravra cot/ccv av rfj 7Tpos ayadov yivofieva rrjv St
aluivos acurrjplav rrapexew aeiofievrjs re yap Ste^drrovGiv at ra>v rrvevfidrojv rrapefnrrd>aeis Kara
ra prjyfiara ras avarrvoas icrxovaai, KaOajs avco
AcAczcTat, KaOaipofievrj re ofifipois dnoKXvêrac
35 rrdvra Ta voacjSrj, rrepvnveofievr) Sc avpats ra re
vnt avrrjv Kal ra vrrep avrrjv elXiKpiveZrat.
Kal
397 b firjv at <f)Xoyes fiev ro irayerwSes rjmaivovaiv ,2 oi
ndyoi Sc Taj <f>Xoyas avtaaxv. /cat rcjv em fiepovs
ra fiev yiverai, ra Sc a/c/xact, ra Sc <f>0eiperai.
1 o v t o s L o r. : o a vros Bekk.
2 rjiTiatvovoi(v) ItC'FG L o r.: maivovaiv codd. cet. Bekk.
382
ON THE COSMOS, 5
up the number o f a month or a year ? In size too the
cosmos is mightiest, in motion swiftest, in brightness
most brilliant, in power never-aging and indestruc
tible. It is this that has given a different nature to
the creatures of the sea, the land and the air, and
measured their lives in terms of its own movements.
From this all creatures breathe and take their life.
O f this even the unexpected changes are accom
plished in due order the winds of all kinds that dash
together, thunderbolts falling from the heavens, and
storms that violently burst out. Through these the
moisture is squeezed out and the fire is dispersed by
currents of air ; in this way the whole is brought into
harmony and so established. The earth, too, that
is crowned with plants of every kind and bubbles with
springs and teems with living creatures everywhere,
that brings forth everything in season and nurtures
it and receives it back again, that produces a myriad
shapes and conditions this earth still keeps its neveraging nature unchanged, though it is racked by
earthquakes, swamped by floods, and burnt in part by
fires. All these things, it seems, happen for the good
of the earth and give it preservation from age to age :
for when it is shaken by an earthquake, there is an
upsurge of the winds transfused within it, which find
vent-holes through the chasms, as I have already
said ; when it is washed by rain it is cleansed of all
noxious things ; and when the breezes blow round
about it the things below and above it are purified.
Furthermore the fires soften things that are frozen,
and frost abates the force of the fires. And of the
particular things on the earth some come into being
while some are in their prime and others are perishing:
tt 395 b 26.
383
[ARISTOTLE]
397 b
/cat at fiev yeveaeis erravaoreXXovoi ras </>0opas,

5 al 8c (f>0opal kov (/)1ôvgl ras yeveaeis. fila Sc c/c
rravrojv rrepaivofievr] acorrjpia Sta
tcXovs
dvnrrepL-
lartofievwv aXXrjXois Kal Tore fiev Kparovvrcov, rore
Se Kparov/ievcov, (f)vXdrrei
alwvos.
6 . Aoirrov Se
10 air Las
817 7Tpl
to
rrjs
ovfirrav a<f>0aprov St*

tcov
oXa>v crvveKriKrjs
K<f>aXai<x)86i>s eirreiv, ov rporrov Kal rrepl rcov
aXXcov 7rXr)fifieXes yap rrepl Koofiov Xeyovras, ct

Kal fir) St* a/cptj 8c t a s , aAA* ofiv ye ats els rvrrwSr)
fiaOrjaiv, t o t o u kog/jlov Kvpitbrarov TTapaXmetv.
dpxcuos fiev ofiv n s A o y o ? /cat rrarpios e o n rraoiv
avOpwrrois cos c/c 0eov rrdvra Kal Sta Oeov rjfiiv
15 GvveaTTjKev,
ov8efila Sc <j>vois avrrj /ca0* eavrtfv
ea n v avrdpKTjs, eprjficode 10a rrjs c/c rovrov oa>rrfpias.
Sto /cat ra>v iraXaicov elrreiv n v e s rtporjx
crav OTt 7ravTa ravra e o n
0ca>v 7rAca T a /cat St*
6</>0aXfitt)v IvSaXXofieva rjfiiv Kal

rrdorjs alcrOrjoecos, t #
20 KarafiaXXofievoi
fiev yap
Xoyov, ov firjv rfj ye overla.
ovrcos arravrcov earl
6rrcoo8rf7rore
fievcov o
Kara
6eos,
aKorjs
St*
Kal
fiev Oela 8vvafiei rrperrovra
rovhe
rov
ocorrjp
Kal yevercop rcov

Koafiov
ov firjv avrovpyov
avvreXov-
Kal errnrovov
(pov Kafiarov vrrofievcov, aAAa Svvafiei ^ p ci/x cv o ?

arpvrco, St* fjs Kal rcov rroppco SoKovvrcov etvai
25 r r e p i y t v e r a i .
e8pav
fia o r
a vros
r r jv
fie v
eX axev,
ovv
a v o ir d r
vn a ros
at, [/ca t]1 /caT a t o v
re
r r o ir jr r jv
1 Kal oni. HC(i Fxir.
384
a> /cat
Sta
rr p c o rr fv
to u to
a K p ora rr)
cuvo-
ko-
ON THE COSMOS, 5-6

and generation is set in the balance against destruc
tion, and destruction lightens the weight of genera
tion. There is one single principle of preservation,
maintained without interruption among all these
things that interchange with one another, ascending
to power and declining in turn, and this keeps the
whole system safe, eternally indestructible.
6.
It remains now to discuss summarily, as the rest
has been discussed, the cause that holds the world
together ; for in describing the cosmos, if not in
detail, at least sufficiently to convey an outline, it
would be wrong for us to omit altogether that which
is supreme in the cosmos. It is indeed an ancient
idea, traditional among all mankind, that all things
are from God and are constituted for us by God, and
nothing is self-sufficient if deprived of his preserving
influence. So some of the ancients were led to say
that all the things of this world are full of gods,a all
that are presented to us through our eyes and hearing
and all the senses ; but in saying this they used terms
suitable to the power of God but not to his essence.
For God is indeed the preserver of all things and the
creator of everything in this cosmos however it is
brought to fruition ; but he docs not take upon him
self the toil of a creature that works and labours for
itself,6 but uses an indefatigable power, by means
of which he controls even things that seem a great
way off. God has his home in the highest and first
place, and is called Supreme for this reason, since
according to the poet c it is on the loftiest crest
0 Cf. the saying attributed to Thales (Diels, Vorsokr.6
11 A 22 = Aristot. Be Anima 411 a 7).
6
The avrovfyyos (cf. 398 a 5, b 4) is the man who works his
own land without a slave, e.g. Electras husband in Euripides
Electra.
e Horn. II. i. 499.
385
[ARISTOTLE]
397 b
pv<f)fj 99 rov avfnravros
iyKadtSpvfievos ovpavov
fiaXiora Se' 7tws avrov rrjs Svvafiews airoXavei to

7rXrjGLOV avrov ad>fiay Kal erxeira ro fier* Klvo,
30
Kal ifeijfjs ovrtos axpt ra>v Kaff rjfias romav. Sto

yrj re Kal ra cm yrjs eot/cev, ev arroordoei rrXeiarrj
rrjs e/c Beov ovra axfreXelas> aaOevrj Kal aKaraXXrjXa
etvai Kal noXXrjs fieora rapaxrjs' ov firjv aAAa
[/cat]1 Kad* oaov em nav hiiKveioBai 7re<f>VK ro
Belov, Kal ra KaBy rjfias ofiolcos ovfifialvei ra re

virep rjfias, Kara ro eyyiov re Kal rroppcorepaj Beov
398 a etvai fiaXXov re Kal fjrrov uxf>eXelas fieraXafijSdvovra. Kpeirrov ovv v7ToXafieivy o Kal irpeirov earl
35
Kal Bea> fiaXiara apfioov, ws rj ev ovpavw Svvafiis

Ihpvfievrj Kal rots irXelarov aêarrjKoaiv, <bs evi
5
ye ei7Tiv, Kal avfirraaiv atria ylverai awrrjplas,

fiaXXov fj <I)S hirjKovaa Kal <f>oircocra evBa firj KaXov
firjhe evoxrifJLOV a-vrovpyel ra em yrjs. rovro fiev
yap ov Se avBpoyrrwv rjyefioaiv dpfiorrei, navrl Kal
rep rvxovn e<f>lora<jBai epycp, olov arpartas apxovrc
fj noXews fj oIkov, [/cat]2 ct XP(*)V orpuifuaroheofiov eirj hrjaai Kal ct rt <f>avXorepov airoreXeiv
io epyov, o 3 Kav ro rvxov av8pa7To8ov rroirjaeiev, aAA*

olov 771 rov
(y a p }
fieyaXov flaaiXetos laropeirai,
K afipvoov3 S epov re
ro
Kal Aapetou 7r/>o-
1 Kat om. CGZ Lor.

2 Kat del. Wendland et Wilamowitz.
3 o . . . K afipvaou sic Lor. : o em ro v
fieyaXov fiaoiXicjs ov k
av t o tvyov avhpairoBov n o v /jo u c y aXX* otov iaropciTO K afifivaov
k tA .
386
Heklc.: v. Lor. ad lot*.
ON THE COSMOS, 6
of the whole heaven that he dwells : his power is
experienced most of all by the body that is closest to
him, less by the next, and so on down to the regions
inhabited by us. So earth and the things that are on
earth, being at the farthest remove from the help of
God, seem to be feeble and discordant and full of
confusion and diversity ; but nevertheless, in that
it is the nature of the Divine to penetrate to every
thing, even the things around us occur in the same
way as the things above us, each having a greater
or smaller share of God's help in proportion to its
distance from him. So it is better to suppose, what
is also fitting and most appropriate to God, that the
power which is based on the heavens is also the cause
of preservation in the most remote things, as we
may say, and indeed in everything, rather than that
of itseli it carries out its tasks on earth by penetrating
and being present where it is not honourable or
fitting that it should.0 For it is not fitting even among
men for princcs to superintend each and every action
that may have to be done for example, the com
mander of an army or leader of a city or head of a
household, if it were necessary to pack up bedding or
perform some other menial task which could be done
by any slave but rather it is fitting that they should
act in the manner which was adopted, according to
the records, under the Great King .6 The pomp of
Cambyses and Xerxes and Darius was ordered on a
The power ** has here become identified with god ;
this is literally inconsistent with 397 b 19 above.
b Pseudo-Aristotle describes the King of Persia in his
glory in the 6th/5th century u.c. He accords well with
Herodotuss (i. 98) account of Deioces* palace and regime at
Ecbatana. This is a description of a fabulous past such as
Aristotle would hardly have given.
387
[ARISTOTLE]
398 a
ox*]!* a els a efiv orrjros Kal vrrepoxrjs vi/jos fi e y a Xorrperrios 8iKKOGfirjTO* a v r o s fiev y a p , d)s Ao y o s ,
ihpvro iv Hoverots fj Etf/Jaravots, rravrl a o p a r o s ,
15 d a v fia o ro v irrexoiv fiaoLXeiov oik ov Kal rrepifioXov
Xpvoa> Kal rjXeKrpw Kal iXe<f>avn acrrpdirrovra'
TTvXwves Se 7ToXXol Kal o v v e x e & rrpoOvpa r e a v x v o is
elp yofiev a o r ah Lois an* dXXrjXcov 6 vpais r e âA/cafe
Kal r e ix e o i fieya X ois (b x v p w r o ea> Se r o v r o jv
av8pes o l rrpGiroi Kal h oK ifidjraroi hieKKoofirjvro ,
20 oi fiev afi<f> a v r o v r o v jSaatAe'a Sopv<f>opoi r e Kal
Oepairovres* o i Se eK a a rov rrepifioXov <f>vXaKes,
nvXcopoi r e Kal w r a K o v o r a l X eyofievoi, o>s av o
fiaaiX evs a v r o s s hearrorrjs Kal Oeos ovofia ^ ofiev os,
rrdvra fiev ]8Aeiroi, rrdvra Se ak o v o i.
r o v r o jv dXXoi KaOeiarrjKeoav rrpooohw v ra fiia i Kal
25 a r p a r rjy o l iroXefiujv Kal K vvrjyeolw v 8wpcov r e
airoSeKrfjpes ra>v r e Xoirrwv epycuv eK a oroi Kara
r a s ^petas iTTifieXrjrai. rrjv Se a vfiira oa v apxrjv rrjs
*A aL as, rreparovfievrjv 'EXXrjarrovrq) fiev iK r w v
7Tpos ecnrepav fieptov , *IvSai Se eic rcov rrpos ecu,
8ieiXrf<f>eoav Kara edvrj arparrjyol Kal aarpdrrai
30 Kal fiaoiXeis, SovXoi rov fieyaXov fiaoiXetoS, flfiepobpofioi re Kal okottoI Kal ayyeXia<f>opoi <f>pVKrcopLcuv1 re irrorrrrjpes * roaovros Se fjv o Koofios,
Kal fiaXiara rwv <f>pvKrioplo)vsl Kara StaSolas
rrvpaevovrcov aXXrjXois* iK irepdrajv rrjs dpxrjs
fiexpi Hovaojv Kal Etf/Jaravajv, ware rov jSacn35 Aea yivdiOKeiv avOrjfiepov iravra ra iv rfj Aata
398 b Kaivovpyovfieva.
vofiiareov Srj rrjv rov fieya Xov fiaoiXecos vrrepoxty rrpos rrjv rov rov Koofiov
1 (fipVKTOjpitOV
$>pvKTU)pitov Bekk.
388
<f>pVKTOJpia)V
ScH pSi :
<f>pVKTCOplU)V .
ON THE COSMOS, 6
grand scale and touched the heights of majesty and
magnificence : the King himself, they say, lived in
Susa or Ecbatana, invisible to all, in a marvellous
palace with a surrounding wall flashing with gold,
electrum and ivory ; it had a succession of many gatctowers, and the gateways, separated by many stades
from one another, were fortified with brazen doors
and high walls ; outside these the leaders and most
eminent men were drawn up in order, some as per
sonal bodyguards and attendants to the King himself,
some as guardians of each outer wall, called Guards
and the Listening-Watch, so that the King himself,
who had the name of Master and God, might see
everything and hear everything. Apart from these
there were others appointed as revenue officials,
leaders in war and in the hunt, receivers of gifts to
the King, and others, each responsible for administer
ing a particular task, as they were necessary. The
whole Empire of Asia, bounded by the Hellespont in
the W est and the Indus in the East, was divided into
nations under generals and satraps and kings, slaves
of the Great King, with couriers and scouts and
messengers and signals-officers. And such was the
orderly arrangement of this, and particularly of the
system of signal-beacons which were ready to burn
in succession from the uttermost limits of the Empire
to Susa and Ecbatana, that the King knew the same
day all that was news in Asia. Now we must suppose
that the majesty of the Great King falls short of the
majesty of the god who rules the cosmos by as much
2 iTVpoevovrcw aXXrjXois Lor. :
nvpacvovauiv
dXXrjXais Bekk.
389
[ARISTOTLE]
398 b ^
irrexovros Beov rocrovrov KaraSeearepav oaov rrjs

Kivov rrjv rov <f>avXordrov re
rov
toov, a)err6,
Kal doBeveord-
ehrep daefivov rjv avrov avrco
5 8ok?v S epijrjv avrovpyelv arravra Kal emreXetv a
flovAoiro
Kal i(f)iardfievov 8ioiKelvs 7roAv fiaXXov
a7Tp7TS av eirj Beep,
aefivorepov Se
TTCoheorepov avrov fiev em
Kal rrpe-
rrjs avcorara) ^copas*
IhpvoBai, rrjv Se 8 vvafiiv Sta rov avfirravros koafxov ScrjKovaav rjXiov re Kiveiv Kal aeXrjvrjv Kal rov
io rrdvra ovpavov rrepiayeiv atn ov re ylveoB ai rols
em rrjs yrjs atorrjpias.
ovSev yap emrexvrjerecos
avrw Set Kal vrrrjpealas rrjs rrap

rols rrap
erepwv, toonrep
rjfiiv apxovoi rrjs rroXvxeipias Sta rrjv
aoBeveiav, aXXa rovro rjv ro Beiorarov, ro fiera

paarwvrjs Kal anXrjs Kivrjcrecos 7ravro8a7ras arro15 reAetv tSeas*, warrep afieAct 8pa>aiv oi firjxavoTroioi*
8 ta fiias opyavov oxôrrjpLas 7roAAas* Kal rroiKiXas

evepyeias airoreXovvres
ofioicos Se Kal oi vevpo-
orirdcrrai fiiav firjpivBov emorraodjievoi rroiovcri Kal

avxeva KiveloSai Kal Xfya r v W ov Ka'L &tJiOV KaL
6<f>6aXfi6v, e o n Se ore rrdvra ra fieprj, fiera n v o s
20 evpvBfiias ovrcos ovv Kal rj Beta (f>vais aito n v o s

1 fi-qYavonoiot Z Lor. (Notes) :
urfxavor^xyat Lor.
Mundo) : fieyaXorexvoi coda. pier. Bekk:.
(De
It is not clear what kind of machine is meant;
the
390
ON THE COSMOS, 6
as the difference between the King and the poorest
and weakest creature in the world, so that if it was
beneath the dignity o f Xerxes to appear himself
to be the actual executor of all things, to carry out
his wishes himself and to administer the Empire by
personal supervision, it would be still more unbe
coming for God. It is more noble, more becoming,
for him to reside in the highest place, while his power,
penetrating the whole of the cosmos, moves the sun
and moon and turns the whole of the heavens and is
the cause of preservation for the things upon the
earth. He has no need of the contrivance and support
of others, as rulers among us men need a multitude
of workers because of their weakness ; the most
divine thing of all is to produce all kinds of result
easily by means of a single motion, just like the
operators of machines, who produce many varied
activities by means of the machine's single releasemechanism. In the same way too the men who run
puppet-shows,6 by pulling a single string, make the
creature s neck move, and his hand and shoulder and
eye, and sometimes every part of his body, according
to a rhythmical pattern. So also the divine being,
varied activities probably refer to the various parts of
the machine, and do not imply multi-purpose machines.
Mechanopoios is most frequently used of military engineers.
Schasteria is used of the release mechanism of catapults and
ballistae. It is also used of the release-mechanism of auto
matic machines (such as Heros machine for providing holy
water) ; but in conjunction with mechanopoios and organon
a reference to catapults, etc., seems more likely.
b Plato twice refers to puppets in the Laws (644 d , 804 b )
as well as in the shadow-theatre of the Republic (514); in the
Laws the puppets are worked by wires. Aristotle uses the
example of puppets to illustrate a scientific theory in Be Gen.
A n. 734 b 10 ff.
391
[ARISTOTLE]
398
a7rXrjs K tvrjaew s
StScucrt
(Tvvexij
rov
ir p w r o v
rrjv S vva fiiv
7raAtv
Kal a n 9 eKelvcov
Sta
pcorepco, fiexp iS a v
rov
vrjO ev y a p e r e p o v v<f>* e r e p o v
e ls r a
els r a i r o p -
n a v r o s StccA0rj* /ct/cat av r o 7raAiv e K iv r fv e v
aXXo arvv K o a fiw , S pw vrcov fie v Trdvrtov o Ik c Icos r a l s
Sc o 8 o v tt&olv
aAAa Sta(f>opov /cat e r e p o i a s , e a n Sc o ts /cat
i v a v r l a s , /catrot rrjs npcorrfs o lo v iv 8 o o e c o s els
25 a<f>erepais K a r a a K e v a is , o v rrjs a v r fjs

o v a rjs,
k Ivtjglv
fiia s 1 ye v o fie v r js ' a ia irep a v e l n s i afarovs*
/cat
o fio v plipeie a<f>aipav
Xiv 8 p o v e K a u r o v y a p
30
k v /3 ov
Kal k w v o v Kal k v -
tStov
a vrcbv K a ra r o
Tts> Ofiov q>ov e v v 8 p o v r e Kal
Orjaerai o x f jf ia V
XepaaTov Kal Trrrjvdv ev r o t s k o Xttols excov

8rjXov
ya p
on
klvtj-
ro
fie v
vifK ro v
d X o fiev ov
c/cj8aAor
e ls
Statrav e K v q ie r a t , r o Sc XPa ^ o v
o<f>erepa rjOrj /cat v o f io v s 8ieep7TV<Ti, r o Se
rrjv
T<*
ea vrov
/c
ea p O ev
35 p u d s
yr js
fie r a p a io v
Trpwrrfs
r ijs
a lr ia s
399 a oLKelav e if ia p e ia v .
Sta
o lx fo e r a i
rraoiv
o v rc o s
T r e r o fie v o v ,
aTroSovorfs
eêt /cat
em
rrjv
K o o fio v
d n X ijs r o v o v f i ira vr o s o v p a v o v 7 T e p ia y to y fjs
ya p
rjfiepa Kal v v K r l irep a ro vfievrjs
ef o8ot
a ep io v
yiv o v r a i,
f ie v w v ,
rcov
5 K ivovfievcD V
Kal r a s
/catrot
fie v
ir a p a
18la s
d arrov,
re
aAAotat
n a v r co v
St
v i to f i i a s o<f>alpas n e p i e x o -
ra
r o jv
rcov
Sc
o X o X a i o r e p o p
8ia o r7 )fia rcov
eK a o rco v K a r a a K e v a s .
firfKrf
oeXrjvr) fie v
y a p e v firjvl r o v ea v r rjs S i a i r e p a i v e r a i k v k X o v a vfofievrj r e
392
Kal fietovfievrj Kal <f)0ivovoa, yjXios
Sc
iv
ON THE COSMOS, 6
with a single movement o f the nearest element dis
tributes his power to the next part and then to the
more remote parts until it permeates the whole. One
thing is moved by another, and itself then moves
a third in regular order, all things acting in the manner
appropriate to their own constitution ; for the way
is not the same for all things, but different and
various, in some cases quite opposite, though the
key of the whole movement, as it were, is set by a
single opening note. For instance, a similar effect
would be produced if one threw from a height a
sphere, a cube, a cone and a cylinder, all together :
each of them will move in the manner appropriate
to its own shape ; or if one held in the folds of ones
cloak an aquatic animal, a land animal and a winged
animal, and then threw them out all togeth er; clearly
the animal that swims will leap into its own habitat
and swim away, the land animal will crawl off to its
own customary pursuits and pastures, and the winged
creature will rise from the ground and fly away high
in the air ; a single cause has restored to all of them
the freedom to move, each in the manner of its
species. So too in the case o f the cosmos : by means
of a single revolution of the whole heaven completed
in a night and a day, the various motions of all the
heavenly bodies are initiated, and though all are
embraced in one sphere, some move rapidly and
others more slowly, according to their distances and
their individual characters. For the moon completes
its orbit in a month, waxing and waning and dis
appearing ; the sun and those which have an equal
L o r.: fjuav codd. Bekk.
aiirrovs scripsi: dyyovs codd. Lor. B ek k .: o p o v s Z : per
1 pi as
proclive Ap.
393
[ARISTOTLE]
399a ^
iviavru> Kal ol rovrov looSpofiot, o re Oajo<j)6pos

Kal o 'Epfiov Aeyofievos, o Se llvpoeis iv SnrXaoiovi
10 tovtojv xpovw, o Se Aids iv eârrXaolovi rovrov,
Kal reXevraios o YLpovov Xeyofievos iv SnrXaoiovi
Kal rjfiioei rov V7TOKara). fiia Se iK ndvrcov apfiovla ovvaSovrwv Kal xopevovrcov Kara rov ovpavov
i evos re ylverai Kal els ev dnoX^yei, Koofiov
irvfiats t o ovfirrav aAA ovk aKoofiiav ovofiaoaoa.
15 Kadarrep Se iv XP$ Kopv<f>aiov Karaptjavros
ovverrrjxei iras o x oP$ dvSpcov, eoO* ore Kal y v vaiKcov, iv Sia<f>opois <f>wvais ovrepais Kal fiapvrepais fiiav apfioviav ififieXrj Kepawvvrwv, ovrcos
exei Kal irrl rov ro ovfirrav Sierrovros Beov- Kara
yap t o avcuOev ivSooifiov vrro rov <f>epcovvficus av
20 Kopv<f>alov TTpooayopevOevros Kiveirai fiev ra dor pa
del Kal o ovfiiras ovpavos, rropeverai Se Sirras
iropelas o 7TafjL<f)ar}s rjXios, rfj fiev fjfiepav Kal
vvKra Siopityojv avaroXfj Kal Svoei, rfj Se ras reooapas cupas aycov rov erovs, irpoooj re fiopeios Kal
omoco vonos Sieep7Tcuv. ylvovrai Se verol 'Kara
25 Kaipov Kal avefioi Kal Spoooi ra re rraOrj ra iv ra>
rrepiexovn ovfiftaivovra Sia rrjv rrpojrrjv Kal apxeyovov 1 air lav. errovrai S c rovrois norafiwv iKpoal,
daXaoorjs avoiSrjoeis, SevSpcov iK<f>voeis, Kaprr&v
ireirdvoeis, yoval ^cocov, iKrpo<f>ai re ndvrajv Kal
aKfial Kal <f>0ioeis, ovfifiaXXofievrjs rrpos ravra Kal
30 rrjs eKaorov KaraoKevrjs, <os e<f>rjv.
orav ofiv o
rrdvrcov rjyefiwv re Kal yeverwp, aoparos tov aXXcp
1 apx*yovov Wendland et Wilamowitz, Iôr.: apxaioyovov
codd. Bekk.
394
ON THE COSMOS, 6
course with it, namely Phosphorus (Venus) and Her
mes (Mercury), complete their course in a year,
Pyroeis (Mars) in twice this time, Zeus (Jupiter) in
twelve years, and lastly the star called after Cronus
(Saturn) in two and a half times the period of the
one below it. The single harmony that is produced
by all these as they sing and dance in concert round
the heavens has one and the same beginning and
one and the same end, in a true sense giving to
the whole the name of order (kw/ios) and not
disorder (a/cotr/Aia). Just as in a chorus at the
direction of the leader all the chorus of men, some
times of women too, join in singing together, creating
a single pleasing harmony with their varied mixture
of high and low notes, so also in the case of the god
who controls the universe : the note is sounded from
on high by him who might well be called the chorusmaster ; then the stars and the whole heavens move
continually, and the all-shining sun makes his double
journey, dividing night from day by his rising and
setting, and bringing the four seasons of the year
as he moves forwards to the North and back to the
South. There are rains in due season, and winds,
and falls of dew, and all the phenomena that occur
in the atmosphere all are the results of the first,
original cause. These are followed by the springing
up of rivers, the swelling o f the sea, the growth of
trees, the ripening of fruit, the birth of animals, the
nurture, the prime and the decay of all things ; and
the individual constitution of each thing contributes
to the process, as I have said. So when the leader
and author of all things, unseen except to the eye of
*
i.e. thirty years. These periods correspond to those of
Eudoxus (<ap. Simplic. In de Caelo 495. 26 ff.).
395
[ARISTOTLE]
399 a
7rXr)v
A o y Laflip,
orjfirjvrj iraarj <f>voei fierav ovpavov
re K a l yrjs <f>epofievrj, KLveirai i r a o a cvScAcxa)? iv
18101s*, rrore fiev a<f>avit,ofiivfq,

Se <f>aivofievrj, fivpias ISeas ava<f>aivovaa re
K a l naXiv arroKpvrrrovaa c k fiias dpxfjs.
eoiKe
399 b Sc KOfitSrj to Spaifievov rols ev 7To\efiov Kaipols
k v k X o l s K a l rrepaaiv
35 7tot
fiaXiara yivofievois, erreiSav fj aaAmyf arjfxrjvr) ra>

aTpaT07reS(p * t o t c yap rrjs <f>a)vfjs eKaaros o l k o v aas o fiev aarrlSa avaipelrai, o Se dwpaKa evSverai,
5 o
8c
KvrjfilSas fj Kpavos fj a>orrjpa rrepLriOerai*
K a l o fiev L7T7TOV x a A iv o i, o Se avvcopi8 a avajSaim ,

o
Sc avvdrjfia napeyyva' Kadlararai Se evdeajs o
fiev
<
A o ây d s*
els
A o ô v ,
8 c raîapxos els ratjiv,
< \ >^ /
f o\ i \\ \
nrrrevs cm Kepas, o oe ifjiAos eis rrjv toiav

eKTpexei x ^ p w âvra Se v<f>* eva orjfiavropa So1 0 velrat Kara itpoaraîv rov to kparos exovros fjyefiovos. ovtoj XPV *<o-l *nepi rov avfinavros <f>povetv
vito yap fitas po7rrjs orpvvofievajv dirdvrajv yiverat
ra otVcta, Kal ravrrjs aoparov Kal a<f>avovs. orrep
ovSafiws eartv efirroSiov ovre eKelvrj irpos to Spav
ovre fjfitv 7rpos to irtarevaar Kal yap fj fax*!* ^
1 5 rjv <bfiev re Kal olkovs Kal rroAeis exofiev, aoparos
oSaa rols epyoLS avrrjs1 oparai' rras yap o rov fttov
Sia Koafios vno ravrrjs evprjrai Kal SiareraKrai Kal
avvexerai, yrjs apoaeis Kal (frvrevaeis, rexvys cm voLat, xP*)aCLS vofiajv, Koafios rroXtretas, evSrjfioi
ttpaeis, VTrepopios rroXefios, elprjvrj, ravra XPV
20 Kal rrepl Oeov SiavoelaOaL, Svvajiei fiev ovros laxvpordrov, KaXXei 8c ev7Tp7Teardrov, t,a>fj Se aOavarov, aperfj 8c Kpariarov, Sioti rrdarj Ovrjrfj <f>voei
396
o oc
ON THE COSMOS, 6
reason, gives the sign to every moving thing between
heaven and earth, everything is moved continually
in its orbit and within its peculiar limits, now dis
appearing, now appearing, revealing innumerable
different forms and concealing them again, all from
a single beginning. The process is very like what
happens, particularly at moments in a war, when the
trumpet gives a signal in a military camp ; then each
man hears the sound, and one picks up his shield,
another puts on his breast-plate, and a third his
greaves or helmet or b e l t ; one harnesses his horse,
one mounts his chariot, one passes on the watchword ;
the company-commander goes at once to his company,
the brigadier to his brigade, the cavalryman to his
squadron, and the infantryman runs to his own
station ; all is stirred by a single trumpeter to a
flurry of motion according to the orders of the supreme
commander. It is a similar idea that we must have
of the universe : by a single inclination all things
are spurred to action and perform their peculiar
functions and this single agent is unseen and in
visible. Its invisibility is no impediment either to
its own action or to our belief in i t ; for the soul,
whereby we live and build households and cities,
though it is invisible is perceived through its deeds :
for all the conduct of life is discovered, arranged and
maintained by the soul the ploughing and sowing
of land, the inventions of art, the use of laws, the
order of a citys government, the activities of people
in their own country, and war and peace with foreign
nations. This is what we must also believe about
God, who is mightiest in power, outstanding in beauty,
immortal in life, and supreme in excellence, because
1 avrrjs codd.
L o r.:
a vrols
codd. al. Bekk.
397
[ARISTOTLE]
399 b
y e v o jie v o s
d O e c o p r jr o s
an
avrcbv
tco v
epycov
0 e u )-
tra t. r a y a p 7r d d r j , K a l ra St a e p o s a n a v r a K a l
r a cm y^s* /cat r a cv uoart, t/cou A e y o i r a v o v t c o s
25 e p y a e t v a i t o v t o v k o g j j l o v i n e x o v r o s * c f o5, /cara
rov < f> va iK ov E/A7TSo/cAca,
pe
/ / )
/)*
* *
7ravt/ o a a r ?)v oaa r e c u o a a r corrat oniacju>9

ScvSpca r * ifSXaorrjae Kal a vep es rj8e y v v a iK e s
Ofjpes t
o lo jv o l re Kal vS a T oO pe/ifioves foO ds.
cot/cc Sc ovtcost ct /cat jjukporepov napafiaXeTv,1

30 rots* 6 {i<f>aXols Xeyojilvois rots* cv rats1 ifjaXiaiv
[XiOois],2 ot fieaoi Keijxevoi Kara rrjv els eKare pov
fiepos evSeoiv ev dpjxovla rrjpovcn Kal iv rafct ro
ttqlv crxypa Trjs âAtSo? /cat aKivrjrov. <f>aol Sc /cat
rov ayaXjiaTonoiov OctStav /caraa/ccuaôvra8 ttjv iv
35 aKponoXei yA0rjvav iv fieajj ttj tavrrjs aamSt ro

caurou npoaconov ivTVTTcboaaOai, /cat avvSrjaai tco
400 a aydXjian Sta rtvos* a<f>avovs Srjjxiovpyias, ware c f
avayKTjs, c t n ? P o v X o it o a i r o nepiaipeiv3 r o avjxnav

dyaXjxa Xveiv re Kal crvyxeiv. r o u r o v o u v c ^ c t r o v
A oyov
0 co?
cv
K o u fic p ,
ovvexcov
ttjv
tc jv
oXcov
5 apjiovlav re Kal ocorrjpiav, nXrjv ovre fieoos cov,

ev0a tj yfj re Kal o 0oXepos ronos o S t o s , aXX* avco
Ka0apos c v KaOapcp Xa)PV IS c jS ^ /c c i? , o v irvpicos / c a A ou/txev ovpavov fiev and t o v opov etvai t o v a v c o ,
wO A u /i7 r o v S c o t o v oXoXajxnfj re Kal na v t o s t,o<f)ov Kal
1 fxiKportpov 7rapapaXtv L o r . :
piK port pov, napapaXXeiv rov
KOOftOV n e k k .
2 Aiflot* d e l . W e n d l a n d et. W i l a i n o w i t z .
3 KaraaKvaôvra H I ) / ;
KaraaKva^6fivov B e k k .
398
[ A r i s t .]
De
M ir .
A itsc,
155;
I> o r .:
ON THE COSMOS, 6
though he is invisible to every mortal thing he is seen
through his deeds. For it would be true to say that
all the phenomena of the air, the land and the water
are the works of the God who rules the cosmos ; from
whom, according to Empedocles a the natural philo
sopher,
grows all that is and was and is yet to come,
the trees and the whole race of men and women,
beasts, birds and water-nurtnred fish.
Though it is rather a humble comparison, he is truly

like the so-called keystones of vaults, which lie
in the middle and by their junction with each side
ensure the proper fit of the whole structure of the
vault and preserve its arrangement and stability.
They say too that the sculptor Pheidias, when he
was making the Athena on the Acropolis, carved his
own face into the middle of her shield, and by some
hidden trick of craftsmanship attached it to the
statue in such a way that if anyone tried to remove
it he inevitably destroyed and demolished the whole
statue .6 And this is the position held in the cosmos
by God, who maintains the orderliness and preserva
tion of the whole: except that he is not in the centre
for here lies the earth, this turbulent, troubled placc
but high aloft, pure in a pure region, which we
rightly call heaven (ovpavos) because it forms the
uppermost boundary (opos . . . avat) or Olympus
because it shines brightly all over (oAoXa/zn-^s') and is
a Diels, Vorsokr* 31 B 91.
b C f Ps.-Aristot. l)e Mir. Ausc. 84-6 a 19 ff.; Plut. Pericles
31 ; Cic. Tusc. Disp. i. 15. 34 ; Val. Max. viii. 14. 6. Cicero
and Plutarch only mention the portrait. The statue was the
gold and ivory Athena in the Parthenon. In several economic
crises the gold was removed and melted down and later
restored.
399
[ARISTOTLE]
400 a
a r d fe r o v K iv r jfia r o s K e x c o p ia fie v o v , o l a y i v e r a i n a p
10 r j f i i v Sta êt/zan'os*
K al
K a l O nOirjTYJS [* O f i r j p o s
a v efic o v
]1
ftta s ,
to a n ep
ecjyq
OvXvfin6v$\ oOi <f>aal Oecov eSos aacf>aXes alel

efifievar ovr? dvefioiai nvaaaerai ovre nor
6fij3pcp
Several, ovre ^ta>v eninlXvarai, aAAa fiaX' aWprj
nenrarai ave<f>eXos, XevKrj 8 eniSeSpofiev aiyXrj.
Se /cat d ^Stos* anas, rrjv avco x<I)pav

anohovs Beep* Kal yap navres avOpconoi avareivofiev
ras x*ipaS k T v ovpavov evâs noiovfievoi. Ka0y
ov Xoyov ov KaKcos /ca/cetvo dvane<f>covrjrai
15 cruvenifiaprvpeT
20
Z evs S eAa^ ovpavov evpvv ev aWepi Kal vecf>eXrjai.

Sto /cat rcov ataOrjrcov ra rifiicorara rov avrov
ene\ei ronov, dor pa re Kal rjXios Kal aeXrjvrj

fiova re ra ovpavia Sta rovro del rrjv avrrjv acoovra raiv SiaKeKoafirjrai, Kal ovnore aAAotcodevra jxereKivrjOrj, KaOanep ra enl yrjs evrpenra
ovr a noXXas erepoicoaeis Kal naOrj dvaSeSe/crar
25 aeia/Jioi re yap rjSrj jStatot noXXa fieprj rrjs yrjs
avepprjâv, ofifipoi re KareKXvaav ef iiîoi Karappayevres, emhpofiai re Kvfiarcov Kal ava\coprjaeis
noXXaKis Kal rjnelpovs edaXarrcoaav Kal OaXarras
rjnelpcoaavt jStat re nvevfiarcov Kal rvc^covwv ean v
30 ore noXeis oXas averpeifrav, nvpKaiai re Kal <f>Xoyes
at fiev ef ovpavov yevofievai nporepov, &anep
<f>aalv, enl Oa eOovros ra npos eco fieprj Kare<f>Xeav,
at Se npos eonepav e/c yrjs avaf3Xvaaaai Kal K<f>varjaaaai, Kadanep rcov ev Airvrj Kparrjpcov avappayevrcov Kal ava rrjv yrjv (f>epofievcov %et/xappou
400 b StKrjv.
evda /cat ro rcov evaefiatv yevos eô^cos
400
ON THE COSMOS, 6
removed from all darkness and disorderly motion
such as occurs among us when there is a storm or a
violent wind ; as the poet says/*
To Olympus, where they say the gods dwelling stands
always safe ; it is not shaken by winds, nor drenched
by showers of rain, nor does snow come near i t ; always
unclouded
the air spreads out, and a white radiance lies upon it.
And all ages bear witness to this fact, and allot the
upper region to God : all of us men stretch out our
hands to the heavens when we pray. According to
this reasoning, the following also has been well said b :
To Zeus belongs the wide heaven in the clouds and the
aether.
So also the same place is occupied by the most honoured

of perceptible things, the stars and the sun and the
moon ; and for this reason only the heavenly bodies
always keep the same order and arrangement, and are
never changed or altered ; while the transient things
on earth admit many alterations and conditions. For
violent earthquakes before now have torn up many
parts of the earth, monstrous storms of rain have burst
out and overwhelmed it, incursions and withdrawals of
the waves have often made seas of dry land and dry
land of seas ; sometimes whole cities have been over
turned by the violence of gales and typhoons ; flaming
fires from the heavens once burnt up the Eastern parts,
they say, in the time of PhaSthon, and others gushed
and spouted from the earth, in the W est, as when the
craters of Etna erupted and spread over the earth
like a mountain-torrent. Here, too, the race of pious
Horn. Od. vi. 42-45.
b Horn. II. xv. 192.
1 "OfiTjpos om. Z Lor.
401
[ARISTOTLE]
400 b
i T t f i r jo e
to v
to
S a ifio v io v ,
nepiKaraXr]<f>devTU)v
pevfxaT O S Sta to j8a<7Tafetv y e p o v t o l s
a>fio)v y o v e T s K a l o c b e i v
in i
in to
tw v
n X rjcflov y e v o f i e v o s o t o v
TTVpOS TTOTdfXOS c fe ^ t 'o r ffy n a p T p eift T TOV </>Xoy~
5 f i o v to f i e v e v d a , t o
Se e v O a , K a l iT T jp rjoev ajSAa-
fie is a fia t o i s y o v e v o i t o v s
v ea v io K o v s.
KafloAou Se on ep i v vtjI fiev KvfiepvrjTrjs, iv

a p fia n Se rjv lo x o s , i v XP$> Se Kopv<f>aios, i v noX ei
Se vofio(JdeTrf)s* i v OTpaTonehcp Se rjyeficov, to v to
6eo s i v Koa/jKpy nXrjv KaO ocrov to is fiev KafiaTq10 pov t o a p xeiv noXvKivrjTOv tc /cat n oX vfiepifivov, tco
Se aX vnov a n ov ov tc Kal n d orjs Kex<opiofievov
owfiaTiKrjs a a 8 eve la s' i v aKivrjTco y a p tSp vfievos
n a v r a Kivel Kal n e p ia y e i, o n o v /JouAeTat /cat o n io s ,
iv Sia<f>opois IBeais tc Kal <f>voeoiv, w o n e p afieXei
Kal o rrjs noXecos v ofios aKivrjTos tov i v toxs tw v
15 x p M ^ v c o v i/jvxcus n a v r a olK ovofiet Ta K ara ttjv
TToXireiav i<f>enofievoi y a p avrco SrjXovon if-iaaiv
a p x o v r e s fiev in i Ta a p x e ia , OeofiodeTai Se els Ta
ot/ceta hiKaoTTjpia, fiovXevTal Se Kal e/c/cAâtaaTat els ovveS pia Ta n poorjK ovra, Kal o fiev tis els
to n p v ra v elov /JaStet otT rjoofievos , o Se n p os to v s
20 St/caoras anoXoyrjcrofievos , o Se els t o SeoficjTrjpiov an oQ avovfievos * y iv o v ra i Se /cat BrjfioOoiviai
vofiifioi Kal n avrjyvpeis iv ia v o io i Oc<ov tc Overlai
Kal rjp(oojv O epaneiai Kal x o a l KeKfirjKOTiov aXXa
Se aXXcos iv ep y o v fiev a K ara fiiav n p oora tjiv fj v o fiifiov i^ o v o la v crcofet to tou n oirjoa v ros ov tcos o t i
noXis S
25
o f i o v f i e v O v fiia fia T W V y e f i e t,
o f i o v Se 7ratava>v T e K al o r e v a y f i a T i o v ,
1 vofiotOervj^s coni. L o r.: voftos codd. Bekk.
402
ON THE COSMOS, 6
men was especially honoured by the divinity, when
they were overtaken by the stream of lava, because
they were carrying their old parents on their shoulders
to keep them safe ; for when the river of fire drew
near them it was split in two and turned one part to
this side and the other to that, and preserved un
harmed both the young men and their parents.
In a word then, as the helmsman in his ship, as the
charioteer in his chariot, as the leader in a chorus, as
the lawgiver in a city, as the commander in a military
camp, so is God in the cosmos, except that their com
mand is wearisome and fraught with many movements
and cares, while God rules without pain and toil, free
from all bodily weakness : for he is established in the
immovable, and moves and directs all things as and
where he wishes, among the varieties of form and
nature ; just as the law of the city, itself immovably
established within the minds of those who observe
it, disposes all the activities of the state : for in
obedience to the law the magistrates go to their
offices, the judges to their appropriate courts, the
councillors and members of the assembly to their
appointed meeting-places; and one man goes to the
prytaneum for his meals, another to the law-courts to
defend himself, a third to prison to die. The law also
ordains public feasts and annual festivals, sacrifices to
the gods, cults of heroes and libations to the dead :
and other varied activities, all arising from a single
ordinance or authority of the law, accord well with
these words of the poet b :
The city is full of heavy incense-fumes,
with crying for deliverance, and laments.
a The story is told of Amphion and his brother by the poet
of the Aetna (625 f.)
b Soph. O.T. 4-5.
403
[ARISTOTLE]
400
oiircos V7ToXr)7TTOV Kal cm rrjs fieiôvos noXecos,

Xeyco Sc rov K oofiov vofios yap rjfiiv lookAivtjs o
Oeos, ovhefiiav emSexofievos SiopBcooiv rj fiera30 Beoiv, Kpeirrcov Sc, olfiai, Kal fiefiaiorepos rcov ev
rats Kvpfteoiv avayeypafifievcov.
rjyovfievov Sc
aKivrjrcos1 avrov Kal ififieXcbs o ovfinas oIkovofielrai 8taKoofios ovpavov Kal yrjs, fiefieptofievos
Kara ras <f>voeis iraoas Sea rcov oiKetcov onepfidrcov
ei$ re <f>vra Kal coa Kara yevr) re Kal ethrj* Kal yap
401 a afirreXoi Kal cf>olvi,Kes Kal Trepoeai
o w e ai re yXvKepal Kal eXalai,
o 7Tovr]rrjs, r a r e a K a p n a fiev, aXXas Sc
TTapexofieva ^pctas*, nXaravoi K a l nirves Kal ttvoi
<f>rfOLV
K XrfO pr) r
a ly e ip o s r e
K a l e v cb h rfs K x y r r d p io o o s ,
5 at re Kaprrov orrcbpas fjSvv aXXcos 8c SvoBrfoavpujrov <f>epovoat,

oxvai Kal poial Kal firjXeat ayXaoKapnoi,
rcov re cocov ra re aypia Kal rjfiepa, ra re ev a ept
Kal cm yrjs Kal ev vhan fiooKOfieva, yiverai Kal
10 a Kfiaêi Kal <f)8eiperai rols rov Beov neiBofieva
Beofiols* irav yap epnerov irXrjyfj v e f i e r a i cos*
<f>r]mv *HpaKXeiros.
7.
Els Sc (ov noXvibvvfios i o n , Karovofiaôfievos
rols ndBeoi iraoiv arrep avros veoxfiol. KaXovfiev
Sc avrov K a l TLrjva K a l Ata, TrapaXXrjXcos xpdifievot
15 rols ovofiacnv, cos Kav el Xeyoifiev St* ov t,&fiev.
Kpovov Sc rrals K a l xP vov Xeyerai, hirjKcov cf
alcbvos arepfiovos els erepov alcova aorpanalos
re K a l fipovralos K a l aWpios K a l afflepios Kepavvios
1 aKivrjruis Stob. Lor. : aeiKimjrcjs codd. Bekk.
404.
ON THE COSMOS, 6-7

So it is, we must suppose, with that greater city, the
cosmos : God is a law to us, impartial and admitting
no correction or change ; he is surely a stronger and
more stable law than those inscribed on tablets.
Under his motionless and harmonious guidance all
the orderly arrangement of heaven and earth is
administered, extending over all things through the
seed proper to their kind, to plants and animals
by genus and species ; vines, palms and perseae,
sweet figs and olives, b as the poet says, and those
that bear no fruit but serve some other purpose,
planes and pines and box-trees, the alder, the
poplar and the sweet-scented cypress-tree 0 ; and
those which in the autumn bring forth a harvest that
is sweet but hard to store, pears and pomegranates
and apples with shining fruit d ; and animals, some
wild, some tame, that live in the air and on the earth
and in the water, all these come into being and grow
strong and perish, obedient to the laws of god. For
every creature that crawls is driven to pasture by his
goad, e as Heracleitus says.
7.
Though he is one, he has many names, accord
ing to the many effects he himself produces. W e call
him both Zena and Dia, using the names interchange
a b ly / as if we were to say " Him through whom (8td
ov) we live ($') He *s ca^ e<i the Son of Cronus and
of time (Chronos), because he lives from endless age
to another age ; God of Lightning and of Thunder,
God of the Air and Aether, God of the Thunderbolt
a A t Athens, tablets on which the early laws were written.
b Horn. Od. xi. 590.
e Horn. Od. v. 64.
d Horn. Od. xi. 589.
Diels, Vorsokr. 22 B 11.
1
Zrjva and Ata are used interchangeably as accusatives of
Zeus.
405
[ARISTOTLE]
401 a
TC Kal VTLO$ OL7TO TCUV VrCUV Kal KepaVVCUV Kal TCUV
aXXcuv KaXeZrai.
Kal firjv iniKapmos fiev and rcuv
20 Kapncuv, noXievs Se <X7to rcuv noXecuv ovofiaêrai,
yeveOXios re Kal epKeZos Kal ofioyvios Kal narpwos 1

and rrjs npos ravra Koivcuvias, eraipeZos re Kal
<f>lXios Kal tjevios Kal orp a n os Kal rponaiovxos,
Kadapoios re Kal naXafivaZos Kal Ikcoios Kal fieiXiXôs, axjnep oi noirjral Xeyovai, acurrjp re Kal
25 iXevOepios irvficus, cus Se t o
nay elneZv, ovpavios
re Kal x^dvios, naorjs incuvvfios (f>vaecus cup Kal

rvx^js, are navrcuv avros atn os tov. Sto Kal ev
rots *Op<f>iKoZs ov KaKcus Xeyerai
Z evs npcuros yevero, Z e is voraros apxêpavvos**
Zeus* K(f>aXrj, TLevs fieocra, Aids 8 K navra
rervKrai'
401 b
7jvs
7jevs
Z*evs
ry \
L evs
n v 6firjv yalrjs re Kal ovpavov aorepoevros'

aporjv yevero, Z evs afifiporos enXero vvfuftr)
nvoirj navrcuv, Zeus aKafiarov nvpos opfirj
/
tty
r7 ' * > r\
\'
novrov pic,a, L evs rjAios rjoe oeArjvr)'
Zeus fiaoiXevs, Zeus apxos anavrcuv apx^Kepavvos*'

navras yap Kpvi/jas avdis <f>aos is noXvyrjOes
ef ieprjs KpaSirjs aveveyKaro, fiepfiepa pecuv.
Otfiai Se Kal rrjv 9AvayKrjv ovk aXXo n XeyeoOai
nXrjv rovrov, olovel aviKrjrov alriav* ovr a, E i/xap-
10 fievrjv 8c Sta t o
eipeiv re Kal ^cupcti' aKcuXijrcus,
1 narptoos Wendland et Wilamowitz, L o r .: Trdrpios codd.

Bekk.
2 apxiKcpavvos I* Lor. ; apyiKepavvos codd. eet. Bekk. (et
*101 b 5 ) .
406
ON THE COSMOS, 7
and the Rain he takes his name from all these
things. He is called Harvest-God and City-God, God
of the Family and the Household, God of Kinsmen
and Ancestral God, because of his connexion with
these things ; God o f Fellowship and Friendship and
Hospitality, of W ar and Victory, of Purification and
Vengeance, of Supplication and Grace, as the poets
say, and in a true sense Saviour and Liberator. To
sum up all, he is a God of Heaven and God of Earth,
and takes his name from every kind of nature and
estate ; for he himself is the cause of all. So it is
rightly written in the Orphic books b :
Zeus is the first-born, Zeus is last, the lord of the lightning ;
Zeus is the head, Zeus the centre ; from Zeus comes all
that is ;
Zeus is the foundation of the earth and the starry heavens;
Zeus is a man, Zeus an immortal maid ;
Zeus is the breath of all things, Zeus is the spring of tire
less fire;
Zeus is the root of ocean, Zeus is the sun and moon ;
Zeus is king, Zeus is the master of all, the lord of the
lightning.
For he hid all men away, and has brought them again to
the lovely light
from the holiness of his heart, working great marvels.
I think too that Necessity ( A m y*^), is nothing but

another name for him, as being a cause that cannot
be defeated (aviKTfros) ; and Destiny (Kljiapfikvrj),
because he binds things together (etjpctv) and moves
Xdovios usually implies the Underworld ; but PseudoAristotle is probably stretching the meaning slightly to suit
his own cosmology.
b Kern, Fragm. Orph. 2 1 a.
4 alrCav
3 vid. 401 a 28.

CG L o r. : ovaiav codd. al. Bekk.
407
[ARISTOTLE]
401 b
Henpcofievrjv Se Sta to neneparcoadai navra Kal

fir)8ev iv rots ova tv arretpov elva t, Kal Motpav fiev
and to v fiefieptoOat, Nefieotv Se anto rrjs eKaarcp
8tavefir)oeco$, 'Ahpaoretav Se avanoSpaarov air Lav
ovoav Kara <f)vaivs A toa v Se del ovaav.
15 t<xs Molpas Kal
tov
rpels fiev yap at Motpat, Kara

fiepLOfievatj vrjfia Se
ofievovy
to
Se
arpaKrov
fieXXov,
TeVa/CTat Se Kara fiev

*
ra re rrepl
arpaKrov els ravro ncos vevei*
to
to
Se
tovs
to
XPV0Vs iLt
fiev iijetpya-
neptarpeôfievov
yeyovos fiia
tcov
Moipcov,
A tporros, inel Ta napeXOovra navra arpenrd icrrt,
20 Kara Se to fieXXov AdêoLS [els]1 navra yap rj

Kara
<f>v(Jiv fievei
Xrjtjis Kara
Se
to
eveoros
KXcoOcb, ovfinepatvovad re Kal KXtodovcra eKaortp

ra ot/ceta.
nepalverai Se /cat o fivOos
ovk
araKTcos.
T a v r a Se 7ravTa i o r lv o v k aXXo t l nXrjv o Oeos ,

KaOanep Kal o y ev v a io s WXarcov (jyqoiv ## o fiev 8rj
25 Oeos, a>onep o naXaids Aoyos*, apxrfv r e Kal reX evrrjv
Kal fie o a rcov ovrcov an dvrcov extov , evd eta n ep a lv ei
K ara <j>voiv n o p e v o fie v o s rtp Se aet i-v v en era i 8iKrj,
rcov d noX em ofievcov t o v Belov v ofiov rificopos tJ?
o yev rjoeod at2 fieXXcov fiaK apios r e
Kal ev8aificov
e f d pxfjs evdvs fie r o x o s eir)**

1 els del. Wendland et VVilamowitz.
2 yeinjaecrOai Biicheler : evSaifiovrjoetv vel cvBaifiovrjaai codd.
(cf. Plato, Laws 716 a ) .
408
ON THE COSMOS, 7
without hindrance ; Fate (flOT/xoficj'r/), because all
things are finite (irtirepaTtotrOai) and nothing in the
world is infinite ; Moira, from the division of things
(jitp'iQziv) ; Nemesis, from the allocation of a share to
each (8iavefA7)(ris) ; Adrasteia a cause whose nature
is to be inescapable (avairoSpatrros atria) ; and Aisa
a cause that exists for ever (del oftra). The story of
the Fates (Moipai) and the spindle also has much
the same tendency : there are three Fates, corre
sponding to different times, and part of the yarn on
their spindles is already completed, part is still to be
spun, and part is now being worked. The past is the
concern of one of the Fates, called Atropos, because
all past things are irreversible (aTpe-Trra) ; the future
belongs to Lachesis, for a fortune allotted (Ar/fis) by
nature awaits all things ; the present is Clothos
province, who settles each m an s own destiny and
spins (kAioOcw) his thread. So the story ends, and it
is well said.
All these things are no other than God, as the great
Plato tells us : God, as the ancient story says,
holding the beginning and the end and the middle of
all things that are, moves by a straight path in the
course of nature, bringing them to fulfilm ent; and
behind him, taking vengeance on all that fall short of
the divine law, follows Justice let no man be without
this, even from his earliest years, if he is to live in
blessed happiness. *
a o fiev . . . rifMopos Laws 715 e 716 a ; fa . . . e?r)
Laws 730 c. The antecedent of fjs in Plato is dXrj&eia.
Pseudo-Aristotle runs the two passages together, making
8ticq the antecedent of
409
INDICES
References are given according to page column and line of Bekker's

Berlin edition, reproduced in this edition in the left-hand margin; other
wise references are to chapters (Roman figures).
I. GREEK IN D E X
a y v o ia
(to v
cX&yxov) 166 b 24,
167 a 21 ff., 168 a 19 ff.

aboXcoxetv 165 b 16, 173 a
32 ff., 181 b 25 ff.
a{A<f>ipoXia 165 b 26,166 a 7 ff.
See ambiguity
*A v aX v riK a 165 b 9
arrttp o v 165 a 12, 167 b 13, 170
^ a 23 ff.
anXws ( t o a. XcyeoOai) 166 b
23, 37 ff., 168 b 11 ff.,
^ 169 b 9 ff.
dnoSeiKTiKos (Aoyos) 165 b 9
diro$tfcs 170 a 24 ff., 172 a
15 ff.
pappapt&iv 165 b 22
hiaX eicriirq, see dialectic

h ta v o ia 170 b 13 ff.
hihaoKaXiKOS (Aoyoj) 165
39 ff.
StSaoKtti' 171 a 32
eAeyxoy, def. 165 a 3, 167 a
22 ff.; false def. of 167 a
22, 168 b 17 ff .; and crvAXoyiofAos 171 a 3 ff.
cXXrjvQciv 182 a 34
e n a y e iv , cTrayuyyrj 165 b 28, 174
a 34
7rofivov 166 b 25, 167 b 1 ff.,
168
b 28 ff., 169 b 7 ff.,
X X V III
ip u rriK o s 165 b 1 ff., 171 b 8 ff.,
175 a 33 ff.
y evos (school of philosophy)
172 b 30
{on} 167 b 28 ff.
yvw fxai 176 b 18

vofxos (opp. (f>vais) 173 a 11 ff.
htatpOL$ 165 b 27, 166 a 33,

168 a 27, 169 a 26, 177 a
33 ff., 179 a 14
ojjLoioax^fJioavvTj 168 a 26,170 a
15
411
INDICES
oficjvvfita 165 b 26,29 ff., 169 a
^ 23 ff., 170 a 14
o v o fia (dist. n p d y ii a ) 165 a 7 ff.,
b 29, 167 a 2 4 ; (dist. 8iav o ia ) 170 b 13 ff.
opyrj 174 a 21
ircipaoriKos 165 b 1 ff., 169 b
25 ff., 171 b 5 ff. See ex
amination
7Tpoocohla 165 b 27,166 b 1,168
a 27,169 a 2 9 ,177b 3,35ff.,
179 a 15
orjfieiov (airohcifis Kara
to
a.)
167 b 10
croXotKtafjLos 165 b 15. Sec
solecism
aoîCTiKos 169 b 21,171 b 7 ff.
and passim; a. tcx*^def.
165 a 22
ovKOf/xxvrrifia 174 b 9
avXXoyiafios passim ; def. 165
a1
crvfipeprjKOS 166 b 22, 28 ff.,
168
a 34 ff., b 27 ff., 169
b 3 ff., 179 a 27
owOeois 165 b 27, 166 a 22 ff.,
168 a 27, 169 a 26, 177 a
33 ff., 179 a 13
TcrpaywvKTfios, rcTpaycjvifav
171 b 15 ff., 172 a 3 ff.
174 a 21
175 a 5
</>vois (opp. vo/jlos) 173 a 7 ff.
(fitXoveiKia
<f>iXoao<f>ia
ij)vhoypa.^rr]p.ai
tpu$oypa<f>ctv
i/tcvboypd<f>os,
171 b 14 ff.,
36 ff.
II. INDEX OF NAMES AND SUBJECTS

absolute (opp. qualified) use
of expressions 166 b 23,
37 ff., 168 b 11 ff., 169 b
11 ff., 180 a 23
accent 165 b 27, 166 b 1,
168
a 27, 169 a 29, XX I,
179 a 15 ; written 177 b 3
accident (avfipcPrjKos) 166 b
22, 28 ff., 168 a 34 ff., b
27
ff., 169 b 3 ff., 179 a 27
Achilles 166 a 38
ambiguity (afi<f>ifioXia) 165 b
26,
166 a 7 ff., XVII, 177
a 16 ff., 179 a 20
Antiphon 172 a 7
babbling, see aSoXearxctv
breathings, written 177 b 4
412
Callias 176 a 1, 7
Callicles 173 a 8
Calliope 173 b 31
case-forms 173 b 26 ff., 182 a
12 ff.
category-mistakes 168 a 26,

169 a 35, 178 a 6 ff., b
24 ff.
cause, fallacy of mistakeu
166 b 26, 167 b 21 ff.,
169
b 14
Cleon 182 a 32
Cleophon 174 b 28
consequent ( t o
i tn 6 ( i v o v \
fallacy of 166 b 25, 167 b
1 ff., 168 b 28 ff., 169 b
7 ff., XXVIII
contentious argument 165 b
1
ff. and passim; five Indian 167 a 8
induction 165 b 28, 174 a 34
aims of III
Coriscus 166 b 33, 173 b 31,
39, 175 b 20 ff., 176 a 7,
language, fallacies dependent
on IV, 166 b 10, 168 a
179 a 1, b 3 ff., 181 a 11,
24 ff., 169 a 37 ff., X I X 182 a 20
X X III
length (as confusing device)
demonstrative adjectives 175
174 a 17 ff.
b 20 ff.
Lycophron 174 b 3-2
demonstrative arguments 165
Lysander 176 b 5
b 9, 170 a 24. ff., 172 a
15 ff.
Mandrobulus 174 b 28
dialectic 165 a 39 ff., 169 b
Melissus 167 b 13, 168 b 36,
26, 171 b 1 ff., 174 a 16,
183 b 1
181 a 28
diction, see language
didactic argument 165 a 39 ff.,
names, symbols for things
171 a 32 ff.
165 a 7 ff. See ovofia
equivocation (ofxcuvofila) 165
b 26, 30 ff., 168 a 25, 169 a
23
ff., X V II, 177 a 10 ff.,
178 a 24 ff., 179 a 17
Ethiopian 167 a 12
Euthydemus 177 b 12
examination 165 b 1 ff., 169 b
25 ff., 171 b 5 ff., 172 a 28,
183 b 1
expression, see language
genitive (ambiguity of) 180
a 9 ff.
Gorgias 183 b 37
Hippocrates 171 b 15
Homer, Iliad 171 a 10;
quoted 166 b 4 ff., 180 a 22
ignoratio elenchi 166 b 24,
167 a 21 ff., 181 a 1 f f .;
other fallacies reducible
to 168 a 18 ff.
paradox 165 b 15,172 b 11 ff.,

174 b 13 ff., 175 b 33 ff.
Parmenides 182 b 27
petitio principii 166 b 25,
167 a 37 ff., 168 b 23 ff.,
169
b 13, 181 a 15 ff.
Piraeus 177 b 12
Plato, Gorgias 173 a 7
proposition (nporaats) 169 a
7 ff., b 17, 172 b 8
Protagoras 173 b 20
qualified use of expressions
166 b 2 3 ,37 ff., 168 b 11 ff.,
169 b 11 ff., 180 a 23 ff.
Sicily 177 b 13
Socrates 166 b 34, 183 b 7
solecism 165 b 15,173 b 17 ff.,
182 a 8 ff.
sophistry 171 b 25 ff., 172 b
12, 174 b 13 ; def. 165 a
22
413
INDICES
substance 168 a 26, 169 a 35,
170 a 15, 178 a 6 ff., 178 b
24 ff
Themistocles 176 a 1
414
third man argument 178

b 37
Zeno 172 a 9,1 79 b 20, 182 b
27
COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY

For a Greek index see the edition by IT. H. Joachim
(Aristotle on Coming-to-be and Passing-away, Oxford, 1922),
pp. 278-296.
IN D E X OF N A M E S A N D SUBJECTS
References a re given according to p ag e , colum n a n d lin e o f B ekker's
B e rlin ed itio n , reproduced i n th is ed itio n i n the left-h an d m a rg in ; other
w ise references a re to ch a p ters (R o m a n fig u re s f o r book , follow ed by A rab ic
figures f o r ch ap ter ).
action (opp. passion) 322 b

7 ff., 323 b 1 ff., I. 7-8
air 328 b 35 ff. See elements
alteration (dAAoi'com?) 327 a
16, 329 b 2 ff., 331 a 9,
332 a 8 ff., 337 a 3 5 ; dist.
coming-to-be I. 1-4 ; dist.
growth I. 5 ; illogical for
Pluralists 314 b 15 ff., 329
b 2 ; Atomists on 315 b
7 ; = change of quality
319
b 6 ff., 329 a 19; in
the soul 334 a 10
analogy 333 a 29 ff.
Anaxagoras :
elements
of 314 a 12 ff., fr. B 17
314 a 12
(Aristotle, other works):
Physics 316 b 18, 317 b 14,
318 a 4, 320 b 28, 323 a 3,
329 a 27, 336 a 13, 19, 337
a 18, 2 5 ; Be Caeto 315 b
31, 325 b 34, 331 a 7 ;

Metaphysics 336 b 29
art (opp. nature) 335 b 28 ff.
association (avyKpiois) 315 b
17,317 a 13 ff., 322 b 7 ff.,
329 a 4 ff., b 27, 333 b
12 ff.
Atomists, see Democritus,

Leucippus
atoms 314 a 21 ff., I. 2, 325 a
28 ff., b 34
categories 317 b 6 ff., 319 a
11
cause, efficient opp. material

318 a 1 f f .; efficient 324 b
13 ff., II. 10 ; material
318
a 1 ff., 319 a 19, 335
a 30 f f .; formal 336 a 3 ;
final 335 b 6 ; causes of
coming-to-be II. 9-11
chance 333 b 7 ff.
415
INDICES
cold, def. 329 b 29. See con
traries
colour, Democritus on 316
a2
coming-to-be: dist. altera
tion, growth I. 1-5; pro
duced by elements I. 6 II.
8 ; material and formal
causes of II. 9 ; final and
efficient causes of II. 1 0 ;
necessity in II. 11
composition (av v O e a is) 315
a 23, 317 a 12, 327 a 18,
334 a 2 7 ; dist. mixture
328 a 6 if.
compound
bodies,
how
formed II. 7-8
condensation 330 b 10
contact 316 a 30 ff., 322 b
22
ff., 328 b 26
contraries 314 b 26, 319 a
20 ff., 324 a 2 ff., 328 a 31,
329 a 32 ff., II. 2-8, 336
a 31
cycle of eoming-to-be 331 b
3 ff., II. 10-11
327 a 10 f f .; and mixture

328 a 15 ff.
dry, def. 329 b 31. See con
traries
earth, see elements
elements (earth, air, fire,
water) II. 1-8 ; in PreSocratics 314 a 11 ff. (see
also Empedocles); inter
change of 318 b 4 ff., 322
b 2 ff., 331 a 7 ff., 333 b
14, 337 a 8 ; only four 332
a 26 ; in compounds II.
7-8
Empedocles 324 b 33, 325 b
1 ff., 329 a 3, b 1, 330
b 20, 334 a 27 ; elements
of 314 a 12 ff., II. 6 ;
frr. B 8 314 b 7, 333 b 14 ;
B 17 333 a 19 ; B 37 333
b 1 ; B 53 334 a 3 ; B 54
334 a 5
ether 333 b 2, 334 a 2
farmers 335 a 14
fire 318 b 3 ff., 319 a 15 ff.,
320 b 20 ff., 322 a 10 ff.,
Democritus 316 a 1, 323 b
10, 325 a 2 ff., 326 a 1 ff.,
323 b 8 ff., 324 a 9, 325 a
20, 327 a 4 ff., b 11 ff.,
327
a 19 ; elements of 314
a 17 ff., 315 b 29 ff. ?
328
b 35 ff., II. 3-8, 336
praised 315 a 34 ff.
a 7 ff., 337 a 5 f f .; only
diminution 314 b 15 ff., 319
element fed 335 a 16;
b 32, 320 b 31, 322 a 33,
like form 335 a 19. See
elements
327
a 23
Diogenes fr, B 2 322 b 13
food 321 a 32 ff., 322 a 1 ff.,
dissociation (8ia .K p io is) 315
327 b 14 ff., 335 a 10 ff.
b 17, 317 a 13 ff., 322 b
form 324 b 5 ff., 328 b 11,
335 a 16, 338 b 13 f f .;
7 ff., 329 a 4 ff., b 27, 333
dist. privation 318 b 17;
b 13 ff.
division : of bodies 316 a
dist. matter 321 b 21 ff.,
322 a 2 ff., 28 f f .; = final
16 ff., 318 a 21, 325 a 8,
416
COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY

cause 335 b 6 ; Platonic
Forms 335 b 11 ff.
God 333 b 21, 336 b 33
growth 314 a 3, 315 a 28 ff.,
325 b 4, 333 a 3 5 ; and
diminution 314 b 15 ff.,
327 a 2 3 ; dist. comingto-be I. 5
heat 314 b 18 ff., 318 b 16,
322 b 16, 324 b 19, 326 a
4,
327 a 3 ff., 329 a 12
heavens 338 a 19
homoeomeries: in Anaxago
ras 314 a 17 ff. See parts
(uniform)
hot 329 b 27. See contraries,
heat
increase, see growth
indivisible magnitudes I. 2
intermediate (element) 332 a
19 ff.
Leucippus 325 a 2, 23 f f .;
elements of 314 a 12ff.;
on alteration, etc. 315 b
6 ff.
liquid 314 b 19, 322 a 2, 327
a 17 ff., 328 b 4, 329 b
19 ff., 332 b 20 ff., 334 b
29 ff., 335 a 1 ff.
Love (in Empedocles) 315 a
17, 333 b 12 ff.
Lynceus 328 a 15
matter I. 6-10, 328 b 33 ff.,
332 a 18, 35,334 b 3, 335 b
18 ff.; def. 320 a 2 ; in
separable 320 a 33, 329 a
10,30
mean (between contraries)

332 a 35, 334 b 27 ff.
Melissus, see 325 a 3
mixture 315 b 4,321 b 1,322 b
8, 327 a 30 ff., 328 a 6 ff.,
b 22, 333 b 19, 334 b 19 ;
pores theory of 324
b 32
moist 329 b 31. See con
traries, liquid
Monists 314 a 7 ff.
motion 315 a 28, 323 a 18,
324 a 27 ff., 334 a 8 ff., II.
9-10, 338 b 2 f f .; in
Empedocles 333 b 2 3 ;
natural 333 b 27 ff.
necessity 335 a 34, II. 11
nutrition (rpofrj) 322 a 23,
See food
Parmenides 330 b 14; fr. B
8
318 b 6. See 325 a 3
parts (uniform and nonuniform) 321 b 18 ff., 322
a 19 ff.
perception : and mixture 327
b 34 ff. ; perceptibility
reality 318 b 19
physical method : dist. dia
lectical 316 a 10 ff.
place 320 a 20 ff., 323 a 1 ff.,
334
b 2 ff., 337 a 27 ff.
planes, indivisible 315 b
30 ff., 325 b 26 ff., 33, 326
a 22
plants 335 a 12
Plato 315 a 29 ff., 325 b
25 ff., 329 a 14, 332 a 29 ;
Divisions of 330 b 16 ;
Timaeus 315 b 30, 325 b
24, 329 a 13, 330 b 16,
417
%
INDICES
332 a 29 ; Phaedo 335 b
11 ff.
pores 324 b 26 ff., 325 b 2 ff.,

326
b 7 ff.
potentiality 316 b 21, 317 b
16 ff., 318 a 21,320 a 13 ff.,
320 b 26, 322 a 6 ff.,
28 ff., 326 b 31 ff., 327 b
23
ff., 334 b 9 ff.
privation 318 b 17, 332 a 23
rarefaction 330 b 10
Socrates 335 b 10
solstices 337 b 12
soul (in Empedocles) 334 a
10
Strife (in Empedocles) 315 a

5 ff., 333 b 12 ff.
substance 314 b 14, 317 b
6 ff., 318 b 15, 35, 319 a
13 ff., 321 a 34, 328 b 33,
335 a 6, 338 b 14 ff.
substratum 315 a 1 ff., 317 a
418
23, 318 b 9 ff., 322 b 19,

324 a 17, 329 a 16 ff., 334
a 2 5 ; in Pre-Socratics 314
b 3 ff. ; = material cause
319 a 1 9 ; dist. property
319
b 6 ff.
sun: in Empedocles 314 b
20 ff., 315 a 1 0 ; motion
of 336 b 18, 338 b 4
time 337 a 22 ff.
transparency 324 b 29, 326
b 11
Unmoved Mover 318 a 4,3 24
a 30 ff., 337 a 19 ff.
void 320 b 27 ff., 325 a 4 ff.,
b 3 ff., 326 a 24, b 15 ff.
water 328 b 35 ff.
See
elements
weight 323 a 8, 326 a 7 ff.,
329 a 12, b 19 ff.
ON THE COSMOS
References a re given accord ing to p a g e , colum n a n d lin e o f Belchers
B e rlin E d itio n , reproduced i n th is e d itio n in the le ft-hand m a rg in .
I. GREEK INDEX
ayaXfia 400 a 1
ayaXfiaronoios 399 b 33
dyyeXicuftopos 398 a 31
ayovos 394 a 20
aSpaarcta 401 b 13
aidepios 392 a 31, b 1,401 a IT
alQrjp 392 a 5, 30,393 a 3, 396
b 27
aWpta 394 a 22 ff.
aXdpios 401 a 17
aliros 398 b 27
ataa 401 b 14
atria 397 b 9,398 a 4, b 35,399
a aft i n i h Q
ala>v 391 b 19,397 a 10, 11,31,

b 8,401 a 16
atcqparos 392 a 9
aKfirj 399 a 29
aicovrl&adai 392 b 3, 395 b 4
aKoafjua 399 a 14
aKpoiroXis 399 b 34
aXcetvos 392 b 8
aXrjfteia 391 a 4
aXXotovadai 392 b 9, 400 a 22
aAa>s 395 a 36 ff.
dfiirants 396 a 26
afi<U<f>aris 395 b 14
avaftAvois 396 a *22
avayKTj 391 b 21, 400 a 1, 401
b8
avdSocris 395 a 9
dvadvfilaais 394 a 9, 19, b 6
dvaKafjupiTjvoos 394 b 36
avaXvais 394 b 17
avairvorj 395 b 20, 397 a 32
avaoxeats 393 b 2
avaroX-q 394 b 19, 23, 399 a
22
dva<j>var)iLa395 a 8,396 a 21
avaifrvarjois 395 b 21
avaxu>ptyta 396 a 18
dvaxdiprjuis 400 a 27
avSpanoSov 398 a 10
avrjp 399 a 16
avOpcjiros 392 a 17, b 19,397 b
14,398 a 6, 400 a 16
avolBrjois 399 a 27
dvravoKoirq 396 a 19
avrapKriKos 392 a 3
avrirra\os 394 a 22
dvrirropOpjos 392 b 23
avrloraois 397 a 1
dvrpov 391 a 21
a(o)v 391 b 26
airapKrias 394 b 29,32
ainjXiarrris 394 b 23
419
INDICES
airXavjs 392 a 10, 17, 22
anoyeios 394 b 14
airo&eKTyp 398 a 25
diroBpavois 394 a 33
airoTraXois 396 a 9
apyiorqs 394 b 25, 30
apytfs 395 a 27
apery 399 b 21
apKTiKos 392 a 3
dptcros 394 b 20,395 a 3
apfia 400 b 7
apfiovla 396 b 17,25,399 a 12,
17, b 31, 400 a 4
apoois 399 b 17
apais 396 a 26
dppev, ro 396 b 9
dpxn 396 a 34, b 25, 398 a 27,
33,399 a 35
aairls 399 b 3, 35
doTpanatos 401 a 16
darpawff 392 b 12, 394 a 18,
395 a 16
darpov 391 b 17, 392 a 5, 10,
395 b 1 ff., 8, 397 a 9, 399
a 20,400 a 21
arfiw&rjs 394 a 14, 19, 27
drpaicros 401 b 15
drpofeXv 395 b 28
avpa 397 a 35
avrovpyeiv 398 a 6, b 4
avrovpryos 397 b 22
avxn* 393 a 22, b 6, 398 b 17
dfowBrjs 394 a 35
aêvSeta 397 a l l
Padv(vXos 392 b 18
pautXeios 398 a 15
paoiXevs 398 a 11 ff.
ptcuos 395 a 5 ff., 22,400 a 25
pios 397 a 18,399 b 16,400 a 15
P60wos 392 b 4, 395 b 12
popeas 394 b 20,28 ff., 395 a 4
420
Popeios 392 a 3, 395 b 15, 399

a 23
PovXevrrp 400 b 17
ppaonrfs 396 a 3
pplBos 394 b 2
Ppofios 395 a 13, 396 a 12
ppovralos 401 a 17
Ppovrfi 392 b 11, 394 a 18, 395
a 13, 16
PvOos 392 b 32,395 a 9
yeveaLS 395 b 5, 396 a 30, 397
b3
yeverrjp 397 a 4
yevtrcop 397 b 21, 399 a 31
yivos 400 b 1,34
yepwv 396 b 3,400 b 2
yewypaffte.lv 393 b 20
yvoj>os 392 b 12
yovevs 400 b 3, 6
yovrj 399 a 28
yovtfios 394 a 27, b 11,397 a 12
ypdfifia 396 b 18
ypafifjutTitcrj 396 b 17
yvvrf 399 a 16
Baxfiovios 391 a 1, 400 b I
SevSpov 396 a 23,399 a 27
heoficoTqptov 400 b 20
BeoiTorqs 398 a 22
BrjfuovpyeTv 396 b 31
Srjfuovpyta 400 a I
hrjfiodoivCa 400 b 21
hiaypa<l>iv 391 a 18
BiaOeois 396 b 6
St'atra 398 b 32
SiaKoafirjois 391 b 11
hiaicoofios 399 b 16, 400 b 32
hidfierpos 391 b 26
Stavoia 391 a 14
SiqLTTeiv392 b 3,395 a 32
hiKaarqpiov 400 b 17
ON THE COSMOS
hiKaarrfs 400 b 19
htvq 396 a 23
hiopOtoais 400 b 29
hoKis 392 b 4, 395 b 12
hopixf>6pos 398 a 20
bovXos 398 a 30
Spoaoiraxwi 394 a 26
bpoaos 394 a 15,23 ff., 399 a 25
Spvfws 392 b 18
Bvvafiis 392 a 7, b 9, 396 b 29,
397 a 16, b 19 ff., 398 a 2,
b 8, 20, 399 b 20
SwaarVLv 395 a 2
Swrts 393 a 18,394 b 21 ff., 399
a 22
eapivos 395 a 4
cyKapatos 392 a 12, 393 a 28
tyKXiois 396 a 9
eyKoXmos 394 b 15
(hpa 397 b 25
cdvos 396 b 2, 398 a 29
ct&os 400 b 34
eUtov 396 b 14
cifiapfievr) 401 b 9
elprjvrj 399 b 19
Kpo\y 396 a 23
k8t)hiv 391 a 12
KKXr)oiaoTrjs 400 b 18
k\vkos 394 a 35
KV<f>ias 394 b 18
Kp7j(is 395 a 15
cKraois 395 a 8
envois 396 a 23,399 a 27
eXevdcpios 401 a 24
iXtyas 398 a 16
iXiKia 395 a 27
Hfju/xLois 395 a 29 ff.
fjuJn>xos 394 b 11
evarrios 396 a 34, b I ff., 24,
3 2 ,398 b 26
evhomixos 399 a 19
ev&oais 398 b 26
eWpyeia 398 b 16
ivOovaiav 395 b 27
eviavrds 397 a 14, 399 a 8
itjcLKovTiofAos 395 b 5
cfauJns 395 b 3
efevoptos 394 b 19
imhpofirj 396 a 19, 400 a 26
7TLKdpTTLOS 401 a 19
imtcrjpos 392 a 34
imKXiirrqs 396 a 1
imvotiv 391 b 7
cVti'oca 399 b 17
imrixyôis 398 b 10
iirii/xiveia 392 a 18, 396 b 31
ciroirrrjp 398 a 31
7ra>vvfjLos 397 a 6
epKctos 401 a 20
<T7repios 395 b 14 ; c/. 398 a
28,400 a 32
coTia 391 b 14
eraipeios 401 a 22
irrjaios 395 a 2
ctos 399 a 23
vdimvoos 394 b 35
Vfidpia 398 b 35
evpiiros 396 a 25
vp6v0T0s 394 b 33
evpos 394 b 20, 22 ff.
evpvOfua 398 b 19
evoeBetSy oi 400 a 34
cvxrj 400 a 17
tyrfoitpos 393 a 5
iutos 394 a l l , 395 b 14 ; cf,\
398 a 29, 400 a 31
ttyvpos 394 b 20,25 ff., 395 a 3
bifHfoqs 392 b 6
la>ypa$ia 396 b 12
^Stop 392 a 13
399
b 21
$ov 391 b 14, 392 b 15, 19,
421
INDICES
3 9 3 a 5 , 3 9 4 b 1 0 , 3 9 7 a 17 f f .,
b 2 3 , 3 9 8 b 3 , 18, 3 0 , 3 9 9 a
Q voia 4 0 0 b 2 2
O a>pa( 3 9 9 b 4
2 8 .4 0 0 b 3 4 ,4 0 1 a 7
a>o<j>6pos 3 9 2 a l l
la jvryp 3 9 9 b 4
taTTuf 3 9 4 b 2 6
id ea 3 9 4 a 1 6 , 3 9 5 b 1 1 , 3 9 7 a
27,
r j y e f i w v 3 9 1 b 6 , 3 9 8 a (j, 3 9 9 a
3 0 .4 0 0 b 8
JjBos 3 9 8 b 3 3
rjXcKrpov 3 9 8 a 15
rjXios 3 9 2 a 2 9 , 3 9 3 b 2 , 3 9 5 a
3 3 , b 2 ,3 9 6 b 2 7 ,3 9 7 a 9 ,3 9 8
b 8 , 3 9 9 a 8 , 2 1 , 4 0 0 a 21
Jyxtpa 3 9 7 a 1 3 , 3 9 9 a 2 , 2 2
f)fitpohpolios 3 9 8 a 3 0
rjvloxos 4 0 0 b 7
rjTTtipos 3 9 2 b 19 , 2 1 , 3 9 3 a 7 ,
398 b
14, 3 9 9 a 3 4 , 4 0 0
b 13
Upos 3 9 2 a 2 6
I jfy f ia r ta 3 9 6 a 4
lkolos 4 0 1 a 2 3
LTT7TVS 3 9 9 b 7
it Tiros 3 9 9 b 5
Ipis 3 9 5 a 3 0 , 3 2 ff .
lovfiepLvos 3 9 4 b 2 4 ff .
laofios 3 9 3 b 2 5 ff .
Loofxoipta 3 9 6 b 3 5
ic rro p ta 3 9 1 b 6
b 1 9 ,4 0 0 a 2 7
ijptDS 4 0 0 b 2 2
davfidtîv 3 9 1 h 1
0 io $ 3 9 1 a 1 , 1 5 , b 1 6 ,3 9 2 a 9 ,
3 0 f . , 3 9 7 b 1 9 , 3 3 , 3 9 8 b 13 ,
20
OeoXoyelv 3 9 1 b 4
0eos 3 9 1 b 1 0 f f ., 3 9 3 a 4 , 3 9 7 b
14 f f ., 3 9 8 a 2 2 , b 2 , 6 , 3 9 9 a
18, b 1 9 ,4 0 0 a 3 , 16 , b 8 , 2 2 ,
2 8 . 4 0 1 a 10, b 2 3
0pa7Tia 4 0 0 b 2 2
dept vos 3 9 4 b 2 2 ff.
dipos 3 9 5 a 2 , 3 9 7 a 12
0eois 3 9 1 a 5 , 3 9 2 a 2 3 , 3 9 4 b 5
0eafio0Trjs 4 0 0 b 16
0ofios 4 0 1 a 10
0U )pla 3 9 1 a 2 4
OijXv, r o 3 9 6 b 9
dXTipis 3 9 4 a 3 0
OpaaKtas 3 9 4 b 3 0
0pa v< J fia 3 9 4 b 4
0vXXa 3 9 5 a 6
d v p a 3 9 8 a 18
422
KaOapoios 4 0 1 a 2 3
KaiKias 3 9 4 b 2 2 , 2 8 , 3 9 5 a 1
K<uvovpyovfjLva9 ra 3 9 8 a 3 5
Kaipos 3 9 6 a 2 7 , 3 9 7 a 2 6 , 3 9 9 a
24,
b 1
Kairvw&qs 3 9 4 a 13
Kofynos 3 9 9 a 2 8 , 4 0 1 a 19
Karaiyis 3 9 5 a 5
KaTdOKcvrj 3 9 8 b 2 4 , 3 9 9 a 6 , 3 0
KaTorrrpov 3 9 5 a 3 4
Kipas 3 9 3 b 5 , 3 9 9 b 8
Kepavvios 4 0 1 a 17
Kpawos3l92 b 1 2 , 3 9 4 a 1 8 , 3 9 5
a 2 2 f f ., 3 9 7 a 2 1 , 4 0 1 a 18
KivTjms 3 9 1 b 5 , 16 , 3 9 2 a 3 0 ,
b 2 , 7 , 3 9 8 b 13 ff .
KipKias 3 9 4
b 31
KXifia 3 9 2 a 3
Kvrjfus 3 9 9 b 4
KotXcofia 3 9 5 b 3 4
koXttos 3 9 3 a 2 1 , b
1 5 ,3 9 8
Kofirjrrjs
b 9
3 f f ., 3 9 4 b
b 31
392
4, 395
32,
ON THE COSMOS
Koirq 394 a 34*
Kopixfxxtos 399 a 15, 19,400 b 8
tcooftos 391 a 26, (def.) 391 b
9 ff., 19, 26,392 b 33 ff., 393
a 4,396 a 34, b 24,30,397 a
4 ff., b 11 ff., 22, 398 a 32,
b 2 ,8 , 23, 399 a 1, 13, b 18,
25,400 a 3, b 8, 27
Kpavos 399 b 4
Kpdais 396 b 18, 25
Kpar-qp 400 a 33
KpvcrraXXos 394 a 25
KvppvrfTr)S 400 b 6
xvpos 398 b 28
KuXtvhpos 398 b 28
KVfia 396 a 19, 26, 400 a 28
Kwrjycoiov 398 a 25
Kvpjieis 400 b 30
fie ra O e a is 400 b 29
fie rp o v 397 a 10
firjKos 393 b 21, 395 b 6
p,ijv 397 a 14, 399 a 6
firjpivOos 398 b 17
firjrq p 391 b 14
livjxavorroios 398 b 15
fiiKpot/ivxla 391 a 23
f u g ts 395 a 2
fxoipa 401 b 12, 14 ff.
fio ix n x rj 396 b 15
fxvBpos 395 b 23
fivdos 401 b 22
fxvtajfia 396 a 13
fiv m jrrjs 396 a 11
fiv x io s 395 b 31
fiv x o s 393 b 24
v d fia 393 a 6,394 a 12,397 a 25
XaiXax// 395 a 7
Xafnrds 395 b 11
ATTTOfipr}s 392 a 35,394 a 10
Xipovoros 394 b 34
AtjSdôiwf 394 b 34
Xifxijv 393 a 20
Xtfivrj 393 b 8, 394 b 16
At^r 394 b 27, 34
XoyiofMos 399 a 31
Aoyos 397 b 13, 20, 398 a 13,
400 a 3, 17
Ao$6s 393 b 15
Ao\ayos 399 b 5
Ao\os 399 b 6
fiaO rjais 391 a 8, 397 b 11
fi4 y c 0 o s 391 a 5, 19, 392 b 1,
394 b 4,397 a 14
lietXlxios 401 a 24
fieorjfippia 394 b 21
lieo rjfip p tv o s 394 b 29
f iia o v (r o v K ooftov ) ,
c f 392 b 33
to
vavs 400 b 6
vtavioKos 400 b 6
v 4 fio is 401 b 12
vo$ 396 b 3
v eo x fu o o is 397 a 20
vevpooTrdoTTjs 398 b 17
v<ôs 392 b 9,394 a 16,21,26,
2 8 ,3 3 ,394 b 17,395 a 11 ff.,
33
tnjfia 401 b 16
v rjaos 392 b 19 ff., 393 a 9 ff.,
b 11, 18, 395 b 22
vi f a r o s 394 b 1
vofxoOcTtjs 400 b 8
vofios 399 b 18, 400 b 14,28
vofios 398 b 33
v o rio s 392 a 4, 395 b 15, 399 a
24
ôtos 394 b 21, 31 ff.
vovs 391 a 12
vv 397 a 13, 399 a 2, 22
391 b 12,
evios 401 a 22
423
INDICES
oyK os 3 9 1 b 2 4 , 3 9 4 b 4
OLKTjrypLov 3 9 1 b 1 5 , 3 9 3 a 5
oLKovfievTf 3 9 2 b 2 0 , 2 6 , 3 9 3 a
10, 16,
9 , 15, 1 8 ,3 9 4 a
otKos 3 9 8 a 8, 1 5 , 3 9 9 b 14
o h critjeiv 3 9 1 a 2 2
oA a, r a 3 9 1 a 3 ,
3 9 7 a 12,
oA vijlttUls 3 9 4
1 1 ,3 9 6
23,
9, 400 a 4
26
o fifipos 3 9 2 b 1 0 , 3 9 4 a 16 f f .,
39 7 a 3 4 ,4 0 0 a 2 6
6fj.lxXrj 3 9 4 a 1 5 , 19
o fio y v io s 4 0 1 a 21
ofioX oyetv 3 9 6 b 3 3
opuoXoyla 3 9 6 b 3 4
6 fi6 v o ia 3 9 6 b 4 , 1 0 , 3 9 7 a 4 ,
2 3 ,4 0 0
iravrjyvpis 4 0 0 b 2 1
7Tapdrpul/LS 3 9 5 b 5
tta ra yos 3 9 5 a 13
iraTpios 3 9 7 b 13
narptpos 4 0 1 a 2 1
'ndyyri 3 9 2 b 1 0 , 3 9 4 a 2 5
naxos 3 9 4 a 2 7 , b 17
irevTjs 3 9 6 b 2
n7rav(7L9 3 9 9 a 2 8
7T7Tp(J)fJ.V7} 4 0 1 b 1 0
7Tpaiovv 3 9 1 a 12
7Tpiayo)yrj 3 9 1 b 1 8 , 3 9 9 a 2
TTtpifloXov 3 9 8 a 1 5 , 2 2
irpixov9 T 3 9 9 a 2 5
TKpiKXvtfiiv 3 9 2 b 2 9
7TTpa 3 9 6
irqyjj 3 9 2
a 4
6pLo<l>vXov, to 3 9 6 b 10
op.<j>aX6s 3 9 9 b 3 0
ovop. a 4 0 1 a 14
OTidipa 4 0 1 a 5
o p y av o v 3 9 8 b 15
opviO ias 3 9 5 a 4
6 p o s 3 9 1 a 2 0 , 3 9 2 b 17
op o s 3 9 3 b 2 2 , 3 1 , 4 0 0 a 7
o v p av io s 3 9 1 a 9 , 4 0 0 a 2 1 , 4 0 1
b 1 5 ,3 9 5 b 1 9 ,3 9 6 a
6,22
TrnXos 3 9 6 a
m 0 o ? 3 9 5 b 12
7riXrjpLa 3 9 4 b
irXavrjros 3 9 2
irXaTOs 3 9 3 b
3 , 3 9 5 a 12
a 1 4 , 19
18
7rXr)nfLc\iv 3 9 2 a 6
irX-qpvpis 3 9 7 a 2 8
irXrjfe 3 9 5
a 21
ttXovolos 3 9 6 b
a 25
ovpavos 3 9 1 h 9 , 1 5 , 1 9 , 3 9 2 a
5 , 10, 18, 3 9 6 b 2 3 , 3 9 7 a 9 ,
2 1 , b 2 7 , 3 9 8 a 2 , b 9 , 3 9 9 a 1,
13, 2 0 , 3 2 , 4 0 0
f f ., 3 0 ,
b 32
ovoia 3 9 2 a 3 5 , 3 9 4 b 1 1 , 3 9 7 b
20
7rveOfia 3 9 4
15 ,
a 17 , b 9 , 3 9 6 a 5 ,
2 4 ,3 9 7 a 3 2 , 4 0 0 a 28
Trot^Tijs 3 9 7 b 2 6 , 4 0 0 a 1 0 ,4 0 1
a 1 ,2 4
irouciXXetv 3 9 2
b 17
TToXefios 3 9 8 a 2 5 , 3 9 9 b 1, 19
TroAccuj *101 a 19
noXis 3 9 1 a 1 9 , 3 9 2 b 1 8 , 3 9 6 b
iraycTwhrjs 3 9 2 b
6,
397 b
n d y o s 3 9 4 a 16, 3 9 7 b I
iraA aioi, o l 3 9 7 b 16
7raX afivatos 4 0 1 a 2 3
7T aX fiarias 3 9 6 a 10
ira v , t o 3 9 6 b 3 4 , 3 9 7 a 2 4 , 3 9 8
b 22
424
1 ,3 9 8
8, 3 9 9
1 ) 7 ,2 7 ,4 0 1
b 1 4 ,4 0 0 a 2 9 ,
a 20
7roAtTia 3 9 9 b 1 8 , 4 0 0 b 15
7roAoj 3 9 1 b 2 5 , 3 9 2 a
b 2 9 ,3 2
7roAu^t/3ta 3 9 8 b 12
TToXvuyvvpjos 4 0 1 a 12
1,
2, 394
ON THE COSMOS
rropdfMos 3 9 6 a 2 5
gkotcivos 3 9 6 b 2 0
t rpvjorrjp 3 9 4 a 1 8 , 3 9 5 a 1 0 , 2 3
oo<f>os 3 9 2 b 19
oiripiia 4 0 0 b 3 3
onovSd(iv 3 9 1 a 3
airovhri 3 9 1 a 18
7rpodvpov 3 9 8
a 17
npoaycios 3 9 2 a 16
npoaoSos 3 9 8 a 2 4
npocrwnov 3 9 9 b 3 5
npo<l>riTViv 3 9 1 a 16
TTpocoais 3 9 6 a 8, 2 0
irpvravetov 4 0 0 b 19
nvXdiv 3 9 8 a 16
TTvXuipos 3 9 8 a 21
rrvp 3 9 5 b 3 f f ., 1 9 , 3 9 6 a 2 2 ,
b30
OTaSta 3 9 3 b 2 0
0T 17A77 3 9 3
397 a 23
pafihos 3 9 5 a 3 0 , 3 5 ff.
pevfia 4 0 0 b 2
prjyfxa 3 9 5 a 9 , 3 9 7 a 3 2
pyKrqs 3 9 6 a 5
p r jfc 3 9 4 b 17
porj 3 9 6 a 2 3
poirq 3 9 9 b 11
pvois 3 9 5 b 8
19, 2 4 , b
10, 2 2 ,
(mjpiyiJLOs 3 9 5 b 7
o rrjp iie o O a i 3 9 2 b 5 , 3 9 5 b 4
SrtAjSaiv 3 9 2 a 2 6
oTotxciov 3 9 2 a
28,
TrvpKaCd 3 9 7 a 2 8 , 4 0 0 a 2 9
irvpoeis 3 9 2 a 2 5 , 3 9 9 a 9
irvpco&qs 3 9 2 a 6, b 2 , 3 9 5 a 2 0 ,
32
8,
b 35, 396 a
b 34
o r o f ia 3 9 3 a 18 , b 3 1 , 3 9 4 a 2
otojxlov 3 9 5 b 2 7
(rrpaTTjyos 3 9 8 a 2 5 , 2 9
a rp arv d 3 9 8 a 8
a r p a n o s 401 a 2 2
o r p a r o irth o v 3 9 9 b 2 , 4 0 0 b 8
arp o p tX o s 3 9 5 a 7
a rp c o fia ro h e a fio s 3 9 8 a 8
o vyycvrjs 3 9 1 a 6, 14
o v fin a v , to 3 9 6 a 3 1 , 3 9 7 b 7 ,
399
a 1 8 , b 10
ov(i7rrjgis 3 9 4 a 3 5
ovfJLirATjydSes 3 9 2 b 13
ov[M<J>poviv 3 9 1 a 14
aaAm y 3 9 9 b 2
aaTpaTnjs 3 9 8 a 2 9
oeiafios 3 9 5 b 3 6 f f . , 3 9 7 a 2 8 ,
400
a 25
adXas 3 9 2
3,
395
31,
a 2 7 , b 2 8 ,3 9 7 a 10, 3 9 8
6,
4 0 0 a 21
oefivorrjs 3 9 8 a 12
oTjixdvroip 3 9 9 b 9
crqfjLtiov 3 9 1
av v d rjfia 3 9 9 b
ovvi& iois 3 9 6 a 3
ocXrjwr) 3 9 2 a 2 9 , 3 9 5 a 3 3 , b 2 ,
b 9, 399 a
ow eS p io v 4 0 0 b 18
gw k tlk 6 s 3 9 7 b 9
4 f f ., 9
396
ovufaovos 3 9 6 b 8, 15
avvavax0pviv 3 9 1 b 18
b 21
of\pay 3 9 5 b 3 1
otcrjirros 3 9 5 a 2 5 , 2 8
oKonos 3 9 8 a 31
o w u ip is 3 9 9 b 5
o v o r a o is 3 9 4 a 2 4 , 3 9 6 b 2 3
a v a rr jf ia 3 9 1 b 9
cruarpenfia 3 9 4
a 32
a<f>alpa 3 9 1 b 2 4 , 3 9 2 a 2 2 , 3 9 6
b 3 1 ,3 9 8 b 2 8 ,3 9 9 a 3
oifxupoeiBrjs 3 9 1 b 19
oifUyyctv 3 9 3 b 9
ox<i<rn)pla 3 9 8 b 15
425
INDICES
391 a 8, b 16, 392 a 30,
397 b 28
g<*>otik6$ 397 a 3
ouirrjp 397 b 20, 401 a 24
owrrjpla 396 b 34, 397 a 31,
b 5, 16, 398 a 4, b 10, 400
a4
oajfMa
rajxias 398 a 24
Taftapxos 399 b
7
rafts 391 b 11,392 a 31,397 a
9,399 b 7,3 2,400 a 22
Tapaxrf 397 b 32
raxps 395 b 7
Tctxps 398 a 18
rixyr] 396 b i t , 19, 399 b 17
Tfirj/xa 395 a 33
ropvos 391 b 22
Tpofxos 396 a 10
rponaiovxos 401 a 23
TponiKa, ra 392 a 12
ri ^ 3 9 2 b 11,395 a 24,400 a
28
rvxn 396 b 7, 401 a 26
v4tios 401 a 18
ueros 394 a 31,399 a 24,401 a
18
u7raT0s 397 b 25
imepoxf) 391 b 4,398 a 12, b 1
v i r q p e o l a 398 b 11
vnoXelfjLfxa 394 a 22
virocrraais 395 a 30 ff.
f y o s 391 a 5, 398 a 12
Oalvcov 392 a 23
</>avraoia 395 a 34, b 6
(jxivraa/ia 395 a 29, b 11
< j)p4ofiios (yrj) 391 b 13
<j>0iois 399 a 29
<j>0oyyos 396 b 16
(f>0opd
426
396 a 30, 397 b 4
<j>i\tos 401 a 22
(f>i\oao<f>ia 391 a 2, 11, b 7
<ftoys 392 b 3,397 b 1 ff., 400
a29#
</>\oyftos 400 b 4
<f>\oyd)8r)s 392 a 35
<f>pvKT(x)piov 398 a 31
<jWAaf 398 a 21
ipvoiKos 399 b 25
<f>vois391 a 19, b 4,10,392 a 31,
b 1, 6, 14, 32, 394 a 5, 15,
396 b 6 ff., 32,397 a 3 ff., 17,
27, b l5 ,3 9 8 b 20,399 a 32,
b 22,400 b 13, 33,401 a 26,
b 20
<f>vTvois 399 b 17
vt6v 392 b 15,394 b 10,397 a
qj, 4,00 h *34
396
b 16, 399 a 16, b 3
0a)a(j)6pos 392 a 27,399 a 8
X<Aaa 392 b 11, 394 a 16,
b 1
Xaofia 396 a 4, 18
Xifiappos 400 a 34
Xip.piv6s 394 b 24 ff.
Xtifjuov 395 a 1, 397 a 13, 22,
400 a 9
xOovios 395 a 10, 401 a 25
Xuov 392 b 10,394 a 16,32
*Aorj 392 b 17
Xorj 400 b 22
Xopcvctv 399 a 12
Xopos 399 a 15, 400 b 7
XprjofjupheTv 395 b 28
Xpovos 401 a 15, b 16
Xpvoos 398 a 15
Xptop.a 396 b 13
i/taKas 394 a 30
t/taMs 399 b 30,32
ipiXos 399 b 8
ON THE COSMOS
(/roAoets 395 a 26
ifivxn 391 a 11, 15, 397 a 19,
399 b 14, 400 b 14
ijtvxos 394 b 7
ajpai 397 a 12, 399 a 23

ajorrjs 396 a 8
drraKovarrjS 398 a 21
cuêAeta 397 b 31,398 a 1
II. EN G LISH IN D E X
Abyssinia 393 b 15 n.
Acropolis 399 b 34
Adriatic Sea 393 a 28
Aegean Sea 393 a 30
Aeolian Islands 395 b 21
aether 392 a 5
Aetion 396 b 12 n.
air 392 b 5, 396 b 29
Aisa 401 b 14
Albion, see England
Alexander 391 a 2
Aloadae 391 a 11
Antarctic Pole 392 a 4
Aparctias (wind) 394 b 29
Apeliotes (wind) 394 b 23
Aphrodite (planet), see Venus
Apollo 392 a 27
Arabian Gulf (Red Sea) 393
b 4 n., 16, 18
Arabian Isthmus 393 b 32
Arctic Pole 392 a 3
Ares (planet), see Mars
Argestes (wind) 394 b 25
art: imitates nature 396 b 12
Asia 393 b 22, 26 if.
Athena, statue of (simile)
399
b 34
Atlantic Ocean, see Ocean
Atropos 401 b 18
axis 391 b 26
Boreas 394 b 20, 28
breezes 394 a 17, 397 a 34
British Isles 393 b 12, 17
Bura, Achaia 396 a 21 and n.
Caecias (wind) 394 b 22

Cambay, see Cutch
Cambyses 398 a l l
Caspian (Hyrcanian) Sea 393
b 3 n., 5 n., 24, 27
catapults 398 b 15
Celts 393 b 9
Ceylon 393 b 14
chariot (simile) 400 b 7
chorus (simile) 399 a 15, 400
b 7
Circias (wind) 394 b 31
city 396 b 1, 400 b 7, 14
Clotho 401 b 21
clouds 392 b 9, 394 a 16,
26
comets, 392 b 4, 395 a 32
continents 392 b 21, 393 a
7
Corsica 393 a 13
Corycian Cave 391 a 21
Cosmos, defined 391 b 9 if.
Cretan Sea 393 a 29
Crete 393 a 13
Cronus (planet), see Saturn
Cutch 393 b 4 n.
Cyclades 393 a 15
Cyprus 393 a 13
Darius 398 a 12
Defaces 398 a 10 n.
Delphi 395 b 29
Destiny 401 b 9
dew 394 a 15, 23
dynamis, see power
427
INDICES
earth (element) 392 b 14, 33,
396 b 30
earth, the 391 b 13, 397 a 24,
b 30
earthquakes 395 b 36, 397 a
28
ff., 400 a 25
Ecbatana 398 a 10 n., 14,
34
Egypt 394 a 1
Egyptian Sea 393 a 29
elements 392 a 8, b 35, 396
b 34
Empedocles 396 b 12 n., 399
b 25
England 393 b 12
Ephialtes, see Giants
Erythraean Sea 393 b 4 n.
Etesian winds 395 a 2
Etna 395 a 24 n h 21, 400
a 33 and n.
Euboea 393 a 13
Kuronotus (wind) 394 b
33
Europe 393 b 22 ff.
Eurus 394 b 20, 24
exhalations 394 a 9 and n.
Fate (7TTTp<OfXVT)) 401 b 10
Kates, the 401 b 15
fire (element) 392 b 2, 395 a
20, 396 b 30
fire, subterranean 395 b 19 ff.
flames 392 b 3
floods 397 a 28
frost 392 b 10, 394 a 16, 26,
397 b I
Galatian Gulf 393 b 9
Galatian Sea 393 a 27
gales 392 b 11
Giants 391 a 11 n., 395 a
24 n.
428
Gibraltar 392 b 23 n.
God 391 b 11, 397 b 14 ff.,
QQQ
a 99
gods 391 b 15, 397 b 17

gods, abode of the 391 b 16,
393 a 4
hail 392 b 11,394 a 16, b 1
halo 395 a 36
harmony 396 b 8 ff., 25
heavens (ovpavos), 391 b 16 ff.,
400
a7
Helice, Achaia 396 a 21
and n.
Hellespont 393 b 1, 398 a
27
Hera 392 a 28
Heracleitus 396 b 20, 401 a
11
Heracles, Pillars of 393 a 24,

b 10, 23, 32
Hermes (planet), see Mer
cury
Hero 398 b 15 n.
Herodotus 398 a 10 n.
Hyreanian Sea, see Caspian
Sea
lapyx (wind) 394 b 26
ice 394 a 25
Ierne, see Ireland
India 392 b 23 n.
India, Gulf of 393 b 3
Indians 393 b 14
Indus 398 a 28
inhabited world (oikoumene)
392 b 20 f f .; dimensions
of 393 b 18
inhabited worlds, plurality
of 392 b 23 ff.
Ireland 393 b 13
islands 392 b 20, 393 a 8 ff.
ON THE COSMOS
Jupiter (planet) 392 a 25,
399 a 10
Nile 393 b 5 n., 31, 394 a 2

Notus (wind) 394 b 21, 32
Nyssa 391 a 21
keystones (simile) 399 b 30

Lachesis 401 b 20
land 393 a 7
law (simile) 400 b 14
lawgiver (simile) 400 b 7
Lebadeia 395 b 29
Lesbos 393 a 14
Libonotus (wind) 394 b 34
Libophoenix (wind) 394 b
34
Libya 393 b 22, 31
lightning 392 b 11, 394 a 18,
395 a 16, 25 n.
Lipara 395 b 21
Lips (wind) 394 b 27
machines 398 b 15 and n.
Madagascar 393 b 15 n.
Maeotis, Lake 393 a 32, b 7
Mars 392 a 26, 399 a 9
Mediterranean, geography
of 393 a 12, 16 ff., b 3 n.,
29
Mercury 392 a 26, 399 a 9
meteors 392 b 3
military camp (simile) 399 b
2,
400 b 8
mind 391 a 12
mist 394 a 15, 19
moon 392 a 29, 396 a 27, 397
a 10, 398 b 9, 399 a 6, 400
a 21
music 396 b 15
Myrtoan Sea 393 a 30
Necessity 401 b 8
Neo-Pythagoreans
20 n.
396
Ocean 392 b 22 ff., 393 a

16
ff., b 3 n., 30
oikoutnene,
see inhabited
world
Olympias (wind), 394 b 26
Olympus 400 a 7
opposite principles 396
a 31
Ornithian winds 395 a 4
Orphic books 401 a 27
Ossa 391 a 11, 21
Otus, see Giants
painting 396 b 21
Pamphylian Sea 393 a 30
Parthenon 399 b 34 n.
Pelion 391 a 11 n.
Persia, Gulf of 393 b 3 n.
Persia, King of (simile) 398
a 10 n.
Persian Empire 398 a 27
Phaethon 400 a 31
Phebol 393 b 15
Pheidias 399 b 33
philosophy 391 a 2, b 7
Phosphorus (planet),
see
Venus
Phrygia 395 b 30
pits (in the sky) 392 b 4
planets 392 a 13
planks (in the sky) 392 b 4
Plato 401 b 24
poles 391 b 25 ff.
Polygnotus 396 b 12 n.
Pontus 393 a 32, b 24 ff.
power 396 b 29, 397 b 23 ff.
and n 398 b 8, 20
Propontis 393 b 1
429
INDICES
puppet-shows 398 b 16 and n.
Pyroeis (planet), see Mars
rain 392 b 10, 394 a 16, 27,
397
a 33, 400 a 26
rainbows 395 a 30
Red Sea, see Arabian Gulf
rivers, 392 b 15, 393 a 6
Sardinia 393 a 13
Sardinian Sea 393 a 27
Saturn (planet) 392 a 24, 399
a 11
Scythians 393 b 8
sea 392 b 14, 393 a 6
ship (simile) 400 b 6
shooting stars, 395 a 32
Sicilian Sea 393 a 28
Sicily 393 a 12
snow 392 b 10, 394 a 16,
32
Socotra 393 b 15 n.
soul 391 a 11, 399 b 14
Spain 393 b 17
Sporades 393 a 14
springs 393 a 6
stars 391 b 17, 392 a 10,
397 a 9, 399 a 20, 400 a
21
streams 392 b 15
sun 392 a 29, 397 a 9, 399 a
8,
21, 400 a 21
Susa 398 a 14, 34
Syrian Sea 393 a 30
Syrtes 393 a 25
Tana, Lake 393 b 15 n.

Tanats, River 393 b 5 n., 26,
30
Taprobane, see Ceylon
Thrascias (wind) 394 b 30
thunder 392 b 11, 394 a 18,
395 a 13
thunderbolts 392 b 12, 394 a
18,
395 a 22, 397 a 21
tides 396 a 26
tropics 392 a 12
Typhon 395 a 24 n.
typhoons 400 a 29
Typhos 395 a 24 n.
Venus (planet) 392 a 28, 399
a8
volcanoes 395 b 21
water (element) 392 b 30,
395
b 19, 396 b 30
waves, tidal 396 a 17 ff.
whirlwinds 392 b 11
wind, names and types of 394
b 8 395 a 10
wind, subterranean 395 b 19,
26 ff.
Xerxes 398 a 11, b 4
Zephyrus (wind) 394 b 20,25
Zeus (god) 400 a 19,401 a 14,
28
Zeus (planet), see Jupiter
Zodiac 392 a 11
Printed in Great Britain by R . & R. ClÂRK, L i m i t e d , Edinburgh
(400)

Aristotle - On Sophistical Refutations On Coming To Be and Passing Away On The Cosmos (Greek - English)

Diunggah oleh

Informasi Dokumen

Judul Asli

Hak Cipta

Format Tersedia

Bagikan dokumen Ini

Bagikan atau Tanam Dokumen

Opsi Berbagi

Apakah menurut Anda dokumen ini bermanfaat?

Apakah konten ini tidak pantas?

Hak Cipta:

Format Tersedia

Aristotle - On Sophistical Refutations On Coming To Be and Passing Away On The Cosmos (Greek - English)

Diunggah oleh

Hak Cipta:

Format Tersedia

T ext and Translation

Text and Translation

PREFAT ORY NOTE

Sophisticis Elenchis and D e Generatione et Corruptione

I have checked the proofs and added

always been regarded as genuine works of Aristotle.

O f these A and B are in a class by themselves.

J. T. Buhle, T ext, Latin Translation and Notes,

T. Taylor, London, 1812.

P. Gohlke, Die Entstehung der aristoielischen Logik,

F. Solmsen, Die Ejitnicklung der aristotelischen Logik

I n translating the Topica and De Sophisticis Elenchis I

API2 TOTEAOT2 riEPI

I . Ylepl Sc TU)V <JO<f)lOTlK&V cACy^OJV Kal T(x)V

* 0 n fiev ofiv ol fiv ciai avXXoyiapoi, ol S

cbairep yap Kal eirl

in i 7(op Xoywv d)cravTo>g c^ci.

e$t ol Sc <f>alvovrai, ^vXeriKws

Kal Tn<JKvd<javrcs avrovs, Kal KaXol

olov ra fiev Xidapyvpiva Kal r a K a m rip iva apyvpa,

rov avrov Sc rpoirov

Kal avXXoyifjpos Kal cAcy^o? o pev cariv, o 8*

The reference appears to he provision o f memhers o f the

I. L et us now treat o f sophistical refutations, th at

That some reasonings are really reasonings, but

a7TtpoL uioirep av a7rexovres noppcoOev Oecopovoiv.

wore Xeyetv erepov rt e dvayKrjs rcbv Keifievcov

7TOIOVOI fiev ov, Sokovoc Sc Sta noXXas airlas, <&v

errel yap ovk eonv avra ra

10 if/rjcfxov rocs Xoyi^ofievois ro S> ovk eonv ofioiov.

cooTrep ovv KaKel ol firj Setvol

fievas eon Kal ovXXoyiofios Kal eXeyxos (f>atv6fievos

eirel S* cart rtcrt fiaXXov irpo epyov

to SoKeiv elvat oo<f>ols fj ro etvai Kal firj SoKeiv

(eon yap rj oocf>LonKrj <f>aivofievrf oo<f)la ovoa S ov,

(f> a w o fiev rfs

a o(f> la s aAA> ovk o v a r j g ) , 8rjX o v o n

17TLV e p y o v 7Tpl Ka(JTOV TOV lS 6 tO $ dlf/v8eLV f i e v

r o i a v r r j 8 v v a f i i s TTovrfvei (f> a lv eo 6 a i aocfrov, oS r v y -

roiovrov Xoycov ycVos*, Kal

o n roiavrrjs i<f>Uvrai 8vvdfiews ovs KaXovfiev cro<f>iaras, 8fjXov.

iroaa 8* iarlv et8i] rcbv Xoycov rcbv

35 ao<j>iariKcbv, Kal K iroacov rov

fits avrrj avvearrjKe, Kal iroaa fiiprf rvyxdvei rrjs

'#E a n 8rj rcbv iv rcb 8iaXeyea0ai Xoycov r e r -

rcbv rov avoKpivofievov So<bv avXXoyt^ofievoi ( 8 ei

5 ariKol 8y ol K TUSV SOKOVVTOJV TO) aTTOKpiVOfliva)

TTJV iTTLOT'qjX'qv (ov TpOTTOV 6, hl(bpLOTCLl V CTtpOLs),

K O I. 7T p l fx k v OVV TCOV d lT o 8 eiKTlK(A)V V TOCS A v a io Xvtlkols Lp7]Tai, 7r e p l 8c tu> v SiaAc/cTt/cajv K a l

II I. Uptbrov 8rf XrjTrriov

15 \frev8os Kal 7rapd8o ov Kal croXoiKiofios Kal 7Tfi7rrov

els ttapaho^ov ayeiv, TeTapTov

Sc goXoiKi^eiv iroieiv to v t o 8 ic T i t o 7roirjaai

a Topics 151) a 25 ff.

ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, ii- iv

Kal vyia^eTo o Kafivcov.

rj irdoxeiv oi>x V arjfiaivei,

fiev o n o vvv Kafivcov,1 o t c S os* eKafive upoTepov.

v y i a l v e i 8 9 o v K a fiv co v , aAA o K a fiv c o v , o v v v v , a X X 9

d fi< f> ifio X ia v o i

1 Deleting rj KaO-qixevos after Kapvwv with Wallies.

avvO fj , ro firj ypa<f>ovTa ypa<j>eiv orffia ivei y a p a>s