EN BANC

[G.R. No. 125299. January 22, 1999]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FLORENCIO DORIA y BOLADO, and
VIOLETA GADDAO y CATAMA @ "NENETH," accused-appellants.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
On December 7, 1995, accused-appellants Florencio Doria y Bolado and Violeta Gaddao y
Catama @ "Neneth" were charged with violation of Section 4, in relation to Section 21 of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.i[1] The information reads:
"That on or about the 5th day of December, 1995 in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a
place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping and aiding one another and without having been authorized
by law, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, administer, deliver and give
away to another eleven (11) plastic bags of suspected marijuana fruiting tops weighing 7,641.08
grams in violation of the above-cited law.
CONTRARY TO LAW."ii[2]
The prosecution contends the offense was committed as follows: In November 1995, members of
the North Metropolitan District, Philippine National Police (PNP) Narcotics Command
(Narcom), received information from two (2) civilian informants (CI) that one "Jun" was
engaged in illegal drug activities in Mandaluyong City. The Narcom agents decided to entrap and
arrest "Jun" in a buy-bust operation. As arranged by one of the CI's, a meeting between the
Narcom agents and "Jun" was scheduled on December 5, 1995 at E. Jacinto Street in
Mandaluyong City.
On December 5, 1995, at 6:00 in the morning, the CI went to the PNP Headquarters at EDSA,
Kamuning, Quezon City to prepare for the buy-bust operation. The Narcom agents formed Team
Alpha composed of P/Insp. Nolasco Cortes as team leader and PO3 Celso Manlangit, SPO1
Edmund Badua and four (4) other policemen as members. P/Insp. Cortes designated PO3
Manlangit as the poseur-buyer and SPO1 Badua as his back-up, and the rest of the team as
perimeter security. Superintendent Pedro Alcantara, Chief of the North Metropolitan District
PNP Narcom, gave the team P2,000.00 to cover operational expenses. From this sum, PO3
Manlangit set aside P1,600.00-- a one thousand peso bill and six (6) one hundred peso billsiii[3]-as money for the buy-bust operation. The market price of one kilo of marijuana was then
P1,600.00. PO3 Manlangit marked the bills with his initials and listed their serial numbers in the
police blotter.iv[4] The team rode in two cars and headed for the target area.
At 7:20 of the same morning, "Jun" appeared and the CI introduced PO3 Manlangit as interested
in buying one (1) kilo of marijuana. PO3 Manlangit handed "Jun" the marked bills worth

P1,600.00. "Jun" instructed PO3 Manlangit to wait for him at the corner of Shaw Boulevard and
Jacinto Street while he got the marijuana from his associate.v[5] An hour later, "Jun" appeared at
the agreed place where PO3 Manlangit, the CI and the rest of the team were waiting. "Jun" took
out from his bag an object wrapped in plastic and gave it to PO3 Manlangit. PO3 Manlangit
forthwith arrested "Jun" as SPO1 Badua rushed to help in the arrest. They frisked "Jun" but did
not find the marked bills on him. Upon inquiry, "Jun" revealed that he left the money at the
house of his associate named "Neneth."vi[6] "Jun" led the police team to "Neneth's" house nearby
at Daang Bakal.
The team found the door of "Neneth's" house open and a woman inside. "Jun" identified the
woman as his associate.vii[7] SPO1 Badua asked "Neneth" about the P1,600.00 as PO3 Manlangit
looked over "Neneth's" house. Standing by the door, PO3 Manlangit noticed a carton box under
the dining table. He saw that one of the box's flaps was open and inside the box was something
wrapped in plastic. The plastic wrapper and its contents appeared similar to the marijuana earlier
"sold" to him by "Jun." His suspicion aroused, PO3 Manlangit entered "Neneth's" house and took
hold of the box. He peeked inside the box and found that it contained ten (10) bricks of what
appeared to be dried marijuana leaves.
Simultaneous with the box's discovery, SPO1 Badua recovered the marked bills from
"Neneth."viii[8] The policemen arrested "Neneth." They took "Neneth" and "Jun," together with
the box, its contents and the marked bills and turned them over to the investigator at
headquarters. It was only then that the police learned that "Jun" is Florencio Doria y Bolado
while "Neneth" is Violeta Gaddao y Catama. The one (1) brick of dried marijuana leaves
recovered from "Jun" plus the ten (10) bricks recovered from "Neneth's" house were examined at
the PNP Crime Laboratory.ix[9] The bricks, eleven (11) in all, were found to be dried marijuana
fruiting tops of various weights totalling 7,641.08 grams.x[10]
The prosecution story was denied by accused-appellants Florencio Doria and Violeta Gaddao.
Florencio Doria, a 33-year old carpenter, testified that on December 5, 1995, at 7:00 in the
morning, he was at the gate of his house reading a tabloid newspaper. Two men appeared and
asked him if he knew a certain "Totoy." There were many "Totoys" in their area and as the men
questioning him were strangers, accused-appellant denied knowing any "Totoy." The men took
accused-appellant inside his house and accused him of being a pusher in their community. When
accused-appellant denied the charge, the men led him to their car outside and ordered him to
point out the house of "Totoy." For five (5) minutes, accused-appellant stayed in the car.
Thereafter, he gave in and took them to "Totoy's" house.
Doria knocked on the door of "Totoy's" house but no one answered. One of the men, later
identified as PO3 Manlangit, pushed open the door and he and his companions entered and
looked around the house for about three minutes. Accused-appellant Doria was left standing at
the door. The policemen came out of the house and they saw Violeta Gaddao carrying water from
the well. He asked Violeta where "Totoy" was but she replied he was not there. Curious
onlookers and kibitzers were, by that time, surrounding them. When Violeta entered her house,
three men were already inside. Accused-appellant Doria, then still at the door, overheard one of
the men say that they found a carton box. Turning towards them, Doria saw a box on top of the
table. The box was open and had something inside. PO3 Manlangit ordered him and Violeta to

go outside the house and board the car. They were brought to police headquarters where they
were investigated.
Accused-appellant Doria further declared that his co-accused, Violeta Gaddao, is the wife of his
acquaintance, Totoy Gaddao. He said that he and Totoy Gaddao sometimes drank together at the
neighborhood store. This closeness, however, did not extend to Violeta, Totoy's wife.xi[11]
Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao, a 35-year old rice vendor, claimed that on December 5, 1995,
she was at her house at Daang Bakal, Mandaluyong City where she lived with her husband and
five (5) children, namely, Arvy, aged 10, Arjay, aged 8, the twins Raymond and Raynan, aged 5,
and Jason, aged 3. That day, accused-appellant woke up at 5:30 in the morning and bought pan
de sal for her children's breakfast. Her husband, Totoy, a housepainter, had left for Pangasinan
five days earlier. She woke her children and bathed them. Her eldest son, Arvy, left for school at
6:45 A.M. Ten minutes later, she carried her youngest son, Jayson, and accompanied Arjay to
school. She left the twins at home leaving the door open. After seeing Arjay off, she and Jayson
remained standing in front of the school soaking in the sun for about thirty minutes. Then they
headed for home. Along the way, they passed the artesian well to fetch water. She was pumping
water when a man clad in short pants and denim jacket suddenly appeared and grabbed her left
wrist. The man pulled her and took her to her house. She found out later that the man was PO3
Manlangit.
Inside her house were her co-accused Doria and three (3) other persons. They asked her about a
box on top of the table. This was the first time she saw the box. The box was closed and tied with
a piece of green straw. The men opened the box and showed her its contents. She said she did not
know anything about the box and its contents.
Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao confirmed that her co-accused Florencio Doria was a friend
of her husband, and that her husband never returned to their house after he left for Pangasinan.
She denied the charge against her and Doria and the allegation that marked bills were found in
her person.xii[12]
After trial, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig City convicted the accused-appellants.
The trial court found the existence of an "organized/syndicated crime group" and sentenced both
accused-appellants to death and pay a fine of P500,000.00 each. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the guilt of accused, FLORENCIO DORIA y BOLADO @ "Jun" and
VIOLETA GADDAO y CATAMA @ "Neneth" having been established beyond reasonable
doubt, they are both CONVICTED of the present charge against them.
According to the amendatory provisions of Sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 7659 which cover
violations of Sec. 4 of Republic Act No. 6425 and which was exhaustively discussed in People v.
Simon, 234 SCRA 555, the penalty imposable in this case is reclusion perpetua to death and a
fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos. Taking into consideration,
however, the provisions of Sec. 23, also of Republic Act No. 7659 which explicitly state that:

'The maximum penalty shall be imposed if the offense was committed by any person who
belongs to an organized/syndicated crime group.
An organized/syndicated crime group means a group of two or more persons collaborating,
confederating or mutually helping one another for purposes of gain in the commission of any
crime.'
the Court is hereby constrained to sentence (hereby sentences) said FLORENCIO DORIA y
BOLADO @ "Jun" and VIOLETA GADDAO y CATAMA @ "Neneth" to DEATH and to pay a
fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) each without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
The confiscated marijuana bricks (7,641.08 grams) shall be turned over to the Dangerous Drugs
Board, NBI for destruction in accordance with law.
Let a Commitment Order be issued for the transfer of accused DORIA from the Mandaluyong
City Jail to the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City and also for accused GADDAO for her
transfer to the Correctional Institute for Women, Mandaluyong City.
Let the entire records of this case be forwarded immediately to the Supreme Court for mandatory
review.
SO ORDERED."xiii[13]
Before this Court, accused-appellant Doria assigns two errors, thus:
"I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT TO THE TESTIMONY OF
THE WITNESSES FOR THE PROSECUTION WHEN THEIR TESTIMONIES WERE SHOT
WITH DISCREPANCIES, INCONSISTENCIES AND THAT THE CORPUS DELICTI OF
THE MARIJUANA ALLEGEDLY TAKEN FROM APPELLANT WAS NOT POSITIVELY
IDENTIFIED BY THE POSEUR-BUYER.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE THE
MARIJUANA FRUITINGS FOUND INSIDE THE CARTON BOX AS THESE WERE
OBTAINED THROUGH A WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND DOES NOT COME WITHIN
THE PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE."xiv[14]
Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao contends:
"I

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY DESPITE THE

INCREDIBILITY OF THE POLICE VERSION OF THE MANNER THE ALLEGED BUYBUST AS CONDUCTED.
II
THE PNP OFFICERS' VERSIONS AS TO WHERE THE BUY-BUST MONEY CAME FROM
ARE INCONSISTENT WITH ONE ANOTHER AND ALSO REEKS WITH INCREDIBILITY.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY AND SENTENCING
HER TO DEATH DESPITE THE MANIFESTLY IRRECONCILABLE INCONSISTENCIES
IN THE VERSIONS OF THE POLICE AS TO HOW AND BY WHOM THE ALLEGED BUYBUST MONEY WAS RECOVERED FROM HER, WHICH IN CONSEQUENCE RESULTS IN
THE EVIDENCE, OF RETRIEVAL FROM HER OF THE SAME, NEBULOUS, AT BEST,
NIL, AT WORST.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE VALIDITY OF THE WARRANTLESS
SEARCH LEADING TO THE SEIZURE OF THE MARIJUANA ALLEGEDLY FOUND
INSIDE THE HOUSE OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT."xv[15]
The assigned errors involve two principal issues: (1) the validity of the buy-bust operation in the
apprehension of accused-appellant Doria; and (2) the validity of the warrantless arrest of
accused-appellant Gaddao, the search of her person and house, and the admissibility of the pieces
of evidence obtained therefrom.
Accused-appellants were caught by the police in a buy-bust operation. A buy-bust operation is a
form of entrapment employed by peace officers as an effective way of apprehending a criminal
in the act of the commission of an offense.xvi[16] Entrapment has received judicial sanction when
undertaken with due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards.xvii[17]
Entrapment was unknown in common law. It is a judicially created twentieth-century American
doctrine that evolved from the increasing use of informers and undercover agents in the detection
of crimes, particularly liquor and narcotics offenses.xviii[18] Entrapment sprouted from the
doctrine of estoppel and the public interest in the formulation and application of decent standards
in the enforcement of criminal law.xix[19] It also took off from a spontaneous moral revulsion
against using the powers of government to beguile innocent but ductile persons into lapses that
they might otherwise resist.xx[20]
In the American jurisdiction, the term "entrapment" has a generally negative meaning because it
is understood as the inducement of one to commit a crime not contemplated by him, for the mere
purpose of instituting a criminal prosecution against him.xxi[21] The classic definition of
entrapment is that articulated by Justice Roberts in Sorrells v. United States,xxii[22] the first

Supreme Court decision to acknowledge the concept: "Entrapment is the conception and
planning of an offense by an officer, and his procurement of its commission by one who would
not have perpetrated it except for the trickery, persuasion or fraud of the officer."xxiii[23] It
consists of two (2) elements: (a) acts of persuasion, trickery, or fraud carried out by law
enforcement officers or the agents to induce a defendant to commit a crime; and (b) the origin of
the criminal design in the minds of the government officials rather than that of the innocent
defendant, such that the crime is the product of the creative activity of the law enforcement
officer.xxiv[24]
It is recognized that in every arrest, there is a certain amount of entrapment used to outwit the
persons violating or about to violate the law. Not every deception is forbidden. The type of
entrapment the law forbids is the inducing of another to violate the law, the "seduction" of an
otherwise innocent person into a criminal career.xxv[25] Where the criminal intent originates in
the mind of the entrapping person and the accused is lured into the commission of the offense
charged in order to prosecute him, there is entrapment and no conviction may be had.xxvi[26]
Where, however, the criminal intent originates in the mind of the accused and the criminal
offense is completed, the fact that a person acting as a decoy for the state, or public officials
furnished the accused an opportunity for commission of the offense, or that the accused is aided
in the commission of the crime in order to secure the evidence necessary to prosecute him, there
is no entrapment and the accused must be convicted.xxvii[27] The law tolerates the use of decoys
and other artifices to catch a criminal.
Entrapment is recognized as a valid defensexxviii[28] that can be raised by an accused and partakes
of the nature of a confession and avoidance.xxix[29] It is a positive defense. Initially, an accused
has the burden of providing sufficient evidence that the government induced him to commit the
offense. Once established, the burden shifts to the government to show otherwise.xxx[30] When
entrapment is raised as a defense, American federal courts and a majority of state courts use the
"subjective" or "origin of intent" test laid down in Sorrells v. United Statesxxxi[31] to determine
whether entrapment actually occurred. The focus of the inquiry is on the accused's predisposition
to commit the offense charged, his state of mind and inclination before his initial exposure to
government agents.xxxii[32] All relevant facts such as the accused's mental and character traits, his
past offenses, activities, his eagerness in committing the crime, his reputation, etc., are
considered to assess his state of mind before the crime.xxxiii[33] The predisposition test
emphasizes the accused's propensity to commit the offense rather than the officer's
misconductxxxiv[34] and reflects an attempt to draw a line between a "trap for the unwary innocent
and the trap for the unwary criminal."xxxv[35] If the accused was found to have been ready and
willing to commit the offense at any favorable opportunity, the entrapment defense will fail even
if a police agent used an unduly persuasive inducement.xxxvi[36] Some states, however, have
adopted the "objective" test.xxxvii[37] This test was first authoritatively laid down in the case of
Grossman v. Statexxxviii[38] rendered by the Supreme Court of Alaska. Several other states have
subsequently adopted the test by judicial pronouncement or legislation. Here, the court considers
the nature of the police activity involved and the propriety of police conduct.xxxix[39] The inquiry
is focused on the inducements used by government agents, on police conduct, not on the accused
and his predisposition to commit the crime. For the goal of the defense is to deter unlawful police
conduct.xl[40] The test of entrapment is whether the conduct of the law enforcement agent was
likely to induce a normally law-abiding person, other than one who is ready and willing, to

commit the offense;xli[41] for purposes of this test, it is presumed that a law-abiding person
would normally resist the temptation to commit a crime that is presented by the simple
opportunity to act unlawfully.xlii[42] Official conduct that merely offers such an opportunity is
permissible, but overbearing conduct, such as badgering, cajoling or importuning,xliii[43] or
appeals to sentiments such as pity, sympathy, friendship or pleas of desperate illness, are not.xliv
[44] Proponents of this test believe that courts must refuse to convict an entrapped accused not
because his conduct falls outside the legal norm but rather because, even if his guilt has been
established, the methods employed on behalf of the government to bring about the crime "cannot
be countenanced." To some extent, this reflects the notion that the courts should not become
tainted by condoning law enforcement improprieties.xlv[45] Hence, the transactions leading up to
the offense, the interaction between the accused and law enforcement officer and the accused's
response to the officer's inducements, the gravity of the crime, and the difficulty of detecting
instances of its commission are considered in judging what the effect of the officer's conduct
would be on a normal person.xlvi[46]
Both the "subjective" and "objective" approaches have been criticized and objected to. It is
claimed that the "subjective" test creates an "anything goes" rule, i.e., if the court determines that
an accused was predisposed to commit the crime charged, no level of police deceit, badgering or
other unsavory practices will be deemed impermissible.xlvii[47] Delving into the accused's
character and predisposition obscures the more important task of judging police behavior and
prejudices the accused more generally. It ignores the possibility that no matter what his past
crimes and general disposition were, the accused might not have committed the particular crime
unless confronted with inordinate inducements.xlviii[48] On the other extreme, the purely
"objective" test eliminates entirely the need for considering a particular accused's predisposition.
His predisposition, at least if known by the police, may have an important bearing upon the
question of whether the conduct of the police and their agents was proper.xlix[49] The undisputed
fact that the accused was a dangerous and chronic offender or that he was a shrewd and active
member of a criminal syndicate at the time of his arrest is relegated to irrelevancy.l[50]
Objections to the two tests gave birth to hybrid approaches to entrapment. Some states in the
United States now combine both the "subjective" and "objective" tests.li[51] In Cruz v. State,lii
[52] the Florida Supreme Court declared that the permissibility of police conduct must first be
determined. If this objective test is satisfied, then the analysis turns to whether the accused was
predisposed to commit the crime.liii[53] In Baca v. State,liv[54] the New Mexico Supreme Court
modified the state's entrapment analysis by holding that "a criminal defendant may successfully
assert a defense of entrapment, either by showing lack of predisposition to commit the crime for
which he is charged, or, that the police exceeded the standards of proper investigation.lv[55] The
hybrid approaches combine and apply the "objective" and "subjective" tests alternatively or
concurrently.
As early as 1910, this Court has examined the conduct of law enforcers while apprehending the
accused caught in flagrante delicto. In United States v. Phelps,lvi[56] we acquitted the accused
from the offense of smoking opium after finding that the government employee, a BIR
personnel, actually induced him to commit the crime in order to prosecute him. Smith, the BIR
agent, testified that Phelps' apprehension came after he overheard Phelps in a saloon say that he
liked smoking opium on some occasions. Smith's testimony was disregarded. We accorded

significance to the fact that it was Smith who went to the accused three times to convince him to
look for an opium den where both of them could smoke this drug.lvii[57] The conduct of the BIR
agent was condemned as "most reprehensible."lviii[58] In People v. Abella,lix[59] we acquitted the
accused of the crime of selling explosives after examining the testimony of the apprehending
police officer who pretended to be a merchant. The police officer offered "a tempting price, xxx a
very high one" causing the accused to sell the explosives. We found that there was inducement,
"direct, persistent and effective" by the police officer and that outside of his testimony, there was
no evidence sufficient to convict the accused.lx[60] In People v. Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng,lxi[61]
we convicted the accused after finding that there was no inducement on the part of the law
enforcement officer. We stated that the Customs secret serviceman smoothed the way for the
introduction of opium from Hongkong to Cebu after the accused had already planned its
importation and ordered said drug. We ruled that the apprehending officer did not induce the
accused to import opium but merely entrapped him by pretending to have an understanding with
the Collector of Customs of Cebu to better assure the seizure of the prohibited drug and the arrest
of the surreptitious importers.lxii[62]
It was also in the same case of People v. Lua Chu and Uy Se Tienglxiii[63] we first laid down the
distinction between entrapment vis-a-vis instigation or inducement. Quoting 16 Corpus Juris,lxiv
[64] we held:
"ENTRAPMENT AND INSTIGATION. -- While it has been said that the practice of entrapping
persons into crime for the purpose of instituting criminal prosecutions is to be deplored, and
while instigation, as distinguished from mere entrapment, has often been condemned and has
sometimes been held to prevent the act from being criminal or punishable, the general rule is that
it is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime that facilities for its commission were purposely
placed in his way, or that the criminal act was done at the 'decoy solicitation' of persons seeking
to expose the criminal, or that detectives feigning complicity in the act were present and
apparently assisting in its commission. Especially is this true in that class of cases where the
offense is one of a kind habitually committed, and the solicitation merely furnishes evidence of a
course of conduct. Mere deception by the detective will not shield defendant, if the offense was
committed by him, free from the influence or instigation of the detective. The fact that an agent
of an owner acts as a supposed confederate of a thief is no defense to the latter in a prosecution
for larceny, provided the original design was formed independently of such agent; and where a
person approached by the thief as his confederate notifies the owner or the public authorities,
and, being authorised by them to do so, assists the thief in carrying out the plan, the larceny is
nevertheless committed. It is generally held that it is no defense to a prosecution for an illegal
sale of liquor that the purchase was made by a 'spotter,' detective, or hired informer; but there are
cases holding the contrary."lxv[65]
The distinction above-quoted was reiterated in two (2) decisions of the Court of Appeals. In
People v. Galicia,lxvi[66] the appellate court declared that "there is a wide difference between
entrapment and instigation." The instigator practically induces the would-be accused into the
commission of the offense and himself becomes a co-principal. In entrapment, ways and means
are resorted to by the peace officer for the purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreaker in
the execution of his criminal plan.lxvii[67] In People v. Tan Tiong,lxviii[68] the Court of Appeals

further declared that "entrapment is no bar to the prosecution and conviction of the
lawbreaker."lxix[69]
The pronouncement of the Court of Appeals in People v. Galicia was affirmed by this Court in
People v. Tiu Ua.lxx[70] Entrapment, we further held, is not contrary to public policy. It is
instigation that is deemed contrary to public policy and illegal.lxxi[71]
It can thus be seen that the concept of entrapment in the American jurisdiction is similar to
instigation or inducement in Philippine jurisprudence. Entrapment in the Philippines is not a
defense available to the accused. It is instigation that is a defense and is considered an absolutory
cause.lxxii[72] To determine whether there is entrapment or instigation, our courts have mainly
examined the conduct of the apprehending officers, not the predisposition of the accused to
commit the crime. The "objective" test first applied in United States v. Phelps has been followed
in a series of similar cases.lxxiii[73] Nevertheless, adopting the "objective" approach has not
precluded us from likewise applying the "subjective" test. In People v. Boholst,lxxiv[74] we
applied both tests by examining the conduct of the police officers in a buy-bust operation and
admitting evidence of the accused's membership with the notorious and dreaded Sigue-Sigue
Sputnik Gang. We also considered accused's previous convictions of other crimeslxxv[75] and held
that his opprobrious past and membership with the dreaded gang strengthened the state's
evidence against him. Conversely, the evidence that the accused did not sell or smoke marijuana
and did not have any criminal record was likewise admitted in People v. Yutuclxxvi[76] thereby
sustaining his defense that led to his acquittal.
The distinction between entrapment and instigation has proven to be very material in antinarcotics operations. In recent years, it has become common practice for law enforcement
officers and agents to engage in buy-bust operations and other entrapment procedures in
apprehending drug offenders. Anti-narcotics laws, like anti-gambling laws are regulatory
statutes.lxxvii[77] They are rules of convenience designed to secure a more orderly regulation of
the affairs of society, and their violation gives rise to crimes mala prohibita.lxxviii[78] They are not
the traditional type of criminal law such as the law of murder, rape, theft, arson, etc. that deal
with crimes mala in se or those inherently wrongful and immoral.lxxix[79] Laws defining crimes
mala prohibita condemn behavior directed, not against particular individuals, but against public
order.lxxx[80] Violation is deemed a wrong against society as a whole and is generally unattended
with any particular harm to a definite person.lxxxi[81] These offenses are carried on in secret and
the violators resort to many devices and subterfuges to avoid detection. It is rare for any member
of the public, no matter how furiously he condemns acts mala prohibita, to be willing to assist in
the enforcement of the law. It is necessary, therefore, that government in detecting and punishing
violations of these laws, rely, not upon the voluntary action of aggrieved individuals, but upon
the diligence of its own officials. This means that the police must be present at the time the
offenses are committed either in an undercover capacity or through informants, spies or stool
pigeons.lxxxii[82]
Though considered essential by the police in enforcing vice legislation, the confidential
informant system breeds abominable abuse. Frequently, a person who accepts payment from the
police in the apprehension of drug peddlers and gamblers also accept payment from these
persons who deceive the police. The informant himself may be a drug addict, pickpocket, pimp,

or other petty criminal. For whatever noble purpose it serves, the spectacle that government is
secretly mated with the underworld and uses underworld characters to help maintain law and
order is not an inspiring one.lxxxiii[83] Equally odious is the bitter reality of dealing with
unscrupulous, corrupt and exploitative law enforcers. Like the informant, unscrupulous law
enforcers' motivations are legion-- harassment, extortion, vengeance, blackmail, or a desire to
report an accomplishment to their superiors. This Court has taken judicial notice of this ugly
reality in a number of caseslxxxiv[84] where we observed that it is a common modus operandi of
corrupt law enforcers to prey on weak and hapless persons, particularly unsuspecting provincial
hicks.lxxxv[85] The use of shady underworld characters as informants, the relative ease with which
illegal drugs may be planted in the hands or property of trusting and ignorant persons, and the
imposed secrecy that inevitably shrouds all drug deals have compelled this Court to be extravigilant in deciding drug cases.lxxxvi[86] Criminal activity is such that stealth and strategy,
although necessary weapons in the arsenal of the police officer, become as objectionable police
methods as the coerced confession and the unlawful search. As well put by the Supreme Court of
California in People v. Barraza,lxxxvii[87]
"[E]ntrapment is a facet of a broader problem. Along with illegal search and seizures,
wiretapping, false arrest, illegal detention and the third degree, it is a type of lawless
enforcement. They all spring from common motivations. Each is a substitute for skillful and
scientific investigation. Each is condoned by the sinister sophism that the end, when dealing with
known criminals of the 'criminal classes,' justifies the employment of illegal means."lxxxviii[88]
It is thus imperative that the presumption, juris tantum, of regularity in the performance of
official duty by law enforcement agents raised by the Solicitor General be applied with studied
restraint. This presumption should not by itself prevail over the presumption of innocence and
the constitutionally-protected rights of the individual.lxxxix[89] It is the duty of courts to preserve
the purity of their own temple from the prostitution of the criminal law through lawless
enforcement.xc[90] Courts should not allow themselves to be used as an instrument of abuse and
injustice lest an innocent person be made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug
offenses.xci[91]
We therefore stress that the "objective" test in buy-bust operations demands that the details of the
purported transaction must be clearly and adequately shown. This must start from the initial
contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment
of the consideration until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject
of the sale.xcii[92] The manner by which the initial contact was made, whether or not through an
informant, the offer to purchase the drug, the payment of the "buy-bust" money, and the delivery
of the illegal drug, whether to the informant alone or the police officer, must be the subject of
strict scrutiny by courts to insure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit
an offense. Criminals must be caught but not at all cost. At the same time, however, examining
the conduct of the police should not disable courts into ignoring the accused's predisposition to
commit the crime. If there is overwhelming evidence of habitual delinquency, recidivism or plain
criminal proclivity, then this must also be considered. Courts should look at all factors to
determine the predisposition of an accused to commit an offense in so far as they are relevant to
determine the validity of the defense of inducement.

In the case at bar, the evidence shows that it was the confidential informant who initially
contacted accused-appellant Doria. At the pre-arranged meeting, the informant was accompanied
by PO3 Manlangit who posed as the buyer of marijuana. PO3 Manlangit handed the marked
money to accused-appellant Doria as advance payment for one (1) kilo of marijuana. Accusedappellant Doria was apprehended when he later returned and handed the brick of marijuana to
PO3 Manlangit.
PO3 Manlangit testified in a frank, spontaneous, straighforward and categorical manner and his
credibility was not crumpled on cross-examination by defense counsel. Moreover, PO3
Manlangit's testimony was corroborated on its material points by SPO1 Badua, his back-up
security. The non-presentation of the confidential informant is not fatal to the prosecution.
Informants are usually not presented in court because of the need to hide their identity and
preserve their invaluable service to the police.xciii[93] It is well-settled that except when the
appellant vehemently denies selling prohibited drugs and there are material inconsistencies in the
testimonies of the arresting officers,xciv[94] or there are reasons to believe that the arresting
officers had motives to testify falsely against the appellant,xcv[95] or that only the informant was
the poseur-buyer who actually witnessed the entire transaction,xcvi[96] the testimony of the
informant may be dispensed with as it will merely be corroborative of the apprehending officers'
eyewitness testimonies.xcvii[97] There is no need to present the informant in court where the sale
was actually witnessed and adequately proved by prosecution witnesses.xcviii[98]
The inconsistencies in PO3 Manlangit's and SPO1 Badua's testimonies and the other police
officers' testimonies are minor and do not detract from the veracity and weight of the prosecution
evidence. The source of the money for the buy-bust operation is not a critical fact in the case at
bar. It is enough that the prosecution proved that money was paid to accused-appellant Doria in
consideration of which he sold and delivered the marijuana.
Contrary to accused-appellant Doria's claim, the one kilo of marijuana "sold" by him to PO3
Manlangit was actually identified by PO3 Manlangit himself before the trial court. After
appellants' apprehension, the Narcom agents placed this one (1) brick of marijuana recovered
from appellant Doria inside the carton box lumping it together with the ten (10) bricks inside.
This is why the carton box contained eleven (11) bricks of marijuana when brought before the
trial court. The one (1) brick recovered from appellant Doria and each of the ten (10) bricks,
however, were identified and marked in court. Thus:
"ATTY. ARIAS, Counsel for Florencio Doria:
Mr. Police Officer, when you identified that box,. Tell the court, how were you able to identify
that box?
A
This is the box that I brought to the crime laboratory which contained the eleven
pieces of marijuana brick we confiscated from the suspect, sir.
Q

Please open it and show those eleven bricks.

PROSECUTOR

Witness bringing out from the said box...

ATTY. VALDEZ, Counsel for Violeta Gaddao:

Your Honor, I must protest the line of questioning considering the fact that we are now dealing
with eleven items when the question posed to the witness was what was handed to him by Jun?
COURT

So be it.

ATTY. ARIAS May we make it of record that the witness is pulling out item after item from the
box showed to him and brought in front of him.
COURT
Q

Noted.

Now tell the court, how did you know that those are the eleven bricks?
x

x.

I have markings on these eleven bricks, sir.

Point to the court, where are those markings?

Here, sir, my signature, my initials with the date, sir.

PROSECUTOR
Q

Witness showed a white wrapper and pointing to CLM and the signature.

Whose signature is that?

ATTY VALDEZ
Your Honor, may we just limit the inquiry to the basic question of the
fiscal as to what was handed to him by the accused Jun, your Honor?
PROSECUTOR
Your Honor, there is already a ruling by this Honorable Court, your Honor,
despite reconsideration.
COURT
Let the prosecution do its own thing and leave the appreciation of what it has
done to the court.
ATTY. VALDEZ
A

We submit, your Honor.

This brick is the one that was handed to me by the suspect Jun, sir.

COURT

Why do you know that that is the thing? Are you sure that is not "tikoy?"

Yes, your Honor.

What makes you so sure?

A
I am sure that this is the one, your Honor. This is the Exhibit "A" which I marked
before I brought it to the PCCL, your Honor.
Q

What are you sure of?

I am sure that this is the brick that was given to me by one alias Jun, sir.

What makes you so sure?

A
Because I marked it with my own initials before giving it to the investigator and
before we brought it to the PCCL, your Honor.
x

x.

PROSECUTOR
May we request that a tag be placed on this white plastic bag and this
be marked as Exhibit "D?"
COURT

Mark it as Exhibit "D."

Q
To stress, who made the entries of this date, Exhibit "A" then the other letters and figures
on this plastic?
A

This one, the signature, I made the signature, the date and the time and this Exhibit "A."

How about this one?

I don't know who made this marking, sir.

PROSECUTOR
Q

May it be of record that this was just entered this morning.

I am asking you about this "itim" and not the "asul."

A
This CLM, the date and the time and the Exhibit "A," I was the one who made these
markings, sir.
PROSECUTOR

May we place on record that the one that was enclosed...

ATTY. ARIAS Your Honor, there are also entries included in that enclosure where it appears D394-95, also Exhibit "A," etc. etc., that was not pointed to by the witness. I want to make it of
record that there are other entries included in the enclosure.
COURT

Noted. The court saw it.

Q
Now, and this alleged brick of marijuana with a piece of paper, with a newspaper
wrapping with a piece of paper inside which reads: "D-394-95, Exhibit A, 970 grams SSL"
be marked as our Exhibit "D-2?"

COURT

Tag it. Mark it.

Q
This particular exhibit that you identified, the wrapper and the contents was given
to you by whom?
A

It was given to me by suspect Jun, sir.

Whereat?

At the corner of Boulevard and Jacinto St., sir.

How about the other items that you were able to recover?
x

x.

A
These other marijuana bricks, because during our follow-up, because according to
Jun the money which I gave him was in the hands of Neneth and so we proceeded to the
house of Neneth, sir.
x

x."xcix[99]

The first brick identified by P03 Manlangit was the brick of marijuana "given to [him] by suspect
Jun" at the corner of Boulevard and Jacinto Streets. This brick, including the newspaper and
white plastic wrapping were marked as Exhibits "D," "D-1," and "D-2" and described as
weighing nine hundred seventy (970) grams.c[100]
We also reject appellant's submission that the fact that PO3 Manlangit and his team waited for
almost one hour for appellant Doria to give them the one kilo of marijuana after he "paid"
P1,600.00 strains credulity. Appellant cannot capitalize on the circumstance that the money and
the marijuana in the case at bar did not change hands under the usual "kaliwaan" system. There is
no rule of law which requires that in "buy-bust" operations there must be a simultaneous
exchange of the marked money and the prohibited drug between the poseur-buyer and the
pusher.ci[101] Again, the decisive fact is that the poseur-buyer received the marijuana from the
accused-appellant.cii[102]
We also hold that the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Doria is not unlawful. Warrantless
arrests are allowed in three instances as provided by Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, to wit:
"Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. -- A peace officer or a private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
x

x."ciii[103]

Under Section 5 (a), as above-quoted, a person may be arrested without a warrant if he "has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense." Appellant Doria was
caught in the act of committing an offense. When an accused is apprehended in flagrante delicto
as a result of a buy-bust operation, the police are not only authorized but duty-bound to arrest
him even without a warrant.civ[104]
The warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao, the search of her person and residence, and the
seizure of the box of marijuana and marked bills are different matters.
Our Constitution proscribes search and seizure without a judicial warrant and any evidence
obtained without such warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.cv[105] The rule
is, however, not absolute. Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence
obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following instances:cvi[106] (1) search incident to a
lawful arrest;cvii[107] (2) search of a moving motor vehicle;cviii[108] (3) search in violation of
customs laws;cix[109] (4) seizure of evidence in plain view;cx[110] (5) when the accused himself
waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures.cxi[111]
The prosecution admits that appellant Gaddao was arrested without a warrant of arrest and the
search and seizure of the box of marijuana and the marked bills were likewise made without a
search warrant. It is claimed, however, that the warrants were not necessary because the arrest
was made in "hot pursuit" and the search was an incident to her lawful arrest.
To be lawful, the warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao must fall under any of the three (3)
instances enumerated in Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as
aforequoted. The direct testimony of PO3 Manlangit, the arresting officer, however shows
otherwise:
"ATTY VALDEZ, Counsel for appellant Gaddao:
We submit at this juncture, your Honor, that there will be no basis for that question.
Q
This particular exhibit that you identified, the wrapper and the contents was given to you
by whom?
A

It was given to me by suspect Jun, sir.

Whereat?

At the corner of Boulevard and Jacinto Street, sir.

How about the other items that you were able to recover?

ATTY. VALDEZ:
question.
COURT

We submit at this juncture, your Honor, that there will be no basis for that

There is. Answer.

A
These other marijuana bricks, because during our follow-up, because according to Jun
the money which I gave him was in the hands of Neneth and so we proceeded to the house
of Neneth, sir.
Q

Whereat?

At Daang Bakal near the crime scene at Shaw Boulevard, sir.

And what happened upon arrival thereat?

A
We saw alias Neneth inside the house and we asked him to give us the buy-bust
money, sir.
Q

You mentioned "him?"

A
sir.

Her, sir. We asked her to give us the money, the marked money which Jun gave her,

And what happened?

At this instance, it was SPO1 Badua who can testify regarding this buy-bust money, sir.
x

x."cxii[112]

SPO1 Badua testified on cross-examination that:

Q

What was your intention in going to the house of Aling Neneth?

To arrest her, sir.

Q
But the fact is, Mr. Witness, when you reached the house of Aling Neneth, Aling
Neneth was there?
A

Yes, sir.

As far as you can see, she was just inside her house?

I saw her outside, sir.

She was fetching water as a matter of fact?

She was `sa bandang poso.'

Carrying a baby?

No, sir.

Q
At that particular time when you reached the house of Aling Neneth and saw her
outside the house, she was not committing any crime, she was just outside the house?
A

No, sir.

Q
She was not about to commit any crime because she was just outside the house doing
her daily chores. Am I correct?
A

I just saw her outside, sir.

And at that point in time you already wanted to arrest her. That is correct, is it not?

Yes, sir.

Q
Now, if any memory of your testimony is correct, according to you SPO1 Manlangit
approached her?
A

PO3 Manlangit, sir.

You did not approach her because PO3 Manlangit approached her?

Yes, sir.

Q
During all the time that this confrontation, arrest or whatever by SPO3 Manlangit was
taking place, you were just in the side lines?
A

I was just watching, sir.

Q
So you were just an on-looker to what Manlangit was doing, because precisely according
to you your role in this buy-bust operation was as a back-up?
A

Yes, sir.

Who got the alleged marijuana from inside the house of Mrs. Neneth?

PO3 Manlangit, sir.

Manlangit got the marijuana?

Yes, sir.

And the money from Aling Neneth?

I don't know, sir.

You did not even know who got the money from Aling Neneth?

PROSECUTOR:
There is no basis for this question, your Honor. Money, there's no testimony on that.
ATTY. VALDEZ:
I was asking him precisely.
PROSECUTOR:
No basis.
COURT:
Sustained.
Q
Alright. I will ask you a question and I expect an honest answer. According to the
records, the amount of P1,600.00 was recovered from the person of Aling Neneth. That's right?
A

Yes, sir, the buy-bust money.

Q
What you are now saying for certain and for the record is the fact that you were not the
one who retrieved the money from Aling Neneth, it was Manlangit maybe?
A

I saw it, sir.

It was Manlangit who got the money from Aling Neneth?

The buy-bust money was recovered from the house of Aling Neneth, sir.

Q
It was taken from the house of Aling Neneth, not from the person of Aling Neneth. Is that
what you are trying to tell the Court?
A

No, sir.

ATTY. VALDEZ:

I am through with this witness, your Honor."cxiii[113]

Accused-appellant Gaddao was not caught red-handed during the buy-bust operation to give
ground for her arrest under Section 5 (a) of Rule 113. She was not committing any crime.
Contrary to the finding of the trial court, there was no occasion at all for appellant Gaddao to flee
from the policemen to justify her arrest in "hot pursuit."cxiv[114] In fact, she was going about her
daily chores when the policemen pounced on her.
Neither could the arrest of appellant Gaddao be justified under the second instance of Rule 113.
"Personal knowledge" of facts in arrests without warrant under Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 must be
based upon "probable cause" which means an "actual belief or reasonable grounds of
suspicion."cxv[115] The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief
of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of
committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested.cxvi[116] A
reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on
the part of the peace officers making the arrest.cxvii[117]
Accused-appellant Gaddao was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged identification made by
her co-accused. PO3 Manlangit, however, declared in his direct examination that appellant Doria
named his co-accused in response to his (PO3 Manlangit's) query as to where the marked money
was.cxviii[118] Appellant Doria did not point to appellant Gaddao as his associate in the drug
business, but as the person with whom he left the marked bills. This identification does not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that appellant Gaddao conspired with her co-accused in
pushing drugs. Appellant Doria may have left the money in her house,cxix[119] with or without
her knowledge, with or without any conspiracy. Save for accused-appellant Doria's word, the
Narcom agents had no reasonable grounds to believe that she was engaged in drug pushing. If
there is no showing that the person who effected the warrantless arrest had, in his own right,
knowledge of facts implicating the person arrested to the perpetration of a criminal offense, the
arrest is legally objectionable.cxx[120]
Since the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Gaddao was illegal, it follows that the search of
her person and home and the subsequent seizure of the marked bills and marijuana cannot be
deemed legal as an incident to her arrest. This brings us to the question of whether the trial court
correctly found that the box of marijuana was in plain view, making its warrantless seizure valid.
Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view
are subject to seizure even without a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence.cxxi[121]
The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement
officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from
which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is
inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be
evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.cxxii[122] The law enforcement
officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can
particularly view the area.cxxiii[123] In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently
across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused.cxxiv[124] The object must be open to eye
and handcxxv[125] and its discovery inadvertent.cxxvi[126]

It is clear that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. The
difficulty arises when the object is inside a closed container. Where the object seized was inside a
closed package, the object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a
warrant. However, if the package proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration,
its transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an observer, then the contents are in plain view
and may be seized.cxxvii[127] In other words, if the package is such that an experienced observer
could infer from its appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in
plain view.cxxviii[128] It must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they
observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.cxxix[129]
PO3 Manlangit, the Narcom agent who found the box, testified on cross-examination as follows:
"ATTY. VALDEZ:
So here we are. When you and Badua arrived, Aling Neneth was inside the house?
A

Yes, sir.

Badua demanded from Aling Neneth the buy-bust money?

Yes, sir.

At that particular instance, you saw the carton?

Yes, sir.

This carton, according to you was under a table?

Yes, sir, dining table.

I noticed that this carton has a cover?

Yes, sir.

I ask you were the flaps of the cover raised or closed?

It was open, sir. Not like that.

COURT
Go down there. Show to the court.
INTERPRETER
Witness went down the witness stand and approached a carton box.

Like this, sir.

PROSECUTOR
Can we describe it?
ATTY. VALDEZ
Yes.
PROSECUTOR
One flap is inside and the other flap is standing and with the contents visible.
COURT
Noted.
Q

At this juncture, you went inside the house?

Yes, sir.

And got hold of this carton?

Yes, sir.

Did you mention anything to Aling Neneth?

I asked her, what's this...

No, no. no. did you mention anything to Aling Neneth before getting the carton?

A
I think it was Badua who accosted Aling Neneth regarding the buy-bust money and he
asked "Sa iyo galing ang marijuanang ito, nasaan ang buy-bust money namin?" sir.
Q

Making reference to the marijuana that was given by alias Jun?

Yes, sir.

Q
When you proceeded to take hold of this carton, Aling Neneth was not yet frisked, is it
not [sic]?
A

I just don't know if she was frisked already by Badua, sir.

Who got hold of this?

I was the one, sir.

You were the one who got this?

Yes, sir.

Q
At that particular point in time, you did not know if the alleged buy-bust money was
already retrieved by Badua?
A

Yes, sir.

You went inside the house?

Yes, sir.

You did not have any search warrant?

Yes, sir.

Q
In fact, there was nothing yet as far as you were concerned to validate the fact that Mrs.
Gadao was in possession of the buy-bust money because according to you, you did not know
whether Badua already retrieved the buy-bust money from her?
A

Yes, sir.

How far was this from the door?

Two and a half meters from the door, sir. It was in plain view.

Under the table according to you?

Yes, sir, dining table.

Somewhere here?

It's far, sir.

PROSECUTOR
May we request the witness to place it, where he saw it?
A

Here, sir.

What you see is a carton?

Yes, sir, with plastic.

Marked "Snow Time Ice Pop?"

Yes, sir.

With a piece of plastic visible on top of the carton?

Yes, sir.

That is all that you saw?

Yes, sir.

PROSECUTOR
For the record, your Honor...
Q

You were only able to verify according to you...

PROSECUTOR
Panero, wait. Because I am objecting to the words a piece of plastic. By reading it...
ATTY. VALDEZ
That's a piece of plastic.
PROSECUTOR
By reading it, it will connote... this is not a piece of plastic.
ATTY. VALDEZ
What is that? What can you say, Fiscal? I'm asking you?
PROSECUTOR
With due respect, what I am saying is, let's place the size of the plastic. A piece of plastic may be
big or a small one, for record purposes.
COURT
Leave that to the court.
PROSECUTOR
Leave that to the court.

Q
The only reason according to you, you were able to... Look at this, no even
Superman... I withdraw that. Not even a man with very kin [sic] eyes can tell the contents
here. And according to the Court, it could be "tikoy," is it not [sic]?
A

Yes, sir.

Siopao?

Yes, sir.

Canned goods?

Yes, sir.

It could be ice cream because it says Snow Pop, Ice Pop?

I presumed it was also marijuana because it may ...

Q
I am not asking you what your presumptions are. I'm asking you what it could
possibly be.
A

It's the same plastic, sir.

ATTY. VALDEZ
I'm not even asking you that question so why are you voluntarily saying the information. Let the
prosecutor do that for you.
COURT
Continue. Next question.
x

x."cxxx[130]

PO3 Manlangit and the police team were at appellant Gaddao's house because they were led
there by appellant Doria. The Narcom agents testified that they had no information on appellant
Gaddao until appellant Doria named her and led them to her.cxxxi[131] Standing by the door of
appellant Gaddao's house, PO3 Manlangit had a view of the interior of said house. Two and a
half meters away was the dining table and underneath it was a carton box. The box was partially
open and revealed something wrapped in plastic.
In his direct examination, PO3 Manlangit said that he was sure that the contents of the box were
marijuana because he himself checked and marked the said contents.cxxxii[132] On crossexamination, however, he admitted that he merely presumed the contents to be marijuana
because it had the same plastic wrapping as the "buy-bust marijuana." A close scrutiny of the
records reveals that the plastic wrapper was not colorless and transparent as to clearly manifest

its contents to a viewer. Each of the ten (10) bricks of marijuana in the box was individually
wrapped in old newspaper and placed inside plastic bags-- white, pink or blue in color.cxxxiii
[133] PO3 Manlangit himself admitted on cross-examination that the contents of the box
could be items other than marijuana. He did not know exactly what the box contained that
he had to ask appellant Gaddao about its contents.cxxxiv[134] It was not immediately
apparent to PO3 Manlangit that the content of the box was marijuana. The marijuana was
not in plain view and its seizure without the requisite search warrant was in violation of the law
and the Constitution.cxxxv[135] It was fruit of the poisonous tree and should have been excluded
and never considered by the trial court.cxxxvi[136]
The fact that the box containing about six (6) kilos of marijuanacxxxvii[137] was found in the house
of accused-appellant Gaddao does not justify a finding that she herself is guilty of the crime
charged.cxxxviii[138] Apropos is our ruling in People v. Aminnudin,cxxxix[139] viz:
"The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and
commends the efforts of our law enforcement officers against those who would inflict this
malediction upon our people, especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this
campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the
protection of the liberty of every individual in the realm, including the basest of criminals. The
Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike against any
manner of high-handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the right of the
individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. As Justice
Holmes, again, said, 'I think it a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the
government should play an ignoble part.' It is simply not allowed in the free society to violate a
law to enforce another, especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself."cxl[140]
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Section
13 of Republic Act No. 7659 punishes the "sale, administration, delivery, distribution and
transportation of a prohibited drug" with the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine
ranging from P500,000.00 to P10 million, to wit:
"Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs.-The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos
to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell,
administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any
prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.
x

x."

In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, what is material is the submission of
proof that the sale took place between the poseur-buyer and the seller thereof and the
presentation of the drug, i.e., the corpus delicti, as evidence in court.cxli[141] The prosecution has
clearly established the fact that in consideration of P1,600.00 which he received, accusedappellant Doria sold and delivered nine hundred seventy (970) grams of marijuana to PO3

Manlangit, the poseur-buyer. The prosecution, however, has failed to prove that accusedappellant Gaddao conspired with accused-appellant Doria in the sale of said drug. There being no
mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the lower penalty of reclusion perpetua must be
imposed.cxlii[142]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig City acting
as a Special Court in Criminal Case No. 3307-D is reversed and modified as follows:
1. Accused-appellant Florencio Doria y Bolado is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00).
2. Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao y Catama is acquitted.
SO ORDERED.

i
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 95847-48. March 10, 1993.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GABRIEL GERENTE y BULLO, accusedappellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT; LAWFUL WHEN
ARRESTING OFFICER HAS PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE THAT THE PERSON TO BE ARRESTED
HAS COMMITTED THE CRIME; CASE AT BAR. The policemen arrested Gerente only some three
(3) hours after Gerente and his companions had killed Blace. They saw Blace dead in the hospital and
when they inspected the scene of the crime, they found the instruments of death: a piece of wood and
a concrete hollow block which the killers had used to bludgeon him to death. The eye-witness, Edna
Edwina Reyes, reported the happening to the policemen and pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente, as one
of the killers. Under those circumstances, since the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent
death of Blace and of facts indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him, they could lawfully
arrest Gerente without a warrant. If they had postponed his arrest until they could obtain a warrant, he
would have fled the law as his two companions did.
2. ID.; ID.; SEARCH AND SEIZURE; VALID EVEN WITHOUT A WARRANT WHEN MADE AS AN
INCIDENT TO LAWFUL ARREST; RATIONALE. The search conducted on Gerente's person was
likewise lawful because it was made as an incident to a valid arrest. This is in accordance with Section
12, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides: "Section 12. Search incident to lawful
arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may
be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant." The frisk and search of
appellant's person upon his arrest was a permissible precautionary measure of arresting officers to
protect themselves, for the person who is about to be arrested may be armed and might attack them
unless he is first disarmed. In Adams vs. Williams, 47 U.S. 143, cited in Justice Isagani A. Cruz's
Constitutional Law, 1991 Edition, p. 150, it was ruled that "the individual being arrested may be frisked
for concealed weapons that may be used against the arresting officer and all unlawful articles found
his person, or within his immediate control may be seized."
3. CRIMINAL LAW; CONSPIRACY; LIABILITY OF CONSPIRATORS; RULE; CASE AT BAR. There
is no merit in appellant's allegation that the trial court erred in convicting him of having conspired and
cooperated with Fredo and Totoy Echigoren to kill Blace despite the testimony of Dr. Valentin Bernales
that the fracture on the back of the victim's skull could have been inflicted by one person only. what Dr.
Bernales stated was a mere possibility that only one person dropped the concrete hollow block on the
head of the victim, smashing it. That circumstance, even if true, does not absolve the other two co-

conspirators in the murder of Blace for when there is a conspiracy to commit a crime, the act of one
conspirator is the act of all. The conspiracy was proven by the eyewitness-testimony of Edna Edwina
Reyes, that she overheard the appellant and his companions conspire to kill Blace, that acting in
concert, they attacked their victim with a piece of wood and a hollow block and caused his death.
"When there is no evidence indicating that the principal witness for the prosecution was moved by
improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so moved and his testimony is entitled to full faith
and credit" (People vs. Belibet, 199 SCRA 587, 588). Hence, the trial court did not err in giving full
credit to Edna Reyes' testimony.
4. ID.; CIVIL INDEMNITY FOR DEATH; INCREASED TO P50,000.00. The Solicitor General
correctly pointed out in the appellee's brief that the award of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity for the
death of Clarito Blace should be increased to P50,000.00 in accordance with our ruling in People vs.
Sison, 189 SCRA 643.
DECISION
GRIO-AQUINO, J p:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch
172, which found the appellant guilty of Violation of Section 8 of Republic Act 6425 (Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972) and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a term of twelve (12) years
and one (1) day, as minimum, to twenty (20) years, as maximum; and also found him guilty of Murder
for which crime he was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The dispositive portion
of the appealed decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing the Court finds the accused Gabriel Gerente in Criminal Case
No. 10255-V-90 guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 8 of R.A. 6425 and hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twelve years and one day as minimum to
twenty years as maximum, and a fine of twelve thousand, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs.
"In Criminal Case No. 10256-V-90, the Court finds the accused Gabriel Gerente guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, and there by (sic) no aggravating circumstances nor
mitigating circumstances, is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; to indemnify
the heirs of the victim in the sum of P30,000.00, and in the amount of P17,609.00 as funeral
expenses, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The accused
Gabriel Gerente shall be credited with the full term of his preventive imprisonment." (p. 25, Rollo.)
Appellant Gabriel Gerente y Bullo was charged with Violation of Section 8, Art. II of R.A. 6425, which
was docketed as Criminal Case No. 10255-V-90 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila. The Information reads:
"That on or about the 30th day of April, 1990, in the municipality of Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without
justification, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and control
dried flowering tops wrapped in foil with markings and place in a transparent plastic bag which are
considered prohibited drugs." (p. 2, Rollo.)
The same accused, together with Totoy and Fredo Echigoren who are both at large, was charged with
Murder in Criminal Case No. 10256-V-90 in an information of the same date and signed by the same
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, as follows:

"That on or about the 30th day of April, 1990, in the municipality of Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused together
with two (2) others who are still at large and against whom the preliminary investigation has not yet
been terminated by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan, conspiring, confederating
together and mutually helping one another, armed with a piece of wood and hallow (sic) block and with
intent to kill one Clarito B. Blace, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evident
premeditation and treachery, attack, assault and hit with the said piece of wood and hollow block the
said Clarito B. Blace, hitting the latter on the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting serious
physical injuries which directly caused the death of the said victim." (p. 3, Rollo.)
Edna Edwina Reyes testified that at about 7:00 a.m. of April 30, 1990, appellant Gabriel Gerente,
together with Fredo Echigoren and Totoy Echigoren, started drinking liquor and smoking marijuana in
the house of the appellant which is about six (6) meters away from the house of the prosecution
witness who was in her house on that day. She overheard the three men talking about their intention
to kill Clarito Blace. She testified that she heard Fredo Echigoren saying, "Gabriel, papatayin natin si
Clarito Blace," and Totoy Echigoren allegedly seconded Fredo's suggestion saying: "Papatayin natin
'yan mamaya." Appellant allegedly agreed: "Sigue, papatayin natin mamaya." (pp. 3-4, tsn, August 24,
1990.)
Fredo and Totoy Echigoren and Gerente carried out their plan to kill Clarito Blace at about 2:00 p.m. of
the same day. The prosecution witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, testified that she witnessed the killing.
Fredo Echigoren struck the first blow against Clarito Blace, followed by Totoy Echigoren and Gabriel
Gerente who hit him twice with a piece of wood in the head and when he fell, Totoy Echigoren dropped
a hollow block on the victim's head. Thereafter, the three men dragged Blace to a place behind the
house of Gerente.
At about 4:00 p.m. of the same day, Patrolman Jaime Urrutia of the Valenzuela Police Station received
a report from the Palo Police Detachment about a mauling incident. He went to the Valenzuela District
Hospital where the victim was brought. He was informed by the hospital officials that the victim died on
arrival. The cause of death was massive fracture of the skull caused by a hard and heavy object. Right
away, Patrolman Urrutia, together with Police Corporal Romeo Lima and Patrolman Alex Umali,
proceeded to Paseo de Blas where the mauling incident took place. There they found a piece of wood
with blood stains, a hollow block and two roaches of marijuana. They were informed by the
prosecution witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, that she saw the killing and she pointed to Gabriel Gerente
as one of the three men who killed Clarito.
The policemen proceeded to the house of the appellant who was then sleeping. They told him to come
out of the house and they introduced themselves as policemen. Patrolman Urrutia frisked appellant
and found a coin purse in his pocket which contained dried leaves wrapped in cigarette foil. The dried
leaves were sent to the National Bureau of Investigation for examination. The Forensic Chemist found
them to be marijuana.
Only the appellant, Gabriel Gerente, was apprehended by the police. The other suspects, Fredo and
Totoy Echigoren, are still at large.
On May 2, 1990, two separate informations were filed by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Benjamin
Caraig against him for Violation of Section 8, Art. II, of R.A. 6425, and for Murder.
When arraigned on May 16, 1990, the appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. A joint trial of the
two cases was held. On September 24, 1990, the trial court rendered a decision convicting him of
Violation of Section 8 of R.A. 6425 and of Murder.

In this appeal of the appellant, the following errors are ascribed to the trial court:
1. the court a quo gravely erred in admitting the marijuana leaves adduced in evidence by the
prosecution; and
2. the court a quo gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crimes charged despite the
absence of evidence required to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The appellant contends that the trial court erred in admitting the marijuana leaves as evidence in
violation of his constitutional right not to be subjected to illegal search and seizure, for the dried
marijuana leaves were seized from him in the course of a warrantless arrest by the police officers. We
do not agree.
The search of appellant's person and the seizure of the marijuana leaves in his possession were valid
because they were incident to a lawful warrantless arrest.
Paragraphs (a) and (b), Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court provide:
'SECTION 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
"(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;"
"(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; . . .'
The policemen arrested Gerente only some three (3) hours after Gerente and his companions had
killed Blace. They saw Blace dead in the hospital and when they inspected the scene of the crime,
they found the instruments of death: a piece of wood and a concrete hollow block which the killers had
used to bludgeon him to death. The eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, reported the happening to the
policemen and pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente, as one of the killers. Under those circumstances,
since the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of Blace and of facts indicating that
Gerente and two others had killed him, they could lawfully arrest Gerente without a warrant. If they
had postponed his arrest until they could obtain a warrant, he would have fled the law as his two
companions did.
In Umil vs. Ramos, 187 SCRA 311, the arrest of the accused without a warrant was effected one (1)
day after he had shot to death two Capcom soldiers. The arrest was held lawful by this Court upon the
rationale stated by us in People vs. Malasugui, 63 Phil. 221, 228, thus:
"To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and searched for the evidence and tokens of
his crime without a warrant, would be to leave society, to a large extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest,
the most expert, and the most depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in many instances."
The search conducted on Gerente's person was likewise lawful because it was made as an incident to
a valid arrest. This is in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court which
provides:
"SECTION 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without

a search warrant."
The frisk and search of appellant's person upon his arrest was a permissible precautionary measure of
arresting officers to protect themselves, for the person who is about to be arrested may be armed and
might attack them unless he is first disarmed. In Adams vs. Williams, 47 U.S. 143, cited in Justice
Isagani A. Cruz's Constitutional Law, 1991 Edition, p. 150, it was ruled that "the individual being
arrested may be frisked for concealed weapons that may be used against the arresting officer and all
unlawful articles found in his person, or within his immediate control may be seized."
There is no merit in appellant's allegation that the trial court erred in convicting him of having
conspired and cooperated with Fredo and Totoy Echigoren to kill Blace despite the testimony of Dr.
Valentin Bernales that the fracture on the back of the victim's skull could have been inflicted by one
person only.
What Dr. Bernales stated was a mere possibility that only one person dropped the concrete hollow
block on the head of the victim, smashing it. That circumstance, even if true, does not absolve the
other two co-conspirators in the murder of Blace for when there is a conspiracy to commit a crime, the
act of one conspirator is the act of all. The conspiracy was proven by the eyewitness-testimony of
Edna Edwina Reyes, that she overheard the appellant and his companions conspire to kill Blace, that
acting in concert, they attacked their victim with a piece of wood and a hollow block and caused his
death. "When there is no evidence indicating that the principal witness for the prosecution was moved
by improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so moved and his testimony is entitled to full
faith and credit" (People vs. Belibet, 199 SCRA 587, 588). Hence, the trial court did not err in giving full
credit to Edna Reyes' testimony.
Appellant's failure to escape (because he was very drunk) is no indicium of his innocence.
The Solicitor General correctly pointed out in the appellee's brief that the award of P30,000.00 as civil
indemnity for the death of Clarito Blace should be increased to P50,000.00 in accordance with our
ruling in People vs. Sison, 189 SCRA 643.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with modification of the civil indemnity
awarded to the heirs of the victim, Clarito Blace, which is hereby increased to P50,000.00.
SO ORDERED.

iiEN BANC
[G.R. No. 123872. January 30, 1998]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RUBEN MONTILLA y GATDULA, accusedappellant.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
Accused-Appellant Ruben Montilla y Gatdula, alias "Joy," was charged on August 22, 1994 for
violating Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended

by Republic Act No. 7659, before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, of Dasmarias, Cavite in an
information which alleges:
That on or about the 20th day of June 1994, at Barangay Salitran, Municipality of Dasmarias, Province
of Cavite, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
not being authorized by law, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, administer,
transport, and deliver twenty-eight (28) kilos of dried marijuana leaves, which are considered
prohibited drugs, in violation of the provisions of R.A. 6425 thereby causing damage and prejudice to
the public interest.[1]
The consequent arraignment conducted on September 14, 1994 elicited a plea of not guilty from
appellant who was assisted therein by his counsel de parte.[2] Trial was held on scheduled dates
thereafter, which culminated in a verdict of guilty in a decision of the trial court dated June 8, 1995 and
which imposed the extreme penalty of death on appellant. He was further ordered to pay a fine in the
amount of P500,000.00 and to pay the costs of the proceedings.[3]
It appears from the evidence of the prosecution that appellant was apprehended at around 4:00 A.M.
of June 20, 1994 near a waiting shed located at Barangay Salitran, Dasmarias, Cavite by SPO1
Concordio Talingting and SPO1 Armando Clarin, both members of the Cavite Philippine National
Police Command based in Dasmarias. Appellant, according to the two officers, was caught
transporting 28 marijuana bricks contained in a traveling bag and a carton box, which marijuana bricks
had a total weight of 28 kilos.
These two officers later asserted in court that they were aided by an informer in the arrest of appellant.
That informer, according to Talingting and Clarin, had informed them the day before, or on June 19,
1994 at about 2:00 P.M., that a drug courier, whom said informer could recognize, would be arriving
somewhere in Barangay Salitran, Dasmarias from Baguio City with an undetermined amount of
marijuana. It was the same informer who pinpointed to the arresting officers the appellant when the
latter alighted from a passenger jeepney on the aforestated day, hour, and place.[4]
Upon the other hand, appellant disavowed ownership of the prohibited drugs. He claimed during the
trial that while he indeed came all the way from Baguio City, he traveled to Dasmarias, Cavite with
only some pocket money and without any luggage. His sole purpose in going there was to look up his
cousin who had earlier offered a prospective job at a garment factory in said locality, after which he
would return to Baguio City. He never got around to doing so as he was accosted by SPO1 Talingting
and SPO1 Clarin at Barangay Salitran.
He further averred that when he was interrogated at a house in Dasmarias, Cavite, he was never
informed of his constitutional rights and was in fact even robbed of the P500.00 which he had with
him. Melita Adaci, the cousin, corroborated appellant's testimony about the job offer in the garment
factory where she reportedly worked as a supervisor,[5] although, as the trial court observed, she
never presented any document to prove her alleged employment.
In the present appellate review, appellant disputes the trial court's finding that he was legally caught in
flagrante transporting the prohibited drugs. This Court, after an objective and exhaustive review of the
evidence on record, discerns no reversible error in the factual findings of the trial court. It finds
unassailable the reliance of the lower court on the positive testimonies of the police officers to whom
no ill motives can be attributed, and its rejection of appellant's fragile defense of denial which is
evidently self-serving in nature.

1. Firstly, appellant asserts that the court a quo grossly erred in convicting him on the basis of
insufficient evidence as no proof was proffered showing that he wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
administered, transported, and delivered 28 kilos of dried marijuana leaves, since the police officers
"testified only on the alleged transporting of Marijuana from Baguio City to Cavite."
Further, the failure of the prosecution to present in court the civilian informant is supposedly corrosive
of the People's cause since, aside from impinging upon appellant's fundamental right to confront the
witnesses against him, that informant was a vital personality in the operation who would have
contradicted the hearsay and conflicting testimonies of the arresting officers on how appellant was
collared by them.
The pertinent provision of the penal law here involved, in Section 4 of Article II thereof, as amended, is
as follows:
SEC. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. - The
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten
million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer,
deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act
as a broker in any of such transactions.
Notwithstanding the provision of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, if the victim of the offense is a
minor, or should a prohibited drug involved in any offense under this Section be the proximate cause
of the death of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed.
Now, the offense ascribed to appellant is a violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, some of the various
modes of commission[6] being the sale, administration, delivery, distribution, and transportation of
prohibited drugs as set forth in the epigraph of Section 4, Article II of said law. The text of Section 4
expands and extends its punitive scope to other acts besides those mentioned in its headnote by
including these who shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or
transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions." Section 4 could
thus be violated by the commission of any of the acts specified therein, or a combination thereof, such
as selling, administering, delivering, giving away, distributing, dispatching in transit or transporting, and
the like.
As already stated, appellant was charged with a violation of Section 4, the transgressive acts alleged
therein and attributed to appellant being that he administered, delivered, and transported marijuana.
The governing rule with respect to an offense which may be committed in any of the different modes
provided by law is that an indictment would suffice if the offense is alleged to have been committed in
one, two or more modes specified therein. This is so as allegations in the information of the various
ways of committing the offense should be considered as a description of only one offense and the
information cannot be dismissed on the ground of multifariousness.[7] In appellant's case, the
prosecution adduced evidence clearly establishing that he transported marijuana from Baguio City to
Cavite. By that act alone of transporting the illicit drugs, appellant had already run afoul of that
particular section of the statute, hence, appellant's asseverations must fail.
The Court also disagrees with the contention of appellant that the civilian informer should have been
produced in court considering that his testimony was "vital" and his presence in court was essential in
order to give effect to or recognition of appellant's constitutional right to confront the witnesses arrayed
by the State against him. These assertions are, however, much too strained. Far from compromising
the primacy of appellant's right to confrontation, the non-presentation of the informer in this instance
was justified and cannot be faulted as error.

For one, the testimony of said informer would have been, at best, merely corroborative of the
declarations of SPO1 Talingting and SPO1 Clarin before the trial court, which testimonies are not
hearsay as both testified upon matters in which they had personally taken part. As such, the testimony
of the informer could be dispensed with by the prosecution,[8] more so where what he would have
corroborated are the narrations of law enforcers on whose performance of duties regularity is the
prevailing legal presumption. Besides, informants are generally not presented in court because of the
need to hide their identities and preserve their invaluable services to the police.[9] Moreover, it is up to
the prosecution whom to present in court as its witnesses, and not for the defense to dictate that
course.[10] Finally, appellant could very well have resorted to the coercive process of subpoena to
compel that eyewitness to appear before the court below,[11] but which remedy was not availed of by
him.
2. Appellant contends that the marijuana bricks were confiscated in the course of an unlawful
warrantless search and seizure. He calls the attention of the Court to the fact that as early as 2:00
P.M. of the preceding day, June 19, 1994, the police authorities had already been apprised by their socalled informer of appellant's impending arrival from Baguio City, hence those law enforcers had the
opportunity to procure the requisite warrant. Their misfeasance should therefore invalidate the search
for and seizure of the marijuana, as well as the arrest of appellant on the following dawn. Once again,
the Court is not persuaded.
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution lays down the general rule that a search and seizure must be
carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant, absent which such search and seizure
becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of said constitutional provision.[12] Evidence secured on
the occasion of such an unreasonable search and seizure is tainted and should be excluded for being
the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In the language of the fundamental law, it shall be inadmissible
in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. This exclusionary rule is not, however, an absolute and
rigid proscription. Thus, (1) customs searches;[13] (2) searches of moving vehicles,[14] (3) seizure of
evidence in plain view;[15] (4) consented searches;[16] (5) searches incidental to a lawful arrest;[17]
and (6) "stop and frisk" measures[18] have been invariably recognized as the traditional exceptions.
In appellant's case, it should be noted that the information relayed by the civilian informant to the law
enforcers was that there would be delivery of marijuana at Barangay Salitran by a courier coming from
Baguio City in the "early morning" of June 20, 1994. Even assuming that the policemen were not
pressed for time, this would be beside the point for, under these circumstances, the information
relayed was too sketchy and not detailed enough for the obtention of the corresponding arrest or
search warrant. While there is an indication that the informant knew the courier, the records do not
reveal that he knew him by name.
While it is not required that the authorities should know the exact name of the subject of the warrant
applied for, there is the additional problem that the informant did not know to whom the drugs would be
delivered and at which particular part of the barangay there would be such delivery. Neither did this
asset know the precise time of the suspect's arrival, or his means of transportation, the container or
contrivance wherein the drugs were concealed and whether the same were arriving together with, or
were being brought by someone separately from, the courier.
On such bare information, the police authorities could not have properly applied for a warrant,
assuming that they could readily have access to a judge or a court that was still open by the time they
could make preparations for applying therefor, and on which there is no evidence presented by the
defense. In determining the opportunity for obtaining warrants, not only the intervening time is
controlling but all the coincident and ambient circumstances should be considered, especially in rural
areas. In fact, the police had to form a surveillance team and to lay down a dragnet at the possible
entry points to Barangay Salitran at midnight of that day notwithstanding the tip regarding the "early

morning" arrival of the courier. Their leader, SPO2 Cali, had to reconnoiter inside and around the
barangay as backup, unsure as they were of the time when and the place in Barangay Salitran, where
their suspect would show up, and how he would do so.
On the other hand, that they nonetheless believed the informant is not surprising for, as both SPO1
Clarin and SPO1 Talingting recalled, he had proved to be a reliable source in past operations.
Moreover, experience shows that although information gathered and passed on by these assets to law
enforcers are vague and piecemeal, and not as neatly and completely packaged as one would expect
from a professional spymaster, such tip-offs are sometimes successful as it proved to be in the
apprehension of appellant. If the courts of justice are to be of understanding assistance to our law
enforcement agencies, it is necessary to adopt a realistic appreciation of the physical and tactical
problems of the latter, instead of critically viewing them from the placid and clinical environment of
judicial chambers.
3. On the defense argument that the warrantless search conducted on appellant invalidates the
evidence obtained from him, still the search on his belongings and the consequent confiscation of the
illegal drugs as a result thereof was justified as a search incidental to a lawful arrest under Section
5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Under that provision, a peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
A legitimate warrantless arrest, as above contemplated, necessarily cloaks the arresting police officer
with authority to validly search and seize from the offender (1) dangerous weapons, and (2) those that
may be used as proof of the commission of an offense.[19] On the other hand, the apprehending
officer must have been spurred by probable cause in effecting an arrest which could be classified as
one in cadence with the instances of permissible arrests set out in Section 5(a).[20] These instances
have been applied to arrests carried out on persons caught in flagrante delicto. The conventional view
is that probable cause, while largely a relative term the determination of which must be resolved
according to the facts of each case, is understood as having reference to such facts and
circumstances which could lead a reasonable, discreet, and prudent man to believe and conclude as
to the commission of an offense, and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the
place sought to be searched.[21]
Parenthetically, if we may digress, it is time to observe that the evidentiary measure for the propriety of
filing criminal charges and, correlatively, for effecting a warrantless arrest, has been reduced and
liberalized. In the past, our statutory rules and jurisprudence required prima facie evidence, which was
of a higher degree or quantum,[22] and was even used with dubiety as equivalent to "probable cause."
Yet, even in the American jurisdiction from which we derived the term and its concept, probable cause
is understood to merely mean a reasonable ground for belief in the existence of facts warranting the
proceedings complained of,[23] or an apparent state of facts found to exist upon reasonable inquiry
which would induce a reasonably intelligent and prudent man to believe that the accused person had
committed the crime.[24]
Felicitously, those problems and confusing concepts were clarified and set aright, at least on the issue
under discussion, by the 1985 amendment of the Rules of Court which provides in Rule 112 thereof
that the quantum of evidence required in preliminary investigation is such evidence as suffices to
"engender a well founded belief" as to the fact of the commission of a crime and the respondent's
probable guilt thereof.[25] It has the same meaning as the related phraseology used in other parts of
the same Rule, that is, that the investigating fiscal "finds cause to hold the respondent for trial," or
where "a probable cause exists."[26] It should, therefore, be in that sense, wherein the right to effect a
warrantless arrest should be considered as legally authorized.

In the case at bar, as soon as appellant had alighted from the passenger jeepney the informer at once
indicated to the officers that their suspect was at hand by pointing to him from the waiting shed. SPO1
Clarin recounted that the informer told them that the marijuana was likely hidden inside the traveling
bag and carton box which appellant was carrying at the time. The officers thus realized that he was
their man even if he was simply carrying a seemingly innocent looking pair of luggage for personal
effects. Accordingly, they approached appellant, introduced themselves as policemen, and requested
him to open and show them the contents of the traveling bag, which appellant voluntarily and readily
did. Upon cursory inspection by SPO1 Clarin, the bag yielded the prohibited drugs, so, without
bothering to further search the box, they brought appellant and his luggage to their headquarters for
questioning.
Appellant insists that the mere fact of seeing a person carrying a traveling bag and a carton box
should not elicit the slightest suspicion of the commission of any crime since that is normal. But,
precisely, it is in the ordinary nature of things that drugs being illegally transported are necessarily
hidden in containers and concealed from view. Thus, the officers could reasonably assume, and not
merely on a hollow suspicion since the informant was by their side and had so informed them, that the
drugs were in appellant's luggage. It would obviously have been irresponsible, if not downright absurd
under the circumstances, to require the constable to adopt a "wait and see" attitude at the risk of
eventually losing the quarry.
Here, there were sufficient facts antecedent to the search and seizure that, at the point prior to the
search, were already constitutive of probable cause, and which by themselves could properly create in
the minds of the officers a well-grounded and reasonable belief that appellant was in the act of
violating the law. The search yielded affirmance both of that probable cause and the actuality that
appellant was then actually committing a crime by illegally transporting prohibited drugs. With these
attendant facts, it is ineluctable that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto, hence his arrest and the
search of his belongings without the requisite warrant were both justified.
Furthermore, that appellant also consented to the search is borne out by the evidence. To repeat,
when the officers approached appellant and introduced themselves as policemen, they asked him
about the contents of his luggage, and after he replied that they contained personal effects, the
officers asked him to open the traveling bag. Appellant readily acceded, presumably or in all likelihood
resigned to the fact that the law had caught up with his criminal activities. When an individual
voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have the same conducted upon his person or premises,
he is precluded from later complaining thereof.
After all, the right to be secure from unreasonable search may, like other rights, be waived either
expressly or impliedly.[27] Thus, while it has been held that the silence of the accused during a
warrantless search should not be taken to mean consent to the search but as a demonstration of that
person's regard for the supremacy of the law,[28] the case of herein appellant is evidently different for,
here, he spontaneously performed affirmative acts of volition by himself opening the bag without being
forced or intimidated to do so, which acts should properly be construed as a clear waiver of his right.
[29]
4. Appellant likewise harps on the alleged failure of the prosecution to "legally, properly and
adequately establish that the 28 bricks of marijuana allegedly confiscated from (him) were the same
marijuana examined by the forensic chemist and presented in court." Indeed, the arresting officers did
not identify in court the marijuana bricks seized from appellant since, in fact they did not have to do so.
It should be noted that the prosecution presented in the court below and formally offered in evidence
those 28 bricks of marijuana together with the traveling bag and the carton box in which the same
were contained. The articles were properly marked as confiscated evidence and proper safeguards
were taken to ensure that the marijuana turned over to the chemist for examination, and which

subsequently proved positive as such, were the same drugs taken from appellant. The trial court,
therefore, correctly admitted them in evidence, satisfied that the articles were indubitably no other than
those taken from appellant.
Complementarily, the corpus delicti was firmly established by SPO1 Clarin and SPO1 Talingting who
categorically related that when they had ascertained that the contents of the traveling bag of appellant
appeared to be marijuana, they forthwith asked him where he had come from, and the latter readily
answered "Baguio City," thus confirming the veracity of the report of the informer. No other conclusion
can therefore be derived than that appellant had transported the illicit drugs all the way to Cavite from
Baguio City. Coupled with the presentation in court of the subject matter of the crime, the marijuana
bricks which had tested positive as being indian hemp, the guilt of appellant for transporting the
prohibited drugs in violation of the law is beyond doubt.
Appellant questions the interrogation conducted by the police authorities, claiming that he was not
allowed to communicate with anybody, and that he was not duly informed of his right to remain silent
and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. Indeed, appellant has a
point. The police authorities here could possibly have violated the provision of Republic Act No.
7438[30] which defines certain rights of persons arrested, detained, or under custodial investigation,
as well as the duties of the arresting, detaining, and investigating officers, and providing corresponding
penalties for violations thereof.
Assuming the existence of such irregularities, however, the proceedings in the lower court will not
necessarily be struck down. Firstly, appellant never admitted or confessed anything during his
custodial investigation. Thus, no incriminatory evidence in the nature of a compelled or involuntary
confession or admission was elicited from him which would otherwise have been inadmissible in
evidence. Secondly and more importantly, the guilt of appellant was clearly established by other
evidence adduced by the prosecution, particularly the testimonies of the arresting officers together
with the documentary and object evidence which were formally offered and admitted in evidence in the
court below.
5. The reversible error of the trial court lies in its imposition of the penalty of death on appellant. As
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, Section 20, Article IV of the Dangerous Drugs Act now provides
inter alia that the penalty in Section 4 of Article II shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is, in
the case of indian hemp or marijuana, 750 grams or more. In said Section 4, the transporting of
prohibited drugs carries with it the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five
hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos. Thus, the law prescribes a penalty composed of two
indivisible penalties, reclusion perpetua and death. In the present case, Article 63 of the Revised
Penal Code consequently provides the rules to be observed in the application of said penalties.
As found by the trial court, there were neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances attending
appellant's violation of the law, hence the second paragraph of Article 63 must necessarily apply, in
which case the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua is the proper imposable penalty. Contrary to the
pronouncement of the court a quo, it was never intended by the legislature that where the quantity of
the dangerous drugs involved exceeds those stated in Section 20, the maximum penalty of death shall
be imposed. Nowhere in the amendatory law is there a provision from which such a conclusion may
be gleaned or deduced. On the contrary, this Court has already concluded that Republic Act No. 7659
did not amend Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code,[31] the rules wherein were observed although
the cocaine subject of that case was also in excess of the quantity provided in Section 20.
It is worth mentioning at this juncture that the law itself provides a specific penalty where the violation
thereof is in its aggravated form as laid down in the second paragraph of Section 4 whereby,

regardless of Section 20 of Article IV, if the victim is a minor, or should a prohibited drug involved in
any offense in said section be the proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the maximum
penalty shall be imposed.[32] While the minority or the death of the victim will increase the liability of
the offender, these two facts do not constitute generic aggravating circumstances, as the law simply
provides for the imposition of the single indivisible penalty of death if the offense is attended by either
of such factual features. In that situation, obviously the rules on the graduation of penalties in Article
63 cannot apply. In herein appellant's case, there was neither a minor victim nor a consequent death
of any victim. Hence, the basic rules in Article 63 of the Code govern.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, of Dasmarias, Cavite in Criminal
Case No. 3401-94 is hereby MODIFIED in the sense that accused-appellant Ruben Montilla y Gatdula
shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is
hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 106288-89 May 17, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
TIRSO ACOL Y BARNUBAL and PIO BOSES Y DOLFO, defendants, PIO BOSES, appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.

MELO, J.:
Two passengers who were apprehended after they supposedly staged a hold-up inside a passenger
jeepney on September 29, 1990 were haled to court, not for the felonious asportation, but for
possession of the two unlicensed firearms and bullets recovered from them which were instrumental in
the commission of the robo (pp. 7-8, Rollo.)
Of the two persons accused, only Pio Boses interposed an appeal from the trial court's judgment (p.
23, Rollo) inasmuch as Tirso Acol y Barnubal had escaped from incarceration (p. 5, Brief for the
Accused-Appellant, p. 60, Rollo ) thereby abating any review of his culpability for the misdeed.

The People's inculpatory accusations during the joint trial were to the effect that at around 3:45 in the
morning of September 29, 1990, when Percival Tan was driving his jeepney, two men boarded the
vehicle in Cubao. When they crossed Pasay Road, the two wayfarers, together with two other
companions, announced a hold-up. Percival Tan was instructed to proceed atop the Magallanes
interchange where the other passengers were divested of their personal belongings, including the
jacket of passenger Rene Araneta. Thereafter, the robbers alighted at the Shell Gas Station near the
Magallanes Commercial Center after which Percival Tan and his passengers went to Fort Bonifacio to
report the crime. A CAPCOM team was forthwith formed to track down the culprits. Victim Rene
Araneta who went with the responding police officers, upon seeing four persons, one of whom was
wearing his stolen jacket, walking casually towards Fort Bonifacio, told the police authorities to accost
said persons. After the CAPCOM officers introduced themselves, the four men scampered to different
directions but three of them, namely, Tirso Acol, Pio Boses, and Albert Blanco, were apprehended.
Tirso Acol and Pio Boses were each found in possession of an unlicensed .38 caliber revolver with
bullets. After the arrest, the three men were brought to Fort Bonifacio and were identified by Percival
Tan and the passengers who ganged up on the accused.
To reinforce the theory of unauthorized possession of firearms, Sgt. Garcia presented a certification
(Exhibit I) issued by the Firearms and Explosives Unit stating that the accused are not licensed firearm
holders.
On the other hand, Pio Boses and Tirso Acol pleaded innocent to the charges levelled against them,
proferring a general denial.
Accused-appellant Pio Boses asserted on the witness stand that after establishing his residence at
Pasay City for about six months, he engaged in the business of vending "balut". During the incident in
question, he recalled that while so engaged in his trade, three persons allegedly acosted him, took his
money, "balut" and "penoy", and that he was thereafter brought to a cell where he was forced to
confess ownership of one gun which was shown to him. He nonetheless denied participation in the
hold up.
For his part, Tirso Acol, a laborer and at that time having resided in Metro Manila for about two
months, recollected that he spent the night at his cousin's house in Paraaque on September 28,
1990, and that he left Paraaque at around 5 in the morning of September 29, 1990. According to him,
the jeepney he was then riding developed engine trouble, and alighting therefrom he was arrested for
no apparent reason. When he was brought to the cell, he was allegedly coerced into admiting
possession of the other gun. Just like his co-accused, he too, denied knowledge of the hold up.
The court a quo was unpersuaded by these general denials, observing:
As can be gathered from the foregoing testimonies of the accused, the line of defense
they have adopted is one of denial. Indeed, they denied that the firearms and
ammunition in question were found in their persons in the early morning of September
29, 1989. They also denied the truth of the testimonies of Sgt. Faltado, Percival Tan,
and Rene Araneta. The defense however did not cite any valid reasons for the Court
not to give credence to the testimonies. In the circumstance, the Court is constrained to
consider the testimonies of the accused to be self-serving. In the face of the positive
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the Court can only take their denials with the
proverbial grain of salt. Verily, it is simply hard for the Court to believe that the accused
are simple provincial who are lost in the big city; that accused Pio Boses who is a
resident of Pasay City, does not know well-known places in Metro Manila such as the
South Super Highway and the Fort Bonifacio-Nichols interchange; that he did not know

the streets where he plied his trade as a balut vendor. Indeed, how can this be true
when he himself admitted that from 7:00 p.m. of September 28, 1989, he spent his time
walking in the street in the area and yet he never claimed he had ever lost his way.
The same is true with accused Tirso Acol. The Court is convinced that he lied on the
witness stand. He claimed that he was in the place where he was arrested because he
had just come from the residence of his cousin, Genny Acol, and the passenger
jeepney he had boarded on his way home just happened to break down at that place.
In the mind of the Court this alibi of the accused is too much of a coincidence, and too
convenient an excuse, for the Court to believe. In this connection, the Court notes his
testimony on cross examination that he was unable to get in touch with his relatives,
including Genny Acol, for possible assistance and to get Genny Acol to corroborate his
testimony, because the latter had already left for the province and that none of his other
relatives knew that he had been charged in this case. But when queried how he was
able to say this, he testified that he had written to his uncle and that he received a reply
letter from him and that it was from this reply letter of his uncle that he learned that
Genny Acol had already left for the province. This testimony of accused Tirso Acol, if it
accomplished anything, helped convinced the Court that he is given to lying. For sure, if
he had written to his uncle and that the latter had replied to him, it is plain that he must
have informed his uncle about the case and that the latter knew about the case and the
fact that he was in jail and needed help. In any event, established jurisprudence
dictates that between the positive testimonies of prosecution witnesses and the denials
of the accused the Court must place its reliance on the former. As a matter of fact,
jurisprudence also indicates that greater weight must be given to the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses when they are officers of the law. (People vs. Mostoles, Jr., 124
SCRA 906; People vs. Patog, 144 SCRA 129).
(pp. 21-22, Rollo.)
As initially intimated herein, Tirso Acol escaped from detention during the trial below, thus obviating
any review of his conviction, as indeed, even if he had appealed and thereafter escaped, he would be
considered as having abandoned his appeal (People vs. Quinitan, 197 SCRA 32 [1991]; Section 8,
Rule 124, Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure).
With respect to Pio Boses, he chose to articulate his protestation of innocence by claiming that the trial
court below erred:
I
. . . IN NOT GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE URGENT MOTION OF ACCUSED PIO
BOSES TO REOPEN THE CASE HENCE DEPRIVING HIM TO PRESENT HIS
WITNESSES WHOSE TESTIMONIES WOULD HAVE BEEN MATERIAL TO HIS
DEFENSE THEREBY AMOUNTING TO A DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS.
II
. . . IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF BOTH ACCUSED PIO
BOSES AND TIRSO ACOL; INSTEAD, IT RELIED SOLELY ON THE TESTIMONIES
OF THE PROSECUTION'S WITNESSES.
III

. . . IN ADMITTING THE PROSECUTIONS EVIDENCE CONSISTING OF EXHIBITS

"E", "F", "F-1" TO "F-5", "G", "G- 1" TO "G-5", SINCE THE ARRESTING OFFICERS
ADMITTED THEY WERE NOT ARMED WITH A WARRANT OF ARREST, NOR A
SEARCH WARRANT WHEN THEY CHASED AND FRISKED ACCUSEDAPPELLANTS AND PROCEEDED TO ARREST THEM.
IV
. . . IN CONVICTING BOTH ACCUSED AS THERE WAS NOT CLEAR SHOWING
THAT EXHIBITS "F", "F-1" TO "F-5", "G", "G-1" TO "G-4" WERE THE ONES USED BY
THE ROBBERS IN COMMITTING THE CRIME OF ROBBERY/HOLD UP.
(p. 1, Appellant's Brief; p. 60, Rollo.)
But the appeal leaves much to be desired.
It is axiomatic to the point of being elementary that herein accused- appellant can not feign denial of
due process where he had the opportunity to present his defense, through his own narration on the
witness stand (Domingo vs. Development Bank of the Philippines, 207 SCRA 766 [1992]; Gonzales
vs. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 595 [1992]. Withal, and as correctly pointed out by the People, the
omission of a party to present witnesses to corroborate the principal basis for exculpation, on account
of the witnesses' admitted tardiness in arriving in court, is a puerile proposition to support re-opening
of the case.
In regard to the second ascription aired by the accused-appellant, emphasis is laid on the fact that the
court a quo should have relied more on the explanation offered by the defense rather than giving
credence to the testimony of the People's witnesses. For one thing, accused- appellant asseverates
that they could not have been positively identified by Percival Tan and Rene Araneta considering that it
was then still dark when the accused boarded the jeep, up to the time they were apprehended. But
counsel for accused-appellant concedes that the jeep was lighted subject to the caveat that it was not
well lighted (p. 12, Brief for Accused-Appellant) which does not entirely foreclose positive identification
of the culprits who admittedly shared a ride with their victims and were thus seated within the closed
quarters of the jeepney. Moreover, it was established by the prosecution that Rene Araneta's jacket
was one of the items which was asported, that it was worn by one of the felons, and that the jacket
was recognized by Rene Araneta from a distance of 1-1/2 meters (p. 7, Brief for Accused-Appellant).
To lessen the impact of the affirmative statements uttered against accused- appellant, it is argued that
the immediate propensity of a criminal is to move out from the scene of the locus criminis and not
merely to walk casually within the vicinity. We said in People vs. Ocampo (G.R. No. 80262, September
1, 1993) that indeed, there can be no legal dispute to the legal proposition that flight from the scene of
the felony is one of the indicia of a guilty conscience, but it is equally true, we proceeded to say, that
culprits, in exceptional cases, have become bolder by returning to the scene of the crime to feign
innocence. At any rate, it has been repeatedly stressed by this Court that the factual findings of the
trial court and the conclusions drawn therefrom are accorded utmost respect since the magistrate at
the court of origin had the first hand impression of the demeanor and deportment of witnesses (People
vs. Lim, 206 SCRA 176 [1992]; People vs. Castillo, 208 SCRA 62).
With respect to the so-called warrantless arrest of accused--appellant, we are of the view that the
search falls within the purview of Section 5(b) of Rule 113 which serves as an exception to the
requisite warrant prior to arrest:

When an offense has in fact been committed, and the has

personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
inasmuch as the police team was formed and dispatched to look for the persons responsible for the
crime on account of the information related by Percival Tan and Rene Araneta that they had just been
robbed (People vs. Gerente, 219 SCRA 756 [1993]; People vs. Tonog, Jr., 205 SCRA 772 [1992]). And
since accused-appellant's arrest was lawful, it follows that the search made incidental thereto was
valid (People vs. Tanilon, 221 SCRA 671 [1993]). Moreover, the unlicensed firearms were found when
the police team apprehended the accused for the robbery and not for illegal possession of firearms
and ammunition (People vs. Cruz, 165 SCRA 135 [1988]). The principle imparted by Justice Padilla in
Cruz was based on the ruling of this Court in Magoncia vs. Palacio (90 Phil. 771 [1948]) that:
. . . When, in pursuing an illegal action or in the commission of a criminal offense, the
offending police officers should happen to discover a criminal offense being committed
by any person, they are not precluded from performing their duties as police officers for
the apprehension of the guilty person and the taking of the corpus delicti.
Nonetheless, the penalty of "reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment" as erroneously imposed by the
lower court must be modified to read only as reclusion perpetua, as provided by Section 1 of
Presidential Decree No. 1866, said penalty being distinct from life imprisonment.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed with the slight modification that the
proper penalty to be imposed is reclusion perpetua. Further, the court orders the forfeiture of the
firearms and other incidental paraphernalia in favor of the Philippine National Police to be disposed of
in accordance with law.
No pronouncement is made as to costs.
SO ORDERED

iiiPEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
IGNACIO TONOG, JR., alias ABDUL TONOG, ALLAN SOLAMILLO, "JOHN DOE" and "PETER DOE",
accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Eduardo T. Sedillo for accused-appellants.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Charged along with three (3) others, Ignacio Tonog, Jr., alias "Abdul" was convicted of Murder and
sentenced to reclusion perpetua in a Decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete
City, Branch XXXIV, 1 promulgated on 3 July 1990. He is now before us, seeking a reversal. The cases
against his co-accused, Allan Solamillo and two (2) other unidentified individuals, were archived as the
latter three have eluded arrest and have yet to be apprehended.

The evidence of the prosecution linking the accused-appellant to the crime charged discloses that on
25 April 1988, at around 6:00 o'clock in the morning, the Dumaguete City Police Station received a
report that there was a "lifeless person found lying at the crossing of Cantil-e, Dumaguete City" (TSN,
6 January 1989, p. 6). The deceased, who had stab wounds all over his body, was later identified as
Efren Flores, son of the Deputy Station Commander of the Dumaguete City Police Force (Id., pp. 2-3).
That same morning, after receiving the report, Patrolman Walter Leguarda went to the place where the
body was found and conducted an investigation. He learned from his investigation that a "motorcab"
with side car number 0164 had stopped near the place where the deceased was found. His
investigation likewise revealed that "the person responsible for the death of Efren Flores was a certain
Abdul Tonog of Bacong, Negros Oriental" (Id., p. 6). Pat. Leguarda based his conclusion principally
from the information given to him by one Liberato Solamillo (Id., p. 12). He was also informed by the
girlfriend of Abdul Tonog's co-accused, Allan Solamillo, that prior to the stabbing incident, "there were
grudges between Efren Flores and Abdul Tonog" (Id., p. 9).
In the afternoon of that same day, 25 April 1988, Pat. Leguarda, together with P/Sgt, Orlando Patricio
and other police operatives, without a warrant (Id., p. 13), "proceeded to Bacong, Negros Oriental, to
look for and effect the apprehension of Abdul Tonog," (Id., pp. 6-7) who, upon being "invited for
questioning," voluntarily went with the law enforcers to the police station, unaccompanied by counsel
(Id., p. 13).
P/Sgt. Patricio narrated that while they were on their way to the police station on board the patrol jeep,
he noticed the presence of blood stains on the pants of the Accused-appellant. When asked where the
stains came from, the latter allegedly answered that they were blood stains from a pig (TSN, July 12,
1989, pp. 4-5). He was then requested to take off his pants for examination at the PC/INP Crime
Laboratory in Cebu, to which request, he supposedly acceded upon reaching the police station (Id).
Also at the police station, the Accused-appellant cried and looked for the Station Commander. He then
confessed to the officer-in-charge of the police station (TSN, January 6, 1989, p. 7), which confession
was not recorded nor reduced to writing (Id., p. 14). He admitted that he was one of the assailants of
Efren Flores and that he used his Batangas knife (Id., p. 7).
After about a month, due to lack of funds, Policewoman Vilma Beltran brought and turned over the
"blood-stained" pants and stainless knife, which was recovered by Pat. Patricio from the grassy
portion where the deceased was found (TSN, July 12, 1989, p. 15), to the PC/INP Crime Laboratory in
Cebu (TSN, August 23, 1989, p. 4).
The. forensic chemist thereat affirmed that the blood stains found on the pants of the Accusedappellant and those on the stainless knife were of type "O" (Id., p. 14), the same as the victim's blood
type (TSN, December 4, 1989, p.3).
Liberato Solamillo, whom Pat. Leguarda had investigated, was likewise called to testify. He attested
that around 7:00 o'clock in the evening of 24 April 1988, he was drinking with the Accused-appellant
and the latter's co-accused, Allan Solamillo, at Nora's Store located in Bacong, Negros Oriental (TSN,
February 20, 1989, pp. 2-3). Accused-appellant then left at around 9:30 p.m. together with a certain
Patrolman Biyok on the latter's motorcycle (Id., pp. 6-7). At 11:00 o'clock that evening, Allan and
Liberato then headed for Pat. Biyok's house to look for the Accused-appellant. They rode on a
"motorcab" with side car number 0164, the "motorcab" regularly driven by Allan. Upon reaching Pat.
Biyok's house, they were informed that the Accused-appellant was not there. They then saw the
victim, Efren Flores, who requested that he be conveyed to Dumaguete City (Id., p. 8).

Allan asked Liberato to stay behind so that the former could take Efren Flores to Dumaguete City.
Liberato stayed behind and conversed with Pat. Biyok until 11:45 that evening. After Allan failed to
return, Liberato decided to ride with a certain Gorio, who happened to pass by, on the latter's
"pedicab" (TSN, March 8, 1989, p. 3).
On his way home, Liberato saw the "motorcab" with side car number 0164 parked outside a store. He
alighted from Gorio's "pedicab" and proceeded to where the "motorcab" was. He saw Accusedappellant, Abdul Tonog, inside the "motorcab." He then heard Allan tell Elvis Bueno, son of the owner
of the store: "Kuha na gyod, "Vis."" (He is already taken, "Vis.") (Id., pp. 4-5). He also noticed the
presence of blood stains (many red spots) on Allan's fatigue shirt, which was not the same shirt the
latter was wearing when they were drinking. Allan then allegedly got angry when asked why there
seemed to be red spots on his shirt (Id., p. 6).
The City Health Officer also took the witness stand. It was he who examined the body of the
deceased. His findings revealed that the corpse of victim, Efren Flores, had twenty-seven (27)
wounds, several of which were fatal, and which may have been caused by a long sharp-bladed
instrument (TSN, May 25, 1989, pp. 3-6).
For his part, Accused-appellant categorically denied having had anything to do with the victim's death.
He asseverated that at around 7:00 o'clock in the evening of 24 April 1988, he was drinking with his
co-accused, Allan Solamillo and prosecution witness, Liberato Solamillo, at Nora's Store in Bacong.
During the drinking spree, a heated argument ensued between him and Allan, prompting the latter to
fire his gun. Accused-appellant immediately left the place to look for a policeman who could arrest
Allan and confiscate the latter's gun (TSN, February 13, 1990, p. 9). Some policemen arrived but
failed to find Allan's gun.
Afraid to spend the night in Bacong, where he shares his place with Allan, Accused-appellant, at
around 9:30 p.m., requested Pat. Biyok to convey him to Tinago where he could stay for the night (Id.).
Upon arrival at Tinago, he immediately slept and woke up at 7:00 o'clock the following morning.
Later that afternoon, after Liberato Solamillo pointed to Accused-appellant and told the policemen:
"That fellow is Abdul. He is Abdul" (Id., p. 10), he was taken to the Dumaguete City Police Station and
detained. He disavowed having had any conversation with any policeman on their way to the police
station (Id.).
Accused-appellant averred that at the police station, he was told to admit the killing of Efren Flores.
The police authorities also ordered him to take off his pants (Id., p. 21). He vehemently denied that his
trousers were stained with blood (Id., pp. 11, 21). He also denied having known or having met the
victim (Id., p. 12).
After trial, the Court a quo rejected the alleged Accused-appelant's extra-judicial confession, as the
latter was not represented by counsel and because it had not been reduced to writing. Nonetheless,
on the basis of circumstantial evidence, it rendered a judgment of conviction, the dispositive portion of
which is quoted hereunder:
WHEREFORE, the accused Ignacio Tonog, Jr., alias "Abdul" Tonog is hereby found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and the court hereby imposes
on him the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
Accused is likewise ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased victim the sum of
THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00) and to pay the costs.

The case filed against his co-accused Allan Solamillo and two other unidentified
individuals are hereby ordered archived, without prejudice to their further prosecution,
considering that until this time they have not yet been apprehended and still remain at
large. (Rollo, pp. 180-181)
Accused-appellant, still professing innocence, now faults the Trial Court for admitting in evidence his
"acid-washed maong" pants and the stainless knife; in declaring that sufficient circumstantial evidence
was adduced to warrant his conviction; in concluding that the presumption of innocence in his favor
has been overcome; in holding that the killing of the victim was attended by the qualifying
circumstance of cruelty; and in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of the use of a motor
vehicle in the commission of the crime (Appellant's Brief, pp.
3-4).
Except for the aggravating circumstances considered, we find ourselves in disagreement.
The "acid-washed maong" pants (Exh. D) were admissible in evidence, They were taken from
Accused-appellant as an incident of his arrest. It may be that the police officers were not armed with a
warrant when they apprehended Accused-Appellant. The warrantless arrest, however, was justified
under Section 5(b), Rule 133 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure providing that a peace officer
may, without a warrant, arrest a person "when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it." In this case,
Pat. Leguarda, in effecting the arrest of Accused-appellant, had knowledge of facts gathered by him
personally in the course of his investigation indicating that Accused-appellant was one of the
perpetrators.
The "maong" pants having been taken from Accused-appellant as an incident to a lawful arrest, no
infirmity may be attributed to their seizure without a warrant. Section 12 of Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court explicitly provides that "A person charges with an offense may be searched for dangerous
weapons or any thing which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense."
We come now to the threshold question of whether or not there was sufficient circumstantial evidence
to warrant Accused-appellant's conviction, enough to overcome the presumption of innocence in his
favor.
It is undisputed that there was no eyewitness to the crime, But it is also well-settled that guilt may be
established through circumstantial evidence. Direct evidence is not always necessary to prove the
guilt of the accused (People v. Aldeguer, No. 47991, April 3, 1990, 184 SCRA 1 at 10, citing People v.
Roa, No. 78052, November 8, 1988, 163 SCRA 783). For circumstantial evidence to succeed , the
following requisites must be present, namely: (1) there must be more than one circumstance; (2) the
inferences must be based on proven facts; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances produces
a conviction beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused (Sec. 5, Rule 133, Rules of Court;
People v. Alcantara, No. L-74737, 29 July 1988, 163 SCRA 783 at 786).
Furthermore, in determining the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to support a conviction, each
case is to be determined on its own peculiar set-up and all the facts and circumstances are to be
considered as a whole and, when so considered, may be sufficient to support a conviction, although
one or more of the facts taken separately would not be sufficient for this purpose (People v. Jora, Nos.
L-61356-57, September 30, 1986, citing 23 CJS p. 555).
The foregoing requisites have been met. The chain of events circumstantially point to Accusedappellant's guilt.

As testified to by prosecution witness, Liberato Solamillo, he, Accused-appellant, and Allan Solamillo
were drinking together in the evening of 24 April 1988 at around 7:00 P.M. Accused-appellant left at
around 9:30 P.M. together with Pat. Biyok on the latter's motorcycle. At around 11:00 P.M., because
Accused-appellant had not yet returned, Liberato and Allan headed for Pat. Biyok's house to look for
him (Accused-appellant). They rode on a "motorcab" with side car number 0164, the "motorcab"
regularly driven by Allan for hire. They did not find Accused-appellant at that house. They then saw the
victim, Efren Flores, hail a pedicab to go to Dumaguete City.
Allan obliged, using the "motorcab" with side car number 0164, and drove off with the victim. In doing
so, Allan asked Liberate to stay behind. The latter did as bidded and conversed with Pat. Biyok until
11:45 that evening. Since Allan failed to return, Liberato decided to go home and ride with a certain
Gorio, who happened to pass by, on the latter's pedicab.
Notably, within that span of time, both Accused-appellant and Allan had mysteriously disappeared from
the group of Pat. Biyok and Liberato, who continued trying to trail their whereabouts.
On his way home, Liberato saw the "motorcab" with side car number 0164, which was used by Allan to
transport the victim, parked outside a store. He alighted from Gorio's pedicab and proceeded to where
the "motorcab" was. He saw Accused-appellant seated therein. He also saw Allan inside the store
buying sardines and Pepsi. He then heard Allan tell one Elvis Bueno, son of the storeowner: "Kuha na
gyod, Vis." (He is already taken, "Vis"). Then Liberato noticed the presence of blood stains on Allan's
fatigue shirt, which was not the same shirt the latter was wearing when they were drinking. When
queried on why there seemed to be red spots on his shirt, Allan reacted angrily.
As the events unfolded, it is evident that Accused-appellant and Allan had been together during the
time that each one separately disappeared from Liberato's sight during which period they had done
away with the victim. The victim was last seen with Allan in the latter's "motorcab." That was around
11:00 o'clock in the evening. Liberato waited for him to return. He never did. Roughly around midnight,
the same "motorcab" was seen outside a store. Accused-appellant was in it, while Allan was in the
store buying some items. Blood stains were noticed on Allan's shirt. Later, at the police station, blood
spots were also seen on Accused-appellant's pants. The latter tried to conceal the crime by stating
that the blood spots were those of a pig. Unwittingly, therefore, he admitted the presence of those
stains except that he attributed them to some other cause.
Note should also be taken of the proven fact that investigation by Pat. Leguarda revealed that the
"motorcab" with side car number 0164, the vehicle that Allan drove with the victim as his passenger,
was seen near the spot where the victim's body was discovered. This lead enabled Pat. Leguarda to
zero in on two suspects, Accused-appellant and Allan, which eventually led to the apprehension of the
former the very same day.
Most telling of all is the proven fact that laboratory examination at the PC/INP Crime Laboratory of the
blood stains on Accused-appellant's "acid-washed maong pants" revealed that they were positive for
human blood, type "O", the same blood type as that of the victim (Exh. "J"). Again of significance is
another proven fact that the stainless knife recovered from the crime scene, upon similar laboratory
examination, exhibited blood stains of the same blood-type "O".
While it may be that Accused-appellant had denied that his pants had blood stains, he nevertheless
admitted that the pants subjected to laboratory testing and presented by the prosecution in this case
were the same pair he wore in the evening when he was drinking with Allan and Liberato and on the
following day when he was brought to the police station.

The foregoing circumstances, considered as a whole, and the inferences from which are derived from
proven facts, constitute an unbroken chain that point to no other rational hypothesis except that of guilt
of Accused-Appellant (People v. Jara, supra).
Liberato's credibility has not been overcome. On the contrary, as testified to by him, Accused-appellant
admitted that he, Liberato and Allan had a drinking spree in the early evening of 24 April 1988.
Accused-appellant's testimony, however, that he and Allan had a heated argument at the time and that
Allan had fired a gun is belied by the fact that the police did not find such a gun on Allan's person,
according to Accused-appellant's own version. Furthermore, Accused-appellant's declaration that he
became afraid of Allan, by reason of his having fired a gun, is negated by the circumstance that they
were together in front of a store at around midnight in the evening of 24 April 1988 and had eaten
together thereafter.
As found by the Trial Court, there is no reason for Liberato to concoct a false story incriminating his
cousin, Allan, and Accused-appellant, an acquaintance of his.
We agree with the defense, however, that the aggravating circumstance of cruelty should not have
been appreciated by the Trial Court. For this aggravating circumstance to be appreciated, it is
essential "that the wrong done in the commission of the crime be deliberately augmented by causing
other wrong not necessary for its commission" (Art. 14 (21), Revised Penal Code). There having been
no eyewitness to the commission of the crime, it can not justifiably be concluded that the wrong done
had been deliberately augmented. The mere fact that wounds in excess of that necessary to cause
death were inflicted upon the body of the victim does not necessarily imply that such wounds were
inflicted with cruelty and with the intention of deliberately and inhumanly increasing the sufferings of
the victim (People v. Siblag, 37 Phil. 703 [1918]). It is necessary to show that the accused deliberately
and inhumanly increased the victim's sufferings (People v. Luna, No. L-28812, July 31, 1974, 58
SCRA 198; People v. Manzano, Nos. L-33643-44, July 31, 1974, 58 SCRA 250). The number of
wounds is not the criterion for the appreciation of cruelty as an aggravating circumstance (Ibid.).
The aggravating circumstance of use of a motor vehicle should neither be appreciated, the same not
having been indubitably proven under the environmental facts of the case.
What may be appreciated, however, is the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength,
also charged in the Information. There is ample evidence to show that two individuals, one of them
Accused-appellant, armed with a knife, attacked a single person, the victim. It is obvious that the
perpetrators of this crime took advantage of their combined strength in order to consummate the
offense. By reason of their superiority, not only in numbers but also in weaponry, they were able to
inflict twenty-seven (27) stab wounds, fourteen (14) of which were fatal.
In fine, Accused-appellant's conviction for the crime of Murder is proper. The indemnity to the heirs of
the victim, however, should be increased to P50,000.00 in line with current jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, except with respect to the
indemnity, which is hereby increased to 50,000.00. Costs against accused-appellant, Ignacio Tonog,
Jr.
SO ORDERED.

iv
v
vi
vii
viii
ixPeople vs. Burgos (G.R. No. L-68955 September 4, 1986)
G.R. No. L-68955 September 4, 1986
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RUBEN BURGOS y TITO, defendant-appellant.
Facts: Defendant is charged with illegal possession of firearm in furtherance of subversion (tasks such
as recruiting members to the NPA and collection of contributions from its members) and found guilty
by the RTC of Digos, Davao del Sur. From the information filed by the police authorities upon the
information given by Masamlok, allegedly a man defendant tried to recruit into the NPA, the police
authorities arrest defendant and had his house searched. Subsequently, certain NPA-related
documents and a firearm, allegedly issued and used by one Alias Cmdr. Pol of the NPA, are
confiscated. Defendant denies being involved in any subversive activities and claims that he has been
tortured in order to accept ownership of subject firearm and that his alleged extrajudicial statements
have been made only under fear, threat and intimidation on his person and his family. He avers that
his arrest is unlawful as it is done without valid warrant, that the trial court erred in holding the search
warrant in his house for the firearm lawful, and that the trial court erred in holding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for violation of PD 9 in relation to GOs 6and 7.
Issue: If defendants arrest, the search of his home, and the subsequent confiscation of a firearm and
several NPA-related documents are lawful.
Held: Records disclose that when the police went to defendants house to arrest him upon the
information given by Masamlok, they had neither search nor arrest warrant with themin wanton
violation of ArtIV, Sec 3 (now Art III, sec 2). As the Court held in Villanueva vs Querubin, the state,
however powerful, doesnt have access to a mans home, his haven of refuge where his individuality
can assert itself in his choice of welcome and in the kind of objects he wants around him. In the
traditional formulation, a mans house, however humble, is his castle, and thus is outlawed any
unwarranted intrusion by the government.
The trial court justified the warrantless arrest under Rule 113 Sec 6 of the RoC:
a)
b)
c)

When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to commit an
offense in his presence;
When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to believe that the
person to be arrested has committed it;
When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another
and the confiscation of the firearm under Rule 126, Sec 12:
A person charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be
used as proof of the commission of the offense.
However, the trial court has erred in its conclusion that said warrantless arrest is under the ambit of
aforementioned RoC. At the time of defendants arrest, he wasnt in actual possession of any firearm
or subversive document, and was not committing any subversive acthe was plowing his field. It is
not enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a
crime in a warrantless arrest. An essential precondition is that a crime must have beenin fact or

actually have been committed first; it isnt enough to suspect a crime may have been committed. The
test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator. The Court also finds no
compelling reason for the haste with which the arresting officers sought to arrest the accused. We fail
to see why they failed to first go through the process of obtaining a warrant of arrest, if indeed they
had reasonable ground to believe that the accused had truly committed a crime. There is no showing
that there was a real apprehension that the accused was on the verge of flight or escape. Likewise,
there is no showing that the whereabouts of the accused were unknown.
In proving the ownership of the questioned firearm and alleged subversive documents, assuming they
were really illegal, the defendant was never informed of his constitutional rights at the time of his
arrest; thus the admissions obtained are in violation of the constitutional right against self-incrimination
under Sec 20 Art IV (now Sec 12, Art III) and thus inadmissible as evidence.
Furthermore, the defendant was not accorded his constitutional right to be assisted by counsel during
the custodial interrogation. His extra-judicial confession, the firearm, and the alleged subversive
documents are all inadmissible as evidence. In light of the aforementioned, defendant is acquitted on
grounds of reasonable doubt of the crime with which he has been charged. Subject firearm and
alleged subversive documents have been disposed of in accordance with law.
The Court also maintains that violations of human rights do not help in overcoming a rebellion.
Reiterating Morales vs Enrile, while the government should continue to repel the communists, the
subversives, the rebels, and the lawless with the means at its command, it should always be
remembered that whatever action is taken must always be within the framework of our Constitution
and our laws.
x

xiRepublic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 72564 April 15, 1988
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANITA CLAUDIO Y BAGTANG, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Romeo C. Alinea for accused-appellant.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch 73 finding the
accused Anita Claudio y Bagtang guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sec. 4, Rep. Act No.
6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended) and sentencing her to serve the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, to pay a fine of P 20,000.00, and to pay the costs.
The information filed against the accused alleged:

That on or about the 21st day of July 1981, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named ACCUSED without
being lawfully authorized, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly transport
1.1 kilos of Marijuana dried leaves, which are prohibited drugs for the purpose of selling
the same from Baguio City to Olongapo City. (Rollo, p. 13)
The lower court established her guilt beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of the prosecution's
evidence as follows:
To prove the guilt of the accused, the prosecution offered the following document and
testimonial evidence as follows: Exhibit "A" Letter request for Examination of suspected
marijuana dried leaves weighing approximately 1.1 kilos dated July 25, 1981; "B"
plastic container; "B- 1"-marijuana contained in the plastic container; "B-1-a"another
plastic container; "C"Chemistry Report No. D-668-81;"C-1" Findings: Positive for
marijuana; "D,","D-1," "D-2"and "D-3; "E" and "E-1" photographs of accused with Pat.
Daniel Obia and Pauline Tiongco showing the marijuana, "F"Victory Liner Ticket No.
84977;"G"Sworn Statement of Pat. Daniel Obia, "H" Request for Field Test on
suspected marijuana from accused by P/Lt. Antonio V. Galindo;"H-1"date of of the
request; "L"Certificate of Field Test dated July 22, 1981; "B-2" and "B-2a" additional
Wrapping paper; and the testimonies of witnesses of the prosecution, Theresa Ann
Bugayong; Pat. Daniel Obio, Cpl. Paulino Tiongco, Cpl. Ernesto Abello and Sgt.
Leoncio Bagang.
Theresa Ann Bugayong22 years old, single, Forensic Chemist and a resident of 1150
Sampaloc, Metro Manila testified that she received a request from the Task Force
Bagong Buhay, Olongapo City, dated July 25, 1981, on specimen marijuana submitted
for examination. The specimen consisted of 900 grams of suspected dried marijuana
flowering tops wrapped in a newspaper placed in a plastic bag with a marking "MB
Store" (Exh. "B").
The examination conducted by her proved to be positive for marijuana. After her
examination, she prepared Chemistry Report No. D-668-81 dated July 29,1981 (Exhs.
"C" and "C-l"). She conducted three eliminations; microscopic examination, the
duguenoi levine test and thirdly, the confirmatory examination of thin layer
chromatographic test. The said specimen was submitted to them by OIC Danilo
Santiago, a representative of the CANU, Olongapo City.
The second witness for the prosecution was Daniel Obia, 37 years old, married,
policeman and residing at 34 Corpuz St., East Tapinac, Olongapo City. Obia testified
that he has been a member of the INP, since 1970 up to the present. He was assigned
in June, 1972 at the Investigation Division as operative. His job then was among other
things to follow up reports in their office, recover stolen items and apprehend suspects.
On July 21,1981, he was on Detached Service with the ANTI-NARCOTICS Unit; and
that on that date, he came from Baguio City and arrived in Olongapo City at about 1:30
o'clock in the afternoon having left Baguio at about 8:30 o'clock in the morning. He took
the Victory Liner in going back to Olongapo City. His family lives in Baguio City. On
board the Victory Liner, he was seated on the second seat at the back. While he was
thus seated, suspect Anita Claudio boarded the same bus and took the seat in front of
him after putting a bag which she was carrying at the back of the seat of Obia. The
bag placed by suspect behind his seat was a wooven buri bag made of plastic
containing some vegetables. The act of the accused putting her bag behind Pat.
Obia's seat aroused his suspicion and made him felt (sic) nervous. With the feeling

that there was some unusual, he had the urge to search the woven plastic bag. But it
was only at San Fernando, Pampanga when he was able to go to the bag. He inserted
one of his fingers in a plastic bag located at the bottom of the woven bag and smelt
marijuana. The plastic woven bag appearing to contain camote tops on the top has a
big bundle of plastic of marijuana at the bottom. He could recognize the smell of
marijuana because he was assigned at that time at the ANTI-NARCOTICS Unit. He did
not, however, do anything after he discovered that there was marijuana inside the
plastic bag of the accused until they reached Olongapo City and the accused alighted
from the bus in front of the Caltex Gasoline Station in Sta. Rita. Right after the accused
alighted from the bus, policeman Obina intercepted her and showed her his Id
Identifying himself as a policeman and told her he will search her bag because of the
suspicion that she was carrying marijuana inside said bag. In reply, accused told him,
"Please go with me, let us settle this at home." However, the witness did not heed her
plea and instead handcuffed her right hand and with her, boarded a tricycle right away
and brought the suspect to the police headquarters with her bag appearing to contain
vegetables.
At the police headquarters Investigation Section, the bag was searched in the presence
of Investigator Cpl. Tiongco; Pat. Obia, the accused and Sgt. Leoncio Bagang. Inside
the plastic bag was found a big bundle of plastic containing marijuana weighing about
one kilo. Witness stated that he could detect marijuana even before the application of
chemicals because of one year and a half assignment with the CANU. After the
marijuana was taken from the bag of the accused, photographs were taken of the
accused and the marijuana confiscated from her possession with Pat. Obia and that of
Investigator Tiongco, accused and himself Identified photographs shown to him in open
Court. (Exhs. "D," "D-l," "D-2" and "D-3"). Witness was likewise shown a plastic bag of
marijuana contained in a plastic container (Exhs. "B," "B-1" and "B-1 -a") and Identified
it as the one confiscated from the accused and pointed to his initials on the newspaper
wrapping which also shows the date and time, although the wrapper at the time he
testified appeared to be soiled already. The marijuana was allegedly still fresh when
confiscated.
To prove further that the accused transported the confiscated marijuana from Baguio
City to Olongapo City, witness Identified Victory Liner Ticket No. 684977 which was
confiscated from the accused and for Identification purposes, the witness presented the
body number of the bus he wrote at the back of the ticket which is "309" (Exhs. "F" and
"F-l"). Regarding himself, he did not pay his fare from Baguio City because as a
policeman, he used his badge and a free ride.
On cross-examination, witness stated that he went to Baguio City on July 15,1981 and
underwent treatment of his heart while he was there. He was given a furlough for
medical treatment. He stayed in Baguio City for about five days and returned to
Olongapo City on July 21, 1981. Prior to July 21, 1981, witness never knew the
accused, and the first time he saw her was in Baguio when she boarded the same
Victory Liner he took. When the accused who was bringing with her a woven plastic bag
placed the bag right behind his seat instead of placing it in front of her or beside her
seat. Witness Obia became suspicious and his suspicion was confirmed when they
reached San Fernando, Pampanga, after he checked the buri bag. The bus stopped at
said town to load some gasoline. Witness inserted one of his fingers inside the buri bag
and thereafter smelt marijuana. He confirmed his testimony on direct that when witness
confronted accused he was invited to go with her in order to settle the matter to which
he refused. Accused further testified that from the time the accused placed her bag

behind his seat from Baguio City, he felt so nervous and had to take his medicine at the
Tarlac Station. It was only after having taken his medicine that his apprehension was
contained and thus was able to insert his right hand inside the buri bag in San
Fernando, Pampanga. His fingers reached the very bottom of the bag. He Identified his
sworn statement regarding this incident given on July 21, 1981 which is Exhibit "G."
Witness likewise Identified accused Anita Claudio in open court.
Paulino Tiongco, 52 years old, married and resident of 31 Canada St., East Bajac
Bajac, Olongapo City, testified that as a policeman on the afternoon of July 21, 1981,
he was inside the Investigation Division of the Police Station, Olongapo City. As Duty
Investigator, between 1:45 and 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, Pat.
Daniel Obia arrived at the Police Station with a woman and Identified her in the
courtroom as Anita Claudio. Pat. Obia reported to him that he apprehended Anita
Claudio inside the Victory Liner bus for possession of marijuana dried leaves. The
marijuana leaves were contained in a buri bag with some vegetables such as camote
tops, bananas and some other vegetables. The marijuana was placed in a plastic
wrapper with the name National Book Store colored black and white. Witness Identified
the wrapper (Exh. "B-2"). The bag contained the markings of Pat. Obia which are his
initials, (Exhs. "B-2-a"), and numbers 210781 representing the date which was placed
by Pat. Obia after Cpl. Tiongco examined the suspected marijuana.
After examining and seeing the marijuana together with the vegetables, he interviewed
apprehending officer Obia and reduced his statements in writing. Cpl. Tiongco
Identifled the sworn statement of Obia (Exh. "G"). He also interviewed accused Anita
Claudio who was all the while inside the Investigation room seated on a chair. After
appraising her of her constitutional rights, he asked the accused whether she was
willing to give her written statements to which the accused refused. Hence, no
statements were taken of her. However, pictures were taken inside the investigation
room. Exhs. "D" and "E," series which were already previously Identified by Pat. Obia,
Witness Identified the persons appearing in the pictures as that of Pat. Obia and the
accused and also of himself. Thereafter, the marijuana contained in the plastic bag
were turned over to Lt. Galindo and Anita Claudio was detained.
Ernesto Abello, 41 years old, married and residing at No. 29 Alba Street, East Tapinac,
Olongapo City, testified he was since March 1972 a policeman and was stationed at
Police Station 21, Olongapo City, Metrodiscom. However, in 1981, he was already
assigned to the CANU General Anti-NARCOTICS Unit. On July 22, 1981, he reported
for work at the CANU and received from Lt. Galindo more than a kilo of suspected
marijuana dried leaves. As requested by Lt. Galindo he conducted a field test on this
marijuana which he received from Lt. Galindo, as evidenced by a request signed by him
dated July 22,1981 (Exh. "H").
In connection with the field test conducted by him on the specimen, he prepared a
Certificate of Fleld Test dated July 22,1981 (Exhs. "I"). The Certificate of Field Test
indicated the presence of tetra-hydrocannabinol (THC), an active substance that can be
only be found in marijuana, a prohibited drug. Cpl. Abello Identified a plastic bag of
marijuana received from Lt. Galindo which he later give to CIC Danilo Santiago, the
Evidence Custodian, for the latter to bring the specimen to the PC Crime Laboratory.
The last witness for the prosecution was Leoncio Bagang, 40 years old, married,
residing at No. 27 Jones St., East Tapinac, Olongapo City, a policeman of Olongapo
City, assigned with Police Station "21." He has been a policeman since 1966 up to the

present. In July, 1981, he was then assigned at the Patrol Division and his duty was to
patrol the city proper from Magsaysay Drive up to east Bajac Bajac.
He narrated that on July 21,1981, between the hours of 1:00 and 2:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, he was at the Caltex Gasoline Station, East Bajac Bajac, Olongapo City
along Rizal Avenue. He was then on duty patrol using a motorcycle. While he was at
the said place, he saw Pat. Obia alighted from the Victory Liner bus ordering
somebody to alight from the same bus. When he heard Pat. Obia he approached him
and asked him what was happening. Pat. Obia told him he apprehended a certain
woman possessing dried marijuana. The woman was still then inside the bus. Pat.
Obia then brought the woman to the police department who was bringing with her a
buri bag. They boarded a tricycle, the woman riding inside the tricycle while Pat. Obia
sat behind the driver. He then followed in his motorcycle the said tricycle to police
station. He went inside the Investigation Section of the Police Station and he was there
when Pat. Obia reported to Cpl. Tiongco his apprehension of the woman possessing
marijuana. He saw the marijuana for the first time inside the Investigation Section
placed in a buri bag covered with newspaper. He witnessed the taking out of the
marijuana from inside the bag by Pat. Obia in the presence of Cpl. Tiongco and the
woman or the accused in this case, and himself. Policeman Bagang Identified the
accused in open Court. When asked about the nature of the marijuana when it was
brought out from the bag, he said that the marijuana was dried but not well dried. Aside
from the marijuana inside the buri bag, there were vegetables and bananas, Witness
Identified in open Court, the marijuana he saw found in the buri bag of the accused. His
means of Identification was the signature of Pat. Obia, (Exh. "B-1"). He likewise
Identified a newspaper wrapping which was already torn.
While in the Investigation Division, witness Bagang heard the accused's answer to Cpl.
Tiongco's questions that she was going to deliver the marijuana to Sta. Rita. He,
however, did not linger long at the investigation Division. After he saw the marijuana
and heard the answer of the accused to Cpl. Tiongcos question the place of delivery of
the marijuana, he left the police station. Witness likewise Identified an initial DO-21-0781 already marked as Exhibit "B-2." DO which is an initial, and not a signature, stands
for Daniel Obia. After the testimony of Leoncio Bagang, the prosecution rested its
case. (Rollo, pp. 42-47)
Accused Claudio raised the following assignments of errors in this appeal:
I
CONVICTION UNDER SECTION 4, ART. II OF R.A. 6425 IS IMPROPER IF ONE OR
SOME OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE IS OR ARE ABSENT.
II
CONVICTION CAN NOT BE HAD UNDER SECTION 4, ART. II OF R.A. 6425 IF THE
ALLEGED BUYMAN WAS NOT PRESENTED TO TESTIFY.
III
APPELLANTS CONVICTION FOR DELIVERY (SEC. 4, ART II, OF R.A. 6424) IS
WRONG BECAUSE SOME MATERIAL FACTS WERE OVERLOOKED AND NOT

CONSIDERED IN FAVOR OF APPELLANT. (Rollo, p. 91)

The accused alleges that she is only liable, at the most, for possession under Sec. 8, Art. II of Rep. Act
No. 6425 and not for violating Sec. 4 of the same Act.
The latter section, Sec. 4 provides:
Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited
Drugs.The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty
thousand to thirty thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless
authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute,
dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of
such transactions. If the victim of the offense is a minor, or should a prohibited drug
involved in any offense under this Section be the proximate cause of the death of a
victim thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed.
Claudio contends that there was no delivery as there was no recipient of the prohibited drugs.
Therefore, she may not be convicted under Sec. 4 of Rep. Act No. 6425.
The contention is without merit. A closer perusal of the subject provision shows that it is not only
delivery which is penalized but also the sale, administration, distribution and transportation of
probihited drugs. Claudio was caught transporting 1.1 kilos of marijuana, thus the lower court did not
err in finding her guilty of violating Sec. 4.
The accused also alleges that before the completion of delivery, the intention of the possessor is
unknown.
This allegation is also unavailing. It is undisputed that Claudio had in her possession 1.1 kilos of
marijuana. This is a considerable quantity. As held in the case of People v. Toledo, (140 SCRA 259,
267) "the possession of such considerable quantity as three plastic bags of marijuana leaves and
seeds coupled with the fact that he is not a user of prohibited drugs cannot indicate anything except
the intention of the accused to sell, distribute and deliver said marijuana.
The accused next contends the warrantless search, seizure and apprehension as unlawful.
The applicable provisions on this issue are found in the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) of the said Rules provides:
.. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
xxx xxx xxx
Meanwhile, its Rule 126, Sec. 12 provides:
Section 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the

commission of an offense, without a search warrant. (12a)

Appellant Claudio was caught transporting prohibited drugs. Pat. Daniel Obia did not need a warrant
to arrest Claudio as the latter was caught in flagrante delicto. The warrantless search being an
incident to a lawful arrest is in itself lawful. (Nolasco v. Pano, 147 SCRA 509). Therefore, there was no
infirmity in the seizure of the 1.1 kilos of marijuana.
The accused takes inconsistent positions in her appellant's brief. At first, she does not deny having
had with her marijuana at the time of her arrest. Instead, she claims that she should just be guilty of
possession. In a complete turnabout, in the latter portion of said brief, she claims that the evidence
against her were mere fabrications and the marijuana allegedly found in her possession was only
planted.
We have carefully examined the records of the case and we find no ground to alter the trial court's
findings and appreciation of the evidence presented.
Credence is accorded to the prosecution's evidence, more so as it consisted mainly of testimonies of
policemen. Law enforcers are presumed to have regularly performed their duty in the absence of proof
to the contrary (People v. De Jesus, 145 SCRA 521). We also find no reason from the records why the
prosecution witnesses should fabricate their testimonies and implicate appellant in such a serious
crime (See People v. Bautista, 147 SCRA 500).
The accused testified that she was not on that bus that came from Baguio City but rather she was in
Olongapo City all that time. She alleged that she was arrested by Pat. Obia for no reason at all.
In the case at bar, alibi does not deserve much credit as it was established only by the accused herself
(People v. De la Cruz, 148 SCRA 582).
Moreover, it is a well-established rule that alibi cannot prevail over positive testimony (People v. De La
Cruz, supra).
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

xii
xiiiSECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 130644. October 27, 1997]
THE MINOR FRANCISCO JUAN LARRANAGA, represented in this suit by his mother MARGARITA
G. LARRANAGA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
RESOLUTION
PUNO, J.:

On October 1, 1997, petitioner Margarita G. Larranaga filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with writs of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction seeking to annul the
information for kidnapping and serious illegal detention against her minor son, Francisco Juan
Larranagga alias Paco, filed in the RTC[1] of Cebu City as well as the warrant of arrest issued as a
consequence thereof. Petitioner as an alternative remedy prays for the annulment of the order[2] of
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu denying Larranaggas motion for a regular preliminary
investigation and that it be conducted by a panel of prosecutors from the office of the State
Prosecutor, Department of Justice. On October 6, 1997, petitioner filed a Supplemental Petition
praying for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus to relieve her son from his alleged illegal
confinement or to grant him bail.
It appears that on September 15, 1997, some PNP CIG authorities went to the Center for Culinary Arts
located at 287 Katipunan Avenue, Loyola Heights, Quezon City to arrest Francisco Juan Larranaga.
Larranaga, thru his lawyer, Atty. Raymundo Armovit remonstrated against the warrantless arrest. The,
police did not carry out the arrest on the assurance that Larranaga would be brought to Cebu City by
his lawyer on September 17, 1997 for perlominary investigation.
On September 17, 1997, Atty. Armovit attended the preliminary investigation conducted by the Office
of the City State Prosecutor of Cebu. Forthwith, he moved that his client be given a regular preliminary
investigation. He also requested for copies of all affidavits and documents in support of the complaint
against his client and that he be granted a non-extendible period of twenty (20) days from their receipt
to file the defense affidavit. The motion was denied by the city prosecutor on the ground that
Larranaga should be treated as a detention prisoner, hence entitled only to an inquest investigation.
Atty. Armovit was ordered to present Larranaga in person. He was warned that his failure would be
treated as waiver of his clients right to a preliminary investigation and he would be proceeded against
pursuant to section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Atty. Armivits verbal motion for reconsideration
was denied by the city prosecutor.
On September 19, 1997, Larranaga, thru counsel, rushed to the Court of Appeals assailing the
actuations of the Cebu prosecutors thru a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.[3]
However, Larranagas effort to stop the filing of a criminal information against him failed. It turned out
that on September 17, 1997 the said prosecutors had filed an information with the RTC of Cebu
charging Larranaga with kidnapping and serious illegal detention. The prosecutors recommended no
bail. On September 22, 1997, counsel filed a Supplemental Petition with the Court of Appeals
impleading the RTC of Cebu City to prevent petitioners arrest. The move again proved fruitless as
Larranaga was arrested on the night of September 22, 1997 by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued by
the Executive Judge of the RTC of Cebu City, the Honorable Priscila Agana. A second Supplemental
Petition was filed by Larranagas counsel in the Court of Appeals bringing to its attention the arrest of
Larranaga. On September 25, 1997 the Court of Appeals dismissed Larranagas petitions, hence, the
case at bar.
On October 8, 1997, we ordered the Solicitor General to file a consolidated comment on the petition
within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days. On October 16, 1997, we temporarily restrained the
presiding judge of Branch 7 of the RTC of Cebu from proceeding with the case to prevent the issues
from becoming moot.
On October 20, 1997, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and motion in lieu of
Consolidated Comment. The Solicitor General submitted that x x x it is within petitioners constitutional
and legal rights to demand that a regular preliminary investigation rather than a mere inquest be
conducted before resolving the issue of whether or not to file informations against him. He asked that
x x x the petition be given due course and petitioner be accorded his right to preliminary investigation.
He further recommended that x x x during the pendency thereof, petitioner be released from detention.

We agree.
Petitioner is entitled not to a mere inquest investigation but to a regular preliminary investigation.
Section 7 of Rule 112 cannot be invoked to justify petitioners inquest investigation. Said section clearly
provides that when a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant for an offense cognizable by the
Regional Trial Court, the complaint or information may be filed by the offended party, peace officer or
fiscal without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted, on the basis of the affidavit of the
offended party or arresting officer or person.
The records do not show that petitioner was "lawfully arrested. For one, the petitioner was not arrested
on September 15, 1997, as his counsel persuaded the arresting officers that he would instead be
presented in the preliminary investigation to be conducted in Cebu City on September 17, 1997. For
another, the arresting officers had no legal authority to make a warrantless arrest of the petitioner for a
crime committed some two (2) months before. So we held in Go vs. Court of Appeals, viz:[4]
Secondly, we do not belie that the warrantless arrest or detention of petitioner in the instant case falls
within the terms of Section 5 of the Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides:
Sec 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be
proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.
Petitioners arrest took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The arresting officers obviously
were not present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had allegedly shot
Maguan. Neither could the arrest effected six (6) days after the shooting be reasonably regarded as
effected when (the shooting had) in fact just been committed within the meaning of Section 5(b).
Moreover, none of the arresting officers had any personal knowledge of facts indicating that petitioner
was the gunman who had shot Maguan. The information upon which the police acted had been
derived from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting one stated that petitioner was
the gunman; another was able to take down the alleged gunmans cars plate number which turned out
to be registered in petitioners wifes name. That information did not, however, constitute personal
knowledge.
It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of petitioner within the meaning
of Section 5 of Rule 113. It is clear too that section 7 of Rule 112 is not applicable. x x x When the
police filed a complaint for frustrated homicide with the Prosecutor, the latter should have immediately
scheduled a preliminary investigation to determine whether there was probable cause for charging
petitioner in court for the killing of Eldon Maguna. Instead, as noted earlier, the Prosecutor proceeded

under the erroneous supposition that section 7 of the Rule 112 was applicable and required petitioner
to waive the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code as a condition for carrying out a
preliminary investigation. This was substantive error, for petitioner was entitled to a preliminary
investigation and that right should have been accorded him without any conditions. Moreover, since
petitioner had not been arrested, with or without a warrant, he was also entitled to be released
forthwith subject only to his appearing at the preliminary investigation.
It then follows that the right of petitioner to a regular preliminary investigation pursuant to section 3 of
Rule 112 cannot stand any diminution. Petitioner, a minor, is charged with a capital offense kidnapping
and serious illegal detention. Its filing in court means his arrest and incarceration as in all probability
he would not be allowed bail. His conviction will bring him face to face with the death penalty. Thus,
petitioners counsel was fart from being unreasonable when he demanded from the city prosecutors
that he be furnished copies of the affidavits supporting the complaint and that he be given a nonextendible period of twenty (20) days to submit defense affidavit. As well pointed of his motion x x x
prevented petitioner from preparing and submitting the affidavits of some forty (40) classmates,
teachers, proctors and security guards who had previously made known their willingness to testify
that:
- during the whole day of July 16 and again on July 17 petitioner and his classmates were all in their
school at Quezon City; in fact in the afternoon of July 16 and 17, 1997, petitioner and his classmates
took their mid-term exams;
- following their exams on July 16 they had partied together first at petitioners Quezon City apartment
until about 9 o clock in the evening, and then repaired to a Quezon City restaurant at Katipunan
Avenue where they stayed on until 3 oclock in the morning of July 17; they even had pictures taken of
their party;
- indeed petitioners July 16 examination papers and that of a classmates are ready for submission as
evidence, along with petitioners grades for the terms end in September 1997;
- two of their teachers, also a proctor, and a security guard actually remember seeing petitioner at their
Quezon City school on July 16 and 17;
- petitioner was duly registered and attended classes starting June 1997 until terms end in September
1997;
- petitioner had also been logged to have been in his Quezon City apartment since June 1997,
particularly including July 16 and 17;
- petitioner only went to Cebu late afternoon of July 17 on board PAL flight No. PR833, as shown by
his plane ticket and boarding pass.
Fairness dictates that the request of petitioner for a chance to be heard in a capital offense case
should have been granted by the Cebu City prosecutor. In Webb vs. de Leon,[5] we emphasized that
attuned to the times, our Rules have discarded the pure inquisitorial system of preliminary
investigation. Instead, Rule 112 installed a quasi-judicial type of preliminary investigation conducted by
one whose high duty is to be fair and impartial. As this Court emphasized in Rolito Go vs. Court of
Appeals, the right to have a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound over for trial for a
criminal offense and hence formally at risk of incarceration or some other penalty, is not a mere formal
or technical right; it is a substantive right. A preliminary investigation should therefore be
scrupulously conducted so that the constitutional right to liberty of a potential accused can be

protected from any material damage.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court resolves: (1) to set aside the inquest investigation of petitioner and to
order the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu to conduct a regular preliminary investigation of the
petitioner in accord with section 3, Rule 112; (2) to annul the order for Detention During The Pendency
of the Case issued by Executive Judge Priscilla Agana against the petitioner in Crim. Case No. CBU45303 and 45304; (3) to order the immediate release of petitioner pending his preliminary investigation
and (4) to order the Presiding Judge of Br. VII, RTC of Cebu City to cease and desist from proceeding
with the arraignment and trial of petitioner in Crim. Case No. CBU-45303 and 45304, pending the
result of petitioners preliminary investigation.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 91107

June 19, 1991

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MIKAEL MALMSTEDT, *defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles for defendant-appellant.

PADILLA, J.:
In an information dated 15 June 1989, accused-appellant Mikael Malmstedt (hereinafter referred to as
the accused) was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 10,
in Criminal Case No. 89-CR-0663, for violation of Section 4, Art. II of Republic Act 6425, as amended,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended. The factual background of the
case is as follows:
Accused Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines for the third time in December
1988 as a tourist. He had visited the country sometime in 1982 and 1985.
In the evening of 7 May 1989, accused left for Baguio City. Upon his arrival thereat in the morning of
the following day, he took a bus to Sagada and stayed in that place for two (2) days.
At around 7:00 o'clock in the morning of 11 May 1989, accused went to the Nangonogan bus stop in
Sagada to catch the first available trip to Baguio City. From Baguio City, accused planned to take a

late afternoon trip to Angeles City, then proceed to Manila to catch his flight out of the country,
scheduled on 13 May 1989. From Sagada, accused took a Skyline bus with body number 8005 and
Plate number AVC 902.1
At about 8: 00 o'clock in the morning of that same day (11 May 1989), Captain Alen Vasco, the
Commanding Officer of the First Regional Command (NARCOM) stationed at Camp Dangwa, ordered
his men to set up a temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain Province, for the
purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to establish a
checkpoint in the said area was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada
were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. Moreover, information was received by the
Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that same morning, that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in
his possession prohibited drugs.2
The group composed of seven (7) NARCOM officers, in coordination with Tublay Police Station, set up
a checkpoint at the designated area at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning and inspected all vehicles
coming from the Cordillera Region.
At about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon, the bus where accused was riding was stopped. Sgt. Fider and
CIC Galutan boarded the bus and announced that they were members of the NARCOM and that they
would conduct an inspection. The two (2) NARCOM officers started their inspection from the front
going towards the rear of the bus. Accused who was the sole foreigner riding the bus was seated at
the rear thereof.
During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist. Suspecting the bulge on
accused's waist to be a gun, the officer asked for accused's passport and other identification papers.
When accused failed to comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging
on his waist. The bulging object turned out to be a pouch bag and when accused opened the same
bag, as ordered, the officer noticed four (4) suspicious-looking objects wrapped in brown packing tape,
prompting the officer to open one of the wrapped objects. The wrapped objects turned out to contain
hashish, a derivative of marijuana.
Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he alighted from the bus,
accused stopped to get two (2) travelling bags from the luggage carrier.
Upon stepping out of the bus, the officers got the bags and opened them. A teddy bear was found in
each bag. Feeling the teddy bears, the officer noticed that there were bulges inside the same which
did not feel like foam stuffing. It was only after the officers had opened the bags that accused finally
presented his passport.
Accused was then brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad,
Benguet for further investigation. At the investigation room, the officers opened the teddy bears and
they were found to also contain hashish. Representative samples were taken from the hashish found
among the personal effects of accused and the same were brought to the PC Crime Laboratory for
chemical analysis.
In the chemistry report, it was established that the objects examined were hashish. a prohibited drug
which is a derivative of marijuana. Thus, an information was filed against accused for violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act.
During the arraignment, accused entered a plea of "not guilty." For his defense, he raised the issue of
illegal search of his personal effects. He also claimed that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM

officers in his pouch bag and that the two (2) travelling bags were not owned by him, but were merely
entrusted to him by an Australian couple whom he met in Sagada. He further claimed that the
Australian couple intended to take the same bus with him but because there were no more seats
available in said bus, they decided to take the next ride and asked accused to take charge of the bags,
and that they would meet each other at the Dangwa Station.
Likewise, accused alleged that when the NARCOM officers demanded for his passport and other
Identification papers, he handed to one of the officers his pouch bag which was hanging on his neck
containing, among others, his passport, return ticket to Sweden and other papers. The officer in turn
handed it to his companion who brought the bag outside the bus. When said officer came back, he
charged the accused that there was hashish in the bag. He was told to get off the bus and his picture
was taken with the pouch bag placed around his neck. The trial court did not give credence to
accused's defense.
The claim of the accused that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers, was belied by his
failure to raise such defense at the earliest opportunity. When accused was investigated at the
Provincial Fiscal's Office, he did not inform the Fiscal or his lawyer that the hashish was planted by the
NARCOM officers in his bag. It was only two (2) months after said investigation when he told his
lawyer about said claim, denying ownership of the two (2) travelling bags as well as having hashish in
his pouch bag.
In a decision dated 12 October 1989, the trial court found accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, specifically Section 4, Art. II of RA 6425, as amended.3 The
dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of the accused Mikael Malmstedt established beyond
reasonable doubt, this Court finds him GUILTY of violation of Section 4, Article 11 of Republic
Act 6425, as amended, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment
and to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
Let the hashish subject of this case be turned over to the First Narcotics Regional Unit at
Camp Bado; Dangwa, La Trinidad Benguet for proper disposition under Section 20, Article IV
of Republic Act 6425, as amended.
SO ORDERED.4
Seeking the reversal of the decision of the trial court finding him guilty of the crime charged, accused
argues that the search of his personal effects was illegal because it was made without a search
warrant and, therefore, the prohibited drugs which were discovered during the illegal search are not
admissible as evidence against him.
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.5 However, where the search is made pursuant
to a lawful arrest, there is no need to obtain a search warrant. A lawful arrest without a warrant may be
made by a peace officer or a private person under the following circumstances.6
Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending,
or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant
shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded
against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. (6a 17a).
Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime was
actually being committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search
made upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of law,
which allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.7
While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant when the search was
made over the personal effects of accused, however, under the circumstances of the case, there was
sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was then and there committing a
crime.
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable,
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the objects sought
in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.8 The required probable cause
that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is not determined by any fixed formula but is resolved
according to the facts of each case.9
Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by this Court as valid,
because of existence of probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag
owned by the accused,10 or where the accused was acting suspiciously,11 and attempted to flee.12
Aside from the persistent reports received by the NARCOM that vehicles coming from Sagada were
transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs, their Commanding Officer also received information
that a Caucasian coming from Sagada on that particular day had prohibited drugs in his possession.
Said information was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM the very same morning that
accused came down by bus from Sagada on his way to Baguio City.
When NARCOM received the information, a few hours before the apprehension of herein accused,
that a Caucasian travelling from Sagada to Baguio City was carrying with him prohibited drugs, there
was no time to obtain a search warrant. In the Tangliben case,13 the police authorities conducted a
surveillance at the Victory Liner Terminal located at Bgy. San Nicolas, San Fernando Pampanga,
against persons engaged in the traffic of dangerous drugs, based on information supplied by some
informers. Accused Tangliben who was acting suspiciously and pointed out by an informer was
apprehended and searched by the police authorities. It was held that when faced with on-the-spot
information, the police officers had to act quickly and there was no time to secure a search warrant.
It must be observed that, at first, the NARCOM officers merely conducted a routine check of the bus
(where accused was riding) and the passengers therein, and no extensive search was initially made. It

was only when one of the officers noticed a bulge on the waist of accused, during the course of the
inspection, that accused was required to present his passport. The failure of accused to present his
identification papers, when ordered to do so, only managed to arouse the suspicion of the officer that
accused was trying to hide his identity. For is it not a regular norm for an innocent man, who has
nothing to hide from the authorities, to readily present his identification papers when required to do
so?
The receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in
his possession, plus the suspicious failure of the accused to produce his passport, taken together as a
whole, led the NARCOM officers to reasonably believe that the accused was trying to hide something
illegal from the authorities. From these circumstances arose a probable cause which justified the
warrantless search that was made on the personal effects of the accused. In other words, the acts of
the NARCOM officers in requiring the accused to open his pouch bag and in opening one of the
wrapped objects found inside said bag (which was discovered to contain hashish) as well as the two
(2) travelling bags containing two (2) teddy bears with hashish stuffed inside them, were prompted by
accused's own attempt to hide his identity by refusing to present his passport, and by the information
received by the NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his
possession. To deprive the NARCOM agents of the ability and facility to act accordingly, including, to
search even without warrant, in the light of such circumstances, would be to sanction impotence and
ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the detriment of society.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed judgment of conviction by the trial court is hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
Sarmiento, J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions
NARVASA, J., concurring and dissenting:
The ancient tradition that a man's home is his castle, safe from intrusion even by the king, has not only
found its niche in all our charters, from 1935 to the present; it has also received unvarying recognition
and acceptance in our case law.1 The present Constitution2 declares that
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose, shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
It further ordains that any evidence obtained in violation of said right, among others, "shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding."3

The rule is that no person may be subjected by the police or other government authority to a search of
his body, or his personal effects or belongings, or his residence except by virtue of a search warrant or
on the occasion of a legitimate arrest.4
An arrest is legitimate, of course, if effected by virtue of a warrant of arrest. Even without a warrant, an
arrest may also be lawfully made by a peace officer or a private person:5
(a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending,
or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant
shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded
against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.
In any of these instances of a lawful arrest, the person arrested "may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search
warrant."6 And it has been held that the search may extend to the area "within his immediate control,"
i.e., the area from which said person arrested might gain possession of a weapon or destructible
evidence.7
Apart from "search incidental to an arrest," a warrantless search has also been held to be proper in
cases of "search of a moving vehicle,8 and "seizure of evidence in plain view."9 This was the
pronouncement in Manipon, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 143 SCRA 267, 276, which drew attention to
Moreno v. Ago Chi;10 Alvero v. Dizon,11 Papa v. Mago,12 and an American precedent, Harris v.
U.S.13
If, on the other, a person is searched without a warrant, or under circumstances other than those
justifying an arrest without warrant in accordance with law, supra, merely on suspicion that he is
engaged in some felonious enterprise, and in order to discover if he has indeed committed a crime, it
is not only the arrest which is illegal but also, the search on the occasion thereof, as being "the fruit of
the poisonous tree.14 In that event, any evidence taken, even if confirmatory of the initial suspicion, is
inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."15 But the right against an unreasonable search and
seizure may be waived by the person arrested, provided he knew of such right and knowingly decided
not to invoke it.16
There is unanimity among the members of the Court upon the continuing validity of these established
principles. However, the Court is divided as regards the ultimate conclusions which may properly be
derived from the proven facts and consequently, the manner in which the principles just cited should
apply thereto.
The proofs of the prosecution and those of the defense are diametrically at odds. What is certain,
however, is that the soldiers had no warrant of arrest when they conducted a search of Malmstedt's
person and the things in his possession at the time. Indeed, the Court a quo acknowledged that the
soldiers could "not be expected to be armed with a warrant or arrest nor a search warrant everytime

they establish a temporary checkpoint . . . (and) no judge would issue them one considering that
searching questions have to be asked before a warrant could be issued." Equally plain is that prior to
the search, a warrantless arrest of Malmstedt could not validly have been in accordance with the
norms of the law. For Malmstedt had not committed, nor was he actually committing or attempting to
commit a crime, in the soldiers' presence, nor did said soldiers have personal and competent
knowledge that Malmstedt had in fact just committed a crime. All they had was a suspicion that
Malmstedt might have some prohibited drug on him or in his bags; all they had was, in the words of
the Trial Court, "the hope of intercepting any dangerous drug being transported," or, as the Office of
the Solicitor General asserts, "information that most of the buses coming . . . (from the Cordillera)
were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs."
This case, is remarkably similar to Peo. v. Aminnudin, decided on July 6, 1988 also by the First
Division.17 There, Aminnudin was arrested without a warrant by PC officers as he was disembarking
from an inter-island vessel. The officers were waiting for him because he was, according to an
informer's report, then transporting marijuana. The search of Aminnudin's bag confirmed the informer's
report; the bag indeed contained marijuana. The Court nevertheless held that since the PC officers
had failed to procure a search warrant although they had sufficient time (two days) to do so and
therefore, the case presented no such urgency as to justify a warrantless search, the search of
Aminnudin's person and bag, the seizure of the marijuana and his subsequent arrest were illegal; and
the marijuana was inadmissible in evidence in the criminal action subsequently instituted against
Aminnudin for violating the Dangerous Drugs Act.
There are, on the other hand, other cases adjudicated by this Court in which apparently different
conclusions were reached. It is needful to devote a few words to them so that the relevant
constitutional and legal propositions are not misunderstood.
In People v. Claudio (decision promulgated on April 15, 1988),18 the accused boarded a "Victory
Liner" passenger bus going to Olongapo from Baguio City. She placed the plastic bag she was
carrying at the back of the seat then occupied by Obia, an INP member "on Detached Service with
the Anti-Narcotics Unit." This avowedly aroused Obia's suspicion, and at the first opportunity, and
without Claudio's knowledge, he surreptitiously looked into the plastic bag and noted that it contained
camote tops as well as a package, and that there emanated from the package the smell of marijuana
with which he had become familiar on account of his work. So when the bus stopped at Sta. Rita, and
Claudio alighted, Obia accosted her, showed her his ID, identified himself as a policeman, and
announced his intention to search her bag which he said contained marijuana because of the
distinctive odor detected by him. Ignoring her plea "Please go with me, let us settle this at home"
he brought her to the police headquarters., where examination of the package in Claudio's bag
confirmed his suspicion that it indeed contained marijuana. The Court held the warrantless arrest
under the circumstances to be lawful, the search justified, and the evidence thus discovered
admissible in evidence against the accused.
In People v. Tangliben (decision promulgated on April 6, 1990),19 two police officers and a barangay
tanod were conducting a "surveillance mission" at the Victory Liner Terminal at San Nicolas, San
Fernando, Pampanga, "aimed not only against persons who may commit misdemeanors . . . (there)
but also on persons who may be engaging in the traffic of dangerous drugs based on information
supplied by informers; . . . they noticed a person carrying a red travelling bag . . who was acting
suspiciously;" they asked him to open the bag; the person did so only after they identified themselves
as peace officers; found in the bag were marijuana leaves wrapped in plastic weighing one kilogram,
more or less; the person was then taken to the police headquarters at San Fernando, Pampanga,
where he was investigated; and an information was thereafter filed against that person, Tangliben,
charging him with a violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (RA 6425), as amended. Upon these
facts it was ruled, citing Claudio, supra, that there was a valid warrantless arrest and a proper

warrantless search incident thereto.

The facts in Tangliben were pronounced to be different from those in People v. Aminnudin, supra. "In
contrast" to Aminnudin where the Court perceived no urgency as to preclude the application for and
obtention of a search warrant, it was declared that the Tangliben case
. . . presented urgency. . . (The evidence revealed) that there was an informer who pointed to
the accused-appellant as carrying marijuana . . . Faced with such on-the-spot information, the
police officers had to act quickly. There was not enough time to secure a search warrant . . . To
require search warrants during on-the-spot apprehensions of drug pushers, illegal possessors
of firearms, jueteng collectors, smugglers of contraband goods, robber, etc. would make it
extremely difficult, if not impossible to contain the crimes with which these persons are
associated.
In Tangliben, therefore, there was in the Court's view sufficient evidence on hand to enable the PC
officers to secure a search warrant, had there been time. But because there was actually no time to
get the warrant, and there were "on-the-spot" indications that Tangliben was then actually committing
a crime, the search of his person and his effects was considered valid.
Two other decisions presented substantially similar circumstance instances: Posadas v. C.A., et al.,
decided on August 2, 1990,20 and People v. Moises Maspil, Jr., et al., decided on August 20, 1990.21
In the first case, Posadas was seen to be acting suspiciously by two members of the INP, Davao
Metrodiscom, and when he was accosted by the two, who identified themselves as police officers, he
suddenly fled. He was pursued, overtaken and, notwithstanding his resistance, placed in custody. The
buri bag Posadas was then carrying was found to contain a revolver, for which he could produce no
license or authority to possess, four rounds of live ammunition, and a tear gas grenade. He was
prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition and convicted after trial. This Court
affirmed Posadas' conviction, holding that there was, in the premises, probable cause for a search
without warrant, i.e., the appellant was acting suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag he
had with him at the time. The Court cited with approval the ruling of the U.S. Federal Supreme Court in
John W. Terry v. State of Ohio,22 a 1968 case, which the Solicitor General had invoked to justify the
search.
In the case of Maspil, et al., a checkpoint was set up by elements of the First Narcotics Regional Unit
of the Narcotics Command at Sayangan, Atok, Benguet, to monitor, inspect and scrutinize vehicles on
the highway going towards Baguio City. This was done because of a confidential report by informers
that Maspil and another person, Bagking, would be transporting a large quantity of marijuana to
Baguio City. In fact, the informers were with the policemen manning the checkpoint. As expected, at
about 2 o'clock in the early morning of November 1, 1986, a jeepney approached the checkpoint,
driven by Maspil, with Bagking as passenger. The officers stopped the vehicle and saw that on it were
loaded 2 plastic sacks, a jute sack, and 3 big round tin cans. When opened, the sacks and cans were
seen to contain what appeared to be marijuana leaves. The policemen thereupon placed Maspil and
Bagking under arrest, and confiscated the leaves which, upon scientific examination, were verified to
be marijuana leaves. The Court upheld the validity of the search thus conducted, as being incidental to
a lawful warrantless arrest,23 and declared that, as in Tangliben, supra, Maspil and Bagking had been
caught in flagrante delicto transporting prohibited drugs at the time of their arrest. Again, the Court
took occasion to distinguish the case from Aminnudin24 in which, as aforestated, it appeared that the
police officers were aware of Aminnudin's identity, his projected criminal enterprise and the vessel on
which he would be arriving, and, equally as importantly, had sufficient time and opportunity to obtain a
search warrant. In the case of Maspil and Bagking, the Court found that the officers concerned had no

exact description of the vehicle the former would be using to transport marijuana, and no inkling of the
definite time of the suspects' arrival, and pointed out that a jeepney on the road is not the same as a
passenger boat on the high seas whose route and time of arrival are more or less certain, and which
ordinarily cannot deviate from or otherwise alter its course, or select another destination.25
The most recent decision treating of warrantless search and seizure appears to be People v. Lo Ho
Wing; et al., G.R. No. 88017, decided on January 21, 1991 (per Gancayco, J.). In that case, an
undercover or "deep penetration" agent, Tia, managed somehow to gain acceptance into a group of
suspected drug smugglers, which included Peter Lo and Lim Ching Huat. Tia accompanied Peter Lo to
Guangzhou, China, where he saw him and other person empty the contents of six (6) tins of tea and
replace them with white powder. On their return to Manila with the cans of substituted "tea," they were
met at the airport by Lim. As they were leaving the airport in separate vehicles, they were intercepted
by officers and operatives of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM), who had earlier been tipped off by
Tia, and placed under arrest. As search of the luggage brought in by Tia and Peter Lo, loaded on the
group's vehicles, quickly disclosed the six (6) tin cans containing fifty-six (56) bags of white crystalline
powder which, upon analysis, was identified as metamphetamine. Tia, Lo and Lim were indicted for
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Tia was discharged as state witness. Lo and Lim were
subsequently convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. One of the questions raised by them in
this Court on appeal was whether the warrantless search of their vehicles and personal effects was
legal. The Court, citing Manipon, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 143 SCRA 267 (1986),26 held legal the search
of the appellants' moving vehicles and the seizure therefrom of the dangerous drug, considering that
there was intelligence information, including clandestine reports by a planted spy actually participating
in the activity, that the appellants were bringing prohibited drugs into the country; that the requirement
of obtaining a search warrant "borders on the impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use
of a moving vehicle that can transport contraband from one place to another with impunity," and "it is
not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.27
In all five cases, Claudio, Tangliben, Posadas, Maspil, and Lo Ho Wing, facts existed which were
found by the Court as justifying warantless arrests. In Claudio, the arresting officer had secretly
ascertained that the woman he was arresting was in fact in possession of marijuana; he had
personally seen that her bag contained not only vegetables but also a package emitting the odor of
marijuana. In Tangliben, the person arrested and searched was acting suspiciously, and had been
positively pointed to as carrying marijuana. And in both cases, the accused were about to board
passenger buses, making it urgent for the police officers concerned to take quick and decisive action.
In Posadas, the person arrested and searched was acting suspiciously, too, and when accosted had
attempted to flee from the police officers. And in Maspil and Lo Ho Wing, there was definite
information of the precise identity of the persons engaged in transporting prohibited drugs at a
particular time and place.
Now, as regards the precise issue at hand, whether or not the facts in the case at bar make out a
legitimate instance of a warrantless search and seizure, there is, as earlier pointed out, a regrettable
divergence of views among the members of the Court.
Contrary to the conclusion reached by the majority, I believe that the appellant should be absolved on
reasonable doubt. There was in this case no confidential report from, or positive identification by an
informer; no attempt to flee; no bag or package emitting tell-tale odors; no other reasonably
persuasive indications that Malmstedt was at the time in process of perpetrating the offense for which
he was subsequently prosecuted. Hence, when the soldiers searched Malmstedt's pouch and the
bags in his possession, they were simply "fishing" for evidence. It matters not that the search
disclosed that the bags contained prohibited substances, confirming their initial information and
suspicion. The search was not made by virtue of a warrant or as an incident of a lawful warrantless

arrest, i.e., under circumstances sufficient to engender a reasonable belief that some crime was being
or about to be committed, or adjust been committed. There was no intelligent and intentional waiver of
the right against unreasonable searches and seizure. The search was therefore illegal, since the law
requires that there first be a lawful arrest of an individual before a search of his body and his
belongings may licitly be made. The process cannot be reversed, i.e., a search be first undertaken,
and then an arrest effected, on the strength of the evidence yielded by the search. An arrest made in
that case would be unlawful, and the search undertaken as an incident of such an unlawful arrest, also
unlawful.
The fact that when investigated at the headquarters of the Narcotic Command at Camp Dangwa, La
Trinidad, Malmstedt had, it is said, willingly admitted that there were was hashish inside the "teddy
bears" in the luggage found in his possession an admission subsequently confirmed by laboratory
examination does not help the cause of the prosecution one bit. Nothing in the record even
remotely suggests that Malmstedt was accorded the rights guaranteed by the Constitution to all
persons under custodial investigation.28 He was not informed, prior to being interrogated, that he had
the "right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice," and that if he could not afford the services of counsel, he would be provided with one; not
does it appear at all that he waived those rights "in writing and in the presence of counsel." The
soldiers and the police officers simply went ahead with the investigation of Malmstedt, without counsel.
The admissions elicited from Malmstedt under these circumstances, as the Constitution clearly states,
are "inadmissible in evidence against him.29
The prohibited drugs supposedly discovered in Malmstedt's bags, having been taken in violation of the
constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures, are inadmissible against him "for any
purpose in any proceeding." Also pronounced as incompetent evidence against him are the
admissions supposedly made by him without his first being accorded the constitutional rights of
persons under custodial investigation. Without such object evidence and admissions, nothing remains
of the case against Malmstedt.
It may be conceded that, as the Trial Court points out, the evidence presented by Malmstedt in his
defense is feeble, unworthy of credence. This is beside the point; for conformably to the familiar
axiom, the State must rely on the strength of its evidence and not on the weakness of the defense.
The unfortunate fact is that although the existence of the hashish is an objective physical reality that
cannot but be conceded, there is in law no evidence to demonstrate with any degree of persuasion,
much less beyond reasonable doubt, that Malmstedt was engaged in a criminal activity. This is the
paradox created by the disregard of the applicable constitutional safeguards. The tangible benefit is
that the hashish in question has been correctly confiscated and thus effectively withdrawn from private
use.
What is here said should not by any means be taken as a disapproval or a disparagement of the
efforts of the police and military authorities to deter and detect offenses, whether they be possession
of and traffic in prohibited drugs, or some other. Those efforts obviously merit the support and
commendation of the Courts and indeed of every responsible citizen. But those efforts must take
account of the basic rights granted by the Constitution and the law to persons who may fall under
suspicion of engaging in criminal acts. Disregard of those rights may not be justified by the objective of
ferreting out and punishing crime, no matter how eminently desirable attainment of that objective might
be. Disregard of those rights, as this Court has earlier stressed, may result in the escape of the guilty,
and all because the "constable has blundered," rendering the evidence inadmissible even if truthful or
otherwise credible.30
I therefore vote to reverse the Trial Court's judgment of October 12, 1989 and to acquit the appellant
on reasonable doubt.

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

I join Mr. Justice Andres R. Narvasa in his dissent, which I believe represents the correct application to
the facts of this case of the provisions of the Bill of Rights and the Rules of Court on searches and
seizures. It is consistent with my ponencia in People v. Aminnudin, 163 SCRA 402, and also with Alih
v. Castro, 151 SCRA 279, the latter being a unanimous decision of the Court en banc, and my
dissents in Umil v. Ramos (on warrantless arrests, 187 SCRA 311, Valmonte v. De Villa (on
checkpoints), 178, SCRA 211, 185 SCRA 665, and Guazon v. De Villa (on "zonas"), 181 SCRA 623.
I write this separate opinion merely to remark on an observation made during the deliberation on this
case that some members of the Court seem to be coddling criminals instead of extending its
protection to society, which deserves our higher concern. The inference is that because of our wrong
priorities, criminals are being imprudently let free, to violate our laws again; and it is all our fault.
Believing myself to be among those alluded to, I will say without apology that I do not consider a
person a criminal, until he is convicted by final judgment after a fair trial by a competent and impartial
court. Until then, the Constitution bids us to presume him innocent. He may seem boorish or speak
crudely or sport tattoos or dress weirdly or otherwise fall short of our own standards of propriety and
decorum. None of these makes him a criminal although he may look like a criminal.
It is so easy to condemn a person on the basis of his appearance but it is also so wrong.
On the question before us, it seems to be the inclination of some judges to wink at an illegal search
and seizure as long as the suspect has been actually found in possession of a prohibited article That
fact will retroactively validate the violation of the Bill of Rights for after all, as they would rationalize,
the suspect is a criminal. What matters to them is the fact of illegal possession, not the fact of illegal
search and seizure.
This kind of thinking takes us back to the intolerant days of Moncado v. People's Court, 80 Phil. 1,
which was discredited in Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383, even before it was definitely rejected by
an express provision in the 1973 Constitution. That provision, which has been retained in the present
Constitution, again explicitly declares that any evidence illegally obtained "shall be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding."
The fruit of the poisonous tree should not be allowed to poison our system of criminal justice.1wphi1
In the case at bar, the search was made at a checkpoint established for the preposterous reason that
the route was being used by marijuana dealers and on an individual who had something bulging at his
waist that excited the soldier's suspicion. Was that probable cause? The ponencia notes that the
military had advance information that a Caucasian was coming from the Sagada with prohibited drugs
in his possession. This is what the military says now, after the fact, to justify the warrantless search. It
is so easy to make such a claim, and I am surprised that the majority should readily accept it.
The conclusion that there was probable cause may have been influenced by the subsequent discovery
that the accused was carrying a prohibited drug. This is supposed to justify the soldier's suspicion. In
other words, it was the fact of illegal possession that retroactively established the probable cause that
validated the illegal search and seizure. It was the fruit of the poisonous tree that washed clean the
tree itself.
In Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, Justice Holmes said sixty-four years ago:

. . . It is desirable that criminals should be detected, and to that end that all available evidence
should be used.1avvphi1 It is also desirable that the government should not itself foster and
pay for other crimes, when they are the means by which the evidence is to be obtained. If it
pays its officers for having got evidence by crime, I do not see why it may not as well pay them
for getting it in the same way, and I can attach no importance to protestations of disapproval if
it knowingly accepts and pays and announces that in the future it will pay for the fruits. We
have to choose, and for my part I think it a less evil that some criminals should escape than
that the government should play an ignoble part.
If by deterring the government from playing "an ignoble part," I am "coddling criminals," I welcome the
accusation and take pride in it. I would rather err in favor of the accused who is impaled with outlawed
evidence than exalt order at the price of liberty.

Padilla vs CA
G.R. No. 121917. March 12, 1997

Facts: High-powered firearms with live ammunitions were found in the possession of petitioner Robin
Padilla:
(1)

One .357 Caliber revolver, Smith and Wesson, SN-32919 with six (6) live ammunitions;

(2) One M-16 Baby Armalite rifle, SN-RP 131120 with four (4) long and one (1) short magazine with
ammunitions;
(3)

One .380 Pietro Beretta, SN-A 35723 Y with clip and eight (8) ammunitions; and

(4)

Six additional live double action ammunitions of .38 caliber revolver.

Appellant voluntarily surrendered item no. 3. and a black bag containing two additional long
magazines and one short magazine.
PNP Chief Espino, Record Branch of the Firearms and Explosives Office issued a Certification which
stated that the three firearms confiscated from appellant, an M-16 Baby armalite rifle SN-RP 131280,
a .357 caliber revolver Smith and Wesson SN 32919 and a .380 Pietro Beretta SN-A35720, were not
registered in the name of Robin C. Padilla. A second Certification stated that the three firearms were
not also registered in the name of Robinhood C. Padilla.
Issue: Whether or not his arrest was illegal and consequently, the firearms and ammunitions taken in
the course thereof are inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule
Held: No. There is no dispute that no warrant was issued for the arrest of petitioner, but that per
se did not make his apprehension at the Abacan bridge illegal.

Warrantless arrests are sanctioned in the following instances:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
Paragraph (a) requires that the person be arrested (i) after he has committed or while he is actually
committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense, (ii) in the presence of the arresting officer or
private person. Both elements concurred here, as it has been established that petitioners vehicle
figured in a hit and run an offense committed in the presence of Manarang, a private person, who
then sought to arrest petitioner. It must be stressed at this point that presence does not only require
that the arresting person sees the offense, but also when he hears the disturbance created thereby
AND proceeds at once to the scene. As testified to by Manarang, he heard the screeching of tires
followed by a thud, saw the sideswiped victim (balut vendor), reported the incident to the police and
thereafter gave chase to the erring Pajero vehicle using his motorcycle in order to apprehend its
driver. After having sent a radio report to the PNP for assistance, Manarang proceeded to the Abacan
bridge where he found responding policemen SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda already positioned near
the bridge who effected the actual arrest of petitioner.
Petitioner would nonetheless insist on the illegality of his arrest by arguing that the policemen who
actually arrested him were not at the scene of the hit and run. We beg to disagree. That Manarang
decided to seek the aid of the policemen (who admittedly were nowhere in the vicinity of the hit and
run) in effecting petitioners arrest, did not in any way affect the propriety of the apprehension. It was in
fact the most prudent action Manarang could have taken rather than collaring petitioner by himself,
inasmuch as policemen are unquestionably better trained and well-equipped in effecting an arrest of a
suspect (like herein petitioner) who , in all probability, could have put up a degree of resistance which
an untrained civilian may not be able to contain without endangering his own life. Moreover, it is a
reality that curbing lawlessness gains more success when law enforcers function in collaboration with
private citizens. It is precisely through this cooperation, that the offense herein involved fortunately did
not become an additional entry to the long list of unreported and unsolved crimes.
It is appropriate to state at this juncture that a suspect, like petitioner herein, cannot defeat the arrest
which has been set in motion in a public place for want of a warrant as the police was confronted by
an urgent need to render aid or take action. The exigent circumstances of hot pursuit, a fleeing
suspect, a moving vehicle, the public place and the raining nighttime all created a situation in which
speed is essential and delay improvident. The Court acknowledges police authority to make the
forcible stop since they had more than mere reasonable and articulable suspicion that the occupant
of the vehicle has been engaged in criminal activity. Moreover, when caught in flagrante delicto with
possession of an unlicensed firearm (Smith & Wesson) and ammunition (M-16 magazine), petitioners
warrantless arrest was proper as he was again actually committing another offense (illegal possession
of firearm and ammunitions) and this time in the presence of a peace officer.

Besides, the policemens warrantless arrest of petitioner could likewise be justified under paragraph
(b) as he had in fact just committed an offense. There was no supervening event or a considerable
lapse of time between the hit and run and the actual apprehension. Moreover, after having stationed
themselves at the Abacan bridge in response to Manarangs report, the policemen saw for themselves
the fast approaching Pajero of petitioner, its dangling plate number (PMA 777 as reported by
Manarang), and the dented hood and railings thereof. These formed part of the arresting police
officers personal knowledge of the facts indicating that petitioners Pajero was indeed the vehicle
involved in the hit and run incident. Verily then, the arresting police officers acted upon verified
personal knowledge and not on unreliable hearsay information.
Furthermore, in accordance with settled jurisprudence, any objection, defect or irregularity
attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea. Petitioners belated
challenge thereto aside from his failure to quash the information, his participation in the trial
and by presenting his evidence, placed him in estoppel to assail the legality of his
arrest. Likewise, by applying for bail, petitioner patently waived such irregularities and defects.
We now go to the firearms and ammunitions seized from petitioner without a search warrant, the
admissibility in evidence of which, we uphold.
The five (5) well-settled instances when a warrantless search and seizure of property is
valid, are as follows:
1. warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence,
2. Seizure of evidence in plain view, the elements of which are:
(a).
a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally
present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b).
are;

the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they

(c).

the evidence must be immediately apparent, and

(d).

plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.

3. search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicles inherent mobility
reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a
highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a
criminal activity.
4. consented warrantless search, and
5. customs search.

In conformity with respondent courts observation, it indeed appears that the authorities stumbled upon
petitioners firearms and ammunitions without even undertaking any active search which, as it is
commonly understood, is a prying into hidden places for that which is concealed. The seizure of the
Smith & Wesson revolver and an M-16 rifle magazine was justified for they came within plain view of
the policemen who inadvertently discovered the revolver and magazine tucked in petitioners waist
and back pocket respectively, when he raised his hands after alighting from his Pajero. The same
justification applies to the confiscation of the M-16 armalite rifle which was immediately apparent to the

policemen as they took a casual glance at the Pajero and saw said rifle lying horizontally near the
drivers seat. Thus it has been held that:
(W)hen in pursuing an illegal action or in the commission of a criminal offense, the . . . police officers
should happen to discover a criminal offense being committed by any person, they are not precluded
from performing their duties as police officers for the apprehension of the guilty person and the taking
of the corpus delicti.
Objects whose possession are prohibited by law inadvertently found in plain view are subject to
seizure even without a warrant.
With respect to the Berreta pistol and a black bag containing assorted magazines, petitioner
voluntarily surrendered them to the police. This latter gesture of petitioner indicated a waiver
of his right against the alleged search and seizure, and that his failure to quash the information
estopped him from assailing any purported defect.
Even assuming that the firearms and ammunitions were products of an active search done by the
authorities on the person and vehicle of petitioner, their seizure without a search warrant nonetheless
can still be justified under a search incidental to a lawful arrest (first instance). Once the lawful arrest
was effected, the police may undertake a protective search of the passenger compartment and
containers in the vehicle which are within petitioners grabbing distance regardless of the nature of the
offense. This satisfied the two-tiered test of an incidental search: (i) the item to be searched
(vehicle) was within the arrestees custody or area of immediate control and (ii) the search was
contemporaneous with the arrest. The products of that search are admissible evidence not excluded
by the exclusionary rule. Another justification is a search of a moving vehicle (third instance). In
connection therewith, a warrantless search is constitutionally permissible when, as in this case, the
officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the search, that
either the motorist is a law-offender (like herein petitioner with respect to the hit and run) or the
contents or cargo of the vehicle are or have been instruments or the subject matter or the proceeds of
some criminal offense.

xiv
xvRepublic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 110995 September 5, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ALVARO SAYCON y BUQUIRAN, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Francisco S. Garcia and Marcelo G. Flores for accused-appellant.

FELICIANO, J.:
Alvaro Saycon was charged with violating Section 15, Article III of R.A. No. 6425 as amended, the
Dangerous Drugs Act, in an information which read as follows:
That on or about the 8th day of July 1992, in the City of Dumaguete, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, not being then
authorized by law, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, deliver and
transport[] from Manila to Dumaguete City approximately 4 grams of
methamphetam[ine] hydrochloride commonly known as "shabu," a regulated drug.
Contrary to Sec. 15, Art. III of R.A. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act) as amended. 1 (Brackets supplied)
At arraignment, Alvaro Saycon entered a plea of not guilty.
After trial, the trial court rendered, on 15 June 1993, a judgment of conviction. The court found Saycon
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of having transported four (4) grams of metamphetamine
hydrochloride ("shabu") and sentenced him to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00. 2
The relevant facts as found by the trial court were gleaned from the testimonies of the arresting
officers Senior Police Officers Winifredo S. Noble and Ruben Laddaran of the Narcotics Command,
PNP; Police Officer Emmanuelito C. Lajot of the Philippine Coastguard Office in Dumaguete City; and
Forensic Analyst N.G. Salinas of the PNP Crime Laboratory. The trial court summarized the facts in
the following manner:
. . . that on or about 8 July 1992, at about 6:00 in the morning, the Coastguard
personnel received information from NARCOM agent Ruben Laddaran that a
suspected "shabu" courier by the name of Alvaro Saycon was on board the MV Doa
Virginia, which was arriving at that moment in Dumaguete City. Upon receipt of the
information, the Coastguard chief officer CPO Tolin, instructed them to intercept the
suspect. A combined team of NARCOM agents and Philippine Coastguard personnel
consisting of CPO Tolin, a certain Miagme, and Senior Police Officers Ruben Laddaran
and Winifredo Noble of NARCOM posted themselves at the gate of Pier 1.
The MV Doa Virginia docked at 6:00 a.m. that same morning at Pier 1 in Dumaguete
City. Alvaro Saycon alighted from the boat carrying a black bag and went through the
checkpoint manned by the Philippine Coastguard where he was identified by police
officer Winifredo Noble of NARCOM. Saycon was then invited to the Coastguard
Headquarters at the Pier area. He willingly went with them. At the headquarters, the
coastguard asked Saycon to open his bag, and the latter willingly obliged. In it were
personal belongings and a maong wallet. Inside that maong wallet, there was a
Marlboro pack containing the suspected "shabu". When police officer Winifredo Noble
asked Saycon whether the Marlboro pack containing the suspected "shabu" was his,
Saycon merely bowed his head. Then Saycon, his bag and the suspected "shabu" were
brought to the NARCOM office for booking. When Alvaro Saycon was arrested, the
NARCOM agents did not have a warrant of arrest. 3

After the arrest of Saycon, the suspected drug material taken from him was brought to the PNP Crime
Laboratory in Cebu City for chemical examination.
The PNP's Forensic Analyst declared in court that she had conducted an examination of the
specimens which had been taken from appellant Saycon and submitted to the Crime Laboratory on 9
July 1992. Her findings were, basically, that the specimens she examined weighing 4.2 grams in total,
consisted of the regulated drug methamphetamine hydrochloride, more widely known as
"shabu." 4
For his part, appellant Saycon denied ownership of the "shabu" taken from his black bag. He claimed
that upon disembarking from the ship at the pier in Dumaguete City, he was met by two (2) unfamiliar
persons who snatched his bag from him. Thereafter, he was taken to the office of the port collector, at
gunpoint, and there his bag was searched by four (4) men despite his protests. The four (4) persons
were later identified by appellant Saycon as Noble, Sixto, Edjec and Ruben Laddaran. When appellant
Saycon asked why his belongings were being searched, the four (4) answered that there was "shabu"
inside his bag. After the search of his bag, appellant continued, he was shown a small wallet
purportedly taken from his black bag which contained "shabu." Appellant Saycon was then detained at
the Dumaguete City Jail. 5
In his appeal before this Court seeking reversal of the decision of the court a quo finding him guilty of
the crime charged, Saycon contends that the search of his bag was illegal because it had been made
without a search warrant and that, therefore, the "shabu" discovered during the illegal search was
inadmissible in evidence against him.
It is not disputed that the arresting officers were not armed with a search warrant or a warrant of arrest
when they searched Saycon's bag and thereafter effected his arrest.
The relevant constitutional provisions are set out in Sections 2 and 3 [2], Article III of the 1987
Constitution which read as follows:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issued
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witness as he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized.
Sec. 3. xxx xxx xxx
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
The general rule, therefore, is that the search and seizure must be carried out through or with a
judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of
the above constitutional provisions. 6 The evidence secured in the process of search and seizure
i.e., the "fruits" thereof will be inadmissible in evidence "for any purpose in any proceeding. 7
The requirement that a judicial warrant must be obtained prior to the carrying out of a search and
seizure is, however, not absolute. "There are certain exceptions recognized in our law," the Court
noted in People v. Barros. 8 The exception which appears most pertinent in respect of the case at bar

is that relating to the search of moving vehicles. 9 In People v. Barros, the Court said:
Peace officers may lawfully conduct searches of moving vehicles automobiles,
trucks, etc. without need of a warrant, it not being practicable to secure a judicial
warrant before searching a vehicle, since such vehicle can be quickly moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought. (People v. Bagista, supra;
People v. Lo Ho Wing, supra) In carrying out warrantless searches of moving vehicles,
however, peace officers are limited to routine checks, that is, the vehicles are neither
really searched nor their occupants subjected to physical or body searches, the
examination of the vehicles being limited to visual inspection. In Valmonte v. De Villa
(178 SCRA 211 [1989]), the Court stated:
[N]ot all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are
reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be
determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the
facts of each case.
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a
vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds, or simply looks
into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these do not constitute
unreasonable search. (Citations omitted)
When, however, a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a
warrantless search would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers conducting
the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the search, that either
the motorist is a law-offender or the contents or cargo of the vehicle are or have been
instruments or the subject matter or the proceeds of some criminal offense. (People v.
Bagista, supra; Valmonte v. de Villa, 185 SCRA 665 [1990]).
While the analogy is perhaps not perfect, we consider that appellant Saycon stands in the same
situation as the driver or passenger of a motor vehicle that is stopped by police authorities and
subjected to an extensive search. In this situation, the warrantless search and arrest of appellant
Saycon would be constitutionally permissible only if the officer conducting the search had reasonable
or probable cause to believe, before the search, that Saycon who had just disembarked from the MV
Doa Virginia upon arrival of that vessel at 6:00 a.m. of 8 July 1992 at Pier I of Dumaguete city, was
violating some law or that the contents of his luggage included some instrument or the subjects matter
or the proceeds of some criminal offense.
It is important to note that unlike in the case of crimes like, e.g., homicide, murder, physical injuries,
robbery or rape which by their nature involve physical, optically perceptible, overt acts, the offense of
possessing or delivering or transporting some prohibited or regulated drug is customarily carried out
without any external signs or indicia visible to police officers and the rest of the outside world. Drug
"pushers" or couriers do not customarily go about their enterprise or trade with some external visible
sign advertising the fact that they are carrying or distributing or transporting prohibited drugs. Thus,
the application of the rules in Section 5 (a) and (b), Rule 133 of the Rules of Court needs to take that
circumstance into account. The Court has had to resolve the question of valid or invalid warrantless
arrest or warrantless search or seizure in such cases by determining the presence or absence of a
reasonable or probable cause, before the search and arrest, that led the police authorities to believe
that such a felony (possessing or transporting or delivering prohibited drugs) was then in progress. In
Barros, the Court listed the kinds of causes which have been characterized as probable or reasonable
cause supporting the legality and validity of a warrantless search and a warrantless arrest in cases of

this type:
This Court has in the past found probable cause to conduct without a judicial warrant
an extensive search of moving vehicles in situations where (1) there had emanated
from a package the distinctive smell of marijuana (People v. Claudio, 160 SCRA 646
[1988]); (2) agents of the Narcotics Command ("Narcom") of the Philippine National
Police ("PNP") had received a confidential report from informers that a sizeable volume
of marijuana would be transported along the route where the search was conducted
(People v. Maspil, 188 SCRA 751 [1990]); (3) Narcom agents were informed or "tipped
off" by an undercover "deep penetration" agent that prohibited drugs would be brought
into the country on a particular airline flight on a given date (People v. Lo Ho Wing,
supra); (4) Narcom agents had received information that a Caucasian coming from
Sagada, Mountain Province, had in his possession prohibited drugs and when the
Narcom agents confronted the accused Caucasian, because of as conspicuous bulge
in this waistline, he failed to present his passport and other identification papers when
requested to do so (People v. Malmstedt, 198 SCRA 401 [1991]); and (5) Narcom
agents had received confidential information that a woman having the same physical
appearance as that of the accused would be transporting marijuana (People v. Bagista,
supra.).
Close examination of the record of the case at bar shows that there did exist reasonable or probable
cause to believe that appellant Alvaro Saycon would be carrying or transporting prohibited drugs upon
arriving in Dumaguete City on the MV Doa Virginia on 8 July 1992. This probable cause in fact
consisted of two (2) parts. Firstly, Senior Police Officer Winifredo Noble had testified in court that the
NARCOM Agents had, approximately three (3) weeks before 8 July 1992, conducted a test-buy which
confirmed that appellant Saycon was indeed engaged in transporting and selling "shabu." The police
authorities did not, on that occasion, arrest Alvaro Saycon, but what should be noted is that the identity
of Saycon as a drug courier or drug distributor was established in the minds of the police authorities. 10
Secondly, the arresting officers testified that they had received confidential information that very early
morning of 8 July 1992, Alvaro Saycon would probably be on board the MV Doa Virginia which was
scheduled to arrive in Dumaguete City at 6:00 a.m. on 8 July 1992, probably carrying "shabu" with
him.
In respect of the first element of the probable cause here involved, the testimony of Police Officer
Winifredo Noble had not been denied or rebutted by the defense; as it happened, Officer Noble was
not even cross-examined on this point by defense counsel.
In respect of the second element of the probable cause here involved, appellant Saycon contended
that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses showed that the NARCOM Agents knew three (3)
weeks before 8 July 1992 that the MV Doa Virginia would be arriving and that the would probably be
on board that vessel. It was argued by Saycon that the police authorities should have procured, and
had the time to procure, the necessary judicial warrants for search and arrest. Saycon also sought to
underscore a supposed confusion in the testimonies of NARCOM Officer Winifredo Noble and
Coastguard Officer Lajot relating to who, as between the NARCOM agent and the Coastguard
elements, had informed the other that appellant would probably be arriving on board the MV Doa
Virginia. The relevant portion of NARCOM Agent Winifredo Noble's testimony includes the following:
Q: Despite the lapse of three (3) weeks, more or less, from acquiring
knowledge through this informant, did you not secure the necessary
search warrant and warrant of arrest on the effect(s) and person of the
subject Alvaro Saycon?

A: All the time we were only informed by the Coastguard that this certain
fellow in the name of Alvaro Saycon is travelling through and through
from Manila to Dumaguete will be carrying shabu from Manila to
Dumaguete and we could not ascertain (with) the time when he will be at
the pier area.
Q: You have not answered my question. My question is: Despite the
lapse of more than three (3) weeks upon being informed by your
informer that this Alvaro Saycon, the accused in this case, has been a
courier from time to time of prohibited drugs, did you not bother to
secure the necessary warrant: search as well as the arrest?
A: As I said earlier, we could not obtain the necessary search warrant to
that effect because we do not know or ascertain when Alvaro Saycon
will arrive [from] Manila. On that particular morning, we were informed by
the Coastguard that Doa Virginia would be arriving and they told us
that probably this suspect will be among the passengers, so you better
come over and (to) identify the subject. 11 (Emphasis supplied)
Upon the other hand, Coastguard Police Officer Emmanuelito Lajot, Jr. testified in the following way:
Q: What time were you in your office?
A: Before 6:00 o'clock, I was there.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: While you were there, did you receive any communication?
A: Yes.
Q: What communication was that?
A: That a certain Alvaro Saycon was on board MV Doa Virginia arriving
at 6:00 o'clock in the morning?
Q: Who gave you that information?
A: Ruben Laddaran(a).
Q: Who is this Ruben Laddaran?
A: NARCOM Agent. 12 (Emphasis supplied)
If there was any confusion or uncertainty in the testimonies of NARCOM Officer Noble and
Coastguard Officer Lajot, that confusion was a minor detail. It was in any case clarified by
NARCOM Officer Noble's explanation that after the NARCOM Command had received
information appellant Saycon would be transporting drugs from Manila to Dumaguete City, they
advised the Coastguard that they (the Narcotics Command) wanted to set up a checkpoint at
Pier I at Dumaguete City because appellant Saycon could be on board one of the vessels

arriving in Dumaguete City. The Coastguard in turn informed the NARCOM Officers of the
arrival of the MV Doa Virginia and assisted the NARCOM Officers in their operation that
morning of 8 July 1992.
The record shows that the NARCOM Officers were uncertain as to the precise date and time appellant
Saycon would arrive from Manila; all they knew was that Saycon would be taking a boat from Manila
to Dumaguete City Pier. 13 The MV Doa Virginia docked at the Port of Pier I of Dumaguete City
between 6:00 and 6:30 in the morning of 8 July 1992. Earlier on that same morning, the NARCOM
Officers received more specific information that appellant Saycon could be on board the MV Doa
Virginia which was arriving that morning. 14 Clearly, the NARCOM Agents had to act quickly but there
was not enough time to obtain a search warrant or a warrant of arrest. It was realistically not possible
for either the NARCOM Agents or the Coastguard Officers to obtain a judicial search warrant or
warrant of arrest in the situation presented by the case at
bar. 15
The Court considers, therefore, that a valid warrantless search had been conducted by the NARCOM
and Coastguard Officers of the "black bag" of appellant Saycon that morning of 8 July 1992 at the
checkpoint nearby the docking place of the MV Doa Virginia and at the office of the Coastguard at
Dumaguete City. It follows that the warrantless arrest of appellant Saycon which ensued forthwith, was
also valid and lawful, since the police had determined, he was in fact carrying or transporting "shabu."
The further consequence is that the four (4) grams of "shabu" obtained from his maong wallet found
inside his black bag was lawfully before the court a quo. We agree with the court a quo that the
evidence before the latter proved beyond reasonable doubt that appellant Saycon had been carrying
with him "shabu" at the time of his search and arrest and his guilt of the offense charged was
established beyond reasonable doubt.
In view of the foregoing, the decision of the trial court dated 15 June 1993, in Criminal Case No.
10325, should be affirmed, but the penalty properly impassable upon appellant Alvaro Saycon must be
reduced to imprisonment for an indeterminate period ranging from six (6) months of arresto mayor as
minimum to six (6) years of prision correctional as maximum, and the fine of P20,000.00 must be
deleted. This reduction of penalty is required by the provisions of Section 20, Article IV of R.A. NO.
6425, as last amended by Section 17, of R.A. No. 7659 (effective 13 December 1993) as construed
and given retroactive effect in People v. Martin Simon (G.R. No. 93028, 29 July 1994) considering that
the amount of "shabu" here involved (four [4] grams) is obviously less than the 200 grams of "shabu"
cut-off quantity established in the amended Section 20 of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the decision of the trial court in Criminal Case No. 10325, is
hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATIONS, however, that appellant shall suffer imprisonment for
an indeterminate period ranging from six (6) months of arresto mayor as minimum to six (6) years of
prision correctional as maximum, and that the fine of P20,000.00 shall be DELETED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

xvi
xvii
xviii

xixRepublic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 110995 September 5, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ALVARO SAYCON y BUQUIRAN, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Francisco S. Garcia and Marcelo G. Flores for accused-appellant.

FELICIANO, J.:
Alvaro Saycon was charged with violating Section 15, Article III of R.A. No. 6425 as amended, the
Dangerous Drugs Act, in an information which read as follows:
That on or about the 8th day of July 1992, in the City of Dumaguete, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, not being then
authorized by law, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, deliver and
transport[] from Manila to Dumaguete City approximately 4 grams of
methamphetam[ine] hydrochloride commonly known as "shabu," a regulated drug.
Contrary to Sec. 15, Art. III of R.A. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act) as amended. 1 (Brackets supplied)
At arraignment, Alvaro Saycon entered a plea of not guilty.
After trial, the trial court rendered, on 15 June 1993, a judgment of conviction. The court found Saycon
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of having transported four (4) grams of metamphetamine
hydrochloride ("shabu") and sentenced him to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00. 2
The relevant facts as found by the trial court were gleaned from the testimonies of the arresting
officers Senior Police Officers Winifredo S. Noble and Ruben Laddaran of the Narcotics Command,
PNP; Police Officer Emmanuelito C. Lajot of the Philippine Coastguard Office in Dumaguete City; and
Forensic Analyst N.G. Salinas of the PNP Crime Laboratory. The trial court summarized the facts in
the following manner:
. . . that on or about 8 July 1992, at about 6:00 in the morning, the Coastguard
personnel received information from NARCOM agent Ruben Laddaran that a
suspected "shabu" courier by the name of Alvaro Saycon was on board the MV Doa
Virginia, which was arriving at that moment in Dumaguete City. Upon receipt of the
information, the Coastguard chief officer CPO Tolin, instructed them to intercept the
suspect. A combined team of NARCOM agents and Philippine Coastguard personnel
consisting of CPO Tolin, a certain Miagme, and Senior Police Officers Ruben Laddaran

and Winifredo Noble of NARCOM posted themselves at the gate of Pier 1.

The MV Doa Virginia docked at 6:00 a.m. that same morning at Pier 1 in Dumaguete
City. Alvaro Saycon alighted from the boat carrying a black bag and went through the
checkpoint manned by the Philippine Coastguard where he was identified by police
officer Winifredo Noble of NARCOM. Saycon was then invited to the Coastguard
Headquarters at the Pier area. He willingly went with them. At the headquarters, the
coastguard asked Saycon to open his bag, and the latter willingly obliged. In it were
personal belongings and a maong wallet. Inside that maong wallet, there was a
Marlboro pack containing the suspected "shabu". When police officer Winifredo Noble
asked Saycon whether the Marlboro pack containing the suspected "shabu" was his,
Saycon merely bowed his head. Then Saycon, his bag and the suspected "shabu" were
brought to the NARCOM office for booking. When Alvaro Saycon was arrested, the
NARCOM agents did not have a warrant of arrest. 3
After the arrest of Saycon, the suspected drug material taken from him was brought to the PNP Crime
Laboratory in Cebu City for chemical examination.
The PNP's Forensic Analyst declared in court that she had conducted an examination of the
specimens which had been taken from appellant Saycon and submitted to the Crime Laboratory on 9
July 1992. Her findings were, basically, that the specimens she examined weighing 4.2 grams in total,
consisted of the regulated drug methamphetamine hydrochloride, more widely known as
"shabu." 4
For his part, appellant Saycon denied ownership of the "shabu" taken from his black bag. He claimed
that upon disembarking from the ship at the pier in Dumaguete City, he was met by two (2) unfamiliar
persons who snatched his bag from him. Thereafter, he was taken to the office of the port collector, at
gunpoint, and there his bag was searched by four (4) men despite his protests. The four (4) persons
were later identified by appellant Saycon as Noble, Sixto, Edjec and Ruben Laddaran. When appellant
Saycon asked why his belongings were being searched, the four (4) answered that there was "shabu"
inside his bag. After the search of his bag, appellant continued, he was shown a small wallet
purportedly taken from his black bag which contained "shabu." Appellant Saycon was then detained at
the Dumaguete City Jail. 5
In his appeal before this Court seeking reversal of the decision of the court a quo finding him guilty of
the crime charged, Saycon contends that the search of his bag was illegal because it had been made
without a search warrant and that, therefore, the "shabu" discovered during the illegal search was
inadmissible in evidence against him.
It is not disputed that the arresting officers were not armed with a search warrant or a warrant of arrest
when they searched Saycon's bag and thereafter effected his arrest.
The relevant constitutional provisions are set out in Sections 2 and 3 [2], Article III of the 1987
Constitution which read as follows:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issued
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witness as he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things

to be seized.
Sec. 3. xxx xxx xxx
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
The general rule, therefore, is that the search and seizure must be carried out through or with a
judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of
the above constitutional provisions. 6 The evidence secured in the process of search and seizure
i.e., the "fruits" thereof will be inadmissible in evidence "for any purpose in any proceeding. 7
The requirement that a judicial warrant must be obtained prior to the carrying out of a search and
seizure is, however, not absolute. "There are certain exceptions recognized in our law," the Court
noted in People v. Barros. 8 The exception which appears most pertinent in respect of the case at bar
is that relating to the search of moving vehicles. 9 In People v. Barros, the Court said:
Peace officers may lawfully conduct searches of moving vehicles automobiles,
trucks, etc. without need of a warrant, it not being practicable to secure a judicial
warrant before searching a vehicle, since such vehicle can be quickly moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought. (People v. Bagista, supra;
People v. Lo Ho Wing, supra) In carrying out warrantless searches of moving vehicles,
however, peace officers are limited to routine checks, that is, the vehicles are neither
really searched nor their occupants subjected to physical or body searches, the
examination of the vehicles being limited to visual inspection. In Valmonte v. De Villa
(178 SCRA 211 [1989]), the Court stated:
[N]ot all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are
reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be
determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the
facts of each case.
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a
vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds, or simply looks
into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these do not constitute
unreasonable search. (Citations omitted)
When, however, a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a
warrantless search would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers conducting
the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the search, that either
the motorist is a law-offender or the contents or cargo of the vehicle are or have been
instruments or the subject matter or the proceeds of some criminal offense. (People v.
Bagista, supra; Valmonte v. de Villa, 185 SCRA 665 [1990]).
While the analogy is perhaps not perfect, we consider that appellant Saycon stands in the same
situation as the driver or passenger of a motor vehicle that is stopped by police authorities and
subjected to an extensive search. In this situation, the warrantless search and arrest of appellant
Saycon would be constitutionally permissible only if the officer conducting the search had reasonable
or probable cause to believe, before the search, that Saycon who had just disembarked from the MV
Doa Virginia upon arrival of that vessel at 6:00 a.m. of 8 July 1992 at Pier I of Dumaguete city, was
violating some law or that the contents of his luggage included some instrument or the subjects matter

or the proceeds of some criminal offense.

It is important to note that unlike in the case of crimes like, e.g., homicide, murder, physical injuries,
robbery or rape which by their nature involve physical, optically perceptible, overt acts, the offense of
possessing or delivering or transporting some prohibited or regulated drug is customarily carried out
without any external signs or indicia visible to police officers and the rest of the outside world. Drug
"pushers" or couriers do not customarily go about their enterprise or trade with some external visible
sign advertising the fact that they are carrying or distributing or transporting prohibited drugs. Thus,
the application of the rules in Section 5 (a) and (b), Rule 133 of the Rules of Court needs to take that
circumstance into account. The Court has had to resolve the question of valid or invalid warrantless
arrest or warrantless search or seizure in such cases by determining the presence or absence of a
reasonable or probable cause, before the search and arrest, that led the police authorities to believe
that such a felony (possessing or transporting or delivering prohibited drugs) was then in progress. In
Barros, the Court listed the kinds of causes which have been characterized as probable or reasonable
cause supporting the legality and validity of a warrantless search and a warrantless arrest in cases of
this type:
This Court has in the past found probable cause to conduct without a judicial warrant
an extensive search of moving vehicles in situations where (1) there had emanated
from a package the distinctive smell of marijuana (People v. Claudio, 160 SCRA 646
[1988]); (2) agents of the Narcotics Command ("Narcom") of the Philippine National
Police ("PNP") had received a confidential report from informers that a sizeable volume
of marijuana would be transported along the route where the search was conducted
(People v. Maspil, 188 SCRA 751 [1990]); (3) Narcom agents were informed or "tipped
off" by an undercover "deep penetration" agent that prohibited drugs would be brought
into the country on a particular airline flight on a given date (People v. Lo Ho Wing,
supra); (4) Narcom agents had received information that a Caucasian coming from
Sagada, Mountain Province, had in his possession prohibited drugs and when the
Narcom agents confronted the accused Caucasian, because of as conspicuous bulge
in this waistline, he failed to present his passport and other identification papers when
requested to do so (People v. Malmstedt, 198 SCRA 401 [1991]); and (5) Narcom
agents had received confidential information that a woman having the same physical
appearance as that of the accused would be transporting marijuana (People v. Bagista,
supra.).
Close examination of the record of the case at bar shows that there did exist reasonable or probable
cause to believe that appellant Alvaro Saycon would be carrying or transporting prohibited drugs upon
arriving in Dumaguete City on the MV Doa Virginia on 8 July 1992. This probable cause in fact
consisted of two (2) parts. Firstly, Senior Police Officer Winifredo Noble had testified in court that the
NARCOM Agents had, approximately three (3) weeks before 8 July 1992, conducted a test-buy which
confirmed that appellant Saycon was indeed engaged in transporting and selling "shabu." The police
authorities did not, on that occasion, arrest Alvaro Saycon, but what should be noted is that the identity
of Saycon as a drug courier or drug distributor was established in the minds of the police authorities. 10
Secondly, the arresting officers testified that they had received confidential information that very early
morning of 8 July 1992, Alvaro Saycon would probably be on board the MV Doa Virginia which was
scheduled to arrive in Dumaguete City at 6:00 a.m. on 8 July 1992, probably carrying "shabu" with
him.
In respect of the first element of the probable cause here involved, the testimony of Police Officer
Winifredo Noble had not been denied or rebutted by the defense; as it happened, Officer Noble was
not even cross-examined on this point by defense counsel.

In respect of the second element of the probable cause here involved, appellant Saycon contended
that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses showed that the NARCOM Agents knew three (3)
weeks before 8 July 1992 that the MV Doa Virginia would be arriving and that the would probably be
on board that vessel. It was argued by Saycon that the police authorities should have procured, and
had the time to procure, the necessary judicial warrants for search and arrest. Saycon also sought to
underscore a supposed confusion in the testimonies of NARCOM Officer Winifredo Noble and
Coastguard Officer Lajot relating to who, as between the NARCOM agent and the Coastguard
elements, had informed the other that appellant would probably be arriving on board the MV Doa
Virginia. The relevant portion of NARCOM Agent Winifredo Noble's testimony includes the following:
Q: Despite the lapse of three (3) weeks, more or less, from acquiring
knowledge through this informant, did you not secure the necessary
search warrant and warrant of arrest on the effect(s) and person of the
subject Alvaro Saycon?
A: All the time we were only informed by the Coastguard that this certain
fellow in the name of Alvaro Saycon is travelling through and through
from Manila to Dumaguete will be carrying shabu from Manila to
Dumaguete and we could not ascertain (with) the time when he will be at
the pier area.
Q: You have not answered my question. My question is: Despite the
lapse of more than three (3) weeks upon being informed by your
informer that this Alvaro Saycon, the accused in this case, has been a
courier from time to time of prohibited drugs, did you not bother to
secure the necessary warrant: search as well as the arrest?
A: As I said earlier, we could not obtain the necessary search warrant to
that effect because we do not know or ascertain when Alvaro Saycon
will arrive [from] Manila. On that particular morning, we were informed by
the Coastguard that Doa Virginia would be arriving and they told us
that probably this suspect will be among the passengers, so you better
come over and (to) identify the subject. 11 (Emphasis supplied)
Upon the other hand, Coastguard Police Officer Emmanuelito Lajot, Jr. testified in the following way:
Q: What time were you in your office?
A: Before 6:00 o'clock, I was there.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: While you were there, did you receive any communication?
A: Yes.
Q: What communication was that?
A: That a certain Alvaro Saycon was on board MV Doa Virginia arriving
at 6:00 o'clock in the morning?

Q: Who gave you that information?

A: Ruben Laddaran(a).
Q: Who is this Ruben Laddaran?
A: NARCOM Agent. 12 (Emphasis supplied)
If there was any confusion or uncertainty in the testimonies of NARCOM Officer Noble and
Coastguard Officer Lajot, that confusion was a minor detail. It was in any case clarified by
NARCOM Officer Noble's explanation that after the NARCOM Command had received
information appellant Saycon would be transporting drugs from Manila to Dumaguete City, they
advised the Coastguard that they (the Narcotics Command) wanted to set up a checkpoint at
Pier I at Dumaguete City because appellant Saycon could be on board one of the vessels
arriving in Dumaguete City. The Coastguard in turn informed the NARCOM Officers of the
arrival of the MV Doa Virginia and assisted the NARCOM Officers in their operation that
morning of 8 July 1992.
The record shows that the NARCOM Officers were uncertain as to the precise date and time appellant
Saycon would arrive from Manila; all they knew was that Saycon would be taking a boat from Manila
to Dumaguete City Pier. 13 The MV Doa Virginia docked at the Port of Pier I of Dumaguete City
between 6:00 and 6:30 in the morning of 8 July 1992. Earlier on that same morning, the NARCOM
Officers received more specific information that appellant Saycon could be on board the MV Doa
Virginia which was arriving that morning. 14 Clearly, the NARCOM Agents had to act quickly but there
was not enough time to obtain a search warrant or a warrant of arrest. It was realistically not possible
for either the NARCOM Agents or the Coastguard Officers to obtain a judicial search warrant or
warrant of arrest in the situation presented by the case at
bar. 15
The Court considers, therefore, that a valid warrantless search had been conducted by the NARCOM
and Coastguard Officers of the "black bag" of appellant Saycon that morning of 8 July 1992 at the
checkpoint nearby the docking place of the MV Doa Virginia and at the office of the Coastguard at
Dumaguete City. It follows that the warrantless arrest of appellant Saycon which ensued forthwith, was
also valid and lawful, since the police had determined, he was in fact carrying or transporting "shabu."
The further consequence is that the four (4) grams of "shabu" obtained from his maong wallet found
inside his black bag was lawfully before the court a quo. We agree with the court a quo that the
evidence before the latter proved beyond reasonable doubt that appellant Saycon had been carrying
with him "shabu" at the time of his search and arrest and his guilt of the offense charged was
established beyond reasonable doubt.
In view of the foregoing, the decision of the trial court dated 15 June 1993, in Criminal Case No.
10325, should be affirmed, but the penalty properly impassable upon appellant Alvaro Saycon must be
reduced to imprisonment for an indeterminate period ranging from six (6) months of arresto mayor as
minimum to six (6) years of prision correctional as maximum, and the fine of P20,000.00 must be
deleted. This reduction of penalty is required by the provisions of Section 20, Article IV of R.A. NO.
6425, as last amended by Section 17, of R.A. No. 7659 (effective 13 December 1993) as construed
and given retroactive effect in People v. Martin Simon (G.R. No. 93028, 29 July 1994) considering that
the amount of "shabu" here involved (four [4] grams) is obviously less than the 200 grams of "shabu"
cut-off quantity established in the amended Section 20 of the Dangerous Drugs Act.

WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the decision of the trial court in Criminal Case No. 10325, is
hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATIONS, however, that appellant shall suffer imprisonment for
an indeterminate period ranging from six (6) months of arresto mayor as minimum to six (6) years of
prision correctional as maximum, and that the fine of P20,000.00 shall be DELETED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

xx
xxi
xxii
xxiiiEN BANC
[G.R. No. 123595. December 12, 1997]
SAMMY MALACAT y MANDAR, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In an Information[1] filed on 30 August 1990, in Criminal Case No. 90-86748 before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 5, petitioner Sammy Malacat y Mandar was charged with violating
Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1866,[2] as follows:
That on or about August 27, 1990, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly keep, possess and/or acquire a hand grenade, without first
securing the necessary license and/or permit therefor from the proper authorities.
At arraignment[3] on 9 October 1990, petitioner, assisted by counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not
guilty.
At pre-trial on 11 March 1991, petitioner admitted the existence of Exhibits A, A-1, and A-2,[4] while the
prosecution admitted that the police authorities were not armed with a search warrant nor warrant of
arrest at the time they arrested petitioner.[5]
At trial on the merits, the prosecution presented the following police officers as its witnesses: Rodolfo
Yu, the arresting officer; Josefino G. Serapio, the investigating officer; and Orlando Ramilo, who
examined the grenade.
Rodolfo Yu of the Western Police District, Metropolitan Police Force of the Integrated National Police,
Police Station No. 3, Quiapo, Manila, testified that on 27 August 1990, at about 6:30 p.m., in response
to bomb threats reported seven days earlier, he was on foot patrol with three other police officers (all
of them in uniform) along Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila, near the Mercury Drug store at Plaza
Miranda. They chanced upon two groups of Muslim-looking men, with each group, comprised of three

to four men, posted at opposite sides of the corner of Quezon Boulevard near the Mercury Drug Store.
These men were acting suspiciously with [t]heir eyes moving very fast.[6]
Yu and his companions positioned themselves at strategic points and observed both groups for about
thirty minutes. The police officers then approached one group of men, who then fled in different
directions. As the policemen gave chase, Yu caught up with and apprehended petitioner. Upon
searching petitioner, Yu found a fragmentation grenade tucked inside petitioners front waist line.[7] Yus
companion, police officer Rogelio Malibiran, apprehended Abdul Casan from whom a .38 caliber
revolver was recovered. Petitioner and Casan were then brought to Police Station No. 3 where Yu
placed an X mark at the bottom of the grenade and thereafter gave it to his commander.[8]
On cross-examination, Yu declared that they conducted the foot patrol due to a report that a group of
Muslims was going to explode a grenade somewhere in the vicinity of Plaza Miranda. Yu recognized
petitioner as the previous Saturday, 25 August 1990, likewise at Plaza Miranda, Yu saw petitioner and
2 others attempt to detonate a grenade. The attempt was aborted when Yu and other policemen
chased petitioner and his companions; however, the former were unable to catch any of the latter. Yu
further admitted that petitioner and Casan were merely standing on the corner of Quezon Boulevard
when Yu saw them on 27 August 1990. Although they were not creating a commotion, since they were
supposedly acting suspiciously, Yu and his companions approached them. Yu did not issue any receipt
for the grenade he allegedly recovered from petitioner.[9]
Josefino G. Serapio declared that at about 9:00 a.m. of 28 August 1990, petitioner and a certain Abdul
Casan were brought in by Sgt. Saquilla[10] for investigation. Forthwith, Serapio conducted the inquest
of the two suspects, informing them of their rights to remain silent and to be assisted by competent
and independent counsel. Despite Serapios advice, petitioner and Casan manifested their willingness
to answer questions even without the assistance of a lawyer. Serapio then took petitioners
uncounselled confession (Exh. E), there being no PAO lawyer available, wherein petitioner admitted
possession of the grenade. Thereafter, Serapio prepared the affidavit of arrest and booking sheet of
petitioner and Casan. Later, Serapio turned over the grenade to the Intelligence and Special Action
Division (ISAD) of the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit for examination.[11]
On cross-examination, Serapio admitted that he took petitioners confession knowing it was
inadmissible in evidence.[12]
Orlando Ramilo, a member of the Bomb Disposal Unit, whose principal duties included, among other
things, the examination of explosive devices, testified that on 22 March 1991, he received a request
dated 19 March 1991 from Lt. Eduardo Cabrera and PO Diosdado Diotoy for examination of a
grenade. Ramilo then affixed an orange tag on the subject grenade detailing his name, the date and
time he received the specimen. During the preliminary examination of the grenade, he [f]ound that
[the] major components consisting of [a] high filler and fuse assembly [were] all present, and
concluded that the grenade was [l]ive and capable of exploding. On even date, he issued a
certification stating his findings, a copy of which he forwarded to Diotoy on 11 August 1991.[13]
Petitioner was the lone defense witness. He declared that he arrived in Manila on 22 July 1990 and
resided at the Muslim Center in Quiapo, Manila. At around 6:30 in the evening of 27 August 1990, he
went to Plaza Miranda to catch a breath of fresh air. Shortly after, several policemen arrived and
ordered all males to stand aside. The policemen searched petitioner and two other men, but found
nothing in their possession. However, he was arrested with two others, brought to and detained at
Precinct No. 3, where he was accused of having shot a police officer. The officer showed the gunshot
wounds he allegedly sustained and shouted at petitioner [i]to ang tama mo sa akin. This officer then
inserted the muzzle of his gun into petitioners mouth and said, [y]ou are the one who shot me.

Petitioner denied the charges and explained that he only recently arrived in Manila. However, several
other police officers mauled him, hitting him with benches and guns. Petitioner was once again
searched, but nothing was found on him. He saw the grenade only in court when it was presented.[14]
The trial court ruled that the warrantless search and seizure of petitioner was akin to a stop and frisk,
where a warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest and
whose object is either to maintain the status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain
more information.[15] Probable cause was not required as it was not certain that a crime had been
committed, however, the situation called for an investigation, hence to require probable cause would
have been premature.[16] The RTC emphasized that Yu and his companions were [c]onfronted with
an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, threatens the destruction of
evidence[17] and the officers [h]ad to act in haste, as petitioner and his companions were acting
suspiciously, considering the time, place and reported cases of bombing. Further, petitioners group
suddenly ran away in different directions as they saw the arresting officers approach, thus [i]t is
reasonable for an officer to conduct a limited search, the purpose of which is not necessarily to
discover evidence of a crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his investigation without fear of
violence.[18]
The trial court then ruled that the seizure of the grenade from petitioner was incidental to a lawful
arrest, and since petitioner [l]ater voluntarily admitted such fact to the police investigator for the
purpose of bombing the Mercury Drug Store, concluded that sufficient evidence existed to establish
petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
In its decision[19] dated 10 February 1994 but promulgated on 15 February 1994, the trial court thus
found petitioner guilty of the crime of illegal possession of explosives under Section 3 of P.D. No.
1866, and sentenced him to suffer:
[T]he penalty of not less than SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY OF
RECLUSION TEMPORAL, as minimum, and not more than THIRTY (30) YEARS OF RECLUSION
PERPETUA, as maximum.
On 18 February 1994, petitioner filed a notice of appeal[20] indicating that he was appealing to this
Court. However, the record of the case was forwarded to the Court of Appeals which docketed it as
CA-G.R. CR No. 15988 and issued a notice to file briefs.[21]
In his Appellants Brief [22] filed with the Court of Appeals, petitioner asserted that:
1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SEARCH UPON THE PERSON OF
ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND THE SEIZURE OF THE ALLEGED HANDGRENADE FROM HIM WAS
AN APPROPRIATE INCIDENT TO HIS ARREST.
2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE AGAINST ACCUSED-APPELLANT
THE HANDGRENADE ALLEGEDLY SEIZED FROM HIM AS IT WAS A PRODUCT OF AN
UNREASONABLE AND ILLEGAL SEARCH.
In sum, petitioner argued that the warrantless arrest was invalid due to absence of any of the
conditions provided for in Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, citing People vs. Mengote.[23]
As such, the search was illegal, and the hand grenade seized, inadmissible in evidence.
In its Brief for the Appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General agreed with the trial court and prayed
that its decision be affirmed in toto.[24]

In its decision of 24 January 1996,[25] the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, noting, first, that
petitioner abandoned his original theory before the court a quo that the grenade was planted by the
police officers; and second, the factual finding of the trial court that the grenade was seized from
petitioners possession was not raised as an issue. Further, respondent court focused on the
admissibility in evidence of Exhibit D, the hand grenade seized from petitioner. Meeting the issue
squarely, the Court of Appeals ruled that the arrest was lawful on the ground that there was probable
cause for the arrest as petitioner was attempting to commit an offense, thus:
We are at a loss to understand how a man, who was in possession of a live grenade and in the
company of other suspicious character[s] with unlicensed firearm[s] lurking in Plaza Miranda at a time
when political tension ha[d] been enkindling a series of terroristic activities, [can] claim that he was not
attempting to commit an offense. We need not mention that Plaza Miranda is historically notorious for
being a favorite bomb site especially during times of political upheaval. As the mere possession of an
unlicensed grenade is by itself an offense, Malacats posture is simply too preposterous to inspire
belief.
In so doing, the Court of Appeals took into account petitioners failure to rebut the testimony of the
prosecution witnesses that they received intelligence reports of a bomb threat at Plaza Miranda; the
fact that PO Yu chased petitioner two days prior to the latters arrest, or on 27 August 1990; and that
petitioner and his companions acted suspiciously, the accumulation of which was more than sufficient
to convince a reasonable man that an offense was about to be committed. Moreover, the Court of
Appeals observed:
The police officers in such a volatile situation would be guilty of gross negligence and dereliction of
duty, not to mention of gross incompetence, if they [would] first wait for Malacat to hurl the grenade,
and kill several innocent persons while maiming numerous others, before arriving at what would then
be an assured but moot conclusion that there was indeed probable cause for an arrest. We are in
agreement with the lower court in saying that the probable cause in such a situation should not be the
kind of proof necessary to convict, but rather the practical considerations of everyday life on which a
reasonable and prudent mind, and not legal technicians, will ordinarily act.
Finally, the Court of Appeals held that the rule laid down in People v. Mengote,[26] which petitioner
relied upon, was inapplicable in light of [c]rucial differences, to wit:
[In Mengote] the police officers never received any intelligence report that someone [at] the corner of a
busy street [would] be in possession of a prohibited article. Here the police officers were responding to
a [sic] public clamor to put a check on the series of terroristic bombings in the Metropolis, and, after
receiving intelligence reports about a bomb threat aimed at the vicinity of the historically notorious
Plaza Miranda, they conducted foot patrols for about seven days to observe suspicious movements in
the area. Furthermore, in Mengote, the police officers [had] no personal knowledge that the person
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. Here, PO3 Yu
[had] personal knowledge of the fact that he chased Malacat in Plaza Miranda two days before he
finally succeeded in apprehending him.
Unable to accept his conviction, petitioner forthwith filed the instant petition and assigns the following
errors:
1. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT
THE WARRANTLESS ARREST OF PETITIONER WAS VALID AND LEGAL.

2. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RULING IN PEOPLE VS.
MENGOTE DOES NOT FIND APPLICATION IN THE INSTANT CASE.
In support thereof, petitioner merely restates his arguments below regarding the validity of the
warrantless arrest and search, then disagrees with the finding of the Court of Appeals that he was
attempting to commit a crime, as the evidence for the prosecution merely disclosed that he was
standing at the corner of Plaza Miranda and Quezon Boulevard with his eyes moving very fast and
looking at every person that come (sic) nearer (sic) to them. Finally, petitioner points out the factual
similarities between his case and that of People v. Mengote to demonstrate that the Court of Appeals
miscomprehended the latter.
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General prays that we affirm the challenged decision.
For being impressed with merit, we resolved to give due course to the petition.
The challenged decision must immediately fall on jurisdictional grounds. To repeat, the penalty
imposed by the trial court was:
[N]ot less than SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY OF
RECLUSION TEMPORAL, as minimum, and not more than THIRTY (30) YEARS OF
RECLUSION PERPETUA, as maximum.
The penalty provided by Section 3 of P.D. No. 1866 upon any person who shall unlawfully possess
grenades is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.
For purposes of determining appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases, the maximum of the penalty, and
not the minimum, is taken into account. Since the maximum of the penalty is reclusion perpetua, the
appeal therefrom should have been to us, and not the Court of Appeals, pursuant to Section 9(3) of
the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B.P. Blg. 129),[27] in relation to Section 17 of the Judiciary
Act of 1948,[28] Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the Constitution[29] and Section 3(c) of Rule 122 of the
Rules of Court.[30] The term life imprisonment as used in Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, the Judiciary Act
of 1948, and Section 3 of Rule 122 must be deemed to include reclusion perpetua in view of Section
5(2) of Article VIII of the Constitution.
Petitioners Notice of Appeal indicated that he was appealing from the trial courts decision to this Court,
yet the trial court transmitted the record to the Court of Appeals and the latter proceeded to resolve the
appeal.
We then set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals for having been rendered without jurisdiction,
and consider the appeal as having been directly brought to us, with the petition for review as
petitioners Brief for the Appellant, the comment thereon by the Office of the Solicitor General as the
Brief for the Appellee and the memoranda of the parties as their Supplemental Briefs.
Deliberating on the foregoing pleadings, we find ourselves convinced that the prosecution failed to
establish petitioners guilt with moral certainty.
First, serious doubt surrounds the story of police officer Yu that a grenade was found in and seized
from petitioners possession. Notably, Yu did not identify, in court, the grenade he allegedly seized.
According to him, he turned it over to his commander after putting an X mark at its bottom; however,
the commander was not presented to corroborate this claim. On the other hand, the grenade
presented in court and identified by police officer Ramilo referred to what the latter received from Lt.

Eduardo Cabrera and police officer Diotoy not immediately after petitioners arrest, but nearly seven (7)
months later, or on 19 March 1991; further, there was no evidence whatsoever that what Ramilo
received was the very same grenade seized from petitioner. In his testimony, Yu never declared that
the grenade passed on to Ramilo was the grenade the former confiscated from petitioner. Yu did not,
and was not made to, identify the grenade examined by Ramilo, and the latter did not claim that the
grenade he examined was that seized from petitioner. Plainly, the law enforcement authorities failed to
safeguard and preserve the chain of evidence so crucial in cases such as these.
Second, if indeed petitioner had a grenade with him, and that two days earlier he was with a group
about to detonate an explosive at Plaza Miranda, and Yu and his fellow officers chased, but failed to
arrest them, then considering that Yu and his three fellow officers were in uniform and therefore easily
cognizable as police officers, it was then unnatural and against common experience that petitioner
simply stood there in proximity to the police officers. Note that Yu observed petitioner for thirty minutes
and must have been close enough to petitioner in order to discern petitioners eyes moving very fast.
Finally, even assuming that petitioner admitted possession of the grenade during his custodial
investigation by police officer Serapio, such admission was inadmissible in evidence for it was taken in
palpable violation of Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution, which provide as follows:
SEC. 12 (1). Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to
be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of
his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
xxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible
in evidence against him.
Serapio conducted the custodial investigation on petitioner the day following his arrest. No lawyer was
present and Serapio could not have requested a lawyer to assist petitioner as no PAO lawyer was
then available. Thus, even if petitioner consented to the investigation and waived his rights to remain
silent and to counsel, the waiver was invalid as it was not in writing, neither was it executed in the
presence of counsel.
Even granting ex gratia that petitioner was in possession of a grenade, the arrest and search of
petitioner were invalid, as will be discussed below.
The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant is needed in order to
validly effect the same.[31] The Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable arrests, searches and
seizures refers to those effected without a validly issued warrant,[32] subject to certain exceptions. As
regards valid warrantless arrests, these are found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which
reads, in part:
Sec. 5. -- Arrest, without warrant; when lawful -- A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped ***
A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) has been denominated
as one "in flagrante delicto," while that under Section 5(b) has been described as a "hot pursuit"
arrest.
Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the following: (1) customs searches; (2)
search of moving vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consent searches;[33] (5) a
search incidental to a lawful arrest;[34] and (6) a "stop and frisk."[35]
In the instant petition, the trial court validated the warrantless search as a stop and frisk with the
seizure of the grenade from the accused [as] an appropriate incident to his arrest, hence necessitating
a brief discussion on the nature of these exceptions to the warrant requirement.
At the outset, we note that the trial court confused the concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and of a search
incidental to a lawful arrest. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite
quantum of proof before they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the
incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g.,
whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search.[36] In this instance, the law
requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made -- the process cannot be
reversed.[37] At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer may search the person of the
arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and
seize any money or property found which was used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the
crime, or that which may be used as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the means of
escaping or committing violence.[38]
Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding the search in
light of the lack of personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt physical act,
on the part of petitioner, indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being committed or was
going to be committed.
Having thus shown the invalidity of the warrantless arrest in this case, plainly, the search conducted
on petitioner could not have been one incidental to a lawful arrest.
We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a "stop-and-frisk" as a "limited
protective search of outer clothing for weapons," as laid down in Terry, thus:
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him
reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the
persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of
investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries,
and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his
own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct
a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons
which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment ***[39]

Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and
frisk,"[40] it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A
genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to
warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him.[41] Finally, a "stop-andfrisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection,
which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an
appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even
without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which
permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not
armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.
Here, here are at least three (3) reasons why the stop-and-frisk was invalid:
First, we harbor grave doubts as to Yus claim that petitioner was a member of the group which
attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda two days earlier. This claim is neither supported by any police
report or record nor corroborated by any other police officer who allegedly chased that group. Aside
from impairing Yu's credibility as a witness, this likewise diminishes the probability that a genuine
reason existed so as to arrest and search petitioner. If only to further tarnish the credibility of Yu's
testimony, contrary to his claim that petitioner and his companions had to be chased before being
apprehended, the affidavit of arrest (Exh. "A") expressly declares otherwise, i.e., upon arrival of five (5)
other police officers, petitioner and his companions were "immediately collared."
Second, there was nothing in petitioners behavior or conduct which could have reasonably elicited
even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were moving very fast an observation which leaves us
incredulous since Yu and his teammates were nowhere near petitioner and it was already 6:30 p.m.,
thus presumably dusk. Petitioner and his companions were merely standing at the corner and were
not creating any commotion or trouble, as Yu explicitly declared on cross-examination:
Q

And what were they doing?

They were merely standing.

You are sure of that?

Yes, sir.

And when you saw them standing, there were nothing or they did not create any commotion?

None, sir.

Neither did you see them create commotion?

None, sir.[42]

Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that petitioner was armed with a
deadly weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was discovered
inside the front waistline of petitioner, and from all indications as to the distance between Yu and
petitioner, any telltale bulge, assuming that petitioner was indeed hiding a grenade, could not have
been visible to Yu. In fact, as noted by the trial court:

When the policemen approached the accused and his companions, they were not yet aware that a
handgrenade was tucked inside his waistline. They did not see any bulging object in [sic] his person.
[43]
What is unequivocal then in this case are blatant violations of petitioners rights solemnly guaranteed in
Sections 2 and 12(1) of Article III of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the Seventeenth Division of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR No. 15988 is SET ASIDE for lack of jurisdiction on the part of said Court and, on ground of
reasonable doubt, the decision of 10 February 1994 of Branch 5 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila
is REVERSED and petitioner SAMMY MALACAT y MANDAR is hereby ACQUITTED and ORDERED
immediately released from detention, unless his further detention is justified for any other lawful cause.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

xxiv
xxv
xxvi
xxvii
xxviiiTHIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 120915. April 3, 1998]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROSA ARUTA y MENGUIN, accusedappellant.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
With the pervasive proliferation of illegal drugs and its pernicious effects on our society, our law
enforcers tend at times to overreach themselves in apprehending drug offenders to the extent of failing
to observe well-entrenched constitutional guarantees against illegal searches and arrests.
Consequently, drug offenders manage to evade the clutches of the law on mere technicalities.
Accused-appellant Rosa Aruta y Menguin was arrested and charged with violating Section 4, Article II
of Republic Act No. 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act. The information reads:
That on or about the fourteenth (14th) day of December, 1988, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being lawfully
authorized, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly engage in transporting approximately
eight (8) kilos and five hundred (500) grams of dried marijuana packed in plastic bag marked Cash
Katutak placed in a travelling bag, which are prohibited drugs.

Upon arraignment, she pleaded not guilty. After trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court of
Olongapo City convicted and sentenced her to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine
of twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos.[1]
The prosecution substantially relied on the testimonies of P/Lt. Ernesto Abello, Officer-in-Charge of the
Narcotics Command (NARCOM) of Olongapo City and P/Lt. Jose Domingo. Based on their
testimonies, the court a quo found the following:
On December 13, 1988, P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informant, known only as Benjie, that a
certain Aling Rosa would be arriving from Baguio City the following day, December 14, 1988, with a
large volume of marijuana. Acting on said tip, P/Lt. Abello assembled a team composed of P/Lt. Jose
Domingo, Sgt. Angel Sudiacal, Sgt. Oscar Imperial, Sgt. Danilo Santiago and Sgt. Efren Quirubin.
Said team proceeded to West Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo City at around 4:00 in the afternoon of
December 14, 1988 and deployed themselves near the Philippine National Bank (PNB) building along
Rizal Avenue and the Caltex gasoline station. Dividing themselves into two groups, one group, made
up of P/Lt. Abello, P/Lt. Domingo and the informant posted themselves near the PNB building while
the other group waited near the Caltex gasoline station.
While thus positioned, a Victory Liner Bus with body number 474 and the letters BGO printed on its
front and back bumpers stopped in front of the PNB building at around 6:30 in the evening of the same
day from where two females and a male got off. It was at this stage that the informant pointed out to
the team Aling Rosa who was then carrying a travelling bag.
Having ascertained that accused-appellant was Aling Rosa, the team approached her and introduced
themselves as NARCOM agents. When P/Lt. Abello asked Aling Rosa about the contents of her bag,
the latter handed it to the former.
Upon inspection, the bag was found to contain dried marijuana leaves packed in a plastic bag marked
Cash Katutak. The team confiscated the bag together with the Victory Liner bus ticket to which Lt.
Domingo affixed his signature. Accused-appellant was then brought to the NARCOM office for
investigation where a Receipt of Property Seized was prepared for the confiscated marijuana leaves.
Upon examination of the seized marijuana specimen at the PC/INP Crime Laboratory, Camp Olivas,
Pampanga, P/Maj. Marlene Salangad, a Forensic Chemist, prepared a Technical Report stating that
said specimen yielded positive results for marijuana, a prohibited drug.
After the presentation of the testimonies of the arresting officers and of the above technical report, the
prosecution rested its case.
Instead of presenting its evidence, the defense filed a Demurrer to Evidence alleging the illegality of
the search and seizure of the items thereby violating accused-appellants constitutional right against
unreasonable search and seizure as well as their inadmissibility in evidence.
The said Demurrer to Evidence was, however, denied without the trial court ruling on the alleged
illegality of the search and seizure and the inadmissibility in evidence of the items seized to avoid prejudgment. Instead, the trial court continued to hear the case.
In view of said denial, accused-appellant testified on her behalf. As expected, her version of the
incident differed from that of the prosecution. She claimed that immediately prior to her arrest, she had
just come from Choice Theater where she watched the movie Balweg. While about to cross the road,

an old woman asked her help in carrying a shoulder bag. In the middle of the road, Lt. Abello and Lt.
Domingo arrested her and asked her to go with them to the NARCOM Office.
During investigation at said office, she disclaimed any knowledge as to the identity of the woman and
averred that the old woman was nowhere to be found after she was arrested. Moreover, she added
that no search warrant was shown to her by the arresting officers.
After the prosecution made a formal offer of evidence, the defense filed a Comment and/or Objection
to Prosecutions Formal Offer of Evidence contesting the admissibility of the items seized as they were
allegedly a product of an unreasonable search and seizure.
Not convinced with her version of the incident, the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City convicted
accused-appellant of transporting eight (8) kilos and five hundred (500) grams of marijuana from
Baguio City to Olongapo City in violation of Section 4, Article 11 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 and sentenced her to life imprisonment and to
pay a fine of twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.[2]
In this appeal, accused-appellant submits the following:
1.
The trial court erred in holding that the NARCOM agents could not apply for a warrant for the
search of a bus or a passenger who boarded a bus because one of the requirements for applying a
search warrant is that the place to be searched must be specifically designated and described.
2.
The trial court erred in holding or assuming that if a search warrant was applied for by the
NARCOM agents, still no court would issue a search warrant for the reason that the same would be
considered a general search warrant which may be quashed.
3.
The trial court erred in not finding that the warrantless search resulting to the arrest of
accused-appellant violated the latters constitutional rights.
4.
The trial court erred in not holding that although the defense of denial is weak yet the evidence
of the prosecution is even weaker.
These submissions are impressed with merit.
In People v. Ramos,[3] this Court held that a search may be conducted by law enforcers only on the
strength of a search warrant validly issued by a judge as provided in Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution which provides:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
This constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition against all searches and seizures as it
operates only against unreasonable searches and seizures. The plain import of the language of the
Constitution, which in one sentence prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures and at the same
time prescribes the requisites for a valid warrant, is that searches and seizures are normally

unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. Thus, the
fundamental protection accorded by the search and seizure clause is that between person and police
must stand the protective authority of a magistrate clothed with power to issue or refuse to issue
search warrants or warrants of arrest.[4]
Further, articles which are the product of unreasonable searches and seizures are inadmissible as
evidence pursuant to the doctrine pronounced in Stonehill v. Diokno.[5] This exclusionary rule was
later enshrined in Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution, thus:
Section 3(2). Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible
in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.
From the foregoing, it can be said that the State cannot simply intrude indiscriminately into the houses,
papers, effects, and most importantly, on the person of an individual. The constitutional provision
guaranteed an impenetrable shield against unreasonable searches and seizures. As such, it protects
the privacy and sanctity of the person himself against unlawful arrests and other forms of restraint.[6]
Therewithal, the right of a person to be secured against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any
deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. A statute, rule or situation which allows
exceptions to the requirement of a warrant of arrest or search warrant must perforce be strictly
construed and their application limited only to cases specifically provided or allowed by law. To do
otherwise is an infringement upon personal liberty and would set back a right so basic and deserving
of full protection and vindication yet often violated.[7]
The following cases are specifically provided or allowed by law:
1.
Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court[8] and by prevailing jurisprudence;
2.

Seizure of evidence in plain view, the elements of which are:

(a)
a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally
present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b)
are;

the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they

(c)

the evidence must be immediately apparent, and

(d)

plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;

3.
Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicles inherent mobility
reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly
reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;
4.

Consented warrantless search;

5.

Customs search;[9]

6.

Stop and Frisk;[10] and

7.

Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.[11]

The above exceptions, however, should not become unbridled licenses for law enforcement officers to
trample upon the constitutionally guaranteed and more fundamental right of persons against
unreasonable search and seizures. The essential requisite of probable cause must still be satisfied
before a warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully conducted.
Although probable cause eludes exact and concrete definition, it generally signifies a reasonable
ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a
cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. It
likewise refers to the existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the item(s),
article(s) or object(s) sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by
law is in the place to be searched.[12]
It ought to be emphasized that in determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and
circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of our rules of evidence of which his knowledge is
technically nil. Rather, he relies on the calculus of common sense which all reasonable men have in
abundance. The same quantum of evidence is required in determining probable cause relative to
search. Before a search warrant can be issued, it must be shown by substantial evidence that the
items sought are in fact seizable by virtue of being connected with criminal activity, and that the items
will be found in the place to be searched.[13]
In searches and seizures effected without a warrant, it is necessary for probable cause to be present.
Absent any probable cause, the article(s) seized could not be admitted and used as evidence against
the person arrested. Probable cause, in these cases, must only be based on reasonable ground of
suspicion or belief that a crime has been committed or is about to be committed.
In our jurisprudence, there are instances where information has become a sufficient probable cause to
effect a warrantless search and seizure.
In People v. Tangliben,[14] acting on information supplied by informers, police officers conducted a
surveillance at the Victory Liner Terminal compound in San Fernando, Pampanga against persons
who may commit misdemeanors and also on those who may be engaging in the traffic of dangerous
drugs. At 9:30 in the evening, the policemen noticed a person carrying a red travelling bag who was
acting suspiciously. They confronted him and requested him to open his bag but he refused. He
acceded later on when the policemen identified themselves. Inside the bag were marijuana leaves
wrapped in a plastic wrapper. The police officers only knew of the activities of Tangliben on the night of
his arrest.
In instant case, the apprehending officers already had prior knowledge from their informant regarding
Arutas alleged activities. In Tangliben policemen were confronted with an on-the-spot tip. Moreover,
the policemen knew that the Victory Liner compound is being used by drug traffickers as their
business address. More significantly, Tangliben was acting suspiciously. His actuations and
surrounding circumstances led the policemen to reasonably suspect that Tangliben is committing a
crime. In instant case, there is no single indication that Aruta was acting suspiciously.
In People v. Malmstedt,[15] the Narcom agents received reports that vehicles coming from Sagada
were transporting marijuana. They likewise received information that a Caucasian coming from
Sagada had prohibited drugs on his person. There was no reasonable time to obtain a search
warrant, especially since the identity of the suspect could not be readily ascertained. His actuations

also aroused the suspicion of the officers conducting the operation. The Court held that in light of such
circumstances, to deprive the agents of the ability and facility to act promptly, including a search
without a warrant, would be to sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the
detriment of society.
Note, however, the glaring differences of Malmstedt to the instant case. In present case, the police
officers had reasonable time within which to secure a search warrant. Second, Arutas identity was
priorly ascertained. Third, Aruta was not acting suspiciously. Fourth, Malmstedt was searched aboard
a moving vehicle, a legally accepted exception to the warrant requirement. Aruta, on the other hand,
was searched while about to cross a street.
In People v. Bagista,[16] the NARCOM officers had probable cause to stop and search all vehicles
coming from the north to Acop, Tublay, Benguet in view of the confidential information they received
from their regular informant that a woman having the same appearance as that of accused-appellant
would be bringing marijuana from up north. They likewise had probable cause to search accusedappellants belongings since she fitted the description given by the NARCOM informant. Since there
was a valid warrantless search by the NARCOM agents, any evidence obtained in the course of said
search is admissible against accused-appellant. Again, this case differs from Aruta as this involves a
search of a moving vehicle plus the fact that the police officers erected a checkpoint. Both are
exceptions to the requirements of a search warrant.
In Manalili v. Court of Appeals and People,[17] the policemen conducted a surveillance in an area of
the Kalookan Cemetery based on information that drug addicts were roaming therein. Upon reaching
the place, they chanced upon a man in front of the cemetery who appeared to be high on drugs. He
was observed to have reddish eyes and to be walking in a swaying manner. Moreover, he appeared to
be trying to avoid the policemen. When approached and asked what he was holding in his hands, he
tried to resist. When he showed his wallet, it contained marijuana. The Court held that the policemen
had sufficient reason to accost accused-appellant to determine if he was actually high on drugs due to
his suspicious actuations, coupled with the fact that based on information, this area was a haven for
drug addicts.
In all the abovecited cases, there was information received which became the bases for conducting
the warrantless search. Furthermore, additional factors and circumstances were present which, when
taken together with the information, constituted probable causes which justified the warrantless
searches and seizures in each of the cases.
In the instant case, the determination of the absence or existence of probable cause necessitates a
reexamination of the facts. The following have been established: (1) In the morning of December 13,
1988, the law enforcement officers received information from an informant named Benjie that a certain
Aling Rosa would be leaving for Baguio City on December 14, 1988 and would be back in the
afternoon of the same day carrying with her a large volume of marijuana; (2) At 6:30 in the evening of
December 14, 1988, accused-appellant alighted from a Victory Liner Bus carrying a travelling bag
even as the informant pointed her out to the law enforcement officers; (3) The law enforcement officers
approached her and introduced themselves as NARCOM agents; (4) When asked by Lt. Abello about
the contents of her travelling bag, she gave the same to him; (5) When they opened the same, they
found dried marijuana leaves; (6) Accused-appellant was then brought to the NARCOM office for
investigation.
This case is similar to People v. Aminnudin where the police received information two days before the
arrival of Aminnudin that the latter would be arriving from Iloilo on board the M/V Wilcon 9. His name
was known, the vehicle was identified and the date of arrival was certain. From the information they

had received, the police could have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to
justify the issuance of a warrant. Instead of securing a warrant first, they proceeded to apprehend
Aminnudin. When the case was brought before this Court, the arrest was held to be illegal; hence any
item seized from Aminnudin could not be used against him.
Another recent case is People v. Encinada where the police likewise received confidential information
the day before at 4:00 in the afternoon from their informant that Encinada would be bringing in
marijuana from Cebu City on board M/V Sweet Pearl at 7:00 in the morning of the following day. This
intelligence information regarding the culprits identity, the particular crime he allegedly committed and
his exact whereabouts could have been a basis of probable cause for the lawmen to secure a warrant.
This Court held that in accordance with Administrative Circular No. 13 and Circular No. 19, series of
1987, the lawmen could have applied for a warrant even after court hours. The failure or neglect to
secure one cannot serve as an excuse for violating Encinadas constitutional right.
In the instant case, the NARCOM agents were admittedly not armed with a warrant of arrest. To
legitimize the warrantless search and seizure of accused-appellants bag, accused-appellant must
have been validly arrested under Section 5 of Rule 113 which provides inter alia:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a)
When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
xxx

xxx

xxx.

Accused-appellant Aruta cannot be said to be committing a crime. Neither was she about to commit
one nor had she just committed a crime. Accused-appellant was merely crossing the street and was
not acting in any manner that would engender a reasonable ground for the NARCOM agents to
suspect and conclude that she was committing a crime. It was only when the informant pointed to
accused-appellant and identified her to the agents as the carrier of the marijuana that she was singled
out as the suspect. The NARCOM agents would not have apprehended accused-appellant were it not
for the furtive finger of the informant because, as clearly illustrated by the evidence on record, there
was no reason whatsoever for them to suspect that accused-appellant was committing a crime, except
for the pointing finger of the informant. This the Court could neither sanction nor tolerate as it is a clear
violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure. Neither was there
any semblance of any compliance with the rigid requirements of probable cause and warrantless
arrests.
Consequently, there was no legal basis for the NARCOM agents to effect a warrantless search of
accused-appellants bag, there being no probable cause and the accused-appellant not having been
lawfully arrested. Stated otherwise, the arrest being incipiently illegal, it logically follows that the
subsequent search was similarly illegal, it being not incidental to a lawful arrest. The constitutional
guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure must perforce operate in favor of accusedappellant. As such, the articles seized could not be used as evidence against accused-appellant for
these are fruits of a poisoned tree and, therefore, must be rejected, pursuant to Article III, Sec. 3(2) of
the Constitution.
Emphasis is to be laid on the fact that the law requires that the search be incidental to a lawful arrest,
in order that the search itself may likewise be considered legal. Therefore, it is beyond cavil that a
lawful arrest must precede the search of a person and his belongings. Where a search is first

undertaken, and an arrest effected based on evidence produced by the search, both such search and
arrest would be unlawful, for being contrary to law.[18]
As previously discussed, the case in point is People v. Aminnudin[19] where, this Court observed that:
x x x accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that
he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank
of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances,
he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the
informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so
subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The identification by the
informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers (and not a judge) that authorized them
to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.
In the absence of probable cause to effect a valid and legal warrantless arrest, the search and seizure
of accused-appellants bag would also not be justified as seizure of evidence in plain view under the
second exception. The marijuana was obviously not immediately apparent as shown by the fact that
the NARCOM agents still had to request accused-appellant to open the bag to ascertain its contents.
Neither would the search and seizure of accused-appellants bag be justified as a search of a moving
vehicle. There was no moving vehicle to speak of in the instant case as accused-appellant was
apprehended several minutes after alighting from the Victory Liner bus. In fact, she was accosted in
the middle of the street and not while inside the vehicle.
People v. Solayao,[20] applied the stop and frisk principle which has been adopted in Posadas v.
Court of Appeals.[21] In said case, Solayao attempted to flee when he and his companions were
accosted by government agents. In the instant case, there was no observable manifestation that could
have aroused the suspicion of the NARCOM agents as to cause them to stop and frisk accusedappellant. To reiterate, accused-appellant was merely crossing the street when apprehended. Unlike in
the abovementioned cases, accused-appellant never attempted to flee from the NARCOM agents
when the latter identified themselves as such. Clearly, this is another indication of the paucity of
probable cause that would sufficiently provoke a suspicion that accused-appellant was committing a
crime.
The warrantless search and seizure could not likewise be categorized under exigent and emergency
circumstances, as applied in People v. De Gracia.[22] In said case, there were intelligence reports
that the building was being used as headquarters by the RAM during a coup detat. A surveillance team
was fired at by a group of armed men coming out of the building and the occupants of said building
refused to open the door despite repeated requests. There were large quantities of explosives and
ammunitions inside the building. Nearby courts were closed and general chaos and disorder prevailed.
The existing circumstances sufficiently showed that a crime was being committed. In short, there was
probable cause to effect a warrantless search of the building. The same could not be said in the
instant case.
The only other exception that could possibly legitimize the warrantless search and seizure would be
consent given by the accused-appellant to the warrantless search as to amount to a waiver of her
constitutional right. The Solicitor General argues that accused-appellant voluntarily submitted herself
to search and inspection citing People v. Malasugui[23] where this Court ruled:
When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made on his person or premises, he is
precluded from complaining later thereof. (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., [V]ol. I, p. 631.)

The right to be secure from unreasonable search may, like every right, be waived and such waiver
may be made either expressly or impliedly.
In support of said argument, the Solicitor General cited the testimony of Lt. Abello, thus:
Q
that?

When this informant by the name of alias Benjie pointed to Aling Rosa, what happened after

A
We followed her and introduced ourselves as NARCOM agents and confronted her with our
informant and asked her what she was carrying and if we can see the bag she was carrying.
Q

What was her reaction?

She gave her bag to me.

So what happened after she gave the bag to you?

I opened it and found out plastic bags of marijuana inside.[24]

This Court cannot agree with the Solicitor Generals contention for the Malasugui case is inapplicable
to the instant case. In said case, there was probable cause for the warrantless arrest thereby making
the warrantless search effected immediately thereafter equally lawful.[25] On the contrary, the most
essential element of probable cause, as expounded above in detail, is wanting in the instant case
making the warrantless arrest unjustified and illegal. Accordingly, the search which accompanied the
warrantless arrest was likewise unjustified and illegal. Thus, all the articles seized from the accusedappellant could not be used as evidence against her.
Aside from the inapplicability of the abovecited case, the act of herein accused-appellant in handing
over her bag to the NARCOM agents could not be construed as voluntary submission or an implied
acquiescence to the unreasonable search. The instant case is similar to People v. Encinada,[26]
where this Court held:
[T]he Republics counsel avers that appellant voluntarily handed the chairs containing the package of
marijuana to the arresting officer and thus effectively waived his right against the warrantless search.
This he gleaned from Bolonias testimony.
Q:

After Roel Encinada alighted from the motor tricycle, what happened next?

A:

I requested to him to see his chairs that he carried.

Q:

Are you referring to the two plastic chairs?

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:
By the way, when Roel Encinada agreed to allow you to examine the two chairs that he
carried, what did you do next?
A:

I examined the chairs and I noticed that something inside in between the two chairs.

We are not convinced. While in principle we agree that consent will validate an otherwise illegal
search, we believe that appellant -- based on the transcript quoted above -- did not voluntarily
consent to Bolonias search of his belongings. Appellants silence should not be lightly taken as
consent to such search. The implied acquiscence to the search, if there was any, could not
have been more than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive
circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional
guarantee. Furthermore, considering that the search was conducted irregularly, i.e., without a warrant,
we cannot appreciate consent based merely on the presumption of regularity of the performance of
duty.(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, accused-appellants lack of objection to the search is not tantamount to a waiver of her
constitutional rights or a voluntary submission to the warrantless search. As this Court held in People
v. Barros:[27]
x x x [T]he accused is not to be presumed to have waived the unlawful search conducted on the
occasion of his warrantless arrest simply because he failed to objectx x x. To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right exists; secondly, that the person involved
had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and lastly, that said person had
an actual intention to relinquish the right (Pasion Vda. de Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 698). The fact that
the accused failed to object to the entry into his house does not amount to a permission to make a
search therein (Magoncia v. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770). As pointed out by Justice Laurel in the case of
Pasion Vda. de Garcia v. Locsin (supra):
xxx

xxx

xxx

x x x As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts
do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officers authority by force, or waiving his
constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a
consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law.
(Citation omitted).
We apply the rule that: courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental
constitutional rights and that we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.[28]
(Emphasis supplied)
To repeat, to constitute a waiver, there should be an actual intention to relinquish the right. As clearly
illustrated in People v. Omaweng,[29] where prosecution witness Joseph Layong testified thus:
PROSECUTOR AYOCHOK:
Q-

When you and David Fomocod saw the travelling bag, what did you do?

A-

When we saw that travelling bag, we asked the driver if we could see the contents.

Q-

And what did or what was the reply of the driver, if there was any?

A-

He said you can see the contents but those are only clothings (sic).

Q-

When he said that, what did you do?

A-

We asked him if we could open and see it.

Q-

When you said that, what did he tell you?

A-

He said you can see it.

Q-

And when he said you can see and open it, what did you do?

AWhen I went inside and opened the bag, I saw that it was not clothings (sic) that was contained
in the bag.
Q-

And when you saw that it was not clothings (sic), what did you do?

AWhen I saw that the contents were not clothes, I took some of the contents and showed it to
my companion Fomocod and when Fomocod smelled it, he said it was marijuana.(Emphasis supplied)
In the above-mentioned case, accused was not subjected to any search which may be stigmatized as
a violation of his Constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. If one had been
made, this Court would be the first to condemn it as the protection of the citizen and the maintenance
of his constitutional rights is one of the highest duties and privileges of the Court. He willingly gave
prior consent to the search and voluntarily agreed to have it conducted on his vehicle and traveling
bag, which is not the case with Aruta.
In an attempt to further justify the warrantless search, the Solicitor General next argues that the police
officers would have encountered difficulty in securing a search warrant as it could be secured only if
accused-appellants name was known, the vehicle identified and the date of its arrival certain, as in the
Aminnudin case where the arresting officers had forty-eight hours within which to act.
This argument is untenable.
Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution provides:
x x x [N]o search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. (Italics
supplied)
Search warrants to be valid must particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized. The purpose of this rule is to limit the things to be seized to those and only those,
particularly described in the warrant so as to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding
what articles they shall seize to the end that unreasonable searches and seizures may not be made.
[30]
Had the NARCOM agents only applied for a search warrant, they could have secured one without too
much difficulty, contrary to the assertions of the Solicitor General. The person intended to be searched
has been particularized and the thing to be seized specified. The time was also sufficiently ascertained
to be in the afternoon of December 14, 1988. Aling Rosa turned out to be accused-appellant and the
thing to be seized was marijuana. The vehicle was identified to be a Victory Liner bus. In fact, the
NARCOM agents purposely positioned themselves near the spot where Victory Liner buses normally
unload their passengers. Assuming that the NARCOM agents failed to particularize the vehicle, this

would not in any way hinder them from securing a search warrant. The above particulars would have
already sufficed. In any case, this Court has held that the police should particularly describe the place
to be searched and the person or things to be seized, wherever and whenever it is feasible.[31]
(Emphasis supplied)
While it may be argued that by entering a plea during arraignment and by actively participating in the
trial, accused-appellant may be deemed to have waived objections to the illegality of the warrantless
search and to the inadmissibility of the evidence obtained thereby, the same may not apply in the
instant case for the following reasons:
1.
The waiver would only apply to objections pertaining to the illegality of the arrest as her plea of
not guilty and participation in the trial are indications of her voluntary submission to the courts
jurisdiction.[32] The plea and active participation in the trial would not cure the illegality of the search
and transform the inadmissible evidence into objects of proof. The waiver simply does not extend this
far.
2.
Granting that evidence obtained through a warrantless search becomes admissible upon
failure to object thereto during the trial of the case, records show that accused-appellant filed a
Demurrer to Evidence and objected and opposed the prosecutions Formal Offer of Evidence.
It is apropos to quote the case of People v. Barros,[33] which stated:
It might be supposed that the non-admissibility of evidence secured through an invalid warrantless
arrest or a warrantless search and seizure may be waived by an accused person. The a priori
argument is that the invalidity of an unjustified warrantless arrest, or an arrest effected with a defective
warrant of arrest may be waived by applying for and posting of bail for provisional liberty, so as to
estop an accused from questioning the legality or constitutionality of his detention or the failure to
accord him a preliminary investigation. We do not believe, however, that waiver of the latter
necessarily constitutes, or carries with it, waiver of the former--an argument that the Solicitor General
appears to be making impliedly. Waiver of the non-admissibility of the fruits of an invalid
warrantless arrest and of a warrantless search and seizure is not casually to be presumed, if
the constitutional right against unlawful searches and seizures is to retain its vitality for the
protection of our people. In the case at bar, defense counsel had expressly objected on
constitutional grounds to the admission of the carton box and the four (4) kilos of marijuana when
these were formally offered in evidence by the prosecution. We consider that appellants objection
to the admission of such evidence was made clearly and seasonably and that, under the
circumstances, no intent to waive his rights under the premises can be reasonably inferred
from his conduct before or during the trial.(Emphasis supplied)
In fine, there was really no excuse for the NARCOM agents not to procure a search warrant
considering that they had more than twenty-four hours to do so. Obviously, this is again an instance of
seizure of the fruit of the poisonous tree, hence illegal and inadmissible subsequently in evidence.
The exclusion of such evidence is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction
against unreasonable searches and seizure. The non-exclusionary rule is contrary to the letter and
spirit of the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.[34]
While conceding that the officer making the unlawful search and seizure may be held criminally and
civilly liable, the Stonehill case observed that most jurisdictions have realized that the exclusionary
rule is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against abuse. This approach
is based on the justification made by Judge Learned Hand that only in case the prosecution which

itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong, will the wrong be
repressed.[35]
Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against which the constitutional guarantees
afford full protection. While the power to search and seize may at times be necessary to the public
welfare, still it may be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of
the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the
basic principles of government.[36]
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the individual
in the name of order. Order is too high a price to pay for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes
declared: I think it is less evil that some criminals escape than that the government should play an
ignoble part. It is simply not allowed in free society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the
law violated is the Constitution itself.[37]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 73, Olongapo
City, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence to establish her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, accused-appellant ROSA ARUTA Y MENGUIN is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered
RELEASED from confinement unless she is being held for some other legal grounds. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

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