Africa Must Unite

KWAME N K R U M A H

F R E D E R I C K A. P R A E G E R , Publisher
New York

BOOKS TH A T M ATTER
Published in the U nited States of America in 1963
by Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., Publisher
64 U niversity Place, New York 3, N.Y.

A ll rights reserved
() K

wame

krumah

1963

L ibrary of Congress Catalog C ard N um ber: 63-18462

Printed in G reat Britain

D edicated to
G eorge

Padm ore

(1900-1959)
an d to
the A frican N ation
th a t m ust be

C O N TE N TS

In tro d u ctio n
i T h e African Background
2 T h e Colonial Im p rin t
3 Colonial P a tte rn of Economics
4 Society U n d e r Colonialism
5 T h e Intellectual V an g u ard
6 Freedom First
7 Achieving our Sovereignty
8 Problem s o f G overnm ent
9 B ringing U n ity in G h an a
10 O u r G h an aian C onstitution
11 T h e A dm inistrative In stru m en t
12 R econstruction a n d D evelopm ent
13 T ow ards Econom ic Independence
14 Building Socialism in G h an a
15 T ow ards African U n ity
16 Some A ttem pts a t U nification
Econom ic a n d Political In te g ratio n : A fricas N eed
18 Neo-colonialism in Africa
19 Africa in W orld Affairs
20 Exam ples o f M ajor U nions of States
21 C ontinental G overnm ent for A frica
In d ex

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I N T R O D U C T I O N

Freedom! Hedsole! Sawaba! Uhuru!

M en, w om en an d children throughout the length and b rea d th
o f Africa repeat the slogans of African nationalism - the greatest
political phenom enon of the latte r p a rt o f the tw entieth century.
N ever before in history has such a sweeping fervour for free
dom expressed itself in great mass m ovem ents w hich are driving
dow n the bastions o f em pire. This w ind of change blow ing
through Africa, as I have said before, is no o rdinary w ind. I t is a
raging hurricane against w hich the old order cannot stand.
T h e great millions of Africa, an d of Asia, have grow n im
p a tie n t of being hewers of wood an d draw ers of w ater, an d are
rebelling against the false belief th a t providence created some to
be the m enials of others.
In this century there have already been two w orld wars fought
on the slogans of the preservation of dem ocracy; on the rig h t of
peoples to determ ine the form of governm ent un d er w hich they
w an t to live. Statesm en have broadcast the need to respect
fundam ental freedoms, the right of m en to live free from the
shadow of fears w hich cram p their dignity w hen they exist in
servitude, in poverty, in degradation an d contem pt. T hey
proclaim ed the A tlantic C h arter a n d the C h arter of the U n ited
N ations, and then said th a t all these h a d no reference to the
enslaved w orld outside the limits o f im perialism an d racial
arrogance.
But in the course of fighting for their own freedom , they had,
like A b rah am Lincoln in fighting A m ericas civil w ar, to enlist
the aid of the enslaved, who began to question the justice of their
being dragged into wars for the freedom of those who intended
to keep them in bondage. T h e dem ocratic enunciations of the
w orlds statesm en cam e un d er the critical exam ination of the
colonized w orld. M en a n d w om en in the colonies began to

I N TR O D U C T I O N

regard them as deceptions; clearly they were not to have uni

versal application.
T he realization was breaking upon the vast w orld of subject
peoples th a t freedom is as m uch their inalienable right as it is of
those who h ad set themselves over them on the pretext of bringing
them Christian light and civilization. T he ideas of freedom and
dem ocracy, w hich the W estern w orld was busily propagating to
engage support for their cause, were being eagerly absorbed by
those to w hom freedom h a d been most strenuously denied. A
boom erang to those who broadcast them , and dangerous in
those to w hom they were not intended to apply, they were
feeding the will to freedom in the overseas areas of the w orld
where their m eaning was most deeply felt an d accepted.
T u rn e d by the nationalist leaders to the interests of the
struggle for political em ancipation, they have helped to fom ent
the revolt of the m ajority of the w orlds inhabitants against their
oppressors. T hus we have witnessed the greatest aw akening ever
seen on this earth of suppressed an d exploited peoples against the
powers th a t have kept them in subjection. This, w ithout a doubt,
is the most significant happening of the tw entieth century.
H ence the tw entieth century has become the century of
colonial em ancipation, the century of continuing revolution
w hich m ust finally witness the total liberation of Africa from
colonial rule and im perialist exploitation. T he independence of
G hana in 1957 opened wide the floodgates of A frican freedom .
W ithin four years, eighteen other African countries achieved
independence. This developm ent is the unique factor in w orld
affairs today. For it has brought about significant changes in the
com position of the U n ited N ations O rganization, and is having a
m om entous im pact upon the balance of w orld affairs generally.
I t has resulted in an expanded w orld of free nations in which the
voice of Africa, an d of the reborn states of Asia, L atin A m erica
and the C aribbean will dem and m ore and m ore careful attention.
This expanding w orld of free A frican nations is the clim ax o f
the conscious and determ ined struggle of the African peoples to
throw off the yoke of im perialism , and it is transform ing the
continent. N ot all the ram parts of colonialism have yet fallen.
Some still stand, though showing gaping rents from the storm y
onslaughts th at have been m ade against them . A nd we who have

I N T R OD U C T I O N

xi

b attled our w ay to independence shall n o t stand quiet until the

last stronghold o f colonialism has been laid to the ground in
Africa.
For we have dedicated ourselves to the a ttain m en t of total
A frican freedom. H ere is one bond of unity th a t allies free Africa
w ith unfree Africa, as well as all those independent states
dedicated to this cause. M y p arty , the C onvention Peoples
P arty, fervently upholds, as an unquestionable right, the b u rning
aspirations of the still subjected peoples of our continent for
freedom . Since ou r inception, we have raised as a cardinal
policy, the total em ancipation of Africa from colonialism in all
its forms. T o this we have added the objective of the political
union of A frican states as the securest safeguard of our hard-w on
freedom an d the soundest foundation for our individual, no less
th a n our com m on, economic, social and cultural advancem ent.
In m y A utobiography, and to some extent also in an o th er book
o f m ine, I Speak o f Freedom, I tried to show how, an d why, the
struggle for independence developed a n d succeeded in the then
Gold Coast. M y purpose now is to trace briefly the A frican
background an d the effects of centuries of colonialism on the
political, economic and social life of Africa as a w hole; to place
developm ents in G h an a in the b ro ad er context o f the A frican
revolution; an d to explain m y political philosophy based on my
conviction of the need for the freedom a n d unification of A frica
an d its islands.1
1 T h e following are the islands of Africa: (i) C anary Islands G ran C a n a ria ,
Tenerife, Las Palmas, Ferro, F uerte-V entura, L anzarote, Spanish; (2) C ape
V erde Islands (Sto. A ntao, Sao T iago), Portuguese; (3) M ad eira w ith
Selvagens, Portuguese; (4) A rquipelago dos Bijagos (Caravela, R o x a),
Portuguese', (5) Los Island, Guinea; (6) F ernando Po, Spanish; (7) Principe,
Portuguese; (8) Sao Tom e, Portuguese; (9) Annohon,Spanish; (10) Ascension,
British; (11) St. H elena, British; (12) T ristan d a C u nha w ith G ough, British;
(13) Prince E dw ard and M arion, South African; (14) M alagasy, Independent;
(15) Bassas d a India, French; (16) E uropa, French; (17) De la R eu n io n ,
French; (18) M auritius, British; (19) Rodriguez, British; (20) Archipel des
Comores (G rande Comore, M oheli, A njouan, M ayotte, Banc du Geyses,
Glorieuses), French; (21) Seychelles (Bird, Denis, Silhouette, Praslin, M a h e,
Platte, A m irante, Desroches, Bijoutier, Alphonse, St. Francois, C oetivy,
A ldabra, Assumption, Cosmoledo, Astove, Providence, St. Pierre, C erf,
F arq u h ar, Agalega), British; (22) Socotra, British; (23) D ahalach C hebir,
Ethiopian; (24) Z anzibar, British; (25) Pem ba, British; (26) M afia, British.

Xll

I N T RO D UC TI ON

O u t of this conviction, I am necessarily as m uch concerned

w ith the problem s of all the different countries w hich m ake up
our great continent as I am w ith those of G hana. I have, there
fore, draw n for illustration upon all patterns of colonialism. I f
there does at times appear to be an emphasis upon the British
p a tte rn and upon events in G hana, it is because these are p a rt of
my personal experience. T hey have been to a considerable
extent the agencies th a t have m oulded my intellectual processes
an d political philosophy. But I have also, as an A frican an d a
political being draw n into the vortex of A frican affairs out of my
dedication to the cause of A fricas freedom and unity, sustained
an indelible impression from the experience of my continental
brothers u n d er other colonial rulers.
T h eir history of colonialist subjection differs from ours only in
detail and degree, not in kind. Some there are who m ake fine
distinctions betw een one b ran d of colonialism and another, who
declare th a t the British are b e tte r m asters th an the French, or
the French b e tte r th a n the Belgian, or the Portuguese or the
white settlers of South Africa, as though there is virtue in the
degree to w hich slavery is enforced. Such specious differentia
tions come from those who have never experienced the miseries
and degradation of colonialist suppression and exploitation.
M ore frequently they are apologists for the colonialism of their
own country, anxious out of jingoistic patriotism to m ake a case
for it.
T h e colonial subject, the true bearer of the w hite m an s
b u rd en , can have no such philosophical approach. H e is, there
fore, unable to ju d g e the delicate difference betw een having to
pass through a door m arked natives in any p a rt of the w orld
and one so m arked in Johannesburg, simply because the latter
would often be in a separate, segregated area.
W hatever the m eans used by the colonialists, the objective
was the same. I t was not th a t a nasty-m inded bunch of m en
awoke sim ultaneously one m orning in England, France,
Belgium, G erm any, Portugal, or in any other of the colonial
countries, and decided th a t it w ould be a good thing to ju m p
into Africa and grind the peoples noses in the dust so th a t they
could all of them retire to their hom elands in due course, rich
and happy from the Africans hardship. I t was a good deal m ore

INTRODUCTION

Xlll

com plex th an th at, despite the plundering compulsions th a t

sent the Portuguese an d others out as early as the fifteenth
century to pluck A fricas gold an d ivory, an d later its h u m an
treasure, to enrich the coffers o f W estern m onarchs and
m erchants.
W hen the great scram ble for Africa began in the last q u a rte r
of the nineteenth century, colonies h a d becom e a necessary
appendage for E uropean capitalism , w hich h a d by then reached
the stage of industrial an d financial m onopoly th a t needed
territorial expansion to provide spheres for capital investm ent,
sources of raw m aterials, m arkets, an d strategic points of
im perial defence. T hus all the im perialists, w ithout exception,
evolved the m eans, their colonial policies, to satisfy the ends, the
exploitation of the subject territories for the aggrandizem ent of
the m etropolitan countries. T hey were all rapacious; they all
subserved the needs of the subject lands to their own dem ands;
they all circum scribed h u m an rights an d liberties; they all
repressed an d despoiled, degraded and oppressed. T hey took
our lands, our lives, our resources, an d our dignity. W ithout
exception, they left us nothing b u t our resentm ent, an d later,
our determ ination to be free and rise once m ore to the level of
m en an d w om en who w alk w ith their heads held high.
W hen th a t tim e cam e an d we showed our resolution to be rid
of them as unbidden an d unwelcom e foreign intruders, they still
refused to go until we forced the issue. I t was w hen they h ad gone
an d we were faced w ith the stark realities, as in G h an a on the
m orrow of our independence, th a t the destitution of the lan d
after long years of colonial rule was b rought sharply hom e to us.
T here were slums an d squalor in our towns, superstitions a n d
ancient rites in our villages. All over the country, great tracts of
open lan d lay untilled an d u n inhabited, while nutritio n al
diseases were rife am ong our people. O u r roads were m eagre, our
railways short. T here was m uch ignorance and few skills. O ver
eighty p er cent o f our people w ere illiterate, a n d our existing
schools were fed on im perialist p ap, com pletely unrelated to our
background an d our needs. T ra d e and com m erce were con
trolled, directed and ru n alm ost entirely by Europeans.
O f industries, we h ad none except those extracting gold and
diam onds. W e m ade not a pin, not a handkerchief, not a m atch.

xiv

I N TR OD UC TI ON

T h e only cloth we produced was hand-w oven kente, traditional

a n d exclusive. W e were w ithout most of the raw m aterials
necessary to industrial production. T hough there h ad been
geological surveys of our sub-soil, we were unaw are w hether
these m aterials existed or not, as the reports had been
scrupulously w ithheld. W e were reliant upon the outside
w orld, and m ore particularly upon the U nited K ingdom , for
practically everything we used in our daily life.
A m ong our roads were those called political roads, the old,
w orn and sometimes u n tarred colonial roads. T here were also
the new roads, built since 1951, w hen m y P arty entered upon
governm ent. T here was T akoradi h arb o u r and the new h a rb o u r
a n d p o rt un d er construction at T em a. W e h ad a telegraph and
telephone system. W e h ad an efficient adm inistrative m achine,
b u t one adjusted to the needs o f colonial rule and decidedly not
the m ost suitable for the new requirem ents of independent
statehood.
As a heritage, it was stark and daunting, and seemed to be
sum m ed up in the symbolic bareness which m et me and my
colleagues w hen we officially m oved into G hristiansborg Castle,
form erly the official residence of the British governor. M aking
our tour through room after room , we were struck by the general
emptiness. Except for an occasional piece of furniture, there was
absolutely nothing to indicate th a t only a few days before people
h ad lived an d w orked there. N ot a rag, not a book was to be
fo u n d ; not a piece of p a p e r; not a single rem inder th a t for very
m any years the colonial adm inistration h a d h ad its centre
there.
T h a t com plete denudation seemed like a line draw n across
our continuity. I t was as though there h ad been a definite
intention to cut off all links betw een the past an d present w hich
could help us in finding our bearings. I t was a covert rem inder
th at, having ourselves rejected th a t past, it was for us to m ake our
future alone. In a w ay it hinged w ith some of our experience
since we h ad taken office in 1951. From tim e to tim e we had
found gaps in the records, connecting links missing here and
there w hich m ade it difficult for us to get a full picture of certain
im p o rtan t m atters. T here were times w hen we had an inkling of
m aterial w ithheld, of files th a t h ad strayed, of reports th a t had

INTRODUCTION

XV

got m islaid5. W e were to find other gaps an d interruptions as we

delved deeper into the business of m aking a going concern o f the
run-dow n estate we h a d inherited. T h a t, we understood, was
p a rt of the business of dislodging an incum bent who h ad not been
too willing to leave an d was expressing a sense of injury in acts of
petulance. O n the other h and, there m ay have been things to
hide. I t was p a rt of the price, like m uch else, th a t we h ad to pay
for freedom . I t is a price th a t we are still paying and m ust
continue to pay for some tim e to come.
For freedom is not a com m odity w hich is given5to the enslaved
upon dem and. I t is a precious rew ard, the shining trophy o f
struggle and sacrifice. N or do the struggle an d sacrifice cease
w ith the a ttain m en t of freedom . T h e period of servitude leaves
behind tolls beyond w hat it has already taken. These are the cost
of filling in the emptiness th a t colonialism has left; the struggle
and the toil to build the foundation, an d th en the superstructure,
of an econom y th a t will raise up the social levels of our people,
th a t will provide them w ith a full an d satisfying life, from w hich
w ant an d stagnation will have been banished. W e have to gu ard
closely our hard-w on freedom and keep it safe from the p redatory
designs of those who wish to reim pose their will upon us.
New nations like ours are confronted w ith tasks and problem s
th a t w ould certainly tax the experience an d ingenuity of m uch
older states. T hey w ould be difficult enough if we existed in a
peaceful w orld, free of contending powers an d interested
countries eager to dabble in our internal affairs an d m anipulate
our dom estic an d external relations in order to divide us
nationally an d internationally. As it is, our problem s are m ade
m ore vexed by the devices of neo-colonialists. A nd w hen we
attem p t to deal w ith them in ways w hich, having regard to all
the facts th a t are know n to us, seem m ost app ro p riate in the
endeavour to m aintain the in ternal unity upon w hich our
viability an d progress depend, we are m isrepresented to the
outside w orld to the point of distortion.
I f th a t outside w orld refuses us its sym pathy and u n d erstand
ing, we have at least the right to ask it to leave us alone to w ork
o ut our destiny in ways th a t seem m ost apposite to our circum
stances and m eans, h u m an as well as m aterial. In any event, we
are determ ined to overcom e the disruptive forces set against us

xvi

I N TR OD UC TI ON

an d to forge in Africa a G h anaian nation th a t will stand out as a

shining exam ple before the rest of the w orld of the A fricans
ability to m anage his own affairs.
T h a t we shall succeed, I have no doubt. But years of toil and
perseverance, of restraint and even privation, lie ahead. W e
have to free ourselves from the grip of economic im perialism , and
protect our freedom . W e have at the same tim e to work cease
lessly for the com plete liberation and unity of Africa.
T here is, in fact, an interacting relation in these objectives.
Im perialism is still a most powerful force to be reckoned w ith in
Africa. I t controls our economies. I t operates on a world-wide
scale in com binations of m any different kinds: economic,
political, cultural, educational, m ilitary; and through in
telligence and inform ation services. In the context of the new
independence m ounting in Africa, it has begun, and will
continue, to assume new forms and subtler disguises. I t is already
m aking use, and will continue to m ake use, of the different
cultural an d econom ic associations w hich colonialism has forced
betw een erstwhile E uropean masters an d African subjects. I t is
creating client states, w hich it m anipulates from the distance. It
will distort and play upon, as it is already doing, the latent fears
of burgeoning nationalism an d independence. I t will, as it is
already doing, fan the fires o f sectional interests, of personal
greed and am bition am ong leaders and contesting aspirants to
power.
These an d m any others will be the devious ways of the neo
colonialism by w hich the im perialists hope to keep their strangle
hold on A fricas resources for their own continued enrichm ent.
T o ensure their continued hegem ony over this continent, they
will use any and every device to h alt and disrupt the growing will
am ong the vast masses of A fricas populations for unity. J u s t as
our strength lies in a unified policy and action for progress and
developm ent, so the strength of the im perialists lies in our dis
unity. W e in Africa can only m eet them effectively by presenting
a unified front and a continental purpose.
W e have to be constantly on the alert, for we are steadfastly
resolved th a t our freedom shall never be betrayed. A nd this
freedom of ours to build our economies, stands open to danger
ju st as long as a single country on this continent rem ains fet-

I N T R OD U C T I O N

x v ii

tered by colonial rule and ju st as long as there exist on African

soil puppet governm ents m anipulated from afar. O u r freedom
stands open to danger ju st as long as the independent states o f
Africa rem ain ap art.
A t this very m om ent, the U nion of South Africa is building up
a m ilitary m achine com parable w ith those of the forem ost
nations of W estern Europe. This presents a most om inous
danger, not ju st to the struggle of those A frican peoples still
fighting for freedom , b u t to the very existence of the independent
A frican states. Unless we m eet this obvious and very powerful
th re a t w ith a unified A frican front, based upon a com m on
economic and defence policy, the strategy will be to pick us off
and destroy us one by one.
O u r essential bulw ark against such sinister threats an d the
other m ultifarious designs of the neo-colonialists is in our
political union. I f we are to rem ain free, if we are to enjoy the
full benefits of A fricas rich resources, we m ust unite to p lan for
our total defence an d the full exploitation of our m aterial an d
h u m an m eans, in the full interests of all our peoples. T o go it
alone will lim it ou r horizons, curtail our expectations, and
th reaten our liberty.
But since we cannot sit idly by w aiting for the consum m ation
of our hopes for the earliest unification of Africa, we in G h an a
are m aking our plans and shall strive unrem ittingly to raise our
people to such higher levels of civilized living as we are able to do
by our own exertions. A t the same tim e, we shall never relax
ou r efforts to bring total independence and unity to this A frican
continent, for the greater good of all Africa and of each of us as
com ponent m em bers o f A frican U nion.

C H A P T E R ON E

TH E

AFRICA N

B A C K G R O U N D

C o l o n i a l i s m and its attitudes die h ard , like the attitudes of

slavery, whose hangover still dom inates behaviour in certain
parts of the W estern hem isphere.
Before slavery was practised in the N ew W orld, there was no
special denigration of Africans. Travellers to this continent
described the in habitants in their records w ith the n a tu ra l
curiosity an d exam ination to be expected o f individuals com ing
from other environm ents. I t was w hen the slave trad e a n d
slavery began to develop the ghastly proportions th a t m ade
them the base o f th a t capital accum ulation w hich assisted the
rise of W estern industrialism , th a t a new attitu d e tow ards
Africans em erged. Slavery in the C aribbean has been too
narrow ly identified w ith the m an of colour. A racial twist has
thereby been given to w hat is basically an economic pheno
m enon. Slavery was not born o f racism : rath e r, racism was the
consequence o f slavery.1 W ith this racial twist was invented the
m yth o f colour inferiority. This m yth supported the subsequent
rap e of our continent w ith its despoliation and continuing
exploitation u n d er the advanced forms o f colonialism an d
im perialism .
I t was during the period th a t has come to be called the
opening up of A frica th a t there began to spring up a school of
w hat some fervid A frican nationalists have d u bbed im perialist
anthropologists, whose ranks extend dow n to the present tim e.
T h eir works are aim ed at proving the inferiority o f the African.
A nything of value th a t has been uncovered in Africa is a ttrib u ted
by them to the influence of some allegedly superior group w ithin
the continent or to people from outside Africa. T h e idea th a t

1 D r Eric W illiam s: Capitalism and Slavery, U niversity of N orth Carolina Press,

Chapel H ill 1944, p. 7.

AF RI CA MUST UNI TE

Africa can have exerted any civilizing influence over other

people is shunned or denied.
O f late, another school of thought is re-assessing the evidence
an d applying m ore objective standards of judgem ent. Some
historians an d anthropologists think th a t civilization daw ned
contem poraneously in Africa an d in C hina. V ery m uch ex
ploration for further evidence which will determ ine the early
history of m an in Africa rem ains to be done.
L. S. B. L eakey1, has this to say:
In every country that one visits and where one is drawn into
conversation about Africa, the question is regularly asked by
people who should know better: But what has Africa contri
buted to world progress? . . . not the wheel, not writing, not
mathematics, not art . . . not this, not that and not the other
thing . . .* These critics of Africa forget that men of science
today are, with few exceptions, satisfied that Africa was the
birth-place of man himself, and that for many hundreds of cen
turies thereafter Africa was in the forefront of all world progress.
I t is certain th a t the origins of E uropean culture trace their
roots to the ancient civilizations of the Nile valley. Early
geographers an d chroniclers speak of well organized African
states and empires on both sides of the continent. N orth Africa,
before the Islam ic invasion inhabited by the T u areg and
Berber people, m aintained flourishing societies and centres of
trade. I t was w ith the spread of Islam th at the mass A rab drive
reached into A fricas no rth ern belt as well as Egypt. From the
discovery of w ritten records in A rabic going back as far as the
n in th century, we are learning som ething of A fricas past. T hey
tell us th a t G h an a was already a centralized state in A.D. 800.
This kingdom , whose centre lay some 200 miles n o rth of the
w atershed betw een the Senegal and N iger rivers, was one
of the earliest of W est African kingdoms. T hough G hana
was seriously weakened by the A lm oravid invasion of the
eleventh century, its traditions of governm ent and em pire did
not die. T hey reached even greater heights in its successor state
of M ali, w hich flourished in the fourteenth century, and which
possessed intellectual centres, such as D jenne and T im buktu,
1 The Progress and Evolution o f Man in Africa (O .U .P . 1961): Lecture 1, T he
Progress of M an in Africa, p. 1.

THE A F RI C A N BA CK G R OU ND

whose colleges could exchange scholars w ith S pain an d other

parts of the M uslim w orld. W hen M ali declined, it was replaced
by the ju st as splendid Songhay em pire of Gao, while farth er to
the east lay the g reat state of K anem , w ith a m onarchy, alm ost as
ancient as th a t of G hana, w hich continued steadfastly into the
nineteenth century.
Books like the Tarikh es Sudan and the Tarikh el Fettach, w ritten
by the African scholars of T im b u k tu in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, give graphic descriptions of still existing
Sudanese states of pow er and prestige. O ne of the great writers
o f Islam , Ib n B attuta, touring through M ali in the m iddle
o f the fourteenth century, observed of its peoples th a t they
are seldom unjust, and have a greater abhorrence of injustice
than any other people. Their sultan shows no mercy to anyone
who is guilty of the least act of it. There is complete security in
their country. Neither traveller nor inhabitant in it has anything
to fear from robbers or men of violence. They do not confiscate
the property of any white man who dies in their country, even if
it be uncounted wealth. On the contrary, they give it into the
charge of some trustworthy person among the whites, until the
rightful heir takes possession of it.1
Could as m uch be said for our E uropean contem poraries of
th a t tim e ? E urope was th en passing into its R enaissance; it was
aw akening from the social torpor of m edievalism and divided
into petty and quarrelsom e kingdoms. C apitalism was on
the uprise and seafaring adventurers were starting out on
their centuries-long search for gold and spices and silks, slaves
an d ivory, th a t they m ight plu n d er them for m oney-hungry
m onarchs an d traders. These voyages b rought them to the coast
of Africa. O riginally, the A frican coastline was explored by
Phoenician an d G reek sailors an d there is growing knowledge of
Chinese contact w ith the east coast going back at least to the early
twelfth century. T h e m odern period of exploration m ay be said
to have begun w ith the Portuguese voyages during the tim e of
Prince H enry the N avigator (1394-1460). B artholom ew Diaz
sailed round the C ape of Good H ope in 1488, an d some ten years
1 Ibn Battuta: Travels in Asia and Africa 1325-1354, translated by H . A. R . G ibb
(Routledge 1929) pp. 329-30.

A F RI CA MUST UNITE

later Vasco da G am a touched on the K enya coast on his way to

In d ia.
W h at kind of people, w hat kind of cities did these plunderers
find ? Basil Davidson, adducing evidence from authentic records
of the tim e, sums up the scene th u s :
They anchored in havens that were thick with ocean shipping.
They went ashore to cities as fine as all but a few they could have
known in Europe. They watched a flourishing maritime trade in
gold and iron and ivory and tortoiseshell, beads and copper and
cotton cloth, slaves and porcelain; and saw that they had
stumbled on a world of commerce even larger, and perhaps
wealthier, than anything that Europe knew.
To these European sailors of the last years of the fifteenth
century the coast of eastern Africa could have seemed no less
civilised than their own coast of Portugal. In the m atter of wealth
and knowledge of a wider world it must have seemed a great deal
more civilised. They were repeatedly surprised by the ease and
substance of the ports and towns they saw and sheltered in and
plundered. They found themselves repeatedly disregarded as
strange and uncouth. When we had been two or three days at
this place, says the laconic log-book of da Gam as flagship, the
Sao Gabriel, of an encounter at a port that was probably Quelimane [above the Zambesi river], two senhores of the country
came to see us. They were very haughty; and valued nothing
which we gave them. One of them wore a cap with a fringe em
broidered in silk, and the other a cap of green silk. A young man
in their company - so we understood from their signs - had come
from a distant country, and had already seen big ships like
ours.1
This was the Africa these plundering sailors found, an Africa
of fair a n d thriving cities, whose inhabitants allowed them u n
im peded entry, to their own undoing. For the strangers,
schooled in the bitter rivalries of Europe . . . fell upon these
tolerant and easy-going civilizations of the Indian Ocean with a
ferocity and violence that were like nothing seen there through
many centuries. . . . All this was as easy for the Portuguese, and
for much the same reasons, as it was in India whenever they met
1 Basil Davidson: Old Africa Rediscovered, V ictor Gollancz L td. 1959, p. 165.

THE A F RI C A N BA CKGR OU ND

with resistance to their greed and theft. They were better armed.
They were trained to ruthlessness. They wanted more than a
simple monopoly of trade, ruinous though that would be for the
coastal cities: they wanted loot as well. African warfare, like
Indian warfare, was designed to minimize casualties, not
maximize them. These invaders had no such care.1
I t is well w orth dwelling upon these facts w hen we recall the
pretexts on w hich late r E uropean colonization o f Africa was
justified. Assuming the C hristian responsibility of redeem ing
A frica from the benightedness of barbarism , the ravages of the
E uropean slave trad e were forgotten; the enorm ities of the
E uropean conquest were ignored. M aps p rep ared in E urope
w hich h ad borne the nam es of M ali an d Songhay were lost.
Records of the A frican kingdom s were left to gath er dust a n d
crum ble away. T h e achievem ents of states th a t h a d m an u
factured in iron an d gold and carried on lucrative intern atio n al
trade were expunged from m em ory.
T hey h a d disappeared as a result of the continuing E uropean
p enetration an d spoliation. For on the heels of the Portuguese
there quickly followed D utch, Spanish, D anish an d English and
French sailors an d traders. T h eir purposes were the same, their
m ethods, too. T hey set up forts an d trad in g posts a t various
points along our coasts, an d added a living com m odity to the
other items of plunder. For over three h u n d red years the slave
trad e dom inated A fricas history; and, in fact, influences it still
today through our dim inished population an d its brutalizing
a n d retarding effects upon our socio-economic order. I t does
not require a very perceptive m ind to appreciate the disastrous
consequences it has h ad upon A frican developm ent. W hole
villages were frequently left em pty of inhabitants either through
capture or flight. T he n u m b er of inhabitants draw n off the
A frican continent as slaves has been variously p u t betw een
tw enty and fifty million.
I n G hana, there exist m any rem inders of those days. Christiansborg Castle, w hich the D anes built in the seventeenth
century, still stands. So also do forts at C ape Coast, their guns
still facing out to sea, w here they once were used to w ard off
1 Basil Davidson: op. cit., pp. 168-70.

A F RI CA MUST UNI TE

attacks by other Europeans who w anted to p lunder gold and

ivory, an d to share in the rich slave trade.
It was the Portuguese who, in the fifteenth century, discovered
gold in the area betw een the A nkobra and V olta rivers and
called the country M ina, the m ine, or the Gold Coast*. T hey
were the first to build fortified warehouses along our shores for
the protection o f their trade. But soon Spanish, English and
D utch ships also began to explore the G uinea Coast, as they
cam e to call it, and m ore forts were established. Tow ards the end
of the sixteenth century the Gold Coast was exporting about ten
thousand slaves a year, an d m ore th an h a lf the trade was in
British hands. In 1808, B ritain stopped trading in slaves, and in
1874 the Gold Coast colony was established, th irty years after
the Bond signed by our chiefs gave B ritain her first real political
influence in the country.
T he notorious scram ble for A frica5 began in the last q u a rte r
of the nineteenth century. A t th a t tim e, G reat B ritain, France,
G erm any, Spain, Portugal, Belgium an d Italy em barked on a
race for colonies. In 1881, France extended her colonial sway
over T unis, an d in the following year B ritain secured control
over Egypt. In 1884, the first G erm an colony was established at
A ngra P equena on the coast of South-W est Africa. T he occupa
tion of T ogoland and the Cam eroons in W est Africa followed. A
French force seized the territory betw een the Cam eroons and
the Portuguese colony of Angola, w hich becam e the French
Congo. In 1894 the tricolour was hoisted over T im buktu,
D ahom ey and the Ivory Coast. T he whole of the western Sudan
was soon occupied by France. In 1885 a protectorate was estab
lished over M adagascar.
T h e n ensued the A nglo-French jealousy which culm inated in
a crisis in 1898 w hen the occupation of the Sudanese post of
Fashoda threatened to upset B ritain's colonial position w ithin
th a t area. W ar betw een France and Britain appeared to be
im m inent, b u t the French force w ithdrew . France then tu rned
her attention to M orocco. T here she cam e up against G erm an
am bitions. A conference of colonial powers was called in
Algeciras in 1906, w ith the result th a t French and Spanish
claims to interfere in M oroccan internal affairs were recognized.
In 1876 the Congo In tern atio n al Association was form ed

THE A F RI C A N BA CK G R OU ND

u nder the direction of Leopold I I of Belgium for the occupation

o f the Congo Basin. A m ong the declared objects of the Associa
tion was the intention cto open to civilization the only p a rt of
our globe where it h ad not yet p e n e trate d . A t the Berlin C on
ference of 1884-85, w hen the E uropean powers divided m ost of
Africa up betw een them , Leopold obtained perm ission to form
the Belgian settlem ents into a Congo Free S tate un d er his
personal suzerainty.
Italy, com ing relatively late into the scram ble for colonies,
occupied, am ong other places, Assab an d M assaw a (on the
A frican shore of the R ed S e a ); and in 1889 the colony of Ita lia n
Som aliland was form ed. T hus, by the beginning of the tw entieth
century, Africa, a p a rt from South Africa w hich developed
differently, was largely divided up betw een the various E uropean
powers. A fricas people, m ineral resources, harbours, rivers,
forests - all were to be used to build up the econom ic an d
political strength of the colonial powers.
Some of the territories changed hands after the First W orld
W ar, w hen form er G erm an colonies were distributed am ong the
victors as m an d ated territories un d er the League of N ations.
B ritain received G erm an East Africa, a q u a rte r of T ogoland and
a piece of the Cam eroons. F rance took over the rem aining threequarters of T ogoland and the g reater p a rt of the Cam eroons,
while Belgium got a slice o f G erm an East Africa. T h e U nion of
South A frica received G erm an South-W est Africa.
J u s t as w hen the colonies were originally seized, the rights of
the indigenous peoples were com pletely disregarded. T errito rial
boundaries were confirm ed or freshly delim ited in accordance
w ith the new share o u t in a quite a rb itra ry fashion. T hey h ad no
relation to ethnic realities. In m any cases boundaries cut across
tribes an d even villages. Problem s resulting from the cynical
parcelling-out of Africa still rem ain, an d can only be settled by
continental union.
T h e reasons w hich led the nations of E urope to seek colonies
have been explained, w ith differing emphasis, by m any his
torians. M ost seem to agree th a t the colonial powers were guided
prim arily by economic, political an d m ilitary considerations,
probably in th a t order. A lthough certain individuals m ay have
come to Africa from purely altruistic motives the general ideas

AF RI CA MUST U NI TE

of the E uropean civilizing mission an d the w hite m an s

b u rd e n have a t last been largely abandoned, even by the most
rab id of im perialists.

C H A PT E R TWO

TH E COLONIAL IM PR IN T

t e r m colony originally m eant a settlem ent of im m i

grants in a foreign land. In the political sense, a colony is either
a settlem ent of the subjects o f a natio n or state beyond its own
frontiers; or a territorial u n it geographically separated from it,
b u t owing allegiance to it. I n m odern colonial history, two types
of colonies have grow n up, owing in the m ain to clim atic con
ditions. T here is the settlem ent5 colony in w hich clim ate an d
geographical environm ent have favoured the establishm ent of
sizeable E uropean com m unities; while the others, regarded
form erly, before the discovery o f prophylactic drugs an d the
clearance of jungles, as inim ical to the h ealth of Europeans,
usually gathered relatively small groups o f business m en,
adm inistrators, soldiers an d missionaries, all of w hom lived in an
environm ent quite different from th a t of the m other country.
These two different forms of colony have been responsible for
the evolution of different systems of governm ent. In fact, there
has been no uniform system of colonial governm ent in Africa.
T h e p a tte rn has varied according to the policy and traditions of
the different colonial powers, as well as to the existence a n d size
o f a settler com m unity.
France, the colonial pow er w hich ru led over the largest area
of territory in Africa, followed a policy o f assim ilation aim ed at
producing an elite class. She hoped by introducing a favoured
class o f Africans to French culture an d civilization an d raising
them to the status o f Frenchm en, to avoid the rise of African
nationalism in the territories u n d er her rule. T h e class of elites,
however, always rem ained relatively small, and outside it the
bulk of the Africans rem ained subjects, to be exploited and
m altreated a t the will o f on-the-spot Frenchm en, both high and
low.
T h e

10

A FRI CA MUST UNITE

W h at was French adm inistration like in practice? I asked a

M oroccan friend w hen I visited the country some years ago.
H e shrugged his shoulders, and proceeded to tell me how the
French had never allowed a national election in M orocco, or
indeed any form of dem ocratic assembly. No M oroccan sat in
the French Assembly or Senate. T here was no question of tra in
ing Africans to m anage their own affairs, even in the field of
governm ent. T here was no freedom of the press. Patriotic
organizations, like Istiqlal, were driven underground.
I t was practically impossible for a M oroccan child to get a
decent education, he said. As for economic m atters, the w ealth
of the country was alm ost entirely in F rench hands.
But French policy can perhaps best be studied in Algeria.
T here the French really tried to m ake the country an integral
p a rt of France. T he D epartm ents of Algiers, C onstantine and
O ra n h ad the same status as D epartm ents inside France itself;
an d the African inhabitants of Algeria had, if they renounced
M uslim law, the same rights as citizens of France. Y et the u tter
failure of French policy in A lgeria is a p p aren t to the w orld.
T he reason is simple. Algeria forms p a rt of the A frican continent.
I t could never be p a rt of France. I t was ju st self-deceit to talk of
French A lgeria; for there is only one A lgeria, an d th a t is A lgerian.
I have publicly stated G h a n a s position tow ards Algeria. W e
supported the A lgerian nationalists publicly. T h e argum ent
th a t the E uropean settlers h ad m ade A lgeria their hom e and
regarded themselves as Algerians, is irrelevant. I f they h ad
been truly patriotic Algerians, they would not have opposed
the A lgerian nationalists: they w ould not have killed and
terrorized, and broken the provisions of the Franco-A lgerian
peace agreem ents. T o the African, the E uropean settler,
w hether living in South Africa, K enya, Angola, or anyw here else
in Africa, is an in tru d er, an alien who has seized African land.
No am ount of arguing about the so-called benefits of E uropean
rule can alter the fundam ental right of Africans to order their
own affairs.
In the areas of settlem ent, the Europeans, in order to buttress
their dom ination and entrench their economic hold, alienated
the land from the Africans and then raised poll and other taxes
upon them in order to drive them out to work for starvation

THE COLONI AL I MPR I N T

II

wages. T hey erected barriers of race to enforce segregation on

grounds of the inferior social developm ent of the indigenous
people, and m ade this a reason for enforcing their right to rule.
T here is no logic except the right of m ight th a t can accept the
undem ocratic rule of a m ajority by a m inority. T he predom inant
racial group m ust, and will, provide the governm ent of a
country. T h e race th a t is in the m ajority is the possessor of the
land it occupies, irrespective of the annexations m ade by a
m inority of settlers. I t is obvious th a t unhappiness, friction and
fear m ust prevail w hen a m inority settler group tries to take
possession of a land, or to dictate to a m ajority, as in the cases of
South Africa, Algeria, K enya, or the C entral A frican Federation.
T he first step tow ards testing the right of rule in com m unities
of m ixed races and creeds is to give every adult, irrespective of
race and creed, the right to vote. W hen each citizen thereby
enjoys equality o f status w ith all others, barriers of race an d
colour will disappear, an d the people will m ix freely together
and will w ork for the com m on good.
Portugal, like France, has also pursued a colonial policy of
assim ilation in its A frican territories, though o f a rath e r different
kind. M ozam bique and Angola are regarded as integral parts
of Portugal, adm inistered by the M inisterio do U ltra m a r in
Lisbon. T he press is censored, and all national m ovem ents sup
pressed. M ozam bique, where the Portuguese have been for over
450 years, has a G overnor-G enerals Council, w ith equal
num bers of official an d non-official m em bers, and sends two
deputies to Lisbon. But the Portuguese have never intended to
allow any developm ent tow ards self-government. Likewise in
Angola, everything is ru n from Lisbon.
Portugal is at hom e an old-fashioned despotic oligarchy estab
lished and m aintained in the interests of a small group o f ex
trem ely w ealthy families. I t is at the same tim e one of the poorest
of E uropean countries. T here is, therefore, a potentially revolu
tionary situation in P ortugal itself. All those who are afraid of
social change in E urope thus becom e the allies of Portuguese
colonialism, since its m aintenance appears to be the only m ethod
by which Portugal itself can be saved from revolution.
A lthough there is no official colour b a r in the Portuguese
colonies, conditions b oth in M ozam bique and Angola are

12

AF RI CA MUST UNITE

am ong the worst in Africa. In recent years, the average African

wage in M ozam bique was about ninepence a day. E ducation has
been shamefully neglected. In 1955, there were only 68 African
high school students in the whole of Angola.
But the system of forced labour, which still operates, is
perhaps the worst blot on the Portuguese record in Africa. I t
am ounts to a form of slavery. M en are treated not as m en, b u t as
chattels, to be pushed around from place to place at the w him
o f the local Ghefe do Posto, or district officer. T h e assim ilado
or civilizado system, w hereby an African m ay, by process of
law, become in effect a w hite m an, if he comes up to certain
E uropean standards, dem onstrates yet another aspect of the
Portuguese b ran d of colonialism. Q uite a p a rt from the arrogant
assum ption of racial superiority im plied in the idea th a t every
African w ould wish to becom e w hite, is the insidious effect
o f a policy aim ed a t deliberately trying to tu rn Africans into
Portuguese. I am rem inded of the A frican from Lourengo
M arques who s a id : T he Portuguese think th a t it was a mistake
on the p a rt of G od to m ake the African, African. T h eir assimilado policy is an effort to correct this divine e rro r.
I intend to discuss the social and economic effects of colonial
ism as a whole in a later chapter. I t is sufficient at this point to
state th a t all the injustice, social degradation and slavery of the
Portuguese regim e in Africa reached a clim ax at the tim e of the
1961 revolt in Angola. T he Angola people have entered the
A frican nationalist revolution, and the country will never be the
same again.
Doubtless the ending of Belgian rule in the neighbouring
Congo encouraged the rise of nationalism in Angola. T he vast
country of the Congo, about 77 times the size of Belgium, was
betw een 1876 and 1908 the exclusive property of one m an, K ing
Leopold I I of Belgium. H e becam e one of the richest m en in the
w orld by mercilessly exploiting the country. A frican workers
were m utilated or shot if they failed to bring in the required
am ount of ru b b er or ivory, the two chief objects of value in the
Congo at th a t tim e. A reliable source has p u t the cost of lives of
L eopolds regime at betw een five and eight million. In 1908, as
a result of a Commission of E nquiry set up to investigate
atrocities, the Congo Free State becam e a colony under the

THE COLONI AL I MPR I N T

13

Belgian G overnm ent. A G overnor-G eneral was appointed,

responsible to the Belgian P arliam ent, b u t he h ad no Legislative
Council or Assembly to check his power, an d no Congolese sat
in the Brussels Parliam ent. N obody in the Congo, w hite or black,
could vote, and the Congolese h ad few, if any, civil rights. T he
essence of the Belgian colonial system, as later developed, was to
buy off any discontent by giving a certain am ount of econom ic
opportunity.
Belgian district commissioners ruled their various localities in
the same a u th o rita ria n m anner as the G overnor-G eneral in
Leopoldville. T h e R om an C atholic church an d big business
were the other, no less, powerful rulers o f the Congo. T he
Belgian G overnm ent, in fact, shared considerably in the invest
m ent holdings of the interlocking combines w hich m onopolized
the Congos economy, often to the extent of as m uch as fifty per
cent.
T h e belated attem pts of the Belgians to prevent m ounting
national feeling in the Congo from expressing itself in violence,
by holding carefully controlled and lim ited m unicipal elections,
failed. T h e Congo becam e independent in J u n e i960, and tragic
subsequent events showed th a t the Belgians never intended th a t
Congolese independence should, in fact, becom e effective. T here
were practically no experienced Congolese politicians or civil
servants, and no A frican officers in the force publique. T h e p er
sistent interference of Belgian big business interests in Congolese
politics has further com plicated an extrem ely difficult situation.
I n South Africa a different, though no less dangerous, state of
affairs exists. T here, governm ent policy can be sum m ed up in
the one w ord, apartheid, w hich involves social, political an d
econom ic segregation on a basis of race. T h e U nion of South
Africa, w hen it was form ed in 1910, was a sovereign, inde
pendent state w ithin the British Em pire.
I t is now a R epublic, no longer a m em ber of the C om m on
w ealth, and the only independent country in Africa governed by
its w hite m inority. T he problem in South A frica is basically the
same as th a t in other settler territories in Africa. In these coun
tries there is a E uropean m inority, settled over a considerable
period of tim e, w hich claims by virtue of race the right to rule
for ever over the m ajority of the inhabitants.

A F RI C A MUST U NI TE

T h e ruling class in South Africa consists of some three m illion

persons of E uropean descent. This ruling class controls the
arm ed forces, w hich are arm ed and trained specifically to deal
w ith civil disturbance. T h e opponents, the rem aining twelve
m illion inhabitants of South Africa, are u narm ed and lack the
elaborate political and economic organization w hich the ruling
class has b u ilt up. I t is because of this th a t the ruling class con
sider th a t their position is safe and th a t they can continue in
definitely to pursue their apartheid policy.
H istory has shown th a t such a calculation is entirely false, and
if we look below the surface it can, I think, be shown th a t the
position of the South A frican G overnm ent is fundam entally
weak. T here has been a significant repudiation of the regim e by
a section of the intellectual class, significant in the context of the
South A frican situation, w here even the slightest liberalism in
race relations brings dow n the w rath of the G overnm ent. I t is
the cloud the size of a m a n s h a n d seen by the Prophet Elijah,
the inevitable approach of the storm .
A second sign of trouble to come is the division in the ruling
class itself. T h e two m ain political parties in South Africa, the
U n ited P arty and the N ationalists, though b o th dedicated to the
m aintenance of racial inequality, differ about how this in
equality should be m aintained. T he significance of the division
is th a t it runs deep enough to have split the unity of the wielders
of South A fricas intensive racialist policy, and the G overnm ent
cannot, therefore, claim undivided loyalty.
Also significant in recent years is the em ergence of the Pro
gressive P arty, an organization of persons of goodwill allied to
some of the shrewdest financiers in the country. These financiers
are m ainly of British stock and represent m ining, m anufacturing
and com m ercial interests, concerned w ith the erection of a wider
internal m arket an d easier international relations th an the
Boer-controlled apartheid policy allows. T he intellectuals w ithin
the p a rty realize th a t there is som ething deeply w rong w ith
South Africa, and th a t if the U nion is to survive, radical changes
m ust be m ade. U ltim ately, however, they all fight shy of the
only change w hich can solve the South A frican situation, the
establishm ent of the principle of one m an one vote, irrespective
of colour or racial origin. Like most reform ing parties which

THE C OLONI AL I MPR I N T

15

spring up on the eve of revolution, they see an abyss opening up

before them , b u t are unable to form ulate any decisive a lter
native.
A gainst the disrupting tendencies in the U nion itself stands the
trem endous unfolding o f the A frican R evolution, w hich has
spread w ith rem arkable swiftness out tow ards the east, centre
and south, so th a t it is now alm ost a t the frontiers of South Africa.
W hy are you so certain th a t there will soon be a change of
regim e in South A frica?5 a m em ber of the G h an a N ational
Assembly asked m e shortly after South Africa left the C om m on
w ealth. I re p lie d : Because of the strength of the A frican R evo
lution w hich has already transform ed m ost of A frica; and
because the South A frican regim e shows exactly those symptom s
w hich have invariably preceded revolutions elsewhere.5 South
Africa is a country tim ed for explosion, like H aiti before its
revolt, and for the same reasons: racial tyranny and fear.
N ot surprisingly, therefore, discontent m ounts in the U nion,
as also in the South A frican adm inistered territory of S outh
W est Africa.
L abour disputes often end in strikes and dem onstrations;
sporadic outbreaks of violence increase in size and num ber.
These in themselves m ay not be enough to disrupt the South
A frican economy, b u t if a sufficient n u m b er of countries boycott
South Africa, the total effect is bound to be considerable.
A lready the U nion governm ent is dangerously isolated politic
ally, cut off from the sym pathy of its A frican neighbours, and
deprived, because of its apartheid policy, o f the m oral support of
m ost of the world.
T h e South A frican question is one upon w hich A frican states
have proved th a t they have a unity of approach, and it should
not be difficult to devise an app ro p riate line of policy w hich
could a tta in universal A frican support. Plans m ust certainly be
m ade to train Africans from South Africa to be ready to take
over positions of responsibility once the existing governm ent has
been overthrow n.
British colonial policy has assum ed various forms in different
parts of Africa. A full description w ould fill several books, an d I
can m ention only w hat I consider to be some of the m ore sig
nificant and characteristic aspects of it. T h e avowed British

i6

A F RI C A MUST U NI TE

policy has been to guide the colonial territories to responsible

self-governm ent w ithin the C om m onw ealth. T he late Ernest
Bevin defined the reasons for this policy as Give . . . and keep.5
I t seems he m eant th a t by voluntary w ithdraw al a t a suitable
tim e the British w ould retain the goodwill of the African,
strengthen the Com m onw ealth, earn the praise of the rest of the
w orld, an d a t the same tim e keep m axim um political and
economic advantages. T h e British, though liking to pose as
dream y idealists who, through absence of m ind, achieved an
em pire, are in m y experience the most hard-headed of realists.
T hey know th a t Africa m ust inevitably be ruled by Africans, and
they w ant to come out of the business in the best possible way.
From early days internal self-government was granted to
colonies of settlem ent, b u t in the case of colonies w here there was
no strong E uropean settler com m unity to ru n affairs, political
developm ent was m uch slower. U nlike France, B ritain did not
consider h er colonies an extension of the hom eland. No colonial
constituencies have at any tim e been represented in the House of
Com m ons in London.
G enerally, a G overnor was placed over each colony. H e was
responsible to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, who in tu rn
was responsible to the House of Comm ons, the C abinet, and
ultim ately to the Crown. H e was not responsible to a local
electo rate; and here the truly au th o rita ria n natu re of the regim e
becomes ap p aren t.
A lthough m ost colonies h a d an Executive Council (Exco),
this was usually appointed by the G overnor, an d again was not
responsible to any locally-elected assembly. In some colonies
unofficial m em bers were in due course appointed. E uropean
unofficial m em bers sat on the Executive Council in K enya after
19 19; and Africans on the Executive Councils of the Gold Coast
(G hana) an d N igeria after 1942. These Councils h a d advisory
pow er only; a n d their proceedings were secret.
U n d er the Executive Council was the Legislative Council
(Legco), w hich passed the Budget and certain laws. I t could
debate and vote on legislative proposals p u t before it, and could
question the governm ent. But the governm ent was not bound
to take its advice. Before the Second W orld W ar no Africans sat
in Legislative Councils in East Africa. In 1944 one was nom i

THE COLONI AL I MPR I N T

17

n ated to the K enya Legislative C o uncil; the following year three

were appointed in U g a n d a ; an d in 1946, two in T anganyika.
Progress was faster in W est Africa. T he first A frican m em ber of
the Legislative C ouncil in the G old Coast was n o m in ated in
1861.
T he pow er of the Legco varied in different countries accord
ing to the ratio betw een official, unofficial (i.e. appointed), and
elected m em bers. W here the elected m em bers were o u t
num bered by the official and unofficial m em bers, the assembly
was controlled, in fact, by the G overnor. But, in any case, the
Legco could n ot cause the governm ent to resign, even if it o u t
voted it on some Bill. T h e G overnor h ad certain reserved
powers by w hich he could invalidate legislation; and he could,
in tim e of extrem e em ergency, suspend the constitution and rule
by decree. T his was actually done not long ago in British
G uiana.
T here have, of course, in recent decades been progressive
revisions of the constitutions of alm ost all U n ited K ingdom
dependencies, an d those w hich are not already independent
have advanced constitutions w hich place responsibility for their
own affairs largely in the hands o f the local people. T h e evolu
tion tow ards parliam en tary governm ent on the W estm inster
m odel has been m arked by an obstinate refusal to g ran t, p a r
ticularly in areas of w hite settlem ent, universal ad u lt suffrage,
the keystone, after all, of tru e dem ocracy.
I n spite of the m oralizings of British colonialists who argue
th a t political reform is granted as and w hen the colony is ready
for it, change has, in fact, come m ostly as a result of pressure
from below. In the case of G hana, a vigorous cam paign waged
by m y party, its slogan Self-G overnm ent N ow , was needed
before independence could be achieved. As I said in the N ational
Assembly on 10 J u ly 1953, w hen presenting the historic m otion
for in d ependence:
There comes a time in the history of colonial peoples when
they must, because of their will to throw off the hampering
shackles of colonialism, boldly assert their God-given right to
be free of a foreign ruler. . . . If there is to be a criterion of a
peoples preparedness for self-government, then I say it is their

i8

A F RI C A MUST UNITE

readiness to assume the responsibility of governing themselves.

For who but a people themselves can say when they are pre
pared ?
I know of no case w here self-government has been handed to a
colonial and oppressed people on a silver platter. T he dynam ic
has h ad to come from the people themselves. I t is a standing joke
in Africa th a t w hen the British start arresting, independence is
ju st around the corner.
T h e principle of indirect rule adopted in W est Africa, and also
in other parts of the continent, allowed a certain am ount of
local self-government in th a t chiefs could rule their districts
provided they did nothing contrary to the laws of the colonial
pow er, and on condition they accepted certain orders from the
colonial governm ent. T he system of indirect rule was notably
successful for a tim e in N orthern N igeria, where the Em irs
governed m uch as they h ad done before the colonial period. But
the system had obvious dangers. In some cases, autocratic chiefs,
propped up by the colonial governm ent, becam e inefficient and
unpopular, as the riots against the chiefs in Eastern N igeria in
1929, and in Sierra Leone in 1936, showed.
In wide areas of East Africa, where there was no developed
system of local governm ent w hich could be used, headm en or
w a rra n t chiefs were appointed, usually from noble families.
T hey were so closely tied up w ith the colonial pow er th a t m any
Africans thought chiefs were an invention of the British.
T h e alliance of the governing pow er w ith the privileged classes
tended to slow up or p u t a break on social change and progress,
as both h ad an interest in m aintaining the status quo. In G hana,
the position of chiefs is entrenched in our C onstitution, and they
still play an im p o rtan t p a rt in the life of the country. Chiefs in
some parts of Africa have been, and still are, in the forefront of
nationalist m ovem ents. In T anganyika, for exam ple, the T a n
ganyika African N ational U nion (TA N U ) claim ed th a t not a
single chief supported the governm ent; they were all supporters
of T A N U . But by and large, the system of indirect rule, where
chiefs were paid to adm inister their areas under the supervision of
the colonial power, did lead frequently to divided loyalties, as
well as to the slowing dow n of dem ocratic processes.

TH E C O L O NI A L I M P R I N T

19

T he establishm ent of local councils, like those in K enya in

1924, was an im provem ent, b u t their powers were strictly
lim ited. T h e D istrict Officer was the ex officio President a n d
retained all executive power. T h e Councils h ad treasuries, b u t
received no share of the general tax.
W hen the Councils were reconstructed, in 1950, as African
D istrict Councils, the presidents an d m em bers were to be
appointed by the Provincial Commissioners. T h e la tte r in
variably appointed D istrict Commissioners as presidents,
though they usually allowed a m ajority of the m em bers o f each
council to be elected by the people.
D edicated to the com plete destruction of colonialism in all its
forms, I can hold no b rief for any colonial governm ent, w hatever
its p a tte rn . British, F rench, Portuguese, Belgians, Spanish,
G erm ans, Italians, all at one tim e or another ruled parts o f Africa
or still continue to do so. T h eir m ethods m ight have varied, b u t
their purpose was the sa m e : to enrich themselves at the expense
of their colonies.

CHAPTER THREE

CO LO N IA L PA TTER N OF E C O N O M IC S

M a n y h a v e argued th a t the resources of Africa were useless

to the native in h abitants until they were developed, an d they
could not have been developed w ithout E uropean capital and
skill. I t has even been said th a t the E uropean investor, however
Jself-interested he m ay have been, was serving A frica.1 This sort
of argum ent rem inds me of the m an who, having found buried
treasure in his neighbours garden, took it aw ay and then told
his neighbour th a t he was doing him no harm , because, until
then, he was unaw are of its existence. In any case, he did not
own a spade. T o those who study the facts fairly, it m ust surely
I be clear th a t the E uropean occupation of Africa was carried out
* for the benefit of Europeans. Concern for the welfare of the
\ African peoples hardly entered into the m atter.
J Jules Ferry, Prem ier of France in 1885, gave the dom inant
(reasons for the E uropean quest for colonies in Africa, w hen he
spoke in the C ham ber of D eputies in defence of the colonial
policy of the F rench G overnm ent.
H e said:
Is it not clear that the great states of modern Europe, the
moment their industrial power is founded, are confronted with
an immense and difficult problem, which is the basis of industrial
life, the very condition of existence - the question of markets ?
Have you not seen the great industrial nations one by one arrive
at a colonial policy ? And can we say that this colonial policy is a
luxury for modern nations ? Not at all, gentlemen, this policy is,
for all of us, a necessity, like the market itself.
Today, as you know, the law of supply and demand, freedom
1 A. J . H an n a : European Rule in Africa (1961). Hist. Assoc. Pam phlet G.46,
p. 17.

C OLONI AL P A T T E R N OF ECONOMICS

21

of exchange, the influence of speculations, all these move in a

circle which extends to the ends of the world.
Colonies are for rich countries one of the most lucrative
methods of investing capital. . . . I say that France, which is
glutted with capital, and which has exported considerable
quantities, has an interest in looking at this side of the colonial
question. It is the same question as that of outlets for our m anu
facture.
Colonial policy is the offspring of industrial policy, for rich
states in which capital is abundant and is rapidly accumulating,
in which the manufacturing system is continually growing and
attracting, if not the most numerous, at least the most alert and
energetic part of the population that works with its hands, in
which the countryside is obliged to industrialize itself, in order
to m aintain itself, in such states exportation is an essential factor
of public property. . . . The protective system is like a steam
boiler without a safety-valve, unless it has a healthy and serious
colonial policy as a corrective and auxiliary. European con
sumption is saturated r i t k necessary to raise new m asses of con
sumers in o th erjp arts^ TlHe globe, eise~we^KalTput modern*
society into bankruptcy and j j r e pare for the dawn of the!
"twentieth century a cataclysmic social liquidation of which we J
cannot calculate thBnconsequen.ces.,^
*
A lbert S arrau t, French C olonial Secretary o f S tate in 1923,
spoke in even stronger term s, a t the Ecole Coloniale in P a ris :
W hat is the use of painting the truth ? At the start colonization
was not an act of civilization, nor was it a desire to civilize. It was
an act of force motivated by interests. An episode in the vital
competition which, from man to man, from group to group,
has gone on ever increasing; the people who set out to seize
colonies in distant lands were thinking primarily of themselves, (
and were working for their own profits, and conquering for their
own power.
S a rra u t concluded his speech w ith these w o rd s: T h e origin of
colonization is nothing else th a n enterprise of individual interests,
a one-sided a n d egotistical im position of the strong upon the
w eak.5 H e thus exposed the falsehood of the theory o f the w hite
m an's b u rd en 5 a n d the mission civilisatrice\

22

A FRI CA MUST UNITE

T he M arxist-Leninist view supports the stand of Jules Ferry,

w hich argues th a t the most determ ined im perialists are fre
quently concealed M arxists and abler exponents of M arxist
analysis th a n m any self-styled socialists. TAccording to the
M arxist-Leninist view, im perialism is the developm ent of the
capitalist system to its highest stage. Its most im portant feature
is th a t of monopoly. T h e concentration of production and capital
has developed to such a degree th a t it has created monopolies
w hich play a decisive role in economic life^N ational monopolies
have linked up internationally to share the w orld am ong them
selves, and the territorial division of the globe is completed.!
Banking capital has reached the stage where it dom inates p ro-'
duction capital; and the export of investm ent capital has become
as vitally necessary as the export of comm odities. I t is true th a t
excess capital could be invested at hom e in the im provem ent of
agriculture, b u t the profits are not by any m eans as large as
those obtained from overseas investm ent in backw ard coun
tries, where labour an d land costs are m inim al. T h e annual
returns on overseas investm ent (one of the chief hidden benefits
of colonies) are often several times the volum e of trade and
shipping w ith the backw ard5 areas. As a result of intensive p ro
duction, there is keen com petition for raw m ate ria ls,/
I t was a t the ju n c tu re w here production was dom inated by
industrial combines an d the shortage of raw m aterials was
becom ing acute, th a t the possession of colonies becam e im
perative, as controlled sources of raw m aterials and outlets for
m anufactured goods and finance capital. O n the colonial scene,
the stage opened w ith the appearance of the missionaries, the
traders and the adm inistrators. W hile missionaries im plored the
colonial subject to lay up his treasures in H eaven, where neither
m oth nor rust doth c o rru p t5, the traders and adm inistrators
acquired his m inerals and land. T here was no intention of pro
cessing locally the discovered raw m aterials. These were in
tended to feed the m etropolitan mills and plants, to be exported
back to the colonies later in the form of finished commodities.
T he simple two-way traffic is im plicit in colonial trade .JIn her
African colonies, B ritain controlled the export of raw m aterials
by preventing their direct shipm ent to foreign m arkets. After
satisfying the dem ands of her hom e industries, she sold the

COLONI AL P A T T E R N OF ECONOMICS

23

surplus to other nations an d netted the profits h e rs e lfjT h e

colonial farm er and w orker h ad no share in those profitsANor
was any p a rt of them used in providing public works and "social
services in the colonies. T here is a belief th a t the British G overn
m ent contributed to the costs of adm inistration an d public
services in their colonies. This is a fallacy. E ach colony raised its
ow n budget out of taxes and revenue, and the first charge upon
it was the salaries of the E uropean officials of the adm inistration.
T h e construction of railways, harbours an d roads was m et out
of loans raised from local sources, an d was u n dertaken largely
to m eet the transport an d com m unications requirem ents of the
colonialists. For exam ple, diam onds an d gold lay a t the basis of
South A fricas railw ay system. Gold prospecting, the finding of
coal a t W ankie, and the opening up of the copper belt fixed the
p a tte rn of R hodesias first railways. O u r own railways in G h an a
were laid dow n in order to take out m inerals and tim ber from
areas of production to the h a rb o u r a t T akoradi.
Im m ense profits have been, an d are still being, taken out of
Africa. Im p o rta n t m ineral deposits in various parts of Africa
have a ttracted foreign capital, w hich has been used m ainly to
enrich alien investors. T h e rich copper mines of N o rth ern
R hodesia are a case in point. T he A nglo-A m erican C orporation
o f South Africa w ith its associated diam ond com bine, besides
having a practical m onopoly o f all the diam onds produced in
Africa, an d ow ning m any gold and coal mines in South Africa,
has a large stake in the R hodesian copper belt.
{, M uch of the great m ineral w ealth of Africa, w hich ought to
have been kept in Africa to develop basic industries here, has
been system atically shipped a w a y ^ h e process is still going on,
even in the independent countries. T here are those who argue
th a t the conditions an d resources of Africa are not suited to
industrialization. In this w ay they seek to excuse the economic
policy of the colonial powers and support the infiltration of neo
colonialism. T h e argum ent falls to the ground w hen the facts are
exam ined.
\ W e have here, in Africa, everything necessary to becom e a
powerful, m odern, industrialized continent. U n ited N ations
investigators have recently shown th a t Africa, far from
having inadequate resources, is probably b etter equipped for

24

A FRI CA MUST UNI TE

industrialization th a n alm ost any other region in the world.

Potential reserves of iron ore, for instance, w ould last some two
thousand years. Coal deposits are estim ated a t 4,500 m illion
tons. T he S a h a ra s oil reserves are thought to be as great as
those in the A rabian peninsula. N atu ral gas abounds in the
bowels of the S ahara. N orthern Rhodesia is reported to have
the second largest vanadium deposits in the world. Potential
hydro-electrical pow er is alm ost limitless. In G hana we have
bauxite reserves estim ated at some 200 m illion tons. I have
m entioned only a few of our n a tu ra l resources; m any other
figures, equally impressive, could be given. W hen the whole
continent has been geologically surveyed, im m ense new riches
will undoubtedly be discovered.
T h e tru e explanation for the slowness of industrial develop
m ent in Africa lies in the policies o f the colonial period.
Practically all our n a tu ra l resources, not to m ention trade,
shipping, banking, building, an d so on, fell into, and have
rem ained in, the hands of foreigners seeking to enrich alien/
investors, an d to hold back local economic initiative. O u t of
148,000,000 allocated betw een 1946 and 1956 under the U .K .
Colonial D evelopm ent and W elfare Aid, only 545,000, less th an
h a lf per cent, was directly used for industrial developm ent.1
C apital investm ent from outside is, of course, required in
Africa. But only if there is real political independence can the
profits from the investm ent of this capital be shared in a way
w hich is fair b oth to the outside investor and to the people of the
country w here the investm ent is m ade.
T h e way in w hich m any foreign com panies obtained their
concessions in Africa was often sordid, to say the least. A Com
mission of Enquiry, set up to investigate the granting of
concessions in the Gold Coast, recently discovered some very
revealing facts.
These concessions were secured by local agents persuading the
chiefs, the custodians of tribal and Stool lands, to sign away the
m ineral and tim ber rights of their people for purely nom inal
sums. Some m oney, a few h u n d red yards of cloth, a few cases of
whisky and gin, were usually sufficient inducem ent to secure the
1 Special Study on Economic Conditions in Non-Self-Goveming Territories. U nited
N ations, 1958.

COLONI AL P A T T E R N OF ECONOMICS

25

m arks o f the chiefs to legal docum ents w hich they could neither
read nor understand.
O ne of G h a n a s best know n chiefs, N an a Sir Ofori A tta I, told
the Legislative Council in 1939 how six of his bro th er chiefs h ad
been deceived w hen they signed aw ay concessions to the largest
of the m ining com panies. O ne, he said, got 6 6 , another 1 3 3 , a
th ird and a fourth received 5 0 each, a n d the fifth an d sixth
2 0 0 an d 1 0 0 respectively. These ren ts, he added, are p ay
able to chiefs in respect of the A shanti Goldfields L im ited, and
nothing goes to any of the chiefs on the profits th a t are earn ed .1
T he chiefs tried to get the then G overnor, Sir A rnold H odson, to
support a Bill w hich w ould require the com pany to pay the
N ative A uthorities a royalty on their profits. H e refused, giving
the reason th a t it would be shortsighted and extrem ely harm ful
to interfere because capital was very sensitive, and it m ight have
the effect of driving it away to other parts of the w orld.
A t the end o f the A shanti wars, about 300 British concerns
secured m ining an d tim ber concessions w hich, according to
L ord H ailey,2 am ounted to about a th ird of the total land area of
the Gold Coast Colony, and about one-eighth of A shanti.
W ith all the w ealth draw n from our m ineral resources, it m ay
come as a shock to some to learn th at, except for a small an nual
trib u te from the gold mines, no m ining com pany in the Gold
Coast ever m ade any contribution by w ay of direct taxes to the
countrys revenue, until m y governm ent introduced its new
taxation m easures in 1952, and these m ade no noticeable im
pression upon the distributed profits of these com panies. I often
w onder ju st how m uch the U nion M ini ere d u H a u t-K a ta n g a
paid for its concessions in the Belgian C o n g o !
Com m ercial exploitation in our country has a long history, as
long, in fact, as E uropean contact w ith the W est A frican coast.
In keeping w ith the im perialist policy of fostering single crop
agriculture in the colonies, our farm ers, having found th a t cocoa
did well in our soil an d clim ate, were encouraged to concentrate
on its production to the neglect of local food crops and a diversity
of cash crops. T h e encouragem ent of m ono-crop cultivation was
not, however, accom panied by stable prices. T h e price of our
1 Gold Coast Legislative Council Debates, 1939, No. 1.
2 Lord H ailey: African Survey, O xford U niversity Press, p. 778.

26

A FRI CA MUST U N I TE

cocoa was m anipulated by E uropean and A m erican buyers, who

included, besides the large chocolate m anufacturers, the big im
porters and distributors of food products, farm im plem ents and
m anufactured goods. Jo in e d together in their association, they
forced down the price of cocoa, while the cost of im ported com
modities, upon w hich our people becam e m ore and m ore
dependent, as a result of single-crop farm ing, rem ained stable.
D uring the w ar, the British G overnm ent set up group m arket
ing boards in the W est A frican colonies as agencies for the bloc
purchase of raw m aterials by the M inistry of Supply in London
as p a rt of its planned arrangem ents for satisfying the m etro
p o litan rationing system. O u r present Cocoa M arketing Board,
w hich operates our bulk purchasing and selling of the crop,
developed out of these w artim e arrangem ents. This system of
p lanned purchase an d sale enables us to give the farm ers a
g uaranteed price fixed to prevent a dom estic inflationary spiral.
T here has been a steady elim ination of the p redatory m iddlem en
who used to act as the agents of the big m erchant firms and
chocolate m anufacturers, while the foremost of the trading firms
has itself retired from this sphere of activity. But the tw in purpose
for w hich our econom y h a d been geared under im perialist rule,
of providing m arkets for British products an d m ercantile
services, an d the export of cocoa, and m ining comm odities, on
the basis of low -paid labour, cannot overnight be replaced by
one m ore suited to the needs of m odern G hana. T h e p a tte rn of
its m onopolistic control was firmly set in the first q u a rte r of the
present century, w7hen the pioneering firms and our own A frican
m erchant princes, as they were called, were either forced out of
business or absorbed by the giant com panies. A substantial
volum e of p etty trad e cam e to be carried on by thousands of
w om en street hucksters an d m arket vendors. These wom en, a
few of w hom have accum ulated some sizeable capital, play an
im p o rtan t p a rt in our internal trade distribution. But they are
reliant for their supplies on the m onopoly firms, for w hom they
provide the cheapest kind of retail distributive system it has been
possible to devise.
U n d er colonial rule, foreign m onopoly interests h ad our whole
econom y com pletely tied up to suit themselves, j In a coun try
whose o u tp u t of cocoa is the largest in the w orld, there was not a

COLONI AL P A T T E R N OF ECONOMICS

27

single chocolate factory. W hile we produce the raw m aterials for

the m anufacture oT soap and edible fats, palm products, the
m anufacture of these items was discouraged. A British firm
owning lim e plantations here, as it does in the W est Indies,
actually expresses the juice from the fruit before shipping it in
bulk to the U nited K ingdom an d exporting it back to us,
bottled, to retail in stores at a high price. T hough we h ad the
raw m aterials needed for their m anufacture, every bottle used in
this country was im ported. These facts have a kind of Alice in
W onderland craziness about them w hich m any will find h a rd to
accept. But they are im plicit in the whole concept and policy of
colonialism. N ative initiative, w here it was likely to endanger
the interests of the colonial power, was quickly stifled.
W e im port a lot of soap and, as I have already said, we have
the raw m aterials rig h t here. Indeed, the overseas m an u
facturers get their vegetable oils from us. I t seemed quite a sound
idea for a G h an aian to establish a soap factory here in G hana.
N ot so sound, though, for the British firm w hich m anufactured
soap, or for those who shipped it to us and im ported it, especially
w hen they were tied up together. A G h an aian factory was
started, b u t the m achinery ordered was o f the w rong type,
designed for anim al rath e r th a n vegetable fat. T h e autom atic
cutter produced bars of lau n d ry soap larger th a n those im ported.
T here were constant break-dow ns w ith the m achinery, and the
larger soap b a r could not retail at a price above th a t charged for
the im ported soap. Inevitably the G h an aian factory was forced
to close down, and soap continued to be im ported.
I cannot understand w hy so m any people in the U n ited
K ingdom still refuse to adm it th a t local industry was deliberately
discouraged in m any of the colonies. A fter all, they learn in their
school history books th a t the A m ericans com plained of the same
sort of thing in the eighteenth century. They, too, were not
allowed to m anufacture any com m odity w hich m ight com pete
w ith industries in the m etropolitan country. I f the A m erican
colonists h ad genuine econom ic grievances, w hy not us? W hy
not A frica?
In his book, West Africa, F. J . Pedler adm its th a t the colonial
governm ents prevented industries from being introduced, b u t
gives the strange reason t h a t : T hey have wished to safeguard the

28

A FRI CA MUST UNI TE

social system of the African tribes against disintegrating in

fluences of u rb a n conditions.1 A nd yet so m any historians
regard the industrial revolution as one of the best things th a t ever
happened to Britain.
T h e view th a t the A frican m ust be spared the dangers of
industrialization and tow n life used to be very widely held. M any
a district officer under the colonial regim e sincerely believed it,
and w ould have been genuinely h u rt if it was suggested th a t his
belief sprang from an inner conviction th a t the Africans were an
inferior people, capable only of prim itive village life. I t is un d er
standable th a t histories of Africa, until recently w ritten almost
entirely by Europeans, should give the E uropean view point.
But it is tim e th a t some of the p opular and most glaring mis
conceptions about colonialism were cleared up. T h e system m ust
be exam ined in the light of the facts, and from the point of view
of those who suffered un d er it.
N ot least am ong our worries in planning the economic
developm ent of our country has been the whole question of
com m unications. Before we took office in 1951, there was no
direct railw ay betw een A ccra an d T akoradi, our capital city and
our m ain port. Passengers an d freight h ad to travel by w ay of
K um asi. This was because K um asi was the centre of the cocoa,
tim ber an d m ining industries. W e have now built a railw ay line
from Achiasi to K otoku, thus linking A ccra to T akoradi by a
direct route. A nother line links A ccra w ith the new h a rb o u r at
T em a.
Sim ilarly w ith roads; there were relatively few before 1951.
Farm ers found it difficult to get their produce to m arket, because
of the lack of feeder roads from farm to m ain highways. Few of
o u r villages h ad any regular transport to a m ain road or station.
In the towns, one was lucky if one happened to live near a
m am m y lorry9route. For the most p a rt our people walked from
place to place.
T h e colonial adm inistration would, no doubt, have claim ed
th a t they were working to a specific budget, a budget strictly
related to the revenue. But our revenue in no way reflected the
volum e of the countrys production, its trade and comm erce.
1 Home Study Books, 2nd edition, M ethuen, 1959, p. 93.

C OLONI AL P A T T E R N OF ECONOMICS

29

Incom e tax was kept at a deliberately low level, w hen it was

steadily rising in the U n ited K ingdom . W orse th an th at, the
British com panies operating in the G old Coast were registered in
E ngland, w hich received the tax benefits from the enorm ous
profits m ade out of our w ealth and labour. I t was not our farm ers
and workers who shared the profits m ade, b u t the British share
holders to w hom dividends were exported. I t is estim ated th a t
d uring the last th irty years of British colonial adm inistration,
British trading and shipping interests took out of our country a
total of 300,000,000. J u s t im agine w hat m ight have been done
by w ay of developm ent if only p a rt of these gigantic transfers of
profit h a d been retained and used for the benefit of our
people.
I have already referred to the grim emptiness th a t faced us on
ou r assum ption of independence, the gaps an d deficiencies.
Behind it all was the refusal to use our w ealth for our develop
m ent. N ot only were our n a tu ra l resources extracted b u t the
benefits o f their exploitation cam e, not to us b u t to the m etro
p olitan country. This is the answer to those economists who
m ain tain th a t im perialism should be ju d g ed not on w hat it takes
aw ay b u t on w hat it leaves behind, as well as to those who p arad e
the heritage of the schools and hospitals and roads th a t the
m issionaries and our colonial rulers left to us. T hey have no case
against the actualities th a t I am describing.
U n d er the British there was no poultry farm ing to speak of;
there was no proper dairy farm ing, an d the ordinary G old Coast
fam ily never saw a glass of fresh m ilk in its life. T here wras no
raising of beef cattle. T here were no industrial crops. C lim ate,
p lan t and cattle disease, are the least of the reasons for this
deplorable neglect, for the G h an a G overnm ent is going ahead
w ith precisely these agricultural projects, w ith considerable
success. T he British sent out a few good veterinary doctors and
botanists, who carried out a certain am ount of field work and
experim ents. These, however, were isolated, a n d rem ained
m ostly unapplied at the p ractical level. Som ehow or other,
useful and necessary knowledge seldom seemed to percolate
dow n to the local farm er.
T he adm inistrators who should have used their scientific results
as the basis of a thorough-going agricultural developm ent policy

30

AF RI C A MUST U NI TE

were either too lethargic or too uninterested to take action. I t

m ay be th a t they were relu ctan t to do anything w hich m ight
interfere w ith the im port of agricultural products a t m onopoly
prices. W hatever the reason, local agriculture was discouraged
and im ports swelled.
D uring the w ar, British troops were stationed in the Gold
Coast. Everyone knows th a t potatoes are to the British w hat
b read is to the French. A m eal is not com plete w ithout them .
U n d e r w artim e conditions, shipping was severely restricted, and
it looked as though the British soldiers would have to go w ithout
their potatoes. I t h a d always been m aintained th a t our clim ate
was not suitable for growing them . But the adm inistration,
m oved at the thought of British servicem en being deprived of
their staple food, began a grow potatoes cam paign. Before long,
o ur hith erto unsuitable clim ate was producing m agnificent
crops. O nce the w ar was over, however, and norm al shipping
facilities were resum ed, the D epartm ent of A griculture changed
its tune. G old Coast potatoes, we were told, were unfit for
h u m an consum ption. T he result was th a t potatoes disappeared
from our fields and once m ore figured am ong our im ports.
W e have wide savannahs in the north, ideal w ith the right
irrigation for the grow ing of cotton. Y et for m any years we spent
millions of pounds im porting richly-patterned cloths from
abroad. W e have m ade plans for irrigating these savannahs, and
have projects for cotton-grow ing and textile-m aking, and our
experim ents are going ahead. W e have h ad to do everything from
scratch, b u t in spite of this great progress is being m ade.
Sim ilarly w ith the fishing industry, we hope in due course to
m ake up for lost tim e. H ere, too, the colonial regim e failed. In
the absence of cattle farm ing, fish was the most im p o rtan t source
of anim al protein in the country, an d there are plenty of good
fishing grounds near our coasts. A com paratively small ex
penditure of m oney on refrigeration and on m otorized boats
would have provided for a sufficient q u an tity of fish to be caught
an d brought hom e in good condition to cover the local m arket
a nd leave some over for export. T h roughout the entire period of
British adm inistration, even though m alnutrition figured as a
basic cause of a num ber of the countrys diseases, and was
certainly a contributory factor in low productivity, no attem pt

COLONI AL P A T T E R N OF ECONOMICS

31

was m ade to initiate such a project. O n the contrary, the Gold

Coast annually im ported large quantities of fish.
T h e failure to prom ote the interests of our people was due to
the insatiable dem ands of colonial exploitation. H ow ever wise,
enlightened and good-hearted certain individual officers m ay
have been, their functions and auth o rity fitted into a p a tte rn of
colonial adm inistration w hich was itself conditioned by the
central and over-all need to extract the riches of the colonies
an d transfer them overseas. I f in the process it was necessary to
build some roads, to construct a h arb o u r, or to educate some
Africans, well and good. T h e p oint I w ant to m ake is th a t any
welfare activity for the benefit of our people was little m ore th an
incidental. I t was far from being the underlying purpose of
colonial rule. .

CHAPTER FOUR

SOCIETY

UNDER

COLONIALISM

growing up in G hana a generation w hich has no

first-hand knowledge of colonial rule. These boys and girls, born
since Independence, will find it difficult to believe th a t there was
a tim e w hen Africans could not walk in certain parts of every
town, unless they h ad business there as servants. T he lim itations
on our freedom , the crimes against our dignity as h u m an beings,
will seem to them rem ote an d unreal. I t is cheering to think th a t
w hen they m eet a E uropean it will never occur to them to touch
the im aginary forelock, or bow in servility, as some o f our older
m en still do, so h a rd is it to break long-established habits.
T h e social effects of colonialism are m ore insidious th an the
political an d economic. This is because they go deep into the
m inds of the people and therefore take longer to eradicate. T he
E uropeans relegated us to the position of inferiors in every aspect
of our everyday life. M any of our people cam e to accept the view
th a t we were an inferior people. I t was only w hen the validity of
th a t concept was questioned th a t the stirrings of revolt began
an d the whole structure of colonial rule cam e under attack.
Signs like n o a f r i c a n a l l o w e d , or f o r e u r o p e a n s
o n l y could at one tim e be seen in practically every p a rt of
Africa. Now they are fast disappearing, though still m uch in
evidence in the R epublic o f South Africa an d in Southern
Rhodesia. I can well im agine w hat the reaction of an English
m an w ould be if he cam e across signs proclaim ing n o b r i t o n
a l l o w e d in any p a rt of Europe, or even in one of the newlyindependent African states. Africans, however, were expected to
p u t up indefinitely w ith such treatm ent in the land of their birth.
T h e colour bar, where it has operated strongly, has been
responsible for m uch of the bitterness, w hich has, in some areas,
entered into African nationalism . This is hardly surprising. But
T h e r e is

SOCIETY U N D E R COLONIALISM

33

w hat is perhaps m ore rem arkable is the m oderation of most

A frican political leaders. N ot a single one has advocated any
kind of policy founded on racial discrim ination. All have stressed
the need for co-operation betw een races, based on the rule of the
m ajority. W e have seen too m uch of racialism to w ant to p e r
petuate the evil in any way.
O f course, it will be some tim e before all traces of colonialism
will disappear from our society. Problem s connected w ith
health, education, housing and living conditions generally,
continue to rem ind us of the colonial period. W e have m uch
ground to m ake up, as a result o f long years of being treated as an
inferior people fit only to provide cheap lab o u r for foreign
employers. W e were supposed not to be able to appreciate, or to
need, any real m easure o f social im provem ent.
I t is tru e th a t shelter in a tropical clim ate is a less urgent
problem th a n it is in a cold or tem perate clim ate. I t is also true
th a t Africans do have im provised hom es. This, in fact, was the
housing position in the G old Coast u nder colonial adm inistration.
But Africans did not live in shacks and m ud huts because they
preferred them to p ro p er houses. T hey h a d no choice. T hey h a d
neither the jobs nor the resources to enable them to build. A nd it
never occurred to the adm inistration to do w hat most advanced
countries perform as an autom atic service, undertake a p opular
housing program m e for the people. N or were there any building
societies to help folk w ithout ready capital to acquire homes.
T hus the people o f this country lived as they h a d always lived,
crow ded together in hovels as far rem oved from the d ream of
living in a three-room ed abode w ith norm al conveniences as a
London messenger boy is of ow ning Buckingham Palace.
T h ere was once in E ngland a sim ilar prevailing upper-class
view of workers who lived in slums. T hey enjoy it,5 was the
sentim ent expressed. T hey like to live crow ded together. I f we
did give them up-to-date houses w ith bathroom s, they w ou ld n 't
know w hat to do w ith them . T hey w ould use the b a th to store
coal.5Strangely enough, this was not m erely a justification for the
Conservative G overnm ents o f the tim e to do nothing to m eet
general housing needs. Some really believed th a t only the
educated u pper class w anted a n d knew how to appreciate a
decent house.

34

A F RI C A MUST UNI TE

W ith the close of the Second W orld W ar there followed a

change in the official outlook on these m atters. M ost established
countries b rought about trem endous alterations in the social
p a tte rn o f their people by clearing slums an d launching vast
housing schemes for the w orking population. These new ideas
of p o pular housing, however, never reached Africa. W e could
go on living as we h ad always lived. W e knew no better. W hat
h a d been good enough for our great-grandparents could go on
being good enough for us an d our children.
T h e housing situation w hen we took office was shocking. It
reflected w hat appeared to be a stan d ard E uropean view of the
A frican attitu d e tow ards domestic shelter: anything th a t keeps
off the rain an d offers shade from the sun is good enough. T he
white m an, living in his stone, brick or concrete house, seemed
to think th a t the A frican native5 neither w anted nor needed an
elaborate structure in w hich he and his fam ily could live in
com fort. I t was considered enough for a few palm fronds and
th atch to give shelter to the fam ily living in the village and for an
im provised shack w ith corrugated iron roof to serve the towns
folk. This assum ption was ju st another facet of the contem ptuous
regard of the A frican as a creature devoid of h u m an sensibility.
In all the years th a t the British colonial office adm inistered
this country, hardly any serious ru ra l w ater developm ent was
carried out. W h at this m eans is not easy to convey to readers who
take for granted th a t they have only to tu rn on a tap to get an
im m ediate supply of good drinking w ater. This, if it had occurred
to our ru ra l com m unities, w ould have been their idea of heaven.
T hey w ould have been grateful for a single village well or stand
pipe.
As it was, after a hard day's work in the hot and hum id fields,
m en and w om en w ould retu rn to their village and then have to
tram p for as long as two hours w ith a pail or pot in which, at the
end of their outw ard journey, they w ould be lucky to collect
some brackish germ-filled w ater from w hat m ay perhaps have
been little m ore th an a swam p. T h en there was the long journey
back. F our hours a day for an inadequate supply of w ater
for w ashing and drinking, w ater for the most p a rt diseaserid d en !
This picture was true for alm ost the whole country and can be

SOCIETY U N D E R COLONIALISM

35

explained by the fact th a t w ater developm ent is costly and no

m ore th a n a public service for the people being adm inistered. It
gave no im m ediate prospect of economic retu rn . Yet a fraction
of the profits taken out of the country by the business and m ining
interests w ould have covered the cost of a first-class w ater
system.
U n d er the colonial adm inistration there was, until m ore
recent times, discrim ination in the G old Coast h ealth services.
For exam ple, there were seven hospitals in the country which
catered for u n d er 3,000 Europeans as against thirty-six for about
4,000,000 Africans. W e all rem em ber w hen the R idge hospital
in A ccra was reserved for whites and w hen only in very special
cases any of our own people were ad m itted there. K orle Bu, the
principal A ccra hospital, was always over-crow ded. Even at
th a t, it was considered one of the best in Africa. In fact, as w ith
education, so the public h ealth and m edical services of the Gold
Coast were rate d to be well ahead of those in most other colonies.
Y et the services they provided w ere hopelessly inadequate.
Some attem p t h a d been m ade by the adm inistration to raise
h ealth standards, and m edical m en a n d nurses h ad been brought
in from B ritain to com plem ent the m edical services w hich h ad
been started by the missions. T h e budget, however, was terribly
restricted an d practically nothing was done by w ay of preventive
m edicine. T h e greatest scourge of our people is m alaria, w hich is
alm ost endem ic. I t is extrem ely debilitating and one of its effects
is sterility in wom en. T o get rid of m alaria one has to rid the
country o f the anopheles m osquito. O th e r diseases* like tu b e r
culosis, yaws, an d kwashiorkor, take a shocking toll o f life an d
energy, an d are im m ediately ascribable to poor nutritio n , over
crow ded living conditions a n d b ad drinking w ater. In fan t
m ortality rates are appallingly high, an d m any surviving
children are crippled or invalid.
A ttem pts were being m ade to bring ab out some am elioration,
through the h ealth services, b u t adm inistrative policy did
nothing to elim inate the economic conditions w hich assisted the
incidence o f death-dealing an d energy-depriving diseases and
m aladies. T o some degree lack of education can also be blam ed,
because w ithout knowledge superstition persists. H e a lth and
education most certainly go h a n d in h an d , and m any of our

36

A F RI CA MUST UN I TE

people resisted the white m a n s m edicine, because they

suspected it of being evil ra th e r th a n good. A cceptance of
tw entieth-century m edical techniques dem ands a certain level of
education, and w ithout this m any of our people accepted death
a n d disease as p a rt of an ordained p attern .
J u s t as the colonialists failed to develop our countries, they did
little to enlarge our intellectual and social horizons. T he reasons
they gave for this were as m uch resented by us as the denial of the
advantages. T h e African, it was m aintained, would not
appreciate better conditions. H e was incapable of education
beyond certain lim its; he would not respond to the incentives of
higher standards of life. All these argum ents, produced over and
over again in the past, have since been shown to be no m ore th an
slander an d calum ny.
In m any parts of our continent, Africans were deliberately
b a rre d from attain in g necessary skills to raise wages and
standards of living. A n industrial colour b a r has existed. Africans
an d Europeans doing the same jo b , as in the C opper Belt, are
given very different p ay ; in most cases Africans are getting about
one-tenth of the E uropean equivalent. Conditions in South
Africa are too well know n to need illustration, though it m ay
come as a surprise to some to learn th a t in C ato M anor, a suburb
of D urban, about 95 per cent of the inhabitants live perm anently
below the b rea d line. Even on the Reef, the richest p a rt of the
country, 70 per cent have incomes below the essential m ini
m u m .1
A W orld H ealth O rganisation rep o rt by D r J . A. M unoz2 has
revealed th a t in Basutoland the already low standard of living
seems to be sinking even lower. T h e birth -rate w hich was 30.6
per thousand in 1951, h a d dropped to 22 per thousand in 1957, it
being thought th a t infertility was due to lack of food. T he infant
m ortality rate doubled betw een 1951 an d 1957, w hen it reached
116 per thousand children.
E uropean colonization has been responsible for m uch of the
suffering of so m any Africans. A recent w riter has gone so far as to
say th a t im perialist rule, far from bringing about progress, has
1 R onald S egal: The Agony o f Apartheid.
2 Patrick D uncan: Contact, 9 Ja n u a ry i960. Q uoted Africa Digest, F ebruary
i960.

SOCIETY U N D E R COLONIALISM

37

led to a catastrophic decline in the stan d ard of living of the A frican

people.1 In m any parts native agriculture was discouraged in
favour of cash crops; soil was ruthlessly exploited, sometimes
causing erosion; and millions were tu rn ed into low -paid workers.
For exam ple, w hen D utch settlers first appeared in South A frica
they found native tribes of strong, healthy people, who lived by
raising cattle, grow ing corn and hun tin g wild gam e. T oday the
diet o f these tribes is alm ost exclusively corn. L aboratory rats
fed on a typical A fricans d iet, according to an article in the New
Scientist,2 will eat their ow n offspring.
I t has been argued th a t Africans are poor because they do not
produce enough. But their capacity to w ork m ust be exam ined. I t
is now generally agreed th a t m alignant m alnutrition is a m ajor
cause of A frican fatigue. I f A frican lab o u r is poor it is because
wages and conditions are poor.
T here is, too, the question of incentive. W h at incentive h a d the
A frican worker u n d er colonial rule, w hen his efforts only served
to enrich non-Africans ? D uring the last tw enty years, A frican
m iners have steadily increased the o u tp u t o f copper in N o rth ern
R hodesia; yet every penny of increased wages h ad to be bitterly
fought for. African workers, once they are liberated from
colonialism, will soon show the w orld w hat they are capable of,
in the same w ay as workers in Russia an d C hina have done.
U n d e r the old regimes, Russians an d Chinese were thought to be
incapable of running a m odern industrialized country.
U n d e r colonialism, A frican workers have no effective
bargaining power. T ra d e unions are frequently disallowed by
law, and they are largely unorganized. T hey have either to
accept the pitifully low wages offered to them or suffer the
consequences of being w ithout work, w hich, in certain regimes,
m akes them liable to a variety o f punishm ents. In South Africa,
under the gruesom e regulations of apartheid, the African worker
is hounded and forced into conditions of helotry. Sham eful
as these are, conditions for Africans in the Portuguese territories
probably surpass them though they have not so far received such
atten tio n from critics.
For the Portuguese colonies in Africa are slave states, and have
1 Ja c k W oddis: Africa, the Roots o f Revolt, Law rence & W ishart i960, p. 166.
2 20 August 1959.

38

AF RI CA MUST U NI TE

always been slave states. T hough theoretically abolished in 1875,

slavery was still continued by various m ethods w hich a P o rtu
guese law of 1899 p u t into definite legal shape. This law, w hich is
still in force in Angola, provides th a t all natives5, th a t is to say,
all Africans, are subject to a m oral and legal obligation* to
acquire by lab o u r the m eans of subsisting or bettering their
social condition*. U n d e r this law every A frican m ale in Angola,
w hich is in practice in terpreted as those above the a p p aren t age
o f ten years, m ay be obliged to show any tim e either th a t he has
w orked for six m onths in the year previous or th a t he is working.
Em ployers who w an t forced labour in d en t to the G overnorG eneral for a supply5, the term used indiscrim inately of goods
an d m en. T h e G overnor-G eneral then allocates a calculated
num ber. Local adm inistrators up an d down the country are sent
orders to ro u n d up the num bers, w hich is done by threatening
the chiefs an d headm en. W hen the required num bers have been
brought to the collecting centres, the D istrict Officer enforces
a collective contract, w hich is entered into on behalf of the
workers by the chiefs and headm en who have produced the
specified num bers.
Less th a n h a lf of the labour em ployed in A ngola is officially
classified by the Portuguese authorities as contract labour, th a t
is, forced labour. O ver h a lf of it is theoretically voluntary labour,
b u t in practice the position of the voluntary labourer is not better
th an th a t of the forced labourer.
T h e voluntary labourer cannot leave his jo b because if he does
he will becom e liable to be classed as idle5 and therefore subject
to forced labour. His only chance of escape is by slipping out of
the Portuguese territory and attem pting to obtain work in other
neighbouring states. Portuguese sources have estim ated th a t in
the ten years previous to 1947 over one m illion people h ad left
the Portuguese colonies by way of clandestine em igration. But
not all the people can go, and those who are left behind often
bear the b ru n t for those who have gone. A nd they have no
m edium through w hich they can m ake their grief known, their
sorrows h e a rd ; now here to tu rn for m itigation of their plight.
W hen others have been in the same position, there have been
those who have raised their voices for them . All over the world
we have h eard cries for people who are reputed to exist in

SOCIETY U N D E R COLONIALISM

39

conditions w hich w ould be paradise to the Africans of the P o rtu

guese colonial territories.
In an attem p t to cover up this system of slavery, the forced
workers are, in theory, p aid wages. In fact, however, threequarters of these wages are deferred until the end of their contract
period and are not h an d ed over until the G overnm ent has
deducted taxation. This is so high th a t at the end of their period
of em ploym ent they are left w ith scarcely any balance a t all. For
exam ple, in one au th en ticated case, a m an em ployed in the
fishing industry had, after he h a d w orked for four years, a final
balance of 3 2s. 6d.
T h e indescribable m isery of A ngolan conditions has con
tinuously been brought to the notice of the Portuguese G overn
m ent, b u t nothing except p a p e r reforms has been carried out.
In 1947 C ap tain H enrique G alvao, D eputy for Angola in the
Portuguese N ational Assembly a n d Senior Inspector of Overseas
T erritories, investigated these conditions on the request of the
Portuguese G overnm ent an d subm itted a com prehensive
report.
G alvao h ad been appointed because the Portuguese G overn
m ent expected from him , as a fervent G overnm ent supporter, a
w hitew ashing rep o rt w hich they could use in the U n ited N ations
a n d elsewhere. In fact, C ap tain G alvao was so shocked by w hat
he saw in Angola th a t he changed his political views and sub
m itted an honest and balanced account of w hat was taking place
in the Portuguese possessions overseas. As m ight be im agined,
the Portuguese G overnm ent did everything possible to suppress
the rep o rt a n d C ap tain G alvao was throw n into prison for his
presum ption in telling the tru th . U ltim ately he escaped from
P ortugal to ap p ear dram atically on the scene in 1961 w hen he
led a b an d of seventy brave m en to seize the Portuguese liner
Santa M aria.
O ne of C ap tain G alvaos chief criticisms of the Portuguese
regim e was its deceit. In theory an d on p a p e r it h a d abolished
forced labour on b eh alf of private firms an d individuals. In fact
forced labour was being stepped up. C ap tain G alvao w ro te :
I n so m e w ay s th e s itu a tio n is w o rse t h a n sim p le sla v ery . U n d e r
sla v ery , a fte r a ll, th e n a tiv e is b o u g h t as a n a n im a l; his o w n e r

40

A F RI CA MUST U NI TE
p refers h im to r e m a in as fit as a h o rse o r a n ox. H e re th e n a tiv e is
n o t b o u g h t, h e is h ir e d fro m th e S ta te , a lth o u g h h e is ca lle d a
free m a n . A n d his e m p lo y e r ca res little if h e sickens o r dies, o n ce
h e is w o rk in g , b e c a u s e w h e n h e sickens o r dies his e m p lo y e r w ill
sim p ly ask fo r a n o th e r.

These opinions he backs up w ith horrifying statistics showing

in some cases a death rate of 40 per cent am ong the forced
labourers.
T he situation has recently been m ade m uch worse by the
introduction of a large settler class. T h e precarious state of the
Portuguese econom y at hom e makes it necessary for Portugal to
export its own poverty an d to com pensate citizens for the work
w hich the State cannot provide them w ith at hom e, by dis
possessing the African population of the colonies and by provid
ing for Portuguese im m igrants land and cheap A frican labour.
Ju s t as the farm ers of South Africa are even harsher an d crueller
em ployers th a n are the m ine owners and big industrial m agnates,
so are the Portuguese settlers, in the m ain, even m ore ruthless
an d cruel th a n the in ternational big-business m en who have
established themselves in Angola.
T h e Portuguese consider the continuance of forced labour
essential as it helps to feed the neo-colonial economy of neigh
bouring states and territories. In 1959, the last year for w hich we
have statistics, only one-third of the labour force of nearly h a lf a
m illion workers em ployed in the South A frican mines cam e from
w ithin the borders of South Africa.
A t the beginning of the century, in the early days of South
A frican m ining and before pass laws and the policy of repression
of Africans generally h a d really got under way, it was impossible
to recruit in South Africa free labour to work in the mines. T he
Portuguese colony of M ozam bique was used, therefore, as a
source of forced labour and in 1903, for exam ple, provided no
less th an 89 per cent of the total labour force of the South African
mines. This supply of conscript labour is still an economic
necessity to South Africa if wages are to be kept dow n and trade
unions prohibited.
Accordingly, the South A frican G overnm ent has entered into
an actual treaty w ith the Portuguese G overnm ent to supply
labour for the mines. T he basis of the agreem ent is th at in retu rn

SOCIETY U N D E R COLONIALISM

41

for a n undertaking by the Portuguese G overnm ent th a t the

South African C ham ber o f M ines shall be the sole recruiting
agency in M ozam bique for mines labour, the South African
G overnm ent form ally undertakes th a t 47.5 p er cent of the sea
borne im port traffic to the m ining areas of South A frica shall go
through the Portuguese h a rb o u r of Lourengo M arques.
O riginally, the m axim um figure for lab o u r recruits un d er the
Convention was 90,000 a year. In 1940, however, the Portuguese
G overnm ent agreed to raise the total to 100,000 a year in retu rn
for an A greem ent by the South A frican G overnm ent to export
340,000 cases of citrus fruit a year through Lourengo M arques.
T h e mines w here this contract A frican lab o u r from the
Portuguese territories works m ay be situated in South A frica or
in the Rhodesias, b u t the m ain shareholders are large financial
an d com m ercial groups in the U n ited States, in the U n ited
K ingdom , in France an d in Belgium. T here are, therefore,
powerful forces in these an d in other countries who are deter
m ined to use their political influence to ensure th a t their
countries support P ortugal in m aintaining its forced labour
system and all the tragedies th a t flow from it.
W h at happens in regard to lab o u r for the mines so far as South
Africa is concerned is m erely, of course, an exam ple. T h e exist
ence o f the Portuguese colonies m akes cheap labour possible,
not only in South Africa, b u t in all the neighbouring colonial
territories and is an im p o rtan t elem ent in the profits not only of
m ining, b u t of m any other industries, including p lan tatio n
farm ing. All those w ith a financial interest in such enterprises
cannot therefore allow P ortugal to lose her colonial possessions.
M uch of the investm ent in the Portuguese colonies is not
Portuguese at all, b u t international. T h e Benguela railw ay was
bu ilt largely by British interests to bring out ores from the mines
of K atan g a. Traversing the great A ngola p lateau, it passes to a
point above Elizabethville in the Congo, an d th en links up w ith
the R hodesian railw ay system, after w hich it passes on to Beira.
N inety per cent of the stock of the Benguela railw ay is held by the
British holding com pany of T anganyika Concessions, dom iciled
since 1952 in Southern R hodesia.
T anganyika Concessions is linked up w ith the copper interests
of N orthern R hodesia a n d w ith U nion M iniere an d other

42

AF RI CA MUST UN I TE

industrial concerns in the Congo. T h rough interlocking

directorates, this com pany is linked w ith For m ini ere and certain
diam ond interests w hich, together w ith De Beers, the great
South A frican m ining com pany, control the Angola D iam ond
C om pany w ith mines in the L u an d a province. This com pany is a
state w ithin a state. I t possesses a prospecting m onopoly over
five-sixths of A ngola an d a labour conscription m onopoly over
m ost of the L u an d a province, one-third the size of G hana. O ne
h a lf of its profit goes to the state, the other h a lf to the private
shareholders. No w onder it can influence policy w hichever way
it likes and holds in its hands the lives of the Africans of the
L u an d a province.
For these econom ic reasons, P ortugal can count on heavy
backing from vested financial interests throughout the world.
H e r position in m aintaining her colonial dictatorship is, in
addition, im m ensely strengthened by her m em bership of the
N o rth A tlantic T re aty O rganization (N .A .T .O .).
I t rem ains to be seen w hat the effect will be o f the vote in the
U nited N ations G eneral Assembly urging Portugal to prepare
for self-government in A ngola. Experience has led us not to place
too m uch hope in resolutions and votes, b u t to rely m ore on
positive action. T h e people of Angola themselves m ust provide
the m otive pow er, an d we, the independent A frican States, m ust
do all we can to help them .
T h e struggle for independence in the Portuguese colonies has
come relatively late partly because of the exceptionally poor
state of education there. I n M ozam bique, the 1950 census re
vealed 99 per cent illiteracy. In 1954, out of 6 m illion Africans
only 5,000 were in prim ary schools, 73 in secondary schools, and
42 in industrial training classes. Portuguese officials have
boasted th a t w hite rule would last longer in their colonial
territories, because education has been deliberately held back.
A n official of the E ducation M inistry in Lourengo M arques has
been quoted as saying: Frankly we do not w ant many educated
natives, until they have an appropriate social background. T hey
have no place to go. T hey become dissatisfied. W h at we w ant
here is a stable society, a stable state. So we move very, very
slowly.51
1 J o h n G unther: Inside Africa, H am ish H am ilton 1955, p. 581.

C H A P T E R FIVE

TH E

I N T E L L E C T U A L

VA NG UA RD

of h u m an achievem ent illustrates th a t w hen an

aw akened intelligentsia emerges from a subject people it becomes
the vanguard of the struggle against alien rule. T here is a direct
relation betw een this fact an d the neglect of the im perial powers
to provide for the proper grow th o f educational facilities in their
colonies. I saw this connection quite soon in m y career, and it
was one o f the m ain reasons w hy I becam e a teacher for a tim e.
T h e trem endous enthusiasm for education in Africa never
fails to impress visitors. A schoolboy once w rote: T think the
happiest event in my life was the day w hen m y father told me to
go to school.1 A nother said: T h e most unfortunate thing th a t
could hap p en to me w ould be to have h a d no education, or to be
sent aw ay from school now, for th en all m y life w ould be
w asted.2 T he b urning desire for education am ong b oth children
a n d adults received little encouragem ent from the colonial
powers, and one of the worst legacies of colonialism has been the
absence o f a train ed body of A frican technicians an d a d
m inistrators.
A b rief glimpse at the educational position in various parts of
Africa will illustrate m y point. I n N o rth ern Rhodesia, in 1960,
only 43 per cent o f A frican children of school age were a t school;
an d only 1.1 per cent of those who reached the eligible age for
secondary education received it. T h e 1954 report for Southern
R hodesia showed only 16.5 p er cent o f the school potential
actually at school. In K enya, the G overnm ent provided hardly
any schools for Africans until the 1930s, so the K ikuyus created
their own. T hey form ed the K ikuyu In d ep en d en t Schools
Association. T o provide teachers, P eter K oinange founded the
T he history

1 Ja c k W oddis: Africa, the Roots o f Revolt, Law rence & W ishart i960, p. 157.
2 ibid.

44

A F RI CA MUST UNITE

K enya T eachers College at G ithunguri, where Jom o K enyatta

later becam e Principal. N ot surprisingly, these K ikuyu schools
tu rn ed out keen nationalists, and they were suppressed by the
British after the M au M au outbreak in 1952. In 1955 there were
only 35 high schools in the entire country for 5 J m illion Africans.
In the whole of French E quatorial Africa there were about 850
elem entary schools, an d most of them were badly equipped and
staffed. O f the children of school age, only about 18 per cent
w ent to school a t all.
As for higher education, until the foundation of the U niversity
College a t Salisbury incorporated in 1955, M akerere College,
founded in 1922, was the only school w ith university ran k in the
whole im m ense distance betw een K h arto u m and Johannesburg.
In all the British colonies p u t together, there were only three
other colleges sim ilar to M a k ere re : A chim ota in G hana, then the
G old Coast, Ib a d a n in N igeria, and F ourah Bay in Sierra
Leone. I n F rench Africa, south of the S ahara, there was one; in
Portuguese Africa, none. T he S udan h ad G ordon College, and
the Belgians opened a small R om an Catholic U niversity outside
Leopoldville, a t Lovanium .
In the U nion, w here little m ore th a n 30 per cent of A frican
children go to school, there are now very few opportunities for
higher education, because the A frikaner nationalists fear
A frican progress. T here were once four universities w hich
accepted Africans, though the total num ber of graduates every
year probably did not exceed 400. But in D ecem ber 1953 D r
M alan, pursuing the policy of apartheid, announced th at the
Universities of C apetow n an d W itw atersrand would no longer
accept Africans. In M ay 1955 the all-African College at Fort
H are was closed dow n as the result of an alleged secret au thority
am ong the students.
T h e problem of education was upperm ost in my m ind and in
the m inds of my p arty w hen we h a d our first m eeting after taking
office under the colonial adm inistration. T he fact th a t most of my
colleagues had, like m e, been trained as teachers reflected their
faith, too, in education as the key to our liberation and advance.
Before we could em bark on our plans, we m ade a review of the
situation as we found it. I t was not heartening. T he picture had
changed little since a foremost British authority on colonial

THE I N T E L L E C T U A L V A N G U A R D

45

affairs, M r L eonard Barnes, w riting in the nineteen-thirties, h a d

this to say about education in the G old C o ast:
In 1913 education there cost 25,000: in 1931, the peak year,
it cost just over a quarter of a million. This is ten times as much,
and there can be no objection to calling it such, or to calling it an
increase of 900 per cent, if you prefer. The same fact can be
stated, though less impressively, by saying that educational
expenditure took eighteen years to rise from 3 per cent to 7 per
cent of Government revenue. Both forms of statement omit
another fact, which is equally relevant, namely, that even in
1931 four Gold-Coast children out of five were receiving no
schooling of any kind, and less than half per cent got past the
primary stage.. . . Authorities have calculated that at our present
rate of progress it will be 700 years before the natives of even the
Gold Coast can read and write their own language. Note: O r
3,500 years, if the natural increase of population is taken into
account.1
I t is difficult to appreciate from these observations th a t the
educational system in the G old Coast was considered to be one
of the m ost advanced in tropical Africa. O u r p rim ary education,
in fact, goes back as far as 1752 an d was begun by missionaries
and continued by them for a very long tim e. After a long period,
they received grants-in-aid from the local governm ent, b u t a
good p a rt of the m oney was used for purely religious purposes
an d in paying for the salaries o f E uropean missionaries. U n
fortunately, too, they p aid the local teachers irregularly and
enforced upon them the purely religious duties of lay preachers,
catechists and Sunday school teachers. These faults aside, it m ust
be adm itted th a t we owe a considerable debt o f gratitude to the
missionaries for the contribution they m ade to such education as
the country received. O n their side, however, they did not lose,
for in addition to the grants received from governm ent, they
charged school fees, an d some of them set up bookshops for the
sale of religious literatu re and school text-books. A few, like the
Basel Mission, even branched out into trad in g a n d have
developed into not inconsiderable business concerns. T o d ay the
mission bookshops m ore or less control the im portation and
1 L eonard B arnes: Empire or Democracy? V ictory Gollancz, L td, 1939, p. 141.

46

A FRI CA MUST UNI TE

distribution of school books, an d m y G overnm ent is faced w ith

the task of establishing other m eans of getting text-books to our
school population w hich will not be subject to the kind of
m anipulation w hich now creates a scram ble for these books and a
too heavy financial b u rd en upon parents.
T here did come a tim e w hen colonial adm inistrators found
th a t it was too expensive for the local budget to im port British
officers for the lower grades of the service, and w hen the E uro
pean trading com m unities discovered a need for African workers
w ith some degree o f literacy. T he colonial adm inistration then
took a h a n d in providing facilities at prim ary and secondary
levels, though they were niggardly, especially in regard to
secondary schools. L ittle attention was given to technical
training, an d as a result educated Africans have acquired a bias
tow ards clerical w ork and a contem pt for m anual labour.
A fateful consequence of this accent upon a literary education
has been the denial to our country of a skilled labour force. I do
not refer here to highly qualified specialists, b u t to our general
body of workers. T here were no university facilities in the Gold
Coast until the college started at A chim ota in 1948 and later
rem oved to Legon. Those of our young m en who could collect
the resources to enable them to pursue higher studies in the
U n ited K ingdom in the m ain w ent in for law. A part from the
fact th a t they found an attractio n in the wig and gown w hich are
the em blem o f this profession, the industrial backwardness of our
country, coupled w ith the reality th a t they could not find places
in the adm inistration - the alm ost sole em ployer of such skills - as
engineers, doctors, pharm acists, agronom ists, accountants,
architects, and the rest, discouraged them from training for these
professions. O th e r considerations were the higher cost and
increased length of study required for these professions as
com pared w ith those required for training in law.
T his lopsided state of affairs has created for us one of the
biggest of our problem s: th a t is, how to create a skilled labour
force an d a body of trained technicians in the m any fields of
m odern agriculture, industry, science and economics in the
quickest possible tim e.
W hen my colleagues and I cam e into office in 1951, we found
some governm ent schools in the principal towns of the country.

THE I N T E L L E C T U A L V A N G U A R D

47

But they served only a small p a rt of the u rb a n populations and a

m inute section of the ru ra l areas. T h e villages, where most of our
people live, boasted few schools; such as there were, were
operated m ainly by the missions. T h e n u m b er of secondary
schools was lim ited, being based m ainly in C ape Coast. These,
too, were largely the products of m issionary endeavour. T here
was the large sem i-governm ental institution a t A chim ota.
W hen we confronted the colonial adm inistration w ith this
appalling situation on taking office at the beginning o f 19 5 1, they
told us th a t the budget was lim ited an d tim e was needed. T im e,
they said, was required to tra in the arm y of teachers needed for
the education of all the children. T h ey did not look very hap p y
w hen we pointed out th a t they seemed to have h a d tim e enough
to allow the traders and shippers and m ining com panies to
amass huge fortunes. As for the budget, we m ade the point th a t it
did not seem inequitable to use p a rt of those fortunes to educate
the children of the lan d from w hich they h a d been draw n. W e
were determ ined, we said, to press for increased expenditure on
social services.
I cannot say th a t in the six years in w hich we form ed a token
governm ent u nder British adm inistration, we were able to
register unqualified success w ith ou r educational plan. W e
certainly did go some w ay tow ards laying the foundations of a
country-w ide educational system. T h e p lan w hich we proposed
in the Legislative Assembly in A ugust 1951 provided for the
abolition of school fees in the p rim ary schools as an initial step
tow ards a m ore com prehensive policy of free education. T h e
R om an Catholic hierarchy strongly resented our decision to dis
continue the subsidizing out of public funds of new schools ow ned
a n d m anaged by religious bodies. I t was not our aim , as we
pointed out, to prevent the establishm ent and m aintenance of
new schools by denom inational bodies thro u g h voluntary
contributions, b u t they could not look to governm ent for
financial support.
A t the beginning o f 1951, p rim ary school enrolm ents stood at
125,000. A t the beginning of 1952, there were 270,000 children
enrolled in our prim ary institutions an d we estim ated th a t this
n um ber w ould reach 400,000 by the beginning of 1957. A ctually,
a t the tim e o f independence in M arch 1957, the figure h ad

48

A F RI C A MUST UN I TE

expanded far beyond h a lf a m illion. W e h ad hoped th at by th at

tim e ou r educational program m e of teacher training and the
erection of buildings and equipm ent w ould be able to cater for
the anticipated increase. But the increase was greater th a n we
h a d expected and our o u tp u t of trained teachers and buildings
h a d not, unfortunately, kept pace w ith it, even though the
train in g college enrolm ent h ad m ore th an doubled over the
period.
W e h ad established a system of scholarships an d had planned
for additional secondary schools. W e established the College of
Arts, Science an d Technology at K um asi, now the K w am e
N k ru m ah U niversity, w hich will provide accom m odation for
2,000 students and offer courses in building, engineering,
accountancy, agriculture, science and com m erce, am ong other
subjects. T eacher training institutions in 1951 produced some
700 new teachers annually, a far too inadequate figure. W e
m anaged to establish twelve new training colleges and to double
the capacity of four. By 1957, we were turning out some 4,000
new teachers each year, b u t this left us far behind the 70,000
teachers req u ired to serve the national needs of elem entary
education.
W e achieved some headw ay in trad e and technical education,
increasing the an nual enrolm ent in six years from 600 to some
2,000, a considerable gain, b u t woefully short of need. W ith
secondary school education we could do very little. A d
m inistrative budget for these needs was m inim al, and we ju st did
n ot have the tim e to tra in teachers to the stan d ard required for
secondary school instruction. T he two institutions of learning,
the U niversity College a t Legon and the College of Technology
a t K um asi, continued to take in m ore students each year and we
were able to im prove and expand their services.
T h ere was enough m aterial in these records from which
attractive brochures could be com piled by the Colonial Office to
present to the U nited N ations showing how m uch was being
done to introduce education to the prim itive peoples of W est
A frica. T hey were often accom panied by p retty pictures of
schools an d happy children at play in the grounds. T hey m ay
well have im pressed the outsider. T hey were of small comfort to
us, w hen we sat dow n in M arch 1957 to consider, not w hat we

THE I N T E L L E C T U A L V A N G U A R D

49

h ad done, b u t w hat rem ained to be done to give every child in

G hana his real b irth rig h t of independence - a basic education.
O ver an d beyond this, we needed to p lan an educational
system th a t will be m ore in keeping w ith the requirem ents of the
economic and social progress for w hich our new developm ent
plans are aim ing. O u r p a tte rn of education has been aligned
hitherto to the dem ands of British exam ination councils. Above
all, it was form ulated an d adm inistered by an alien a d
m inistration desirous of extending its dom inant ideas and
thought processes to us. W e were train ed to be inferior copies of
Englishm en, caricatures to be laughed a t w ith our pretensions
to British bourgeois gentility, our gram m atical faultiness and
distorted standards betraying us a t every tu rn . W e were neither
fish nor fowl. W e were denied the knowledge of our A frican past
an d inform ed th a t we h ad no present. W h at future could there
be for us ? W e were tau g h t to regard our culture and traditions as
barbarous and prim itive. O u r text-books were English tex t
books, telling us about English history, English geography,
English ways of living, English customs, English ideas, English
w eather. M any of these m anuals h ad not been altered since 1895.
All this has to be changed. A nd it is a stupendous task. Even
the ordering of text-books is an involved m atte r th a t makes the
introduction of new ones w ith a G h an aian ch aracter a prolonged
affair. This is som ething th a t we are, however, getting on w ith, as
it is vital th a t we should n u rtu re our own culture an d history if
we are to develop th a t A frican personality w hich m ust provide
the educational an d intellectual foundations of our Pan-A frican
future.

C H A P T E R SI X

F R E E D O M

FIRST

I t is m y deep conviction th a t all peoples wish to be free, and

th a t the desire for freedom is rooted in the soul of every one of us.
A people long subjected to foreign dom ination, however, does
not always find it easy to translate th a t wish into action. U nder
a rb itra ry rule, people are a p t to becom e leth a rg ic ; their senses
are dulled. Fear becomes the dom inant force in their lives; fear
of breaking the law, fear of the punitive measures w hich m ight
result from an unsuccessful attem p t to break loose from their
shackles. Those who lead the struggle for freedom m ust break
through this ap a th y and fear. T hey m ust give active expression
to the universal longing to be free. T hey m ust strengthen the
peoples faith in themselves, and encourage them to take p a rt in
the freedom struggle. Above all, they m ust declare their aims
openly and unm istakably, a n d organize the people tow ards the
achievem ent o f their goal of self-government.
T h e essential forger of the political revolution is a strong, wellorganized, broadly based political p arty, knit together by a
program m e th a t is accepted by all the m em bers, who also subm it
themselves to the p a rty s discipline. Its program m e should aim
for Freedom first. Seek ye first the political kingdom , becam e
the principal slogan of the C onvention Peoples P arty, for w ith
out political independence none o f our plans for social and
econom ic developm ent could be p u t into effect.
T h ere has been a good deal of talk about dependent territories
m aking themselves viable before attem pting to take upon them
selves the responsibilities of self-government. T h a t is precisely
w hat they cannot do. As long as the governm ent of less de
veloped countries rem ains in the hands of colonial adm inis
trators, their economies are set to a p attern determ ined by
the interests, not of the indigenous inhabitants b u t of the national

F REEDOM FIRST

51

beneficiaries of the ruling country. Im provem ent in living

conditions for the bulk of the people will not come until political
pow er passes into their hands.
T hus, every m ovem ent for independence in a colonial
situation contains two elem ents: the d em and for political
freedom and the revolt against poverty a n d exploitation.
R esolute leadership is required to subordinate the u n d erstan d
able desire of the people for b etter living conditions to the
achievem ent of the prim ary aim of the abolition o f colonial
rule.
Before the Second W orld W ar, a n u m b er of political dem on
strations and strikes took place in various parts of colonial Africa.
T h e m ost com m on dem ands were for reform s; few people
envisaged a t th a t tim e the em ergence of n ational political parties
dem anding independence.
D uring the 1940s, however, m any A frican n ational organiz
ations were form ed. For exam ple, in 1944, the N ational C ouncil
of N igeria and the Cam eroons was founded, and, in the same
year, the N yasaland N ational Congress.1 T w o years later, the
K enya A frican U nion was form ed; a n d the R assem blem ent
D em ocratique A fricain, a federation o f the various organizations
w hich h a d developed th ro ughout the F rench colonies in W est
an d E quatorial Africa. T here followed, in 1947, the form ation of
the N o rth ern R hodesian A frican N ational C ongress;2 and, in
our country the U nited G old Coast C onvention, w ith its aim :
self-government in the shortest possible tim e. O n 12 J u n e 1949,
cam e the split w ith the U .G .C .C . w hen I founded the C on
vention Peoples P arty w ith the declared aim o f achieving Self
G overnm ent N ow .
T h e 1950s saw the em ergence o f the U g an d a N ational
Congress (1952), the T anganyika A frican N ational U nion
( : 953)3 a n d the A frican N ational Congress in S outhern
R hodesia.3 T h ere were also n ational organizations form ed in the
1 This was banned in 1958 an d the M alaw i Congress P arty set u p in its
place.
2 W hen the C entral African Federation was form ed in 1953, this p arty split
up, an d others em erged, e.g. T h e U nited N ational Independence P arty
u n d er K enneth K au n d a in 1958.
3 This was originally founded in 1920. I t was banned in 1959, an d the
N ational D em ocratic P arty was formed.

52

A F RI CA MUST UNI TE

Congo. In Portuguese Africa, the U niao dos Populacaos de

A ngola an d the M ovem ento P opular de L ibertacao de Angola
were form ed. Eventually, in 1959, they m erged to form the
A frican R evolutionary F ro n t A gainst Portuguese Colonialism.
This organization includes supporters in M ozam bique and
Portuguese G uinea.
I have m entioned only a few of the m any A frican political
organizations form ed during an d after the Second W orld W ar.
T here are m any others. T h eir structure, organization, and the
quality o f their leadership, have varied, b u t all have h ad in
com m on the determ ination to struggle for the abolition of
colonial rule an d the im provem ent of economic and social
conditions.
O n the eve of the Second W orld W ar, only L iberia, Ethiopia
an d Egypt were independent. But by the end of 1959, th a t is,
tw enty years later, there were nine independent African S ta te s:
Egypt, Sudan, M orocco, T unisia, Libya, L iberia, E thiopia,
G hana an d G uinea. In i960, N igeria, the Congo, F rench
T ogoland, F rench Cam eroons an d Som alia achieved independ
ence. T hey were followed, in 1961, by Sierra Leone,
T anganyika, U g an d a and N yasaland. T he independence of
K enya, N orthern R hodesia and Z anzibar cannot long be
delayed.
T his fundam ental change in the A frican situation has been
b rought about by the struggles and sacrifices of the A frican
peoples themselves, and nothing can now stop the rushing tide of
nationalism . As long as a single foot of A frican soil rem ains under
foreign dom ination, the b attle m ust continue.
I t m ay be th a t the tim e has come to have a com m on political
p a rty w ith a com m on aim and program m e. For instance, instead
of the Convention Peoples P a rty in G hana, there m ight be the
G hana Peoples Party. In K enya, the progressive p arty could be
the K enya Peoples P arty ; in G uinea, the G uinea Peoples Party,
an d so on; each p arty having one com m on aim and objective,
the freedom and unity of Africa.
T h e various Peoples Parties, w ith their com m on aim , would
co-operate w ith each other. A central organization would u n
doubtedly be necessary, and also a highly-trained headquarters
staff. I f this kind of solidarity on the p arty political level could be

FREEDOM FIRST

53

achieved, it w ould surely strengthen A frican continental

freedom and unity.
P arty leaders in countries w hich are still not free w ould be able
to derive strength and inspiration from close association w ith
their opposite num bers in independent countries. T hough beset
by difficulties, they w ould gain confidence from being p a rt of a
strong continental organization w ith im m ense resources, w hich
they could draw upon in tim e of need. From its inception, the
C onvention Peoples P arty declared in its constitution th a t it
w ould seek to establish fraternal relations w ith, an d offer
guidance and support to all nationalist, dem ocratic and socialist
m ovem ents, in A frica an d elsewhere, w hich are fighting for
national independence and self-determ ination!
A m ong independent countries the com m on p a rty w ould act
as a unifying force. Also, if a com m on dom estic policy could be
w orked ou t it w ould help im m easurably in the planning an d
developm ent of the A frican continent as a whole, in the economic
an d social spheres.
T he unevenness o f developm ent in Africa, b o th political and
economic, is a m ajor problem . Some countries are poor in n a tu ra l
resources; others rich. Some achieved independence com
paratively easily, and peacefully; others are still struggling. T h e
obvious solution is unity, so th a t developm ent can be properly
and cohesively planned.
C ountries u n d er alien rule achieve independence in different
ways. In d ia was prom ised freedom by steady evolution tow ards
self-governm ent in ordered constitutional stages. In fact it took
twenty-seven years of civil com m otion an d passive disobedience
for In d ia to achieve her aim . Libya was granted independence
by the U n ited N ations O rganization as a direct result of Ita ly s
defeat in the Second W orld W ar. T h e Portuguese colony of G oa
was liberated by In d ia. Several countries in the M iddle East owe
their existence as separate states to the W estern powers, w hen
they carved up the O tto m a n E m pire after the First W orld
W ar.
In Africa, the n atu re of the freedom struggle has varied
according to the background conditions against w hich it has h a d
to operate and the position of the in ternational scene at a given
tim e.

54

A F RI C A MUST U NI TE

G enerally, in territories where there is a settler problem , the

struggle has been m ore prolonged an d sometimes violent, as in
K enya during the M au M au period. W here there is no settler
problem , as in W est Africa, the struggle has been hard, though
on the whole peaceful a n d constitutional. I have already told
how independence was achieved in G h a n a .1
Looking back, an d trying to determ ine the reasons for the
successful outcom e of our struggle for freedom , one factor stands
out above all others, nam ely, the strength of a well-organized
political party , representative of the b ro ad mass of the people.
T h e C onvention Peoples P arty represented the ordinary,
com m on folk who w anted social justice an d a higher stan d ard of
living. I t kept in daily, living touch w ith the ordinary mass of
people it represented, unlike the opposition, w hich was supported
by a galaxy of lawyers an d m em bers of other conservative p ro
fessions, the self-styled aristocracy5 of the G old Coast. T hey did
not un d erstan d the new m ood o f the people, the growing
nationalism and the revolt against econom ic hardship. T hinking
th a t th eir lofty assertions were enough to w in adherents to their
ranks, they m ade little effort to come into close contact w ith the
masses in the way th a t I h a d done in my early days as secretary of
the U .G .C .C ., an d continued through m y years of leadership of
the C .P.P. As a m atter of fact, w hen the leaders of the U .G .C .C .
discovered th a t I h a d spearheaded a mass m ovem ent, they
recoiled in fright. T h a t was som ething they h ad not bargained
for. T hey had w anted me to build up a m ovem ent whose ranks
w ould not question their self-assumed right to political leader
ship, b u t w ould nevertheless provide a solid enough base for them
to pose as the national cham pions in pressing for constitutional
change. I t was w hen the leaders of the U .G .C .C . dem anded I
get rid of the mass following I h ad built up, th a t I w ithdrew from
their secretariat, an d form ed the C onvention People's P arty.
U nw illing to come dow n to the masses, w hom they scorned as
flotsam a n d jetsa m 5, it was not surprising th a t those leaders
failed to m ake headw ay w ith the ordinary people, and were
constantly rejected by them .
In the early years of the C .P.P., and frequently since, I urged
m em bers to follow the advice of the C hinese:
1 In my autobiography, Ghana. Thom as Nelson & Sons 1957.

FREEDOM FIRST

55

Go to the people
Live among them
Learn from them
Love them
Serve them
Plan with them
Start with what they know
Build on what they have.
This w ould be m y advice to m em bers of any nationalist and
progressive P arty.
T h e cam paign of the C onvention Peoples P arty was helped
by the press. O n the very day I left the U .G .C .C . the first issue of
m y p ap er The Accra Evening News was published, w ith its
challenging m o tto : W e prefer self-governm ent w ith danger to
servitude in tran q u illity . I reached a wide circle of readers
th rough the colum ns of this pap er, and ham m ered hom e the
message o f full self-governm ent a n d the need to organize for
victory: T he strength of the organized masses is invincible. . . .
W e m ust organize as never before, for organization decides
everything.1
T h e whole question of publicity, the spreading of inform ation
about the aims an d achievem ents o f any political party, is of
suprem e im portance. In the struggle for independence, w here
the colonial governm ent controls the m ajor avenues of in
form ation and gives its blessing to the reactionary press, the
m echanics of pro p ag an d a em ployed by the freedom m ovem ent
are vital. T h e reach of the press is, o f course, narrow er in areas
w here there is a high degree of illiteracy; b u t even in those areas
the people can always be reached by the spoken w ord. A nd
frequently the w ritten w ord becomes the spoken w ord.
A p opular anti-colonial press developed in Africa d uring the
1930s. In 1932, H ab ib B ourguiba founded the Action Tunisienne.
I n M orocco, the Action du Peuple edited by M u h am m ad H asan elO uezzani appeared in A ugust, 1938; the editorial com m ittee
contained the nucleus o f the leadership of M oroccos Com ity
d A ction M arocaine. In the Ivory Coast UEclaireur de la Cote
d Ivoire began in 1935. T hree years later, in 1938, D r N nam di
1 T h e Accra Evening News, 14 Ja n u a ry 1949.

5^

A F RI CA MUST UNITE

Azikiwes West African Pilot prep ared the ground for the in
dependence m ovem ent in N igeria.
These, an d other newspapers, have undoubtedly helped in
the spread of A frican nationalism . T hey have em phasized the
need for freedom first5 an d then developm ent. I f we are to
banish colonialism utterly from our continent, every African
m ust be m ade aw are of his p a rt in the struggle. Freedom
involves the u n tiring efforts of every one engaged in the struggle
for it. T h e vast A frican m ajority m ust be accepted as the basis of
governm ent in Africa.

C H A P T E R S E VE N

A C H IE V IN G

OU R

S O V E R E IG N T Y

I t i s becom ing axiom atic th a t colonial powers do not willingly

retire from political control over any given land. Before they go
they m ake superhum an efforts to create schisms an d rivalries
w hich they hope to exploit after they have gone. In d ia, w ith its
division into two separate parts, leaving its sad legacy o f comm unalism and religious feuding, is the m ost glaring exam ple. But
the rifts in B urm a, Ceylon, T he Cam eroons, V iet-N am , the
breaking dow n o f the two federations of French W est Africa and
French E quatorial Africa into separate states of the F rench Com
m unity, all stand as eloquent witnesses to this extended policy of
divide and ru le. So also does the federal division of N igeria into
three regions, w here the British adm inistration h ad previously
m ost carefully built up a u n itary form of governm ent out of a vast
conglom eration of different peoples.
Looked at superficially, it is difficult to understand the ways of
the colonial powers. T hey will not leave Africa alone, even w hen
they realize full well th a t they are clutching a t a straw in trying
to prevent the total and final liquidation of the colonial system.
T hey act as if the right to m eddle in the in tern al affairs o f newlyem ergent states is still theirs, and even presum e to dictate w hich
things are rig h t and which are w rong am ong the acts perform ed
by us. E xam ined closely, these manoeuvres are seen to be p a rt of
the strategy o f divide and ru le , wielded from afar.
D uring our struggle for independence, and even after, all the
arm oury of the British press was b rought into play against me
an d against the C onvention Peoples P arty. Special corre
spondents were sent to discover th a t we were not only C om
m unist, b u t deep in bribery an d co rru p tio n . T hey cam e to
in terp ret the tussle betw een the C .P .P. an d the N ational
L iberation M ovem ent over the issue of our C onstitution as one of

A FRI CA MUST U N I TE

dictatorial am bition on our p a rt against the disinterested effort

o f our opponents to secure a dem ocratic form of governm ent.
T h e raising by the N .L .M . of the dem and for federation was
eagerly seized upon as a hopeful m eans of fragm enting our small
an d largely hom ogeneous country.
In A pril 1955, 1 h a d p u t the issue of a federal form of govern
m ent before a Select Com m ittee, after having allowed the
O pposition the privilege of five seats in our C onstituent
Assembly w hen they were legally entitled to two. T he C om
m ittees rep o rt decided against a federated governm ent. In
order to ensure the widest dem ocratic acceptance of a con
stitution for independence, I sought a C onstitutional Adviser
through the British G overnm ent and in Septem ber, Sir Frederick
Bourne cam e to advise on the devolution of powers and functions
to the regions. W e agreed th a t there should be decentralization of
certain powers to the regions and, on the basis of Sir Fredericks
work, we felt confident of m ajority support for our proposals
w hen we p u t them forw ard. T h e Secretary of State h a d laid down
two conditions as the prerequisite for the g ran t of in dependence:
th a t a substantial m ajority of the people should show their
desire for independence in the very n ear future and th a t they
should agree upon a constitution th a t w ould m eet their needs
an d be w orkable. Sir Frederick Bourne cam e back again as
C onstitutional Adviser to the conference w hich opened at
A chim ota on 16 F ebruary 1956 to exam ine his recom m enda
tions. All political parties, traditional councils and other
app ro p riate bodies were invited to attend. T h e conference
report agreed upon alm ost all of Sir Fredericks recom m en
dations an d m ade the proposal th a t there should be a House of
Chiefs in each region of the country to discuss social and cultural
legislation.
How ever, the N .L .M ., in spite of the untiring efforts I m ade to
secure their co-operation, h ad refused to take p a rt in the
deliberations and absented themselves from the proceedings.
T h e term s of the Secretary of State, therefore, h ad not been fully
m et, w hich h a d been the oppositions purpose. H ence we were
m ade to subm it to the general election of 1956, w hich confirm ed
the C .P.P. ascendancy and the desire o f the overw helm ing
m ajority of the people for independence and a unitary form of

A C H I EV I N G OUR S OV ER EI GN TY

59

governm ent, w hich was the platform on w hich we w ent to the

country.
People who are independent, free an d sovereign m ake their
ow n constitution. A lthough G h an a achieved w hat is called Tull
independence on 6 M arch 1957, there were certain provisions
in the constitution im posed on us w hich lim ited the full em ploy
m ent of our freedom , w hich were an affront to our sovereignty, a
fetter upon our free developm ent. These were the entrenched
clauses w hich the British G overnm ent insisted upon w riting into
the constitution as a condition of our accession to independence.
W e raised our argum ents against their inclusion, b u t the concern
in British official quarters for the protection of m inority rights and
the welfare of British civil servants in G h an aian em ploy o u t
weighed consideration for the prerogatives of our independence
an d the expressed will of our people. O u r resentm ent a t being
forced to accept w hat was partially a d ictated constitution in
order to keep the tim e-table of independence th a t we h ad
given to our people, was m ade quite p lain by m e an d m y
G overnm ent, as was our determ ination to divest ourselves of the
objectionable clauses as soon as we were in a position to do so
constitutionally.
W hen it was found in 1956 th a t it w ould be impossible to delay
full independence m uch longer, negotiations were started to
fram e the constitution by w hich an independent G h an a w ould
be governed. M y G overnm ent was th en a G overnm ent largely
in nam e, ultim ate pow er residing in the G overnor of the G old
Coast, who really represented the Colonial Office on the spot.
U ntil the m om ent w hen the instrum ent of independence was
actually placed in our hands, freedom could be denied us. O u r
stand th a t independence involved the right of the local
p opulation alone to determ ine the n a tu re of the laws, regulations
an d procedures o f their State through their parliam en tary
institutions, was discountenanced. T h e British argum ent was
th a t they held in sacred trust the rights of all the people in the
G old Coast, and it was incum bent upon them to safeguard the
position of a section o f the population, albeit a m inority, w hich
m ight be opposed to the existing G overnm ent. T his we con
sidered a som ew hat grotesque prem ise an d sought in vain for a
precedent in special protection of m inority opposition to the

6o

AF RI CA MUST U NI TE

reigning G overnm ent of B ritain. W e protested our ability to

safeguard the rights of our own people and were resentful of
the doubts cast on our intentions. I posed the suggestion th at if
m y G overnm ent could be suspected of ulterior intentions towards
our political opponents, we were equally open to the suspicion
th a t we m ight abrogate the im posed constitution on the m orrow
of British departure. W here, then, was the purpose of negotiating
a constitution ? W hy not let us fram e our own C onstitution ?
T h e British G overnm ent was adam ant. T hey m ade it u n
equivocally clear th a t unless we entered into constitutional
negotiations they would take no further steps tow ards the g ran t
of independence. This was the atm osphere in w hich we m et and
the m ood in w hich the constitution em erged th a t was to tie the
future o f G hana. I t saw the light of day, indeed, not as a legal
instrum ent from our own G hanaian Assembly, b u t as a British
O rd e r in Council. Its official title was T he G hana (Constitution)
O rd e r in Council, 1957 o f the British G overnm ent. I t was
published by the British G overnm ent on 22 F ebruary 1957.
Some m ight charge th a t there was a good deal of em otionalism
involved in our attitu d e to the m anner o f the fram ing of our
constitution for independence. Review ing it w ith the dis
passionate objectiveness of three years of governm ent under its
provisions, we are reinforced in our conviction th a t only im
perialist arrogance could have decided th a t entrenched clauses
are irrem ovable, even under such constitutional stringencies as
those by w hich the British sought to tie us down. Perhaps we
were regarded as too stupid to be able to extricate ourselves by
constitutional m eans from the strait-jacket of the Special
procedure for passing Bills relating to the Constitution and other
im p o rtan t m atters, in w hich the British strapped us w ith the
freedom th a t they gave. T h e British G overnm ent h ad decided
th a t constitutional change should be m ade as difficult as possible
for us, indeed alm ost impossible.
Clause 32 of our independence constitution allowed th a t
No Bill for the amendment, modification, repeal or re-enact
ment of the constitutional provisions of Ghana . . . shall be
presented for Royal Assent unless it has endorsed on it a certi
ficate under the hand of the Speaker that the number of votes

A C H I E V I N G OUR S OV ER EI GN TY

6l

cast in favour thereof at the third meeting of the Assembly

amounted to not less than two-thirds of the whole num ber of
Members of Parliament.
In short, a simple p arliam en tary m ajority could not change
any p a rt of the constitution, nor even a tw o-thirds m ajority of
m em bers present and voting. T h ere h ad to be a supporting vote
from tw o-thirds o f the total m em bership of the Assembly. O u r
opposition was n ot even obliged to be present at the debate on a
Bill for constitutional change. M erely by the fact of being an
opposition it could, if its num bers w ere large enough, destroy any
likelihood of constitutional change. This is surely giving an odd
twist to the dem ocratic principle.
As a m atter o f fact, the p o pularity o f the G overnm ent in the
country, and the strength of the C .P .P. in the N ational Assembly,
were such th a t we could have changed its term s absolutely in
accord w ith the constitution, shortly after becom ing free in 1957.
T he C .P.P. enjoyed a parliam en tary m ajority w hich w ould have
given us the required over-all tw o-thirds vote; an d th a t m ajority
increased as tim e w ent on. W e w ould have been well w ithin our
rights to present a Bill to the Assembly scrapping T he G h an a
(Constitution) O rd er in Council, 1957. This, however, I was
relu ctan t to do. Public opinion, both a t hom e an d abroad, is not
norm ally so well-inform ed and so equipped w ith detailed in
form ation on constitutional m atters th a t it w ould have u n d e r
stood the absolute legality of our action. T h e issue w ould at once
have becom e controversial an d the idea spread th a t we were
guilty o f a breach of faith. I t was no p a rt o f m y purpose to start
our existence as an independent country clouded by the suspicion
th a t we h a d broken a contract, irrespective of the m oral duress
u n d er which we h ad signed it. K now ledge of this duress, in any
event, was not public. H aving consideration for all the factors
involved, we decided th a t we w ould let the constitution stand
a n d respect all its clauses. W e w ould proceed to procure its
alteration w hen the ap p ro p riate occasion presented itself, in
conform ity w ith its term s.
M eantim e, our first duty was to ensure the unity o f the n ation
an d its tranquillity, in order to go forw ard w ith ou r tasks of
developm ent.

62

A F RI CA MUST UNITE

T he unrest w hich prevailed in certain parts of the country at

the launching of our independence was not m ade any less by the
provisions relating to the setting up o f Regional Assemblies and
the powers to be invested in them . T h e British negotiators of our
constitution were m ore am enable to the federal aspirations of the
O pposition th a n to the C .P.P. w hich represented the wishes of
the m ajority of the people. T he O pposition view was prom pted
by motives o f political separatism , and these were reflected in the
constitutional clauses relating to the establishm ent of Regional
Assemblies.
In the same way, every opportunity was provided by the con
stitution for cram ping our developm ent endeavours. In com
m unications, for instance, the G overnm ent m ight decide on a
tru n k ro ad th a t w ould pass through several Regions. O pposition
by the R egional Assembly of one affected Region could hold up
the project indefinitely. As p a rt of its national health scheme, the
G overnm ent m ight determ ine the sites on w hich hospitals and
clinics should be built. T h e R egional Assemblies could object to
an d obstruct these plans, in keeping w ith their constitutional
au th o rity over the regional health and m edical services.
I t was laid down th a t in each Region there shall be a H ead of
the R egion, who, except in the case of the A shanti Region, shall
be chosen by the House of Chiefs in the R egion. No dem ocratic
principle was to be em ployed b u t use m ade instead of the o u t
m oded procedure current under the colonial system of Indirect
R ule w hich gave authority to com pliant chiefs. I f the chiefs of a
certain R egion happened to be opposed to m odern health
m ethods an d m edical practices, they could effectively block any
G overnm ent program m es involving up-to-date treatm en t of
disease in their area, for the restrictions of the constitution would
safeguard them . E xtend this to education, public works, housing,
agricultural and industrial developm ent, and it can be accepted
th a t the central G overnm ent would have been in the position of
possessing m erely token sovereignty. O u r hands and feet would
be virtually bound the m om ent we attem pted to govern.
T h e ground, it can be seen, was well laid for the prom otion of
disunity an d fragm entation. T he clue to the British purpose was
really contained in the phrase, except in the case of the A shanti
Region*. T h ro u g h o u t the provisions relating to Regional

A C H I EV I N G OUR S O V E R E I GN T Y

63

Assemblies, A shanti was om itted and special regulations were

introduced giving it powers superior to those of the other Regions.
Everywhere else the head of the Region was to be chosen by the
House of Chiefs. I n A shanti, the constitution specifically stated
th a t the A santehene shall be the H ead of the A shanti R egion.
W h at kind of dem ocracy were the British laying dow n on the eve
o f their dep artu re, in designating the person who was to be the
effective governor o f a p a rticu la r R egion? W here was the
respect for our sovereignty ? O u r independence was supposed to
give us sovereignty over our own affairs. But there we were, a
dem ocratic G overnm ent, lim ited by constitutional provisions,
designed by the retiring pow er, to a designated individual to
conduct the highest executive post in the m ost delicate national
territory. I t was so openly a device to concede to the opposition
p a rty the opportunities they h a d been deprived o f by their
defeat at the polls th a t it was difficult to believe the British
could have been so deceitful to their m uch-vaunted respect for
dem ocracy.
T h e choice o f the A santehene for this special elevation was
deliberate. H e was know n to share the views of the N ational
L iberation M ovem ent, whose politics o f violence h a d m ade our
final steps to independence so im m ensely difficult. Considerable
suspicion as to his original connections w ith the M ovem ent h a d
been curren t since its inception, because his chief linguist, the
m an closest to him in the affairs of the A shanti state, was a
founder m em ber and its C hairm an. T h e A santehene h ad
worked well w ith the British, even though his uncle Prem peh I
h a d fought them in the A shanti wars earlier in the century and
h a d been exiled to the Seychelles islands for his A frican
patriotism . For his services to the British in carrying out th eir
colonial rule, the A santehene h ad been knighted. His position as
the spiritual an d tem poral head of A shanti gave him the in
fluence of a feudal lord over all the chiefs of the R egion and over
the local people, an d m ade him extrem ely powerful. By seeking
to safeguard his continued authority in the new G hana through
specific clauses in the constitution, the British were n ot only
repaying him for services rendered and m aking good in p a rt the
prom ise of the N .L .M . to crow n him K ing of G hana, b u t were
entrenching the greatest focal point of disintegration w ithin our

64

A FR I C A MUST U NI TE

new state. This was a most dangerous situation and a lim itation
upon our pow er as a fully independent G overnm ent th a t we
could not accept. I t would have am ounted to the exclusion of
A shanti from the sphere of G h a n a s sovereignty. I t was u n
thinkable we should lay ourselves open to this possibility and so
endanger the future of the country.
O bserving the provisions of the constitution, w hich set out th at
R egional Assemblies shall be established by act of Parliam ent in
a n d for each R egion, I nam ed a commission of inquiry to
exam ine the m eans by which they should be set up and the most
efficient m ethods for their conduct. T h e commission took some
tim e m aking its considerations and reporting back, and m ean
tim e we proceeded in P arliam ent w ith other, m ore urgent
m atters. A m ong these, regional needs were well to the forefront,
an d I am certain th a t the developm ent schemes we have
introduced so far in each of the Regions go far beyond anything
th a t w ould have been accom plished if left solely to local
initiative.
O ld-established democracies are equipped for wide de
centralization. T hey possess skilled an d experienced local bodies
to carry out urgent developm ent tasks th a t would otherwise be
the concern of the central G overnm ent. A new country, where
there is strong national b u t lim ited local leadership and vigour,
cannot afford to gam ble on the ability or incom petence of a
regional body to develop its Region. A new country needs to
initiate central nation-w ide planning fitting the required
activities of each R egion into the over-all program m e. I t cannot
allow the program m e to be held up by a dilatory or backw ard or
obstructive R egional Assembly. Provision m ust natu rally be
m ade for local authorities w ith powers to carry out local develop
m ent projects in co-operation w ith or under the guidance of the
central G overnm ent. W e suggested this to the British during our
constitutional negotiations, b u t they insisted on the creation of
R egional Assemblies w ith powers wide enough to im pinge on
those o f the central G overnm ent, and w ith tight safeguards
m aking m odification virtually impossible. T he only thing they
failed to do was to include a date by w hich the Assemblies were
to be established, and this was the loophole th a t we used to allay
the tensions in the country and prepare the ground for the

A C H I E V I N G OUR S O V E R E I G N T Y

65

rem oval o f w hat we regarded as an obstructive m echanism in the

w ay of our developm ent.
By the tim e the commission of inquiry into the setting up of
R egional Assemblies h a d m ade its report an d the Assemblies
were established, the strides w hich the country was m aking in all
directions an d the m ood of the people h a d b rought most of the
chiefs to a recognition of the sincerity o f the G overnm ent and
its developm ent aims. Even the A santehene began to show
a startling change in a ttitu d e , an d I know th a t he is now
com pletely identified w ith our independence an d shares the
hopes an d aspirations of the new G hana. In this atm osphere of
n ational unity, the new ly-created R egional Assemblies m et and
voted themselves out of existence. T h ro u g h the constitutional
procedure, w hich we faithfully followed, the instrum ents were
elim inated w hich the British h a d devised to keep us divided and
backw ard. T h e establishm ent an d dissolution of the R egional
Assemblies opened the w ay to constitutional changes in other
directions.

CHAPT E R EIGHT

PROBLEMS OF G O V ER N M EN T

I n o u r struggle for freedom , p arliam entary dem ocracy was as

vital an aim as independence. T he two were inseparable. I t was
n ot our purpose to rid the country of the colonial regim e in order
to substitute an A frican tyranny. W e w anted to free our people
from arb itra ry rule, an d to give them the freedom to choose the
kind of governm ent they felt w ould best serve their interests an d
enhance their welfare. O u r struggle was fought to m ake our
people free to practise the religion they chose, to give them the
liberty to associate in w hatever groups they wished, to create an
atm osphere in w hich they could say, w rite an d think freely,
w ithout harm ing their neighbour or jeopardizing the state.
W e introduced principles basic to the settled and established
dem ocracies of the w orld, such as the separation of powers
betw een the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. As the
repository of the peoples will, the legislature is suprem e. I t is
sovereign and unlim ited in its enactm ent of laws, which are
binding upon the people and the governm ent. Election to the
legislature is by universal adult suffrage, and m en and wom en
enjoy equality of rights and duties. T h a t all persons in the state
are equal before the law is another principle well enshrined in
o ur constitution.
T h e governm ent on the other han d has the responsibility of
directing the affairs of the state and of initiating and executing
policy. I t is, however, at all times answ erable to the legislature
and could not rule unless it com m anded a m ajority in p arlia
m ent. For all legislation it initiates becomes the law of the land
only if approved by parliam ent, and parliam ent can at any tim e
it wishes throw out the governm ent.
All of this is the recognized m achinery of parliam entary rule
in the old-established democracies. In our conditions, as an ex

PROBLEMS OF GOV E RN MEN T

67

colonial country, w ith our existing p a tte rn o f trib al loyalties and

traditional customs strained by the superim position of other
loyalties and practices, it could not be regarded as extraordinary
if the p a tte rn proved too tight here a n d there, or too loose in
other places. M em bers of the m atu rer dem ocracies will tend
natu rally to equate our conditions w ith those current in their
own country, forgetting the tim e it took their n atio n to evolve
to its present standard, and forgetting, too, the economic and
social conditions of our people. I t is n a tu ra l for people to look at
another country through their own telescope an d quite h u m an
to ju d g e an o th ers achievem ents or failings by their own
experience.
T h ere is a tendency to forget th a t B ritains evolution into
dem ocracy was n ot altogether peaceful. I t was a little over three
h u n d red years ago th a t they chopped off the head of a king,
m ade their middle-class revolution and installed Crom well as
their dictator. T h e feudal ties were not com pletely broken and it
required another revolution m ore th a n two centuries later, w ith
its accom panying social jolts, to secure the base of th a t p a rlia
m entary dem ocracy w hich the British people today m istakenly
assume as a m erit inherent in their national character. T h e
states of A m erica fought a b itter civil w ar, whose m em ories still
condition attitudes an d thinking, to impose their union. Its con
stitution, based upon the affirm ation of the equality of all m en,
took several years to find full acceptance, and even today its
tenets are disregarded in m any parts of the country. T here is
still strife in A m erica over the application of the essence of
dem ocracy to all of its m em bers.
Conditions in G hana today are com parable w ith those p re
vailing in B ritain or France or A m erica a t the tim e w hen they
were struggling to establish a free form of governm ent, rath e r
th a n those which currently o b tain in those countries. I t would be
fairer, therefore, to ask w hat was the n atu re of the regim e in those
countries then an d m ake the ap propriate adjustm ents for the
developm ent of liberal ideas in the w orld since those days. T h e
econom ic position of ou r people is no b etter th a n th a t of the
workers in B ritain a t the same stage o f their social and political
developm ent, perhaps a little w7orse in some aspects. T h eir social
services were ju st as prim itive, their country-w ide educational

68

A FRI CA MUST UNITE

standards ju st as low. I think no one would deny th a t the m ain

tenance o f a dem ocracy by the people of Europe and A m erica
a t the parallel stage w ould have been a massive task. Y et it is the
task we faced in G hana on our assum ption of independence.
This task m ight have been eased a little h ad we been blessed
w ith a reasonable and not violently destructive opposition. A
serious, w ell-intentioned opposition keeps a governm ent alive
to its responsibilities, guarantees extrem e care in the p re
p aratio n an d form ulation of program m es, and underlines the
need for sponsors of legislation to be able to justify their proposals.
T h e essence of such discussion, if it is to be of benefit, is th a t it
m ust be constructive. This is the strength of the opposition in the
established dem ocracies of the w orld. T hey recognize th a t they,
together w ith the governm ent of the day, proceed from the
m ajor prem ise th a t they have a jo in t aim , to advance the welfare
of the people. Both have a vital p a rt to play in the building of
th eir country an d the speeding of its developm ent. T h e govern
m ent initiates; the opposition is constructively critical.
U nfortunately this has not been the case in G hana. T he
narrow est interp retatio n of the term opposition5 has been the
guiding principle for the opposition p arty both inside and o u t
side P arliam ent. T h eir repeated rejection by the electorate con
vinced them th a t the possibility of gaining office by constitu
tional m eans was rem ote. T hey therefore em barked on a policy of
obstructing the governm ent, w ithout devising a program m e on
which they w ould base an alternative one. T h eir politics have
been narrow ly regional in concept, and often violent, abusive and
terroristic in action. W ithin P arliam ent, the castigation of the
cabinet has been, to them , an end in itself ra th e r th an an instru
m ent for securing better conditions for the people. T h e m easure
o f their in te n t is th a t they seek to add to the difficulties of govern
m ent and heighten the obstacles w hich need to be overcome so
th at, w ith a breakdow n in adm inistration, they m ay get a chance
of grasping the reins of office.
I t m ay be argued th a t some of these characteristics are present
in any opposition party. This is true, b u t not to the same extent
as in G hana. Elsewhere they are set in the context of an alter
native over-all program m e of governm ent. T he L abour P arty
in B ritain, for exam ple, follows a political doctrine opposed to

PROBLEMS OF GOV E RN MEN T

69

th a t of the Conservative P arty. Ideologically they are widely

rem oved. T here are clashes over such concepts as nationaliza
tion. T here rem ain, however, b ro ad areas of in tern al and foreign
affairs where there is a com m unity of view. T he opposition will
m ake helpful suggestions b u t will not irresponsibly oppose.
T herein lies the strength of th a t dem ocracy.
T he opposition in G hana cannot boast this same sense of
responsibility and m aturity. So far it has been m ostly destruc
tive. W e have seen the historic reasons for this in the revulsion of
the U n ited Gold Coast C onvention leaders from the mass m ove
m ent I h ad achieved as their secretary, an d the subsequent
form ation of the C onvention Peoples P arty to em brace th a t
mass m ovem ent as the instrum ent for the achievem ent of
freedom . T he U .G .C .C . leaders never forgave me an d m y asso
ciates for proving the rightness of our policy of Self-Govern
m ent N ow in the results of the 1951 election. T hereafter their
opposition am ounted to a virtual denial o f independence a n d a
reluctance for the British to leave. T hey were p rep ared to
sacrifice our national liberation if th a t w ould keep me an d m y
colleagues out of governm ent.
In colonial countries endeavouring to throw off the yoke of
im perialism , the upsurge o f nationalism finds expression in a
m ajor m ovem ent em bracing the po p u lar aspirations for freedom
an d a better way of life. Even w here there is some disagreem ent
am ong different local groups over the m eans to be em ployed in
the attain m en t of freedom , the force w hich is brought into
operation by the presiding pow er frequently secures their union
on a broad national front. T hus the nationalist m ovem ent
represents the m ajority of the population. Those dissident groups
pursuing individual or particularist aims opposed to the n atio n a
list objectives are doom ed to frustration. I t is inevitable, there
fore, th a t on a free franchise o f universal adult suffrage, the
nationalist p a rty gets elected w ith a m ajority th a t makes it
ap p ear to those accustom ed to the m ore evenly balanced b i
partisan politics of, for instance, B ritain an d A m erica, th at
intim idation has been used.
I am rem inded of the words of Julius N yerere w hen he spoke
of the overw helm ing support of the nationalist m ovem ent by the
people of T anganyika: T he N ationalist m ovem ent w hich fights

70

A F RI CA MUST U NI TE

for and achieves independence inevitably forms the govern

m ent of the new state. I t would surely be ridiculous to expect
th a t a country should voluntarily divide itself for the sake of con
form ing to a p articu lar expression of dem ocracy, and to do so
during a struggle w hich calls for the com plete unity of its people.
N o one should ju m p to the conclusion th a t such a country is not
dem ocratic or does not intend to be dem ocratic.1
T h e popularity of the p arty th a t brings freedom continues
into the period of full independence an d is even enhanced w here
im provem ents in economic an d social conditions are obtained
u nder its governm ent, and its m ajority grows. Since this over
w helm ing m ajority in p arliam ent carries through the govern
m en ts policy alm ost w ithout exception, it gives the appearance
o f a one-party regim e. This is the p a tte rn w hich has resulted in
the states em erging from colonialism, a p a tte rn w hich I have
term ed a Peoples P arliam entary D em ocracy and which the
people of G hana have accepted.
H ow ever, to level against us, as a result of this situation, the
criticism of authoritarianism , as has been done, would seem to
suggest a contradiction in the W estern idea of w hat constitutes
dem ocracy. D em ocracy, if we are to accept the A ristotelian
description, is the law of the state th a t directs th a t our poor
shall be in no greater subjection th an the rich ; nor th a t the
suprem e pow er shall be lodged w ith either of these, b u t th at both
shall share it. For if liberty and equality, as some persons sup
pose, are chiefly to be found in a dem ocracy, it m ust be so by
every dep artm en t of governm ent being alike open to all; b u t
as the people are a m ajority, and w hat they vote is law, it follows
th a t such a state m ust be a dem ocracy. This description has not
been invalidated because our m odern w orld has outgrow n the
city state and all the people can no longer conveniently p artici
p ate in governm ent b u t delegate their right to their p a rlia
m entary representatives. T h e description has, indeed, been re
validated an d enlarged to its widest extrem ity in L incolns con
cept of governm ent of the people by the people for the people.
T h e im pression th a t m y P arty an d I drew from m uch of the
criticism levelled against us was th a t we should have divided up
the m andate given to us by the people and handed over p a rt of
1 Jam es C am eron: The African Revolution, Tham es & H udson 1961, p. 186.

P R O B L EM S OF G O V E R N M E N T

71

it to an opposition. I f the will of the people is dem ocratically

expressed in an overw helm ing m ajority for the governing party,
an d thereby creates a w eakening of the accepted tw o-party
p a tte rn , as, for instance, in G hana, we, the governm ent, are
obliged to respect the will of the people so expressed. W e have
no rig h t to divide our m andate in defiance of the p o pular will.
T h e opposition, deprived of popular support, looked around
for a m eans to underm ine our authority. T hey found it in
separatism . T hey dem anded the virtual secession of A shanti,
the N o rth ern Region, an d w hat was form erly British Togoland,
from the sphere of central G h an aian authority. I t was not their
first attem p t to cut off the nose an d ears of the M otherland in
order to spite the face of the C .P .P. In 1956, w hen there was a
plebiscite in British T ogoland to determ ine w hether it was to
continue as a British T ru st territory or to jo in w ith the G old
Coast an d soon becom e a p a rt of independent G hana, the
opposition p a rty proclaim ed its support for T ogolands continu
ance as a British T ru st territory. T he people of T ogoland proved
to be m ore freedom -m inded th a n our opposition an d the
plebiscite result was union w ith us. W hen we gained full in
dependence, British T ogoland becam e a p a rt of free G hana.
T h ere followed after the plebiscite the general election of
1956, to w hich I h ad reluctantly agreed in order not to prejudice
the early g ran t of independence. This election b rought the
C .P.P. back for the th ird tim e w ith an overw helm ing m ajority.
T h e opposition h a d not done as well as they m aintained they
w ould do in A shanti an d the N o rth ern T erritories, even though
these were their m ajor strongholds, w here they h ad the backing
of the A santehene and other leading chiefs. T h e C .P.P. gained
m ore th an a th ird o f the seats in A shanti an d alm ost h a lf in the
N orthern T erritories. In the rest of the country we h a d a la n d
slide. W e h ad proved indisputably th a t we were the only p a rty
qualified to speak in a national sense. T h e British G overnm ent
could not deny this proof, an d independence followed.

CHAPT E R NINE

B R IN G IN G U N IT Y IN GHANA

T h e r e s o u n d i n g victory of the C .P.P. a t the 1956 polls so

w eakened the opposition th a t they decided to assert themselves
outside the dem ocratic fram ew ork. T h e ir agitation in A shanti,
in the N o rth ern R egion an d in Togoland, h a d already led to
serious clashes, often developing into arm ed violence, in which
some C .P.P. workers were actually m urdered. As our inde
pendence daw ned, we were placed in the anom alous position of
having to send the forces of law into now free T ogoland to quell
arm ed disturbances. These outbreaks were fom ented w ith the
purpose of discrediting me an d m y governm ent. T hey gave the
im pression th a t we were not in control of the country, th a t we
were not a p o p u lar governm ent, th a t there was w idespread dis
content.
In a country ju st em erging from colonial rule, there are m any
ills to right, m any problem s to solve. T im e and m oney and expert
knowledge are required to deal w ith them . T he end of the
colonial adm inistration in G hana left us, m oreover, w ith a low
level of education am ong the bulk of our people, and no system
of universal education. Such a public is easy prey for u n
scrupulous politicians. I t is am enable to dem agogic appeals and
readily exploitable by eloquence th a t arouses the emotions rath e r
th a n reason. I t was not difficult for the opposition in these con
ditions to discover grounds of dissatisfaction in w hich to p lan t
and w ater the seeds of resentm ent and grievance. In Accra,
they w orked upon the tribal feelings of the G a people and
related them to the shortage of housing. T hey encouraged the
form ation of the G a Shifimo K pee, a strictly tribal organization,
in our capital th at was fast becom ing cosm opolitan; they
fom ented separatism in A shanti an d dissension in the N orth.
T hey tried to dem onstrate to the w orld th at they, the opposition,

B R I NG I N G U N I TY IN G HA N A

73

h a d been right in insisting th a t we were not ripe for indepen

dence.
G hana was the cynosure of all eyes, friendly and unfriendly.
T h e w orlds press was represented in our capital, an d w hat they
missed the opposition filled in for them w ith their own explana
tions. No occasion, no event, was too sm all to exploit in order
to discredit both G h an a an d the governm ent before the w orld
and reduce the high prestige w hich ou r struggle an d a ttain m en t
of freedom h a d won for G hana. N ot often, surely, has an opposi
tion been so active in sacrificing the interests of its country
to serve its own ends in disrupting the essential national
unity.
I saw the state being underm ined, its independence in danger
o f destruction, all in the nam e of dem ocracy an d freedom of
expression. O u r opposition used the press as a forum in a way
th a t it h a d n ot been used in Europe, to vilify an d attack us as a
m eans of destroying our young state. T o have served writs upon
them for libel w ould have kept us busy in the courts to the ex
clusion of our p roper duties. T hough u n d er extrem e pressure
from m y p arty, I was still hesitant to take action. H aving placed
our faith in the w orking of a liberal dem ocracy, I ardently
desired to give it every chance, even a t the risk of some abuse to
w hich I knew it was open, especially in the absence o f a legal
code such as operated in the U n ited K ingdom b u t h ad not been
applied to the archaic laws of the G old Coast. W e were finding
th a t an adm inistrative and legal p a tte rn u n d er w hich a colonial
regim e could contrive to m ain tain itself required constant piece
m eal ad ap tatio n to deal w ith the very different problem s of our
need to bring order an d unity w ithin a dem ocratic fram ew ork
an d to establish a firm base for our n ational developm ent.
O u r toleration of the disruptive excesses of the opposition was
accepted not as a n expression of good faith in the dem ocratic
process b u t as a m ark of weakness, and stim ulated them to ever
bolder action. T h e disinclination to take salutary m easures was
also being m isunderstood abroad, w here it was being regarded
as a trial of strength betw een us, the lawfully constituted govern
m ent, and the subversive non-governm ental elem ents. W e
w atched the antics of the foreign press w ith misgiving. I t seemed
as though our overseas critics were in ten t u pon destroying us

74

A F R I C A MUST UNI TE

before we ever got started. N othing was too small to be twisted

as evidence in m isrepresenting the strength and quality of my
governm ent or to support the fiction of the growing strength of
the opposition.
I n times of national em ergency, the W estern democracies
have been com pelled to lim it their citizens freedom . W e were
facing a tim e of n ational em ergency. W e were engaged in a kind
of w ar, a w ar against poverty a n d disease, against ignorance,
against tribalism a n d disunity. W e were fighting to construct, not
to destroy. W e needed to secure the conditions w hich w ould
allow us to pursue our policy of reconstruction and develop
m ent.
M y governm ent brought in the Avoidance of D iscrim ination
Bill to deal w ith the control of political parties based on tribal or
religious affiliations. Its full title was A n A ct to prohibit organi
zations using or engaging in racial or religious p ro p ag an d a to
the detrim ent of any other racial or religious com m unity, or
securing the election of persons on account of their racial or
religious affiliations, a n d for other purposes in connection there
w ith . T h e effect was to bring the form ation o f the various
opposition parties into a U n ited P arty. O ddly enough, our show
of firmness wras reflected in a tem porary change in the tone of
the foreign press.
The Economist, for instance, sum m ed up the negative position
of the opposition in a leading a rtic le :
The criticism that has always been levelled against the
N.L.M ., and which is much more applicable to the present
assorted bunch of critics (the United Party), is that while accus
ing the government of corruption, totalitarianism, destructive
ness and inefficiency, it has offered no alternative policies of its
own. The opposition has two rather contradictory answers to
this: first, that the United Party is soon to announce a con
structive policy (which has never come) and, second, that its
programme has to be vague or the government will appropriate,
and spoil, its ideas. In Ghana this fear is not altogether base
less. The only fundamental difference of opinion between the
government and the opposition is over the relative power of the
centre and the regions. Since there is no basic difference in their
approach to, say, employment, education and housing, the

BR I N GI N G U N I T Y IN GHANA

75

opposition can only criticize in a rather woolly way, saying, in

effect, that they would do the same things, only better and more
honestly.1
U nfortunately, the fundam ental difference over the relative
pow er of the centre an d the regions w ent deeper th a n The
Economist's passing reference to it w ould suggest. I t was the core
o f dissension betw een the G overnm ent an d the opposition. I t
involved the whole question of our continuance as a u nitary
state exercising the dem ocratic principle of m ajority rule. T he
opposition was em ploying the lever given to it by the constitu
tionally entrenched clauses enthroning the special position of
A shanti, to force by disruptive m easures the secession of the
region.

H ere was the root cause of the b itter feuding th a t h ad gripped

our beloved country on the eve of independence an d continued
to m ar and harass our days of freedom . T h e N .L .M . h a d based
its support on the A santehene an d other autocratic chiefs
anxious to retain the special privileges and powers w hich the
British colonial practice of In d irect R ule h a d conferred upon
them . T h e ir confidence in the success of their coercive m ethods
was sustained by the willing allies they found am ong im perialist
groups. I t has been the unfortunate experience in all colonial
countries where the national aw akening has crystallized into a
p o p u lar m ovem ent seeking the fundam ental dem ocratic right
to the rule of the m ajority, th a t vested interests have come to the
aid of m inority separatist groups.
These governm ents have often shown a touching concern for
the rights of these m inorities. In fact, their concern has in some
cases been so great th a t it has overlooked entirely the rights of
the m ajority. Exam ples of this attitu d e m ay be seen in the
exercise of apartheid in South A frica and the enforcem ent, for
m any years, of the C entral A frican Federation against the
wishes of the Africans of N orthern an d S outhern R hodesia an d
N yasaland. I t was the operative principle in K enya, w hich sup
ported the suprem acy of the E uropean m inority over the African
m ajority and was im plicit in the view th a t the rights o f th a t alien
1 The Economist, 16 N ovem ber 1957.

76

A F RI CA MUST UNITE

m inority needed arm ed protection against the indigenous

m ajority. In fledgeling states, imperialist interestsflourish where there is
an atmosphere o f dissension. They are endangered in an atmosphere o f
national unity and stability.
For two an d a h a lf years of difficult state-building my govern
m ent took no action to lim it the freedom of the press. T he
opposition was quick to exploit this freedom and soon debased
it into licence. E ach day, its newspapers cam e out w ith scream ing
headlines ab o u t the perfidy of the governm ent. T hey heaped
abuse an d libel upon my colleagues an d me. T hey w rote and
preached, they called press conferences w ith local and foreign
correspondents, they addressed public m eetings all over the
country, stigm atizing the governm ent an d singling out me and
m y im m ediate associates for special attack, abuse and ridicule.
D uring the struggle for independence we h a d em phasized the
need for national unity for the attain m en t of freedom , and for
the enorm ous responsibilities of statehood th a t wrould follow.
These call for a suprem e effort on the p a rt of every citizen. H ow
could our people pull their w eight w ith zeal and dedication w hen
it was ceaselessly being drum m ed into them th a t their govern
m ent was unscrupulous, inept an d c o rru p t; th a t their leaders
were venal an d pow er-thirsty, an d th a t the national effort was
invoked, not for the greater glory of G hana b u t for the personal
glory o f K w am e N k ru m ah ? This was not freedom of expression.
T his was irresponsible licence, and if allowed to continue u n
bridled, it could have underm ined our state, our independence
and the peoples faith in themselves an d their capacities.
This was the in ternal picture. T he im pact on the m ovem ents
for liberation in the rest of Africa could be ju st as unfortunate.
I t was likely to cause despondency in their ranks and friction
betw een us and their leaders, who m ight have no m eans of
recognizing the falsity of opposition attacks upon us. T h e colonial
powers would also not be unm indful of these happenings and
possibly use them as a pretext for delaying their departure from
trust an d colonial territories by citing the m agnified political
b a ttle in G hana as a frightening exam ple of prem ature
independence.
W e cam e to the point w here it was obvious th a t the govern
m ent m ust take action if we were to avert the dangers inherent

B R I N GI N G U N I T Y IN G HA N A

77

in a false situation. T he im position of any form of press censor

ship was an idea most rep u g n an t to me, since it ra n counter to
everything I h ad always believed in, everything for w hich I h ad
struggled in m y life. Freedom of expression h ad been one of the
essential rights for w hich I h ad fought. I h ad gone to prison for
daring to say things the colonial adm inistration h a d not liked.
O u r fight h ad been the fight for the freedom of our people, and
the native in h abitants of the land, against an alien regim e th a t
denied freedom . Now th a t we h a d won our em ancipation and
launched our national existence, were we to allow our independ
ence to be endangered by the very people whose speech an d
action h ad abetted the colonial regim e ? W e h a d em barked upon
a course th a t aim ed to push forw ard the clock of progress. W ere
others to be given the freedom to push it back ? W e h a d to face
up squarely to the question w hether a seedling less developed
state, eager to m odernize itself in the interests of the com m unity,
threatened by the unpatriotic deeds of a m inority opposition,
could perm it itself all the forms w hich established dem ocracies
have taken generations to evolve. A young state has to work
doubly h ard , has to deny itself m any of the trim m ings th a t have
becom e the accepted norm in the older nations.
O u r experience is proving th a t dem ocracy as a functioning
system in newly em ergent states m ust inevitably undergo m any
stresses. Its m achinery and p a tte rn of governm ent are being
superim posed upon social structures different from those in
w hich they originally developed. D em ocracy has undergone
developm ent to its present accepted forms in the advanced
countries in circum stances of com pulsion th a t have yet to be
reached in the young nations now attem pting to throw them
selves apace out of a stagnating econom ic backw ardness into
m odern industrialized settings able to provide wide m aterial and
social benefits for all the people. I t is not a t all accidental th a t
the great exponents of dem ocracy are precisely those countries
w here industrial grow th has achieved its highest levels w ithin
free developm ent. T h a t grow th, accom panied a t periods by
social distress an d discontent, was based upon vast private
accum ulations of capital and proceeded a t a pace w hich was
slower in the countries th a t em barked earlier upon the industrial
ro ad an d faster in those th a t started later.

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AF RI C A MUST U N I TE

R ecently em ergent states like G hana are having to tackle the

task of industrialization at the period of its highest developm ent
in the old-established dem ocracies, in conditions w hich have
precluded the am assing of large capital reserves in the hands of
private citizens. U p o n the governm ent, therefore, devolves the
task of planning an d establishing the m ain base of economic
developm ent and of pushing it through at a speedy rate against
the form idable odds of an uneducated population devoid of
technical and scientific knowledge, and the lack of even the most
prim itive industrial foundations. T im e is the essence of our
problem , and we are in d uty bound to use the overw helm ing
m an d ate given to us by our people to advance their standards
o f life, to em ploy tim e for the purpose of securing the quickest
possible econom ic and social developm ent for our country. This
du ty resolves itself into the obligation to use the pow er bestowed
up o n us by the m ajority decision of the people to the lim it of the
task it imposes. T o abdicate any p a rt of th a t pow er to an
opposition th a t has been repeatedly rejected by the people and
engages itself in activities prejudicial to the independence, safety
an d forw ard grow th of the State, w ould, I subm it, be a betrayal
of the p o p u lar will an d trust. I t would be com pletely incom pre
hensible to our people, an d in the present state of their educa
tional developm ent w ould place our whole future in jeopardy.
W e intend to preserve the rights and freedom of our people, so
long as these are exercised w ithin the limits of the law, and w ith
out th re a t to the security of the nation. W e welcome criticism,
b u t we will not tolerate subversive and terroristic activities
against the State, an d illegal acts designed to prom ote the selfish
greed of a dissident m inority, supported by alien interests.

CHAPTER TEN

O U R GHANAIAN C O N S T IT U T IO N

E v e r y s o v e r e i g n people undoubtedly possesses the sovereign

rig h t to introduce changes in the regulations by w hich they are
governed, to keep pace w ith the dynam ic changes w rought by
social, political, econom ic and technological progress. Such
changes should not be a rb itrary , nor should they be effected
except through the chosen instrum ent o f the people, P a rlia
m ent, or, in m atters o f vital m om ent, th rough the direct ex
pression of the peoples will by plebiscite, or referendum . No one
w ould dream of justifying G h an aian subservience for eternity to
regulations passed by a British P arliam ent before we achieved
independence.
In the three years th a t we w orked un d er the constitution
arranged for us by the retiring im perialist power, we found th a t
change was necessary. W e were not concerned w ith change for
the sake of change, sim ply because distasteful clauses h a d been
im posed upon us against our will, or because the constitution as
a whole h ad not been of our m aking. O u r basic consideration
was th a t certain parts o f the constitution were found to be
ham pering our free developm ent. W e even found th a t some of
its provisions w ith w hich we h a d fully agreed a t the tim e o f
negotiation, and w hich we m ight well have introduced ourselves
w ithout im position from others, were now ou td ated arid no
longer suited to the realities of G hana.
T h e year 1960, after three years o f independence, seem ed an
appropriate tim e to introduce the necessary changes in our con
stitution, suited to the m ood of the times, the tem per of the
people, the political and cultural patterns of the country, the
urgent need to develop our lan d an d advance the liberation o f
the A frican continent. These factors were reflected in the funda
m ental articles of the new constitution. T he most im p o rtan t

8o

A F RI CA MUST U NI TE

change was the conversion of G hana from a m onarchy to a

republic. Since people have an essentially personal attitude
tow ards the m onarchy, I decided th a t in addition to introducing
a Bill to p arliam ent for its abolition and securing the necessary
tw o-thirds m ajority, I w ould also subm it the issue to the nation
in a referendum . T h e N ational Assembly passed the Bill w ith an
overw helm ing m ajority. T he referendum was held in three
stages over the country during an eight-day period and resulted
in an equally heavy m ajority for the republican constitution and
the continuance of the C .P.P. governm ent under m y presidency.
I well knew w hat a h o rn ets nest I would be stirring up w hen
I decided th a t it was incom patible w ith full independence for
G h an a to continue to pay allegiance to the British C nnvn as
H ead of State. I knew th a t m y action w ould be understood by
all the republics o f the w orld, an d they form the bulk of the
U n ited N ations m em bers. I also knew th a t this action w ould
find little sym pathy in B ritain and in the other countries of the
Com m onw ealth.
I t cannot be claim ed th a t the people in those countries have
always shown sym pathetic understanding of every m ajor act of
policy w hich G h an a has followed since it becam e independent.
T here are of course am ong them m any m en of goodwill, b u t
quite a lot seem still to resent the fact th a t we are no longer
governed from W hitehall. W e have the impression th a t sub
consciously they w ould like us to fail. A t all events, they are
quick to ascribe uncharitable motives to any of our actions
w hich they feel touch them on a tender spot. A nd the m onarchy
in B ritain is a very tender spot. T here is a certain m ystique about
the British m onarchy, whose influence is intangible b u t very
real. I w ould venture the thought th a t there is hardly a serious
anti-royalist in B ritain. T here appears to be no conscious
ness of anything paradoxical in a highly advanced dem ocracy
m aintaining an hereditary m onarchy. I f I were a B riton living
in the U nited K ingdom , I m ight feel the same.
How ever, I am an African, a m em ber of a country w hich has
b u t recently broken the shackles linking it to Britain. W e had,
however, retained the link w ith the m onarchy, b u t our o rienta
tion tow ards the continent o f Africa m ade it an anachronism . I t
was out o f keeping w ith the full m eaning of our independence:

OUR G H A N A I A N C ONST I TUTI ON

8l

it symbolized a n hierarchical pinnacle th a t no longer h ad

reality in the G hana-B ritain relationship. I t injected a falsity
into our relationship w ith the states on our continent. W e are
com m itted to the pursuance of an A frican U nion. W e are
obliged in our affiliations to consider their effects upon our
progress tow ards this cardinal goal. N um bers of our people,
m oreover, believe it to be the height of incongruity for the in
habitants of the G h an aian tow n of T am ale, for instance, to find
the H ead of their State living in Buckingham Palace, London.
T h e H ead of the W est A frican State of G h an a should be a
G h an aian having his residence in G hana.
I t seemed tendentious, therefore, to find m yself dub b ed a
d ictator by some and an enfant terrible by others w hen rum ours
of m y intention began to ap p ear in the British press. A dis
interested consideration of the facts would have produced a m ore
sober reaction. How ever, as I m entioned earlier, people in other
countries tend to in terp ret the actions of foreigners in term s of
their own experience. H ence the irresistible tem ptation of
Britishers to say th a t w hat is good for B ritain is good for G hana.
But how could a Q ueen resident abroad, or her representative
who was a national of a foreign State, seek to symbolize the people
of G h an a ? T hey were such obvious strangers to our country, to
our way of life, to the spirit of our people. T h e very presence of
a G overnor-G eneral in the official position w hich he occupied
was an affront to the sovereignty w hich we h a d fought for an d
achieved. I t would have been equally a n affront h ad the
G overnor-G eneral been an African.
I t is no discourtesy to Q ueen E lizabeth I I if I an d m y people
h a rb o u r the same conscientious objection to taking an o ath to
her as we would to swearing allegiance to the President o f the
U n ited States, or the President of the Soviet U nion.
N or should anything I have said be taken as reflecting the
slightest disrespect to our two G overnors-G eneral. I t was largely
due to their tact and understanding allied to their b road liberal
views th a t our relationship was so free from friction.
T he President, according to our R epublican C onstitution, is
not only the H ead of State b u t also the chief executive and head
of governm ent. This form ula was not reached by us w ithout
keen exam ination and com parative study of the m any different

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A FR I C A MUST U NI TE

republican systems o f the w orld. W e pondered for m any m onths

w hether we should establish the system followed in such countries
as In d ia an d the Soviet U nion, w hereby the titu la r H ead of
S tate is the holder of an honorary position w ithout pow er; or
w hether to com bine the Prem iership w ith the Presidency and
give the highest position in the land to the effective leader of the
nation, as in the U n ited States. W e decided upon the latter
form ula, m aking our necessary adaptations.
O u r decision took account of w hat seemed to us the most
logical, the most dem ocratic an d the m ost straightforw ard
form ula. In a dem ocracy, the real leader of the country is the
m an who has been dem ocratically elected as leader of the p arty
which com m ands a m ajority in P arliam ent, w hich has been
dem ocratically elected by the people. H e is in fact the peoples
choice. W hy, then, should he not com bine the governm ental
powers w ith the cerem onials attaching to the headship of the
State ? In our present environm ent and circum stances our people
associate prim acy w ith power. T h e position of a titu la r P re
sident, m erely signing acts of P arliam ent upon w hich he makes
no im pact, w ould not have been easy for them to grasp. I t is
n ot easy indeed for the student of dem ocracy to grasp, for it is a
m eaningless fiction, w ithout content.
I t is our hope th a t the system we have adopted, w hich com
bines the Prem iership w ith the Presidency, will give stability
an d resolute leadership in the building of our country. In our
opinion, it responds to the m ood of our people and meets the
exigencies of our actual situation. T he reservation of certain
powers to the President was felt to be necessary in order to allow
opportunity for decisive action in pushing forw ard our develop
m ent.
G hana has established a dem ocratic structure em ploying the
norm al p arap h ern alia associated w ith such a governm ental
form , w hich is really ahead of our pre-industrial status. T o have
effective control over the rate of our developm ent, we h ad to hold
som ething in reserve. W e h a d to trim our political coat to suit
our social an d economic cloth.
T h e increased authority given to the President is to enable
him to exercise the positive leadership th a t is so vital to a country
seeking to pull itself up by its bootstraps. I f I m ay change the

OUR G H A N A I A N C ON S T I TU TI ON

83

m etaphor, it is in some ways the w ork of Sisyphus, except th at

instead of a stone our task is to roll a whole people uphill. T here
are some jobs in the w orld th a t can be best done by a com
m ittee, others need a m anaging director.
I will not hide the fact th a t I am im p atien t w hen it comes to
building G hana. W e have to get on w ith the jo b resolutely. Each
m inister m ust regard him self as a m anaging director an d get his
p articu lar jo b done in the allotted tim e, an d properly done. H e
m ust know th a t inexplicable failure can result in his giving
place to another to prove his capacities. R eal difficulties lead
ing to legitim ate delay always receive understanding considera
tion. But the driving urge to succeed m ust perm eate every b ran ch
of governm ent, stem m ing from the m inisterial fountain-head,
who m ust com bine a high sense o f responsibility w ith a high
sense of urgency. Each m inister m ust show him self an exam ple
to the people by his devotion to his work, by simple living, by
leading in service. G h an a faces im m ense difficulties in her tasks
o f reconstruction. I t is by no m eans a simple business to raise
educational levels, to tra in skilled workers an d to im p a rt a sense
o f responsibility speedily, especially in circum stances of restricted
availability of local qualified personnel and m aterial resources.
Nevertheless, there is m uch th a t can be done quickly if everyone
puts every ounce of ability an d strength into the building of the
nation. I t is a prim e task of leadership in G h an a to m ake the
people aw are of the com pelling need to p u t forth their most
intense effort on b eh alf of the progress of the country a n d of
themselves.
W ithin a society poising itself for the leap from pre-industrial
reta rd a tio n to m odern developm ent, there are trad itio n al forces
th a t can im pede progress. Some of these m ust be firmly cut at
their roots, others can be retained an d a d ap ted to the changing
need. T h e place of chiefs is so interw oven w ith G h an aian society
th a t their forcible eradication w ould tea r gaps in the social
fabric w hich m ight prove as painful as the retention o f other
m ore u n ad ap tab le traditions. T h e constitution takes careful
account of these factors, an d the D eclaration of F u n d am en tal
Principles states th a t the office of Chiefs in G hana, as existing
by custom ary law an d usage, should be g u a ra n tee d . I am fully
aw are of the body o f opinion th a t regards chieftaincy as an

84

A F RI CA MUST UNITE

anachronism , b u t w hen it is possible for the A santehene to advise

the chiefs w ithin the K um asi State Council to change according
to the tim es, I think we are fully justified in our decision to
m ain tain the tradition. Addressing the Council on 24 M ay i960,
the A santehene was reported to have said th at
it was impossible at this stage of the countrys development to
forecast that the former privileges, coupled with a large number
of attendants, would ever be enjoyed by any modem Ghanaian
chief. The Asantehene observed that with the increased number
of new schools in every hamlet of Ghana, chiefs would not find it
easy to have attendants such as umbrella bearers.1
In G hana, a chief w ithout his um brella b earer is an unthink
able phenom enon. For the most powerful p aram o u n t chief in
this country to w arn th a t chiefs will, by reason of w ider educa
tional facilities, in due course be denied one of the m ain symbols
of their office, is tan ta m o u n t to w arning of the n a tu ra l a tte n u a
tion of chieftaincy under the im pact of social progress. If, in the
interregnum , chieftaincy can be used to encourage popular
effort, there would seem to be little sense in arousing the a n ta
gonism w hich its legal dissolution w ould stim ulate. T he a d a p ta
tion of our chiefs to w hat m ust, for them , be distressing exigencies
created by the changing relations in the national polity, has been
rem arkable. W e could wish th a t other forces w ith vested interests
m ight have proved as adaptable.
M ore obstructive th a n chieftaincy were the entrenched clauses
in our independence constitution concerning the appointm ent,
prom otion, transfer an d term ination of appointm ent of civil
servants. Disagreeable to us in the extrem e, they h ad the effect of
surrounding each civil servant w ith a barricade w hich the
governm ent was allowed to scale only w ith the greatest difficulty.
T h e new constitution retains the status and financial p ro
visions of the earlier one. Powers of appointm ent and dismissal,
however, have been transferred to the President, who exercises
them through a Civil Service Commission. O nly those who are
disloyal or incom petent need fear this change, all the rest will be
strengthened by it. For prom otion, which form erly cam e from
1 Daily Graphic, Accra, 25 M ay i960.

OUR G H A N A I A N C ON S T I TU TI ON

85

time-servingj will now be the rew ard of m erit. T h e new consti

tution contains a high challenge to our civil servants. T h eir
response will be recorded in the accelerated rate of our national
developm ent.
T he changes in our constitution w hich I have so far described
an d explained, have been designed to create an environm ent in
w hich G hana can proceed m ore positively w ith national recon
struction. But even as I have always been concerned w ith the
independence an d developm ent of G h an a as p a rt of the total
liberation an d reconstruction of Africa, and have m ade this a
guiding principle in the foreign policy of m y governm ent, so I
felt th a t our constitution should m ake a positive dem onstration
of G h a n a s willingness to surrender h er individual sovereignty
to the total sovereignty of Africa, if this should ever be required.
O u r relations w ith the rest of Africa did indeed have m ore th a n
a little bearing on our decision to sever the link w ith the British
Crow n and transform our state into a republic. But we con
sidered th a t some m ore revolutionary illustration of our a tta c h
m ent to the cause of A frican U nion should be em bedded in the
instrum ent th a t governs the countrys policy. H ence, in the p re
am ble to our new constitution, there is to be found the statem ent
th a t:
We the people of Ghana . . . in the hope that we may by our
actions this day help to further the development of a Union of
African States . . . do hereby enact and give to ourselves this
constitution. . . .
W hile the D eclaration of F u n d am en tal Principles includes these
specific conditions:
T hat the Union of Africa should be striven for by every lawful
means, and, when attained, should be faithfully preserved; and
T hat the independence of Ghana should not be surrendered
or diminished on any grounds other than thefurtherance of African
Unity.
This, I believe, is the first tim e th a t an independent, sovereign
state has voluntarily offered to surrender its sovereignty for the

86

A F RI CA MUST UN I TE

sake of u n ity .1 I t is our contribution, m ade freely, openly and

sincerely by the governm ent and people of G hana, tow ards the
linking together of neighbouring brother states as the best m eans
o f prom oting the welfare of the people throughout the whole
continent. I t is our fervent hope th a t other states in Africa will
follow suit, an d th a t we need not w ait u n til the entire continent
has seen the light of brotherhood. A start can be m ade w ith as
little as two, three or four states willing to subm it themselves to a
sovereign union.
G hana, G uinea, M ali an d some other newly em ergent
African states have m ade a start by inscribing this ideal in their
constitutions. I t is for others to w ater this seed of destiny until it
flourishes into a glorious tree of union and brotherhood am ong
the peoples o f Africa.
1 T h e constitutions of G uinea, T unisia, M ali an d U .A .R . also contain a
sim ilar provision.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

THE A D M IN ISTRA TIV E IN STRUM EN T

A n e w s o c i a l structure does not autom atically follow the

attain m en t of political freedom . T h a t, like the battle for in
dependence, has to be fought for and won by an arm y of stal
w arts as determ ined in purpose as those who w aged the struggle
for freedom .
This second stage of the revolutionary process, w hen reviewed
soberly, appears if anything, h ard er th a n the first. M ore th a n
once, during the pre-independence days, I was assailed by doubts
w hether we w ould have the forces to carry it through. T h ere was
m y party, the C onvention Peoples P arty, and the overw helm ing
mass support behind us. These, however, did not sit in the seat
o f adm inistration from w here policies for achieving our second
im p o rtan t objective of raising ourselves out of our socio
econom ic backw ardness are p u t into action. T hey were, in
reality, an extra-adm inistrative arm y, on whose co-operation
we could rely for the carrying out of our program m es a t the m ore
intim ate level of village, ham let an d tow nship. But there w ould
have to be a fully m anned force at the central point of adm inis
tratio n capable of carrying through from top to bottom the
necessary directives for fulfilling the governm ents policies.
For all the protestations of the British th a t the aim o f their
colonial policy was to prepare the people of the subject territories
for self-government, it was only w hen the nationalist m ovem ents
took the reins th a t any real move was m ade to im plem ent its
W hen we took over, our civil service was definitely and abso
lutely British in substance a n d n a tu re ; it was certainly not
African. I t was the realization of this fact th a t caused me, some
times w ith dism ay, to recognize th a t w hen we did take firmly
into our hands the reins of governm ent, there w ould be the
danger o f finding ourselves in possession of an adm inistrative

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A F RI C A MUST UNITE

m achine th a t h ad a general staff and other ranks b u t was devoid

of officers.
M y cabinet, m y general staff, w ould come from am ong the
P arty, and down below was the ran k an d file of our arm y - the
people. These were our own. But w hat of the group in betw een,
the officers and the N .C .O .s, who w ould be responsible for the
execution of policy laid down from above ? W here were our tried
a n d loyal African com m anders? W here were the African
directors of our cam paign for clearing aw ay the debris of
colonialism and erecting our own G h anaian edifice m ore in keep
ing w ith our wider, progressive perspective ? T h e finest plans we
could conceive for our country w ould never leave the blue-print
stage unless we h ad first-class civil servants whose outlook was
a ttu n ed to our A frican aspirations and upon whose loyalty we
could depend unquestioningly.
T h e civil service, being the adm inistrative arm of governm ent,
is the instrum ent for p u ttin g into effect the economic and social
program m e of the governm ent. I t is through its m achinery th a t
the political platform of the p a rty in pow er is given effective
im plem entation. O u r civil service, the one which we inherited
d uring our spell of in tern al self-governm ent betw een 1951 and
M arch 1957, was the m achine th a t h a d been form ed by the
im perial pow er to carry out its colonial policy. T hough we had
jo in t control, it was as a ju n io r p artn er. W e were, it is true, the
ruling p arty, b u t the im perial governm ent still reigned suprem e,
an d we were subordinate to its colonial pro-consul, the G overnor.
T w o courses of action lay open to me and m y party. W e could
boycott the existing colonial governm ent m achinery, the civil
service, the police, the judiciary. O r we could co-operate w ith it,
m eanw hile strengthening the position of m yself and m y col
leagues in the cabinet and so advance the date for full inde
pendence.
In choosing the second, we did not forget, b u t tried to bury,
past differences and sought co-operation writh the existing exe
cutive m achinery of governm ent. Tw o m ajor aims im pelled
this decision: the speeding up of A fricanization, and the p re
vention of a breakdow n in adm inistration through a wholesale
exodus of British officials. T here was no regret for the departure
of those officials who were so opposed to our aims as to render

THE A D M I N I S TR AT I V E INST R UMEN T

89

them quite unfit and unreliable co-workers. W e felt equally well

rid of those who were likely to resent taking orders from an
African. M y keenest anxiety was to avoid any dislocation of
governm ent. W e h ad a t all costs to hold off any possibility of a
situation of instability w hich w ould enable B ritain an d other
colonial powers to point at us the finger of scorn and gloat over
the disastrous effects of han d in g over self-governm ent p re
m aturely5 to Africans.
I t was of prim e im portance to us, therefore, an d the freedom
m ovem ents in other parts of Africa, th a t we should be able to
effect a sm ooth a n d grad u al take-over of pow er, free from
serious adm inistrative shocks. T herefore, we decided in favour
of m aintaining the services of those British officials who were
civil servants in the best sense of the w ord, non-partisan in the
fulfilm ent of their duties an d p rep ared to carry out orders given
by an African. I t called for w hat I term ed at the tim e tactical
action5, b u t w hat an A m erican friend jokingly suggested m ight
be m ore appropriately nam ed tactful5 action.
In countries like B ritain, w here the civil service does not
change w ith a change in the governing party , as it does, for
instance, in the U n ited States, the adm inistration is expected to
rem ain as loyal to the new governm ent as it h a d been to the
ousted one. H ere you get the insistence upon the fiction th a t civil
servants are non-political. This fiction, if carried to its logical
conclusion, w ould in fact deprive the civil servant of his basic
dem ocratic right to vote. For in casting his vote, he exercises a
choice in favour o f one political p a rty an d thereby dem onstrates
a bias.
T h a t his vote is secret does not alter the fact of selection. In
order to m ake a selection he m ust have his personal views,
w hether private or openly expressed, upon the alternative p ro
gram m es or objectives of the parties contending for power. As a
good civil servant, however, he is required, should the p arty
retu rn ed to pow er not be the one o f his choice, nonetheless to
give it his absolute loyalty and unswerving integrity. This in
most instances he does, for he has been trained to understand
th a t it is only his patriotic d uty to serve faithfully the existing
governm ent of his country. I t is in the rare, extrem e cases, where
the servants o f governm ent find the pull betw een governm ent

90

AF RI CA MUST U N I TE

policy in certain respects an d their conscience too great, th at

they abandon their loyalty in submission to their conscience.
In the case of our civil service, we were reliant not upon our
ow n nationals b u t alm ost entirely upon nationals of a pow er
w hich h ad been ruling us and who h ad been trained to conduct
the policy of th a t power. Bound to the interests of their own
country for so long, it could hardly be expected, a p a rt from a few
exceptional cases, th a t they would change their attitu d e tow ards
us overnight. W h at we needed was our own African civil service.
I f the colonial pow er h a d been sincere in its claim of preparing
the Gold Coast for self-government, one of its p rim ary contri
butions would have been to speed up A fricanization of the civil
service an d to offer access to the top posts to Africans. A n excuse
frequently offered for the p u ttin g off of self-governm ent was th at
the country did not have a sufficiency of adm inistrators and
personnel train ed in other respects for the h a rd responsibilities
o f ru nning a state. But nothing was done to m ake good the
deficiency. A t no tim e throughout the period of British adm inis
tratio n was any A frican allowed to fill the highest posts of the
civil service. Africans who were em ployed were allowed into the
ju n io r grades an d denied the prospect of rising to the higher
ranks. T h e British justification for holding them dow n was th a t
they lacked the ap propriate academ ic qualifications an d the
necessary adm inistrative experience. T h e sophistry of im perialist
reasoning is studded w ith these truths of the vicious circle.
E ducational facilities were in adequate to provide academ ic
standards for Africans, an d experience can only be gained by
experience. T h e logic of the British argum ent an d its laggard
approach to the problem w ould have kept us w aiting a h undred
years an d m ore before we h a d a train ed civil service to im plem ent
self-government.
W e were not prep ared to w ait, and I turn ed my attention to
the problem s as soon as I becam e L eader of G overnm ent Busi
ness in 19 5 1. Eighty per cent of the G old Coast senior civil
servants were British. T h e tw enty per cent African governm ent
employees were m ainly in the lower ranks of the senior service.
H ence I h a d to retain the most essential of the eighty per cent,
move up the best of the tw enty per cent to take over from the
British who w ould leave, an d introduce m ore Africans into the

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senior grades of the service. This w ould ensure an am ple nucleus

o f A frican civil servants ready to take over the highest positions
o f trust w hen we gained full independence.
T his program m e w ould, I knew, have the effect of reducing
the incentive of British officials to stay. I m ade no secret about my
ultim ate intentions an d aims, an d they knew th a t their days
were num bered. I n the subsequent bargaining I w ould have
h ad , if I h ad not already been sceptical of the claim , to revise
the self-asserted claim th a t British civil servants entered the
colonial service from a sense of altruistic concern for the b e tte r
m ent of the backw ard, prim itive peoples. J o h n S tu art M ills
description of the colonial civil service as a form of outdoor relief
for the sons of the British m iddle class is m ore apposite.
For their point of view I h ad full understanding. I knew they
h a d careers to consider and h a d jo in ed the colonial service under
certain conditions of security. T hey w ould be unable in the new
regim e of independence to reta in the status they h ad enjoyed
un d er the old colonial regim e. T hey h ad the choice of leaving
or of surrendering their existing term s of ap pointm ent and jo in
ing the Gold Coast service u n d er full local control. I therefore
offered inducem ent in the form of a com pensation program m e
for loss of career. T here was a good deal of haggling and I was
ra th e r saddened at the open explosion of the m yth of the British
colonial civil servants disinterestedness in financial rew ards, his
m issionary purpose of carrying the w hite m a n s b u rd en . O ne
h u n d red and forty decided to leave im m ediately an d another
eighty-three left shortly after. T h e A fricanization program m e
therefore h ad to be stepped up. O n the surface, some of the
British officials appeared to adjust themselves to the new con
ditions and seemed to a d a p t their m inds to w orking under, or
side by side w ith, their A frican colleagues.
After 1957, w hen G h an a achieved independence, the position
of our civil service becam e better th an it h ad been in 1951. But it
was still far from satisfactory. For though the British h a d ceased
to rule, they h ad hedged us in w ith the detailed safeguards, set out
in the constitution, of the position, salary, pension rights an d
tenure of office of the civil servant. R eading these, one m ight
be forgiven for im agining th a t this c h arter h ad been specially
fram ed to guarantee the security of the civil servant rath e r th an to

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A FRI CA MUST UNI TE

afford the opportunity for the free, dem ocratic evolution of a

whole society. Insistence on the insertion of these clauses by the
British delegation to the negotiations on the constitution
stem m ed from two purposes: to safeguard the interest of the
British expatriate who would be continuing his service with the
G h an a governm ent; to give the G h anaian civil servant the same
status a n d security enjoyed by the British colonial civil
servant.
T h e first purpose we considered unnecessary. All along it h ad
been m ade clear by us th a t there was room in the new G hana
for experienced service from m en and w om en who w orked here
in the G old Coast civil service an d desired to help the new state.
I expressed our willingness to welcome the continued stay of
those who were p rep ared to be loyal to the new governm ent and
faithfully carry out the policies initiated by their political chiefs.
I g uaranteed their salaries an d pension rights and com pensation
for loss of Colonial Office career. I considered it an imposition,
however, for the G hana G overnm ent to be forced to retain the
services of those who h ad elected to stay an d were later found to
be incom petent, obstructive or disloyal. L et me say a t this point
th a t m any expatriates have given excellent service to G hana and
have discharged their duties faithfully. O thers have proved less
th a n com petent and have failed to pull their w eight. Some, we
know, continued in the service w ith the set purpose either of
hindering our efforts or of holding a w atching b rief for British
interests. I t is certainly not ju st th a t the rights of such civil
service m em bers should be safeguarded by clauses entrenched in
the constitution. As an independent governm ent, the pow er to
appoint an d dismiss civil servants m ust surely rest w ith the
governm ent of the state, and this should hold w hether the civil
servant is a British expatriate or a G hanaian. For they play a
delicate, sometimes a key, p a rt in carrying out governm ent
policy.
T h e second British purpose is understandable: the desire to
b eq u eath to G hana the p a tte rn of civil service obtaining in G reat
B ritain. T h e purpose, however, is dictatorial and unrealistic,
an d ignores the totally different needs of a less developed
state. I agree th a t the British civil service enjoys a high rep u ta
tion for integrity, for probity, for loyalty to w hatever govern

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93

m ent comes to power, for abstention from political interference.

I t also has the rep u tatio n of being cautious, conservative, staid,
static, often corollaries of personal security. These are decidedly
no t the qualities required by a new state about to launch its
people on a vast new program m e of dynam ic developm ent.
G overnm ent and civil service are inter-related. G overnm ent
determ ines policy, the body of civil servants carries it out. T h e
finest program m es will get bogged dow n if the civil servants who
direct their practical execution are incom petent an d w ithout
dedication. O u r desired rate of developm ent m ust not be im
peded because we are obliged to carry w hite-collar governm ent
employees who will p u t in a stan d ard stint of office hours and
th en forget all about the jo b ; who will never p u t a foot w rong
b u t who will never have an original id ea; who will think the
task perform ed w ith the w riting of a com petent le tte r; who will
be m ore concerned w ith status and prestige th a n w ith helping
the p u b lic ; whose fear of responsibility will always p ro m p t the
passing on of decisions and action; who will m odel themselves
on the H o m burg-hatted um brella-carrying civil servant of an
established state ra th e r th a n on the pioneer w orker of a new
a n d developing country.
Security of em ploym ent is a fine principle an d one w hich I
endorse, b u t I do not think a civil servant in G h an a today has
greater rig h t to security th a n the fisherm an, the cocoa-grower,
the driver, the p o rt w orker, the teacher, the ro ad labourer or
m arket w om an. I am averse to our civil servants being lodged in
the State apparatus like a nail w ithout a h e a d : once you drive
it in, you cannot pull it out. G overnm ent m ust retain the right
of dismissal, an d the civil servant m ust be m ade to realize th at
he can be dismissed if he does not perform the jo b required of
him . H e m ust be grappling w ith his w ork all the tim e, thinking
tw enty-four hours a day how best he can serve his country by his
perform ance for the m inistry in w hich he works. T he G h anaian
civil servant m ust be utterly devoted and dedicated to the ideal
of reconstructing our country. H e m ust show leadership, he
m ust, like his M inister, set an exam ple to the people he serves.
H e m ust be a pioneer.
These are the dem ands w hich we m ake of our civil service.
T hey are high, for the task of the civil servant in the building up

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A F R I C A MUST UNITE

o f G hana is crucial. O u r best laid plans will go aw ry if they are

not h andled w ith h eart as well as head.
A t the m om ent of independence, we had several first-class
A frican officials who could assume the highest positions of trust
in several m inistries, b u t there still rem ained m any ministries
whose p erm anent secretary was an expatriate. Expatriates also
continued to fill m any of the high-grade key positions in the
execution of policy. N or can I say th a t every African civil servant
was suited to his jo b . Some were good and experienced. Some
were good, b u t lacked training. Some were second-rate. W hen
ever I an d m y cabinet colleagues sat dow n to form ulate policy,
we always h a d to keep in m ind the capability lim its of our civil
service in the im plem entation of our program m es in the tim e
we h ad set.
I have come to appreciate, however, th a t even some of the
A frican staff who, to p u t it conservatively, were lukew arm in
th eir support of m y governm ent and its program m e, given
responsibility, have risen to the dem ands m ade upon them . M y
m inisterial colleagues and I work a very full day and the pace
we set is quite gruelling. I t has w arm ed me to see how m any
m em bers o f m y staff, accustom ed as they were to the m eander
ing m ethods of the colonial adm inistration, have stiffened their
rate of work to m eet the new and urgent dem ands m ade upon
them .
In num erable exasperations and difficulties rem ain, and the
m ore I think about this problem of the civil service in less
developed countries planning for developm ent, the m ore I feel
th a t the leaders of freedom m ovem ents and of em ergent states
m ust pay added attention to the need to start early in the selec
tion and training of their future executive officers. Some coun
tries, like In d ia, Pakistan an d Ceylon, were able to send their
sons to overseas universities to tra in for future leadership, and
w ere given the opportunity of introducing them into certain
branches of their colonial adm inistration. T hey too experienced
difficulties, in spite of having a core of civil servants of their own
nationals. O th e r countries, like Israel, spent the im m ediate years
before they achieved independence in training up a corps of
high-level officials who never actually w orked in the British
adm inistration b u t who studied the problem s of organization

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95

arid adm inistration, and were ready to take over the duties of
governm ent the m om ent the British departed.
For most countries em erging into independence, this has not
been done. N or have they been able, as G hana was not able, to
speed the A fricanization of their civil service at the necessary
rate. W e know colonialism and we know th a t we cannot look
to the colonial pow er for help in this m atter. I t is som ething we
Africans have to do ourselves. O u r chief difficulty during the
revolutionary struggle is th a t our m ain activity is political and
not adm inistrative. Because of this, our best m en and wom en
cannot be spared for civil service training, as they are needed to
advance the political battle. W ith independence they becom e
m inisters, m em bers of parliam ent, regional p a rty leaders,
regional officers, am bassadors. Y et top civil servants, gifted w ith
adm inistrative skill an d im bued w ith the fervour of independence
an d the hope of developm ent, are vital to the reconstruction of
a state. T o rely on expatriates is to endanger the revolution. For
the m en and wom en who carry out our policy m ust be as devoted
an d dedicated to the idea of freedom and national grow th as the
leaders of the country. T hey m ust be free of patriotic and in
tellectual attachm ents to outside forces. W ith our own nationals
of integrity we get a civil service concerned only w ith the public
welfare. Theirs is a tw enty-four hours a day jo b , ju st like th a t of
th eir political leaders. U p o n them , to a large extent, depends the
quality o f the countrys developm ent an d the speed w ith w hich
it can be fulfilled.
I n 1952 there was only one G h an aian head of d ep artm ent. By
1957 the figure h ad risen to tw enty-tw o. Now all the perm an en t
and pensionable posts are held by G hanaians.
A n Institute of Public A dm inistration has been established,
w here post-graduate students take a y ears diplom a course in
the theory and practice o f public adm inistration. T here are also
special short courses and sem inars for senior civil servants: and
research is being carried out to find new techniques in public
adm inistration specially appropriate for Africa. Degree courses
in adm inistration are being offered.
T he country needs expert civil servants, aw are of, and in
tegrated into, the society aro u n d them , and w ith interests
directed particularly tow ards the problem s of Africa. H itherto,

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AF RI C A MUST UN I TE

m any civil servants entered the service w ith little or no training.

A knowledge of m inute w riting, the Civil Service Act, and office
routine, was about all the practical training they h ad experi
enced.
W e have now achieved our aim of building up a G hanaian
civil service able to adm inister the country efficiently, an d I
w ould like my brothers in the em erging states of this continent
to know th a t G hana stands ready to help them in their initial
stages of self-government. O u r civil service is at their disposal.
W e can lend them top officials to start their ministries, we can
send them instructors to tra in their ow n indigenous civil service.
I t is a problem whose com plexity they will discover only w ith
the departu re of the colonial power. I t w ould indeed be a boon
to all the new A frican states if those o f us who have enjoyed a
som ew hat longer period of independence were to m ake available
some o f our officials to form a kind of A frican civil service pool,
standing at the service of em erging A frican states and ready to
serve the new U nion of A frican States.

CHAPTER TWELVE

R ECO NSTRU C TIO N AND DEVELOPMENT

S t a t e s e m e r g i n g from colonialism face the gigantic problem

of transform ing their alm ost purely trading an d raw -m aterial
producing economies into productive units capable of bearing
a superstructure of m odern agriculture an d industry. W e have,
all of us, a sim ilar dearth of capital, train ed labour and tech
nically-skilled personnel to assist forw ard our developm ent at
the pace w hich our objectives dem and. O u r late start, an d the
speed a t w hich we m ust work if we are to m odernize our coun
tries, are bound in some degree to sharpen the stresses an d strains
w hich have accom panied industrialization everyw here in the
w orld.
Every advance in m ethods of production m ade by the fore
m ost industrialized countries increases the gap betw een them
and us. T here is a theory th a t the countries w hich ap p ear last
upon the industrial scene can autom atically start a t the latest
point of developm ent reached by the m ost advanced. This
theory can only be applicable w here the accum ulation of capital
is great enough to m ake an effective take-off possible. Even in
those circum stances, there m ust also be available a literate p o p u
lation able to provide a sufficient body o f train ed labour, and
m anagers to head and m an the evolving industrial m achine.
These circum stances do not exist in G hana. T hey do not exist
in any of the colonialized territories, w here subsistence farm ing,
m ono-crop production and extractive industries have dom inated
the economy under the influence o f financial a n d com m ercial
monopolies.
I n G hana, we have h a d to o btain technical knowledge and
staff from better equipped sources, and this process will continue
until we are able to produce a sufficient num ber o f our own
experts. W e are getting help from international bodies like

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AF R I C A MUST UNI TE

U .S .O .M ., U .N .T .A .B ., F .A .O ., W .H .O ., b u t since we are
having to com pete w ith so m any other bidders, we have h a d to
apply also to private quarters. Even there, the dem ands are too
heavy to leave an am ple supply of best quality people. In order
to secure even the m inim um of well-qualified technicians we are
having to offer term s of service w hich m ake developm ent for us
disproportionately costly. M oney w hich we could otherwise
spend on m ore basic requirem ents has to go, for exam ple, into
housing and other am enities for foreign personnel. These w ould
be m atters for private provision if we were able to recruit the
same people locally. T hey are, m oreover, requirem ents w hich
create precedents th a t our own people dem and w hen they come
to take over posts form erly held by expatriates. W e are trying to
establish m ore realistic standards of service for our local people
in governm ent em ploy, though we have m et a certain am ount of
resistance.
I do appreciate th a t in a m arket w here m any are com peting,
we have to m ake our term s of service to expatriates as inviting as
we can, even though they place an additional strain upon our
far from unlim ited resources. Y et I fe e la strong sense of injustice
in th a t we lately-colonial countries are forced to bear such addi
tional burdens through the fact of th a t very backwardness in
w hich we were kept by the countries w hich have m ade their
industrial progress to a large extent out of us. I t is these same
im perialist powers who are reaping another harvest today by
providing the m achinery, equipm ent, m anagem ent, consultants
an d personnel w hich are the requisites of our reconstruction.
C apital investm ent, too, we have to seek abroad. T here has
n ot been developed in Africa even th a t bourgeois accum ulation
of \vealth based upon landholding, trade, com m erce a n d in
dustry w hich has arisen to some extent in some unadvanced
countries in Asia, let alone the accum ulation out of which Europe
financed its industrial revolution. This I think can be attrib u ted
in a m easure to the fact th a t the British banking firms which
operated here were essentially banks of exchange and looked
unfavourably upon the dispensing of credit to A frican entre
preneurs. This attitu d e was upheld by the fact th a t our system of
lan d tenure does not encompass individual ownership offreehold.
W hen it came to the question of the provision of collateral against

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99

loans, our people were at a disadvantage, since even the ow ner

ship of buildings could be brought into dispute w here the right
to the land on w hich they were erected m ight well be disputed.
Lands in G h an a in theory belong to the Stools, headed by
the chiefs. But w hen E uropeans arrived in our m idst, bringing
enticem ents of m oney an d goods, m any chiefs signed aw ay con
cessions ; an d some, in com plete disregard o f custom , m ade o u t
rig h t sales. W h at is worse, parcels of land were sold by families
in possession of them , to different purchasers, an d this started a
whole series o f law suits w hich, u ntil m y governm ent cam e into
office, was the chief source of incom e to our lawyers, m any of
w hom m ade fortunes out of persuading parties to lan d quarrels
to resort to the extended m achinery of native law over tracts
o f land frequently not w orth 1 0 0 . T he whole question of land
tenure in G h an a is one w hich requires exam ination and careful
overhaul. I t becomes increasingly clear th a t the system is too
cum bersom e a n d com plex to adjust to the needs an d pace of our
developm ent.
M y governm ent has m ade efforts to p u t some order into the
adm inistration of Stool lands, w hich has now been bro u g h t un d er
the control of local authorities. This m easure was adopted as a
m eans of stopping the m isappropriation of funds from lan d
adm inistration, w hich was beginning to assume alarm ing p ro
portions. W e have also m ade laws w hich enable the governm ent
to acquire lands suitable for developm ent purposes.
C ertain changes in our lan d tenure system seem to me inevit
able if we are to pursue our developm ent plans, b u t these will
have to be very carefully w orked out. T hey m ust avoid the
creation of rifts in the body politic, an d will accordingly have to
take into account customs and fundam ental traditions. O ne of
the blessings of our land tenure system is th a t it has not tu rn ed
ours into a n atio n w here lan d hunger w ould have forced us to
break up vast holdings for redistribution am ong a destitute
peasantry. O u r customs, m oreover, h a d erected a kind of social
security a d a p te d to our subsistence economy. Some of our
farm ers, it is true, have fallen victim s to the rap acity of m oney
lenders. M y governm ent is trying to m eet this problem of
peasant indebtedness by w ay of credit an d other facilities. W e
are also stim ulating the grow th of the co-operative m ovem ent

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AF RI CA MUST UNITE

and encouraging farm ers to jo in the U n ited G hana F arm ers

Council, the farm ers representative council in G hana, w hich
assists the sale of their produce and makes m onetary advances
to them a t the beginning of the crop seasons.
T h rift has not been a characteristic of our people, largely
because they have not enjoyed enough incom e to m ake the
question anything b u t academ ic. H ow to instil a need to spend
an d save wisely am ong them has become a m ajor preoccupation
now th a t they are beginning to enjoy higher incomes and the
taste for am enities. O u r fam ily system actually discourages
fam ily heads from saving, for the system, in effect, penalizes the
m an w ith initiative in favour of the lazy and the weak. T he
indigent m em bers of the fam ily live upon the m ore fortunate
ones. A praisew orthy and useful practice in our past, m ore or less
stagnant society based on subsistence farm ing, it acts today as a
break upon am bition an d drive. A t the present tim e, the m an
who makes a reasonable living finds his m oney eaten up by his
relatives (and this includes the most extended m em bers reaching
to the n th degree of relationship), so th a t he simply cannot m eet
his personal obligations, let alone save anything.
But save we m ust, if we are to build up the h a rd reserves of
capital necessary for our developm ent. Side by side w ith the
fam ily hindrance to saving, there has been a real and developing
increase in expenditure upon a vast m iscellany of im ported
goods. T h e danger inherent in trying to keep up w ith the
Joneses w hich results in the rising cost in personal expenditure
is som ething upon w hich we are trying to p u t a brake, not m erely
because this kind of spending encourages inflation, b ut because it
produces false standards and illusory ideas of w ealth in an
economy w hich has not yet got off to a real start on the road of
reconstruction and developm ent. I t is for these several reasons
th a t we have introduced com pulsory savings and curtailed the
im portation of w hat we regard as inessential goods. W e have also
established a national lottery, extended post office savings facil
ities, and set up a savings b ran ch in our national bank. W e
are looking into the m eans of encouraging investm ent in new
businesses an d industrial undertakings, which will encourage
enterprise an d initiative and help in building up m anagerial
skill.

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101

Investm ent capital is our great need. O u r colonial status p re

vented us from accum ulating as individuals the reserves of
capital necessary to establish on a private basis those m ajor
enterprises w hich will lay the foundations of a sound indus
trialized econom y an d expand an d diversify our agriculture.
O nly the governm ent, in fact, has resources large enough to
m ake a realistic approach to the problem of reconstruction and
developm ent. A nd even governm ent, because of low national
production, is obliged to seek investm ent from abroad. But while
w anting to a ttra c t capital, we are continually on the alert to
ensure th a t this does not endanger our independence by m aking
us subordinate to a new form of im perialism . T h e kind of invest
m ent assistance we prefer is th a t w hich will enter into a p a rtn e r
ship arrangem ent w ith the governm ent, or any of our statutory
institutions, un d er w hich our own citizens will be train ed to take
over m anagem ent, direction an d technical posts at all levels. W e
are already receiving assistance o f this kind, an d m ore is on the
way.
I m ust say th a t we are ra th e r chary of the fortune hunters who
come to our shores in shoals, seeking to m ake use of w hat they
regard as our innocence an d naivete in these m a tte rs; or of th a t
arm y of business people, who have followed in one delegation
after another, m ore in ten t upon taking m oney from us in the
form of com m odity sales w hich w ould enhance their own
national revenues, th a n upon contributing to our econom ic ex
pansion. T here are circum stances in w hich the im port of foreign
capital is of benefit to the im porting country, especially in the
case of the em erging developing country w here large-scale
sources of capital accum ulation are small and not so easy to
mobilize. Foreign capital is thus useful and helpful if it takes
the form of a loan or credit to enable the borrow ing country to
buy w hat it needs from w hatever sources it likes, and at the same
tim e to retain control o f the assets to be developed.
O ne o f the worst things th a t can happen to less developed
and em erging countries is to receive foreign aid w ith political
and economic strings attached. These aids are very often
w rapped up in financial term s th a t are not easily discernible.
Foreign investm ent m ade in an em erging and developing
country by a foreign com pany in order th a t such com pany can

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A F RI C A MUST UN I TE

m ake a profit, has nothing to do w ith aid. This does not m ean th at
a developing country m ay not find it advantageous to m ake a
contract w ith a foreign com pany for the setting up of, say, a
factory or an industry.
R eal aid is som ething quite different. I t consists of direct gifts
or loans th a t are given on favourable term s and w ithout strings
attached.
In other words, the problem is how to obtain capital-investm ent an d still keep it under sufficient control to prevent undue
exploitation; and how to preserve integrity and sovereignty
w ithout crippling economic or political ties to any country,
bloc or system.
W e have h ad enough of E uropean m onopoly dom ination of
our economy. W e have em ancipated ourselves politically, and
we have now to shake off the economic m onopoly th a t was the
objective of foreign political control. This is the crux of our
econom ic policy, an d the essential h e a rt of our endeavours. For
unless we atta in econom ic freedom , our struggle for independ
ence will have been in vain, and our plans for social an d cultural
advancem ent frustrated. H ence we are extrem ely vigilant in
scenting out the subtle and insidious infiltrations of neo
colonialism an d the sabotage of foreigners enjoying our hospi
tality and the privilege of building economic enterprises in our
m idst. In furtherance of our goal o f unshackling ourselves
from foreign economic dom ination, we are creating agencies
which will assist in breaking through this alien m onopoly and
stim ulate capital accum ulation for re-em ploym ent in w ider
developm ent.
A countrys capital is, of course, also to be found in its body of
technical, scientific an d m anagerial knowledge, as well as in its
productive capacity. In these fields we have to acknowledge
deficiencies w hich we know it will take tim e to wipe out. M ore
over, the low rate of productivity makes our labour, in spite of
the relatively small wages it receives, quite expensive. A t the
present tim e, low nutrition, a deficient sense of responsibility, the
fear of being out of work, govern the rate at w hich work is p er
form ed. These factors are the environm ental effects of historical
circum stances. T rib al controls an d taboos followed by the au to
cratic paternalism of colonialism have held in leash the sense of

R EC ON ST RU C TI ON AND D E V EL O P M E NT

IO3

initiative a n d responsibility which develops in a freer society.

As living conditions grow b etter un d er the im provem ents w hich
the governm ent is pledged to effect, an d indeed has already
m ade to some extent, as unem ploym ent lessens an d the m o
m entum of developm ent gathers speed, a quickening of p ro
ductive o u tp u t throughout the economy m ust follow. Productive
increase will also respond to encouraging incentives, w hich need
not always be of a financial n ature. For a productivity increase
w hich is com pletely eaten up through expanded consum ption
will defeat the developm ent program m e, whose investm ent
capital m ust come from surpluses. Some austerity is im perative
an d our new controls are aim ed at this. A t the same tim e, we
are trying to elim inate, by p arty discipline and other m eans,
wide gaps betw een the lower and higher incom e groups. W e are
setting our hands as firmly as we can against the grow th of a
privileged section.
T here m ust also be guards against the danger of spiralling
inflation, w hich too often attends a constructing economy, such
as ours is rapidly becom ing. C areful planning can an d m ust
keep inflation w ithin lim its so th a t the advantages of economic
developm ent shall not be dissipated in an ever-soaring cost of
living and building.
But the building of a new state requires m ore th a n the pre
p a ra tio n of program m es, the design o f plans an d the issue of
instructions for their im plem entation. I t requires the w hole
h earted support an d self-identification o f the people, an d the
widest possible response to the call for voluntary service. A w ar
on illiteracy has to be w aged; an d a country-w ide self-help
program m e of com m unity developm ent arranged, to prom ote
the building of schools, roads, drains, clinics, post offices, houses
an d com m unity centres.
T h e effects of self-help schemes, valuable in themselves a n d
the incentive they give to initiative, are, however, local in com
pass an d lim ited in purpose. R ap id developm ent on a national
scale an d the a ttain m en t of economic independence dem and a
m ore intensive an d w ider application of ability and inventive
ness, the speedy acquisition of technical knowledge and skills, a
vast acceleration of productivity as a prerequisite to accum u
lation of savings for re-investm ent in industrial expansion. In

104

A FR I C A MUST U NI TE

a less developed society there are several im pedim ents to in

dustrialization, quite a p a rt from the lack of requisite capital
accum ulations, technical skills, scientific knowledge and in
dustrial enterprise, w hich, unless they are elim inated, will
stultify our efforts at advancem ent. For they have their cum u
lative effect precisely in the lack of these requisite reserves.
Customs w hich extol the virtues o f extended fam ily allegiance
sustain nepotic practices, and regard the giving and taking of
presents as im plicit and noble, because they prom ote the fam ily
welfare. T hey encourage indolence and bribery, they act as a
brake upon ability, they discourage th a t deeper sense of in
dividual responsibility w hich m ust be ready in a period of active
reconstruction to accept obligation and fulfil trust. Above all,
they re ta rd productivity an d oppose savings, the crucial factors
in the rate of developm ent. Polygam y donates its quota to these
retard in g influences, while our laws of succession an d in
heritance stifle the creative and inventive urge.
I t is certainly not accidental th a t the industrial revolution
cam e first to E ngland, where the law of prim ogeniture entailed
the inheritance of estates to the eldest son and m ade it necessary
for the younger ones to follow pursuits which increased capital
w ealth. T he historian, G. M . T revelyan writes:
A distinguishing feature of the English gentry, which aston
ished foreign visitors as early as the reign of Henry V II, was their
habit of turning their younger sons out of the manor-house to
seek their fortunes elsewhere, usually as apprentices to thriving
merchants and craftsmen in the towns. Foreigners ascribed the
custom to English want of family affection. But it was also,
perhaps, a wise instinct of what was best for the boy, as well
as a shrewd calculation of what was best for the family fortunes.
The habit of leaving all the land and most of the money to the
eldest son built up the great estates, which by steady accumu
lation down the years, became by Hanoverian times so marked
a feature of English rural economy.
The younger son of the Tudor gentleman was not permitted
to hang idle about the manor-house, a drain on the family
income like the impoverished nobles of the Continent who were
too proud to work. He was away making money in trade or in

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105

law. He often ended life a richer and more powerful man than his
elder brother left in the old home.1
A nother incentive was Puritanism w hich encouraged frugality
an d frow ned upon wastefulness an d ostentatious expenditure.
As far as the national econom y in an under-developed country is
concerned, savings converted into ornam ents an d squandered
in celebrating religious festivals, in extravagant w edding and
funeral expenses, are as m uch lost as though they w ere throw n
into the sea. T rib a l society, counting little b u t sunrise, sunset and
the m oons apogee, w elcom ed these festive breaks in the
m onotony of passing days, and has carried over the customs into
the present, w here another, m ore stirring philosophy needs to
induce industriousness an d thrift.
T he legend of the m edieval church th a t to labour is to p ray
encouraged tillage of the soil. I t was im proved upon by the
exhortations of Protestantism to work h a rd an d be thrifty,
w hich raised to a cardinal virtue the saving of m oney an d its
investm ent in profitable enterprise. O u r less energetic society
m ust be goaded into the acceptance of the stim uli necessary to
rap id econom ic developm ent by alterations in our social
relationships an d habits, if necessary by law. J a p a n , for instance,
since the end of the Second W orld W ar, has legislated for a c u r
tailed fam ily u n it w hich comprises husband and wife and their
children. Legally, the husband has no responsibility for any
o ther m em bers of the fam ily outside this close unit. M oreover,
children are being tau g h t not to look to their parents to will
them an inheritance b u t to fend for themselves. T h e initiative,
energy and drive thus released are being tu rn ed to the expansion
of J a p a n s national economy.
A sense o f devotion and sacrifice helps to instil acceptance o f
narrow er standards for the present in the interest of w ider ones
in the future. A certain am ount of belt-tightening is essential.
T h e W elfare State is the clim ax o f a highly developed in
dustrialism . T o assure its benefits in a less developed country
is to prom ise m erely a division o f poverty. U n doubtedly
there m ust be an investm ent o f a proportion of the capital
reserves in the establishm ent of m inim um wage levels to assure
1 G. M . T revelyan: English Social History (Longm ans 1946), p. 125.

io6

A FRI CA MUST UN I TE

proper diet, as well as m inim um health and housing facilities.

But poverty is progressively reduced only as productivity
increases an d industrialization progresses an d p a rt of its surplus
can be m ade available in increased wages, better housing and
generally im proved social conditions.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

TOWARDS ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE

W h e r e i n d e p e n d e n c e has been preceded by a struggle,

there rem ains a residue o f enthusiasm to start off the new
national existence, w hich, if properly harnessed a n d directed,
provides a spur in dealing w ith the tasks of state building.
H ow ever, there is an accom panying lessening o f tension, a sense
of pressure eased, a pause for b rea th after battle. T here is a
feeling th at, having m ade the suprem e an d sustained effort
called for in ridding the country of colonial rule, a w ell-earned
rest can now be taken.
T h e governm ent has to m ake it clear th a t a new an d greater
effort is dem anded to consolidate the nationalist victory. T he
people have to be fully re-anim ated so th a t they will drive
forw ard w ith zest an d courage to a m ore form idable b attle in
w hich they will be faced w ith different obstacles an d hardships
as the new state develops.
I n G hana, the C onvention Peoples P arty h a d the task of
rousing the spirit of devotion and sacrifice necessary for the
program m e of developm ent w hich it was given a m andate to
discharge. T h e pre-independence slogan of Self-Governm ent
N ow was replaced w ith th a t of s e r v e g h a n a n o w . W e held
out no glowing hopes o f w ealth w ithout labour. O n the contrary,
we stressed the need for everyone to w ork doubly h a rd now th a t
we were labouring for ourselves an d our children, an d not for the
enrichm ent of the form er colonial power. T he rew ards would be
national and individual dignity, the satisfaction w hich comes
from creation and a raised stan d ard of life. Forem ost o f all
w ould be economic independence, w ithout w hich our political
independence would be valueless.
U n d e r colonial rule, a country has very restricted economic

io8

A F RI CA MUST U N I TE

links w ith other countries. Its n a tu ra l resources are developed

only in so far as they serve the interests of the colonial power.
How ever, once political independence has been achieved, the
countrys full potentialities can, and m ust, be explored. T he
dom estic econom y m ust be planned to prom ote the interests of
its own nationals; and new and w ider econom ic links m ust be
created w ith other countries. O therw ise, the new ly-independent
country m ay fall victim to the highly dangerous forces of
econom ic im perialism , and find th at it has m erely substituted
one kind of colonialism for another.
In the past, all G h a n a s econom ic links were w ith the W est,
m ainly the U n ited K ingdom . Since independence, we have
forged new links w ith countries such as Russia, C hina, Poland,
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. T he Report o f the United Kingdom
Trade and Industrial Mission to Ghana, published in 1959, showed
th a t 85 per cent of all G h a n a s im port trad e was in the hands of
E uropean firms (m ainly British), 10 per cent in the hands of
Asians (Indians, Syrians and Lebanese), and only 5 per cent in
G h an aian hands. Now, m any G hanaians are participating fully
in the im port and export business of the country. This was at one
tim e the privilege of the few, because the m arket was lim ited to
the sterling area only, and m any o f the p o pular brands of
m erchandise were m onopolized by the few principal firms w ith
foreign capital. In i960, G hana bought goods to the value of
G i2 9 ,617,497 from the outside w orld an d sold goods w orth
6115 982 854
In planning national developm ent, the constant, funda
m ental guide is the need for econom ic independence. This
involves a stock-taking of the national resources, both actual and
potential, h u m an as well as m aterial, and the need to develop
them by m eans of careful priorities and skilful integration so as to
produce a strong, healthy and balanced economy. A n im
p o rta n t essential is to reduce ou r colonial-produced economic
vulnerability by lessening the dependence on m ono-crop
farm ing.
A lthough cocoa still rem ains our m ain export, we have
succeeded to some extent in diversifying our agriculture. W e
plan to relate our agricultural production prim arily to the needs
o f the dom estic m arket an d to provide raw m aterials for

, , .

TO WAR D S ECONOMIC I N D E P E N D E N C E

log

secondary industries. W e have begun to export bananas,

coconuts, copra, palm kernels, and palm oil, kola an d other nuts,
plantains, ru b b er, coffee, spices, an d tobacco. Several of these
products, such as palm oil, tobacco, coffee an d ru b b er, we shall
use in increasing am ounts in our ow n industries.
T h e governm ent has provided grants for the regional
developm ent of w ater resources, for soil conservation and
im provem ent projects, for financing experim ental plantations
of new crops, and for the application of new techniques to old
crops. O u r farm ers are getting practical advice on how to use
their land to the best advantage an d to produce greater yields.
T hey are being assisted by hire purchase an d co-operative
schemes to acquire m odern agricultural m achinery and process
ing equipm ent. M ore ratio n al m arketing procedures are being
steadily introduced. G hana has begun to export agricultural
products w hich have never been grow n here before, an d im
proved m ethods of grow ing established crops have led to
substantial increases in yield.
Diversity of agriculture has been accepted as a shibboleth, b u t
if the developm ent is simply tow ards the end of exportation, this
can defeat the aim , since the fact th a t so m any countries are now
concentrating upon sim ilar objectives can produce a n over
extension of the sellers m arket w ith subsequent depression of
w orld prices. T h e fall in w orld prices o f raw m aterials since the
end of the Second W orld W ar has deprived the less developed
countries of the staggering sum of 574,000 m illion, an am ount
greater th a n all the so-called aid w hich these countries have
received from the advanced nations. This in itself represents a
denial of trem endous capital for m uch-w an ted developm ent th a t
w ould not have happened h a d we newly em ergent states been
united and strong enough to m ake our bargaining on the in te r
national com m odity m arkets effective.
T h e m ajor advantage w hich our independence has bestowed
upon us is the liberty to arrange our national life according to
the interests of our people, an d along w ith it, the freedom , in
conjunction w ith other countries, to interfere w ith the play of
forces in the w orld com m odity m arkets. U nder-developed
countries, utilising their newly won independent status, can by
purposive policy interferences m anage to alter considerably the

no

A F RI CA MUST UN I TE

direction of the m arket processes u nder the im pact of which they

have hitherto rem ained backw ard,5m aintains G u n n ar M y rd a l.1
T his is a reality w hich we recognize, and we are using the in ter
national organizations and other m edia to exert pressures in our
favour. Nevertheless, the richer countries are still in a position to
lim it the returns we o btain for our prim ary products, and we
w ould seem to be m ore strategically placed as the m ajor pro
ducer of a single raw m aterial, either agricultural or extractive,
for w hich there is a heavy w orld dem and. O u r cocoa production
has h itherto given us such a com m anding position bu t, w ith
o ther comers tending to equalize the field, we are discovering
th a t a satisfactory price level can be held only by agreem ent w ith
the other large producers, such as Brazil, N igeria, and others.
W ith judicious use of our jo in t bargaining pow er, we m ay
continue to use our exports of p rim ary products to assist our
industrialization.
Fluctuations in prim ary pro d u ct prices are one of the
insecurities in planning for less developed countries. Yet this
cannot invalidate planning, w hich is the prim e m edium by
w hich developm ent can be undertaken in the given conditions.
T h e governm ent has to take the place of the adventurous
entrepreneurs who created the capital basis of industrialization
in the advanced countries.
T h e fishing industry has also benefited from governm ent
planning. A local building yard is tu rning out high-standard,
pow ered fishing vessels to increase the scope of our fishing fleets.
C om plem enting it, is a partnership association w ith overseas
interests in a storage an d refrigeration p lan t to take vegetables
and other perishable goods as well as fish. A fishing h arb o u r has
been built at E lm ina near Cape Coast, at one tim e a thriving
Portuguese slaving and trading fort. A far larger fishing harb o u r
has been constructed at our new coastal town of T em a. W e hope
th a t these two harbours, w ith adequate refrigeration facilities,
will not only provide an adequate supply of high protein food for
o ur people b u t enough fish to give work to a canning factory, the
o u tp u t from which will swell our exports.
In the industrial sphere, our aim has been to encourage the
1 G unner M yrdal: Economic Theory and Under-Developed Regions, G erald
D uckw orth & Co. Ltd, p. 66.

TO WAR D S ECONOMIC I N D E P E N D E N C E

I 11

establishm ent of plants where we have a n a tu ra l advantage in

local resources an d labour or w here we can produce essential
com m odities required for developm ent or for dom estic con
sum ption. D uring 1961, over sixty new factories were opened.
A m ong them was a distillery, a coconut oil factory, a brew ery, a
m ilk processing plant, and a lorry and bicycle assembly plant. In
addition, agreem ents were signed for the establishm ent of a large,
m odern oil refinery, an iron and steel works, a flour m ill, and
sugar, textile and cem ent factories.
I n forestry, we have introduced a program m e for conservation
an d disease control, w hich will both safeguard our forest reserves
and perm it an advance in tim ber production. For G h an aian
lum ber continues to be greatly prized in overseas m arkets and
has a high place on our export list. P roduction in our local tim ber
and cork factories has been expanded, and a m arked im prove
m ent has taken place in the o u tp u t of our m ining of gold,
diam onds, m anganese and bauxite.
O u r First D evelopm ent Plan, launched in 1951, concentrated
on com m unications, public works, education and general
services. I t p repared the w ay for our industrialization drive.
This was the keynote of our Second D evelopm ent Plan w hich
will provide for the establishm ent of m any factories, of varying
size, to produce a range o f hundreds of different products.
Financial provision is being m ade to ensure th a t adequate
facilities will be available to prospective investors in industrial
developm ent.
C apital projects, such as the V olta R iver scheme and T em a
h arb o u r and its extension, will provide opportunities for our
people to develop skills at all levels. A n essential elem ent in our
industrial developm ent m ust be the building up of our store of
technical and m anagerial knowledge. W e are encouraging
foreign investm ent, b u t to accept it m erely for the purpose of
w idening our industrial base w ithout strengthening our own
skills and techniques will leave us as econom ically im poverished
as we were un d er colonialism. Unless our own nationals are
given the opportunity of learning the jo b on the spot, side by side
w ith foreign experts, we shall be as ignorantly backw ard as
ever.
T here is an argum ent th a t contends th a t young nations

112

A F RI CA MUST UNITE

em erging from colonialism are indulging in wasteful expenditure

by duplicating industries and ventures which have already been
perfected by the older industrialized nations of the w orld, whose
products are available a t lower cost th an th a t for which they can
be m anufactured by us. I t m ay be true in some instances th a t our
local products cost m ore, though by no m eans all of them , and
then only in the initial period. But even if it were substantially the
fact, it is not an argum ent th a t we can accept. I t is precisely
because we were, under colonialism, m ade the dum ping ground
of other countries m anufactures and the providers m erely of
p rim ary m aterials, th a t we rem ained b a c k w a rd ; and if we were
to refrain from building, for exam ple, a soap factory simply
because we m ight have to raise the price of soap to the com
m unity, we should be doing a disservice to the country.
Every tim e we im port goods th a t we could m anufacture if all
the conditions were available, we are continuing our economic
dependence and delaying our industrial grow th. I t is ju st these
conditions th a t we are planning to provide, so as to m ake o u r
selves independent of the im portation of goods and foodstuffs
th a t we can produce ourselves. These are the conditions which
will assist to build up our body of knowledge, techniques and
skills, to m ake us m ore self-confident and self-sufficient, to push
tow ards our economic independence. A nother no less im portant
aspect is th a t the exchange thus saved can be used to finance
capital m achinery for our own industries, w hich alone can give
value to our industrialization.
U n d e r colonial adm inistration, postal, telegraphic and rail
com m unications, broadcasting, such electricity and w ater
services as existed, were all publicly owned and adm inistered.
Since independence we have added an airline, a shipping line,
and a national bank. W e have m et w ith active resistance from
vested interests in our efforts to establish our own m ercantile
fleet.
In connection w ith the founding of G hana Airways, it was
m aintained th a t there were enough international airlines to
serve our needs, and th a t the form ation of a new one was an u n
necessary m ultiplication, which w ould only serve to satisfy our
national pride. Even if this were true, which it is not, it was an
argum ent which did not appeal to us. N aturally, it increases our

TO WAR D S ECONOMIC I N D E P E N D E N C E

self-confidence to observe our own people helping to control the

intricate m echanism s involved in the functioning of our own
airways services, and we certainly experience a glow of pride in
seeing our flag flying on planes and ships travelling to other
countries. But again, we m ust encourage every kind of project
th a t will add to our technical skills an d national experience, and
the operation of our own airlines and shipping m akes a valuable
contribution to this end.
W e are at present planning to ch art routes w hich will connect
up the m ore im p o rtan t cities and towns of Africa. O ne of the
factors m aking contact betw een Africans difficult is the absence
of proper and plentiful m eans o f com m unication. A t the present
tim e, A fricas com m unications look outw ard and not inw ard.
T hey connect us ra th e r w ith countries overseas th a n w ith our
selves. Shipping is not planned to go all the w ay round the coast,
connecting roads criss-crossing the continent are non-existent,
an d the established routings operated by the existing in te r
national airlines are planned to serve travellers from E urope
ra th e r th a n Africans wishing to go from one p a rt of this continent
to another.
T h e routings of the E uropean airlines frequently m ake it
necessary for us to go, for instance, from N o rth or East to W est
Africa by way of Europe. T h e absurdity of this is too obvious to
need stressing. Alm ost every country in Europe has its own a ir
line and the routes over the E uropean continent are m any an d
well-served, an d no one thinks it a t all strange th a t B.E.A., for
exam ple, duplicates some of S abenas services. T herefore, the
contention th a t we young nations on other continents should
refrain from entering this vital field of com m unications smacks
to us of the old im perialist attitude. Africa is a considerably larger
continent th an Europe, and there is m ore th a n enough reason for
us African nations to develop com m unications betw een ourselves
as a m eans o f bringing us closer together and m aking our
com m on intercourse easier and m ore fruitful.
T h e difficulties in getting ou r Black S tar shipping line started
have been successfully overcom e and we are now enlarging it
w ith a n um ber of vessels whose keels have been laid in G erm any,
England, H olland and other countries. A n efficient an d adequate
shipping fleet o f our own will establish a powerful instrum ent to

ii4

AF RI CA MUST UNITE

break the hold w hich the m onopoly interests, including foreign

shippers, have upon our trade. T he revenue th at goes abroad
every year m erely in the shipm ent of our cocoa runs into several
millions sterling. W ithout shipping of our own, we are placed at
the m ercy of the foreign shipping lines, who could hold us to
ransom , as they have in the past, at any tim e they wished. W ith
our own shipping we shall become independent of external
m aritim e agencies. W e shall bring revenue to our own coffers,
and once m ore m ake a fine addition to our skills and experience.
I n connection wdth our com m unication projects, we have
organized a nautical training school and a flying school which are
designed to supply us w ith sufficient trained personnel to m an
and officer our ships and aircraft. T raining is planned to proceed
in stages so as to afford an annual outp u t of m en for im m ediate
absorption into the shipping and flying services.
All industries of any m ajor economic significance require, as a
basic facility, a large and reliable source of power. In fact, the
industrialization of Britain, A m erica, C anada, Russia, and other
countries too, em erged as a result of the discovery of new sources
of energy. N ew er nations, like our own, which are determ ined to
catch up, m ust have a plentiful supply of electricity if they are to
achieve any large-scale industrial advance. This, basically, was
the justification for the V olta R iver Project.
This project, an d the extension of the p ort and harb o u r at
T em a, will have a massive effect on our national economy and
enlarge its developm ent. T he V olta R iver scheme involves the
production of hydro-electrical power by dam m ing the river and
applying the great volume of resultant cheap power to convert
our bauxite resources into alum inium and to provide electri
fication for the natio n s other industries. T he V olta is our
largest river, and we have enough bauxite to feed an alum inium
sm elter w ith a capacity of 200,000 tons. As originally conceived,
the project called for raising the level of the w ater through the
erection of a single high dam w ith a power station below to
harness the energy released by the drop and convert it into
electricity. Almost its whole o u tput was to be devoted to the
working of a smelter for rolling bauxite into alum inium sheets.
This and the estim ated cost of 300 m illion sterling dim m ed the
attractiveness of the project.

T OWARDS ECONOMIC I N D E P E N D E N C E

Nevertheless, I p u t it up to the colonial adm inistration, who

could see no prospect of raising the capital. I t was obvious th a t
the project w ould have to w ait for independence and th a t I
would have to take upon m yself the task of enlisting financial
help from overseas. W ith independence, we would be in a
position to give governm ent guarantees to outside investors. As
soon as we becam e free, I started pushing the project, b u t quickly
cam e up against a blank wall - the leading m anufacturers of
alum inium . T hey were organized into a consortium controlling
the bulk of the w orlds output, and were not interested in a new
com petitor, still less in a new source of cheap alum inium . T hey
expressed polite in te rest; one even sent a study mission to m ake
an on-the-spot investigation and then tu rn ed the project down.
In the m iddle of 1958, I accepted an official invitation from
President Eisenhower to visit the U nited States. D uring the talk
I h ad w ith him I told him of the V olta R iver scheme. This led to a
m eeting w ith m em bers of the H enry J . K aiser Com pany, one of
the large independent alum inium producers. T hey prom ised to
send a team of experts to reassess engineering aspects of the
original scheme. T he team m ade their investigations and were
favourably impressed. T h eir reassessment report recom m ended
the construction of the dam at a different point from th a t
originally proposed, and the extension of the scheme by the
provision of two other hydro-electrical stations which would
supply the more northerly p a rt of the country w ith m uch-needed
w ater and power.
T he original V olta R iver project was designed to channel the
bulk of the electricity produced by the dam to an alum inium
smelter, and a com paratively small proportion only would have
been m ade available for dom estic consum ption. T he reassess
m ent rep o rt recom m ended the installation of a national
electricity grid covering the m ajor p a rt of Southern G hana, from
the h a rb o u r and industrial tow n of T em a, through A ccra,
T akoradi, T arkw a, D unkw a, K um asi, K oforidua and back to
the dam site a t Akosombo. By the addition of the two sm aller
stations at Bui and K pong, at higher points on the V olta, the
national grid will extend into the territory on the other side of the
river. A t selected points on the grid there will be outlets from
which electricity will be distributed for dom estic and industrial

ii

AF RI CA MUST UNI TE

users over an extended area. T he routing of the grid will also

provide outlets for pow er supplies to m any of the larger mines. I f
transm ission lines could be installed economically, there would
be sufficient electricity to provide pow er for the whole country,
and even to have some to sell to our neighbours.
This scheme was accepted in principle by the governm ent, not
only because it provided for reasonably economic operation in
the early years by selling pow er to a smelter, b u t because it also
provided for the production of a large and reliable source of
electrical power, for m any years to come, for G h a n a s develop
m ent. T he m ain hydro-electrical project at Akosombo is being
financed by G hana, Britain, the U nited States and the In te r
national Bank, while an agreem ent has been reached w ith the
Soviet U nion for the design and construction of the power dam
station at Bui.
O ne of the incidental results of the project will be the
form ation of an in lan d lake, w hich will cover 3,275 square miles
a n d will be the largest m an-m ade lake in the world. T he lake
will, it is estim ated, eventually produce up to 10,000 tons of fresh
fish a year, m uch of it readily accessible to areas of G hana too far
from the sea for our sea-w ater catches to be readily transported
there. T h e lake fishing industry m ay well becom e very im
p o rtan t, and it is proposed to develop this as soon as the lake has
filled, and the fish have had tim e to m ultiply. A further ad v an t
age is th a t about six hu n d red square miles of land around the
shores of the new lake will be flooded each season at high w ater,
and should be suitable for the intensive cultivation of crops such
as rice.
A private com pany has been form ed by some of the w orlds
greatest producers of alum inium , to establish the sm elter at an
estim ated cost of 1 0 0 million. This com pany, known as Valeo
(V olta A lum inium C om pany L im ited), will em ploy about
1,500 people. O nce its pioneer com pany relief period is over, it
will pay taxes to the G hana G overnm ent, and also pay the V olta
R iver A uthority nearly 2 \ m illion yearly for electricity.
T he construction of the p ort an d h arb o u r at T em a was an
integral p a rt of the V olta R iver scheme. Some two thousand
workers were em ployed to build thousands of housing units,
planned w ith m odern shopping areas in each suburb, a good net

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117

work of roads, and sites for the alum inium p lan t and subsidiary
factories. These will serve, an d be served by, the large p ort area
w ith its m ain, lee an d south breakw aters. T h e quays have
provision for extension, spacious sheds and warehouses, and
railw ay links to each point of need.
T he p ort started to operate in 1961, and already the tow n
boasts alm ost 30,000 inhabitants. T he ultim ate population will
be about 250,000. A whole fishing village has been m oved from
the condem ned slums in w hich it was housed to a new one
providing m odern amenities.
T em a is G h a n a s first planned city. T o see its construction, and
to rem em ber the quiet palm -fringed cove w hich it replaces is to
feel a sense of creation an d developm ent. M ore im portant, to see
our m en at work and to recall their pre-independence lounging
under the palm s, is to refresh our faith in our capacity to build
our country.
T he harbour, one of the largest in Africa, took over seven years
to build. A t peak periods during its construction, m ore th a n
3,500 m en worked on it, some of them in the hills tw enty miles
away, where they quarried over ten m illion tons of rock for the
m ain breakw aters. T he h arb o u r is nearly h a lf as large again as
the one at T akoradi, 160 miles to the west, and it encloses about
400 acres of w ater. I t has a fishing h arbour, and will eventually
have five quays an d fifteen berths.
Some two weeks before I opened the h a rb o u r at T em a, I
officially launched the V olta R iver scheme by pressing a b u tto n
to dynam ite a slice out of the hillside a t Akosombo. H undreds of
people danced, cheered, sang and fired guns into the air as the
local chief poured libation and offered a sheep in sacrifice. O ne
of m y greatest dream s was com ing true. I n a few years there will
be sufficient pow er to serve the needs of our industrial grow th for
a long tim e ahead.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

BUILDING

SOCIALISM

IN GHANA

W h e n I s a t d o w n w i t h m y p a r t y c o ll e a g u e s a fte r i n d e p e n d e n c e
t o e x a m i n e o u r u r g e n t p r io r it ie s , w e f r a m e d a s h o r t lis t. W e m u s t
a b o li s h p o v e r t y , ig n o r a n c e , i l li t e r a c y a n d im p r o v e o u r h e a lt h
s e r v ic e s . T h e s e w e r e d ir e c t a n d s im p le o b j e c t iv e s n o t e x a c t l y
a m e n a b l e to le g i s l a t io n . I n o u r s i t u a t io n t h e y w e r e f o r m id a b le
lo n g - t e r m o b j e c t iv e s i n v o l v i n g t h e e l i m i n a t io n o f s o c ia l ills w h ic h
h a v e t r o u b le d t h e w o r ld s in c e t h e b e g in n i n g o f h is t o r y a n d s t ill,
i n v a r y in g d e g r e e s , p la g u e a ll t h e c o u n t r ie s o f t h e g lo b e .

Delegations, official and semi-official, travel abroad from tim e

to tim e, exam ining w hat other countries have to offer us in the
w ay of experience and knowledge th a t can be applied to our
circum stances. I m aintain th a t there is no universal p a tte rn for
industrialization th a t can serve as an absolute m odel for new
nations em erging out o f colonialism. Looking around, we find no
exam ples th a t are identical. E uropean countries stretched their
industrialization over a m uch longer period and in a different
economic, scientific and social epoch. T he U nited States cleared
virgin land and used slave labour to amass its prim ary wealth.
I t has a geographic span th a t gave it special opportunities for a
rap id industrial expansion and large-scale m anufacture. T he
Soviet U nion, starting from practically nothing, covering a vast
lan d mass w ith m anifold resources, swept aw ay the form er
bureaucracy, and em ployed an au th o ritarian dictatorship to
achieve its purpose.
Frequently, the nearest models are those countries, like J a p a n ,
or C hina, or In d ia, th a t have m ade or are m aking their industrial
revolution against conditions m ore nearly approxim ating to
our own an d in a tim e cycle closer to ours. In d ia and C hina
cover huge stretches of land and have excessive populations.
J a p a n , though m uch sm aller, has also created a population th at

B U I L D I N G SOCIALISM IN G H A N A

Iig

gives her one of the highest densities in the w orld. These are
factors w hich bear directly upon the planning for industrial
developm ent and econom ic independence. T hey provide both
causes and solutions in the draw ing up o f program m es, and the
degree of adjustm ent th a t is m ade to the problem s w hich they
also raise will depend upon the econom ic course th a t is taken.
In G hana, we have em barked on the socialist p a th to progress.
W e w ant to see full em ploym ent, good housing an d equal
opportunity for education and cultural advancem ent for all the
people up to the highest level possible. This m eans t h a t :
- prices of goods m ust not exceed w ages;
- house rentals m ust be w ithin the m eans o f all g ro u p s;
- social welfare services m ust be open to a ll;
- educational and cultural am enities m ust be available to
everyone.
I t m eans, in short, th a t the real incom e and stan d ard of life of all
farm ers and workers m ust rise appreciably.
I have already m ade it clear th a t colonial rule precluded th a t
accum ulation of capital am ong our citizens w hich would have
assisted thorough-going private investm ent in industrial con
struction. I t has, therefore, been left to governm ent, as the holder
o f the m eans, to play the role o f m ain entrepreneur in laying the
basis of the national econom ic and social advancem ent. I f we
tu rn ed over to private interests the going concerns capitalized
out of n ational funds and national effort, as some of our critics
w ould like to see us do, we should be betraying the trust of the
g reat masses of our people for the greedy interests of a small
coterie of individuals, probably in alliance w ith foreign
capitalists. P roduction for private profit deprives a large section
of the people of the goods and services produced. If, therefore, we
are to fulfil our pledge to the people and achieve the program m e
set out above, socialism is our only alternative. For socialism
assumes the public ownership of the m eans of production, the
land and its resources, and the use of those m eans in fulfilm ent
of the peoples needs.
Socialism, above all, is predicated upon the ability to satisfy
those needs. I t is obvious, therefore, th a t G hana at this tim e is
not possessed of the socialist m eans. Indeed, we have still to lay
the actual foundations on w hich they can be built, the m odern-

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A FRI CA MUST UNITE

ization of our agriculture and the industrialization of our

country. W e have to transfer to the hands of the people the m ajor
m eans of production and distribution.
O u r rate of developm ent will be governed by the surpluses th at
will be m ade available out of heightened productivity, which
includes, besides the greater outp u t from labour and increased
agricultural yields, the m ore efficient em ploym ent of investm ent
and the resulting increased productivity. G overnm ent in ter
ference in all m atters affecting economic grow th in less developed
countries is today a universally accepted principle, and interests,
dom estic or foreign, enjoying the opportunities of profitable
gain, cannot object to some control of the reinvestm ent of p a rt of
th a t gain in the national developm ent of the country in which it
is reaped. T oday, not even in the advanced countries dedicated
to private enterprise is the principle of laissez faire allowed
absolutely free play. Restrictions of all kinds interfere w ith the
uninhibited m ovem ent of capital. T he governm ent of G hana,
while m aking investm ent in our developm ent as attractive as
possible, cannot, however, place th a t developm ent and our
ultim ate economic independence in jeo p ard y by surrendering
their intrinsic prior requirem ents.
These requirem ents are at the central h eart of our planning,
and in the context of our national independence and advance
m ent and the greater objective of Pan-A frican unity they m ust
govern our policies.
T h e road of reconstruction on w hich G hana has em barked is a
new road, parts of whose topography are only hazily sensed,
other parts still unknow n. A certain am ount of trial and error in
following the road is inevitable. Mistakes we are bound to make,
and some undoubtedly we have already m ade. T hey are our own
and we learn from them . T h a t is the value of being free and
independent, of acquiring our experience out of the consequence
of our own decisions, out of the achievem ents of our own efforts.
O u r planning will be geared to our policy of increasing
governm ent participation in the n atio n s economic activities,
and all enterprises are expected to accept this policy and to
operate w ithin the fram ew ork of our national laws. O u r aim is
the building of a society in which the principles of social justice
will be p aram ount. But there are m any roads to socialism, and in

B U I L D I N G SOCIALISM IN G H A N A

121

the circum stances of our present retardedness, we m ust em ploy

all the forces at our disposal while we fashion others w hich will
accelerate our progress tow ards our goal.
G h a n a s economy m ay be divided into five sectors. These a r e :
(i) State enterprises; (2) enterprises owned by foreign private
interests; (3) enterprises jointly ow ned by State and foreign
private interests; (4) co-operatives; and (5) small-scale G h a n a
ian private enterprise. T h e governm ent has given recognition to
the activities of these different sectors, and has decided th a t in no
sector of the economy will exclusive rights of operation in respect
o f any com m odity be conferred on any single person. Private
small-scale personal enterprise, however, is reserved to
G hanaians, in order to encourage and utilize personal initiative
and skill am ong our own people.
N aturally the operations of these different sectors have to be
taken into account in our calculations for planning our basic
econom ic reconstruction. W e have to create in the quickest
possible tim e, w ithout a hasty im provisation th a t will ultim ately
defeat our objective, a diversified, m any-sided econom y able to
supply a growing population w ith the basic com m odities th at
will lessen the b urden now imposed on the country by the need
to im port so m any of its requirem ents. In order to increase our
m aterial resources, we have, as a m ajor priority, to raise
significantly agricultural productivity. This is a pre-condition
for our industrial grow th, as all our plans can founder on a
countryside th a t does not contribute a rising quota of production.
T here m ust be a transform ation of our subsistence farm s into
com m odity producing farms, so th a t they m ay provide enough
food for our steadily rising population, give raw m aterials to feed
secondary industries and cash crops to help pay for our necessary
im ports. Priority will be given to those investm ents w hich will
quickly prom ote capital form ation; will save im ports or increase
exports; and reduce the differences betw een the different
regions of the country created by colonialism.
O u r over-all plan will take account of our population and
their requirem ents, taking into consideration the yearly increase,
w hich is estim ated at about three per cent. I t will count our m an
power and our actual and potential reservoir of skills, and will
set annual targets of achievem ent. These targets will em brace

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A F RI CA MUST U NI TE

not only o u tp u t and the absorption of planned num bers of

workers in the different categories and at different levels, b u t will
arrange for the training of skilled workers, and of m anagers and
executives qualified and able to see th a t the planned projects are
carried out efficiently, econom ically and to schedule.
W ithin the general planning are included our educational,
social welfare and health program m es. T hey are devised in
relation to the needs of our healthy developm ent and the
im provem ent of the lives of the people. A p art from the
h u m an itarian principles by w hich the governm ent is guided, an
educated, healthy population represents the h u m an investm ent
in our developm ent, and anything th a t can be spared from our
surpluses will be added to the already planned allocations for the
purpose.
O u r planning will stretch out into the regions beyond the
m ain centres. A t the present tim e there are big differences in the
degree of economic and social developm ent betw een the various
regions of the country, and our population density is extrem ely
uneven. R egional planning will contribute to reducing the
differences by providing a m ore even distribution of economic
activity betw een the various regions, by utilizing the n atu ral
potentialities of each region. I t will also aim at controlling and
reducing unnecessary m igration, w ith its atte n d an t problem s.
O u r over-all planning, in short, will be designed to unify and
discipline econom ic activity. I t will expand the creative spirit of
the people by the tasks of responsibility th a t will be given them in
m anagem ent, supervision and invention.
Control from the top m ust ensure th a t individual executives
and adm inistrators do not m isinterpret policy and instructions
and break out of the co-ordinated p a tte rn w ith the introduction
of im provised schemes. As we proceed, it m ay be found th at
certain priorities m ay have to give way to others which m ay
present themselves as m ore urgent in relation to the needs of
capital form ation or strategic developm ent. Thus, while there
m ust be the strictest control to safeguard against unrelated over
spreading on any project, there m ust be a certain elasticity to
allow for em endation or adjustm ent w ithout upsetting the
general p lan and our budgeting.
O u r present budgetary and fiscal systems have been taken over

B U I L D I N G SOCIALISM IN G H A N A

123

from the colonial regim e and call for adjustm ent to the socialized
objective of our planning. These are being overhauled and
a d ap ted to our developm ent needs and the planned grow th of
our diversified agricultural and industrial base. O u r fiscal policy
m ust be so fram ed as to release the m axim um initiative and
husband our national financial resources for efficient and
effective investm ent in our developm ent. I t w ould sim ply defeat
our whole objective of economic independence, for instance, to
encourage foreign investm ent in our developm ent and see the
flight of capital from G h an a exceed or even approxim ate the
totality of such investm ent.
U n d er the new policy, surpluses m ust be pressed out of rising
production to finance developm ent. As the state sector widens,
developm ent finance will come less and less from taxes and dues,
though private enterprise, both foreign an d dom estic, will
continue to provide its quota through these avenues. O u r real
w ealth will come from increased productivity. This does not
m ean th a t every advance in productivity will lead to an im
m ediate rise in the stan d ard of living. This is especially the case in
the early stages of industrialization, w hen the need to plough
back capital for further developm ent is of p a ra m o u n t im
portance. W ages, however, m ust be set a t a level w hich will
provide proper diet a n d m aintain working energy, while the
increased productivity is used to give effective balance betw een
the desirability of capital developm ent and secondary industries
a t any given tim e.
T h e socialist objective implies the universal good of the
nation, and in the interests of th a t socialist objective it will be
necessary for all of us to forgo some im m ediate personal desire
for a greater benefit a b it later on. Speedier developm ent out of
surpluses or social services in the interest of the com m unity
confer m ore advantages upon a greater n um ber of people th an
would increased wages for certain groups of workers.
But as productivity rises appreciably and the socialist base of
the economy extends through increasing public ownership of the
m eans of production, the governm ent will not only be able to
m obilize a g reater surplus for use in the interests of the country,
b u t will be in a position to rew ard labour for its greater exertions
by increased wages.

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A F RI CA MUST U NI TE

I f our new economic and industrial policy is to succeed, there

m ust be a change of outlook am ong some of those who are
responsible for ru n n in g our affairs. T hey m ust acquire a socialist
perspective and a socialist drive keyed to the national needs and
dem ands. T he executives of our public and statutory organiz
ations m ust achieve a new attitu d e to their jobs, which they owe
to the struggles of the people and the labours of our farm ers and
workers. No economy, least of all a young one like ours struggling
to find a stable base, can afford to d rain its resources in sub
sidizing unproductive ventures from w hich only w ell-paid
executives profit. M oreover, it cannot afford to waste resources
in m en and m aterials, b u t m ust use them wisely in pursuit of the
socialist objective.
T he spirit of service to the nation m ust perm eate throughout
our society. In a daw n broadcast on 8 A pril 1961, 1 spoke of the
dangers arising from G h an aian public m en attem pting to com
bine business w ith political life, and w arned th a t those who
could not give entirely disinterested service should leave politics
or be throw n out. Legislation has since lim ited the am ount of
p roperty our public m en m ay own.
O u r profound need at the present tim e is for tolerably p ro
ficient technicians, capable of m anning, supervising and
m anaging our agricultural and industrial developm ents.
Necessarily, there m ust be a nucleus of m ore advanced graduates
to take over teaching jobs in these spheres and to provide us w ith
a corps of scientific knowledge w hich can sustain invention and
apply its learning to our extended developm ent. For the
m om ent, however, while we require advanced engineers,
physicists, scientists, bio-chemists, and others, the emphasis
cannot lie in this direction.
W e are having to devise an educational system th a t will
provide in the shortest possible tim e a body of skilled personnel
able to serve the countrys needs at all levels. T he U niversity of
G hana has been reform ed so th a t too m uch emphasis will not be
placed, as under the colonial adm inistration, on purely literary
and academ ic subjects. W hile we appreciate th at these are
necessary and desirable, they are a t this ju n ctu re in our national
life rath e r in the natu re of luxuries w hich we cannot afford to
indulge in as m uch as we should like.

B U I L D I N G SOCIALISM IN G H A N A

!25

I n accord w ith our needs, the governm ent has introduced free
an d com pulsory prim ary and m iddle school education, w ith the
view to the total literacy of the country by the tim e we celebrate
the tenth anniversary of our R epublic. W e have, unfortunately,
a shortage of teachers. T o m eet this shortage, em ergency training
centres have been established where volunteers can ob tain the
appropriate certificates; while the problem of in adequate
accom m odation is being coped w ith by the adoption of a shift
system in m any schools.
T h e study of science has been m ade com pulsory for all school
curricula, an d p rim ary technical schools are to be established.
These schools will be m anned by graduates and will operate
alongside the general p rim ary schools. T hey will give concurrent
training to boys and girls, so th a t by the tim e the pupil leaves
p rim ary school, the technical training gained will give sufficient
proficiency for semi-skilled work. T h e bright scholar can
continue his technical training together w ith his general studies
at secondary school to prepare him to com plete a short technical
course at one of our technological institutes.
T h e U niversity of G hana at Legon and the K w am e N krum ah
U niversity of Technology at K um asi and m any other colleges
an d institutes in various parts of the country cater for higher
education and research. T he G hana A cadem y of Sciences carries
out research in the sciences, history, languages, sociology,
m edicine, an d so on. T he w ork of these institutions is planned
and co-ordinated by the N ational Council for H igher Education.
T h e annual m eeting and report of the G hana A cadem y of
Sciences are m atters of national im portance, for they record
progress and outline plans for the future. W e attach considerable
im portance and pride to the title o f A cadem ician5, w hich is to be
recognized as one of the highest national aw ards.
T here are m any problem s for the solution of w hich we m ust
look to our scientific institutions. For instance, w ith m ore and
m ore cocoa com ing to glut the m arket, the Cocoa R esearch
Institute will tu rn its attention to setting up, w ithout any loss of
tim e, a dep artm en t for dealing w ith cocoa derivatives and their
uses. W e have, too, m any species of tim ber th a t are not being
utilized. This is a com plete waste and the T im b er U tilization
R esearch U n it is being tu rn ed into an institute, adequately

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A FRI CA MUST U NI TE

staffed so th a t it can cope w ith the problem and give effective

results. W e are faced w ith the task of producing crops for
conversion into comm odities, and m ust depend upon our
research institutes to assist us w ith the problem s involved. T he
dem ands th a t will be m ade upon our scientific institutions as we
proceed will grow m ore varied and extensive, and we shall have
to strengthen them .
O ne of our problem s a t the present tim e is th a t of unem ploy
m ent, p articularly am ong school-leavers whose education has
not gone very far. T o m eet this problem , we have form ed a
W orkers Brigade, w hich has absorbed about 12,000 young m en
an d wom en, who are being trained in discipline, responsibility
and citizenship. T hey are being given the elem ents of skill which
will enable them to find em ploym ent in agriculture and industry
as our developm ent gathers m om entum . T h eir training is m ean
w hile being supplem ented by valuable experience in work on
com m unity projects and in co-operative agriculture. T he V olta
R iver project will require 15,000 workers over a period of five
years and our official em ploym ent exchanges are now placing
alm ost 2,000 workers in all kinds of jobs every m onth.
W ith the changes brought by the new social and economic
policy, there has been a re-exam ination of the role of our trade
unions. T h e public and sem i-public sectors of the economy have
been w idening out, so th a t the governm ent is now the largest
em ployer of labour in the country, while its regulations are
placing an increasing obligation upon private enterprise not only
to respect the rights of labour b u t to m ake its contribution to the
investm ent in our national developm ent. T h e workers un d er
stand th a t they are working for a state w hich is directed by a
governm ent of their own choosing, whose program m e they have
helped to form ulate through p arty m em bership, and which they
actively endorse and support. H ence the aspirations of the people
and the economic and social objectives of the governm ent are
synonymous.
T h e role of the trade unions, therefore, in our circum stances, is
entirely different from th a t in a capitalist society where the
m otivating force is the accum ulation of private profit. T he aims
o f our trade unions, being identified w ith those of the govern
m ent, weds them to active participation in the carrying out of the

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127

governm ents program m e. W ithin the capitalist states, the trad e

unions play the role of watchdogs for labour against the em
ployers. Even so, they are by no m eans free. T h eir leaders are
bought off by the sweets of office and often have their secret
arrangem ents w ith employers. M ore th a n th at, they have for the
most p a rt accepted the ideology of their capitalist class and,
through its exposition throughout their extensive forums and the
w itch-hunting of those who do n ot conform , have openly
identified themselves w ith th a t ideology.
In such circum stances there cannot be any talk of freedom . In
G hana, the trad e unions are openly associated w ith the C on
vention Peoples P arty as one of its wings. T hey have no need to
hide this association behind hypocritical sophistries. T hey are, in
fact, draw ing the workers into the im plem entation of govern
m ent plans by setting up works councils inside the public enter
prises to give effective expression to their national consciousness.
For it is only through the consent of the people in action th a t
our target for national reconstruction can be achieved. In co
operation w ith the T rades U nion Congress, we are devising a
program m e o f productivity and w aste-avoidance incentives
w hich will include prom otions, decorations, cash bonuses and
publicity for individuals who have done exem plary work.
By the industry and exam ple of the G hana labour m ovem ent,
we hope to inspire other Africans still fighting colonialism. O u r
cruel colonial past and the present-day intrigues of neo
colonialism have ham m ered hom e the conviction th a t Africa
can no longer trust in anybody b u t herself and her resources.
Im perialism , having been forced out through the door by A frican
nationalism , is attem pting to re tu rn by other, back-door m eans.
African workers, as the likeliest victims of these infiltrations, m ust
be on their guard. T here is a constant endeavour to use the
A frican trad e union m ovem ent as a protagonist in the cold w ar
conflict, and some of the leaders, through flattery and the
acceptance of financial assistance for their unions, have allowed
themselves to be suborned. This is a dangerous situation as it can
drag Africa into active particip atio n in cold w ar politics and
deprive us of our safeguarding w eapon of independent n o n
alignm ent. U nfortunately, there are also some leaders of the
African independent states who cannot see this danger. M ore-

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AF RI CA MUST U N I TE

over, because of their alliances w ith E uropean powers, they are

obliged at times to act against the interests of their workers and
their trade unions in support of the alien interests in their
countries. T he A frican trade union m ovem ent m ust prom ote
the independence and welfare of the African w orker; it cannot
ru n the risk of subordinating the safety of African independence
and the needs of African developm ent to other, non-A frican
influences.
I see in the All-African T ra d e U nion Federation, because of
its independent A frican orientation, a dynam ic and positive
instrum ent for draw ing together the peoples of the African
countries. I t can act as a rallying pivot for all the African trade
union m ovem ents on the co n tin e n t; it can become an im m ediate
practical union, bringing together the labour m ovem ents
existing in the independent African states and leaving room for
others to jo in as they become free. W e in Africa m ust learn to
b a n d together to prom ote A frican interests or fall victims to
im perialist manoeuvres to re-colonize us.
T he developm ent of a united A frican trade union m ovem ent
will give our working classes a new A frican consciousness and the
right to express themselves in the councils of w orld labour u n
fettered by any foreign view and uncoerced by external force.
T h e In tern atio n al C onfederation of Free T rad e U nions and the
W orld Federation of T rad e U nions are organizations com m itted
to the ideological policies of W est and East. T he All-African
T ra d e U nion Federation will give the w orld a new force in
dependent of both of them , and loyal not only to the needs of the
new Africa and the new African, b u t also to the international
w orking class.
T he grow th of this new African trad e unionism is linked up
w ith the future of Africa. Such a dynam ic force, allied to
political action, is the surest m eans of routing out of our continent
the last rem nants of colonialism and exploitation, since it will
stim ulate the effectiveness of the nationalist m ovements.
J u s t as political independence could not have been attained
w ithout the leadership of a strong, disciplined party, so G h a n a s
economic independence and the objective of socialism cannot
be achieved w ithout decisive p arty leadership. I am convinced
th a t the C onvention Peoples Party, based as it is on the support

B U I L D I N G SOCIALISM IN G H A N A

129

of the overw helm ing m ajority of the people, is best able to carry
through our economic plans and build a socialist state. T he
structure of the C .P.P. has been built up out of our ow n ex
periences, conditions and environm ent. I t is entirely G h an aian
in content and A frican in outlook, though im bued w ith M arxist
socialist philosophy.
A t all stages, we seek the fullest co-operation of the people and
their organizations, and in this way, and through public control
of the m eans of production, we hope to evolve the truest kind of
dem ocracy w ithin the A ristotelian m eaning. By mass con
sultation we shall associate the people w ith the ru n n in g of the
n atio n s affairs, w hich m ust th en operate in the interests of the
people. M oreover, since control of the m odern state is linked up
w ith the control of the m eans of production and distribution,
true dem ocracy can only be said to exist w hen these have passed
into the hands of the people. For then the people exercise control
o f the State through their will as expressed in the direct con
sultation betw een governm ent an d them . T his m ust surely
provide the most concrete and clearest operation of true
dem ocracy.
T o a tta in this dem ocratic, socialist control, we have from
tim e to tim e to m ake a review o f the adm inistrative ap paratus a t
o ur disposal, rem em bering th a t it was originally bequeathed to
us by a colonial regim e com m itted to a very different purpose.
Even though this ap paratus has already been subjected to
considerable change, it still carries vestiges of inherited attitudes
and ways of thought w hich have been transm itted even to some
o f our new er institutions. In our adaptations, because we are
em barking upon an unch arted p ath , we m ay have to proceed
pragm atically. Changes w hich are m ade today m ay themselves
call for further change tom orrow . But w hen we are endeavouring
to establish a new kind of life w ithin a new kind of society, based
upon up-to-date modes of production, we m ust acknowledge the
fact th at we are in a period of flux and cannot afford to be hide
bound in our decisions and attitudes. W e m ust accom m odate our
m inds and attitudes to the need for constant ad aptation, never
losing sight of principle and our expressed social objective.
W ith this new approach to our econom ic and industrial
developm ent, every avenue of education and inform ation m ust

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AF RI CA MUST UNITE

be used to stir and nourish the political consciousness of the

people and m ake and keep them aw are of the welfare objectives
of the governm ents planning. W e m ust at all times ensure their
fullest support, w ithout which our plans for their enhanced well
being can fail. T hey m ust be refreshed by the elan which swept
them into the battle for political em ancipation in order to carry
through the m ore exacting battle for economic freedom and
advanced social progress.
Socialism needs socialists to build it. Accordingly, we are
taking positive steps to ensure th a t the p arty and the country
produce the m en and w om en who can handle our socialist
program m e.
Those m em bers who are to be in the forefront of the
educational drive take refresher courses in p arty political
teaching. T h e youth of the country are organized in the Y oung
Pioneers M ovem ent, w hich is designed to give them training in
citizenship w ithin a society w hich will be rooted in co-operation
and not acquisitive com petition. For this end Africa needs a new
type of citizen, a dedicated, m odest, honest and inform ed m an.
A m an who submerges self in service to the nation and m ankind.
A m an who abhors greed and detests vanity. A new type of m an
whose hum ility is his strength and whose integrity is his g reat
ness.
M em bers of the Young Pioneers take p a rt in educational and
cultural activities. T hey learn about the history of G hana and
Africa, and about the present political scene in Africa. T hey
have their choral and dram atic groups, and attend classes in
m any practical subjects. T hro u g h m anual work and self-help
schemes they are instilled w ith the idea of service. Physical
training, too, plays an im p o rtan t p a rt in the m ovem ent, to teach
the virtues of team work and the need to build healthy bodies and
m inds. Teachers and instructors are recruited directly from
schools and teacher training colleges for part-tim e w ork; others
are prepared a t the P a rty s training centre, the K w am e N krum ah
Institute at W inneba, which is responsible for the P arty s general
political education.
All, from m em bers of the C entral Com m ittee, M inisters and
high p arty officials to the lowest propagandist in the field, pass
through a course at the Institute. Farm ers, factory workers, and

B U I L DI N G SOCIALISM IN G HA N A

others from all walks of life m eet at W inneba, where they have
the opportunity to broaden their political knowledge and
ideological understanding. T hey strengthen their qualities of
loyalty and discipline, thereby increasing the total discipline of
the p arty and the loyalty of the general m em bership.
T he Institute does not cater for G hana alone. Its doors are
open to all from Africa and the w orld who seek knowledge to fit
themselves for the great freedom fight against im perialism , old or
new.
P arty study groups exist all over the country, in factories,
workshops, governm ent departm ents an d offices, in fact, in
every nook and cranny of G hana, for the study of A frican life and
culture, p arty ideology, decisions and program m es, and for
explaining governm ent policies and actions. For we have a
trem endous, herculean task before us. It calls for all our attention,
all our brains. O u r party, through all its m em bers, m ust show
its m erits in this our greatest mission yet, the building of a
socialist G hana, and the laying of the foundations for the
political and economic unification of Africa.

C H A P T E R F I F TE EN

TOWARDS

AFRICAN UNITY

T h e r e a r e those who m ain tain th a t Africa cannot unite

because we lack the three necessary ingredients for unity, a
com m on race, culture an d language. I t is true th a t we have for
centuries been divided. T h e territorial boundaries dividing us
were fixed long ago, often quite arbitrarily, by the colonial
powers. Some of us are Moslems, some C hristians; m any believe
in traditional, trib al gods. Some of us speak French, some
English, some Portuguese, not to m ention the millions who
speak only one of the hundreds of different African languages.
W e have acquired cultural differences which affect our outlook
an d condition our political developm ent.
All this is inevitable, due to our historical background. Yet in
spite of this I am convinced th a t the forces m aking for unity far
outw eigh those w hich divide us. In m eeting fellow Africans from
all parts of the continent I am constantly impressed by how m uch
we have in com m on. I t is not ju st our colonial past, or the fact
th a t we have aims in com m on, it is som ething which goes far
deeper. I can best describe it as a sense of one-ness in th a t we are
Africans.
In practical term s, this deep-rooted unity has shown itself in
the developm ent of Pan-Africanism , and, m ore recently, in the
projection of w hat has been called the African Personality in
w orld affairs.
T he expression T an-A fricanism did not come into use until
the beginning of the tw entieth century w hen H enry SylvesterW illiams of T rin id ad , and W illiam E dw ard B urghardt DuBois
of the U nited States of A m erica, both of African descent,
used it at several Pan-A frican Congresses which were m ainly
attended by scholars of A frican descent of the New W orld.

TOWARDS A F RI C A N U N I TY

133

A notable contribution to African nationalism and P a n

Africanism was the Back to A frica m ovem ent of M arcus
Garvey.
T he First Pan-A frican Congress was held in Paris in 1919
while the peace conference was in session. T h e French Prim e
M inister, C lem enceau, w hen asked w hat he thought of the
holding o f a Pan-A frican Congress, re m a rk e d : D ont advertise
it, b u t go ah ead . His reaction was fairly typical am ong E uropeans
at the tim e. T he very idea of Pan-A fricanism was so strange th a t
it seemed unreal an d yet a t the same tim e perhaps potentially
dangerous. Fifty-seven representatives from various A frican
colonies and from the U n ited States of A m erica and the W est
Indies attended. T hey drafted various proposals, though nothing
m uch cam e of them . For exam ple, they proposed th a t the allied
an d associated powers should establish a code of law for in te r
national protection of the natives of A frica.
T he Second Pan-A frican Congress was held in L ondon in
1921. T he British G overnm ent, if not sym pathetic, was tolerant,
and 113 delegates attended. This Congress, though far from
being truly representative of A frican opinion, nevertheless w ent
some w ay tow ards p u ttin g the A frican case to the world. In a
Declaration to the World, drafted at the closing session, it was
stated th a t the absolute equality of races, physical, political
and social, is the founding stone of world and h um an advance
m en t. T hey were m ore concerned in those days w ith social th an
w ith political im provem ent, not yet recognizing the pre-em ption
of the latte r in order to engage the form er.
Tw o years later, in 1923, a T h ird Pan-A frican Congress was
held in London. A m ong the resolutions passed was one w hich
asked for a voice for Africans in their own governm ents; and
another which asked for the rig h t of access to lan d and its
resources. T he political aspect of social justice was beginning to
be understood. But in spite of the work o f DuBois an d others,
progress was slow. T he m ovem ent lacked funds and m em bership
was lim ited. T he delegates were idealists ra th e r th a n m en of
action. How ever, a certain am ount of publicity was achieved,
and Africans and m en of African descent for the first tim e
gained valuable experience in working together.
A F ourth Pan-A frican Congress was held in New York in

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AF RI CA MUST UNITE

1927, w hich 208 delegates attended, b u t after th a t the m ove

m ent seemed to fade out for a tim e.
A non-party organization, the Intern atio n al A frican Service
Bureau, was set up in 1937, an d this was the forerunner of the
Pan-A frican Federation, the British section of the Pan-A frican
Congress m ovem ent. Its aim was to prom ote the well-being and
unity of A frican peoples and peoples of A frican descent through
out the w orld, and also to strive to co-operate betw een African
peoples and others who share our aspirations.
Pan-A fricanism and African nationalism really took concrete
expression w hen the Fifth Pan-A frican Congress m et in M an
chester in 1945. For the first tim e the necessity for well-organized,
firm ly-knit m ovem ents as a prim ary condition for the success of
the national liberation struggle in Africa was stressed.
T he Congress was attended by m ore th an two hundred dele
gates from all over the world. George Padm ore and I had been
jo in t secretaries of the organizational com m ittee which planned
the Congress and we were delighted w ith the results of our work.
A m ong the declarations addressed to the im perialist powers
asserting the determ ination o f the colonial people to be free
was the follow ing:
The Fifth Pan-African Congress calls on intellectuals and pro
fessional classes of the Colonies to awaken to their responsi
bilities. The long, long night is over. By fighting for trade union
rights, the right to form co-operatives, freedom of the press,
assembly, demonstration and strike, freedom to print and read
the literature which is necessary for the education of the masses,
you will be using the only means by which your liberties will be
won and maintained. Today there is only one road to effective
action - the organization of the masses.1
A definite program m e of action was agreed upon. Basically,
the program m e centred round the dem and for constitutional
change, providing for universal suffrage. T he m ethods to be
em ployed were based on the G andhist technique of non-violent
non-co-operation, in other words, the w ithholding of labour,
1 Declaration to the Colonial Peoples o f the World (by the present author),
approved and adopted by the Pan-African Congress held in M anchester,
E ngland, 15-21 O ctober 1945.

TOWARDS A F R I CA N U N I T Y

*35

civil disobedience and econom ic boycott. T here were to be

variations of emphasis from territory to territory according to the
differing circum stances. T he fundam ental purpose was id en tic a l:
national independence leading to A frican unity. T h e lim ited
objective was com bined w ith the w ider perspective.
Instead of a ra th e r nebulous m ovem ent, concerned vaguely
w ith black nationalism , the Pan-A frican m ovem ent h ad becom e
a n expression of A frican nationalism . U nlike the first four
Congresses, which h ad been supported m ainly by middle-class
intellectuals and bourgeois reformists, the Fifth Pan-A frican
Congress was atten d ed by workers, trade unionists, farm ers and
students, most of w hom cam e from Africa.
W hen the Congress ended, having agreed on the program m e
for Pan-A frican nationalism , a working com m ittee was set up
w ith DuBois as chairm an and m yself as general secretary. T he
Congress headquarters were m oved to London, w here shortly
afterw ards the W est A frican N ational S ecretariat was also
established. Its purpose was to p u t into action, in W est Africa,
the policies agreed upon in M anchester. I was offered, and
accepted, the secretaryship.
W e published a m onthly p ap er called The New African, an d
called two W est A frican Conferences in London. By this tim e
the political conscience of African students was thoroughly
aroused, and they talked of little else b u t the colonial liberation
m ovem ent. T he m ore enthusiastic am ong us form ed a kind of
inner group w hich we called The Circle. O nly those w orking
genuinely for W est A frican freedom and unity were adm itted,
and we began to prepare ourselves actively for revolutionary
work in any p a rt of the A frican continent.
I t was at this point th a t I was asked to re tu rn to the Gold
Coast to become general secretary of the U n ited G old Coast
C onvention. I accepted w ith some hesitation. T here was m y
work for the W est A frican N ational S ecretariat to consider, and
also the preparations w hich were being m ade for the calling of a
W est African N ational Conference in Lagos in O ctober 1948.
I called at Freetow n and M onrovia on the way hom e, and
spoke w ith A frican nationalists there, telling them of the con
ference plans and urging them to attend. T he political contacts
I m ade in both Sierra Leone and Liberia were to prove signi

136

A FRI CA MUST UNITE

ficant later, though the conference in Lagos never, in fact, took

place.
W hen I retu rn ed to W est Africa in 1947, it was w ith the
intention of using the G old Coast as a starting-off point for
A frican independence and unity. W ith the mass m ovem ent I
was able to build up in the C onvention Peoples Party, the Gold
Coast secured its freedom and em erged as the sovereign state of
G hana in 1957. I a t once m ade it clear th a t there w ould be no
m eaning to the national independence of G hana unless it was
linked w ith the total liberation of the A frican continent. W hile
our independence celebrations were actually taking place, I
called for a conference of all the sovereign states of Africa, to
discuss plans for the future of our continent.
T h e first Conference of Ind ep en d en t African States m et in
A ccra in A pril 1958. T here wrere th en only eight, nam ely, Egypt,
G hana, Sudan, Libya, T unisia, Liberia, M orocco and E thiopia.
O u r purpose was to exchange views on m atters of com m on
interest; to explore ways and m eans of consolidating and safe
guarding our independence; to strengthen the economic and
cultural ties betw een our countries; to decide on workable
arrangem ents for helping fellow Africans still subject to colonial
ru le; and to exam ine the central w orld problem of how to secure
peace.
W hen, on 15 A pril 1958, 1 welcomed the representatives to the
conference, I felt th a t at last Pan-A fricanism h ad m oved to the
A frican continent where it really belonged. I t was an historic
occasion. Free Africans were actually m eeting together, in
Africa, to exam ine and consider A frican affairs. H ere was a signal
d eparture from established custom , a j a r to the arrogant
assum ption o f non-A frican nations th a t A frican affairs were
solely the concern of states outside our continent. T h e African
personality was m aking itself known.
Because m any of the speeches m ade at the conference were
sim ilar in content, it was alleged in some quarters th at there had
been previous collaboration. I am able to state categorically th a t
all of us who spoke h ad prepared our speeches independently.
I f they showed identity of thought and belief, it was because our
attitudes in Africa were assum ing an identity of vision and
purpose.

TOWARDS A FR I C A N U NI T Y

137

T he A ccra Conference resulted, as indeed I hoped it w ould, in

a great upsurge of interest in the cause o f A frican freedom an d
unity. But m atters did not rest there. Some weeks after the con
ference ended some of m y colleagues and I set out on a tour of the
countries which took p a rt in the conference. O u r purpose was to
convey to the heads of states and governm ents, m any of w hom
were unable to atten d the conference personally, the good wishes
of the governm ent and people o f G hana.
Everyw here we w ent we were enthusiastically received, and
were able to discuss ways and m eans o f strengthening further the
ties of friendship betw een our respective countries. Plans to
im prove cultural and econom ic relations were the subject of a
series of com m uniques. O u r com m on background and basic
com m on interests drew us together.
T h e year 1958 was m em orable not only for the first conference
o f independent A frican states, b u t also for the opening of the
All-African Peoples Conference in A ccra in D ecem ber 1958.
Delegates from 62 A frican nationalist organizations attended
the conference.
T h e will to unity w hich the conference expressed was at least
equal to the determ ination to carry forw ard the process of in
dependence throughout Africa. T h e enthusiasm generated
am ong the delegates retu rn in g to their own countries profoundly
influenced subsequent developm ents. T h e Belgian Congo,
U ganda, T anganyika, N yasaland, K enya, the Rhodesias, South
Africa, all were affected by the com ing together in A ccra of
representatives of the various freedom m ovem ents o f the
continent. T he total liberation and the unity of the continent at
w hich we aim ed were evolving and gaining reality in the
experience of our international gatherings.
In N ovem ber 1959, representatives o f trade unions all over
Africa m et in A ccra to organize an All-A frican T rad e U nion
Federation. T h e A frican labour m ovem ent has always been
closely associated w ith the struggle for political freedom , as well
as w ith economic and social developm ent.
A further step forw ard in the direction of all-A frican co
operation took place a few m onths later w hen the conference to
discuss Positive A ction and Security in Africa opened in A ccra in
A pril i960. I t was called by the governm ent of G hana, in

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A FRI CA MUST UNITE

consultation w ith other independent African states, to consider

the situation in A lgeria and in South Africa, and also to discuss
a nd p lan future action to prevent Africa being used as a testing
ground for nuclear weapons. Equally im p o rtan t m atters to be
considered were the total liberation of Africa, and the necessity
to gu ard against neo-colonialism and balkanization, both of
which w ould im pede unity.
In m id -1960 a further conference of In dependent African
states, twelve in num ber, was held in Addis A baba, and yet
another all-A frican conference m et in Accra. T he latter, a con
ference of African wom en to discuss com m on problem s, opened
on 18 Ju ly . T he delegates spoke of freedom and unity, and of the
urgent need for social and economic progress.
W hile their conference was taking place, events in the newlyindependent Congo were causing one international crisis after
another. T he province of K atan g a was attem pting to secede
from the R epublic of Congo, and Patrice L um um ba, the
Congolese Prim e M inister, h a d asked for U nited N ations aid.
Some of the dangers of neo-colonialism and balkanization,
w hich we h ad foreseen, now becam e realities. Foreign business
interests, as well as policies connected w ith the cold w ar, began
to dom inate the Congo political scene and prevented early action
by the U nited N ations which, if it h ad been used to effect the
purpose for which it h ad been called in, could well have been
decisive in m aintaining the sovereignty of L u m u m b as govern
m ent.
I f at th a t tim e, J u ly 1960, the independent states of Africa h ad
been united, or h ad at least a jo in t m ilitary high com m and and a
com m on foreign policy, an A frican solution m ight have been
found for the Congo; and the Congo m ight have been able to
work out its own destiny, unhindered by any non-A frican
interference.
As it was, the position in the Congo steadily worsened, and all
the unrest and dangers of disunity becam e fully apparent. T he
only people to score from the situation were the neo-colonialists
and their allies in South Africa and the Rhodesias, who used
the struggle in the Congo as an argum ent to dem onstrate the
inability o f Africans to m anage their own affairs.
In a last m inute attem p t to save the situation, and to show

TOWARDS A F R I C A N U N I TY

139

some kind of African solidarity, a conference of independent

A frican states m et in Leopoldville from 25-30 August, at the
invitation of Patrice L um um ba. A t the conference, w hich was at
Foreign M inisters level, delegates aired their views on the Congo
crisis. A lthough the conference did not achieve its purpose, it
was significant in th a t it enabled the delegates to see for them
selves w hat was really going on in the Congo and to report on
this personally to their governm ents. A valuable object lesson,
however, on the im perative need for unity in defence of the
independence of Africa h ad been dem onstrated.
A gainst a background of continuing struggle in the Congo,
and of trouble in South Africa, Algeria, and other parts of the
continent, an All-African Peoples Conference m et in C airo
early in 1961. A bout two h u n d red delegates attended. T he
conference w arned independent African states to bew are of neo
colonialism, w hich was associated w ith the U nited K ingdom , the
U nited States of A m erica, France, W estern G erm any, Israel,
Belgium, the N etherlands, and South Africa. I t also w arned
states to be on their g u ard against im perialist agents in the guise
of religious or philanthropic organizations. Resolutions included
a call to the anti-im perialist bloc to help in the developm ent of
African economies by granting long-term loans at low interest
rates to be p aid in local currencies. T hey dem anded the ex
pulsion of South Africa from the U nited N ations O rganization;
the dismissal of M r H am m arskjold; the im m ediate release of
Jo m o K e n y a tta ; the im m ediate independence of the Rhodesias
and the dissolution of the C entral A frican Federation. T he
conference also called for a trade boycott of the Rhodesias;
criticized policies in Angola, C am eroon and the Congo, and
affirm ed th a t M . G izengas regim e in Stanleyville was the
legitim ate Congo governm ent.
As the years go by, further All-African Peoples Conferences
will take place, and their resolutions an d declarations will
become increasingly significant as they gain m ore power. O th er
all-African gatherings will continue to m ake their impression,
w hether they are held to discuss political, social or economic
problem s. H ardly a week goes by w ithout news of some gathering
together of Africans from different parts of the continent. As the
whole of Africa becomes free, these gatherings will gain in

140

A FRI CA MUST UNITE

m em bership, strength and effectiveness. But it is only w hen full

political unity has been achieved th a t we will be able to declare
the triu m p h a n t end of the Pan-A frican struggle and the African
liberation m ovem ents.

C HA P T E R SIXTEEN

SOME ATTEMPTS

AT U N IFIC A TIO N

step tow ards A frican political union was taken on

23 N ovem ber 1958, w hen G h an a and the R epublic of G uinea
united to form a nucleus for a U nion of A frican States. W e
established a system of exchange of resident m inisters, who were
recognized as m em bers of both the governm ent of G hana an d the
governm ent of G uinea.
T he following year, in J u ly 1959, the Presidents of Liberia and
G uinea, and I, m et at Sanniquellie to discuss the whole question
of African em ancipation and unity. A t the end of our talks we
issued a D eclaration of Principles, in w hich we stated th a t the
nam e of our organization w ould be the C om m unity of I n
dependent A frican States. M em bers of the C om m unity would
m aintain their own national identity and constitutional
stru c tu re ; and each m em ber o f the C om m unity w ould agree not
to interfere in the internal affairs o f any other m em ber. T h e
general policy of the C om m unity would be to build up a free and
prosperous A frican C om m unity for the benefit of its peoples,
and the peoples of the world. T he policy w ould be founded on the
m aintenance of diplom atic, economic and cultural relations, on
a basis o f equality and reciprocity, w ith all the states of the w orld
w hich adopted positions com patible w ith A frican interests. O ne
of its m ain objectives would be to help A frican territories not yet
free to gain their independence.
M em bership o f the C om m unity was declared open to all
independent A frican states an d federations, an d any n on
independent country of Africa was given the right to jo in the
C om m unity on a ttain m en t of independence. T he m otto adopted
for the C om m unity was i n d e p e n d e n c e a n d u n i t y .
O n 24 D ecem ber i9 6 0 1 m et President Sekou T oure of G uinea
and President M odibo K eita of M ali a t Conakry, w ith the result
T he f ir s t

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AF RI CA MUST UNITE

th a t a special com m ittee m et in A ccra from 13 to 18 J a n u a ry

i960 to form ulate proposals for a G hana-G uinea-M ali Union*
T h e three of us had a further series of m eetings in Accra from
27 to 29 A pril 1961, and agreed upon a C harter.
O u r U nion was nam ed T h e U nion of African States (U.A.S.)
an d was to form the nucleus of the U nited States of Africa. I t was
declared open to every state or federation of A frican states which
accepted its aims and objectives. Articles 3 and 4 of the C harter
contained the aims and activities of the U nion, and I quote them
below in fu ll:
Article 3. The aims of the Union of African States (U.A.S.) are
as follows:
to strengthen and develop ties of friendship and fraternal co
operation between the M ember States politically, diplo
matically, economically and culturally;
to pool their resources in order to consolidate their independence
and safeguard their territorial integrity; to work jointly to
achieve the complete liquidation of imperialism, colonialism
and neo-colonialism in Africa and the building up of African
Unity;
to harmonize the domestic and foreign policy of its Members, so
that their activities may prove more effective and contribute
more worthily to safeguarding the peace of the world.
Article 4. The Unions activities shall be exercised mainly in the
following fields:
a. Domestic Policy. The working out of a common orientation of
the States.
b. Foreign Policy. The strict observance of a concerted diplomacy,
calculated to achieve closer co-operation.
c. Defence. The organization of a system of joint defence, which
will make it possible to mobilize all the means of defence at
the disposal of the State, in favour of any State of the Union
which may become a victim of aggression.
'
d. Economy. Defining a common set of directives relating to
economic planning, aiming at the complete decolonization
of the set-ups inherited from the colonial system, and organiz
ing the development of the wealth of their countries in the
interest of their peoples.
e. Culture. The rehabilitation and development of African cul
ture, and frequent and diversified cultural exchange.

SOME ATTEMPTS AT U NI F I CA T I ON

143

T h e C harter also provides for regular conferences betw een the

H eads of State of the U nion. In fact the suprem e executive organ
of the U nion is the Conference, w hich meets once a q u a rte r in
A ccra, Bam ako and Conakry, respectively, and is presided over
by the H ead of State o f the host country. A t these conferences we
exchange views on African and w orld problem s, and see how we
can best strengthen and w iden our U nion.
A fter the second sum m it conference of U .A .S. held a t Bam ako
on 26 J u n e 1961, we issued a jo in t com m unique in w hich we
reaffirm ed our determ ination to continue to support the A frican
peoples in their struggle for national liberation, p articularly in
A lgeria, the Congo, and A ngola. O n the problem of the E uro
p ean C om m on M arket we agreed on a com m on policy, and
decided to take jo in t action in order to establish an A frican
C om m on M arket.
O u r conferences have been characterized by an identity o f
view on m ost of the problem s exam ined an d an atm osphere o f
perfect understanding. T hey have been followed by m eetings of
official representatives from our different countries to exam ine
ways and m eans for giving effective realization to our decisions,
out of w hich recom m endations are being m ade a n d action
endorsed. This shows clearly the w orkability of union betw een
A frican states. I t is m y great hope th a t the U .A .S. m ay prove to
be the successful pilot scheme w hich will lead eventually to full
continental unity.
T h e ultim ate goal of a U n ited States of Africa m ust be kept
constantly in sight am idst all the perplexities, pressures and
cajoleries w ith w hich we shall find ourselves confronted, so th at
we do not perm it ourselves to be distracted or discouraged by the
difficulties and pitfalls which undoubtedly lie ahead.
D uring 1961 sharp differences appeared betw een the so-called
C asablanca an d M onrovia groups of states. T h e C asablanca
states, com prising G hana, G uinea, M ali, Libya, Egypt, M orocco
and the A lgerian F.L .N . m et from 3 to 7 J a n u a ry 1961 in the
M oroccan capital. T he delegations of G hana, G uinea, M ali
and Egypt were led by their H eads of State, the A lgerian
Provisional G overnm ent by F e rh at A bbas, an d Libya by her
Foreign M inister. Ceylon sent their am bassador in C airo, M r
A. C. Pereira, as an observer. T he conference was convened by

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A F RI CA MUST UNI TE

the late K ing M oham m ed V of M orocco, who was chairm an,

and the th en Crow n Prince led the M oroccan delegation.
T h e central them e o f the conference was the situation in the
Congo, and the failure of the U nited N ations to deal w ith it by
effectively enforcing its own resolutions. I t was agreed th a t the
states should w ithdraw their troops from the Congo unless the
U .N . com m and acted im m ediately to support the central govern
m en t; M o b u tu s arm y should be disarm ed; all Belgians and
others not u n d er U .N . com m and should be expelled; and the
Congo P arliam ent reconvened.
A m ong other im p o rtan t decisions reached were those con
cerned w ith A lgeria, the French testing of atom ic bom bs in the
S ahara, and the whole question of apartheid. In general, the
conference reaffirm ed, an d undertook to im plem ent, the
decisions taken a t the B andung, A ccra, M onrovia and Addis
A baba conferences, w hen it was agreed to impose transport bans
and boycotts on South Africa.
But perhaps the most far-reaching result of the C asablanca
Conference was the publication o f the African C harter of
C asablanca. This established a p erm anent A frican C on
sultative Assembly, an d three p erm anent functional com
m ittees: the first, political, com prising H eads o f S tate; the
second, economic, com prising M inisters of Econom ic Affairs;
and the th ird , cultural, consisting of M inisters of E ducation. A
jo in t A frican H igh C om m and, composed of the Chiefs of Staff of
the independent A frican nations, was also provided for in the
C harter. T hey were to m eet periodically w ith a view to ensuring
the com m on defence of Africa in case of aggression against any
p a rt of the continent, and w ith a view to safeguarding the in
dependence o f A frican states.
T he C h arter ended:
W e , th e H e a d s o f A fric a n S ta te s, c o n v e n e d in C a s a b la n c a
fro m th e 3 rd J a n u a r y to th e 7 th J a n u a r y , 1961, re a ffirm o u r
fa ith in th e C o n fe re n c e o f I n d e p e n d e n t A fric a n S tate s, h e ld in
A c c ra in 1958, a n d in A d d is A b a b a in i9 6 0 , a n d a p p e a l to a ll
I n d e p e n d e n t A fric a n S ta te s to asso ciate th em selv es w ith o u r
c o m m o n a c tio n for th e c o n s o lid a tio n o f lib e rty in A fric a a n d th e
b u ild in g u p o f its u n ity a n d se c u rity . W e so le m n ly re a ffirm o u r
u n s h a k e a b le a d h e re n c e to th e U n ite d N a tio n s C h a r te r a n d to th e

SOME ATTEMPTS AT U NI F I CA T I ON

145

Declaration of the Afro-Asian Conference held in Bandung,

with the aim of promoting co-operation among all the people of
the world, and of consolidating international peace.
In m y speech a t the closing session of the conference, I w arned
against the dangers of delay in achieving u n ity :
I can see no security for African states unless African leaders,
like ourselves, have realized beyond all doubt that salvation for
Africa lies in unity . . . for in unity lies strength, and as I see it,
African states must unite or sell themselves out to imperialist and
colonialist exploiters for a mess of pottage, or disintegrate
individually.
C ertain sections of the foreign press gave great publicity to the
C asablanca conference. Some saw in it a step forw ard on the way
to u n ity; others seemed to take great delight in pointing out th a t
only a handful of A frican states attended, and it could therefore
not be regarded as truly representative of African opinion.
N igeria, T unisia, E thiopia, L iberia, Sudan, T ogoland,
Som alia, In d ia and Indonesia were all, in fact, invited to the
conference. French C om m unity states, w hich coalesced round
the meetings in A bidjan a n d Brazzaville a t the end of i960, were
not asked. T here seemed, therefore, some justification for the
view th a t three different blocs were em erging in Africa.
T his view received added support w hen the M onrovia
Conference took place in M ay 1961. T he sponsors of the con
ference were Cam eroon, L iberia, N igeria, an d T ogoland. O u t
of the twenty-seven independent A frican states tw enty sent
delegations, and fifteen of them were led by Presidents and Prim e
M inisters. T he President of Liberia was elected chairm an.
T h e seven absentees were G hana, G uinea, M ali, M orocco,
Egypt, S udan and the Congo. T he Congo h ad not been invited,
because of the lack of settled governm ent there.
F our m ain topics were discussed, nam ely, ways an d m eans to
achieve better understanding and co-operation and ways of
prom oting unity in A frica; threats to peace an d stability in
A frica; the establishm ent of special m achinery to w hich A frican
states m ight refer in case of disputes am ongst them selves; and the
possible contribution of African states to w orld peace. I t was

146

A F RI CA MUST UNITE

agreed th a t a technical commission should m eet at D akar to

draw up plans for co-operation in research, com m unications,
a n d so o n ; and principles for a perm anent association were
agreed. These included the principle of non-interference in the
dom estic affairs of other independent states; the political
equality of all independent A frican states; freedom to accept or
reject political unions, and respect for the territorial integrity of
all states.
I n m ore detailed resolutions the conference condem ned
South Africa, supported independence for Algeria, pledged
loyalty to the U n ited N ations, offered assistance to the A ngolan
nationalists, and condem ned all nuclear tests.
Both the C asablanca and M onrovia conferences resulted in
m eetings o f experts to consider detailed plans for economic co
operation am ong the respective m em bers. Experts of the
C asablanca countries, m eeting in Conakry, recom m ended the
ending of customs barriers over five years from 1 J a n u a ry 1962,
an d the ending of quota systems and preferential treatm ent from
the same date. T hey also proposed the creation of a Council of
A frican Econom ic U n ity (C .U .E .A .) and an African develop
m ent b an k ; and suggested the form ation of jo in t air and shipping
lines.
Experts of the M onrovia group, m eeting at D akar, also dis
cussed the setting up of an A frican developm ent bank. T hey
recom m ended the prom otion of trade betw een African countries
by regional customs unions, and the progressive establishm ent of
com m on external tariffs. Am ong other suggestions were the
harm onization of developm ent policies, including investm ent
codes an d conventions, an investm ent and guarantee fund, the
exchange of economic inform ation, and the co-ordination of
research program m es. I t was agreed th a t a netw ork o f roads and
railways should be built to link the countries together, and jo in t
shipping an d air-lines form ed. T hey agreed, also, to co-operate
in educational schemes and to adopt com m on standards.
T h e fundam ental sim ilarity of aims betw een those who m et at
C asablanca and Conakry and those who m et at M onrovia and
D akar are a p p aren t from a study of the resolutions passed and
recom m endations adopted. Both aim ultim ately at some kind of
unity. T h e C asablanca powers are convinced th a t political unity

SOME ATTEMPTS AT U N I F I CA TI ON

147

should come first, as the necessary prelude to the creation of the

extended field for w hich integrated plans for developm ent in the
econom ic an d social spheres can be w orked out. T h eir belief in
the im portance o f p u ttin g political aims first is strengthened by
experience in their own countries, w here political independence
h a d to be achieved before economic reconstruction could be
taken in hand.
T here m ay be some significance in the fact th a t M onrovia,
which has given its nam e to the group th a t attaches priority to
economic associations, is the capital of the one country on the
A frican continent which has not h a d to fight a battle for its
political sovereignty. Nevertheless, L iberia has h a d ruggedly to
hold its national integrity and viability against the territorial
and economic encroachm ents of outside powers throughout its
som ew hat chequered history, and m ust m any times have wished
for the help th a t its colonialized neighbours were then unable to
give.
In spite of the very real difference o f approach betw een the
two groups to the vital issue o f unity, it cannot be said th a t there
is a rigid division betw een us. O n the contrary, every oppor
tun ity and m eans are used for cordial intercourse an d useful dis
cussion. For exam ple, the Prim e M inister of N igeria enjoyed a
very friendly visit to G uinea in D ecem ber 1961. A t about the
same tim e, we welcomed to G hana the President of M au ritan ia,
a- country w hich our C asablanca colleague, M orocco, did not
then recognize.
In D ecem ber i960 His Im p erial M ajesty H aile Selassie I,
E m peror o f Ethiopia, visited G hana. In the com m unique issued
at the end o f the visit it was declared th a t the H eads of State of
G h an a and E thiopia a g re e d : T h a t a U nion of the A frican States
is a necessity which should be pursued energetically in the
interests of A frican solidarity and security.
President A bdulla O sm an of Som alia expressed sim ilar views
on unity during his official visit to G h an a in O ctober 1961. In a
jo in t com m unique we reaffirm ed our faith and belief in African
unity as the most reliable safeguard against neo-colonialism and
the balkanization of the African continent.
In a world divided into hostile cam ps and w arring factions,
Africa cannot stand divided w ithout going to the wall. Patrice

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A F RI CA MUST UNITE

L um um ba, who h ad seen and suffered from the evils of disunity

in the Congo, held this view very strongly w hen he cam e to
Accra in A ugust i960. I t m ay not be generally known th at he
agreed then to work in the closest possible association w ith other
independent African states for the establishm ent of a U nion of
African States.
T here are bound to be differences betw een the independent
states o f Africa. W e have frontier troubles, and a host o f other
inter-territorial problem s w hich can only be resolved w ithin
the context of African unity.
A t the Lagos conference of independent states, held in J a n u a ry
1962, N orth Africa was not represented a t all. This was because
the A lgerian provisional governm ent was not invited. T h e Casa
blanca powers, and the Sudan, also declined to go to Lagos for
this reason. Nevertheless, w ith the Congo an d T anganyika
taking the place of T unisia and Libya, the Lagos attendance was
as large as th a t at M onrovia, 20 of A fricas 28 independent states
being represented.
T h e conference agreed upon a whole new complex m achinery
for inter-A frican co-operation. I t included a sem i-perm anent
council of m inisters, a biennial representative assembly, and a
perm anent secretariat of the A frican an d M alagasy states.
A m ong resolutions passed were those calling for a developm ent
bank, a private investm ent guarantee fund, an organization for
health, labour and social affairs, an educational and cultural
council, and certain other commissions to deal w ith various
practical m atters.
In the early flush of independence, some of the new African
states are jealous of their sovereignty and tend to exaggerate
their separatism in a historical period th a t dem ands A fricas
unity in order th at their independence m ay be safeguarded. I
cannot envisage an A frican union in w hich all the m em bers,
large or small, heavily or thinly populated, do not enjoy legal
equality under a constitution to which all have laid their hand.
But the insistence on not w anting to cede certain functions to a
central unifying political authority in w hich all the m em bers
will have an equal voice is unrealistic and unfounded. O n the
other hand, an association of a confederate or even looser nature,
w hich does not give effective powers to a central authority and

SOME ATTEMPTS AT U N I F I C A TI ON

149

determ ine those to be left to the sovereign states, can leave the
w ay open for the dom ination of the sm aller and weaker m em bers
by larger and stronger ones.
G hana has declared her stand in no u n certain term s. W e have
provided in our republican constitution for the surrender of our
sovereignty, in whole or in p a rt, in the w ider interests of A frican
unity. G uinea has m ade the same provision. So have M ali,
T unisia an d the U nited A rab R epublic. Every A frican m ust
ju d g e for him self which view is the m ore progressive and
realistic; w hich is dedicated fully to the practical needs and
interests of Africa, unrestrained by fear of external pressures;
and w hich reflects the true voice of Africa.

C H A P T E R S EV EN TE EN

E C O N O M IC AND PO LIT IC A L
I N T E G R A T I O N : A F R I C A S N E E D

A f r i c a , it is frequently m aintained, is poor. Yet it is widely

acknowledged th a t its potentials provide trem endous possi

bilities for the w ealthy grow th of the continent, already known
to contain vast m ineral and pow er resources. T h e economic
weakness of the new African states has been inherited from the
colonial background, w hich subordinated their developm ent to
the needs of the colonial powers. T o reverse the position and
bring Africa into the realm of highly productive m odem
nations, calls for a gigantic self-help program m e. Such a pro
gram m e can only be produced and im plem ented by integrated
planning w ithin an over-all policy decided by a continental
authority.
T h e superstructure o f colonial particularism upon A fricas
subsistence economies, has resulted in a highly uneven regional
developm ent of the continent. O n the whole, the coastal areas,
the m ining regions, and the highland areas where soil and clim ate
are good, have been exploited w ithin the lim itations of colonial
requirem ents for raw m aterials. Areas requiring m ore pre
exploitation study an d com paratively higher capital invest
m ents were left m ore or less untouched. H ence there are in
Africa huge areas of practically virgin land which, for these
reasons and from geographical considerations, it has up till
now been thought useless to try to develop. W ithin the confine
m ent of these lim itations Africa has, however, m anaged to
produce from its agriculture the following percentages of the
w orld supplies, according to the 1954 figures:1
66% cocoa; 58% sisal; 65% palm oil; 26% groundnuts;
14% coffee; 11 % olive oil.
1 Economic Development in Africa 1954-5. U .N . & F.A .O . Report.

ECONOMICAL AND P OL I T I C A L I N T E G R A T I O N

15 1

Considerable am ounts of barley, wool, cotton, m aize, tea,

rubber, tobacco, w heat, p yrethrum , cloves an d rice are also
produced.
I n m ineral production, ou r continent provided, according to
U n ited N ations O rganization findings for 19561, the following
proportions of the w orlds o u tp u t:
96% of gem diam onds (excluding U .S .S .R .); 69% cobalt;
63% gold; 48% antim ony; 37% m anganese; 34% chrom ite;
32% phosphate rock; 24% copper; 19% asbestos; 15% tin ;
4% iron ore; 4% bauxite.
N igeria produces 85% of the w orlds supply of colum bite. G hana
is the second largest m anganese producer in the world.
In addition, Africa possesses some of the w orlds greatest
know n reserves of u ranium ore, and this m ay m ake possible the
relatively early introduction of nuclear-electrical plants. As well
as the know n deposits a t Shinkolobwe in the Congo, reserves of
fissionable raw m aterials have been found in G hana, N igeria,
R hodesia, N yasaland, M ozam bique, M adagascar, various parts
of the form er French tropical territories, and in E thiopia.
Pow er resources are no less impressive. Africa has the greatest
w ater pow er potential in the w orld. M ost of it lies w ithin the
tropical area, the Congo having 21.6% of the w orld total. A ctual
installed capacity, however, is only about 1% of the w orld total.
G hana has m ade a start on the V olta R iver project. T here are
new projects on the K onkoure in G uinea, on the K ouilou in
form er French E quatorial Africa, an d a dam is envisaged a t the
Inga falls in the lower Congo. H ydro-electrical developm ent has
taken place on the Sanaga a t Edea in C am eroon, at Boali
n ear N abui, and on the Djou n ear Brazzaville. In the Congo,
there are hydro-electrical developm ents on the Lufira an d
L ualaba rivers, and on the Inkisi. M ention m ust also be m ade of
the projects on the D ande, C atum bela and Cunene rivers in
A ngola; and on the Revue river in M ozam bique. In East and
C entral Africa there are the O w en falls dam and the K a rib a
dam .
Coal an d iron ore are necessary for industrialization. Africa
1 Economic Survey o f Africa since 1950. Published 1959.

152

A F RI CA MUST UNI TE

has coal reserves estim ated at 4,500 m illion tons. Coal of coking
q uality is m ined at W ankie in Southern R hodesia and low grade
coal is m ined in N igeria, the Congo and M ozam bique. In
addition, coal is know n to exist in T anganyika, N orthern
Rhodesia, M adagascar and N yasaland. Iro n ore is m ined in
Southern R hodesia, Liberia, G uinea and Sierra Leone. W hen
a full geological survey is carried out, further deposits m ay be
found. New oil deposits are also suspected. M eanw hile, oil has
been discovered in the S ahara, N igeria, the G abon basin and
near L u an d a in Angola. T h e French G overnm ent certainly
seem ed to be im pressed w ith the S ahara potentialities, to judge
from the im portance attached to them in negotiating the A lgerian
peace settlem ent. O il prospecting has been going on in G hana,
Som alia, E thiopia, Z anzibar, T anganyika, M ozam bique, and
M adagascar. In recent years a m ethane gas deposit w ith a heatproducing potential equal to 50 m illion m etric tons of coal was
reported b eneath Lake K ivu.
All these are know n resources, an d they are by no m eans in
considerable. W h at econom ic possibilities will be opened up as
our whole continent is surveyed and its economic exploitation
tackled on a total basis, there is no telling. From our experience
in G hana, w here we have already discovered m any new re
sources, wre can anticipate th a t the economic potentialities of
A frica m ust be imm ense.
O n the agricultural plane, too, Africa is estim ated to have a
vast unused potential. Crop, anim al-breeding and pest-control
experim ents are being carried out w hich will undoubtedly result
in higher and m ore varied output. In the tim ber industry, trials
are being m ade w hich should lead to a big expansion. Africa
contains about 27% of the total world forest area, and not enough
profitable use has so far been m ade of it. Some thirty species of
trees are now being regularly accepted in the world m arkets and
successful tests have been carried out in the pulping of m ixed
tropical woods. A pilot pulp and pap er mill has been established
n ear A bidjan, and there are expectations of the increased use of
tropical woods for plywood an d press wood.
So m uch was neglected u nder colonialism th a t w ould even
have benefited the im perialist interests, if their concern had not
been lim ited to developing the best land, the most lucrative

ECONOMIC AND P OL I T I C A L I N T E G R A T I O N

I53

mines, the harbours and towns connected w ith their econom ic

engagem ents. T hey w anted quick and easy returns, and would
not occupy themselves w ith w hat appeared to be less prom ising
areas of exploitation.
O u r African view is different. T here is no single p a rt of the
African continent w hich is not precious to us and our develop
m ent. A nd w ith the technological resources available today,
w hat would form erly have been regarded as m iraculous can now
be done w ith the help of scientific aids, provided the m eans are
there. N ow adays even clim ate is not regarded as an impossible
im pedim ent to economic progress, and certainly not drought.
A bout two-fifths of tropical Africa is steppe or desert; at least
one-third is savannah country w ith a seasonal rainfall. A t first
sight, this m ay seem unprom ising, b u t the problem s presented
can be overcome to some extent by large-scale irrigation and
suitable afforestation.
Soil, of course, presents special problem s. M uch of the soil in
rain forest and savannah areas is poor. But a lot can be done to
im prove it. Artificial m anures, com posting, litter-farm ing, green
m anuring, can be em ployed. T he grow th of m ixed farm ing has
been held up by the tsetse fly. Full control of the tsetse can only
be achieved, like th a t of the anopholes m osquito (the b earer of
m alaria), on a continental scale, since insect pests are no
respecters of territorial boundaries. W ith the elim ination of the
tsetse, m ixed farm ing could go ahead, an d anim als could then
supply the restorative m anures to our soil.
T here is indeed a vast horizon of im provem ent w aiting upon
developm ent in Africa. T he N iger river inland delta scheme an d
the G ezira scheme in the Sudan, for exam ple, m ight be greatly
extended. Irrig atio n w ork could be carried out along the
G am bia, Senegal, Rufiji, T a n a , an d Zam besi rivers, an d in the
Lake C had basin. Im m ense advances could be m ade in the w ay
o f controlling the flow of sm aller stream s, the digging of shallow
surface reservoirs, an d the bunding of flat areas to reduce ru n
off an d increase soak-in during the rain y seasons. Sw am p areas
such as the Bahr el G hazal region in the U p p er Nile, the Bangw eulu swam p in N orthern Rhodesia and the O kovanggo swam p
in B echuanaland, could be thoroughly explored to see if, w ith
suitable treatm ent, they cannot be tu rn ed into useful agricultural

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AF RI CA MUST U NI TE

areas. In N orthern Rhodesia alone, the six largest swamps total

13,754 square miles, or six per cent of the total area. In rain
forest regions, m echanical trench diggers m ight be m ade m ore
use of, to im prove drainage. M ango trees could be cut out, and
fields bunded and sown w ith rice. Efforts in this direction are
being m ade in Sierra Leone. Experience gained there could be
profitably p u t a t the disposal of other A frican countries w ith
sim ilar problem s.
A n essential p a rt of w hat is today term ed the infrastructure of
developm ent is com m unications. L ord L ugard, a pioneer carrier
of the white m an s b u rd en , said th a t the m aterial developm ent
of Africa m ay be sum m ed up in one w ord - tran sp o rt.1 A lthough
this is obviously an over-sim plication, the developm ent of tra n
sport on a continental basis is vital to African intercourse and
econom ic advancem ent. W h at Africa really requires is a fully
integrated transport system for the continent, properly planned
by a central organization, w hich will exam ine the relative
potentials and economics of road, rail, river, air and sea systems
in correlation w ith an over-all p lan for inter-A frican trade and
progressive economic and social developm ent. A t the present
tim e, com m erce and the exchange of goods betw een A frican
countries is small. Colonialism in terru p ted the interchange th at
existed before its incursion and subsequently all forms of com
m unication - roads, railways, harbours - were pointed outw ards,
the necessary auxiliary arm s for transporting raw m aterials
from their African sources to their E uropean convertors overseas.
These com m unications are now proving inadequate to m eet
the increasing dem ands being m ade upon them by the expanding
traffic th a t independence has brought. All over Africa, harbours,
railways, roads and airports have becom e greatly overburdened
in recent years.
W hen we talk about these com m unications looking outw ard,
m ore is m eant th an th a t they point tow ards the coasts and over
seas. Railw ays were deliberately constructed for taking goods
to ports planned an d equipped for on-board ship-loading rath er
th an for both loading and unloading. T hus most of our existing
railw ays still consist of single track routes w ith a few branch and
connecting lines. T hey were designed by the colonial powers to
1 L ord L ugard: The Dual Mandate in Tropical Africa, Blackwood 1922, p. 5.

ECONOMIC AND P OL I T I C A L I N T E G R A T I O N

I55

link m ining areas or to carry cash crops and raw m aterials from
collection points to the ports for export. Farm ers h ad to find their
own m eans of getting crops to the collecting centres. G hana and
N igeria are better served w ith railways th a n m ost parts of Africa,
each having m ain eastern and w estern lines w hich are linked
together. G h an aian railways handle some two m illion tons a
year, m ore th a n the com bined lines of form er F rench W est
Africa, b u t less th a n i per cent of the tonnage carried in the
U nited K ingdom . R oads, too, are quite inadequate to m eet the
growing needs of em ergent Africa. T he cost of m aking them is
high, and the building of a continent-w ide system w ould have to
be centrally planned and financed.
T h e clim ate and geography of Africa present special problem s
for the construction and m aintenance of both roads and railways.
But these difficulties could be surm ounted w ithin the fram e
work of a plan for over-all A frican developm ent, w hich w ould set
aside reserves of funds an d m aterials for the purpose. Such a vast
scheme would, naturally, take tim e to com plete an d priorities
w ould certainly be necessary to secure speedier fulfilm ent at
points of developm ent vital to the corporate progress of the
continent. But w ith the will to attack and overcom e the m any
problem s and their involvem ents, the real opening u p of Africa
will begin. A nd this tim e it will be by the Africans for the
Africans.
This contention is supported by the exam ple of the U nited
States. A m ericas real expansion began w ith her union, w hich
assisted the building up of a vast netw ork of railways and roads,
so th a t D. W . Brogan, a n accepted authority on A m erican
political history, after rem arking th a t in A m erica, regions as
unlike as N orw ay and A ndalusia are united under one govern
m ent, speak a com m on language, regard themselves as p a rt of
one n atio n , is able to assert: This unity is reinforced by the
most elaborate tran sportation system in the w orld, a system the
elaboration of w hich has been m ade possible by the political
un ity .1
Ports an d w aterw ays are no less im p o rtan t th a n good roads
and railways. Africa has the shortest coastline in relation to its
1 D. W . Brogan: U .S.A .: An Outline o f the Country, its People and Institutions,
Oxford U niversity Press, p. 9.

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AF RI CA MUST UNITE

size o f any continent b u t it is not so fortunate w ith its n atu ral

harbours. W e do have a few excellent artificial ports, and
facilities exist for m ore. N otable am ong them are those at
M onrovia and T em a. O lder ports include D akar, Freetown,
Lagos, D ar-es-Salaam , M om basa, Beira, M atad i, Port H a r
court, an d A lexandria, to nam e only some. A m ong ports which
have recently been greatly im proved is C onakry in G uinea.
T here is need for the building of new ports and the im provem ent
o f old ones.
In the case of in land waterw ays the problem is also im p o rtan t
even though navigable waterw ays have only lim ited im portance
in most areas. T here are exceptions. In W est Africa, the River
N iger plays a significant p a rt in the bulk shipm ent of palm oil,
tim ber, peanuts, an d im ported petroleum products. O n the
Senegal river, small ships operate all the year round on the 177
miles from St Louis to P o d o r; and for a lim ited tim e on to Kayes.
I t is estim ated th a t there are about 9,000 miles of navigable
rivers in the Congo, and the system is reckoned to be the most
im p o rtan t inland w aterw ay of tropical Africa. Rivers like the
Zam besi, Rufiji and T a n a , w hich flow into the In d ia n O cean,
are navigable for short stretches. Considerable use, on the other
h an d , is m ade of the M iddle Nile in the Sudan. T hen there are
the East African lakes. Shipping on Lake V ictoria totalled some
215,000 tons in 1956.
Coastal lagoons an d tidal creeks m ust also be taken into
account. A canal in the Ivory Coast allows m ovem ent by lagoon
across h a lf the coast, and perm its the collection and dispersal of
goods to A bidjan at reduced costs. Porto Novo in D ahom ey is
linked by lagoons to Lagos. W hen the V olta river project is com
pleted, low-cost w ater transport will be provided from the
artificial lake area to the N orthern region. W aterw ays of all
kinds can be im proved or extended if we pool our resources.
A ir transport, both for passengers and freight, probably has
the greatest future. M any large in ternational airlines operate
services in Africa, b u t most of them have planned their routes
to serve the needs of passengers travelling to and from countries
outside Africa. M ost o f the best routes ru n from N orth to South.
A ir links betw een, for exam ple, East and W est African countries
are generally poor an d few an d far betw een. So far, the dem and

ECONOMIC AND P OL I T I C A L I N T E G R A T I O N

I57

for in tern al air services has been lim ited, b u t this is som ething
w hich is changing w ith the grow ing need for inter-continental
com m unication and trade.
T h e necessary capital for all these developm ents can only be
accum ulated by the em ploym ent of our resources on a conti
n ental extension. This calls for a central organization to form u
late a com prehensive econom ic policy for Africa w hich will
em brace the scientific, m ethodical and economic planning of
our ascent from present poverty into industrial greatness.
In te rn a l customs barriers can be elim inated; differences in
dom estic structures accom m odated. C urrency difficulties m ust
disappear before a com m on currency. N one o f our problem s is
insuperable unless we are set against their solution. In J u ly
1961 customs, barriers betw een G h an a an d U p p er V olta were
rem oved. A n A frican D evelopm ent In stitute is to be set up at
D akar to tra in economists, to provide experts who can be sent
on request to African States, to carry out research, an d to co
ordinate policies. This In stitute, w hen it is operating, will, it is
hoped, go some w ay tow ards counteracting the excessive d u pli
cation of experim ental work th a t now goes on in Africa because
we have no central economic planning organization for directing
research and pooling knowledge a n d experience.
T h ere are some w ho refute the requirem ent of continental
unity as the essential prerequisite to full industrialization. O thers
refer to economic confederations like the Zollverein of nine
teenth-century G erm any as likely p atterns upon which we m ight
m odel our African co-operation for industrial fulfilm ent. This
ignores the historical fact th a t the Zollverein proved unequal to
the task of creating the capital form ations G erm any needed to
carry forw ard her industrialism , w hich only got fully u n d er way
w hen the states surrendered their sovereignty to the G erm an
E m pire. I t was the unification of G erm any w hich provided the
stim ulus to expanding capitalism an d gave a suitable po p u la
tion basis for the absorption of m anufactured goods, p articularly
as population grow th in G erm any was high and quickly reached
forty-one millions. A t th a t period of scientific invention, this was
a large enough consum ption group to enable G erm any to p ro
gress from a m ainly agricultural country in 18 7 1 to the industrial
achievem ents th a t led her into the scram ble for colonies before

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A F R I C A MUST U NI TE

the m iddle eighties. In the first decade of the tw entieth century,

G erm an capitalism attain ed the stage of com m ercial and
financial m onopoly whose expansionist needs im pelled her into
the 1914 w ar.
T h e G erm an exam ple illustrates the advantages of uniting
parts into a m ore effective whole. T his G erm an developm ent
took place w ithin the typical national exclusivism of the nine
teenth century, w hich reached its apotheosis under the W il
sonian doctrine of self-determ ination after the end of the First
W orld W ar, w hen the countries of the A ustro-H ungarian
E m pire assum ed sovereignty behind boundaries whose in ter
necine possibilities were subsequently exploited by the great
powers. M otivated by the am bitions of rising bourgeoisies for
political control as the m eans to capitalist developm ent, the
leaders of the E uropean nationalist m ovem ents, once they
assum ed power, discovered th a t they were too weak to stand by
themselves. But instead of coalescing into a w ider fraternity of
nations w hich w ould have strengthened their economies and
provided a defence against big-pow er encroachm ents, they
hugged their exclusivism a n d m ade pacts w ith the stronger
states, which in the end underm ined their self-confidence and
failed to save them from im perialist expansion.
T oday, the m ajor E uropean powrers, confronted w ith the
deepening competitiveness of acquisitive production, intensified
by the new scientific inventions, shrinking em pires and the
enlargem ent of the socialist conclave o f nations, are form ing their
associations of strength, both economic, political and m ilitary.
I t seems, then, curiously paradoxical th a t in this period when
national exclusivism in Europe is m aking concessions to super
national organizations, m any of the new African states should
cling to their new-found sovereignty as som ething m ore precious
th a n the total well-being of Africa an d seek alliances w ith the
states th a t are com bining to balkanize our continent in neo
colonialist interests.
Some o f these states are aligning themselves w ith the E uropean
associations in the m istaken belief th a t they will profit sufficiently
to prosper their economies. I t is true th a t the overseas m em bers
of the E uropean Com m on M arket are enjoying at the present
tim e certain benefits from the E uropean D evelopm ent Fund.

ECONOMIC AN D P OL I T I C A L I N T E G R A T I O N

159

But in the face of the enorm ous requirem ents of industrial

developm ent, these are infinitesim al in size and restricted in
character. O u t of the applications subm itted, the projects so far
approved ignore the requests for the establishm ent of industries
and concentrate on social projects and the building o f roads,
railways an d ports. These, it is true, are necessary to fuller
developm ent an d the raising of welfare, an d undoubtedly are
welcome additions to the econom ic and social base. But it is
wishful thinking not to recognize them as the bribes they
are, an d to suppose th a t the E uropean C om m on M arket, w hich
is devised to increase the welfare of the E uropean m em ber
countries, should conscientiously prom ote industrialization in
the raw m aterial producing countries o f Africa. I t is equally
rom antic to think th a t the D evelopm ent F u n d could ever be big
enough to provide anything like the investm ent capital the
A frican states require for substantial developm ent. As is only to
be expected, emphasis is placed upon m odernization and im
provem ent schemes th a t will increase E uropean econom ic
stren g th ,1 and w iden still m ore the productivity gap betw een
Europe and Africa.
T h e enticem ent of aid w hich the E uropean Com m on M arket
holds out dem ands close exam ination and it is p articularly
curious th a t M r Leopold Senghor, President of the R epublic of
Senegal, should lend him self to a subtle appeal to the English
speaking countries to enter. In an interview appended to an
article in International Affairs for A pril 1962, President Senghor
expresses his pleasure ab out it,
above all for Africa, because we ourselves, a French-speaking
state, are associated with the Common M arket, and I think that,
if Britain joins in, the English-speaking countries of Africa will
wish to do so too. From a purely selfish point of view that might
not be entirely to our advantage, for the greater num ber of par
ticipants, the smaller the individual share in the European fund.
But I think there is a more im portant side to it: what we lose on
the level of material aid, we gain on the level of cohesion and
co-operation. We shall then be able to harmonize our technical
1 S tu art de la M ahotire: The Common Market, H odder & Stoughton 1961,
pp. 30-48. This book offers a com prehensive survey of the subject from a
E uropean supporter.

i6 o

AF RI CA MUST U NI TE

and economic co-operation between Africans, both French

speaking and English-speaking.1
T his argum ent, despite the gratuitous m agnanim ity expressed,
is a special plea for collective colonialism of a new order.
For if technical an d economic co-operation betw een Africans
(whom he is careful to divide linguistically) is a feasibility, as
President Senghors inference allows, then where is the need to
tie it in w ith the E uropean C om m on M arket, w hich is a E uropean
organization prom oted to further E uropean interests? T he
overseas associated m em bers have gone in as providers of raw
m aterials, not as equals dealing w ith equals. W h at reasons have
they to assume th a t cohesion and co-operation will be fashioned
by those controlling the instrum entalities of the M arket for the
good of Africas com m on developm ent? All the evidence, both
past and present, surely points in the other direction; th a t the
design is to m aintain the historical relationship of E uropean
industrial convertor an d A frican supplier of prim ary products.
N otw ithstanding the outw ard signs of change th a t have taken
place at m any points of the continent, the n atu re of African
econom y has rem ained practically unaltered since the first
E uropean adventurers cam e to its coasts in the fifteenth century.
I t is purely and simply a trad in g economy. O u r trade, however,
is not betw een ourselves. I t is tu rn ed tow ards Europe and em
braces us as providers of low -priced prim ary m aterials in ex
change for the m ore expensive finished goods we im port. Except
where we have associated and form ed a com m on selling policy,
we come into a com petition th a t acts to force down the prices
we receive to the profit of the overseas buyers. I t is because of
the effects of this colonial relationship in lim iting their economies,
th a t some of the African states have joined the E uropean
C om m on M arket. T hey have the hope th a t by this m eans they
will inject new life into their economies. But this is an illusion,
because the benefits received by way of aid will do nothing to
change the fundam ental natu re of these economies, and they
can, therefore, never thrive in the way th a t most advanced
countries do. T hey m ay well regress, because, while inter1 Leopold Senghor: Some Thoughts on Africa in International Affairs, April
1962.

ECONOMIC AND P OL I T I C A L I N T E G R AT I O N

l6l

national trade betw een highly industrialized countries m ay be

m utually beneficial, a quite norm al result of unham pered trade
betw een two countries, of which one is industrialised and the
other less developed, is the initiation of a cum ulative process
tow ards the im poverishm ent and stagnation of the la tte r.1
T h e tariff arrangem ents o f the E uropean C om m on M arket
m ust deepen the divisions betw een the overseas m em bers an d the
non-m em bers on the A frican continent on account of the in
creased competitiveness th a t m ust result betw een them . Q u o ta
restrictions an d depressed prices can be the only outcom e. In his
comprehensive guide to The Common Market, S tu a rt de la
M ahotiere forecasts the extension o f industrial monopolies to
deal w ith the keen com petition w hich will develop betw een the
E uropean m em bers o f the M arket, an d declares th a t the key
note to success will undoubtedly be in the first instance the
ability to keep costs dow n an d prices com petitive.2 R aw
m aterials and labour costs are the two m ajor items in production
costing, so it is quite obvious w here the keynote to success m ust
lead. T h e developm ent aid w hich the associated African
m em bers m ay receive from the E uropean F u n d will be o u t
balanced by a grad u al decline in the n ational revenues from
p rim ary products. Even united A frican arrangem ents for the
m aintenance of a com m on selling policy for certain raw m aterials
such as cocoa, cannot be upheld if one or m ore o f the parties to
the arrangem ents adheres to the E uropean organization. T h e
prices which will be fixed by the E uropean m em bers will apply
to all the overseas m em bers supplying the C om m on M arket, and
the C om m on M arket states w ithin the A frican alliance will have
to conform to the fixed prices if they are to enjoy the aid for
w hich they jo in ed it. A frican loyalty will be split betw een the
E uropean attach m en t an d the A frican association, an d the
obligation to the form er will nullify fidelity to the A frican
interest.
This is the neo-colonialism o f the E uropean Com m on M arket,
w hich holds out to the undeveloped A frican states the th re a t of
discrim inatory tariffs for those who do n ot come in, and the
promise of aid for those who do. I t is a heads I win, tails you
1 G u n n ar M y rd a l: Economic Theory and Under-Developed Regions, p. 99.
2 S tu art de la M ahotidre: The Common Market, p. n o .

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A FRI CA MUST U N I TE

lose* policy, w hich aims to create a b itter schism am ong the

independent A frican states or else to cajole them all into the
fold of the E uropean m arket, in the same old im perialist relation
ship of the E uropean rid er on the A frican horse. Any of the states
th a t enter deprive themselves of the possibility of independent
action. T hey will have lost their freedom to trade w herever it is
most advantageous or to secure capital from the most convenient
sources. T hey will, m oreover, have surrendered their policy of
non-alignm ent by attaching themselves to the E uropean eco
nom ic organization w hich is linked w ith the N orth A tlantic
T reaty O rganization (N .A .T .O .). Even worse, they will be com
pelled to betray the cause of A frican freedom , by the support
they will be obliged to give to the im perialist suppression of the
em ancipation struggle in Africa. In short, they will have sold
their A frican b irth rig h t for a mess of neo-colonialist pottage.
N or could there be any idea of solid industrialized advance
m ent for these A frican states in the interests of their people.
For, having retu rn ed themselves to the im perialist fold, this tim e
of their own free5 will an d not by territorial conquest, the same
forces w hich kept them tagging behind the industrialized coun
tries of the W est will continue to operate. T he African countries
will once m ore be wide open to im perialist exploitation. Political
independence will be a sham and will have gained nothing
except the aggrandizem ent of certain opportunist groups
w ithin the national societies and the enrichm ent of the neo
colonialist interest. Econom ic independence will be farther away
th a n ever and the conflicts w ithin these A frican societies will be
m ore severe, because the class divisions will crystallize sharply
under the m ore ruthless dem ands of neo-colonialist m onopoly
to feed its greedier an d greedier economic and m ilitary
m achines.
A n A frican Com m on M arket, devoted uniquely to African
interests, would m ore efficaciously prom ote the true require
m ents of the A frican states. Such an A frican M arket presupposes
a com m on policy for overseas trade as well as for inter-A frican
trade, and m ust preserve our right to trad e freely anyw here. If
it is a good thing for the E uropean buyers to regulate their affairs
w ith their overseas suppliers by com bination, then it m ust be
equally good for Africans to do likewise in offering their wares.

ECONOMIC AND P OL I T I C A L I N T E G R A T I O N

163

Besides, an A frican Com m on M arket th a t does not concert its

policy in regard to its exports seriously reduces its effectiveness,
since the m u tu ality of interest m ight well be violated by in
dividual actions in reg ard to the sale of crops com m on to several
of the m em bers. O ne of the principal objectives of our African
Com m on M arket m ust be to elim inate the com petition th a t
presently exists betw een us, and m ust continue to do so while
any one of us m istakenly shelters under the um brella of the
E uropean C om m on M arket. T h e cash crops th a t we produce
m ust be pooled, so th a t our com bined totals will give us a com
m anding position and, through a united selling policy, enable
us to extract better prices. For instance, G hana a n d N igeria
betw een them produce about 50 per cent of the w orlds cocoa.
So far we have been selling against each other, b u t in uniting our
policy, we can beat the u ndercutting tactics of the buyers who
set us one against the other.
T he surpluses thus derived from increased revenues resulting
from a com m on selling policy could be placed to realistic
developm ent (rejected by the E uropean D evelopm ent F u n d ),
an d give a spurt to fundam ental industrialism . T h e trad e now
beginning to be developed betw een us w ould be stim ulated,
while a com m on currency w ould elim inate the difficulties of
exchange as well as the illegitim ate dealings w hich a t present
rob us of p a rt of our w ealth. A com m on currency, free of links
w ith outside currency zones, would enable us to reserve the
foreign exchange m ade from our export trad e for essential
im ports.
In the same way, the pooled sum of our present individual
investm ents in our sim ilar national projects, if used w ithin an
integrated plan, w ould give greater benefit in m utual develop
m ent. Indeed, the total integration of the A frican econom y on a
continental scale is the only way in w hich the A frican states can
achieve anything like the levels of the industrialized countries.
T he idea of A frican union is not ju st a sentim ental one, em a n a t
ing from a com m on experience of colonialism and a desire for
young, u n tried states to come together in the effervescence of
their new freedom , though sentim ent undoubtedly has its p a rt.
T h e unity of the countries of Africa is an indispensable p re
condition for the speediest an d fullest developm ent, not only o f

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A FRI CA MUST UNI TE

the totality of the continent b u t of the individual countries linked

together in the union.
A dvancing science, the new technologies, the constant im
provem ents in modes of production and techniques of m anage
m ent, the economic realities of this second h a lf of the tw entieth
century dem and large expanses of land, w ith their variegated
n a tu ra l resources, and massive populations, to obtain the greatest
benefits from them and thereby sustain their profitability. T o
day, those powers em bracing large aggregates of population
and earth surface are m ore capable of full industrialization.
U nfortunately, in the present-day conflict of political ideo
logies, these are the powers th a t m ake claims to greatness. T he
others are virtual satellites oscillating betw een their orbits. T he
cu rren t im pact of the cold w ar on w orld affairs governs the
external policy, and influences in m any ways the internal
policies of most of the rest of the world. O nly C hina, w ith its huge
population and massive land extent, com bined w ith its non
com petitive, centrally planned system of production and dis
tribution, has a rate of productivity th a t is m aking her a potential
challenger of the only two powers whose w eight counts in our
present w orld. T h a t is the root reason why the U nited States
refuses to adm it C hina into the U nited N ations and w hy the
Soviet U nion is respectful of her attitudes. C hinas rate o f pro
ductivity puts her ahead of the declining im perial powers whose
industrial extension, lim ited by their shrinking empires, has led
them into the E uropean Com m on M arket, in the hope th at the
increased productivity and expanded m arket offered by 170
m illion people will provide a m ore effective challenge to
A m ericas industrial - and hence political - m astery of the
capitalist world. Industrial o u tp u t in C hina increased 276 per
cent in the years betw een 1950 and 1957, and it is estim ated th at
if the relative rates o f developm ent persist, she will outstrip J a p a n
and Britain in the not too distant future.
Only the Soviet Union, China, and perhaps Indonesia among
the under-developed countries possess the material and popula
tion base sufficient for successful (socialist) economies. The
individual territories of Africa and South America, to say
nothing of the territorial boundaries of such countries as South

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165

Korea, Formosa, Pakistan, South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia,

Jordan, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, Greece, Turkey, and the
West Indies, are too limited. . . . As a consequence, there is an
implicit movement in the world today towards regionalism - not
the regionalism of the various pacts inspired by the capitalist
world, although some of these may unwillingly foster the move
ment. But a regionalism based upon economic and cultural
identification and co-operation.1
T he greatest single lesson th a t can be draw n from the history
o f industrial developm ent in the w orld today is the uncounted
advantages w hich planning has in the first place over the laissez
faire go-as-you-please policies of the early pioneers of indus
trialism ; and secondly, how im m ensely superior planning on a
continental scale, allied to a socialized objective, has proved for
the giant latecom ers into the realm of m odern statehood over the
fragm ented discordant attem pts of disunited entities, as on the
South A m erican continent. T h e rates of grow th of the Soviet
U nion and C hina are m uch higher even th a n th a t of the other
continental giant, the U n ited States of A m erica, whose economic
evolution stretched over a longer period of tim e an d whose
capital accum ulations, as a result of large-scale p lan tatio n farm
ing by slave labour, an d the conversion of its products into
m anufactured goods, were already considerable before her largescale industrialization got un d er w ay in earnest, after the w ar to
m ain tain the union. A m erica is the most vocal proponent of free
enterprise, unfettered by central planning. H e r society shows the
most glaring social inequalities, from the N egro sharecropper
living close to or below the subsistence line and financial tycoons
amassing astronom ical fortunes, w ith all possible gradations of
w ealth and poverty in betw een. Sixteen m illion people still
rem ain unintegrated w ith the body politic.
Soviet em barkm ent upon p lanned industrialization occurred
on the edge of the nineteen-thirties, after a really critical
approach h a d been m ade to the intricate problem s involved in
m aking the take off5 w ith a paucity of reserves an d resources
ra th e r greater th a n our own at the present tim e. T here were the
1 Prof. O liver C. Cox of Lincoln University, U .S.A ., in a p ap er entitled
Factors in Development o f Under-Developed Countries, delivered in Accra, Ju n e

1959-

AF RI CA MUST U N I TE

conditions created by the afterm ath of revolution and civil w ar,

including the destruction of such industrial p lan t as h ad existed
under the Czarist em pire or its alienation to the states th at had
seceded. T here was a population scattered unevenly over a sixth
of the e a rth s surface, in varying stages of developm ent, from
nom adic tribes on the steppes an d w astelands to a cultured in
telligentsia in L eningrad and M oscow and a relatively small
p ro letariat w orking in the m ain cities an d towns. T he in te r
necine strife an d hatreds am ong these people was proverbial, and
the m ultiplicity of languages and religions not m uch less th an in
present-day Africa. O ver and above all this, the Soviet U nion
h ad to m ake its way in a state of isolation forced upon her by her
exclusion from the w orld com ity of nations on account of the
social ideology she h ad adopted as her guide. Furtherm ore, she
was surrounded by a cordon sanitaire of satellite states, which were
used as the threatening outposts of the great powers.
A gainst all the disadvantages, the open enm ity an d contri
vance aim ed at her success, and the appalling devastation and
m aterial an d h u m an losses resulting from the Second W orld
W ar, the Soviet U nion, in a little over th irty years, has built up
an industrial m achine so strong an d advanced as to be able to
launch the Sputnik and follow it up by being the first to send a
m an into space. T here m ust be som ething to be said for a system
of continental organization allied to clearly defined socialized
objectives th a t m ade this rem arkable achievem ent, and I pose
it as an exam ple of w hat an integrated economic program m e
could do for Africa. I am aw are of the deep social disturbances
th a t were created an d the harshness of the repressive m achinery
used against critics, dissenters and others in the course of a tta in
m ent. In recognizing the achievem ent I can only regret the
excesses, though I m ay, out of our own experience, understand
some of the causes th a t produced them .
N or w ould I suggest th a t we in Africa should slavishly p a tte rn
our course on the Soviet m odel. I m erely present it as an example
of w hat can be done through planning an integrated economic
course on a united continental plane. I have frequently said th at
there is no universal p a tte rn of developm ent th a t is applicable to
A frican conditions, environm ent and particu lar economic cir
cumstances. T h e economic theories th a t have em anated from

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167

E urope have been erected out of the experience there. T hey

were not evolved as guides in advance o f econom ic developm ent,
b u t w ere the result of analysis of th a t developm ent after the
event. Even L enins theory of im perialism issued from his study
of the grow th o f capitalism a n d its m onopolistic expansion, A nd
w hen he cam e to lead the em ergent Soviet state into reh a b ilita
tion on socialist foundations, he h a d no blue-print w hich he could
use as a guide.
W e are m ore fortunate, an d we are not isolated. W e m ay have
enemies, b u t we have friends, too. W e have the exam ples of the
U n ited States, o f the Soviet U nion, o f C hina, of In d ia . T hey are
all operating their economies on a continental scale and offer us
a choice o f m eans and m ethods w hich we can a d a p t to the A frican
scene. But one thing is certain, unless we p lan to lift A frica up
out of her poverty, she will rem ain poor. For there is a vicious
circle w hich keeps the poor in their ru t of im poverishm ent,
unless an energetic effort is m ade to in te rru p t the circular
causations of poverty. O nce this has been done, and the essential
industrial m achine has been set in m otion, there is a snow
balling5effect w hich increases the m om entum o f change. But the
essential industrial m achine, w hich alone can break the vicious
circle of Africa's poverty, can only be b u ilt on a wide enough
basis to m ake the take-off realistic if it is p lanned on a continental
scale.
A t the m om ent, we call our conferences a n d m eetings,
w hich, while obviously useful, m ust rem ain ineffective unless
supported by jo in t action. T he A frican econom y has shown little
im provem ent since the establishm ent of the Econom ic Com
mission for Africa (E.C.A .) in 1958. D uring the spring 1962
session of the Commission, it was pointed out th a t the population
of Africa h ad probably increased by some 8 per cent since 1958,
w ith the result th a t there were nearly 20 m illion m ore people to
feed. Yet advances in agriculture a n d industry h a d not kept pace
w ith the rising population. In fact, figures showed th a t the
A frican balance of trad e h a d actually deteriorated.
I t is clear th a t radical changes in economic planning in Africa
are urgently needed, an d this can only be achieved quickly and
effectively if we are united politically. A t the 1962 m eeting of the
E.C .A . to which reference has ju st been m ade, speakers found it

A FR I C A MUST U N I TE

difficult to separate economic and political issues. This is because

they are, for us, inseparable at this tim e in our history. For the
radical changes th a t are urgently needed in economic planning
can only be brought ab out quickly and effectually if we are
united politically. Conversely, our national independence can
only be given full m eaning if a vast pool of economic and indus
trial resources can be created to provide the various A frican
states w ith a strong enough base to support the welfare of their
peoples.
In the isolation of purely national planning, our rate of pro
gress can only be halting, our individual developm ents doom ed
to slowness, no m atter how intensive our efforts or how careful
our projects. Expansion of extractive industries, extension and
diversification o f agriculture, establishm ent of secondary in
dustries, some infra-structure, the building of a few key industries
- this is w h at we m ay expect w ithin the confines of our national
planning, an d even this is not assured. C ertainly not w ithout the
most careful trim m ing an d austerity, and an uneven struggle at
all times against coercive pressures, both external and domestic.
Each of us alone cannot hope to secure the highest benefits
of m odern technology, w hich dem ands vast capital investm ent
and can only justify its economics in serving an extensive popu
lation. A continental m erging of our lan d areas, our populations
an d our resources, will alone give full substance to our aspirations
to advance from our pre-industrial state to th a t stage o f develop
m ent th a t can provide for all the people the high standard of
living an d welfare am enities of the m ost advanced industrial
states.
I t m ay, of course, be argued th a t any economic integration at
this tim e w ould be like a pooling of poverty. But this ignores the
essential core of integration: th a t it will co-ordinate all the exist
ing resources, economic, agricultural, m ineral, financial, and
em ploy them m ethodically so as to im prove the over-all surplus,
to assist a w ider capital developm ent. F urther, a co-ordinated
survey of the continental resources, actual and potential, hum an
and m aterial, will perm it planning to elim inate the present im
balance in identical forms of prim ary trading economies and
provide for the erection of a com plem entary p a tte rn of develop
m ent w hich will give the fullest opportunity for progressive

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169

capital form ations. W e w ould still need to exchange p rim ary

products for capital goods, and I have explained how an A frican
C om m on M arket and com m on currency w ould facilitate the
accum ulation of reserves from our pooled production and
com m on selling policy. M oreover, w ithin the unity of integrated
econom ic planning, we should be b etter placed to extract the
most advantageous aid agreem ents free of clauses th a t w ould
jeopardize our independence of action. T h e larger potentials of
g reater lan d area and num bers w ould offer g reater a ttrac tio n to
outside investm ent capital because of their anticipated higher
profitability ratio. A nother advantage for outside investm ent
capital w ould be the soundness o f the guarantees th a t unified
continental developm ent could offer. No single individual could
undertake such investm ent, so th a t it w ould have to be done by
corporate or public investm ent. In fact, the tren d today is
tow ards public investm ent, because public guarantees are
dem anded. Foreign countries will not loan to a private individual
in another country b u t will only lend to a private institution or
a public institution w ith a guarantee from the governm ent. As
a rule, it will not come w ithout this guarantee, and often enough
the investm ent will not be allowed to come to the borrow ing
country w ithout the approval o f the governm ent of the lender.
T h a t kind of investm ent is the m ore solid kind o f investm ent
th a t Africa needs from abroad, and both in tern atio n al an d public
capital w ould find it m uch less com plex to deal w ith and secure
guarantees from an all-A frican adm inistration th a n from the
several governm ents they now have to deal w ith. I t w ould m ake
for easier co-operation all round.
Separatism , indeed, cuts us off from a m ultitude of advantages
w hich we w ould enjoy from union. T hough G h an a is bearing
the cost of erecting the V olta dam , we w ould be m ore th an
willing to share its benefits w ith our im m ediate neighbours
w ithin a com m on economic fram ew ork. T h e In g a dam , a blue
p rin t dream for the Congo, m ay not get beyond th a t stage w ith
out the co-operation of other A frican states, for no single state
could afford to build it. Y et if it were built, the dam w ould
provide 25 m illion kilowatts of electricity, w hich is estim ated to
be four-and-a-half times the o u tp u t expected from the largest
hydro-electrical p lan t in the Soviet U n io n : the Bratsk D am .

A F RI CA MUST UNITE

T he In g a project could go a long way tow ards electrifying the

whole of the A frican continent.
I f the independent states h a d a united, integrated economic
policy, the building of the In g a dam could be carefully planned
to support an extended industrial grow th, catering for a far
larger population. Its cost w ould, therefore, be economically
spread. T his is only a single illustration of w hat African inte
g rated econom ic planning m ight do. E xtend it to all sectors of
our economies, and its possibilities are infinite.
I have often been accused o f pursuing a policy of the im
possible. But I cannot believe in the impossibility of achieving
A frican union any m ore th an I could ever have thought of the
impossibility of attaining African freedom . W hen I cam e back
to G hana in 1947 to take a leading p a rt in the anti-colonial
struggle, I was dubbed an irresponsible ag itato r. Independence
a t th a t tim e looked a long w ay off. N one of us really im agined
th a t by 1962 m ost of the A frican countries w ould have throw n
off political dom ination and em barked upon their own national
existence as sovereign states. B ut th a t did not stop us from going
forw ard w ith our efforts, buoyed by the certainty of ultim ate
victory. A nd it has come, as I said, m uch sooner th a n anticipated.
T h a t is how I feel about A frican union. J u s t as I was con
vinced th at political freedom was the essential forerunner of our
econom ic grow th and th a t it m ust come, so I am equally con
vinced th a t African union will come and provide th a t united,
integrated base upon w hich our fullest developm ent can be
secured. T here is no doubt th a t the task before us is a challenging
one. No easy ro ad to the achievem ent of m odem industrializa
tion has so far been discovered. T he most we can hope is to learn
from the m ore glaring mistakes of those who have preceded us
on the road w hat we should obviously avoid, and w hat will most
assist us in pushing forw ard to the goal as speedily as possible
w ithout sustaining too m any b itter shocks to the body politic.
But there is absolutely no d oubt th a t the key to significant
industrialization of this continent of ours lies in a union of African
states, planning its developm ent centrally and scientifically
through a p a tte rn of economic integration. Such central plan
ning can create units of industrialism related to the unit re
sources, correlating food and raw m aterials production w ith the

ECONOMIC AND P OL I T I C A L I N TE G R A T I O N

17 1

establishm ent of secondary m anufactures and the erection of

those vital basic industries w hich will sustain large-scale capital
developm ent. T he national com ponents will each perform their
essential role in the practical im plem entation of the total p lan
and feel secure in the co-operative task of elim inating the eco
nom ic unevenness th a t now exists betw een the different regions.
T h e individual character of population groups m ight properly
be expressed in special kinds of developm ent w ithin the universal
plan, p articularly in the fields of specialized production, w hether
in agriculture or industry, of handicrafts an d culture. This w ould
infuse energy into the realization of the p lanned developm ent,
as the people would be given every opportunity to expand their
individual genius.
Because of the enorm ously greater energy, both h u m an an d
m aterial, th a t w ould be released through continentally inte
g rated planning, productivity increase w ould be incom parably
higher th a n the sum of the individual growths w hich we m ay
anticipate w ithin the individual countries un d er separatism .
T h e cum ulative surpluses th a t m ust result w ould achieve con
tinuing capital form ations for increasing the A frican investm ent
in expanding developm ent. I t is quite obvious th a t integrated
continental planning cannot find a substitute in the kind of
tinkering th a t lim its us to inter-territorial associations w ithin
customs unions, trad e agreem ents, inter-com m unications ser
vices, an d the like. W hile these will n atu rally increase our
com m on intercourse and provide for certain inter-action, they
can only be partially beneficial in their effects. For such tinker
ing does not create the decisive conditions for resolute develop
m ent, since it ignores the crucial requirem ent of continental
integration as the essential prerequisite for the m ost bountiful
economic progress, w hich m ust be based in the widest possible
extension of land and population. T h e planned industrialization,
m oreover, m ust be geared to the social objective of the highest
upliftm ent o f the masses of the people, and presupposes the
elim ination of those acquisitive tendencies w hich lead to sec
tional conflicts w ithin society. By these m eans alone can Africa
m aintain the p o pular support w ithout w hich the planned p ro
gram m e cannot succeed, and arrive a t th a t economic freedom
w hich is the intertw ined goal of political independence.

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A FRI CA MUST UNITE

In the face of the forces th a t are com bining to reinforce neo

colonialism in Africa, it is im perative th a t the leaders should
begin now to seek the best and quickest m eans by w hich we can
collectivize our economic resources and produce an integrated
p lan for their careful deploym ent for our m utual benefit. I f we
can do this, we shall raise in Africa a great industrial, economic
an d financial pow er com parable to any th a t the world has seen
in ou r tim e.
Such effective economic links, however, are impossible
to establish w ithout sound political direction to give them
force and purpose. Therefore, we m ust come to grips first w ith
the m ajor and basic issue of A frican unity, w hich alone can clear
the w ay for the united effort in erecting the powerful industrial
and economic structure which will give substance and reality
to our dream of a strong A frican continent, absolutely freed from
political and economic colonialism.

C H A P TE R E I G HT E EN

NEO-COLONIALISM

IN AFRICA

T h e g r e a t e s t danger a t present facing Africa is n eo c o lo n ial

ism and its m ajor instrum ent, balkanization. T h e latte r term is
particularly appropriate to describe the breaking up of Africa
into small, weak states, since it arose from the action of the great
powers w hen they divided up the E uropean p a rt of the old
T urkish Em pire, and created a n um ber of dependent and com
peting states in the Balkan peninsula. T he effect was to produce
a political tinderbox w hich any spark could set alight. In fact,
the explosion cam e in 1914 w hen an A ustrian archduke was
m urdered at Sarajevo. Because the Balkan countries were so
closely tied up w ith the great powers and their rivalries, the
m urder resulted in the First W orld W ar, the greatest w ar which
h a d been fought up to th a t tim e.
In the same w ay as alliances by the Balkan states w ith rival
powers outside the Balkans resulted in w orld w ar, so a w orld
w ar could easily originate on our continent if A frican states m ake
political, economic an d m ilitary alliances w ith rival powers o u t
side Africa. A lready political com m entators have referred to
Africa as a vast new battleground for the cold w ar.
As the nationalist struggle deepens in the colonial territories
an d independence appears on the horizon, the im perialist
powers, fishing in the m uddy w aters of com m unalism , tribalism
and sectional interests, endeavour to create fissions in the national
front, in order to achieve fragm entation. Irelan d is the classic
exam ple, In d ia another. T h e French dism em bered the F edera
tion of W est Africa and th a t of E quatorial Africa. N igeria was
broken into regions an d is anticipating further partitions.
R u a n d a -U ru n d i has been fragm ented w ith independence.
Because we in G h an a survived pre-independence attem pts to
split us, the British foisted on us a constitution th a t aim ed at

174

A F RI CA MUST UNI TE

disintegrating our national unity. T he Congo, hastily invested

w ith independence, w ith m alice aforethought, im m ediately
becam e the battleground of im perialist-fom ented division.
These are all p a rt of the policy of intentional balkanization of
Africa for m anipulation by neo-colonialism , w hich in effective
ness can be m ore dangerous to our legitim ate aspirations of
freedom and econom ic independence th a n outright political
control. For instance, L enin m aintained th a t:
A form of financial and diplomatic dependence, accom
panied by political independence, is presented by Portugal.
Portugal is an independent, sovereign state, but actually,
for more than two hundred years, since the war of the Spanish
Succession (i 701-14), it has been a British protectorate.
Great Britain has protected Portugal and its colonies in order to
fortify her own positions in the fight against her rivals, Spain and
France. In return, Great Britain has received commercial
privileges, preferential conditions for importing goods and
especially capital into Portugal and the Portuguese colonies,
the right to use the ports and islands of Portugal, its telegraph
cables, etc., etc.1
T h e form taken by neo-colonialism in Africa today has some
of these features. I t acts covertly, m anoeuvring m en and govern
m ents, free of the stigm a attached to political rule. I t creates
client states, independent in nam e b u t in point of fact pawns of
the very colonial pow er w hich is supposed to have given them
independence. T his is one of the diverse forms of dependent
countries w hich, politically, are form ally independent, b u t in
fact, are enm eshed in the net of financial an d diplom atic de
pendence5.2 T h e E uropean pow er forces the conclusion of pacts
w ith the balkanized states w hich give control of their foreign
policy to the form er. O ften, too, they provide for m ilitary bases
and standing arm ies of the alien pow er on the territories of the
new states. T h e independence of those states is in nam e only, for
their liberty of action is gone.
France never subscribed to the thesis of ultim ate independence
for her colonial territories. She had always m aintained her
1 L enin: Imperialism, The Highest Stage o f Capitalism, pp. 137-8.
2 ibid, pp. 136-7.

N EO- COLO NI AL I S M IN AFRI CA

x75

colonies as tightly closed preserves. W hen it becam e obvious

th a t national sovereignty could no longer be w ithheld, the
ground was prepared for m aintaining the em erging independent
nations w ithin the French orbit. T hey were to rem ain suppliers of
cheap raw m aterials and tropical foodstuffs while continuing to
serve as closed m arkets for French products.
Soon after the Second W orld W ar, F rance set up two financial
organizations for the purpose of aiding economic developm ent
in her overseas territories. These were F .I.D .E .S . (Fonds
d Investissement et Developpement Economique et Social) and the
G .G .O .M . {Caisse Centrale de la France d Outre-mer.)
Subventions from C .C .O .M . w ent to the budgets of the form er
French colonial territories to help m eet the cost of public
adm inistration and the m aintenance o f French forces in the
territories. Investm ent in the social and economic developm ent
of F ran ces overseas territories was largely an euphem ism for the
siphoning of funds through F .I.D .E .S . into these form er French
colonies and back again to France. I t has been estim ated th a t
as m uch as 80 per cent of such so-called investm ent retu rn ed to
France in the form of paym ents for m aterials, services, com
missions, bank charges and salaries of French staffs and agents.
Projects undertaken were m ainly in the sphere of public services
and agriculture. T hey were woefully in adequate and im properly
planned, w ith little or no regard for local conditions or needs.
No attem p t was m ade to lay the foundations for industrial
grow th or a diversification of agriculture w hich w ould assist true
developm ent. F.I.D .E .S . and C .C .O .M . have given place to the
F.A .C. (Fonds d'Aide et de Cooperation) and C .C .C .E . (Caisse
Centrale de Cooperation Economique). T h e newly nam ed agencies,
however, perform the same functions as the old ones on exactly
the same terms. Investm ent continues to support the production
o f exportable com m unity crops and the trad in g enterprises of
French com m ercial houses an d contracting firms who secure
their supplies from F rench factories and industrial centres.
French bankers and financial concerns linked w ith some of the
biggest raw m aterial converters are being encouraged to extend
the exploitation of m inerals in the form er colonial territories for
exportation in their prim ary form.
Thus, even though independent in nam e, these countries

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A F RI CA MUST UNITE

continue the classical relationship of a colonial economy to its

m etropolitan p atron, i.e. providers of prim ary products and
exclusive m arkets for the la tte rs goods. O nly now the relation
ship is covered up under the guise of aid and protective solicitude,
one of the m ore subtle forms of neo-colonialism.
Since France sees her continued grow th and developm ent in
the m aintenance of the present neo-colonialist relationship w ith
the less developed nations w ithin her orbit, this can only m ean
the w idening of the gap betw een herself and them . I f the gap
is ever to be narrow ed, not to say closed, it can only be done
by a com plete break w ith the present patron-client relation
ship.
W hen neo-colonialism can m ake such effective penetrations
by other m eans, there seems a certain illogicality, viewed from
their standpoint, in clinging bitterly to political control of the
rem aining territories in Africa. Unless, of course, it is to use tim e
to increase the differences and deepen the schisms, and to allow
South Africa to build up her m ilitary forces, to use, in alliance
w ith the Rhodesias and Portugal, against the fighters for
freedom and the new A frican independence. I t is in this con
text th a t the form er insistence on the inviolability of the C entral
A frican Federation in the teeth of African opposition m ust
be understood and m et. T here is discernible a curious variance
of purpose w hen one com pares the British concurrence to the
dem and for regionalism in N igeria and their refusal for so long
to concede to African clam our for the dissolution of the C entral
A frican Federation. I t was claim ed for the continuance of
C entral African F ederation th a t it m ade for economic cohesion
and progress. I f a larger aggregate is good for one p a rt of Africa,
the settler-controlled p art, then surely it m ust contain the same
beneficent seed for the independent parts.
T h e conversion of Africa into a series of small states is leaving
some of them w ith neither the resources nor the m anpow er to
provide for their own integrity and viability. W ithout the means
to establish their own economic grow th, they are compelled to
continue w ithin the old colonial trading fram ew ork. H ence they
are seeking alliances in Europe, w hich deprive them of an
independent foreign policy and perpetuate their economic de
pendency. But this is a solution th at can only lead backwards,

N EO- COLO NI AL I S M IN AFRI CA

177

not forw ards. T he forw ard solution is for the A frican states to
stand together politically, to have a united foreign policy, a
com m on defence plan, an d a fully integrated econom ic p ro
gram m e for the developm ent of the whole continent. O nly then
can the dangers of neo-colonialism and its h an d m aid en balkani
zation be overcom e. W hen th a t has been accom plished, our
relations w ith E urope can enter upon a new phase.
A lthough the end of E uropean rule in A frica is in sight,
E uropean econom ic interests are ascendant a n d its political and
cultural influences strong. In a n u m b er of territories, m other
co u n try ideology and cu ltu ral identity have strongly affected
certain political leaders. P aul-M arc H enry, designated F rench
official expert on A frican affairs, has argued th a t the story of
nationalism in French Africa is basically different from th a t in
British territories. H e says:
African deputies and senators have learned their politics not
in the narrow confines of territorial problems, but in the strange
and stimulating world of the French parliament. . . . One could
argue that the world as seen from Paris is rather distorted.
French deputies themselves were not always aware of the real
factors in power politics. The continuous presence of friendly and
able African colleagues led them to believe that there was no
such thing as African nationalism in French areas, that the idea
was a foreign import and, in some cases, one of those notorious
plots against Franco-African community and its spiritual
achievements. On the other hand, there was no better school for
intellectual and political sophistication than that of the French
Parliament of the Fourth Republic.1
H en ry s rem arks serve to underline the m yopia w hich seems
to have becom e endem ic to the French ruling class since the
days of the Bourbons. T h e transm ission of the affliction to
Africans whose attitudes have been conditioned by sophisticated
flatteries aw ay from an A frican orientation tow ards a FrancoAfrican com m unity can only be regarded as sinister and
inim ical to African interests. M esm erized by the strange and
stim ulating w orld of the French p a rliam e n t, issues as seen at
1 P aul-M arc H enry: Article entitled Pan-Africanism - A D ream Com e
T ru e in Foreign Affairs, April 1959.

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A F RI CA MUST U NI TE

A bidjan can be quite as distorted for A frican politicians as they

can for F rench deputies in Paris.
Viewed thus, it is small w onder th a t G eneral de G aulles
referendum of 28 Septem ber 1958, on the constitution of the
F rench C om m unity, should have trium phed w ith the single dis
sentient vote of G uinea. T he w eight of the G enerals promise of
largess for those who rem em bered the intertw ined destiny and
com m on cultural heritage of the C om m unity and the th re a t of
excom m unication for those who rejected this destiny, and for
swore their noble inheritance, was irresistible. W hile the long
standing politicians of the rest of French Africa were dism ayed
a t the prospect of a future severed from the em bracing arm s of
France, Sekou T o u re rallied his countrym en round him for a
N o vote, and G uinea was rudely ejected from the C om m unity.
T he French C om m unity was evolved by G eneral de Gaulle
to replace the F rench U nion, devised by the statesm en of the
F o u rth R epublic w ithin la loi cadre, the outline law. T h e French
U nion was an a tte m p t to contain the rising tide of African con
sciousness by the cover of a spurious autonom y in certain de
partm ents of adm inistration. Events in G hana and our steady
progress to full independence revealed the counterfeit character
of the F rench U nion, and w ith the near civil w ar precipitated
by the attem pted m ilitary seizure of power in Algeria, G eneral
de G aulle, ensconced in pow er in Paris, form ulated the French
C om m unity to replace the sham pretensions of the U nion. W hen
prom ulgated, the provisions of the constitution of the Com
m unity in respect of the powers they allotted to the A frican terri
tories were seen to fall short of those regarded as too constricted
un d er the U nion. T h e breaking dow n into separate entities
before the referendum of the F ederation of W est Africa and th at
of E quatorial Africa was the key to the new political policy of
France. I t was balkanization in practice. I t reinforced the am
bitions of political personalities and deepened schisms which
were on the way to being closed. A new rift was opened in African
politics betw een R epublicans and Federalists, th at is, betw een
those who felt they would advance their careers w ithin the strict
lim its of autonom y and those who, responding to popular
clam our, sought association w ith other units. This popular
pressure in the A frican lands has achieved several modifications

N EO- COLO NI AL I S M IN AF RI CA

179

in the w orking of the C om m unity constitution an d has even

succeeded in m aking some of the clauses inoperative.
T he com ing together of Senegal and S udan in the M ali
F ederation secured them a jo in t independence w ithin the C om
m unity, subject to the French retention of a m ilitary base. T h e
M ali Federation, because of the difference in the political a tti
tudes of the leaders, M r Leopold Senghor an d M r M odibo
K eita, has since divided once m ore into its national parts,
Senegal an d M ali. H ouphouet-B oigny followed by dem anding
independence for the countries of the Conseil de IsE n te n te ,1
Ivory Coast, U p p e r V olta, N iger and D ahom ey, w ithout p re
ceding agreem ents. Sovereignty has since been conferred on
Togo, the Congo R epublic (Brazzaville), C had, G abon,
Cam eroon, the C entral African R epublic (formerly U bangui
Shari), and M adagascar. A nd a t last, A lgeria has wrested
independence after seven years of bitter fighting.
Now th a t A frican freedom is accepted by all except the die
h a rd racialists as an inescapable fact, there are efforts in certain
quarters to m ake arrangem ents w hereby the local populations
are given a token freedom while cords attach in g them to the
m other country5rem ain as firm as ever. T his arrangem ent gives
the appearance of nationhood to the A frican territory b u t leaves
the substance of sovereignty w ith the m etropolitan power. A
certain token aid is pum ped in by the colonialist pow er in order
to m islead the people and give the im pression th a t som ething is
being done for them . I t is m eant to divert the nascent dem and for
a change of governm ent involving m ore positive independence
a n d a program m e envisaging po p u lar welfare. T h e intention is
to use the new A frican states, so circum scribed, as puppets
through w hom influence can be extended over states w hich
m aintain an independence in keeping w ith their sovereignty.
T h e creation of several weak an d unstable states of this kind in
Africa, it is hoped, will ensure the continued dependence on the
form er colonial powers for economic aid, and im pede A frican
unity. This policy of balkanization is the new im perialism , the
new danger to Africa.
Its m echanics are simple. In the dynam ics o f n ational
revolution there are usually two local elem ents: the m oderates
1 Council of Understanding.

i8 o

A F RI CA MUST U NI TE

o f the professional and aristocratic5 class and the so-called

extremists of the mass m ovem ent. T he m oderates would like
some share in their governm ent b u t are afraid of im m ediate
responsibility because they lack experience and skill. T hey are
prepared to leave the m ain areas of sovereignty to the colonial
power, in retu rn for a prom ise of economic aid. T h e so-called
extremists are m en who do not necessarily believe in violence b u t
who dem and im m ediate self-government and com plete inde
pendence. T hey are m en who are concerned w ith the interests
of their people and who know th a t those interests can be served
only by their own local leaders and not by the colonial power.
T hey know th a t the tasks of independence are onerous and th at
w ithout colonialist help they m ay m ake mistakes. But they prefer
to m ake their own mistakes in freedom rath e r th an to be denied
the opportunity of responsibility, in the belief th at even good
governm ent is no substitute for self-government.
H aving learned from experience th a t the greater and m ore
b itter their resistance to extrem ist5 dem ands for independence
the m ore extrem e and m ore powerful they become, certain
colonial powers began to respond m ore positively to signs of
nationalist stirrings in some of their territories. T he understand
ing daw ned th a t in the absence of a b itter struggle, there is a
chance of treating w ith the m oderate leaders, who m ay be
tem pted to show their followers th a t the m asters are being
reasonable5 an d are open to persuasion, th a t quiet and peaceful
negotiation can produce an advance tow ards freedom. T he
colonial power, experienced in the ways of diplom acy, seeks to
curb the efforts of the extremists by ostentatiously polishing the
silver p latte r on which they prom ise to han d over independence.
U n d ern eath the shining surface is the dross. O nly the outw ard
form will have changed, the intrinsic relationship is m aintained.
Foreign im ports are still protected, local developm ent clam ped
down, fiscal policy controlled from the m etropolitan capital.
T he im pact of such sem i-independent states on the liberation
of Africa has been unfortunate, even dangerous. Bound up as
these countries are w ith the policies of their sponsors, they try
to shun the issues involving colonialists and the still enslaved
peoples on the A frican continent, where they do not directly
align themselves on the colonialist side. Some of their leaders, it

NEO- COLO NI AL I SM IN A F RI CA

l8l

m ust be confessed, do not see the struggle of their bro th er

Africans as p a rt of their struggle. Even if they did, they w ould
not be free to express their solidarity. T h e im perialists can thus
sit back an d regard w ith sly satisfaction the rift betw een Africans.
T h e results can only be to re ta rd the independence o f countries
not yet free an d to cause friction and disunion am ong the peoples
o f Africa. H ere is a phenom enon against which all A frican
freedom fighters m ust be on their g u ard an d resist to the utm ost.
In A frica today there are several app aren tly independent
states who, consciously or not, accept this p a tte rn an d serve the
interests of the new im perialism , w hich seeks to salvage some
thing from the wreck of the old im perialism . T h e E uropean
Com m on M arket is an outstanding exam ple. T h e new th re a t
this organization offers to A frican unity is no less om inous for
being unobtrusive.
As far as G h an a is concerned, we do not oppose any arran g e
m ent w hich the nations of E urope m ay wish to m ake am ong
themselves to seek greater freedom of trad e w ithin E u ro p e ; b u t
we are most decidedly and strongly opposed to any arrangem ent
which uses the unification of W estern Europe as a cloak for p er
p etuating colonial privileges in Africa. W e therefore natu rally
protest against any economic or political grouping of E uropean
powers w hich seeks to exert political a n d econom ic pressures
upon the newly em ergent countries of Africa, or w hich discrim i
nates against the trade of those countries w hich are not willing
to p articipate in these exclusive and unfair arrangem ents. T h e
operation of the E uropean Econom ic C om m unity, as a t present
conceived, will not only discrim inate against G h an a and other
independent states of Africa econom ically, b u t w hat is m ore
im portant, it will p erpetuate by economic m eans the m any
artificial barriers which were im posed on Africa by the E uropean
colonial powers.
A ny form o f economic union negotiated singly betw een the
fully industrialized states of E urope and the newly em ergent
countries of Africa is bound to re ta rd the industrialization, an d
therefore, the prosperity and the general economic and cultural
developm ent, of these countries. For it will m ean th a t those
African states w hich m ay be inveigled into jo in in g this union
will continue to serve as protected overseas m arkets for the m anu-

182

A F RI CA MUST UNITE

factured goods of their industrialized partners, and sources of

cheap raw m aterials. T he subsidy w hich they will receive in
re tu rn for assuming these obligations will be small com pared
w ith the losses w hich they will suffer from perpetuating their
colonial status, losses w hich are to be m easured not only in
term s of their own retarded economic, technical and cultural
developm ent, b u t in the h arm which they do the peoples of Africa
as a whole. T he question m ust be raised as to where this subsidy
comes from. I t is difficult to believe th a t it is a purely altruistic
contribution m ade by the E uropean m em bers of the M arket
to the cause of A frican well-being. Such subsidy m ust, in fact,
come out of the trading profits m ade from forcing down the
prices of p rim ary products bought from the African countries
an d raising the cost of the finished goods they are obliged to take
in exchange. I t is also included in the cost of the projects which
constitute the subsidy, a good p a rt of w hich returns to the
E uropean contributors in the form of paym ents for m aterials,
services, salaries, and banking commissions and interest.
I t is true th a t by joining they obtain a preferential m arket for
their cash crops and m inerals in the territories of E uropean
economic union. But the advantages of this are largely illusory
since most of the comm odities w hich they export are goods which
the E uropean partners w ould in any case have to buy from them .
O n the other h and, they deprive themselves of the advantages
of m eeting their own requirem ents in the w orld m arket and will
be bound to have to pay considerably m ore for everything they
buy, quite a p a rt from the hindrances w hich the Com m on
M arket is bound to impose on their own internal industrial
developm ent. A dm ittedly, the Rom e T reaty introduces explicit
safeguards concerning tariff protection by the overseas terri
tories of the E uropean Econom ic U nion. But in the circum
stances, I am by no m eans confident th a t these safeguards will
prove effective. T he ex-French colonies of Africa have plenty of
direct experience of the difficulties they have encountered in
setting up m anufacturing industries in those cases where these
safeguards operate to the disadvantage of industries in France.
I t is true, of course, th a t the producers of prim ary m aterials
are always a t a disadvantage in bargaining w ith powerful m an u
facturers in industrial countries. This naturally follows from their

N E O- COLO NI AL I S M IN AF RI CA

economic weakness, a weakness w hich can be corrected through

unity o f action betw een the different raw m aterial producing
countries, and not through exclusive trad in g arrangem ents
betw een the strong and the weak. T h e case o f D aniel and the
lions m ay occasionally come out right, b u t it is not a safe basis
for economic planning.
T h e p a tte rn of im perialist aid to Africa is set not only to draw
the unw ary back into the neo-colonialist relationship b u t to tie
them into cold-w ar politics. T his has been am ply explained by
M r W alt W hitm an Rostow, Counsellor and C hairm an of the
Policy P lanning Council of the U .S. State D epartm ent, in an
interview given to the weekly jo u rn a l, U.S. News and World
Report.1 Asked w hat A m erica is doing about the underdeveloped
areas, M r Rostow refers to the grad u al creation of a p a tte rn to
succeed the colonial period. W e helped pioneer this p a tte rn in
our relationship w ith the Philippines. After com m enting upon
the new relationships established w ith their form er colonies by
B ritain, France an d Belgium, who is m aking an im p o rtan t con
tinuing contribution to the C ongo, he states t h a t : As the residual
problem s are solved we look, as I say, to a new p artnership
based on the com m on interests of the n o rth ern an d southern
parts of the free w orld. T his M r Rostow adm its is a long-term
process. In playing the gam e in the underdeveloped areas you
m ust be p repared to play for a long tim e, and hence, in some of
the underdeveloped countries, as in most of Africa, we have to
start from a very low level - with specific projects, not national plans
o f a sophisticated k in d ' 2 For, says M r Rostow, using the examples
of Ita ly and Greece in the M arshall P lan period, we are buying
tim e to protect crucial pieces of real estate - an d the possibility
of h u m an freedom for those who lived there. A nd in the end we
sw eated it out and won. . . . Buying tim e is one o f the m ost
expensive and thankless things we do w ith our m oney - as in
South K o rea.
This is perhaps one of the most cynical b u t clear-cut summ ings
up th a t has ever appeared in p rin t o f the approach o f a rich
pow er to the needs an d hopes of the new nations of the w orld.
1 D ated 7 M ay 1962. T his jo u rn al is published in W ashington by the U n ited
States News Publishing C orporation.
2 Italics added.

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AF RI CA MUST UNI TE

T here is no need to underscore the intention it so blatantly

exposes in playing the gam e5 o f buying tim e5. I t should be an
object lesson for all those African statesm en who think th at
associations w ith non-A frican powers will foster their true
interests and give them the opportunity to prosper their nations
w ithin continuing independence of action. This objective can
only be achieved by close economic association betw een the
A frican states themselves, w hich in tu rn presupposes close
political co-operation betw een them . I t is on account of its
retrograde consequences for the cause of African unity and
econom ic independence th a t the governm ent of G hana is so
com pletely opposed to the E uropean C om m unity in its present
form .
T h a t m any of the leaders of the new African states find them
selves in a perplexing position, there is no doubt. T hey are
strongly dependent on foreign contributions simply to m aintain
the m achinery o f their governm ents. M any of them have
deliberately been m ade so w eak economically, by being carved
up into m any separate countries, th a t they are not able to sustain
out of their own resources the m achinery of independent govern
m ent, the cost of w hich cannot be reduced beyond a certain
m inim um . I recognize the impossible position in w hich they
were placed w hen the transfer of pow er took place. T h eir
frontiers were not of their own choosing, and they were left
w ith an economic, adm inistrative and educational system which,
each in its own way, was designed to perpetuate the colonial
relationship.
G h a n a s case was no different, b u t we are m aking decisive
efforts to change the p a tte rn and are determ ined to retain our
independence of policy an d action. I regard as culpable the
insidious reluctance of these states to form ulate an independent
policy even though it m ay involve the loss of the contributions
w hich were offered in exchange for continued conform ity to the
policies of the colonial powers. E qually reprehensible is the
refusal to give recognition to the natu re of the new im perialism
th a t is using them as pawns in keeping Africa divided, as a means
of aborting total independence and m aintaining neo-colonial
hegem ony. W orse still are the deceits in the pretended willing
ness of some leaders to co-operate on certain levels of African

NEO- COLONI AL I SM IN AFRI CA

affairs, while actually conniving w ith the colonial powers to

m islead the efforts a t m utual A frican assistance and unity. T he
perfidy of these artifices cannot be too strongly denounced for
their fatal im plications in the betrayal of A frican freedom . T hey
bring in question the patriotism of the leaders em ploying them
and give rise to suspicions of their sincerity and honesty. I f they
h a d h a d to fight a stern b attle for their independence, they
m ight have valued it m ore.
A point in our history has been reached where A fricas interests
m ust be the prim e concern of A fricas leaders. T h e safety and
progress of every one of our states can be safeguarded only by
the acceptance of this precept, w hich can best be prom oted by
our unalloyed unity. This m eans th a t w here associations linking
African countries w ith E uropean powers cut across basic A frican
interests at any level and offer im pedim ents to the goal of union,
they m ust be discarded, and rejected where they are offered. In
all relations w ith the w orld overseas, the key consideration m ust
be not m erely the superficial or even intrinsic advantage of
such relationships for the given A frican country b u t the obliga
tion to the A frican continent as a whole. H ow ever m uch we m ay
protest our loyalty to the cause of A frican freedom and our
united destiny, our affirm ations will be w ithout value unless we
accept this approach as the cardinal guide to our actions.
States em erging from the tutelage of other colonial powers
have not always understood G h a n a s attach m en t to the C om
m onw ealth and the sterling area. T h a t is because the loose, ad
hoc n atu re of the structure is not correctly com prehended by
those who have been or are m em bers of a m ore form al associa
tion. I t is difficult for those not accustom ed to a free connection
w ith Europe to appreciate th a t the C om m onw ealth is an associ
ation of sovereign states, each o f w hich is free from interference
from the others, including the U nited K ingdom . Each decides
for itself its own foreign and dom estic policies and the p a tte rn of
its governm ent, as provided in the W estm inster S tatute of 1931,
w hich laid dow n t h a t : D om inions are autonom ous com m unities
w ithin the British Em pire, equal in status, in no w ay subordinate
to one another in their dom estic or external affairs though
united by a com m on allegiance to the Crown, an d freely asso
ciated as m em bers of the British C om m onw ealth of N ations.

AF RI CA MUST U NI TE

Some of the nom enclature is outm oded b u t the principle of

sovereign identity of the m em bers of the Com m onw ealth is more
m eaningful th a n ever. M em bers, however, have the right to
criticize each other, an d do. For exam ple, events in the U nion of
S outh Africa and the whole subject of apartheid cam e under
heavy fire at the Conference of the Com m onw ealth Prim e
M inisters in M ay i960, an d in 1961 South Africa left the
Com m onwe a lth .
T here is no com pulsion to rem ain w ithin the C om m onw ealth,
or even to becom e a m em ber. B urm a exercised the right to sever
her relations w ith the Com m onw ealth on becom ing free in 1947.
O th e r states, like C an ad a an d A ustralia, acknowledge the
British Crow n as H ead of State. In d ia, Pakistan, Ceylon and
now G hana, choose to m ain tain Republics.
T here are m istaken claims th a t the French Com m unity, by
virtue of the changes th a t have been w rought in its original
intentions through the greater panoply of powers vested in the
new African states (which are the result of p o pular pressures),
is taking on the character of the C om m onw ealth. T h e resolution
from the recent m eeting of the Brazzaville G roup at Bangui,
calling for the transform ation of the C om m unity into a French
speaking association p attern ed on the C om m onw ealth, does not
com prehend the essential uniqueness of the Com m onw ealth.
T he fact is th at, in the circum stances of having to dissolve an
existing association to replace it w ith a new one, constitutionm aking will have to be invoked. This will at once instil a
principle w hich is entirely out of keeping w ith the whole idea
of the Com m onw ealth, w hich is not governed by any constitu
tion. I t grew out of the association of the w hite dom inions w ithin
the British Em pire and has ad ap ted itself, w ith custom ary
British flexibility, to the continuing evolvem ent of political in
dependence am ong the non-E uropean m em bers.
Nevertheless, if the U nited K ingdom opts into a close
E uropean federation by attaching to the E uropean Com m on
M arket, the position of G hana, as a m em ber of the sterling area,
w ould be prejudiced, and we m ight be forced to w ithdraw from
the C om m onw ealth to safeguard our trad ing position. It seems
anom alous, therefore, th a t the new African states at this tim e,
w hen the F rench C om m unity is in decline and the unity of the

N EO- COLO NI AL I S M IN A FRI CA

187

C om m onw ealth in question, should seek to bind themselves once

m ore into a E uropean political association w hich can only
intensify th eir economic dependence on France.
I t is significant th a t the w ord E urafrica has come into use in
connection w ith the E uropean Com m on M ark et negotiations.
I t sums up the dangerous conception o f a close, continuing link
betw een Europe and Africa on neo-colonialist term s, which m ust
be cem ented in any political form ation such as th a t envisaged
in the Bangui resolution.1T h e newly em ergent states do not m ake
it a principle to break off all relations w ith th eir form er colonial
m asters. In the context of a united Africa these relations w ould
take on new an d m ore dignified forms. Even at this tim e, there
m ay be certain advantages in m aintaining a link w hich history
has forged. No question of dictation, however, m ust arise. T he
new states m ust ensure th a t such relations are the result of a
free choice freely negotiated, in which they can tre a t w ith the
E uropean pow er ju st as w ith any other state in the w orld w ith
w hom they m ay wish to prom ote friendship. Nonetheless, how
ever loose such a relationship m ay be, if it should tend in the
slightest degree to im pinge upon the A frican states relations
w ith other A frican states, its retention becomes indefensible.
Pan-A frica and not E urafrica should be our w atchw ord, an d the
guide to our policies.
W h at is a t stake is not the destiny of a single country b u t the
freedom and destiny of the African continent, the unalterable
prelude to African U nion a n d the fullest developm ent of the
m any countries com prising the continent. J u s t as we are alive to
the dangers of a w orld w hich is half-slave, half-free, so we are
alert to the perils of an A frican continent split betw een states th a t
are wholly sovereign an d states th a t are only half-independent.
Such a p a tte rn can only im pede the real independence of Africa
an d its transform ation into an industrialized continent exercis
ing its rightful influence upon w orld affairs.
N one of us should be u n d er any illusion ab o u t the diffi
culties th a t lie ahead in the forging of continental governm ent.
Enem ies of A frican unity will m ultiply their endeavours to
deflect us from our course. T h eir device is the creation of discord
1 Resolution at the Conference of Brazzaville States held a t Bangui from
25-26 M arch 1962.

A FRI CA MUST U NI TE

and distrust in order to keep a wedge betw een us. Besides the
open m ethods of division, the im pact of rising nationalism
and independence has encouraged the m ore subtle velvet-glove
w eapon of flattery of our national egos. Play is m ade upon our
vanities, the im portance of each of us is m agnified at the expense
of others. W e are subjected to the insidious suggestion th a t a
certain A frican state is anxious to exalt itself to the place of the
retired colonial pow er; th a t some African states have a large
m outh, open and ready to swallow their neighbours. A ppeal is
directed to our personal am bitions and we are rem inded th a t in
a union of African states there will be room for only one Prim e
M inister, a single cabinet and a sole representation at the U nited
N ations. H ints are spread around th a t some states, on account
of their size and m agnitude of population, are m ore qualified
th an others to play the role of leadership in Africa and to be its
m outhpiece. T here is a tendency to divide Africa into fictitious
zones no rth and south of the S ahara w hich emphasizes racial,
religious and cultural differences.
T h e basic fallacy of these persuasions, dangerous to the in
dependence of Africa in their shrew d exploitation of our pride
and vanities, is the deliberate distortion of our vision of African
U nion. W e do not intend a relationship of unequal partners. W e
envisage the A frican U nion as a free m erging together of peoples
w ith a com m on history and a com m on destiny. As w ith other
existing unions, the size and resources of countries joining the
A frican U nion will be irrelevant to the choice of union leader
ship. In A m erica, the President is not chosen from the largest
of the states. Both President Eisenhower and President T ru m a n
cam e from am ong the sm aller states.
In the early nineteenth century Simon Bolivar, the great
liberator of the South A m erican colonies from Spain, had a
vision of a U nion of South A m erican States as the precursor to
the economic developm ent of the South A m erican continent.
U nfortunately for the subsequent history of these lands, he was
not able to bring his farsighted idea to triu m p h over the personal
am bitions and jealousies of contending individuals and forces.
W e have seen the u n h ap p y results of this failure in the dissidence
an d sloth in w hich the South A m erican countries were sunk for
so m any decades. I t is only today, against the pressures of popular

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189

discontent and welfare aspirations, th a t they are m aking some

headw ay on the road to developm ent. Unless, however, they can
come together in a union such as Bolivar envisaged, their rate
of developm ent can never reach anyw here n ear those of the
integrated, planned economies of the U .S .S .R . and C hina.
T he U n ited States of A m erica, b u t for the firm resolve of
A b rah am Lincoln to m aintain the union of the states, m ight well
have fallen into a disintegration w hich would have b arred the
way to the trem endous acceleration of developm ent th a t an
enorm ous agglom eration of land, resources an d people m ade
possible. Lincoln plunged into a civil w ar to m ain tain the union
as the only logical base of viability. Slavery and its abolition was
a secondary, subservient consideration, though the advantage of
free labour in a growing industrial economy, m aking for lower
working costs, and greater productivity, were impressing their
reasoning upon the entrepreneurs of the N orth.
H ere, then, is the lesson for Africa, and our choice. A re we
to take the ro ad of n ational exclusivism or the ro ad of
union?
In the British W est Indies at this tim e we are witnessing a
sorry spectacle of political jugglery w hich refuses to subordinate
selfish big island interests to total W est In d ia n welfare w ithin
federation. Inter-island rivalries and jealousies, adroitly stirred
by designing politicians, local racial dissensions w hich have been
deliberately fostered to break dow n a one-tim e at least super
ficial cosm opolitanism in such m ulti-racial islands as T rin id a d
an d Ja m a ica , the skilfully exploited fears of the p redom inant
East In d ia n population of the South A m erican m ainland terri
tory of British G uiana of being sw am ped w ithin federation by
the total African-descended population, the com placency of
island leaders, have all played their several parts in interring the
still-born federation.
F ederation of the British W est In d ia n territories, leading
eventually to a w ider unity w ith those under other suzerainties,
is the only answer to the present poverty and stagnant agricul
tu ral societies of the C aribbean w orld. T h e islands are less
num erous an d scattered th a n those of Indonesia, where the
central governm ent is reaching out to bring them all w ithin a
centrally directed state. Unless they succeed in com ing together

A F RI CA MUST UNITE

w ithin a federation m ore strongly knit under a firm er central

authority th a n the first attem pt, the islands of the W est Indies
can have a future no different from th a t of the b a n a n a republics5
of C entral A m erica, notw ithstanding T rin id a d s oil and asphalt
industries and J a m a ic a s bauxite extraction and secondary
m anufactures. For these are, anyw ay, all foreign-owned and
controlled, and the illusion they give of industrialization m ust
disintegrate before the perennial problem s of over-population
in islands like J a m a ic a and Barbados, unem ploym ent in all of
them , and the steadily rising inflation which has become a
noticeable feature of W est In d ia n economies.
M eantim e, separate and inw ardly split into m inuteness by
political friction and group animosities, they are unable to give
support to the A frican struggle for freedom and unity, in spite
of the bonds of race and sym pathy th a t exist.
V anity and narrowness of outlook were w hat kept the leaders
of the original states of N orth A m erica from uniting for a long
tim e. T hey w ere finally overw helm ed by the exertions of the
people and the em ergence of leaders of stature, m atu rity and
farsightedness. No one today doubts th a t the welfare and pros
perity of the U nited States w ould never have been achieved if
each state still cherished its petty sovereignty in splendid isola
tion. Yet in those days there was perhaps less obvious reason for
South C arolina to jo in N ew H am pshire as m em bers of a conti
nen tal union th an there is today for G hana and Nigeria, G uinea
a n d D ahom ey, Togo and Ivory Coast, C am eroon and M ali,
and others, to form themselves into a U nion as a first step to the
creation of a union of all the states of the African continent.
T h a t is why any effort a t association betw een the states of
Africa, however lim ited its im m ediate horizons, is to be wel
com ed as a step in the right direction: the eventual political
unification of Africa.
T h e C entral African F ederation was never to be confused
w ith these free associations of Africans expressing their own desire
to come together. T he Federation of N orthern an d Southern
R hodesia an d N yasaland was forced upon the Africans of those
territories by the white settler m inorities, w ith the consent of the
U n ited K ingdom G overnm ent, in the hope th a t they w ould be
able to extend their com bined hegem ony over a dom inion freed

N EO- COLO NI AL I S M IN AFRI CA

from the supervision of W hitehall, and to spread the intensive

racial practises of Southern R hodesia to the other parts.
T here is a strong financial an d ideological connection betw een
South Africa and the Rhodesias w hich extends through P o rtu
guese A ngola an d M ozam bique. T here is talk of a secret m ilitary
pact betw een Portugal and the U nion of South Africa. T h e
m ilitary m achine th a t is being built up by South Africa presents
a most threatening danger, not only to the struggle for independ
ence in C entral, East and South Africa, b u t to the safety of the
already independent A frican states. I t is unfortunate th a t the
U nited K ingdom , even though South Africa has w ithdraw n
from the C om m onw ealth following the heavy censure of her
apartheid policy from the m ajority of the m em bers, continues to
give support to the U n io n s policy of m ilitary preparedness.
W e cannot afford either to ignore the sinister chain of interests
w hich unites events in the Congo and A ngola to East an d South
Africa. These interests are also connected w ith the East-W est
b attle for world suprem acy an d the frenzied efforts being m ade
to drag the newly em erging countries of Africa into the orbit of
the cold w ar. T h e contest for ideological influence over the new
states of Africa is throw ing into confusion and com plicating even
m ore w hat is already a com plex enough struggle for freedom
from im perialist political a n d economic dom inance and the
unification o f the continent. A ny difference, any kind of fissure
am ong Africans is seized a n d tu rn ed to the im perialist an d coldw ar interests. T h e Congo offers perhaps the most striking
exam ple of how trib al dissensions a n d political careerism are
exploited in order to fragm ent united territories and exacerbate
divisions. T he aim of the m arionette control of local careerists
like Moise Tshom be, besides the m aintenance o f econom ic
pow er, is to cut across the A frican determ ination to secure
continental unity in full independence. I t was unfortunate th a t
the U nited N ations was m anoeuvred into a position w here a t one
tim e it appeared to be w eighting its influence against the
legitim ate Congolese G overnm ent on the side of those who were
responsible for throw ing the country into upheaval and for the
m urder of Patrice L um um ba.
W e m ust be forgiven, I think, if we also see some connection
betw een events in the Congo and Angola and N .A .T .O . T h e

192

AF RI CA MUST U NI TE

dom inating powers joined in this organization - B ritain, France,

the U n ited States - are all influenced by financial, industrial and
m ilitary considerations in m aintaining in Africa regimes th at
will support their interests. T he means used for doing so are, if the
evidence is to be believed, dubious in the extrem e. I t would be
difficult to convince most people of w hat can only be described as
the crim inal in ten t behind certain actions th a t are em ployed to
upset the stability of states trying to sustain their national unity
and integrity against subversive forces. I t has been left, however,
to a publication linked w ith N .A .T .O . to reveal the strategy of the
coup d'etat, w hich is recom m ended for use out of the search for
alternative m ethods of violence. This publication, the General
Military Review, published in its O ctober 1957 issue an article by
a C ap tain Goodspeed, on this subject, in w hich he advised th a t:
In s u r g e n t le a d e r s s h o u ld e n d e a v o u r to e n s u r e t h a t p u b lic
o p i n i o n i s i n f l a m e d a g a i n s t t h e g o v e r n m e n t p r i o r t o t h e coup.
C a r e f u lly se le c te d a c t s s h o u ld b e p e r f o r m e d w h ic h w ill p r o v o k e
o f f ic ia l r e a c t io n , a n d t h is r e a c t io n s h o u l d b e p r e s e n t e d t o t h e
p u b l i c i n t h e w o r s t p o s s ib le lig h t . T h e r e is p r o b a b l y n o b e t t e r
w a y o f a c h ie v in g t h is t h a n b y a j u d ic io u s a s s a s s in a t io n o r tw o .
T h e g e n e r a l p u b l i c , f r o m t h e v e r y i n c e p t i o n o f t h e coup , s h o u l d
b e k e p t in f o r m e d , n o t n e c e s s a r ily o f w h a t is a c t u a ll y g o in g o n ,
b u t a t le a s t o f w h a t t h e r e b e ls w is h t h e m t o b e lie v e .
T h e o b j e c t o f t h is is t o in f lu e n c e t h e p u b l ic i n t h o s e c o u r s e s o f
a c t io n d e s ir e d b y t h e in s u r g e n t s , a n d it is n o t n e c e s s a r y t h e r e fo r e
t h a t th e b r o a d c a s t s c o r r e s p o n d to th e r e a l s it u a tio n .
This exposure m ust surely give credence to the publication of
plots th a t governm ents in Africa have uncovered from tim e to
tim e, aim ed a t assassinating the leaders and overturning the
state.
As we exam ine the m ultifarious dangers to w hich the new
states and the freedom fighters of Africa are exposed, the m ore it
becomes certain th a t our best, indeed our one, protection is in
unity. For it is th a t very unity which all the im perialist designs
and actions are intended to prevent. I t should, therefore, be
glaringly obvious th at these designs can only be circum vented by
achieving the end they are planned to frustrate. A t present, an
ap p a re n t diversity of view am ong the leaders of some of the

N E O - COLO NI AL I S M IN A F RI CA

193

African territories draw s a fagade of disharm ony across the

fervent will to unity th a t pervades the ran k and file of the large
nationalist m ovem ents throughout the continent. I t is the idea of
the universality of freedom th a t has im pelled the struggle for in
dependence. A nd ju st as the vast masses of the peoples of Africa
instinctively absorbed the notion of freedom s indivisibility, so, in
contradistinction to those unpatriotic leaders who ally them
selves w ith foreign interests ra th e r th an support A fricas con
tinental cohesion, they spontaneously u n d erstand an d uphold
the need for African union. T h e ir A fricanism is a m ore solid
reality, for they have not been seduced by the sophistries of
assim ilation into an alien culture an d foreign ideological
identity. T here is a bond of unity here th a t cannot be dis
regarded. I t m ust be used to m ould the cause of A frican U nion
and carry us forw ard to its a ttain m en t and the exorcism of every
vestige of im perialism from our continent. O u r course is clear.
W e m ust bew are of the gift of fictitious independence and refuse
the falsities of encum bered foreign alliances. W e m ust exam ine
carefully praise from questionable sources and give to the people
guarantees of our sincerity in every way. W e m ust stand firmly
together against the im perialist forces w hich are engineering our
division and seeking to m ake Africa a w ar-ground of contending
interests. For it is only in the A frican association of unity and not
in a rider-horse relationship w ith the very powers th a t are
p lanning our balkanization th a t we can counteract an d sur
m ount this m achiavellian danger.
A U nion of African States m ust strengthen our influence on the
intern atio n al scene, as all Africa will speak w ith one concerted
voice. W ith union, our exam ple o f a m ultiple of peoples living
an d w orking for m u tu al developm ent in am ity and peace will
point the w ay for the sm ashing of the inter-territorial barriers
existing elsewhere, and give a new m eaning to the concept of
h u m an brotherhood. A U nion of A frican States will raise the
dignity of Africa and strengthen its im pact on w orld affairs. I t
will m ake possible the full expression of the A frican personality.

CHAPTER NINETEEN

AFRICA

IN W O R L D

AFFAIRS

I t is impossible to separate the affairs of Africa from the affairs

of the w orld as a whole. N ot only has the history of Africa been
too closely involved w ith Europe and the W estern hem isphere,
b u t th a t very involvem ent has been the driving force in bringing
about m ajor wars and in ternational conflicts for w hich Africans
have not been responsible. Africa has too long been the victim of
disruptive aggression, w hich still attem pts to m ake a hunting
ground of our continent.
O u r interest, therefore, in the m aintenance of peace and the
elim ination of the forces w hich daily threaten it, is very real
indeed. H ence, our co-operation in any living organism th a t can
be counted on effectively to prom ote international peace,
provided it does not invade our independence of action, is
assured. A t the m om ent there exists only the U nited N ations
O rganization w hich offers, w ith all its defects, the possibility of
w orking tow ards a peaceful world.
W hen the U n ited N ations O rganization was founded in 1945,
Asian and A frican nationalism was of little consequence. Since
then, however, so m any form er colonies have achieved in
dependence th a t Afro-Asian countries now form the most
influential single group w ithin the U nited Nations.
A t the end of 1961, A frican states occupied m ore th an a
q u a rte r of the seats. T he proportion m ight rise to alm ost a third
as the entire African continent becomes free. This possibility was
certainly in the m inds of those at the Lagos conference w hen they
passed a resolution calling for a specifically African group at the
U nited N ations.
But the d ram atic increase in the international im portance of
independent Africa, though it m ay at first sight appear to

A FRI CA IN W OR LD AF FAI RS

*95

dem onstrate strength, in fact reflects weakness, since it is based in

the fragm entation of the continent into m any states, few of
w hich are really viable.
T h e two m ost powerful countries in the w orld are the
U .S .S .R . and the U .S.A ., w ith populations of 215 millions and
185 millions respectively. Both have one representative each at
the U n ited N ations, as entities; though the Byelo Soviet Socialist
R epublic an d the U krainian Soviet Socialist R epublic, units of
the U .S .S .R ., are each represented since Laos an d C am bodia
were adm itted. In d ia, w ith her population of 460 millions, also
has only one representative. W hen the Peoples R epublic of
C hina is adm itted, its m ighty population of over 640 m illion
people will doubtless have a single representative. T here is no
reason, therefore, w hy Africa, w ith its approxim ately 300 m illion
people, once united, should not send a single representative to
the U n ited N ations. A single representation, resting on the
strength of a whole continent, w ould be m ore positive in its
influence th an all the separate representations of the A frican
states p u t together.
A lthough confidence in the U n ited N ations has suffered
several shocks since its foundation, an d p articularly of late in
connection w ith the Congo crisis, it rem ains the only w orld
organization in w hich the m any problem s of the w orld have a
chance of finding reasonable solution. I t m ust, therefore, be
supported by all interested in the preservation of peace an d the
progress of h u m an civilization.
W e in G h an a showed our faith in the organization w hen we
responded at once w ith troops to support U n ited Nztions in ter
vention in the Congo in i960. T h e reason why we did not w ith
d raw our troops w hen several other countries did, was because
we felt th a t by doing so we w ould w eaken the au thority
of the U n ited N ations and leave the w ay open for the intensi
fication of intervention from ju st those forces we are anxious to
oust.
Recently, in J a n u a ry 1962, G h an a was elected to serve for two
years as a non-perm anent m em ber of the eleven-nation Security
Council. W e welcom ed the opportunity to take our share of
responsibility in the U n ited N ations, though this does not deter
us from pressing for certain changes in the adm inistrative

A F RI CA MUST UNITE

structure w hich we consider necessary if it is to function as a m ore

objectively serviceable organ of w orld peace.
T h e U nited N ations, in its present form, does not reflect true
conditions in the w orld at this tim e. T oday, m ore and m ore
countries are assum ing the dignity of sovereign states out of a
colonial status w hich previously m ade them nothing but
appendages or vassals of im perialism . I t has not, however,
elim inated the view th a t the powerful nations (and some who
regard themselves as still powerful even though events have
proved their brittle vulnerability) have a right to set the p a tte rn
for the budding nations an d even to interfere nakedly in the
in ternal affairs of these struggling states.
I n the past m ight m eant right. T he idea th a t right presides in
m ight still persists. Indeed, it has achieved its fateful acme in the
contest betw een the two colossi, who seek to draw the rest of the
w orld into their opposing camps. H ow ever, the very fact of a
progressively enlarging w orld, w hich is altering not only in the
n um ber of independent nations b u t in kind, is having its im pact
in creating a fringe bloc of states which, though individually
u n im portant, collectively are able to exert an influence on the
in ternational scene w hich is unprecedented.
T h eir com m on concern w ith the anti-colonial struggle and
the continuing liberation of subjected territories is forcing the
U n ited N ations to abandon its tem porizing m ethods for more
positive m easures in connection w ith a rb itra ry rule in Africa, as
well as the extension of aid to the less developed parts of the
w orld. T h e constant w hittling at South A fricas resistance
resulted in the visit in M ay 1962 of a U nited N ations special
mission to the trust territory of South-W est Africa to investigate
allegations of slavery and m altreatm ent. A nother delegation
from the U n ited N ations special com m ittee on colonization
visited East Africa to enquire into conditions in M ozam bique
from freedom fighters who h ad been forced into exile in
T anganyika an d elsewhere. A seventeen-nation sub-com m ittee
w hich sent a mission to C entral Africa to exam ine the tenability
of C entral A frican Federation, recom m ended its breaking up, as
it im posed no freedom measures on the m ajority population. It
found th a t the proposed new constitution for N orthern Rhodesia
was basically undem ocratic and discrim inatory. T he principle

AF RI CA IN WO R LD AFFAIRS

197

o f p a rity m ade a sham of dem ocracy by providing 70,000 nonAfricans w ith fifteen seats in parliam en t an d giving the same
num ber to 3,000,000 Africans.
N othing like this busy concern w ith the A frican surge for
freedom could ever have happened w ithout the concerted
pressure of the newly independent states w ithin the w orld
organization of nations.
A nd they are able to operate their decisive influence because
m any o f them adhere to a policy of non-com m itm ent to either of
the East-W est blocs, a policy of n eu tral non-alignm ent, b u t not
of passivity. T hey exercise their right of free choice in supporting
those acts w hich they consider will help to m aintain the peace on
w hich their continuance as independent nations rests.
W hen the U nited N ations cam e into being, the old order still
existed and its rules m ade concessions to the prevailing
assum ption of the priority of the great powers. I t is now necessary
th a t recognition be given and concession m ade to the novel factor
of a grow ing num ber of new states unw illing to be swallowed up
by the older, powerful ones. T hus, a t the Conference of N on
A ligned Countries, held in Belgrade in Septem ber 1961, I
suggested th a t three deputy secretary-generals should be
appointed, one from the East, one from the W est, and the th ird
from am ong the uncom m itted nations. This would reflect the
m ain stream s of c u rren t political thought, restore confidence in
the secretary-generalship, and enlarge the objectivity of the
secretariat.
I also proposed the setting up of an executive body, elected by
the G eneral Assembly, whose duty it would be to ensure th a t the
decisions of both the G eneral Assembly and the Security Council
were faithfully and prom ptly p u t into effect. For it cannot be
denied th a t decisions are n ot always readily executed. A n
effective secretariat is essential to the proper functioning of
the U nited N ations and the energetic im plem entation of
decisions.
Ever-darkening clouds over A ngola, South-W est Africa, the
Rhodesias, Congo, Laos, K orea, and over Berlin, gravely over
cast the in ternational sky. I t is significant th a t so m any uneasy
centres are in Africa an d Asia. For w here they are not the direct
outcom e of W estern im perialist m anceuvrings, they are engaged

198

AF RI CA MUST U NI TE

w ith an issue arising from the conflict betw een the two great
pow er blocs of East and W est, w ith w hich the peace of the world
is dangerously tied up. These two blocs are each com m itted to its
own political an d economic ideology. Both are m ilitarily pow er
ful, and each is suspicious of the thoughts an d actions of the
other. T he failure to reach any agreem ent over such fundam ental
issues as disarm am ent and the testing of nuclear weapons seems
to hold out little hope for the future.
A new and vigorous approach to the problem of peace and w ar
is needed. T h e tim e has come wrhen the destiny of m ankind
should cease to hang so dangerously on the aims and am bitions
o f the great powers. In recent years I have travelled extensively
in A m erica, in the Soviet U nion, in Europe, In d ia and C hina,
w here I have spoken to m en an d w om en in all walks of life.
Everyw here, I have noticed a deep longing for peace. This
universal, b u t often inarticulate, desire for peace m ust find
expression an d exert its proper influence on the conduct of
w orld affairs. For peace is indivisible. D isagreem ent betw een
East and W est, for exam ple over Laos or Berlin, can th reaten the
security of the whole of the rest of the world.
These were the kind of considerations behind the Belgrade
Conference o f the N on-A ligned C ountries, held in Septem ber
1961, w hich 25 countries1 attended. A t Belgrade, we did not
in ten d to form a th ird pow er bloc, b u t we did hope by our
solidarity to constitute ourselves into a distinct m oral force
w hich m ight hold the balance of pow er betw een East an d W est
in the cause of peace.
A t th a t tim e the U nited States was spending an estim ated
$47,966 m illion a year on defence and arm am ents alone, more
th an h a lf the entire national budget. In i960 the Soviet U nion
spent some 96,100 m illion roubles on defence, out of a national
budget of 745,800 m illion roubles. In a declaration issued at the
end of the Belgrade Conference, the U nited N ations was asked
to convene either a special session of the G eneral Assembly
1 Afghanistan, Algeria, Burm a, C am bodia, Ceylon, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus,
Ethiopia, G hana, G uinea, India, Indonesia, Ira q , Lebanon, M ali, M orocco,
N epal, Saudi A rabia, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, U nited A rab Republic,
Y em en and Yugoslavia. T here were observers from Brazil, Bolivia, and
Ecuador.

A FRI CA IN WOR L D AFFAIRS

*99

to discuss disarm am ent, or to call a w orld disarm am ent

conference.
W hen the non-aligned nations talk of disarm am ent they are
not m erely concerned w ith the destructiveness an d m adness of
the arm am ents race. T hey are thinking of the vast possibilities
now denied the people of the less-developed areas for increased
standards of living, the developm ent of agriculture and industry,
the planning of cities, the abolition of illiteracy an d w ant, and the
curing of disease. I t has been estim ated th a t one-tenth of the
expenditure involved in arm am ents w ould be enough to raise the
whole of the less-developed w orld to the level of a self-sustaining
economy. T he influence of the uncom m itted nations m ust be
exerted to the full to restore a p roper sense of values to the
w orld.
As a contribution to this end, the G hana governm ent set aside
50,000 for an Assembly held in A ccra in J u n e 1962, and
atten d ed by representatives of all organizations throughout the
w orld whose aim is the ending of the th re a t of nuclear w arfare
and the establishm ent of universal peace. A t the m eeting of the
P rep arato ry C om m ittee for this A ccra Assembly, held in
Zagreb, Yugoslavia, in M arch 1962, it was agreed th a t the
following subjects should be discussed: the reduction o f in te r
national tensions; m ethods of effective inspection an d control in
d isarm am ent; the transform ation of existing m ilitary nuclear
m aterials to peaceful purposes, an d the prevention of the spread
of nuclear w eapons; economic problem s involved in or arising
from d isarm am en t; and the exam ination of such fundam ental
problem s as hunger, disease, ignorance, poverty an d servitude,
w ith a view to utilizing for social purposes resources now misused
as a result of the arm am ents race.
T he three basic aims of G h a n a s foreign policy are A frican in
dependence, A frican unity, and the m aintenance of w orld peace
through a policy of positive n eutrality an d non-alignm ent. T he
first two aims are inextricably bound together, since until we are
free from foreign dom ination we cannot be com pletely united.
Yet u n ited action is essential if we are to achieve full independ
ence. T he th ird aim is closely associated w ith the other two.
Living as we do u n d er the constant th re a t of universal
destruction, the m ore unaligned nations there are, the w ider the

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AF RI CA MUST UNITE

non-com m itted area of the w orld, the better the chances of

h u m an survival. By m oral force, if not by m aterial strength, the
non-aligned nations m ust exert their influence to save the world
from ultim ate disaster. T he unity of Africa and the strength it
would gather from continental integration of its economic and
industrial developm ent, supported by a united policy of non
alignm ent, could have a most powerful effect for w orld peace.
I do not believe it is possible for a state, in the w orld today, to
secure its safety by w ithdraw ing from international affairs and
refusing to take a stand on issues w hich affect peace and w ar. This
w ould be to follow a policy of negative neutralism w hich is
tan ta m o u n t to a fatal belief th a t w ar betw een the great powers
w ould bring misery and destruction only to those who partici
p ated in it. Since w ar, if it comes, is likely to destroy most of us,
w hether we are participants or not, w hether or not we are the
cause of it, negative neutralism is no shield at all. I t is completely
im p o ten t and even dangerous.
T he participants in the Belgrade Conference held this view.
T hey agreed it was essential th a t the non-aligned countries
should p articipate in solving outstanding international issues
concerning peace and security in the w orld as none of them can
rem ain unaffected by, or indifferent to, these issues.1 T hey
considered th a t the further extension of the non-com m itted area
of the w orld constituted the only possible alternative to the
policy of the total division of the w orld into blocs, and the
intensification of cold w ar policies.
A free and united Africa would contribute greatly to the
strength of the non-com m itted area. W hile the enormous
obstacles th a t still stand in the way of African freedom and unity
m ust not be under-estim ated, account m ust be taken of the ever
growing strength of our cause. For the opposition to colonialism,
both m oral an d m aterial, is greater in the w orld today th an it has
ever been, and it is becom ing m ore powerful all the tim e.
I t is significant th at, at the fifteenth session of the G eneral
Assembly of the U nited N ations, a D eclaration on the granting
of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples was
adopted. N ot only was colonialism condem ned, b u t colonial
powers were asked to begin preparations at once for the liberation
1 D e c l a r a t i o n is s u e d a t t h e e n d o f t h e C o n f e r e n c e , i n O c t o b e r 1 9 6 1 .

AF R I C A IN WOR LD AFFAI RS

201

of all territories still u n d er their rule. This declaration was

strongly supported at the Belgrade Conference, though it has yet
to be im plem ented.
U nited States spokesmen have often declared their con
dem nation of colonialism an d latterly have affirm ed their support
of A frican independence. W e m ust hope this m eans th a t d eter
m ined efforts will be m ade to h alt the im perialist interventions of
the W estern bloc in Africa. T h e Soviet U nion, by the very n a tu re
of its state and constitution, is a supporter of independence. W e
can count, also, on large num bers of well-wishers in B ritain and
in other colonial countries. T he days of colonialism in Africa are
num bered, despite the m ilitary reinforcem ents Portugal has
hurriedly packed into A ngola, and the im perialist an d cold-w ar
m achinations in the C ongo; despite the latest suppressions o f the
nationalist m ovem ents in the Rhodesias, the gruelling enforce
m ent of apartheid in South Africa, and the frenzied manoeuvres
o f neo-colonialism in Africa. Sooner or later, an d I think it
will be m uch sooner th a n the w orld thinks, all these frantic
efforts to save im perialism in Africa will be swept into the debris
o f history.
Along w ith them will go the fascist dictatorships in E urope
th a t are so finely balanced on the prolongation of colonialism,
which, in the case of Spain, provided the m ilitary m eans for the
seizure of p o w e r; w ith the concurrence of a dem ocratic w orld
m ore concerned a t the tim e w ith supporting reactionary ruling
cliques as a bastion against C om m unism th a n w ith the issue of
popular liberty. I n the present, there is a positive revolutionary
connection betw een C ap tain G alvaos exposure of Portuguese
atrocities in Angola after his plucky break for freedom and the
intensification of nationalist activities in the Portuguese colonies.
These, in tu rn , are undoubtedly having th eir reaction upon the
intellectual and working class revolt in progress against the
dictatorship in Portugal. T he w eakening of Portuguese fascism
sim ultaneously a t the m etropolitan centre and in the colonial
periphery can start off a chain of events which m ight successfully
engage Portuguese forces split betw een the m etropolis and the
colonies, provided there is no interference from the neo
colonialist and cold-w ar elements. T here is the danger th a t
South A fricas m ilitary forces m ay be brought into play to

2 02

A F RI CA MUST UNITE

prevent the extension of the colonial revolt to its own and its
neighbours borders.
T h e freedom fighters of Africa m ust prepare themselves for
this danger, w hich also threatens the independent states, who can
m eet it effectively by unifying their m ilitary com m and and
foreign policy, and uniting w ith the liberation m ovements
through a concerted strategy. T he dangerous potentials herein
envisaged are a graphic illustration of the direct bearing of im
perialism on intern atio n al affairs through its instrum ents,
colonialism and neo-colonialism . I t can be readily seen th a t
im perialism is a fundam ental cause of w ar. A n iniquitous system
w hich has generated intense rivalries and conflicts betw een
nations th a t erupted into open w arfare on a m ajor scale in the
scram ble to secure a place in the sun of colonial suprem acy, it
has today spaw ned the neo-colonialism w hich is as busy as ever in
creating clashes am ong the nations. In their eagerness to exploit
the resources of the overseas territories, they engage in wicked
policies th a t bring a serious th re a t to the peace of the world.
T h eir grabbing involves them in a constant scram ble, like crabs
in a pot, clim bing over each o th ers backs in order to get the
biggest helping. M ore often th a n not this scram ble ends in
physical fighting, w ith the loss of countless innocent lives.
W hen we in Africa denounce im perialism and the recent off
shoot, neo-colonialism , we do it not only because we believe th at
Africa belongs to the Africans and should be governed by them ,
b u t also in the interest of w orld peace w hich is so essential to our
developm ent and freedom . By abolishing im perialism in all its
forms, the w orld will be rid of m any of the present areas of
conflict.
I t is in the same interest of w orld peace th a t we also advocate
unity. A united Africa would be able to m ake a greater con
trib u tio n tow ards the peace and progress of m ankind. For one
thing, it w ould resolve the problem s of those arb itrary frontiers
erected by the colonial powers, and so elim inate irredentist
dissensions. T here w ould be no foreign m ilitary bases on African
soil. W ith a united foreign policy and a com m on defence plan,
there would be no need for them . In the concourse of African
union, no African country would be left in a position of solitary
weakness in w hich it could be bullied into allowing them . Any

A F R I C A IN W O R L D A F F A I R S

203

kind of m ilitary pacts or alliances w ith outside powers w ould be

unnecessary. O u r united strength would be sufficient to deter
any w ould-be aggressor, since an attack on any A frican country
w ould be regarded as an attack on the U nion.
T h e m aintenance of m ilitary forces imposes a heavy financial
b u rd en on even the most w ealthy A frican states. W e all need
every penny we can get for developm ent, an d it is suicidal for
each of us, individually, to assume such a heavy b u rd en w hen the
w eight could be lightened by sharing it am ong ourselves. I do
not im agine th a t F rance w ould have d ared to attack Bizerta if
we had been united. N or w ould she explode atom ic bom bs in the
S ahara in spite of urgent and repeated A frican objections.
W orld peace today needs A fricas total independence, needs
A fricas unity, as positive contributions to an elim ination of the
elem ents engaged in creating the conditions for w ar. Some of
these elem ents are connected w ith the supply of m aterials for an d
prom otion of the m anufacture of the most lethal weapons of
destruction yet devised. T o ensure the continuance of this supply,
Africa is being draw n into the danger zone of w ar. In A ngola, the
Rhodesias, in South Africa, a m enacing m ilitary m achine is
being built up, aim ed at destroying A frican independence and
m aintaining the servitude of millions of Africans to w hite
suprem acy, in conditions of slavery.
W orld peace is not possible w ithout the com plete liquidation
of colonialism and the total liberation of peoples everywhere.
T h e indivisibility of peace is staked upon the indivisibility of
freedom. A nd this indivisibility extends to m inorities w ithin
independent states who are segregated from the body politic.
W herever there is the possibility of conflict arising out of dis
crim inations and the refusal of h u m an rights, the peace of the
w orld is threatened.
H ence it follows th at, if the true interest o f all peoples is
pursued, there m ust come an end to all forms of exploitation and
oppression of m an by m an, of nation by n a tio n ; there m ust come
an end to w ar. T here m ust result peaceful co-existence an d the
prosperity and happiness of all m ankind.
T he balance of forces in the w orld today has reached such a
stage th a t the only avenue open to m ankind is peaceful co
existence. T he alternative to this is chaos, destruction and

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A F RI CA MUST U NI TE

annihilation. H ow ever, in term s of the African R evolution, we

cannot speak of a balance of forces or even of co-existence as long
as the problem of colonialism rem ains unsolved. U ntil
colonialism and im perialism in all their various forms and
m anifestations have been com pletely eradicated from Africa,
it would be inconsistent for the African Revolution to co-exist
w ith im perialism .

CHAPTER TWENTY

EXAMPLES OF M AJOR UNIONS

OF STATES

are in the w orld several unions of states w hich can offer

examples or case studies for the political unification of A frica:
the U nited States of A m erica, the U nion of Soviet Socialist
Republics, A ustralia, C anada, Sw itzerland an d V enezuela.
E ach of them cam e into being at different historical periods, b u t
all aim ed at giving greater protection to the uniting states
against in tern al and external disintegrating pressures; and at
providing w ithin the union the conditions of viability and
security w hich would lead to faster economic evolution.
T h e first o f them was the U n ited States of A m erica, whose
constitution has, w ith m odifications and adaptations, provided
a p a tte rn for m ost of those w hich followed. Jam es Bryce, a
fam ous English ju rist who died in 1922, in his Studies in History
and Jurisprudence, defined the most perfect form o f a federation
of states as th a t w hich delegates to a suprem e federal govern
m ent certain powers or functions inherent in themselves or in
their sovereign or separate capacity. In its tu rn , the federal or
union governm ent, in the exercise of those specific powers, acts
directly on the individual citizen no less th an upon the com
m unities m aking up the federation. T he separate states retain
unim paired their individual sovereignty in respect of the residual
powers unallotted to the central or federal authority. T he
citizens of the federated states owe a double allegiance, one to
the individual state, the other to the federal governm ent.
By the constitution adopted in 1787 and p u t into effect in
1789, the original thirteen m em bers of the U nited States of
A m erica, each wholly independent of the other, form ed a
federal republic by a voluntary com bination. This form ation
strengthened and centralized the confederation and perp etu al
T here

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AF RI CA MUST UNITE

union th a t had been established under the confederation articles

accepted in 1777 and operated betw een 1781 and 1789. T he
constitution recognized a com m on citizenship for the whole
union, and gave powers to the federal governm ent to exercise
such authority as was expressly delegated to it. These powers
w hich are extrem ely wide, are set out under Article O ne Section
8 o f the constitution as follows:
T h e C o n g r e s s s h a ll h a v e p o w e r t o la y a n d c o lle c t t a x e s, d u t ie s ,
im p o r t s a n d e x c is e , t o p a y t h e d e b t s a n d p r o v i d e f o r t h e c o m m o n
d e fe n c e a n d g e n e r a l w e lf a r e o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s ; b u t a ll d u t ie s ,
im p o r t s a n d e x c ise s h a ll b e u n if o r m t h r o u g h o u t t h e U n it e d
State s;
T o b o r r o w m o n e y o n t h e c r e d it o f t h e U n it e d S t a t e s ; to r e g u
la t e c o m m e r c e w it h f o r e ig n n a t io n s , a n d a m o n g t h e s e v e r a l
sta te s, a n d w it h t h e In d i a n t r ib e s ; to e s t a b lis h a u n if o r m r u le o f
n a t u r a liz a t io n , a n d u n if o r m la w s o n t h e su b je c t o f b a n k r u p t c ie s
th ro u g h o u t th e U n it e d S ta te s;
T o c o in m o n e y , r e g u la t e t h e v a lu e th e re o f, a n d o f f o r e ig n c o in ,
a n d f ix t h e s t a n d a r d s o f w e ig h t s a n d m e a s u r e s ;
T o p r o v id e f o r t h e p u n is h m e n t o f c o u n t e r f e it in g t h e s e c u r itie s
a n d c u r r e n t c o in o f th e U n it e d S ta te s ;
T o e s t a b lis h p o s t -o f f ic e s a n d p o s t - r o a d s ;
T o p r o m o t e t h e p r o g r e s s o f s c ie n c e a n d u s e fu l a rts, b y s e c u r in g
f o r lim it e d t im e s t o a u t h o r s a n d in v e n t o r s t h e e x c lu s iv e r ig h t to
t h e ir r e s p e c t iv e w r it in g s a n d d is c o v e r ie s ;
T o c o n s t it u t e t r ib u n a ls in f e r io r to t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t ;
T o d e f in e a n d p u n i s h p ir a c ie s a n d f e lo n ie s c o m m it t e d o n t h e
h ig h se a s, a n d o ffe n c e s a g a in s t t h e la w o f n a t io n s ;
T o d e c la r e w a r , g r a n t le t te rs o f m a r q u e a n d r e p r is a l, a n d
m a k e r u le s c o n c e r n in g c a p t u r e s o n la n d a n d w a t e r ;
T o r a is e a n d s u p p o r t a rm ie s , b u t n o a p p r o p r ia t io n o f m o n e y
to t h a t u se s h a ll b e fo r a lo n g e r te rm t h a n tw o y e a rs ;
T o p r o v id e a n d m a in t a in a n a v y ;
T o m a k e r u le s fo r t h e g o v e r n m e n t a n d r e g u la t io n o f th e la n d
a n d n a v a l fo rc e s;
T o p r o v id e f o r c a llin g f o r t h t h e m ilit ia to e x e c u t e t h e la w s o f
th e U n io n , s u p p r e s s in s u r r e c t io n s a n d r e p e l in v a s io n s ;
T o p r o v id e fo r o r g a n iz in g , a r m in g a n d d is c ip lin in g th e
m ilit ia , a n d fo r g o v e r n in g s u c h p a r t o f t h e m a s m a y b e e m p lo y e d
i n t h e s e r v ic e o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , r e s e r v in g t o t h e st a te s r e s p e c
t i v e l y , t h e a p p o i n t m e n t o f t h e o f f ic e r s , a n d t h e a u t h o r i t y o f

EXAMPLES OF MAJOR UNIONS OF STATES

207

t r a in in g t h e m ilit ia a c c o r d in g to t h e d is c ip lin e p r e s c r ib e d b y
C o n gre ss;
T o e x e r c is e e x c lu s iv e le g is la t io n i n a ll c a s e s w h a t s o e v e r , o v e r
s u c h d is t r ic t ( n o t e x c e e d in g t e n m ile s s q u a r e ) a s m a y , b y c e s s io n
o f p a r t ic u la r sta te s, a n d th e a c c e p ta n c e o f C o n g r e s s , b e c o m e th e
s e a t o f t h e g o v e r n m e n t o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , 1 a n d t o e x e r c is e lik e
a u t h o r it y o v e r a ll p la c e s p u r c h a s e d b y t h e c o n s e n t o f t h e le g is
la t u r e o f t h e sta te in w h ic h t h e s a m e s h a ll b e , f o r t h e e re c t io n o f
fo rts, m a g a z in e s , a rs e n a ls , d o c k y a r d s a n d o t h e r n e e d f u l b u i ld
in g s ; a n d
T o m a k e a ll la w s w h ic h s h a ll b e n e c e s s a r y a n d p r o p e r fo r
c a r r y in g in t o e x e c u t io n t h e f o r e g o in g p o w e r s v e st e d b y t h is C o n
s t it u t io n i n t h e g o v e r n m e n t o f t h e U n it e d S t a t e s , o r in a n y
d e p a r t m e n t o r o f f ic e t h e r e o f .
A p art from allocating certain special powers to the federal
governm ent, the U nited States constitution lays dow n certain
specifics in regard to m igration of persons, the inviolability of
habeas corpus except w hen in cases o f rebellion or invasion, the
public safety m ay require it5, export taxes a n d duties, inter-state
duties, the avoidance of preference in the regulation of com
m erce or revenue as betw een the ports o f the different states,
the app ro p riatio n of moneys from the federal treasury, as well
as a n u m b er of other m atters.
T h e constitution can be am ended by approval of tw o-thirds
of both houses of Congress, or on the application of the legis
latures of tw o-thirds of the several states, shall call a convention
for proposing am endm ents, w hich in either case shall be valid
to all intents and purposes, as p a rt of this C onstitution, w hen
ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several states,
or by conventions in three-fourths thereof, as the one or the
o ther m ode of ratification m ay be proposed by Congress5. No
am endm ent, however, can, w ithout its consent, deprive any of
the states of its equal suffrage in the Senate.
T hree distinct authorities have been entrusted w ith the powers
o f the central governm ent: executive, legislative and judicial.
T h e executive head is the President, w ho is elected for a term of
four years by electors chosen for th a t purpose from each of the
1 T h a t is, the D istrict of Colum bia, in w hich W ashington, the capital, is
situated.

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AFRI CA MUST UNITE

states. H e chooses a n d dismisses his own cabinet, m em bers of

w hich are responsible to the President and not to the Legislature.
In case of his resignation or death, the V ice-President, ex officio
President of the Senate, assumes the presidency. T he presidential
succession is regulated by an act of 1887. Beginning w ith the
Secretary o f State, the succession goes according to the seniority
o f the departm ents.
Legislative pow er is vested in a Congress consisting o f two
houses: a H ouse of Representatives, composed of representatives
in num bers proportionate to the population of each state. T hey
hold their seats for two years. T h e senior house is the Senate,
having two m em bers from each of the states, elected for six years,
b u t in rotating thirds. T he suprem e ju d icial authority is vested
in a suprem e court, w hich consists o f a chief justice and eight
associate justices, all appointed for life by the President, subject
to confirm ation by the Senate. T h e task of the Suprem e C ourt is
to balance the rights of the citizens w ith the in terpretation of the
constitution.
D efining briefly the n atu re of the Soviet U nion, the constitu
tion sets o ut its role as the determ inator and director of the union
economy, in w hich it safeguards the small private economy of
individual peasants and handicraftsm en based on their own
lab o u r and precluding the exploitation of the labour of others.
I t also protects the personal property right of citizens in their
incomes, the savings from them and their personal effects,
including houses, and the right to inh erit such property.
T h e Soviet U nion consists of sixteen sovereign republics and
some h u n d red autonom ous republics, autonom ous regions and
areas. T he first Soviet constitution, adopted in 1924, revised in
1936 and subsequently am ended in certain respects, guarantees
equal rights for all citizens regardless of race or nationality.
Every citizen of a U nion republic is also a citizen of the U .S .S.R .,
giving d ual citizenship.
T h e Suprem e Soviet is the highest organ of power. I t is elected
every four years an d consists of two cham bers: the Council of
the U nion and the Council of N ationalities, both of which have
equal rights, and m ust approve legislation before it becomes
effective. Election to the Council o f the U nion is by direct vote
on the basis of one deputy for every 300,000 of the population.

EXAMPLES OF MAJOR UNIONS OF STATES

209

T h e Council of N ationalities is elected on an eq u alitarian basis

o f twenty-five deputies for each U nion republic, eleven from
each autonom ous republic, five each from the autonom ous
regions an d one from each autonom ous area. T h e Suprem e
Soviet meets a t least twice a year for ab o u t ten days, b u t a small
n u m b er of m em bers is elected to carry on its w ork betw een
sessions. This is called the Praesidium . I t does the m ajor p a rt of
the w ork o f the suprem e authority, b u t its actions m ust be
ratified by the Suprem e Soviet. T h e Suprem e Soviet, a t a jo in t
sitting o f the two cham bers, appoints the Council of M inisters
of the U .S .S .R ., w hich includes the heads of the various state
com m ittees and also the chairm en of the Councils of M inisters
of the U nion republics, by virtue of their office. T h e division
betw een A ll-U nion m inisters an d republican m inisters is defined
by the constitution.
T h e powers of the A ll-U nion governm ent are specifically
defined an d include foreign affairs; defence an d security;
finance, m oney and cred it; the use of the land an d its resources,
w hich are n atio n alized ; the planning, adm inistration and super
vision of the U nion econom y; education an d h ealth ; the jud icial
system an d procedure; weights and m easures; m arriage an d
fam ily; rights of citizens an d aliens; a n d m any other m atters.
O utside of the spheres o f central au thority set out in the con
stitution, the U nion republics exercise independent au thority
and are in great m easure responsible for carrying out their parts
of the unified state program m e. Specifically, the U .S .S .R .
protects the sovereign rights of the U nion republics, whose
territory m ay not be altered w ithout the consent of the republic
concerned. Since F ebruary 1944, each republic has the rig h t:
(1 ) to h a v e its o w n n a t io n a l a r m y f o r m a t io n ;
(2 ) to e n t e r in t o d ir e c t n e g o t ia t io n s w it h f o r e ig n g o v e r n m e n t s ,
to c o n c lu d e a g re e m e n t s w it h t h e m a n d to h a v e d ip lo m a t ic
a n d c o n s u la r re p r e s e n t a t io n a b r o a d ; a n d
( 3 ) t o s e v e r r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e U n i o n a n d s e c e d e f r o m it . ( T h i s
r ig h t w a s a c a r d in a l r ig h t g r a n t e d i n t h e f ir s t c o n s t it u t io n ,
b u t is n o w m o r e c le a r ly d e fin e d .)
E ach U nion republic has its own constitution, w hich takes
account of the specific features of the republic and is draw n up

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A FRI CA MUST UNITE

in full conform ity w ith the constitution of the U .S .S.R . In the

event of divergence betw een a law of the U nion republic and a
law of the U nion, the U nion law prevails. Laws of the U nion are
published in the languages of all the U nion republics.
T h e right to nom inate candidates for election belongs to the
various social organizations and societies: the Com m unist Party,
trad e unions, co-operatives, youth organizations and cultural
societies. H ow ever, only the Com m unist P arty is tolerated, all
other organizations being classified as non-party.
T h e U .S .S .R ., beginning wUh four republics, now comprises
sixteen. Few would have thought th a t so m any different peoples
at various levels of social, political and economic developm ent,
could have been welded into the m ighty power which the Soviet
U nion has become in a com paratively short space of time.
Sim ilarly, in the case of N orth A m erica, the original thirteen
states have grown to fifty and 1787 constitution, w ith various
am endm ents, still operates in the U nited States.
T here is, however, a significant difference betw een the union
of the A m erican states and th a t of the Soviet Socialist Republics,
in the historical circum stances th a t secured their com bination.
T hough originally conceived as a free union of sovereign states,
the U nited States of A m erica, in its present form, was not
achieved as a free and voluntary union, b u t was imposed as the
result of the N o rth s victory over the South in the civil w ar. T he
right to secede was brought into the open w hen some states broke
aw ay in 1861, and President Lincoln, in order to m aintain
the unity of the nation, began the civil w ar against the
secessionists.
T hough the seceding states w anted to break up the U nion
because of the N o rth s growing opposition to slavery, Lincoln,
w riting to H orace Greeley, editor of the New York Herald Tribune,
in 1862, declared th at my p aram o u n t object is to save the U nion,
and not either to save or destroy slavery. I f I could save the
U nion w ithout freeing any slave, I would do it; if I could save
it by freeing all the slaves, I would do it; and if I could do it by
freeing some and leaving others alone, I w ould also do th a t.1
T he w ar was won and Lincoln was able to assert most solemnly
th a t I did all in my ju d g m en t th a t could be done to restore the
1 A braham L incoln: Life, Public Service and State Papers.

EXAMPLES OF MAJOR UNIONS OF STATES

211

U nion w ithout interfering w ith the institution of slavery. W e

failed, and the blow a t slavery was struck.5
T h e survival of the U nion, however, required the abolition of
slavery. O ne was incom patible w ith the other, supporting our
Pan-A frican stand th a t com plete freedom is im perative for
A frican unity. W ithin the U n ited States, the continuance of the
U nion paved the w ay for A m erica's vital industrial a d v a n c e :
T h e r ic h s e c tio n , w h ic h h a d b e e n k e p t b a c k in t h e g e n e r a l
d e v e lo p m e n t b y a s in g le in s t it u t io n , a n d h a d b e e n a c lo g o n t h e
a d v a n c e o f t h e w h o le , h a d b e e n d r a g g e d u p to t h e le v e l o f t h e
re st o f th e c o u n t r y . F r e e la b o u r w a s s o o n to s h o w its e lf fa r
s u p e r io r to sla v e la b o u r in th e S o u t h . . . . T h e p o w e r o f th e
n a t io n , n e v e r b e f o r e a s s e r t e d o p e n ly , h a d m a d e a p la c e f o r it s e lf ;
a n d y e t th e c o n t in u in g p o w e r o f th e sta te s s a v e d th e n a t io n a l
p o w e r f r o m a d e v e lo p m e n t in t o c e n t r a liz e d t y r a n n y . A n d th e
n e w p o w e r o f t h e n a t io n , b y g u a r a n t e e in g t h e r e s t r ic t io n o f
g o v e r n m e n t to a s in g le n a t io n in c e n t r a l N o r t h A m e r ic a , g a v e
s e c u r it y a g a in s t a n y in t r o d u c t io n o f in t e r n a t io n a l r e la t io n s ,
in t e r n a t io n a l w a r s a n d c o n t in u e d w a r t a x a t io n in t o t h e t e r r it o r y
o c c u p ie d b y th e U n it e d S ta te s.1
T hus the A m erican nation em erged stronger out of the civil
w ar to continue its ro ad to its present em inence as the forem ost
free enterprise state in the w orld.
In the Soviet U nion, the story was different. T here the right
of secession was the crucial testing p oint of the T re aty of U nion.
L enin m ade this clear in the assertion t h a t :
J u s t a s m a n k in d c a n a c h ie v e t h e a b o lit io n o f c la s s e s o n l y b y
p a s s in g t h r o u g h th e t r a n s itio n p e r io d o f th e d ic t a t o r s h ip o f th e
o p p r e s s e d c la s s , s o m a n k i n d c a n o n l y a c h ic v e t h e i n e v it a b l e
m e r g in g o f n a t io n s b y p a s s in g t h r o u g h t h e t r a n s it io n p e r io d o f
c o m p l e t e l i b e r a t i o n o f a l l t h e o p p r e s s e d n a t i o n s , i. e . t h e i r
fre e d o m to se c e d e .2
O n this, the th ird A ll-Russian Congress of Soviets am plified
L enin5s standpoint in its declaration of 24 J a n u a ry 1918 th a t:
1 Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1947. A rticle on T h e H istory o f th e U n ited
States o f A jnerica, Vol. 22, p. 810.
2 L enin: Selected Works} V ol. V , pp. 270-1.
H*

212

A FRI CA MUST U NI TE

t h e S o v ie t R e p u b lic is e s t a b lis h e d o n t h e b a s is o f a fre e u n io n

c o m p o s e d o f fre e n a t io n s . I n o r d e r to a v o id m is u n d e r s t a n d in g
o n t h e q u e s t io n , t h e d e c la r a t io n o ffe rs to t h e w o r k e r s a n d
p e a s a n t s o f e v e r y n a t io n a lit y t h e r ig h t to m a k e t h e ir o w n d e
c is io n s in t h e ir o w n a u t h o r iz e d S o v ie t c o n g r e s s : d o t h e y w is h ,
a n d o n w h a t g r o u n d s , to p a r t ic ip a t e in t h e fe d e ra l g o v e r n m e n t
a n d o t h e r f e d e r a l S o v ie t in s t it u t io n s .
T h e strength of the Soviet U nion has been proved in the
furnace of w ar. Even un d er the im pact of fascist savagery, it
rem ained unbroken.
T h e union of C an ad a c a m t into being as an effort to resolve
the A nglo-French racial differences betw een the provinces of
U p p e r an d Low er C anada, w hich were being fanned by the
rivalries betw een E ngland an d France. T hough united in one
legislature after the conferm ent of self-government under a
governor, a deadlock was reached in governm ent, and a union
was m ooted. O n i J u ly 1867 four provinces united. T hey were
U p p e r C an ad a (now O n tario ), Lower C anada (now Q uebec),
N ova Scotia an d New Brunswick. W ith the new era th a t was
opening in A m erica, following the civil w ar, the union of the
C anadian provinces offered the sole hope of successful grow th5.
R u p e rts L and was added in 1869 by purchase from the H udson
Bay C om pany, and British C olum bia joined in 1871. T he
British G overnm ent transferred to C anada in 1878 all of British
N o rth A m erica except N ew foundland.
T heoretically, the executive consists o f a governor-general
an d privy council, b u t in practice it is a cabinet under a prim e
m inister. T he governor-general is appointed for five years to
represent the sovereign in all m atters of federal governm ent.
T here is a H ouse of Com m ons elected by the different provinces
according to population. L ieutenant-governors of the provinces
are nom inated by the governor-general. All local legislation is
carried on by the provincial parliam ents of single houses, except
in the case of Q uebec, w hich has two. T h e federal parliam ent
has jurisdiction over all m atters not specifically assigned to the
local legislatures.
In the C om m onw ealth of A ustralia, the federal parliam ent
exercises jurisdiction over those m atters expressly assigned to it
by the constitution. T h e States retain control, accordingly, over

EXAMPLES OF MAJOR UNIONS OF STATES

213

those subjects th a t are not w ithdraw n by constitutional defini

tion. Nevertheless, the central au thority is quite extensive,
ranging over trade, industry, crim inal law, taxation, q u aran tin e,
m arriage an d divorce, weights and measures, legal tender, copy
rights and patents, n atu ralizatio n and aliens. T h e federal
principle of equal representation of the states is practised by the
election of six m em bers from each of the six states to the Senate,
for a period of six years, h a lf retiring every three years. Election
to the House of R epresentatives is on a population basis, w ith
not less th an five m em bers from each of the States.
I f union did not bring to C an ad a and A ustralia, for exam ple,
the trem endous surge forw ard th a t it gave to the U n ited States
an d the Soviet U nion, it is because other factors were not equal.
T hough C an ad a is considerably bigger th a n the U n ited States,
her territory includes large stretches o f w asteland w here civilized
hab itatio n has so far proved impossible. A ustralia, on h er side,
has a great belt of arid country in the interior, and the population
is m ore or less confined to the coastal areas. Both C an ad a an d
A ustralia are thinly populated and are encouraging a policy of
im m igration from G reat B ritain an d Europe.
T hough b oth dom inions rem ain tied to the British C om m on
w ealth, C a n a d a s contiguity w ith the U nited States has brought
her w ithin the orbit of A m erican m onopoly capitalism , w hich
today has m ajor investm ents in the grow ing C anadian economy,
to the chagrin o f certain critics. W ool and gold helped to
accum ulate early capital in A u stra lia ; b u t industrialization did
not really get un d er w ay on a large scale until fairly recently.
H ere, again, A m erican m onopoly is sinking in its teeth. In
C anada, there is still a certain am ount of racial friction betw een
the French an d English com m unities and this is aggravated by
the interference of the R om an C atholic C hurch.
A federal form of governm ent operates in V enezuela, an d the
provision of the constitution adopted in 1936 vests legislative
pow er in a national congress of two houses: the Senate and
C ham ber of D eputies. I t meets every year a t Caracas. T he
Senate consists o f two m em bers from each of the nom inally
independent, self-governing states. This gives forty m em bers,
elected by the state legislatures for a period o f four years.
Election to the C ham ber is by direct vote of a suffrage lim ited to

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A F RI CA MUST UNITE

V enezuelan males, literate and over the age of twenty-one, in the

proportion of one deputy for every 35,000 of population. Each
state is entitled to send a t least one deputy. T he presidential
term is for five years and, constitutionally, the President cannot
im m ediately succeed himself. T h e President is assisted by a
cabinet of m inisters and the governor of the federal district. T he
nom inally autonom ous state governm ents consist of legislative
assemblies composed of deputies elected by ballot for a period of
three years, and for each a president and two vice-presidents
chosen by the legislative assembly for a period of three years.
I t has been said th a t Sw itzerland is a m odel of federal govern
m ent. I t consists of tw enty-tw o sovereign states or cantons. Tw o
legislative cham bers constitute the ap paratus of governm ent.
T hey are the Senate or Council of States, in w hich each canton
has equal representation; and the N ational Council, chosen on
the basis of one m em ber to every 20,000 of the population. T h e
two bodies form the Federal Assembly. A n Executive Council of
seven m em bers is elected by the Federal Assembly for a period
of three years, and one of its m em bers is chosen annually, also
by the Federal Assembly, to be President of the Council. His
powers are no greater th a n those of his colleagues, although he is
President of the state and represents the nation on all cerem onial
occasions. T h e constitution provides th a t not m ore th an one
councillor can come from any one canton, w hich carries the
federal principle into the structure of the executive. T h e Federal
Council is responsible to the Federal Assembly, b u t it does not
resign if its policy is rejected by the legislature. O f a coalition
character, it m ore nearly represents a council o f perm anent
heads of dep artm en t th an the cabinet of a p arliam entary system.
In order to im prove effectively and quickly the serious dam age
done to Africa as a result of im perialism and colonialism, the
em ergent African States need strong, u nitary States capable of
exercising a central authority for the m obilization of the national
effort and the co-ordination of reconstruction and progress. For
this reason, I consider th a t even the idea of regional federations
in Africa is fraught w ith m any dangers. T here is the danger of
the developm ent of regional loyalties, fighting against each
other. In effect, regional federations are a form of balkanization
on a grand scale. These m ay give rise to the dangerous interplay

EXAMPLES OF MAJOR UNIONS OF STATES

215

not only of pow er politics am ong A frican States and the regions,
b u t can also create conditions w hich will enable the im perialists
and neo-colonialists to fish in such troubled waters. Indeed, such
federations m ay even find objection to the notion of A frican
unity. W e m ust look a t the problem from the point of view of its
practical and im m ediate objectives. For exam ple, w hereas it
m ay be inexpedient geographically and otherwise for G hana to
jo in an East African F ederation, there w ould be no difficulty
for T anganyika, let us say, joining a political union of Africa.
W e m ust endeavour to eradicate quickly the forces th a t have
kept us a p art. T he best m eans of doing so is to begin to create a
larger and all-em bracing loyalty w hich will hold Africa together
as a united people w ith one governm ent and one destiny.

CHAPTER TW EN TY- ONE

CONTINENTAL GOVERNM ENT

FOR AFRICA

have seen, in the exam ple of the U nited States, how the
dynam ic elements w ithin society understood the need for unity
an d fought their b itter civil w ar to m aintain the political union
th a t was threatened by the reactionary forces. W e have also
seen, in the exam ple of the Soviet U nion, how the forging of
continental unity along w ith the retention of national sovereignty
by the federal states, has achieved a dynam ism th a t has lifted a
most backw ard society into a most powerful u nit w ithin a re
m arkably short space of tim e. From the examples before us, in
Europe and the U n ited States of A m erica, it is therefore p aten t
th a t we in Africa have the resources, present and potential, for
creating the kind of society th a t we are anxious to build. I t is
calculated th a t by the end of this century the population of Africa
will probably exceed five h u n d red millions.
O u r continent gives us the second largest land stretch in the
w orld. T he n a tu ra l w ealth of Africa is estim ated to be greater
th an th a t of alm ost any other continent in the world. T o draw
the most from our existing and potential m eans for the achieve
m ent of abundance and a fine social order, we need to unify our
efforts, our resources, our skills and intentions.
E urope, by way of contrast, m ust be a lesson to us all. Too
busy hugging its exclusive nationalism s, it has descended, after
centuries of wars interspersed w ith intervals of uneasy peace,
into a state of confusion, simply because it failed to build a sound
basis of political association and understanding. O nly now, under
the necessities of economic stringency and the th re a t of the new
G erm an industrial and m ilitary rehabilitation, is Europe trying
- unsuccessfully - to find a modus operandi for containing the
th reat. I t is deceptively hoped th a t the E uropean C om m unity
W e

C O N T I N EN TA L GOV E RN MEN T FOR AF RI CA

217

will perform this m iracle. I t has taken two w orld wars an d the
break-up o f empires to press hom e the lesson, still only partly
digested, th a t strength lies in unity.
W hile we in Africa, for w hom the goal of unity is param o u n t,
are striving to concert our efforts in this direction, the neo
colonialists are straining every nerve to upset them by encourag
ing the form ation of com m unities based on the languages of their
form er colonizers. W e cannot allow ourselves to be so dis
organized an d divided. T h e fact th a t I speak English does not
m ake me an Englishm an. Sim ilarly, the fact th a t some of us
speak French or Portuguese does not m ake us F renchm en or
Portuguese. W e are Africans first and last, an d as Africans our
best interests can only be served by uniting w ithin an African
C om m unity. N either the C om m onw ealth nor a Franco-A frican
C om m unity can be a substitute.
T o us, Africa w ith its islands is ju st one Africa. W e reject the
idea of any kind of partition. From T angier or C airo in the
N o rth to C apetow n in the South, from C ape G uardafui in the
E ast to C ape V erde Islands in the W est, Africa is one and
indivisible.
I know th a t w hen we speak of political union, our critics are
quick to observe an atte m p t to impose leadership and to ab ro
gate sovereignty. B ut we have seen from the m any examples of
union p u t forw ard, th a t equality of the states is jealously guarded
in every single constitution and th a t sovereignty is m aintained.
T here are differences in the powers allotted to the central
governm ent and those retained by the states, as well as in the
functions of the executive, legislature and judiciary. All of them
have a com m on trad e an d econom ic policy. All of them are
secular, in order th a t religion m ight not be dragged across the
m any problem s involved in m aintaining unity and securing the
greatest possible developm ent.
W e in Africa who are pressing now for unity are deeply con
scious of the validity of our purpose. W e need the strength of our
com bined num bers and resources to protect ourselves from the
very positive dangers of retu rn in g colonialism in disguised
forms. W e need it to com bat the entrenched forces dividing our
continent an d still holding back millions of our brothers. W e
need it to secure total A frican liberation. W e need it to carry

2 l8

A FRI CA MUST UNITE

forw ard our construction of a socio-economic system th at will

support the great mass of our steadily rising population at levels
of life w hich will com pare w ith those in the most advanced
countries.
But we cannot m obilize our present and potential resources
w ithout concerted effort. I f we developed our potentialities in
m en and n a tu ra l resources in separate isolated groups, our
energies would soon be dissipated in the struggle to outbid one
another. Econom ic friction am ong us would certainly lead to
b itter political rivalry, such as for m any years ham pered the
pace of grow th and developm ent in Europe.
A t present most of the independent African States are m oving
in directions w hich expose us to the dangers of im perialism and
neo-colonialism . W e therefore need a com m on political basis
for the integration of our policies in economic planning, defence,
foreign and diplom atic relations. T h a t basis for political action
need not infringe the essential sovereignty of the separate
A frican States. These States would continue to exercise in
d ependent authority, except in the fields defined and reserved
for com m on action in the interests of the security and orderly
developm ent of the whole continent.
In m y view, therefore, a united Africa - th a t is, the political
and economic unification of the African C ontinent - should seek
three objectives:
Firstly, we should have an over-all economic planning on a
continental basis. This would increase the industrial and
economic pow er o f Africa. So long as we rem ain balkanized,
regionally or territorially, we shall be at the m ercy of colonialism
and im perialism . T h e lesson of the South A m erican Republics
vis-a-vis the strength and solidarity of the U nited States of
A m erica is there for all to see.
T h e resources of Africa can be used to the best advantage and
the m axim um benefit to all only if they are set w ithin an over
all fram ew ork of a continentally planned developm ent. An over
all economic plan, covering an Africa united on a continental
basis, would increase our total industrial and economic power.
W e should therefore be thinking seriously now of ways and
m eans of building up a Com m on M arket of a U nited Africa and
not allow ourselves to be lured by the dubious advantages of

C O N TI N E N TA L GOVE RNMENT FOR AF RI CA

2 ig

association w ith the so-called E uropean Com m on M arket. W e

in Africa have looked outw ard too long for the developm ent of
our econom y and transportation. Let us begin to look inw ards
into the African C ontinent for all aspects of its developm ent. O u r
com m unications were devised un d er colonial rule to stretch out
w ards tow ards E urope and elsewhere, instead of developing
internally betw een our cities and states. Political unity should
give us the pow er and will to change all this. W e in Africa have
untold agricultural, m ineral and w ater-pow er resources. These
alm ost fabulous resources can -be fully exploited and utilized in
the interest of Africa and the A frican people, only if we develop
them w ithin a U nion G overnm ent of A frican States. Such a
G overnm ent will need to m aintain a com m on currency, a
m onetary zone and a central bank of issue. T he advantages of
these financial and m onetary arrangem ents w ould be in
estim able, since m onetary transactions betw een our several
States w ould be facilitated and the pace of financial activity
generally quickened. A central bank of issue is an inescapable
necessity, in view o f the need to re-orientate the econom y of
Africa and place it beyond the reach o f foreign control.
Secondly, we should aim at the establishm ent o f a unified
m ilitary and defence strategy. I do not see m uch virtue or
wisdom in our separate efforts to build up or m aintain vast
m ilitary forces for self-defence w hich, in any case, w ould be in
effective in any m ajor attack upon our separate States. I f we
exam ine this problem realistically, we should be able to ask ou r
selves this p ertinent q u estio n : w hich single State in Africa today
can protect its sovereignty against an im perialist aggressor ? In
this connection, it should be m entioned th a t a n ti-apartheid
leaders have alleged th a t South Africa is building a great
m ilitary force w ith all the latest weapons of destruction, in order
to crush nationalism in Africa. N or is this all. T here are grave
indications th a t certain settler governm ents in Africa have
already been caught in the dangerous arm s race and are now
arm ing themselves to the teeth. T h eir m ilitary activities con
stitute a serious th re a t not only to the security of Africa, b u t also
to the peace of the w orld. I f these reports are true, only the unity
of Africa can prevent South Africa and these other governm ents
from achieving their diabolical aims.

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A F RI CA MUST UNITE

I f we do not unite and com bine our m ilitary resources for

com m on defence, the individual States, out of a sense of in
security, m ay be draw n into m aking defence pacts w ith foreign
powers w hich m ay endanger the security of us all.
T here is also the expenditure aspect o f this problem . T he
m aintenance of large m ilitary forces imposes a heavy financial
b u rd en on even the m ost w ealthy States. For young African
States, who are in great need of capital for internal developm ent,
it is ridiculous - indeed suicidal - for each State separately and
individually to assume such a heavy burden of self-defence,
w hen the w eight of this b u rd en could be easily lightened by
sharing it am ong themselves. Some a tte m p t has already been
m ade by the C asablanca Powers and the A fro-M alagasy U nion
in the m atte r of com m on defence, b u t how m uch better and
stronger it would be if, instead of two such ventures, there was
one over-all (land, sea and air) Defence C om m and for Africa.
T he th ird objective w hich we should have in Africa stems
from the first two w hich I have ju st described. I f we in Africa
set up a unified economic planning organization and a unified
m ilitary and defence strategy, it will be necessary for us to adopt
a unified foreign policy and diplom acy to give political direction
to our jo in t efforts for the protection and economic developm ent
of our continent. M oreover, there are some sixty odd States in
Africa, about thirty-tw o of w hich are a t present independent.
T he b urden of separate diplom atic representation by each State
on the C ontinent of Africa alone would be crushing, not to
m ention representation outside Africa. T h e desirability of a
com m on foreign policy w hich will enable us to speak w ith one
voice in the councils of the w orld, is so obvious, vital and im
perative th a t com m ent is hardly necessary.
I am confident th a t it should be possible to devise a constitu
tional structure applicable to our special conditions in Africa and
not necessarily fram ed in term s o f the existing constitutions of
Europe, A m erica or elsewhere, which will enable us to secure
the objectives I have defined and yet preserve to some extent
the sovereignty of each State w ithin a U nion of African States.
W e m ight erect for the tim e being a constitutional form th at
could start w ith those states willing to create a nucleus, and leave
the door open for the attachm ent of others as they desire to jo in or

C ON T I N E N TA L G OV E RN MEN T FOR A F RI C A

221

reach the freedom w hich w ould allow them to do so. T h e

form could be m ade am enable to adjustm ent and am endm ent
a t any tim e the consensus of opinion is for it. I t m ay be th a t
concrete expression can be given to our present ideas w ithin a
continental parliam en t th a t w ould provide a lower and an upper
house, the one to perm it the discussion of the m any problem s
facing Africa by a representation based on p o p u la tio n ; the other,
ensuring the equality o f the associated States, regardless of size
and population, by a sim ilar, lim ited representation from each of
them , to form ulate a com m on policy in all m atters affecting the
security, defence and developm ent of Africa. I t m ight, through
a com m ittee selected for the purpose, exam ine likely solutions
to the problem s o f union and draft a m ore conclusive form of
constitution th a t will be acceptable to all the independent
States.
T h e survival of free Africa, the extending independence of
this continent, and the developm ent tow ards th a t bright future
on w hich our hopes an d endeavours are pinned, depend upon
political unity.
U n d e r a m ajor political union o f Africa there could em erge a
U n ited Africa, great and powerful, in w hich the territorial
boundaries w hich are the relics of colonialism will become
obsolete and superfluous, w orking for the com plete an d total
m obilization of the econom ic planning organization under a
unified political direction. T he forces th a t unite us are far greater
th an the difficulties th a t divide us at present, and our goal m ust
be the establishm ent of A fricas dignity, progress and prosperity.
Proof is therefore positive th a t the continental union of Africa
is an inescapable desideratum if we are determ ined to move
forw ard to a realization o f our hopes and plans for creating a
m odern society w hich will give our peoples the opportunity to
enjoy a full and satisfying life. T h e forces th a t unite us are
intrinsic and greater th a n the superim posed influences th a t
keep us a p art. These are the forces th a t we m ust enlist and
cem ent for the sake of the trusting millions who look to us, their
leaders, to take them o ut of the poverty, ignorance and disorder
left by colonialism into an ordered unity in w hich freedom and
am ity can flourish am idst plenty.
H ere is a challenge w hich destiny has throw n out to the

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AF RI CA MUST UNITE

leaders of Africa. I t is for us to grasp w hat is a golden oppor

tu nity to prove th a t the genius of the A frican people can sur
m ount the separatist tendencies in sovereign nationhood by
com ing together speedily, for the sake of Africas greater glory
and infinite well-being, into a U nion of African States.

INDEX

Abbas, Ferhat, 143

Abdulla Osman, President of Somalia,
147

Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Alhaji Sir,

Prime Minister of Nigeria, 147
Accra Assembly (1962), 199
Accra Evening News , 55
Achimota College, Ghana, 44, 46; and
see Legon University
Africa,
.
islands of, xin
scramble for, xii-xiii, 6-7
dawn of civilization in, 2
early Chinese contacts with, 3
exploration of, 3-4
European exploitation of, 4-6, 23,
29> 3i
mineral resources, 23-4, 25, 150-1,

!52.

roll of independent countries, 52

dangers of disunity, 75-6
agricultural and forestry resources,
150-1, 152
provider of low-priced primary
materials, 160-1
and see United States of Africa
African Development Institute, Dakar,
157

Africans, status of, 1-2

African traditional customs,
family obligations, 100
polygamy, 104
expenditure on festivals, 104-5
Afro-Malagasy Union, 148, 220
Agricultural resources,
of Ghana, 25-6, 29-30
mono-crop economies, 25-6, 108-9
research into, 29-30, 125
of Africa, 150-1, 152
Algeciras Conference (1906), 6
Algeria,
French policy in, 10
Ghana supports liberation of, 10
and Accra Conference of i960, 138
F.L.N. at Casablanca Conference,
143

not invited to Lagos Conference, 148

All-African Peoples Conference,

(Accra, 1958), 137
(Cairo, 1961), 139
All-African Trade Union Federation,
128, 137
Angola, 11-12
1961 revolt, 12
forced labour in, 38-40
Angola Diamond Co., 42
U .N . resolution on, 42
political parties in, 52
and see Portuguese colonies
Apartheid, 13-15
Ashanti and the Asantehene, 62-5, 71,
84
Ashanti Goldfields Ltd, 25
Assimilation policies,
French, 9-10
Portuguese, 11-12
Atta, Nana Sir Ofori, 25
Australia, union of, 212-13
Azikiwe, Dr Nnamdi,Governor-General
of Nigeria, 55-6
Balkanization policies, 157-8, 173-4,
179-S0
Bandung Conference, 144-5
Barnes, Leonard, 45
Basel Mission, 45
Basutoland, 36
Belgrade Conference (1961), 197, 198
201
Berlin Conference (1884-5), 7
Bevin, Ernest, 16
Black Star Shipping Line, 113-14
Boigny, Houphouet, 179
Bolivar, Simon, 188-9
Bourguiba, Habib, President of Tunisia,
55
.
Bourne, Sir Frederick, 58
Brazzaville States, Conference of
(Bangui, 1962), 186-7
British colonial policy, 15-19
indirect rule, 18, 62
Colonial Development and Welfare
Corporation, 24

224

I N D EX

(British colonial policy, cont.)

in Ghana, 58-63
neo-colonialism, 176
British Commonwealth of Nations,
185-6
Brogan, D. W., 155
Bryce, James, 205
Caisse Centrale de Cooperation Economique

(C.C.G.E.), 175
Caisse Centrale de la France d Outremer

(C.C.O.M.), 175
Cameron, James, 70
Cameroon, 145
Canada, union of, 212, 213
Casablanca Conference (1961), 143-4,
146-7
African Charter of Casablanca, 144-5
common defence policy, 220
Central African Federation, 75, 176,
190-1; and see Nyasaland;
Rhodesias
Ceylon, 143
Chiefs,
under indirect rule, 18
under Ghanaian Constitution, 83-4
and see Ashanti and the Asantehene
China,
industrialization of, 37
advice on revolution, 55-6
potentialities of, 164-5
Civil service,
after independence, 84-5
retention of British officials, 87-92,
94, 9? .
Africanization of, 90-1, 94-5
dynamism required, 92-4
selection and training, 94-5
Institute of Public Administration, 95
Ghana ready to help in training, 96
Clemenceau, Georges, 133
Cold War, see Non-Aligned Countries
Colonial Development and Welfare
Corporation, 24
Colonial government,
forms of, 8
British, 15-19
and see Assimilation policies; Euro
pean settlers
Colonialism, conditions under,
forms of rule, 15-19
overseas investment, 22
supply of raw materials, 22-3, 112
profits taken out of country, 23, 29, 31
industrialization discouraged, 23-4,
26-8
concessions to foreign companies,

24-5

(Colonialism, cont.)
single-crop agriculture, 25-6
fluctuating export prices, 25-6
communications, 28
income tax kept low, 28-9
agricultural and veterinary research,

29-30

welfare development, 31
housing, 33-4
building societies, 33
rural water supply, 34-5
health services, 35-6
malnutrition, 36-7
lack of incentive to work, 37
trade unions, 37
forced labour, 37-41
settlers, 40
vested international financial in
terests, 41-2
education, 43-9
reluctance to grant independence,
57-8
and see Neo-colonialism
Colonialist powers, motives of, xii-xiii,
7-8, 20-1
Colour bar, see Racialism
Common Market, African, 143, 162-4,
218-19
common currency, 163
common selling policy, 163
Common Market, European,
and Africa, 143, 158, 163
inimical to African industrialization,
159-60, 181-2
neo-colonialism of, 161, 181-2
linked with N.A.T.O., 162
raison d'etre of, 164
Eurafrica, 187
Communications,
railways and roads, 28, 154-5
airtransport, 112-13, 156-7
shipping, 113-14
ports and waterways, 114, 117,

155-6

Conakry Conference (i960), 141-2

Congo, Belgian,
establishment of, 12-13
Union Miniere, 42
Congo, Republic of,
asks for U.N. aid, 138, 191-2
conference at Leopoldville (i960),
139

Casablanca Conference and, 144

at Lagos Conference, 148
Inga dam, 169-70
Congo Free State, 6-7, 12-13
Conseil de lEntente, 179
Convention Peoples Party (Ghana),
i7> 5> 5i

INDEX
(Convention Peoples Party, cont.)
relations with other African parties,
53
contrast with U.G.C.C., 54-5
struggle with N.L.M ., 57-8
electoral strength in Ashanti and the
North, 71
and trade unions, 127-8
role of, 128-9
Council of African Economic Unity
(C.U.E.A.), 146
Cox, Prof. Oliver C., 165n
Davidson, Basil, 4-5
De la Mahotiere, Stuart, 15971, 161
Democracy, see Parliamentary demo
cracy; Press
Disarmament, 198-9
DuBois, W. E. B., 132, 133, 135
Economic Commission for Africa
(E.C.A.), 167-8
Education,
in Northern Rhodesia, 43
in Kenya, 43-4
universities and university colleges,
44 j 46
technical, 46-7, 124-5
grants to mission schools, 47, 48
teacher training, 48
text-books, 49
Egypt, see United Arab Republic
Eisenhower, President D. W., 115
Ethiopia, 136, 147
i960 conference at Addis Ababa, 138
not at Casablanca Conference, 145
Eurafrica, 187
European Community, 216-17
European Development Fund, 158-9,
161, 163
European settlers, 10-11, 40
Executive Councils, 16
Fashoda crisis (1898), 6
Federation,
unsuitable for Ghana, 57-8, 62-5
forms of, 205-14
regional federations dangerous, 214
15

Ferry, Jules, 20-1

Finance, international,
motives for, 20-1
profitability of, 22
vested interests of, 41-2
difficulty in finding, 97, 98
loans with political and economic
strings, 101-2
and see European Development Fund
Fissionable raw materials, 151

225

Fluctuating markets, see World market

price fluctuation
Fonds d Aide et de Cooperation (F.A.C.),
*75
.
Fonds d'Investissement et Development Econo mique et Social (F.I.D.E.S.), 175
Food and Agriculture Organization
(F.A.O.), 98
Forced labour in Portuguese colonies,
12, 37-41
Forest resources,
in Ghana, 111
research on, 125-6
in Africa, 152
Fourah Bay College, Sierra Leone, 44
French colonies,
Rassemblement Democratique Africain, 51
assimilation policy, 9-10
nuclear tests in Sahara, 144
neo-colonialism in, 174-6, 177-9, *82
French Community, 178-9, 186
Galvao, Capt. Henrique, 39-40, 201
Garvey, Marcus, 133
Ga Shifimo Kpee, Ghana tribal
organization, 72
Gaulle, Gen. de, 178
Ghana, ancient state of, 2
Ghana, Republic of,
cocoa, 25-6
women retail agents, 26
agriculture, 29-30
fishing industry, 30-1, 110
National
Liberation
Movement
(N.L.M .), 57-8, 63, 75
Constituent Assembly, 58
independence won, 59
minority rights, 59-60
Ghana (Constitution) Order-inCouncil (1957), 60-1
Regional Assemblies, 62-5
Asantehenes position, 63-4
Opposition tactics after independence
72-5
Avoidance of Discrimination Bill, 74
United Party, 74
becomes a republic, 80-1
the Presidency, 81-3
and African unity, 85-6
United Ghana Farmers Council, 100
external trade, 108
diversification of crops, 108-9
industrialization, 111-12
forestry development, 111
Development Plans, 111
Volta River Project, i n , 114-16
Tema harbour, i n , 116-17
Ghana Airways, 112-14

226

INDEX

(Ghana, cont.)
Black Star Line, 113-14
Valeo, 116
adoption of socialism, 119-21
economic reconstruction plans, 121-4
technical education, 124-5
Academy of Sciences, 125
Cocoa Research Unit, 125
Timber Utilization Research U nit,
125-6
unemployment, 126
Workers Brigade, 126
trade unions, 126-7
democratic socialist control, 129-30
Young Pioneers Movement, 130
Kwame Nkrumah Institute, 130-1
union with Guinea Republic, 141
and the Union of African States,

Mi-3

and the Casablanca Conference, 143

surrend of sovereignty, 149
attachment to the Commonwealth,

i85-6

membership of Security Council, 195

and Congo crisis, 195
and see Civil service; Convention
Peoples Party; Gold Coast Colony
Githunguri College, Kenya, 44
Gold Coast Colony,
foundation of, 6
motion for independence (1953),
17-18
education in, 45-9
United Gold Coast Convention, *1,
54-5, 135
Goodspeed, Capt., 192
Gordon College, Khartoum, 44
Greeley, Horace, 210
Guinea, Republic of,
surrender of sovereignty, 86, 149
union with Ghana, 140
and Union of African States, 141-2
at Casablanca Conference, 143
voted against French Community,
178
Gunther, John, 42
Haile Selassie 1, Emperor of Ethiopia,
147
Hailey, Lord, 25
Hanna, A .J ., 20
Health services, 35-7
Henry, Paul-Marc, 177
Hodson, Sir Arnold, 25
Housing, 33-4
Hydro-electric potential, 151
Inga dam, 169-70
and see Volta River Project

Ibadan University, Nigeria, 44

Ibn Battuta, 3
Imperialism,
Marxist-Leninist views on, 22
thrives on disunity, 75-6
and war, 202-4
Independence, problems of,
finding investment capital, 97, 98,
101-2, and technicians, 97-8
land tenure reform, 98-9, 104-5
savings, 99-100, 104-5
neo-colonialism, 102
inflation, 103
Welfare State, 105-6
sustaining enthusiasm, 107
world price fluctuations, 109-10
Independent African States,
Accra Conference (1958), 136-7
Addis Ababa Conference (i960), 138
Community of, 141
India, 145
Indirect rule, 18, 62
Indonesia, 145
potentialities of, 164
Industrialization,
under colonial rule, 23-4, 26-8
in U.S.S.R., 37, 165-7
in Ghana, n 1-12
European Common Market unlikely
to promote, 159
in a united Africa, 163-4, 167-72
Inga dam (Congo), 169-70
International African Service Bureau,

!34

Investment, overseas capital, see Finance

Irrigation, 153
Japan, family unit defined by law, 105
Kaiser (Henry J.) Company, 115
Kanem, ancient state of, 3
Kaunda, Kenneth, 5m
Keita, Modibo, President of Mali, 141,

179

Kenya,
local councils, 19
education in, 43-4
Kenya African Union, 51
Kenyatta, Jomo, 44
Kikuyu Independent Schools Associa
tion, 43-4
Koinange, Peter, 43-4
Kwame Nkrumah Institute, 130-1
Kwame Nkrumah University, 48
Lagos Conference of
States (1962), 148
Land tenure,
and credit, 98-9

Independent

227

INDEX
(Land tenure, cont.)
Stool lands in Ghana, 99
English law of primogeniture, 104-5
Leakey, L. S. B., 2
Legislative Councils, 16-17
Legon University, Ghana, 46
Lenin,
on imperialism, 22
on British position in Portugal, 174
on freedom to secede, 211
Leopold 11, King of the Belgians, 7, 12
Liberia, 135-6
and Community of Independent
African States, 141
sponsors Monrovia Conference, 145,
147
Libya, 136, 143
Lincoln, Abraham, 189, 2 1 0 -n
Lovanium University, Congo, 44
Lugard, Lord, 154
Lumumba, Patrice, 138,139,147-8,191
Makerere College, Uganda, 44
Malagasy Republic, 148, 220
Mali, ancient state of, 2-3
Mali Federation, 179
Mali Republic, 86
and Union of African States, 141-2
at Casablanca Conference, 143
surrender of sovereignty, 149
Mandated territories, 7
Marketing Boards, 26
Marxist-Leninist theory, see Lenin
Mauritania, 147
Mill, J. S., 91
Mineral resources, 23-4, 25, 150-1, 152
Missions,
bookshops, 45-6
grant-aided schools, 45, 47, 48
Mobutu, Col., 144
Monrovia Conference (1961), 143,

145-7

Morocco,
French government in, 10
Istiqlal movement, 10
at Accra Conference, 136
at Casablanca Conference, 143
King Mohammed V and Crown
Prince, 144
Mozambique, n - 12
labour supply for South Africa, 40-1
education in, 42
Muhammed Hasan el-Ouezzani, 55
Munoz, Dr J. A., 36
Myrdal, Gunnar, 109-10, 161
N a tio n a l L ib e r a tio n M o v e m e n t
(Ghana), 57-8, 63, 75

Neo-colonialism, 102
All-African Peoples Conference on,
139

balkanization the chief weapon,

173- 4 , i 79- 8o
French, 174-6, 177-9, *82
British, 176
.
mother-country ideology, 177, 179
backing of moderates against ex
tremists, 180-1
European Common Market and,
161, 181-2
foreign aid and, 183-4
African leaders who connive at, 184-5
covert campaign against Pan-Afri
canism, 187-8
N.A.T.O. states and, 191-2
need to eliminate, 202-4
Nepotism 104
Neutralism, negative, 200
and see Non-Aligned Countries
Nigeria,
National Council of Nigeria and the
Cameroons, 51
sponsors Monrovia Conference, 145,
147
Lagos Conference, 148
regionalism in, 5, 173, 176
Nkrumah, Kwame,
visits Eisenhower, 115
work for Pan-African Congresses, 134,
! 35
.
secretary of West African National
Secretariat, 135
general secretary of the U .G .C .C ., 135
at Sanniquellie Conference, 141
at Conakry Conference, 141-2
speech at Casablanca, 145
at Belgrade Conference, 197
Non-Aligned Countries, Conference of
(Belgrade, 1961), 197, 198-201
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(N.A.T.O .), 42, 162
Congo, Angola and, 191-2
General M ilitary Review, 192
Nuclear tests, 144, 203
Nyasaland, political parties in, 51
and see Central African Federation
Nyerere, Julius, 69-70
Padmore, George, 134
Pan-Africanism, 132-3
Pan-African Congresses, 133-5
Pan-African Federation, 134
Declaration to the Colonial Peoples
of the World, 134
Positive Action and Security in Africa,
Conference on (i960), 137-8
opposition to, 187-8

228

I N DE X

(Pan-Africanism, cont.)
and see All African Peoples Confer
ence; United States of Africa
Parliamentary democracy, adaptation
to local conditions, 66-8, 76-8
role of opposition, 68-9
and nationalist parties, 69-71
Pedler, F. J., 27-8
Planning and laissez-faire, 165
Political parties, 50-5
Peoples Parties, 52-5
need to co-operate, 52-3
and see Parliamentary democracy
Portugal, 174
dictatorship in, 201-2
Portuguese colonies,
assimilation policy, n -1 2
forced labour, 12, 37-41
and see Angola; Galvao; Mozambique
Press,
role of, 55-6
freedom of, 76-7
Primary products, see Raw materials

Somalia, 145,147
Songhai Empire, 3
South Africa, Republic of,
menace of, xvii, 191
apartheid, 13-15
Progressive Party, 14
ripe for revolt, 15
boycott of, 15, 144
dependence on Portuguese African
labour, 40-1
and Accra Conference (i960), 138
South American States, Union of, 188-9
South West Africa, 15
Spain, 201
Sudan, Republic of the, 136
not at Casablanca, 145, or Lagos
Conferences, 148
and see Mali, Republic of
Suffrage, universal,
as test of right to rule, 11
refusal to grant, 17
Switzerland, federal government in, 214
Sylvester-Williams, Henry, 132

Racialism,
bom of slavery, 1
African governments eschew, 32-3
in industry, 36-7
Raw materials,
colonialism and, 22-3, 112
fissionable, 151
Africa as provider of low-priced,
160-1
and
see Agricultural
resources;
Mineral resources; World market
price fluctuation
Regionalism, see Federation; Nigeria
Rhodesias, the, 138
education in, 43
parties in, 51
and see Central African Federation
Rostow W. W., 183

Tanganyika,
T.A .N .U ., 18, 51
Tanganyika Concessions Ltd., 41-2
at Lagos Conference, 148
Technicians,
shortage of, 97-8
technical education, 46-7, 124-5
Tema harbour, i n , 116-17
Togo, Republic of, 145
Togoland, 71
Tour, Skou, President of Guinea,
141, 178
Trade unions, 37
in Ghana, 126-8
All-African Federation, 128,137
Transport, see Communications
Trevelyan, G. M., 104
Tsetse fly, 153
Tshombe, Moise, 191
Tunisia, 86n, 136
not at Casablanca, 145
and surrender of sovereignty, 149

Sanniquellie Conference (1959), 141

Sarraut, Albert, 21
Segal, Ronald, 63
Self-government before economic via
bility, 50-1
Senegal and Mali Federation, 179
Senghor, Leopold, President of Senegal,
159-60, 179
Sierra Leone, 135-6
Slavery,
slave trade, 5-6
in U.S.A., 211
Socialist economies,
Ghana adopts, n 9-21, 129-30
and regionalism, 164-5

Uganda National Congress, 51

Union of African States (U.A.S.), 141-3
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(U.S.S.R.),
industrialization of, 37, 165-7
constitution of, 208-12
United Arab Republic, 86n, 136
at Casablanca, 143
surrender of sovereignty, 149
United Gold Coast Convention (U.G.
C.C.), 51, 54-5, 135

229

I N DE X
United Nations Organization,
resolutions on Angola, 42, and Congo,
138, 191-2
Technical Assistance Board (U.N.
T.A.B.), 98
African representation in, 194-5
Ghana as member of Security
Council, 195
influence of small states on, 196
need to reorganize, 197
Declaration on the granting of
Independence to Colonial Coun
tries, 200-1
United States of Africa, 85-6, 142
African leaders views on, 147-8
surrender of sovereignty, 149, 220
pooled investment capital, 163
best basis for rapid industrialization,
163-4, 167-72
political strength of, 193
regional federations dangerous,

214-15

problems of political unity, 217-18

unified economic planning, 218-19
unified defence strategy, 219-20
unified foreign policy, 220
programme for formation of, 220-1
and see Common Market, African;
Pan-Africanism

United States of America,

economic evolution of, 165
unification of, 189, 190
Constitution of, 205-8
Upper Volta, customs agreement with
Ghana, 157
Uranium deposits, 151
Venezuelan Constitution, 213-14
Veterinary research, 29-30
Volta River Project, 111, 114-16, 169
Water-supply, rural, 34-5
Welfare development, 31
West African National Conference,

135-6

West African National Secretariat, 135

The New African, 135
The Circle', 135
West Indies, British, 189-90
Williams, Dr Eric, 1
Woddis, Jack, 36-7
Women, Conference of African (Accra,
i960), 138
Workers Brigade, 126
World Health Organization (W .H .O .),

98

World market price fluctuation, 2 5-6,

109-10, 160, 161, 163

K W A M E N K R U M A H s first book was his

autobiography, Ghana, published on
Independence D ay, 1957. In 1960, his
speeches were collected, edited, and issued
as a book o f his political and social beliefs,
I Speak o f Freedom. Africa M ust Unite is a
n atural sequel to the story o f his fight for
G h a n a s independence.

FREDERICK A. PRAEGER, Publisher

New Y ork London

'