G.R. No.

L-6207

August 4, 1911

SIMON MALAHACAN, administrator of the goods, chattels and credits of GUILLERMA MARTINEZ, deceased, plaintiffappellee,
vs.
JOSEFA IGNACIO, MACARIO IGNACIO, PAULA IGNACIO and AGUEDA BUAG, defendants-appellants.
M.P. Leuterio for appellants.
No appearance for appellee.
MORELAND, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the subprovince of Marinduque, Province of Tayabas, the Hon. J.S.
Powell presiding, awarding the possession of the lands described in the complaint to the plaintiff, with costs.
The action is brought by Simon Malahacan as administrator of the goods, chattels, and credits of Guillerma Martinez, deceased,
against the defendants, the only heirs at law of the said deceased, to recover possession of the real estate of which the said
Guillerma Martinez died seized, which said real estate the defendants had been occupying for some years before the commencement
of this action.
Under the provisions of the Civil Code the ownership of real estate passes to the heirs of the owner instantly in his death. Guillerma
Martinez, having died seized of the lands involved in this suit, leaving the defendants as her only heirs at law, it follows that said heirs
instantly became the owners and were entitled to the immediate possession thereof. It is not alleged in the complaint nor does it
appear from the record or the evidence in this case that there were debts outstanding against Guillerma Martinez at the time of her
death. The only ground upon which an administrator can demand of the heirs at law possession of the real estate of which his
intestate died seized is that such land will be required to be sold to pay the debts of the deceased. In the case of Ilustre, administrator
of the estate of the deceased Calzado vs. Alaras Frondosa (17 Phil. Rep., 321), this court said:
Under the provisions of the Civil Code (arts. 657-661), the rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the
moment of his death; in other words, the heirs succeed immediately to all of the property of the deceased ancestor. The
property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and
delivered to them a deed for the same before his death. In the absence of debts existing against the estate, the heirs may
enter upon the administration of the said property immediately. If they desire to administer it jointly, they may do so. If they
desire to partition it among themselves and can do this by mutual agreement, they also have that privilege. The Code of
Procedure in Civil Actions provides how an estate may be divided by a petition for partition in case they can not mutually
agree in the division. When there are no debts existing against the estate, there is certainly no occasion for the intervention
of an administrator in the settlement and partition of the estate among the heirs. When the heirs are all of lawful age and
there are no debts, there is no reason why the estate should be burdened with the costs and expenses of an administrator.
The property belonging absolutely to the heirs, in the absence of existing debts against the estate, the administrator has no
right to intervene in any way whatever in the division of the estate among the heirs. They are coowners of an undivided
estate and the law offers them a remedy for the division of the same among themselves. There is nothing in the present
case to show that the heirs requested the appointment of the administrator, or that they intervened in any way whatever in
the present action. If there are any heirs of the estate who have not received their participation, they have their remedy by
petition for partition of the said estate.
The judgment appealed from is reversed and the complaint dismissed on the merits, without special findings as to costs.
Torres, Mapa, Johnson, and Carson, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-21725

November 29, 1968

AURELIO ARCILLAS, petitioner,

vs.
HON. GREGORIO D. MONTEJO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga, MODESTA ALFARO, GERONIMO
ARCILLAS and VICENTE ARCILLAS, respondents.
Antonio J. Calvento for petitioner.
T. de los Santos for respondents.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
Filed before the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga on November 12 and 16, 1962, respectively, are two separate petitions having
direct and special reference to Lot No. 276. This lot, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-244 (2155 (0-656), forms a major
part of the estate of the late Eustaquio Arcillas who died intestate on March 8, 1958 in the City of Zamboanga.
In the petition dated November 12 Geronimo Arcillas, one of the heirs of the deceased, sought the cancellation of TCT No. RT-244 in
the name of the deceased and prayed for the issuance of a new certificate of title in the names of the heirs in the enumerated
proportions alleged in the petition. It was claimed that at various dates after the death of the deceased, several transactions affecting
Lot No. 276 transpired, prominent among which were the separate sales of their respective shares and participation in Lot No. 276
executed by four (4) other children of the deceased in favor of co-heir Vicente Arcillas. Invoking section 112 of Act No. 496 (Land
Registration Act), Geronimo Arcillas argued that the proportion of each heir's participation in said lot should be accurately reflected in
a new certificate of title. But before any other material pleading could be filed with respect to this petition, five (5) other children of
the deceased filed the November 16 petition aforementioned. This later petition, docketed as Special Proceeding No. 632, prayed for
the issuance of letters of administration in favor of herein petitioner preparatory to the final settlement of the deceased's estate.
Paragraphs 3 and 4 of this later petition, insofar as pertinent to this case, read:
3. That the deceased left an estate consisting of real property in Zamboanga City with a probable value of not less than SIX
THOUSAND PESOS (P6,000.00), Philippine Currency;
4. That as far as petitioners know, the deceased left no debts remaining unpaid;
In the meantime, on November 23, 1962 herein petitioner filed his opposition to the November 12 petition on the ground that
inasmuch as Lot No. 276 the subject matter thereof was included in the estate of the deceased for which a petition for
administration had actually been filed and was awaiting resolution, that petition (the one dated November 12) should be held in
abeyance until after Special Proceeding No. 632 was closed and terminated. Recognizing then the merit of petitioner's ground,
respondent Judge issued an order on December 1, 1963 temporarily holding in abeyance resolution of the November 12 petition until
the termination of the intestate proceedings.
Meanwhile, in his answer to the November 16 petition (Sp. Proc. No. 632) Geronimo Arcillas, this time joined by Vicente Arcillas and
the widow Modesta Alfaro, opposed the issuance of letters of administration to herein petitioner, arguing that inasmuch as Lot No.
276 was the only property left by the deceased and the deceased left no debts, the petition for administration was improper. However
petitioner, in his reply on January 18, 1963, insisted that there were still other properties of the estate of the deceased besides Lot
No. 276; he likewise took issue with respondents' view that administration proceedings could be dispensed with asserting, firstly, that
there was no unanimity among the heirs for extrajudicial partition and, secondly, that some of the heirs had been unduly deprived of
their participation in the estate.
On March 8, 1963 respondent court denied the November 16 petition for the issuance of letters of administration and at the same
time gave due course to the November 12 petition. Reasoned the court: "... to obviate the necessity of spending uselessly which
would only deplete the funds of the estate; to avoid unnecessary delay in the partition of the property involved herein, and following
the doctrines established by the Honorable Supreme Court in several cases of the same nature, which is in consonance with the

provisions of Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, the court is of the opinion that the herein petition (should) be denied and (holds
that) the cadastral motion of the oppositor Geronimo Arcillas covering the same property is the most expedient and proper action."
Unable to have this order reconsidered petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari with mandamus and preliminary injunction.
On December 2, 1963, upon filing by petitioner of the required bond, we issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining respondent
Judge from proceeding with the hearing of the "cadastral motion" dated November 12, 1962.
The issues to be determined are whether respondent Judge acted properly (1) in dismissing the administration proceedings under the
authority of section 1, rule 74 of the New Rules of Court upon averments that the estate left no debts and all the heirs entitled to
share in its distribution are all of age and (2) in maintaining that the "cadastral motion" brought under the provision of section 112 of
the Land Registration Act was the more proper proceeding under the circumstances.
Under section 1, Rule 74 of the New Rules of Court, if the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs and legatees are all of age,
or the minors are represented by their judicial guardians, the parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the estate
among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the Register of Deeds and should they
disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. And primarily anchored on the proposition that inasmuch as in the present
case the minimum requirements of the aforementioned section obtain, i.e. the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all
of age, respondents claim that there is no necessity for the institution of special proceedings and the appointment of an administrator
for the settlement of the estate for the reason that it is superfluous and unnecessary. In other words, respondents apparently view
section 1 of Rule 74 as mandatory upon the heirs so long as the deceased left no will nor any pending obligations to be paid and his
heirs are all of age.
We cannot entirely agree with the respondents. On a similar contention in the past, we had occasion to explain inRodriguez, et al. v.
Tan, et al., 92 Phil. 273:
... section I does not preclude the heirs from instituting administration proceedings, even if the estate has no debts or
obligation, if they do not desire to resort for good reasons to an ordinary action of partition. While section 1 allows the heirs
to divide the estate among themselves as they may see fit, or to resort to an ordinary action of partition, it does not compel
them to do so if they have good reasons to take a different course of action. Said section is not mandatory or compulsory as
may be gleaned from the use made therein of the word may. If the intention were otherwise the framer of the rule would
have employed the word shall as was done in other provisions that are mandatory in character. Note that the word may its
used not only once but in the whole section which indicates an intention to leave the matter entirely to the discretion of the
heirs.
Having decided to institute administration proceedings instead of resorting to the less expensive modes of settlement of the estate,
i.e. extrajudicial settlement or ordinary action for partition, the heirs may not then be rebuffed in the exercise of their discretion
granted under section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court merely on the ground that the expenses usually common in administration
proceedings may deplete the funds of the estate. The resultant delay and necessary expenses incurred thereafter are consequences
which must be deemed to have been voluntarily assumed by the heirs themselves so that they may not in the future be heard to
complain of these matters. Besides, the truth or veracity of petitioner's claim as to the alleged existence of other properties of the
deceased aside from the lot in question can be more adequately ascertained in administration proceedings rather than in any other
action.
Understandably the allowance of the hearing of the "cadastral" motion, supposedly brought under the authority of section 112 of Act
496, cannot be sustained. While this section authorizes, among others, a person in interest to ask the court for any erasure,
alteration, or amendment of a certificate of title "upon the ground that registered interests of any description, whether vested,
contingent, expectant, or inchoate have terminated and ceased," and apparently the November 12 petition comes within its scope,
such relief can only be granted if there is unanimity among the parties, or there is no adverse claim or serious objection on the part of
any party in interest; otherwise the case becomes controversial and should be threshed out in an ordinary case or in the case where
the incident properly belongs (see Puguid v. Reyes, L-21311, August 10, 1967 and the cases cited therein). In the instant case the
obvious lack of unanimity among the parties in interest, manifestly demonstrated by petitioners' express objection to the cancellation
of TCT No. RT-244, sufficiently removes the November 12 petition from the scope of section 112 of Act 496. Besides, the proceedings
provided in the Land Registration Act are summary in nature and hence inadequate for the litigation of issues which properly pertain
to the case where the incident belongs.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered setting aside the appealed orders and directing respondent Judge or
whoever is presiding the court below to reinstate Special Proceedings No. 632; the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued
enjoining respondent Judge from proceeding with the hearing of the "cadastral" motion dated November 12, 1962 is hereby made
permanent. Costs against respondents, except respondent Judge.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando and Capistrano, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-81147 June 20, 1989

VICTORIA BRINGAS PEREIRA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and RITA PEREIRA NAGAC, respondents.
Benjamin J. Quitoriano for petitioner.
Linzag-Arcilla & Associates Law Offices for private respondent.

GANCAYCO, J.:
Is a judicial administration proceeding necessary when the decedent dies intestate without leaving any debts? May the probate court
appoint the surviving sister of the deceased as the administratrix of the estate of the deceased instead of the surviving spouse?
These are the main questions which need to be resolved in this case.
Andres de Guzman Pereira, an employee of the Philippine Air Lines, passed away on January 3, 1983 at Bacoor, Cavite without a will.
He was survived by his legitimate spouse of ten months, the herein petitioner Victoria Bringas Pereira, and his sister Rita Pereira
Nagac, the herein private respondent.
On March 1, 1983, private respondent instituted before Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite, Special Proceeding No.
RTC-BSP-83-4 for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor pertaining to the estate of the deceased Andres de Guzman
Pereira. 1 In her verified petition, private respondent alleged the following: that she and Victoria Bringas Pereira are the only surviving

heirs of the deceased; that the deceased left no will; that there are no creditors of the deceased; that the deceased left several
properties, namely: death benefits from the Philippine Air Lines (PAL), the PAL Employees Association (PALEA), the PAL Employees
Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (PESALA) and the Social Security System (SSS), as well as savings deposits with the Philippine
National Bank (PNB) and the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB), and a 300 square meter lot located at Barangay
Pamplona, Las Pinas, Rizal and finally, that the spouse of the deceased (herein petitioner) had been working in London as an auxiliary
nurse and as such one-half of her salary forms part of the estate of the deceased.
On March 23,1983, petitioner filed her opposition and motion to dismiss the petition of private respondent 2alleging that there exists
no estate of the deceased for purposes of administration and praying in the alternative, that if an estate does exist, the letters of
administration relating to the said estate be issued in her favor as the surviving spouse.
In its resolution dated March 28, 1985, the Regional Trial Court, appointed private respondent Rita Pereira Nagac administratrix of the
intestate estate of Andres de Guzman Pereira upon a bond posted by her in the amount of Pl,000.00. The trial court ordered her to
take custody of all the real and personal properties of the deceased and to file an inventory thereof within three months after receipt
of the order. 3
Not satisfied with the resolution of the lower court, petitioner brought the case to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court affirmed
the appointment of private respondent as administratrix in its decision dated December 15, 1987. 4
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari where petitioner raises the following issues: (1) Whether or not there exists an estate of
the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira for purposes of administration; (2) Whether or not a judicial administration proceeding is
necessary where there are no debts left by the decedent; and, (3) Who has the better right to be appointed as administratrix of the
estate of the deceased, the surviving spouse Victoria Bringas Pereira or the surviving sister Rita Pereira Nagac?
Anent the first issue, petitioner contends that there exists no estate of the deceased for purposes of administration for the following
reasons: firstly, the death benefits from PAL, PALEA, PESALA and the SSS belong exclusively to her, being the sole beneficiary and in
support of this claim she submitted letter-replies from these institutions showing that she is the exclusive beneficiary of said death
benefits; secondly, the savings deposits in the name of her deceased husband with the PNB and the PCIB had been used to defray the
funeral expenses as supported by several receipts; and, finally, the only real property of the deceased has been extrajudicially settled
between the petitioner and the private respondent as the only surviving heirs of the deceased.
Private respondent, on the other hand, argues that it is not for petitioner to decide what properties form part of the estate of the
deceased and to appropriate them for herself. She points out that this function is vested in the court in charge of the intestate
proceedings.
Petitioner asks this Court to declare that the properties specified do not belong to the estate of the deceased on the basis of her bare
allegations as aforestated and a handful of documents. Inasmuch as this Court is not a trier of facts, We cannot order an unqualified
and final exclusion or non-exclusion of the property involved from the estate of the deceased. 5
The resolution of this issue is better left to the probate court before which the administration proceedings are pending. The trial court
is in the best position to receive evidence on the discordant contentions of the parties as to the assets of the decedent's estate, the
valuations thereof and the rights of the transferees of some of the assets, if any. 6 The function of resolving whether or not a certain
property should be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator is one clearly within the
competence of the probate court. However, the court's determination is only provisional in character, not conclusive, and is subject to
the final decision in a separate action which may be instituted by the parties. 7
Assuming, however, that there exist assets of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira for purposes of administration, We
nonetheless find the administration proceedings instituted by private respondent to be unnecessary as contended by petitioner for
the reasons herein below discussed.
The general rule is that when a person dies leaving property, the same should be judicially administered and the competent court
should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order established in Section 6, Rule 78, in case the deceased left no will, or in case he
had left one, should he fail to name an executor therein. 8 An exception to this rule is established in Section 1 of Rule 74. 9 Under this
exception, when all the heirs are of lawful age and there are no debts due from the estate, they may agree in writing to partition the
property without instituting the judicial administration or applying for the appointment of an administrator.
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court, however, does not preclude the heirs from instituting administration proceedings,
even if the estate has no debts or obligations, if they do not desire to resort for good reasons to an ordinary action for partition. While
Section 1 allows the heirs to divide the estate among themselves as they may see fit, or to resort to an ordinary action for partition,
the said provision does not compel them to do so if they have good reasons to take a different course of action. 10 It should be noted
that recourse to an administration proceeding even if the estate has no debts is sanctioned only if the heirs have good reasons for not
resorting to an action for partition. Where partition is possible, either in or out of court, the estate should not be burdened with an
administration proceeding without good and compelling reasons. 11

Thus, it has been repeatedly held that when a person dies without leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of age or
not, are not bound to submit the property to a judicial administration, which is always long and costly, or to apply for the appointment
of an administrator by the Court. It has been uniformly held that in such case the judicial administration and the appointment of an
administrator are superfluous and unnecessary proceedings . 12
Now, what constitutes "good reason" to warrant a judicial administration of the estate of a deceased when the heirs are all of legal
age and there are no creditors will depend on the circumstances of each case.
In one case,

13

We said:
Again the petitioner argues that only when the heirs do not have any dispute as to the bulk of the hereditary estate
but only in the manner of partition does section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court apply and that in this case the
parties are at loggerheads as to the corpus of the hereditary estate because respondents succeeded in
sequestering some assets of the intestate. The argument is unconvincing, because, as the respondent judge has
indicated, questions as to what property belonged to the deceased (and therefore to the heirs) may properly be
ventilated in the partition proceedings, especially where such property is in the hands of one heir.

In another case, We held that if the reason for seeking an appointment as administrator is merely to avoid a multiplicity of suits since
the heir seeking such appointment wants to ask for the annulment of certain transfers of property, that same objective could be
achieved in an action for partition and the trial court is not justified in issuing letters of administration. 14 In still another case, We did
not find so powerful a reason the argument that the appointment of the husband, a usufructuary forced heir of his deceased wife, as
judicial administrator is necessary in order for him to have legal capacity to appear in the intestate proceedings of his wife's deceased
mother, since he may just adduce proof of his being a forced heir in the intestate proceedings of the latter. 15
We see no reason not to apply this doctrine to the case at bar. There are only two surviving heirs, a wife of ten months and a sister,
both of age. The parties admit that there are no debts of the deceased to be paid. What is at once apparent is that these two heirs
are not in good terms. The only conceivable reason why private respondent seeks appointment as administratrix is for her to obtain
possession of the alleged properties of the deceased for her own purposes, since these properties are presently in the hands of
petitioner who supposedly disposed of them fraudulently. We are of the opinion that this is not a compelling reason which will
necessitate a judicial administration of the estate of the deceased. To subject the estate of Andres de Guzman Pereira, which does not
appear to be substantial especially since the only real property left has been extrajudicially settled, to an administration proceeding
for no useful purpose would only unnecessarily expose it to the risk of being wasted or squandered. In most instances of a similar
nature, 16 the claims of both parties as to the properties left by the deceased may be properly ventilated in simple partition
proceedings where the creditors, should there be any, are protected in any event.
We, therefore, hold that the court below before which the administration proceedings are pending was not justified in issuing letters
of administration, there being no good reason for burdening the estate of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira with the costs and
expenses of an administration proceeding.
With the foregoing ruling, it is unnecessary for us to delve into the issue of who, as between the surviving spouse Victoria Bringas
Pereira and the sister Rita Pereira Nagac, should be preferred to be appointed as administratrix.
WHEREFORE, the letters of administration issued by the Regional Trial Court of Bacoor to Rita Pereira Nagac are hereby revoked and
the administration proceeding dismissed without prejudice to the right of private respondent to commence a new action for partition
of the property left by Andres de Guzman Pereira. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 134329

January 19, 2000

VERONA PADA-KILARIO and RICARDO KILARIO, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SILVERIO PADA, respondents.
DE LEON, JR., J.:
The victory1 of petitioner spouses Ricardo and Verona Kilario in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court 2 in an ejectment suit3 filed against
them by private respondent Silverio Pada, was foiled by its reversal 4 by the Regional Trial Court5 on appeal. They elevated their
cause6 to respondent Court of Appeals7 which, however, promulgated a Decision8 on May 20, 1998, affirming the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court.
The following facts are undisputed:
One Jacinto Pada had six (6) children, namely, Marciano, Ananias, Amador, Higino, Valentina and Ruperta. He died intestate. His
estate included a parcel of land of residential and coconut land located at Poblacion, Matalom, Leyte, denominated as Cadastral Lot
No. 5581 with an area of 1,301.92 square meters. It is the northern portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581 which is the subject of the
instant controversy.
During the lifetime of Jacinto Pada, his half-brother, Feliciano Pada, obtained permission from him to build a house on the northern
portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581. When Feliciano died, his son, Pastor, continued living in the house together with his eight children.
Petitioner Verona Pada-Kilario, one of Pastor's children, has been living in that house since 1960.
Sometime in May, 1951, the heirs of Jacinto Pada entered into an extra-judicial partition of his estate. For this purpose, they executed
a private document which they, however, never registered in the Office of the Registrar of Deeds of Leyte.
At the execution of the extra-judicial partition, Ananias was himself present while his other brothers were represented by their
children. Their sisters, Valentina and Ruperta, both died without any issue. Marciano was represented by his daughter, Maria; Amador
was represented by his daughter, Concordia; and Higina was represented by his son, Silverio who is the private respondent in this
case. It was to both Ananias and Marciano, represented by his daughter, Maria, that Cadastral Lot No. 5581 was allocated during the
said partition. When Ananias died, his daughter, Juanita, succeeded to his right as co-owner of said property.
On June 14, 1978, Juanita Pada sold to Engr. Ernesto Paderes, the right of his father, Ananias, as co-owner of Cadastral Lot No. 5881.
On November 17, 1993, it was the turn of Maria Pada to sell the co-ownership right of his father, Marciano. Private respondent, who is
the first cousin of Maria, was the buyer.
Thereafter, private respondent demanded that petitioner spouses vacate the northern portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581 so his family
can utilize the said area. They went through a series of meetings with the barangay officials concerned for the purpose of amicable
settlement, but all earnest efforts toward that end, failed.
On June 26, 1995, private respondent filed in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Matalom, Leyte, a complaint for ejectment with
prayer for damages against petitioner spouses.
On July 24, 1995, the heirs of Amador Pada, namely, Esperanza Pada-Pavo, Concordia Pada-Bartolome, and Angelito Pada, executed a
Deed of Donation9 transferring to petitioner Verona Pada-Kilario, their respective shares as co-owners of Cadastral Lot No. 5581.
On February 12, 1996, petitioner spouses filed their Answer averring that the northern portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581 had already
been donated to them by the heirs of Amador Pada. They contended that the extra-judicial partition of the estate of Jacinto Pada
executed in 1951 was invalid and ineffectual since no special power of attorney was executed by either Marciano, Amador or Higino in
favor of their respective children who represented them in the extra-judicial partition. Moreover, it was effectuated only through a
private document that was never registered in the office of the Registrar of Deeds of Leyte.
The Municipal Circuit Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of petitioner spouses. It made the following findings:
After a careful study of the evidence submitted by both parties, the court finds that the evidence adduced by plaintiff failed
to establish his ownership over . . . Cadastral Lot No. 5581 . . . while defendants has [sic] successfully proved by
preponderance of evidence that said property is still under a community of ownership among the heirs of the late Jacinto
Pada who died intestate. If there was some truth that Marciano Pada and Ananias Pada has [sic] been adjudicated jointly of
[sic] the above-described residential property . . . as their share of the inheritance on the basis of the alleged extra judicial
settlement, how come that since 1951, the date of partition, the share of the late Marciano Pada was not transferred in the
name of his heirs, one of them Maria Pada-Pavo and still remain [sic] in the name of Jacinto Pada up to the present while the
part pertaining to the share of Ananias Pada was easily transferred in the name of his heirs . . ..

The alleged extra judicial settlement was made in private writing and the genuineness and due execution of said document
was assailed as doubtful and it appears that most of the heirs were not participants and signatories of said settlement, and
there was lack of special power of attorney to [sic] those who claimed to have represented their co-heirs in the participation
[sic] and signing of the said extra judicial statement.
Defendants were already occupying the northern portion of the above-described property long before the sale of said
property on November 17, 1993 was executed between Maria Pada-Pavo, as vendor and the plaintiff, as vendee. They are in
possession of said portion of the above-described property since the year 1960 with the consent of some of the heirs of
Jacinto Pada and up to the [sic] present some of the heirs of Jacinto Pada has [sic] donated . . . their share of [sic] the abovedescribed property to them, virtually converting defendants' standing as co-owners of the land under controversy. Thus,
defendants as co-owners became the undivided owners of the whole estate . . . . As co-owners of . . . Cadastral Lot No.
5581 . . . their possession in the northern portion is being [sic] lawful.10
From the foregoing decision, private respondent appealed to the Regional Trial Court. On November 6, 1997, it rendered a judgment
of reversal. It held:
. . . [T]he said conveyances executed by Juanita Pada and Maria Pada Pavo were never questioned or assailed by their coheirs for more than 40 years, thereby lending credence on [sic] the fact that the two vendors were indeed legal and lawful
owners of properties ceded or sold. . . . At any rate, granting that the co-heirs of Juanita Pada and Maria Pada Pavo have
some interests on the very lot assigned to Marciano and Ananias, nevertheless, said interests had long been sadly lost by
prescription, if not laches or estoppel.
It is true that an action for partition does not prescribe, as a general rule, but this doctrine of imprescriptibility cannot be
invoked when one of the heirs possessed the property as an owner and for a period sufficient to acquire it by prescription
because from the moment one of the co-heirs claim [sic] that he is the absolute owner and denies the rest their share of the
community property, the question then involved is no longer one for partition but of ownership. . . . Since [sic] 1951 up to
1993 covers a period of 42 long years. Clearly, whatever right some of the co-heirs may have, was long extinguished by
laches, estoppel or prescription.
xxx

xxx

xxx

. . . [T]he deed of donation executed by the Heirs of Amador Pada, a brother of Marciano Pada, took place only during the
inception of the case or after the lapse of more than 40 years reckoned from the time the extrajudicial partition was made in
1951. Therefore, said donation is illegal and invalid [sic] the donors, among others, were absolutely bereft of any right in
donating the very property in question.11
The dispositive portion of the decision of the Regional Trial Court reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, a judgment is hereby rendered, reversing the judgment earlier promulgated by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
of Matalom, Leyte, [sic] consequently, defendants-appellees are hereby ordered:
1. To vacate the premises in issue and return peaceful possession to the appellant, being the lawful possessor in concept of
owner;
2. To remove their house at their expense unless appellant exercises the option of acquiring the same, in which case the
pertinent provisions of the New Civil Code has to be applied;
3. Ordering the defendants-appellees to pay monthly rental for their occupancy and use of the portion of the land in question
in the sum of P100.00 commencing on June 26, 1995 when the case was filed and until the termination of the present case;
4. Ordering the defendants to pay to the appellant the sum of P5,000.00 as moral damages and the further sum of
P5,000.00 as attorney's fees;
5. Taxing defendants to pay the costs of suit. 12
Petitioners filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for review of the foregoing decision of the Regional Trial Court.
On May 20, 1998, respondent Court of Appeals rendered judgment dismissing said petition. It explained:
Well-settled is the rule that in an ejectment suit, the only issue is possession de facto or physical or material possession and
not de jure. Hence, even if the question of ownership is raised in the pleadings, the court may pass upon such issue but only
to determine the question of possession, specially if the former is inseparably linked with the latter. It cannot dispose with

finality the issue of ownership, such issue being inutile in an ejectment suit except to throw light on the question of
possession . . . .
Private respondent Silverio Pada anchors his claim to the portion of the land possessed by petitioners on the Deed of Sale
executed in his favor by vendor Maria Pada-Pavo, a daughter of Marciano, son of Jacinto Pada who was the registered owner
of the subject lot. The right of vendee Maria Pada to sell the property was derived from the extra-judicial partition executed
in May 1951 among the heirs of Jacinto Pada, which was written in a Bisayan dialect signed by the heirs, wherein the subject
land was adjudicated to Marciano, Maria Pavo's father, and Ananias Pada. Although the authenticity and genuineness of the
extra-judicial partition is now being questioned by the heirs of Amador Pada, no action was ever previously filed in court to
question the validity of such partition.1wphi1.nt
Notably, petitioners in their petition admitted among the antecedent facts that Maria Pavo is one of the co-owners of the
property originally owned by Jacinto Pada . . . and that the disputed lot was adjudicated to Marciano (father of Maria Pavo)
and Ananias, and upon the death of Marciano and Ananias, their heirs took possession of said lot, i.e. Maria Pavo the vendor
for Marciano's share and Juanita for Ananias' share . . . . Moreover, petitioners do not dispute the findings of the respondent
court that during the cadastral survey of Matalom, Leyte, the share of Maria Pada Pavo was denominated as Lot No. 5581,
while the share of Juanita Pada was denominated as Lot No. 6047, and that both Maria Pada Pavo and Juanita were in
possession of their respective hereditary shares. Further, petitioners in their Answer admitted that they have been occupying
a portion of Lot No. 5581, now in dispute without paying any rental owing to the liberality of the plaintiff . . . . Petitioners
cannot now impugn the aforestated extrajudicial partition executed by the heirs in 1951. As owner and possessor of the
disputed property, Maria Pada, and her vendee, private respondent, is entitled to possession. A voluntary division of the
estate of the deceased by the heirs among themselves is conclusive and confers upon said heirs exclusive ownership of the
respective portions assigned to them . . ..
The equally belated donation of a portion of the property in dispute made by the heirs of Amador Pada, namely, Concordia,
Esperanza and Angelito, in favor of petitioner Verona Pada is a futile attempt to confer upon the latter the status of coowner, since the donors had no interest nor right to transfer. . . . This gesture appears to be a mere afterthought to help
petitioners to prolong their stay in the premises. Furthermore, the respondent court correctly pointed out that the equitable
principle of laches and estoppel come into play due to the donors' failure to assert their claims and alleged ownership for
more than forty (40) years . . . . Accordingly, private respondent was subrogated to the rights of the vendor over Lot No.
5581 which include [sic] the portion occupied by petitioners.13
Petitioner spouses filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing decision.
On June 16, 1998, respondent Court of Appeals issued a Resolution denying said motion.
Hence this petition raising the following issues:
I.
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT PETITIONERS, AS CO-OWNERS, CANNOT BE EJECTED FROM
THE PREMISES CONSIDERING THAT THE HEIRS OF JACINTO PADA DONATED TO THEM THEIR UNDIVIDED INTEREST IN THE
PROPERTY IN DISPUTE.
II.
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT WHAT MARIA PADA SOLD WAS HER UNDIVIDED SHARE IN
THE PROPERTY IN DISPUTE.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS ARE BUILDERS IN GOOD FAITH.14
There is no merit to the instant petition.
First. We hold that the extrajudicial partition of the estate of Jacinto Pada among his heirs made in 1951 is valid, albeit executed in an
unregistered private document. No law requires partition among heirs to be in writing and be registered in order to be valid. 15 The
requirement in Sec. 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court that a partition be put in a public document and registered, has for its
purpose the protection of creditors and the heirs themselves against tardy claims. 16 The object of registration is to serve as
constructive notice to others. It follows then that the intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the prescribed formalities is not
undermined when no creditors are involved.17 Without creditors to take into consideration, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to
enter into an agreement for distribution thereof in a manner and upon a plan different from those provided by the rules from which, in

the first place, nothing can be inferred that a writing or other formality is essential for the partition to be valid. 18 The partition of
inherited property need not be embodied in a public document so as to be effective as regards the heirs that participated
therein.19 The requirement of Article 1358 of the Civil Code that acts which have for their object the creation, transmission,
modification or extinguishment of real rights over immovable property, must appear in a public instrument, is only for convenience,
non-compliance with which does not affect the validity or enforceability of the acts of the parties as among themselves. 20 And neither
does the Statute of Frauds under Article 1403 of the New Civil Code apply because partition among heirs is not legally deemed a
conveyance of real property, considering that it involves not a transfer of property from one to the other but rather, a confirmation or
ratification of title or right of property that an heir is renouncing in favor of another heir who accepts and receives the
inheritance.21 The 1951 extrajudicial partition of Jacinto Pada's estate being legal and effective as among his heirs, Juanita and Maria
Pada validly transferred their ownership rights over Cadastral Lot No. 5581 to Engr. Paderes and private respondent, respectively. 22
Second. The extrajudicial partition which the heirs of Jacinto Pada executed voluntarily and spontaneously in 1951 has produced a
legal status.23 When they discussed and agreed on the division of the estate Jacinto Pada, it is presumed that they did so in
furtherance of their mutual interests. As such, their division is conclusive, unless and until it is shown that there were debts existing
against the estate which had not been paid.24 No showing, however, has been made of any unpaid charges against the estate of
Jacinto Pada. Thus, there is no reason why the heirs should not be bound by their voluntary acts.
The belated act of Concordia, Esperanza and Angelito, who are the heirs of Amador Pada, of donating the subject property to
petitioners after forty four (44) years of never having disputed the validity of the 1951 extrajudicial partition that allocated the
subject property to Marciano and Ananias, produced no legal effect. In the said partition, what was allocated to Amador Pada was not
the subject property which was a parcel of residential land in Sto. Nino, Matalom, Leyte, but rather, one-half of a parcel of coconut
land in the interior of Sto. Nino St., Sabang, Matalom, Leyte and one-half of a parcel of rice land in Itum, Sta. Fe, Matalom, Leyte. The
donation made by his heirs to petitioners of the subject property, thus, is void for they were not the owners thereof. At any rate it is
too late in the day for the heirs of Amador Pada to repudiate the legal effects of the 1951 extrajudicial partition as prescription and
laches have equally set in.
Third. Petitioners are estopped from impugning the extrajudicial partition executed by the heirs of Jacinto Pada after explicitly
admitting in their Answer that they had been occupying the subject property since 1960 without ever paying any rental as they only
relied on the liberality and tolerance of the Pada family. 25 Their admissions are evidence of a high order and bind them insofar as the
character of their possession of the subject property is concerned.
Considering that petitioners were in possession of the subject property by sheer tolerance of its owners, they knew that their
occupation of the premises may be terminated any time. Persons who occupy the land of another at the latter's tolerance or
permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that they will vacate the same upon
demand, failing in which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against them. 26 Thus, they cannot be considered
possessors nor builders in good faith. It is well-settled that both Article 448 27 and Article 54628 of the New Civil Code which allow full
reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the premises until reimbursement is made, apply only to a possessor in good
faith,i.e., one who builds on land with the belief that he is the owner thereof. 29 Verily, persons whose occupation of a realty is by sheer
tolerance of its owners are not possessors in good faith. Neither did the promise of Concordia, Esperanza and Angelito Pada that they
were going to donate the premises to petitioners convert them into builders in good faith for at the time the improvements were built
on the premises, such promise was not yet fulfilled, i.e., it was a mere expectancy of ownership that may or may not be
realized.30 More importantly, even as that promise was fulfilled, the donation is void for Concordia, Esperanza and Angelito Pada were
not the owners of Cadastral Lot No. 5581. As such, petitioners cannot be said to be entitled to the value of the improvements that
they built on the said lot.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is HEREBY DENIED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-6871

January 15, 1912

JOSE McMICKING, administrator of the estate of Margarita Jose, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
BENITO SY CONBIENG, administrator of the estate of Pio de la Gurdia Barretto Sy Pioco, defendant-appellee.
Haussermann, Cohn & Fisher for appellant.
D. R. Williams for appellee.
MORELAND, J.:
On or about the 5th of February, 1902, one Margarita Jose, a native of the Philippine Islands, died at Amoy, in the empire of China,
leaving an estate consisting of personal property partly in Hongkong and partly in the Philippine Islands. On the 16th of April, 1902,
one Engracio Palanca was appointed administrator with the will annexed of the estate of the said Margarita Jose, deceased, by the
Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, and Mariano Ocampo Lao Sempco and Dy Cunyao became his sureties and qualified as
such in the sum of P60,000. After the execution of this bond the said Palanca, as such administrator, took possession of all the
property of the said Margarita Jose, amounting in all to $58,820.29 Hongkong currency. On the 22d of April, 1904, the Mariano
Ocampo Lao Sempco died in the city of Manila, testate. The fact of his death was brought to the attention of the Court of First
Instance of said city on the 2nd of November, 1904, by an application made by one of the legatees of said Margarita Jose, deceased,

for an order directing said administrator to furnish a new bond. Pursuant to this application the court, on the 10th of November, 1904,
made an order directing the said Palanca to furnish a bond in the sum of P60,000 to take the place of the undertaking upon which
said Mariano Ocampo, deceased, and Dy Cunyao were sureties. The bond thus required was duly filed on the 22nd of November,
1904, the sureties thereon being Juan Fernandez, Luis Saenz de Vismanos and Alejandro Palanca. On the 11th of May, 1904, one
Doroteo Velasco was appointed administrator with the will annexed of said Mariano Ocampo Lao Sempco, deceased, and on July 7
following Mariano Velasco and Pio de la Guardia Barretto qualified as sureties of the said administrator in the sum of P30,000. Said
Mariano Ocampo Lao Sempco left him surviving as his heirs at law and devises and legatees one daughter, to whom he devised twothirds of his estate, and three sons in China, to whom he devised the remaining one-third. On the 27th of July, 1904, said Doroteo
Velasco, as such administrator, filed with the court a complete report and inventory of the property of the deceased, together with a
statement of all his debts and liabilities. As a part of this report and inventory said administrator filed an instrument signed by all of
the persons interested in the estate of the said Mariano Ocampo agreeing to the partition of he estate among themselves without
proceedings in court, at the same time assuming the payment of all obligations against the estate. This agreement of partition was
drawn and executed under sections 596 and 597 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the purposes and to attain the ends therein
mentioned. On the 28th of July, 1904, the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, upon the request of the administrator with the
will annexed and of all parties interested in the estate of the said Mariano Ocampo, deceased, entered an order in said agreement.
Pursuant to such agreement and order of the court approving the same, and after all the liabilities under which said estate lay had
been fully paid and satisfied, the said Doroteo Velasco, as said administrator, delivered to the devisees and legatees of the said
Mariano Ocampo, deceased, all of the property of said decedent pursuant to the terms of said agreement of partition, leaving in the
hands of said administrator no property or thing of value whatsoever belonging to the said estate. From that time forward said
administrator has not had in his possession or control any of the assets of the said estate and has not had any participation in the
management thereof. At the time the agreement for participation was made and signed and at the time of the distribution of the
property of the estate pursuant thereto, no committee had been appointed to hear claims against the estate of the said Mariano
Ocampo, deceased, and no notice had been published to creditors of the said deceased to present their claims against the said estate
in the manner prescribed by law.
On the 30th of March, 1908, by virtue of an order made by the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, upon application of all
parties interested, the said Engracio Palanca was removed from office as administrator of the estate of said Margarita Jose, deceased,
and the plaintiff herein, Jose McMicking, was appointed in his stead. The said Palanca was removed from office by reason of the fact
that he failed and refused to render an account of the property and funds of the estate of the said Margarita Jose, deceased, which
has come to his possession as such administrator, and failed and refused, on order of the court, to deliver said property and funds or
any portion thereof to the court or to the said Jose McMicking, his successor. Instead of so doing, he retained possession of said
property and funds, absconded with the same, and never returned to the Philippine Islands. At the time of his removal he was
indebted to the estate in the sum of P41,960.15, no part of which has ever been received by the estate or by its representative.
On the 30th of June, 1909, Jose McMicking, as administrator, made an application to the court for the appointment of commissioners
of the estate of said Mariano Ocampo for the purpose of hearing claims against the estate. The commission having been appointed
and qualified, a claim was presented to it by the plaintiff based upon the defalcation of said Engracio Palanca, as administration with
the will annexed of Margarita Jose, deceased, which claim was allowed by said commission and later approved by the court, which
directed that the said claim be paid by Doroteo Velasco, if he had sufficient funds to make such payment. No part of the sum thus
found to be due by the commission has been paid to the representative of the estate of said Margarita Jose, deceased.
On the 3rd of November, 1905, Pio de la Barretto, who, it will be remembered, was one of the sureties on the undertaking of Doroteo
Velasco, as administrator with the will annexed of Mariano Ocampo, deceased, died in the city of Manila, leaving an estate consisting
of real and personal property located in the city. Said deceased left a will which was admitted to probate by the Court of First Instance
of the city of Manila on the 3rd day of February, 1906, and letters of administration with the will annexed were issued to Benito Sy
Conbieng, the defendant in this case. On the 4th of June, 1909, upon the application of the plaintiff in this case, a committee was
appointed by the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila to appraise the estate of the said Pio de la Guardia Barretto, deceased,
and to hear claims presented against his estate. Thereafter and within the time prescribed by law the plaintiff herein presented to
said committee a claim for the sum of P30,000 "based upon the fact that the claim for the larger amount had been allowed in favor of
the estate of said Margarita Jose Sempco, deceased;" and based upon the further fact "that the Court of First Instance had ordered
the said Doroteo Velasco, as administrator of the estate of said Mariano Ocampo Lao Sempco, deceased, to pay the said claim if there
were funds sufficient to make such payment, but that it has not been paid by the said Doroteo Velasco, or any part thereof," The
claim so presented against the estate of Pio de la Guardia Barretto, deceased, was disallowed by the committee thereof. The plaintiff
herein within the time allowed by law appealed to the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila from the order of the committee
disallowing said claim.
It is disputed in the case that all of the claims against the estate of Mariano Ocampo were fully paid and satisfied at the time of the
partition of said estate, with the exception of the alleged claim arising by virtue of his having been a surety of the default Palanca. It
nowhere appears in the evidence or the record exactly when this claim arose it may be inferred from the time of presentation in 1909,
and we have no means of determining whether the defalcation represented by the said claim occurred before or after the substitution
of sureties herefore referred to.
Upon these facts it was contended by counsel for plaintiff that the judgment should be rendered in his favor for the sum of P30,000,
with costs, while counsel of defendant contended that upon said facts judgment should be rendered in favor of defendant, dismissing

the complaint, with costs. The court having heard the evidence and the arguments of counsel, rendered judgment in favor of the
defendant and against the plaintiff, dismissing the complaint upon merits, without costs. This appeal is from that judgment.
We are of the opinion that the judgment must be affirmed. We base our affirmance upon the ground that Doroteo Velasco, for whom
the deceased Pio de la Guardia Barretto was surety, would not have been liable himself had this action been commenced against him.
If the principal is not liable upon the obligation, the surety cannot be.
At the head of the law of administration of the Philippine Islands stands sections 596 and 597 of the Code of Civil Procedure. They are
as follows:
SEC. 596. Settlement of intestate estates, without legal proceedings, in certain cases. Whatever all the heirs of a
deceased person are of lawful age and legal capacity, and their are no debts due from the intestate estate, or all the debts
have been paid by the heirs, the heirs may, by a family council as shown under Spanish law, or by agreement between
themselves, duly executed in writing, apportion and divide the estate among themselves, as they may see fit, without
proceedings in court.
SEC. 597. In such case distributees liable for debts. But if it shall appear, at any time within two years after such
settlement and distribution of the estate, that there are debts outstanding against the estate which have not been paid, any
creditor may compel the settlement of the estate in the courts in the manner hereinafter provided, unless his debt shall be
paid, with interest; and the administrator appointed by the court may recover the assets of the estate from those who have
received them, for the purpose of paying the debts; and the real estate belonging to the deceased shall remain charged with
the liability to creditors for the full period of two years after such distribution, notwithstanding any transfers thereof that may
have been made.
These sections provide for the voluntary division of the whole property of the decedent without proceedings in court. The provisions
which they contain are extremely important. The wisdom which underlies them is apparent. It is the undisputed policy of every people
which maintains the principle of private ownership of property that he who owns a thing shall not be deprived of its possession or use
except for the most urgent and imperative reason and then only so long as is necessary to make the rights which underlie those
reasons effective. It is a principle of universal acceptance which declares that one has the instant right to occupy and use that which
he owns, and it is only in the presence of reasons of the strongest and most urgent nature that that principle is prevented from
accomplishing the purpose which underlies it. The force which gave birth to this stern and imperious principle is the same force which
destroyed the feudal despotism and created the democracy of private owners.
These provisions should, therefore, be given the most liberal construction so that the intent of the framers may be fully carried out.
They should not be straitened or narrowed but should rather be given that wideness and fullness of application without which they
cannot produce their most beneficial effects.
Standing, as we have said, at the head of the law of administration of these Islands, they are the first provisions to which our
attention is directed in seeking a legal method for the division and distribution of the property of deceased persons. They are thus
made prominent. And justly so. The purpose which underlies them, as we have already intimated, is to put into one's hands the
property which belongs to him not only at the earliest possible moment but also with the least possible expense. By permitting the
partition and division without proceedings in court no time is lost and substantially all expense and waste are saved. This is as it
should be. The State fails wretchedly in its duty to its citizens if the machinery furnished by it for the division and distribution of the
property of a decedent is no cumbersome, unwidely and expensive that a considerable portion of the estate is absorbed in the
process of such division. Where administration is necessary, it ought to be accomplished quickly and at very small expense; and a
system which consumes any considerable portion of the property which it was designed to distribute is a failure. It being undoubted
that the removal of property from the possession of its owner and its deposit in the hands of another for administration is a
suspension of some of its most important rights of property and is attended with an expense sometimes entirely useless and
unnecessary, such procedure should be avoided whenever and wherever possible.
In the case at the bar we are of the opinion that, under the broad and liberal policy which we must adopt in the interpretation and
application of the provisions referred to, the decision of the property of Mariano Ocampo, deceased, in the form, in the manner and
for the purposes expressed, falls within the provisions of said sections and may be termed, therefore, and we hold it to be, a partition
of the property of a decedent without legal proceedings within the meaning of those sections. The fact of the prior appointment of an
administrator and the filing of an inventory before such partition is of no consequence so far as the right of the owners to partition is
concerned. The only requisite for such petition prescribed by the law is that "there are no debts . . . or all the debts have been paid by
the heirs." When the condition is fulfilled the partition can take place, no matter what stage the administration may have reached. By
this it is, of course, not meant that the partition after the appointment of an administrator will interfere with the rights acquired by
third person dealing with said administrator within the limits of his authority and prior to the partition; nor that the administrator can
be deprived of the property of which he is legally in possession without proper proceedings and the consent of the court.
As we have already indicated, the basis of the liability of a surety on an administrators' bond is the fault or failure of the principal. The
liability of the principal precedes that of the surety. If Velasco incurred no liability, then his surety incurred none. The question that
naturally suggests itself is, then, In what was Velasco at fault or in what did he fail? When the persons interested in the estate of

Mariano Ocampo agreed voluntarily upon a partition and division of the property of said estate and the actual partition followed, the
matter passed out of the hands of Velasco as administrator. The parties to the partition stood invoking their rights under section 596
and 597. Velasco was helpless. He was powerless to prevent the parties from taking the property to which they were entitled under
the agreement, it being conceded that they were actually entitled thereto in law. Those sections were applicable to the situation and
there was nothing that Velasco could do to prevent the estate from being divided according to their provisions. In giving his consent
to the partition and in assisting the parties to obtain the approval of the court thereto he did no wrong. He simply aided in carrying
out the provisions of the sections referred to. It is a universal principle that one who follows a law commits no fault, incurs no failure
and wounds no rights. If one obeys the law he is free not only in person but in property. Observance of the law discharges obligations;
it does not create them; and an obligation once discharged cannot be re-acted by the act of others in which the person as to whom it
was discharged takes no part. The proceedings under sections referred to were, after the partition was actually made and the
property duly turned over the administrator under the proper proceedings, a complete settlement of the estate of Mariano Ocampo,
deceased, as it then stood, so far as the administrator was concerned. Nothing further needed to be done. Every duty which Velasco
owed up to the time of the partition had been met. All debts presented or known had been paid. The court had given it approbation to
the delivery of the property by the administrator to the partitioning parties. Every obligation which lay upon him had been removed.
Nor could there arise against him any obligation in the future in relation to the same property. The instant that the partition occurred,
in the form and manner stated, he stood stripped of all responsibility to the estate, to its creditors, to the heirs and to the court. He
stood divested o every official duty and obligation, as fully as before his appointment as completely as if he had not been
appointed at all. In law, therefore, he was no longer administrator with the will annexed of the estate of Mariano Ocampo, deceased.
He was in effect, discharged. As to him the estate had been wiped out as a legal entity. It had ceased to exist. And, while at any time
within two years after the partition the property, or a portion thereof, then in the possession of the partitioning persons could have
been placed in administration upon the happening of certain events, it would not have been the same estate that had been
represented by Velasco, nor would Velasco have been the administrator of the estate by virtue of his appointment in the old. It would
have been necessary for the court, upon the proper application setting forth the conditions prescribed by the sections, to appoint
another administrator for the purposes specified therein. It might have been Velasco, if he would have accepted the appointment, or
it might have been another. The point is that it would have been necessary to appoint a new administrator just as if one had not been
named before. The new administrator would have had new duties, some of which would have been quite different from those of the
administrator appointed originally. He would have had different sureties, who would have found themselves to different obligations.
That on the partition under said section the estate was, in this case, completely wiped out and the administrator as completely
discharged cannot be doubted for the following reasons:
1. The whole estate was, by virtue of these sections, taken from the administrator and turned over to the partitioning
persons. No security was required or given for its safekeeping or return.
2. The persons to whom the estate was thus turned over became absolute owners of the same, subject to be devastated,
wholly or only partly, on the happening of certain events and the taking of certain proceedings thereon. But even such
divestiture could not have been avoided by the payment by the parties, or any of them, of the debt which was the moving
cause thereof.
From these premises it is the merest conclusion to say that the decedent's estate was merged in their partitioning parties; and this no
matter whether the partition occurred before or after the appointment of an administrator. When one has been named to perform
certain acts in relation to a given thing, and before said acts have been begun, or, having been begun, are completed, the appointing
power has placed the thing upon which those acts were to operate wholly beyond the possession, jurisdiction and control of the one
so appointed, there is a complete revocation of such appointment, so far as all subsequent acts are concerned. An administrator
cannot be held to any accountability for property over which he has absolutely no power or jurisdiction and in which he has not the
slightest legal interest. The thing on which he was appointed to operate having been withdrawn wholly beyond his ken by the very
power (the law) which appointed him, there is a complete revocation of the appointment.
Moreover, the sureties of an administrator so appointed can not be held liable for property which by force of law has been taken from
the principal and its ownership and control turned over to others. Their obligation is that their principal shall obey the law in the
handling and distribution of the estate. Their obligation is discharged when the estate is legally turned over to those entitled thereto.
The law requires the principal to turn it over to those who bring themselves within the provisions of section 596. Having turned over
the whole estate under the compelling power of the law, his obligation ceased. The responsibility of the sureties ceased at the same
time. Without their consent another obligation could not be imposed upon them in relation to the same principal, and the same
property, or apart thereof, especially after the lapse of two years. Their undertaking was that their principal should discharge one
obligation, not two.
It requires no argument to demonstrate that the duties and obligations imposed upon an administrator appointed under section 597
might and probably would be different in many respects from those of an administrator appointed in the first instance; and that,
therefore, the obligation of his sureties would not be the same as that of the sureties of the administrator appointed originally. The
administration contemplated by section 597 is a new administration and one entirely apart from any other administration theretofore
had. This section requires the appointment of a new administrator, with a new undertaking. The administration under the section is
distinct and separate from any administration which may have been in progress at the time of the partition and division under section
596. This is clear for the following reasons:

After the partition and division provided for in sections 596 and 597 have been fully consummated, no further administration of the
estate can be had unless there occur the following requisites:
1. There must have been discovered a claim against the estate "within two years after such settlement and distribution of
estate."
2. The creditor holding the claim must be the person who moves the court for the appointment of an administrator.
If those requisites are lacking, there can be no administration. When one fails the right too such administration does not arise and any
person intersted in the estate may oppose any effort to administer under such circumstances. These requisites combined are that
and that alone which give to the administrator when appointed the right to recover the assets from the persons who received them
on the a partition. Indeed, if these requisites are lacking no administrator can lawfully be appointed, and, if improperly appointed, he
fails of legal power to maintain an action to recover the assets in the hands of those among whom they have partitioned; in other
words, he is powerless to administer. If these requisites fail, then the real estate in the hands either of the persons among whom it
has been partitioned or of their assignees is free from the lien created by section 597 and any attempt to enforce such lien can be
successfully opposed by any person interested in such property. The appointment of an administrator without the concurrence of
these requisites is without warrant of law and the appointee is powerless to perform any act of administration. The statute must be
strictly complied with in every essential before it operates. Every essential requirements must be fulfilled before it will be permitted
that a partition which has the clear sanction of the law and which is strictly in accord with the public policy of the estate shall be set
aside and destroyed with all the evil consequences thereby entailed.
It is necessary deduction from the provisions of the sections mentioned that the appointment of an administrator ought not to be
permitted, even when the requisites above mentioned occur, unless the heirs or the persons among whom the property was
partitioned have been given an opportunity to be heard on that application. It would be extremely unusual to proceed to the
appointment of an administrator under section 597, by virtue of a debt which had been discovered after the partition and division,
without giving the heirs an opportunity to avoid such administration by the payment of the debt, it being kept in view that the object
of the law in originally giving the right to pay the debts and having partition without proceedings in court was to avoid that every
administration. Such a proceeding would be unusual and irrational. Such a course would be in direct opposition to the purposes which
animated the provisions authorizing the original partition.
(1) In the case at bar no debt was discovered during the prescribed period. It was nearly four years after the partition of the
estate and the taking possession by the heirs of their respective portions before it was even discovered that Palanca had
been guilty of converting the property of the estate to his own use; and, so far as the records shows, it was nearly five years
before the alleged claim against the estate of Mariano Ocampo was fixed.
(2) No creditor made his application.
The requirements of section 597 not having been met, there could be no administration under section. Therefore, the appointment of
commissioners for the hearing of the claim against the estate of Mariano Ocampo presented by the plaintiff in this case was an
appointment without warrant or authority of law. It was appointment in respect to an estate that did not exist and in relation to an
administration that had never been inaugurated. Under section 597 the commencement of the administration is the application of the
creditor and the appointment of the administrator pursuant to such application. Without such appointment there is no administration.
As we have before stated, when the property was partitioned a described heretofore, the estate, as such, ceased to exist and the
administration thereof by Doroteo Velasco was wiped out. There was no administrator to carry on the administration. By operation of
the law the estate had been passed on the heirs who had become the absolute owners of it. They were subject to the orders of the
old administrator and they held rights inferior to no one. To be sure, as we have already stated, those rights might be modified to a
certain extent by the happening of subsequent events; but until those events transpired their rights were absolute. Those conditions
never having been met, a fact admitted by both parties in the case at bar, there was absolutely no estate at all, much less one in the
process of administration, at the time the commissioners were appointed to her the claim for P30,000 presented against the estate of
Mariano Ocampo, deceased, by the plaintiff herein. Add to this the fact that there was no administrator of said estate in extense at
the time, and we have before us the absurdity of the appointment of the commissioners to report on a claim against an estate which
did not exist and under the direction of an administrator that had never been appointed.
The necessary conclusion is that the appointment of commissioners to hear the claim above referred to was beyond the powers of the
court and was without jurisdiction. The finding of the commissioners had no force or effect. It gave no right against the estate and
none against the so-called administrator.
It must be remembered that it is only debts discovered within the prescribed period that can be made the reason for an
administration of the estate subsequent to its partition. The necessary result is t hat a debt not discovered within that period cannot
be made the reason for an administration of the estate. The debt in the case at bar having first discovered more than four years after
the partition of the estate of Mariano Ocampo, deceased, an administrator, even though appointed under section 57, would not no
authority in law, over the objection of one interested, to pay the debt in question or to maintain an action or other proceeding for the
recovery of property for that purpose. This section creates a statute of limitations which deprives all debts which are not discovered
within the prescribed time of the power of requiring an administration of the estate. The administration of the estate after the

partition under the law has been accomplished depends upon the discovery of the debt "at any time within two years after such
settlement and distribution of the estate." The law does not operate unless that discovery is made within the time prescribed.
We have not overlooked the contention that at the time this partition took place there was a contingent claim against the estate
partitioned, namely, the claim which would arise on the contingency that the administrator for whom Mariano Ocampo was surety
might default or otherwise fail to perform his duties thus rendering Mariano Ocampo liable on his bond; and that contingent claim,
being one expressly recognized by sections 746 to 749 of the Code of Civil Procedure as a claim entirely proper to present, no
partition of this estate under section 596 and 597 was legally possible until such claim was provided for by the petitioning parties.
This contention goes upon the assumption that a partition under the sections of the Code of Civil Procedure so often referred to is
void unless every debt is paid or provided for by the petitioning parties, and may therefore be entirely disregarded by the creditor
holding a claim either unpaid or provided for. We do not believe that this assumption is warranted. In the first place, we must
remember that the partition proceedings in question are proceedings out of court. Consequently there is no prescribed method of
ascertaining and settling claims. The appointment of commissioners, the publication of notice to creditors, and all the other
proceedings necessary in cases of administration in court are not required in partition out of court. The law is silent as to how the
claims are to be ascertained, presented and determined. We must assume, therefore, that the method of ascertaining them and
determining their validity was left to the good sense and sound judgment of the persons concerned. Usually no difficulty will be
experienced in solving the problem presented by this conclusion. It is obvious that creditors always know who owes them and that
debtors generally know whom they owe. It is equally obvious that, generally speaking, a creditor is one of the first to learn of the
death of the debtor, and that heirs of the latter are the first to begin to calculate how much of his property they are to receive. This
cannot be known until the debts are determined. The heirs know they cannot escape payment of the debts. A surreptitious division
behind the backs of the creditors would not avail as the latter have two years thereafter in which to throw at least a portion of the
estate into administration and thereby nullify the attempt to overreach them. Even the transfer by the partitioning persons of the
property received on the partition to third persons would not profit them, inasmuch as the consideration received on such transfer
would, if necessary, be subject to seizure to pay the debt presented and the real estate would go into the hands of the vendees
charged with the lien of said debt.
The method of ascertaining claims against the defendant's estate not being prescribed, it is apparent that no objection to a partition
can be urged by a creditor whose claim has not been paid, due to the faulty method adopted by the partitioning parties to ascertain
claims, or, even, the absence of any effort at all to ascertain them.
In the second place, it must be on served that express provisions is made by sections 596 and 597 for the payment of a claim
discovered by them or presented after the partition. That is one of the main provisions. It is a necessary deduction, therefore, that it
was not the intention of the law to pronounce the partition void of no effect simply because not all of the debts were paid before the
partition was made. The fact of non payment cannot, then, because by the creditor as a reason for attacking the partition directly;
that is, by asserting that, inasmuch as a payment of all the debts is a condition precedent to the right of partition, such partition
cannot legally and validly take place while a debt is outstanding. While a partition manifestly fraudulent in inception and result might
possibly be attacked directly by an action to set aside, a question which we do not discuss or decide, the manner of attacking the
partition prescribed by the law is the one, generally speaking, preferably to be followed; and that is to throw into administration so
much of the estate as is necessary to pay the outstanding claim. The method, though indirect, accomplishes a better result than
a direct attack. The latter, by destroying the validity of the partition, would throw the whole situation into confusion and uncertainty,
something always to be avoided. The former does not produce that result. Where there is no fraud, and possibly where there is, a
direct attack on the partition is impossible under the provisions under discussion. A claim discovered and presented within the two
years serves not to destroy, primarily, the partition. It does not even permit the whole estate to be thrown into administration. Only
such portion as is necessary to pay the discovered debt can be administered. This is apparent when it is observed that on such
administration the administrator is authorized to recover only the amount of property necessary to pay the debt presented, leaving
the partitioning parties in undisturbed possession of the remainder. Moreover, the partitioning parties may still pay the debt and
preserve undisturbed the partition in all it parts and thus assure and maintain the rights of the parties thereunder. The mere fact,
therefore, that a creditor was not paid before the partition took place furnishes no ground for a revocation of the partition. It simply
provides a fact which he may urge as a reason for the appointment of an administrator and the consequent administration of so much
of the estate as may be necessary to pay the debt discovered.
But, as already seen, in order that it be a reason for such appointment and administration, the claim must be presented within two
years from the date of the partition and distribution.
Summarizing, we have seen that lack of opportunity, either by want of notice or otherwise, and the consequent failure to present a
claim before partition, is, under the sections we are discussing, of no consequence whatever in so far as the validity of the partition is
concerned.
We have also seen that the fact that there were debts outstanding and unpaid at the time the partition took place is of no importance
so far as the validity of the partition is concerned, leaving out account the question of fraud to which we have already adverted and
left undecided.

We have also seen that the fact such claim exists and is valid and subsistent against the estate is of no consequence whatever with
respect to the right of its holder to require an administration of the estate unless such claim is discovered and presented within two
years.
The fact that the claim in the case at bar was, during a certain period, a contingent one is of no importance. The sections under
discussion make no distinction between claims.
The creditor himself is not without duties. In the case at bar it was five years after the petition before the alleged creditor made any
attempt whatsoever to "discover" or present his claim. He knew of the death of Ocampo very soon after it occurred. He knew that it
was among the possibilities that Ocampo's estate might be called upon to respond for the failure of Palanca to perform his duty as
administrator. It was his duty to see to it that he would be protected in that event. Nevertheless he permitted the estate of Ocampo to
be partitioned and distributed without protest and without the presentation of his contingent claim, and sat quiet and passive for
nearly five years thereafter knowing that it was very probable that the property of the estate was being consumed, incumbered, and
transferred by the persons among whom it had been distributed.
The judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed, without special finding as to costs.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa and Johnson, JJ., concur.
Carson and Trent, JJ., concur as to the dispositive part.

G.R. No. L-47475

May 6, 1942

DONATO LAJOM, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
JOSE P. VIOLA, RAFAEL VIOLA, and SILVIO VIOLA, defendants-appellees.
Simeon P. Mangaliman for appellant.
Adolfo A. Scheerer for appellees.
BOCOBO, J.:
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, sustaining the defendants' demurrer to the plaintiff's
amended complaint and dismissing the case. On March 17, 1939, the plaintiff-appellant, Donato Lajom, filed a complaint, which
amended on May 16, 1939, praying, among other things, that he be declared a natural child of the late Dr. Maximo Viola and
therefore a co-heir of the defendand-appellees, Jose P. Viola, Rafael Viola, and Silvio Viola, legitimate children of said Dr. Maximo Viola;
and that after collation, payment of debts and accounting of fruits, a new partition be ordered, adjudicating one-seventh of the estate
to the plaintiff and two-sevenths to each of the defendants. Among the allegations of the complaint are the following:
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2. That the plaintiff is a natural child, impliedly recognized and tacitly acknowledged by his father, the late Dr. Maximo Viola,
begotten by the deceased Filomena Lajom and born in 1882 when both, Maximo Viola and Filomena Lajom, were free and
could have contracted marriage;
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4. That from early childhood until before the year 1889, and even thereafter, the plaintiff had been living with his father, the
late Dr. Maximo Viola, and had been enjoying the status of a son, not only within the family circle but also publicly, on
account of the acts of his said father;
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6. That a testate proceeding was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, covering the estate left by the said Dr.
Maximo Viola, registered as civil case No. 4741 of said Court; and this special proceedings was already closed on March 17,
1937, as can be seen in a copy of the order of said Court, hereto attached, marked as Annex D, and is being made an
integral part hereof;
7. That the plaintiff did not intervene during the pendency of the special proceeding above mentioned, as he expected that
his brothers, the herein defendants, would disclose and tell the truth to the Court that they have a natural brother whom
they knew to be living, and whose address was well known to them; a brother who should also participate in the estate of
their deceased father; and besides, the herein defendants promised to the herein plaintiff that they would give him his lawful
share in the estate of their father;
8. That the herein defendants willfully, deliberately and fraudulently concealed the truth from the Court that they have a
natural brother who should also participate in the estate of their deceased father, with the single and avowed intention to
deprive deliberately and fraudulently the herein plaintiff of his lawful participation in the estate in question;
9. That the herein defendants partitioned among themselves the estate in question, as can be seen in their "Convenio de
Patricion y Adjudicacion," dated October 25, 1935, a copy of which is hereto attached, marked as Annex E, and is made an
intergral part hereof, and since then up to the present time, each of the herein defendants has been occupying, possessing
and enjoying his corresponding share, in accordance with the said "Convenio de Particion y Adjudicacion"; while the
properties alleged to be paraphernal properties of the late Juana Roura in said "Convenio de Particion y Adjudicacion" are not
paraphernal but conjugal properties of the late spouses, Dr. Maximo Viola and Doa Juana Roura, acquired during their
martial life;
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18. That the plaintiff had demanded of the defendants that they give to him his lawful participation of the estate in question,
as well as of the products therefrom, in order not only to comply with their promise but also in order to comply with the law;
but the herein defendants have failed to give to the herein plaintiff his lawful share of the estate in questions, nor of the
products or fruits therefrom; and the said defendants continue to fail to give to him his legal portion of the said estate and
the fruits or products therefrom, of which the plaintiff is entitled to one-seventh (1/7) while each of the three defendants is
entitled to two-sevenths (2/7) of the same.

By an order dated July 31, 1939, the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija sustained the defendants' demurrer and dismissed the
case. The Court held that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action because its allegation called for
the exercise of the probate jurisdiction of the court and consequently did not constitute a cause of action in an ordinary civil case like
the present. It was further held that the court had no jurisdiction because there was no allegation that the late Dr. Maximo Viola was,
at the time of his death, a resident of Nueva Ecija; on the contrary, the complaint showed that the will of the deceased had already
been probated in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan and that court having first taken cognizance of the settlement of the estate,
the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija could no longer assume jurisdiction over the same case.
The two grounds for sustaining the demurrer to the complaint will now be discussed.
First, as to the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija. The complaint alleges that the plaintiff and one of the
defendants, Jose P. Viola, are residents of Nueva Ecija; and from the complaint it appears that 16 of the parcels of land belonging to
the estate are situated in the Province of Nueva Ecija, while 3 lots are in the Province of Isabela, 1 in the City of Baguio, 6 in Manila,
and the rest (46 parcels) are found in the Province of Bulacan. Paragraphs 7, 8, and 18 of the complaint allege a violation of contract,
a breach of trust, and therefore the case may be instituted in the Province of Nueva Ecija. Paragraph 7 alleges "the herein defendants
promised to the herein plaintiff that they would give him his lawful share in the estate of their father." Paragraph 8 states that "the
herein defendants willfully, deliberately and fraudulently concealed from the Court the truth that they have a natural brother who
should participate in the estate of their deceased father, with the single and avowed intention to deprive deliberately and
fraudulently the herein plaintiff of his lawful participation in the estate in question." And paragraph 18 asserts that "the plaintiff
herein had demanded of the defendants that they give to him his lawful participation of the estate question, as of the products
therefrom, in order not only to comply with their promise but also in order to comply with the law; but the herein defendants have
failed to give the herein plaintiff his lawful share of the estate in question." These allegations clearly denounce a breach of trust
which, if proved at the trial, the courts could not for a moment countenance. Regardless of any legal title to the plaintiff's share,
declared by the Court of First Instance of Bulacan in favor of the defendants in the testate proceedings, high considerations of equity
vehemently demand that the defendants shall not take advantage of such legal title, obtained by them through a betrayal of
confidence placed in them by the plaintiff. So far as plaintiff's share in the inheritance is concerned, the defendants are trustees for
the plaintiff, who may bring an action in Nueva Ecija for breach of trust. (Sec. 337, Act No. 190, and sec. 1, Rule 5 of the Rules of
Court.) If this promise should be shown by proper evidence, its enforcement would not necessitate the revision or reconsideration of
the order of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan approving the partition, because leaving that court order as it is the trust can and
should be carried out through conveyance to the plaintiff of his share, by the defendants out of their respective participations in
virtue of the partition.
The case of Severino vs. Severino (44 Phil. 343 [year 1923]) has declared certain principles that may be applied in the case at bar. In
that case, the defendant Guillermo Severino, who was agent of Melecio Severino, had obtained a Torrens title in his own name to four
parcels of land belonging to the principal. More than one year having elapsed since the entry of the final decree adjudicating the
lands to the defendant, the question was whether the defendant could be compelled to convey the lands to the estate of the
deceased principal, Melecio Severino. This Court maintained the affirmative holding in part:
In the case of Felix vs. Patrick (145 U. S. 317), the United States Supreme Court, after examining the authorities, said:
"The substance of these authorities is that, wherever a person obtains the legal title to land by any artifice or
concealment, or by making use of facilities intended for the benefit of another a court of equity will impress upon
the land so held by him a trust in favor of the party who is justly entitled to them and will order the trust executed
by decreeing their conveyance to the party in whose favor the trust was created." (Citing Bank of
Metropolis vs. Guttschlick, 14 Pet. 19, 31; Moses vs. Murgatroyd, 1 Johns, Ch. 119; Cumberland vs. Codrington, 3
Johns, Ch. 229, 261; Neilson vs. Blight, 1 Johns. Cas. 205; Weston vs. Barker, 12 Johns. 276.)
The same doctrine had also been adopted in the Philippines. In the case of Uy Aloc vs. Cho Jan Ling (19 Phil. 202), the facts
are stated by the court as follows:
"From the facts proven at the trial it appears that a number of Chinese merchants raised a fund by voluntary
subscription with which they purchased a valuable tract of land and erected a large building to be used as a sort of
clubhouse for the mutual benefit of the subscribers to the fund. The subscribers organized themselves into an
irregular association, which had no regular articles of association, and was not incorporated or registered in the
commercial registry or elsewhere. The association not having any existence as a legal entity, it was agreed to have
the title to the property placed in the name of one of the members, the defendant, Cho Jan Ling, who on his part
accepted the trust, and agreed to hold the property as the agent of the members of the association. After the club
building was completed with the funds of the members of the association, Cho Jan Ling collected some P25,000 in
rents for which he failed and refused to account, and upon proceedings being instituted to compel him to do so, he
set up title in himself to the club property as well as to the rents accruing therefrom, falsely alleging that he had
bought the real estate and constructed the building with his own funds, and denying the claims of the members of
the association that it was their fund which had been used for that purposes."

The decree of the court provided, among other things, for the conveyance of the clubhouse and the land on which it stood
from the defendant, Cho Jan Ling, in whose name it was registered, to the members of the association. In affirming the
decree this court said:
"In the case at bar the legal title of the holder of the registered title is not questioned; it is admitted that the
members of the association voluntarily obtained the inscription in the name of Cho Jan Ling, and that they had no
right to have that inscription cancelled; they do not seek such cancellation, and on the contrary they allege and
prove that the duly registered legal title to the property is in Cho Jan Ling, but they maitain, and we think that they
rightly maintain, that he holds it under an obligation, both express an implied, to deal with it exclusively for the
benefit of the members of the association, and subject to their will."
Torrens titles being based on judicial decrees there is, of course, a strong presumption in favor of their regularity or validity,
and in order to maintain an action such as the present the proof as to the fiduciary relation of the parties and of the breach
of trust must be clear and convincing. Such proof is, as we have seen, not lacking in his case.
But once the relation and the breach of trust on the part of the fiduciary is thus established, there is no reason, neither
practical nor legal, why he should not be compelled to make such reparation as may lie within his power for the injury
caused by his wrong, and as long as the land stands registered in the name of the party who is guilty of the breach of trust
and no rights of innocent third parties are adversely affected, there can be no reason why such reparation should not, in the
proper case, take the form of a conveyance or transfer of the title to the cestui que trust. No reasons of public policy demand
that a person guilty of fraud or breach of trust be permitted to use his certificate of title as a shield against the
consequences of his own wrong.
In the present case, the defendants partitioned the estate among themselves in the administration proceedings before the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan. Even granting that the partition was binding against the whole world (though it will be shown later that it
was not), nevertheless it could not have a more puissant finality than a decree of title under the Torrens system. Upon the authority of
the Severino vs. Severino, the legal title obtained by the defendants to the plaintiff's share in the estate, in the partition approved by
the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, must yield to the superior and inviolate rights equity of the plaintiff, who abstained from taking
part in that partition because of the promise made to him by the defendants that they would deliver to him lawful share as an
acknowledged natural child.
A posssible objection to the promise of the defendants to give the plaintiff his share in the estate as an acknowledged natural child is
that such agreement may run counter to article 1814, Civil Code, which reads: "No se puede transigir sobre el estado civil de las
personas, ni sobre las cuestiones matrimoniales, ni sobre alimentos futuros" (There can be no compromise over the civil status of
persons, or over matrimonial questions, or over future support). However, it does not appear from the complaint that the defendants
ever impugned or denied the plaintiff's status as an acknowledged natural child; on the contrary, according to the complaint, the
defendants admitted such status by promising to give the plaintiff his lawful share in the estate of the father. There having been, in
accordance with the allegations in the complaint, no controversy over the condition of the plaintiff as acknowledged natural child, the
agreement between the plaintiff and defendants alleged in par. 7 of the complaint, if shown at the trial, is not a compromise at all,
and is not frowned upon by the legislator in article 1814 of the Civil Code.
Furthermore, article 1965 of the Civil Code, which has been held by this court to be still in force, in spite of secs. 43 et seq. of the
Code of Civil Procedure (Bargayo vs. Camumot, 40 Phil., 857 872-3) provides as follows: "No prescribe, entre coheredores, condueos
o propietarios de fincas colindantes la accion para pedir la particion de la herencia, la division de la cosa cumon o el deslinde de las
propiedades contiguas." (Among coheirs, co-owners or proprietors of adjoining lands, the action to ask for the partition of the
inheritance, the division of the thing owned in common or the fixing of boundaries of adjoining lands, does not prescribe.) The
defendants having, according to the complaint, promised to give the plaintiff his share in the inheritance, his right to demand
partition of the inheritance does not prescribe, in view of said article 1965.
In the case of Bargayo vs. Camumot, just cited, the defendant, Jorge Camumot, an uncle of the plaintiffs, had been in possession for
many years, of the whole estate in question, which had belonged to the deceased grandfather of the plaintiffs and father of the
defendant. This court held that the defendant had not acquired the property by prescription under section 41 of the Code of Civil
Procedure because his possession had not been hostile and adverse, and that therefore, the plaintiffs should be awarded one half of
the estate This court said:
Taking the evidence together, it does not appear that the defendant's act upon the land had been of real ouster, i e., that if
among strangers said acts may be sufficient to characterize his possession as adverse, such is not the case in the present
suit wherein we are dealing with prescription among coheirs. For it appears that when called upon by the plaintiffs to bring
about the partition, the defendant did not deny that the plaintiffs had any right to share in the inheritance. When Basilio
Bargayo was asked why they did not institute this action before, he replied that it was because they considered the
defendant as their father, since he was their uncle, and they expected him to give them their respective shares of the
inheritance, and that when they first asked him to make the partition, he (defendant) asked them a postponement, saying
that they should leave him the in the possession of the land in order to compensate himself from what he has spent for their
grandfather when the latter was, and died, under his (defendant's) care. All of these show in some way that defendant's

possession was not adverse, i. e., hostile or repugnant to the plaintiff's right. The same witness, who is once of the plaintiffs,
only says that whenever they would ask him for the partition, the defendant did not pay any attention to them, i. e., he
limited himself in laying aside the fullfiment of the partition, a conduct which can be explained in various ways. And it is
probable that said conduct was simply tolerated by the plaintiffs on account of his being their uncle, and they never thought
that by said conduct the defendant inheritance, not that the defendant would have so intended. In any way dealing as we do
here with the acquisition of a thing by prescription, the evidence must be so clear and conclusive as to established said
prescription without any shadow of doubt. This does not happen in the instant case, for the defendant did not even try to
proven that he has expressly or impliedly refused plaintiff's right over an aliquot part of the inheritance.
But regardless of the defendants' under taking referred to, the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija had jurisdiction over the case
because the complaint contains allegations which, if shown at the trial, would be sufficient to support and warrant an action for
reivindiction of his right as a co-owner of the sixteen parcels of land situated in the Province of Nueva Ecija. From the moment of the
death of the late Dr. Maximo Viola on September 3, 1933, succession was opened (art. 657, Civil Code.) The possession of his whole
estate was transmitted to all his heirs (including the plaintiff) without interruption and from the moment of his death. (Article 440,
Civil Code.) The plaintiff's dominion over his share of the estate was therefore automically and by operation of law vested in him upon
the death of his natural father, subject of course to the lien of the creditors of the decedent. This being true it is difficult to ignore the
right of the plaintiff to recover his charge in the lands in Nueva Ecija, (the debts of the estate having been adjusted before the
partition approved by the Court of First Instance of Bulacan) by an action of reivindication because of the defendant's refusal to
deliver said share to him.
In the case of Ramirez vs. Gmur (42 Phil. 855, 869), this court held:
The law in force in the Philippine Islands regarding the distribution of estates of deceased persons is to be found in section
753 et seq., of the Code of Civil Procedure. In general terms the law is that after the payment of the debts and expenses of
administration the court shall distribute the residue of the estate among the persons who are entitled to receive it, whether
by the terms of the will or by operation of law. It will be noted that while the law (sec. 754) provides that the order of
distribution may be had upon the application of the executor or administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, no
provision is made for notice, by publication or otherwise, of such application. The proceeding, therefore, is to all intents and
purposes ex parte. As will be seen our law is every vague and incomplete; and certainly it cannot be held that a purely ex
parte proceeding, had without notice by personal service or by publication, by which the court undertake to distribute the
property of deceased persons, can be conclusive upon minor heirs who are not represented therein.
Section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that ten years actual adverse possession by "occupancy grant, descent, or
otherwise" shall vest title in the possessor. This would indicate that a decree of distribution under which one may be placed
in possession of land acquired by descent, is not in itself conclusive, and that, as held in Layre vs. Pasco (5 Rob [La.], 9), the
action of revindication may be brought by the heir against the persons put in possession by decree of the probate court at
any time within a period allowed by the general statute of limitations.
In the case just cited, this court upheld two propositions: (1) that a judicial partition in probate proceedings does not bind the heirs
who were not parties thereto; and (2) that in such cases, the heir who has been deprived of his share in the estate may bring an
action for reivindication with the prescriptive period against the persons put in possession by the probate court.
Upon the first point, the following quotation from Corpus Juris (vol. 47, pp. 434 and 435) would seem to be pertinent:
Sec. 417. Persons concluded A judgment in partition is conclusive upon all persons having any interest who were made
parties to the proceeding.
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Persons not parties The general rule is that persons not parties to the action or suit are not bound by the decree or
judgment for partition and their rights cannot be adjudicated; but such a decree is not invalid as between the parties
thereto, although it has been considered as erroneous. Among the persons held not to have been concluded by the decree or
judgment, by reason of not having been made parties, are, besides owners of an undivided in the property, persons having a
contigent remainder therein, a widow with a dower right, creditors having a lien on the property, and a person who had
attached, on mesne process, the interest of one of the tenants in common.
In Rodriguez vs. De la Cruz (8 Phil., 665, 667), this court said:
With reference to the first assignment of error above noted, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that for the reason that the
said Matea E. Rodriguez had not been made a party in the action for partition between the present defendants and the said
Hilarion de la Cruz, interest in said lands was in no way prejudiced by the decision of the court in that cause.

But, it may be said, the plaintiff knew of the probate proceedings in the Province of Bulacan, and is therefore bound thereby. However,
it is alleged in the complaint and admitted by the demurrer, that he did not appear in those proceedings because of the defendant's
promise to give him his share.
On the second point, that is to say, that the aggrieved coheir may bring an action for reivindication within the prescriptive period, this
court in the case of Ramirez vs. Gmur properly applied section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure regarding acquisitive prescription
after ten years of adverse possession by "occupancy, grant, descentor otherwise." In order words, that even after a decree of
distribution, an action for recovery may be brought by the excluded heir within ten years.
In Layre vs. Pasco (5 Rob. [La.] 9), cited by this court in Ramirez vs. Gmur, it was held:
II. This action may be considered as petitory one, brought against a third possessor. The plaintiff must recover upon the
strength of her title to the succession of her sister; and for that purpose, she must show that she is the natural sister of the
deceased, and that the deceased left no lawful heir entitled to her inheritance. This has been done satisfactorily. The
evidence establishes. that the defendant was put in possession of the estate, as testamentary heir, by a decree of the Court
of Probates. It was, therefore, useless for the plaintiff to attempt to demand the possession of the property of the succession,
since it had been delivered to the defendant, and the estate had ceased to be under the control and supervision of the
Probate Court. Her application to the Court of Probates Court would have had no object, as that court was no longer
possessed of any power over the succession, and, consequently, no order could have been rendered to take it out of the
defendant's hands. The action of reivindication was left to the plaintiff, and we are not prepared to say, that previous to her
instituting it, it was necessary that she should have been recognized as heir by the Probate Court. This requisite is only to be
complied with, as long as the succession is under the supervision of the court by which the administrator, curator, or
executor has been appointed, as it seems to us, that after delivery to the heir who is apparently entitled thereto, it would be
requiring a vain thing. Lex neminen cogit ad vana.
xxx

xxx

xxx

With regard to the exception of jurisdiction: it was not insisted on by the defendant's counsel, and was properly overruled by
the Judge, a quo. The rule is well established, that "when an action of reivindication is instituted by an heir at law, against
the testamentary heir or universal legatee, who has been put in possession of the estate, and who sets up the will as his title
to the property, District Courts are the proper tribunals in which such suits must be brought." (Roberts vs. Allier, 17 La. 15.)
It would not be amiss, at this juncture, to bring into view section 196 of the Code of Civil Procedure (similar to sec. 12 of Rule 17 of
the Rules of Court) and article 405 of the Civil Code.
Section 196 of Act No. 190 provides:
Section 196. Paramount rights and amicable partition not affected. Nothing herein contained shall be construed so as to
injure, prejudice, defeat, or destroy the estate, right or title of any person claiming a tract of land, or any part thereof, by
title under any other person, or by title paramount to the title of the joint tenants, tenants in common, or co-parceners by
whom partition may have been made. (emphasis supplied.)
The plaintiff has a paramount title to his share in the estate.
Article 405 of the Civil Code reads:
La division de una cosa comun no prejudicara a tercero, el cual conservara los derechos de hipoteca, servidumbre u otros
derechos reales que la pertenecieran antes de hacer la particion. (Emphasis supplied.) (The division of a thing owned in
common shall not prejudice any third person, who shall preserve the rights of mortgage, easement or other real rights which
might belong to him before the partition.)
It is to be observed that ownership is the real right par excellence. If, as alleged in the complaint, the plaintiff is the owner of a share
in the estate, then rights are shielded by article 405 of the Civil Code against any adverse or inimical effect of the partition already
mentioned.
These safeguards established both by the Code of Civil Procedure and the Civil Code are sound in principle and farsighted in the
protection of property rights. They are morally and juridically right because no partition, either by decree of court or by extrajudicial
agreement, could add one iota or particle to the interest which the partitioners had during the joint possession. Partition is of the
nature of a conveyance of ownership (Manresa's comment on article 400-406, Civil Code), and certainly none of the co-owners may
convey to the others more than his own true right. Section 196 of Act No. 190 and article 405 of the Civil Code are also an effective
guarranty of ownership because otherwise, it would be possible for usurpers to carry out their covetous designs either by deceiving
the court or through the egregious mockey of a contract solemnized by the signature and seal of a notary public.

Moreover, a judicial partition in probate proceedings is not final and conclusive, as shown by articles 1073, 1074, 1080 and 1081 of
the Civil Code.
1073. Las particiones pueden rescindirse por las mismas causas que las obligaciones.
1074. Pordan tambien ser rescindidas las particiones por causa de lesion en mas de la cuarta parte, atendido el valor de las
cosas cuando fueron adjudicadas.
1080. La particion hecha con pretericion de alguno de los herederos no se rescindira, a no ser que se pruebe que hubo mala
fe o dolo por parte de los otros interesados; pero estos tendran la obligacion de pagar al preterido la parte que
proporcionalmente le corresponda.
1081. La particion hecha con uno a quien se creyo heredero sin serio, sera nula.
The above legal provisions section 196 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and articles 405, 1073, 1074, 1080 and 1081 of the Civil
Code are material in this aspect of the present case, not because we believe the partition in the probate proceedings in Bulacan
should be annulled or rescinded but because said partition not being of such definitive character as to stop all means of redress for a
coheir who has been deprived of his lawful share, such coheir may still, within the prescriptive period, bring an action for
reivindication in the province where any of the real property of the deceased may be situated. In this case, 16 of the lots belonging to
the estate of the deceased Dr. Viola are located in the Province of Nueva Ecija where the present action was brought.
Broad perspectives of which policy, which the lawmaker must have contemplated, would seem to reveal the wisdom of allowing a
coheir the benefits of the law of prescription even after a partition, judicial or extrajudicial, has been had. Not infrequently, the heirs
are living in different provinces, far from one another and far from the residence of the decedent. Some of them may not hear of the
probate proceedings, or if they do, they may not have at the time either the means or the inclination to participate therein.
Sometimes, one of the heirs, by cajolery, bluster or truculence succeeds in preventing a number of the coheirs from laying their just
claims before the probate court. There are also instances where an heir, cut of a sense of self-reliance, does not care to show keen
and active interest in the partition. In some cases, as it might have happened in the present one, a cohier, from delicacy or fitting
pride does not want, at the time of the settlement of the estate, to appear in court as a natural child, and thus make himself the
object of public pity or disdain and inconsiderately lift the veil which time has benignantly placed over the father's past social
deviation. Why should it be presumed that the lawmaker did not respect this attitude of the child? It often occurs, likewise, that a
child, out of reverence for the memory of the deceased, is loath to show eagerness to secure his share of the inheritance. Why should
it be assumed that the legislator wanted to compel such a child to haggle and argue over sordid and material things when the heartwounds from the death of the beloved father or mother still smart? To such a child, zealous alacrity to get one's share in the
inheritance so soon after the death of the father or mother is akin to the sacrilegious avarice of those who, after the Crucifixion,
parted and divided the garments. It is reasonable to suppose that the lawmaker did not deem such child's feelings worthy of
deferential regard?
The second main question is, Does the complaint state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action?
Paragraph 2 of the complaint reads thus:
2. That the plaintiff is a natural child, impliedly recognized and tacitly acknowledge by his father, the late Dr. Maximo Viola,
begotten by the deceased Filomena Lajom, and born in 1882 when both, Maximo Viola and Filomena Lajom, were free and
could have contracted marriage;
Law 11 of Toro, promulgated in 1505, provides:
Ordenamos y mandamos que entonces se digan ser los hijos naturales, cuando al tiempo que nacieren, o fueren concebidos,
sus padres podian casar con sus madres justamente sin dispensacion. (We order and command that children shall be said to
be natural when at the time they are born, or conceived, their fathers could marry their mothers justly without dispensation.)
The complaint does not allege that the parents were free to marry "each other" and "without dispensation." One who is prone to
search for the "nice sharp quillets of the law" would consider these omissions in the complaint fatal because Law 11 of Toro requires
that the children's "fathers could marry their mothers justly without dispensation" ("sus padres podian casar con sus madres
justamente sin dispensacion"). In other words, a strict interpretation of the complaint would hold (1) that the parents might be free to
marry others but not each other; and (2) that by omitting the words "without dispensation," the complaint contains no allegation that
the parents were not so related as to require dispensation to get married to each other. For example, under Law 11 of Toro, if the
parents are uncle and niece, the child is not natural because they need dispensation to marry each other. Law 11 of Toro is on this
point different from the Civil Code in that under the latter (article 119) it is sufficient if the parents can marry each other "without
dispensation," that is to say, according to the Civil Code, even if the parents are, for instance, uncle and niece, the child is natural if
said parents have obtained dispensation to marry each other.

But pleadings should be liberally construed with a view to substantial justice between the parties (sec. 106, Code of Civil Procedure
and sec. 17, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court). Upon this principle the complaint is sufficient because the allegation that the parents
"were free and could have contracted marriage" signifies that neither was married and that there was no impediment on account of
relationship which would have required dispensation. In the case of Ramirez vs. Gmur (42 Phil., 855, 861-862), this court held:
Relative to this presumption of the capacity of the parents to marry, the author Sanchez Roman makes the following
comment:
"Furthermore, viewing the conception of natural child in connection with two mutually interrelated circumstances, to
wit, the freedom of the parents to inter-marry, with or without dispensation, at the time of the conception of the
offspring stigmatized as natural, the first of those, or freedom to marry, is a point upon which there is, according to
the jurisprudence of our former law, whose spirit is maintained in the Code, an affirmative presumption which
places the burden of proving the contrary upon those who are interested in impugning the natural filiation." (Vol. 5,
Derecho Civil, pp. 1018, 1019.)
The Supreme Tribunal of Spain in its Sentence of October 11, 1882, declared that paternity having been proved, it is presumed that
the parents were not disqualified to marry each other.
This liberal interpretation of the complaint is the more compelling in this case because the status of the plaintiff as a natural child is
to be determined in harmony with Law 11 of Toro, which was the least serve toward natural children in the history of Spanish
legislation. The development of the law on this subject has had three periods; first, the Roman law viewpoint which was the most
strict; second, the Laws of Toro which gave the largest measure of concessions to the natural child; and third, the Civil Code, which
places greater limitations on the concept of natural children. (See "Hijos Naturales" by Victor Covian, Vol. XVII, Enciclopedia Juridica,
p. 809; and "Comentario Historico, Critico y Juridico a las Leyes de Toro," by Joaquin Francisco Pacheco, pp. 136-141.) The Laws of Toro
having been promulgated in 1505, their relatively liberal concept of natural children was the one which prevailed in the Philippines
during practically the entire period of the Spanish regime.
The complaint states that the plaintiff was born in 1882 when his parents were free to marry. This is sufficient because Law 11 of Toro
requires the freedom of the parents at the time either of the conception or of the birth of the child, although according to the Civil
Code this freedom to marry must exist at the time of the Child's conception (article 119).
The complaint alleges that "the plaintiff is a natural child, impliedly recognized and tacitly acknowledged by his father." Under Law 11
of Toro, voluntary recognition of a natural child may be tacit while under the Civil Code (article 131) it must be in a record of birth, in a
will or in any other public document.
Finally, it is proper and pertinent to invoke the case of Larena and Larena vs. Rubio (43 Phil. 1017). Asuncion Larena, Maximiana
Larena and Eustaquio Larena appeared in the proceedings for settlement of the estate of the deceased Demetrio Larena, alleging that
they were his natural children and claimed the right to participate in the inheritance. The widow, Josefina Rubio viuda de Larena, by
whom the deceased had had four legitimate children, opposed the petition. The lower court dismissed the petition, and Asuncion
Larena appealed. The appellant was Demetrio Larena's natural daughter, born in 1880 when he and the mother were free and could
have been married to each other. From early childhood she had been living with her father and enjoying the status of a daughter, not
only within a family but also publicly on account of the acts of her father. This court reversed the order of the lower court and
declared the appellant as the natural daughter of the deceased with a right to a share in the estate, holding in part as follows;
The lower court based its decision upon the fact that since the appellant had attained the age of majority in the year 1901,
and her father having died in 1916, without any effort on her part previous to that time looking to her acknowledgment as a
natural child, she had lost such right in view of article 137 of the Civil Code which requires that action for acknowledgment
should be commenced during the lifetime of the father. This is an error. The Civil Code is not applicable to this case. The
appellant was born and had enjoyed the status of a natural child by acts of acknowledgment of her father even before the
said Code was put in force here. Under the law at that time (Law 11 of Toro), this tacit acknowledgment on the part of her
father was itself sufficient to give the appellant the status of a natural child, and such acknowledgment could be established
by the ordinary means of evidence without any limitations as to time. This civil status granted to the appellant by the former
law, derived from the fact of her birth and from the acts of implied acknowledgment of her father, having taken place under
the former legislation, gives appellant a vested interest inherent to her status which cannot in any way be impaired by the
provisions of the civil Code. The transitory provisions of this Code declare that the changes introduced by it, when prejudicial
to the rights acquired under the former civil legislation, shall not have retroactive effect, and such former legislation shall
regulate all the rights arising under it although the Civil Code may provide differently or may not recognize them. (Decisions
of the Supreme Court of Spain of January 16, 1900; of April 11 and December 28, 1907; and decisions of this court in the
cases of Mijares vs. Nery, 3 Phil. 195. and of Llorente vs. Rodriguez, 3 Phil. 697.)
Upon the authority of the decision just cited, the plaintiff in the present case is entitled to be considered and declared a natural son of
Dr. Maximo Viola, voluntarily acknowledged by him through his own acts. There is, however, a statement in the decision in the Larena
case which needs some revision, and it is this: "Such acknowledgment could be established by the ordinary means of
evidence without any limitations as to time." These italicized words seemed to have been based on the sentence of the Supreme

Tribunal of Spain of December 28, 1906 cited by Manresa in his comment on the 1st rule of the transitory provisions. But later
decisions of that Tribunal, such as that of January 10, 1919, have held that the action by a natural child under Law 11 of Toro is limited
by the period for personal actions, which under article 1964 of the civil Code is fifteen years from the death of the natural father. (See
also Sentence of December 29, 1927.) It should also be noted that personal actions under Law LXIII of Toro should be brought within
twenty years; and that under section 44 of the code of Civil Procedure all action not otherwise provided for should be brought within
ten years after the cause of action accrues. It will thus be seen that whether Law LXIII of Toro, or the Civil Code or the Code of Civil
Procedure is applied, there is a period for the bringing of an action by a natural child whose status is governed by Law 11 of Toro. In
view of the repealing provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure in section 795 thereof, the period for bringing an action by a natural
child voluntarily recognized by the father under Law 11 of Toro, for declaration of the status of a natural child, should be 10 years
from the death of a natural father. In this case, less than six years have elapsed from the death of Dr. Maximo Viola to the filing of the
complaint. In any event this matter of prescription of the action has not been set up as a defense.
Wherefore, the order of the lower court sustaining the demurrer to the plaintiff's amended complaint and dismissing the case, should
be and is hereby reversed, without pronouncement as to costs. Let record of the case be returned to the Court of First Instance of
Nueva Ecija. So ordered.
Yulo, C.J., Moran and Ozaeta, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PARAS, J., concurring:
I concur in the result for the reason that the demurrer admits the allegation in the complaint that the plaintiffs is half brother to the
defendants and that the latter promised to convey to him his legal share in the estate left by their common father. A good cause of
action in equity has thus been shown. The Court of First Instance of the Province of Nueva Ecija where the plaintiff resides has
jurisdiction to enforce the obligation assumed by the defendants.

G.R. No. L-26876

December 27, 1969

LUCRECIA JEREZ, JULIA JALANDONI, JULIETA JALANDONI, EVA JALANDONI, CARMELO JALANDONI, JOSE JALANDONI and
ELISEO JALANDONI, petitioners,
vs.
HON. EMIGDIO V. NIETES, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, LUCILO JALANDONI and VICTORIA JALANDONI DE
GORRICETA, respondents.
Tomas Concepcion, Lorenzo F. Miravite and Corazon Miraflor for petitioners.
No appearance for respondents.
FERNANDO, J.:
This Court has not had previously the opportunity to pass squarely on the question raised in this petition for the review of a resolution
of the Court of Appeals sustaining an order of respondent Judge Emigdio V. Nietes of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, reopening the
proceedings in the intestate estate of the late Nicolas Jalandoni, after having approved a project of partition and final accounting, and
allowing a plea of intervention filed within the reglementary period by the other respondents, Lucilo Jalandoni and Victoria Jalandoni
de Gorriceta, allegedly children of the deceased with an illegitimate status. The petitioners are the widow and the legitimate children
of the late Nicolas Jalandoni.1
The Court of Appeals cannot be reversed for recognizing the existence of such a power possessed by the respondent Judge to thus
act favorably on a motion to intervene even if submitted at such a stage. That is the answer we give to the main issue thus posed.
Our approval of the action taken, however, is not unqualified. For respondent Judge apparently was much too generous in his
appraisal of the right of the private respondents to intervene, accepting as established what ought to have been proved. A
modification of the appealed resolution is thus called for.
The facts are undisputed. Nicolas Jalandoni died on October 3, 1960. Before the end of that month, on October 27, a special
proceeding2 for the settlement of his estate was filed before the sala of respondent Judge, petitioner Lucrecia Jerez, his widow, being
appointed as administratrix. A project of partition and final accounting was submitted on June 14, 1966, resulting in an order from
respondent Judge dated June 15, 1966, approving the same. On June 29, 1966, respondent Lucilo Jalandoni, alleging that he is an
acknowledged natural child of the late Nicolas Jalandoni, and respondent Victoria Jalandoni de Gorriceta, alleging that she is an

illegitimate daughter, sought to be allowed to intervene on the ground that they were preterited in the project of partition which they
would have respondent Judge reject for being contrary to law. Then came on July 80, 1966 an order of respondent Judge allowing
intervention and reopening the proceedings to permit the movants, now private respondents, "to present whatever evidence they
may have to show their right to participate in the estate of the deceased." After a motion for reconsideration, filed by petitioners, was
denied, the matter was elevated to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction filed on
September 3, 1966.
As set forth at the opening of this decision, the Court of Appeals in a resolution of September 21, 1966 denied such petition to annul
and set aside the order of respondent Judge. The basis for such resolution, penned by Justice Martin with the concurrence of Justice
Rodriguez, Justice Esguerra concurring in the result with a separate opinion, was explained in this wise: ". . . that the determination of
a prima facie interest in an estate to justify reopening proceedings for the settlement thereof is primarily addressed to the sound
discretion and judgment of the probate court; that, while no supporting documents are appended to the motion to reopen tending to
show the personality to intervene, the said motion is nevertheless verified upon oaths of the claimants of interest and the probate
court has authority to require the submission of at least a prima facie showing of said interest; that the motion to reopen was filed on
June 29, 1966 before the order closing the proceedings of June 15, 1966 had achieved finality and during the reglementary period
within which the court still had jurisdiction over the case and retained full power to amend and control its process and orders so as to
make them comfortable to law and justice; that, because the closure order aforesaid had not yet become final, the requirements of
Rule 38 respecting relief from judgment do not apply and, hence, the failure of the motion to reopen to allege any of the grounds
therein stated is not fatal; that the better practice in case of the appearance of alleged preterited heirs is to secure relief by
reopening the proceedings by a proper motion within the reglementary period (Ramos, et al. vs. Ortuzar, et al., G.R. No. L-3299,
August 20, 1951), it being desirable that all aspects of a controversy be ventilated in the same proceeding and thus avoid multiplicity
of suits; . . . ."3
Evidently, an ordinary division of three Justices did not suffice for a decision on such petition for certiorari and prohibition resulting in
a creation of a division of five. Two Justices dissented from the aforesaid resolution, the dissenting opinion being penned by Justice
Lucero with whom Justice Villamor concurred. The dissent is premised on the following considerations: "We should not let Lucilo
Jalandoni (alleged acknowledged natural son) and Victoria Jalandoni de Gorriceta (alleged illegitimate daughter) to come in first and
identify themselves later, because the better policy according to jurisprudence (Asinas vs. Court, 51 Phil. 665) is to require them first
to produce prima facie evidence of such a civil status before opening the door and letting them in. Under Section 2, Rule 12, Revised,
'a person may, before or during a trial, be permitted by the court, in its discretion, to intervene in an action, if he has legal interest in
the matter in litigation.' The possibility of interlopers getting in for a share in the estate cannot be totally discounted specially
considering that the present intestate proceedings had been pending for the last six (6) years without a motion to intervene having
been filed by the present claimants in spite of the notice of publication and the in rem character of the intestate proceedings.
According to their residence certificate, the claimants are residents of Iloilo City (Rec. 20). The procedure adopted by the lower court
is more conducive to prejudice and unnecessary loss of time, effort and expense than the method suggested by jurisprudence of
requiring first a prima facie evidence of status before letting them come in to intervene. Hence, the order of July 30, 1966 sought to
be nullified under the present petition insofar as it reconsidered the approval of the project of partition and the first accounting is
unjustified, as practically putting the cart before the horse instead of the horse before the cart. Moreover, the claims can be asserted
in a separate action against the legitimate children to whom the share of the deceased Nicolas Jalandoni was adjudicated." 4
Stress is laid in this petition for review in respondent Judge allowing private respondents to intervene after the intestate proceedings
were closed. We do not see it that way. We repeat what we said at the outset. The challenged resolution cannot be reversed insofar as
it recognized the power of respondent Judge to reopen the proceedings and allow intervention. While it is undeniable that the
question presented has not been definitely passed upon before, still an indication of how such an issue should be resolved is to be
found in an opinion of Justice Tuason in Ramos v. Ortuzar,5 referred to in the resolution of the Court of Appeals. Thus: "The only
instance that we can think of in which a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is
left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence. Even then,
the better practice to secure relief is reopening of the same case by proper motion within the reglementary period, instead of an
independent action the effect of which, if successful, would be, as in the instant case, for another court or judge to throw out a
decision or order already final and executed and reshuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of."
The above excerpt commends itself for approval. We do so now and definitely hold that rather than require any party who can allege
a grievance that his interest was not recognized in a testate or intestate proceeding to file a separate and independent action, he
may within the reglementary period secure the relief that is his due by a reopening of the case even after a project of partition and
final accounting had been approved.
Such a view finds support in the doctrine of liberality as to pleas for intervention so consistently followed and adhered to by this
Court.6 As was emphatically expressed by Justice Makalintal, speaking for this Court, in Balane v. De Guzman:7 "Respondent Judge
would have done well to brush aside narrow technicalities in this case, allow the intervention prayed for and thus avoid needless
delay in the resolution of the conflicting interests of all the parties."
It is thus understandable why the resolution of the Court of Appeals upholding the power of respondent Judge to reopen the
proceedings and allow intervention is not vulnerable to attack. It was within his competence to do so. The question remains, however,
whether he did so in the appropriate manner. It is not the existence of the power but the mode of its exercise that is open to question.
In that sense, the appealed resolution bears further scrutiny.

It is indisputable that after the project of partition and final accounting was submitted by the counsel for petitioner Lucrecia Jerez, as
administratrix, on June 14, 1966, respondent Judge approved the same and declared closed and terminated the intestacy the next
day, June 15, 1966. Subsequently, on a verified petition by private respondents, filed on June 29, 1966, based on the assertion made
that they should have had a share in the estate as illegitimate children but that they were omitted in the aforesaid project of partition,
they sought to be allowed to intervene and "to have the project of partition rejected for being contrary to law." Such a pleading,
without more, resulted in the questioned order of July 30, 1966, reopening the proceedings and reconsidering the approval of the
project of partition and final accounting, to enable the private respondents "to present whatever evidence they may have to show
their right to participate in the estate of the deceased." Although the recognition of their right to intervene appeared to be tentative
and conditional, it cannot be denied that they were given a standing sufficient to set aside the project of partition.
Respondent Judge acted too soon. The verified motion on the part of private respondents did not suffice to call into play the power of
respondent Judge to allow intervention. There must be proof beyond allegations in such motion to show the interest of the private
movants. In the absence thereof, the action taken by respondent Judge could be considered premature. As was stated by us in an
opinion penned by Justice Sanchez: "No one may quibble over the existence of the court's discretion on whether to admit or reject
intervention. But such discretion is not unlimited." 8
WHEREFORE, the resolution of September 21, 1966 of the Court of Appeals is hereby modified in the sense that respondent Judge,
Honorable Emigdio V. Nietes of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo Judicial District, Branch I, or whoever may be acting in his place, is
directed to require private respondents Lucilo Jalandoni and Victoria Jalandoni de Gorriceta to present evidence to justify their right to
intervene in Special Proceeding No. 1562 re Intestate Estate of Nicolas H. Jalandoni pending before such sala. In the event that they
could so justify such a right, the lower court on the basis of such evidence is to proceed conformably to law. Without pronouncement
as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ.,concur.

G.R. No. L-19060

May 29, 1964

IGNACIO GERONA, MARIA CONCEPCION GERONA, FRANCISCO GERONA and DELFIN GERONA,petitioners,
vs.
CARMEN DE GUZMAN, JOSE DE GUZMAN, CLEMENTE DE GUZMAN,
FRANCISCO DE GUZMAN, RUSTICA DE GUZMAN, PACITA DE GUZMAN and VICTORIA DE GUZMANrespondents.
Manuel J. Serapio for petitioners.
D. F. Castro and Associates for respondents.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming that of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan.
In the complaint, filed with the latter court on September 4, 1958, petitioners herein, namely, Ignacio, Maria Concepcion, Francisco
and Delfin, all surnamed Gerona, alleged that they are the legitimate children of Domingo Gerona and Placida de Guzman; that the
latter, who died on August 9, 1941 was a legitimate daughter of Marcelo de Guzman and his first wife, Teodora de la Cruz; that after
the death of his first wife, Marcelo de Guzman married Camila Ramos, who begot him several children, namely, respondents Carmen,
Jose, Clemente, Francisco, Rustica, Pacita and Victoria, all surnamed De Guzman; that Marcelo de Guzman died on September 11,
1945; that subsequently, or on May 6, 1948, respondents executed a deed of "extra-judicial settlement of the estate of the deceased
Marcelo de Guzman", fraudulently misrepresenting therein that they were the only surviving heirs of the deceased Marcelo de
Guzman, although they well knew that petitioners were, also, his forced heirs; that respondents had thereby succeeded fraudulently
in causing the transfer certificates of title to seven (7) parcels of land, issued in the name of said deceased, to be cancelled and new
transfer certificates of title to be issued in their own name, in the proportion of 1/7th individual interest for each; that such fraud was
discovered by the petitioners only the year before the institution of the case; that petitioners forthwith demanded from respondents
their (petitioners) share in said properties, to the extent of 1/8th interest thereon; and that the respondents refused to heed said
demand, thereby causing damages to the petitioners. Accordingly, the latter prayed that judgment be rendered nullifying said deed of
extra-judicial settlement, insofar as it deprives them of their participation of 1/18th of the properties in litigation; ordering the
respondents to reconvey to petitioners their aforementioned share in said properties; ordering the register of deeds to cancel the
transfer certificates of title secured by respondents as above stated and to issue new certificates of title in the name of both the
petitioners and the respondents in the proportion of 1/8th for the former and 7/8th for the latter; ordering the respondents to render
accounts of the income of said properties and to deliver to petitioners their lawful share therein; and sentencing respondents to pay
damages and attorney's fees.
In their answer, respondents maintained that petitioners' mother, the deceased Placida de Guzman, was not entitled to share in the
estate of Marcelo de Guzman, she being merely a spurious child of the latter, and that petitioners' action is barred by the statute of
limitations.
After appropriate proceedings, the trial court rendered a decision finding that petitioners' mother was a legitimate child, by first
marriage, of Marcelo de Guzman; that the properties described in the complaint belonged to the conjugal partnership of Marcelo de
Guzman and his second wife, Camila Ramos; and that petitioners' action has already prescribed, and, accordingly, dismissing the
complaint without costs. On appeal taken by the petitioners, this decision as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, with costs against
them.
Petitioners maintain that since they and respondents are co-heirs of the deceased Marcelo de Guzman, the present action for partition
of the latter's estate is not subject to the statute of limitations of action; that, if affected by said statute, the period of four (4) years
therein prescribed did not begin to run until actual discovery of the fraud perpetrated by respondents, which, it is claimed, took place
in 1956 or 1957; and that accordingly, said period had not expired when the present action was commenced on November 4, 1958.
Petitioners' contention is untenable. Although, as a general rule, an action for partition among co-heirs does not prescribe, this is true
only as long as the defendants do not hold the property in question under an adverse title (Cordova vs. Cordova, L-9936, January 14,
1948). The statute of limitations operates as in other cases, from the moment such adverse title is asserted by the possessor of the
property (Ramos vs. Ramos, 45 Phil. 362; Bargayo v. Camumot, 40 Phil. 857; Castro v. Echarri, 20 Phil. 23).
When respondents executed the aforementioned deed of extra-judicial settlement stating therein that they are the sole heirs of the
late Marcelo de Guzman, and secured new transfer certificates of title in their own name, they thereby excluded the petitioners from
the estate of the deceased, and, consequently, set up a title adverse to them. And this is why petitioners have brought this action for
the annulment of said deed upon the ground that the same is tainted with fraud. 1wph1.t
Although, there are some decisions to the contrary (Jacinto v. Mendoza, L-12540, February 28, 1959; Cuison v. Fernandez, L-11764,
January 31, 1959; Maribiles v. Quinto, L-10408, October 18, 1956; and Sevilla v. De los Angeles, L-7745, November 18, 1955), it is
already settled in this jurisdiction that an action for reconveyance of real property based upon a constructive or implied trust,
resulting from fraud, may be barred by the statute of limitations (Candelaria v. Romero, L-12149, September 30, 1960; Alzona v.
Capunita, L-10220, February 28, 1962).

Inasmuch as petitioners seek to annul the aforementioned deed of "extra-judicial settlement" upon the ground of fraud in the
execution thereof, the action therefor may be filed within four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud (Mauricio v. Villanueva, L11072, September 24, 1959). Such discovery is deemed to have taken place, in the case at bar, on June 25, 1948, when said
instrument was filed with the Register of Deeds and new certificates of title were issued in the name of respondents exclusively, for
the registration of the deed of extra-judicial settlement constitute constructive notice to the whole world (Diaz v. Gorricho, L-11229,
March 29, 1958; Avecilla v. Yatco, L-11578, May 14, 1958; J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Magdangal, L-15539, January 30, 1962; Lopez v.
Gonzaga, L-18788, January 31, 1964).
As correctly stated in the decision of the trial court:
In the light of the foregoing it must, therefore, be held that plaintiffs learned at least constructively, of the alleged fraud
committed against them by defendants on 25 June 1948 when the deed of extra-judicial settlement of the estate of the
deceased Marcelo de Guzman was registered in the registry of deeds of Bulacan, Plaintiffs' complaint in this case was not
filed until 4 November 1958, or more than 10 years thereafter. Plaintiff Ignacio Gerona became of age on 3 March 1948. He
is deemed to have discovered defendants' fraud on 25 June 1948 and had, therefore, only 4 years from the said date within
which to file this action. Plaintiff Maria Concepcion Gerona became of age on 8 December 1949 or after the registration of
the deed of extra-judicial settlement. She also had only the remainder of the period of 4 years from December 1949 within
which to commence her action. Plaintiff Francisco Gerona became of age only on 9 January 1952 so that he was still a minor
when he gained knowledge (even if only constructive) of the deed of extra-judicial settlement on 25 June 1948. Likewise,
plaintiff Delfin Gerona became of legal age on 5 August 1954, so that he was also still a minor at the time he gained
knowledge (although constructive) of the deed of extra-judicial settlement on 25 June 1948. Francisco Gerona and Delfin
Gerona had, therefore, two years after the removal of their disability within which to commence their action (Section 45,
paragraph 3, in relation to Section 43, Act 190), that is, January 29, 1952, with respect to Francisco, and 5 August 1954, with
respect to Delfin.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed, with costs against petitioners herein. It is so ordered.

G.R. No. 118680

March 5, 2001

MARIA ELENA RODRIGUEZ PEDROSA, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE, CARMEN, MERCEDES & RAMON, all surnamed RODRIGUEZ, ROSALINA RODRIGUEZ,
CHAN LUNG FAI, MATEO TAN TE, TE ENG SUY, LORETA TE, VICTORIO S. DETALIA, JEROME DEIPARINE, PETRONILO S.
DETALIA, HUBERT CHIU YULO, PATERIO N. LAO, LORENSITA M. PADILLA, IMMACULATE CONCEPCION COLLEGE AND
LILIAN EXPRESS, INC. and TIO TUAN, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition assails the decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 23, 1994 which affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 15, of Ozamiz City in Civil Case No. OZ-1397.
The facts of this case are as follows:
On April 8, 1946, the spouses Miguel Rodriguez and Rosalina J. de Rodriguez initiated proceedings before the CFI of Ozamiz City for
the legal adoption of herein petitioner, Maria Elena Rodriguez Pedrosa. On August 1, 1946, the CFI granted the petition and declared
petitioner Pedrosa the adopted child of Miguel and Rosalina.
On April 29, 1972, Miguel died intestate. Thereafter, petitioner and Rosalina entered into an extrajudicial settlement of Miguel's
estate, adjudicating between themselves in equal proportion the estate of Miguel.
On November 21, 1972, private respondents filed an action to annul the adoption of petitioner before the CFI of Ozamiz City, with
petitioner and herein respondent Rosalina as defendants docketed as OZ 349.
On August 28, 1974, the CFI denied the petition and upheld the validity of the adoption. Thereafter, the private respondents appealed
said decision to the Court of Appeals.
On March 11, 1983, while said appeal was pending, the Rodriguezes entered into an extrajudicial settlement with respondent Rosalina
for the partition of the estate of Miguel and of another sister, Pilar. Rosalina acted as the representative of the heirs of Miguel
Rodriguez. Pilar had no heirs except his brothers and sisters.
The Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition covered fourteen parcels of land covering a total area of 224,883 square meters.
These properties were divided among Jose, Carmen, Mercedes, Ramon and the heirs of Miguel, represented solely by Rosalina. The
heirs of Miguel were given 226 square meters of parcel 2, and 9,567 square meters and 24,457 square meters of parcels 7 and 9,
respectively.1 The total land area allocated to the heirs of Miguel was 34,250 square meters.
Armed with the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition, respondents Rodriguezes were able to secure new Transfer Certificates
of Title (TCTs) and were able to transfer some parcels to the other respondents herein. 2
Lots 504-A-6, 504-B-3 and 504-C-4, portions of Parcel 3, designated as Lot 504, were transferred to respondents Chuan Lung Fai, 3 but
not included in the Deed of Settlement and Partition, were transferred to respondent Lilian Express, Inc. and are now registered under
TCT No. T-11337. Parcel 6, Lot 560, was subdivided among Ramon, Jose, Carmen and Mercedes and was designated as Lots 560-A,
560-B, 560-C, 560-D and 560-E. Lot 560-A covering 500 square meters was transferred to respondent Victorino Detall 4 and was
subsequently transferred to Jerome Deiparine who registered it under his name under TCT No. T-10706. Lot 560-B with 500 square
meters was transferred to respondent Petronilo Detalla5 and was later transferred to respondent Hubert Chiu Yulo who registered it

under his name under TCT No. T-11305. Lot 560-C was transferred and registered under the name of respondent Paterio Lao with TCT
No. T-10206. Lot 560-D was sold to and subsequently registered in the name of Lorensita M. Padilla under TCT No. T-10207. The
remaining portion, Lot 560-E consisting of 43,608 square meters was bought by respondent Immaculate Concepcion College and was
registered in its name under TCT No. T-10208.6
On June 19, 1986, the parties in the appeal which sought to annul the adoption of petitioner Pedrosa filed a joint Motion to Dismiss.
On June 25, 1986, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal but upheld the validity of the adoption of petitioner.
Thereafter, petitioner sent her daughter, Loreto Jocelyn, to claim their share of the properties from the Rodriguezes. The latter refused
saying that Maria Elena and Loreto were not heirs since they were not their blood relatives.
Petitioner, then, filed a complaint to annul the 1983 partition. The said complaint was filed on January 28, 1987. Said complaint was
later amended on March 25, 1987 to include the allegation "that earnest efforts toward a compromise were made between the
plaintiffs and the defendants, but the same failed."7
The Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court. Its ruling was premised on the
following grounds:8
1) that the participation of Rosalina has already estopped her from questioning the validity of the partition, and since she is
already estopped, it naturally follows that Maria Elena, her successor-in-interest, is likewise estopped, applying Article 1439
of the Civil Code;
2) that the appeal of Maria Elena and her claim that the partition is null and void is weakened by her inconsistent claim that
the partition would have been alright had she been given a more equitable share;
3) the action is essentially an action for rescission and had been filed late considering that it was filed beyond the 4 year
period provided for in Article 1100 of the Civil Code;9
4) that fraud and/or bad faith was never established.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated December 20, 1994. 10
Hence, this petition wherein the petitioner asserts that the following errors were allegedly committed by the Court of Appeals in I. FINDING THAT THE EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT AND PARTITION ENTERED INTO BY DEFENDANT JUREDINI AND DEFENDANTSAPPELLANTS RODRIGUEZES WAS VALID AND BINDING UPON THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT WHO DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN SAID
TRANSACTION
II. CONCLUDING THAT THE CLAIM OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT HAVE ALREADY PRESCRIBED TWO (2) YEARS AFTER PUBLICATION OF
THE EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT AND PARTITION IN THE NEWSPAPER OF GENERAL CIRCULATION
III. ...CONCLUDING THAT THE CLAIM OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT IS BARRED OR ESTOPPED IN FILING THIS CASE (sic) IN VIEW OF THE
DISMISSAL OF THE APPEAL IN CIVIL CASE NO. OZ 349 INTERPOSED BY HEREIN DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES WHO WERE THEN
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS IN AC [C]-G.R. NO. SP-00208
IV. SUSTAINING THE DEFENDANT-APPELLEES' CLAIM THAT AS THEY HAVE NOT AS YET RECOGNIZED PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT AS AN
ADOPTED DAUGHTER OF MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ IT WAS NOT NECESSARY FOR THEM TO HAVE HER PARTICIPATE IN THE EXTRAJUDICIAL
SETTLEMENT, EXHIBITS "S" AND "I"
V. CONCLUDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT HAD NOT CONCLUSIVELY SHOWN THAT MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ WAS A CO-OWNER
OF THE LANDS SOLD AND HENCE IT FOLLOWS THAT SHE HAS NO RIGHT OF REDEMPTION OF THOSE LANDS
VI. FINDING THAT PORTION OF LOTS NOS. 504 AND 560 SOLD TO THE OTHER DEFENDANTSAPPELLEES WERE CLEAN AND FREE
FROM ENCUMBRANCES OR ANY FLAWS HENCE WERE VALID
VII. FINDING THAT THE PLANTIFFAPPELLANT NEVER APPEARED IN COURT TO TESTIFY OR REBUT THE ASSERTIONS OF THE
DEFENDANTSAPPELLANTS THAT THERE WAS A VALID PARTITION
VIII. AWARDING PLAINTIFFAPPELLANT DAMAGES FOR THE INCOME OF HER SHARE IN THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION 11

In sum, the issues to be resolved in our view are (1) whether or not the complaint for annulment of the "Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement and Partition" had already prescribed; (2) whether or not said deed is valid; and (3) whether or not the petitioner is
entitled to recover the lots which had already been transferred to the respondent buyers.
Petitioner argues that the complaint for annulment of the extrajudicial partition has not yet prescribed since the prescriptive period
which should be applied is four years following the case of Beltran vs. Ayson, 4 SCRA 69 (1962). She also avers that Sec. 4, Rule 74
which provides for a two-year prescriptive period needs two requirements. One, the party assailing the partition must have been
given notice, and two, the party assailing the partition must have participated therein. Petitioner insists these requirements are not
present in her case,12 since she did not participate in the "Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition." She cites Villaluz vs. Neme,
7 SCRA 27, 30 (1963), where we held that a deed of extrajudicial partition executed without including some of the heirs, who had no
knowledge and consent to the same, is fraudulent. She asserts that she is an adoptive daughter and thus an heir of Miguel. 13
Petitioner also contends that the respondent buyers were buyers in bad faith since they failed to exercise the necessary due diligence
required before purchasing the lots in question.14 In the alternative, petitioner wants to redeem the said lots as a co-owner of
respondent Rodriguezes under the provisions of Article 1620 of the New Civil Code. 15
Lastly, petitioner asserts that she will suffer lesion if the partition would be allowed. She asks for the rescission of the said partitioning
under Articles 165-175 of the Civil Code.16
Respondents, in response, claim that the action of petitioner had already prescribed. In addition, they argue that petitioner, Maria
Elena, and Rosalina already have their shares in the estate of Miguel Rodriguez reflected in the compromise agreement they entered
into with the respondent Rodriguezes in AC- G.R. SP 00208. Finally, respondents aver that the non-participation of Maria Elena in the
extrajudicial partition was understandable since her status as an adopted child was then under litigation. In any case, they assert that
the shares of Miguel's heirs were adequately protected in the said partition. 17
Section 4, Rule 7418 provides for a two year prescriptive period (1) to persons who have participated or taken part or had notice of the
extrajudicial partition, and in addition (2) when the provisions of Section 1 19 of Rule 74 have been strictly complied with, i.e., that all
the persons or heirs of the decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or are represented by themselves or through
guardians.20
Petitioner, as the records confirm, did not participate in the extrajudicial partition. Patently then, the two-year prescriptive period is
not applicable in her case.
The applicable prescriptive period here is four (4) years as provided in Gerona vs. De Guzman, 11 SCRA 153 (1964), which held that:
[The action to annul] a deed of "extrajudicial settlement" upon the ground of fraud...may be filed within four years from the
discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have taken place when said instrument was filed with the Register of
Deeds and new certificates of title were issued in the name of respondents exclusively. 21
Considering that the complaint of the petitioner was filed on January 28, 1987, or three years and ten months after the questioned
extrajudicial settlement dated March 11, 1983, was executed, we hold that her action against the respondents on the basis of fraud
has not yet prescribed.
Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court is the applicable rule on publication of extrajudicial settlement. It states:
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the
manner provided in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has
not participated therein or had no notice thereof.22
Under said provision, without the participation of all persons involved in the proceedings, the extrajudicial settlement cannot be
binding on said persons. The rule contemplates a notice which must be sent out or issuedbefore the Deed of Settlement and/or
Partition is agreed upon, i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to participate in the said deed of extrajudicial settlement and
partition, not after, which was when publication was done in the instant case. Following Rule 74 and the ruling in Beltran vs. Ayson,
since Maria Elena did not participate in the said partition, the settlement is not binding on her.
The provision of Section 4, Rule 74 will also not apply when the deed of extrajudicial partition is sought to be annulled on the ground
of fraud. A deed of extrajudicial partition executed without including some of the heirs, who had no knowledge of and consent to the
same, is fraudulent and vicious.23 Maria Elena is an heir of Miguel together with her adopting mother, Rosalina. Being the lone
descendant of Miguel, she excludes the collateral relatives of Miguel from participating in his estate, following the provisions of Article
1003 of the Civil Code.24 The private respondent Rodriguezes cannot claim that they were not aware of Maria Elena's adoption since
they even filed an action to annul the decree of adoption. Neither can they claim that their actions were valid since the adoption of
Maria Elena was still being questioned at the time they executed the deed of partition. The complaint seeking to annul the adoption
was filed only twenty six (26) years after the decree of adoption, patently a much delayed response to prevent Maria Elena from

inheriting from her adoptive parents. The decree of adoption was valid and existing. With this factual setting, it is patent that private
respondents executed the deed of partition in bad faith with intent to defraud Maria Elena.
In the case of Segura vs. Segura, the Court held:
This section [referring to section 4, Rule 74] provides in gist that a person who has been deprived of his lawful participation
in the estate of the decedent, whether as heir or as creditor, must assert his claim within two years after the extrajudicial or
summary settlement of such estate under Sections 1 and 2 respectively of the same Rule 74. Thereafter, he will be
precluded from doing so as the right will have prescribed.
It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the partition in question which was null and void as far as the plaintiffs
were concerned. The rule covers only valid partitions. The partition in the present case was invalid because it excluded six of
the nine heirs who were entitled to equal shares in the partitioned property. Under the rule, "no extrajudicial settlement shall
be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof." As the partition was a total nullity
and did not affect the excluded heirs, it was not correct for the trial court to hold that their right to challenge the partition
had prescribed after two years from its execution in 1941.25
To say that Maria Elena was represented by Rosalina in the partitioning is imprecise. Maria Elena, the adopted child, was no longer a
minor at the time Miguel died. Rosalina, only represented her own interests and not those of Maria Elena. Since Miguel predeceased
Pilar, a sister, his estate automatically vested to his child and widow, in equal shares. Respondent Rodriguezes' interests did not
include Miguel's estate but only Pilar's estate.
Could petitioner still redeem the properties from buyers? Given the circumstances in this case, we are constrained to hold that this is
not the proper forum to decide this issue. The properties sought to be recovered by the petitioner are now all registered under the
name of third parties. Well settled is the doctrine that a Torrens Title cannot be collaterally attacked. The validity of the title can only
be raised in an action expressly instituted for such purpose. 26
Petitioner asks for the award of damages. No receipts, agreements or any other documentary evidence was presented to justify such
claim for damages. Actual damages, to be recoverable, must be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. Courts cannot simply
rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact and amount of damages. 27 The same is true for moral damages.
These cannot be awarded in the absence of any factual basis.28 The unsubstantiated testimony of Loreto Jocelyn Pedrosa is hearsay
and has no probative value. It is settled in jurisprudence that damages may not be awarded on the basis of hearsay
evidence.29 Nonetheless, the failure of the petitioner to substantiate her claims for damages does not mean that she will be totally
deprived of any damages. Under the law, nominal damages are awarded, so that a plaintiff's right, which has been invaded or
violated by defendants may be vindicated and recognized.30
Considering that (1) technically, petitioner sustained injury but which, unfortunately, was not adequately and properly proved, (2)
petitioner was unlawfully deprived of her legal participation in the partition of the estate of Miguel, her adoptive father, (3)
respondents had transferred portions of the properties involved to third parties, and (4) this case has dragged on for more than a
decade, we find it reasonable to grant in petitioner's favor nominal damages in recognition of the existence of a technical injury. 31 The
amount to be awarded as such damages should at least commensurate to the injury sustained by the petitioner considering the
concept and purpose of said damages.32 Such award is given in view of the peculiar circumstances cited and the special reasons
extant in this case.33 Thus, the grant of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P100,000.00) PESOS to petitioner as damages is proper in view of
the technical injury she has suffered.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The "Deed
of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition" executed by private respondents on March 11, 1983 is declared invalid. The amount of
P100,000.00 is hereby awarded to petitioner as damages to be paid by private respondents, who are also ordered to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-5033

June 28, 1954

In the matter of the Summary Settlement of the intestate estate of the deceased
JOSE M. FRANCISCO, TIBURCIA M. VDA. DE FRANCISCO, administratrix-appellees,
vs.
FAUSTA CARREON and CATALINA CARREON, oppositors-appellants.
Celestino L. de Dios for appellants.
Pedro Magsalin for appellee.
BENGZON, J.:

September 2, 1947, Rosa Aldana Francisco petitioned the Court of First Instance of Rizal summarily to settle the estate of her husband
Jose M. Francisco who had died in 1944. Alleging under oath that they had three minor children who were his legal heirs, and that the
deceased left a parcel of land with house thereon, and no creditors, she asked for declaration that the persons entitled to share in his
estate are the said three minor children, with herself as usufructuary.
In connection with her petition she requested for appointment as guardian ad item of her three minor children, and her request was
granted in due course.
After the requisite publication, the petition was heard, and later approved by an order dated November 29, 1947, declaring "the
petitioner Rosa Aldana Francisco, and her children Jose Francisco Jr., Thelma Francisco and Aurelio Francisco as the only heirs of the
deceased" and adjudicating unto the said heirs the above-mentioned property in the proportion of one-half undivided share to the
widow, and the other half in equal parts, to the said children.
This order was registered in the office of the Register of Deeds, who issued thereafter (January 15, 1948) a new certificate of title in
the names and in the proportion already stated.
August 4, 1948, Rosa Aldana Francisco mortgaged her share of the realty to the sisters Fausta Carreon and Catalina Carreon for the
sum of P13,000, and the deed of mortgage was duly registered August 16, 1948. Afterwards, on January 19, 1950 she conveyed by
absolute deed of sale, to the aforesaid creditors, her interest and participation in the land. This sale was likewise inscribed in the
office of the Register of Deeds.
However, in a motion of March 14, 1950, Tiburcia Magsalin Vda. de Francisco, mother of the deceased Jose M. Francisco, allegedly in
representation of the minor Jose Francisco y Palumpon, seventeen, averred that this minor was a recognized natural son of the
deceased, with legal right to participate in his estate, that the previous proceedings were void because Rosa Aldana Francisco had
concealed such fact, and because she had interests in conflict with those of her three sons, the truth being that the land was private
property of Jose M. Francisco of which she could not have been awarded a portion in fee simple.
Tiburcia prayed specifically for the following remedies:
(a) Her appointment as guardian ad item of Jose Francisco y Palumpon; (b) her appointment as guardian ad itemof the three
legitimate children Jose, Thelma and Aurelio, in place of Rosa Aldana Francisco; (c) declaration that Jose Francisco y Palumpon was a
recognized natural child of the deceased with the right to inherit; (d) annulment of the order of November 29, 1947, with the
adjudication that the only heirs of the deceased are the four children already named, the widow being entitled to usufruct
only; (e) annulment of the mortgage and sale executed by Rosa Aldana Francisco in favor of the Carreon sisters; and (f) appropriate
instruction to the Register of Deeds.
Oppositions to the motion were presented by Rosa Aldana Francisco and by the two sisters Fausta and Catalina Carreon.
One of the objectors pointed out that Tiburcia Magsalin could not be named guardian of the natural and the legitimate children,
because she would then be representing interests in conflict. Wherefore the court chose to appoint, and did appoint, the natural
mother of Jose Francisco y Palumpon (Macaria Palumpon) as his guardianad item even as it named Tiburcia Magsalin Vda. de
Francisco the guardian ad item of the minors, legitimate children Jose Thelma and Aurelio.
Now, when the motion to annul or reopen was called for hearing, Macaria Palumpon requested in open court the dismissal, without
prejudice, of Jose Francisco y Palumpon's demand for recognition. Her request was granted; but the court announced that the three
minor children's petition for reopening of the order adjudicating one-half to Rosa Aldana Francisco, with all consequent effects upon
the mortgage and sale, will be taken up later, i.e., on May 5, 1950.
Both Rosa Aldana and the Carreons moved for reconsideration, contending that, inasmuch as Jose Francisco y Palumpon had
withdrawn, there was no authority to continue, for the matter became a closed incident.
Thereafter, and probably to meet objections, Tiburcia Magsalin Vda. de Francisco, as guardian ad item of the three legitimate,
submitted an "amended motion" wherein she made practically the same allegations of her previous motion and prayed for identical
remedies except those touching the recognition of Jose Francisco y Palumpon.
Overruling objections, the court admitted the amended motion, heard it granting the interested parties opportunity to present their
evidence and arguments, and rendered judgment holding the realty was private property of the deceased Jose Francisco, who had
acquired it four years before his marriage to Rosa Aldana. Wherefore it revoked the order of November 29, 1947; it held that the
whole property passed to the ownership of the three legitimate children of the deceased, subject to usufructuary rights of the widow;
it annulled the mortgage and the sale executed by Rosa Aldana in favor of the Carreon sisters, and then issued other appropriate
instructions to the Register of Deeds.
Rosa Aldana acquiesced in the resolution. Not the Carreon sisters, who appealed in due time, asserting the court erred: (1) in
continuing to hear the motion for reopening, even after the natural child had withdrawn from the litigation and (2) in taking
cognizance of the annulment of the mortgage and sale, which it could validly consider as a probate court.
Arguing their first assignment of error, the appellants assert that Jose Francisco y Palumpon was the only one applying for positive
relief recognition as natural child and that once his petition for recognition had been withdrawn, the court had no jurisdiction in
ordering the continuance of the hearing in so far as the other heirs were concerned. The "amended motion", appellants add, could

serve no purpose, because the motion was not susceptible to any amendment, for it had ceased to exist. Strictly speaking, and at
first blush, appellants seem to be correct. Yet inasmuch as the original order granting the widow Rosa Aldana one-half of the property
was entirely erroneous, and she apparently failed to fully protect her children's right, their point results in pure technicality on which
"scant consideration" is ordinarily bestowed.1 All the more when it serves to promote unfair advantage.
Nevertheless, let us carefully examine the motion of March 14, 1950. It is signed by Tiburcia Magsalin. In it she asked for appointment
as guardian ad item for the natural child and for the three legitimate children. She asked for remedial measures beneficial to
the four children. Hence, the motion may be regarded in a spirit of liberality, as interposed on behalf of the said four children not
only a motion of the natural child. It is true that the motion begins, "Comparece el menor Jose Francisco y Palumpon, quien en este
case sera representado por su curadura-ad-litem etc."; but that did not necessarily exclude the other children for whom relief was
prayed. Precisely, because the complaint also prayed for relief beneficial to the three legitimate children contrary to the interests
of the natural child as hereinbefore related the court declined to permit Tiburcia Magsalin to represent the four children, but
allowed her to act for three only. At any rate "parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or of its
own initiatives at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just".2And in line with this receipt, the court's position may
equitably be upheld.
Again, supposing the original motion of March 14 did not afford legal standing to the three legitimate children, and that it could not be
"amended", as contended by appellants, we perceive no reason to prevent the court below from considering such amended motion
as a new and independent petition in the expediente, filed expressly on behalf of the three minor children.3 The matter of time might
conceivably be material in regard in considering the "amended" motion as "original" motion; but in this case it happens to be
immaterial, because under section 5 of Rule 74 such motion may be lodged with the court within one year after the minors have
reached majority; and they are still minors now. Incidentally this section 5 fully answers appellants' contention that Tiburcia's moves
should have been initiated within two years after November 8, 1947.
Appellants may not justly complain that they thought such petition for readjustment or reopening could take place only within two
years as prescribed by section 4 of Rule 74 and as annotated in the certificate of title; because they are conclusively presumed to
know the existence and provisions of section 5, Rule 74. As the trial judge correctly observed:
But the whole trouble is that they accepted the mortgage with the encumbrance annotated; and while it referred to Rule 74,
Section 4, and did not specifically mention section 5, the fact that section 4, Rule 74 was therein noted should have been
sufficient warning to them that the title was subject to the interest of persons unduly prejudiced hereby. We take judicial
notice of the fact that in the adjudication in summary settlements more often that not, the order merely says that the sale
shall be subject to the provisions of section 4, Rule 74. This is the case because the Court can not foresee whether the
movant would be affected; but section 5 being an imposition of the law, and being a mere sequence to the provisions of
Section 4; we hold that where the title on its face shows that it was subject to the provisions of Rule 74, section 4, a third
person who accepts it must take notice that he is running the risk of interferring with the rights of minors as provided under
section 5, Rule 74.
Contrary to appellants' claim, relief for the minors cannot be directed against the bond which, according to appellants, should have
been demanded under section 3, Rule 74, because that section applies where personal property is distributed not where, as here,
realty is the subject of partition.
Last stand of appellants is the proposition that the court of first instance of Rizal, acting as probate court, had no jurisdiction to act on
the petition, which should have been the subject of a separate action. And the case ofMendiola vs. Mendiola 7 Phil., p. 7 is cited; but
such precedent is inapplicable, because there a partition by contract was signed by the parties who were all of age.
Of course, several decisions hold that "If during the summary proceeding some of the heirs claim, by title adverse to that of the
decedent, some parcels of land, the probate court has no jurisdiction to pass upon the issue which must be decided in a separate
suit".4 But here there is no question that the realty belonged to the decedent; and a separate suit was unnecessary, specially
remembering that in these summary settlements the judge is expected to "proceed summarily" and "without delay" "to determine
who are the persons legally entitled to participate in the estate, and to apportion and divide it among them." 5
The resolution under review apportions property admittedly belonging to the decedent among his legal heirs. It is no objection that it
affects the herein appellants. They knew or ought to know the rule permitting such to reapportionment even after two years, and they
have been given every chance to be heard, having been by their own petition, regarded as parties to the entire proceedings. And
section 4, Rule 74 (which must be deemed extensible to situations covered by section 5, Rule 74) expressly authorizes the court to
give to every heir his lawful participation in the real estate "notwithstanding any transfers of such real estate" and to "issue
execution" thereon. All this implies that, when within the amendatory period the realty has been alienated, the court in re-dividing it
among the heirs has authority to direct cancellation of such alienation in the same estate proceedings, whenever it becomes
necessary to do so. To require the institution of a separate action for such annulment would run counter to the letter of the above rule
and the spirit of these summary settlements.
From the foregoing, the conclusion follows that no prejudicial error was committed by the lower court, whose order is, consequently,
affirmed with costs.
Paras, C. J., Pablo, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador and Concepcion, JJ.,concur.

G.R. No. L-10474

February 28, 1958

BENNY SAMPILO and HONORATO SALACUP, petitioners,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and FELISA SINOPERA respondent.
Clodualdo P. Surio for petitioners.
Moises B. Ramos for respondents.
LABRADOR, J.:
Certiorari against decision of the Court of Appeals, Third Division, affirming with slight modification a judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan, declaring plaintiffs owners of one-half portion of four parcels of land described in the complaint, with costs.
The judgment was rendered in an action instituted by Felisa Sinopera, administrative of the estate of Teodoro Tolete, to recover from
defendants one-half share of the aforesaid parcels of land, which, it is alleged belong to the deceased Teodoro Tolete.
According, to the facts found by the Court of Appeals, Teodoro Tolete died intestate in January, 1945. He left for parcels of land, lots
Nos. 12006, 119967, 14352 and 12176 of the cadastral survey of San Manuel, Pangasinan He left as heirs his widow, Leoncia de Leon,
and several nephews and nieces, children of deceased brothers and sisters. On July 25, 1946, without any judicial proceedings, his
widow executed an affidavit stating that "the deceased Teodoro Tolete left no children or respondent neither ascendants or
acknowledged natural children neither brother, sisters, nephews or nieces, but the, widow Leoncia de Leon, the legitimate wife of the
deceased, the one and only person to inherit the above properties" (Record on Appeal, p. 9). This affidavit was registered in the Office
of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan. On the same day, she executed a deed of sale of all the above parcels of land in favor of
Benny Sampilo for the sum of P10,000. This sale was also registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan. On June 17,
1950, Benny Sampilo, in turn, sold the said parcels of land to Honorato Salacup for P50,000 and this sale was also registered in the
Office of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan (See Annexes "A", "B", "C", attached to the complaint).
In March, 1950, Felisa Sinopera instituted proceedings for the administration of the estate of Teodoro Tolete (Special Proceeding No.
3694, Pangasinan), and having secured her appointment as administratrix, brought the present action on June 20, 1950. Notice of lis
pendens was filed in the Office of the Register of Deeds and said notice was recorded on certificates of title covering the said
properties on June 26, 1950. This notice, however, was subsequent to the registration of the deed of sale, in favor of Honorato
Salacup, which took place on June 17, 1950.
The complaint alleges that the widow Leoncia de Leon, had no right to execute the affidavit of adjudication and that Honorato Salacup
acquired no rights to the lands sold to him, and that neither had Benny Sampilo acquired any right to the said properties. Sampilo and
Salacup filed an amended answer alleging that the complaint states no cause of action; that if such a cause exists the same is barred
by the statute of limitations; that defendants are innocent purchasers for value; and that the complaint is malicious, frivolous and
spurious, intended to harass and inconvenience the defendants.
After trial the Court of First Instance rendered judgment for the plaintiff, Felisa Sinopera, declaring that the affidavit of adjudication
Exhibit "A", the deed of sale Exhibit "B", and the deed of sale Exhibit "C", are all null and void; declaring plaintiff owner of one-half
portion of the four parcels of land in question, and finally declaring that the usufructuary rights of Leoncia de Leon to said properties
are terminated. The case was appealed to the Court of Appeals. This court held that the annulment of the affidavit of adjudication,
Exhibit "A", by the trial court was correct but that the annulment of the deeds Exhibits "B" and "C", insofar as one-half of the
properties, conveyed is concerned, and in adjudicating one-half of the same to the heirs of the deceased, is premature. Hence, it
modified the judgment, declaring that Exhibits "B" and "C" are null and void only insofar as the properties thereby conveyed exceed
the portion that the responds to Leoncia de Leon. Therefore, it ordered the defendants to deliver to the plaintiff, in her capacity as
administratrix of the estate of Teodoro Tolete, for disposition according to the law, one-half of the lands described in the complaint,
but reserved to Honorato Salacup the right to claim and secure adjudication in his favor of whatever portion of said properties may
correspond to Leoncia de Leon and also his right to bring an action for the damages that he may have suffered against Leoncia de
Leon and Benny Sampilo.
Benny Sampilo and Honorato Salacup have appealed to this Court by certiorari and have assigned the following errors in their brief:
I
The Court of Appeals erred in affirming that respondent Felisa Sinopera's right of action to recover her and her co-heirs'
participation to the lands in question had not prescribed at the time the action to recover was filed.
II

The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the petitioners are innocent purchasers for value.
III
The Court of Appeals erred in aiming the lower court's denial of petitioner's motion for new trial.
In support of the first assignment of error, it is argued that as the action was instituted almost four years after the affidavit of
adjudication, Exhibit "A", was registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds Of Pangasinan, the right of action of the administratrix
has prescribed and lapsed because the same was not brought within the period of two years as Prescribed in Section 4 of Rule 74 of
the Rules of Court, and as decided in the cases of McMickingvs. Sy Conbieng, 21 Phil., 211 and Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil., 855 869.
Section 4 of Rule 74 provides, in part, as follows:
SEC. 4. Liability of distributees and estate. If it shall appear at any time within two years after the settlement and
distribution of an estate in accordance with the provisions of either of the first two sections of this rule, that an heir or other
has been unduly deprived of his lawful participation of the such heir or such other person may compel the settlement estate
in the courts in the manner hereinafter provided for the purpose of satisfying such lawful participation. . . .
Section 1, which is mentioned in Section 4, reads as follows:
SEC. 1. Extrajudcial settlement by agreement between the heirs. If the decedent left no debts and the heirs and legatees
are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial guardians, the parties may, without securing letters of
administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the
register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir or one
legatee, he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds. It
shall be presumed that the decedent left no debts if no creditor files a petition for letters of administration within two years
after the death of the decedent.
It will be noted that the provision next above-quoted contains two parts, the first referring to a case in which there are two or more
heirs interested in the estate of a deceased person, and the second in which there is only one heir. The section was taken from
Section 596 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190, as amended by Act No. 2331). Said Section 596 as amended, was as
follows:
SEC. 596. Settlement of Certain Intestates Without Legal Proceedings. Whenever all the heirs of a person who died
intestate are of lawful age and legal capacity and there are no debts due from the estate, or all the debts have been paid the
heirs may, by agreement duly executed in writing by all of them, and not otherwise, apportion and divide the estate among
themselves, as they may see fit, without proceedings in court.
We notice two significant provisions in Sections 1 and 4 of Rule 74. In Section 1, it is required that if there are two or more heirs, both
or all of them should take part in the extrajudicial settlement. This requirement is made more imperative in the old law (Section 596,
Act No. 190) by the addition of the clause "and not otherwise." By the title of Section 4, the "distributees and estate" are indicates the
persons to answer for rights violated by the extrajudicial settlement. On the other hand, it is also significant that no mention is made
expressly of the effect of the extrajudicial settlement on persons who did not take part therein or had no notice or knowledge thereof.
There cannot be any doubt that those who took part or had knowledge of the extrajudicial settlement are bound thereby. As to them
the law is clear that if they claim to have been in any manner deprived of their lawful right or share in the estate by the extrajudicial
settlement, they may demand their rights or interest within the period of two years, and both the distributes and estate would be
liable to them for such rights or interest. Evidently, they are the persons in accordance with the provision, may seek to remedy, the
prejudice to their rights within the two-year period. But as to those who did not take part in the settlement or had no notice of the
death of the decedent or of the settlement, there is no direct or express provision is unreasonable and unjust that they also be
required to assert their claims within the period of two years. To extend the effects of the settlement to them, to those who did not
take part or had no knowledge thereof, without any express legal provision to that effect, would be violative of the fundamental right
to due process of law. In the case of Ramirez vs. Gmur, supra, cited by the appellants in this case, we held:
It will be noted that while the law (see. 754) provides that the order of distribution may be had upon the application of the
executor or administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, no provision is made for notice, by publication or
otherwise, of such application. The proceeding, therefore, is to all intents and purposes ex parte. As will be seen our law is
very vague and incomplete; and certainly it cannot be held that a purely ex parte proceeding, had without notice by
personal service or by publication, by which the court undertakes to distribute the property of deceased persons, can be
conclusive upon minor heirs who are not represented therein.
The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 of extrajudicial settlement, or by affidavit, is an ex parteproceeding. It cannot by any
reason or logic be contended that such settlement or distribution would affect third persons who had no knowledge either of the
death of the decedent or of the extrajudicial settlement or affidavit, especially as no mention of such effect is made, either directly or

by implication. We have examined the two cases cited by appellants and there is no similarity at all between the circumstances on
which the ruling therein had been predicated and those of the case at bar.
Following the above-quoted decision of this Court in the case of Ramirez vs. Gmur, supra, we are of the opinion and so hold that the
provisions of Section 4 of Rule 74, barring distributees or heirs from objecting to an extrajudicial partition after the expiration of two
years from such extrajudicial partition, is applicable only (1) to persons who have participated or taken part or had notice of the
extrajudicial partition, and, in addition, (2) when the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 have been strictly complied with, i.e., that all
the persons or heirs of the decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or are represented by themselves or through
guardians. The case at bar fails to comply with both requirements because not all the heirs interested have participated in the
extrajudicial settlement, the Court of Appeals having found that the decedent left aside from his widow, nephews and nieces living at
the time of his death.
The next contention of appellants is that plaintiff's action is barred by the statute of limitations. The origin of the Provision (Section 4,
Rule 74), upon which this contention is predicated, which is Section 596 of Act No. 190, fails to support the contention. In the first
Place, there is nothing therein, or in its source which shows clearly a statute of limitations and a bar of action against third person's. It
is only a bar against the parties who had taken part in the extrajudicial proceedings but not against third persons not Parties thereto.
In the second place, the statute of limitations is contained in a different chapter of Act No. 190, Chapter XL, and if Section 596 of the
Act had been meant to be a statute of limitations, it would naturally have been included in the chapter which defines the statute.
But even if Section 4 of Rule 74 is a statute of limitations, it is still unavailing to the defendants. The action is one based on fraud, as
the widow of the deceased owner of the lands had declared in her affidavit of partition that the deceased left no nephews or niece, or
other heirs except herself. Plaintiff's right which is based on fraud and which has a period of four years (Section 43, par. 3, Act no.
190; Article 1146, Civil Code), does not appear to have lapsed the action was instituted. Judicial proceedings where instituted in
March, 1950 and these proceedings must have been instituted soon after the discovery of fraud. In any case, the defendants have the
burden of proof as to their claim of the statute of limitations, which is their defense, and they have not proved that when the action
was instituted, four years had already elapsed from the date that the interested parties had actual knowledge of the fraud.
The second assignment of error, i.e., that the defendants-appellants are innocent purchasers for value was rejected as unfounded by
the court of Appeals. Said court said.
The claim that defendants-appellants did not have sufficient knowledge or notice of the claim of the heirs of Teodoro Tolete,
deceased, over the land in question does not find support in the evidence of record. As regards defendant Benny Sampilo, it
is an admitted fact that he is a nephew of Leoncia de Leon and he had been living with the latter. Both Benny Sampilo and
the heirs of the deceased who are claiming the property are residents of San Manuel, Pangasinan. It is hard, therefore, to
believe that Benny Sampilo did not know the existence of said heirs, and that he was not aware that they were nephews and
nieces, children of the deceased brothers, of the deceased Teodoro Tolete. The fact furthermore that Benny Sampilo
accompanied his aunt Leoncia de Leon to Sison, Pangasinan, when the later saw Notary Public Ladislao Villamil, who was the
former's uncle, to have him prepare the affidavit of adjudication Exhibit "A", and the deed of conveyance Exhibit "B" by
which on the same date she conveyed to Sampilo all the property which she had adjudicated to herself, both of which she
acknowledged before said notary public, coupled with the fact that there is no sufficient showing that the consideration for
the conveyance of P10,000 had in fact been paid, strengthens our belief that said Benny Sampilo knew that the deceased
Teodoro Tolete had other heirs who may claim the property, and that the immediate conveyance thereof to him was a
strategem concocted to defeat the former's rights. And as regards Honorato Salacup, while the claim that no notice of lis
pendens appeared annotated in the certificates of title issued to Benny Sampilo when he acquired the property might be
true, for he purchased the property on June 17, 1950, and the notice of lis pendens was noted on said certificates of title on
June 26, 1950, nevertheless, he cannot claim that he was a purchaser in good faith for value of the property. It is well-settled
rule in this jurisdiction that a purchaser of registered lands who has knowledge of facts which should put him upon inquiry
and investigate as to the possible defects of the title of the vendor and fails to make such inquiry and investigation cannot
claim that he as a purchaser in good faith for value and he had acquired a valid title thereto. Leung Yee vs. Strong Machinery
Co., 37 Phil., 644; Dayao vs. Diaz, G.R. L-4106, May 29, 1952.
Finding no error in the decision of the Court of Appeals, we hereby affirm it in toto, with costs against the petitioners. So ordered.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.