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1 of 96 DOCUMENTS
CUBA B. SCHMID, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees v. RICHARD F. RUTTER, et al.,
Defendants-Appellants
C.A. No. 2505
Court of Appeals of Ohio, Ninth Appellate District, Wayne County
1989 Ohio App. LEXIS 4899

December 27, 1989, Decided

PRIOR HISTORY:
[*1] APPEAL FROM
JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE COMMON PLEAS
COURT, COUNTY OF WAYNE, OHIO, CASE NO. 88
CI 153.

COUNSEL: MARION F. GRAVEN, III, Attorney at

Law, Wooster, Ohio, for Plaintiffs.
MARK W. BASERMAN, Attorney at Law, Wooster,
Ohio, for Defendants.
JUDGES: DANIEL B. QUILLIN,
CIRIGLIANO, J., CONCUR

BAIRD,

J.,

OPINION BY: QUILLIN

OPINION
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
QUILLIN P. J.
This cause was heard upon the record in the trial
court. Each error assigned has been reviewed and the
following disposition is made:
Defendant-appellants assert that the trial court erred
in entering judgment contrary to the agreement read into

the record by the parties. We reverse and remand to the

trial court.
Plaintiff-appellee, Cuba Schmid initiated this action
alleging that defendant-appellant, Richard Rutter,
impaired the use of a joint driveway on land owned
jointly by the parties. The parties entered into an
settlement agreement which was read into the record in
open court. Later, the trial court, over Rutter's objection,
purported to journalize the agreement. Rutter claims that
judgment entry does not accurately reflect the agreement.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
"The trial court erred in entering judgment contrary
to an express settlement [*2] agreement between the
parties."
Where the parties voluntarily enter into settlement
agreement in the presence of the trial court, the
agreement is a binding contract and may be enforced.
Mack v. Polson Rubber Co. (1984), 14 Ohio St. 3d 34,
36; Spercel v. Sterling Industries (1972), 31 Ohio St. 2d
36, paragraph one of the syllabus. Where a settlement
agreement is arrived at in open court and preserved by
being read into the record, the trial court may approve a
journal entry which accurately reflects the terms of the
agreement, adopting the agreement as its judgment.
Bolen v. Young (1982), 8 Ohio App. 3d 36, 37; Emerine
v. Emerine (Oct. 25, 1989), Lorain App. No.

Page 2
1989 Ohio App. LEXIS 4899, *2

89CA004571, unreported.
In the case sub judice, Rutter contends that the
agreement calls for payment of one-half of the driveway
resurfacing cost to be due 30 days following the
completion "and billing" of the work, while the judgment
entry only calls for payment 30 days after "completion"
of the work. Rutter also claims that the judgment entry
fails to reflect that each parties' maximum liability for the
cost of the driveway resurfacing work was to be $ 837.50.
Upon a review of the record, we hold that [*3] the
judgment entry does not accurately reflect the settlement
agreement read into the record.
The record reveals that the parties did intend that
each parties' liability for the driveway resurfacing be
limited to $ 837.50, and that the parties also intended that
payment would be due 30 days following the completion
"and billing" of the resurfacing work. The trial court's
judgment entry failed to include these provisions.
Rutter further asserts, incorrectly, that the judgment
entry does not reflect that the parties agreed on the record
that: (1) the parties would execute a reciprical easement
agreement and record said agreement on the public
record; (2) that the easement created shall run with the
land; and (3) the new easement agreement would
supercede the earlier "article of agreement" filed on the
public record.
The in-court agreement provided that the parties
were to either record a reciprical easement agreement
and/or the trial court was to require that the judgment
entry memorializing the agreement be recorded in the
chain of title. The judgment entry accurately provides
that the court's order memorializing the agreement is to
be recorded on the public record.

The judgment entry [*4] also accurately reflects that

the settlement agreement is to "remain in full force and
effect inuring to the benefit of the parties, their respective
heirs and assigns." See Stapleton v. Columbia Gas
Transmission Corp. (1981), 2 Ohio App. 3d 15, 19; Peto
v. Korach (1969), 17 Ohio App. 2d 20, 23.
Further, Rutter's contention that the parties
agreement was intended to supersede the original "article
of agreement" is not well taken. The record shows that
the settlement agreement was intended to supplement the
earlier "article of agreement", and the trial court properly
journalized this intention.
Because the trial court's judgment entry failed to
accurately reflect the entire settlement agreement, the
assignment of error is sustained.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the
cause remanded.
The Court finds that there were reasonable grounds
for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this
court, directing the County of Wayne Common Pleas
Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified
copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate,
pursuant to App. R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document
shall constitute the journal [*5] entry of judgment, and it
shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals
at which time the period for review shall begin to run.
App. R. 22(E).
Exceptions.