Diaz,
Mayudini
&
Bodegon
for
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Respondent Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch
166, is taken to task by petitioners in this special civil action
Intervenors
Lourdes
The old law declared that Executive Labor Arbiters and Labor
Arbiters should be members of the Bar, with at least two (2)
years experience in the field of labor management relations.
They were appointed by the President upon recommendation
of the Chairman, and were "subject to the Civil Service Law,
rules and regulations."
On the other hand, RA 6715 requires that the "Executive
Labor Arbiters and Labor Arbiters shall likewise be members
of the Philippine Bar," but in addition "must have been in the
practice of law in the Philippines for at least seven (7) years,
with at least three (3) years experience or exposure in the
field of labor-management relations." For "purposes of
reappointment," however, "incumbent Executive Labor
Arbiters and Labor Arbiters who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least five (5) years may be considered
as already qualified." They are appointed by the President, on
recommendation of the Secretary of Labor and Employment,
and are subject to the Civil Service Law, rules and
regulations.
B. Exclusive Original Jurisdiction
Before the effectivity of RA 6715, the exclusive original
jurisdiction of labor arbiters comprehended the following
cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or nonagricultural:
(1) Unfair labor practice cases;
(2) Those that workers may file involving wages, hours of
work and other terms and conditions of employment;
(3) All money claims of workers, including those based on
non-payment or underpayment of wages, overtime
compensation, separation pay and other benefits provided by
law or appropriate agreement, except claims for employees'
compensation,
benefits;
social
security,
medicare
and
maternity
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
PADILLA, J.:
Controversy is focused anew on Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987
Constitution which provides:
Sec. 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent
of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of
constitutional
Election).
commissions
of
Audit,
Civil
Service
and
whose
11
it came from the hands of its framers, and was voted and
adopted by the people . . . 16
The function of the Court in passing upon an act of Congress
is to "lay the article of the Constitution which is invoked
beside the statute which is challenged and to decide whether
the latter squares with the former" and to "announce its
considered judgment upon the question." 17
It can not be overlooked that Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987
Constitution was deliberately, not unconsciously, intended by
the framers of the 1987 Constitution to be a departure from
the system embodied in the 1935 Constitution where the
Commission on Appointments exercised the power of
confirmation over almost all presidential appointments,
leading to many cases of abuse of such power of
confirmation. Subsection 3, Section 10, Art. VII of the 1935
Constitution provided:
3. The President shall nominate and with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the
executive departments and bureaus, officers of the Army
from the rank of colonel, of the Navy and Air Forces from the
rank of captain or commander, and all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not herein otherwise
provided for, and those whom he may be authorized by law
to appoint; . . .
The deliberate limitation on the power of confirmation of the
Commission
on
Appointments
over
presidential
appointments, embodied in Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987
Constitution, has undoubtedly evoked the displeasure and
disapproval of members of Congress. The solution to the
apparent problem, if indeed a problem, is not judicial or
legislative but constitutional. A future constitutional
convention
or
Congress
sitting
as
a
constituent
(constitutional) assembly may then consider either a return
to the 1935 Constitutional provisions or the adoption of a
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, GrioAquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Nocon,
JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
BIDIN, J.:
This petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction seeks to annul the Order dated June 29, 1992
issued by public respondent Labor Arbiter Reynaldo J.
Gulmatico denying petitioner's motion for "Claims on R.A.
809" in RAB VI Case No. 06-07-10256-89, the dispositive
portion of which reads, in part:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion to dismiss
dated July 31, 1989 and the supplement thereto dated
September 19, 1989 filed by respondent company together
with the motion to dismiss filed by respondent Ramon Jison
dated August 27, 1990 and Francisco Jison dated September
20, 1990, respectively, are hereby DENIED.
xxx xxx xxx
(Rollo, p. 59)
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On July 4, 1989, respondent union, the National Federation of
Sugar Workers-Food and General Trades (NFSW-FGT) filed
RAB VI Case No. 06-07-10256-89 against herein petitioner
Hawaiian-Philippine Company for claims under Republic Act
809 (The Sugar Act of 1952). Respondent union claimed that
the sugar farm workers within petitioner's milling district
have never availed of the benefits due them under the law.
Under Section 9 of R.A 809, otherwise known as the Sugar
Act of 1952, it is provided, to wit:
(Emphasis supplied.)
ROMERO, J.:
On March 11, 1993, petitioners William Dayag, Edwin Dayag,
Eduardo Corton, Edgardo Corton, Leopoldo Nagma, Aloy
Flores, and Romeo Punay filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal, non-payment of wages, overtime pay, premium
pay, holiday pay, service incentive leave, 13th month pay,
and actual, moral and exemplary damages against Alfredo
Young, a building contractor doing business under the firm
name Young's Construction. They filed the complaint with the
National Capital Region Arbitration Branch of the NLRC which
docketed the same as NLRC-NCR-Case No. 00-03-01891-93.
The case was subsequently assigned to Labor Arbiter
Potenciano Canizares, Jr.
Petitioners alleged that they were hired in 1990 by Young to
work as tower crane operators at the latter's construction site
at Platinum 2000 in San Juan, Metro Manila. In November
1991, they were transferred to Cebu City to work at the
construction of his Shoemart Cebu project. Petitioners worked
in Cebu until February 1993, except for Punay who stayed up
to September 29, 1992 only and Nagma, until October 21,
1992.
The rationale for the rule is obvious. The worker, being the
economically-disadvantaged
partywhether
as
complainant/petitioner or as respondent, as the case may be,
the nearest governmental machinery to settle the dispute
must be placed at his immediate disposal, and the other
party is not to be given the choice of another competent
agency sitting in another place as this will unduly burden the
former. 13 In fact, even in cases where venue has been
stipulated by the parties, this Court has not hesitated to set
aside the same if it would lead to a situation so grossly
inconvenient to one party as to virtually negate his claim.
Again,
in Sulpicio
Lines,
this
Court,
citing Sweet
14
Lines vs. Teves, held that:
An agreement will not be held valid where it practically
negates the action of the claimant, such as the private
respondents herein. The philosophy underlying the provisions
on transfer of venue of actions is the convenience of the
plaintiffs as well as his witnesses and to promote the ends of
justice. Considering the expense and trouble a passenger
residing outside Cebu City would incur to prosecute a claim in
the City of Cebu, he would probably decide not to file the
SARMIENTO, J.:
The sole issue in this special civil action for certiorari is
whether or not the courts may take cognizance of claims for
damages arising from a labor controversy.
The antecedent facts are not disputed.
On July 1, 1977, the Commercial Bank and Trust Company, a
Philippine banking institution, entered into a collective
bargaining agreement with the Commercial Bank and Trust
Company Union, representing the rank and file of the bank
with a membership of over one thousand employees, and an
affiliated local of the National Union of Bank Employees, a
national labor organization.
NARVASA, J.:
Petitioners assail in this Court the resolution of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dismissing their appeal
from the decision of the Executive Labor Arbiter 1 in Cebu
City which found private respondent to have been illegally
dismissed by them.
Said private respondent, Carlito H. Vailoces, was the manager
of the Rural Bank of Ayungon (Negros Oriental), a banking
institution duly organized under Philippine laws. He was also
a director and stockholder of the bank.
On June 4, 1983, a special stockholders' meeting was called
for the purpose of electing the members of the bank's Board
of Directors. Immediately after the election the new Board
proceeded to elect the bank's executive officers.
Pursuant to Article IV of the bank's by-laws, 2 providing for
the election by the entire membership of the Board of the
executive officers of the bank, i.e., the president, vicepresident, secretary, cashier and bank manager, in that
board meeting of June 4, 1983, petitioners Lorenzo Dy,
William Ibero and Ricardo Garcia were elected president,
vice-president and corporate secretary, respectively. Vailoces
GRIO-AQUINO, J.:p
This is a petition for certiorari with prayer to annul the
resolution dated May 29, 1987 of respondent National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) reversing the order dated
December 3, 1985 of the Labor Arbiter which dismissed
private respondent Antonio M. Lagdameo's (Lagdameo for
brevity) complaint for Illegal Dismissal (NLRC NCR Case No.
1-228-85) against petitioner Fortune Cement Corporation
(FCC for brevity) for lack of jurisdiction.
Lagdameo is a registered stockholder of FCC.
Arbiter Porfirio
E.
REGALADO, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari which seeks to annul the
resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), dated June 26, 1995, affirming in toto the order of
the labor arbiter, dated April 26, 1994, which dismissed
petitioner's complaint for illegal dismissal with money claims
for lack of jurisdiction.
The records show that petitioner Purificacion Tabang was a
founding member, a member of the Board of Trustees, and
the corporate secretary of private respondent Pamana
Golden Care Medical Center Foundation, Inc., a non-stock
corporation engaged in extending medical and surgical
services.
On October 30, 1990, the Board of Trustees issued a
memorandum appointing petitioner as Medical Director and
Hospital Administrator of private respondent's Pamana
Golden Care Medical Center in Calamba, Laguna.
Although the memorandum was silent as to the amount of
remuneration for the position, petitioner claims that she
received a monthly retainer fee of five thousand pesos
(P5,000.00) from private respondent, but the payment
thereof was allegedly stopped in November, 1991.
As medical director and hospital administrator, petitioner was
tasked to run the affairs of the aforesaid medical center and
perform all acts of administration relative to its daily
operations.
On May 1, 1993, petitioner was allegedly informed personally
by Dr. Ernesto Naval that in a special meeting held on April
30, 1993, the Board of Trustees passed a resolution relieving
her of her position as Medical Director and Hospital
Administrator, and appointing the latter and Dr. Benjamin
Donasco as acting Medical Director and acting Hospital
she
Medical
Director
and
Hospital
Administrator.
The
13
vouchers submitted by petitioner show that the said
amount was paid to her by PAMANA, Inc., a stock corporation
which is separate and distinct from herein private
respondent. Although the payments were considered
advances to Pamana Golden Care, Calamba branch, there is
no evidence to show that the Pamana Golden Care stated in
the vouchers refers to herein respondent Pamana Golden
Care Medical Center Foundation, Inc.
Pamana Golden Care is a division of Pamana, Inc., while
respondent Pamana Golden Care Medical Center Foundation,
Inc. is a non-stock, non-profit corporation. It is stated in the
memorandum of petitioner that Pamana, Inc. is a stock and
profit corporation selling pre-need plan for education,
pension and health care. The health care plan is called
Pamana Golden Care Plan and the holders are called Pamana
Golden Care Card Holders or, simply, Pamana Members. 14
It is an admitted fact that herein petitioner is a retained
physician of Pamana, Inc., whose patients are holders of the
Pamana Golden Care Card. In fact, in her complaint 15 filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, herein petitioner
is asking among others, for professional fees and/or retainer
fees earned for her treatment of Pamana Golden Care card
holders. 16 Thus, at most, said vouchers can only be
considered as proof of payment of retainer fees made by
Pamana, Inc. to herein petitioner as a retained physician of
Pamana Golden Care.
Moreover, even assuming that the monthly payment of
P5,000.00 was a valid claim against respondent corporation,
this would not operate to effectively remove this case from
the jurisdiction of the SEC. In the case ofCagayan de Oro
Coliseum, Inc. vs. Office of the Minister of Labor and
Employment, etc., et al., 17 we ruled that "(a)lthough the
reliefs sought by Chavez appear to fall under the jurisdiction
of the labor arbiter as they are claims for unpaid salaries and
other remunerations for services rendered, a close scrutiny
thereof shows that said claims are actually part of the
perquisites of his position in, and therefore interlinked with,
his relations with the corporation. In Dy, et al., vs. NLRC, et
al., the Court said: "(t)he question of remuneration involving
as it does, a person who is not a mere employee but a
stockholder and officer, an integral part, it might be said, of
the corporation, is not a simple labor problem but a matter
that comes within the area of corporate affairs and
management and is in fact a corporate controversy in
contemplation of the Corporation Code."
WHEREFORE, the questioned resolution of the NLRC is hereby
AFFIRMED, without prejudice to petitioner's taking recourse
to and seeking relief through the appropriate remedy in the
proper forum.
SO ORDERED.
SO ORDERED.3
SO ORDERED.6
Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration, which was
denied by the appellate court in a Resolution dated August
31, 2000.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner Nacpil submits that:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER
WAS APPOINTED BY RESPONDENT'S BOARD OF DIRECTORS
AS COMPTROLLER. THIS FINDING IS CONTRARY TO THE
COMMON, CONSISTENT POSITION AND ADMISSION OF BOTH
PARTIES. FURTHER, RESPONDENT'S BY-LAWS DOES NOT
INCLUDE COMPTROLLER AS ONE OF ITS CORPORATE
OFFICERS.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS WENT BEYOND THE ISSUE OF THE
CASE WHEN IT SUBSTITUTED THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION'S DECISION TO APPLY THE APPEAL
BOND REQUIREMENT STRICTLY IN THE INSTANT CASE. THE
ONLY ISSUE FOR ITS DETERMINATION IS WHETHER NLRC
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DOING THE
SAME.7
The issue to be resolved is whether the Labor Arbiter had
jurisdiction over the case for illegal dismissal and nonpayment of benefits filed by petitioner. The Court finds that
the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over the same.
Under Presidential Decree No. 902-A (the Revised Securities
Act), the law in force when the complaint for illegal dismissal
was instituted by petitioner in 1997, the following cases fall
under the exclusive of the SEC:
closed.' To date, the value of said checks have not been paid
by Filipinas Tyrom, which as payee of the checks, had been
credited with their peso equivalent;
These findings have given rise to the Bank's loss of trust and
confidence in you, the same being acts of serious misconduct
in the performance of your duties resulting in monetary loss
to the Bank. In view thereof, the Board has resolved not to reelect you to the position of Assistant Vice President of the
Bank. Accordingly, your services are terminated effective
immediately. In relation thereto, your monetary and
retirement benefits are forfeited except those that have
vested in you.'
In her position paper, complainant alleged that the real
reason for her dismissal was her filing of the criminal cases
against the bank president, the vice president and the
auditors of the Bank, such filing not being a valid ground for
her dismissal. Furthermore, she alleged that it would be selfserving for the respondent to state that she was found guilty
of gross misconduct in deliberately withholding the clearing
of the two dollar checks. She further alleged that she was not
afforded due process as she was not given the chance to
ESCOLIN, J.:
This petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus raises
anew the legal question often brought to this Court: Which
tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction over an action filed by an
employee against his employer for recovery of unpaid
salaries, separation benefits and damages the court of
general jurisdiction or the Labor Arbiter of the National Labor
Relations Commission [NLRC]?
The facts that gave rise to this petition are as follows:
On September 19, 1980, respondent Abraham Tumala, Jr.
filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Davao,
docketed as Civil Case No. 13494, against petitioners PepsiCola Bottling Co., Inc., its president Cosme de Aboitiz and
other company officers. Under the first cause of action, the
compensation,
benefits;
social
security,
medicare
and
maternity
labor Arbiter who has jurisdiction over the case. Besides, the
issue raised is not for Us to determine in this certiorari
proceeding. The extraordinary remedy of certiorari
proceeding. The extraordinary remedy of certiorari offers
only a limited form of review and its principal function is to
keep an inferior tribunal within its jurisdiction. 5
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted, and respondent judge is
hereby directed to dismiss Civil Case No. 13494, without
prejudice to the right of respondent Tumala to refile the same
with the Labor Arbiter. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
FELICIANO, J.:
In line with an Innovation Program sponsored by petitioner
San Miguel Corporation ("Corporation;" "SMC") and under
which management undertook to grant cash awards to "all
SMC employees ... except [ED-HO staff, Division Managers
and higher-ranked personnel" who submit to the Corporation
Ideas and suggestions found to be beneficial to the
Corporation, private respondent Rustico Vega submitted on
23 September 1980 an innovation proposal. Mr. Vega's
proposal was entitled "Modified Grande Pasteurization
Process," and was supposed to eliminate certain alleged
defects in the quality and taste of the product "San Miguel
Beer Grande:"
Title of Proposal
Modified Grande Pasteurization Process
Present Condition or Procedure
With
Counterclaim
Corporation
alleged
and
that
Position
private
SO ORDERED.
Buyo,
Caballero
and
Fuentes
for
The case was set for conciliation but since the parties could
not agree on any settlement, the case was certified to the
Labor Arbiter. Thereafter, the Executive Labor Arbiter
required the parties to submit their position papers. Based on
the position papers submitted, a decision was rendered on
December 7, 1977. The dispositive portion reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is hereby
ordered to pay complainant's claim for separation pay in the
amount of P11,813.36. His claim for moral, actual, and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees are hereby
dismissed for lack of merit. (Rollo, p. 46)
The decision of the Executive Labor Arbiter was affirmed on
appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission on
October 9, 1978. A motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied. Hence, this petition.
We do not find any bad faith or fraud on the part of the bank
officials who denied the petitioner's request for a six months'
leave of absence without pay. If the petitioner was made to
believe that his request would be granted, we can not fault
the branch manager or his subsequent replacement for
giving their assurances. They were merely personal
assurances which could be reconsidered on the basis of later
developments or upon consultation with higher authorities
and which are not binding. Certainly, the bank officials who
gave their verbal assurances had only the petitioner's
paramount welfare in their minds. There is no evidence to
show that they meant to deceive the petitioner. They
themselves thought that such a request would be granted.
Unfortunately, company policy had to be followed. The fact
that the petitioner's request for six months' leave of absence
was denied does not ipso facto entitle him to damages.
PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL
vs.
FLORENCE O. CABANSAG, respondent.
SO ORDERED.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Court reiterates the basic policy that all Filipino workers,
whether employed locally or overseas, enjoy the protective
mantle of Philippine labor and social legislations. Our labor
statutes may not be rendered ineffective by laws or
judgments promulgated, or stipulations agreed upon, in a
foreign country.
The Case
xxxxxxxxx
SO ORDERED."
Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:
"1. Whether or not the arbitration branch of the NLRC in the
National Capital Region has jurisdiction over the instant
controversy;
"2. Whether or not the arbitration of the NLRC in the National
Capital Region is the most convenient venue or forum to hear
and decide the instant controversy; and
"3. Whether or not the respondent was illegally dismissed,
and therefore, entitled to recover moral and exemplary
damages and attorneys fees."8
Jurisdiction
The jurisdiction of labor arbiters and the NLRC is specified in
Article 217 of the Labor Code as follows:
"ART. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission.
(a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code the Labor
Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear
and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after the
submission of the case by the parties for decision without
x x x x x x x x x"
2. Termination disputes;
with no prospect for another job. She was not even provided
with a return trip fare. Fifth, the notice of termination is an
utter manifestation of bad faith and whim as it totally
disregards [respondents] right to security of tenure and due
process. Such notice together with the demands for
[respondents] resignation contravenes the fundamental
guarantee and public policy of the Philippine government on
security of tenure.
SO ORDERED.
SOCO, petitioner,
CORPORATION
OF
DAVAO
AND
THE
ALAMPAY, J.:
Petition for certiorari to annul the order dated October 25,
1979 of the former Deputy Minister of Labor in Case No.
ROXI-C-209-79 and Case No. LR-30-79, which affirmed the
order dated May 31, 1979 of the Regional Director, granting
the application of private respondent Mercantile Corporation
of Davao (MERCO), for clearance to terminate petitioner
Domiciano Soco and dismissing the latter's complaint for
unfair labor practice.
Private respondent is engaged in the sale and distribution of
ice cream in Davao City. Petitioner who was employed as
driver of MERCO's delivery van, was the President of the
MERCO Employees Labor Union (MELU), an affiliate of the
Federation of Free Workers (FFW). In the last week of January,
1979, the personnel officer of private respondent conducted
an investigation due to reports that petitioner was carrying
on his union MELU activities during his working hours for the
purpose of transferring his Union's affiliation from the FFW to
the Southern Philippines Federation of Labor (SPFL) and for
this purpose he was even utilizing the company vehicle of
MERCO, in violation of the Company's Rule No. 19(a) which
prescribes a penalty of suspension of 15 days for the first
offense and dismissal for succeeding offenses.
It appears that on January 25, 1979, petitioner was ordered
to deliver ice cream to the Imperial Hotel and Maguindanao
Hotel at CM Recto Avenue and to Your Goody Mart at Anda
Street, all in Davao City, but he deviated from the usual route
VITUG, J.:
For consideration are the incidents that flow from the familiar
doctrine of non-suability of the state.
In this petition for certiorari, the Department of Agriculture
seeks to nullify the Resolution, 1 dated 27 November 1991, of
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Fifth
Division, Cagayan de Oro City, denying the petition for
injunction, prohibition and mandamus that prays to enjoin
permanently the NLRC's Regional Arbitration Branch X and
Cagayan de Oro City Sheriff from enforcing the decision 2 of
31 May 1991 of the Executive Labor Arbiter and from
attaching and executing on petitioner's property.
The Department of Agriculture (herein petitioner) and Sultan
Security Agency entered into a contract 3 on 01 April 1989 for
security services to be provided by the latter to the said
governmental entity. Save for the increase in the monthly
rate of the guards, the same terms and conditions were also
made to apply to another contract, dated 01 May 1990,
between the same parties. Pursuant to their arrangements,
guards were deployed by Sultan Agency in the various
premises of the petitioner.
On 13 September 1990, several guards of the Sultan Security
Agency filed a complaint for underpayment of wages, nonpayment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift
differential pay, holiday pay and overtime pay, as well as for
damages, 4 before the Regional Arbitration Branch X of
Cagayan de Oro City, docketed as NLRC Case No. 10-0900455-90 (or 10-10-00519-90, its original docket number),
against the Department of Agriculture and Sultan Security
Agency.
The Executive Labor Arbiter rendered a decision on 31 May
finding herein petitioner and jointly and severallyliable with
Sultan Security Agency for the payment of money claims,
aggregating P266,483.91, of the complainant security
guards. The petitioner and Sultan Security Agency did not
SO ORDERED.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:p
PONDOC, petitioner,
COMMISSION (Fifth
City)
and
EMILIO
Salary
of
(2)
premium
Regular
pay
for
differential
underpayment
holiday
holiday
services
for
P35,776.00;
and
902.00;
(3)
Premium
services
(4)
13th
pay
for
month
rest
pay
day
3,840.00;
3,600.00
INC., petitioner,
COMMISSION,
GOGFREDO
MARTINEZ, J.:
Can the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), even
without a complaint for illegal dismissal tiled before the labor
arbiter, entertain an action for injunction and issue such writ
enjoining petitioner Philippine Airlines, inc. from enforcing its
Orders of dismissal against private respondents, and ordering
for
But just the same, we have to stress that Article 279 does not
speak alone of backwages as an obtainable relief for illegal
dismissal; that reinstatement as well is the concern of said
law, enforceable when necessary, through Article 218 (e) of
the Labor Code (without need of an illegal dismissal suit
under Article 217 (a) of the Code) if such whimsical and
capricious act of illegal dismissal will "cause grave or
irreparable injury to a party". . . . . 4
Hence, the present recourse.
Generally, injunction is a preservative remedy for the
protection of one's substantive rights or interest. It is not a
cause of action in itself but merely a provisional remedy, an
adjunct to a main suit. It is resorted to only when there is a
pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which
cannot be remedied under any standard of compensation.
The application of the injunctive writ rests upon the existence
of an emergency or of a special reason before the main case
be regularly heard. The essential conditions for granting such
temporary injunctive relief are that the complaint alleges
facts which appear to be sufficient to constitute a proper
basis for injunction and that on the entire showing from the
contending parties, the injunction is reasonably necessary to
protect the legal rights of the plaintiff pending the
litigation. 5 Injunction is also a special equitable relief granted
only in cases where there is no plain, adequate and complete
remedy at law. 6
In labor cases, Article 218 of the Labor Code empowers the
NLRC
(e) To enjoin or restrain any actual or threatened commission
of any or all prohibited or unlawful acts or to require the
performance of a particular act in any labor dispute which, if
not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave or
irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any
decision in favor of such party; . . ." (Emphasis Ours)
The ruling of the NLRC that the Supreme Court upheld its
power to issue temporary mandatory injunction orders in the
case of Chemo-Technische Mfg., Inc. Employees Union-DFA,
et. al. vs. Chemo-Technische Mfg., Inc. et. al., docketed as
G.R. No. 107031, is misleading. As correctly argued by the
petitioner, no such pronouncement was made by this Court in
said case. On January 25, 1993, we issued a Minute
Resolution in the subject case stating as follows:
Considering the allegations contained, the issues raised and
the arguments adduced in the petition for certiorari, as well
as the comments of both public and private respondents
thereon, and the reply of the petitioners to private
respondent's motion to dismiss the petition, the Court
Resolved to DENY the same for being premature.
It is clear from the above resolution that we did not in
anyway sustain the action of the NLRC in issuing such
temporary mandatory injunction but rather we dismissed the
petition as the NLRC had yet to rule upon the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner. Thus, the minute
resolution denying the petition for being prematurely filed.
Finally, an injunction, as an extraordinary remedy, is not
favored in labor law considering that it generally has not
proved to be an effective means of settling labor
disputes. 20 It has been the policy of the State to encourage
the parties to use the non-judicial process of negotiation and
compromise, mediation and arbitration. 21 Thus, injunctions
may be issued only in cases of extreme necessity based on
legal grounds clearly established, after due consultations or
hearing and when all efforts at conciliation are exhausted
which factors, however, are clearly absent in the present
case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed
Orders dated April 3, 1995 and May 31, 1995, issued by the
Accountant
charge
and
Officer-in-
2. Paterno Llarena
3. Gregorio Nicerio
Supervisory Waiter
4. Amado Macandog
Roomboy
5. Luis Guades
Utility/Maintenance Worker
6. Santos Broola
Roomboy
7. Teodoro Laurenaria
Waiter
8. Eduardo Alamares
Roomboy/Waiter
9. Lourdes Camigla
Cashier
Cashier
Technician
Dishwasher
Helper
Cook
Waiter
Cook
and
Kitchen
Petitioners insist that it was error for the Labor Arbiter and
the CA to have ruled that petitioner Josefa Po Lam is the
owner of Mayon Hotel & Restaurant. They allege that the
documents they submitted to the Labor Arbiter sufficiently
and clearly establish the fact of ownership by petitioner
Pacita Po, and not her mother, petitioner Josefa Po Lam. They
contend that petitioner Josefa Po Lam's participation was
limited to merely (a) being the overseer; (b) receiving the
month-to-month and/or year-to-year financial reports
prepared and submitted by respondent Loveres; and (c)
visitation of the premises.24 They also put emphasis on the
admission of the respondents in their position paper
submitted to the Labor Arbiter, identifying petitioner Josefa
Po Lam as the manager, and Pacita Po as the owner. 25 This,
they claim, is a judicial admission and is binding on
respondents. They protest the reliance the Labor Arbiter and
the CA placed on their failure to submit additional documents
to clearly establish ownership of the hotel and restaurant,
claiming that there was no need for petitioner Josefa Po Lam
to submit additional documents considering that the
Certificate of Registration is the best and primary evidence of
ownership.
The NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter, finding that "no clear
act of termination is attendant in the case at bar" and that
respondents "did not submit any evidence to that effect, but
the finding and conclusion of the Labor Arbiter [are] merely
based on his own surmises and conjectures." 41 In turn, the
NLRC was reversed by the CA.
It is petitioners contention that the CA should have sustained
the NLRC finding that none of the above-named respondents
were illegally dismissed, or entitled to separation or
retirement pay. According to petitioners, even the Labor
Arbiter and the CA admit that when the illegal dismissal case
was filed by respondents on April 1997, they had as yet no
cause of action. Petitioners therefore conclude that the filing
by respondents of the illegal dismissal case was premature
and should have been dismissed outright by the Labor
Arbiter.42 Petitioners also claim that since the validity of
respondents' dismissal is a factual question, it is not for the
reviewing court to weigh the conflicting evidence. 43
We do not agree. Whether respondents are still working for
petitioners is a factual question. And the records are
unequivocal that since April 1997, when petitioner Mayon
Hotel & Restaurant suspended its hotel operations and
transferred its restaurant operations in Elizondo Street,
respondents Loveres, Macandog, Llarena, Guades and Nicerio
have not been permitted to work for petitioners. Respondent
Alamares, on the other hand, was also laid-off when the
Elizondo Street operations closed, as were all the other
respondents. Since then, respondents have not been
permitted to work nor recalled, even after the construction of
the new premises at Pearanda Street and the reopening of
the hotel operations with the restaurant in this new site. As
stated by the Joint Decision of the Labor Arbiter on July 2000,
or more than three (3) years after the complaint was filed: 44
[F]rom the records, more than six months had lapsed without
[petitioner] having resumed operation of the hotel. After
more than one year from the temporary closure of Mayon
Hotel and the temporary transfer to another site of Mayon
Restaurant, the building which [petitioner] Josefa allege[d]
w[h]ere the hotel and restaurant will be transferred has been
finally constructed and the same is operated as a hotel with
bar and restaurant nevertheless, none of [respondents]
herein who were employed at Mayon Hotel and Restaurant
which was also closed on April 30, 1998 was/were recalled by
[petitioner] to continue their services...
Parenthetically, the Labor Arbiter did not grant separation
pay to the other respondents as they had not filed an
amended complaint to question the cessation of their
employment after the closure of Mayon Hotel & Restaurant
on March 31, 1997.45
The above factual finding of the Labor Arbiter was never
refuted by petitioners in their appeal with the NLRC. It
confounds us, therefore, how the NLRC could have so
cavalierly treated this uncontroverted factual finding by
ruling that respondents have not introduced any evidence to
show that they were illegally dismissed, and that the Labor
Arbiter's finding was based on conjecture. 46 It was a serious
error that the NLRC did not inquire as to thelegality of the
cessation of employment. Article 286 of the Labor Code is
clear there is termination of employment when an
otherwise bona fide suspension of work exceeds six (6)
months.47 The cessation of employment for more than six
months was patent and the employer has the burden of
proving that the termination was for a just or authorized
cause.48
Moreover, we are not impressed by any of petitioners'
attempts to exculpate themselves from the charges. First, in
the proceedings with the Labor Arbiter, they claimed that it
Petitioners next claim that the cost of the food and snacks
provided to respondents as facilities should have been
included in reckoning the payment of respondents' wages.
They state that although on the surface respondents
appeared to receive minimal wages, petitioners had granted
respondents other benefits which are considered part and
parcel of their wages and are allowed under existing
laws.82 They claim that these benefits make up for whatever
inadequacies there may be in compensation. 83 Specifically,
they invoked Sections 5 and 6, Rule VII-A, which allow the
deduction of facilities provided by the employer through an
appropriate Facility Evaluation Order issued by the Regional
Director of the DOLE.84 Petitioners also aver that they give
five (5) percent of the gross income each month as
incentives. As proof of compliance of payment of minimum
wages, petitioners submitted the Notice of Inspection Results
issued in 1995 and 1997 by the DOLE Regional Office. 85
The cost of meals and snacks purportedly provided to
respondents cannot be deducted as part of respondents'
minimum wage. As stated in the Labor Arbiter's decision: 86
While [petitioners] submitted Facility Evaluation Orders (pp.
468, 469; vol. II, rollo) issued by the DOLE Regional Office
whereby the cost of meals given by [petitioners] to
[respondents] were specified for purposes of considering the
same as part of their wages, We cannot consider the cost of
meals in the Orders as applicable to [respondents].
[Respondents] were not interviewed by the DOLE as to the
quality and quantity of food appearing in the applications of
[petitioners] for facility evaluation prior to its approval to
determine whether or not [respondents] were indeed given
such kind and quantity of food. Also, there was no evidence
that the quality and quantity of food in the Orders were
voluntarily accepted by [respondents]. On the contrary; while
some [of the respondents] admitted that they were given
meals and merienda, the quality of food serve[d] to them
were not what were provided for in the Orders and that it was
only when they filed these cases that they came to know
about said Facility Evaluation Orders (pp. 100; 379[,] vol.
II, rollo; p. 40, tsn[,] June 19, 1998). [Petitioner] Josefa
herself, who applied for evaluation of the facility (food) given
to [respondents], testified that she did not inform
[respondents] concerning said Facility Evaluation Orders (p.
34, tsn[,] August 13, 1998).
Even granting that meals and snacks were provided and
indeed constituted facilities, such facilities could not be
deducted
without
compliance
with
certain
legal
87
requirements. As stated in Mabeza v. NLRC, the employer
simply cannot deduct the value from the employee's wages
without satisfying the following: (a) proof that such facilities
are customarily furnished by the trade; (b) the provision of
deductible facilities is voluntarily accepted in writing by the
employee; and (c) the facilities are charged at fair and
reasonable value. The records are clear that petitioners failed
to comply with these requirements. There was no proof of
respondents' written authorization. Indeed, the Labor Arbiter
found that while the respondents admitted that they were
given meals and merienda, the quality of food served to
them was not what was provided for in the Facility Evaluation
Orders and it was only when they filed the cases that they
came to know of this supposed Facility Evaluation
Orders.88 Petitioner Josefa Po Lam herself admitted that she
did not inform the respondents of the facilities she had
applied for.89
Considering the failure to comply with the above-mentioned
legal requirements, the Labor Arbiter therefore erred when he
ruled that the cost of the meals actually provided to
respondents should be deducted as part of their salaries, on
the ground that respondents have availed themselves of the
food given by petitioners.90 The law is clear that mere
availment is not
employees' wages.
sufficient
to
allow
deductions
from
FELICIANO, J.:
The present petition involves the question of whether or not
union members who did not ratify a waiver of accrued wage
(Emphasis supplied)
13
(Emphasis supplied)
not act on the motion and ordered the parties to submit their
respective position papers.
On December 10, 1995, the labor arbiter rendered a decision,
which provides:
"In the light of the foregoing, respondents are hereby
declared guilty of ILLEGAL SHUTDOWN and that respondents
are ordered to pay complainants their separation pay
equivalent to one (1) month pay for every year of service.
Considering the malicious act of closing the business
precipitately without due regard to the rights of
complainants, moral damages and exemplary damage in the
sum of P 50,000.00 and P 30,000.00 respectively is hereby
awarded for each of the complainants.
Finally 10 % of all sums owing to complainants is hereby
adjudged as attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED."5
On February 5, 1996, petitioners appealed to the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) alleging abuse of
discretion and serious errors in the findings of facts of the
labor arbiter.
On August 30, 1996, NLRC issued a resolution, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
"PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is
hereby, AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the award of
moral and exemplary damages is hereby, DELETED.
SO ORDERED."6
On November 20, 1996, NLRC denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.7
PUNO, J.:
In this petition for certiorari, petitioner Kanlaon Construction
Enterprises Co., Inc. seeks to annul the decision of
respondent National Labor Relations Commission, Fifth
Division and remand the cases to the Arbitration Branch for a
retrial on the merits.
Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the
construction business nationwide with principal office at No.
11 Yakan St., La Vista Subdivision, Quezon City. In 1988,
petitioner was contracted by the National Steel Corporation
to construct residential houses for its plant employees in
Steeltown, Sta. Elena, Iligan City. Private respondents were
hired by petitioner as laborers in the project and worked
under the supervision of Engineers Paulino Estacio and Mario
Dulatre. In 1989, the project neared its completion and
petitioner started terminating the services of private
respondents and its other employees.
In 1990, private respondents filed separate complaints
against petitioner before Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch XII,
Iligan City. Numbering forty-one (41) in all, they claimed that
petitioner paid them wages below the minimum and sought
payment of their salary differentials and thirteenth-month
pay. Engineers Estacio and Dulatre were named corespondents.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court to annul and set aside the decision of the
National Labor Relations Commission[1] in NLRC CA No. L001268 dated April 12, 1994 which affirmed the decision of
the Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch No. I in Dagupan City
finding that the private respondent Carlito Lacson was
constructively dismissed by the petitioner Delfin Garcia doing
business under the name NAPCO-LUZMART, Inc. and
awarding respondent backwages and separation pay.
The following facts as adopted by the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) are uncontroverted:
Complainant Carlito Lacson was employed on March 5, 1987
as boiler operator technician by Northwest Agro-Marine
Products Corporation (NAPCO). On December 12, 1990
respondent Luzmart, Inc., acquired NAPCO in a foreclosure
sale. Both companies were managed by respondent Delfin
Garcia.
On January 28, 1993, there was a mauling incident which
involved the complainant and Julius Z. Viray, his immediate
supervisor and allegedly a friend and compadre of
respondent Garcia. As complainant suffered injuries as a
result thereof he reported the matter to police authorities
and he sought treatment at the Teofilo Sison Memorial
Provincial Hospital. Both the complainant and Viray were
asked to explain their sides. After the submission of the
written explanations, Delfin Garcia suspended both of them
from work for a period of one month effective April 15,
1993. In the same suspension order, complainant was
further directed to explain in writing why he should not be
dealt with disciplinary action or terminated for his continued
absences from February 15, 1993 up to the date of the
QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the Decision dated
February 26, 1992 of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) in NCR Case No. 00-09-04050-88 and its
Resolution dated April 22, 1992, denying petitioner's motion
for reconsideration. The decision held that the members of
the Union who did not ratify or avail of the benefits under the
Compromise Agreement entered into between petitioner and
the Union were not bound thereby (Rollo, pp. 32-41). In our
Resolution dated June 29, 1992, we issued a temporary
restraining order.
I
In September 1988, the Lakas Manggagawa sa Jag (Union)
composed of the rank-and-file employees of Jag & Haggar
Jeans and Sportswear Corporation, petitioner herein, staged a
strike. Petitioner filed a petition to declare the strike illegal.
On November 29, 1988, Labor Arbiter Eduardo Madriaga
rendered a decision, declaring the strike illegal and ordering
the dismissal of the officers, as well as the members of the
Union who took part in the illegal strike. The dispositive
portion of said decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the strike conducted by
respondent union and individual respondents on September
22, 1988 and subsisting to date, is hereby declared to be
illegal for failure to observe the cooling-off period as agreed
upon by the parties and the conduct of the strike vote as
required by law, as well as for commission of illegal acts in
the staging of the said strike as averred in the affidavits of
witnesses for petitioner.
Accordingly, the officers of the union, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
comply with the Revised Rules of Court and Circular Nos. 188 and 28-91 (G.R. No. 105184, Rollo, p. 35).
On June 19, 1992, petitioner filed a motion for leave to refile
its petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 105710). In a resolution
dated June 29, 1992, the Third Division of this Court granted
the petition and resolved to issue a temporary restraining
order (Rollo, p. 44). The case was reassigned to the First
Division.
II
The main issue to be resolved is whether or not the
Compromise Agreement entered into by petitioner and the
Union is binding upon private respondents.
Petitioner contends that the Compromise Agreement was
deemed ratified by the union members considering that 102
out of the 114 affected employees already availed of and
received the benefits under the said agreement and that
private respondents were represented in all stages of the
proceedings without them questioning the authority of their
union officers and their counsel. It cites the case of Betting
Ushers Union (PLUM) v. Jai-alai, 101 Phil. 822 (1957) wherein
we ruled that the "will of the majority should prevail over the
minority" and which ruling was reiterated in Dionela v. Court
of Industrial Relations, 8 SCRA 832 (1963) and Chua
v. National Labor Relations Commison, 190 SCRA 558 (1990).
On the other hand, private respondents allege that for a
compromise agreement to be binding upon them, a special
power of attorney or their express consent was necessary for
what was being waived or surrendered under the agreement
was their right to an employment. Such right is protected
under the security of tenure provision of the Labor Code of
the Philippines and cannot be lost without due process of law
(Rollo, p. 62).
TERMS
AND
CONDITIONS
OF
2. That with regards [sic] to NLRC CASE NO. RAB-III-10-181790 pending with the NLRC parties jointly and mutually agreed
that the issues thereof, shall be discussed by the parties and
resolve[d] during the negotiation of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement;
3. That Management of the Empire Food Products shall make
the proper adjustment of the Employees Wages within fifteen
(15) days from the signing of this Agreement and further
agreed to register all the employees with the SSS;
4. That Employer, Empire Food Products thru its Management
agreed to deduct thru payroll deduction UNION DUES and
other Assessment[s] upon submission by the LCP Labor
Congress individual Check-Off Authorization[s] signed by the
Union Members indicating the amount to be deducted and
further agreed all deduction[s] made representing Union
Dues and Assessment[s] shall be remitted immediately to the
LCP Labor Congress Treasurer or authorized representative
within three (3) or five (5) days upon deductions [sic], Union
dues not deducted during the period due, shall be refunded
or
reimbursed
by
the
Employer/Management.
Employer/Management further agreed to deduct Union dues
from non-union members the same amount deducted from
union members without need of individual Check-Off
Authorizations [for] Agency Fee;
5. That in consideration [of] the foregoing covenant, parties
jointly and mutually agreed that NLRC CASE NO. RAB-III-101817-90 shall be considered provisionally withdrawn from the
Calendar of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC),
while the Petition for direct certification of the LCP Labor
Congress parties jointly move for the direct certification of
the LCP Labor Congress;
NLRC, 212 SCRA 631; Dagupan Bus Co. v. NLRC, 191 SCRA
328; Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corp. v.
NLRC, 190 SCRA 505; Hua Bee Shirt Factory v. NLRC, 186
SCRA 586; Mabaylan v. NLRC, 203 SCRA 570 and Flexo
Manufacturing
v.
NLRC,
135 SCRA
145). In
Atlas
Consolidated, supra, this Honorable Court explicitly stated:
It would be illogical for Caballo, to abandon his work and then
immediately file an action seeking for his reinstatement. We
can not believe that Caballo, who had worked for Atlas for
two years and ten months, would simply walk away from his
job unmindful of the consequence of his act. i.e. the
forfeiture of his accrued employment benefits. In opting to
finally to [sic] contest the legality of his dismissal instead of
just claiming his separation pay and other benefits, which he
actually did but which proved to be futile after all, ably
supports his sincere intention to return to work, thus
negating Atlas' stand that he had abandoned his job.
In De Ysasi III v. NLRC (supra), this Honorable Court stressed
that it is the clear, deliberate and unjustified refusal to
resume employment and not mere absence that constitutes
abandonment. The absence of petitioner employees for one
day on January 21, 1991 as testified [to] by Security Guard
Orlando Cairo did not constitute abandonment.
In his first decision, Labor Arbiter Santos expressly directed
the reinstatement of the petitioner employees and
admonished the private respondents that "any harassment,
intimidation, coercion or any form of threat as a result of this
immediately executory reinstatement shall be dealt with
accordingly.
In his second decision, Labor Arbiter Santos did not state why
he was abandoning his previous decision directing the
reinstatement of petitioner employees.
PADILLA, J.:p
This is a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction, seeking to set aside or
modify the Order of the respondent National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), dated 6 September 1988, which set
aside the order of the Labor Arbiter dated 31 October 1984. 1
On 5 December 1988, a temporary restraining order was
issued by this Court enjoining the respondents from enforcing
the questioned NLRC Order until further orders from the
Court. 2
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
On 30 April 1973, the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR)
rendered a decision in Case No. 5478-ULP, entitled "Alba
Patio de Makati Employees Association, et al, complainants,
vs. Alba Patio de Makati, et al., respondents," the dispositive
part of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, respondents are hereby declared guilty of
unfair labor practices as charged and are ordered to cease
and desist from further committing said acts, to reinstate the
herein four (4) individual complainants with full back wages
and to pay them their respective shares in the service
charges for May 1 to 15, 1970 and for the rest of that month
until their forced resignation.
A motion for reconsideration of the said decision filed by
respondents (herein petitioners) was denied on 6 November
1973.
Petitioners then sought a review by this Court of the CIR's
decision and resolution. The case was docketed as "Alba
Patio de Makati, Anastacio Alba and Claudio Olabarrieta,
petitioners, vs. Alba Patio de Makati Employees Association,
The NLRC was correct in setting aside the order of the Labor
Arbiter dated 31 October 1984, as the same was void. It
rendered the very decision of this Court meaningless, and
showed disrespect for the administration of justice. 11 This
should not be sanctioned.
It was incumbent upon the counsel for the complainant (now
respondent) Lucio Cagano to have seen to it that the interest
of an complainants (now private respondents) was protected.
The quitclaim and release in the preparation of which he
assisted clearly worked to the grave disadvantage of the
complainants (private respondents). As we have stated
earlier, to render the decision of this Court meaningless by
paying the backwages of the affected employees in a much
lesser amount clearly manifested a disregard of the authority
of this Court as the final arbiter of cases brought to it. 12
As for the Labor Arbiter, he should have consciensciously
examined the veracity and reliability of the quitclaim
purportedly executed by the other complainants (now
respondents) through Lucio Cagano, especially so when the
counsel of record of private respondents Cruz and Aclado,
Atty. Felipe Fuentes, Jr., was not present when the document
was filed. Moreover, he should have been aware of this
Court's standing rulings that quit-claims and releases signed
by employees are normally frowned upon as contrary to
public policy. His precipitate approval of the release and
quitclaim resulted in the reduction of the backwages to a
much lesser amount due the private respondents and in
releasing petitioners from their obligation to reinstate the
complainants under a final judgment of this Court. This is
indeed lamentable.
Finally, we agree with the Solicitor General, that having
submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the NLRC,
petitioners should not be allowed to repudiate that same
DIRECTOR OF LABOR
PILI, respondents.
RELATIONS,
AND
OSCAR
from
paying
the
MEDIALDEA, J.:
time of the registration. It does not mean that the said local
union cannot stand on its own. Neither can it be interpreted
to mean that it cannot pursue its own interests
independently of the federation. A local union owes its
creation and continued existence to the will of its members
and not to the federation to which it belongs.
When the local union withdrew from the old federation to join
a new federation, it was merely exercising its primary right to
labor organization for the effective enhancement and
protection of common interests. In the absence of
enforceable provisions in the federation's constitution
preventing disaffiliation of a local union a local may sever its
relationship with its parent (People's Industrial and
Commercial Employees and Workers Organization (FFW) v.
People's Industrial and Commercial Corporation, No. 37687,
March 15, 1982, 112 SCRA 440).
There is nothing in the constitution of the NATU or in the
constitution of the THEU-NATU that the THEU was expressly
forbidden to disaffiliate from the federation (pp. 62,
281, Rollo), The alleged non-compliance of the local union
with the provision in the NATU Constitution requiring the
service of three months notice of intention to withdraw did
not produce the effect of nullifying the disaffiliation for the
following grounds: firstly, NATU was not even a legitimate
labor organization, it appearing that it was not registered at
that time with the Department of Labor, and therefore did not
possess and acquire, in the first place, the legal personality
to enforce its constitution and laws, much less the right and
privilege under the Labor Code to organize and affiliate
chapters or locals within its group, and secondly, the act of
non-compliance with the procedure on withdrawal is
premised on purely technical grounds which cannot rise
above the fundamental right of self-organization.
March 13, 1984, 128 SCRA 180). In the instant case, the
factual findings of the arbitrator were correct against that of
public respondents.
Further, there is no merit in the contention of the
respondents that the act of disaffiliation violated the union
security clause of the CBA and that their dismissal as a
consequence thereof is valid. A perusal of the collective
bargaining agreements shows that the THEU-NATU, and not
the NATU federation, was recognized as the sole and
exclusive collective bargaining agent for all its workers and
employees in all matters concerning wages, hours of work
and other terms and conditions of employment (pp. 667706, Rollo). Although NATU was designated as the sole
bargaining agent in the check-off authorization form attached
to the CBA, this simply means it was acting only for and in
behalf of its affiliate. The NATU possessed the status of an
agent while the local union remained the basic principal
union which entered into contract with the respondent
company. When the THEU disaffiliated from its mother
federation, the former did not lose its legal personality as the
bargaining union under the CBA. Moreover, the union security
clause embodied in the agreements cannot be used to justify
the dismissals meted to petitioners since it is not applicable
to the circumstances obtaining in this case. The CBA imposes
dismissal only in case an employee is expelled from the
union for joining another federation or for forming another
union or who fails or refuses to maintain membership therein.
The case at bar does not involve the withdrawal of merely
some employees from the union but of the whole THEU itself
from its federation. Clearly, since there is no violation of the
union security provision in the CBA, there was no sufficient
ground to terminate the employment of petitioners.
Public respondents considered the existence of Arturo Dilag's
group as the remaining true and valid union. We, however,
GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
The petitioner, Kapatiran sa Meat and Canning Division
TUPAS Local Chapter No. 1027) hereinafter referred to as
"TUPAS," seeks a review of the resolution dated January 27,
1988 (Annex D) of public respondent Pura Ferrer-Calleja,
Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, dismissing its
appeal from the Order dated November 17, 1987 (Annex C)
of the Med-Arbiter Rasidali C. Abdullah ordering a
certification election to be conducted among the regular daily
paid rank and file employees/workers of Universal Robina
Corporation-Meat and Canning Division to determine which of
the contending unions:
ZALDIVAR, J.:p
Appeal to this Court on purely questions of law from the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila in its Civil
Case No. 58894.
The undisputed facts that spawned the instant case follow:
No. 3350 merely excludes ipso jure from the application and
coverage of the closed shop agreement the employees
belonging to any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of
their members with any labor organization. What the
exception provides, therefore, is that members of said
religious sects cannot be compelled or coerced to join labor
unions even when said unions have closed shop agreements
with the employers; that in spite of any closed shop
agreement, members of said religious sects cannot be
refused employment or dismissed from their jobs on the sole
ground that they are not members of the collective
bargaining union. It is clear, therefore, that the assailed Act,
far from infringing the constitutional provision on freedom of
association, upholds and reinforces it. It does not prohibit the
members of said religious sects from affiliating with labor
unions. It still leaves to said members the liberty and the
power to affiliate, or not to affiliate, with labor unions. If,
notwithstanding their religious beliefs, the members of said
religious sects prefer to sign up with the labor union, they
can do so. If in deference and fealty to their religious faith,
they refuse to sign up, they can do so; the law does not
coerce them to join; neither does the law prohibit them from
joining; and neither may the employer or labor union compel
them to join. Republic Act No. 3350, therefore, does not
violate the constitutional provision on freedom of association.
2. Appellant Union also contends that the Act is
unconstitutional for impairing the obligation of its contract,
specifically, the "union security clause" embodied in its
Collective Bargaining Agreement with the Company, by virtue
of which "membership in the union was required as a
condition for employment for all permanent employees
workers". This agreement was already in existence at the
time Republic Act No. 3350 was enacted on June 18, 1961,
and it cannot, therefore, be deemed to have been
incorporated into the agreement. But by reason of this
amendment, Appellee, as well as others similarly situated,
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, J, concurring:
The decision arrived at unanimously by this Court that
Republic Act No. 3350 is free from the constitutional
infirmities imputed to it was demonstrated in a manner
wellnigh conclusive in the learned, scholarly, and
comprehensive opinion so typical of the efforts of
the ponente, Justice Zaldivar. Like the rest of my brethren, I
concur fully. Considering moreover, the detailed attention
paid to each and every objection raised as to its validity and
the clarity and persuasiveness with which it was shown to be
devoid of support in authoritative doctrines, it would appear
that the last word has been written on this particular subject.
Nonetheless, I deem it proper to submit this brief expression
of my views on the transcendent character of religious
freedom 1 and its primacy even as against the claims of
protection to labor, 2 also one of the fundamental principles
of the Constitution.
NARVASA, J.:
Under the Industrial Peace Act, 1 government-owned or
controlled corporations had the duty to bargain collectively
and were otherwise subject to the obligations and duties of
employers in the private sector. 2 The Act also prohibited
supervisors to become, or continue to be, members of labor
organizations composed of rank-and-file employees, 3 and
prescribed criminal sanctions for breach of the prohibition. 4
It was under the regime of said Industrial Peace Act that the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS, for short)
became bound by a collective bargaining agreement
executed between it and the labor organization representing
the majority of its employees, the GSIS Employees
Association. The agreement contained a "maintenance-ofmembership" clause, 5 i.e., that all employees who, at the
time of the execution of said agreement, were members of
the union or became members thereafter, were obliged to
maintain their union membership in good standing for the
duration of the agreement as a condition for their continued
employment in the GSIS.
There appears to be no dispute that at that time, the
petitioners occupied supervisory positions in the GSIS. Pablo
Arizala and Sergio Maribao were, respectively, the Chief of
the Accounting Division, and the Chief of the Billing Section
of said Division, in the Central Visayas Regional Office of the
GSIS. Leonardo Joven and Felino Bulandus were, respectively,
the Assistant Chief of the Accounting Division (sometimes
Acting Chief in the absence of the Chief) and the Assistant
employees
of
or
controlled
NARVASA, C.J.:
In this special civil action of certiorari the University of the
Philippines seeks the nullification of the Order dated October
30, 1990 of Director Pura Ferrer-Calleja of the Bureau of
Labor Relations holding that "professors, associate professors
and assistant professors (of the University of the Philippines)
are . . rank-and-file employees . . ;" consequently, they
should, together with the so-called non-academic, nonteaching, and all other employees of the University, be
represented by only one labor organization. 1 The University
is joined in this undertaking by the Solicitor General who "has
the
review
of
the
LITHOGRAPHIC
SERVICES,
INC.
SUPERVISORY,
ADMINISTRATIVE,
PERSONNEL,
PRODUCTION,
ACCOUNTING
AND
CONFIDENTIAL
EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION-KAISAHAN NG MANGGAWANG PILIPINO
(KAMPIL-KATIPUNAN), respondents.
Romero, Lagman, Valdecantos & Arreza Law Offices for
petitioner.
Esteban M. Mendoza for private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
FELICIANO, J.:
The present Petition for certiorari seeks to annul and set
aside the Decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission rendered on 18 March 1988 in NLRC-NCR Case
No. 00- 0301035-87, entitled "Luz Lumanta, et al., versus
Food Terminal Incorporated." The Decision affirmed an order
of the Labor Arbiter dated 31 August 1987 dismissing
petitioners' complaint for lack of Jurisdiction.
On 20 March 1987, petitioner Luz Lumanta, joined by fiftyfour (54) other retrenched employees, filed a complaint for
unpaid 'd retrenchment or separation pay against private
respondent Food Terminal, Inc. ("FTI") with the Department of
Labor and Employment. The complaint was later amended to
include charges of underpayment of wages and non-payment
of emergency cost of living allowances (ECOLA).
Private respondent FTI moved to dismiss the complaint on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It argued that being a
government-owned and controlled corporation, its employees
are governed by the Civil Service Law not by the Labor Code,
and that claims arising from employment fall within the
jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission and not the
Department of Labor and Employment.
The petitioners opposed the Motion to Dismiss contending
that although FTI is a corporation owned and controlled by
the government, it has still the marks of a private
CORTES, J:
Primarily, the issue raised in this petition is whether or not
the Regional Trial Court can enjoin the Social Security System
Employees Association (SSSEA) from striking and order the
striking employees to return to work. Collaterally, it is
whether or not employees of the Social Security System
(SSS) have the right to strike.
The antecedents are as follows:
On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City a complaint for damages with a prayer for a
MR. LERUM. I think what I will try to say will not take that
long. When we proposed this amendment providing for selforganization of government employees, it does not mean
that because they have the right to organize, they also have
the right to strike. That is a different matter. We are only
talking about organizing, uniting as a union. With regard to
the right to strike, everyone will remember that in the Bill of
Rights, there is a provision that the right to form associations
or societies whose purpose is not contrary to law shall not be
abridged. Now then, if the purpose of the state is to prohibit
the strikes coming from employees exercising government
functions, that could be done because the moment that is
prohibited, then the union which will go on strike will be an
illegal union. And that provision is carried in Republic Act
875. In Republic Act 875, workers, including those from the
government-owned and controlled, are allowed to organize
but they are prohibited from striking. So, the fear of our
honorable Vice- President is unfounded. It does not mean
that because we approve this resolution, it carries with it the
right to strike. That is a different matter. As a matter of fact,
that subject is now being discussed in the Committee on
Social Justice because we are trying to find a solution to this
problem. We know that this problem exist; that the moment
we allow anybody in the government to strike, then what will
happen if the members of the Armed Forces will go on strike?
What will happen to those people trying to protect us? So
that is a matter of discussion in the Committee on Social
Justice. But, I repeat, the right to form an organization does
not carry with it the right to strike. [Record of the
Constitutional Commission, vol. 1, p. 569].
It will be recalled that the Industrial Peace Act (R.A. No. 875),
which was repealed by the Labor Code (P.D. 442) in 1974,
expressly banned strikes by employees in the Government,
including
instrumentalities
exercising
governmental
functions, but excluding entities entrusted with proprietary
functions:
GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch III, dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction, the petitioner's complaint in Civil Case No.
88- 44048 praying for a declaration of illegality of the strike
of the private respondents and to restrain the same. The
Court of Appeals denied the petitioner's petition for certiorari,
hence, this petition for review.
The key issue in this case is whether the petitioner, National
Parks Development Committee (NPDC), is a government
agency, or a private corporation, for on this issue depends
the right of its employees to strike.
This issue came about because although the NPDC was
originally created in 1963 under Executive Order No. 30, as
the Executive Committee for the development of the Quezon
Memorial, Luneta and other national parks, and later
renamed as the National Parks Development Committee
under Executive Order No. 68, on September 21, 1967, it was
registered in the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
as a non-stock and non-profit corporation, known as "The
National Parks Development Committee, Inc."
However, in August, 1987, the NPDC was ordered by the SEC
to show cause why its Certificate of Registration should not
be suspended for: (a) failure to submit the General
Information Sheet from 1981 to 1987; (b) failure to submit its
Financial Statements from 1981 to 1986; (c) failure to
register its Corporate Books; and (d) failure to operate for a
continuous period of at least five (5) years since September
27, 1967.
SO ORDERED.
MEDIALDEA, J.:p
This petition seeks to review the Resolution of respondent
Secretary of Labor and Employment Franklin M. Drilon dated
November 3, 1989 which affirmed an Order of Med-Arbiter
Renato P. Parungo (Case No. NCR-O-D-M-1-70), directing the
holding of a certification election among certain employees
of petitioner Manila Electric Company (hereafter "MERALCO")
as well as the Order dated January 16, 1990 which denied the
Motion for Reconsideration of MERALCO.
SCOPE
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 2. Excluded from the appropriate bargaining unit and
therefore outside the scope of this Agreement are:
(a) Employees in Patrol Division;
(b) Employees in Treasury Security Services Section;
(c) Managerial Employees; and
(d) Secretaries.
II
III
the company, they are not eligible to join the rank and file
bargaining unit, pursuant to Sec. 2(c), Rule V, Book V of the
then Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code
(1988) which reads as follows:
organization for the rank and file, (the condition in the CBA
deemed as not having been written into the contract, as
unduly restrictive of an employee's exercise of the right to
self-organization). We shall discuss the rights of the excluded
employees (or those covered by Sec. 2, Art. I, MEWA-CBA
later.
Anent the instant petition therefore, STEAM-PCWF, and
FLAMES would therefore represent supervisory employees
only. In this regard, the authority given by the Secretary of
Labor for the establishment of two labor organizations for the
rank and file will have to be disregarded since We hereby
uphold certification elections only for supervisory employees
from Pay Grade VII and up, with STEAM-PCWF and FLAMES as
choices.
As to the alleged failure of the Secretary of Labor to establish
a demarcation line for purposes of segregating the
supervisory from the managerial employees, the required
parameter is really not necessary since the law itself, Art.
212-m, (as amended by Sec. 4 of RA 6715) has already laid
down the corresponding guidelines:
Art. 212. Definitions. . . .
(m) "Managerial employee" is one who is vested with powers
or prerogatives to lay down and execute management
policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall,
discharge, assign or discipline employees. Supervisory
employees are those who, in the interest of the employer,
effectively recommend such managerial actions if the
exercise of such authority is not merely routinary or clerical
in nature but requires the use of independent judgment. All
employees not falling within any of the above definitions are
considered rank-and-file employees for purposes of to Book.
In his resolution, the Secretary of Labor further elaborated:
(emphasis ours)
Paragraph 2, Sec. 1, Rule II, Book V, is similar to Sec. 2 (c),
Rule V, also of Book V of the implementing rules of RA 6715:
Rule
REPRESENTATION
INTERNAL-UNION CONFLICTS
CASES
V.
AND
Sec. 1. . . .
Sec. 2. Who may file.Any legitimate labor organization or
the employer, when requested to bargain collectively, may
file the petition.
The petition, when filed by a legitimate labor-organization
shall contain, among others:
(a) . . .
(b) . . .
(c) description of the bargaining unit which shall be the
employer unit unless circumstances otherwise require;
and provided further, that the appropriate bargaining unit of
the rank-and-file employees shall not include supervisory
employees and/or security guards;
xxx xxx xxx
(emphasis ours)
Both rules, barring security guards from joining a rank and
file organization, appear to have been carried over from the
old rules which implemented then Art. 245 of the Labor Code,
and which provided thus:
Art. 245. Ineligibility of security personnel to join any labor
organization.Security
guards
and
other
personnel
employed for the protection and security of the person,
Philippines, Inc. vs. Central Bank, G.R. No. 51353, June 27,
1988, 162 SCRA 628, We stated:
The rule-making power must be confined to details for
regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law
as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to
amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to
embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that
subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned. (citing University
of Sto. Tomas vs. Board of Tax Appeals, 93 Phil. 376).
While therefore under the old rules, security guards were
barred from joining a labor organization of the rank and file,
under RA 6715, they may now freely join a labor organization
of the rank and file or that of the supervisory union,
depending on their rank. By accommodating supervisory
employees, the Secretary of Labor must likewise apply the
provisions of RA 6715 to security guards by favorably
allowing them free access to a labor organization, whether
rank and file or supervisory, in recognition of their
constitutional right to self-organization.
We are aware however of possible consequences in the
implementation of the law in allowing security personnel to
join labor unions within the company they serve. The law is
apt to produce divided loyalties in the faithful performance of
their duties. Economic reasons would present the employees
concerned with the temptation to subordinate their duties to
the allegiance they owe the union of which they are
members, aware as they are that it is usually union action
that obtains for them increased pecuniary benefits.
Thus, in the event of a strike declared by their union, security
personnel may neglect or outrightly abandon their duties,
such as protection of property of their employer and the
persons of its officials and employees, the control of access
to the employer's premises, and the maintenance of order in
the event of emergencies and untoward incidents.
and Financial Systems are included within the rank and file
bargaining unit.
SO ORDERED.
The reversal is anchored on the respondent NLRC's
conclusion that based on Section 1, 3 Rule II, Book V of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, as amended
by Section 3, Implementing Rules of E.O. No. 111; paragraph
(c) Section 2, Rule V of the same Code, as amended by
Section 6 4 of the Implementing Rules of E.O. No. 111; and
Article 245 5 of the Labor Code, as amended:
. . . all workers, except managerial employees and security
personnel, are qualified to join or be a part of the bargaining
unit. . . .
It further ruled that:
The Executive Labor Arbiters directive that the service
engineers and sales representatives to (sic) conduct a
referendum among themselves is erroneous inasmuch as it
arrogates unto said employees the right to define what the
law means. It would not be amiss to state at this point that
there would be no one more interested in excluding the
subject employees from the bargaining unit than
management and that it would not be improbable for the
latter to lobby and/or exert pressure on the employees
concerned, thus agitating unrest among the rank-and-file.
Likewise, the Executive Labor Arbiter's declaration that the
Division Secretaries and all Staff of general management,
personnel and industrial relations department, secretaries of
audit, EDP and financial system "are confidential employees
and as such are hereby deemed excluded in (sic) the
bargaining unit" is contrary to law for the simple reason that
the law, as earlier quoted, does not mention them as among
those to be excluded from the bargaining unit only
(sic) managerial employees and security guards. As a matter
SERVICE
(Non-Bargaining
(Bargaining
AREAS OF INTEREST Unit Employees) Unit Employees)
Qualifications
Professional
Employees
High
School/
Vocational
Grads.
Work
Schedule
With
Night
Shift
None
Schedule
Night
Shift
10%
of
Basic
Rate
None
Differential
Pay
Stand-By
Call
&
On
Stand-By
Call
with:
None
Allowance
First
Line:15%
of
basic
rate
Second
Line:
10%
of
basic
rate
Uniforms
None
2
sets
of
polo
&
pants
every
6
months
Retirement Benefits 15 yrs. ser.70% 15 yrs. serv. 50%
16
75%
16
85%
17
80%
17
90%
18
85%
18
100%
19
90%
19
115%
20
100%
20
135%
Year End Performance Merit Increase system None
Evaluation
Sales
Commission
Yes
None
Car
Loan
Yes
None
Precalculated
Kilometer allowance
Yes
None
10
21
which
MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioner is a union of supervisory employees. It appears
that on March 20, 1995 the union filed a petition for
certification election on behalf of the route managers at
Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. However, its petition was
denied by the med-arbiter and, on appeal, by the Secretary
of Labor and Employment, on the ground that the route
managers are managerial employees and, therefore,
ineligible for union membership under the first sentence of
Art. 245 of the Labor Code, which provides:
Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor
organization; right of supervisory employees. Managerial
employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor
organization. Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for
membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file
employees but may join, assist or form separate labor
organizations of their own.
Petitioner brought this suit challenging the validity of the
order dated August 31, 1995, as reiterated in the order dated
September 22, 1995, of the Secretary of Labor and
Employment. Its petition was dismissed by the Third Division
for lack of showing that respondent committed grave abuse
of discretion. But petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,
pressing for resolution its contention that the first sentence
of Art. 245 of the Labor Code, so far as it declares managerial
employees to be ineligible to form, assist or join unions,
contravenes Art. III, 8 of the Constitution which provides:
SUPERVISORY
UNION
Supervisor)
====================
Operatives
or
Operating
Middle
Management
First-Line
Management
(also called
Employees
FIRST-LINE MANAGERS The lowest level in an organization
at which individuals are responsible for the work of others is
called first-line or first-level management. First-line managers
direct operating employees only; they do not supervise other
managers. Examples of first-line managers are the "foreman"
or production supervisor in a manufacturing plant, the
technical supervisor in a research department, and the
clerical supervisor in a large office. First-level managers are
often called supervisors.
MIDDLE MANAGERS The term middle management can
refer to more than one level in an organization. Middle
managers direct the activities of other managers and
sometimes also those of operating employees. Middle
managers' principal responsibilities are to direct the activities
that implement their organizations' policies and to balance
the demands of their superiors with the capacities of their
subordinates. A plant manager in an electronics firm is an
example of a middle manager.
TOP MANAGERS Composed of a comparatively small group
of executives, top management is responsible for the overall
management of the organization. It establishes operating
policies and guides the organization's interactions with its
environment. Typical titles of top managers are "chief
executive officer," "president," and "senior vice-president."
Actual titles vary from one organization to another and are
Determinations
of
Route
Managers
B. PRINCIPAL ACCOUNTABILITIES
DOLE's
Finding
that
Route
Managers
Managerial
Employees
Supported
Substantial Evidence in the Record
are
by
The Court now finds that the job evaluation made by the
Secretary of Labor is indeed supported by substantial
evidence. The nature of the job of route managers is given in
a four-page pamphlet, prepared by the company, called
"Route Manager Position Description," the pertinent parts of
which read:
A. BASIC PURPOSE
A Manager achieves objectives through others.
As a Route Manager, your purpose is to meet the sales plan;
and you achieve this objective through the skillful
MANAGEMENT OF YOUR JOB AND THE MANAGEMENT OF
YOUR PEOPLE.
These then are your functions as Pepsi-Cola Route Manager.
Within these functions managing your job and managing
your people you are accountable to your District Manager
for the execution and completion of various tasks and
1.2.2 Ensure the upkeep of all route sales reports and all
other related reports and forms required on an accurate and
timely basis.
1.2.3 Ensure proper implementation of the various company
policies and procedures incl. but not limited to shakedown;
route shortage; progressive discipline; sorting; spoilages;
credit/collection; accident; attendance.
1.2.4 Ensure
accounts.
collection
of
receivables
and
delinquent
To : CESAR T . REOLADA
of
Managerial
Right
of
Self-Organization
Employees under the Labor Code
of
Managerial
Thus, the dictum in the Caltex case which allowed at least for
the theoretical unionization of top and middle managers by
assimilating them with the supervisory group under the
broad phrase "managerial personnel," provided the lynchpin
for later laws denying the right of self-organization not only
to top and middle management employees but to front line
managers or supervisors as well. Following the Caltex case,
the Labor Code, promulgated in 1974 under martial law,
dropped the distinction between the first and second subgroups of managerial employees. Instead of treating the
terms "supervisor" and "manager" separately, the law
lumped them together and called them "managerial
employees," as follows:
Art. 212. Definitions . . . .
(k) "Managerial Employee" is one who is vested with powers
or prerogatives to lay down and execute management
policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall,
discharge, assign or discipline employees, or to effectively
recommend such managerial actions. All employees not
falling within this definition are considered rank and file
employees for purposes of this Book. 22
The definition shows that it is actually a combination of the
commonly understood definitions of both groups of
managerial employees, grammatically joined by the phrase
"and/or."
This general definition was perhaps legally necessary at that
time for two reasons. First, the 1974 Code denied supervisors
their right to self-organize as theretofore guaranteed to them
by the Industrial Peace Act. Second, it stood the dictum in
the Caltex case on its head by prohibiting all types of
managers from forming unions. The explicit general
Separate Opinions
hierarchy. Such a ruling will wreak havoc on the existing setup between management and labor. If all managerial
employees will be allowed to unionize, then all who are in the
payroll of the company, starting from the president, vicepresident, general managers and everyone, with the
exception of the directors, may go on strike or picket the
employer. 40 Company officers will join forces with the
supervisors and rank-and-file. Management and labor will
become a solid phalanx with bargaining rights that could be
enforced against the owner of the company. 41 The basic
opposing forces in the industry will not be management and
labor but the operating group on the one hand and the
stockholder and bondholder group on the other. The
industrial problem defined in the Labor Code comes down to
a contest over a fair division of the gross receipts of industry
between these two groups. 42 And this will certainly bring illeffects on our economy.
The framers of the Constitution could not have intended a
major upheaval of our labor and socio-economic systems.
Their intent cannot be made to override substantial policy
considerations
and
create
absurd
or
impossible
43
situations. A constitution must be viewed as a continuously
operative charter of government. It must not be interpreted
as demanding the impossible or the impracticable; or as
effecting the unreasonable or absurd. 44 Courts should always
endeavour to give such interpretation that would make the
constitutional provision and the statute consistent with
reason, justice and the public interest. 45
I vote to dismiss the petition.
VITUG, J., separate concurring and dissenting;
The pivotal issues raised in the case at bar, aptly stated by
the Office of the Solicitor General, are:
80% Seven-Up
PCPPI
RM's JOB DESCRIPTION
A. GENERAL/OVERALL OBJECTIVE OF THIS POSITION
To contribute to the growth and profitability of PCPPI via wellselected, trained and motivated Route Sales Team who sell,
collect and merchandise, following the Pepsi Way, and
consistent with Company policies and procedures as well as
the corporate vision of Customer Satisfaction.
40% Mirinda
65% Mt. Dew
5% Out of Stock
ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE 65% Current (Incl. Legal & Col.)
MANAGEMENT 80:20 Cash to Credit Ratio
DSO assigned Std. to Division
by the District
4 CED's/Rte.
_____% NTG
70% Pepsi
Co. Assets
c). ANNOUNCEMENT
Days on TD
18 Productive Calls
MANAGEMENT reports.
B. FIELD WORK
PCPPI
ROUTE RIDE
IN
CLEAN
AND
NEAT
UNIFORM
2. SALESMAN's CPC
(GOOD
4. LOAD FACTOR
5. SALESMAN's ROUTING SYSTEM EVALUATION
BC/SC
a). ATTENDANCE/GROOMING
a). MERCHANDISING
b). SERVICING
c). RM's TERRITORY FAMILIARITY
d). KEY ACCOUNTS GOODWILL
TRADE DEVELOPMENT
1. PREPARATION PRIOR TO CALL
2. ACTUAL CALL
3. POST CALL ANALYSIS
(HOW DID I FARE? WHY? WHAT ACTIONS TO TAKE)
4. FOLLOW-UP ACTION
C. AT CLOSE OF DAY
1. MAINTAINS & UPDATES CORRECT & ACCURATE RECORDS &
REPORTS
2. RM-SLM DEBRIEFING
1.2 Administration
1.2.1 Ensure the proper loading of route trucks before checkout and the proper sorting of bottles before check-in.
1.2.2 Ensure the upkeep of all route sales reports and all
other related reports and forms required on an accurate and
timely basis.
1.2.3 Ensure proper implementation of the various company
policies and procedures include but not limited to
shakedown; route shortage; progressive discipline; sorting;
spoilages; credit/collection; accident; attendance.
1.2.4 Ensure
accounts.
collection
of
receivables
and
delinquent
existence
of
a
substantive
evil
sought
to
be
6
addressed. Indeed, in the exercise of police power, the
State may, by law, prescribe proscriptions, provided
reasonable and legitimate of course, against even the most
basic rights of individuals.
The restriction embodied in Article 245 of the Labor Code is
not without proper rationale. Concededly, the prohibition to
form labor organizations on the part of managerial
employees narrows down their freedom of association. The
very nature of managerial functions, however, should
preclude those who exercise them from taking a position
adverse to the interest they are bound to serve and protect.
The mere opportunity to undermine that interest can validly
be restrained. To say that the right of managerial employees
to form a "labor organization" within the context and ambit
of the Labor Code should be deemed totally separable from
the right to bargain collectively is not justified by related
provisions of the Code. For instance
Art. 212. Definitions. 7 . . .
(g) "Labor organization" means any union or association of
employees which exists in whole or in part for the purpose of
collective bargaining or of dealing with employers concerning
terms and conditions of employment.
xxx xxx xxx
(m) "Managerial employee" is one who is vested with powers
or prerogatives to lay down and execute management
policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall,
discharge, assign or discipline employees. Supervisory
employees are those who, in the interest of the employer,
effectively recommend such managerial actions if the
exercise of such authority is not merely routinely or clerical
in nature but requires the use of independent judgment. All
employees not falling within any of the above definitions are
Separate Opinions
60 cases on Rolling/Permanent
To contribute to the growth and profitability of PCPPI via wellselected, trained and motivated Route Sales Team who sell,
collect and merchandise, following the Pepsi Way, and
consistent with Company policies and procedures as well as
the corporate vision of Customer Satisfaction.
Kiosks
by the District
MANAGEMENT reports.
PCPPI
B. FIELD WORK
ROUTE RIDE
2. SALESMAN's CPC
IN
CLEAN
AND
NEAT
UNIFORM
(GOOD
BC/SC
a). ATTENDANCE/GROOMING
c). ANNOUNCEMENT
a). MERCHANDISING
b). SERVICING
TRADE DEVELOPMENT
2. ACTUAL CALL
C. AT CLOSE OF DAY
2. RM-SLM DEBRIEFING
3. SLR DISCUSSION (BASED ON A.M. SLR)
4. COORDINATES WITH DM ON PLANS & PROGRAMS
5. PREPARATIONS FOR NEXT DAY's ACTIVITIES 3
convey no more than those that are aptly consigned to the
"supervisory" group by the relatively small unit of
"managerial" employees. Certain portions of a pamphlet, the
so-called "Route Manager Position Description" referred to by
Mr. Justice Vicente Mendoza, in his ponencia, hereunder
reproduced for easy reference, thus
A. BASIC PURPOSE
A Manager achieves objectives through others.
As a Route Manager, your purpose is to meet the sales plan;
and you achieve this objective through the skillful
management of your job and the management of your
people.
These then are your functions as Pepsi-Cola Route Manager.
Within these functions managing your job and managing
your people you are accountable to your District Manager
for the execution and completion of various tasks and
activities which will make it possible for you to achieve your
sales objectives.
B. PRINCIPAL ACCOUNTABILITIES
1.0 MANAGING YOUR JOB
The Route Manager is accountable for the following:
1.2.4 Ensure
accounts.
collection
of
receivables
and
delinquent
Art. 263. . . .
The maxim "ut res magis quam pereat" requires not merely
that a statute should be given such a consequence as to be
deemed whole but that each of its express provisions equally
should be given the intended effect.
KAPUNAN, J.:
On November 26, 1992, the Toyota Motor Philippines
Corporation Labor Union (TMPCLU) filed a petition for
certification election with the Department of Labor, National
Capital Region, for all rank-and-file employees of the Toyota
Motor Corporation. 1
In response, petitioner filed a Position Paper on February 23,
1993 seeking the denial of the issuance of an Order directing
the holding of a certification election on two grounds: first,
that the respondent union, being "in the process of
registration" had no legal personality to file the same as it
was not a legitimate labor organization as of the date of the
filing of the petition; and second, that the union was
ROMERO, J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of
Preliminary Injunction seeking to reverse and set aside the
Order of public respondent, Undersecretary of the
employees sought
bargaining unit.
to
be
included
in
the
appropriate
bargaining
law." 24
provisions
of
the
SO ORDERED.
x----------------------------------------x
The facts are clear that the strike arose out of a bargaining
deadlock in the CBA negotiations with the Hotel. The
concerted action is an economic strike upon which the aforequoted "no strike/work stoppage and lockout" prohibition is
squarely applicable and legally binding. 19
course, the laborer was able, willing and ready to work but
was illegally locked out, suspended or dismissed or otherwise
illegally prevented from working. While it was found that
respondents expressed their intention to report back to work,
the latter exception cannot apply in this case. In Philippine
Marine Officer's Guild v. Compaia Maritima, as affirmed
in Philippine Diamond Hotel and Resort v. Manila Diamond
Hotel Employees Union, the Court stressed that for this
exception to apply, it is required that the strike be legal, a
situation that does not obtain in the case at bar. 28
In this light, we stand by our recent rulings and reinstate the
61 Union members without backwages.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the CA's May 6, 2004
Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 70778 is hereby AFFIRMED.
The CA's January 19, 2004 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 76568
is hereby SET ASIDE. The October 9, 2002 Decision of the
NLRC
in
NLRC
NCR
CC
No.
000215-02
is
hereby AFFIRMED withMODIFICATIONS, as follows:
The 29 Union officials are hereby declared to have lost their
employment status, to wit:
1. LEO ANTONIO ATUTUBO
2. EDWIN E. BALLESTEROS
3. LORETTA DIVINA DE LUNA
4. INISUSAN DE VELEZ
5. DENNIS HABER
6. MARITES HERNANDEZ
7. BERNARD HUGO
8. NORZAMIA INTAL
9. LAURO JAVIER
10. SHANE LAUZ
11. MAY BELEN LEANO
12. EDGAR LINGHON
13. MILAGROS LOPEZ
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
JOSE MUZONES
RAY NERVA
JESUS NONAN
MARLYN OLLERO
CATHY ORDUNA
REYNALDO RASING
JUSTO TABUNDA
BARTOLOME TALISAYON
JUN TESORO
LYNDON TESORO
SALVADOR TIPONES
SONNY UY
WILFREDO VALLES, JR.
MEL VILLAHUCO
EMMA Q. DANAO
JORDAN ALEJANDRO
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
SHERWIN FALCES
JELA FRANZUELA
REY GEALOGO
ALONA GERNOMINO
VINCENT HEMBRADOR
ROSLYN IBARBIA
JAIME IDIOMA, JR.
OFELIA LLABAN
RENATON LUZONG
TEODULO MACALINO
JAKE MACASAET
HERNANIE PABILONIA
HONORIO PACIONE
ANDREA VILLAFUERTE
MARIO PACULAN
JULIO PAJINAG
JOSELITO PASION
VICENTE PASIOLAN
HAZEL PENA
PEDRO POLLANTE
EDUARDO RAMOS
IMELDA RASIN
DELFIN RAZALAN
EVANGELINE REYES
RODOLFO REYES
BRIGILDO RUBIO
RIO SALCEDO
JUANITO SANCHEZ
MA. THERESA SANCHEZ
DONATO SAN AGUSTIN
RICARDO SOCORRO
VALERIO SOLIS
DOMINADOR SUAREZ
ORLANDO TABUGOCA
HELEN TALEON
ROBERT TANEGRA
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
LOURDES TAYAG
ROLANDO TOLENTINO
REYNALDO TRESNADO
RICHARD SABLADA
MAE YAP-DIANGCO
GILBERTO VEDASTO
DOMINGO VIDAROZAGA
DAN VILLANUEVA
Separate Opinions
the
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION
and
THE
SECRETARY
OF
THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
EDUCATION,
CULTURE
AND
SPORTS, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari from the judgment of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 38316, which affirmed several
resolutions of the Civil Service Commission finding petitioners
guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service, as well as its resolution of April 12, 1996 denying
petitioners' motion for reconsideration. 1
Petitioners, except Rodolfo Mariano, were among the 800
public school teachers who staged "mass actions" on
September 17 to 19, 1990 to dramatize their grievances
concerning, in the main, the alleged failure of the public
authorities to implement in a just and correct manner certain
laws and measures intended for their material benefit.
suspending
incorrect.
them,
are
illegal.
These
submissions
are
PLANA, J:
This is a petition for prohibition seeking to annul the decision
dated February 20, 1982 of Labor Arbiter Ethelwoldo R.
Ovejera of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
with station at the Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI-A,
Bacolod City, which, among others, declared illegal the
ongoing strike of the National Federation of Sugar Workers
(NFSW) at the Central Azucarera de la Carlota (CAC), and to
restrain the implementation thereof.
I. FACTS
1. NFSW has been the bargaining agent of CAC rank and file
employees (about 1200 of more than 2000 personnel) and
has concluded with CAC a collective bargaining agreement
effective February 16, 1981 February 15, 1984. Under Art.
VII, Sec. 5 of the said CBA
hereby
premises
considered,
judgment
is
III. DISCUSSION
1. Articles 264 and 265 of the Labor Code, insofar as
pertinent, read:
Art. 264, Strikes, picketing and lockouts. ...
(c) In cases of bargaining deadlocks, the certified or duly
recognized bargaining representative may file a notice of
strike with the Ministry (of Labor and Employment) at
least thirty (30) days before the intended date thereof. In
cases of unfair labor practices, the period of notice shall be
shortened tofifteen (15) days; ...
(d) During the cooling-off period, it shall be the duty of the
voluntary sttlement. Should the dispute remain unsettled
until the lapse of the requisite number of days from the
mandatory filing of the notice, the labor union may strike or
the employer may declare a lockout.
(f) A decision to declae a strike must be approved by at least
two-thirds (2/3) of the total union membership in the
bargaining unit concerened by secret ballots in meetings or
referenda. A decision to declae a lockout must be approved
by at least two-thirds (2/3) of the board of direcotrs of the
employer corporation or association or of the partners in a
partnership obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for
the purpose. the decision shall be valid for the duration of
the dispute based on substantially the same grounds
considered when the strike or lockout vote was taken . The
Ministry, may at its own intitiative or upon the request of any
affected party, supervise the conduct of the secret
balloting. In every case, the union of the employer shall
furnish the Ministry the results of the voting at least seven
(7) days before the intended strike or lockout, subject to the
cooling-off periodherein provided. (Emphasis supplied).
specifically
and
emphatically
prescribed
by
law,
the purposes (hereafter discussed) for which the filing of the
strike notice and strike-vote report is required would not be
achieved, as when a strike is declaredimmediately after a
strike notice is served, or when as in the instant case
the strike-vote report is filed with MOLE after the strike had
actually commenced Such interpretation of the law ought not
and cannot be countenanced. It would indeed be selfdefeating for the law to imperatively require the filing on a
strike notice and strike-vote report without at the same time
making the prescribed waiting periods mandatory.
(b) Purposes of strike notice and strike-vote report. In
requiring a strike notice and a cooling-off period, the avowed
intent of the law is to provide an opportunity for mediation
and conciliation. It thus directs the MOLE "to exert all efforts
at mediation and conciliation to effect a voluntary
settlement" during the cooling-off period . As applied to the
CAC-NFSW dispute regarding the 13th month pay, MOLE
intervention
could
have
possibly
induced
CAC
to provisionally give the 13th month pay in order to avert
great business loss arising from the project strike,without
prejudice to the subsequent resolution of the legal dispute by
competent authorities; or mediation/conciliation could have
convinced NFSW to at least postpone the intended strike so
as to avoid great waste and loss to the sugar central, the
sugar planters and the sugar workers themselves, if the
strike would coincide with the mining season.
So, too, the 7-day strike-vote report is not without a purpose.
As pointed out by the Solicitor General
Many disastrous strikes have been staged in the past based
merely on the insistence of minority groups within the union.
The submission of the report gives assurance that a strike
vote has been taken and that, if the report concerning it is
false, the majority of the members can take appropriate
Separate Opinions
leaders and lawyers of adequate if not expert knowledgeability in regard to their rights and other relevant matters
affecting labor. I am satisfied that there is here no occasion
to apply the Civil Code rule regarding vigilance whenever
there is inequality in the situations of the parties to an
agreement or transaction.
In conclusion, I concur fully in the main opinion of Justice
Plana as regards both issues of illegality of the strike here in
question and the non- applicability hereto of whatever has
been said in Marcopper. I have added the above remarks only
to make myself clear on labor-management issues before I
leave this Court, lest there be no other appropriate occasion
for me to do so.
practice, and that it could declare the strike even before the
expiration of fifteen (15) days thereafter. The unfair labor
practice relied upon was management's alleged renegation
of the November 30, 1981 agreement, considering that the
finality of the Marcopper Decision had "clearly held that the
employer is liable to pay a 13th month pay separate and
distinct from "the Christmas bonus".
2. On the other hand, LA CARLOTA took the position that the
strike was not a ULP strike but an economic strike subject to
a cooling period of thirty (30) days with its attendant
requirements.
3. It is clear that the controversy between NFSW and LA
CARLOTA substantially hinges on the question of whether or
not the Marcopper Decision has clearly held that a Christmas
bonus, in whatsoever form, should not deter the employer's
obligation to the payment of the 13th month pay.
C. The proceedings in the case below were as follows:
filed
Motion
for
part of it, they are in reality wages within the meaning of the
Act.
Separate Opinions
MAKASIAR, J., concurring:
Concurs in the separate opinion of qualified concurrence as
to the illegality of the strike and of dissent as to the
interpretation of Presidential Decree No. 851 submitted by
the Chief Justice.
FERNANDO, CJ., concurring:
With qualifications on the questions of the legality of the
strike and dissenting on the interpretation to be accorded
Presidential Decree No. 851 on the thirteenth-month
additional pay.,
There is at the outset due acknowledgmen t on my part of
the high quality of craftsmanship in the opinion of the Court
penned by Justice Efren Plana. It is distinguished by its
lucidity. There is the imprint of inevitability in the conclusion
approached based on the basic premise that underlies it. So
it should be if the decisive consideration is the language used
both of the applicable provisions of the Labor Code, Article
264 (c), (e), and (f) and Article 265, as well as of Presidential
Decree No. 851. In that sense, the decision of the Court can
stand the test of scrutiny based on sheer logic.
That for me would not suffice. Such an approach, to my mind,
is quite limited. The standard that should govern is the one
supplied by the Constitution. That is the clear implication of
constitutionalism. Anything less would deprive it of its quality
leaders and lawyers of adequate if not expert knowledgeability in regard to their rights and other relevant matters
affecting labor. I am satisfied that there is here no occasion
to apply the Civil Code rule regarding vigilance whenever
there is inequality in the situations of the parties to an
agreement or transaction.
In conclusion, I concur fully in the main opinion of Justice
Plana as regards both issues of illegality of the strike here in
question and the non- applicability hereto of whatever has
been said in Marcopper. I have added the above remarks only
to make myself clear on labor-management issues before I
leave this Court, lest there be no other appropriate occasion
for me to do so.
practice, and that it could declare the strike even before the
expiration of fifteen (15) days thereafter. The unfair labor
practice relied upon was management's alleged renegation
of the November 30, 1981 agreement, considering that the
finality of the Marcopper Decision had "clearly held that the
employer is liable to pay a 13th month pay separate and
distinct from "the Christmas bonus".
2. On the other hand, LA CARLOTA took the position that the
strike was not a ULP strike but an economic strike subject to
a cooling period of thirty (30) days with its attendant
requirements.
3. It is clear that the controversy between NFSW and LA
CARLOTA substantially hinges on the question of whether or
not the Marcopper Decision has clearly held that a Christmas
bonus, in whatsoever form, should not deter the employer's
obligation to the payment of the 13th month pay.
C. The proceedings in the case below were as follows:
filed
Motion
for
part of it, they are in reality wages within the meaning of the
Act.
FELICIANO, J.:
Private respondent Jose Bacalso was employed as an
admeasurer by the petitioner Gold City Integrated Port
Services, Inc. ("Gold City"). He was suspected by
management of under measuring cargo. Hence, on 23
January 1987, the cargo control officer ordered two (2) other
admeasurers to re-measure three (3) pallets of bananas
which
had
already
been
measured
by
private
1
respondent. The re-measurement revealed that respondent
had under-measured the bananas by 1.427 cubic meters. 2
Private respondent felt insulted by the re-measurement and
so the next day he went to the office of the Chief
Admeasurer, Rolando Guanaco, and there confronted Nigel
Mabalacad, one of the two (2) admeasurers who had rechecked his work, regarding the matter. Private respondent
quarreled with Mabalacad in the presence of Guanaco, their
immediate superior, inside the latter's office. Guanaco
directed private respondent to stop provoking Mabalacad and
told both that being in his office, they should behave
properly. Private respondent ignored this oral directive and a
ILLEGAL
AND
law leaves no room for doubt that the cooling-off period and
the seven-day strike ban after the strike-vote report were
intended to be mandatory, 21 and in case of union busting
where the existence of the union is threatened, it is only the
15-day cooling-off period that may be dispensed with.
Article 263(f) in part states: "In every case, the union or the
employer shall furnish the Department the results of the
voting at least seven days before the intended strike or
lockout, subject to the cooling-off period herein provided."
This provision should be read with Section 3, Rule XXII, Book
V of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code, then applicable
at the time of the dispute, the relevant provisions of which
state:
However, in case of unfair labor practice involving the
dismissal from employment of any union officer duly elected
in accordance with the union constitution and by-laws which
may constitute union-busting where the existence of the
union is threatened, the fifteen-day cooling-off period shall
not apply and the union may take action immediately after
the strike vote is conducted and the results thereof
submitted to the appropriate regional branch of the
Board. (emphasis supplied)
The NCMB Primer on Strike, Picketing, and Lockout (January
31, 1992) provide the same wording. The foregoing provision
of the implementing rules should also be compared to the
provisions of the Labor Code under Article 263(c):
(c) x x x However, in case of dismissal from employment of
union officers duly elected in accordance with the union
constitution and by-laws, which may constitute union busting
where the existence of the union is threatened, the 15-day
cooling-off period shall not apply and the union may take
action immediately.
xxxx
customers;52Intimidating,
harassing, preventing, and
discouraging customers from
entering the
restaurant;53 publicly
denouncing the reputation of
the establishment;54 openly
threatening non-strikers with
bodily harm;55
President
Knowingly participating in an
illegal strike; shouting at the
security guard "Granada!"
which caused panic among the
Billy Bacus
Analiza
Cablay
Jose Neil
Arcilla
Knowingly participating in an
illegal strike; Intimidating,
harassing, preventing, and
discouraging customers from
entering the restaurant;56 use of
abusive language towards
management or nonstrikers;57 deliberately blocking
the movements of management
or non-strikers inside the
Vice President restaurant;58
Secretary
Treasurer
Knowingly participating in an
illegal strike; Intimidating,
harassing, preventing, and
discouraging customers from
entering the restaurant;59
Knowingly participating in an
illegal strike; Intimidating,
harassing, preventing, and
discouraging customers from
entering the
restaurant;60 publicly
denouncing the reputation of
the establishment;61 coercing
non-strikers to strike;62 Cursing
management or non-strikers
inside the
restaurant;71 intimidating,
harassing, preventing, and
discouraging customers from
entering the restaurant;72
Knowingly participating in an
illegal strike; intimidating,
harassing, preventing, and
discouraging customers from
entering the restaurant;64
Claudio
Panaligan
Board
Member
Knowingly participating in an
illegal strike; use of abusive
language towards
management, non-strikers, or
customers;65 intimidating,
harassing, preventing, and
discouraging customers from
entering the
restaurant;66deliberately
blocking the movements of
management or non-strikers
inside the restaurant;67
Member
Intimidating, harassing,
preventing, and discouraging
customers from entering the
restaurant;68
Jimmy Balan
Intimidating, harassing,
preventing, and discouraging
customers from entering the
restaurant;69
Cursing and use of abusive
language towards
management, non-strikers, or
customers;70deliberately
blocking the movements of
Intimidating, harassing,
preventing, and discouraging
customers from entering the
restaurant;81
Antonio
Enebrad
Member
Id.82
Edgar
Member
Rey Arsenal
Hermie Raz
Member
Intimidating, harassing,
preventing, and discouraging
customers from entering the
restaurant;73
Lito Arce
Member
Id.74
Cesar
Sangreo
Member
Id.75
Rolando
Fabregas
Member
Id.76
Member
Eugenio
language towards
management, non-strikers, or
customers;84
Intimidating, harassing,
preventing, and discouraging
customers from entering the
restaurant;85
Arnel
Salvador
Member
Id.86
Ricky Del
Prado
Member
Id.87
Bernie Del
Mundo
Member
Id.
88
Roberto Eco
Member
Id.89
Id.90
Rigoberto
Tubaon
Member
Intimidating, harassing,
preventing, and discouraging
customers from entering the
restaurant;93 cursing and use of
abusive language towards
management, non-strikers, or
customers;94
Merly Naz
Member
Intimidating, harassing,
preventing, and discouraging
customers from entering the
restaurant;95 cursing and use of
abusive language towards
management, non-strikers, or
customers;96
Lino Salubre
Rolando
Pugong
John Bathan
Member
Member
Member
Intimidating, harassing,
preventing, and discouraging
customers from entering the
restaurant;99
declared
to
have
lost
their
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
resolve the dispute, as the case may be. The decision of the
President, the Secretary of Labor and Employment, the
Commission or the Voluntary Arbitrator shall be final and
executory ten (10) calendar days after receipt thereof by the
parties.
In the case at bar, the Supreme Court did not issue any
Temporary Restraining Order. There is therefore no legal
impediment to the enforcement of the Writ of Execution and
Alias Writ of Execution previously issued by this Office.
This, to say the least, is elementary. Thus, as correctly cited
by the UNION, [11] this Court in Santiago v. Vasquez [12] said Petitioner further posits, however, that the filing of the
instant special civil action for certiorari divested the
Sandiganbayan of its jurisdiction over the case therein.
Whether generated by misconception or design, we shall
address this proposition which, in the first place, had no
reason for being and should not hereafter be advanced under
like similar procedural scenarios.
The original and special civil action filed with this Court is, for
all intents and purposes, an invocation for the exercise of its
supervisory powers over the lower courts. It does not have
the effect of divesting the inferior courts of jurisdiction validly
acquired over the case pending before them. It is elementary
that the mere pendency of a special civil action for certiorari,
commenced in relation to a case pending before a lower
court, does not even interrupt the course of the latter when
there is no writ of injunction restraining it. The inevitable
conclusion is that for as long as no writ of injunction or
restraining order is issued in the special civil action
for certiorari, no impediments exists and there is nothing to
prevent the lower court from exercising its jurisdiction and
proceeding with the case pending before it. And, even if such
injunctive writ or order is issued, the lower court nevertheless
continues to retain its jurisdiction over the principal action.
petition in G.R. No. 127215 was not even submitted yet for
decision. The pleadings had yet to be completed.
Indeed, it would be unfeeling, if not unchristian, to ignore the
hunger strike of the workers and allow them to be exposed
to the elements - the cold of the night and the scorching heat
of the noonday sun. But the strikers must realize that judicial
decisions are not issued on pity and sympathy. They are
weighed according to the established facts and the merits of
the arguments of the parties. This Court at times may show
compassion and mercy but it cannot hem and haw to lay
aside its emotional nuance and sacrifice the broader interest
of fair play and justice. Let this then be a stern warning to all
those who hanker for justice yet desire to obtain it through
improper pressure and influence, e.g., demonstrations,
pretensions, mass actions, etc. This schematic artifice will
take them nowhere. On the contrary, such wantonness and
unrestrained misconduct gravely offend and affront the
dignity of the Court.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 122743 is GRANTED.
Respondent
TEMIC
TELEFUNKEN
MICROELECTRONICS
(PHILS.), INC., is ORDERED to accept back immediately all
striking
workers
of
TELEFUNKEN
SEMICONDUCTORS
EMPLOYEES UNION - FFW WITHOUT EXCEPTION.
In G.R. No. 127215, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of
merit. Accordingly, respondent Secretary of Labor and
Employment is DIRECTED to ensure the effective
enforcement of the writ of execution he issued and determine
WITH DISPATCH the legality of the strike as well as the
liability of the individual strikers, if any. The members of the
TELEFUNKEN SEMICONDUCTORS EMPLOYEES UNION - FFW
are WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar mass
demonstration within or about the premises of this Court will
be dealt with severely.
SO ORDERED.
REGALADO, J.:
jurisdiction over the aforesaid case docketed as NCMB-RBVIINS-06-050-89 and directing the parties to return to the status
quo before the work stoppage. The decretal portion of the
order reads:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Office hereby
assumes jurisdiction over the labor dispute at the
International Pharmaceuticals, Incorporated pursuant to
Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, as amended.
Accordingly, all striking workers are hereby directed to return
to work and management to accept them under the same
terms and conditions prevailing before the work stoppage,
within twenty four (24) hours from receipt of this Order.
Management is directed to post copies of this Order in three
(3) conspicuous places in the company premises.
The parties are likewise ordered to cease and desist from
committing any and all acts that will prejudice either party
and aggravate the situation as well as the normalization of
operations.
SO ORDERED.
On January 15, 1990, the Union filed a motion in NCMB-RBVIINS-06-050-85, the case over which jurisdiction had been
assumed by the Secretary of Labor and Employment
(hereafter referred to as the Secretary), seeking the
consolidation of the three NLRC cases (NLRC Cases Nos. VII09-0810-89, VII-08-0715-89, and VII-08-0742-89) with the
first stated case.
In an order dated January 31, 1990, Secretary of Labor Ruben
D. Torres granted the motion and ordered the consolidation of
the three NLRC cases with NCMB-RBVII-NS-06-050-89, as
follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the Associated Labor Union's Motion to
be meritorious, the same is granted and NLRC Cases Nos. VII-
vs.
BCI EMPLOYEES & WORKERS UNION-PAFLU and
DONACIANO S. ANDRADA and the COURT OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.
Ross, Selph, Salcedo, Del Rosario, Bito & Misa for petitioners.
Leonardo C. Fernandez and Cipriano Cid & Associates for
respondents.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
On May 3, 1963, respondent labor union and
Donaciano Andrada filed an unfair labor practice charge in
the Court of Industrial Relations against petitioner company
alleging that the latter unduly discriminated against
respondent Andrade, one of its employees, with regard to his
status and conditions of employment in violation of Sec. 4(a)
(4) of Republic Act 875.
After investigating the charge, the acting prosecutor of
the Court filed on September 4, 1963, the formal complaint
against petitioners company and some of its officials. The
principal averment in the complaint was 1
That in the year 1954, complainant Danaciano Andrada
was promoted to the position of Invoice Processing Clerk, but
respondents refused to implement his wage scale as
embodied in the several collective bargaining agreements
between the Benguet Balatoc Workers Union, the
complainant labor organization and the company, starting
1954, on account of:
(a) His militant union activities;
G.R. No. L-25471
xxx
x x x1wph1.t
FERNAN, C.J.:
This petition for certiorari seeks to annul and set aside: (1)
the majority decision dated January 28, 1985 of the National
Labor Relations Commission First Division in Case No. NCR83566-83, which reversed the Order dated April 6,1984 of
Labor Arbiter Bienvenido S. Hernandez directing the
reinstatement of petitioner Moises de Leon by private
respondent La Tonde;a Inc. with payment of backwages and
other benefits due a regular employee; and, (2) the
Resolution dated March 21, 1985 denying petitioner's motion
for reconsideration.
It appears that petitioner was employed by private
respondent La Tonde;a Inc. on December 11, 1981, at the
Maintenance Section of its Engineering Department in Tondo,
Manila. 1 His work consisted mainly of painting company
building and equipment, and other odd jobs relating to
maintenance. He was paid on a daily basis through petty
cash vouchers.
In the early part of January, 1983, after a service of more
than one (1) year, petitioner requested from respondent
company that lie be included in the payroll of regular
GANCAYCO, J.:p
Is there an employer-employee relationship between
petitioners and private respondent Hi-Line Timber, Inc. or
merely an employer-independent contractor relationship
between said private respondent and petitioner Isagani Ecal
with the other petitioners being mere contract workers of
Ecal? In the case of the latter, is Ecal engaged in "job"
contracting or "labor-only" contracting? What then is the
FERNAN, C.J.:
of
employees
in
the
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This petition for certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the
resolution issued by the respondent National Labor Relations
Commission dated June 10, 1985 dismissing the appeal of
petitioner for lack of merit and affirming in toto the decision
of the Executive Labor Arbiter dated September 15, 1982
declaring private respondent Calamba as a regular employee
entitled to reinstatement to the position of gardener without
loss of seniority and with full backwages, benefits and
privileges from the time of his dismissal up to reinstatement
including 13th month pay.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
constrained to file its own petition for certiorari with the CA,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 63553 pending with the Special
Fourth Division, just to stress that there is no guaranty of
perpetual employment in favor of the complainants.
On August 31, 2001, the CA denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
The petitioner is now before the Court, assailing the twin
resolutions of the CA. It points out that BSMI has filed its
petition for certiorari before the CA one day late and yet, the
Special Fourth Division admitted the petition in the interest of
substantial justice, and directed the respondents to file a
comment thereon;31 whereas, in the instant case, the mere
lack of proof of authority of Wack Wacks General Manager to
sign the certificate of non-forum shopping was considered
fatal by the CAs Twelfth Division. It further asserts that its
petition for certiorari is meritorious, considering that the
NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering Wack
Wack to reinstate the respondents Cagasan and Dominguez,
and to pay their backwages when indubitable evidence
shows that the said respondents were no longer employees
of Wack Wack when they filed their complaints with the Labor
Arbiter.
There is merit in the petition.
In Novelty Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,32 the Court
recognized the authority of the general manager to sue on
behalf of the corporation and to sign the requisite verification
and certification of non-forum shopping. The general
manager is also one person who is in the best position to
know the state of affairs of the corporation. It was also error
for the CA not to admit the requisite proof of authority when
in the Novelty case, the Court ruled that the subsequent
submission of the requisite documents constituted
substantial compliance with procedural rules. There is ample
jurisprudence holding that the subsequent and substantial
SARMIENTO, J.:p
that he had been involved in project works will not alter his
status because the law requires a "specific project or
undertaking the completion or termination of which has been
determined at the time of the engagement" in order to make
a project employee a true project employee. Based on his
employment contract:
Your herein Appointment Employment will be co-terminus
with the need of Structures [of North Luzon Expressway
(Stage) II] as it will necessitate personnel in such number and
duration contingent upon the progress accomplishment from
time to time. The company shall determine the personnel
and the number as the work progresses. 17
we can not say that the petitioner's engagement has been
pre-determined because the duration of the work is
"contigent upon the progress accomplishment" and secondly,
the company, under the contract, is free to "determine the
personnel and the number as the work progresses." Clearly,
the employment is subject to no term but rather, a condition,
that is, "progress accomplishment." It can not therefore be
said to be definite that will therefore exempt the respondent
company from the effects of Article 280. 18
It is to be noted that under Policy Instructions No. 20 of the
Secretary of Labor, regular employment in specific
undertakings are recognized and defined as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Members of a work pool from which a construction company
draws its project employees, if considered employees of the
construction company while in the work pool, are non-project
employees or employees for an indefinite period. If they are
employed in a particular project, the completion of the
project or of any phase thereof will not mean severance of
employer-employee relationship.
PADILLA, J.:p
1962-1963
P1.50
P2.00
P3.00
P4.00
P5.00
P5.00
1975-1978
1978-1979 P7.00
P6.00
11
NARVASA, J.:
The question presented by the proceedings at bar 1 is
whether or not the provisions of the Labor Code, 2 as
amended, 3 have anathematized "fixed period employment"
or employment for a term.
The root of the controversy at bar is an employment contract
in virtue of which Doroteo R. Alegre was engaged as athletic
director by Brent School, Inc. at a yearly compensation of
P20,000.00. 4 The contract fixed a specific term for its
existence, five (5) years, i.e., from July 18, 1971, the date of
execution of the agreement, to July 17, 1976. Subsequent
subsidiary agreements dated March 15, 1973, August 28,
1973, and September 14, 1974 reiterated the same terms
and conditions, including the expiry date, as those contained
in the original contract of July 18, 1971. 5
Some three months before the expiration of the stipulated
period, or more precisely on April 20,1976, Alegre was given
a copy of the report filed by Brent School with the
Department of Labor advising of the termination of his
services effective on July 16, 1976. The stated ground for the
termination was "completion of contract, expiration of the
definite period of employment." And a month or so later, on
May 26, 1976, Alegre accepted the amount of P3,177.71, and
signed a receipt therefor containing the phrase, "in full
payment of services for the period May 16, to July 17, 1976
as full payment of contract."
However, at the investigation conducted by a Labor
Conciliator of said report of termination of his services,
Alegre protested the announced termination of his
employment. He argued that although his contract did
former over the latter. Unless thus limited in its purview, the
law would be made to apply to purposes other than those
explicitly stated by its framers; it thus becomes pointless and
arbitrary, unjust in its effects and apt to lead to absurd and
unintended consequences.
Such interpretation puts the seal on Bibiso 31 upon the effect
of the expiry of an agreed period of employment as still good
rulea rule reaffirmed in the recent case of Escudero
vs. Office of the President (G.R. No. 57822, April 26, 1989)
where, in the fairly analogous case of a teacher being served
by her school a notice of termination following the expiration
of the last of three successive fixed-term employment
contracts, the Court held:
Reyes (the teacher's) argument is not persuasive. It loses
sight of the fact that her employment was probationary,
contractual in nature, and one with a definitive period. At the
expiration of the period stipulated in the contract, her
appointment was deemed terminated and the letter
informing her of the non-renewal of her contract is not a
condition sine qua non before Reyes may be deemed to have
ceased in the employ of petitioner UST. The notice is a mere
reminder that Reyes' contract of employment was due to
expire and that the contract would no longer be renewed. It
is not a letter of termination. The interpretation that the
notice is only a reminder is consistent with the court's finding
in Labajo supra. ... 32
Paraphrasing Escudero, respondent Alegre's employment was
terminated upon the expiration of his last contract with Brent
School on July 16, 1976 without the necessity of any notice.
The advance written advice given the Department of Labor
with copy to said petitioner was a mere reminder of the
impending expiration of his contract, not a letter of
termination, nor an application for clearance to terminate
which needed the approval of the Department of Labor to
CIELO, petitioner,
NATIONAL
LABOR
RELATIONS
COMMISSION,
HENRY
TRUCKINGrespondents.
LEI
and/or
HENRY
LEI
CRUZ, J.:p
The petitioner is a truck driver who claims he was illegally
dismissed by the private respondent, the Henry Lei Trucking
Company. The Labor Arbiter found for him and ordered his
reinstatement with back wages. 1 On appeal, the decision
was reversed by the National Labor Relations Commission,
which held that the petitioner's employment had expired
under a valid contract. 2 The petitioner then came to us
on certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Required to submit a Comment (not to file a motion to
dismiss), the private respondent nevertheless moved to
dismiss on the ground that the petition was filed sixty-eight
days after service of the challenged decision on the
petitioner, hence late. The motion was untenable, of course.
Petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 may be instituted within
a reasonable period, which the Court has consistently
reckoned at three months.**
In his own Comment, the Solicitor General defended the
public respondent and agreed that the contract between the
petitioner and the private respondent was a binding
agreement not contrary to law, morals or public policy. The
petitioner's services could be legally terminated upon the
expiration of the period agreed upon, which was only six
months. The petitioner could therefore not complain that he
had been illegally dismissed.
SECOND PARTY
stipulations:
under
the
following
conditions
and
January 22, 1985, the petitioner filed his complaint with the
Ministry of Labor and Employment.
1. That the term of this Agreement is six (6) months from and
after the execution hereof, unless otherwise earlier
terminated at the option of either party;
2. That the net income of the said vehicle after fuel and oil
shall be divided by and between them on ninety/ten percent
(90/10%) basis in favor of the FIRST PARTY;
3. That there is no employer/employee relationship between
the parties, the nature of this Agreement being contractual;
AFFIDAVIT
(Sgd.)
HENRY
LEI
First Party Second Party
(Sgd.)
ZOSIMO
CIELO
______________
Driver
The private respondent rests its case on the agreement and
maintains that the labor laws are not applicable because the
relations of the parties are governed by their voluntary
stipulations. The contract having expired, it was the
prerogative of the trucking company to renew it or not as it
saw fit.
and,
soon
after,
moved to quash the writ, but the Labor Arbiter denied the
same. Again, respondents took issue with the NLRC.
Meanwhile, on May 31, 2004, the NLRC issued its
Decision35 in the appeal with respect to the Labor Arbiters
July 21, 2000 decision. The dispositive portion thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated July
21, 2000 is hereby SET ASIDE and a new one entered
DISMISSING the consolidated cases for lack of merit.
With respect to complainant Ms. Begonia Blanco, her
demotion is hereby declared illegal and respondent PAL is
ordered to pay her salary differential covering the period
from the time she was downgraded in July 1998 up to the
time she resigned in October 1999.
Respondent PAL is likewise ordered to pay the separation
benefits to those complainants who have not received their
separation pay and to pay the balance to those who have
received partial separation pay.
The Order of the Labor Arbiter dated April 6, 2000 is also SET
ASIDE and the Writ of Execution dated November 13, 2000 is
hereby quashed.
Annexes "A" and "B" are considered part of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.36
FASAP moved for reconsideration but it was denied; hence it
filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals which was denied in
the herein assailed Decision.
FASAPs motion for reconsideration was likewise denied;
hence, the instant petition raising the following issues:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED THE
CASE A QUO IN A WAY CONTRARY TO LAW AND/OR
APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT DENIED FASAPS
or
reduction
of
pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least onehalf (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is
higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be
considered one (1) whole year.
The law recognizes the right of every business entity to
reduce its work force if the same is made necessary by
compelling economic factors which would endanger its
existence or stability.40 Where appropriate and where
conditions are in accord with law and jurisprudence, the
Court has authorized valid reductions in the work force to
forestall business losses, the hemorrhaging of capital, or
even to recognize an obvious reduction in the volume of
business which has rendered certain employees redundant. 41
Nevertheless, while it is true that the exercise of this right is
a prerogative of management, there must be faithful
compliance with substantive and procedural requirements of
the law and jurisprudence, for retrenchment strikes at the
very heart of the workers employment, the lifeblood upon
which he and his family owe their survival. Retrenchment is
only a measure of last resort, when other less drastic means
have been tried and found to be inadequate. 42
The burden clearly falls upon the employer to prove
economic or business losses with sufficient supporting
evidence. Its failure to prove these reverses or losses
necessarily means that the employees dismissal was not
justified.43 Any claim of actual or potential business losses
must satisfy certain established standards, all of which must
concur, before any reduction of personnel becomes
legal.44 These are:
(1) That retrenchment is reasonably necessary and likely to
prevent business losses which, if already incurred, are not
merely de minimis, but substantial, serious, actual and real,
or if only expected, are reasonably imminent as perceived
objectively and in good faith by the employer;
Records show that PAL was not even aware of its actual
financial position when it implemented its retrenchment
program. It initially decided to cut its fleet size to only 14
("Plan 14") and based on said plan, it retrenched more than
1,400 of its cabin crew personnel. Later on, however, it
abandoned its "Plan 14" and decided to retain 22 units of
aircraft ("Plan 22"). Unfortunately, it has retrenched more
than what was necessary. PAL admits that:
This only proves that PAL was not aware of the true state of
its finances at the time it implemented the assailed massive
retrenchment scheme. It embarked on the mass dismissal
without first undertaking a well-considered study on the
proposed retrenchment scheme. This view is underscored by
the fact that previously, PAL terminated the services of 140
probationary cabin attendants, but rehired them almost
immediately and even converted their employment into
permanent and regular, even as a massive retrenchment was
already looming in the horizon.
To prove that PAL was financially distressed, it could have
submitted its audited financial statements but it failed to
present the same with the Labor Arbiter. Instead, it narrated
a litany of woes without offering any evidence to show that
they translated into specific and substantial losses that would
necessitate retrenchment, thus:
1. It is a matter of public knowledge that PAL had been
suffering severe financial losses that reached its most critical
condition in 1998 when its liabilities amounted to about
P90,642,933,919.00, while its assets amounted to only about
P85,109,075,351.00. The precarious situation prompted PAL
to adopt cost-cutting measures to prevent it from becoming
totally bankrupt, including the reduction of its flight fleet
from 56 to 14 aircrafts and the retrenchment of unneeded
employees.
xxxx
26. To save its business, PAL had every right to undergo a
retrenchment program immediately. PAL did not need, by
law, to justify or explain to FASAP the reasons for the
retrenchment before it could implement it. Proof of actual
financial losses incurred by the company is not a condition
sine qua non for retrenchment. 70
This bare and unilateral claim does not suffice. The Labor
Arbiters finding that PAL "amply satisfied the rules imposed
by law and jurisprudence that sustain retrenchment," is
without basis, absent the presentation of documentary
evidence to that effect. In Saballa v. National Labor Relations
Commission,71 we ruled that where the decision of the Labor
Arbiter did not indicate the specific bases for such crucial
finding that the employer was suffering business reverses,
the same was arbitrary. We ratiocinated therein that since
the employer insisted that its critical financial condition was
the central and pivotal reason for its retrenchment, there was
no reason why it should have neglected or refused to submit
its audited financial statements.
PALs assertion that its finances were gravely compromised
as a result of the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the pilots
strike lacks basis due to the non-presentation of its audited
financial statements to prove actual or imminent losses. Also,
the fact that PAL was placed under receivership did not
excuse it from submitting to the labor authorities copies of its
audited financial statements to prove the urgency, necessity
and extent, of its retrenchment program. PAL should have
presented its audited financial statements for the years
immediately preceding and during which the retrenchment
was carried out. Law and jurisprudence require that alleged
losses or expected imminent losses must be proved by
sufficient and convincing evidence.
Likewise, PAL has not shown to the Courts satisfaction that
the pilots strike had gravely affected its operations. It
offered no proof to show the correlation between the pilots
strike and its alleged financial difficulties. In Guerrero v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 72 the Court held that
where the employer failed to prove its claim with competent
evidence that the employees strike paralyzed its operations
and resulted in the withdrawal of its clients orders, the
retrenchment of its employees must be declared illegal. 73
Also, the claim that PAL saved P24 million monthly due to the
implementation of the retrenchment program does not prove
anything; it has not been shown to what extent or degree
such savings benefited PAL, vis--vis its total expenditures or
its overall financial position. Likewise, its claim that its
liabilities reached P90 billion, while its assets amounted to
P85 billion only or a debt to asset ratio of more than 1:1
may not readily be believed, considering that it did not
submit its audited financial statements. All these allegations
are self-serving evidence.
Interestingly, PAL submitted its audited financial statements
only when the case was the subject of certiorari proceedings
in the Court of Appeals by attaching in its Comment 76 a copy
of its consolidated audited financial statements for the years
2002, 2003 and 2004.77 However, these are not the financial
statements that would have shown PALs alleged precarious
position at the time it implemented the massive
retrenchment scheme in 1998. PAL should have submitted its
financial statements for the years 1997 up to 1999; and not
for the years 2002 up to 2004 because these financial
statements cover a period markedly distant to the years in
question, which make them irrelevant and unacceptable.
Neither could PAL claim to suffer from imminent or resultant
losses had it not implemented the retrenchment scheme in
1998. It could not have proved that retrenchment was
necessary to prevent further losses, because immediately
thereafter or in February 1999 78 PAL was on the road to
recovery; this is the airlines bare admission in its Comment
to the instant petition.79 During that period, it was recalling to
duty cabin crew it had previously retrenched. In March 2000,
PAL declared a net income of P44.2 million. In March 2001, it
reported a profit of P419 million. In March 2003, it again
registered a net income of P295 million.80 All these facts are
anathema to a finding of financial difficulties.
Tardiness -10
93
The appellate court held that there was no need for PAL to
consult with FASAP regarding standards or criteria that the
airline would utilize in the implementation of the
RUBEN
SERRANO, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and
ISETANN DEPARTMENT STORE, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
VILLANUEVA
WHEREFORE, above
hereby decreed:
premises
considered,
judgment
is
xxx
xxx
not the case here. There are three reasons why, on the other
hand, violation by the employer of the notice requirement
cannot be considered a denial of due process resulting in the
nullity of the employee's dismissal or layoff.
The first is that the Due Process Clause of the Constitution is
a limitation on governmental powers. It does not apply to the
exercise of private power, such as the termination of
employment under the Labor Code. This is plain from the text
of Art. III, 1 of the Constitution, viz.: "No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law. . . ." The reason is simple: Only the State has authority to
take the life, liberty, or property of the individual. The
purpose of the Due Process Clause is to ensure that the
exercise of this power is consistent with what are considered
civilized methods.
The second reason is that notice and hearing are required
under the Due Process Clause before the power of organized
society are brought to bear upon the individual. This is
obviously not the case of termination of employment under
Art. 283. Here the employee is not faced with an aspect of
the adversary system. The purpose for requiring a 30-day
written notice before an employee is laid off is not to afford
him an opportunity to be heard on any charge against him,
for there is none. The purpose rather is to give him time to
prepare for the eventual loss of his job and the DOLE an
opportunity to determine whether economic causes do exist
justifying the termination of his employment.
Even in cases of dismissal under Art. 282, the purpose for the
requirement of notice and hearing is not to comply with Due
Process Clause of the Constitution. The time for notice and
hearing is at the trial stage. Then that is the time we speak of
notice and hearing as the essence of procedural due process.
Thus, compliance by the employer with the notice
requirement before he dismisses an employee does not
JENNY
M.
AGABON
and
VIRGILIO
C.
AGABON, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC),
RIVIERA HOME IMPROVEMENTS, INC. and VICENTE
ANGELES, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review seeks to reverse the decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals dated January 23, 2003, in CA-G.R. SP No.
63017, modifying the decision of National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) in NLRC-NCR Case No. 023442-00.
Private respondent Riviera Home Improvements, Inc. is
engaged in the business of selling and installing ornamental
and construction materials. It employed petitioners Virgilio
Agabon and Jenny Agabon as gypsum board and cornice
installers on January 2, 19922 until February 23, 1999 when
they were dismissed for abandonment of work.
to
Anent the deduction of SSS loan and the value of the shoes
from petitioner Virgilio Agabon's 13th month pay, we find the
same to be unauthorized. The evident intention of
Presidential Decree No. 851 is to grant an additional
income in the form of the 13th month pay to employees not
already receiving the same 43 so as "to further protect the
level of real wages from the ravages of world-wide
inflation."44 Clearly, as additional income, the 13th month pay
is included in the definition of wage under Article 97(f) of the
Labor Code, to wit:
the
amount
of
P2,150.00
isAFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that private respondent Riviera Home
Improvements, Inc. is furtherORDERED to pay each of the
petitioners the amount of P30,000.00 as nominal damages
for non-compliance with statutory due process.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, SandovalGutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales,
Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, and Garcia,
JJ., concur.
SEPARATE OPINION
TINGA, J:
I concur in the result, the final disposition of the petition
being correct. There is no denying the importance of the
Court's ruling today, which should be considered as definitive
as to the effect of the failure to render the notice and hearing
required under the Labor Code when an employee is being
dismissed for just causes, as defined under the same law.
The Court emphatically reaffirms the rule that dismissals for
just cause are not invalidated due to the failure of the
employer to observe the proper notice and hearing
requirements under the Labor Code. At the same time,
The Decision likewise establishes that the Civil Code
provisions on damages serve as the proper framework for the
appropriate relief to the employee dismissed for just cause if
the notice-hearing requirement is not met. Serrano v.
NLRC,1 insofar as it is controlling in dismissals for
unauthorized causes, is no longer the controlling precedent.
Any and all previous rulings and statements of the Court
inconsistent
with
these
deemed inoperative.
determinations
are
now
Considerations
Notice-Hearing
B.P. Blg. 130 which amended the Labor Code. And it was still
much later when the notice requirement was embodied in the
law with the amendment of Art. 277(b) by R.A. No. 6715 on
March 2, 1989.35
attempt
at
self-censorship,
there
are
certain
provisions here which are properly for legislation.52
xxx
xxx
April 4, 2003
x x x. (Annex C, CJPP)
On the same date, the complainants filed separate
complaints for illegal dismissal. And following the
amendment of said complaints, they submitted their joint
position paper on April 4, 1991. Respondent filed its position
paper on April 2, 1991.
It is the contention of the complainants that they were not
apprentices but regular employees whose services were
illegally and unjustly terminated in a manner that was
whimsical and capricious. On the other hand, the respondent
invokes Article 283 of the Labor Code in defense of the
questioned dismissal.2
On October 18, 1991, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision,
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
A. To pay complainants
underpayment of their wages:
the
amount
representing
SO ORDERED.3
October 4, 2004
ALAN
D.
GUSTILO, Petitioner,
vs.
WYETH PHILIPPINES, INC., FILEMON VERZANO, JR.,
AURELIO MERCADO and EDGAR EPILEPSIA,respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
At bar is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the
Decision1 dated January 24, 2001 and Resolution 2 dated
August 10, 2001 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 57545, entitled "Wyeth Phils., Inc. and/or Filemon
Verzano, Jr., Aurelio Mercado and Edgar Epilepsia vs. National
Labor Relations Commission (Fourth Division) and Alan
Gustilo."
The facts as borne by the records are:
pay 106,890.0
0
3.
Car
reimbursement
68,000.00
.
4.
Moral
damages
25,000.00
.
5. Exemplary
.
6.
Attorneys
.
damages
fees
25,000.00
90,105.26
Grand
Total P 991,157.
.
90
Respondents are further directed to deposit the total amount
of NINE HUNDRED NINETY ONE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
FIFTY SEVEN PESOS and 90/100 (P991,157.90) with the
Cashier, this Arbitration Branch, within ten (10) days from
receipt hereof, for proper disposition.
SO ORDERED."
Respondents then appealed to the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), Fourth Division at Cebu City.
SO ORDERED."
the
petition
is DENIED. Costs
against
SO ORDERED.
Therefrom, JAKA went on appeal to the NLRC, which, in a
decision dated August 30, 1999,4 affirmed in toto that of the
Labor Arbiter.
SO ORDERED.
Their motion for reconsideration having been denied by the
NLRC in its resolution of April 28, 2000,6 respondents went to
the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari, thereat
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 59847.
As stated at the outset hereof, the Court of Appeals, in a
decision dated November 16, 2000, applying the doctrine laid
down by this Court in Serrano vs. NLRC,7 reversed and set
aside the NLRCs decision of January 28, 2000, thus:
WHEREFORE, the decision dated January 28, 2000 of the
National Labor Relations Commission is REVERSEDand SET
ASIDE and another one entered ordering respondent JAKA
Foods Processing Corporation to pay petitioners separation
pay equivalent to one (1) month salary, the proportionate
submitting,
for
our
separation pay is
(Emphasis supplied)
lost
for
obvious
reasons. xxx".